Filed 11/30/21 P. v. Chaidez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT CHRISTIAN CHAIDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D078168

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD181666)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. 

Ragland, Alana Cohen Butler, and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Robert Chaidez petitioned the trial court to recall his sentence 

pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (TSRA) (Prop. 36, as 

approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)). The trial court denied the 
2

petition as untimely and found that Chaidez did not show good cause to 

excuse the delay. Chaidez appeals, contending he showed good cause for the 

delay by establishing that he was housed in the prison’s security housing unit 

(SHU) when the TSRA was enacted and remained housed there with only 

limited access to legal materials and no actual knowledge of Proposition 36 

until 2016, when he filed his petition. We conclude the trial court erred when 

it denied Chaidez’s petition as untimely when Chaidez’s undisputed 

testimony established that he promptly petitioned for relief as soon as he 

learned of Proposition 36 and—rather than making an adverse finding 

regarding Chaidez’s credibility—the trial court observed that Chaidez’s 

version of events had remained consistent since 2016. We therefore reverse 

the trial court’s order denying Chaidez’s petition as untimely and remand for 

further proceedings on his petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2006, Chaidez was convicted of two counts of first degree residential 

burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459 and 460),1 one count of receiving stolen property 

(id., § 496), and one count of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851). Chaidez was 

sentenced to an indeterminate term of 60 years to life in prison. The 

sentence calculation included 25 years to life for each of the two counts of 

burglary; 25 years to life for receiving stolen property (stayed under Pen. 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
3

Code, § 654); 25 years to life for vehicle theft (imposed concurrently); and five 

years for each of the serious felony prior convictions.2

In 2016, Chaidez filed a petition to recall the sentence under 

section 1170.126, which the superior court denied as untimely. This court 

affirmed the denial in People v. Chaidez (Oct. 23, 2017, D070609) [nonpub. 

opn.].3 

In 2018, Chaidez filed additional petitions in the trial court seeking to 

explain the reasons for his delay. Without addressing the issue of delay, the 

trial court denied those petitions, concluding that the presence of the two first 

degree burglary counts rendered Chaidez ineligible for resentencing on the 

two nonserious felony convictions. In People v. Chaidez (July 19, 2019, 

D074872) [nonpub. opn.], we reversed the trial court’s order and remanded 

the case to the trial court to reconsider the nonserious felony life term 

sentences, as well as the remaining issues of undue delay and dangerousness. 

(See People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 682 (Johnson) [in ruling on a 

Proposition 36 petition for resentencing, the trial court must engage in a 

count-by-count analysis and may resentence the nonserious felony 

convictions even though the sentences on the serious or violent felony 

convictions remain].)

2 The facts of the underlying offense, which are not relevant to the issue 

raised on appeal, are set forth in Chaidez’s prior appeal, People v. Chaidez

(Sept. 10, 2008, D049656) [nonpub. opn.]. We take judicial notice of this 

opinion, as well as Chaidez’s other prior appeals discussed post. (Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subd. (a), 459, subd. (a).)

3 In this prior appeal, Chaidez conceded the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his initial Proposition 36 petition because the petition 

did not set forth any reasons for the delay in filing. 
4

On remand, the parties filed additional briefing. Chaidez contended 

that he met the criteria for resentencing under Proposition 36, that he is no 

longer a current, unreasonable threat to public safety, and that he had good 

cause for the delay in filing his original petition in 2016. On the latter issue 

of delay, he contended he was housed in the SHU “on and off throughout the 

years between 2012 and 2016,” and did not learn of his potential eligibility for 

relief until he read about Proposition 36 in a magazine in 2016. The People 

argued that Chaidez’s petition was untimely and there was no good cause for 

the delay, and his long history of criminality and incarceration established

that he still poses a risk of danger to public safety. 

The parties appeared for hearings during September and October 2020. 

Chaidez testified that he was continuously housed in the SHU at various 

institutions beginning in 2006, when he was first sent to the Department of 

Corrections, until 2016, when he was released to the general population. He 

claimed he could not make phone calls in the SHU. He had access to mail but 

did not get magazines in the mail. Some inmates shared magazines, and he 

read magazines that were left on a table. Chaidez had access to the law 

library while housed in the SHU, but the law library in the SHU was a very 

small room with no books and some forms. Inmates had to fill out a form to 

request a book and were not permitted to talk in the law library room. 

Chaidez claimed he did not talk to the inmates in the SHU, but he also 

testified that, when he was housed in the SHU at Pelican Bay, he helped his 

“next-door neighbor” Todd Ashker with litigation that ultimately resulted in 

a settlement releasing inmates from the SHU into the general prison 
5

population.4 Then, between 2011 until 2014 when he was housed at 

Corcoran, he participated in hunger strikes that were related to the Ashker

lawsuit. Chaidez explained that plans for the hunger strike spread by “word 

of mouth” and further explained that news, and especially legal news, 

typically spread through the SHU in the same manner. 

Chaidez acknowledged that he filed a petition for relief under 

Proposition 47 in 2014; he testified that he “heard about Prop 47” during 

November 2014, when he was briefly housed in Kings County “court jail.” 

Chaidez testified that, in 2016, while being escorted by prison guards to 

a medical appointment, he found a discarded magazine with an article that 

discussed resentencing in a mixed felony case. He stated that he read that 

the “California Supreme Court just ruled that mixed felonies[,] they have to 

be sent back for Prop 36; that is why I wrote [the petition] because I read it 

right there.” He claimed that this was the first time he heard about 

Proposition 36, and, within days of stumbling across the article that 

discussed mixed-felony resentencing, he filed his Proposition 36 petition. 

In November 2020, the trial court denied Chaidez’s petition as 

untimely. The trial court noted that there were “volumes of documents” in 

Chaidez’s case, including an “informal request[] [for disclosure]” that Chaidez 

filed in January 2009, when housed in the SHU, and a petition Chaidez filed 

in December 2014 to recall his sentence under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, 

4 Ashker v. Governor of the State of California (N.D.Cal., No. 4:09-CV05796), filed in 2009, resulted in a settlement agreement pursuant to which 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation agreed, among 

other things, that it would not place inmates in the SHU solely on the basis of 

their gang validation status. We take judicial notice of the settlement 

agreement filed in that case on September 1, 2015, and approved by the court 

on January 26, 2016. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
6

subd. (a)). In addition, beginning in 2016, Chaidez filed a series of petitions 

for relief, beginning with his initial Proposition 36 petition, which was filed 

on April 1, 2016. 

The trial court observed that Chaidez’s initial Proposition 36 petition 

was not filed until April 2016, more than one year and several months after 

the expiration of the two-year window to apply for relief. (§ 1170.126, 

subd. (b); Prop. 36, § 6, eff. Nov. 7, 2012.) The trial court acknowledged that 

Chaidez “is adamant that he had no knowledge of Proposition 36 until 

February 2016” and that he only learned about it “by happenstance” when he 

picked up a magazine from a trash pile. The trial court emphasized that 

Chaidez’s explanation regarding how he learned of Proposition 36 had 

remained consistent since 2016. 

