Washington, DC 20548 

September 12, 2007 

The Honorable Bill Nelson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher 

Chairwoman

The Honorable Terry Everett 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative

The U.S. relies on infrared satellites to provide early warning of enemy missile launches and protect the 

nation, its military forces, and allies. In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Space 

Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program to replace the nation’s current missile detection system and 

provide expanded capabilities to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. DOD 

expected to field SBIRS by 2004 at a cost of about $4.2 billion. However, over the past 11 years, SBIRS 

has proven to be technically challenging and substantially more costly. In an effort to stem cost 

increases and schedule delays, DOD has restructured the program multiple times, including revising 

program goals.1

 SBIRS is now estimated to cost over $10.4 billion, and the first satellite launch is 

expected in 2008. Because of continuing problems with SBIRS, DOD began a parallel alternative effort in 

2006 known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS), to compete with SBIRS and ensure that 

the nation’s missile-warning and defense capabilities are sustained, or possibly provide a follow-on 

capability to SBIRS. 

You requested that we assess both SBIRS and AIRSS. As agreed with your office, with respect to SBIRS, 

we focused on the extent to which DOD is prepared to deliver the first two SBIRS satellites within 

revised cost, schedule, and performance goals. With respect to AIRSS, we examined the adequacy of 

DOD’s decision to proceed with AIRSS as an alternative to SBIRS as well as whether DOD is attaining 

 1

 DOD restructured the program, to include setting new cost and schedule goals, in 2002, 2004, and 2005. 

Page 1 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
the knowledge it needs to position the program for success. To address these objectives, we reviewed 

schedule and funding information and performed our own analysis of cost and schedule projections

using the contractor’s 2006 cost performance report data. We also examined the resources committed 

and planned as well as users’ needs for the competing effort. We presented our preliminary findings on 

SBIRS and AIRSS in briefings to your staffs in March 2007. This letter transmits the information provided 

in that briefing. We conducted our work between August 2006 and March 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. A copy of the briefing is enclosed. 

Results in Brief 

Over 12 months after its restructuring, SBIRS still faces challenges in meeting cost, schedule, and 

performance goals—particularly relating to the development of spacecraft and ground system software. 

At the time of our review, for example, spacecraft software development efforts were behind schedule 

by as much as 32 percent. Moreover, management reserves—designed to cover unanticipated work—

were being depleted at a much higher rate than anticipated. In addition, DOD has not adequately 

justified its decision to proceed with AIRSS, and there is disagreement within the department on the 

purpose and scope of the program. DOD has also not adequately positioned the program for success. For 

example, a demonstration satellite is not being planned in a way that would maximize DOD’s ability to 

incorporate knowledge gained into the AIRSS program. Based on these findings, we recommend that 

DOD reexamine the AIRSS program. DOD concurred with our findings and recommendation. 

Background 

DOD initiated the SBIRS program to meet all military infrared surveillance requirements through a 

single, integrated system and to provide better and timelier data to the Unified Combatant Commanders, 

U.S. deployed forces, U.S. military strategists, and U.S. allies. SBIRS is to replace the existing infrared 

system, the Defense Support Program (DSP), which has provided early missile warning information 

since the 1970s. The SBIRS program was originally conceived as having high- and low-orbiting spacebased components and a ground segment for mission data processing and control to improve current 

capabilities. However, in 2001, the SBIRS Low component was transferred from the Air Force to the 

Missile Defense Agency and renamed the Space Tracking and Surveillance System. The Air Force 

continued developing SBIRS High (herein referred to as “SBIRS”). It, along with its associated ground 

segment, is one of DOD’s highest priority space programs. Originally, SBIRS consisted of four satellites 

in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two infrared sensors placed on separate host satellites in highly 

elliptical orbit (HEO)—known as “HEO sensors”—and a ground segment for mission-data processing 

and control. The Air Force also had planned to acquire a fifth GEO satellite to serve as a spare that 

would be launched when needed. 

