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i 

65–592 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–25] 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 16, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri, Chairman 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

MARY KATE CUNNINGHAM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 16, 2011, Amphibious Operations ......................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 16, 2011 ................................................................................... 25 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2011 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Subcommittee on 

Seapower and Projection Forces ......................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Blake, VADM Terry, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration 

of Capabilities and Resources ............................................................................. 7 

Flynn, Lt. Gen. George, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command ....................................................................................... 5 

Stackley, Hon. Sean, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition ........................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 29 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................... 30 

Stackley, Hon. Sean, joint with VADM Terry Blake and Lt. Gen. George 

Flynn .............................................................................................................. 32 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 47 

(1) 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 16, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Todd Akin (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

Mr. AKIN. The hearing will now come to order, and I have a brief 

opening statement. And I don’t know if we will have maybe but one 

and just allow you gentlemen to proceed, I think, unless the minority leaders here—— 

Unless—do you have a statement, too? 

Okay, you do that. Okay, fine, thank you. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to receive testimony regarding 

the amphibious requirements and operational development plans 

necessary to effectively meet the U.S. combatant commanders’ demands to engage forward, respond to crisis, and project power. 

Today’s witnesses include the Honorable Sean Stackley, Lieutenant General George Flynn, Vice Admiral John Blake. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank you for your 

longstanding service to our country and the great job that I know 

that you all do. 

First, I would appreciate at some point if Admiral Blake and 

General Flynn could give us an update on how the 7th Fleet is responding to the current crisis in Japan. That is kind of a little parenthesis, but I think everybody is interested. Our thoughts and 

prayers go out to all the victims, survivors and family members, 

who are trying to get through this terrible disaster. 

Fortunately, we have the United States Navy and Marine Corps 

that can provide humanitarian assistance in cases such as this, 

and I know the subcommittee would appreciate a short update on 

how they are doing. This is, of course, relevant to today’s hearing. 

We know that Department of Navy officials agreed that a 38-ship 

amphibious force would more fully meet the Marine Corps 2.0 Expeditionary Brigade assault echelon lift requirement. We also know 

that a 33-ship amphibious force is the minimum number. And, in 

fact, that minimum number currently isn’t planned to be reached 

until 2017. We need to fully understand what risk is associated 

with maintaining an amphibious ship inventory less than 38 ships. 
2 

Finally, it is no secret that I do not agree with the decision to 

terminate the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle]. I fear that although there is a lot of talk about support for a new vehicle to replace EFV, history tells us that when all is said and done, the Marine Corps will probably only get an upgraded version of the current AAV [Amphibious Assault Vehicle]. It is important for the 

members of this committee to understand what the current status 

of the EFV contract is, how the $3.3 billion dollars that has been 

spent on this program won’t be for naught. 

And, again, thank you for being here, and I look forward to your 

testimony. I would now yield to my friend, Mrs. Davis, for an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am pleased to step 

in for Mr. McIntyre. I want to thank you and certainly thank Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, General Flynn for being here 

and for testifying before this committee once again. 

Today, we will hear testimony from both the Navy and the Marine Corps on how they plan to execute amphibious operations and 

how we as Congress can best support that mission. The need for 

a forward-deployed amphibious force comprised of both Naval and 

Marine assets cannot be seen more clearly than now. 

The tragic events that we have witnessed in the aftermath of the 

Japanese earthquake and subsequent tsunami only further highlight the need for a quick response force that can effectively move 

from the sea to shore in order to provide assistance. 

I look forward to hearing any updates our witnesses can provide 

on how our forces are doing in support of the Japanese relief. Our 

thoughts and our prayers are with all those who have been affected. 

The Marine Corps represents our Nation’s 9/11 emergency response force, and that enables us to quickly respond to events anywhere in the world. There is no question that our marines have 

been a crucial part of our forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but 

it is essential that we transition the Marine Corps away from being 

a second land force and back to one that is an amphibious-based 

expeditionary force. 

In doing so, it is essential that we carefully examine what that 

force should look like, whether that be the appropriate number of 

amphibious ships or the most capable platform for moving marines 

ashore. 

After the recent decision to terminate the Expeditionary Fighting 

Vehicle, the EFV, I am particularly interested to hear our witnesses’ views on what the current requirement is for an amphibious vehicle. I would also like to hear what the requirements will 

be for any new follow-on vehicle, such as speed, distance and plane 

requirements. 

I would like to hear from the Navy on what the minimum shipto-shore distance is for Navy amphibious ships to safely deliver ma-
3 

rines ashore in a new vehicle. And I believe that these are important questions that should be carefully analyzed as we transition 

our force. 

Whether it is crisis response, disaster and humanitarian relief or 

forward presence, our Navy and Marine Corps amphibious capability is a vital asset for the United States that we must maintain. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here today, 

and we all look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

And Secretary Stackley, why don’t you start off, and I will let 

you determine your order, and then we have a bunch of people with 

a lot of questions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Chairman Akin, Representative 

Davis, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss amphibious 

operations and, more importantly, for your steadfast support for 

our sailors and marines around the world. 

I propose to keep my opening remarks brief and submit a formal 

statement for the record with your concurrence. 

Mr. AKIN. I concur. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, your Navy, Marine Corps team is the Nation’s 

force on the move—sea, air and land. About 90,000 sailors and marines are today deployed around the world, conducting missions 

that span the full spectrum of operations, from humanitarian assistance, disaster response, to maritime security, to combat operations. 

Be it in response to the Nation’s call in Iraq or Afghanistan or 

in response to events unplanned and unimagined in Libya or 

Japan, this team is first on the scene and remains on scene, prepared to serve in whatever capacity the Nation calls for. 

It is our will to exercise our freedom of the seas in times of 

peace, our mission to exercise command of the seas in times of war, 

and our ability to project forces ashore in the most austere environments, every ocean, every continent that ensures our Nation’s readiness to respond to crisis or conflict, wherever our interests are 

challenged. 

In considering our investments and capabilities required for the 

force, our first priority is in addressing the fight we are in and in 

taking care of our sailors and marines in the fight. The Marine 

Corps, in particular, has been on point in key developments in 

rapid fielding of capabilities critical to this priority. 

In addition to these priorities, the 2012 President’s budget request continues the recapitalization of the Marine Corps’ amphibious capabilities, an effort that has been sustained for over the past 

decade plus. The ships, aircraft and vehicles required to conduct 

amphibious operations are uniquely capable of conducting ship-to- 
4 

shore lift operations in environments ranging from austere to hostile. 

And it is the fleet’s ability to aggregate at sea a mix of type and 

number of ships, aircraft and landing craft that provides our ability 

to respond to a crisis or conflict at a scale appropriate to that crisis 

or conflict. 

So, to this end, our amphibious force requirements have been 

shaped over the past decade to provide two Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade lift within an assault echelon of battle force amphibious 

ships in addition to equipment prepositioned within our Maritime 

Prepositioning Force to support an additional brigade. 

As discussed at last week’s shipbuilding hearing, 38 amphibious 

ships are required to meet the full extent of this requirement. In 

balancing the risk across our shipbuilding program, the department’s plan builds a balanced mix of 33 amphibious ships, providing aviation and well deck facilities to support combined vertical 

and horizontal lift operations by embarked aircraft, landing craft 

and assault vehicles. And to this force, we are adding logistics lift 

capability with procurement of the Mobile Landing Platform and 

Joint High Speed Vessel. 

The aviation component of amphibious forces is in the midst of 

total recapitalization. The President’s budget request continues 

procurement of the MV–22 Osprey, remanufacture and new build 

of the utility and attack versions of the H–1 helicopter, development and limited re-procurement of the short takeoff vertical landing version of the Joint Strike Fighter, and new development programs for the heavy-lift helicopter and the Small Tactical Unmanned Air System. 

These programs provide increased lift, air support and aerial surveillance capabilities today in the case of MV–22 and H–1 and 

within the future years’ defense plan in the case of the Joint Strike 

Fighter, heavy-lift helo and unmanned air systems. 

As well we are here today to address landing craft and ground 

combat tactical vehicles required for amphibious operations. In determining the force structure and capabilities required to respond 

to the wide range of environments and threats potentially confronting amphibious operations, the amphibious force must balance 

lift, mobility on water and land, range and speed, survivability, fire 

power, and command and control. 

The key elements of horizontal lift for amphibious operations are 

the Landing Craft Utility, or LCU, which provides low-speed, highvolume ship-to-shore transfer of personnel and equipment; the 

Landing Craft Air Cushion Vehicle, or LCAC, which provides highspeed ship-to-shore transfer of equipment; and the Amphibious Assault Vehicle, or AAV, a tracked amphibious vehicle which provides 

lift over water and over land and limited protection and fire for a 

squadron of marines. 

I would like to highlight two programs in particular. The LCAC 

fleet, whose service life has been extended through a SLEP [Service 

Life Extension Program] program requires recapitalization commencing later this decade. Accordingly, this year, we will be opening competition for a new ship-to-shore connector, a modern replacement for the LCAC to provide high-speed ship-to-shore transfer of Marine Corps ground vehicles. 
5 

The Amphibious Assault Vehicle was planned to be replaced by 

the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, or EFV. As announced by the 

Secretary of Defense in December, the Department has concluded 

that the cost of recapitalizing the AAV fleet with the EFV in terms 

of both procurement and sustainment costs is not affordable. 

The reality is that the 573 vehicles planned for this program, which were projected to cost about $17 million each in production, 

would alone consume the projected budget for Marine Corps tactical vehicles for a decade, crippling other critical recapitalization 

requirements within this portfolio. 

The decision to terminate the EFV is accompanied with a decision to pursue an integrated vehicle modernization effort comprising investment in AAV upgrades to extend that vehicle’s mission effectiveness, the development of a new amphibious combat vehicle to replace the AAV that will leverage investment made in the 

EFV and be defined and designed from inception with affordability 

as a key requirement, an acceleration of the procurement of a Marine personnel carrier, a low-risk capability that complements the 

assault vehicle program. 

As we consider future development and recapitalization efforts 

for our ground combat tactical vehicles, increased emphasis on distributed command and control and vehicle survivability, armor and 

protection systems have introduced significant challenges to these 

vehicles’ mobility and their affordability. The decision to restart our 

assault and vehicle program reflects the challenges posed to all of 

our future programs and the need to address affordability head on, 

early on. 

In sum, the Department is committed to continuing its efforts to 

recapitalize the force of ships, aircraft and vehicles, which provide 

our Nation the forward-presence and the unique ability to rapidly 

deploy forces from ship to shore across a wide spectrum of environments and threats that challenge our operations. Added to these 

operational challenges, we have yet new affordability challenges 

which are causing us to revisit past decisions and acquisition strategies. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, General 

Flynn, and Admiral Blake can be found in the Appendix on page 

32.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And General Flynn, were you next? Or have you guys picked an 

order? 

Okay, why don’t you go ahead, General Flynn? 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE FLYNN, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 

General FLYNN. Mr. Chairman Akin, Representative Davis, and 

members of the committee, it is good to be here with you again 

today—this time to discuss amphibious operations. I am happy to 

join Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral Blake. We have submitted a joint written statement, so like Mr. Stackley, I will be 

brief. 
6 

Today, your Marine Corps executes its role as America’s expeditionary force in readiness and is operationally relevant, because it 

is enabled by the United States Navy and the ships they crew and 

maintain. The product of this partnership is the ability to conduct 

a variety of amphibious operations against the full range of military operations that prevent conflict, respond to crisis and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. 

This operation flexibility is due in large part to this committee’s 

continued support. I thank you for that, and I thank you for the 

support of all our marines and sailors. 

During the Cold War, U.S. forces were largely based overseas, 

with access maintained through an extensive network of forward 

bases. In many ways, as the world and the operating environment 

have changed, we have also changed our approach. 

Today, U.S. forces are largely based within the United States, 

and our ability to exert influence overseas is reliant on expeditionary operations and capabilities, both forward-postured and 

surged, that can overcome diplomatic, geographic and/or military 

impediments to access. 

Amphibious capabilities remain critical enablers for overcoming 

access challenges and the key means to project power and influence 

events ashore. The military challenges we will face in the future 

will include state and, very possibly, non-state actors in possession 

of modern anti-access and aerial-denied weapons and technologies, 

meaning that amphibious operations, even those conducted for benign purposes like humanitarian assistance may be conducted in 

an uncertain or even hostile environment. 

Overcoming these challenges requires innovative tactics and capabilities. This is why I believe Secretary Gates said in August 

that the Marines’ unique ability to project combat forces from the 

sea under uncertain circumstances is the capability that America 

has needed in this past decade and will require in the future. 

As current events have shown, this could not be more true. While 

some still question both the necessity and feasibility of amphibious 

operations, today, again, as recent events have shown, they are 

needed. These modern-day operations bear little resemblance to the 

operations and sacrifices made at places like Tarawa, Peleliu and 

Iwo Jima. 

As you look to the future, we are not looking to replicate those 

battles or that level of self and courageous sacrifice. This is why 

we continue to evolve the tactics and capabilities to use the sea as 

maneuver space and as a base to conduct ship-to-objective maneuver, which allows us to avoid heavily defended areas where feasible 

and defeat likely adversaries. 

In humanitarian operations, these same littoral maneuver capabilities allow us to deliver disaster relief supplies directly to the 

points needed ashore, rather than dropping them off on the beach 

where they would be dependent upon the devastated, austere or 

nonexistent infrastructure and transportation system for distribution. 

Partnered with the United States Navy, marines are forward deployed today and responding today to crisis and still engaged in 

combat operations in Afghanistan. 
7 

This past year alone, our sea-based forces conducted humanitarian assistance missions in Japan, Pakistan, Haiti and the Philippines; recaptured the pirated ship Magellan Star and rescued its 

crew from Somali pirates; rapidly reinforced in Afghanistan by 

committing the battalion landing team from the forward-deployed 

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and then reinforcing the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the Kearsarge and USS Ponce, with 

another 400 marines flown in from United States in order to respond to crisis in North Africa. 

History teaches us that preventing conflict is equally as important as responding to crisis. Amphibious capabilities that provide 

forward presence in a short access are a critical enabler for both. 

This is validated by the continuous increase in the geographic combatant commander demand signal for amphibious forces. 

Since 2007, the geographic combatant commanders’ cumulative 

requests for naval forces have grown 86 percent for amphibiousready groups and Marine expeditionary units, and 53 percent for 

individually deployed amphibious ships. While our geographic combatant commanders are unconstrained in their requests, our job is 

to determine how best to meet their demand, given the resources 

available. 

For the foreseeable future, we will continue to maintain a forward-based amphibious-ready group and Marine expeditionary unit 

in the Western Pacific and maintain continuous presence in the 

Arabian, Indian Ocean as well. As recent events in North Africa 

and the Middle East demonstrate, it may also be necessary to 

maintain presence in the Mediterranean and along the coast of Africa. 

In an era of declining access and strategic uncertainty, the operational value of amphibious forces for missions across a range of 

military operations cannot be overstated. Amphibious capabilities 

provide mobility, persistence and responsiveness without which our 

Nation would be disadvantaged in its ability to respond to crisis. 

If these capabilities are allowed to decline, the alternatives would 

likely involve higher operational risk and higher cost. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update to the 

Congress. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Flynn, Secretary 

Stackley, and Admiral Blake can be found in the Appendix on page 

32.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, General. 

And, Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY BLAKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES 

AND RESOURCES 

Admiral BLAKE. Chairman Akin, Representative Davis, members 

of the committee, it is my honor to appear before you with Mr. 

Stackley and General Flynn to discuss amphibious operations. 

Today, over 57,000 of our sailors are deployed with 26,000 on 

land or at sea in the Central Command area of operations. Fifty 

percent of our fleet is under way and roughly 40 percent of our 

ships are deployed. 
8 

Our sailors are on point throughout the world projecting power 

in Afghanistan, providing deterrence against North Korea, conducting counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, maintaining 

global nuclear deterrence, providing ballistic missile defense in the 

Arabian Gulf, Western Pacific and Eastern Mediterranean, and 

building partnerships in Africa, South America and the Pacific. 

Our sailors also answer the call to support humanitarian relief 

and disaster assistance when needed, as we did last year in Haiti 

and Pakistan. Even today, our sailors and marines are responding 

to world crises, maintaining stations off the coast of Libya and 

helping the people of Japan. 

Our national security and economic prosperity depend upon a 

strong Navy that can keep the sea lanes free, deter aggression, 

safeguard our sources of energy, protect the interests of our citizens, and reassure our friends and allies. To do this, our Navy 

must maintain its global reach and persistent presence while delivering warfighting capability wherever and whenever it is needed. 

In partnership with the Marine Corps, the Navy amphibious 

forces support the core capabilities of our maritime strategy, including power projection, deterrence, forward presence, maritime 

security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 

With this budget, we will invest in our platforms that have proven to be consistently and effectively accomplishing these missions 

while expanding our capability to meet the most likely evolving 

threats. 

Investment in the mid-life upgrades of the LSD–41 class dock 

landing ships and installation of the self-defense systems on the 

LHD–1 amphibious assault ships are vital to retain the Navy’s capabilities for future conflicts and to keep our ships on track to 

reach their full service lives. 

We will also advance our capabilities with the LPD–17 class of 

amphibious transport dock ships and the LHA–6 class, general purpose amphibious assault ships, the Zumwalt Class, DDG–1000 

class destroyers, the mobile landing platforms and the Littoral 

Combat Ships with their mission packages. 

Looking to the future, we are working to reintroduce a well deck 

into LHA–8 to define the requirements for replacements and to define requirements for the replacement of the dock landing ship, the 

LSD(X), while continuing progress towards procurement of a shipto-shore connector replacement for our landing craft air cushion vehicles. 

As we build the Navy’s future, I am very concerned about the 

long-term impact of the current continuing resolution. In addition 

to the delays in procuring the lead mobile landing platform and 

cancellation of several important ship availabilities, including the 

USS Peleliu, if the CR [continuing resolution] continues to the end 

of March, the lack of authorization for the fiscal year 2011 budget 

will very likely lead to significant cost growth in many of our 

Navy’s programs. 

I ask for your support for our 2012 budget request for our programs and to address those programs and capabilities being impacted by the continuing resolution. 
9 

Thank you for all your support to the United States Navy and 

the Marine Corps and our ability to answer our Nation’s call when 

needed in conflict and disaster. I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Blake, Secretary 

Stackley, and General Flynn can be found in the Appendix on page 

32.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

As we were talking just briefly before the beginning of the hearing, one of the concerns I have had all way along is the fact that, 

particularly on the Marine expeditionary vehicle—that was the 

thing that was my number one interest for our hearing today—that 

I haven’t just seen a simple ‘‘here are the different alternatives, 

here is how much each one costs, and this is why we think this one 

is the best.’’ 

And so that line of—and it doesn’t have to be something that is 

documented with 200 pages of notes after each one, but just rough 

in some numbers on that and just say, ‘‘Hey, what do they look 

like?’’ And I don’t know that each of us taking 5 minutes in asking 

questions produces that product. 

So as we discussed, just starting out, what I would like to do is 

to schedule a hearing that specifically looks at EFV. And I would 

like to look at whatever four or five good alternatives, or at least 

logical alternatives to investigate and say, ‘‘What is the cost? What 

are the capabilities of each package?’’ And when you take a look 

at cost and performance, what is probably the thing that we are 

going to need, which way we are going to need to go. 

And so that is going to require some homework to be done. I 

think it might have been good to have the homework done before 

we set anything in concrete, and I hope we haven’t set anything 

in concrete. 

So that is just a request and a note to the other members of the 

committee here that I think this structure, the way the committee 

hearing is set up, isn’t going to get to that question probably. 

And you weren’t prepared to have that, am I correct, Secretary? 

You don’t have that data right now. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, what I would propose is a briefing as 

opposed to a hearing. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. We would go through the current state of 

I call it the termination of the EFV and the process and the analysis to date leading up to the amphibious combat vehicle, which is 

the terminology being used for the replacement to the AAV. 

Mr. AKIN. Did you answer my request to have, let us take a look 

at different ways to do this thing? I mean, it sounded to me like 

what you just said you have already assumed the EFV is dead on 

arrival. Maybe that is your decision. 

My concern is, did we look at half the number? Do you have a 

hard number from the manufacturer how much each one would 

cost? And have you run the numbers to say, what are these different alternatives, what is the performance we get for each one 

and the price performance? And has all of that been done? If it has, 

we would really like to know that even right now. 

It seemed to me that there are several assumptions built into 

some of what I am hearing the Marine Corps say. The first one is, 
10 

is that we don’t need a higher rate of speed for plane. It might be 

nice but we don’t have to have it. 

The second one is the Navy is comfortable coming in to 12 instead of 24 miles. I understand that maybe there is some technology that gives you some comfort to do that for the time being, 

but is that assumption 20 years from now a good distance to be 12 

miles off the shore or not? That is a big assumption. 

The assumption, it appears to me was, is that 500—what was 

it—573 is too expensive. Does that mean 286 is also too expensive, 

as we talked about? 

Those are the kinds of things that—and I am okay if it is a briefing. That is okay. But what I really want is I want some great big 

old pieces of paper, and I want to have this is alternative one, alternative two, alternative three. Here is what you get for each one, 

here is how much it costs, and this is why we think this one is the 

best alternative. And that is what I am not seeing. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. And what I have seen is what I believe are some pretty good size assumptions built into the direction you are going. I 

am not sure those assumptions—you know, everything depends on 

assumptions, and I am not sure those assumptions are—first of all, 

the standoff distance from the Navy from the shore, what is that 

like now, what it is going to be like 5 years, 10 years out, because 

as you guys say, the enemy has a vote, too. And they are going to 

be developing cheaper weapons that maybe can try to still hit our 

ships at closer distances. A little more distance is a lot of safety. 

And the smaller number. And then the other question is I think 

the idea was eventually we are going to develop a new replacement 

for the EFV which is—maybe go a little slower, we have got maybe 

a V-shaped hull, and we are going to have to develop that, and 

then build it and fund it. How long is that going to take and how 

much does that development cost? Is it going to be another $3.3 billion or not? 

And those are the kinds of things, I think, probably some of my 

colleagues are interested in. And we need to get in—if that is a 

brief, that is okay. But, Secretary, I think we want an analysis of 

a whole series of whatever more or less logical alternative so we 

can see which one is the right path for us to go. Is that what you 

meant? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I would like to schedule a briefing 

at your convenience, and we will go through those details. There 

are several things that are mixed here. One is the requirements. 

