alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
p.1 

OAR Box 1828 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

47) ll-K- (B) -35 

Docket Number: 

A-83-27 

Printed 11/12/2008 11:12:49 AM Sheet 47 of 325 
P.2 

/A\ (P) -< 

H-K-(B)-35 

IERL-RTP SUPPORT TO THE INDUSTRIAL BOILER NSPS -

ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS FOR ITAR TECHNOLOGIES. 

Letter from J.D. Mobley, EPArlERL to A. Wehe, EPArSASD. 

May 7, 1980. 

THIS INFORMATION CAN BE FOUND IN DOCKET A-79-02, ITEM 

II-K-(B)-35
#### Becker Plastic Corp., Respondent, v Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company et al., Appellants.

In an action on certain policies of insurance, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated January 18, 1977, which, *inter alia,*denied their motion for summary judgment. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. A review of the record on appeal indicates that there are triable issues of fact. Hopkins, J. P., Margett, Shapiro and Suozzi, JJ., concur.
### §§1427 to 1431. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Sections 1427 to 1431 were omitted in the general revision of the United States Housing Act of 1937 by Pub. L. 93–383, title II, §201(a), Aug. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 653.

Section 1427, act Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, §28, formerly §27, 50 Stat. 899, renumbered July 15, 1949, ch. 338, title III, §307(h), 63 Stat. 431, provided for application of provisions when conflicting with other laws relating to housing or slum clearance.

Section 1428, act Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, §29, formerly §28, 50 Stat. 899, renumbered July 15, 1949, ch. 338, title III, §307(h), 63 Stat. 431, made available funds for the District of Columbia.

Section 1429, act Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, §30, formerly §29, 50 Stat. 899, renumbered July 15, 1949, ch. 338, title III, §307(h), 63 Stat. 431, provided for separability of provisions.

Section 1430, act Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, §31, formerly §30, 50 Stat. 899, renumbered July 15, 1949, ch. 338, title III, §307(h), 63 Stat. 431, set forth short title of provisions as "United States Housing Act of 1937". See section 1 of act Sept. 1, 1937, as added by section 201(a) of Pub. L. 93–383, set out as a Short Title note under section 1437 of this title.

Section 1431, Pub. L. 91–556, title IV, Dec. 17, 1970, 84 Stat. 1463, which provided that the necessary expenses of providing representatives at sites of non-Federal projects in connection with construction of these projects by public housing agencies with aid under this chapter, be compensated by these agencies by payments of fixed fees, was from the Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act, 1971, and was not repeated in subsequent appropriation acts. Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:

Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. 91–126, title III, 83 Stat. 242.

Oct. 4, 1968, Pub. L. 90–550, title III, 82 Stat. 956.

Nov. 3, 1967, Pub. L. 90–121, title II, 81 Stat. 360.

Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89–555, title II, 80 Stat. 688.

Aug. 16, 1965, Pub. L. 89–128, title II, 79 Stat. 542.

Aug. 30, 1964, Pub. L. 88–507, title II, 78 Stat. 665.

Dec. 19, 1963, Pub. L. 88–215, title II, 77 Stat. 447.

Oct. 3, 1962, Pub. L. 87–741, title II, 76 Stat. 739.

Aug. 17, 1961, Pub. L. 87–141, title II, 75 Stat. 363.

July 12, 1960, Pub. L. 86–626, title II, 74 Stat. 444.

Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86–255, title II, 73 Stat. 517.

Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. 85–844, title II, 72 Stat. 1081.

June 29, 1957, Pub. L. 85–69, title II, 71 Stat. 241.

June 27, 1956, ch. 452, title II, 70 Stat. 355.

June 30, 1955, ch. 244, title II, 69 Stat. 215.

June 24, 1954, ch. 359, title II, 68 Stat. 297.

July 31, 1953, ch. 302, title II, 67 Stat. 315.

July 5, 1952, ch. 578, title III, 66 Stat. 417.

Aug. 31, 1951, ch. 376, title IV, 65 Stat. 299.

Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, Ch. VIII, title II, 64 Stat. 723.

Aug. 24, 1949, ch. 506, title II, 63 Stat. 659.

June 30, 1948, ch. 773, title II, 62 Stat. 1190.

July 30, 1947, ch. 358, title II, 61 Stat. 579.

July 20, 1946, ch. 589, title II, 60 Stat. 592.

