Bats on v . Kent uc ky , 47 6 U

. S. 79 , 10 6 S. C t

. 17 1 2 , 90 L. E d

. 2d 69 (19 8 6 ). 1 

## NO. 12-07-00394-CR

IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

SHED RIC M OSL EY, § APP EAL FRO

M T HE 2 41 ST APPELLANT
V . § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TH E ST ATE OF TEX AS, APP ELL EE § SMI TH CO UN TY, T EXAS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Shedric Mosley

appea ls from his conviction for a ssaul t o n a p ublic serva nt, a third deg ree f e l o n y
. A f

t e r f i n d i n g h i mg u i l t y , t h e j ur y a s s e s s e d p un i s h m e n ta tf

i v e ye ar s o f

i mp r i s o n m e n t

. In thr e e iss ue s, Ap pe lla

nt c la ims tha

t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyinghis Batson motion and in allowing 1 evidenc e of e x trane ous offe nses, and that the evidenc e is le g ally and fac tually insufficient to support the c on vic tio n. We a ff

ir m.

B ACKG ROUND On September 14, 2006, while he was on duty in Smith County , Texas, Trooper Ba rry Goines observe d a pickup truc k speedingand initiated a traffic stop. Appellant was a passeng er in the pickup. Althoug h the driver of t he pickup initially complied with the stop by pulling to the side of th e r o a d , h e s p e d aw ay o n c e T r o o p e r G o in e s e xit e d h is v e h ic le

. T r o o p e r G o in e s th en initiated a

ve hic le c ha se that la ste d s e ve ra l mi le s. The driver eventua lly stopped the pickup ag ain. This time, the driver e x ited the vehicle and2

ran a way . The pa sseng er, Appellant, exit ed the vehicle and ran in another direc tion. Appellant ra n
near the home of Christine Te nnison, an octog enar ian who re sided in the are a. Ms. T ennison had wi t n es s eda p o rt i o n o f t h e v e h i cl e c h as e, an d s h e t al k edt o Ap p el l an tt o s ee wh at wa s h ap p en i n g. Trooper Goines continued patrolling the a re a u ntil he located Ms. Te nnison, who indicated that Appellant mig ht be one of the individuals for whom Trooper Goines was sear ching . Trooper Goines then attempted to ar

rest Ap p el l an t, but Appellant resisted. As a result of his ac tions during the incident, Appellant wa s char ged with assault on a public servant. The matter proc eede d to a jury tr ia l. After

voir dire e x amination, the State used its pe remptory strikes to strike the two Afr ican Americ ans who c ould have se rved on the j ury . Appellant, who is Afr ican Ame rica n, made a Batson motion complaining of the State’s strikes. Afte r an e videntiary hear ing, the trial court de nied the mot ion . A t tr ia l, t

he State pr e se nte d unc on tr ov e rt e d te sti mony that App e ll ant res is te d th e arr e st. Howeve r, the de tails of his actions wer e disputed. Ac cordingto Trooper Goines, Appe llant swung at him three times, made contac t with two of the s wing s, rammed him wit h his shoulder, and then ran f rom him. Trooper G oines then tac kled Appellant a nd shot his gun once afte r Appellant kicke d

and e lbo we d h im. Ac c or din g to M s. Tenni so n, Appel lant r an a wa y fr om T ro op e r G oin e s, and in response , Trooper

Goines shot his gu n twice. Af ter the se cond shot, Appellant fe ll down, and Trooper Goines ar

rested A ppell an t . Ms. Tennison did not see Appe llant hit, ram, kick, or elbow Trooper Goines. Ms

. Tennison admit ted t hat s he turned her back to Troope r Goines a nd Appellant to walk bac k to her house. Howeve r, she said she t urned back around when she hear d running , but said she did not see any fig hting. The jury found Appe llant guilty and sente nced him to five year s of imprisonment. This appea l followed.