Since its inception, SBIRS has been burdened by immature technologies, unclear requirements, unstable 

funding, underestimated software complexity, poor oversight, and other problems that have resulted in 

billions of dollars in cost overruns and years in schedule delays. These problems have been documented 

in GAO reports as well as independent teams chartered by DOD.2

 In addition, the program has been 

 2

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, 

GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 

Programs, GAO-07-406SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific

Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, (May 2003) (also referred to as the 

“Young Panel report”) and the July 2004 update to this report. Space-Based Infrared System Independent Review Team, Final 

Report, February 2002. 

Page 2 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
restructured several times to account for cost and schedule problems. The Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) directed the Air Force to begin 

parallel efforts to develop a viable competing capability for SBIRS, referred to as AIRSS. USD (AT&L) 

identified three overall objectives for AIRSS: 

• motivate successful execution of the SBIRS program by initiating a viable competing capability; 

• pursue an alternative approach, with acceptable technical risk that offers DSP-like missile warning 

capability to ensure current capabilities are sustained, if SBIRS GEO falters; and 

• develop a next-generation SBIRS system to meet worldwide surveillance requirements by initiating

efforts for technology risk reduction, system definition, and evaluation of alternative sensor 

architectures. 

In 2006, the Air Force completed studies that provided recommendations for technology development, a 

road map for inserting those technologies, options for future infrared systems that offer the potential to 

improve the performance and reduce the cost of SBIRS, and an acquisition strategy for AIRSS. In 2006, 

program officials awarded contracts that aim to advance key technologies and capabilities. USD (AT&L) 

directed the Air Force to have the first AIRSS satellite available for launch no later than May 2015. The 

Air Force has budgeted over $3.3 billion for AIRSS, from fiscal year 2007 through 2013. 

Space Based Infrared System 

Although the Air Force has acted to reduce risks in the SBIRS program and has had some recent 

successes, the program still faces risk of not delivering promised capabilities within its revised goals. To 

reduce risk, the SBIRS program cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. It 

deferred capabilities, such as mobile data processors for the Air Force and the Army and a fully 

compliant backup mission control facility, and it pushed off a decision to procure the third and fourth 

satellites. The Air Force also concurrently initiated AIRSS as a secondary means of achieving the same 

capability. However, about 11 months after the most recent SBIRS program’s restructuring, a November 

2006 assessment report by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) showed that some efforts 

within the program were experiencing significant cost increases and schedule overruns and that the 

outlook is worsening. Furthermore, the program is rapidly spending its management reserves—funds set 

aside to address unexpected problems. 

DCMA projected additional cost increases in some areas, including satellite sensor and software 

development as well as satellite integration, test, and assembly. Our analysis of data from the 

contractor’s cost performance reports shows that some of these areas have been particularly 

problematic and are still exceeding cost and schedule goals, even after the program’s recent 

restructuring. For example, we estimate that the cost of the satellite’s pointing and control assembly will 

increase about $25 million by the time its fabrication is complete. Although the program has put into 

place strategies for deferring work that can be completed at a later time—thereby reducing cost and 

schedule risks—some work cannot be deferred. For example, some software development activities for 

the satellite’s pointing and control assembly can be completed at a later date. However, all of the 

software related to the satellite’s flight system must be completed before launch. In addition, DCMA 

program assessment reports through November 2006 indicated that efforts to develop software are 

significantly behind schedule. In particular, efforts to develop software for the spacecraft lagged behind 

schedule—by as much as 32 percent. Furthermore, due to the growing amount of rework resulting from 

unresolved software discrepancies, DCMA estimated that further schedule slips in software delivery are 

likely to occur. During our review, program officials acknowledged that some of the problems identified 

by DCMA were still an issue. 

Page 3 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
In addition, the contractor’s management reserve, which is supposed to last through 2012, has decreased 

from about $232 million to $166 million (about 28 percent) within a span of about 7 months, indicating 

that unexpected problems continue to emerge. For example, additional development and testing for 

spacecraft software and issues with the satellite sensors have necessitated additional expenditures. Our 

analysis shows that if this expenditure rate continues, an additional $500 million, or more, will be 

required through September 2012. In addition, the program has deferred needed capabilities to meet cost 

and schedule goals, but the costs associated with these capabilities are not part of the program’s total 

cost estimate. The cost associated with fully fielding these capabilities is estimated to be about $491 

million. 

