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i 

58–105 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–159] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY RESERVE, 

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 27, 2010 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

KATY BLOOMBERG, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 27, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Air 

National Guard Training and Operations .......................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 27, 2010 .......................................................................................... 25 

TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND 

AIR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Raymond W., USA, Acting Director, U.S. Army National 

Guard .................................................................................................................... 6 

Stultz, Lt. Gen. Jack C., USA, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve ................................... 3 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III, USAF, Director, U.S. Air National Guard ......... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Raymond W. ................................................................. 62 

Castle, Hon. Michael N., a Representative from Delaware .......................... 34 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 33 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 29 

Stultz, Lt. Gen. Jack C. .................................................................................... 35 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III .......................................................................... 50 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 82 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 81 

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 81 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY RESERVE, 

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 27, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2117, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the 

Readiness Subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal 

year 2011 budget request for training for the Army Reserve, Army 

National Guard, and Air National Guard. 

Witnesses have also been asked to provide their views on current 

training operations and the future needs of their respective components. I thank our distinguished witnesses from the Army and Air 

Force for appearing before the subcommittee today, and thank you 

for your service and all the great things that you do for our country. All of them have had distinguished military careers and we 

just are so happy that you are with us this morning. We lack a few 

members but they will be coming in as we move along with the testimony. 

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, hundreds of thousands of Americans serving in these components of our military, the Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Air National Guard, have been 

mobilized and deployed on missions both here, at home and overseas. Today more than 98,000 soldiers and airmen from these elements of our country are on active duty carrying out missions that 

cover the full range of military activities. Each one of them has left 

behind their families and put their civilian jobs on hold as they 

serve the Nation. Those soldiers and airmen not mobilized on active duty also continue to serve and stand ready to support domestic authorities in the event of a natural disaster or emergency. 

Clearly the high number of troops mobilized today attest to the 

fact that the Reserve elements of our military are no longer a ‘‘strategic’’ Reserve intended to be rarely used. These Reserve Components are now clearly ‘‘operational,’’ Operational Reserves that support, augment, and assist our active duty forces on a routine and 

continuing basis. 
2 

We look forward to hearing today just how this transformation 

was accomplished, and what it means to the soldiers and airmen 

who have served and continue to serve. We also look forward to 

hearing how the fiscal year 2011 budget request matches up with 

the expected missions and operations. 

Finally, and most critically, we look forward to hearing how we 

maintain these components as an ‘‘Operational Reserve’’ in the future, and even as the war in Iraq begins to end. As of today, many 

questions on this issue remain unanswered, including: How much 

will it cost each year to maintain our Reserve forces at their current level of activity? How many Reserve soldiers and airmen can 

we expect to have mobilized in future years? If the Reserves return 

to a ‘‘Strategic Reserve’’ status, what will it mean for the quality 

of the force and for recruiting and retention? Over the long term 

is it possible that the size of our Reserve forces may need to grow? 

If so, in what way? 

These are the issues we will be exploring today. And our witnesses today are Lieutenant General Jack Stultz—General, it is so 

good to see you again, sir. He is the United States Commanding 

General for the Army Reserve Command; Lieutenant General 

Harry M. Wyatt, III, Director for the Air National Guard; and 

Major General Raymond W. Carpenter, Acting Director for the 

Army National Guard. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman 

from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks the he would like to 

make. Mr. Forbes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to echo 

your appreciation for our three witnesses today, their service to our 

country, and the great job that they do with our men and women. 

We meet again to discuss the readiness of some of our Reserve 

Component forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to 

face budgetary pressures against the backdrop of the ongoing war 

on terror, continued high operations tempo, and a need to recapitalize much of its aging equipment. 

There is no doubt that the challenges facing the Department of 

Defense are significant. Years of underfunded procurement accounts continue to manifest in aging fleets of aircraft ships and vehicles. This aging equipment is costly to maintain, offers reduced 

reliability, and requires increased manpower to keep it serviceable. 

Nowhere is this more evident than in the National Guard and the 

Reserves. 

The Reserve Component has faced many additional challenges 

because it started this long war positioned as a Strategic Reserve. 

For decades we postured the National Guard with the Cold War 

mindset. We believed we could accept risk in equipping and training the Guard because we thought there would be a clear unambiguous signal to get them ready. We also believed there would be suf-
3 

ficient time to field the equipment and get them trained before 

they would be needed on the battlefield. 

We have learned many lessons since September 11, 2001. We 

have learned that there is not time to ready the Guard from a Strategic Reserve posture because the threat doesn’t allow it, because 

the industrial base can’t support it, and because natural disasters 

like Hurricane Katrina come with little or no warning. 

The need for a trained, well-equipped, and integrated Reserve 

Component is clear. However, I believe we must be patient and 

thoughtful as we continue to transition from a Strategic Reserve to 

an Operational Reserve. We knew this transition would take years 

and require substantial investment, even if there were no other 

operational demands on the National Guard and the Reserves. I 

also understand that reality gets a vote when you are at war. I am 

aware that in some cases, equipment slated for the Reserve Component was redirected to Afghanistan in support of the surge. That 

was the right thing to do in order to meet the deployment timeliness set by the combatant commander. And we must continue to 

balance strong support for our troops in harm’s way in Afghanistan 

and Iraq with our efforts to modernize and fully equip the Reserve 

Components. 

In a hearing on this matter in 2008, I remarked that in order to 

be successful in operationalizing the Reserve Component we must 

be patient, we must have a solid plan of action, and we must provide the funding stream necessary to make it happen. I still believe 

that to be true. Now that we are two years down the road, I hope 

our witnesses will be able to give us an update on how things are 

going. 

I also look forward to a discussion on sufficiency of the fiscal year 

2011 budget request and an opportunity to understand more about 

the comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Component as proposed in the Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Once again, thank you for being here, thank you for your service. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Before we go into the testimony, after consultation 

with the minority, I now ask unanimous consent that Mr. Michael 

Castle be authorized to question the panel members at today’s 

hearing. Mr. Castle will be recognized after all House Armed Services Committee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

Mr. ORTIZ. We are going to go ahead and listen to the testimony 

now. General Stultz you can begin, followed by General Wyatt and 

General Carpenter. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. 

ARMY RESERVE 

General STULTZ. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, first and 

foremost thank you for the support that you and your committee 

and Congress has given to the Army Reserve over the past several 

years. As you indicated in your statement, we have been and continue to transition from what was a Strategic Reserve force into an 
4 

operational force. And it has, as Congressman Forbes indicated, 

been a slow, methodical process accelerated by the demand of the 

current conflicts and extended conflicts. 

I think the good news that I can tell you is today the Army Reserve has authorized 205,000 soldiers, to grow to 206,000 by fiscal 

year 2013. Today in my ranks, I have 207,749 so I am almost 2,750 

over my authorized strength. 

Just last Friday here in the Capitol, I conducted a reenlistment 

ceremony for 60 Reserve soldiers representing all 50 states, plus 

the territories of Guam and American Samoa, and, by the way, did 

a virtual reenlistment with one soldier in Germany who was unable to be here because of the volcanic ash. But our retention rates 

are exceeding our goals; our recruiting rates are exceeding our 

goals. So the good news is the soldiers we have in our ranks today 

joined our Army, or reenlisted in our Army, since 9/11/2001. They 

know what they have gotten into, and so they are joining the Army 

Reserve knowing that they are going to be called upon in an operational context. 

The challenge we have is we are still being funded or budgeted 

based on the old strategic model of one weekend a month, two 

weeks in the summertime. So we are dependent upon Overseas 

Contingency Operation (OCO) funding to operate as an Operational 

Reserve. 

We have implemented a training strategy using a regional training center concept where we position equipment and position training resources in various regions of the country. We bring our units 

into those locations prior to the mobilization cycle to give them the 

best training on the most modern equipment. That has resulted in 

a reduction in our post-mobilization training time from what used 

to be about 70 to 80 days to now about 30 to 40 days. So we are 

getting 10 to 11 months boots-on-the-ground time with our soldiers 

in theater. And the one thing the soldiers tell me is, ‘‘Don’t waste 

my time. If you are going to use me, use me.’’ 