Another is when we talked about alternatives, I think when you 

described alternatives, you are including a mix of EFVs, plus some 

other vehicle. 

Mr. AKIN. It could be. I don’t know. 

Secretary STACKLEY. And then separately, there are alternatives 

where the alternatives would be different versions, like an AOA 

[Analysis of Alternatives], to come in and meet the requirements 

that we defined on the front end for this amphibious combat vehicle. And then we will walk through the analysis that we have to 

date. 

Mr. AKIN. I think where I have been coming from, and this is all 

the way along, but just to restate. I am unwilling and un-negoti-
11 

ating. To me, it is nonnegotiable that we have to get marines from 

the ocean to the shore. That is not—how you do it and the most 

effective way to do it, that is both of our business, and we all need 

to be comfortable with that decision. 

And anything goes as far as I am concerned. Top speed and performance at lowest cost, you know. What is the best deal we can 

get? And I think anything should be on the table, and if that 

means some smaller number of EFV fits in there, that is okay. If 

it doesn’t work, if they are way too expensive when you get the 

order quantity smaller and the price goes through the roof, okay, 

it doesn’t work. But I want to look at everything and, you know, 

keep everything on the table in order to meet that requirement. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. I have used up a lot of time, so I am going to 

just go ahead and go to—let us see. The first question would be for 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you very much. And my 

thanks to Mrs. Davis for sharing my opening statement, my being 

tied up on another matter. 

General Flynn and Admiral Blake, thank you for your service. 

We heard last year that the Department was looking at different 

weapons and projectiles and ways to mitigate gaps in the naval 

surface fire support plan. With DDG–1000 line truncated and the 

electromagnetic railguns still years away, are there any weapons or 

projectiles or other capabilities currently fielded or planned, which 

will serve to cover these gaps? 

And the question is also has that requirement changed? And can 

you tell me if there are any plans for a 5-inch long-range land attack projectile for the current destroyers and cruisers? 

Mr. Admiral, yes. 

Admiral BLAKE. Yes, sir. As you are aware, the triad of fires, 

which supports the amphibious landing, is made up of three distinct pieces—the naval surface fire support, organic fires and tactical air. And it is these three, if you will, intricate pieces which 

make up the entire requirement in order to be met. 

What we have done is with the DDG–1000, we have the 155-millimeter gun onboard. That will be onboard that ship with a longrange land attack projectile. That round will be in excess of—the 

requirement is for an excess of 60 miles for that. In addition, we 

also have the tactical Tomahawk, which is available on both the 

DDGs and the CGs, as well as the 5-inch/54 and the 5-inch/62 guns 

onboard the destroyers and the cruisers. 

At this time, we do not currently have in the program of record 

a program for a long-range 5-inch round. However, that said, we 

are open to all options and are looking at all options. In particular, 

we are looking at the railgun, which you mentioned, which with a 

32-megajoule capability would be able to reach out to ranges 

around 100 miles. So that is the one of the leg triangle, which are, 

well, the triads of fires, which we are also working on. 

In addition, the Marines have the organic fires pieces, which 

would be their artillery when they were able to get it ashore. And 

then the third piece, which we have also invested heavily in, is tactical air. We have invested in smart weapons for all of our attack 

aircraft so that in combination with these three systems or these 
12 

three legs of the triad, we would be able to shape the battlefield 

as we were going in. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

One thing I forgot to add. What is a reasonable timeframe that 

we could have that brief? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, we work around your convenience. I 

think your schedule is—— 

Mr. AKIN. I think we are gone next week. Would it be the following week? Would that be—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Week after next? We will arrange that. 

Mr. AKIN. Is that doable? Well, we are not asking for a whole lot 

of super details, but just a rough analysis of each category. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Is that too fast? Would 3 weeks be better? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, 3 weeks would be 1 week smarter. 

But we can—I would rather work around your schedule, recognizing what you have pressing you all, and—— 

Mr. AKIN. We have a slot on April 7th available to the committee. Is that alright? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We will work it, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. We will talk. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. There is some markup going on afterwards, and we 

are going to deal with that a little bit. 

Okay. 

Congressman Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to wait for the EFV hearing on April 7th, or whenever 

we decide to do it. And Mr. Coffman has got a great question about 

amphibs and construction, so I am going to yield my time to Mr. 

Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank Secretary Stackley, General Flynn, Admiral 

Blake. Thank you so much for your service. 

I did want to talk specifically about amphibs. As you know, we 

are currently at 29 amphibs, and both yourself, the commandant 

and the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] have said that the requirement is at 38. The Navy says they can live with 33. That is 

an acceptable risk. We don’t get to 33, though, until 2016. A little 

bit of gap there, I think, that concerns all of us. 

And we see what is happening around the world. We see humanitarian missions being performed in Haiti, the flooding in Pakistan, 

now looking at a situation in Japan. We are continuing to be 

spread further and further. 

We see ourselves in a situation in the Mediterranean of potentially deploying a MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] there. So we 

see a scenario of a MEU being attached to the 5th Fleet, the 6th 

Fleet, and then a continuing presence there in the Pacific Command. So we are seeing a heightening of need across a variety of 

different areas for our amphibs. 

And if you look in the past years, as we placed emphasis on our 

more advanced ships, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the Vir-
13 

ginia-class submarine, the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship], and I like 

to go back to what General Amos said and that is, you know, the 

Ford F–150s of the fleet are our amphibious ships, and they are the 

ones that are out there each and every day and where the most immediate need many times exists. 

And I wanted to get your thoughts. If you look at where we are 

with this shortfall and if you look at the scenario where we see the 

older Whidbey Island-class LSDs [Landing Ship, Dock] approaching 

26 years of service, we see we are approaching some challenges 

there. 

Can you give me a timeline about when you see LSD(X) coming 

online? And can you give us a little clarification on the situation 

with the USS Peleliu LHA–5? It is pending decommissioning. And 

also where we are with the delivery of USS America LHA–6. 

So either Secretary Stackley or General Flynn, whichever of you 

there, or Admiral Blake, whichever of you would like to answer 

those questions, I think having that clarity on the overall vision 

about our amphibious fleet and then some specifics about some of 

our aging portions of the fleet. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me propose to split the response here. I will start with—let me just start with the plan right 

now for shipbuilding in terms of amphibs. 

You highlighted LHA–6, the America. She is under construction 

right now at Ingalls. She is about a year—our projected delivery 

date for the LHA–6 is about a year later than what we had contracted for. And as a result of that, we have decided to extend the 

service line for the Peleliu to minimize the gap in terms of big deck 

amphibs. So she is about 30 percent complete, and 2015 timeframe 

she will be in service. 

The follow-on ships to the America class, LHA–7, is in the 2011 

budget request. And so that is one of the ships that is caught up 

inside the continuing resolution, but we are continuing to work 

with Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in terms of planning and 

advance procurement of materials to try to keep that ship’s schedule preserved as much as possible while we work through the balance of the budget and the negotiations associated with that ship. 

Its next follow-on is the LHA–8, and that is when we return to 

a well deck in our big decks. So today while we build the LHA– 

6, negotiating, working around the budget associated with the 

LHA–7, we are going through a mini analysis of alternatives for 

the best method for restoring a well deck to our big decks to support that 2016 ship, and then as well you see the advance procurement preceding that in the 2012 FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. 