The trial court observed that Chaidez’s position was that, because he 

was in the SHU without “normal access to reading materials and [the] law 

library[,] he had no way of knowing” about Proposition 36; however, the trial 

court found that, “[e]ven though [Chaidez] attempts to portray himself as cut 

off from all legal resources, in his testimony and in his many filings including 

one from 2009 while he was in ‘SHU,’ he did have access to legal materials 

albeit more limited than if he had been in general population in that he 

needed to know what he was looking for when making requests for law 

library material.” The court noted that Chaidez “painted a picture of himself

as being isolated and cut off from others and without general reading 

materials,” but the court found that during the period after Proposition 36 

was passed and the filing of his initial petition, Chaidez was “actively taking 

part in hunger strikes and other activities to improve the conditions for 

[inmates housed in the SHU],” and “[t]hose efforts were successful.” 
7

The trial court considered the length of the delay and the “nature and 

strength of the justification for the delay.” The court pondered whether a 

defendant housed in the SHU presumptively has good cause for delay, but 

reasoned that, here, there was evidence that Chaidez repeatedly had and 

used law library access (albeit access more restricted than that available to 

the general prison population), while there was no evidence he attempted to 

reach out to any defense resources to learn what opportunities for relief were 

available under Proposition 36.5 Based on this evidence, the trial court 

found that Chaidez “had potential resources and his failure to either learn of 

[Proposition] 36 or perhaps to decide not [to] pursue [Proposition] 36 because 

it would not apply to him[] puts him in the category of other inmates who 

don’t file petitions within the time periods allowed and are consequently 

denied. . . . [T]o find otherwise would mean that there is no time limit for 

filing a petition . . . for those who are housed in the ‘SHU,’ unless . . . they are 

notified of the changes in the law through some . . . documented official 

source.” The trial court concluded that good cause did not exist to justify the 

delay of over a year past the expiration of the deadline to file a resentencing 

petition and denied the petition as untimely.6

DISCUSSION

Prior to its amendment in 2012, “the Three Strikes law required that a 

defendant who had two or more prior convictions of violent or serious felonies 

5 The trial court observed that the record indicated that Chaidez had 

received “ ‘ “legal mail” on a medical appeal’ ” which enclosed a pamphlet 

regarding potential relief under Proposition 47. However, there was no 

reference to any communications with Chaidez regarding Proposition 36. 

6 Based on the finding that the petition was not timely filed, the trial 

court declined to rule on the issue of Chaidez’s current dangerousness. 
8

receive a third strike sentence of a minimum of 25 years to life for any 

current felony conviction, even if the current offense was neither serious nor 

violent.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 680.) “In 2012, the California 

electorate approved Proposition 36 and enacted the TSRA, which included 

the addition of section 1170.126 to the Penal Code.” (People v. Drew (2017) 

16 Cal.App.5th 253, 256 (Drew).) The TSRA’s effective date was November 7, 

2012. (Ibid.)

“The [TSRA] amended the Three Strikes law with respect to defendants 

whose current conviction is for a felony that is neither serious nor violent. In 

that circumstance, unless an exception applies, the defendant is to receive a 

second strike sentence of twice the term otherwise provided for the current 

felony, pursuant to the provisions that apply when a defendant has one prior 

conviction for a serious or violent felony.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

p. 681.) “In addition to reducing the sentence to be imposed for some third

strike felonies that are neither violent nor serious, the Act provides a 

procedure by which some prisoners already serving third strike sentences 

may seek resentencing in accordance with the new sentencing rules.” (Id. at 

p. 682.) Under those rules, an inmate may file “a petition for a recall of 

sentence” within two years of Proposition 36’s effective date

(November 2012), “or at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” 

(§ 1170.126, subd. (b); Drew, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 256.) 

Under the TSRA, trial courts have broad discretion to determine 

whether good cause exists for an inmate’s delay in filing. (Drew, supra, 

16 Cal.App.5th at p. 257.) “In circumstances where such discretion exists, 

our review of the trial court’s ‘good cause’ determination employs the familiar 

‘abuse of discretion’ standard.” (Id. at p. 257.) This standard “ ‘involves 

abundant deference to the trial court’s rulings.’ ” (People v. Williams (2018) 
9

19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1062 [reviewing denial of section 1170.126 petition for 

abuse of discretion].) However, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when the 

factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.” 

(People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [reviewing denial of 

defendant’s Romero motion to strike (People v. Superior Court (Romero) 

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) for abuse of discretion].)