So we are making great progress. But again, our funding for 

those operations of those regional training centers depends on overseas contingency funds. We have got to get that training strategy 

and we have got to get that operational training model into our 

base budgets by fiscal year 2012. We are working diligently with 

the Chief of Staff the Army and others over the 1217 program to 

put the operational training strategy into the 1217 budget. 

The other thing I would highlight is the equipment. While we 

send every soldier into theater, whether Iraq or Afghanistan, with 

the best trained and most modern equipment, we don’t have that 

same level of equipment back home to train on in a lot of cases. 

And just as importantly, with the trained and combat-seasoned 

force we have now, with those soldiers who have done multiple deployments, it becomes a morale factor when a soldier who has been 

to Iraq or Afghanistan, or both places, operating the latest and 

greatest equipment, the highest technology available, but comes 

back home to look at a 35-year-old truck sitting in the motor pool. 

And so we have to continue to press for the equipment. 

The National Guard and Reserve Equipping Accounts (NGREA) 

that we are dependent upon are so critical to us to give us the flexibility to buy the right equipment in prior times where we need to, 
5 

so that we can get that most modern equipment back home for 

those soldiers to train on. 

Another area of focus for us is medical, dental readiness. We 

have made huge strides in that capacity, but, again, trying to get 

to a level of 80 percent or better in medical readiness, we are only 

funded to get to about 65 percent right now, and so it continues 

to be a challenge. 

So I think in summary, what I would tell you is the good news 

is the Army Reserve is an operational force, the morale is high, our 

recruiting and our retention are at record levels, but we still need 

to press because we are dependent upon overseas contingency ops 

right now, funding, instead of getting that model put into a base 

program. So I look forward to your questions and, again, thank you 

for your support. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Wyatt. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, U.S. AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

General WYATT. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today and share information about the 

readiness posture of our Air National Guard. 

As you know, our authorized end strength is 106,700. And I am 

proud to report today that our current end strength is 108,403, 

about 1,700 airmen over and above our end strength. 

In my previous life as the Adjutant General (TAG) of Oklahoma, 

I had the opportunity to command Air and Army and National 

Guard units. And I will tell you that as I watched the Army National Guard become more of an operational force after 9/11, I 

couldn’t help but make the comparisons between the Air National 

Guard and the Army National Guard. And from my current position, it is encouraging, and I think a key point of our readiness in 

the Air National Guard is we have about 30 percent of our force 

is full-time and resourced, which helps us maintain our readiness 

in the Air National Guard. I have watched the Army National 

Guard, from my perch as the Adjutant General of Oklahoma, get 

better through the years. But I am thankful that we get the support that we do from the Air Force as far as the support of our fulltime force. 

Obviously, the strength of the Air National Guard in addition to 

the full-time force is our drill-status guardsmen. We continue to deploy at unprecedented rates. Since 9/11 we have deployed over 

146,000 Air National Guardsmen; this last year alone, we deployed 

18,366 guardsmen to 62 countries, to every continent in the world, 

including Antarctica. We do that at about a 75 percent volunteerism rate, relying upon mobilization for only about 25 percent 

of the requested forces. 

As we look to our readiness as far as quantities of equipment, we 

are in pretty good shape as far as quantities, but always struggle 

with the quality of our equipment, spending most of our NGREA 

on dual-use modernization, for dual-use equipment, state and fed-
6 

eral. We look to the importance of that account to help modernize 

our equipment, because for us to remain operational it is important 

that we integrate fully into the total force. We would be able to fly 

the same equipment, operate the same systems, so that we can 

truly be an operational force. 

We have been operational basically since the first Gulf War and 

have transitioned through the great support of the Air Force to an 

equal partner, I think, in the total Air Force. We provide about a 

third of the Air Force capability, for about 7 percent of the budget, 

which I think points out the efficiencies that we manage to practice 

in the Air National Guard and the value that we bring to America. 

We continue to struggle as we move from sunset missions to 

emerging missions with training our force and converting from 

those old missions to the new missions. And so while the budget 

adequately funds our training and equipping, we share with the 

Air Force and with the Air Force Reserve limited seats in some of 

the emerging capabilities; capabilities like TACPs, Tactical Air 

Control Parties, and the individuals, especially the enlisted individuals who serve in that critical career field. 

Even though we are above our end strength we do have some 

critical areas, especially in the officer corps, where we are 1,500 officers short. We have critical areas as far as chaplains, intelligence 

officers, engineers, air mobility air crews, individuals who take a 

high degree of education and also a lot of training to get them on 

the step and fully operational. And because of the limited numbers 

of training seats, we share equitably with the active duty and with 

the Air Force Reserve, but we are all struggling with trying to get 

the requisite number of our airmen through those training programs. 

I would be happy to answer the questions of the committee as 

we get further into this morning’s presentation. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Carpenter. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, 

ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

General CARPENTER. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to represent more than 362,000 citizen soldiers in the Army National 

Guard, and, as I speak, 52,807 of our soldiers are serving in harm’s 

way for this Nation. The sacrifice of those soldiers, their families, 

and their employers is something we must not only acknowledge 

but certainly appreciate. 

The National Guard of today is dramatically different from the 

one I joined over four decades ago. The last eight years have seen 

the Guard transform to an operational force. The enablers for the 

Army National Guard have been provided by and sustained by congressional initiatives. We thank you for your continued support, 

and today I would like to talk to you a little bit about readiness. 

As all of you know, the Army National Guard has had a significant evolution in the last eight years. The U.S. Army employs the 
7 

Army National Guard units as an operational force. Units mobilize 

and deploy from different states, territories, and provide support to 

overseas contingency operations and to the homeland defense missions. Our units maintain high levels of readiness, achieving outstanding results in both state and federal missions. 

The key to the readiness of our operational National Guard is 

our personnel, equipment readiness, and facilities. We continue to 

emphasize and improve the quality of our force as we maintain our 

assigned strength. Today I am proud to report that the Army National Guard Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) qualification 

rate exceeds 90 percent, a historic figure. We also continue to 

strengthen our combat, maintenance, aviation, simulation, and 

qualification training centers. 

The Army National Guard has made significant progress modernizing and converting to an operational force. As a result of 

transformation, the Army National Guard’s structure was expanded to include 114 brigades. This includes 28 combat brigades, 

38 functional brigades, and 48 multifunctional brigades across 54 

states, territories and a district. The Army National Guard has 

moved along with the active Army from a division-centric force to 

a more flexible brigade-centric force and is restructuring to create 

units that are more stand-alone and alike while enhancing fullspectrum capabilities. 

Despite equipment shortages, the Army National Guard met all 

mission requirements and continued to support overseas and domestic missions. The current equipment levels in the Army National Guard are 77 percent of all equipment on hand. Critical 

dual-use equipment, a subset of Army National Guard equipment 

that can be used for both the warfight, as well as emergencies and 

disaster operations, has reached an on-hand percentage of 83 percent with 66 percent of that available to the Governors in the 

states and territories. 

During fiscal year 2009 the Army G8 released a new Army 

equipping strategy that establishes a goal of at least 80 percent 

equipment on hand for critical dual use for all Army National 

Guard units, regardless of their rotational cycle in the Army’s 

fourth generation model. 

The National Guard Reserve Equipment Account has been especially important in our pursuit of equipping the force. The Army 

National Guard via the National Guard Reserve and Equipment 

Account received $770 million in fiscal year 2006, 1.1 billion in fiscal year 2007, 1.3 billion in fiscal year 2008, and 779 million in fiscal year 2009. This funding has been used for critical dual-use 

items to support what we call the essential 10 capabilities provided 

to each state, those being command and control, communications, 

aviation, force protection, engineering, logistics, maintenance, medical security, and transportation. 

Thanks to NGREA, for example, we will retire the venerable 

‘‘deuce-and-a-half,’’ the M35 deuce-and-a-half truck from our inventory in fiscal year 2011, a vehicle which was first introduced in 

1949 and continued to be manufactured in 1950. 

The continued support of Congress is critical in several other 

areas. We need the Congress to fully fund our budget request for 

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. These are critical to 
8 

readiness. When those funds are reduced or redirected to other priorities, unit readiness suffers directly. 

