Responding to War and

S t a t eC o l l a p s ei nWe s tA f r i c a

B r i e f l y . . .

• The past dozen years of warfare in West Africa have led to the death, injury, and

mutilation of hundreds of thousands of people and the displacement of millions

more.

• C o n f l ict erupted in Liberia in 1989, Sie r ra Leone in 1991, and Guinea in 2000, but

f ig ht i ng in West Africa has not been confined to these states. Serious bloodshe d

also occurred in Guinea-Bissau (1999), the southern Casama nce re g ion of Sene g a l

( o ngo i ng), and Nige r ia (ongo i ng) and conflict thre a t e ns to engulf Côte d’Iv o i re.

• Wo r k i ng group members were divided over the future of the re g ion: some were caut iously optimistic that Sie r ra Leone’s Revolutio nary United Fro nt (RUF) is finishe d

as a military fo rce; others believed that the rebel group will fig ht again to ma i ntain cont rol of the Sie r ra Leonean dia mo nd fie l d s.

• T he group agreed that the causes of these conflicts are ma n i fo l d. Int e r nal fa c t o r s

i nc l ude poverty, lack of econo m ic opportunity, ethnic animo s i t ie s, and a history of

p o l i t ical abuse and corruption. External factors inc l ude the int e r v e nt io ns of Burkina

Faso, Libya, and a host of non-state actors.

• Unde r l y i ng the pro l i f e ra t ion of the so-called “soft threats” to U.S. na t io nal security is the gro w i ng phe no me non of state collapse in Africa. The cycle of state collapse now occurring in Liberia, Sie r ra Leone, and Guinea places the ent i re We s t

A f r ican re g ion at risk.

• In fiscal year 2000 the United States contributed over $128 million to the Un i t e d

Na t io ns Armed Mission to Sie r ra Leone (UNAMSIL), a fig u re that grew to ne a r l y

$190 million in fiscal year 2001. This accounts for a sig n i f ic a nt pro p o r t ion of the

U.S. hu ma n i t a r ian aid budget, funds that are de s p e rately ne e ded elsewhe re.

• T he key to future collaborative efforts in the re g ion between the United States

a nd its Western European allies will be to ide ntify ways to harness Fra nce’s cons ide rable re g io nal influence and elicit polic ies from Paris that are mo re compatible with our own.

• T he adm i n i s t ra t ion has followed a thre e - p ro ng approach in West Africa. First, the

United States has cont i nued to support UNAMSIL fina nc ially and through military

t ra i n i ng of African peaceke e p e r s. The U.S. go v e r n me nt has also worked closely with

t he United Kingdom and supported Britain’s lead role in re s t o r i ng peace in Sie r ra

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O RT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

January 21, 2002

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

Early last year, the situa t ion on the gro u nd in

West Africa looked grim. War ra ged between Sie r ra

L e o ne’s Revolutio nary United Fro nt and Guine a n

fo rces in southern Guinea, and various arme d

g roups staged inc u r s io ns on both sides of the

L i b e r ia / G u i nean borde r. In lig ht of this fig ht i ng

a nd the gloomy specter of a gro w i ng re g io nal war

in West Africa, the United States Institute of

Peace fo r med the West Africa Wo r k i ng Group and

c o n v e ned groups of experts on these conflicts fo r

four me e t i ngs between Ma rch and Au g u s t .

The primary purpose of the working group was to

b r i ng toge t her ind i v iduals from various na t io na l

a nd int e r na t io nal age nc ies and org a n i z a t io ns to

s hed lig ht on the na t u re of the conflicts in We s t

A f r ica and re c o m me nd appro p r iate Ame r ic a n

re s p o ns e s. This report summarizes the most salie nt

p o i nts of discussion and puts forth a dozen 

re c o m me nda t io ns for Ame r ican polic y ma ke r s

a t t e m p t i ng to address the ins t a b i l i t y.