Alternative Infrared Satellite System 

In reviewing DOD’s decision to pursue AIRSS, we found that USD (AT&L) established objectives for the 

program that were incompatible given the time frame and budget to complete the work under each 

objective. One was to solely ensure current missile-warning and defense capabilities are sustained, and 

the other was to develop the next generation of missile-warning and defense systems. The first would 

require DOD to pursue a low-risk technology path in order to deliver capability quickly. The second 

would require DOD to advance technologies and/or design and, thus, budget more time for knowledge 

building in advance of an acquisition program. In other words, one objective served as an insurance 

policy for SBIRS; the other was a major effort to advance the way DOD detects missile launches. 

Subsequently, USD (AT&L) never clarified what was wanted from the program, and the Air Force, in 

turn, set out to develop advanced capabilities. Moreover, we found that there was disagreement within 

OSD as to whether the approach being pursued for AIRSS was the only and/or best option available to 

the Air Force. For example, DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group as well as Program Analysis and 

Evaluation staffs expressed concern that the focus on developing technology would hinder delivery of 

an AIRSS satellite available for launch in 2015. During our review, it also became evident that AIRSS 

could not realistically serve as a back-up to SBIRS because the proposed satellite delivery schedule is 

very aggressive for meeting the 2015 launch availability date, according to AIRSS program officials. 

In addition, in its effort to pursue advanced capability, the Air Force has not positioned the AIRSS 

program for success. First, in our opinion, not enough time is budgeted for developing and launching the 

first satellite. At the direction of USD (AT&L), the Air Force set 2015 as the launch date for the first 

satellite. Our assessment found the period planned between “preliminary design“review and “critical 

design” review for AIRSS is shorter than for most other major space programs.3

 Specifically, the program 

is allowing only 12 months from preliminary to critical design review, and 4 years from critical design 

review to satellite delivery. By contrast, the SBIRS High program took 44 months from preliminary 

design review to critical design review. Two newer programs, Space Radar and Transformational 

Satellite Communications System (TSAT), have planned for 16 and 27 months respectively. AIRSS 

Program officials acknowledged that the current time frame is very optimistic. 

Second, the AIRSS program may be optimistic in its assumptions about technology risk. The program’s 

schedule shows critical technologies reaching a high level of maturity at program start, and most are 

 3

Preliminary design review determines whether preliminary designs are complete and if the program is prepared to start

detailed design and test procedure development. Critical design review assesses the systems final design, and according to GAO

best practices, at least 90-percent of engineering drawings should be completed to provide tangible evidence that the design is

stable. 

Page 4 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
now rated at a technology readiness level of 5 or higher—meaning that the basic components have been 

integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements in order that the technology can be tested in a 

simulated environment. These readiness levels are comparatively higher than other satellite programs 

we have reviewed. However, we found that the program was still facing considerable technical risk since 

it is working to build an infrared telescope with a large viewing capability that has never before been 

developed and it is planning to use “cryocoolers” that have yet to demonstrate low levels of jitter, high 

efficiency, and long life, and a sensor chip whose assembly’s performance level has yet to be verified.

4

Third, the Air Force’s research laboratory officials have stated that on-orbit testing is the only way to

validate the proposed capability for AIRSS and reduce risk to an acceptable level. To achieve these 

results, the Air Force is proposing to launch a small-scale demonstration satellite in late 2010. However, 

the results from the on-orbit demonstration satellite will not be ready in time to fully inform the 

development of the first AIRSS satellite. Furthermore, AIRSS officials plan to award contracts for the 

first satellite before data from on-orbit testing is completed. Our analysis shows that if the tests do not 

go well, DOD will not have time to return to an approach using lower-risk technology. 

Conclusion

SBIRS continues to face risks that endanger DOD’s ability to sustain, replace, and expand its current 

missile-warning and defense capabilities. Moreover, the program still has complex and difficult work 

ahead as it undertakes efforts to integrate technology. Recognizing these risks, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense made a sound decision in pursuing the AIRSS program to act as an alternative to 

the third SBIRS GEO satellite. However, the program has since diverged from this purpose and opted to 

pursue a higher risk effort in order to advance capability. Moreover, the Air Force has added risk to this 

effort by compressing the schedule and limiting the knowledge gained from the demonstration effort. 