For manning, we are asking the Armed Services Committee to 

improve an increase in the Army National Guard’s civilian nondual status technicians. These civilian technicians who do not deploy are critical to the continuous provision of administrative and 

financial functions needed to support our military personnel who do 

deploy. Please support that request, increasing from 1,600 to 2,520 

in non-dual status technicians. 

We are asking Congress’s continued support for the National 

Guard facilities with military construction as well as sustainment 

funds. We have a lot of old Cold War buildings, no longer adequate 

for the operational force, so we need your help to modernize those 

facilities. 

In closing I would like to say that I am confident that the Army 

National Guard will continue to be a full partner in the U.S. 

Army’s total force. As an Operational Reserve, we need to maintain 

our readiness levels, provide full-time manning, equip and train 

our units to meet the combatant commanders’ expectations in a recurrent, predictable cycle, while maintaining our capabilities to respond to the domestic mission. 

We need Congress to continue to support, to properly maintain 

our readiness levels, and to be able to meet the expectations of our 

Nation and its citizens. Our goal is to achieve full-spectrum readiness for the Army National Guard units and full deployment readiness upon mobilization. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and look forward 

to your questions and thank you for your support. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in 

the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. I am going to begin with a question from you, General 

Carpenter. Somebody just said the other day that your vehicles run 

on diesel fuel, jet fuel, but that this institution runs on rumors. 

What we have heard and it is my understanding that the Pentagon 

officials are considering using the Army National Guard for any 

funding in future years because they believe the Army cannot get 

access to the Army National Guard unit that is needed. I just want 

to know is this true or is this a rumor, and what are your thoughts 

on this issue? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, we are having discussions about assured access to the Reserve Component and the National Guard, 

and they center around what happens when the demand in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

decline; will the Army have a continued access to the National 

Guard? The Chief of Staff of the Army has a model that says on 

a rotational basis there is a requirement in three bins for one 

corps, five divisions, 20 brigade combat teams, and 90,000 personnel enablers. And our part of that in the Army National Guard 

is to provide one division, five brigade combat teams, and somewhere around 40,000 of those enablers. 

I would say that the best representation of assured access to the 

National Guard can be found in a couple of areas. The National 

Guard will be ready and will respond when required, regardless of 
9 

the environment, and the response that was provided in 9/11, I 

think, demonstrates that fairly well. Whether it be in New York or 

Pennsylvania or in the Pentagon, we will respond. 

In terms of rotational and ready access, we are exceeding our recruiting requirements. Our retention rate is 115 percent, our soldiers are staying with us in this volunteer force after eight years. 

I think that as you look at that conceptually, if those soldiers were 

not willing to be part of an Operational Reserve, they would have 

left us a long time ago. And that is not happening. 

The other connection here that is important for us to remember 

—and from my generation in Vietnam—the connection between the 

Army and the communities that generate our Army is important. 

And the National Guard provides that connection. We just had 

homecoming ceremonies for the 30th brigade, a brigade out of 

North Carolina. Half of North Carolina showed up to welcome that 

brigade home. We also had a homecoming ceremony for the 34th 

Division up in Minnesota. Again, half of St. Paul and Minneapolis 

showed up to welcome those soldiers home. 

So I think there is a will on the part of the operational piece of 

our soldiers who sign up for this mission to want to be employed. 

The question is whether we will employ them and whether we will 

fund the Operational Reserve. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, when I severed in the Army, I came out 

and I was on a Reserve unit in Corpus Christi. And I think that, 

from my experience, you all do a heck of a job in defending our 

country and being ready to defend it in case that we might have 

to. All we have to do is look at what is happening to the south of 

us, and we need to give you what you need. 

You know, maintaining an Army National Guard costs only a 

fraction of what an active duty unit costs. How can the Army take 

advantage of this efficiency in the years ahead of us? Maybe you 

can give us a little input into that. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, the calculations that have been done by 

the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in this area show 

that it costs about 32 cents on the dollar to have a Reserve Component unit, a National Guard unit available for employment. Even 

when we are called to active duty and mobilize and deploy, we still 

are a bargain because we only represent 90 percent of what the active component soldier costs. And so in terms of a business case for 

the Army National Guard, I don’t think there is any question that 

there are savings to be garnered in terms of investment in the 

Army National Guard and the Army Reserve and the Air National 

Guard. 

There is a balance, of course, in terms of how big the active component is and how big the Reserve Component is. And I think as 

we go forward in the future, that will be certainly a discussion 

item. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I have one more question for General Stultz, and then 

I want to allow members to ask questions because this is a very 

important hearing. General, what kind of changes have you made 

to the Army Reserve’s training system to accommodate the new demands in the Army Reserve and how could the system evolve into 

the future? 
10 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. As I mentioned in the opening, one of 

the changes we made—first of all, we have gone to the fourth generation cycle, a five-year program with four years back home for 

every one year deployed. And in that every four-year buildup to 

that deployment, we have developed a training strategy that increases the number of training days in years three and four to accommodate building a higher level of readiness than what we were 

able to do in a Strategic Reserve. 

In order to do that and as I indicated earlier, in order to make 

sure that the soldiers are training on the latest equipment, the 

most modern equipment, and getting the best training available, 

we have tried to develop a regional training approach. We have established regional training centers at our installations at Fort Hunter Liggett; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and 

other places. There we provided a cadre of trainers that are the experts. So all the warrior leader tasks that are required for any soldier deploying into Iraq or Afghanistan, they are able to go to those 

installations and get the top-of-the-line training. That saves a lot 

of time on the other side of mobilization, so that they are able to 

get more time in theater, boots-on-the-ground time. 

But it also allows us, with the rapid fielding initiative (RFI), 

where they are getting the latest equipment, uniforms, helmets, 

sights, all those types of things that normally they wouldn’t get 

until they get to a mobilization station, we can position that RFI 

at those locations. And when the soldier goes to do his weapons 

qualification, he qualifies with the right weapon, with the right 

sights, with the right helmet with everything, again, saving a lot 

of time. The feedback from the soldiers, they are telling us, ‘‘This 

is the best training I’ve ever had. Well worth my time. You are not 

wasting my time.’’ 

Our next level, we are establishing what we call the Combat 

Support Training Centers (CSTC). And our CSTCs, as we are calling them, are focusing on the collective training, those logisticstype or enabler-type units, again in that premobilization phase, so 

they can come in and train as a unit in a collective format and, 

again, save that time of, when you get mobilized you are not sitting 

in a mobilization station doing training, wasting time, you can get 

on to the mission in theater. 

As I indicated earlier, those types of training activities are currently being funded by OCO. It is costing us around 250 million 

RPA and about 250 million O&M to run those types of operations. 

We are mobilizing, or keep mobilized, around 30,000 soldiers; so a 

significant number of soldiers going through that training every 

year at a significant expense, but well worth the dollar, just as 

General Carpenter indicated, when you look at what return on investment we are getting as a Nation from our Reserve forces. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. The chair recognizes my good friend, 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, again thank 

you for your comments today. 

I have two questions, would love to have your responses to both 

of those, and I will throw them both out so you can do them together. One of the concerns we always have and we recognize is 

that it is critical in developing a force that is ready and has strong 
11 

leadership throughout the ranks to have a good professional military education program. One of the things we always worry about 

is with the demands on the force, the unique structure of the Reserve Components may not allow individuals to pursue educational 

and professional development opportunities. 

So my first question for any of you who care to respond is, What 

comments would you give us on that? Do you think that program 

is working well? Are we providing those opportunities? Is there 

something else that we need to do? 

And then kind of a take-off of a little comment you made, General Carpenter, about simulation centers. How do the three of you 

see modeling and simulation now as an attribute that perhaps you 

can utilize in terms of training or even some of your operational 

functions; how important is that with reduced expenses and costs 

that we have and the utilization that you can make of those two 

components? 

So, any of you in whatever order that you care to do. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. On the first question on professional 

education, it is a challenge. With the operational tempo and the 

fact that our soldiers are citizen soldiers, they have a civilian job 

as well as a military job, and trying to fit all the requirements plus 

a professional education in the amount of time they have got available is tough. We have made great use of distributed learning distance education to get our professional education requirements. 

