alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jonathan A. Korn, Appellant-Respondent, v First UNUM Life Insurance Company, Respondent-Appellant, and Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Respondent.

[717 NYS2d 892]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals (1), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Donovan, J.), entered September 24, 1999, as denied his cross mo*357tion for summary judgment on the complaint, and (2) from an order of the same court, entered September 24, 1999, which denied his motion to preclude the defendant First UNUM Life Insurance Company from using certain affidavits and exhibits in support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and the defendant First UNUM Life Insurance Company cross-appeals from so much of the order and judgment as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States is awarded one bill of costs payable by the appellant-respondent.

The Supreme Court properly denied the motion of the defendant First UNUM Life Insurance Company for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint. There are issues of fact as to whether the plaintiffs occupation was that of an orthopedic surgeon and whether he was “totally disabled” within the meaning of the disability income insurance policies *(see,*CPLR 3212 [b]; *Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562; *McGrail v Equitable Life Assur. Socy.,*292 NY 419, 425; *Godesky v First Unum Life Ins. Co.,*239 AD2d 547).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Santucci, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MARCO VENTURES, INC., et al.,

Defendants ___________________________________

MARCO VENTURES, INC., 

Counter-claimant

 v.

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC,

Counter-defendant

 /

No. C-08-4906 MMC

ORDER GRANTING 

COUNTERDEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; VACATING

APRIL 9, 2010 HEARING; VACATING

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL

DATES

Before the Court is counter-defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC’s (“Ford

Credit”) Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Partial Summary

Judgment, filed March 5, 2010. Counter-claimant Marco Ventures, Inc. (“Marco”) has not

filed opposition. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of the motion, the

Court deems the matter suitable for decision thereon, VACATES the hearing scheduled for

April 9, 2010, and rules as follows.

//

Case 3:08-cv-04906-MMC Document 50 Filed 04/01/10 Page 1 of 2
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For the reasons stated by Ford Credit, the Court finds Ford Credit is entitled to

summary judgment on each of Marco’s counterclaims. Each counterclaim is based on the

allegation that Ford Credit ceased performing under its agreements with Marco before

Marco defaulted on its obligations under such agreements. (See Counterclaims ¶¶ 8, 13,

17.) Ford Credit has offered evidence, however, that Marco was in material breach of its

obligations under the parties’ agreements before Ford Credit ceased performance

thereunder (see Bascio Decl., filed March 5, 2010, ¶ 19; Ex. G), and Marco has failed to

offer any evidence to the contrary.

Accordingly, Ford Credit’s motion for summary judgment on Marco’s counterclaims

is hereby GRANTED.

The remaining claims in this action are those alleged in Ford Credit’s First Amended

Complaint. The Clerk has entered the default of each defendant named in the FAC, and,

by order filed March 30, 2010, the Court has set a deadline of April 30, 2010 for Ford Credit

to file a motion for default judgment. Under such circumstances, the June 1, 2010 Pretrial

Conference and June 14, 2010 trial dates are hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2010 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-04906-MMC Document 50 Filed 04/01/10 Page 2 of 2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED August 20, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-40148 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus SIXTO RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-02-CR-468-1

-------------------- Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Sixto Rodriguez Rodriguez appeals his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry into the United States following deportation. He argues that 8 U.S.C. 1326(b), the statute under which he was convicted and sentenced, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in his case in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). However, Rodriguez concedes that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224No. 03-40148 -2- (1998), but wishes to preserve the issue for further review by the Supreme Court. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; see also United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court therefore must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Rodriguez’s argument is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
### §3796gg–11. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796gg–11 was editorially reclassified as section 10453 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
§ 518.33 Federally-owned and exempt property. ( a ) Federally-owned property. ( 1 ) Title to federally-owned property remains vested in the Federal Government. Recipients shall submit annually an inventory listing of federally-owned property in their custody to the Federal awarding agency. Upon completion of the award or when the property is no longer needed, the recipient shall report the property to the Federal awarding agency for further Federal agency utilization.
( 2 ) If the Federal awarding agency has no further need for the property, it shall be declared excess and reported to the General Services Administration, unless the Federal awarding agency has statutory authority to dispose of the property by alternative methods (*e.g.*, the authority provided by the Federal Technology Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 3710(I)) to donate research equipment to educational and non-profit organizations in accordance with E.O. 12821, “Improving Mathematics and Science Education in Support of the National Education Goals.”) Appropriate instructions shall be issued to the recipient by the Federal awarding agency.
( b ) Exempt property. When statutory authority exists, the Federal awarding agency has the option to vest title to property acquired with Federal funds in the recipient without further obligation to the Federal Government and under conditions the Federal awarding agency considers appropriate. Such property is “exempt property.” Should a Federal awarding agency not establish conditions, title to exempt property upon acquisition shall vest in the recipient without further obligation to the Federal Government.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. SS.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Advanced Optics  Electronics,  Inc.
(the  "Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the six months ended June 30, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, John Cousins, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