The working group was chaired by Chester Cro c ke r,

p rofessor of stra t e g ic stud ies at Georgetown Un i v e rs i t y, and coord i nated by Timo t hy Docking, pro g ra m

of f icer in the Je n n i ngs Randolph Pro g ram for Int e rna t io nal Pe a c e. The report was written by Docking .

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pe a c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

T he West Africa Regio nal Wa r 2

T he Big Pic t u re 3

Causes of the Conflic t 4

U.S. Int e rests in West Afric a 4

U.S. Po l icy toward the Regio n 6

C h a l l e nges to U.S. Po l ic y 6

C o nc l u s io n 7

R e c o m me nda t io ns 7
L e o ne. Fina l l y, the United States cont i nues its military and fina nc ial support to the

C o nté go v e r n me nt in Guinea. The main aim of the adm i n i s t ra t ion’s policy is to

i nc rease re g io nal stability while bring i ng about re g i me change in Liberia .

• U N A MSIL must be seen for what it is: a quick-fix, capacity-building effort that is

not sustainable over the long run. Unless the profo u nd socio - e c o no m ic pro b l e ms

that grip the ent i re re g ion are addre s s e d, West Africa will re main fertile gro u nd fo r

f u t u re vio l e nt conflic t .

The West Africa Regional Wa r

For observers of the West Africa re g io nal war, the re c e nt calm in the war-torn Ma no

River Un ion (MRU) states—Liberia, Sie r ra Leone, and Guinea—has given rise to optimism. Gua rded as this optimism mig ht be, the de c rease in vio l e nce in West Africa du ri ng the second half of 2001 is an important de v e l o p me nt given the scope and int e ns i t y

of fig ht i ng that gripped these states earlier in the year. While observers agree that the

c u r re nt absence of wide s p read vio l e nt conflict in the MRU is a muc h - w e l c o med de v e lo p me nt, it must not mask the profo u nd cleavages within these socie t ie s, the tenuo u s

na t u re of the UN-imposed peace in Sie r ra Leone, and the cont i nued serious threat of

re newed warfa re in the re g io n .

A brief overview of the ho r re ndous and persistent conflicts that have engulfed the

MRU over the past de c a de unde r s c o res the need for vig i l a nce by the int e r na t io nal community in its pursuit of lasting peace in West Africa. 

T he past dozen years of vio l e nt conflict in West Africa have led to the death, injury,

a nd mu t i l a t ion of hu ndreds of tho u s a nds of people and the displaceme nt of millio ns mo re.

C o nservative estimates place the total number of war-related de a t hs du r i ng the sevenyear civil war in Liberia (1989–1996) at 150,000, mo re than 5 perc e nt of Liberia’s estimated population (SIPRI Yearbook, 1996). But this number only begins to tell the story

of the ho r ror that civil war bro u g ht to this small na t ion of 2.8 million [United Na t io ns

D e v e l o p me nt Pro g ram (UNDP), Human Development Report, 1995]. Hu ndreds of tho u s a nd s

mo re Liberia ns were injure d, displaced, and terrorized by the conflict, and today the tiny

state re ma i ns the ho s t a ge of its corrupt and brutal dic t a t o r, Charles Ta y l o r.

After the war spread into Sie r ra Leone in 1991, it had a similarly de v a s t a t i ng effect.

As in Liberia, armed ins u rge nts preyed on the rural populatio ns, ra p i ng, pillaging, and

fo rcefully induc t i ng children into their ra n k s. During the eig ht years of warfa re that

fo l l o w e d, it is estimated (conservatively) that over 60,000 of Sie r ra Leone’s estima t e d

4.2 million inhabitants were killed and hu ndreds of tho u s a nds mo re injure d, mu t i l a te d, and displaced (SIPRI Yearbook, 2001; U N D P, Human Development Report, 1995).

T he 2001 UNDP Human Development Report ranks Sie r ra Leone last out of the 162

na t io ns rated on the hu man de v e l o p me nt index (HDI), a composite me a s u re based on

life ex p e c t a nc y, educ a t ion, and gross do me s t ic pro duct per capita.

