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FLAG ON THE BAG?: FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 18, 2009

Serial No. 111–68

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE

BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

TED POE, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

DON MACDONALD, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JOHN BRODTKE, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

TOM SHEEHY, Republican Professional Staff Member 

ISIDRO MARISCAL, Subcommittee Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Kristin M. Lord, Ph.D., Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for 

a New American Security .................................................................................... 7

Walid Phares, Ph.D., Director, Future of Terrorism Project, Foundation for 

Defense of Democracies ....................................................................................... 15

Mr. Samuel Worthington, President and Chief Executive Officer, InterAction . 26

Kenneth Ballen, Esq., President, Terror Free Tomorrow .................................... 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Kristin M. Lord, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 10

Walid Phares, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 17

Mr. Samuel Worthington: Prepared statement ..................................................... 28

Kenneth Ballen, Esq.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 36

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia: Prepared statement ............................................................... 54

(1)

FLAG ON THE BAG?: FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Sherman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to thank everyone for being here. As it 

happens, we are doing a markup of a bill that could conceivably involve trillions of dollars over in Financial Services, and so myself, 

the ranking member, and some other members of the subcommittee 

may have to go there. I know our vice chair may be able to chair 

these hearings for some portion of the hearing, and I expect that 

the gentleman from Virginia may do so as well. 

We are engaged in a global war on terror, or whatever we are 

calling it this week. Support for foreign aid is relatively weak 

among the people of the United States. I think foreign aid is the 

right thing to do because it is the right thing to do. But, we go back 

and tell our constituents that foreign aid is a critical part of the 

global war on terror or the effort for national security. And, it 

would certainly help if that were true. The more true it is, the 

more those of us who go to town halls will be able to explain that 

foreign aid is not just charity, it is not a ‘‘waste of money,’’ but it 

is as important to our national security as any aircraft carrier. 

That presentation will work better if it is actually true. 

Now, there is no shortage of projects for us to provide foreign aid 

to. Our generosity does not match the need. It doesn’t come close. 

So, even if we were to ignore certain opportunities to provide aid, 

and concentrate on others, we would have no difficulty finding excellent development projects. So even if we confine our aid to those 

projects that are consistent with our global national security effort, 

we will do just as much good as if we ignore our national security 

effort and only focus on our development objectives. 

And so I believe that we should look at our global war on terror 

objectives, our national security objectives, when we select which 

country to aid, select what program, decide on the methodology of 

the program. Do you just distribute food, or do you put the flag on 

the bag? And, finally, the public diplomacy effort that goes along 

with the foreign aid effort: To what extent do you resource that effort and what strategy? 

2

Now, I know the purists would say we should only do good, and 

only do the most good we can, without ever trying to seek any credit for it. I realize that philosophers and theologians who have focused on charity have said that the highest level of charity is when 

you provide aid and you do it anonymously. But these same advocates of purity internationally are happy to tell Members of Congress to go home and lie to our constituents for a good cause, and 

to tell our constituents that our foreign aid programs are carefully 

calibrated to meet our national security objectives, when in fact 

here in Washington they resist that very effort. 

Now, I know that a large portion of our aid currently is going to 

Iraq and Afghanistan, and there it is part and parcel of our national security effort. But those are temporary programs for the 

most part. I guess we may be providing aid to Afghanistan decades 

from now, after our national security interest is over. Iraq is an oilrich country. But in any case, my focus here is not on Iraq and Afghanistan, but on our ongoing development efforts. 

Now, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage made substantial efforts in this area with his National Security Strategy in 2004. He 

insisted literally on the flag on the bag and graphics of ‘‘From the 

American People.’’ He faced considerable opposition. He succeeded. 

American foreign aid can help improve the image of the United 

States. 

For example, we provide very massive aid to Egypt but have only 

a 27 percent approval rating. In 2003, the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World issued a report stating that too few people in the Arab and Muslim world knew the 

extent of U.S. foreign assistance efforts. If people don’t know about 

our aid, one wonders how that can be part of an effort to gain popularity for the United States and our values. 

A positive element was seen in Indonesia. In 2004, 79 percent of 

Indonesians said they had a more favorable view of the United 

States as a result of our aid in the wake of the tsunami. In recent 

surveys in Pakistan, it was found that more than six out of every 

ten Pakistanis, even those who have a favorable view of bin Laden 

and al-Qaeda, said their opinion of the United States would significantly improve if the United States increased its aid to Pakistanis. 

Now, those who are advocating that we take the flag off the 

bag—and they are seeking to do that by persuading the administration—should realize that this is not only good policy, it is the 

law. Section 202 of the Food for Peace Act and section 641 of the 

Foreign Assistance Act require branding to the fullest extent practicable. 

I should note that in the area of foreign affairs, sometimes this 

administration and the prior two administrations simply ignore 

statute, for example, the Iran Sanctions Act. But I would hope that 

those who are advocates of development and democracy in foreign 

countries would believe in democracy in the United States. And 

whether they think the flag on the bag is good policy for the United 

States or not, a proper respect for the rule of law would call upon 

them to ask the administration to adhere to the law while it is on 

the books. 

The administration has not been able to provide us with a witness here today. This shows a tragic lack of focus on the issue we 

3

are talking about. If we had a division that didn’t have a general 

for 10 months, it would be a national scandal. But who can say 

that USAID is less important to American national security than 

a single division in the United States Army? 

Yet, we do not have a head of USAID, and in fact we don’t have 

anybody over there who feels that they can come here and explain 

how our foreign aid policy juxtaposes with and coordinates with our 

national security policy. Do you think that there is a single general 

who can’t describe how his division juxtaposes with our national security policy? And yet I think that our foreign aid policy is more 

important than any aircraft carrier group to our national security. 

So whether it is country selection, project selection, project methodology, or public diplomacy, all of these need to be tailored to 

meet our national security objectives. This is important for our national security and has the additional advantage of allowing us to 

go back and advocate foreign aid and to do so truthfully. If we can 

show that our foreign aid is tailored to our national security efforts, 

then we might well see our foreign aid efforts funded at the aircraft 

carrier level. 

Until then, the efforts of the purists are both inconsistent with 

any purist obligation to tell the truth, and inconsistent with the objective of increasing our foreign, aid and, coincidentally, inconsistent with our national security objectives. 