May 3, 1945, ch. 106, title I, 59 Stat. 124.
### §3762a. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3762a was editorially reclassified as section 10171 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
§ 401.16 Statement in response. ( a ) Except as otherwise provided pursuant to § 410.19, a Government and any interested person, other than the applicant, may present a statement in response to the Commission within thirty days after the filing of an application. A statement in response shall set forth facts and arguments bearing on the subject matter of the application and tending to oppose or support the application, in whole or in part. If it is desired that conditional approval be granted, the statement in response should set forth the particular condition or conditions desired. An address for service of documents should be included in the statement in response.
( b ) When a statement in response has been filed, the secretaries shall send a copy forthwith to the applicant and to each Government except the Government which presented the said statement in response. If so directed by the Commission, the secretaries shall inform those who have presented statements in response, of the nature of the total response.
#### § 1429.13 Official time.

If the participation of any employee in any phase of any proceeding before the Board, including the investigation of unfair labor practice charges and representation petitions and the participation in hearings and representation elections, is deemed necessary by the Board, the General Counsel, any Administrative Law Judge, Regional Director, Hearing Officer, or other agent of the Board designated by the Board, such employee shall be granted official time for such participation, including necessary travel time, as occurs during the employee's regular work hours and when the employee would otherwise be in a work or paid leave status. In addition, necessary transportation and per diem expenses shall be paid by the Department.
#### Benjamin Kudela, Appellant, v Barbara Kudela, Respondent.

[716 NYS2d 231]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: We reject plaintiff’s contention that Supreme Court abused its discretion in awarding defendant ownership of the marital residence. The court awarded plaintiff ownership of business property and attempted to equalize the distribution by directing defendant to pay a distributive award to plaintiff. “[T]he trial court is vested with broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of marital property and, absent an abuse of discretion, its determination will not be disturbed” *(Bossard v Bossard,*199 AD2d 971).

Plaintiffs further contention that the court erred in failing to consider the tax consequences of a sale of the business property is not preserved for our review. In any event, the court was not required to consider the tax consequences of a sale of the business property in the absence of “some evidence from which the court could have determined the dollar amount of the tax consequences” *(De La Torre v De La Torre,*183 AD2d 744, 745; *see, Wadsworth v Wadsworth,*219 AD2d 410, 415). Nor was it required to consider the tax consequences when there was no evidence that the business property would have to be sold *(see, Atwal v Atwal*[appeal No. 2], 270 AD2d 799, *lv denied*95 NY2d 761).

Contrary to plaintiffs contention, the court properly set forth the factors that it considered in awarding maintenance and the reasons for its decision *(see, Hartog v Hartog,*85 NY2d 36, 51). *1016The court’s “failure to analyze each of the statutory maintenance factors * * * [does] not alone warrant appellate alteration of the award” *(Hartog v Hartog, supra,*at 51). Also contrary to plaintiffs contention, the court considered the parties’ predivorce standard of living in reaching its determination. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in the amount and duration of the maintenance awarded *(see, Myers v Myers,*255 AD2d 711, 716-717).

Plaintiff contends that the court erred in denying his motion pursuant to CPLR 4403 to modify the report of the Referee in part by reducing the maintenance award based on defendant’s posttrial employment. Plaintiffs allegations in this regard, however, were conclusory and lacking in any evidentiary value. Notwithstanding denial of that motion, plaintiff may apply for modification of that part of the judgment awarding maintenance upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Niagara County, Koshian, J.— Matrimonial.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Pine, Hayes, Wisner and Kehoe, JJ,
#### Jack Werner, Appellant, v Donald F. Cawley, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York, et al.,

Supreme Court, New York County, entered April 7, 1977, denying petitioner’s motion and dismissing his application to annul the determination of respondent police commissioner, unanimously affirmed, with $60 costs and with disbursements payable to respondents by petitioner. Whatever may have happened theretofore, the dispositive stipulation entered into in circumstances completely free of any coercive factor, is controlling. Having received substantial benefits resulting from the stipulated settlement, petitioner is estopped from questioning its result. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Silverman, Evans, Fein and Markewich, JJ.
§ 519.400 Penalties. ( a ) Any person who makes an expenditure prohibited herein shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such expenditure.
( b ) Any person who fails to file or amend the disclosure form (see appendix B) to be filed or amended if required herein, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such failure.
( c ) A filing or amended filing on or after the date on which an administrative action for the imposition of a civil penalty is commenced does not prevent the imposition of such civil penalty for a failure occurring before that date. An administrative action is commenced with respect to a failure when an investigating official determines in writing to commence an investigation of an allegation of such failure.
( d ) In determining whether to impose a civil penalty, and the amount of any such penalty, by reason of a violation by any person, the agency shall consider the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, the effect on the ability of such person to continue in business, any prior violations by such person, the degree of culpability of such person, the ability of the person to pay the penalty, and such other matters as may be appropriate.
( e ) First offenders under paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of $10,000, absent aggravating circumstances. Second and subsequent offenses by persons shall be subject to an appropriate civil penalty between $10,000 and $100,000, as determined by the agency head or his or her designee.
( f ) An imposition of a civil penalty under this section does not prevent the United States from seeking any other remedy that may apply to the same conduct that is the basis for the imposition of such civil penalty.
#### John RUSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles R. WHITE, William Southard, James Mosely, Mrs. Guinn Daniel, David Whittington, Gene Parker, Ray Donathan, Mrs. T. J. Collier, Alroy Puckett, and Gerald Fisher, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-2145.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 18, 1982.

