U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

54–939PDF 2010

YEMEN ON THE BRINK:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 3, 2010

Serial No. 111–81

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

ROBERT MARCUS, Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (Former United States Ambassador 

to Lebanon) ........................................................................................................... 4

The Honorable Robert F. Godec, Principal Deputy Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State (Former United States Ambassador to Tunisia) ................. 6

Christopher Boucek, Ph.D., Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .............................................................................. 38

Mr. Jonathan Schanzer, Vice President for Research, Foundation for Defense 

of Democracies ...................................................................................................... 57

Mr. Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate & Regional Director for the Middle 

East and North Africa, The National Democratic Institute ............................. 67

Mr. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The 

Brookings Institution ........................................................................................... 74

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman and the Honorable Robert F. Godec: Prepared statement ................................................................................................... 8

Christopher Boucek, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 41

Mr. Jonathan Schanzer: Prepared statement ....................................................... 59

Mr. Leslie Campbell: Prepared statement ............................................................. 69

Mr. Bruce Riedel: Prepared statement .................................................................. 77

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 92

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 94

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 96

The Honorable Ron Paul, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 98

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 100

The Honorable Mike Pence, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 101

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 103

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia: Prepared statement ............................................................... 104

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas: Prepared statement ................................................................... 106

Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from the State of California .................................................... 112

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan and 

responses from: 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman ..................................................................... 115

Christopher Boucek, Ph.D. .................................................................................. 118

Mr. Jonathan Schanzer ....................................................................................... 119

Mr. Leslie Campbell ............................................................................................. 120

Mr. Bruce Riedel .................................................................................................. 122

Page

IV

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Michael T. McCaul, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and responses from: 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman ..................................................................... 123

Christopher Boucek, Ph.D. .................................................................................. 126

Mr. Jonathan Schanzer ....................................................................................... 130

Mr. Leslie Campbell ............................................................................................. 133

Mr. Bruce Riedel .................................................................................................. 135

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and responses from: 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman and the Honorable Robert F. Godec ........ 136

Christopher Boucek, Ph.D. .................................................................................. 144

Mr. Jonathan Schanzer ....................................................................................... 147

Mr. Leslie Campbell ............................................................................................. 151

Mr. Bruce Riedel .................................................................................................. 154

(1)

YEMEN ON THE BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR 

U.S. POLICY 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman 

presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. In a moment I will recognize myself and the ranking member for 7 minutes each for purposes of making an opening statement. Without 

objection, all of the members may submit opening statements or 

additional materials for the record. Before we get to the statements, let me take a moment to inform my colleagues about some 

upcoming committee hearings and other events. We are still trying 

to deal with next week’s hearing and the administration’s ability 

to testify at a Haiti hearing versus all the other things they have 

to do in terms of Haiti, but on Wednesday, February 24, the committee will host members of the Russian Duma Foreign Affairs 

Committee for a series of meetings on key issues, including Iran, 

regional conflicts, arms control, trade and energy. 

The following day we will welcome Secretary of State Clinton for 

her annual testimony on the international affairs budget. That will 

be February 25. In the near future, we are hoping to hold hearings 

on a number of other topics, including the upcoming nonproliferation treaty review conference, export controls and foreign assistance reform. Now, I will yield to myself. 

With so many pressing issues in the Middle East, the country of 

Yemen has received relatively little public attention since the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, but all that has changed in the 

last 3 months. 

On November 5, 2009, 12 brave soldiers and one Army civilian 

were brutally gunned down at Fort Hood, Texas, by an Army psychiatrist with links to a radical Yemeni-American cleric. On Christmas Day, a young, Nigerian man who had plotted with al-Qaeda 

operatives in Yemen tried to bring down Northwest Airlines Flight 

253. Even before these heinous acts, the Obama administration recognized that Yemen should be a much higher priority and took 

steps to more than double U.S. economic and military assistance to 

that country. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the numerous challenges that endanger Yemen’s domestic stability and regional security. These include the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, religious 

2

and tribal conflict, separatist movements, dwindling natural resources and a failing economy. 

I am going to try to abbreviate part of my opening statement because we do have two panels today. 

Yemen is rich in culture, history and geographic beauty, but it 

is also the poorest country in the Arab world. Yemen’s oil, which 

provides the government with 75 percent of its income, is quickly 

running out. An even more precious liquid, water, is also quickly 

running out. Yemen could, in fact, become the first nation ever to 

exhaust its freshwater supplies. 

Then there is the pervasive use of qat, a narcotic plant that produces feelings of euphoria and stimulation, but ultimately undermines individual initiative. Sort of like being in Congress. The 

overwhelming majority of Yemeni males are known to chew qat, 

and for many, it is a daily habit. Qat production may use as much 

as 40 percent of water resources consumed by local agriculture. 

The most immediate threats to Yemen’s stability are the ongoing 

civil war against Houthi rebels in the north, a rejuvenated secessionist movement in the south, and a resurgent al-Qaeda. The 

Houthi rebellion, which began in 2004, spilled across the border 

and has engaged Saudi Arabia’s military forces since November. 

The more unstable Yemen becomes, the more likely it is that terrorism will thrive there, threatening U.S. regional interests and 

our homeland. 

After years of tepid bilateral relations, now is the time for the 

United States to engage Yemen comprehensively. President Obama 

is working with the Yemeni Government and others to aggressively 

pursue terrorists. But a policy of counterterrorism in isolation will 

not suffice. Yemen’s deteriorating security is intimately linked to a 

host of political, economic and social problems. This hearing provides an opportunity to ask some key questions: How important is 

Yemen’s stability to U.S. interests and U.S. security? Is Yemen on 

the brink of becoming another ‘‘failed state’’? And, what, if anything, can the United States do to tip the balance in the right direction? 

To help us answer these questions, we have two panels of distinguished witnesses whom I will introduce shortly. Before I do, let 

me turn to the ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any opening remarks that she would like to make. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, as always. Thank you for holding this hearing, and thank you for agreeing to the minority’s request that we have a government panel and 

invite administration witnesses to address the critical issue of U.S. 

policy toward Yemen. I would note that U.S. participation in last 

week’s Yemen conference in London and would be interested in 

hearing about the outcome of that important conference. We also 

look forward to receiving more detailed information on the overall 

strategy to address the challenges in Yemen and other jihadists as 

a basis, and framework for such a strategy was provided by the 

Congress through the terrorist sanctuaries provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

This provision focuses on situations involving a government that 

either expressly consents to the use of its territory to be used by 

jihadists, or, with knowledge, allows, tolerates or disregards such 

3

use of its territory by jihadists and other global extremist groups. 

While Yemen may not yet meet that threshold, it is, unfortunately, 

coming dangerously close. It is no accident that al-Qaeda found a 

home in Yemen akin to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The central government does not control the tribal areas of Yemen, its borders, or, 

in some cases, its population centers. Like other countries in the 

region, a small group controls most of Yemen’s wealth, which relies 

on oil revenues. 

However, Yemen’s oil revenues are rapidly diminishing, compromising the ability of that small group to buy off tribal and commercial interests there. Like Saudi Arabia in 2003, Yemen hosts many 

radical clerics who promote jihad. A substantial separatist undercurrent has also emerged in the wave of demonstrations sweeping 

southern provinces from 2007 through 2009. As protestors and government escalate in both violence and rhetoric, the southern movement has become increasingly isolated from northern society, 

threatening further instability. These risks will increase as oil production continues to fall, as revenues from oil sales provide the 

foundation for the patronage system holding the country together. 

As the chairman pointed out, the ongoing Houthi rebellion has 

again flared, with Yemenis accusing Iran of interference. The potential for this to spiral out of control cannot be understated or underestimated. Combined with additional local conflicts, many fear 

that Yemen will continue to dissolve into semiautonomous regions 

amid various insurgencies which reinforce each other. The U.S. and 

other leading aid donors and the World Bank have provided significant direct development aid to Yemen over the past decade, over 

$300 million in Fiscal Year 2008 alone. Other donors have provided 

additional assistance, but throwing more money at the problem has 

not improved the situation. 

The United States has also increased military and intelligence 

support to the weak Yemeni Government and its leader over the 

past several months as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has 

grown bolder. For years, Yemen has established a pattern of appeasement with al-Qaeda elements and has refused to keep wanted 

al-Qaeda operatives and associates jailed or to transfer them to the 

United States. Many of these militants initially protected the state 

from attack by al-Qaeda; however, according to U.S. intelligence officials, al-Qaeda is now targeting the Yemeni state, as well as U.S. 

and other foreign targets inside and outside Yemen. There is an interesting article in the L.A. Times by Greg Miller entitled ‘‘Yemen 

Group: A Top U.S. Worry.’’

He says Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair told a 

Senate panel that American spy agencies have intensified surveillance of the al-Qaeda affiliates’ operations and made concerns that 

the group once considered a regional menace is focused on the recruitment of Westerners and other individuals with access to the 

U.S. homeland. In light of these developments, I would ask our administration panel: Has the Government of Yemen changed its 

strategic calculus, its mindset about al-Qaeda and other jihadists? 

Do we now have a true partner in fighting this threat? There have 

been numerous reports of Afghan and Pakistan Arabs returning to 

Yemen, penetrating political, security, tribal and religious institutions. 

4

Former Guantanamo detainees released by the United States 

pepper the high-level and mid-level ranks of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and constitute elements of its operations in Yemen 

and beyond. Last month, after bipartisan pressure, the Obama administration agreed to stop returning detainees to Yemen; however, 

this is far too little. We need a coherent policy and a strategy now 

before Yemen deteriorates to the point of no return and is further 

used as a launching pad or a staging ground for attacks against 

our nation and our interests abroad. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for the time and the hearing. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. Now, to introduce our first panel. 

Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman is the assistant secretary of state for 

near eastern affairs. A career member of the Foreign Service since 

1986, Ambassador Feltman previously served as principal deputy 

assistant secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and before that, as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. Prior to his assignment 

in Lebanon, he headed the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Office 

in the Erbil Province of Iraq. Ambassador Robert Godec is the principal deputy coordinator for counterterrorism in the Department of 

State. From 2006 to 2009, Ambassador Godec served as U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia. He has also served as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and was deputy coordinator for the transition in Iraq. Secretary Feltman, we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON) 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member RosLehtinen, members of the committee, thank you very, very much 

for holding this hearing and inviting Ambassador Godec and me to 

appear before you today. We look forward to working with this 

committee in efforts to address the many challenges Yemen faces 

that were outlined by the chairman and the ranking member’s 

opening statements. We would like to submit a lengthier testimony 

for the record in which we will detail some of these challenges. 

Chairman BERMAN. Your entire testimony will be included in the 

record. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Last week I was in London at the meeting that Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen mentioned with Secretary 

Clinton. This meeting focused on many of the issues and challenges 

that we will be discussing today. The United States, the United 

Kingdom, our Arab partners in the Gulf, the Yemeni Government 

and other international partners reaffirmed our shared goal of a 

peaceful, prosperous and united Yemen. The meeting also marked 

the launch of a process, a process that will continue to coordinate 

international efforts concerning Yemen in the future. I would like 

to make four points in the opening statement and then look forward to answering any questions that the committee may have. 

The first point, as Chairman Berman said, is that Yemen has 

been a top U.S. foreign policy priority since this administration 

took office 1 year ago. Given the gravity and the complexity of the 

situation in Yemen, the Obama administration launched a fullVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

scale policy review shortly after coming into office recognizing the 

increasing importance of dealing with Yemen in strategic, not just 

tactical, terms. The resulting strategy is twofold: Bolstering and 

supporting Yemen on the security side, and promoting good governance and development on the socio-economic and governance side. 

We believe that focusing on one dimension at the exclusion of the 

other is simply not going to work. 

The attempted terrorist attack on Christmas Day served as a 

wake up call to some regarding the apparent growing capability of 

al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen to carry out attacks beyond the Middle East, but it confirmed what many of us have known for years: 

Militant extremists in Yemen are able to operate in the unsettled 

environment there, and they threaten U.S. national security as 

well as Yemen interests and the interests of key allies. With the 

support of this committee and Congress we have been steadily 

ramping up security development assistance since Fiscal Year 

2008. 

Recognizing the toxic effect of deteriorating governance, and 

human rights protections and stagnant development, the United 

States Government has developed an assistance strategy that will 

take aim at Yemen’s social and economic challenges. The second 

point I would like to emphasize is that we are not alone in engaging Yemen to improve the situation there. The international community, and particularly Yemen’s neighbor states, is well aware 

that it must help Yemen address its security and economic challenges both in the short and the long term, and I think that the 

London meeting illustrated that commitment. We will continue to 

coordinate closely with other countries to work with the Government of Yemen to bolster its ability to deliver services to its people, 

to fight corruption and to confront the threat posed by al-Qaeda 

and other violent extremists. 

Third, just picking up on some points that Ranking Member RosLehtinen said, we are realistic about the capabilities of our Yemeni 

partner. The Government of Yemen is beset by many, many challenges, including unrest in the south of the country and a violent 

conflict in parts of the north. The government’s ability to provide 

services and exercise its authority is inconsistent over different 

parts of its territory. Its track record on human rights, on governance, and on anticorruption also has been wanting and is in need 

of intense focus and attention. In terms of the Government of Yemen’s determination and willingness to confront the threat of alQaeda-related militants in the country, we should be, and, in fact, 

we are, encouraged by recent steps that the government has taken. 

Our partnership and support for Yemen’s counterterrorism measures is not an endorsement of all the government’s policies. In fact, 

we are supporting government reform efforts, education and training initiatives and an emerging civil society in order to promote 

better transparency in governance, better human rights protection 

and to ensure that the Yemeni people can participate in shaping 

and addressing national priorities. We will continue to seek improvements in all of these areas, even as we help the government 

take on al-Qaeda. Fourthly, finally, I would like to emphasize the 

importance of your support and the participation of all U.S. Government agencies in our pursuit of success in Yemen. 

6

As Secretary of State Clinton said recently, in states where the 

odds of succeeding may be long, ‘‘the risks of doing nothing are far 

greater.’’ In Yemen, the complexity of the economic, political and 

security situation truly require a whole of government approach to 

our policy. We cannot afford to neglect the experience, the resources or the leverage available across our Government. Thank 

you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Godec? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. GODEC, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, 

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO TUNISIA) 

Ambassador GODEC. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member RosLehtinen, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear today to discuss the challenge of Yemen, 

the threat of terrorism and the way ahead on U.S. policy. I join Assistant Secretary Feltman in asking that our joint written testimony be entered into the record. 