For instance, in the Army War College, we have most of our lieutenant colonels and colonels going through the distance learning 

program. A lot of them will tell you it is a lot tougher program 

than the residents face, because, one, they are trying to balance a 

civilian career but at the same time they are also doing a lot of 

coursework. 

I think where we are struggling right now, where we need to 

focus is on the joint education. Our soldiers are getting joint experience in deployments, but in their joint professional education, there 

are limited opportunities because there is not as much available 

through a distributed or distance learning program. 

Currently, if you go to the resident war college, you get credit for 

joint professional education. But if you take the distance learning 

course, you don’t. There is not very much difference. So that is 

where we are pressing the Army and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) to say, ‘‘Let’s get joint credit for our distance learning courses.’’ We do have Advanced Joint Professional Military 

Education (AJPME) through a distance course, but through the 

War College and other courses like that. 

On the other question: Simulation, I think, is the future. Obviously we are using it now, but just what I said in the opening 

statement. Well, that soldier who has been in combat and he has 

worked on the latest techniques, tactics, procedures, he has worked 

with the latest equipment, the last thing I can do is bring him back 

home and say, ‘‘Go to your drill center next weekend and sit in a 

classroom and listen to somebody give you a lecture.’’ He wants 

hands-on. 

The problem is we can’t put him in the same environment he just 

came from back in hometown America, but we can through simulations. There are a lot of great simulation systems out there for ve-
12 

hicle operations, for watercraft operations, for light infantry operations, clearing buildings, things like that. But they cost money. 

I am going down next Monday to Orlando, Florida to the Simulation Training Command and to a couple of other companies that 

are in that area just to look at their simulation systems that they 

have got. But they come with a price tag. 

But I think we have to figure out a way of either making simulations available on a regional basis or being able to make them 

available on a mobile basis, so you can get it out there to that soldier and put him in the right training environment that is going 

to retain his skills but also going to retain him as a soldier. 

General WYATT. Congressman Forbes, on behalf of the Air National Guard, professional military education is extremely important to all of our members, officers and enlisted. You kind of hit 

the nail on the head when you talked about the demands for acquiring that professional military education (PME), especially as it 

relates to our drill status guardsmen. We, like the Army National 

Guard, rely heavily upon the distributed learning system to afford 

access from homes or from the wing to the education systems. But 

it is imperative that we continually modify and improve those 

learning systems. 

Just recently, as far as a commissioning program, an example of 

joining with the Air Force and with the Air Force Reserve, we have 

moved our commissioning from McGhee Tyson, Tennessee to partner up with the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force base and the Air 

Force Reserve. But because most of our members are prior service 

and have military experience before they are commissioned, the 

need for a lengthy commissioning program is not a requirement of 

ours, but the Air Force has allowed us to maintain our shorter commissioning program; but because we are at the same location as 

the Air Force and Air Force Reserve, we have a shared common experience that helps us to become more of the total force. So I like 

the progress in that area. 

As far as resident seats, we see greater opportunities for guardsmen to access some of the resident seats. We are always asking for 

more. We see guardsmen who, as we become more operational, decide in their lives that they have more time to spend in residence, 

and so we are looking for increased resident seats to help us with 

our PME. We share the same concerns as the Army National 

Guard does with joint PME. We think that is necessary to develop 

our officer and enlisted corps for follow-on assignments in the joint 

world. 

And to answer your modeling and simulation, I think that is an 

area that we need to invest in more heavily. The quality of the simulators is so much better today, the type of work that is required 

of air crew and even non-air crew can be very well simulated. We 

can now link up the live world, a live training world, a virtual 

world, and a simulation world through networking of all of our simulators. So I think it is critical that we invest in that. 

When we talk about the expense of flying aircraft, which is necessary to do certain levels of training, there is a large block of 

training that can be accomplished very well in simulators; and the 

saved expenses and the saved wear and tear on the aircraft make 

that investment vital. And I think you will see, as we acquire new 
13 

weapons systems in the future, that, in addition to the platforms, 

that there will be great interest put into the simulators that go 

along with that to make us a better total force. 

Thank you, sir, for the question. 

General CARPENTER. Congressman, from the Army National 

Guard perspective, professional military education is absolutely essential for us to be able to conduct our business, whether it is education in the technical side of the house or whether it is leadership 

oriented. Very, absolutely important and critical for us. 

We have seen a backlog now in Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) as a result of mobilization and deployments. We are in the midst of trying to work that particular backlog off. We have got about 40,000 soldiers that need to go to some 

level of NCOES out there, and we have a plan to mitigate that over 

the next couple of years. 

From the Office of Professional Military Education, we have actually seen some successes there because we have been allocated slots 

in resident courses that were left vacant by our active component 

counterparts as they mobilized and deployed. And so that has provided a greater opportunity for us to send some of our officers to 

resident courses that they would not have otherwise had the opportunity to do. 

We have also seen an increase in the number of what we call 

SAMS (School of Advanced Military Studies) graduates, which is 

an accelerated intermediate program at Fort Leavenworth that has 

allowed more National Guardsmen to participate in that particular 

program to round out their professional military education. 

In the area of simulations and distance learning, we have 339 

distance learning centers around the Army National Guard. And 

our challenge is now to be able to refresh those in the long term 

and, again, we have some funding issues there that we are working 

with the Army in terms of trying to make sure that we stay 

abreast of the latest technology in those distance learning centers. 

We also spend a lot of time doing exercises related to those simulations. We have an exportable Combat Training Center package 

that we use as part of the deployment process to validate battalionand brigade-level organizations before they deploy, as well as Battle Command Training Centers in Fort Leavenworth and Fort 

Indiantown Gap. 

Probably the most successful simulator I have seen is the Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) simulator. I am not 

sure what the statistic is for us in the Army National Guard but 

the G3 of the Army says that 30 percent of the soldiers they enlist 

into the Army have never had a driver’s license. And so when you 

take that 30 percent and you put them in an oversized, high-center-of-gravity vehicle and expect them to operate it safely, there is 

a fair amount of training that has to take place. If you put them 

in an MRAP simulator, it is a no-fault situation where you can roll 

that MRAP over and nobody gets hurt, and you get a chance to 

start at the beginning of the process and train. 

So there are some excellent simulators out there that are provided by the technology we see around the country. 

Mr. FORBES. We don’t have time today because as the chairman 

said we want to get to some other questions, but I will leave you 
14 

maybe with a request that at some point in time—Chairman Ortiz 

and I both co-chaired the Modeling Simulation Caucus, and we 

would love if you have time—and I know you have a lot on your 

plate—at some point in time to get your thoughts of how we can 

coordinate better what we are doing with modeling and simulation 

for all of you to utilize; whether you submit that to us in writing 

or perhaps meet with us individually to do that, because I’m like 

you, I think that is kind of the wave of the future. We get a lot 

of bang for our buck and want to make sure we are not duplicative 

in what we are doing, and would love to chat with you further 

about that. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The chair recognizes Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses 

for their testimony today. 

Actually, in the state of Connecticut, in a short span of time in 

March and early April, the Connecticut National Guard demonstrated, again, their incredible importance in value to our state 

and Nation. At the end of March, we were hit by terrible floods, 

which actually President Obama just declared a disaster designation for the state of Connecticut in terms of the terrible weather 

that occurred there. The Connecticut National Guard was called 

out. They saved millions of dollars of property with the pumper 

trucks that were deployed. 

There was a sewer treatment plant in the town of Jewett City 

that was literally about an inch away from just being totally overwhelmed by rising waters. A National Guardsman dove into the 

Quinnipiac River with the hose that was needed to set up the 

pumper and literally saved the day. And the people of that community are so grateful for the amazing talent and training, and obviously courage, that was displayed there. 

On Easter Sunday, a convoy in Afghanistan carrying a number 

of Connecticut National Guardsmen was hit by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED); again, a couple of soldiers over at Walter 

Reed recovering from that terrible event. 

And we now have the largest deployment of Connecticut National 

Guardsmen in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the largest since the Korean War. At every end of the spectrum, we are seeing the amazing 

contribution that these volunteer warriors are providing to our 

state. 