With that, I will yield to our ranking member. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

The subject of today’s hearing, branding foreign aid—in other 

words, letting the recipient of the aid know that it is the U.S. that 

is doing the aiding—I think we agree that in a number of instances 

this can generate goodwill. The chairman has shared with you the 

often-cited results of U.S. relief efforts that in the 2004 tsunami 

clearly indicated that it had a beneficial effect in Indonesia, and 

certainly we saw some of that in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. And presumably goodwill translates into Indonesian and Pakistani Government policies that are more aligned 

with ours, including combating terrorism. Emergency relief aid, 

though, might be unique. 

I have read through a CRS memo that notes that after providing 

tens of billions of dollars in aid to Egypt over the years, much of 

that aid branded, only 6 percent of Egyptians view the United 

States favorably. 

I spent this morning with a Colonel Kim who had defected from 

North Korea and testified before the Tom Lantos Human Rights 

Commission. He shared with us the result of the foreign aid, the 

food aid, that went into North Korea and explained how that aid 

ends up supporting the North Korean military. 

As a matter of fact, there was one particular example where the 

NGO was so insistent that they go along to see the aid given out 

in the community that the military took the NGO out there with 

the aid, and then came back up afterwards and collected the aid 

and took the aid where they always take it, which is the military. 

Now, I did ask him, does it always end up in the hands of the military? No. It turns out the French NGOs were right; some of it ends 

up on food exchanges in the nation’s capital where it is sold for 

hard currency. But one way or another, none of it gets into the 

4

hands—well, suffice it to say that this, in his view, it was propping 

up the regime and it had for years. And, on top of that, it had the 

added benefit, from the standpoint of the North Koreans, of helping 

give them the hard currency so that they could develop three-stage 

ICBMs, helped them a little bit in terms of their efforts developing 

a nuclear weapon, and he explained to us how they are now working to miniaturize those nuclear weapons so they will have delivery 

capability. 

But when asked about this kind of aid, he said: ‘‘Why wouldn’t 

you instead give us medicines that they couldn’t have sold, and at 

least that could be done? You know the effects of the malnutrition 

on North Koreans. Half of them are affected to the point where 

they, you know, we can see that they are stunting their growth.’’

But this is me speaking now for a moment. I have been over in 

North Korea. It is very clear that the malnutrition is affecting the 

ability of children to think and conceptualize and so forth. Why not 

that kind of aid instead of the type of aid that ends up getting into 

the hands of the regime? Why aren’t we more cautious about this? 

Well, I think part of it is we never check our premise on this. 

We never ask ourselves: How are these totalitarian regimes utilizing this aid and for what purpose? And I think at the end of the 

day, you know, we know that it has been U.S. policy to try to brand 

foreign aid when possible. 

But I do think, I agree with the chairman, I think the application 

of this has been somewhat haphazard, whether it is U.S. law or 

not. There are exceptions which are wise, if branding threatens the 

lives of aid providers, certainly, but others are unacceptable to me 

if the name on the bag is a self-promoting NGO instead of ‘‘USA’’ 

on the bag. 

And that brings us to one of the other questions that I think we 

will get into today. All aid will have a brand of some sort, because 

resources do not go unclaimed. Sometimes our enemies rebrand the 

aid. Unbranded or U.N.-branded aid that we provide has been manipulated, and sometimes even granted to terrorists, as we have 

heard in the past about such groups as Hamas ending up utilizing 

aid for its own purposes. Al-Shabab in Somalia certainly is a problem. Some portion of our aid to Afghanistan reportedly fell into the 

hands of the Taliban who used it for their own purposes. 

I hope the committee moves H.R. 1062, Ranking Member RosLehtinen’s Foreign Assistance Partner Vetting Act of 2009, because 

that bill would address these types of abuses. 

In considering these issues, we should guard against falling into 

a self-absorbed view that events throughout the world, especially 

the Muslim world, are mainly determined by what we do. And this 

is something I would caution our witnesses, because I have more 

and more seen a tendency for us to think this way, and the 

mindset is that if only we do this, or if only we do that differently 

than we do now, the situation on the ground overseas is magically 

going to improve. 

Countries struggle with their own demons, many including despotism that goes far, far back that creates dysfunctional society. 

And it is not all about us. It isn’t. And the presumption that if we 

do things differently it is going to change, I think, is an interesting 

one. 

5

One dangerous force at play is the jihadist activity that we see 

around the world, a very intolerant version of Islam that gravely 

threatens the United States abroad and at home. I think the Fort 

Hood massacre underscores that. 

Boosted by petro dollars, and highly organized, I have seen 

jihadists march across Central Asia and across Africa. In my trips 

over there when I chaired the Africa Subcommittee, I watched it 

grow like a cancer, displacing in many areas—displacing mainstream Islam with a very different version and very confrontational 

version of this. And jihadists have a dark and grim vision for their 

societies. Women are battered in these societies. The slightest offense to the orthodoxy can end up meaning death. 

I have seen schools where 13 boys were decapitated in Central 

Asia because they rejected jihad in the madrassah, so a Gulf state 

custom was suddenly imposed. 

The Taliban certainly are adherent to this philosophy. And this 

jihadist thinking has been around for a long time. It is going to 

continue its hostility to our country, regardless of U.S. foreign policies, I am afraid, from what I have seen. And no matter how much 

aid we trumpet, I think the madrassahs are going to continue to 

turn out young men who have this ambition. Where radical Islam 

rules, I would say, Do not expect to be loved, flag or no flag on the 

bag. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Mr. SHERMAN. At this point, are there other opening statements? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I recognize Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s 

hearing on what I believe to be a vital component of our effort to 

revive the mission and identity of the United States Agency for National Development. 

The need for drawing a coherent connection between our national 

security and international policies, I think, has reached a critical 

point. To its credit, the administration has initiated steps to evaluate current U.S. development policy. 

In July, the State Department announced its Quadrennial Development and Defense Review which will provide the short-, medium-

, and long-term blueprint for our diplomatic development efforts. 

Soon after that, the President authorized a Presidential Study 

Directive on Global Development Policy. These assessments are, at 

best, adequate first steps, but we must continue striving for the 

larger goal of overhauling the U.S. development apparatus so that 

foreign assistance is distributed in the most efficacious way possible. 

Of course, all of these efforts have been hampered by the fact 

that we have gone nearly a year without clear leadership at 

USAID. The nomination of current Agriculture Under Secretary 

Rajiv Shah is encouraging, but the administration must equip him 

with the tools and freedom to hit the ground running if we are to 

succeed in reviving the agency and its mission. Effective development requires a strong USAID and experienced development professionals in the field. 

