The President’s Authority to Adjust Sugar Quotas

The President, pursuant to an executive agreement codified in the Tariff Schedules of the United 

States, Schedule 1, Part 10, Subpart A, Headnote 2, may reduce Nicaragua’s share of the 

annual quota o f imported sugar on the basis of foreign policy concerns, if he finds that it is in 

the best interests o f the United States and he gives “due consideration,” as denned by law, to 

Nicaragua’s interests in the United States sugar market.

April 25, 1983

M e m o r a n d u m O p i n i o n f o r t h e C o u n c i l t o t h e P r e s i d e n t

Recent events in Nicaragua have led the President to consider reducing the 

amount of sugar which may be imported into the United States from that 

nation. This memorandum addresses whether the President has the legal authority to reduce Nicaragua’s present share of the United States sugar quota 

using the authority of a specific provision of an Executive Agreement.1 Our 

review of this Executive Agreement in the context of prior practice under it, the 

case law construing it, and the history of Presidential activity related to the 

imposition of export controls similar to the pending proposal, persuades us that 

the President has the requisite legal authority. We should note that this memorandum does not address questions that have been raised about the validity of 

the proposed action under various international agreements to which the United 

States and Nicaragua are parties.2 We understand that the Office of the Legal 

Adviser at the Department o f State will be giving you its views directly on 

these issues, and we anticipate reviewing its analysis in the near future in 

connection with our customary review of a proposed proclamation.

1 W e have also exam ined several other sources o f authority for the contemplated action- § 232 of the Trade 

Expansion A ct of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862; § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S C. § 624; and the 

International Em ergency Economic Pow ers Act (IEEPA), 50 U S.C. §§ 1701 el seq. O f these, we have 

rejected the first two as being inappropriate bases for the proposed action and have concluded that only 

IEEPA would be a clear source of authority. W e understand that there are policy reasons which argue 

persuasively against use o f IEEPA. The only other potential source of authority of which we are aware is the 

E xecutive Agreement.

2 Article X V I o f the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and the 

R epublic o f N icaragua, 9 U.S.T. 450, T.I.A .S. 4024 (1956), forbids either party to impose discriminatory 

im port restrictions. A rticle XIII of the G eneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, discussed below, obliges 

contracting parties to apply quotas in a non-discrim inatory fashion. Article 58 of the International Sugar 

Agreement, T.I.A .S. 9644, obligates every importing m em ber to guarantee “access” to its markets for 

exporting members.

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I. History of Presidential Authority

In 1962, Congress authorized the President to negotiate trade agreements 

with foreign countries for the reduction or modification of existing duties or 

import restrictions. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Act), § 201 (codified at 19 

U.S.C. § 1821).3 These agreements were to help promote the Act’s listed 

purposes.4 During rounds of talks involving the General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade (GATT),5 the President, using the authority of the Act, negotiated an 

Executive Agreement permitting him to set and adjust quotas for sugar imported into the United States.6 Executive agreements have the force of law 

unless overridden by Congress.

The opening paragraph of the Agreement was originally negotiated as part of 

the 1949 round of GATT negotiations held in Annecy, France. 64 Stat. B139, 

B145. In 1951, during the round held in Torquay, England, the United States

3 The statute provides in pertinent part:

(a) W henever the President determines that any existing duties or other import restrictions of 

any foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of 

the United States and that any o f the purposes stated in section 1801 of this title will be promoted 

thereby, the President may —

(1) after June 30, 1962, and before July 1, 1967, enter into trade agreements with foreign 

countries or instrumentalities thereof; and

(2) proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty or other im port restriction, such continuance of existing duty free or excise treatment, or such additional import 

restrictions, as he determines to be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade 

agreement.