“The ‘good cause’ exception suggests that not every delay in filing a 

recall petition is excusable.” (People v. Valencia (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 641,

648.) In Drew, this court outlined relevant factors for determining what 

constitutes good cause for delay. We concluded the nature and strength of 

the justification for the delay and the duration of the delay are two factors 

which “are relevant analytical tools in determining ‘good cause’ under 

section 1170.126 . . . .” (Drew, at p. 258.) In addition, the trial court “must 

consider all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case, ‘applying 

principles of common sense to the totality of circumstances.’ ” (Id. at p. 257.)

Chaidez argues that he demonstrated good cause to excuse the delay in 

filing his initial Proposition 36 petition in April 2016. The Attorney General 

disagrees, contending the trial court’s determination that Chaidez did not 

establish good cause was within its broad discretion (see Drew, supra, 

16 Cal.App.5th at p. 257). 

Here, the trial court acknowledged Chaidez’s litigious history and

acknowledged that Chaidez’s access to legal materials was “more limited 

than if he had been in general population in that he needed to know what he 

was looking for when making requests for law library material.” The trial 

court further acknowledged that Chaidez “is adamant that he had no 

knowledge of Proposition 36 until February 2016.” The court pondered 

whether a defendant housed in the SHU presumptively has good cause for 
10

delay, but concluded that Chaidez “had potential resources and his failure to 

either learn of [Proposition] 36 or perhaps to decide not [to] pursue 

[Proposition] 36 because it would not apply to him[] puts him in the category 

of other inmates who don’t file petitions within the time periods allowed and 

are consequently denied.” (Italics added.) 

We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing two 

issues: (1) whether the trial court made any findings regarding Chaidez’s 

credibility or lack of credibility—in particular, with respect to his testimony 

that he never heard of Proposition 36 before he filed his petition for 

resentencing in 2016, and (2) what evidence, if any, supports the trial court’s 

suggestion that Chaidez knew about Proposition 36, but 

“perhaps . . . decide[d] not [to] pursue [Proposition] 36” relief until he filed his 

petition for resentencing in 2016.7

The parties agree the trial court made no credibility finding as to 

Chaidez’s testimony that he never heard of Proposition 36 before he filed his 

petition for resentencing in 2016. The Attorney General argues that, in a 

prior hearing, the trial court made an “unfavorable finding[] as to [Chaidez’s] 

credibility” when it remarked, in denying Chaidez’s prior motion for selfrepresentation, that Chaidez’s “perception of what happened [during 

proceedings] . . . is just not accurate. I know you believe it. [¶] . . . [¶] Your 

perception of what is going on is part of the problem.” While this remark 

shows that the court criticized Chaidez’s perception on a separate occasion, it 

7 We also asked the parties to address whether the “California Lifers 

Newsletter” that Chaidez referenced in his testimony was part of the record 

before the trial court. The parties agree the newsletter was not part of the 

record. They further agree that no other such newsletters were introduced 

into evidence to possibly demonstrate whether Chaidez knew, or should have 

known, of Proposition 36 before he filed his petition. 
11

was not directed toward the credibility of Chaidez’s claim that he was 

unaware of Proposition 36 until 2016. Indeed, the trial court observed that 

Chaidez’s story regarding how he learned of Proposition 36—by stumbling 

across a discarded magazine—has remained consistent since 2016. 

With respect to the trial court’s suggestion that Chaidez may have 

known about Proposition 36 but “perhaps . . . decide[d] not [to] pursue 

[Proposition] 36” relief until he filed his petition for resentencing in 2016, 

both parties acknowledge the statement is speculative. However, the parties

disagree whether evidence in the record supports the suggestion. Chaidez 

contends no evidence in the record supports the suggestion and points out 

that “[s]uspicion is not evidence” (see People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 

745, 755), while the Attorney General contends the court’s suggestion that 

Chaidez knew of Proposition 36 but opted not to pursue relief was a 

reasonable inference supported by Chaidez’s admissions that he had access to 

the law library, by his awareness of Proposition 47, and by “his clear 

understanding of the mechanics of legal briefing.” “A reasonable inference, 

however, ‘may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, 

speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] . . . A finding 

of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than . . . a mere 

speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” (People v. Morris (1988) 