Foreign aid can benefit noble causes: Women’s empowerment, 

poverty reduction, disease reduction. And it ought to be centralized, 

6

not micromanaged. I know the committee will address this issue on 

a larger scale in coming months, and I thank the chairman for his 

leadership in foreign aid reform. 

There is a misconception that development is based on shortterm charity. That notion is false. The true goal of development is 

to empower local populations to gain skills and build institutions 

that improve their lives and the lives of future generations. This 

in turn helps the United States by promoting economic and social 

stability. It also can help spur goodwill and improve our relations 

with a myriad of other nations. 

While there are circumstances in which we or our partners may 

not want to push the USAID brand, it is clear we are not seizing 

strategic opportunities with the aid we do provide. If the United 

States plans its foreign aid strategy properly, investments in that 

aid will return to us many times over. 

Just look at the strides already made in education, for example. 

The agency’s American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program has 

assisted 237 institutions in more than 70 countries. It has facilitated the development and sustainment of superior libraries, 

schools, and medical centers in Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, Latin 

America, Caribbean, and the Near East. 

We need a robust reinvigorated U.S. development agency, one 

which consolidates and coordinates the disparate initiatives such as 

the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the President’s Emergency 

Program for AIDS Relief, short funding, and the expanded bilateral 

program with Pakistan, just to name a few. 

In addition, I believe USAID ought to have a seat in the National 

Security Council to further cement its mission and voice as the lead 

agency in this government on international development matters. 

Moving forward, our foreign assistance and development policies 

must have a focal point for their articulation and to ensure full accountability. The time has come, in my opinion, to rebuild and 

refocus the Agency for International Development. And I yield 

back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are there other opening statements? The gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. KLEIN. I thank the chairman and ranking member for this 

important hearing. As the full committee is engaged in a discussion 

about how to make foreign aid more effective and efficient, this discussion comes at an opportune time and very timely as we begin 

this process. 

Foreign aid is one of many important ways that we can express 

our foreign policy priorities, and with the right strategies America 

can advance its leadership and values. I am glad this hearing will 

focus on whether or not we claim credit for the funds we distribute, 

which has already been discussed. And I also want to make sure 

to mention that whether or not we promote the American role in 

the aid, it is the taxpayers’ money, and taxpayers have every right 

to hold our partners accountable. This means appropriate and sensible vetting. This also means flexibility to respond to events that 

happen around the world. And this means implementing robust 

end-use monitoring strategies. We must know where our equipment and funds end up. And, obviously, from time to time—when 

7

we hear the stories about it ends up in the wrong hands—Americans are rightfully upset. 

Just last week, the New York Times reported that in the middle 

of what could be a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Yemeni extremist groups ‘‘do not seem to need military supplies from 

outside the country; they have no trouble buying or stealing them 

from Yemen’s military,’’ which receives supplies from us, the 

United States. 

So I look forward to this conversation and the opportunity to 

learn more from our guests today, and I thank the witnesses for 

being here and for their thoughts. I yield back the balance of my 

time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are there further opening statements? Seeing 

none—ordinarily when I would leave, our vice chair would come to 

the chair. It is my understanding that he, like myself, wants to 

spend more time at Financial Services. So I will call upon the gentleman from Virginia at some point, unless he has found Financial 

Services to be less interesting than I do. But I want to hear at least 

the first witness. Then I am going to turn it over to the gentleman 

from Virginia. I will be back to ask questions. And I have read 

most of your statements, so if I am not here in person it is not that 

I am going to lose the opportunity to learn your wisdom, I just will 

miss the opportunity to see you deliver it in person. 

Dr. Lord is the vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security. Prior to that she was a fellow in 

foreign policy studies at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy 

at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Lord. 

STATEMENT OF KRISTIN M. LORD, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT 

AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN 

SECURITY 

Ms. LORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Royce, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is 

a true honor to appear before you today to discuss the branding of 

foreign assistance and its place in the struggle against violent extremism. 

As the first speaker on this panel, I will summarize some of the 

benefits of publicizing foreign assistance, but I will also sound a 

few notes of caution. 

Violent extremism is a complex phenomenon, with many causes, 

and I have tried to lay out a few of those causes in my written testimony. But it is also sustained by anti-Americanism. Widespread 

anti-American sentiment provides fertile grounds for extremist 

ideologies and makes it harder to accomplish American foreign policy objectives, including but not limited to countering terrorism. 

Support for terrorist networks like al-Qaeda is waning in many 

predominantly Muslim societies, but nonetheless violent extremists 

still find it all too easy to translate anti-American attitudes into 

tangible benefits: Money, safe havens, new recruits, and moral support. Anti-American attitudes remain prevalent despite positive reactions to the election of President Obama. Indeed, just 27 percent 

of Egyptians, 25 percent of Jordanians, and 16 percent of Pakistanis hold favorable views of the United States. 

8

These attitudes, frankly, mystify many Americans who see the 

large amounts of financial assistance Americans provide to those in 

need, and they recall the military commitments our country has 

made to defend Muslim societies residing in Kuwait and the Balkans. If the world just knew how much good we do, some argue, 

anti-American attitudes would subside and violent extremists 

would find less fertile territory for their vicious ideologies. 

This argument presumes that anti-Americanism stems from a 

fundamental lack of awareness about our country’s good intentions 

and actions. And for those who hold this belief, a logical extension 

is to recommend that the United States should build greater 

awareness of American aid by both branding and publicizing foreign assistance. And, indeed, there is solid empirical evidence that 

at least in cases of two significant humanitarian disasters, foreign 

assistance did improve public opinion toward the United States. 

The chairman and ranking member have already provided these 

figures, they are in my written testimony, but let me add just one 

more provided by the nonprofit group, Terror Free Tomorrow, 

whose president is with us today. 

According to Terror Free Tomorrow, 63 percent of Indonesians 

and 78 percent of Pakistanis reported having a more favorable 

opinion because of that assistance. So, in other words, those who 

had a more favorable opinion attributed that directly to American 

aid, and I think that is worth underscoring. Yet we should not over 

learn the lesson that foreign assistance leads to more favorable 

public opinion. 