Most of the re f u gees sought shelter in ne ig h b o r i ng Guinea. By the end of the 1990s,

over 500,000 re f u gees were housed in hu ndreds of camps and settleme nts in Guinea, one

of the largest re f u gee populatio ns in the world (U.S. Commission for Refuge e s, G u i n e a :

Country Report 1999, w w w. re f u ge e s. o rg / w o r l d / c o u nt r y r p t / a f r ic a / 1 9 9 9 / g u i ne a . ht m ) .

While the de s t a b i l i z i ng effects on Guinean society of large numbers of Liberian and Sie rra Leonean re f u gees was profo u nd thro u g hout the 1990s, sustained cro s s - b o rder conflic t

d id not break out between Guinea and her ne ighbors until 2000. Cro s s - b o rder attacks

i nto Guinea by Sie r ra Leone’s Revolutio nary United Fro nt (RUF) and various Liberia n -

based rebel groups precipitated a harsh military re s p o nse from the Guinean military,

w h ich led to tho u s a nds of militia and civilian casua l t ie s.

Of course, fig ht i ng in West Africa du r i ng the 1990s was not confined to the MRU 

s t a t e s. Serious bloodshed occurred in Guinea-Bissau (1999), the southern Casama nc e

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an indep e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion cre a t e d

by Cong ress to pro mote the pre v e nt ion, ma na geme nt, and peaceful re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Institute me e t s

its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of

p ro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s, fellowships,

p rof e s s io nal tra i n i ng, educ a t ion pro g ra ms fro m

h igh school through gra duate school, confere nc e s

a nd worksho p s, library servic e s, and public a t io ns.

T he Institute's Board of Directors is appointed by

t he Pre s ide nt of the United States and confirme d

by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, F o u nder and 

fo r mer Pre s ide nt, Peace Links, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns fo r

Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. 

• M o ra L. McLean, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t it u t e, New York, N.Y. • María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C IO N

I nt e r na t io nal, Some r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling,

State Senator and fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne,

Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs C o m m i t t e e, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R S E X O F F I C I O

Lorne W. Cra n e r, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State for Demo cra c y, Hu man Rig ht s, and Labor • Douglas J. Fe i t h , Unde r

S e c retary of Defense for Po l icy • Paul G. Gaffney II, V ic e

Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r -

s i t y • R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
3

re g ion of Senegal (ongo i ng), and Nige r ia (ongo i ng) and conflict thre a t e ns to eng u l f

Côte d’Iv o i re. Some t i mes re f e r red to as “the arc of conflict” in West Africa, these wars

escape simple classific a t ion. While the war that started in 1989 in Liberia has become

re g io nalized in the rest of the MRU, the other areas of instability in West Africa are

based on int ra-state phe no me na. Ne v e r t he l e s s, the bro a der and deeper that ins t a b i lity grows in West Africa, the greater the risk that conflicts will me rge and spre a d, furt her exa c e r b a t i ng cond i t io ns that ma ke West Africa the most impoverished re g ion in

t he world. 

The Big Picture

In lig ht of this fig ht i ng and the gloomy specter of a gro w i ng re g io nal war in We s t

A f r ica, the United States Institute of Peace convened a group of experts on the conf l icts in West Africa and fo r med a working group to bring toge t her ind i v iduals fro m

v a r ious na t io nal and int e r na t io nal age nc ies and org a n i z a t io ns to shed lig ht on the

na t u re of the conflicts in West Africa and re c o m me nd appro p r iate Ame r ican re s p o nse s. In this way, the group ende a v o red to inform itself and support the Bush adm i n i st ra t ion’s new Africa team that was confro nted with complex and difficult polic y

c ho ic e s. This effort led to four gathe r i ngs of the West Africa Wo r k i ng Group (WAW G )

between Ma rch and Au g u s t .