The LSD class, as Admiral Blake referred, we are conducting a 

midlife upgrade, and that is high priority inside of our budget to 

ensure that we are able to not just sustain them to their service 

life, but ensure that they are both mission-effective and affordable 

in terms of upkeep and maintenance through the balance of their 

service life. 

And the LSD(X), which is the planned replacement for the LSD– 

41 class, today sits in 2017. So we are in fact looking at the total 

force lift requirements in terms of lift capabilities by platform. And 

as we complete the LHA–8, where we restore the well deck, and 
14 

we look at the capability assessment that the Marine Corps is completing for future force requirements, when we look at the balance 

of force, that then defines what lift capability LSD(X) has to have. 

So the sequence of events is, complete the LHA–8 in terms of its 

upfront mini analysis of alternatives, get the balance of the lift capability required by the LSD(X), conduct that analysis of alternatives, and then get in to the—we call it the TD [Technology Development] phase for LSD(X). But we are firm in the 2017 requirement for a start of procurement for LSD(X). 

Mr. AKIN. We have got now Mrs. Davis with a question, I believe. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, all of you, for your service to the country. 

I wanted to ask about our operations in Japan right now and the 

disaster relief there and to have a better understanding of how our 

amphibious assets are being used there and what you see as the 

importance of those assets in these kinds of activities. 

I know strategic shaping, looking at environments and how we 

can better position ourselves for noncombatant evacuations, other 

activities. What role is that playing now and how critical really is 

that? 

Admiral BLAKE. Mrs. Davis, right now, the forces, it is a combination of forces over there. It is not only the amphibious—it is 

not only the ESG [Expeditionary Strike Group], the Essex ESG in 

particular, because as you are aware, they are part of our permanently forward-deployed forces that are over there. They are in the 

process of supporting events in Japan. 

In addition, the Ronald Reagan Strike Group was redirected and 

is now in position off the northern part of the island where the 

bulk of the events are taking place, and they are in support of 

events on the ground. In fact, they are using their helo support in 

order to move both food and supplies ashore. 

Additionally, you have ships from the George Washington Battle 

Group, which is home ported in Yokosuka, supporting events, and 

they are being tasked as needed to go out, as well as the flagship 

for the 7th Fleet, the USS Blue Ridge. 

So the 7th Fleet commander at this time has the Essex ARG 

[Amphibious Ready Group], ships from the GW Battle Group, as 

well as the Ronald Reagan underway supporting that. And what 

our primary is to get the helo decks over there in order to be able 

to move stuff from the ship-to-shore in order to support the people 

on the ground, which is one of our primary functions in any humanitarian assistance, disaster relief event. 

Mrs. DAVIS. So looking at that area, at least, of response is not 

a critical issue in terms of losing any of the amphibious-related 

platforms. That is not the issue—— 

Admiral BLAKE. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. That we would be facing. Can you talk 

a little bit more about how that effort is organized generally? I 

think I have been asked are the commanders in the field at that 

time in control? I mean, who is in charge? And is there confusion 

sometimes about who should be in control, who should be in 

charge? 

Admiral BLAKE. No, ma’am. Basically, you have got the PACOM 

[U.S. Pacific Command], the Pacific commander, the combatant 
15 

commander in that theater. Underneath the Pacific commander, 

you have got the fleet commander. Both of them are at Pearl Harbor. 

Then, when you walk it down, you come to the 7th Fleet commander who has his flagship in Yokosuka. And then you also have 

the commander of naval forces Japan, a two-star who is on, if you 

will, the shore side. And so they all work in conjunction, and then 

they all work for the PACOM commander. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is that same level of expertise really available in all 

the commands across the globe? 

Admiral BLAKE. Yes, ma’am. Yes, ma’am. And I can only speak 

for the Navy, but that is the way we are organized in order to be 

able to operate. 

In addition, we have also got the Marine Corps elements, which 

are participating, because as you are aware, the Essex ARG has 

marines assigned to them, as well as you have also got the third 

MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] down at Okinawa, which is 

available to support. And they can, of course, shift forces and they 

will all be following under Pacific command there. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And everybody is trained in those efforts. I think we 

are obviously doing a substantial job, and I appreciate that. I think 

that it is very important. 

Admiral BLAKE. Yes, ma’am. In fact, one of our greatest skills is 

we are an expeditionary force, and then we are able to go forward 

and perform a full spectrum of operations, as I mentioned in the 

opening remarks. We can do everything from power projection to 

deterrence to what we are currently doing, which is humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Where is the need in that arena that we are not able 

to meet right now? 

Admiral BLAKE. I am not sure I understand your question, 

ma’am. 

Mrs. DAVIS. In all the operations that are being done now, the 

use of the carrier groups, et cetera, is there, I mean, is there anything that we are lacking in the ability to help and support in that 

region? 

Admiral BLAKE. No, ma’am. The way the Pacific commander, the 

combatant commander in theater would be requesting forces and 

they would be working through Pacific, the fleet commander, and 

then it would go right on down. 

And if you needed assets to be shifted from the continental 

United States, then they would go back to the 3rd Fleet commander, pull those forces. They would then ‘‘chop’’ to 7th Fleet, if 

you will. ‘‘Chop’’ is a term we use when you go from one commander to another. 

And that is exactly what we do. It is how we always operate. And 

they would also, if necessary, be able to pull forces from Pearl Harbor or from any of the West Coast ports. You could even go to the 

East Coast ports, if you needed to. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. AKIN. Congressman Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, Mr. Secretary, I thank you so much for your service. 

Admiral, General, your service to this country as well. 
16 

I do have one question on EFV, and then I want to talk about 

some of our shipping requirements. 

But that is that, Mr. Secretary, my concern is that, to meet our 

requirements—ship-to-shore requirement, we are just going to use 

a service life extension program for the AAV. Do you plan on simply modernizing the AAV and say it meets the requirements? Or 

is a new vehicle needed? And what is really your position on this? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I am going to share this response 

with General Flynn. In terms of the AAV and meeting requirements, when we move from EFV to this amphibious combat vehicle, 

we are in the stage of actually defining what is the limit of capability that we can bring to this vehicle and still have it be an effective fighting vehicle for the Marine Corps. 

And the capabilities that we are looking at that that were cost 

drivers on the EFV that we are trying to scale back into the range 

of affordability, speed is a major driver. So we are looking at the 

speed, distance, time equation, which comes back to the issue that 

Chairman Akin raised, which is how far from shore do you plan to 

deploy the force. And speed is the critical element there. 

So speed was a major cost driver on EFV. Speed is, frankly, a— 

I call it deficiency on AAV today. We have to do better in terms 

of the speed that the AAV brings to the force. So we have got to 

increase our capability that the AAV has today in speed or mobility. 

Another area that we had already planned on upgrading the 

AAV for is survivability. So it is an old vehicle. The survivability 

requirements have increased, driven a lot by experience in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. And so we had planned on increasing the survivability of the AAV. We are going to continue with that, and any future vehicle that replaces the AAV will likewise have an emphasis 

on increased survivability. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

General Flynn. 

General FLYNN. Sir, I think one of the key things when we take 

a look at affordability, it is not just the affordability of the EFV. 

It is the affordability of what we have to do across all our ground 

vehicles. The reality is largely driven by protection requirements 

and also the need to increase our network mobility. 

The cost of ground procurement has not only increased. It has increased exponentially. So, first of all, when we looked at affordability of the program, we looked at affordability in the context of 

the overall requirements for the Marine Corps. 