Decided June 1, 1982.

Debra K. Hutchens, Byron Freeland, Mitchell, Williams & Selig, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard H. Wootton, Richard L. Slagle, Wootton, Land & Matthews, Hot Springs, Ark., for defendants-appellees.

Before ROSS, ARNOLD and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Dr. John Russ, formerly Dean of Instruction at Garland County Community College in Hot Springs, Garland County, Arkansas, against Dr. Gerald Fisher, President of the College, and the members of the College’s Board of Trustees. Plaintiff’s principal claims are that he was discharged as a result of his exercise of rights of free speech secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that his property (that is to say, his job) was taken from him without due process of law. In support of the second claim, plaintiff urges that certain business relationships among two of the trustees and the President of the College created such a conflict of interest that the hearing given plaintiff by the Board of Trustees was not impartial.

The District Court,1 after a non-jury trial, filed a detailed opinion holding for defendants. It found that plaintiff’s conduct and utterances were significantly disruptive of good order at the College, and that the hearing given him was fair and impartial for present purposes. These findings are *48not clearly erroneous, and we see no error of law in the District Court’s opinion. We do not read that opinion as holding that school administrators as a class have no First Amendment right to express opinions on school policy, but rather as concluding, on this record, that Dr. Russ’s discharge did not result from any protected activity on his part. We are in basic agreement with the District Court, and we affirm its judgment substantially for the reasons stated in its opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 14.

Costs will be assessed against appellant, but, in accordance with the view of a majority of the Court, that portion of costs attributable to appellees’ choice to print their brief, instead of reproducing it by a less expensive method, will not be allowed.

Affirmed.

1

. The Hon. Oren Harris, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0434 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SABRINA MARIE SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including March 8 , 2023, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 30 2023

01/30/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0434
#### Arthur O. ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael F. EASLEY; M.D. Congleton; City of Wendell; Chief of Police Department; L. Houpe; John Doe, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-1045.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 12, 2007.

Decided: May 3, 2007.

*121Arthur 0. Armstrong, Appellant Pro Se. Grady L. Balentine, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina; Kari Russwurm Johnson, Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Arthur 0. Armstrong appeals the district court judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint as frivolous, sanctioning him $8000 and enjoining him from filing anything in the district court without first getting leave of court. We have reviewed the record and the district court order and affirm for the reasons cited by the district court. *See Armstrong v. Easley,*No. 5:06-cv-00495-D (E.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2006). We deny Armstrong’s motion to supplement the record. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
§ 234.5 Non-impairment of the Guarantee. After issuance of a Guarantee, that Guarantee will be an unconditional, full faith and credit obligation of the United States of America, and will not be affected or impaired by any subsequent condition or event. This non-impairment of the guarantee provision shall not, however, be operative with respect to any loss arising out of fraud or misrepresentation for which the claiming Noteholder is responsible or of which it had knowledge at the time it became a Noteholder. Moreover, the Guarantee shall not be affected or impaired by: ( a ) Any defect in the authorization, execution, delivery or enforceability of any agreement or other document executed by a Noteholder, USAID, the Fiscal Agent or the Borrower in connection with the transactions contemplated by this Guarantee; or
( b ) The suspension or termination of the program pursuant to which USAID is authorized to guarantee the Eligible Notes.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Federico FLORES-ESPINOSA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-14309.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 21, 2007.

Latisha Vánese Colvin, Federal Defenders Office, Carlos Alfredo Williams, Fred*830erick W. Tiemann, Federal Defender Org., Kristen Gartman Rogers, Federal Public Defender, Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Richard H. Loftin, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, HULL, Circuit Judge, and FORRESTER,* District Judge.

*

 Honorable J. Owen Forrester, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

After review and oral argument, we find no reversible error in the district court’s order of April 20, 2006, which denied defendant Federico Flores-Espinosa’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Flores-Espinosa’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.
#### § 231.14 Arbitration.