F rom the outset, the working group adopted a “big pic t u re” ana l y t ical fo c u s. That

i s, the group quickly agreed that the series of conflicts in the MRU stre t c h i ng over the

1990s and into the 2000s should be looked at as a who l e. Conc e p t ua l l y, the MRU conf l ict was the re fo re seen as a re g io nal war with re g io nal dime ns io ns. Thu s, what started in Liberia in 1989 is related to the war in Sie r ra Leone and to the fig ht i ng that

b ro ke out in Guinea in 2000. And while differe nt dy na m ics are re s p o nsible for the

i nstability ra d ia t i ng beyond the MRU into other parts of West Africa toda y, these conf l icts further me nace re g io nal peace and complicate efforts to find a lasting peace

a c ross the West African re g io n .

The West Africa region includes 14 states that belong to the Economic Community of

West African States (shown in gray).

The broader and deeper that

i n s tability grows in We s t

Africa, the greater the risk

that conflicts will merge and

s p read, further exa c e r b a t i n g

conditions that make We s t

Africa the most impove r i s h e d

region in the world. 

C o n c e p t u a l l y, the Mano Rive r

Union conflict was seen as a

regional war with re g i o n a l

d i m e n s i o n s.
4

The working group attracted a diverse array of U.S. and foreign specialists that

varied depending on the topic of the particular session. The group included representatives from Capitol Hill, British and French governments, Center for Strategic

and International Studies, Georgetown University, intelligence agencies, International Peace Academy, Interaction, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), National Security Council, Pentagon, Physicians for Human

Rights, State Department, United Nations, and United States Agency for International Development. The views expressed here represent a summation of issues

examined by the WAWG, highlighting the most salient findings and policy recommendations.

T he re were few points of disagre e me nt du r i ng the ma ny hours of discussio ns,

both over what has led to the curre nt crisis in West Africa and how the Un i t e d

States should move fo r w a rd in the re g ion. Perhaps the most sig n i f ic a nt and sust a i ned point of cont e nt ion within the WAWG was the de g ree of optimism/pessimism

s h a red over the curre nt process of de mo b i l i z a t ion, disarma me nt, and re s e t t l e me nt

(DDR) in Sie r ra Leone. While some WAWG members were cautiously optimistic that

t he RUF is finished as a military fo rc e, others believed that the rebel group will dig

up its guns and resist ex p u l s ion from the dia mo nd fie l d s. These group members also

c o nc l uded that the UN mission lacks the will to confro nt the RUF if such a scena r io

plays out. 

Causes of the Conflict

T he group quickly re a c hed a cons e nsus that the re are ma ny de l e t e r ious fo rces at play

in the re g ion, beyond Charles Taylor and the RUF, that have led to vio l e nt conflict in

t he MRU. Int e r nal factors stemming from poverty, lack of econo m ic opportunity, ethn ic animo s i t ie s, and a history of political abuse and corruption have fueled the brutal conflic t s. External factors have also had a major impact on the du ra t ion and

f e rocity of the conflict, especially the int e r v e nt io ns of Burkina Faso and Libya (states

that have reportedly tra i ned and armed Taylor and the RUF) and the activities of no n -

state actors, mostly profiteers such as dia mo nd, timber, and arms tra f f ic ke r s.

Wo r k i ng group partic i p a nts also re a c hed the early conc l u s ion that while the poor

s o c io - e c o no m ic factors in the re g io n — West Africa cont a i ns 11 of the world’s 20 poorest states—were exa c e r b a t i ng both the du ra t ion and int e nsity of the re g io nal conf l ict, efforts to change the state of unde rde v e l o p me nt in West Africa will be fruitless

u ntil the security aspects of the problem are addressed (UNDP, Human Development

Report, 2001). Ac c o rd i ng l y, the group focused its analysis on cont a i n i ng and end i ng

t he fig ht i ng .