A key part of that is, we were always thinking, you know, even 

in October, when we released the request from industry to take a 

look at a survivability upgrade for the AAV, we had to upgrade 

that anyway, because the IOC [Initial Operating Capability] for the 

EFV was not going to occur until 2016, and it would take us 10 

years to get to. Because we tried to spread out the program so 

much to make it affordable, it would have taken us 10 years to get 

to full operating capability. 

So we were looking at a survivability upgrade anyway. I think 

the key thing as we move forward, now that we have the request 

for industry out there, is to take a look what industry is going to 

come back with. We are going to have an industry day towards the 
17 

end of March, and by the end of April, we will have a better idea 

of what is going to be capable. 

And one of the key things we are going to have to trade off between what we do to the AAV is what opportunity cost do you invest in the AAV at the expense of creating a new vehicle and the 

minimum capabilities that we need to be able to execute the amphibious mission. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Blake, due to the continuing resolution, the amphibious 

ship, the USS Peleliu’s maintenance availability was recently cancelled. Furthermore, the Navy plans to extend the Peleliu’s decommissioning date by 1 year in 2014. What impact will this missed 

maintenance availability have on keeping her operationally available to meet amphibious lift requirements? What options are being 

planned to mitigate missed yard times across the fleet? 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, first of all, Peleliu is only one of five ships 

that are—as the result of the continuing resolution as of 30 March, 

we will be required to cancel five avails. That would be the Peleliu, which you mentioned. We have also got to cancel a LSD–41 class 

availability. We are also going to have to look at canceling two 

DDG–51 class availabilities and one FFG–7 class availability. 

So that is just the extent, so it is not just the Peleliu. It is five 

ships total, and that is as of the 30th of March. As the continuing 

resolution continues to move on, we will, of course, have to look at 

additional availabilities in order to cancel, which we will be required to cancel. 

That is one of the challenges we are having right now, because 

as was mentioned earlier by Representative Wittman, the Peleliu, we have decided that because of the delay in the delivery of America, we are going to now delay the decommissioning of Peleliu from 

2013 to 2014. So with the fleet commander, we are required to do 

now is to look at his options in order to determine how to be able 

to support the global requirements and at the same time get the 

Peleliu into an avail. 

There is a double-edged sword to that when you extend a ship 

like the Peleliu, because there are unexpected manpower costs, 

there are unexpected operational costs, and then as you extend 

that, we are probably going to have to look at doing an additional 

maintenance period for that ship in order to get it to go to that. 

So those are all the factors, if you will, that the fleet commander 

will have to look at as he is meeting the global commitments based 

on what the combatant commanders come in with. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Although we are going to have a briefing on EFV, I have some 

issues that I wanted to ask about, because I am a little confused 

about how we got to where we are still. Because I am reading 

through the Nunn-McCurdy certification, and the analysis—and 

this is only less than 4 years ago. And the analysis came up. It said 

the lowest program acquisition unit cost, PAUC, was associated 

with upgrading the AAV alternative. Okay, that is lowest cost. 

Next lowest was estimated for the fix, the EFV alternative, and 

the new start alternative had the highest cost. So we are ending 
18 

the EFV as we know it, and we are really going to a new start, 

which, according to the Nunn-McCurdy, was the highest cost alternative. And I am just curious as to what has changed that either 

makes this a false statement or makes what we are doing actually 

going to cost more? 

And I am not trying to beat a dead horse here, but what I am 

trying to figure out is that there is a level of confidence that we 

have to have in the information that we are getting, and this was 

the best information we had at the time, which predates me, of 

course, but I am trying to figure out where are we going. 

Now I know that the RFI [Request for Information] just went 

out. What was that, about a month ago? And the request was asking for a new start, an upgraded AAV, and I am going to go to the 

AAV, which does, what, on a good day about 8 knots? 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. So—and now the drop-in distance is changed. 

So we have got an issue, because initially it was 25 nautical miles. 

Now it is 12, is that correct? 

General FLYNN. Sir, the launch distance, what we have put out 

in the RFI, is at a minimum launch distance of 12 nautical miles, 

minimum launch distance of 12 nautical miles. And when the 

Nunn-McCurdy was done, sir, the launch distance was—that was 

part of Nunn-McCurdy—was 10 to 20 miles. 

Mr. CRITZ. Oh, so we are still within that range. 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. Now, as I understand it, we tried to make the 

EFV do 25 knots, too, so that it could plane and travel up to 25 

nautical miles, is that correct? 

General FLYNN. Sir, what drove it to plane was the ability to get 

up to be able to do, I guess, around the 25-knot requirement, because it all goes back to this speed, distance, habitability requirement on the vehicle to get ashore. That is where the trade would 

be. 

If you say what changed, what changed a little bit is how we are 

looking—what changed is how we are looking at the requirement. 

So how long can you—what distance do you have to traverse, what 

is the speed that you are going to traverse, and what is the habitability in the vehicle. And if you can be comfortable in the vehicle, 

we can do some trades there, and that is where the trade is. 

And then what also changed since the Nunn-McCurdy breach is 

all the other things that are affecting the affordability of this program, and not just this program, but the other things that we need 

to do around it. That is what changed, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. Now, it is my understanding that you don’t 

want your marines in the vehicle on the sea more than maybe 40 

minutes, or they are going to get beat up so badly that they are 

not going to be as effective when they hit the shore. 

General FLYNN. It depends on the vehicle, sir. And I would say 

that is true for the AAV. Again, it is the quality of the ride. Is it 

cool? Are you sucking in diesel fumes? Are you bobbing up and 

down? That is what you do in the AAV. 

On the EFV, when it was up on plane, it was a relatively smooth 

ride. The climate was pretty good. So as we look at a future design, 

the key part that we are going to be is what is the habitability, if 
19 

you will, or the quality of life in the back of the vehicle. And that 

is a key thing we are going to have to look at in the new alternative. 

Mr. CRITZ. And one of the cost drivers was it having to plane, 

which was what drove the cost up so much because it was, I don’t 

know, if it was new technology, it was pretty forward-thinking 

technology, is that correct? 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. The size of the engine to move it, to 

bring it up on plane and also the complexity of the technology to 

configure the vehicle to plane. 

Mr. CRITZ. So we are probably going to—if we are still looking 

at 12 nautical miles, you are still going to have to plane. 

General FLYNN. Sir, we are not saying right now that we think 

we are going to have to plane. There may be an option to get that 

far that would not require planing. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. Well, I just figure, 12 nautical miles, you got 

to be going 18 knots to do 40 minutes. So that is pretty fast. 

Okay. And one thing I was unclear with, as my time runs out, 

is that when the Nunn-McCurdy hit, the 1993 dollars for the EFV 

was 13.3 million. Is it now 17.3 or something like that? Is that in 

1993 dollars or is that current problem? 

General FLYNN. In fiscal year 2007 dollars, it was about $17 million, sir, in fiscal year 2007 dollars. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. All right, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Rigell. 

Mr. RIGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Stackley, General Flynn, and Admiral Blake, 

thank you very much for your testimony today. 

And I just want to pick up a bit on this discussion of speed and 

hull design. I know from, frankly, a lifetime of adult boating and 

reading all the magazines, there is just some profound physics taking place between a planing hull and a non-planing hull, when 

moving at displacement speeds. 

So, General, would you just comment, please, on—you mentioned, I believe, that the speed which you want the new vehicle 

to be able to approach the shore has not yet been determined. Is 

that correct? 

General FLYNN. That is correct, sir, until we have a better idea 

of what the alternatives are. 

Mr. RIGELL. Okay. Well, we are going to be—you know, as we 

look at this balance between speed and a V-shaped hull design, let 

me ask you this. Is part of what we are trying to accomplish as 

well the ability of this vehicle once on land to withstand an IED 

[Improvised Explosive Device]? 