While it is acceptable in any given portfolio to take some high risks, it is not sound for all investments to 

be high risk—particularly when the capability is as critical to the conduct of military operations as the 

mission-warning capability is. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to reassess its investment in AIRSS and alternative ways of reducing the risk 

posed by the SBIRS program, to more confidentially assure that current missile-warning and defense 

capabilities are sustained. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

We provided draft copies of this letter to DOD for review and comment. DOD concurred with our 

findings and recommendation. DOD’s letter is reprinted as Enclosure I. 

Scope and Methodology 

 4

“Cryocoolers” are refrigeration devices used to reach cryogenic temperatures, or very low temperatures (below –238 °F, –150 

°C, or 123 K). Cryogenic refrigeration technology for satellites enables the performance of onboard infrared sensors to enhance

missile detection, conduct intelligence gathering, and enable space situational awareness. 

Page 5 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
To determine the SBIRS program’s ability to meet cost and schedule projections, we examined schedule 

and funding information for developing hardware and software. We reviewed formal program reviews 

and DCMA and contractor-performance reports. In addition, we performed our own analysis of cost and 

schedule projections using the contractor’s, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, 2006 cost 

performance-report data. To determine the potential problems and risks relating to cost, schedule, and 

performance that are still facing the SBIRS program, we reviewed technical reports and program 

briefings and held discussions with program and contractor officials regarding ongoing challenges. 

To assess efforts in attaining the knowledge DOD needs before the start of a competing effort, we 

examined the resources (technology, communications infrastructure, and funding) committed and 

planned for the competing effort as well as the users’ needs for the competing system. We considered 

DOD’s plans for maturing the critical technologies when we obtained technology-readiness information 

for each critical technology against best-practice standards to determine if technologies will be 

sufficiently mature when DOD plans to start product development. We also reviewed risk-management 

plans and concept-development information. 

We will send copies of the correspondence to Department of Defense and interested congressional 

committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this correspondence, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations 

and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this correspondence. Principal contributors to this 

report were Arthur Gallegos, Assistant Director; Maricela Cherveny; Claire Cyrnak; Jean Harker; Leslie 

Pollock; and Greg Campbell. 

Sincerely yours, 

Cristina Chaplain 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 6 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense Enclosure I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 7 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

1

Missile Detection Systems 

Development

SBIRS/AIRSS Briefing to Congressional Staff

Preliminary Findings

March 13, 2007 

Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 8 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 9 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

2

Briefing Overview

• Due to extreme cost, schedule, and technical problems, DOD 

has recently restructured the Space Based Infrared System 

(SBIRS) High missile detection satellite program and undertaken 

a competing effort, known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite 

System (AIRSS), in order to ensure continuity of missile

detection operations.

• Per requests by the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate

Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic

Forces, House Armed Services Committee and discussions with 

committee staff members, we assessed both SBIRS High and 

AIRSS. 
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 10 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

3

Briefing Overview

• SBIRS High

• Background

• Program Status

• Objective

• Results in Brief

• GAO Findings

• AIRSS

• Background

• Program Status

• Objectives

• Results in Brief

• GAO Findings

• Conclusions

• Scope and Methodology

• Due to extent and significance of findings, we plan to brief first on SBIRS

High, then on AIRSS
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 11 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

4

Background

• SBIRS High was undertaken in 1996 to improve DOD's 

missile detection/warning capabilities.

• The program has experienced schedule slips of at least 6 

years and cost increases that have triggered legislative 

requirements to reassess and recertify the program several

times—most recently in spring 2006.

• While DOD’s total program cost estimate was about $4.1

billion, it is now $10.4 billion—more than a 300 percent unit 

cost increase. 