Chairman BERMAN. It is part of the record without objection. 

Ambassador GODEC. I would like to build on my colleague’s statement and make three points. First, the threat from al-Qaeda in 

Yemen is not new, but it is clearly evolving. The presence of alQaeda in Yemen goes back to before the USS Cole attack in 2000 

when al-Qaeda affiliates attempted to kill U.S. servicemen on their 

way to Somalia. The group has carried out a string of attacks on 

embassies, tourists and the security services in Yemen in the past 

couple of years. In August 2009, the newly established al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, launched a failed attack against the 

chief of counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia, and, of course, AQAP 

has claimed credit for the attempt on December 25 by the Omar 

Farooq Abdulmutallab to bomb Northwest Flight 253. 

This was the first time that an al-Qaeda affiliate demonstrated 

the will and the capacity to attempt a strike on the continental 

United States. Second, well before December 25, the U.S. Government was engaged in Yemen, and specifically, this administration 

has focused on Yemen since day one. The two pronged strategy described by Assistant Secretary Feltman will help Yemen confront 

the immediate security threat posed by AQAP and will also address 

the serious longer term political and economic issues and challenges that drive extremism. This strategy requires full Yemeni 

partnership. It also requires close cooperation with regional partners and allies, and it requires hard work and American resources. 

The challenges are great and many, but the risk of doing nothing 

is grave. With support from Congress, U.S. security assistance to 

and engagement with our Yemeni partners has increased in recent 

years. The Departments of State and Defense provide training and 

assistance to Yemen’s key counterterrorism units. Working with 

DOD, we currently give substantial Section 1206 counterterrorism 

assistance to Yemen. Through our antiterrorism assistance program we provide training to Yemen security forces. We are currently consulting with the Yemeni Government and assessing YemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
7

en’s security requirements to identify opportunities to further 

strengthen Yemen’s counterterrorism capacity. 

In the last year, senior administration officials have traveled to 

Yemen frequently: General Petraeus; Assistant to the President, 

John Brennan; Assistant Secretary Feltman; and, most recently, 

the coordinator for counterterrorism, Ambassador Dan Benjamin. 

All of them have stressed during their trips our deep concern about 

AQAP. Our engagement is paying off. President Saleh and the 

Yemeni Government have shown increased commitment to confront 

AQAP. In the past 2 months, Yemen has conducted multiple operations designed to disrupt AQAP’s operational planning and deprive its leaders of safe haven. Yemen has significantly increased 

the pressure on AQAP. It has carried out air strikes and ground 

operations against senior al-Qaeda targets. 

While these security operations are essential, delegitimatizing 

AQAP also requires addressing Yemen’s cycle of radicalization 

while we build Yemeni institutions. A key part of our work to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is to 

assist the Yemeni people to build strong institutions and forge a 

better future. Third, regional and international cooperation is fundamental to our security strategy. The threat of terrorism in 

Yemen is a common challenge. It is a problem that will require engagement with our partners, particularly those in the region. Secretary Clinton has said today’s security threats cannot be addressed in isolation. 

Last week’s London meeting, during with the international community reiterated its prior commitments to aid development and 

security, was a good start. Now we must follow-up to build on the 

momentum. Ultimately, the goal of U.S. and international efforts 

in Yemen must be a stable, secure and effectively governed country. It is the only road to success in our counterterrorism strategy. 

Toward this end, while we work with Yemeni security forces we 

will also assist the government and people to strengthen institutions, build infrastructure and deliver services. As the Government 

of Yemen grows more transparent and responsive and Yemenis find 

hope for their future, the seeds of extremism and violence will find 

less fertile ground and the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will truly recede. We look forward to continuing our work with 

Congress, and this committee specifically, as we refine and implement our strategy. I look forward, too, to your questions. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassadors Feltman and Godec follows:]

8


54939b-1.eps
9


54939b-2.eps
10


54939b-3.eps
11


54939b-4.eps
12


54939b-5.eps
13


54939b-6.eps
14


54939b-7.eps
15


54939b-8.eps
16

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you both very much. I will yield 

myself 5 minutes and begin the questioning. The ranking member 

closed her opening comments with the question do we have a partner in the Government of Yemen to confront and deal with alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? Now, you have talked about some 

signs of improvements, of growing commitment. I guess two questions. One, what are the things that could threaten that continued 

commitment? Are we at the point where we can call it a partnership? In Pakistan we have a sense these days that many different 

organizations, the Pakistan Taliban, the Afghanistan Taliban, 

Losher, Tiba, other groups that we consider terrorist groups, along 

with al-Qaeda, have this level of coordination they may not have 

had in earlier years. Is any of that taking place in Yemen? The 

Houthis in the north, the rebellious elements in the south, alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is there any morphing of goals 

and tactics with any of these groups? So that is, I guess, my first 

two part question. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The Government of Yemen, let us be frank, has been an inconsistent partner 

in the past on many of these issues, both on the security side, as 

well as on the governance and development side. As both of our 

opening statements indicate, we have been encouraged by the determination that the Government of Yemen has shown in the last 

couple of months to take on the al-Qaeda threat. We were also encouraged by the determination the Government of Yemen showed 

at the London conference last week to tackle the development and 

governance challenges. We will stay engaged on all of these, mindful of the needs and mindful of the past. 

In terms of your question about what would threaten the Government of Yemen’s determination to continue the fight with al-Qaeda, 

I will make a couple of comments. First, as some of your own statements noted, the Government of Yemen has been a victim of the 

al-Qaeda presence in Yemen. We believe that the Government of 

Yemen fully understands this threat and that helps explain the determination. The Houthis in their current north and the secessionists in the south are different from al-Qaeda in that we believe that 

these are mostly local grievances. This is mostly based on local politics, longstanding grievances in the south dating back to the time 

of unification, longstanding grievances in the north. This is different from al-Qaeda. 

Chairman BERMAN. But that is the way it started out in Pakistan, too. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. These conflicts have a risk of distracting 

the government from the al-Qaeda challenges, which is one of the 

reasons we have been calling for a cease fire. We are encouraged 

by the fact that the Saudis and the Houthis seem to be deescalating their own conflict, with the Houthis declaring a cease fire 

with Saudi Arabia. We want to see a cease fire in the north that 

leads to the type of political reconciliation that will address the 

grievances of the north and not make the Houthi conflict a distraction from the fight against al-Qaeda. 

Chairman BERMAN. Okay. Let me just interject there because I 

only have 1 more minute and I do want to get this question out 

there for an answer. The Yemeni Government, backed by the 

17

Saudis, has made numerous claims that the Iranian Government 

is militarily, financially and politically supporting the al-Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen. Many observers dispute this. Is there 

evidence that Iran is materially supporting the Houthis? What influence does the Iranian Government have in Yemen? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. We think at heart, at base, this is a local 

conflict. These are local grievances. We have heard the accusations, 

we are aware of the threat, we certainly are aware of Iranian misbehavior in the region, places like Lebanon, Iraq, et cetera, but this 

is overwhelmingly a local issue, and we have called for outsiders 

not to interfere. Let us see this solved locally. 

Chairman BERMAN. Anything to add, Ambassador? 

Ambassador GODEC. Mr. Chairman, I would just——

Chairman BERMAN. I have 9 seconds. 

Ambassador GODEC [continuing]. Say that I believe Assistant 

Secretary Feltman is exactly right in his remarks. 

Chairman BERMAN. Okay. My time has expired. The ranking 

member is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I wanted 

to ask the excellent panelists about the budget increases that have 

been presented. It was just recently released, the Fiscal Year 2011 

budget, and it increases assistance to Yemen $106 million, more 

than six times the $17 million that was spent in Fiscal Year 2008. 

Economic support funds are increasing almost sevenfold in just 1 

year from $5 million in Fiscal Year 2010 to $34 million for Fiscal 

Year 2011. So I wanted to ask about those numbers. First of all, 

can that be absorbed on the ground to accommodate such an increase in funding? 

Does the Embassy have the ability to project its presence on the 

ground to implement this funding and this programming effectively? Also, how does the Yemeni Government itself have the ability to absorb all of this increase? Related to that, what are the performance metrics? How do we judge success and how we are doing 

with this funding and programming? Lastly, what conditions are 

we placing on U.S. assistance to the Government of Yemen, particularly regarding the implementation of its financial sector and 

economic reform program? So it is basically the budget, how it is 

going to be absorbed, how can we measure success of our funding, 

and what the Yemeni Government is doing. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, thank 

you. I mean, I should say from the outset that there is no cash 

going to the Government of Yemen. I think we all understand that. 

This is technical assistance, this is support, these are helping get 

services delivered to the people at the local level, but this is not 

a question of transferring cash to the Government of Yemen. In 

September, USAID signed a new strategy, a 3-year strategy, with 

the Government of Yemen that has two pillars that get at some of 

the questions that you have asked. One pillar is called a communities’ livelihood program, the other part is national governance 

program. It is getting at the capacity issues in both directions. 

For the first part, the community livelihoods initiative, it is 

building capacity at the local level, helping services get delivered 

at the local level: Health, education, youth employment. How do 

you organize civil society, support civil society so that they can enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
18

gage with their local officials, and at the national level, building capacity on budget transparency, decentralization, issues like this? 

So we are working both locally and nationally in order to build capacity to help the Government of Yemen deliver services, create 

jobs, and create economic opportunities. It is definitely a challenge 

working in Yemen for security reasons, but USAID, U.S. State Department, other U.S. Government agencies now have quite a lot of 

experience in dealing in insecure environments and how you deliver, monitor, your assistance. 

In terms of conditionality, I want to go back to the London conference for 1 minute because this was a question that everyone had 

in London was conditionality and absorb to capacity. There were 

$5.2 billion committed to Yemen a few years ago at a Friends of 

Yemen conference hosted in London. Most of that was coming from 

the Gulf. Most of that hasn’t been delivered. It hasn’t been delivered because of questions of capacity, questions about conditionality. So the international community is working together to address these, sending a unified message to the Yemenis about what 

we expect in terms of transparency, in terms of responsiveness to 

real needs, in terms of delivering services across the country, and 

the unified message in terms of help and building the capacity of 

the government. So it is more than just the United States that are 

sending a message to the Yemenis about their need to deliver, it 

is all of us working together. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, the 

gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Wow! Well, first, you 

talk about the risk of doing nothing, and I couldn’t agree with you 

more on that, but I think, as we all know, there is a risk of doing 

everything. It seems to me that we have been trying to do everything, everywhere, mostly by ourselves in a lot of instances, and we 

are starting to lack the resources, or the ability, or the will of the 

American people to do that, but you still can’t do nothing. I think 

we should be looking at the problem of trying to do everything. 

This place, I don’t know if I would call it looking like it is going 

to be a failed state. I don’t know that they ever got to the real state 

status in order to become a failed state afterwards. 

I can’t remember when. I mean, you know, you have got the Hatfields and the McCoys, you have got the Houthis and the 

whatevers, and you have the separatists, and you have al-Qaeda 

filtering or flooding in, depending on your perspective, and these 

people spend the afternoon getting away from reality by the whole 

country getting high and like, wow, we have got no problems, just, 

we are running out of gas, we are running out of water, we have 

no resources for ourselves, so let us forget about it. I think we have 

to look around in the neighborhood and try to figure out what we 

do to help, and, you know, there are the Saudis who are unrealistic 

about the whole thing to begin with, I think. 

Somebody has to tell our friends over there that they have to be 

part of the solution, the real solution, not just throwing some 

money into the thing. Maybe they should go into one of these airVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
19

port machines and do a full body scan and figure out that this 

place next door is really a wart that is on their butt, and they better do something about it because it is starting to turn malignant. 

I understand you could even spread it through someone else’s underwear. This thing is highly problematic. My question is, instead 

of looking, or in addition to looking for allies within the government in Yemen, why aren’t we doing more looking for allies within 

Saudi Arabia and getting them to focus not just on throwing in

$1 billion and let us see what happens, but helping to provide some 

infrastructure, some technology, some help, some support to try to 

build the place because it seems to me they are a heck of a lot closer than we are, and you don’t need one of these long flights to mess 

up Saudi Arabia. 

I think they really know that, but I don’t think they are focused 

on real solutions. Do we have a partner there? Can we spend more 

time walking them through what they should be doing or how we 

could help them do what they know they should be doing? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman Ackerman, I don’t have the 

felicitous terms or phrases that you do, but——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Whatever that means, I take it as a compliment. 

Maybe you could provide an answer in whatever terms. 

Ambassador FELTMAN [continuing]. We agree with you. We agree 

with your basic point. The GCC countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, and the GCC as a whole, have vital interest in Yemen. 

They are the immediate neighbors of Yemen and they have faced 

the immediate threats that emanate from Yemen. You know, Ambassador Godec mentioned the August attempted assassination of 

Deputy Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi 

Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the GCC have to be part of the solution. 

Part of the discussions at the meeting in London last week was 

how do we initiate a process? We don’t want simply a meeting, we 

want a process of addressing the long and short term security, and 

development and governance challenges in Yemen. 

The GCC countries have stepped up as a response to London and 

said, okay, fine, we are going to have a meeting February 27 and 

28, the GCC meeting in Riyadh, to talk about Yemen in-house with 

the Yemenis talking about Yemen. We see a new seriousness on 

the part of the GCC countries to work directly with the Yemenis 

on their own, and also to work with us in the international community. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But the history of that seems to be just send 

them in some money and here you go, guys, fix your problem. It 

is hard to tell a patient, you know, here is $1 million, go cure yourself. I think we have to have a more serious bilateral discussion. 

with the Saudis in particular, others as well, but sit down in a 

room with the Saudis, my suggestion, and say, look, guys, here is 

what I think you really have to do. Not just put money in there, 

but you have to do A, B, C and D, to help build this place into a 

real place with some sense of leadership, with some sense of being 

able to build a state that can control themselves. They are living 

in a world of illusion over there. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. We agree with you on working with the 

Saudis 100 percent. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. 