U.S. Interests in West Africa

T he working group agreed that unde r l y i ng the pro l i f e ra t ion of the so-called “sof t

t h reats” (no n - t ra d i t io nal security threats to the United States, like the spread of cont a g ion, int e r na t io nal criminal ne t w o r k s, and terrorism) is the gro w i ng phe no me non of

state collapse. In Afghanistan, Colombia, the Demo c ra t ic Republic of the Congo ,

I ndo ne s ia, and Soma l ia, the de l e t e r ious effects of the crumbling state are plain to

s e e. In each of these cases, instability and vio l e nce have ultimately led to the weake n i ng, and in some ins t a nces the fa i l u re, of cent ral go v e r n me nt and to direct costs

for the United States—econo m ic a l l y, militarily, in terms of re g io nal stability, and in

hu ma n i t a r ian terms. 

While each of the above cases has elicited a stro ng policy re s p o nse from past and

c u r re nt adm i n i s t ra t io ns, U.S. policy toward the war in West Africa is still taking shape.

The group quickly reached a

consensus that there are many

deleterious fo rces at play in

the region, beyond Charles 

Taylor and the RUF, that have

led to violent conflict.

While the poor socio-economic

fa c tors in the region . . . we re

exacerbating both the dura t i o n

and intensity of the re g i o n a l

conflict, efforts to change the

s tate of underd evelopment in

West Africa will be fruitless

until the security aspects of

the problem are addre s s e d .
5

Yet state collapse in Liberia (1989) and Sie r ra Leone (1991) now thre a t e ns to spre a d

to a number of West African states inc l ud i ng the borde r i ng na t io ns of Guinea and Côte

d ’ Iv o i re. A re v iew of what is at stake for the United States in West Africa illustra t e s

t he importance and urge ncy of de v e l o p i ng a policy to stop the spread of the conflic t

in the re g ion and to cut the legs out from under the war’s two main vectors: Liberia ’ s

Charles Taylor and Sie r ra Leone’s RUF.

T he cycle of state collapse now occurring in the three member states of the wartorn MRU places the ent i re West African re g ion at risk. Inde e d, this area is ho me to

nu me rous military dictatorships and simme r i ng ethnic rivalrie s. And as we have alre a dy

w i t nessed in other parts of the world, as fig ht i ng and instability spread in West Afric a ,

so too does the growth of terrorist networks and int e r na t io nal criminal org a n i z a t io ns ;

t he de s t r uc t ion of the enviro n me nt; the spread of disease, re f u ge e s, poverty, and ethn ic strife; and the ge ne ral unra v e l i ng of living cond i t io ns for the re g ion’s nearly 240

m i l l ion people. 

No w he re in West Africa is stability mo re important to the United States than in Niger ia, the cont i ne nt’s most populous na t ion (estimated to be 126 million in 2001, accordi ng to the World Fact Book, w w w. c ia . go v / c ia / p u b l ic a t io ns / fa c t b o o k / ge o s / n i . html) and

our most important re g io nal ally. Not only does the United States rely on Nige r ia as

a major source of oil (10 perc e nt of U.S. imports in 2000), but Nige r ia is also one

of two (along with South Africa) focal points of Ame r ican fo re ign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States has stro ngly supported the de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nt of

P re s ide nt Olusegun Obasanjo and has established a stro ng military coopera t ion prog ram with Nige r ia that has led to the tra i n i ng of five battalio ns of Nige r ian soldie r s.

Mo re o v e r, the United States clearly has an int e rest in supporting the success of nex t

year’s important local electio ns (sche duled for April) and state and fede ral electio ns

in 2003. 

T he partnership with Nige r ia the re fo re pre s e nts an important test case for the

United States: support for our frie nd will not only inc rease the chances for do me s t ic

a nd re g io nal stability in West Africa, it will de mo ns t rate to other frie ndly Afric a n

states that the United States is eng a ged on the cont i ne nt. Inde e d, inc reased U.S.

e ng a ge me nt in the re g ion is also necessary to counter the de l e t e r ious effects of the

a c t i v i t ies of corrupt non-state actors, the potent ial growth of militant Islam, and

Libyan ex p a ns ionism in West Afric a .