And I guess the question I want to ask, it sort of touched on 

some of the earlier exchanges, was the event that occurred Easter 

Sunday, luckily the soldiers were in an MRAP vehicle. Again, Mr. 

Taylor’s leadership in terms of increasing the size of MRAPs over 

the last few years has paid off in terms of saved lives over and over 

again. But, obviously, Afghanistan has posed a little bit of a challenge because of the roads there, and some of the guardsmen that 

I have spoken to have said that they are still in a situation where 

some use of Humvees is still a reality there because of the need to 

reconfigure the MRAP axle. 

I am just sort of wondering if there is any issue at all in terms 

of guardsmen that are deployed in Afghanistan not having adequate use or access to the MRAP vehicles which obviously provide 

far greater protection than the Humvees. 
15 

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. The Army and the Department of 

Defense have expended a huge amount of effort and funding to get 

the new modern MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M–ATV) version of the 

MRAP into Afghanistan, and they have put forth Herculean efforts. 

It has taxed the air transportation piece of DOD and the commercial fleet almost to the breaking point. So there is a huge effort 

being applied towards that. 

I know that we have had discussions with the Army with regard 

to the future of Humvees and the fact that they are not allowed 

off from the forward operating bases in Iraq. They are not supposed 

to be off from the operating bases in Afghanistan after the M–ATV 

is fully fielded. 

My impression is that we have almost completed the fielding of 

the M–ATV in Afghanistan. So if there are Humvees still being 

used in those operations, I would suggest to you it won’t be much 

longer and they will be replaced. There is a time, space, and physics part of this when you introduce a new piece of equipment; and 

that is, to get the piece of equipment into theater to be used by our 

forces. So to the best of my knowledge, I believe that if there are 

Humvees being used there, they are being used in a limited manner. And I would say they won’t be used much longer after the 

complete fielding of the M–ATVs. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Having spoken to the mother of one 

of the soldiers over at Walter Reed, she got a crash course in the 

value of the MRAP vehicle and wanted me to express the urgency 

to make sure that as many of our folks over there have that protection, and certainly wanted me to encourage the Congress to continue its efforts to make sure that we have a full fleet to make sure 

that transporting people and equipment is done in the safest manner possible. 

Thank you for your follow-up on that effort. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. Mr. Castle. 

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just 

thank both you and the ranking member and the generals who are 

here for what is a nice hiatus in some of my committee meetings 

which tend to be a lot more political, not always in the best interest of the country. You all are serving our country well and we appreciate that tremendously. 

General Wyatt, I would like to ask you a couple of questions of 

the transfers of the C–130s which affects our Delaware Air National Guard, because one of those planes would be from the National Guard. Just reading through all my notes, I am having trouble understanding exactly how many planes we are talking about 

here. I have anything from 12 to 18 to 16 to 21. So you can 

straighten me out on that. 

But I understand, at least the press has reported, this may not 

be accurate. The press reported you have been tasked by the Air 

Force to develop an alternative plan to the proposed fiscal year Air 

National Guard budget. And that is where all this appeared, by the 

way, that would transfer the C–130H aircraft from several states 

to Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas. I just wanted to ask you 

questions about that. The Air Force’s rationale for the planned 

transfer was based in part on Mobility Capabilities and Require-
16 

ments Study (MCRS) 2016 that projects a decrease in the number 

of C–130s required that already been challenged. 

Did the U.S. Air Force request the Air National Guard input or 

suggestions on developing courses of action prior to the President’s 

budget being released to the Congress? 

General WYATT. Congressman, thank you for the question. I am 

pretty familiar with the C–130 process. Basically what happened 

was as the Quadrennial Defense Review was released, as the Mobilities, Capabilities Requirement Studies was nearing completion, 

the headquarters staff had visibility into the preliminary findings 

of the MCRS. Now, this was back in the November-December time 

frame as we were preparing, helping prepare the Air Force budget. 

As it turns out, the MCRS did not change much from that draft 

study. And what that told the Air Force was that there was excess 

capacity in the C–130 fleet. 

Through the Air Force corporate process, a decision was made to 

reduce and retire some of the older C–130s, primarily the E models 

and some of the early Hs. The Air National Guard did participate 

up to a particular point in the process, but, you know, we don’t 

have the tie-breaking vote. So when we saw what the proposal was, 

and the proposal was to retire Es and Hs that were primarily resident in the active component at Little Rock being used to train C– 

130 legacy training, legacy being the training for H 2s, 2.5s and 3s, 

whereas the J model, primarily owned and operated by the active 

component, most of that training was done by the active component. 

So when the decision was made to retire the Es and Hs, there 

was a need at Little Rock to provide aircraft to do the legacy training that was done by an active component wing there. So the initial 

PB–11 (Presidents Budget for Fiscal Year 2011) to backfill the need 

to train provided the removal—permanent transfer of I think it 

was 12 Air National Guard tails from nine different states. In addition to that, there were six C–130E models in Puerto Rico that 

were not part of the training picture, but because they were E models—and the schedule to retire in 2014 that was accelerated to 

2011. 

And then there were three, I think, fighter support aircraft, earlier H models, that were actually Air Force Reserve airplanes but 

were being operated by the Air National Guard that were also to 

be retired. 

As we neared the budget submissions the Reserve Component, 

myself, General Stenner, Commander of the Air Force Reserve, 

worked with the Headquarters Air Force staff representatives from 

Air Education Training Command, Air Mobility Command, and the 

headquarters Air Force staff to start looking at an alternative plan, 

did not have the opportunity to fully vet that alternative plan before the deadline approached for the submission. So the Air Force 

went ahead and submitted the transfer, permanent transfers of 

tails that I just mentioned, that included I think eight Air Force 

Reserve tails, too, as part of the PB–11, with the instruction to continue working an alternative plan. And we have continued to do 

that and in fact are nearing completion with the alternative plan. 

The alternative plan complies with the President’s budget as far 

as the savings generated to the Air Force and accomplishes the 
17 

goal of retiring some of the earlier Es and Hs, but instead of a permanent transfer of the tails from various National Guard units and 

various states to Little Rock, what it involves is not a transfer of 

personnel but a loan of those tails. In other words, the aircraft 

would remain on the books of the Air National Guard but temporarily be loaned to Little Rock for purposes of training. And we are 

setting up under the alternative plan an ARC (Army Reserve Command) association with the Guard and Reserve to handle the old 

legacy training, if you will. And then as the legacy C–130 training 

drops off in the 2014–2015 time range and as the C–130J training 

comes up, those tails that have been loaned by the states will be 

returned back to those states that had loaned those—and they 

won’t be all at once, they will be as the training demand diminishes—then we will start distributing those back out to the states, 

because the states’ units are primarily combat operational units, 

and to preserve their operational capability it is in the best interest 

of the Air Force that those tails, when they are no longer needed 

for training, be transferred back to the Air National Guard. 

So that is kind of the alternative. Instead of a permanent take, 

it is a loan to address a rather short-term training need, but permanent ownership remains with the Air National Guard. And as 

early as we can, we will move those back out to the Adjutants General in the states. 

I visited with General Vavala, the TAG at Delaware, and several 

of the TAGs involved. I think we have a consensus. I have another 

video teleconference (VTC) with the involved TAGs this afternoon, 

as a matter of fact, to bring them up to date. And then we will see 

where the Air Force goes. Right now we are massaging the numbers to make sure that this is doable and still accomplishes the objectives as set forth in the President’s budget. 

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you, gentlemen. My time is up, my questions 

are not. I would ask permission perhaps to submit some questions 

to you in writing. I have a statement for the record, if I may, with 

the consent of the chair. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Castle can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. We try to stay within the 5-minute rule so that all 

members will have a chance to ask questions. Let me yield to my 

good friend, Mr. Reyes. Chairman Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank 

you for your service and leadership at this very critical time. 

General Wyatt, just following up on my colleague’s question, the 

issue of the C–130s you were just referring to was for training and 

not, as we have heard, the transfer of 12 C–130s from the Guard 

to the active component that covers shortage of airlift capacity. Are 

those two different issues? 

General WYATT. Basically, they are related, sir. 

Mr. REYES. They are related? 