First, the data linking aid and favorable public opinion is extremely limited and it is largely focused on large-scale disaster relief which could be a special case. The USAID has conducted analyses of public opinion before and after communications campaigns 

in recent years. Such studies are the exception. They have surveyed only limited audiences, and they haven’t tracked the impact 

of foreign assistance on public opinion over sustained periods of 

time. If we are honest with ourselves, we actually have very little 

empirical evidence to justify a face on branding. 

Second, favorable reactions to humanitarian assistance seem to 

have a relatively short shelf life. Only 1 year after delivering earthquake aid, only 15 percent of Pakistanis reported favorable opinions toward the United States, a lower percentage than the years 

immediately before the aid was delivered. In addition, while 38 percent of Indonesians reported favorable views of the United States 

after the tsunami aid, that percentage soon dropped to 29 percent 

in 2007. 

Third, the link between foreign assistance and more favorable 

public opinion is far from clear-cut. The recent announcement of a 

$7.5 billion aid package to Pakistan, the so-called Kerry-Lugar bill, 

was met by widespread outrage, not gratitude, due to Pakistani 

perceptions that mandatory protections against corruption were too 

intrusive. To give another example, only 27 percent of Egyptians 

hold favorable opinions of the United States, though Egypt has received nearly $70 billion in U.S. aid since 1975. 

In addition to being careful not to draw unwarranted conclusions 

about the relationship between aid and opinion, there are special 

9

circumstances when our Government should consider carefully 

whether to brand or publicize foreign aid assistance at all. 

When the lives of aid workers are placed in jeopardy due to their 

association with U.S. assistance programs, the protection of these 

individuals should weigh heavily against the desire to claim credit. 

And in the midst of active counterinsurgency campaigns, such as 

the war in Afghanistan, questions of how and whether to brand assistance should be evaluated in the context of broader security, economic, political, and cultural considerations. In these circumstances, America’s strategic success, not to mention American 

lives, depends on strengthening public confidence in the indigenous 

government and its ability to deliver services to the population. 

Thus, the United States should maintain enough flexibility in its 

branding guidelines to make sure it is not undermining its own 

wartime strategy. 

In most instances, however, the real question will not be whether 

to brand or publicize foreign assistance, but how. Americans generally should embrace transparency and take steps to make foreign 

publics aware of the assistance that is provided by our Nation and 

funded by our taxpayers, but we should not undermine our own objectives by giving the appearance that we are only giving assistance 

in order to improve our own popularity. 

U.S. representatives overseas should therefore take care not to 

create the impression that the United States gives aid only to get 

something in return. Where U.S. foreign assistance is unpopular, 

those perceptions in fact often arise because of the belief that aid 

is an attempt to meddle in the affairs of other nations, perhaps 

even with maligned intent. So spreading knowledge of U.S. assistance without addressing perceptions about why that assistance is 

given could be time ill-spent. 

In conclusion, the United States gives foreign aid for many reasons unrelated to public opinion, and it should continue to do so. 

Improving foreign opinions about the United States is only one, 

and not even the most important, reason why the United States 

provides assistance to foreign countries. Though assistance can and 

should play a role in improving America’s relations with the world, 

public diplomacy—and, by the way, I am known as a public diplomacy advocate——

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Lord, I am going to have to cut you off. You 

have gone considerably over. 

Ms. LORD. My apologies. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is okay. I didn’t start tapping until a few 

seconds ago. With that, I am going to turn it over to the gentleman 

from Virginia, and I look forward to coming back when it is time 

for me to ask questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lord follows:]

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Mr. CONNOLLY [presiding]. Thank you very much, Dr. Lord. 

Dr. Walid Phares is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He also leads the Foundation’s Future of Terrorism project. He is also a senior fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy, and an adjunct professor at National Defense 

University. 

I would say to all of our witnesses, we have your full statement 

which will be included in the record. So if you could summarize 

your testimony, that would be most welcome. Dr. Phares. 

STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., DIRECTOR, FUTURE OF 

TERRORISM PROJECT, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. PHARES. Thank you very much. I would like to thank the 

chairman and the members of the committee for extending this invitation to me to testify on foreign assistance and the struggle 

against terrorism. 

For almost a decade the United States has been involved in a 

confrontation with terror forces overseas and at home. During 

these years, huge amounts of foreign aid has been dispensed in the 

countries where these forces operate and produce radicalizations. 

The first three quick questions are: Has that aid, strategically 

speaking, and humanitarian assistance been helpful in countering, 

reducing, and even containing radicalization, let alone terrorist activities and influence? The short answer is no. 

The second question: Should we use foreign aid and humanitarian assistance in our global strategy to mitigate extremism and 

enhance counterterrorism? The short answer, of course. 

The third question: Are there problems and oppositions in using 

foreign aid? Do we encounter resistance when we are engaging this 

policy? The short answer, yes, they were; and, yes, they are. 

Based on my 30 years of experience before the Cold War, after 

the end of the Cold War, and after 9/11, and in engaging with 

ideologues who basically refuse the idea of American foreign aid, 

interaction with European lawmakers and experts who have a parallel experience in extending foreign aid and the resistance to it, 

and of course after having consulted on strategic communications 

across U.S.—defense, national security, and diplomacy since 9/11—

I would raise five points related to the issue and make my recommendations. 

Point one is the use of aid. Point two is, do we have the resources? Point three, are there forces countering our messaging? 

Point four, what is the state of our strategic communications in response to that challenge? Point five, what are the actual options in 

branding that we have and recommendations? 

Point number one. USAID must be used basically to ensure that 

these societies engaged in resistance or in struggles against terrorist forces would actually benefit from our help, and, at the same 

time, are backed by the international community. USAID is one of 

the most strategic tools the United States has in the struggle 

against terrorism and radicalization. It may, if well used and 

smartly, avoid future confrontations. 

Point number two. Do we have the resources? We have a vast 

panoply of agencies and resources in the existing agencies. My estiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:21 Mar 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\TNT\111809\53672 HFA PsN: SHIRL
16

mate is that what we have now exceeds what we need to counter 

the narrative. 

So the question is, how come we failed? There are two answers. 

One has to do with the forces that are countering the U.S. messaging. And, second, the failure of U.S. strategic communications in 

assisting in this messaging. 

The forces countering U.S. messaging are simply wide, global, 

interconnected, and focused on rejecting the message that goes 

along with U.S. aid. They are regimes, they are organizations, and 

they are media that are coming together in an effort, a global effort, not always a coordinated effort, to basically sink our message. 