T he United States should also ma i ntain a keen int e rest in the success of the Un i ted Na t io ns Armed Mission to Sie r ra Leone (UNAMSIL). Since its near collapse in 2000,

U N A MSIL has re g rouped with the stro ng support of the British and today appears to

be mo re cohe re nt and effective. The success of this mission is essent ial to the

s t re ng t he n i ng of the UN Departme nt of Pe a c e ke e p i ng Opera t io ns—a de v e l o p me nt that

is clearly in the int e rest of the United States. Mo re o v e r, the United States has invested heavily in the mission. In fiscal year 2000, the United States contributed over $128

m i l l ion to UNAMSIL, a fig u re that grew to nearly $190 million in fiscal year 2001. This

a c c o u nts for a sig n i f ic a nt pro p o r t ion of the U.S. hu ma n i t a r ian aid budget, funds that

a re de s p e rately ne e ded elsewhe re.

F i na l l y, the int a ngible costs of Ame r ican ina c t ion in the re g ion would be substant ia l .

T he ma rg i na l i z a t ion of African crises from Ame r ican fo re ign policy conc e r ns perpetua t e s

t he perc e p t ion within the int e r na t io nal community that the United States does not care

about the plig ht of Afric a ns. This unde rcuts our status as the int e r na t io nal leader fo r

de mo c ra c y, hu man rig ht s, and peace and da ma ges our na t io nal credibility abro a d.

Just as the ma rg i na l i z a t ion of West Africa jeopardizes U.S. int e re s t s, targeted Ame rican eng a ge me nt in the re g ion could bear ample fruit. U.S. eng a ge me nt in the re g io n

in coopera t ion with our Fre nch and British allies could pro v ide an important test case

a nd perhaps a mo del of Western coopera t ion that could be called upon elsewhe re on

t he cont i ne nt (notably in the Demo c ra t ic Republic of the Congo, DRC) to address war

a nd state collapse. The working group agreed that the key to future collabora t i v e

The partnership with Nigeria

p resents an important test

case for the United Sta t e s :

support for our friend will 

not only increase the chances

for domestic and regional 

s tability in West Africa, it 

will demonstrate to other

friendly African states that 

the United States is engaged

on the continent.

The success of [UNAMSIL] is

essential to the stre n g t h e n i n g

of the UN Department of

Peacekeeping Opera t i o n s

—a development that is 

clearly in the interest of the

United Sta t e s.

Just as the marginalization of

West Africa jeopardizes U.S.

i n t e re s t s, ta rgeted American

engagement in the region could

bear ample fruit.
6

e f forts in the re g ion between the United States and its Western European allies will

be to ide ntify ways to harness Fra nce’s cons ide rable re g io nal influence and elicit polic ies from Paris that are mo re compatible with our own.

In add i t ion to working mo re closely with our Western allies on the fo r ma t ion of

A f r ica polic ie s, U.S. coopera t ion with the Econo m ic Community of West African States

( E C O WAS) could also set an important pre c e de nt for future cooperative actio ns on the

c o nt i ne nt .

U.S. Po l i cy towa rd the Region

Ac c o rd i ng to adm i n i s t ra t ion sourc e s, Ame r ica’s policy toward Africa is based on thre e

goals: inc re a s i ng peace and stability, spre a d i ng de mo c ra c y, and inc re a s i ng econo m ic

p rosperity on the cont i ne nt. Within this approach the re are several substantive policy prio r i t ies: addre s s i ng disease (HIV/AIDS, tuberc u l o s i s, and ma l a r ia), opening ma rkets (Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, AG OA, and perhaps the cre a t ion of AG OA II

de s ig ned to inc rease the number of items covered by the fre e - t ra de agre e me nt), political libera l i z a t ion, and end i ng wars on the cont i ne nt (especially in the DRC, Sie r ra

L e o ne, and Sudan). The go v e r n me nt int e nds to do this while at the same time supp o r t i ng African states such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Nige r ia, South Africa, Mo z a mb i q u e, and Botswana, whe re socio - e c o no m ic pro g ress has been ma de.