• Our reviews have attributed past problems to an acquisition 

approach that decreased oversight of contractors, technology 

challenges, and software development problems.
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 12 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

5

Capabilities

MISSIONS DSP SBIRS H STSS

MISSILE WARNING X X o

MISSILE DEFENSE X X

TECHNICAL INTEL X o

BATTLESPACE X o

CHARACTERIZATION

X – Primary Mission o – Offers Inherent Capability

MISSIONS DSP SBIRS H STSS

MISSILE WARNING X X o

MISSILE DEFENSE X X

TECHNICAL INTEL X o

BATTLESPACE X o

CHARACTERIZATION

X – Primary Mission o – Offers Inherent Capability

Legacy System:

Defense Support

Program (DSP)

In Development:

Space Tracking

and Surveillance

System

• DSP Successor

• Higher Sensitivity—Sees 

Dimmer Objects, More Often

• Taskable Sensor—Can do Many

Missions at Once

• More Accurate Estimate of 

Missile Location—Including 

Launch Point and Impact Point

• Missile Warning (with a 

classified Probability of

Detection) for North America

• Detection and reporting of

strategic and theater ballistic

missiles and other infrared

events of interest

In Development:

SBIRS High

• Space Tracking and Surveillance System formerly called

SBIRS Low

• Critical Element of the Groundbased Midcourse Defense —

Managed by Missile Defense 

Agency

• Tracks Threat Missiles Through 

Entire Flight—From Launch to

Intercept

• Sees Extremely Dim Targets—

Can Track and Discriminate

Objects That are Not Burning

• Inherent Capabilities Also

Support Other Missions

Background: Space Based Infrared Systems
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 13 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

6

SBIRS High Program Status: 

Restructured Acquisition Strategy

• Restructured Acquisition Baseline

• Up to 3 GEO satellites and 2 highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors on

classified hosts

• Milestone Decision Authority will decide whether to procure GEO 3 

based on the performance of GEO 1

• Worldwide system requirements can not be met with 3 GEO satellites--

a constellation of 4 satellites is needed 

• A plan for follow-on missile warning satellites is needed

• December 2005 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

• Directs that maintaining schedule, even at the sacrifice of

performance, should be the key to program management
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 14 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

7

SBIRS High Program Status:

Recent Program Accomplishments

HEO PAYLOAD

• Initial on orbit performance exceeding specifications

GEO PAYLOAD:

• 100% of GEO 1 payload components delivered and integrated

• September 2006: Completed Acoustic Testing

GEO BUS:

• 95% GEO 1 bus components delivered and integrated

• August 2006: Completed Spacecraft Functional Testing

• December 2006: Began First-time Thermal Vacuum Testing
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 15 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

8

Objective: SBIRS High

• Determine to what extent DOD is prepared to deliver the first

two SBIRS satellites within cost, schedule and performance 

goals.
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 16 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

9

Findings: SBIRS High

• In brief, we found that SBIRS High continues to face substantial risks as it 

enters what is perhaps the most difficult phase of development—

integration. Even though the program has just recently been restructured, 

management reserves1 are being spent at higher than anticipated rates, 

and cost and schedule variances are deteriorating. 

• Faces challenges in meeting cost and schedule goals

• Total program cost not fully accounted for

• Faces challenges in software development

1A management reserve budget is an amount of the total allocated budget withheld by contractors for management 

control purposes.
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 17 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

10

Finding:

Challenges to Meet Cost and Schedule Goals

• SBIRS High program not meeting cost and schedule goals

• Program assessment reports by the Defense Contract

Management Agency (DCMA), after restructuring, show that 

cost and schedule variances are deteriorating

• November 2006 DCMA report shows Variance at 

Completion at about $25.6 million; causes include 

integration test and operations, thermal vacuum test 

preparations, and engineering rework

• GAO analysis shows that some efforts that were having trouble

before the February 2006 re-baseline, such as assembly, 

integration, and test, are still over-running cost and schedule, 

and that contractor estimates are overly optimistic
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 18 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

11

Finding (cont.):

Challenges to Meet Cost and Schedule Goals

• Management Reserve (MR) expenditure rate is not

sustainable and may result in a need for additional funding

• Contractor (Lockheed Martin) spent approximately 28 

percent ($66 million) of its MR from April 2006 to

November 2006

• MR designed to last to 2012; at current rate contractor 

MR will deplete by May 2008 (5 months before projected 

GEO 1 launch date)