Among the regimes that have been openly involved in countering 

the U.S. message that comes with United States aid are certainly 

Sudan, Iran, and Syria. I have examples I can use in the Q and 

A section. 

Among the organizations that have been able to counter the U.S. 

message that comes with U.S. aid, you have two types: Those that 

are in control of areas, specific areas, and those that are influential 

in those specific areas. Type one examples: Hamas in Gaza; 

Hezbollah in Lebanon; Taliban in the Pakistani-held areas inside 

the northwestern provinces; an example also in Somalia, Shababal jihad, in those areas, and I could expand on that later. 

These organizations have been able to deploy a vast array of 

means and ways to either counter the message or appropriate the 

message, let alone to control the distribution system. 

Other organizations that are not dominant in their areas or their 

countries, such as Salafist, neo-Wahabis, Deobandis, and multiple 

countries—and I would indicate the weakest countries would be the 

Safal areas in Africa stretching from Chad to Senegal—have also 

been very effective in countering our message. 

So, basically, the strategic global success of the United States depends, on the one hand, on the capacity of these forces in countering our message. The examples of success of U.S. messaging was 

in the tsunami case, as it was mentioned. But keep in mind that 

1 week after the rate went up, a collaboration between various 

Salafi forces in Indonesia and the intense activity by media that 

counters our message basically killed the progress that was made. 

The same could be said about Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Phares, I am going to have to ask you to sum 

up. 

Mr. PHARES. I would only mention here that strategic communication has to be reviewed both in regard to the cultural advising 

body that we have, and with regard to the U.S.-funded media that 

we also have. 

Branding, we have three options: One is to not brand at all, and 

that would give the adversaries the ground; blind branding; that is, 

to put the flag but not the message, and that would return to not 

branding. 

I would recommend strongly to use the strategy or the option of 

strategic branding; that is, branding but, of course, have a strategic 

messaging that would go with it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phares follows:]

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Dr. Phares. 

Samuel Worthington has been president and CEO of InterAction, 

the Nation’s largest alliance of U.S.-based international relief and 

development NGOs, that is nongovernmental organizations, since 

October 2006. Mr. Worthington serves on the Advisory Committee 

for Voluntary Foreign Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development, and also sits on the board of directors for 

the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign and the Alliance to End 

Hunger. Welcome, Mr. Worthington. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SAMUEL WORTHINGTON, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTERACTION 

Mr. WORTHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Thank you very 

much for this opportunity to address you today and to talk a little 

bit about foreign assistance and the role that the U.S. NGO community plays in spreading generosity around the world. As mentioned, InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S. nonprofits involved in relief and development. We have more than 185 members 

operating in every developing country, in many ways, with 106,000 

staff, many of them mostly local, working to overcome poverty, exclusion, and suffering. 

Our community supports the marking and branding of U.S. foreign assistance. We recognize it as an important tool of America’s 

image overseas. We routinely mark ‘‘from the American people’’ on 

the programs we are engaged with in partnership with the American Government. We are proud to express the compassion of the 

American people. And it is important to note this engagement of 

Americans that most of the resources received from our community, 

over 70 percent, come directly from private contributions. We are 

engaged in villages and communities overseas, in many ways 

thanks to an outpouring of the American people. 

The current marking and brandy policy of U.S. Government represents a workable and fair balance to ensure foreign assistance is 

properly credited to a source. At the same time, with members of 

our staff killed, threatened, or kidnapped, we do not want to compromise the safety of U.S. citizens, our national staff, or partners 

as they operate and work on the ground, particularly with local 

groups under authoritarian regimes. 

There are situations to establish exemptions in these areas, and 

it is important to recognize that in those countries that have authoritarian regimes, the ability to rest, to engage in aid, depends 

on our ability of having aid workers on the ground. These are rare 

exceptions. They are waivers that, however, are critical to the safety of our staff. This is a very real danger. In 2008, 206 humanitarian aid workers were killed, kidnapped, or seriously injured; 28 

of those were employees of our member organizations. 

I saw this firsthand when I visited our members’ programs in El 

Fasher, Darfur, traveling through the center of town with a large 

‘‘No Gun’’ symbol on our vehicle. In this kind of situation, it is not 

just the American flag that will draw hostile criminal attention, 

but any flag of any wealthy nation. 

And just some points in conclusion. The members of InterAction 

believe that marking and branding of U.S. Government-funded programs overseas is important and vital to shaping the goodwill and 

27

generosity of Americans overseas and to sharing that with the populations we try to reach. 

At the same time, we see that we have an important responsibility for the safety of our employees, and recognize that there are 

circumstances where a population may receive something, where 

they will feel afraid to be attacked by a third party if it is marked 

or branded. In these cases, where the marking of goods and programming as distinctly American, places the lives of our employees 

at additional risk, we will take advantage of these rare exceptions 

provided by the U.S. Government regulations to have waivers to 

these requirements. 

It is crucial, as organizations that operate in the world’s most 

dangerous places, that we do not cede the dangerous streets of this 

world to extremists, and see the utility of program that we run as 

powerful tools in fostering a positive view of the American people. 

In many ways, nonprofits operating overseas are a face of America 

operating in the most difficult circumstances, and this type of humanitarian assistance or development aid programs overseas are 

two very powerful weapons in what has been known as the war on 

terror. 

Marking and branding are important, but they are simply one 

tool in ensuring that this presence of nonprofits overseas exists and 

that as we, as a community of Americans, often with our own resources, try to show our Nation’s character and values in very difficult circumstances are able to operate. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Worthington follows:]

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Worthington. 

Ken Ballen. Ken Ballen is the president of Terror Free Tomorrow. During his more than 20 years of experience in international 

relations, he has advised Members of Congress on policy initiatives 

regarding crime prevention and security, intelligence oversight, and 

select national security measures. Welcome, Mr. Ballen. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH BALLEN, ESQ., PRESIDENT, TERROR 

FREE TOMORROW 

Mr. BALLEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you for holding this hearing, trying to get at the facts behind what 

occurs in other countries and set policy based on those facts. That 

is what we have been doing since 2004. 

Our mission at Terror Free Tomorrow is to understand why people support extremism and, as importantly, why they might oppose 

it. We have conducted over 30 public opinion surveys in Muslim 

majority nations, interviewed more than 100 extremists. My focus 

today, however, is not on why an individual may become a terrorist 

or extremist, but how public opinion matters. 