B A TS ON M OT I ON I n h is f ir st i ssu e , App e lla

nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis Batson motion. Spe c if ic a lly , App e lla

nt a lle g e s that the State e ng a g e d in pur po se fu l disc ri min a tio n whe n it us e d it s pere mptory

challeng es to excuse t he two re maining A frica n Americ an individuals from the ve nire. Appli cable Law The Equa l Prote ction Clause of the F ourtee nth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion3

forbids a prosecutor from challeng ing potential jurors sol ely on the basis of t heir race

. U.S. C O N ST
. ame nd . X I V; Batson , 4 76 U. S. at 89 , 1 06 S. Ct . at 17 19

. A tr ia l c ourt fo llo ws a thr e e ste p p ro c e ss to evaluate a cla im that a litigant has ma de a pe remptory strike based on rac e. Sny de r v . L oui sia na , _ U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207, 170 L

. Ed. 2d 175 (2008). First, a defe ndant who makes a Batson

c ha lle ng e mus t make a

pr ima fa c ie sh ow ing that th e pr os e c uto r h a s u se d a pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e to

remove a potential juror on a ccount of rac e. Snyder , 128 S. Ct

. at 1207; Purkett v. Elem , 5 14 U. S. 76 5, 76 7, 11 5 S. Ct. 17 69 , 1 77 0, 13 1 L . E d. 2d 83 4 ( 19 95 ). A de fe nd ant may e sta bli sha pr ima fa c ie

c a se so le ly

on e vid e nc e c on c e rn ingthe pr os e c uto r’ s e xer c ise of pere mpt or y c ha lle ng e s at tr ia l. Batson , 476 U.S. a

t 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. He must also show that these fac ts and any other re levant circ umstances r aise a

n infere nce that the prosec utor used that prac tice to e x clude the ve niremen f rom the petit jury

on acc ount of their ra ce. Id
. On c e the de fe nd ant h a s ma de a pr ima fa c ie sh ow ing , th e burd e n s hif ts t o the State to c ome forwa rd with a ra ce ne utral explanation for c halleng ing the ju rors. Snyder , 128 S. Ct . at 1207; Batson , 4 76 U. S. at 97 -9 8, 10 6 S. Ct. 17 23 -2 4. I f the State of fe rs ra c e ne utr a l r e a so ns fo r t he str ike s, the defe ndant is g iven the opportunity to rebut those explanations. Shuf fi e ld v . St ate , 189 S.W .3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The de fenda nt has the burde n to prove purpose ful discrimination. Id. The de fenda

nt must attack the prose cutor’s r ace neutra l rea sons as beingcontrived or prete x tual t o conce al ra cially

discriminatory

intent. Ja sp e r v

. St ate , 6 1 S. W. 3 d 4 1 3 , 4 2 1 ( T ex. C rim. App. 2001). The cre dibilit y of t he prosecutor’s reasons for di sparate s triking of jurors can be mea sured by “the pr osecutor’ s demea

nor; by how re asonable , or how i m p ro b able, the e x planations are ; and by whether the proff ere d rationale has some basis in acc epted tria l strateg y .” Mil le r– El v . Co c kre ll , 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S. C t. 1029, 1040, 154 L . Ed. 2d 931 (2003). We w il l d is tu

r b a tr ia l c o u rt’ s r

u li n g on a Ba tson motion only if it is “clear ly

err oneous.” Snyder , 128 S. Ct . at 1207; Guz man v. Sta te , 85 S.W .3d 242, 25 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Gene rally , a fa ct fi n d er ’s decision is clearly err oneous whe n it leaves a n appellate court with a “def inite a nd firm conviction that a mistake has bee n committed.” Guzm an , 85 S.W .3d at 254. The clea rly err oneous standard is a n espec ially

rig orous one whe re the finding s are based pr imarily on oral testimony

and the tria l judge has viewe d the demea nor of t h e witnesses. United Stat es v. Fernandez , 887 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Ale xa nde r v . St ate , 8 6 6 S. W. 2 d