• If this trend continues, $500 million in additional MR will 

be required through September 2012
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 19 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

12

Finding:

Total Program Cost Not Fully Accounted For

• To meet SBIRS validated operational requirements, 2 HEO

payloads and 4 GEO satellites are needed to complete the constellation and achieve required coverage

• Current program unit cost for GEOs 1-3 is about $3.5B

• Fourth GEO satellite not part of current acquisition baseline

• Cost of GEO 4 and/or 5 satellites have been estimated 

but there are uncertainties due to several factors

including industrial base issues, technology obsolescence, number of satellites to be procured, and 

engineering rework
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 20 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

13

Finding (cont.):

Total Program Cost Not Fully Accounted For

• SBIRS High program has 

deferred needed capabilities to 

meet cost and schedule goals;

these capabilities are not part

of the program’s total cost

estimate

• Additional funds will be needed 

if these and other deferred 

capabilities are eventually

provided

Total $453 $38 $491

Ground Refresh 105 0 105

61 5 66 Relay Ground Station 3rd

Antenna

62 10 72 Army Multi-Mission

Processors

79 15 94 Air Force Multi-Mission

Processors

71 7 78 Integrated Training Suite 

Increment 2

$75 $0 $75 Mission Control StationBackup Facility

Total

($ mil.)

To 

Completion

($mil.)

FY06-FY11

($ mil.) Capability
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 21 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

14

Finding:

Challenges in Software Development

Spacecraft Software Challenges:

• DCMA program assessment reports through November 2006 show software 

development is behind schedule

• Most recent report shows schedule variance around -32 percent

• DCMA high risk threshold for schedule variance is -5 percent

• Pointing and Control Assembly (PCA) software

• Restructured work to allow viable off-ramp options

• Off-ramp options may lower risk

• Flight Software System (FSS) 

• All FSS capabilities are needed for launch – no off-ramp possible

• Increased schedule risk due to delayed qualification

• Tracking algorithms and software not yet completed or demonstrated

• Hundreds of open deficiency reports -- and growing

• According to the DCMA, there is not enough schedule margin to accommodate 

unforeseen risks
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 22 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

15

Finding (cont.):

Challenges in Software Development

Ground Software Challenges:

• The program office is attempting to reduce the length of time

it will take to certify the accuracy of the data processed from

GEO 1 (currently about two years) by accelerating ground 

software development

• Late delivery of space software databases to inform the

ground software development team has created a lack of 

coordination between the space and ground systems

• GAO is assessing reported software capability of contractor
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 23 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

16

Alternative Infrared Satellite System

(AIRSS)
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 24 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

17

AIRSS Background

• After the most recent Nunn-McCurdy breach, DOD restructured the SBIRS

High program and directed the Air Force to begin developing a competing 

capability to ensure that the nation’s missile warning capability is sustained 

• The December 2005 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) also stated the 

AIRSS effort should:

• “plan for a new program for space-based Overhead Non-imaging Infrared 

that generates competition for the SBIRS High GEO 3 satellite”

• “perform technology risk reduction, perform system definition, and

evaluate alternative sensor architectures”

• “provide insurance against further difficulties encountered on the SBIRS 

program”

• “pursue an approach with acceptable technical risk that offers DSP-like

missile warning capability”

• There is no full cost estimate of AIRSS because the system has not been 

defined due to its early stage of development
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 25 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

18

AIRSS Background

• Congress reduced the fiscal year 2007 AIRSS budget by $35 million for program moderation

• The latest program cost estimate from Fiscal Year 2007 

through 2013 is over $3.3 billion

67.552 230.887 354.308 543.534 708.657 722.287 736.998 3364.223

Cost ($ in

Millions)

Total FY

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 2007-2013

Source: Air Force
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 26 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

19

AIRSS Status: Activities since Acquisition 

Decision Memorandum

• DOD completed 30-day and 120-day studies into alternative infrared

concepts (including Wide Field of View (WFOV))

• Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC)/Air Force Research

Laboratory issued two Broad Agency Announcement contracts for

development of WFOV technologies to Raytheon ($54.4 million) and 

SAIC ($26 million)

