If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

July 23, 2019

v No. 342706

Muskegon Circuit Court

JERMAINE DUJUAN MAJOR-LANG, LC No. 16-006162-FC

 17-000801-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

SHAPIRO, J. (concurring).

I concur in the result in this case but disagree with the majority’s treatment of the priorbad-acts issue. The trial court, prosecution and defense were all mistaken in concluding that a 

prior bad act may be introduced under MCL 768.27 without passing muster under MRE 404(b). 

The statute allows for prior bad acts to be introduced. However, MRE 404(b)(2) requires at least 

14-days’ notice in advance of trial for such evidence to be presented. Prior-bad-acts evidence 

may not be introduced under MCL 768.27 without also complying with MRE 404(b)(2)’s notice 

requirement.

In the absence of a conflict, statutes and court rules should be read in harmony. Lapeer 

Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich 146, 165; 665 NW2d 452 (2003). Here, MCL 

768.27 and MRE 404(b) are not in conflict with one another. MRE 404(b) merely imposes an 

additional procedural requirement not found in the statute. The absence of a notice requirement 

in MCL 768.27 does not create an inherent conflict. And there is no case of record in which

MRE 404(b)’s notice requirement was found not applicable because it is not in MCL 768.27. 

Indeed, if MRE 404(b) could be avoided by simply invoking MCL 768.27, that would effectively 

be the end of MRE 404(b). Because the court rule and the statute are in harmony, the 

prosecution must always comply with MRE 404(b)(2)’s notice requirement when seeking to 

introduce prior bad acts.

The evidence that defendant previously assaulted his girlfriend (the complainant), 

including a stabbing incident, would be admissible under the substantive requirements of MRE 

404(b)(1). Defendant argued that when he fired the shot, he did not intend to harm the 
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complainant. The fact that he previously assaulted her is therefore directly relevant to the 

question of intent and so proper under the rule’s exception for evidence of intent.

However, it is uncontested that the prosecution failed to provide pre-trial notice of its 

intent to use such evidence and so did not satisfy the 14-day notice requirement of MRE 

404(b)(2). Further, there was no good cause for this failure. The prior-bad-acts evidence should 

therefore have been excluded. And, unlike the majority, I would conclude that its admission was 

plain error despite defense counsel’s waiver of the issue.

I would nevertheless affirm because, after a review of the entire record, I conclude that 

the error was harmless. Admittedly, the type of prior-bad-acts evidence admitted here would 

typically require reversal given the high degree of prejudice involved. This case is unusual, 

however, in that the prosecution’s case was extraordinarily strong. Further, in his own 

testimony, defendant admitted he was the only person with the child during the time in which she 

suffered the multiple injuries. While defendant argues on appeal that expert evidence might have 

rebutted the claim that the child’s compression fractures were non-accidental, he could not offer 

any explanation for the multiple other injuries that arose while the child was with him alone. 

Moreover, his attempts to prevent the child from receiving medical care were also highly 

inculpatory. Finally, in his testimony he admitted shooting the child’s mother, which gave rise to 

the primary charge of assault with intent to murder. Given these circumstances, I agree that 

defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro