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“Negotiations without 

preconditions will not resolve 

the Western Sahara conflict. 

The U.N. should recognize 

that further rounds of meetings, formal or informal, 

where the parties talk past 

each other while fixed in 

their positions, are futile.”

April 23, 2010 

Western Sahara: The Failure of 

“Negotiations without Preconditions”

Summary

•	 The ongoing effort to use negotiations without preconditions to resolve the conflict between 

Morocco and the Polisario Front over Western Sahara has not produced results. The April 6, 

2010 report of the United Nations secretary-general to the U.N. Security Council admits that 

there has been no movement on the core substantive issues. 

•	 The informal talks between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front organized by 

Christopher Ross, current personal envoy to the U.N. secretary-general, from February 10–11, 

2010, resulted at an impasse. 

•	 Neither Morocco nor the Polisaro Front is prepared to accept the other’s proposal as the 

sole basis for future negotiations. Barring pressure from their Western allies, nothing in their 

relations, in the region or international environment is likely to occur to change this in the 

foreseeable future. 

Introduction

The conflict over Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, which 

represents the people of Western Sahara, has been on the agenda of the United Nations Security 

Council for close to 19 years, since June 1991, when the council took up the issue and established 

MINURSO, the U.N. mission in Western Sahara. Throughout this period, the U.N. cannot show any 

real progress towards resolution of the conflict, other than occasional outbursts of optimism that 

eventually have come to naught. 

Peacemaking efforts towards a political solution, undertaken in order to move the parties away 

from the winner takes all solution envisaged by the referendum on self-determination under the 

U.N. Settlement Plan, have been at an impasse since June 2004. James A. Baker, III, the first United 

Nations personal envoy of the secretary-general, charged with such a task, resigned from his 

position at that time after he served in that role for seven years, stating that he had done all he 

could to resolve the conflict. He pointed out that only the parties themselves could exercise the 

political will necessary to reach an agreed-upon solution, as the U.N. would not solve the problem 

without requiring the parties to do something they would not voluntarily agree to do. The most 

recent informal talks between the parties organized by Christopher Ross, current personal envoy, on 

February 10 and 11, 2010 resulted at an impasse as did all previous talks organized by the U.N. since 

the Security Council adopted Resolution 1754 on April 30 2007, asking the parties to negotiate 

without preconditions.

Anna Theofilopoulou

E-mail: anna_theofilo@yahoo.com

peaceBrieF22
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Western Sahara: The Failure of “Negotiations without 

Preconditions” page 2 • PB 22 • April 23, 2010

This Peace Brief outlines why the mediation process remains stalled. Specifically, it discusses why 

the U.N. plan of negotiations without preconditions is not working. The parties remain entrenched 

in their positions, and key regional and international actors are not pressuring Polisario or Morocco 

to make compromises that would move the negotiations forward. The conflict has gone on for 

so long, without the bloodshed and other devastating effects of most international conflicts, that 

the international community has become comfortable with the status quo, often using the lack of 

violence as measure of success for the U.N. This also seems to suit both parties and Algeria, a key 

supporter for Polisario. 

Setting the Stage for “Negotiations without Preconditions” 

In early April 2007, Morocco and Polisario submitted two different and irreconcilable peace 

plans. On April 10, 2007 Polisario submitted a proposal for a solution through the Baker Plan and 

offered guarantees to Morocco, in the event of independence; the next day, Morocco submitted 

a proposal granting autonomy to its “southern provinces,” as it refers to Western Sahara, within 

the framework of the Kingdom’s sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity. Morocco had 

promised to submit such plan after it rejected the Baker Peace Plan in April 2004. 

The Security Council responded to these two proposals on April 30 with Resolution 1754, 

which asked the parties to negotiate without preconditions, under U.N. auspices, with a view to 

achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution which would provide for the 

self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Resolution 1754 was adopted three years 

after the council weakened its support of mediation efforts by Baker, which had prompted his 

resignation in June 2004.

Resolution 1754, approved on April 30, 2007, came about after Personal Envoy Peter van 

Walsum, appointed in August 2005, came to the conclusion that proposing another peace plan 

would be pointless given the parties’ entrenched positions. In January 2006, he suggested two 

prospects to the Security Council: either continuation of the stalemate, with all the dangers that 

it entailed, or start negotiations between the parties without preconditions. Negotiating without 

preconditions would not require Polisario to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory 

in order to discuss autonomy, nor leave room for a demand by Polisario for a referendum with 

independence as one of the options. In responding to van Walsum’s suggestions, the council 

seemed to favor Morocco’s proposal. At the prompting of the U.S., Resolution 1754 singled out the 

Moroccan proposal as “serious and credible,” while “taking note” of the Polisario proposal.1

 

From the beginning, Resolution 1754 raised questions about whether the council’s request 

could really result in any progress. Firstly, the resolution does not elaborate on the meaning of 

“negotiations without preconditions”; or, the council’s expectations of what should be negotiated. 

As a result, each party interpreted it differently and proceeded to advocate and retain its own 

position during the sessions. Secondly, the call to work towards a mutually acceptable political 

solution, which implies a compromise satisfying both parties, is contradictory to the concept of 

self-determination through choice by the people. Moreover, the call for self-determination overlooks Morocco’s claim of “sovereignty” in its offer of autonomy, which Polisario does not accept. 

Finally, Morocco felt its proposal was more widely accepted since the resolution had welcomed it 

as “serious and credible.” For Polisario, all that matters is that both proposals are on the table and 

therefore both ought to be discussed. 

Neither the Security Council, nor the individual states within and outside the council took into 

account that both sides adhered to the same positions as they had had when Baker resigned. 

Morocco does not accept any solution that would include a referendum with independence as an 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Western Sahara: The Failure of “Negotiations without 

Preconditions” page 3 • PB 22 • April 23, 2010

option; for Polisario, an act of self-determination must include such an option. Neither the council 

nor individual countries with influence over Morocco or Polisario are willing to pressure them to 

make some concessions and find a solution.

The “Negotiations” and Subsequent Events

As directed by Resolution 1754, the parties began negotiation without preconditions. The parties 

held four rounds of negotiations: June and August of 2007 and January and March of 2008. None 

of these resulted in modifications of either party’s position. Communiqués issued by Personal 

Envoy van Walsum, in agreement with the parties, stated that during the talks the parties continued to express strong differences on the fundamental questions at stake, while at the same time 

reiterating their commitment to continue meeting. 

In his briefing to the Security Council in April 2008, the personal envoy informed the council 

that having both parties’ irreconcilable proposals on the table hindered negotiations. It did not 

encourage either side to compromise. Therefore, he suggested that both proposals be taken 

off the table and further negotiations be based on the fact that the Security Council would not 

make Morocco accept a referendum with independence as an option and that the U.N. would not 

recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the Territory. Furthermore, the personal envoy asked for 

clearer guidance from the council, warning that if the council could not make a choice, the parties 

would not be able to either. 

Resolutions 1813 and 1871 ignored the key points of van Walsum’s briefing and repeated the 

request of 1754 for “negotiations without preconditions.” 2

 Subsequently, van Walsum became 

persona non grata for Polisario and Algeria, with both accusing him of bias towards Morocco and 

its proposal. In August 2008 van Walsum’s contract, as the secretary-general’s personal envoy, was 

not renewed. Christopher Ross was named personal envoy on January 7, 2009. 

Ross visited the region twice before announcing that the parties had accepted his proposal for 

an informal meeting prior to a fifth round, which he hoped “would ‘make an important contribution to the search for a resolution to the conflict.’ ”3

 The first informal meeting under Ross took 

place in Austria on August 10-11, 2009. At its closing, the personal envoy, in agreement with the 

parties, issued a statement that the discussions had taken place in an atmosphere of serious 

engagement, frankness and mutual respect and that the parties reiterated their commitment to 

continue their negotiations as soon as possible at a date and place fixed by him in consultation 

with them. A few days later, each side went public pointing to the other side’s inflexibility and 

insisting on its position, while stressing that its preferred solution was the only reasonable one that 

could fairly resolve the conflict. An identical statement was issued by Ross at the end of the second 

informal meeting adding that the proposals of both parties were again presented and discussed 

but at the end neither party had accepted the other’s proposal as the sole basis of future negotiations. The two sides nevertheless said they would continue their negotiations as soon as possible.

The Haidar Affair and the Regionalization Committee

A further complication to the conflict in late 2009 was the expulsion to the Canary Islands and 

subsequent hunger strike by Saharan human rights activist Animatou Haidar. Upon Haidar’s arrival 

to the Laayoune airport, Moroccan authorities confiscated her Moroccan passport because she 

indicated in her entry form that her nationality was “Saharawi,” rather than Moroccan. 

For more than one month, even as various organizations outside the U.N. appealed to Morocco, 

made public statements calling for Haider’s release, and drew attention to her deteriorating health, 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Western Sahara: The Failure of “Negotiations without 

Preconditions” page 4 • PB 22 • April 23, 2010

the Moroccan authorities did not relent. The situation was resolved when the U.S., France and 

other European countries convinced Morocco to accept her back on humanitarian grounds. 

On January 3, 2010 King Mohammed VI announced the establishment of an Advisory Committee on Regionalization. One of its key objectives would be to see that Morocco’s recovered 

“southern provinces” were among the first to benefit from the regionalization system. 

Performance by Key Players

The Security Council continues pressing for self-determination and a mutually acceptable political 

solution in its resolutions, but ignores that there is no common ground between the parties on 

these issues. All resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Western Sahara provide for 

a referendum with the option of independence. But, Morocco views Western Sahara as part of it, 

while Polisario rejects this. Thus, linking self-determination with independence, while no action is 

taken to make it happen, has only contributed to the irresolution of the conflict.