      3.    The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      4.    The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

                                                 /S/ John Cousins
                                                 -----------------------
                                                 Chief Financial Officer
                                                 August 13, 2005

A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, an other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
required by Section 906,  has been  provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its
staff upon request.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2547

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Solvent blue 124. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 23, 2005

Mr. LANGEVIN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Solvent blue 

124.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SOLVENT BLUE 124. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.32.73 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 Solvent blue 124) is amended by striking ‘‘12/31/2006’’ 

7 and inserting ‘‘12/31/2008’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 
2

•HR 2547 IH 

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of enactment of this Act.

Æ
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 235 (Wednesday, December 8, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 71056]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-26989]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION


Ocean Transportation Intermediary License Rescission of Order of 
Revocation

    Notice is hereby given that the Orders revoking the following 
licenses are being rescinded by the Federal Maritime Commission 
pursuant to sections 14 and 19 of the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 U.S.C. 
app. 1718) and the regulations of the Commission pertaining to the 
licensing of Ocean Transportation Intermediaries, 46 CFR Part 515.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              License No.                         Name/address
------------------------------------------------------------------------
016071N...............................  Heron International, Inc., 1149
                                         Ellsworth Drive, Pasadena, TX
                                         77506
017940F...............................  Kristen Brandimarte dba Emmeli
                                         Shipping, 3200 Sunset Avenue,
                                         Suite 209, Ocean, NJ 07712
016027F...............................  Lion Exhibition Freight, Inc.,
                                         1153 Willingham Drive, Atlanta,
                                         GA 30349
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Sandra L. Kusumoto,
Director, Bureau of Certification and Licensing.
[FR Doc. 04-26989 Filed 12-7-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6730-01-P
#### § 236.10 Payment to USAID of excess amounts received by a Noteholder.

If a Noteholder shall, as a result of USAID paying compensation under the Guarantee, receive an excess payment, it shall refund the excess to USAID.
### §5196c. Grants for construction of emergency operations centers

#### (a) Grants

The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency may make grants to States and Indian tribal governments under this subchapter for equipping, upgrading, and constructing State, local, and Tribal emergency operations centers.

#### (b) Federal share

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the Federal share of the cost of an activity carried out using amounts from grants made under this section shall not exceed 75 percent.

(Pub. L. 93–288, title VI, §614, as added Pub. L. 103–337, div. C, title XXXIV, §3411(a)(3), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 3107; amended Pub. L. 110–53, title II, §202, Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 295; Pub. L. 117–251, §11(a), Dec. 20, 2022, 136 Stat. 2358.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 2288 of the former Appendix to Title 50, War and National Defense, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 103–337, §3412(a).

#### Amendments

2022—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 117–251 inserted "and Indian tribal governments" after "grants to States" and substituted "State, local, and Tribal" for "State and local".

2007—Pub. L. 110–53 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, funds appropriated to carry out this subchapter may not be used for the purpose of constructing emergency operating centers (or similar facilities) in any State unless such State matches in an equal amount the amount made available to such State under this subchapter for such purpose."

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2022 Amendment

Pub. L. 117–251, §11(b), Dec. 20, 2022, 136 Stat. 2358, provided that: "The amendments made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall apply with respect to amounts appropriated on or after the date of enactment of this Act [Dec. 20, 2022]."

#### Non-Federal Cost Share

Pub. L. 108–7, div. K, title IV, §419, Feb. 20, 2003, 117 Stat. 526, provided that: "Notwithstanding 42 U.S.C. 5196c, amounts provided in Public Law 107–117 [see Tables for classification] and subsequent appropriations Acts for the construction of emergency operations centers (or similar facilities) shall only require a 25 percent non-Federal cost share."
§ 224.20 Disclosure of documents. ( a ) Upon written request to the reviewing official, the defendent may review any relevant and material documents, transcripts, records, and other materials that relate to the allegations set out in the complaint and upon which the findings and conclusions of the investigating official under § 224.4(b) are based, unless such documents are subject to a privilege under Federal law. Upon payment of fees for duplication, the defendant may obtain copies of such documents.
( b ) Upon written request to the reviewing official, the defendant also may obtain a copy of all exculpatory information in the possession of the reviewing official or investigating official relating to the allegations in the complaint, even if it is contained in a document that would otherwise be privileged. If the document would otherwise be privileged, only that portion containing exculpatory information must be disclosed.
( c ) The notice sent to the Attorney General from the reviewing official as described in § 224.5 is not discoverable under any circumstances.
( d ) The defendant may file a motion to compel disclosure of the documents subject to the provisions of this section. Such a motion may only be filed with the ALJ following the filing of an answer pursuant to § 224.9.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2495 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2495