Any controversy or claim between USAID and any noteholder arising out of this Guarantee shall be settled by arbitration to be held in Washington, DC in accordance with the then prevailing rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.
### §3796ll–2. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796ll–2 was editorially reclassified as section 10533 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
### §5196f. Disaster related information services

#### (a) In general

Consistent with section 5151(a) of this title, the Administrator of Federal 1 Emergency Management Agency shall—

(1) identify, in coordination with State and local governments, population groups with limited English proficiency and take into account such groups in planning for an emergency or major disaster;

(2) ensure that information made available to individuals affected by a major disaster or emergency is made available in formats that can be understood by—

(A) population groups identified under paragraph (1); and

(B) individuals with disabilities or other special needs; and

(3) develop and maintain an informational clearinghouse of model language assistance programs and best practices for State and local governments in providing services related to a major disaster or emergency.

#### (b) Group size

For purposes of subsection (a), the Administrator of Federal 1 Emergency Management Agency shall define the size of a population group.

(Pub. L. 93–288, title VI, §616, as added Pub. L. 109–295, title VI, §689e, Oct. 4, 2006, 120 Stat. 1452; amended Pub. L. 111–351, §3(c)(2), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3864.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2011—Pub. L. 111–351 substituted "Administrator" for "Director" in subsecs. (a) and (b).

1 So in original. The word "the" probably should appear before "Federal".
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clifford J. Ellsworth, Also Known as John Ellsworth, True Name John Clifford Ellsworth, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered February 4, 1976, convicting the defendant upon his plea of guilty of attempted forgery in the second degree, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the plea vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Bail is continued pending such further proceedings. In the interrogation with respect to his plea, the court elicited that the defendant, who appeared *pro se,*had written the name of his comaker on a check on a joint *769bank account, but with respect to authority so to do, he contended that he had verbal permission at the time. There was thus raised the question of criminal intent, which was not satisfactorily disposed of before the plea of guilty was accepted. *(People v Serrano,*15 NY2d 304.) Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Evans, Capozzoli and Lane, JJ.
### §4346b. Expenditures in support of international activities

The Council may make expenditures in support of its international activities, including expenditures for: (1) international travel; (2) activities in implementation of international agreements; and (3) the support of international exchange programs in the United States and in foreign countries.

(Pub. L. 91–190, title II, §208, as added Pub. L. 94–52, §3, July 3, 1975, 89 Stat. 258.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

DENIED

Judge Maxine M. Chesney

Request Untimely

August 25, 2010

Case 3:08-cv-05023-MMC Document 32 Filed 08/25/10 Page 1 of 1
Case 3:08-cv-04462-MHP Document 10 Filed 03/26/10 Page 1 of 1
#### GARROTT & BROOKS *vs.*FULLER.

| DETINUE EOR SLATES.]

1. *Liability of sureties on detinue bond; judgment reversed in part, and rendered.*— There is no statute in this State, authorizing a summary judgment for costs against the sureties on a detinue bond, jointly with their principal, on his dismissal of the suit; and if such judgment is rendered, it will be reversed on error as to the sureties, and affirmed as to their principal.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Perry.

The record does not show the name ot the presiding judge.

This was an action of detinue, instituted by Thomas H. Nelms, as the administrator of Alfred Fuller, deceased, against Elijah W. Fuller and others. The plaintiff made the affidavit, and gave the statutory bond, with I. W. Garrott and ¥m. M. Brooks as his sureties, to obtain the possession of the property.' At the return term of the summons, the plaintiff dismissed his suit; and the court thereupon rendered judgment for the costs against him and his sureties. From this judgment the sureties now appeal, and here assign the same as error.

Garrott & Brooks, *pro se.'*

J.R. John, *contra.*

A. J. WALKER, C. J.

There is no statute in this State, authorizing the. summary judgment for costs which was rendered against the sureties on the detinue bond. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed as to the sureties, but must stand so far as the plaintiff in the action is concerned; and the cause will not be remanded.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Marlon B. Lee, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[716 NYS2d 633]

—Re-sentence unanimously affirmed. Same Memorandum as in *People v Lee*(277 AD2d 1006 [decided herewith]). (Appeal from Resentence of Niagara County Court, Fricano, J. — Resentence.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Pine, Hayes, Wisner and Kehoe, JJ.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NUANCE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ECOPY, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 08-04227 JSW

No. C 08-04942 JSW

No. C 08-02912 JSW

AMENDED ORDER ADOPTING

RECOMMENDATION OF

SPECIAL MASTER TO ADJUST

SCHEDULE

The Court has reviewed Special Master Meredith Martin Addy’s Recommendation to

adjust the schedule and adopts it in every respect. Accordingly, the Court CONTINUES the

scheduling dates as set forth in the Recommendation in all related cases. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-04227-JSW Document 180 Filed 06/08/10 Page 1 of 1