There are three issues. One, why people support al-Qaeda or extremism? What can the United States do about it? And, third, why 

does it matter? And I would agree with the ranking member. Sometimes we have too much of an American-centric view on these matters, and oftentimes public opinion in other nations is driven by internal factors having little to do with the United States. Nonetheless, we must act. 

And that brings up an important point. When people in surveys 

say they are sympathetic to bin Laden or al-Qaeda, what does it 

really mean? Is that support a deeply held ideological belief, or is 

it more in the nature of a protest vote? Are they saying they are 

unhappy with their own government, or they are unhappy with 

American foreign policy? 

We found through over 30 surveys that it is the latter. For the 

vast majority of people who indicate support for extremism, it is 

more in the nature of a protest vote, more in the nature of a dissatisfaction with their own condition, intensely felt as it is, than 

any kind of deep ideological commitment. 

Indeed, what we find when we have asked people what would 

change their view from supporting extremism—as the chair mentioned earlier—Mr. Chairman, we found that in Pakistan, through 

four nationwide surveys, that six out of ten people who support alQaeda, who support bin Laden, would change their point of view 

if American aid was directed to Pakistani people themselves. Now, 

of course, not everyone is going to change their point of view. There 

are some people that, no matter what the United States does, it 

makes no difference whatsoever. They are die-hard dead-enders for 

al-Qaeda and the extremist point of view. 

We have seen two examples where we did the first polling, both 

in Pakistan and Indonesia, after the tsunami and after the earthquake, where American aid made a substantial difference. Now, 

some people have said that has to do with the fact that it was an 

emergency, and tragedy was vast. That is true. But I submit what 

we found in our surveys, based on the evidence that what drove the 

change of opinion toward the United States, was the fact that 

35

American aid went directly to the people in the countries involved 

and directly helped them. It did not go to a corrupt government 

where it was siphoned off, or an unpopular government. 

And that is the lesson that we should take from those experiences. Not that American aid cannot change opinion and not that 

that change in opinion cannot be sustained, because it can be sustained. It is the type of aid that is delivered and how it is delivered. And it is important also to remember, both in Pakistan and 

Indonesia, that it wasn’t the United States that carried the message of our aid, it was the local media inside the country that was 

trusted by people viewing it. That is an important distinction, too. 

So it didn’t come across as propaganda or as message, but as news. 

And people saw the United States and al-Qaeda supporters and bin 

Laden supporters and people who supported Pakistani terrorist 

groups said they welcomed the United States in their view change. 

So these are valuable lessons that we should take. We can make 

an impact on the support for extremism around the world. The people who indicate support for that extremist are not much different 

from their contemporaries. They want economic development, they 

want more democracy, they want goals that are anathema to alQaeda itself. 

The people who support—the very small, small, small group of 

people that support al-Qaeda can be isolated in these countries. We 

have seen success stories in Indonesia and in the Philippines where 

American policy, working together in the country delivering aid on 

the ground and in a sensible fashion, achieves a real victory in the 

war on terror. 

We can have more victories like that, and United States foreign 

assistance can play an important role. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ballen follows:]

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Ballen. 

And the subcommittee will operate under the 5-minute rule. Let 

me say before my time starts that we expect votes to be called any 

minute, and there are going to be at least four votes and it is probably going to be about 40 minutes on the floor. So we are going to 

have to interrupt the hearing, and I hope you will be able to indulge us and stay. Members of the subcommittee don’t control the 

floor schedule; otherwise we would postpone these votes for this 

hearing. So bear with us. Thank you. 

If I could begin with you, Mr. Ballen. I am very intrigued with 

what you just said and what we have learned: That what creates 

a popular shift in opinion is the hands-on dirty business of actually 

delivering real development assistance. And I think there has always been a debate, frankly—I used to work in the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee. My job was to write the Foreign Assistance 

Act every year, or legislation every year. And, frankly, the folks at 

the State Department all too often were satisfied with writing big 

checks to the central bank to keep a client-state happy when the 

folks at AID were actually trying to do the more difficult task of 

actually developing projectized aid. It seems to me that what you 

suggest we have learned is projectized aid has much to commend 

it. 

Mr. BALLEN. I think you are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman. 

That is the point. I mean—and it was earlier cited, statistics about 

Egypt—when we give large amounts of aid to a government that 

is basically and deeply unpopular inside the country, I don’t know 

how we can expect, whether we brand that aid or not, people to appreciate that aid. You know, it is just either feeding—and we have 

this experience in Pakistan. We gave $10 billion to the Musharraf 

regime, a regime that became deeply unpopular in Pakistan, and 

it is not going to win us any points among the Pakistani people. 

And I think it is a Cold War model. I think we used to see—we 

had to buy off client-states, and it was just a matter of giving the 

aid to the government. 

You know, that is over with. We are in a different kind of struggle. The struggle against extremism comes from the ground up. 

And if we are going to start to affect it with our foreign assistance, 

then we have got to affect it from the ground up and not from the 

top down. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And the final point on what you are saying too, 

that I draw, is it goes way beyond the issue of labeling. 

Mr. BALLEN. Absolutely. I think that is not the fundamental 

issue. The fundamental issue is the type aid we give. And then if 

we do that, I think the message will get out. I think the idea that 

we can somehow have Madison Avenue marketing or branding or 

whatever, I think that is foolish. I don’t think it is effective and I 

think it can be counterproductive. But if we are delivering aid in 

a meaningful way, in the way that people for Mr. Worthington’s 

group do and other people do, that is going to make a difference 

over time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And that requires patience and investments of 

time. And Mr. Worthington, you are shaking your head in concurrence. Did you want to comment? 

44

Mr. WORTHINGTON. One thing that the nonprofit community has 

learned is that the only way to make a difference in the lives of 

people is to have people involved in their own development process. 

They have to be engaged in change that benefits their children, 

their families, their community. 

And it is not just targeting the people, but it is the front line of 

government. It is that interface between a community and that 

local municipal government, enabling that government to provide 

services to a people. That is what our community has been doing 

for decades, and we have primarily been doing it with private resources that are donated by the American people directly to our organizations. Oftentimes we find that project aid, even projectized 

aid that isn’t listening to what the people want, doesn’t become 

owned by them, so that that school is a school that is given, rather 

than one of our members who has about 450 schools in Pakistan 

or built by the local community themselves. They respect that type 

of aid. It is slow, it is complicated, it is one valley at a time, and 

it does take decades. 