1 , 8 ( T e x.4

Crim. App. 1993). We reviewthe evidenc e in t he li g ht most favor able to the t rial court’s ruling and afford g reat defe renc e to that ruling

. Jasper , 61 S.W .3d at 422. Fur thermore , a cla im that t h e p roffere d rac e
ne utr a l re a so ns fo r str ike s ar e pr e te xtua l pre se nts a qu e sti on of fa c t, n ot l aw, and

the tr ia l c ourt

is i n the be st p os iti on

to e va luate su c h c la ims

. Wa tki ns v . St ate , 245 S.W .3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), petition for cert. filed , ( U

. S

. M ay 1 3 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( N o
. 0 7

- 1 1 0 3 7 ) ; Gibs on v. State , 144 S.W .3d 530, 5 3 4 (T ex
. Crim. App. 2004). The ultimate plausibility of a r ace neutra l expl anation is to be considere d in the context of whether the defe ndant has satis fi ed his burden that the strike w as the product of the prosec utor’s purpose ful discrimination. Wa tki ns , 245 S.W .3d at 447. Ana lys is At trial, Appellant objected t hat t he S tate had struck the two Afric an American me mbers of the prospec tive jury

panel, Jurors 28 and 32. The State responde d that it had leg itimate, rac e neutr al

rea sons for the strikes. To e x plain its strike of J uror 28, the S tate arg ued that he knew Appellant’s counsel, kne w an e mploy ee of the Smith C ounty

District Attorney ’s o ffice , had a f amily member with some heal t h p ro b l em s , and had unf avora ble community

ties. The trial c ourt found that the State’s re asons wer e ra ce ne utral, spec ifically mentioning the State’ s rea sons that J uror 28 kne w Ap pe lla nt’ s c ouns e l and

Juro r 2 8' s w if

e ha d h e a lthpr ob le ms. We c ann ot de te rm ine fr om the re c or d wh a t wa s un fa vo ra ble a bo ut Jur or

28 ' s c omm

un ity tie s. The State provide d scant in fo rm at i on reg ardingthis reason, stating , “And in addition to that, that g oes to co m munity

ties as a whole , which g oes to Yar boroug h versus State.” Other c ourts have previously

held that a lac k of commu n i t y t i es i s a leg itimate, rac e neutr al re ason for a strike, see He rna nde

z v . St ate , 808 S.W .2d 536, 544 (Tex. A pp.–Waco 1991, no pet.), but the re cord doe s not support that J uror 2 8 l ac k ed communit y ties. We also cannot dete rmine fr om the rec ord why the State argued that Juror 28' s acqua intance w ith an employ ee of the Smith C ounty

District Attorney ’s office was a

bad cha rac teristic. Consequently , if these two rea sons ha d been the State’s only rea sons for strikingJ uror 28, Appe llant could make a strong argument that the State’s re as o n s wer e pr e te xtua l. H ow e ve r, Juro r 2 8 a lso ha d me t App e lla nt’ s c ouns e l se ve ra l ti me s and ha d a wi fe wi th signific ant hea lth problems. The trial cour t’s decision t hat t hese reasons were rac e neutral and not prete x tual has support in the re cord.5

To e xpla in i ts s tr ike of Juro r 32 , the State argue d that sh e ha d un fa vo ra ble c omm un ity tie s, had a ma iden name that was shar ed by a we ll known family

that included seve ral c onvicts, and had

serve d on a jury

in a criminal trial that resulted in a hung jury

. The trial court found that the latter tw o r e a so ns we re ra c e ne utr a l. Ag ain, the State’s re ason re g ardingcommunity ties is difficult to understand fr om the rec ord. When expl aining this basis to the trial court, the State claimed, “That w as another basis, as we ll as the community

ties to the Chapel Hill are a whe re multiple individuals have bee n prosec uted.” F ur the r, a s wa s the c a se wi th Jur or 28 , th e re c or d d oe s n ot s up po rt that Jur or