In West Africa this policy unde rg i rds a number of U.S. pro g ra ms. First, the Un i t e d

States has cont i nued to support UNAMSIL fina nc ially and through military tra i n i ng of

A f r ican peaceke e p e r s. The U.S. go v e r n me nt has also worked closely with the Un i t e d

K i ngdom and supported Britain’s lead role in re s t o r i ng peace in Sie r ra Leone. Fina l l y,

t he United States cont i nues its military and fina nc ial support to the Conté go v e r nme nt in Guine a .

T hese efforts comprise part of a bro a der U.S. strategy in West Africa de s ig ned to

support our re g io nal allies and contain the spread of the war. The main target of this

p o l icy has been the Charles Taylor go v e r n me nt in Liberia. The adm i n i s t ra t ion has thu s

attempted to break the link between the Taylor re g i me and the sale of conflict diamo nds through the support of legislation in the United States and of UN sanc t io ns on

d ia mo nd exports and arms sales and a travel ban on Liberian go v e r n me nt of f ic ia l s. In

a dd i t ion to its cont a i n me nt policy toward Ta y l o r, the United States has also attempted to sho re up re g io nal allies like Pre s ide nts Ku four (Ghana), Ko naré (Mali), Wa de

( S e negal), and Obasanjo (Nige r ia). It is also clear that the United States has little

c ho ice but to work with Pre s ide nt Gbagbo (Côte d’Iv o i re), despite his contested rise

to power, to preserve stability. 

Challenges to U.S. Po l i cy

B e y o nd these policy thrusts, the working group ide nt i f ied several challenges to the

a dm i n i s t ra t ion’s policy and important questio ns that have yet to be addre s s e d.

S h o r t - Term Issues

• How can the United States best support the United Kingdom’s lead role in Sie r ra

L e o ne ?

• What else should the United States do to bring about a mo re de mo c ra t ic re g i me in

L i b e r ia ?

• How can the United States avert inc reased instability in Guinea, Guine a - B i s s a u ,

a nd Côte d’Iv o i re while fo s t e r i ng socio - e c o no m ic libera l i z a t ion in these states?

T h e re are seve ral substa n t i ve

p o l i cy priorities: addre s s i n g

d i s e a s e, opening markets, 

political liberalization, and

ending wars on the continent. 

In addition to its conta i n m e n t

p o l i cy towa rd Ta y l o r, the United

S tates has also attempted to

s h o re up regional allies like

P residents Ku four (Ghana),

Konaré (Mali), Wade (Senegal),

and Obasanjo (Nigeria).
7

• How should the United States collaborate with the Fre nch to foster econo m ic

de v e l o p me nt and good go v e r na nce in West Afric a ?

• How will the adm i n i s t ra t ion pre p a re the political terrain in Wa s h i ngton to win support for these initiatives on the Hill?

L o n g - Term Issues

• What are our long-term commitme nts to UNAMSIL and how will the United States

de f i ne an exit stra t e g y ?

• How does the U.S. go v e r n me nt envisage mo v i ng from DDR to econo m ic growth in

S ie r ra Leone and the rest of the West African re g io n ?