General WYATT. They are related. The aircraft that were located 

in the states primarily dedicated to airlift, and satisfied some of the 

requirements of Air Mobility Command. That is why they were involved in this alternative plan that we moved forward. But because 

the budget retired some of the older Es and Hs that were used pri-
18 

marily for training at Little Rock, there was a need to backfill that 

training need, and so the transfer initially proposed under the 

budget as a permanent transfer was necessary. 

As we work through the alternative plan—and we realize that 

the training demand was not steady state through the outyears, 

that it would be decreasing—it opened up the opportunity to consider an alternative and that would be a loan of the tails by the 

Air National Guard and the Adjutants General to Little Rock, to 

be flown by primarily Air Force Reserve pilots and crew to handle 

the training. And then as the training began to drop off, as the C– 

130J training ramped up, then we would pump those tails back out 

to the states. So they are airlift-dedicated airplanes being temporarily used for training, but then going back to the airlift mission. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. REYES. But doesn’t that mean a loss of airlift capacity under 

Title 32? And if so, how much of that loss will these transfers, temporary transfers, represent? And the reason I ask is because oftentimes when we have humanitarian or disaster relief assistance required, C–130s are the backbone of that airlift capability. And I am 

a little bit concerned that there is going to be some degradation of 

Title 32 capacity here. 

General WYATT. While the tails are loaned, yes, sir, there would 

be a degradation. There would not be a permanent degradation as 

there would be under the budget. But under the alternative plan 

while those aircraft are on loan, they would be lost to the particular states. We believe that there are sufficient C–130s in the 

Air National Guard that could be accessed by one state to another 

that may have an additional need for C–130 airlift through the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts that the states have 

with one another that the Adjutants General work out. So for the 

Title 32 state mission requirements that a Governor may need, we 

believe that it will take a little extra work, and it will take a lot 

more coordination, but barring a huge catastrophe, we think there 

would be adequate airlift while we do the training mission, with 

the intent to get that airlift that you mentioned back to the states 

as quickly as we can. 

Mr. REYES. And what is the projected timeframe that this vulnerability will exist? 

General WYATT. We will have a total of, right now, there is an 

Air National Guard nine, primary assigned aircraft (PAA), nine-aircraft unit at Little Rock that does training, and that Air National 

Guard unit will be there even after the loan situation resolves 

itself. 

The additional airplanes that the Guard will bring in will be 

eight, I believe, and the Air Force Reserve will bring in 10, for a 

total of 27 on location for their training. And so as the C–130J 

draws down, that Air National Guard unit that is there and does 

the training mission will remain in place. And we will then be able 

to transfer individual tails back out to the Guard and the Reserve 

as quickly as we can. We think that we will initially begin a year 

or two after we initially get those tails in there. And then by the 

2014, 2015 time frame, we think—— 

Mr. REYES. So it is basically about a five-year period? 
19 

General WYATT. About a four- to five-year period at the longest, 

and there will be some states that won’t be affected that long. 

Some states will be affected for a much shorter period of time. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for your service and for the service of those you lead. We appreciate 

that. I don’t have so much a question as a comment and any kind 

of response that you would care to give as well. 

Every time I hear my colleagues or others propose solutions to 

domestic issues that involve the Guard, whether it is border security or police action in Chicago, whatever it is, my antennae go up 

because I worry about the—now that you are a tactical element as 

opposed to a strategic element—that those demands on the team, 

on top of continuing demands to go to Afghanistan and other 

places, will be something that we would need to know. 

If you get an order, you are going to make it happen, you are 

going to make it work. But to the extent that that requirement 

can’t be fulfilled in the normal, annual training commitment, the 

normal annual work that you do, it goes beyond that. But it takes 

those folks away from jobs, away from families, and away from 

their lives in an unexpected way. 

How can we as policymakers understand the impact of a broad 

border security initiative of some sort or, I don’t think the folks in 

Chicago were really serious about bringing the National Guard in 

to stand in on the corners there, but how do we understand the impact that would have on your team, as it relates to the continuing, 

you know, one-year work and every five years, that rotation, which 

is where we want to get to. Can you give us some thoughts on 

when you hear policymakers talk about using the Guard for solutions that aren’t in a traditional guard role, what kind of contingency plans or plan to do you have in place to look at that? 

Any of the three. It probably doesn’t affect the Air Guard as 

much but the other two. 

General CARPENTER. Congressman, from the Army National 

Guard perspective, we have been living in this environment for the 

last nine years, whether it was an immediate requirement to provide airport security after 9/11, which we did for nine months without any incident and did it in an incredible manner thanks to soldiers we have inside our formations, or the Operation Jump Start, 

which was the border security piece that we completed about a 

year and a half ago. Those, although they are not the normal kinds 

of missions out there, those are missions that the National Guard 

in many cases was designed to respond to in a Title 32 status and 

to support the Governors out there as they go about their business. 

I would tell you that if I am breaking dwell or unannounced 

kinds of requirements out there, that does present some problems 

for some soldiers inside of our formation. We rely on the Adjutants 

General and the commanders throughout the chain of command to 

identify those soldiers that have an absolute serious problem where 

they can’t mobilize and deploy and cross-level other soldiers into 

those formations to be able to respond in that kind of a situation. 
20 

So there is a process in place inside the states to accommodate 

or mitigate some of the issues for people that have hardship situations. 

General STULTZ. From the Army Reserve’s perspective, first, you 

know, being a Title 10 force, we do not get, obviously, call for the 

Title 32. 

However, I see that as probably a waste of resources in some 

cases. When we talk about homeland issues such as hurricanes or 

other disasters like that, quite often we use annual training as a 

mechanism because there is no other authority to call up the Army 

Reserve for those homeland events unless it is a weapons of mass 

destruction event. 

Yet we have, for instance, in the state of Texas, I have 18,500 

Army Reserve soldiers in the state of Texas, which are medical 

units, engineer units, logistics units, all types of capability, which 

in hurricanes go unused unless I take the initiative to use annual 

training as the mechanism. 

We have been saying for some time we think there should be legislation to allow the use of those Title 10 resources, both Army, Air 

and Navy and Marine Corps in those resources, for those homeland 

events. Because, as a taxpayer, the taxpayer doesn’t know this is 

a Title 10 resource versus a Title 32. All they know is there is a 

lot of equipment sitting there in an Army Reserve center that is 

not being used when we need it, and those soldiers who live in 

those communities want to help. In most cases, we do the right 

thing, but we do it using training dollars versus operational dollars. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Chairman Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us and 

thanks for all you do for our Nation and the men and women that 

you represent. Major General Carpenter, I am going to direct this 

to you. 

I remain concerned that although the Army motto is ‘‘we train 

as we fight’’, that I don’t really see a sufficient number of mine resistant vehicles at the training installations for the troops, particularly those who have not deployed once already, for them to get a 

good feel of the MRAP, getting in and out of it, driving that topheavy vehicle around, the restrictions of the vehicle. 

I will use Mississippi’s Camp Shelby as an example. I think we 

have got about two dozen MRAPs to train as many as 5- or 6,000 

troops at a time. That does not strike me as training as they fight. 

Keep in mind that if you have got two dozen on any given day, five 

or six are probably broken so that you really don’t even have the 

two dozen. 

Given the enormous amount of equipment that is being drawn 

down out of Iraq—and I realize, thank goodness, a lot of these single-axle vehicles are being modified in Kuwait to a dual suspension 

where that can be used off road in Afghanistan—but I have still 

got to believe that there is a significant number of MRAPs, singleaxle MRAPs, that are surplus to the inventory. To what extent are 

you and the other services trying to get those to training installations? 
21 

General CARPENTER. Sir, first of all, I talked to Major General 

Freeman specifically the other day on this specific subject. And, of 

course, as you know, Camp Shelby is certainly within his sphere 

of interest. He told me that they had delivered 18 M–ATVs to 

Camp Shelby for training within the past week. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

General CARPENTER. Your description of the situation, even in 

spite of those 18, is fairly accurate. There are too few vehicles to 

train on, too little time at the mobilization station for us to be able 

to get everybody through those trainers and to be able to qualify 

them. 