32 la c ke d c omm

un ity tie s. We ar e tr ou

ble d by the State ’s re a so n r e g ard ingJuro r 3 2' s ma ide n n ame . Sp e c if ic a lly , th e State asked the venire men if any had a f riend or f amily member tha

t was eve r ac cused of

a crime. J uror 32 did not respond to that question. Thus, her me mbership in this supposedly infamous clan is not

su pp or te d b y the re c or d. Th e State ne ve r s pe c if ic a lly a sk e d Juro r 32 a

bo ut he r re lativ e s, and

thu s, Appellant’s a

rgument that this rea son was pretextual has som e support in the record. Aga in though,

we do not analy

ze a Batson c ha lle ng e in a va c uum. T he tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld h ave fo un d th a t th e State

w a s m e r e l y m i s t ak e n a

b o u t t h e i d e n t i t y o f J ur o r 3 2 ' s f am i l y, r a th e r th an p ur

p o s e f u l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r

y. Fur th e r , Ju r o r 3 2 h a d s e r

v e d o n a ju

r y th a t f a il e d to r e tu

r n a v e r d ic t. Wh e n a sked during Appellant’s voir dire examination about prior jury service , J uror 32 state d that she had serve d on a jur y in Smit h County fo r a c ri min a l tr ia l. Whe n f ur the r a sk e d w he the r t

he jur y ha d r e a c he d a

ve rd ic t, J uror 32 r esponded that “[i] t was unable to resolve.” Be cause th i s l i n e of que stioning occ urre d duri ngAp pe lla

nt’ s v oir dir e e xami natio n, the State did no t have the op po rt un ity to fo llo w u

p w ith any questions of its own. A rea sonable conclusion from the above exchang e is that Ju ro r 3 2 was involved in a c ri m i n al j u ry t rial that re sulted in a hungjury . A bad r ecor d during previous jury service is a rac e neutra l rea son. Baus le y v . St ate , 9 97 S.W. 2d

31 3, 31 6 ( Te x. Ap p. –D a lla s 1 99 9, pe t. ref ’d). The trial court’ s deter m i nation that this reason wa s rac e neutr al and not pre text ual has support in the rec ord. Havingrevie wed the e ntire re cord, w e conc lude the trial c ourt’s dec ision to deny Appellant’s Batson motion wa s not c lear ly err oneous. Even though a prima f acie case of ra cial discrimination

wa s e sta bli sh e d, the State pr ov ide d ra c e ne utr a l e xplanatio ns fo r i ts u se of pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s,
and Ap pe lla

nt fa ile d to c arr

y his burd e n of pe rs ua sio n that the state d re a sons were p rete xtua l.6

Appellant has not argued that any jurors who provide d simil ar r esponses to those of Juror 28 or Juror 32, but w ere not A frica

n Americ an, wer e not struc k by the State, and our re view of the rec ord has not shown this to be the case . Giving, a s we must , defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s ruling , we do not have a “def

inite and firm conviction t hat a mistake has bee n committed.” Guzm an , 85 S.W .3d at 25 4; Bausl

ey , 997 S.W .2d at 316. We overr ule Appellant’ s first issue.