4 These purposes are listed in 19 U.S.C. § 1801:

The purposes of this chapter are, through trade agreements affording mutual trade benefits —

(1) to stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain and enlarge foreign 

markets for the products of United States agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce;

(2) to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the development of open 

and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world; and

(3) to prevent Communist economic penetration. *

5 The GATT is a multilateral trade agreem ent encom passing most of the major trading countries Although 

GATT’s General Articles, which set out the basic trade policy commitments of the contracting parties, were 

negotiated in the late nineteen-forties, seven other rounds o f negotiations have led to many further agreements and revisions, all of which are subsumed within references to “the GATT."

6 The full text of the agreement provides:

The rates in the tariff schedule shall be effective only during such time as title II of the Sugar Act 

of 1948 or substantially equivalent legislation is in effect in the United States, w hether or not the 

quotas, or any of them, authorized by such legislation, are being applied or are suspended: 

Provided,

(i) That, if the President finds that a particular rate not lower than such January 1,1968, rate,

limited by a particular quota, may be established fo r any articles provided for in item 1SS.20 or 

155.30, which will give due consideration to the interests in the United States sugar market o f

domestic producers and materially affected contracting parties to the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade, he shall proclaim such particular rate and such quota limitation, to be 

effective not later than the 90th day following the termination o f the effectiveness of such

legislation;

(ii) That any rate and quota limitation so established shall be m odified if the President finds

and proclaims that such modification is required or appropriate to give effect to the above

considerations; and

(iii) That the January 1, 1968, rates shall resume full effectiveness, subject to the provisions 

o f this headnote, if legislation substantially equivalent to title II of the Sugar Act of 1948 

should subsequently become effective

(Emphasis added.)

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negotiated subparagraphs (i)-(iii), see 3 U.S.T. 586, 615, 1171 (1951), which 

were proclaimed as part of domestic law twice, first in 1951, see Proclamation 

2929, 3 C.F.R. 111 (1949-1953 Comp.), and again in 1967 after they had been 

the subject of further negotiations in the Kennedy Round. Proclamation 3822, 

3 C.F.R. 167, 175 (1966-1970 Comp.). This latter Proclamation added the 

agreement to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) as a headnote to 

the schedules on sugar. TSUS, Schedule 1, Part 10, Subpart A, Headnote 2. The 

codification of the Agreement as a headnote to the sugar tariff has led to its 

being referred to as the Headnote authority, and it will be referred to as such 

during the rest of this memorandum.

The Headnote authority was negotiated pursuant to § 201 of the Trade 

Expansion Act of 1962 which, of course, specifically provided for the negotiation of trade agreements providing for the establishment of import quotas and, 

more pertinent here, for the “modification” of such quotas “as [the President] 

determines to be . . . appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement.” See

supra note 3. One of the principle purposes of the Act was “to prevent 

Communist economic penetration.” 19 U.S.C. § 1801(3).7

Subparagraphs (i)-(iii) of the Headnote were negotiated as contingent authority for the President for the time when the Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 1100-1123 (1970 & Supp. I 1971), which had been given several extensions, would expire.8 Therefore, when the Sugar Act expired in 1974, the 

President was able to use his authority under the Headnote to proclaim a duty 

and quota on imported sugar. Both the duty and the quota have been extensively modified in subsequent Proclamations.9 The most recent modification 

occurred last spring, when the President reduced the annual global sugar quota from

6,900,000 short tons to approximately 2,800,000, allocating the quota on a countryby-country basis that reflected each country’s average percentage of imports over a 

period of years.10 Proclamation 4941,47 Fed. Reg. 19961, 19962 (1982)."

7 The statutory basis for the Headnote w as recently confirm ed in United States Cane Sugar R efiners' A ss 'n

v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 402-03 (C C.P A. 1982).

8 At the tim e the Headnote was negotiated, and until the Sugar Act expired in 1974, the President had 

explicit authority under the Sugar Act to adjust quotas on im ported sugar “whenever and to the extent that the 

President finds that the establishment or continuation of a quota or any part thereof for any foreign country 

would be contrary to the national interest o f the United States.” Pub. L. No 89-331, 79 Stat. 1271, 1273 

(1965) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 1 12(d)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1965-66)). See also 7 U.S.C. § 1112(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 

IV 1974). In negotiating an Executive A greem ent designed to replace the Sugar Act when it expired, the 

President evidenced no desire to deny him self this authority to take foreign policy concerns into account 

when adjusting sugar quotas, an authority that the courts had confirmed as belonging to the President under 

the Sugar Act even before Congress made it explicit. See South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. 

United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert, denied. 379 U.S 964 (1965).

9 See Proclam ation 4888, 3 C.F.R. 77 (1982); Proclamation 4770, 3 C.F.R. 81 (1981); Proclamation 4720, 3 

C.F.R. 14 (1981); Proclam ation 4663,3 C .F.R . 40 (1980); Proclamation 4610, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1978); Proclamation 4539, 31 C.F.R. 62 (1978); Proclamation 4463, 3 C.F.R. 56 (1976); Proclamation 4334, 3 C.F.R 420 

(1971-1975 Comp.).

10 This reduction was substantial because the 6,900,000 short-ton quota had been purposefully set so high 

that it was never reached. Thus, the United States had effectively had no quota on sugar prior to this action.

11 The President took this action after C ongress had intervened in the sugar market by enacting Pub. L. No. 

97-98, 95 Stat. 1213, 1257 (1981), which raised support pnces for domestic sugar producers The President

Continued

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Domestic importers challenged the quota established in 1982 by Proclamation 4941 as being beyond the President’s authority, but the Court of International Trade found that the imposition of quotas was legal because the Headnote, 

on which the action was based, was a valid exercise of the authority granted to 

the President under § 201 and the President had taken the procedural steps 

required by the Headnote. United States Cane Sugar Refiners’ A ss’n v. Block

(Sugar Cane I), 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int’l Trade), aff d, United States Cane

Sugar Refiners’ A ss’n v. Block (Sugar Cane II), 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 

1982).12

II. Analysis

The President would now like to reduce the 2.1% share of the annual quota 

allocated last spring to Nicaragua because he believes that Nicaragua is using 

the hard currency derived from sugar sales to buy arms for anti-government 

guerrillas in El Salvador. The President would like to revise Proclamation 4941 

to reduce Nicaragua’s percentage from 2.1% of the annual quota — now about

2,800,000 tons — to .21%, resulting in the importation from Nicaragua of 

about 6000 tons rather than almost 60,000. The legal issue is whether the 

Headnote permits the President to reduce Nicaragua’s percentage of the quota 

to this level. Because the President, in making this adjustment, would not be 

lowering the overall import quota or otherwise affecting domestic producers of 

sugar, and because the action would presumptively have a negative effect on 

Nicaragua, which is the only affected GATT member, the proposed action 

would appear not to be authorized by the Headnote’s language unless the 

Headnote can be read to permit this action on the basis of the President’s 

foreign policy concerns after giving the interests of Nicaragua the “due consideration” required by the Headnote.

The Headnote authorizes the President to modify sugar quotas — such as the 

one established for Nicaragua last spring — whenever he finds:

that such modification is required or appropriate to give effect to 

the [interests in the United States sugar market of domestic 

producers and materially affected contracting parties to the 

GATT],

Headnote, subparagraph (ii). As noted above, Presidents have been modifying 

sugar quotas since 1974. They have couched their findings in the language of 

subparagraph (i) of the Headnote under which the original quota was established — i.e., they have made a finding that the quota will give “due consider11 (. . . continued)

thereafter exercised his authority under § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 624, to impose 

fees on imported sugar in December 1981, and, on May S, 1982, used the Headnote to adjust the quota on 

imported sugar by issuing Proclamation 4941, supra.

12 The Court o f International Trade, 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (Supp. V 1981), is an Article III court with 

exclusive jurisdiction over certain trade matters. Id. § 1581. Its decisions are reviewed by the Court of 

Customs and Patent Appeals. Id. § 1541(a).