20

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman, and I thank the witnesses. I 

am sorry I wasn’t here to hear your testimony. I have not had a 

chance to really go through it, so forgive me if you have gone 

through this already. We have known for, well, really since the 

Fort Hood shooting, and suspected before that, that there were 

problems there in Yemen. Can you tell me what the state is doing 

now that it wasn’t doing before? Is it just a matter of intensity: We 

have got to build institutions faster, we have got to work for the 

government there, we have got to get the neighbors involved, or is 

it a complete change in focus? What is happening today that 

wasn’t, you know, 6 months ago? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Sorry to monopolize the hearing, Bob. In 

fact, the administration came into office last year and looked 

around the world and focused on Yemen as one of the priorities 

very early on in the administration, both in terms of development 

and governance challenges and in terms of the security challenges. 

There has been a series of meetings that Ambassador Godec and 

I and our bosses have attended since last year, a lot of meetings 

on Yemen, where we developed this two pronged strategy I was describing earlier addressing governance and development challenges, 

and addressing security challenges. What has happened since December 25, though, is we have the ability of really engaging the region and international partners. 

It was as a result of the December 25 attempted attack that led 

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to issue the invitation, issue 

the call for the Yemen conference that I attended last week with 

Secretary Clinton. This is allowing us to coordinate our approach, 

coordinate our messages, get international support and basically 

use the international community and regional partners as increased leverage to address challenges in Yemen. So the December 

25 attempted attack did not wake up the United States regarding 

the United States administration’s challenges in Yemen, but it did 

allow us to use the international community in new ways. 

Mr. FLAKE. We have had a number of successful predator strikes 

in Yemen of terrorists over the past couple of years, is my understanding. How does that impact the work that the State Department does? Is it understood by the government? How much are 

those moves by the U.S. supported by the government there such 

as it is? 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, I think I would just underscore that the United States is cooperating very closely with the 

Yemeni Government in a variety of ways on the fight on counterterrorism. They understand the contributions that we are making 

by way of training and assistance. They value it. I know they find 

it very important. We have been working very closely with them 

to address the threat, which they take now very seriously. I do 

think that recent developments, the actions of the government, 

have underscored just how seriously they take it and how they do 

intend to address this problem. 

Mr. FLAKE. So to the extent that there was push back from government, that is lessened now after recent activity, or was there no 

push back early on? Have they been cooperating all along? 

21

Ambassador GODEC. I think it is fair to say that the cooperation 

across time has been uneven. There have been instances and times 

and places in the past where the cooperation is not everything that 

we hoped it would be. I do think that their recent actions, however, 

show on the part of President Saleh and the government a new 

commitment and a strong commitment to cooperate with us on 

counterterrorism. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. I thank the gentleman. His time has been 

yielded back. Now the gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LEE. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you 

both for being here. Just to reiterate the fact that the implications 

of this country’s stability on U.S. policy in Yemen and the surrounding region in the larger context of our efforts to curb extremism around the globe, you all are really, I think, charting a new 

course in a new direction. The presence of al-Qaeda in Yemen and 

elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula really further illustrates the 

difficulties, of course, that we will face in sustaining efforts to reduce extremism if the United States engages these challenges with 

military centric solutions. 

I can’t help but wonder and want to ask you this question about 

any thoughts or discussion with regard to any authorization to use 

force against Yemen. Of course, we, you know, conducted military 

actions in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of our strategy. It is very 

similar now in terms of what is taking place in Yemen. I wanted 

to find out, I hope not, but has that been on the table for discussion? Secondly, I don’t know if you mentioned the numbers of alQaeda members that we think are in Yemen versus Afghanistan to 

get a sense of, you know, where the real fight is. Thirdly, I would 

like to just ask about the increase in funding aimed at building 

Yemen’s military and counterterrorism capacity, but also, the zeroing out of development assistance and what that means given our 

overall strategy in terms of what we are trying to do on the development front, which you have laid out. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative Lee, first of all, the President has been clear, Admiral Mullen has been clear, General 

Petraeus has been clear, we are not talking about U.S. combat 

boots on the ground in Yemen. You know, we are not looking at a 

situation like in Iraq or Afghanistan, something like that. We are 

looking at supporting a new determination by the Government of 

Yemen to go after the al-Qaeda threat. We are providing support 

to the Government of Yemen in its own fight against al-Qaeda. 

That certainly is in our interest. On the number of al-Qaeda, you 

asked specifically, I will quote the Foreign Minister of Yemen. Foreign Minister Qirbi of Yemen has said that they estimate, the Yemenis estimate, 200 to 300. I don’t have anything more to add on top 

of what Foreign Minister Qirbi would say in terms of numbers. 

Ms. LEE. Excuse me. Correct me if I am wrong, but there are 

fewer al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan than in Yemen? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Since my writ ends at Iran, I will defer 

to Ambassador Godec. 

Ambassador GODEC. I think that, you know, there are many alQaeda, unfortunately, around the world in a range of places. They 

22

do pose a threat. It is not always easy to get a precise handle on 

the exact number of al-Qaeda in any given location. They do obviously pose a real threat, whether it be in Yemen or Afghanistan. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. So we don’t know the numbers in Afghanistan 

at this point or not? 

Ambassador GODEC. Congresswoman, I would be happy to get 

back to you with an estimate on that, if you would like. We would 

be happy to take that back. 

Ms. LEE. Yes, I would like that. Okay. Thank you. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative Lee, you asked about the 

development assistance. If you note, what we have done is we have 

increased the ESF, that we are moving into a situation where we 

are using ESF as our tool rather than development assistance, so 

the overall levels of assistance have been going up since Fiscal 

Year 2008. There is some, you know, shifting between the budget 

lines, but the overall level is going up in order to help the Government of Yemen address the challenges, and particularly, as I said 

earlier, to try to work at the local level, to try to show delivery of 

services at the local level and do job creation at the local level. 

Ms. LEE. Okay, but it is my understanding, correct me again if 

I am wrong, that even with the ESF funds and the development 

assistance account we are still looking at a reduction of about $6 

million over the previous year. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I will look at the numbers carefully. The 

overall assistance, not counting the 1206 money, in Fiscal Year 

2008 we were providing about $17 million, Fiscal Year 2009 

amounted to about $40 million, Fiscal Year 2010 amounts to $67 

million, and the President’s budget request that was just submitted 

has $106 million for Fiscal Year 2011. So, in fact, we are on a 

steady increase on both tracks of our policy which means providing 

security assistance and providing assistance for development. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. Finally, let me just ask you how many Americans 

are living in Yemen? Do we have an idea? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. You know, our Embassy would definitely 

have an idea, and I will have to get back to you on what they report their estimates are. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. But primarily are they U.S. Government workers, personnel? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative Lee, it seems that the estimate from the Embassy and consular affairs section is 40,000 to 

50,000. 

Ms. LEE. 40,000 to 50,000. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield 

the balance of my time. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Going back to the chairman’s question about Iran, Ambassador Feltman, you described 

Iran’s activities as misbehavior. Misbehavior? And that the United 

States has asked regional neighbors not to interfere in Yemen’s internal affairs. That hasn’t seemed to work in Lebanon, or Iraq, or 

North Africa. Are we underestimating Iran’s interests and activities in Yemen? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative Burton, I am sorry if my 

choice of words didn’t properly convey how serious the challenge 

23

Iran poses to U.S. interests in the region are because it is enormous. I was Ambassador in Lebanon. I saw up close how damaging 

to Lebanon’s security the presence of Hezbollah and Iranian support for Hezbollah is. I do not underestimate the challenge that 

Iran poses or its——

Mr. BURTON. Well, the reason I bring that up is the attitude of 

the administration has been to try to talk to all these people 

around the world and work out our differences verbally and continue to go on, and on, and on saying, you know, that we are going 

to do this, or we are going to do that, we are going to impose sanctions if they don’t change, stop their nuclear development program, 

stop the terrorists in Yemen, and so on and so forth, or stop their 

assistance to them, and things don’t change. It just continues to get 

worse. We have had two attempts in the last year by people who 

were at least partially involved or trained by al-Qaeda terrorists in 

Yemen, and it just seems like we ought to use stronger language 

and really be stronger in our interrogation of these people. 

One of the things that has concerned me is officials over in the 

Senate testified that an elite interrogation team created to replace 

a controversial CIA program dismantled by President Obama last 

year is now operational. It is not operational, is it? Does anybody 

know who it is? I have no idea who it is. Have you heard of who 

that is, either one of you? I mean, is it operational, and, if so, who 

have they been interrogating, and have they gotten any information, and, you know, what is the result? 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, I am aware that there is an 

interrogation team. I believe there was testimony yesterday about 

it, that it is operational. We can certainly get back to you with additional details about it. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, over in the Senate officials testified that this 

interrogation team really wasn’t operational, and then they came 

back and said a couple days later that it is operational, and so, you 

know, once again we are hearing, it is like a ping pong ball, it is 

operational, it isn’t operational. I would like to know really if it is, 

and, if so, I would like to know what they are doing in Yemen and 

elsewhere to get information about these terrorists before they try 

to blow up a plane here in the United States or kill a bunch of people at Fort Hood. I mean, you know, if we have got an interrogation 

team and we know al-Qaeda is there or a subsidiary of it is, why 

in the world isn’t our intelligence people and our military people 

capturing these individuals and really digging the truth out of 

them, and also, using technology and procedures that are going to 

be able to get information. 

I know the President said, well, waterboarding is inhumane, and 

I saw a television commentator on television actually going through 

waterboarding. He said it was very scary, but he survived it and 

it didn’t seem to bother him too much, and yet, when we used it 

they said, my gosh, it is inhumane and it is a terrible approach to 

getting information. I think when you are dealing with terrorists 

who want to kill 250 people or so on a plane or terrorists that are 

instructing somebody at Fort Hood to kill a bunch of American 

military personnel that we ought to do whatever is necessary within certain bounds to get that information. 

24

I am one of those who believes we ought to use waterboarding 

or whatever it takes to get that information because once they kill 

a bunch of Americans, everybody is going to say why didn’t we do 

something about that? That is why I am very concerned about this 

interrogation team, because I don’t believe it exists and I believe 

they are scrambling around right now trying to get it together so 

they can say, yeah, we have been doing that and we have had it 

for a while. One more thing, Mr. Chairman, if I might. This guy 

that got his Miranda rights after he got on that plane or after he 

got off the plane and he got a lawyer paid for by the United States 

of America, the FBI said they went over and they talked to his parents and that gave them the information necessary to elicit more 

information from him about what was going on in Yemen where he 

was trained. Are we going to be sending FBI agents around to parents all over the world to get information like that? That is ridiculous. If we get a person who is a terrorist who tried to blow up a 

plane, we need to get on him right away. Quickly. Fast. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome. I am over 

here. Last year I traveled to Yemen, walked the streets of Yemen, 

along with our Navy Seals, of course. The thing that struck me was 

as we moved through the city, at exactly 1 o’clock all of the men 

that we could see were reaching in bags getting this green stuff, 

sticking it in their jaw. It was so disfiguring, grotesquely. You 

could see it all over where we looked over the streets. These 

weren’t just young kids, these were police officers, they were businessmen. The issue that I want to ask is what are we doing to address this issue? It is more than just a leisure thing. Qat has become the primary degradation of their poverty. 

It requires an immense amount of water of which there is a 

shortage for. Their number one economic asset being oil will be depleted in 7 years. It takes so much land to grow the qat that they 

can’t even grow food. So it seems to me that this is a fundamental 

situation that I think we have got to address because it is the driving characteristic of that economy, of that culture, that is not only 

making Yemen a failed state, it has become a failed state, and this 

is the driving force for it. What is our strategy to deal with qat? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative Scott, I think you have described the problem very articulately. You know, qat is depriving 

families from income, it is preventing people from effective employment, it is, as you said, using up precious water resources. The 

World Bank and others are working on ways to combat this, to 

tackle this. It is hard. You know, this is a cultural thing, as you 

yourself witnessed when you were there. You know, we are working behind this. We are working to back up the World Bank and 

other people’s efforts on this, and we are trying to compliment it 

by the new USAID strategy I described with you which will have 

some focus on small business development and agribusiness development to try to create new opportunities and new markets to provide incentives to get people away from this. 

This is a severe problem, it is a long-term challenge, and you are 

absolutely right that all of us need to be working together to adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
25

dress it. I don’t think there is any short-term fix to the long-term 

qat problem. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank you. Mr. Godec, let me ask you to comment on the accuracy of the size of al-Qaeda there. Last week I 

read in the New York Times where a member of the Obama administration stated that we have killed approximately 20 percent, and 

they put an accurate figure of between 300 and 400, al-Qaeda 

operatives in Yemen. First of all, is that accurate? 1) Have we 

eliminated in the past few months 20 percent? 2) Is the 300 or 400 

the accurate figure of the number of al-Qaeda in Yemen? 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, as Secretary Feltman said, 

the number that we have on al-Qaeda in Yemen is from the Foreign Minister, from Foreign Minister Qirbi. What he said was 200 

to 300. Several hundred was his specific reference. That is the best 

number that I have available this morning. Obviously, as I said, 

the Government of Yemen has taken a number of steps to address 

this threat. There have been a number of actions, military, and law 

enforcement and others. A number of al-Qaeda have been taken off 

the streets, a number have been killed, a number are in prison. I 

can’t give you confirmation that the 20 percent number is accurate. 

It may be accurate, but clearly, ongoing actions are in fact, taking 

al-Qaeda off the streets in Yemen right now. This really is a commitment by the Government of Yemen to address this problem. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. In my last 10 seconds I hope I can get this in. 

This is a regional situation. Have we involved the nations of 

Kenya, Ethiopia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia as well, and Djibouti to 

impact a regional effort dealing with Yemen? 

Chairman BERMAN. I think the time has expired. Maybe you can 

work that answer into an answer to someone else’s question. The 

gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 

much. Sorry that I am a little late. Recently I visited the prison 

at Guantanamo Bay, this is for the panel, and left with a feeling 

that it was probably the best living conditions that terrorist enemies had ever experienced. Dozens of those inmates have been released from Guantanamo to Yemen and have been reintegrated 

with al-Qaeda in Yemen. Despite all the terrorist activity taking 

place within Yemen, it is still eager to accept up to 100 additional 

inmates. My question is, can Yemen really be serious about wanting to assist us in eradicating al-Qaeda when it is eager to welcome 

Guantanamo inmates? I understand we are not sending those inmates now, and I agree with that policy, but if you can answer my 

question. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, I know that in my region, 

which is the near east region from Morocco through Iran, all countries that have nationals who are incarcerated in Guantanamo, all 

the countries policies are that they want their nationals back. That 

is a standard policy across the region. It varies from place to place 

about what that is, what they would do with them, et cetera, but 

it is not unique to Yemen that the Yemeni Government says please 

send the Yemenis back to Yemen. As you pointed out, the President on January 5 made the decision that because of the security 

environment, because of threat considerations, that he was susVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
26

pending the return of any Yemeni Guantanamo detainees back to 

Yemen. 