C o n c l u s i o n

T he working group agreed that the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y, striving to end the ho rror of West Africa’s re g io nal war, must begin by overseeing the successful re s o l u t ion of

c o n f l ict in Sie r ra Leone. Yet despite re c e nt pro g ress ma de in end i ng that war and the

i m p l e me nt a t ion of DDR, a number of unpleasant re a l i t ies re main, ma k i ng policy fo rma t ion for the United States and the rest of the int e r na t io nal community ex t re me l y

d i f f icult. UNAMSIL thus must be seen for what it is: a quick-fix, capacity-building

e f fort that is not sustainable over the long run. The econo m ie s, political org a ns, and

state ins t i t u t io ns in Sie r ra Leone and Liberia are in a shambles and hu man capital is

e nt i rely de p l e t e d. The Kabbah go v e r n me nt is a shell, and as one WAWG member put it,

“ T he re is no the re the re” in Sie r ra Leone.

Still mo re tro u b l i ng is the possibility of further vio l e nce and de s t a b i l i z a t ion in the

re g ion: the RUF cont i nues to me nace the peace process; the Conté and Gbagbo go ve r n me nts lack legitimacy at ho me and are thre a t e ned from within their own states;

a nd tens io ns re main high between no r t hern Mu s l i ms and southern Christia ns in Côte

d ’ Iv o i re after several years of divisive ethnic politics that have set the groups agains t

o ne ano t he r. Mo re bro a d l y, profo u nd socio - e c o no m ic pro b l e ms grip the ent i re We s t

A f r ica re g ion, ma k i ng it fertile gro u nd for future vio l e nt conflic t .

This reality points to several funda me ntal questio ns for the U.S. go v e r n me nt: have

t he events of September 11 given rise to a re newed appre c ia t ion of the da ngers of collapsed states? Or, will the curre nt war on terrorism cont i nue to draw attent ion and

re s o u rces away from the crises in West Africa? And fina l l y, can the United States work

with its European (especially Fre nch) and African allies to help ma na ge conflict and

build econo m ic prosperity in the re g ion? 

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

a . P ro v ide stro ng support to British leadership in Sie r ra Leone.

b. S uccessfully marry the adm i n i s t ra t ion’s West Africa pro g ram with the ambitious conf l ict pre v e nt io n / de v e l o p me nt pro g ra ms being articulated at the U.S. Age ncy fo r

I nt e r na t io nal Developme nt .

c. Consider Sierra Leone a model for learning how the United States should

approach complex humanitarian crises, state collapse, and regionalized conflict

in Africa.

d. I nc rease U.S. do me s t ic political will to eng a ge in the re g ion through public educ at ion and aware ness building .

e. F i nd a middle gro u nd for working with the Fre nch on the role Liberia’s Charles Ta ylor will play in the future of the re g io n .

H a ve the events of September

11 given rise to a re n ewe d

a p p reciation of the dangers of

collapsed states? Or, will the

c u r rent war on terro r i s m

continue to draw attention 

and re s o u rces away from the

crises in West Africa? 
f . Develop a mid- and long-term re g io nal plan for West Africa that accounts for big -

p ic t u re econo m ic and hu man de v e l o p me nt tre nd s.

g . I m p l e me nt the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act as soon as possible and draft and

t hen impleme nt AG OA II, thus ex t e nd i ng the number of pro ducts covered by the legi s l a t io n .

h .B u t t ress socio - e c o no m ic de v e l o p me nt in Nige r ia, the most populous and perhaps

most important U.S. ally in sub-Saharan Afric a .

i . Cut off fina nc ial re s o u rces to warlords who gain sustena nce from non-state prof iteers like dia mo nd and timber buyers as well as from state actors int e nt on cre a ti ng instability to further their own political and econo m ic go a l s.

j . C o nt i nue military assistance to the key re g io nal armies to prof e s s io nalize them and

build linka ges with the United States.

k . Speed up debt fo rg i v e ne s s, especially for those count r ies that play by the rules and

a re in the process of socio - e c o no m ic libera l i z a t io n .

l . I nc rease aid to the re g ion as an investme nt in stability, socio - e c o no m ic de v e l o pme nt, and the cre a t ion of new ma r kets for the United States and to help pre v e nt

state collapse.

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our website

( w w w. u s i p . o rg), which has an online

e d i t ion of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related websites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 8 1