46 Cal.3d 1, 21, disapproved on another ground by In re Sassounian (1995) 

9 Cal.4th 535, 543, fn. 5.) Here, Chaidez’s willingness and ability to file 

petitions for relief on his own behalf, coupled with his testimony regarding 

how he became aware of Proposition 47 and promptly petitioned for relief 

thereunder suggest that, had Chaidez previously known of Proposition 36, he 

would have petitioned for relief at an earlier time. We thus reject the 

Attorney General’s contention that the trial court’s suggestion that Chaidez 
12

may have known about Proposition 36 but “perhaps . . . decide[d] not [to] 

pursue [Proposition] 36” relief until he filed his petition for resentencing in 

2016 was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence.

Chaidez maintains that, in 2016, he found a discarded magazine that 

discussed resentencing in a mixed felony case, that this was the first time he 

heard about Proposition 36, and, within days of stumbling across the 

magazine article, he filed his Proposition 36 petition. Chaidez argues his 

situation is distinguishable from that of the inmate in Drew, supra, 

16 Cal.App.5th 253. In Drew, the inmate waited more than two years after 

the expiration of the statutory deadline to file his petition for resentencing 

pursuant to Proposition 36. (Id. at p. 255.) Drew stated “that he ‘never 

contacted anyone seeking relief because he did not know he was eligible’ and 

his case was never ‘caught by any of the myriad agencies who were working 

to identify and file the cases that were eligible for relief.’ ” (Id. at p. 255.) On 

appeal, he further argued that his “delay[] during a time he lacked legal 

representation . . . should be excused,” and that he promptly filed his petition 

upon being alerted by counsel of the potential for resentencing. (Id. at 

p. 259.) “In effect, he contend[ed]there should be no time limits for filing a 

recall petition as long as no one told him he had the ability to request 

resentencing. Were this contention accepted, it would be tantamount to 

erasing the limitations period from the statute in all but the most unusual of 

circumstances.” (Id. at p. 259.) The Drew court rejected the inmate’s 

asserted justification, finding that “the delay was lengthy and the reason for 

[the inmate’s] inactivity [was] unexplained except by the absence of a lawyer 

proactively advising him regarding his rights and remedies.” (Id. at p. 260.)

Unlike the petitioner in Drew, who had not been advised that he might 

be eligible for relief under Proposition 36, Chaidez testified that he was 
13

completely unaware of Proposition 36’s existence because he was cut off from 

mainstream resources while in SHU housing. He admitted he had access to 

the SHU’s law library, but, as the trial court recognized, “he needed to know 

what he was looking for when making requests for law library material.” 

Chaidez contends he made “Herculean efforts to protect his rights by filing 

multiple motions to reduce his sentence”8 and contends this shows that he 

met Drew’s requirement to exercise diligence to investigate potential relief for 

resentencing under Proposition 36. (Drew, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 260.) 

The trial court appeared to accept Chaidez’s claims regarding limited access 

to resources and made no adverse findings regarding Chaidez’s credibility. 

Moreover, as discussed, no evidence supports the trial court’s suggestion that 

Chaidez may have known about Proposition 36 but “perhaps . . . decide[d] not 

[to] pursue [Proposition] 36” relief. Under these circumstances, we conclude 

Chaidez’s situation is unlike that in Drew, and the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied Chaidez’s petition as untimely.

8 By contrast, Drew noted there was “no evidence [the defendant] did 

anything to investigate potential relief for three and one-half years . . . . He 

did not contact the court. He did not request assistance from the public 

defender’s office that previously represented him. He did not inquire of 

anyone at the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.” (Drew, supra, 

16 Cal.App.5th at p. 260.) 
14

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Chaidez’s Proposition 36 petition as 

untimely is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings to 

determine whether Chaidez is entitled to relief under Proposition 36. 

GUERRERO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.