The previous administration had sent 14 detainees back to 

Yemen, this administration had sent seven back to Yemen, including one in September that was under Court ordered release, but all 

of these decisions that the administration has made were done by 

consensus, evaluating the threat environment, evaluating the individuals in question and taking into account all the information that 

we had. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Would you like to comment on it as 

well? 

Ambassador GODEC. I would just indicate that, you know, I share 

Secretary Feltman’s views and comments on this. I agree with him. 

I think there has been a very intensive process in this administration, a review of all of the detainees in Guantanamo by a task force 

of 60 lawyers, experts and various sorts, and anyone sent back anywhere was done so by a unanimous agreement. The key point, I 

think, with regard to Yemen at this moment is that, as Secretary 

Feltman said, the President announced on January 5 that he is 

suspending the transfer of detainees back to Yemen. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. My second question is, recent events 

in Yemen, coupled with past events, suggest that Yemen is not a 

partner in the war on terror. I want to get your thoughts on that 

and see if you believe this is a working relationship which can be 

salvaged, and if it is worth salvaging, what type of preconditions 

would you put on any aid we might provide? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, we would agree with you 

that Yemen has been, I would describe it as an inconsistent partner. There have been times when Yemen has focused on the alQaeda challenges, there have been times when Yemen hasn’t been 

as focused as we believe they should. We are encouraged by the determination the Government of Yemen has taken over the past couple of months. We believe that the leadership in Yemen from the 

President on down now understands that al-Qaeda is the preeminent threat in Yemen to Yemeni interests. We want to build on 

that. Our security assistance goes hand in hand with our development assistance in Yemen, but it is based on a partnership that 

must address these challenges. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Would you like to address that as well? 

Ambassador GODEC. I would just underscore the importance of 

looking at Yemeni actions. I think that those actions recently have 

been very clear, and they have been taking the fight directly to 

AQAP. Frankly, given that it is ultimately Yemenis who have suffered most from AQAP attacks, more Yemenis have died because 

of their attacks than others, I think that that commitment is a 

good thing, it is a positive thing and it does indicate, I think, that 

it will continue. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. I remind 

the committee that we have an excellent panel of expert outside 

witnesses to testify after the Secretary and the Ambassador are 

finished, and I recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly, for 5 minutes. 

27

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, I thank you both for appearing 

here today, and I would ask unanimous consent that my opening 

statement be entered into the record at this point. 

Chairman BERMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, before I begin asking some questions of the witnesses I just want to respond to my good friend Mr. 

Burton. I respect him, but I do not agree. I profoundly disagree 

with the idea that the United States of America would engage in 

torture to ring confessions out of would be suspects. Torture—

waterboarding is torture—is not an American value. We have always striven in this republic for the higher plane. We represent 

values. That is what makes Americans Americans. Not our ethnicity, not our religion, not our credo, but our values. Torture is 

never, and must never be, an American value. The facts of the case 

of Abdulmutallab, as a matter of fact, would be contrary to what 

was suggested. 

The visit to his parents elicited cooperation. The reading of his 

Miranda rights was no different than the reading of the Miranda 

rights to the shoe bomber, Mr. Reid, which occurred in the previous 

administration, I might add, not once, but four times. As a matter 

of fact, we now have the cooperation of the suspect in sort of singing his song about his contacts and the network. It has been an effective strategy. Not torture, but good, hard investigative techniques. I wouldn’t want anyone watching this hearing, Mr. Chairman, to believe for a second that the idea that torture is okay for 

the United States of America as a weapon in the fight against terrorism because torture actually can turn against us. 

It puts every American who travels abroad at risk, it costs us the 

high ground, and, as a matter of fact, it is counterproductive. So 

I just wanted to say that at the beginning, Mr. Chairman, because 

I wouldn’t want anyone to think that that view was representative 

of most of us, I think, in the United States Congress on both sides 

of the aisle. Now, if I may ask, isn’t the problem in Yemen one of 

governance? I mean, is there a functioning government we can 

work with? You know, there are so many things one can point to 

that would suggest serious disfunctionality. If we don’t have a functioning government to work with, how do we secure our interest in 

what is now yet another boiling pot in an obscure part of the 

world? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. There are many problems facing Yemen. 

There are many problems inside the government. I will quote a 

former Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, who last week or 

2 weeks ago described Yemen as a fragile state rather than a failed 

state. There is a history of trying to solve problems locally. There 

are 21 different governorates. The 21 different governorates have 

different cultures, geography, relationships with the central government, but there is, in fact, a government. It may not be a government that is functioning as well as we would all like it to, it 

may be a government that there are certain grievances against it 

by different parts of the population, but there is a government, and 

it is a government that we want to work with in partnership on 

all of these areas. 

We don’t only want to work with the government, and that is an 

important point. There are 7,000 civil society organizations in 

28

Yemen. This is a very vibrant civil society. We are working with 

those as well. There are local governments that address local challenges. We are working with that as well. So we are not relying exclusively on the central government even as we partner with the 

central government to face some security and development challenges. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is it a government that is cooperating with us, 

Mr. Assistant Secretary, in your opinion? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. It is. As we have said here, we have seen 

new determination that is encouraging in the fight against alQaeda, and we have also seen new determination that is encouraging in trying to improve the governance and its own capacity. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Ambassador, we have 44 seconds. 

Ambassador GODEC. I would just underscore again that we have 

seen, I think, some real changes recently in the Government of 

Yemen and in its determination to cooperate with us in key areas, 

areas that are of great importance to the United States, first and 

foremost, the fight against AQAP. I think that this is new and that 

it is a very positive development. We hope going forward that we 

can deepen this cooperation, certainly in the security area, but also 

in the development area. It is essential. We need to work with the 

Yemenis very closely, and we need the assistance of our friends 

and allies in the region in order to address the challenges. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. I am sorry that I got here late. Combination of trying to figure out what happened in Illinois in the 

election last night and trying to figure out what happened in Illinois in general in the past 100 years. There was an article written 

November 19 of this past year in the Washington Post concerning 

two brothers from the country of Yemen. One of the brothers had 

been detained at Guantanamo for the past 8 years, alleged to have 

been involved in the USS Cole incident, the other brother living in 

Yemen. The brother in Yemen talked about the promise of the 

President to close GITMO. 

He says if the President does anything less than closing GITMO, 

that is, moving GITMO to the United States, that the hatred and 

animosity that the terrorists and possible recruits for the terrorists 

have toward GITMO would be transferred to the U.S. facility, ostensibly in Thomson, Illinois. He said moving that facility will 

make the Yemenis even more prone toward terrorism than they are 

now and even exacerbate and increase the recruitment of al-Qaeda. 

I was wondering if you could comment on that. You don’t have to 

fight over who is going to answer the question, you know. 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, I think I would just underscore that there is a real commitment on the part of the administration and President Obama to close Guantanamo. I think there 

is no doubt that it is a real problem for us around the world, the 

existence of Guantanamo and the facility there. Our senior military 

leaders have indicated that, in fact——

Mr. MANZULLO. You know, I understand that. I am asking if you 

could comment on what the Yemenis themselves are thinking 

29

where one brother is incarcerated, the other one is out, on the attitude of transferring that hate from GITMO to Thomson, Illinois. 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, I am not aware specifically of 

any Yemeni reaction to the question of the possibility of transferring the facility. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Ambassador, what I quoted you was actually, let me give you the exact quote. Uthman Abdul Rahim is the 

person at GITMO. His brother is Arif. Said he was confident 

Obama would close GITMO in 1 year. If he doesn’t or if Uthman 

and other detainees are sent to a prison in the U.S., many families 

would consider it an even greater betrayal. ‘‘The families, their 

friends, their tribesmen will have more hatred for the United 

States,’’ Arif said, ‘‘and perhaps they will consider taking the same 

path as the extremists.’’ So my question to you is to comment on 

that statement coming from the Yemenis themselves. 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, I think that obviously we 

have a situation where there are individuals in Guantanamo. 

Something needs to be done with them and the administration is 

considering all of its options. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand. I am just asking you to comment 

on this. This is not a difficult question. 

Ambassador GODEC. I would be happy to take the question for 

the record, Congressman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. This matter has been around for months. It has 

been discussed publicly. It is not something that I am going to give 

to you and you can take back and answer me in 6 weeks. I mean, 

you are familiar with the area more than anybody. It is very intimate. This is one brother who is saying his brother is at GITMO 

and if GITMO is transferred to the United States, the hatred will 

transfer. That is a very simple question. Do you agree with him or 

not? 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, I would just have to repeat or 

reiterate that I would really have to take that question back for 

consideration. I am not sufficiently familiar with this specific case 

or these two brothers in order to comment on it. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Ambassador, that is the problem, okay? I 

represent Thomson, Illinois. I had 12 hours notice that it was going 

to be moved to my congressional district. I have got nothing less 

than obscure answers every time I ask a question. I am asking for, 

I mean, do you agree or not? This is a statement of a Yemeni himself. If he hates GITMO and GITMO is transferred, will he hate 

Thomson, Illinois? 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I would ask to have 30 additional seconds. 

Chairman BERMAN. I am sorry. I don’t understand how the Ambassador can answer a question coming from someone that he is 

not familiar with and evaluate whether it is an accurate statement 

or not. In any event, my feeling is irrelevant, the time has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past several years U.S. foreign policy to Yemen has averaged between $20 million and $25 million annually. However, in Fiscal Year 2010 the 

Obama administration requested about $50 million in aid. The asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
30

sistance to Yemen in this fiscal year has already reached $67 million, and the Fiscal Year 2011 request is closer to $100 million. So 

keeping these increases in mind, should we be expecting a Yemen 

supplement later this year? Can you mention, either one of you, 

who our partners are in Yemen, and what can we expect from them 

in the next few years? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative, thanks for the question. 

The money for Fiscal Year 2010 and the President’s request for the 

budget for Fiscal Year 2011 are in the regular budget. They are 

part of our regular foreign assistance numbers. Of course, we have 

had to evaluate how best to devote those resources and came up 

with those figures for Yemen, so I would not expect a supplemental 

for Yemen. In terms of the partners, it is a good question because 

we do have to leverage our assistance with others. In terms of Europe, the British are major donors. The British have announced £50 

million starting in 2011. That is about $82 million, $83 million for 

Yemen. So it is in the ballpark with what we are doing. 

The Netherlands and Germany are big donors, the World Bank 

is involved. The major donors are the Gulf countries, Yemen’s immediate neighbors, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others. The UAE 

announced a $600 million plus pledge to Yemen just recently. So 

the London conference that I attended with Secretary Clinton last 

week was an important milestone because it started out a process 

by which all of us will be working together in order to support development, stability, economic opportunities in Yemen which we 

hope will start to reverse some of the really appalling social and 

economic indicators in Yemen that can feed into the very hatreds 

and problems that we have been talking about. 

Ms. WATSON. I understand that about 50 percent of the children 

are malnourished and illiteracy is high, and piracy has travelled 

from Somalia into Yemen in the last few years, income from oil is 

failing, and, as in my own district, Los Angeles, California, water 

scarcity is a growing problem. With respect to these problems, 

what has been the result of the aid that we have given, the aid 

that the partnership is involved in, and how do we intend to improve the impact of this aid? Tell us how it relates to our best interests, too. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I will answer the last first, which is we 

firmly believe that if we just look at Yemen tactically we are not 

going to be able to solve these issues, and if we only look at Yemen 

from a security perspective, that is also insufficient to actually address the security challenges. We need to look at Yemen over the 

long term to address the sort of development challenges, the grievances, the despair that people have that can feed into a negative 

security environment. So we want to address security, development, and governance at the same time. We have a new strategy 

in terms of our assistance strategy to Yemen. We signed it with the 

Yemeni Government in September. 

So before the Fort Hood attacks, before the December 25 attempted bombing, we were already looking at new ways in order 

to most effectively get assistance delivered to the people on the 

ground because you pointed out the social indicators yourself. They 

are appalling. The Government of Yemen admits they are appallVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
31

ing. We need to find ways to make sure that health, education and 

job opportunities are available at the local level. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. I will yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentlelady has been yielded 

back. I was advised, and actually remember, that a previous member on the majority side, because I wasn’t alert was given about 50 

extra seconds to question, and so I am going to reverse the ruling 

of the lower Court and give Mr. Manzullo 50 seconds to pursue his 

question. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the administration’s top experts on the Middle East and on counterterrorism, how 

would transferring the entire Guantanamo Bay detention center to 

the U.S. make our nation any safer when there are clear warnings, 

such as what happened on December 25? 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, I think that, you know, it is 

clear that al-Qaeda needs sort of no further excuse than it has already got to attack the United States. I mean, it is constantly plotting and planning to attack the United States. It poses a real 

threat to us in its many manifestations. 

Mr. MANZULLO. You are not answering the question. Nineteen 

seconds. 

Ambassador GODEC. I would just emphasize that Guantanamo 

needs to be closed. It is essential that it be closed. I think that obviously the administration has——

Mr. MANZULLO. I want to say how disappointed I am in your unwillingness to answer this very simple question. I am now out of 

time. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recently, I will just ask 

this question, the New York Times ran that story on Imam University. Four thousand men gather there in a football-sized mosque 

every week, and, as they say in the story in the Times, Zindani, 

the headmaster who is the theological advisor to Osama bin Laden, 

after all this, this is a guy who is a designated terrorist by the U.S. 

Treasury, he sort of oversees this operation, and this is where John 

Walker Lindh studied before fighting us in Afghanistan, it is where 

the internet preacher, Anwar al-Awlaki, who preached to the Fort 

Hood shooter got his ability to give lectures. 

He also was tied to the Nigerian who attempted to hit us on 

Christmas Day. Now we have reports that up to three dozen Americans who have converted to Islam during incarceration in the 

United States are currently in Yemen, and they have traveled to 

Yemen to study Islam. Now, I assume that means they are going 

to the Imam University where these other terrorists were trained. 