With a program with that type of approach, I do believe that you 

will find the aid program of the United States will change hearts 

and minds. It is not in years, but it will happen. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. I am going to try to get one more 

question in before I hand the gavel back over to our chairman. 

Dr. Lord, I was listening to your testimony and it is very striking that $70 billion to Egypt, pretty much as a Camp David Accord, 

and not widely appreciated. We are not getting a lot of bonbon and 

flower pedals at our feet. 

Indonesia and Nigeria are two Muslim majority nations with a 

positive opinion of America and our involvement in those two countries. To what do you attribute the contrast? And, Dr. Phares, 

please feel free to comment as well. 

Ms. LORD. Well, I am not an expert on the details of those aid 

packages, but I can make some comments. I think one major issue 

is the one I raised about perceived intent, when people think that 

aid is being given but the objectives of the United States are not 

in their best interests. 

So to give one example, I know a television producer in Egypt 

who received United States aid funds, produced some television 

programs, and he was pilloried afterwards because people kept asking him why did the United States fund the series? What were 

they trying to convince Egyptians to believe? And I think that 

shows up in the polls that show that a striking percentage of Egyptians believe that the goal of the United States in Egypt is to weaken and divide Islam. So I think that is one answer. 

I think the other potential answer—and these gentlemen would 

be better qualified to comment—is the nature of the programs that 

U.S. assistance is funding. So I would encourage you to investigate 

where is money going. And I believe in Indonesia, it has been much 

more directed at the local level over the period of time in discussion. 

Mr. PHARES. Yes, I will add a couple of things with regard to 

those percentages that are very worse than to us. I will take the 

example of Egypt. I don’t have contention with the actual results 

of these polls because let me give you one example about Egypt. 

45

Egypt has 10 percent of its population, 10 percent Copts. Now, 

when we ran the polls with regard to Copts through their churches, 

80 percent basically supported being helped by the United States. 

So there is something wrong with the numbers. How can 80 percent of 10 percent completely support, and then there is 1 percent 

of the rest of Muslim communities——

Mr. SHERMAN [presiding]. I am afraid the time has expired. I am 

doing that because we are going to have a vote on the floor, and 

I want to yield to Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Phares, you testified that Hamas ensures that 

the distribution of aid in Gaza occurs via groups set up by the organization itself. I was going to ask you, whose aid is Hamas distributing in Gaza? 

Mr. PHARES. Hamas has a strategy basically to counter United 

States aid or European aid with their own strategies. Number one, 

if they can’t take the control of that aid directly, i.e., by having Europeans or the United States accepting of Hamas as a government 

would do so, that would be the A) preference. It is not happening. 

B) Hamas would then set organizations, NGOs, or partner with 

NGOs, local NGOs, or even penetrate, if you may say, NGOs. Those 

NGOs are recognized by the United States or by the Europeans or 

the international communities and they will set the distribution of 

aid. What is missing in that operation is that the message that 

should go to the Palestinians living in Gaza will be simply eliminated. So we would be sending aid, it would be indirectly controlled 

by NGOs, controlled by Hamas, and the message won’t go. That is 

why in the polling return that we have, you are not going to have 

a superb majority of Palestinians in Gaza supporting the idea. 

Mr. ROYCE. Do you see Hamas’ control of aid there as integral 

to their sort of maintaining political control? Is that one of the 

ways in which they are able to——

Mr. PHARES. Across the board, Hamas, Hezbollah, or the dominant organizations I mention in my testimony, the first concern basically is not the actual physical logistical aid; they would welcome 

that aid, they would want to basically distribute it themselves; it 

is the message that would come with it. 

If it comes through NGOs or directly through the United States, 

that would promote values that are not the values of Hamas, or a 

project which is not Hamas, such as engaging in peace negotiations 

with Israelis or multipartners, especially after June 2007, then 

that will not be to their interest. 

Therefore, anytime United States or European aid will be delivered to the region, it is in their interest that they will seize the 

control of that aid for strategic reasons for this organization. 

Mr. ROYCE. I always saw it as sort of the, say, Tammany Hall 

did it in New York for these organizations. 

I was going to ask Dr. Lord, it has been reported that the U.S. 

Agency for International Development has distributed foreign assistance into Hamas-linked Islamic University in Gaza and al-Quds 

University. Do you think our aid needs better vetting? 

Ms. LORD. Sir, I am not qualified to answer that question. I can’t 

confirm that the aid went there. I would question if that is true, 

what exactly the aid went to; was it a humanitarian reason, was 

46

it an educational reason? I would need far more information, I am 

afraid, to give you a good answer. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Kristin. 

Let me ask Mr. Phares another question. You have written that 

jihadi ideology is spreading and is crossing the barriers of 

ethnicities, races, nationalities, and geographical frontiers. We now 

have Fort Hood. So I was going to ask: This suggests, then, that 

it is a movement driven by much more than opposition to U.S. foreign policy, I would presume, in your mind. 

Mr. PHARES. Yes. There are two schools that look into the issue. 

One school begins by saying anti-Americanism is generating 

jihadism. The other school, which I advocate, looks at it differently. 

Jihadism, as an ideology, is generating anti-Americanism and also 

other agendas for the simple historic reason that the jihadist 

ideologies have preceded—our U.S. foreign policy in the region 

have preceded the Arab-Israeli conflict. So the ideological rules of 

organizations such as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood or the 

Salafi combat groups have begun in the 1920s. So that is number 

one. 

Number two, the jihadists are basically an ideological movement 

within Muslim communities. And sometimes we have the confusion 

between Islamists and Muslim societies. Muslim societies are regular societies around the globe; the Islamists are a political movement that want to establish a certain regime. The jihadists are 

those who want to take that doctrine into action, into what they 

perceive or what they call jihad. 

Over the past 20–30 years, the jihadists have been able to go beyond the Arab cultural field and been able to penetrate other 

ethnicities and other cultures, other regions. That is why we see 

today, for example, jihadists are very active in the Sahal area of 

Africa or in Somalia, or all the way down to the south Philippines, 

or in Kashmir. Which means that, practically speaking, it is now 

an international movement; it is not just a local national liberation 

movement as could have been the case 30 or 40 years ago. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Phares. 