In the case of Iraq, the driver qualification for those vehicles 

happened primarily at Camp Buehring and that was done through 

a road test and a trainer course that was done there that required 

70 hours of driving before the individual was licensed before they 

went up into Iraq and conducted operations. The Army is formulating a similar setup in Afghanistan to ensure that the drivers are 

qualified before, before they operate the vehicle. 

A combination of the simulation, M–ATV simulation trainer that 

I mentioned earlier and fielding of the actual vehicles, M–ATVs, is 

going to be the solution. You do get some value in training on any 

MRAP vehicle because you get the feel of a high-profile vehicle that 

is certainly an overweight vehicle on narrow roads. But to actually 

qualify, you have to be qualified on that vehicle. 

Again, as I mentioned earlier, the challenge here is that we have 

a limited number of vehicles and a limited amount of time, and our 

goal is to ensure that every driver that drives that vehicle and gets 

the license is qualified and validated no matter how much time it 

takes. But it is a problem. 

Mr. TAYLOR. This would be a question for you and General 

Schultz. In a fairly recent trip to Iraq visiting the 155th, a Colonel 

Van told me that he had an amnesty day, turn it in, no questions 

asked. He had a line of vehicles two miles long, just everything 

under the sun. 

I am curious, given that almost—after every conflict there seems to be some budget tightening, and with the Nation $13 trillion in 

debt that has got to happen at some point. To what extent do your 

commands take a look at those things that are available in Iraq, 

and even if they are not on your requirements list, make a case for, 

gee, you know what, I would like to have that thing, whether it is 

a generator, or whether it is a track hoe, a bulldozer, all those 

things you are going to use after a natural disaster or weapons of 

mass destruction—to what extent do you have the freedom to reach 

out and get those things that the taxpayers have paid for and bring 

them home at what I would think would be a bargain price as opposed to a new acquisition? 

I know it is just one base, so if that is going on at Balad, multiply that times 30 to 50 major installations around Iraq, I have 

got to believe that there is a lot of stuff over there that has been 

purchased by the taxpayers and what I don’t want to see ends up 

at the black market in Syria or Baghdad or even Iran, for all we 

know. 

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. After our last meeting here about 

a month and a half ago on this specific subject, and Colonel Van, 
22 

the situation that you identified, we went back and we did the research. And those vehicles that were being turned into the amnesty 

point at that day, in fact, were being reintroduced into the system 

and are being either redistributed into Afghanistan or are scheduled to return to the United States or a part of a foreign military 

sales program. 

Sir, in addition to that, the discussion I had with you about having an individual in theater to be able to identify property that 

could be used by state and local governments for use in emergencies and disaster operations for their responsibilities, I think 

you will be happy to know—and I think the Army has notified you 

that they do have a person in theater right now who is doing that, 

and they are arranging for that property to be returned to the 

United States. And my—I believe the latest information I had was 

that there were state governments in Alabama that were going to 

have that equipment returned to them for their use. 

And so I would be happy to report, and I think that General Stevenson from the G–4 of the Army has the more detailed information that your efforts to have that property returned for state and 

local government use is, in fact, happening. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I would welcome that report at your convenience, General. 

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. Again, General, thank you for all you 

gentlemen for what you do in war and peace for our Nation. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Before I go to Mr. Johnson how did that equipment 

get out of the system? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, I am not sure I am in a position to really describe, other—other than the accountability process in a time 

of war is probably less than ideal. Other than that, I would have 

to refer you to the Army or the theater commander for more details, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, because we would like to avoid what has 

happened in the past, you know. We have a lot of hurricanes in our 

area, and we need those, the equipment, and Mr. Taylor has put 

it real well, maybe you might say that is equipment that can only 

be used for the next year. 

Well, we have two hurricanes every year, and they would be used 

very professionally in our areas. So if we could just check into that, 

and we don’t want to be losing any more equipment. We would like 

to have better accountability. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, I would say that the equipment isn’t 

necessarily lost, it is just the accountability of it isn’t necessarily 

on the books, and so the equipment is in the hands of the U.S. 

forces and is being used by the U.S. forces. It is just that the documentation isn’t necessarily accompanying all of the equipment and, 

again, that goes to some of the situations I described. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, back in the early 1980s, as a young man I considered 

going into the Army National Guard, and I was only looking at it 

from the standpoint of, you know, one weekend a month and two 

weeks during the summer, and the mission has changed drastically 

since that time. So I want to thank you and the people that you 
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lead and their families, and your families as well, for the sacrifice 

that the Reserves and the National Guard units have been called 

upon to fulfill over the last 10 years. 

Lieutenant General Wyatt, were any of those C–130 aircraft 

transferred from Georgia units, state of Georgia units? 

General WYATT. Sir, I believe they were probably talking about 

the Savannah unit. Under the President’s budget, they were scheduled to lose one airplane, but they were also scheduled to transition 

into a different version of airplanes. Under the alternative plan, I 

believe Georgia would be asked again to loan an airplane instead 

of lose a tail so, yes, sir, they were affected. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me ask another question, Lieutenant General 

Wyatt. The requirement for fighter aircraft has been reduced from 

2,200 in 2008 to 2,000 for 2010. How will that reduction affect the 

Air National Guard’s ability to perform the Air Sovereignty Alert 

(ASA) mission? 

General WYATT. Thank you, sir. The ASA mission, the Air Sovereignty Alert mission, currently flown by the Air National Guard 

at 16 locations nationwide out of a total of 18 locations. As you 

know, the 2010 combat Air Forces reduction, which you mentioned, 

took the total number of fighter aircraft in the combat forces from 

about 2,250 to 2,000. As we look at the air sovereignty mission in 

2010 and in the outyears, we are okay right now. It did not affect 

our ability to carry on the Air Sovereignty Alert mission. But at 

those 16 locations, 10 and sometimes 11 of those locations are 

flown by some of the older Block 30 F–16 units, which do have a 

life expectancy concern. Those are older airplanes, they are reaching the end of their service life. We think most of that have fleet 

will age out about 2015 or 2016. So my concern is how do we cover 

the Air Sovereignty Alert mission in those outyears. 

The Chief of Staff has indicated that there is a Department of 

Defense obligation, and he has pledged adequate resources to make 

sure that that mission is covered. There are ways to approach the 

requirements of that mission. We know that currently the Commander of NORTHCOM, General Renuart, is conducting a study on 

their current requirements, which will be the first one post-9/11, to 

determine if 18 is the required number or if it is perhaps more or 

a little bit less. 

We should have that report out here pretty soon. And when that 

report is filed then we will be able to relook our ability to cover the 

Air Sovereignty Alert mission, especially as we approach the 2015, 

2016 time period. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. With respect to the retirement or 

the accelerated retirement of the legacy aircraft, how involved was 

the Air National Guard in the analysis that led to the reduction? 

General WYATT. You are talking about the 2010 reduction from 

2,250 to 2,000, sir? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

General WYATT. We were involved, part of that process, the Air 

Force corporate structure allows participation by the Reserve Components all the way through the process. Again, there are debates, 

specifically how a particular reduction will be made, but reviewing 

how that was done, it was shared across all three components, all 

three components took reductions. 
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Mr. JOHNSON. Was that decision made before or after the Air National Guard’s involvement? 

General WYATT. The final decision was made after, with our 

input. And, like I say, the Air National Guard probably didn’t get 

100 percent of what we wanted. The same thing could be said 

about the Air Force Reserve. The same thing could probably be 

said about the Air Force. It was a collaborative effort. We all 

shared in the reduction to some degree. 

There were some good things that came out of the reduction. For 

example, some of the older—we had a Block 25 unit in Duluth, 

Minnesota, for example, that was able to upgrade to Block 50, F– 

16s that were being drawn out of Spangdahlem Air Force Base, 

Germany. So we were able to upgrade some of the models at some 

of our units. 

There were other fighter units that lost their airplanes, but we 

have been able to roll in new missions, emerging missions. The 

150th Fighter Wing in New Mexico is an example, currently losing 

their F–16s, but they are transitioning into C–130 and HH–60 special operations training mission. And they are doing a great job in 

that transition, working with the active component. 