Law enforcement officials have been concerned. They say they have 

dropped off the radar for weeks. Now, in the past, President Saleh 

has been lobbied to have Zindani removed from the terrorism list. 

I don’t know what he is thinking about this university, but I would 

think that it might be time to do something since this is being used 

to train terrorists. I wanted your opinion in terms of your feelings 

about that and maybe what steps you are taking. 

32

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman Royce, thanks. Let me 

make a couple of comments and ask Ambassador Godec to add. As 

you know, Yemen is a sovereign country so part of our dialogue 

with Yemen, our requests of Yemen of course are associated with 

things like how to build an effective counterradicalization program. 

Ultimately, these decisions are Yemeni decisions, but yes, we are 

engaged with the Government of Yemen on exactly the sorts of recruitment tools that we see happening in Yemen. We have also 

talked to the Yemenis about watching their own immigration rules. 

I think the Yemenis have recently picked up some Americans, in 

fact, for immigration violations and people who have overstayed 

their visas, which is an encouraging——

Mr. ROYCE. You have got 36 ‘‘blond-haired, blue-eyed Americans,’’ who our Government said ‘‘we thought we had this place 

blanketed, we thought we were working it very closely, but now 

they have fallen off the radar.’’ So, you know, I understand we are 

appealing to them, but in the meantime, terrorists are being 

trained apparently. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. No. Without question, this is a concern. 

There is very little ability, I think, of the U.S. Government—you 

would have to talk to the immigration officials to prevent the travel 

by U.S. citizens. So we have to be in touch with the Government 

of Yemen about any violations in their own rules. We are also 

doing things to promote counterradicalization in Yemen. We are 

working on programs. The Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

Bureau of the State Department, for example, runs a very effective 

program on religious tolerance in Yemen. So we are working on 

this problem——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, I understand, but you have still got 4,000 people 

meeting every week in a football-sized mosque where, if the New 

York Times is correct, they are being encouraged by, what will we 

call it, the brain trust for al-Qaeda, to launch terrorist attacks, and 

that is still going on, right? 

Ambassador GODEC. I would just underscore what Assistant Secretary Feltman said. We are deeply concerned about this, we are 

very well aware of this and other institutes, and schools and universities which are engaged in transmitting or teaching the extremist message. It is something that we are seized with. We are working with the government on this. We are looking for a variety of 

ways to address the problem. It is a serious issue. 

Mr. ROYCE. In the meantime, with al-Shabaab. You have got 

these Yemenis from this same university are training and fighting 

with al-Shabaab right now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. Remember, for the remaining members who haven’t questioned yet, we do 

have a second panel. Now it is the gentleman from American 

Samoa, Mr. Eni Faleomavaega, who is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate 

your leadership and initiative in having this hearing this morning. 

I do want to say that I think too often we don’t say enough to express thanks on behalf of the members and certainly our colleagues 

to those of our fellow Americans who serve in the Foreign Service. 

Secretary Feltman and Ambassador Godec, thank you for your 

commitment and your dedicated service on behalf of our country. 

33

I mean that sincerely because in this part of the world, for any 

given day any of your lives could be taken. The sacrifices that your 

families make, I think we sometimes tend to overlook that. We do 

deeply appreciate the service that you give to our country. 

Yemen has 24 million people and is a failed state. Several incidents and instances where our country has given some kind of connection in such a way that has not necessarily been positive. Just 

to make sure for the record that I have a sense of understanding, 

the al-Qaeda movement, was this initiated by Osama bin Laden? 

Your understanding, gentlemen? I just want to make sure. 

Ambassador GODEC. Yes. I mean, he certainly was one of the——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Founders. 

Ambassador GODEC. Yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Okay. Would it be safe for me to say also 

that one of the deepest concerns that our country has raised is that 

Yemen has become a breeding ground for al-Qaeda? Then I would 

like to ask, what is the estimated number of al-Qaeda now present 

in Yemen? 

Ambassador GODEC. The number that we have is from the Foreign Minister of Yemen, Foreign Minister Qirbi, and he has said 

that there were several hundred, 200 to 300, specifically, al-Qaeda 

in Yemen right now. That is the number that we have. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I want to make this connection, and I am 

not trying to be parenthetical about what I am expressing concern 

about. If the media reports are accurate, there are some 27,000 

Taliban in Afghanistan and a couple of hundred al-Qaeda. We already have 68,000 soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan, and we 

are about to send another 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan totaling 

approximately 100,000 soldiers that are going to be looking for 

these 27,000 Taliban and a couple of hundred al-Qaeda. And I suspect in the next 18-month period, that there is going to be another 

$100 billion that we are going to have to spend to look for these 

people. My question to both of you gentlemen: Is there some kind 

of a policy about proportionality? 

How many Yemenis are we going to be chasing when the alQaeda is going to be acting or giving its presence, whether it be 

in Africa or in other parts of the world? My concern is that is there 

some point where the administration is making a determination to 

say we have got a couple hundred al-Qaeda in Yemen, so therefore, 

we have got to do everything that we can. Is the issue of al-Qaeda 

just a security concern or is it more than just that? What is it that 

attracts these people to join the al-Qaeda movement? I am sure it 

is not just for the fun of killing Americans. 

I think it is a deep-seated idealogy, thousands of years of traditions, tribal rivalries and all of these things at play. But here, our 

whole objective is security on our part, to protect the security of the 

American people. Who doesn’t want that? In the meantime, we are 

going to be killing these people who have no idea what democracy 

is about, nor do they care. I just want to ask you gentlemen a question. We are going to be giving more economic assistance to Yemen, 

more of the same thing that we are doing to Afghanistan, but is 

it going to solve the problem of al-Qaeda? Gentlemen? Here is my 

problem. 

Ambassador GODEC. Go ahead. Please. 

34

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. There are no ethnic Afghans. There are 12 

million Pashtuns, 7 million Tajiks, almost 3 million Uzbeks and 

three or four other major tribes that make up the population of Afghanistan. Right on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan are 27 

million Pashtuns, even though they may be Pakistani citizens. So 

is it any wonder Osama bin Laden has been freely roaming between Afghanistan and Pakistan? We couldn’t find him after 8 

years. What makes you think that we are going to be able to solve 

the Afghanistan problem by sending 100,000 soldiers to do this 

task? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I know we are running out of time but I 

would just like to note, Representative, if I may, that Yemen is different. 

Chairman BERMAN. You have made that point, and you have run 

out of time. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Sorry. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Miller. Both of our witnesses have to leave at 11:15. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There have been a lot 

of questions this morning about governance in Yemen, and sometime in the past Yemen led the region in democratic governance reforms, and that obviously is not the case now. Whether you call it 

a failed state or a fragile state, it is pretty clear that much of 

Yemen is ungoverned and all of it is lightly governed. General Anthony Zinni said that ungoverned areas were a Petri dish for extremism and radicalism and that certainly appears to be the case in 

Yemen. There was a recent Washington Post article that said there 

was a London conference to encourage or insist upon very broad political and economic reforms in exchange for a package of long term 

development and security assistance, not just from the United 

States, from other nations. 

What is the nature of what we are asking Yemen to do? What 

do they appear to do? Are other nations supporting us in our demands? Are we supporting the demands of other nations? And then 

second, you mentioned earlier the neighbors of Yemen are the natural donors. They have got the money to do it. There was a conference in 2006. There were pledges of $4.7 billion in assistance to 

Yemen, but the most recent information is only 7 percent of that 

pledged aid has arrived. Why is that? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. On the last question, we believe the figure is more like a third. It is still only a third of what became $5.2 

billion. There were some extra pledges that came in. Part of it is 

questions of capacity, part of it is questions of governance, lack of 

confidence in some of the institutions of the state. So part of our 

challenge now is working together, sending a collective message to 

the Government of Yemen about what do we expect in terms of 

how they would manage this assistance, and providing assistance 

and actually managing donor funds, managing accounting for donor 

funds and delivering services. We ourselves believe that we need 

to be working across Yemen. 

I would describe Yemen as being poorly governed in many cases. 

We are working, for example, through our Middle East Partnership 

Initiative in 14 governorates. USAID’s new two pronged strategy is 

trying to get at some of the areas where there has been an absence 

35

of government functions in a way to try to build those functions so 

that there is a sense by the local population that their grievances 

are being addressed, that their needs are being met. What is encouraging out of London was the consensus among the regional 

partners, the international community and the international organizations represented there, which is that we need to be working 

together. 

We need to be working not to interfere in Yemen, not to be imposing international mandate or something on Yemen, but to encourage the Yemenis to put in place types of systems that are responsive to the real needs of the people. In addition, we are working, through these civil society organizations, to help them organize 

themselves to be able to make demands of the Yemeni Government. Yemen has elections next year. In April 2011 there will be 

parliamentary elections in Yemen. We hope that those elections involve the sorts of groups that would make those elections credible—responsive political parties, active civil society, full engagement by women in the electoral process. The international community will be sending these sorts of messages and providing this sort 

of assistance as we move ahead. 

Mr. MILLER. Who are these 200 or 300 people? AQI, al-Qaeda in 

Iraq, appears to be entirely indigenous. They aren’t going anywhere. They are just going to stay there. Are these 200 or 300 

Yemeni mostly, or are they from elsewhere? Have they failed in Afghanistan? More broadly, are they native to Yemen or are they 

being given sanctuary by other Yemenis, which, by Yemenis, would 

suggest more support for them and less support by the government. 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, many of them are Yemeni, 

but some do come from other places. Some of them are Saudi. As 

we know, at least one of them is also a dual Yemeni-American citizen. They are from a range of places. Some of them do have experience or training in other regions, in South Asia, for example, but 

many of them are Yemeni. They have built over time their relations through tribal, and marriage and other ties. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. At 11:15 

I am going to excuse both witnesses, and any members who have 

not been able to question them will have the first opportunity to 

question, assuming that is an appropriate way to work it out for 

the next panel. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Klein, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, nice to see 

you, and Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here. I think we all 

understand that there is a clear price to pay if we don’t increase 

our attention to this part of the world. We also know that we have 

a responsibility to commit serious and rigorous oversight over what 

we are doing and the resources that we are putting into that area. 

The language in the Yemen-U.S. End Use Monitoring Agreement 

basically says that the equipment can be used for a mutual threat 

or for ‘‘internal security, individual defense or civic action.’’ I don’t 

know if I am alone in thinking this, but the language sounds somewhat ambiguous, and I understand this is standard language for 

State Department commitments like this. 

There was a recent story in the New York Times that talked 

about Yemeni extremist groups having no trouble in buying or 

36

stealing equipment from Yemen’s military, which has struggled to 

maintain its morale, discipline, in a region torn by tribal allegiances, and largely beyond control of its government. Again, I 

want to be clear, this is the epicenter of what could be a serious 

problem with al-Qaeda and others, so I am very committed to the 

goals here, but we also know we have to be very smart. We have 

had experiences in the past where we have put military equipment 

and resources in a particular country that isn’t stable and that 

equipment gets into the hands of people that are not only going 

after our men and women and supplying terrorists. So the question 

is—tell me about this end use monitoring agreement. How we are 

using it? Has it been revised to reflect an increased commitment 

to Yemen, and obviously a need for transparency? What oversight 

do we have in making sure that these resources and equipment are 

going to be used for the purposes intended? 

Ambassador GODEC. Congressman, we are obviously very concerned about the possibility of the misuse of our assistance, whether it be sort of broadly developmental assistance or security assistance. We have a variety of controls that are in place in both cases. 

Specifically with respect to security equipment, we do have these 

end use monitoring agreements. We have a Blue Lantern program 

in effect. So we do have the opportunity to follow-up. So it is not 

just a matter of give the equipment and then it is sort of there and 

we don’t ever get to see it again. We do have an opportunity to 

check up on it and to ensure that it is being properly used. 

I can assure you that, you know, we are quite vigorous in our efforts to help ensure that there is proper use of the equipment that 

we are giving, the security equipment. We do not want it misused, 

we do not want it transferred or given away or for other things to 

happen which would be inappropriate. So it is a serious concern on 

the part of the Embassy, it is a serious concern, I know, on the part 

of the Department of Defense and others, and we are aggressively 

working through the various programs that we have got, Blue Lantern and others, to follow-up. 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Ambassador, are the challenges different in 

Yemen in terms of this oversight? Obviously each country has its 

different set of challenges, but knowing what we know about 

Yemen and the level of involvement that the government has in 

controlling, or the military or how the military is operating, and 

the threats and the extremist groups there, are you comfortable at 

this stage that we are doing everything we can? Or not only just 

language in a commitment agreement, it is actions, obviously, are 

the key here. Are you comfortable we are doing every single thing 

we can, or is this an ongoing process to evolve, making it as safe 

as possible? 

Ambassador GODEC. Well, clearly, Congressman, I think it is an 

ongoing process. It is something we have to evaluate constantly. 

We have to look at are we doing this as well as we can? In my experience, there is almost always opportunity for improvement in 

human life, so there may be some opportunities for improvement. 

I am comfortable that we are aggressively following-up on this, 

that we are focused on it and that there is a genuine effort to ensure that this equipment is being put to the purpose that we, you 

know, the administration, that the Congress and that the American 

37

people want that equipment put to, which is helping to enhance the 

security of Yemen, and therefore, ultimately, the security of the 

United States. 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Secretary, do you have any thoughts on this? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I concur with what Ambassador Godec 

said. We are aware of a poor human rights record in Yemen, and 

we are aware of the fact that the country is awash in a black market on weapons. So, these factors very much play into how we do 

the monitoring. Like Ambassador Godec, I am comfortable with 

where we are, but this is something we need to watch all the time. 

Mr. KLEIN. I would ask, obviously this is a very important issue 

and the worst thing we can have for our country, and our troops 

and our interests over there, to find that U.S. weapons are being 

used against us, so just be vigilant about it and we will stay in 

touch. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. The last 

questioner for 2 minutes will be the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 

Sheila Jackson Lee. Then we will bring on our next panel. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much to both of you for your 

service. Let me commend President Obama for modifying our 

Yemen policy by asking the National Security Council to undertake 

a comprehensive review, quite contrary to our friends who have indicated that has not been the case, and quite contrary to the ignoring of Yemen for the last couple of years. Putting that on the table, 

I believe this is serious. I think it is at a crisis level. I would ask 

you to engage the Yemenis to let them know that it is at a crisis 

level. Number one, who are our allies to help us with the Yemen 

policy about the crisis of al-Qaeda and terrorists in Yemen? Who 

are we working with? Who are we pumping up? To whom are we 

saying this is in your best interest as well? Finally, their actions 

have cost lives. I am very unhappy about it. I don’t think we should 

take them lightly, and I would like to hear you tell me how we are 

not taking them lightly. Thank you. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. First, our partners in addressing alQaeda are virtually everybody, all 20 countries and five international organizations that were together in London last week with 

Secretary Clinton. Everybody recognizes that this is a threat to 

Yemen, it is a threat to the region, it is a global threat. So we have 

partners across the globe vis-a`-vis the al-Qaeda threat and it is 

particularly important that, you know, the Saudis and Yemen’s immediate neighbors are very, very strong partners on this, and they 

themselves have been victims of the security threats emanating 

from Yemen. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How are you highlighting the crisis? You 

know, how are we ramping up? How are we pushing Saudi to do 

more? 

