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OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 5, MARCH 7, AND MARCH 14, 2002

Serial No. 71

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WISCONSIN, Chairman

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

LAMAR SMITH, Texas

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin

RIC KELLER, Florida

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

MIKE PENCE, Indiana

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina

ZOE LOFGREN, California

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

MAXINE WATERS, California

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

RIC KELLER, Florida

[VACANCY]

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

JAY APPERSON, Chief Counsel

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Counsel

ELIZABETH SOKUL, Counsel

KATY CROOKS, Counsel

ERIC HULTMAN, Full Committee Counsel

BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

HEARING DATES

Page

March 5, 2002

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: COORDINATION AND DUPLICATION .................. 1

March 7, 2002

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS ..................... 41

March 14, 2002

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: WASTE FRAUD AND ABUSE .............................. 83

March 5, 2002

OPENING STATEMENT

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime ............................................ 1

The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime ............................ 2

WITNESSES

The Honorable Deborah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice

Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Mr. Nolan Jones, National Governors Association, Washington, DC

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 12

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14

Ms. Laurie O. Robinson, former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice

Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 17

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19

Mr. Ralph E. Kelly, Commissioner, Department of Juvenile Justice, Frankfurt, KY

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 23

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25

March 7, 2002

OPENING STATEMENT

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime ............................................ 41

The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime ............................ 42

WITNESSES

Mr. David B. Muhlhausen, Policy Analyst, Center for Data Analysis, The

Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 43

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 44

Page

IV

Mr. John Cary Bittick, President, National Sheriff’s Association, Washington,

DC

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 49

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 51

Dr. Laurie Ekstrand, Director, Justice Issues, General Accounting Office,

Washington, DC

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 54

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 56

Mr. David B. Mitchell, Executive Director, National Council of Juvenile and

Family Court Judges, Reno, NV

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 70

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 72

March 14, 2002

OPENING STATEMENT

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime ............................................ 83

The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime ............................ 84

WITNESSES

The Honorable Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 85

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 87

Ms. Tracy A. Henke, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office

of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 94

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 96

Mr. Carl Peed, Director, COPS Program, U.S. Department of Justice

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 101

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 103

Ms. Bonnie Campbell, former Director, Violence Against Women Office, Office

of Justice Programs

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 104

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 107

APPENDIX

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

March 5, 2002

The Honorable Bobby Scott, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Virginia ............................................................................................................. 117

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 118

Shay Bilchik, President/CEO of the Child Welfare League of America

(CWLA) ................................................................................................................. 119

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

March 5, 2002

Press Release from the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, the Committee on Judiciary .............................................................................................. 123

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Laurie O. Robinson, former Assistant Attorney General, Ofiice of Justice Programs ............................................. 123

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Nolan E. Jones, Director, Human

Resources Committee, National Governors Association ................................... 125

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Debroah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice ............ 128

Page

V

March 7, 2002

Resolution from the National Sheriffs’ Association—Recommending that Congress Continue Funding for the Office of Domestic Preparedness ................... 138

National Sheriffs’ Association—ONDCP/CTAC - Action by the National Sheriffs’ Association to Support ONDCP’s Counterdrug Technology Assesment

Center (CTAC) and Requesting Assist to Combat Terrorism ........................... 139

National Sheriffs’ Association—FEMA and ODP - Action by the National

Sheriffs’ Association to Oppose OMB’s Proposed Elimination of Federal

Funding for Counterterrorism and Shift of Authority to FEMA ..................... 140

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from John Cary Bittick, President, National Sheriffs’ Association, Washington, DC .................................................... 140

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from David B. Muhlhausen, Policy Analyst, Center for Data Analysis, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC .. 142

Repsonses to Post-Hearing Questions from Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director, Justice Issues, General Accounting Office, Washington, DC ................................. 145

March 14, 2002

Letter from Carol Petrie, Director, Committee on Law and Justice National

Research Council, The National Academies ...................................................... 149

Letter from Chris F. Ryan, M.S. Associate Director of Public Affairs of the

Consortium of Social Science Associations (COSSA) ......................................... 151

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Bonnie Campbell, Esq., fomer

Director, Violence Against Women Office, Office of Justice Programs ............ 152

Reponses to Post-Hearing Questions from Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General,

U.S. Department of Justice ................................................................................. 156

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Carl Peed, Director, COPS Office,

U.S. Department of Justice ................................................................................. 157

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions from Tracy A. Henke, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department

of Justice ............................................................................................................... 160

References:

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs—

United States General Accounting Office—The Honorable Bob Schaffer,

House of Representatives, Juvenile Justice: Better Documentation of

Discretionary Grant Monitoring Is Needed (October 2001, GAO–02–

65) ................................................................................................................... 165