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ation” to these interests. Id. See supra note 9.13 Because Presidents since 1974 

have read the standard under subparagraph (ii) to be identical to that imposed 

originally by subparagraph (i), we believe that the appropriate question is what 

“due consideration” means.

As summarized in the Headnote’s legislative history, a quota could be 

proclaimed under subparagraph (i) “provided that the President, after giving

due consideration to the interests of both domestic producers and materially 

affected contracting parties in the United States sugar market, should find that 

such rate and duty should be established.” Analysis o f Torquay Protocol of

Accession, Schedules, and R elated Documents 317, 347 (1951) (emphasis 

added). This provision appears to establish a standard that is essentially procedural, rather than substantive, requiring merely that the President consider, 

before acting, the effect the new quota will have on these two interests rather 

than setting a standard under which the President can only act if the new quota 

would arguably protect or advance the interests of domestic producers or of 

affected GATT members in the United States sugar market.14 In short, “due 

consideration” means “fitting or appropriate” consideration,15 — a finding that 

is committed to the President’s discretion.16 As a legal matter, we believe that 

the President’s determination that this proposed action would be in our national 

interest after his consideration of its potential, and presumptively negative, 

impact on Nicaragua, would be fully authorized by the Headnote and would 

specifically advance one of the original purposes of the Trade Expansion Act of 

1962, “to prevent Communist economic penetration.” 19 U.S.C. § 1801(3).17 

Indeed, a contrary conclusion would require us to take the position that Congress and the President, in the series of legislative and executive actions 

discussed in note 8, supra, intended to strip the Executive of his acknowledged 

power to adjust sugar quotas and duties on the basis of our national interest. We 

therefore believe that the Headnote authorizes modification of sugar quotas and

13 Subparagraph (i) by its term s only authorized action during the 90 days after the Sugar Act of 1948 

expired. See supra note 6. Thereafter, m odifications of the quota established under subparagraph (i) were 

done under the authority o f subparagraph (ii).

14 The Proclam ations issued under the Headnote since 1974 do not resolve the issue, because the quotas put 

in place w ere so high that the issue of whether a particular quota failed to give “due consideration'’ to a GATT 

m em ber’s interests has apparently never arisen. See supra note 10.

15 The Am erican H eritage Dictionary o f the English Language 403 (1976). See also W ebster’s New

International D ictionary (2nd ed.) 796.

16 In exercising that discretion, the President may consider foreign policy concerns. Congress is generally 

presum ed to be aw are that foreign policy concerns influence Presidential decisionmaking when it grants the 

kind o f broad pow er found in § 201 of the Trade Expansion A ct of 1962. See Farr Man Sc Co. v. United

States, 544 F. Supp. 908, 910 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1982); South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United

States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965). See also United States v. Yoshida In t’l

Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975); supra note 8.

17 W e note that the reduction in Nicaragua’s quota, some 54,000 short tons, is scheduled to be redistributed 

to H onduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica, three countries that may be threatened by actions taken by the 

governm ent o f N icaragua. Thus, in cutting N icaragua's quota, the President will both dim inish Nicaragua’s 

ability to penetrate the market for sugar in the United States and presumably diminish Nicaragua’s ability to 

interfere in the econom ies o f those three countries. Both of these effects w ould appear to advance the purpose 

o f the Trade Expansion Act o f 1962 as declared in 19 U.S.C. § 1801(3).

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that the President may modify Proclamation 4941 to reduce Nicaragua’s percentage of our sugar quota if he makes the required findings.

Conclusion

The Headnote authorizes the President to adjust sugar quotas. Sugar Cane I

and Sugar Cane II hold that he may modify the quotas on a country-by-country 

basis. If the President finds that reducing Nicaragua’s percentage of our annual 

quota is in this Nation’s best interest and if he finds that the quota will give 

“appropriate” consideration to Nicaragua’s interests in our sugar market, we 

believe that his action in reducing the quota will be authorized by the Headnote.

T h e o d o r e B . O l s o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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