External allies to Morocco or Polisario have not helped to end the conflict. France and the U.S. 

have been strong supporters of Morocco. Indeed, in April 2004, the U.S. weakened its support 

of the Baker Plan after Morocco rejected it and joined France and Spain in supporting a solution 

based on Morocco’s future autonomy proposal. Morocco’s cooperation on counterterrorism was 

a key factor influencing the U.S. to depart from its previously more neutral approach. Polisario, 

on the other hand, enjoys support from Algeria, South Africa, Cuba, Venezuela, some European 

parliaments, some members of the U.S. Congress, and several other countries. 

Spain has moved closer to Morocco. However, Spain’s support is tempered by the widespread 

public support that Polisario enjoys in Spain and Algeria’s protests of Spain’s position. China 

and Russia have been inconsistent in their positions due to contradictions in their own internal 

politics: China will not take a position that could raise questions about Tibet, while Russia is caught 

between its refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence on the one hand and its recognition of 

Abkazia and South Ossetia on the other. 

In an interesting juxtaposition to Russia, the U.S., France and several members of the European 

Union have recognized Kosovo’s independence but refuse to accept the same option for Western 

Sahara—despite their “lip service” to the cause of self-determination. In fact favoring Morocco’s 

offer of self-determination and ignoring Morocco’s open provocation to the Security Council when 

referring to its “sovereignty and territorial integrity” when referring to Western Sahara, demonstrates quite clearly that for these key actors bilateral interests have priority over efforts to seek a 

fair and long-term solution to the conflict. 

The appointment of another U.S. national as personal envoy and the change in the U.S. 

administration raised Polisario’s hopes that the U.S. might abandon its pro-Moroccan policy of 

the Bush administration. Meanwhile, Morocco feared that a new U.S. administration might be 

tempted to change a policy that hitherto had brought only scant results towards resolution. As 

such, Morocco elevated its rhetoric regarding its uniqueness in safeguarding U.S. counterterrorism efforts in North Africa and intensified, with successful results, its lobbying of members of 

the U.S. Congress. Still, the U.S. cannot afford to ignore Algeria’s importance in the hydrocarbon 

business or counterterrorism cooperation, especially since the creation of U.S. African Command. This necessitates that the U.S. tread carefully between Algeria and Morocco, its two North 

African allies. 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

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www.usip.org

About This Brief

This Peace Brief provides an 

analysis of why the United Nations 

strategy of urging the parties to 

negotiate without preconditions 

has stalled efforts to resolve the 

conflict over Western Sahara, 

Morocco and the Polisario Front. 

Anna Theofilopoulou, a former 

U.N. official and a member of 

James Baker’s negotiating team, 

has covered the conflict from 

1994 to 2006. This Peace Brief 

has been sponsored by Dorina 

Bekoe, senior research associate 

in the Center for Conflict Analysis 

and Prevention at the U.S. Institute 

of Peace. It is part of a series of 

papers on the developments in 

Western Sahara. 

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

Conclusions and Recommendations

The question arises whether real progress towards peace requires constant nudging by others or 

whether parties will move ahead when their own self-interest propels them to do so. An axiom 

of negotiations—that the mediator cannot want a solution more than the parties themselves—

appears to be ignored in the case of Western Sahara. Since 1991 the parties have been supported 

and nudged by the U.N. with little to show by way of progress. Only the parties could exercise the 

political will necessary to agree on a solution if the U.N. is not willing to ask them to do something 

that they would not voluntarily agree to do. Resolution 1754 is not asking them to do anything of 

the kind, with predictable results. 

Negotiations without preconditions will not resolve the Western Sahara conflict. The U.N. should 

recognize that further rounds of meetings, formal or informal, where the parties talk past each 

other while fixed in their positions, are futile.

The Security Council and the mediator need to set goals which the parties should be pressed 

to consider seriously even if they do not meet their total aims. The parties should be asked to 

undertake compromises that they are not willing to make and the Security Council should be asked 

to support such requests. In order to help resolve the conflict, the council should abandon the “negotiations without preconditions” formula and demand concrete steps towards a definite solution. 

The Haidar incident is indicative of the bad faith and lack of trust between the parties and 

demonstrated further the absence of good will and desire for cooperation from both sides. The 

new push by Morocco towards regionalization and its stated key objective aimed at Western 

Sahara appear to boycott U.N. peacemaking efforts. However, the manner in which the Haidar 

affair was resolved shows that pressure by strong allies stressing the advantage of compromise can 

bring results. As Vice President Joseph Biden said recently when referring to Israel, only a friend can 

deliver the hardest truth. 

In this spirit, key countries and supporters of Morocco and Polisario should pressure them to 

make meaningful compromises in resolving the Western Sahara conflict—something that could 

be a key card in Ross’s hands if he is willing to use it.

Endnotes

1. S/RES/1754(2007)

2. S/RES/1813(2008), S/RES/1871(2009)

3. “Western Sahara: U.N. Envoy Wraps Up Regional Visit.” U.N. News Center, July 1, 2009. 

(http://www0.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31334). 

Western Sahara: The Failure of “Negotiations without 

Preconditions” page 5 • PB 22 • April 23, 2010