E X TR A N EO U S O FF ENSES As part of his second and third issues, Appellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in allowing evidenc e of e x trane ous offe nses. Appellant c laims t h at such evide nce w as inadmissible based on Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). Spec ifically , Appellant argues that the trial court should not have admi tt e d e v id e n c e th a t “ Ap p e ll an t w a s c o n v ic te d o f p o s s e s s io n o f ma r ih u an a , r e s is ti n g ar

rest and flee ing.” Stand ard of Review A trial cour

t’s decision to admit or ex clude evidence is revie wed unde r an a buse of discr etion standard. Rod

rig ue z v . St ate , 2 03 S.W. 3d

83 7, 84 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). Th e tr ia l cour t is in the be st p os iti on

to d e c ide qu e sti on s o f a dmi ssi bil ity , a nd we wi ll u ph old a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

to admit or exclude evidenc e if it is “within the z one of rea sonable disagr eeme nt.” Id . A deter mination is bey ond the zone of re asonable disag ree ment if by no rea sonable pe rce ption of common experience could i t be concluded that the proffere d evidenc e had a tendency to make the exis tence of a fact of conseque nce more or less probable than i t would be other wise. Mo ntgomer

y v . St ate , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on re h’g ). Appli cable Law Rul e 40 4( b) of

the Te xas R

ule s o f E vid e nc e pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art

a s f oll ow s:

E vi dence of

ot her cr i mes, wr ongs or act s i s not admi s s i bl e t o prove t he cha r act er of a per s on i n or der t o s how ac t i on i n c onf

ormi t y t her ewi t h. I t m ay , however , b e a dm i s s i bl e f or ot her pur po s es , s uch as pr oof of mot i v e, oppor t u n i t y , i n t en t , pr epa r at i on , pl an , k n owl edg e, i den t i t y , or a bs en ce of mi s t ak e or a c c id e n t.

T EX
. R. E V ID
. 40 4( b) . F ur the r, e vid e nc e of

e xtra neous off ens es may

be a dmi ssi ble if

it i s sa me transac tion context ual evidenc e. Camac ho v . St ate , 864 S.W .2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).7

Same transa ction contextual evidenc e provides the j ury with essential information to understand the context and c ircumstance s of the conduct at issue, and thus, is admissible to “illuminate the nature of the c rime alleg ed.” Id. Howeve r, same tra nsaction conte x tual evidenc e is admissible “only to the

ex t ent t hat it is necessa

ry to the jury ’s under standing of the off ense.” Mc

Do nal d v . St ate , 179 S.W .3d 571, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “Releva nt evidence ” mea

ns evidenc e having any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of c on se qu e nc e to t

he de te rm inatio n o f t

he a c tio n mor e pr ob a

ble or le ss p ro ba

ble tha n it wo uld be without the evidenc e. T EX
. R. E V ID
. 401. Evidence that is not re levant is inadmissible. T EX
. R. E V ID
. 40 2. Th e c ourt

of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls h a s e xpla ine d th e re le va nc y inq uir y ne c e ssa ry un de r R ule 40 4( b) a s f

oll ow s:

U nd er M o n t

g o m ery , t h en , i t a ppea r s t h at “ f ac t of c on s equ en ce ” i n cl u des e i t h er a n e l eme n t al f ac t or an ev i d e n t i a r y f

a c t f r o m w h i c h a n e l e m e n t a l f a c t c a n b e i n f

e r r e d

. A n e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t t h a t s t a n ds whol l y un conne ct ed to a n elem ent al f act , howev er , i s not a “ f act of cons equen ce. ” A cour t t hat
ar t i cul at es t he r el eva ncy of ev i dence t o an e vi dent i ar y f act but does not , i n any way , dra w t he i nf er enc e t o a n e l eme n t al f

ac t h as n ot c ompl et ed t h e n ec es s ar y r el ev an cy i n qu i r y be ca u s e i t h as not s h own h ow the e v id e n c e m a k e s a “fac t o f co n se q u e n c e ” in the c a se m o re o r le ss like ly.