• SMC issued two Program Research and Development Announcement 

contracts for system design to General Dynamics ($23.3 million) and 

Northrop Grumman Space Technology ($24.8 million) 

• Air Force Space Command drafted a requirements document for global 

space infrared surveillance systems, a family of systems that includes

AIRSS as the SBIRS High follow-on 

• review by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is scheduled 

for summer 2007

• National Security Space Office (NSSO) completed its infrared

architecture study in December 2006
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 27 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

20

Objectives: AIRSS

• Determine how DOD has justified its decision to proceed with 

preliminary efforts for an alternative to SBIRS High, known as 

the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS)

• Determine to what extent DOD is taking the steps necessary 

to build the knowledge it needs to pursue AIRSS
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 28 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

21

Findings: AIRSS

• Specifically, AIRSS is not being pursued as a “plan B” program as

originally envisioned. Rather than seek to maintain continuity of 

operations, the program is focused on advancing capabilities. 

Moreover, it is doing so within highly compressed timeframes. 

There is disagreement among DOD stakeholders as to the wisdom 

of this approach, given past experiences with space acquisitions.

• The Air Force is moving forward and pursuing two potentially

incompatible objectives within one program:

1) ensure sustainment of current missile warning capability, and

2) develop next-generation SBIRS High

• Faces challenges in meeting its target delivery date of 2015
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 29 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

22

• The December 2005 ADM directs the Air Force to:

• develop a competitor for GEO 3 to ensure sustainment of 

missile warning capability (DSP-like)

• pursue technology risk reduction

• However, the AIRSS program is primarily focused on technology

that is newer than the technology on SBIRS GEO

• FY07 funding is largely being spent pursuing these 

technologies that pose technical challenges

• The AIRSS on-orbit demonstration satellite results will not be ready 

in time to fully inform development of the first AIRSS satellite

Finding: Air Force pursuing incompatible

goals within AIRSS
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 30 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

23

• Some DOD officials believe AIRSS should be following lower-risk

approach in order to assure continuity of missile detection capability 

• Cost Analysis Improvement Group and Program Analysis and 

Evaluation staff expressed concern that the focus on 

technology development will hinder the delivery of an AIRSS 

satellite available for launch in 2015

• According to AIRSS officials, the Air Force wants to look to the

future promised by current technologies, not spend time

resurrecting DSP-like technologies. They assert that there are no 

viable alternatives beyond these two paths. However, others in 

DOD disagree and believe the 120-day study should have been 

more robust.

Finding (cont.): Air Force pursuing 

incompatible goals within AIRSS
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 31 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

24

• AIRSS program technology schedule shows critical technologies reaching 

a high level of maturity by program start. Moreover, most are now rated at

a technology readiness level (TRL) 5 or higher.

• However, the WFOV capability has not been achieved with the materials 

and technologies specifically planned for AIRSS. For example,

• Mercury-cadmium-telluride sensor chip assembly performance 

level has yet to be verified

• Full-earth infrared telescope has yet to be developed and 

demonstrated

• Cyrocoolers have yet to demonstrate low jitter, high efficiency and 

long life

Finding: AIRSS may face challenges in

meeting launch date of FY 2015
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 32 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

25

• Some DOD stakeholders also believe the WFOV technology

development schedule is optimistic. 

• Moreover, according to the Air Force Research Laboratory, flight

testing is the only way to validate the WFOV approach to a point

where risk is significantly lowered. But this test is not scheduled to 

happen until 2010. 

• GAO believes that if the flight test does not go well, DOD will not 

have time to return to a lower risk technology effort that focuses on 

sustaining current capability.

Finding: AIRSS may face challenges in

meeting launch date of FY 2015
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 33 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

26

Finding (cont.): AIRSS may face challenges in

meeting launch date of FY 2015

• The AIRSS office assessed current and projected technology readiness levels (TRLs)

for enabling technologies for a WFOV capability. Although the technologies offer

varying levels of performance, final WFOV design will determine which technologies

will be used.