I have seen it across Africa—it is quite a phenomenon—and in 

central Asia. Increasingly, villagers are asking questions about the 

changing of the culture; that their culture is being changed to Gulf 

State culture primarily through the madrassahs that spring up 

there, especially when they decapitate the young men for leaving 

the jihadist training. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am going to have to interrupt at this point and 

also impose strictly the time limit on myself if we are going to have 

even 1 minute or 2 for the gentleman——

Mr. BOOZMAN. That is fine, I am enjoying this. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, we will try to maximize the entertainment 

value in the future of these proceedings. 

First of all, I think at least one witness commented that we don’t 

want to be perceived as being selfish in the reasons why we give 

out aid. Let me assure you that no matter how pure we are, we 

will be perceived as being selfish. No one in the world is going to 

think that we are doing something and not keeping in mind our 

own interests, even if the truth be that we are not. 

47

Second, I want to echo the ranking member and his comment 

about Tammany Hall. Those of us who hold elective office, who 

hold some degree of power in the United States Government, understand that one of the key things to maintaining that power is 

bringing home the bacon. A ribbon-cutting is perhaps the most significant political activity. And I realize bringing home the bacon is 

not Halal, it is also not kosher, but it is critical to any government 

staying in power. 

And so the question then is, do we have examples of when our 

aid has gone through hostile governments, where hostile governments get to cut the ribbon, or through hostile quasi-governmental 

institutions such as Hamas? We have heard about Hamas. Does 

anyone here have an example of where it is the Hamas flag on the 

bag or the anti-American flag on the bag? 

Mr. Ballen. 

Mr. BALLEN. When we went into Pakistan after the earthquake, 

we were competing with local radical and extremist organizations 

who definitely put their mark and their brand on the bag. It was 

a competition. It was the same thing in Indonesia. And this is true, 

as others can—Dr. Phares can testify on the West Bank in Gaza, 

Hamas and Hezbollah definitely put their brand on the bag. There 

is no doubt about it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does anybody have an example of where we pay 

for the bag and the wrong flag is on the bag? 

Mr. PHARES. If I may go north to Hezbollah was mentioned over 

the past 5 years. We could provide significant reporting, if asked. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You are asked. Please provide it for the record. 

Mr. PHARES. Well, Hezbollah has been able to mount, actually, 

NGOs, Lebanese NGOs, or penetrate other existing NGOs, both 

human rights, humanitarians. And those NGOs have been recipients of U.S. aid through the Embassy and through other ways, so 

that when Hezbollah or the NGOs controlled by Hezbollah went to 

the Bakhar in the south, what the individual Lebanese shia have 

seen basically is an NGO whose members are from their neighborhoods, Hezbollah. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So these were Hezbollah front organizations distributing our aid? 

Mr. PHARES. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think most people in this room are good advocates of foreign aid, so please don’t tell my constituents about the 

World Bank loans to Iran, and please don’t tell them about these 

examples of United States aid going to Hamas and Hezbollah front 

organizations. 

Are we spending enough on public diplomacy? The natural tendency is to take every development dollar and spend it on development. I would argue that you should spend a certain percentage of 

it telling people. When I see private corporations do good, they put 

advertisements on my TV. I sometimes think maybe 75 percent of 

the money is going to tell me how much good the 25 percent is 

doing. 

I will go down the list. Maybe a quick yes, no. Are we spending 

enough to publicize our aid? 

Mr. BALLEN. You know, we could spend as much as we want, and 

it is not going to work if the aid itself is not going to the people. 

48

Mr. SHERMAN. So we need a good strategy of the aid and the effort. 

Mr. BALLEN. Correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But assuming we let you control the dollars that 

are being spent on public diplomacy, are there enough dollars? 

Mr. BALLEN. Probably I would say yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Worthington, enough dollars, yes or no? We 

will get to strategy later. 

Mr. WORTHINGTON. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Phares. 

Mr. PHARES. What we have earmarked exceeds the necessity for 

the battle of strategic communications. I am not expert on aid per 

se, but for strategic communications exceed. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we are spending more than we need to on communications. 

Dr. Lord. 

Ms. LORD. Mr. Chairman, my answer is no. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We have to spend more? 

Ms. LORD. Correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Next, there are a number of criteria that go into selecting a country to aid and a project to fund. The question here is: In the foreign 

aid decisions that we make now, is that number one, or tied for 

number one, as a criteria for selecting projects, in general? 

Mr. Ballen. 

Mr. BALLEN. We clearly do that. I mean, I think it is tied. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So it is a major priority. 

Mr. BALLEN. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Worthington. 

Mr. WORTHINGTON. A direct link to U.S. foreign aid to strategic 

countries. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Phares. I think we need to divert the strategy 

to have partnership on the ground, NGOs. We don’t have it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Lord, in your testimony you said that it 

shouldn’t be the number one criteria for selecting projects. Is it? 

Ms. LORD. No, I don’t think it is. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It isn’t, and it shouldn’t be. 

We should vote. I don’t know if the gentleman from Arkansas 

has any comments. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Yes. I would just like to follow up on your label 

question. 

The U.N. doesn’t allow labels on the U.N. stuff from their partners that are distributing. USAID does, and sometimes it gets so 

labeled that you don’t really know what is there. Should USAID 

consider going to the U.N. style and adopting that strategy? 

Mr. WORTHINGTON. My answer would be no. In the difficult 

places in the world where labeling is a problem, the reality is what 

is on the bag is really not important. If anything, our committee 

tries not to label anything, including the names of our member organizations, because it is too dangerous. 

Ultimately, it comes down to you are feeding someone. And I 

have seen an Islamic organization handing out a bag that is clearly 

marked from the American people, and showing that partnership 

between an Islamic organization from the American people being 

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handed out to help people in a place like Darfur I think is a powerful message. 

Mr. PHARES. The Islamic Republic of Iran or Qatar or Saudi Arabia, when they do send foreign aid to areas, they are proud to have 

the flag. And they accompany this flagging with individuals who 

explain what this aid is for. They will, in some cases, actually display the ideology.I21I think the United States, to be able to reach 

similar objectives, should not be afraid of flagging or of claiming. 

What it should do, in peril, is to have its partners, NGOs, non-government organizations, from the region, from the societies who 

espouse the same ideals, be accompanying this operation. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think we now stand adjourned. We have 4 minutes and 28 seconds to go vote. Thank you very much, witnesses. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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