Rank in v . St ate , 974 S.W .2d 707, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Appli cation When de scribing Appellant’s conduct toward Trooper Goines, the jury hear d that Appellant fled fr om T rooper Goines and resisted the trooper’ s attempts to a rre st him. Further, the trial court admitted evidenc e that Appellant had marijuana in his possession when Trooper Goines attempted to arre st him. Whil e lega lly separ ate offense s, these events are interwove n. This evidence provides information to the jury

that is essential to understanding t h e co n t ex t of the off ense of assault on a public serva

nt. See Ca m ac ho , 864 S.W .2d at 532. Moreove r, this evidence of the c ircumstance s of the a ssault is essential beca use it tends to prove the a lleg ations in t h e i n d i ct m en t. Ba sed on Appellant’s aversion to ar rest, the jury

could have inferr ed the r equisite intent to cause bodily injury to Trooper

Goines. Thus, these e x trane ous offe nses ar e same tra nsaction conte x tual evidenc e, rele vant, and pr operly

admitted by

the trial cour

t. See id

. Additionally , we note that Appellant’s counse l also asked Tr ooper G oines what c harg es we re filed ag ainst Appellant as a result of Appe llant’s actions on September 14, 2006. Trooper

Goines8

responde d that he cha

rg ed Appe llant with resisting arre st, assaulting a public serva

nt, fleeingfrom a police of

fice r, and posse ssion of marijuana. T hus, even if e vidence of these thr ee e x trane ous offe nses was not a dmissibl e, any err or is ha rmless. Le da

y v . St ate , 983 S.W. 2d 71 3, 71 7 (T e x. Cr im. App. 19 98)(When same fac ts are shown by other e vidence that is not challeng ed, the imprope r admission of evidenc e does not c onstitut e reve rsible err or.). The ref ore, w e over

rule the por

tion of Appellant’s se cond and third issues that r elates to a dmission of ex trane ous offe nse evide nce.

S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE Ap pe lla nt a lso argue s in

his se c on d a

nd thi rd iss ue s, re sp e c tiv e ly , th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa ctually

insufficient to support the ve rdict. Appe llant asserts t h er e is no evidenc e, or alter n a ti v e ly , f a c tu a ll y in s u f f ic ie nt e v idence , that he knew Trooper Goines wa s investigating c riminal

a c tiv ity , a nd thu s la wf ull y dis c ha rg ingan o ff

ic ia l duty a t th e tim e of

the a lle g e d a ssa

ult

. Stand ard of Review The due proce ss gua

rante e of t h e Fo u rtee nth Amendment re quires that a c onviction be supported by

leg ally sufficie nt evidence

. See Ja c ks on v . V irg inia , 443 U. S. 307 , 3 15 –1 6, 99 S. Ct

. 2 7 8 1 , 2 7 8 6

– 8 7 , 6 1 L

. E d

. 2 d 5 6 0 ( 1 9 7 9) ; Ro ss v. S tat e , 133 S.W .3d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Wi llis v

. St ate , 1 9 2 S. W. 3 d

5 8 5 , 5 9 2 ( T e x. Ap p
. – T yle r 2 0 0 6 , p e t. r e f

’ d )

. E v id e n c e is n ot leg ally sufficie nt if, when viewing the evidenc e in a li g ht most favor able to the verdict, we c onclude that no rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential el em en t s o f the off ense be y ond a

rea sonable doubt. See Jackson , 4 43 U. S. at 31 9, 99 S. Ct . at 27 89 ; see also Jo hnso n v . St ate , 871 S.W .2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We reviewthe fa ctual suff ici en cy o f the evidenc e without the light most favor able to the verdic t, and we de termine whe ther, c onsidering all the evidence in a neutral light, (1) the evidenc e
su pp or tin g the c on vic tio n is too we ak to wi ths tand sc rutiny , s o th e fa c t fin de r’ s d e te rm inatio n is cl e ar ly w r o n g an d

ma n if e s tl y u n ju s t, o r ( 2 ) th e g r e a t w e igh t a

n d p r e p o n d e r an c e o f

th e e v id ence
c on tr a dic ts the jur

y ’s ve rd ic t to the e xtent th a t th e ve rd ic t is cle arl y wrongand manif e stl y un jus t. See Grott i v . St ate , No. PD-134-07, 2008 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 761, at *2 3 (T ex
. C rim. App. J une 25, 2008); Wa tso n v