Ambassador GODEC. I would just underscore we are in constant 

contact with the Saudis. I think it is regularly discussed with the 

Saudis, the issue of Yemen and how to address it, but I think the 

Saudis themselves are very much seized with this challenge. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentlelady has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. I thank both of you for being with us. Very 

much appreciate your insights into the situation. I now want to 

38

welcome our second panel. We very much appreciate your patience, 

and your being here today and taking the time to both prepare and 

share your insights with us. Dr. Christopher Boucek is an associate 

in the Carnegie Middle East Program where his research focuses 

on regional security challenges. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, he was a post-doctoral researcher at Princeton University 

and a lecturer in politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. Jonathan 

Schanzer is vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Until recently, Mr. Schanzer was deputy executive director of the Jewish Policy Center and the editor of the 

JPC’s journal, inFOCUS Quarterly. From 2004 to 2007, Mr. 

Schanzer served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury. 

Leslie Campbell is a senior associate & regional director of the 

Middle East and North Africa at The National Democratic Institute. Prior to assuming his current position in 1996, Mr. Campbell 

served with the NDI in Russia, Croatia and Serbia. Mr. Campbell 

just returned from a trip to Yemen where he has been working on 

governance issues for over a decade. We look forward to hearing 

about his experiences on the ground there today. Finally, known, 

I think, to all of us is Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow in the Saban 

Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution. In 

2006, he retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 30 

years of service. 

Mr. Riedel served on the National Security Council staff as a 

senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East under the last 

four Presidents. He was a negotiator at several Arab-Israeli peace 

summits, including at Camp David and Wye River. In January 

2009, President Obama asked him to chair a review of American 

policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, the results of which the 

President announced in his speech on March 27, 2009. Mr. Riedel 

has traveled extensively in Yemen and it is interesting to note that 

his father served there with the United Nations during the last 

days of the British Colony in Aden. Thank you all for being here. 

Dr. Boucek, why don’t you start. Your entire statements will be 

made part of the record and you could summarize. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BOUCEK, PH.D., ASSOCIATE, 

MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. BOUCEK. Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, distinguished members of the committee, I would like to thank you for 

the opportunity to be here toady to discuss this very critical issue 

about Yemen and American policy toward Yemen. I think, broadly 

speaking, Yemen is facing three critical challenges: Economic, 

human security and demographics, and hard security and terrorism. What I would like to do very briefly is speak about the first 

two, about the economy and human security. I think one of the 

things that becomes very apparent when you are looking at Yemen 

is every issue in the country is connected to every other issue and 

they compound one another and make one another worse. 

On the economy, this is the single biggest challenge facing the 

Yemeni Government. About 75 percent of the country’s income 

comes from the sale of oil. Right now the country’s quickly running 

39

out of oil has been noted in the previous panel. Several years ago 

the country was producing about 450,000 barrels a day. Right now 

they produce about 180,000 barrels a day, and that is quickly running out. Within 10 years, most likely 5 years, the country will be 

out of oil, and there is no planning for a post-oil economy. Right 

now there is discussion about liquified natural gas possibly taking 

the place of oil sales. However, it is unlikely that natural gas sales 

would either meet the current volume of sales of oil or would come 

on line in time that oil goes off line. 

Furthermore, inflation is currently about 12 percent, and that is 

down from 20 percent earlier last year. Unemployment is officially 

at 35 percent, which is on par with the Great Depression in this 

country. Unofficially, it is probably closer to 50 percent. The economy suffers from a whole series of subsidies which fuel the other 

problems going on in the country. On human security, there are 

currently 23 million Yemenis, in 20 years there will be 40 million, 

and in three decades there will be 60 million. There is no way that 

the Yemeni economy can absorb all of this labor domestically. 

Yemen will have to become a net labor exporter. 

Furthermore, education and healthcare is in a poor state. The 

Yemeni Government is not able to provide social services throughout much of the country. Corruption in governance, as has been 

mentioned in the previous panel, is a major issue with the way in 

which the Yemeni Government has historically governed, has led 

to more and more problems in the long run. The biggest probably 

concern in my estimation is water. The country is quickly running 

out of water. Nineteen of twenty-one aquifers are not being replenished, and it has been estimated that 99 percent of water consumed 

in the country is extracted illegally. Right now there is no system 

to govern the extraction of underground water, and this is something that needs to be focused on. 

As the chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, it is very 

likely that Sanaa will become the first capital in modern history to 

run out of water, and this is a catastrophic problem. Where 20 million Yemenis or 40 million Yemenis will go when they run out of 

water is a major concern. The last issue, hard security, I believe 

others on the panel will speak about in more depth. There is an 

ongoing civil war in Saada against Shia Zaidi revivalists. There is 

a southern secessionist movement and a resurgent al-Qaeda organization which has proved over the last years to have the capacity 

to strike domestically inside the country, regionally inside Saudi 

Arabia, and now internationally. 

I would just say one thing about the hard security issues, and 

that is this civil war in Saada is rapidly accelerating the economic 

collapse of Yemen. The country is spending money at an alarming 

rate, money that they don’t have to spend on water, education, 

fighting al-Qaeda, anything else. By some estimations, the country 

is spending over $200 million a month of hard currency reserves, 

which would equate to about $1 billion over the course of the last 

round of fighting. Moreover, the conflict has led to a huge budget 

deficit forecast for this year, 23 percent by some estimations. 

Over 80 percent of the Yemeni budget is things that you can’t 

cut, including salaries, pensions and subsidies. This war needs to 

end not only for humanitarian reasons, but for the immense damVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
40

age it is doing to the Yemeni economy. I think I would like to conclude by saying that when we are looking forward and we are 

thinking about how to engage with Yemen and how to deal with 

Yemen looking ahead, we need to make sure that we focus on the 

systemic challenges to Yemeni security. By that, I mean the economics, and the hard security and the human security issues. We 

need to look at all of this in totality. It will not be al-Qaeda that 

leads to the downfall of the Yemeni Government, it will be these 

other issues. 

Right now we have the opportunity to get on the right side of 

this issue by focusing our attention on these long term issues. 

Yemen has always been a weak state, but it has a strong society. 

I think that is something that we need to keep in mind. Furthermore, I would reiterate what was said in the previous panel, that 

the American Government needs to keep the pressure on the Yemenis to make the painful choices that it needs to make on addressing issues like governance, on corruption, on subsidies, and keeping 

its attention focused on al-Qaeda. It will be only through the international community keeping the attention on Yemen and leading 

this discussion that the Yemeni Government will make this a priority. With that, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucek follows:]

41


54939c-1.eps
42


54939c-2.eps
43


54939c-3.eps
44


54939c-4.eps
45


54939c-5.eps
46


54939c-6.eps
47


54939c-7.eps
48


54939c-8.eps
49


54939c-9.eps
50


54939c-10.eps
51


54939c-11.eps
52


54939c-12.eps
53


54939c-13.eps
54


54939c-14.eps
55


54939c-15.eps
56


54939c-16.eps
57

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. That is an optimistic note to 

start off on. Jonathan Schanzer? 

STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN SCHANZER, VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR RESEARCH, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. SCHANZER. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member RosLehtinen and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf 

of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank you for the 

invitation to address you today. 

I had the opportunity to visit Yemen in 2003 to conduct research 

on al-Qaeda. During my visit, I met with high level officials and 

journalists who made a convincing argument that Yemen was 

working hard to defeat the terrorists in its midst. Upon my return 

from Yemen, I even wrote several articles praising Yemen’s effort. 

However, those efforts soon flagged, and today I believe that Yemen’s counterterrorism program is woefully insufficient. 

Al-Qaeda has been active in Yemen since 1989. It attempted its 

first known attack against U.S. soldiers in Yemen bound for Somalia in 1992. In subsequent years, al-Qaeda used Yemen to house its 

businesses and logistical hubs, and by the 1990s, al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen carried out several small operations before shifting 

their sites to high profile U.S. targets, notably the USS Cole in 

2000. More attacks followed. In 2002, al-Qaeda elements attacked 

the French tanker, the Limburg, and then nearly succeeded in 

shooting down a U.S. oil company’s helicopter with SAM missiles 

and automatic gunfire. 

To be clear, the nature of the threat in Yemen is as serious as 

any country in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda has long viewed this 

country as critical for training, financing and executing attacks. 

Yemen’s understanding of this, however, was initially slow and 

begrudging. Only after the Limburg attack did the Yemenis appear 

to understand the need to work more closely with us. Thereafter, 

Yemen developed closer ties with U.S. Special Forces, the CIA, and 

the FBI. It allowed us access to air space and its waters. It even 

monitored mosques and launched a public relations campaign 

whereby clerics convinced young radicals that jihadism was anti-Islamic in nature. In short, Yemen earned the millions of dollars that 

we provided them in counterterrorism in the early part of this decade. 

This effort yielded tremendous results. In November 2002, based 

on Yemeni intelligence, the CIA launched a hellfire missile on six 

high value al-Qaeda operatives from a predator drone. Cooperation 

with Yemen also yielded many important arrests. This unlikely 

success story was remarkable, but it did not last long. In retrospect, this decline was not about a lack of capabilities, it was about 

Yemen’s unwillingness to continue cooperating with the United 

States. 

In April 2003, 10 USS Cole suspects somehow escaped from a 

Yemeni jail. This was shocking. Jailbreaks almost never take place 

in the Arab world. This raised the question of whether Yemen had 

allowed the jailbreak to occur. 

Later that year, President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced he 

would release dozens of al-Qaeda fighters if they simply pledged 

58

not to return to terrorism. What began as an influx of Yemeni 

fighters to the Iraq insurgency led to an increase in terrorist infrastructure. In 2006, another 20 jihadists broke out of jail. One of 

them notably was Nasir al-Wahishi, an associate of bin Laden who 

went on to lead al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula. In 2007, even 

as Yemen rounded up terror suspects, it released other high value 

prisoners, including bin Laden’s former bodyguard and an organizer of the USS Cole attack. 

Meanwhile, Saleh has welcomed Hamas delegations on several 

occasions. He confirmed in 2002 that his country had raised $7.8 

million for Hamas. Recently, a Yemeni news agency announced 

that Yemen opened a paramilitary camp for foreign fighters to 

train in Gaza as well. Yemen has refused to seize the passports 

and assets of Abdul Majid al-Zindani, who we heard about earlier, 

after his designation by the United Nations as an al-Qaeda financier. In fact, Zindani travelled to Saudi Arabia in December 2005 

for a summit of the organization of the Islamic conference as part 

of President Saleh’s official delegation. 

The current thinking in Washington is that Yemen needs our 

help. It undoubtedly does. However, upping our aid to Yemen without strict preconditions is not the answer. 

If Yemen continues to allow terrorists to roam free, the problems 

in Yemen will continue to amount, and it is up to the Yemenis to 

fix this. The government must prove it will put our taxpayer funds 

to good use rather than squander them as it has in recent years. 

The government must prove that it has a plan before we commit 

our taxpayer money. Indeed, Yemen must articulate how it will reverse the poor policy choices that have brought us to this position 

today. 

U.S. aid should never be guaranteed. U.S. allies must earn it. In 

recent years, Yemen has failed to uphold its end of the deal. It 

must now demonstrate that it is ready to get serious about combating terrorism again. On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies, I thank you for inviting me to testify here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:]

59


54939f-1.eps
60


54939f-2.eps
61


54939f-3.eps
62


54939f-4.eps
63


54939f-5.eps
64


54939f-6.eps
65


54939f-7.eps
66


54939f-8.eps
67

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Campbell? 

STATEMENT OF MR. LESLIE CAMPBELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE & 

REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 

AFRICA, THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

committee. On behalf of The National Democratic Institute, or 

NDI, I also thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I returned from Yemen late last week after talks with government and 

opposition figures, and exiled leaders from the former South 

Yemen. NDI has been active in the country for almost 20 years. My 

task last week was to seek dialogue and compromise among political leaders as a way of addressing the political concerns which are 

at the heart of the war in the north and the unrest in the south. 

Unlike the failed states that Yemen is often compared to, the country laid the groundwork for a long-term solution to extremism 

years ago through democratic and political reforms. 

President Saleh’s decision to establish basic democratic structures arose from a pragmatic decision after the 1990 reunification 

of north and south that democracy, or at least elements of democracy, were necessary to govern a quarrelsome, stratified, armed 

and proudly independent population in a poor, rugged and diverse 

country. The existence of strong leaders from a variety of political 

groups and tribes, a history of dialogue and consensus building, vibrant civil society and the existence of nascent, democratic institutions all auger well for a comprehensive solution to the country’s 

current instability. As was mentioned by a previous speaker, 

Yemen once led the Arabian Peninsula in democratic reform. 

Yemen has extended the voting franchise to women, established 

an independent election commission, held regular, mostly fair, elections, encouraged the formation of nongovernmental organizations 

and has tolerated, even encouraged, the development of opposition 

political parties, and it has created elected local government councils. Yemen’s Parliament, while still developing, is an important 

forum for seeking consensus on policies and it does exercise oversight over Executive Branch decisions, although that oversight is 

limited. In an initiative that has been noted as a potential democratic development model for the Arab world, Yemen’s main opposition parties ejected extremists from the ranks and formed the 

‘‘Joint Meeting Party’’ coalition of moderate Islamists and former 

South Yemen socialists in 2003. 

Having said that, democratic institutions have atrophied and the 

Yemen Government’s increasing unilateralism is exacerbating the 

country’s challenges. While the democratic institutions that have 

been built could be a part of a genuinely stable government, the 

limited democratic reforms have not weathered political crisis of 

the past several years well. Political debate is becoming polarized, 

elected local councils lack resources and training and they are 

hampered by centrally appointed officials who still exercise control. 

