SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3036-18T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SCOTT DIROMA,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted January 7, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Firko.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Somerset County, Docket No. 19-13.

Scott DiRoma, appellant pro se.

Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Lauren R. Casale, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Scott DiRoma appeals from a January 31, 2019 Law Division 

order, which found defendant guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 because he 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 28, 2020
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operated his motorcycle with a license plate that was mounted upside down. We 

affirm.

On June 22, 2018, defendant was operating his motorcycle on Mount 

Bethel Road in Warren Township when he was pulled over by a police officer. 

The officer stopped defendant's motorcycle because his license plate was 

mounted upside down. When questioned by the police officer why the license 

plate was upside down defendant responded, "he thought it was cool," and "[h]e 

wanted to be different."

As a result, defendant was issued a citation for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-

33, which provides in pertinent part that the owner of a vehicle, including a 

motorcycle, must display on the vehicle an identification mark or marks 

furnished by the Division of Motor Vehicles, which "shall be kept clear and 

distinct and free from grease, dust or other blurring matter, so as to be plainly 

visible at all times of the day and night."

On de novo review, the Law Division judge found that an upside down

license plate is not "clear and distinct" because it frustrates the ability of a law 

enforcement officer to identify the characters quickly and may cause confusion. 

The judge also found that in enacting N.J.S.A. 39:3-33, the Legislature did not 

intend to permit owners of motor vehicles to mount their plates upside down. 
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Because defendant's license plate was upside down, the judge found him guilty 

of N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 and imposed the municipal court's sentence of a $106 fine 

and $33 in court costs.

On appeal, defendant argues that the court, as did the police officer, 

misconstrued N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 because the statute does not prohibit an upside

down license plate on a motorcycle because the Legislature drew a distinction 

between motorcycle and automobile license plates. Defendant also contends the 

statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the statute does not 

provide sufficient clarity as to the prohibited conduct. We disagree.

Our standard of review is limited following a trial de novo in the Law 

Division conducted on the record and developed in the municipal court. State 

v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005). In such an appeal, 

we "consider only the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal 

court." State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001). We focus 

our review on "whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence . . . in the record' 

to support the trial court's findings." State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 

(2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 

(1964)). On a legal determination, in contrast, our review is plenary. State v. 

Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 383 (2015). 
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Nevertheless, we will reverse only after being "thoroughly satisfied that 

the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests 

of justice demand intervention and correction . . . ." Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162

(internal citations omitted). "We do not weigh the evidence, assess the 

credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." State v. 

Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997). Because neither the appellate court nor the 

Law Division judge is in a good position to judge credibility, the municipal 

court's credibility findings are given deference. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 

470-71 (1999).

The rule of deference is more compelling where, as here, both judges made 

concurrent findings. Id. at 474. "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts 

ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and 

credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and 

exceptional showing of error." Ibid. (citation omitted). Therefore, appellate 

review of the factual and credibility findings of the municipal court and the Law 

Division "is exceedingly narrow." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 167 (2015) 

(quoting Id. at 470).

The statute, which identifies various violations relating to the display of 

identification marks, reads in pertinent part:
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The owner of an automobile which is driven on the 

public highways of this State shall display not less than 

[twelve] inches nor more than [forty-eight] inches from 

the ground in a horizontal position, and in such a way 

as not to swing, an identification mark or marks to be 

furnished by the division; provided, that if two marks 

are issued they shall be displayed on the front and rear 

of the vehicle; and provided, further, that if only one 

mark is issued it shall be displayed on the rear of the 

vehicle; and provided, further, that the rear 

identification mark may be displayed more than [fortyeight] inches from the ground on tank trucks, trailers 

and other commercial vehicles carrying inflammable 

liquids and on sanitation vehicles which are used to 

collect, transport and dispose of garbage, solid wastes 

and refuse. Motorcycles shall also display an 

identification mark or marks; provided, that if two 

marks are issued they shall be displayed in the front and 

rear of the motorcycle; and provided, further, that if 

only one mark is issued it shall be displayed on the rear 

of the motorcycle.

. . . .

All identification marks shall be kept clear and distinct 

and free from grease, dust or other blurring matter, so 

as to be plainly visible at all times of the day and night.

[N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 (emphasis added).]

Contrary to defendant's argument, he was not found in violation of the 

provision of the statute regarding horizontal placement of his license plate. 

Rather, he was found guilty of failing to comply with the requirement that the 

plate be clear and distinct.
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We disagree with defendant's constricted construction of N.J.S.A. 39:3-

33 as only applying to automobiles and that motorcycles are "exempt" from the 

horizontal plate orientation requirement. By its plain and unambiguous terms, 

N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 applies to identification marks on automobiles and 

motorcycles. Furthermore, the statute requires a license plate to be "clear and 

distinct" so as to be "plainly visible at all times of the day and night." Ibid. The 

upside down mounting of a license plate causes the reader to view characters in 

reverse order, which would lead to confusion, doubt, and mistake. Moreover, 

an upside down license plate clearly impedes law enforcement's ability to 

perform its duties.

Defendant has referred to nothing in the plain language of the statute or 

its legislative history to warrant a more restrictive meaning. Indeed, the Law 

Division judge correctly found that "the Legislature did not intend for drivers to 

mount their license plates upside down because it would impact [l]aw 

[e]nforcement's ability to protect the public on New Jersey's roads and 

highways." We agree.

Defendant's remaining arguments—to the extent we have not addressed 

them—lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e).
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We conclude that defendant's motorcycle was being operated in violation 

of N.J.S.A. 39:3-33, and accordingly, we affirm.