. St ate , 20 4 S.W. 3d 40 4, 41 4– 15 , 4 17 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). To re ve rs e under the second gr ound, we must deter mine, with some objective basis in the recor d, that the g reat9

we ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of a ll the evi den ce, tho ugh le g a lly su ff ic ie nt, c on tr a dic ts the ve rd ic t. Grott i , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 761, at *23. A clea rly wron g an d m anife stly

unjust verdict

occur s where the jury ’s finding “shocks the c onscienc e” or “cle arly demonstrates bia s.” Jones v. Sta te , 944 S.W .2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Under either standa

rd, our role is that of appe llate re view, and the fac t finder is the judg e of t h e w e i g h tan d

c r e d i b i l i t y o f

a w i t n e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. We sb ro ok v . St ate , 29 S.W .3d 103, 111–12 (Tex. Cr im

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 0 )

. T h e f a c t f in d e r ma y c h o o s e to b e li e v e a ll , s o me , o r n o n e o f a w it n e s s’s t e s t i m o n y. Shar

p v . St ate , 707 S.W .2 d 6 1 1 , 6 1 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Thus, the fac t finder deter mines the weig ht to be g iven testimony and resolves a ny conflicts in the evide nce. Wesbrook , 29 S.W. 3d

a t 11 1. Withre sp e c t to our f a c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we are a

uth or ize d to dis a g re e wi th the ju ry ’s d et er m i nation, even if probative e vidence exis ts that supports the verdict, see Clewis v. Sta te , 9 2 2 S

. W

. 2 d

1 2 6 , 1 3 3 ( T e x. C r i m
. Ap p
. 1 9 9 6 ) , b u to ur e v a l u a t i o ns h o u l d

n o ts u b s t a nti a lly i n t r u d e u p o nt h e j u r y ’ s r o l e a s t h e j u d g e o f th e w e i g h tan d

c r e d i b i l i ty o f

w i tn e s s t e s t i m o n y. Sant e lla n v . St ate , 939 S.W .2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). App lic abl e Law a nd A nal ys is A s c h ar g e d

i nt h e i n d i c t m e n t , t h e S t a t e w a s r e qu i r e d t o p r o v e th a t1 ) Ap p e l l an ti n t e n t i o n a l l y, knowing ly , or re cklessly

cause d bodily

injury to Trooper

Goines, 2) Appel lant knew that Tr ooper Goines wa s a public ser

vant, and 3) Trooper

Goines was lawfully discharg ing a n officia l duty

. See T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN
. § 22.01 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). Appellant rec og nizes that, as a g ener al rule, the State nee d not prove that a defe ndan t knew the public se rvant wa s lawfully discharg ing a

n officia l duty

. Mo nto

y a v . St ate , 7 4 4 S. W. 2 d

1 5 , 3 0 ( T e x. Cr im

. Ap p
. 1 987), overruled on othe r grounds by Cockre ll v

. St ate , 933 S.W .2d 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Appellant ar g ues, howe ver, that the State ac cepte d a hig her bur den in this case by permitting the trial court to sub mit an application par ag raph that r equire d the jury to c onvict only if they believed Appellant knew at the tim e of th e a ssa

ult that T ro op e r G oin e s w a s a pu bli c se rv ant and was investig ating and deta ining Ap pe lla nt f or a vio latio n o f t

he la w. We have pr e vio us ly a dd re sse d this argume nt in a

no the r c a se and found it to be wi t hout merit. See Thur man v. Sta te , No. 12-05-00384- CR, 2007 Tex . App. L EXI S 135, at *12-13 (Te x . App.–Ty ler 2007, no pe t.) (mem. op., not desig nated f or publication).10