Communications suite 8 8

Spacecraft (structure, power, attitude control system (ACS), etc.) 8 8

18o Infrared Telescope 5-6 6

Processor (300 multimode interference photonic switches (MIPS)) 8 9

5 6

•30K gates 8 9

•400K gates

Radiation hardened Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FGPAs)

Spatial filtering algorithms for theater reporting 6-7 7-9

110K (for HgCdTe) 7 8

Cryocooler

6 8

5-6 8

•Sensor Chip Assembly – (mercury-cadmium-telluride, or HgCdTe) 5-6 8

•Hybrid Focal Plane Assembly

•Read-out Integrated Circuits

Focal Plane Array Sensor

2006 2008

TRL Item
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 34 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

27

• AIRSS officials acknowledge its schedule is “very aggressive” for

meeting a 2015 launch availability date

• 12 months from preliminary to critical design review (CDR)

• 4 years from CDR to satellite delivery

• AIRSS officials plan to award system contracts before data from 

key sensor on-orbit testing is completed. 

• GAO has reported that it is important for DOD to gain knowledge 

about technology readiness prior to proceeding with system 

development. 

Finding: AIRSS may face challenges in

meeting launch date of FY 2015
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 35 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

28

Conclusion

While it is okay in any given portfolio to take some high risks, it is not

sound for all investments to be high risk—particularly if the 

capability being pursued is critical to the conduct of military

operations and national security. The SBIRS High program 

continues to face risks that endanger DOD’s ability to sustain its

missile detection capability. Recognizing this risk, DOD made a

sound decision in pursuing AIRSS to act as an alternative to the

third GEO satellite, envisioning this as a low-risk approach. 

However, the program is now pursuing a higher risk effort than 

originally envision because it believes there are not other viable 

alternatives. Given internal disagreements about whether there are 

other alternatives, DOD should direct the Air Force to further

explore the availability of more mature technologies and designs, or

justify its decision not to do so.
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides 

Page 36 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

29

Scope and Methodology

To determine the program’s ability to meet cost and schedule projections, we examined

schedule and funding information for developing hardware and software. We 

reviewed formal program reviews, DCMA and contractor performance reports. In

addition, we performed our own analysis of cost and schedule projections using

Lockheed Martin’s 2006 cost performance report data. To determine the problems

and potential risks relating to cost, schedule, and performance that are still facing 

the SBIRS High program, we reviewed technical reports and program briefings and

held discussions with program and contractor officials regarding ongoing challenges.

To assess DOD’s efforts in attaining the knowledge it needs before the start of a 

competing effort, we examined the resources (technology, communications

infrastructure, and funding) committed and planned for the competing effort as well

as the users’ needs for the competing system. We considered DOD’s plans for 

maturing the critical technologies when we obtained technology-readiness

information for each critical technology against best practice standards to determine 

if they will be sufficiently mature when DOD plans to start product development. We 

also reviewed risk management plans and concept development information.
Page 37 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

30

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

• Key documents reviewed and analyzed:

• SBIRS High Acquisition Decision Memorandum

• SBIRS High Program Review Updates to AT&L

• SBIRS High Program office and prime contractor schedules and 

technology development plans

• SBIRS High Program Assessment Reports – Defense Contract 

Management Agency, Lockheed Martin Sunnyvale

• SBIRS High Lockheed Martin Cost Performance Reports

• AIRSS Office update briefings

• AIRSS 120-day study report

• National Security Space Acquisition Policy

• Selected Acquisition Reports for major DOD space acquisitions

• DOD budget documentation for SBIRS High and AIRSS
Page 38 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

31

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

Locations for interviews and documentation: 

• Air Force

• SBIRS High Program Office and AIRSS office, Los Angeles Air Force Base

• Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO

• Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM

• Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC

• Other Defense 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Arlington,

VA

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Arlington, VA

• Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-2 and J-8), Arlington, VA

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, Arlington, VA
Page 39 GAO-07-1088R Space Based Infrared System 

32

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

• Other Defense (cont.)

• National Security Space Office, Fairfax, VA

• U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE

• U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington D.C.

• Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, VA and 

Sunnyvale, CA

• SBIRS High Contractors

• Northrop Grumman Space Technology, Azusa, CA

• Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, CA

We conducted our work from August 2006 to February 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(120650) 
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