General FLYNN. Sir, that is one of the things that has changed 

since the initial development of the EFV is we have learned a lot 

more about protection. We have learned a lot more about underbelly blast protection than we knew in the past. You know, we in 

some cases went even beyond V-shaped hulls. We may be inserting 

chimneys in vehicles now to mitigate blast. 

So we have learned a lot about blast, and that is one of the 

things if we start this anew, that we are going to be able to take 
20 

a fresh look at it. How do you get the better blast protection that 

we would like to see in this vehicle? 

Mr. RIGELL. So. but wouldn’t you say that you would probably 

start out with a bias in favor of a V-shaped hull? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I wouldn’t be biased towards a V-shaped 

hull, because what I am seeing now is there are some things that 

maybe even better than a V-shaped hull just because of everything 

that we are learning about blast effects. 

Mr. RIGELL. Okay. Very good. And I know the whole committee 

would be looking forward to seeing exactly what your requirements 

are going to be of the new vehicle. 

Looking over the cost that was spent on the EFV, 3.7 billion, and 

I know for all of us, for all of us, that is just painful, given our fiscal crisis. And with the chairman’s indulgence, I would like to ask 

for a moment, if we could talk just a moment about the Marine 

personnel carrier. 

I know it is not amphibious, of course, but could you describe, 

General, what the unique mission requirements for the Marine 

Corps might be that would cause us to need to develop a new vehicle? Because that’s the information I am—my understanding is we 

are also going to pursue development of a Marine personnel carrier. 

General FLYNN. Sir, when the expeditionary fighting vehicle 

went through the Nunn-McCurdy effort in 2007, one of the ways 

that we attempted to deal with affordability back there was we had 

a requirement for 12 battalions worth of armored or mobile lift. To 

make it affordable, what we then went down the road for is eight 

battalions worth of EFV lift and four battalions of Marine personnel carrier lift. 

So that was when we first started looking at the Marine personnel carrier. It was a part of the effort. That is when we reduced 

the quantity of the EFV requirement from a little over 1,000 vehicles down to about 571. 

So that is where the origin of the MPC [Marine Personnel Carrier] program was. It was, if you will, the partner program to the 

expeditionary fighting vehicle program. 

Mr. RIGELL. Sure. 

General FLYNN. So the approach on the MPC is going to be a little bit different than the other vehicles. There are, we believe, right 

now, six potential off-the-shelf or commercial alternatives available 

right now. 

In addition, we have already built one technology demonstrator. 

So we have a pretty good idea what this vehicle would look like. 

And again, the requirement is not new. The requirement goes back 

to 2007, and it was part then of the effort to make the EFV more 

affordable and to provide the 12 total battalions worth of armored 

lift that we were looking for on the battlefield. 

Mr. RIGELL. Well, I am encouraged and I applaud your effort at 

really looking at off-the-shelf. I know each one of us wants to 

squeeze every dollar of efficiency that we can. To the extent that 

we use something that is presently out there, we are going to leverage our money that much more. 

In the few seconds that are remaining, General, could you just 

for my benefit help me to understand how the Stryker vehicle may 
21 

or may not play into this. I know it is a sophisticated family of vehicles with tremendous amount of capability. 

General FLYNN. Sir, one of the key requirements that we will be 

looking for in a Marine personnel carrier is the ability to swim 

across rivers. 

Mr. RIGELL. Okay, that is it right there. 

General FLYNN. So that is one of the key things. And plus, I 

think, you know, it has to—what underbelly armoring is the best? 

And that is the second part of what we are really going to be looking at in the future, sir. 

Mr. RIGELL. Very good. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

I want to continue with the line of comments and the questions 

that our chairman asked. And my first question has to do with the 

process. 

You obviously go through a very rigorous process in deciding 

what new platform what you want to develop. We are not privy of 

that process at all. And so you come to us with an already-made 

decision as to what that ought to be. And we are then placed in 

kind of an adversarial role, because you have pride of authorship, 

and you are in kind of a defensive role defending what you are proposing, and we are kind of in an adversarial role with you. 

This is not a productive way to proceed. I would like, and I am 

sure a number of our members would like, to be involved in the 

process that you go through to make these decisions. 

You seek the advice of a lot of experts. You do war gaming. You 

look at the limits of technology. You look at the rate at which technologies are developing and could be developed, because many of 

these platforms are going to be with us for 30, 40, 50 years. So we 

need to be looking down the road, which I know it was one of the 

concerns of our chairman. And he is talking about standoff is what 

we do today, relative to standoff appropriate for what we need to 

be doing 10 or 20 years from now. 

Can we be involved in that process? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I would describe—and this goes a 

little bit back to your discussion about briefing in a couple of weeks 

in terms of where we are today. I am, frankly, not aware of anything right now in our process that would be—let us put it this 

way. I believe that the process we are executing right now, we have 

the ability to be fully transparent with you all to share with you 

the analysis that we are doing, the trades that we are considering—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. This is after the fact. I would like to be involved 

before the fact so that we are involved in the—yes, I am sure you 

go through a very rigorous program before you decide what new 

platform you want to bring out. There is no fundamental reason we 

couldn’t be involved with that, is there? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Fundamentally, I think the decision to terminate the EFV program that was announced by the Secretary was 

not a traditional program new start process. This was a case of in 

the course of, frankly, the budget process and taking a look at the 
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challenges in POM 12 associated with continuation of that program 

and that budget process, that is where the affordability issue—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. But there was some internal discussion. I think 

our chairman would have been very much more comfortable if he 

had had the opportunity of potentially being involved in there. 

Let me go to a specific question about this process. Technologies 

mature at various rates, and there are some physical limits to the 

asymptote for many technology advancements. 

In looking to the future for a mechanism of getting our Marines 

to the shore, with the access denial capabilities that our enemies 

are developing or could develop, I am not comfortable that we have 

done an adequate analysis of alternatives and have adequately 

competed the missions to decide that this amphib ship-to-shore is 

exactly the right thing to do. 

I do not know the rate at which these technologies will develop, 

but it is conceivable to me that access denial in the future will be 

so robust that we are not going to be able to get anywhere near 

12 miles to the coast, in which case, don’t you think we need another alternative for getting our marines ashore? 

What we have got now, sir, is more than we need for most of our 

activities. Going aboard to Haiti or to Libya or any of these places, 

you know, they don’t have much access denial. But one day we will 

be in a war with a peer that will have a lot of access denial. 

I am not comfortable that 12-mile standoff will be the right 

standoff 20 years from now. Are you? 

Secretary STACKLEY. So I am going to turn the requirements officer to talk about the derivation of the requirement that establishes 

the—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. We have only 18 seconds. We can’t do that. What 

I would like to do, sir, is to be involved in the process of how you 

got there. Our chairman is an engineer. I am a scientist. We have 

very good professional staff that could benefit by—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me, in the time remaining, just describe 

the approach that was taken. The requirement to deploy marines 

from 20-odd miles from shore was driven principally by anti-ship 

cruise missiles. And at the time that requirement was established, 

we really had limited defense against anti-ship cruise missiles, particularly if they are coming from over the horizon. 

So when we go after that threat through Navy Integrated Fire 

Control-Counter Air capability in the past couple of years, in fact, 

particularly this past year, we have been able to successfully demonstrate that capability coming forward on the maturity of technology timeline that enables the Navy to determine that they in 

fact can go closer to shore in the face of that threat. 

Now, that doesn’t cover all threats. And the bottom line is that 

that becomes a limiting factor in terms of whether it is an anti-ship 

cruise missile. In your defense against that or other threats, you 

are going to consider that threat in determining how you deploy 

your forces. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Look forward to working with you in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Young, did you have a question or an inquiry at 

this point? 
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Mr. YOUNG. Thank you so much for being with us, gentlemen. 

I think I will pivot off of my esteemed colleague from Maryland’s 

line of questioning there and just follow up a bit on the EFV. 

It is my understanding that this ship-to-shore capability power 

projection that has really defined the Marine Corps, at least in the 

20th century, we are seeking to continue it here. And I would just 

like to step away and ask kind of a larger question as a marine 

myself here. 

It has been some time since we have had a contested amphibious 

landing, and this question may have already been asked, but with 

the prospect of access denial weapons out there being developed by 

so many countries, would it make more sense perhaps to invest our 

resources in capabilities from the air, redefining the Marine Corps’ 

amphibious capabilities perhaps. 

Or, instead, is the justification behind the EFV and other similarly equipped vehicles that we need to have redundancy, if for 

some reason we were encounter an enemy that could defeat us 

from ground-to-air as we insert our marines into a given area? Is 

that the reason why we need our amphibious vehicles? 

I am not sure I have seen this tested out in any robust way, at 

least in the literature I have read in recent months, so perhaps one 

of you gentlemen or more could address that. 

General FLYNN. I think at the heart of your question is when and 

where do you need the capability. And I think the question on that 

is you are needed across the full range of military operations. 

At the high end, if you say that we are going to do a two-brigade 

forcible entry operation, we are going to have in conjunction with 

marshalling the forces to do that probably anywhere from 45 to 60 

days of shaping operations to do it. So that is one end of the spectrum that will influence, you know, the threat that you would have 

to launch in there is how much time you would have to shape your 

environment. 

Then the other part is—and some would say at the high end is 

the least likely chance that you would have. But as you said there, 

there has to be redundancy. 

And when was the last forcible entry operation? Well, the one 

that I come to mind when we talk about an air-only option is the 

amphibious withdrawal from Somalia. I would not have wanted 

been the last person getting on the last helicopter in a collapsing 

perimeter. I like the fact that I had that ability to be able to withdraw back to the sea base and fight as you withdraw. So that is 

one part. 

So at the lower end of the range of military operations, you may 

not have the shaping time. You may have to respond today just like 

forces responded the same day the crisis was in Japan. We responded that day. So what capability do you need? And I think you 

do have to have the balance. 

And then the key question is, you know, under that threat environment, how closer are we going to be able to get. And we do believe that we are not going to get any closer than 12 nautical miles, 

but we are not going to plan ourselves at 12 nautical miles. That 

could be the launch point for the vehicle to go. And then the 

launching platform then pulls away from the 12 nautical miles. It 
24 

is very similar now to how we do high-speed launches even closer 

right now. 

So I do think you need to balance capability of having both an 

air and a surface option, because on the surface is the only way you 

can rapidly build combat power up and get off the beach quickly. 

So that is how I—when I looked at the requirement that’s as I see 

it, but I don’t just focus on the high end. I also look at all the variables that would take us down to a lower threat level or a more 

likely area of employment. 

Mr. YOUNG. By way of follow-up in our remaining 50 seconds 

here, your point that only on the ground is where you could build 

up a fairly robust combat power, is that to say that—maybe you 

could tease that out. Explain exactly what you mean by that, why 

that cannot be done by inserting your marines from air and—? 

General FLYNN. I think it is just to be able to get the volume of 

combat power that you need to be decisive. In the future environment, we are going to spread out over the battlefield, but still the 

reality of pushing things across, the volume really comes from the 

surface. And initially, you have to establish the beachhead, and 

then you have to push off the beach, and then that is where the 

robust supplies come in. 

Mr. YOUNG. You mean the volume of personnel, the volume of 

marines, or are you referring to our ability to place equipment? 

General FLYNN. I think all of the above, sir. I think it is not only 

to get the combat forces in, but to get the sustainment in as well. 

Mr. YOUNG. All right. Thanks, General. 

Mr. AKIN. We have a vote before too long here. I thank you all 

for coming in. I think just from the questions, it says that in a couple of weeks we will be able to have a probably interesting briefing. 

And we will look forward to that. And thank you so much for your 

time. 

[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 16, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 16, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2011 

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. The USMC LAV Program Manager met with HASC staff in January 

2010 and reported significant benefits associated with side and wheel-well armor 

kits added to the USMC fleet of LAV’s. These kits were developed by Armatec and 

installed at the Barstow and Albany USMC Depots. The Committee was informed 

that these kits added needed survivability to the LAV’s, while also extending LAV 

service life. The HASC also understands that several allied countries are incorporating, into their vehicle fleets, additional technologies developed by this company 

such as Mine Blast Floor and Underbelly Protection Kits, Roof Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats, and Armored Fuel Tanks. Are there plans to evaluate the technologies from recent LAV survivability upgrades for possible use in upgrade programs for the AAV or HUMMWV fleets? 

General FLYNN. Yes. CD&I manages the capabilities included in the Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy as a portfolio. AAV will benefit from the lessons 

learned from LAV and all other USMC vehicles in the portfolio, plus some Army 

vehicles such as the Bradley with its Urban Survival Kit and Stryker with its new 

Double Vee Hull. CD&I is actively connected to relevant intelligence from the National Ground Intelligence Center and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, and 

it communicates with protection experts from Army Research Labs and TARDEC to 

stay current on best practices with respect to Force Protection and Survivability. 

The AAV upgrade initiative is planned to improve protection against roadside and 

underbelly IEDs by upgrading protective armor and modifying the interior of the 

vehicle to mitigate blast and fragmentation effects while maintaining current water 

and land mobility capabilities. 

Analyses are ongoing to underpin AAV protection requirements, and to ensure 

these requirements are balanced against others such as swim capability, land mobility, etc. For instance, CD&I, PM AAVS, and MCOTEA are assessing the feasibility 

of protecting the occupants of the AAV during underbelly attacks through a deliberate study performed by Army Research Labs. In this study, ARL is estimating the 

potential benefit afforded by all-external applique ́, all-internal applique ́, and some 

combination of the two, using 3D modeling and simulation. Given that AAV has 

stricter swim mobility requirements than LAV, more attention is being paid to the 

second order effects of adding heavy protection to the belly of the AAV. CD&I anticipates leveraging Government (Naval Surface Warfare Center) and academia (Stevens Institute of Technology) to assess the effects of heavy upgrades on swim performance, and Nevada Automotive Test Center to assess the effects on land mobility, reliability, and ride quality. 

Likewise, future HMMWV upgrade initiatives will benefit from the lessons 

learned from past initiatives, to include recent LAV upgrades, experimentation on 

the SCTVC (also known as ‘‘Capsule’’), ongoing experimentation on DARPA’s Blast 

Mitigation System (also known as Structural Blast Channel or Chimney), plus the 

ongoing technical development of the new-start Joint Light Tactical Vehicle systems. 

The USMC is actively pursuing better protection for a portion of the HMMWV fleet, 

and anticipates a recapitalization initiative that will likely replace older cabs with 

more protected ones, while improving off-road mobility in order to expand maneuver 

space, within established cost and transportability constraints. Knowing that protected mobility for the light fleet is an extremely difficult task within the USMC’s 

unique transportability requirements, it will continue to leverage the experience of 

Science and Technology activities such as the Office of Naval Research and DARPA, 

from Industry through our Materiel Developers at Marine Corps Systems Command, 

and from Research and Development Activities such as TARDEC and ARL, to ensure a balanced and effective set of capabilities is fielded. 

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