The suff iciency of the evidenc e is no long er me asure d by the application paragraph of the cha rg e. Id. I nstead, we measure the l eg al s ufficie ncy of t he evidence ag ainst a hy pothetically

corr ect jury char ge th a t “ a c c ur a te ly

se ts o ut t

he law, is a

uth or ize d b y

the ind ic tme nt, do e s n ot u nn e c e ssa ri ly incre ase t h e S t at e’ s burden of proof or unnece ssarily

restric t the State’s theorie s of liability , and adequately

descr ibes the par

ticular off

ense f or which the defe ndant was trie d.” Id. Her e, a hy pothetically

corr ect jury

char g e would not re q uire proof that Appellant knew

at the time of the assault t hat Trooper Goines was a public serva

nt and was inve stigating a nd detainingAppellant for a violation of the law

. Viewingthe evidenc e in t h e lig ht most favorable to the jury ’s ver dict, Trooper Goines’s testimony established that Appellant punched, rammed, elbowed, and kicked Tr ooper G oines in an eff ort to avoid being arreste d. Trooper Goines’s testim ony further established that he experience d pain as a result. We conclude that the jury could have deter

mined beyond a re asonable doubt that Appellant committed assault on a public serva nt as charg ed in the indictment. Thus, we hold that th e e v id e n c e is le g a ll y

s u fficie nt. See Wil

lis , 192 S.W .3d at 592. We overr ule the portion of Ap p e l l an t ’ s s e c o n d

i s s u e t h a tr e l a t e s t o l e g a l s u f f i c i e n c y. As to A ppellant’s fac tual sufficie ncy challeng e, in addition to the evidence discussed above , we c onsider the e vidence that contra dicts the jury ’s ver dict. We also measure fac tual evidentiary sufficie ncy

by the eleme nts of t h e o ffe nse as de fined by a hy pothetically

corr ect jury

char g e. See Wo ole y v . St ate , No. PD-0861-07, 2008 WL 2512843, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. J un e 2 5 , 2 0 08). Tennison testified that she sa w no fig hti n g . She claimed that Appe llant was runningawa y from Tr oo pe r G oin e s and

that Appe lla

nt t he n f e ll t o th e g ro un d a ft e r T ro op e r G oin e s sh ot h is p ist ol a

se c on d ti me . A dd iti onall y , Tro ope r G oin e s w a s n ot b ru ise d b y any of Ap pe lla nt’ s c on du c t. Although T rooper

Goines had la cer ations on his a rm, he testified that those we re c aused by wre stling with Appellant in a bria

r patc h. The jury could have deter mined that those lace rations wer e ca used by the trooper ’s attempting to catch a nd arr est Appellant rather than by Appellant’s a ssaulting Tr oo pe r G oin e s. Although the re is evide nce that contradic ts the jury ’s ver dict, we a re c onvinced that the verdic t is supported by

fac tually sufficie nt evidence . Reg ardingTennison’s t e s ti mo ny , the jury hear d11

that sh e tur

ne d h e r back f

or a t le a st a

po rt ion of the inc ide nt. F ur

the r, the jur

y wa s w ith in i ts discretion to believe the testimony of the a lleg ed victim of the a ssault, Trooper Goines, over that of Tennison. Wesbrook , 29 S.W .3d at 111. Having revie wed the entire rec ord, we conclude that the pr oo f o f guil t is no t so ob vio us ly we ak or oth e rw ise so g re a tly outw e ig he d b y c on tr ary pr oo f a s to rende r Appellant’s conviction clea rly wrong or manife stly

unjust. See Grott

i , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 761, at *23. There fo re , we h old that the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt. We overrule the p o rt i o no f Ap p e l l an t ’ s t h i r d

i s s u e r e l a t i n g t o f

a c tu a l s u f f i c i e n c y. D I S P OS I T I ON We af fi rm the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.



### BRIAN HO Y LE J ustice

Opinion delivere d September 24, 2008. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(DO N OT PUBL I SH)