There is increasing suspicion that President Saleh is grooming his 

son, Colonel Ahmed al-Saleh, who heads the Yemen Republican 

Guard, to ascend to the presidency when his term expires. 

Still, others believe that President Saleh may amend the constitution to extend his term, which should end in 2013. The current 

68

focus on security in Yemen allows the government to skirt responsibility for its own domestic failures. Perversely, some ruling party 

officials in Yemen seem to welcome the country’s infamy believing 

that development aid, controlled mostly by the ruling party dominated government, and more military assistance will bolster their 

credibility. The ultimate antidote to Yemen’s instability, though, in 

my opinion, can be found in continuing the political reform started 

almost 20 years ago. Inclusion and dialogue with the Houthis in 

the north and the former southern Yemen leaders and modern 

Islamists, combined with better governance, will largely muzzle 

and constrain the extremists. 

Last week I helped facilitate discussion between the ruling GPC 

and the opposition coalition, suggesting a formula by which the 

governing party and the opposition could form a joint dialogue committee to plan an agenda for talks inclusive of all Yemen political 

factions, including from the south and the Houthi tribal areas. 

President Saleh agreed to participate in such a dialogue, but full 

agreement on the process remains illusive. At minimum, the 

Yemen Government should release political prisoners in the south, 

estimated at 900 by Human Rights Watch—mostly southerners 

who have been arrested for planning demonstrations—as a sign of 

good faith. The opposition coalition should agree to move forward 

with the national dialogue if those prisoners are released. 

The principal of dialogue is valid. There will be no lasting antidote to Yemen’s instability without inclusive government and some 

form of power sharing. Here are some recommendations: The ruling 

regime cannot solve the problems unilaterally and must work 

through the existing institutions to help facilitate dialogue; the 

Government of Yemen should enact policies that devolve district 

and governorate level fiscal, social and governing authority to local 

elected councils that already exist to ensure that local development 

priorities are reflected in national policy; addressing grand corruption must happen and requires a serious commitment to investigate 

and prosecute corrupt actors at the highest level of government; to 

build confidence in outcomes from the political process, the Government of Yemen should implement previously agreed upon political 

and electoral reforms, including agreements with the opposition 

that have been made previously; for the U.S. Government, development assistance should include democratic reform and governance; 

as a key pillar, aid packages should include clearly defined, achievable benchmarks for democratic reform against which continuation 

of aid would be evaluated; and finally, security and stabilization 

strategies supported by the U.S. Government and implemented by 

the Government of Yemen should include stipulations to ensure 

that legitimate, peaceful opposition movements operating within 

the political framework are not defined as destabilizing political 

forces and not repressed, as they are currently. Thank you very 

much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

69


54939d-1.eps
70


54939d-2.eps
71


54939d-3.eps
72


54939d-4.eps
73


54939d-5.eps
74

Chairman BERMAN. Finally, Bruce Riedel. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE RIEDEL, SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN 

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. RIEDEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to the other 

members of the committee. I thank you for taking my written testimony into the record, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the shout 

out to my dad. He will deeply appreciate it. You already heard how 

complex, difficult, and indeed, dire the situation is in Yemen. Much 

of what I have been listening to in the last few minutes I completely agree with. What I would like to do very briefly is cover 

three points: Our enemy, our partner and our allies. Osama bin 

Laden has had his eye on Yemen as a redoubt for al-Qaeda since 

at least 1989. It is the historic home of his family. He is very familiar with it. He knows the situation there. 

In the last several years he has made a concerted effort to try 

to revive al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and he was behind the 

decision to merge al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda in Yemen 

1 year ago. It has turned out to be a force multiplier for both. AlQaeda’s goals in Yemen, I think, are twofold at least. First, they 

seek Yemen to become a base to threaten not just the Yemeni Government, but more importantly, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf 

States, and now to strike globally. It was no accident that the first 

attack by the new al-Qaeda in the Arabia peninsula of significance 

was the attack on Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. He had successfully led the repression of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, and they 

sought to eliminate him. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also operates within a network of traditional jihadist and other extremist religious elements. 

I wouldn’t focus so much on the numbers. I think those numbers 

don’t really tell you very much. I would focus on the jihadist networks, not all of which are violent, but many of which are fellow 

travelers with al-Qaeda and its world view. The most dangerous 

element today is of course the recruitment of foreigners and Americans to operate against the United States. Secondly, al-Qaeda 

wants to use Yemen to expand the global battle space against 

America, that is, to stretch our resources even further, if possible, 

to bog the United States down in local conflicts in Yemen which 

can become quagmires, and, through all of this, relieve some of the 

pressure that the al-Qaeda core in Pakistan and Afghanistan is underway today. 

The al-Qaeda core continues to regard Pakistan as its number 

one priority, but there it is facing increasing pressure from American efforts. The best case for al-Qaeda would be to entice, to goad, 

to lure the United States into another bleeding war in Yemen as 

part of its grand strategy to wear down the United States through 

bleeding wars throughout the region. Al-Qaeda’s grand strategy is, 

in short, to do to the United States in the 21st Century what they 

believe the Mujahedin did to the Soviet Union in the 20th Century. 

They would welcome large American deployments of combat troops 

on the ground. The United States clearly needs to be aware of this 

trap. I think so far the Obama administration, and the American 

military and CENTCOM has been well aware that there is no 

75

made in the USA solution to this problem, and that as difficult and 

complex as our partner is, Yemenis have to in the end be the ones 

who provide law, governance and order in their own country. 

Consequently, we need to work with the Yemeni Government. 

You have heard already how flawed it is. Successive American administrations have found dealing with Ali Abdullah Saleh very, 

very difficult to do. He has his own agenda, he has a record of inconsistency. His sympathy for America is limited, to put it mildly, 

but he is the leader who is there. I am glad to hear that he seems 

to be more focused on al-Qaeda from the administration. That is a 

step in the right direction. But he continues to be much more concerned about two of his more local problems, the Houthi Zaidi rebellion in the north, which has been an on and off problem for most 

of the last decade which has now dragged the Saudis into the war 

as well, and secessionism in the south. 

Let me say one word about the problem in the north. That deals 

with the question that you raised of Iranian involvement. Iranian 

involvement in this conflict is certainly a plausible scenario, but so 

far, the evidence of Iranian involvement is simply not there. We at 

the Saban center have looked very hard at the evidence that we 

can find, and so far, it doesn’t add up to anything significant. That 

doesn’t mean there isn’t something there we don’t know about, but 

we can’t find it, and we would welcome more information from the 

Yemenis and the Saudis on it. More importantly, though, seeing 

the Houthi rebellion as an Iranian machination is also a trap, a 

trap to draw us into a local conflict which is not relevant to America’s national security interests. 

We need to be careful not to be drawn into these local conflicts, 

and here, the administration’s efforts to encourage dialogue, to encourage a return to ceasefires, are steps in the right direction. Second, of course Saleh is even more worried about southern secessionism. Yemen today is really a country created by a shotgun marriage in 1990, reinforced by a civil war in 1994. Al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula seeks to appeal to southern secessionism, seeks 

to use that as a way to increase its strength and its importance. 

Here again, we need to be careful not to be drawn into these local 

conflicts. A word about our allies. This is very much not just an 

American problem. 

Yemen sits athwart one of the most important strategic choke 

points of the global economy, the Bab al-Mandeb. I had the opportunity just 2 months ago to sail through there. There is a very impressive international effort to prevent piracy in those waters 

today, but it is entirely defensive. We have no offensive effort to 

stabilize the northern and southern shores. Many, many countries 

around the world have an interest in stabilizing this: China, India, 

the United States, Europe and others. Our challenge has to be to 

motivate all of them to work together on this. In particular, the 

Saudis, the UAE, Qatar and Oman have to be motivated and 

pushed to take real steps, not just pledges of support, but real 

steps to help stabilize Yemen. 

They need to open up their job markets to Yemenis. There will 

never be enough jobs for Yemenis in Yemen, but there are jobs in 

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. They need to deliver on their aid 

promises, they need to deliver on their promises to rebuild the Port 

76

of Aden in order to make it a thriving capital once again on the 

Indian Ocean. The administration has made a strong start in London in this direction, but one thing we have learned over the last 

30 years of United States/Yemeni relations is we have got to have 

constancy and consistency in our policy, and we have got to keep 

our eye on the ball. It is too easy to lose interest in Yemen because, 

after all, it is a remote place on the far side of the world, but as 

events of the last few months have demonstrated, this is an important country to American national interests. Thank you very much, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Riedel follows:]

77


54939e-1.eps
78


54939e-2.eps
79


54939e-3.eps
80


54939e-4.eps
81


54939e-5.eps
82

Chairman BERMAN. Thank all of you. I am going to recognize on 

the majority side, Mr. Costa first, and then Ms. Woolsey, and then 

on the minority side go in seniority order, so I now yield 5 minutes 

to the gentleman from California, Mr. Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this important hearing today. Before I get to my questions to the witnesses 

let me, as it was discussed in the previous panel for the record and 

I would like to submit it, indicate that notwithstanding the fact 

that Guantanamo is an emotional issue and has been, both during 

this administration and the previous administration, there is bipartisan support for closing it. 

Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense in both administrations, said 

that Guantanamo itself is a condemnation and it will be an advertisement for al-Qaeda as long as it is open; Admiral Mullen has 

said Guantanamo has been a recruiting symbol for extremists and 

jihadists who would fight us; General David Petraeus, serving in 

both administrations, again, I oversee a region in which the existence of GITMO has indeed been used by the enemy against us; Admiral Dennis Blair, Guantanamo is a rallying cry for terrorist recruitment and harmful to our national security; and finally, General Colin Powell, who clearly served in the previous administration, said Guantanamo has become a major, major problem for 

America’s perception as it is seen and the way the world perceives 

America, if it was up to me, I would close Guantanamo not tomorrow, but this afternoon. 

Clearly, this is an issue that, notwithstanding its passion and 

emotion, there is overwhelming bipartisan support for closing that 


54939e-6.eps
83

facility. To Yemen. Your recurring themes as it relates to the challenges with governance, the problems with the economy and our 

partners as we try to get it right or recalibrate a prescription to 

get this current governance, the President, on the right track is 

troubling for me. You said, I guess I understood in all the witnesses who testified just now, that there was a good start, I guess, 

in London last week. Is that correct? Am I getting a head nodding 

there? Maybe? Maybe not? How do we keep the commitment, Mr. 

Riedel, with your long history on the point that you closed on with 

Saudi Arabia, with the other Gulf States, to actually make good on 

their commitments and to ensure that we, as a partner, and the 

Europeans are serious about follow through? 

Mr. RIEDEL. It is deeply ironic for the Saudis now to be supporting the Saleh government since they spent much of a decade 

trying to overthrow it, but they seem to have finally come around 

to the notion that he is the only game in town and that he is better 

than the alternatives. Whether they are willing to put money behind that, open up job opportunities, as I said, is the question that 

remains in front of us. I think the administration has to appeal to 

the king at the highest level, President Obama to King Abdullah, 

to recognize this is now a very serious threat, not just to us, but 

to Saudi Arabia. After all, it was Prince Mohammed bin Nayef who 

was almost killed by this group. I think the Saudis can be brought 

around. I think they recognize. I think that attack last August was 

a wake up call for them as well. 

Mr. COSTA. You think their active participation in effect will 

bring the other Gulf States in a serious effort to provide financial 

support and resources? 

Mr. RIEDEL. It is tricky because there is a lot of rivalry between 

the Gulf States there. 

Mr. COSTA. I understand. 

Mr. RIEDEL. The Qataris like to promote reconciliation between 

the government and local rebels. The Saudis prefer to go after the 

local rebels. I think we have to provide the leadership, frankly. I 

think we are going to have to be the ones to corral them. 

Mr. COSTA. We are going to have to provide the glue that keeps 

this thing stuck together and stay with it. Mr. Campbell, you 

talked about your efforts last week or in 2 weeks with the various 

party factions within Yemen. Is there really a desire to make these 

weak institutions work? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think there is desire. As I have mentioned also, 

the institution——

Mr. COSTA. Or is it just a competition for power and who runs 

the country? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. There is some competition. The paramount tribal 

leader in Yemen, Sheik Abdullah al-Akmar, died last year and his 

sons are attempting to move up the chain. They are attempting to 

challenge President Saleh’s son. So some of this is local politics and 

jockeying among people seeking power, but some, I think, is genuine. 

Mr. COSTA. My time is almost up. To the other two, and I don’t 

know if you care to comment on it, but the water issue I will get 

to. That is an issue that I am heavily involved in in California. 

84

With the issue of the drug problem, the qat, how significant is that 

a scourge within the population? 

Chairman BERMAN. Unfortunately, the gentleman’s time has expired, but perhaps we can get back to that. I recognize the ranking 

member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I do have some questions but knowing that we may be called to a vote at any moment, 

well, I am alone so I will ask it, Mr. Schanzer, can you expand on 

your testimony regarding Yemen’s ties to Hamas? What changes 

should we require from Yemen regarding its ties to this extremist 

group and other violent extremist groups, as well as their state 

sponsors? Also, in your testimony you state that of the 74 Guantanamo Bay prisoners who returned to jihadism, at least a dozen 

have rejoined al-Qaeda to fight in Yemen. An alarming statistic. 

When you say as long as Yemen fails to take counterterrorism seriously, the transfer of Guantanamo prisoners is ill-advised, do you 

recommend no transfers to Yemen or to anywhere? Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, I thank you very 

much for the question. With regard to Hamas, I would posit that 

the Yemeni Government does not view Hamas as a terrorist organization, but rather views it as a resistance organization. It has really been supporting Hamas, whether through training, through 

weapons, through financing from almost its inception from the late 

1980s. That aid has been stepped up since the year 2000, since the 

intifada broke out in 2000, where there have been several high 

level delegations from Hamas that have come to Yemen. The President himself has welcomed them and has rolled out the red carpet 

for them. They have gone around and met with various political officials within Yemen. 

So there is a lot of concern there, and it really underscores the 

question as to whether we can rely on Yemen to fight some terrorist elements and then ignore others. I think we need to be asking for consistency as we move forward. 