And we seek to do that with all units that may be losing aircraft, 

either to upgrade the aircraft or transition them into an emerging 

mission that will take advantage of huge human capital, great experience and skills of our guardsmen, which remain in demand 

whether we are flying platforms or not. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for your service, and we will take 

your recommendations very seriously. I think that they are very 

sound. We don’t know where the next conflict is going to be. We 

are going to have to keep you well-funded, well-equipped and welltrained. 

We have an excellent committee here, subcommittee, that wants 

to work with you. 

Like I said, I had a chance to serve on the Army Reserve when 

I came out, and I think that what you see, the personnel that 

serves either on the Reserves or National Guard are cream of the 

crop. They are well trained. They joined because they love their 

country and they want to be of help and service, and we just want 

to say thank you so much for the great job that you do and we will 

keep working together. 

If there are no further questions, some questions may be submitted later for the record. This hearing stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 27, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 27, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 27, 2010 

(81) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. You have been quoted in the press calling for as much as $1 billion 

in additional funding over the next five years in order to maintain the ‘‘operational’’ 

status of the Army Reserve. Is that still your view? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES 

Mr. REYES. We are increasing funding for training time and equipment sets so 

that we can fund the train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model anticipating that the 

Army Reserve and Army National Guard will continue deploying every fifth year for 

sustained conflict. We are increasing this capacity even as we begin a massive drawdown of deployed Reserve forces in Iraq this year and Afghanistan next year. What 

will happen with this increased capacity after Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General STULTZ. Given the fact that there will be a drawdown and Army will continue with train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model, the Army Reserve anticipates 

our increased operational capacity will be applied towards expanded Institutional 

Support missions, Domestic Support Operations (CCMRF), OCONUS Domestic Support Operations, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events. 

Mr. REYES. In 2008, the Air Force stated its requirement for fighter aircraft at 

approximately 2,200; this year, the Air Force reduced this requirement to 2,000. 

Previous witnesses from DOD and the Air Force have stated that this reduction is 

made possible, in part, because traditional fighter missions may be pushed to UAVs. 

Is this a realistic assertion concerning ASA missions? What ASA missions could be 

accomplished by UAVs? 

General WYATT. Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) may have a role in the future 

of homeland defense, but not in the sense that a traditional manned fighter performs in the current environment. Our current RPA capabilities are best suited for 

surveillance and targeting fixed or slow moving ground targets. Our increased use 

of RPA capabilities has allowed us to transfer the other traditional requirements 

from fighters to these assets; however, the dynamic environment of ASA does not 

fit as one of those traditional mission sets. 

Mr. REYES. I understand that the Air National Guard and Air Reserve fly the 

overwhelming majority of Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) missions in defense of the 

homeland. I also understand that you fly these missions with aging F–15 and F– 

16 aircraft which are nearing the end of their service. In light of continuing delays 

in the F–35, are you concerned with your ability to continue ASA missions? Do you 

have concerns about the apparent tension between planned aircraft retirements and 

the fielding of new aircraft to the Air Guard and Reserve? 

General WYATT. Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee and to 

highlight the significant role the Air National Guard (ANG) plays in providing for 

our Nation’s homeland defense. The ANG operates 16 of the 18 Operation Noble 

Eagle ground alert locations. Many of these sites are operated by units equipped 

with some of the oldest aircraft in the Air Force (AF) inventory. 

The AF has recently reassured Congress that defense of the homeland remains 

DOD’s highest priority mission and that the AF will continue to steadfastly support 

Operation Noble Eagle through the Total Force concept as it has since 9/11. The 

ANG concurs with the AF assessment that under FY11 programmatic assumptions, 

along with small investments in the F–16 Block 30 fleet sustainment, the impact 

on the ANG Homeland Defense missions are minimal through the FYDP. Aggressive 

management of the F–35 program combined with 4th generation modernization and 

service life extension programs are being reviewed to reduce risk outside the FYDP. 

While I cannot speak to any F–35 program delays, the AF has acknowledged that 

additional 4th generation aircraft will become available to recapitalize older ANG 

fighters as the F–35 is fielded. We continue to work closely with the AF to ensure 

the ANG is a part of this process and included in any recapitalization plans. 

Mr. REYES. We are increasing funding for training time and equipment sets so 

that we can fund the train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model anticipating that the 
82 

Army Reserve and Army National Guard will continue deploying every fifth year for 

sustained conflict. We are increasing this capacity even as we begin a massive drawdown of deployed Reserve forces in Iraq this year and Afghanistan next year. What 

will happen with this increased capacity after Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General CARPENTER. The same capacity built over the course of the present conflict will be sustained, rather than increased, through the funding of the Guard and 

Reserves as an operational force. This sustained readiness level will maintain the 

National Guard’s ability to continue the same capability to respond to both overseas 

and domestic requirements. 

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states that the DOD ‘‘requires vibrant National Guard and Reserves that are seamlessly integrated into the broader All-Volunteer Force’’ and that ‘‘our nation must have a force generation model that provides sufficient strategic depth.’’ The train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model (Army 

Force Generation, or ARFORGEN,) is the result of this initiative. 

Over the past eight years, the Guard and Reserves have made sustained contributions to ongoing operations. The additional funding for training time and equipment 

sets will allow the Guard and Reserve to sustain the Operational Readiness that 

has been built while supporting the current conflicts. Furthermore, the Quadrennial 

Defense Review acknowledges that ‘‘using the National Guard and Reserves in this 

way will lower overall personnel and operating costs . . . ’’ 

Mr. REYES. How much less dedicated pre-deployment collective training at the brigade level do Reserve and Guard units receive than their active duty counterparts? 

General CARPENTER. 

Reserves: 

The Army is unable to provide sufficient Live-Virtual-Constructive operational environment training experiences for Army Reserve CS and CSS forces. The Army Reserve has developed the Combat Support Training Center (CSTC) program to meet 

this requirement prior to mobilization station training. Army Reserve is synchronizing and integrating with Army this capability with its Combat Training Center 

and home station opportunities (e.g. CASCOM’s Command Post Exercise – 

Sustainment) to off-set this deficit. The CSTC program is currently resourced by 

Overseas Contingency Operations funding. If the Reserve Components were no 

longer funded for this pre-mobilization training capability, more post-mobilization 

training time would be required to meet the same standard as their active duty 

counterparts. 

Guard: 

Active duty units train to brigade level proficiency while the Army National 

Guard trains to company level proficiency with staffs trained to level organized. The 

factors that limit our capability to attain company level proficiency have been tied 

to chronic under funding of our operational tempo accounts. Shortfalls in base training programs to include operational tempo accounts have been masked by the use 

of overseas contingency funds. 

During the three year active duty Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle a 

unit is expected to receive two Battle Command Warfighter exercises and two Combat Training Center rotations (like the National Training Center). The Army National Guard five year ARFORGEN model only provides for one Battle Command 

Warfighter exercise and one Combat Training Center rotation. Currently, only brigade combat teams that are conducting full-spectrum operations are scheduled for 

Combat Training Center rotations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Mr. KISSELL. Are there any concerns for recruitment and retention of Reserve doctors? Are there any plans to address the need for Reserve doctors to continue to pay 

their private practice expenses when deployed? Is deployment pay adequate to address the professional and personal expenses Reserve doctors must continue to address when deployed? Are there solutions outside of the Department of Defense to 

fix problems in the system? 

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. KISSELL. Is there a shortage of C–130s in the Air Force? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. KISSELL. Are states affected by the C–130 restructuring and ‘‘loan’’ arrangement going to have a decreased ability to react to emergencies within the state? If 

so, how are the risks mitigated? 
83 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. KISSELL. Are you working alongside Major General Byers to help determine 

the location of a fourth Silver Flag Exercise Site? What is the status of the selection 

committee? Have you considered Stanly Airport and the 145th Civil Engineer 

Squadron? 

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. KISSELL. I recently sent a letter to General McKinley addressing my support 

of opening a second ChalleNGe Academy in North Carolina. Major General Ingram 

and the North Carolina National Guard do a wonderful job turning young lives 

around at their existing facility. Major General Ingram has a great plan to expand 

his capability and reach more of our at-risk youth. What is the timeline for a decision? What criteria are you basing your decision? I appreciated your response to my 

letter, but would like more details. 

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] 

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