   To suspend temporarily the duty on Chloroacetic Acid, Sodium Salt.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 19, 2005

  Mr. Hayes introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To suspend temporarily the duty on Chloroacetic Acid, Sodium Salt.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CHLOROACETIC ACID, SODIUM SALT.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.05.70      Chloroacetic Acid,  Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         Sodium Salt (CAS                                                   31/2008
                         No. 3926-62-3)
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         2915.40.50)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Edgar V. Beals, Appellant, v. Fred H. Voght et al., Individually and as Copartners Doing Business as Voght’s Garage, Respondents.

Appeal from a dismissal of the complaint at the end of the plaintiff’s case on the ground of failure to establish a cause of action. The complaint alleged the defendants were negligent in repairing his automobile and breached a contract existing between them. The testimony adduced at the trial showed that plaintiff was the owner of a 1949 Nash automobile and that on May 14, 1955, while traveling on the Thruway the automobile became disabled due to engine trouble and which necessitated it being taken to the defendants’ garage for repairs. After some conversations between the parties, the work was undertaken and repairs were made to the engine block, rods, bearings and other items with the understanding that the defendants would not guarantee the work done on the block. When the work" was completed the plaintiff went to the garage, paid for the repairs and drove the automobile some 70 miles to Syracuse where he left it out in the open for some weeks and according to his testimony, it was not driven during that period. Eventually he drove the automobile from Syracuse to the vicinity of Albany where he again experienced engine trouble and it was repaired by an Albany garage. A mechanic from that garage testified at the trial and in substance stated that the trouble and damage to the motor was due to a leak of oil caused by a hole in the pan and that the trouble was between the No. 2 and No. 3 rods. His testimony did not establish the damage was caused by any work or failure on the part of the defendants. The plaintiff testified that on the occasion of driving from Syracuse to Albany he had stopped *537and the car had been greased and the oil checked. Exhibits were offered as to the statements of both garages. In examining the testimony, if there is any evidence in the record — direct or circumstantial — from which the defendants’ negligence might be reasonably inferred, it was a jury case and error to dismiss the complaint. *(Lubelfeld*v. *City of New York,*4 N Y 2d 455, 460.) Giving the plaintiff the full intendment of the rule we fail to perceive where he has established a prima facie case on either theory of his complaint. There is no affirmative evidence from which a verdict for the plaintiff would be proper or justified. His own witnesses establish that the damages could be the result of several causes. When or how the hole in the pan of the automobile was caused is a sheer guess and the plaintiff failed to prove any facts sufficient to sustain the cause of action set forth in his complaint. Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, without costs.
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 2004)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 76420]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-27875]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 73

[MM Docket No. 93-48]


Broadcast Services; Children's Television

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule; announcement of effective date.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Federal Communications Commission has received Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) approval for rules published at 61 FR 43981 
(August 27, 1996). Therefore, the Commission announces that 47 CFR 
73.673 and 47 CFR 73.3500 are effective January 2, 1997.

DATES: The rules in 47 CFR 73.673 and 47 CFR 73.3500 published at 61 FR 
43981 (August 27, 1996) are effective January 2, 1997.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Communications Commission has 
received OMB approval for rules published at 61 FR 43981 (August 27, 
1996). Through this document, the Commission announces that it received 
this approval on December 30, 1996. The effective date for rules 47 CFR 
73.673 and 47 CFR 73.3500 is January 2, 1997.
    Pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, 
an agency may not conduct or sponsor a collection of information unless 
it displays a currently valid control number. Notwithstanding any other 
provisions of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for 
failing to comply with a collection of information subject to the 
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) that does not display a valid control 
number. Questions concerning the OMB control numbers and expiration 
dates should be directed to Cathy Williams, Federal Communications 
Commission, (202) 418-2918 or via the Internet at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#395a584d5140174e5055555058544a795f5a5a175e564f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="8ae9ebfee2f3a4fde3e6e6e3ebe7f9caece9e9a4ede5fc">[email protected]</span></a>.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 04-27875 Filed 12-20-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P


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