As for Guantanamo Bay, I would say that the figures that you 

cite from my testimony are, in fact, very alarming. That it is a very 

high percentage of recidivism. It is my recommendation right now 

that no prisoner be allowed to return to Yemen at this point until 

they are able to first get a handle on their prison break situation, 

and also perhaps articulate their policy of who gets let out of jail 

and why. And then, more broadly, just why is it that such a high 

percentage of these fighters are returning back to the field? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Just one note. A member had brought out the bipartisan support for the GITMO closure. 

I wanted to point out that the House passed the Lewis of California 

amendment that said no funds should be used to bring Guantanamo detainees to the United States without a Presidential certification. That passed June 2009. It was a motion to recommit that 

was on the floor preventing an Executive Order from taking effect, 

and it failed by only one vote. So I think there is a different interpretation of bipartisan support. I will yield back the balance of my 

time, Mr. Chairman, so some members can ask. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. I thank the ranking member. We have been 

called for votes so we have about 8, 10 minutes here, and then I 

85

think we are going to have to end this. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Here is a general 

question to any of you that would like to take a stab at it. What 

have we, or have we, learned lessons from our involvement in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, lessons that can be used regarding Yemen before 

we find ourselves sending troops and taking a position that may 

not fit with the rest of the world? Can we do something besides 

military involvement in Yemen early on by adopting a smarter security platform, like increasing development aid, debt relief? Do we 

have enough smart ways to try to offset what could happen? Because this is the world’s, well, isn’t it one of the world’s poorest 

countries, if not, the? Can we support civil society programs, support women? How are women treated in Yemen? Don’t start with 

that, start with my original earlier question. We will talk about 

women if we have time. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I am happy to just address one or two points on 

that. In terms of what we have learned from Iraq, I think that the 

recent success, or relative success let us say, of the surge underscores the point that we really do need cooperation on the ground 

from various tribes and political leaders. I believe that it is something that we don’t have at this point from Yemen. There needs to 

be a coalition of tribal leaders and elders who are willing to work 

with the United States, and Yemeni forces for that matter, to truly 

get to the heart of this terrorist problem. 

As for the nonmilitary solutions, we haven’t heard much about 

this, but the Yemeni regime is an authoritarian one, and there is 

a lot of discomfort with that on the ground in Yemen. The fact that 

you have a President who has been in power since 1978 and is now 

grooming his son to succeed him should not be lost in this committee. We need to start to see democratization take place in 

Yemen, and I think as that starts to happen, hopefully we will see 

a drop in militancy as well. 

Mr. RIEDEL. If I can address your question as well, I think there 

are actually many good news stories in Yemen. One of them is 

that, as Assistant Secretary Feltman said, there are 7,000 civil society organizations in the country, many of them very, very active, 

very able to do the work. They are service delivery organizations, 

women’s organizations, handicapped organizations, advocacy organizations. There are elected local councils, and I think with devolution of power, with decentralization, they can better address local 

concerns. I should also mention that tribal leaders in Yemen already have reached out to U.S. nongovernment organizations, like 

NDI, but also to the U.S. Government asking for help in terms of 

conciliation, getting service to their areas. 

They are not hostile in most cases, actually, to the U.S., and so 

you have an infrastructure to build dialogue with the tribes that 

does not require military assistance. On the question of women, 

Yemen is a very conservative country, it resembles the Gulf countries that way, but women vote. They have been elected both to 

local councils, hundreds and hundreds of them to the national Parliament. They are registered to vote in large numbers and quite assertive. A number of women have been cabinet ministers, ambassadors and so on. I don’t want to gloss it over too much because 

86

there are many challenges, but Yemen has an underlying basis 

that makes it much more than just a poor, conservative country. 

It has much more potential. 

Mr. RIEDEL. If I could add a point. I think a lesson we have 

learned in Iraq and Afghanistan is our al-Qaeda enemy is very 

agile, very adaptive, they have a very strong learning curve, and 

we have to be just as agile and adaptive. We need to not be 

dragged into local conflicts which we become bogged down in, 

which become very, very costly for us. That means that the counterterrorism only or the military only approach is not the approach 

that is going to work. The kind of approach that you suggested of 

trying to build governance, reaching out, bringing in allies, getting 

others to be part of this is absolutely crucial. Going it alone, relying 

purely on troops on the ground is a strategy that doesn’t work. 

Mr. BOUCEK. I would just add briefly that looking at nonmilitary 

solutions, there are things that we can do. Something that would 

be very helpful would be to help Yemen draft and implement effective counterterrorism legislation so that they could charge the people we would like charged, help train judges and lawyers to convict 

the people we would like to see convicted, help professionalize the 

police service so this cuts down on abuse, professionalize the prison 

service, so they stay in prison once they are incarcerated. I think 

there are things that we can do that are low cost and high impact 

in that way. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. I have 1 second so this is just a general question. 

Is it possible if the government is a dictatorship and doesn’t want 

to help us? 

Chairman BERMAN. I think we will leave that question in the either. Gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized. 

Mr. BURTON. I will be quick because I know we have votes on. 

Let me just ask this question. First of all, I want to make a statement, and that is there is an organization called SERE, the Survival, Evasion, Rescue and Escape Training Program, and it has 

been used by all pilot Special Forces for generations, including the 

Navy SEALs. In that training program they use waterboarding. 

These are our troops that they train and they have been doing it 

for 30 years. So when they talk about waterboarding being torture, 

I think for the edification of my colleagues, they ought to take a 

good look at the training that our troops are going through, or have 

been going through, for at least 30 years. Now let me just ask this 

question. Yemen, Mr.—how do I pronounce your name? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Schanzer. 

Mr. BURTON. Schanzer. There have been two escapes from the 

prisons that you were talking about a while ago, and you also said 

that it is very rare that this takes place. Is the administration 

there in Yemen, in your opinion, complicit with somebody, maybe 

an al-Qaeda or other organizations, in allowing these people to escape? Would it be because of sympathetic views or because of financial reasons, if they are complicit? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, if you are asking, sir, if at the highest levels of government, if they are cooperating with al-Qaeda, I would 

say that the answer is no. I believe there have been more than two 

prison breaks. These are the two major ones, but there have been 

others as well. And these seem to underscore that the security apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:25 Apr 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020310\54939 HFA PsN: SHIRL
87

paratus has been infiltrated by jihadists, by al-Qaeda. So at the 

mid-level we are seeing some of that infiltration and cooperation 

and that largely stems, at least as I understand it, from tribal affiliations, and perhaps financial considerations as well. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, how can the legal apparatus function there if 

you have got people who are in opposition to the positions the government is taking in incarcerating these people, how can that system even work? I mean, it seems to me that it is just wide open, 

and how can the United States work with a government like that 

that can’t control the prison? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, Representative Burton, this is exactly the 

point of my testimony. It is my assertion that Yemen has really 

failed to demonstrate how it is willing to accept the training and 

aid that we plan to give it in order to step up its counterterrorism 

efforts. We need to see, I think, very distinct milestones set by the 

Yemeni Government and an understanding of where they have 

been lacking to date, and how they plan to really take things in 

a new direction. In my estimation, they have really failed over the 

last decade. 

Since the USS Cole bombing they have learned very little. In 

fact, I would say they have actually gone backwards. So the question is, as we begin to engage with Yemen, I know we have been 

hearing lots of warm and wonderful things from the administration, but I would say that even if they have articulated a renewed 

interest, what we have seen is a record over the last 10 years of 

going backwards. This is of great concern to me and to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, the only other thing I was going to ask is you 

have made some comments about the Yemeni Government and how 

we should deal with them. It escapes me how we can work with 

them and give them all the money, the financial assistance we are 

giving them, and you say that they are going to have to solve the 

problems themselves because we can’t start a third front in the 

world war against terrorism. If all these things are going on, how 

are we going to do that? 

Mr. RIEDEL. Consistency and constancy in our engagement, and 

having our eyes wide open about our partner. We have no delusions about Ali Abdullah Saleh and the people around him, but 

taking this problem over as an American problem is not the solution either. We don’t have the resources to take it over as an American——

Mr. BURTON. Well, the only thing I will say, and I will end with 

this, it seems to me that if they are going to Yemen away from 

Pakistan and Afghanistan because of the heat that has been put 

on them there and we can’t really do whatever is necessary to defeat them, we are going to give them sanctuary in a place and it 

is going to cause us more problems down the road. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. RIEDEL. I think, Mr. Congressman, we are putting heat on 

them now, and there are real results from some of these military 

actions by the Yemenis assisted by the United States. My suggestion is let us not take our eye off the ball 6 months from now when 

we think we have got the problem in a redactive mode. We have 

got to stay at this for a long time to come. 

88

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. I am going to yield myself to ask a couple of 

questions and hopefully then get Mr. Scott into this. Schanzer says 

strict conditionality on our aid, Riedel says no boots on the ground. 

Riedel, what do you think of Schanzer’s position on aid? Schanzer, 

what do you think of Riedel’s position on boots on the ground? 

Mr. RIEDEL. If I could, Mr. Chairman, let me be clear. There may 

be places for Special Forces, there may be places for particular kinetic action. I am not ruling out any kind of military role, but not 

a large-scale Iraq or Afghanistan kind of operation. 

Chairman BERMAN. I understood that you were focused on that. 

Mr. RIEDEL. Okay. Conditionality is always a good idea. It is always very difficult when you are trying to entice the partner to 

work with you and how you go about that conditionality. Our experience with Yemen over 30 years, though, argues for a fair amount 

of conditionality. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Mr. Chairman, I would actually say that I agree 

very much with what Mr. Riedel says. I think the idea of putting 

troops on the ground in significant numbers is ill-advised. The idea 

of Special Forces working with the Yemenis is acceptable. I like the 

idea of continued predator drone attacks, hellfire missiles. Why 

that has stopped in recent years, I do not know. As I understand 

it, the Yemenis are uncomfortable projecting the fact that they are 

working with the United States. This is something that they don’t 

want their population to be aware of. I would love to see that cooperation continue, and continued, you know, joint cooperation on 

other CT efforts as well. 

Chairman BERMAN. And then my final question. Your comment 

about Yemen and Hamas, you talk about a conservative regime. Is 

it conservative in the sense of Islamic fundamentalists, in the sense 

of Muslim brotherhood? Is that the appeal or is it more of a tactical 

kind of decision about who to ally with? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Mr. Chairman, Yemen is a very complicated 

country, to be sure. The government has to appeal to various tribal 

elements, various political factions. The Islah Party, which is the 

Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, is a popular one in Yemen. I think 

that it was a tactical decision on the part of the President to figure 

out a way to support one jihadist movement. You have to remember, of course, that the Arab-Israeli conflict, or let us say resistance 

against Israel, as they call it, is really the lowest common denominator in the Arab world. This does not excuse, in my opinion, what 

the President has done. But he has decided that this is the one 

thing that he can squarely get behind, and I think that this really 

demonstrates a great deal of inconsistency on the part of the Yemeni Government. 

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Consistent with us making our vote. 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. Do want to make this point, though, as 

I mentioned before, having just come from over there. Two points. 

One is there is a great sense of urgency that I think we may have 

even a greater sense of urgency. We have an immediate problem. 

Yemen is ground zero for the national security of our nation on the 

war on terror. It is not coming from Pakistan, I think, because we 

89

have the troop manifestation up there, but if you look at the past, 

the USS Cole, if you look at Fort Hood situation, if you look at the 

assassination situation, the Christmas Day underwear bomber, all 

come out of a situation in Yemen. There is a reason for that. Now, 

what I think is we have to have a dual track. We are sort of in 

a, not only in a box, but we are sort of in a straight jacket of a 

box we have got to get out of. I think, after going there and talking 

with our special operations people and our Navy SEALs, I think 

that needs to be the approach. We have got to find a way to cripple 

the operation of al-Qaeda in Yemen immediately to give the people 

in the United States some breathing room and to give us some help 

on our war on terror here. That is where the attacks are coming 

from, that is where it is. The other thing I wanted to say is that 

I think that there needs to be more emphasis on Yemen from the 

East Africa standpoint, from the Horn of Africa standpoint. From 

my visit there, Yemen has far more connectivity to East Africa, 

particularly the relationship between Somalia and Yemen. They 

feed one another. You have got the training camps for al-Qaeda in 

Yemen, but you have also got the training camps for al-Qaeda and 

al-Shabaab connected in Somalia. So those are the points I wanted 

to try to get out. I think it is very important for us to emphasize 

we have got to kill al-Qaeda in Yemen. 

Chairman BERMAN. As much as I would like to get your reaction 

to that, I think if we are going to make the vote, we better adjourn 

the hearing. Thank you all very much. Appreciate your being with 

us today. 

[Whereupon, at 2:36 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(91)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

92


54939n-1.eps
93


54939n-2.eps
94


54939m-1.eps
95


54939m-2.eps
96


54939a-1.eps
97


54939a-2.eps
98


54939j-1.eps
99


54939j-2.eps
100


54939l.eps
101


54939k-1.eps
102


54939k-2.eps
103


54939g.eps
104


54939h-1.eps
105


54939h-2.eps
106


54939i-1.eps
107


54939i-2.eps
108


54939i-3.eps
109


54939i-4.eps
110


54939i-5.eps
111


54939i-6.eps
112

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JIM COSTA, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


54939ad-1.eps
113


54939ad-2.eps
114


54939ad-3.eps
115


54939t-1.eps
116


54939t-2.eps
117


54939t-3.eps
118


54939u.eps
119


54939x.eps
120


54939v-1.eps
121


54939v-2.eps
122


54939w.eps
123


54939o-1.eps
124


54939o-2.eps
125


54939o-3.eps
126


54939s-1.eps
127


54939s-2.eps
128


54939s-3.eps
129


54939s-4.eps
130


54939r-1.eps
131


54939r-2.eps
132


54939r-3.eps
133


54939p-1.eps
134


54939p-2.eps
135


54939q.eps
136


54939y-1.eps
137


54939y-2.eps
138


54939y-3.eps
139


54939y-4.eps
140


54939y-5.eps
141


54939y-6.eps
142


54939y-7.eps
143


54939y-8.eps
144


54939z-1.eps
145


54939z-2.eps
146


54939z-3.eps
147


54939ac-1.eps
148


54939ac-2.eps
149


54939ac-3.eps
150


54939ac-4.eps
151


54939aa-1.eps
152


54939aa-2.eps
153


54939aa-3.eps
154

Æ


54939ab.eps