United States General Accounting Office—Report to the Honorable Bob

Schaffer, House of Representatives, Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting

Requirements for Discretionary and Formula Grantees and Concerns

About Evaluation Studies (October 2001, GAO–02–23) ............................. 165

United States General Accounting Office—Report to Congressional Requesters, Justice Discretionary Grants: Byrne Program and Violence

Against Women Office Grant Monitoring Should Be Better Documented

(November 2001, GAO–02–25) ..................................................................... 166

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OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS:

COORDINATION AND DUPLICATION

TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:10 p.m., in Room

2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The Subcommittee on Crime will come to order. I am

going to recognize Members for opening statements, including myself, and then introduce the witnesses. We’ll look forward to a very

informative hearing today.

Today the Crime Subcommittee holds the first in a series of oversight hearings to examine the operations of the Office of Justice

Programs, OJP. This hearing will focus on the overlap and duplication that exists within OJP and the efforts that are being taken

and should be taken to reduce that duplication.

This Subcommittee has planned three oversight hearings on the

Office of Justice Programs. The next hearing, which will be on

Thursday, March 7, will examine the methods OJP uses to evaluate the effectiveness of the grants it distributes to State and local

governments. The following Thursday, March 14, we will hear testimony regarding programs that have been less than successful and

grants that have been used for questionable purposes.

All of these hearings are designed to help the Office of Justice

Programs and this Committee reorganize and refocus the grant dollars into programs that work. The goal of these hearings is to determine how we can improve the process at OJP to create a more

integrated system that will better serve State and local governments and the American people. More than $4 billion was appropriated last year for grant programs at OJP. That represents a 400 percent increase in the last

10 years. The Federal Government owes it to the taxpayers to ensure that their money is being used in an effective and efficient

manner. Taxpayers deserve to know what programs the Federal

Government is funding with their money and whether these programs work or not.

The Office of Justice Programs, which consists of five bureaus,

six program offices, and six administrative offices, is the primary

grant-making office within the Department of Justice. The programs that OJP is currently operating were authorized by various

crime bills during the past two decades. Although these grant proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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grams provide a vital resource for State and local law enforcement

agencies, some of the programs at OJP overlap or duplicate other

programs at OJP and within other agencies.

For example, some COPS programs, Local Law Enforcement

Block Grants, and Byrne grants are all focused on providing funds

to local jurisdictions to fight crime in the same way.

The duplication and overlap also exist in the functions of the offices.

The lack of coordination among the various bureaus and offices

sometimes results in administrative duplication in the Office of

Justice Programs.

On another subject, in the budget request for fiscal year for 2003,

the Administration reduced the funding for OJP by approximately

$1.2 billion. A substantial portion of this reduction was in funding

for Office of Domestic Preparedness, which it proposed to transfer

to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA.

The Judiciary Committee is not sure FEMA is the appropriate

agency for these responsibilities.

The Committee is concerned that the transfer of

counterterrorism training and equipment grant programs out of the

Department of Justice to FEMA will shift the focus away from law

enforcement and reduce local crisis management capabilities.

Today the Subcommittee looks forward to hearing from our four

witnesses on the above subjects, and several others as well. That

concludes my remarks, and now the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.

Scott, will be recognized for his opening statement.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’m pleased to join

you in convening this oversight hearing on the Office of Justice

Programs.

We are aware of the important role OJP plays in administering

its more than 50 grant programs for the benefit of State and local

law enforcement, juvenile justice, victims of crime, and others.

OJP’s organizational structure is unique. It has developed over the

years as a direct response to congressional funding, including many

earmarks and mandates.

The bureau’s offices and programs in OJP are numerous and

complex in their design and operation. Substantive functions of the

bureaus are vested by law in their directors rather than the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General. These statutes

have provided that the directors have final authority over grants,

cooperative agreements and contracts awarded by their respective

agencies. And as a result, OJP operates, to a large degree, as a network of independent agencies which share a common infrastructure.

Funding for OJP programs exceeded $4 billion up from $1.1 billion in 1995. As a result of the rapid growth in size and complexity

of operations, inefficiencies, duplications, and difficulties began to

be noted by some of those observing or negotiating the maze of

grant, research, and technical assistance programs under OJP.

So in 1997, Congress, through the appropriations process, directed OJP and DOJ to develop a proposal for reorganization,

which would clarify and streamline its operations. In 1999, DOJ responded with a report, which proposed changes to the present OJP

structure in an effort to accomplish these objectives. They proposed

3

various changes, such as focusing authority in the Assistant Attorney General through the elimination of presidentially appointed

bureau chiefs, elimination of some bureaus, consolidating some program offices, and consolidating all research under NIJ.

During the oversight hearings in 1999, we heard from a variety

of customers of OJP, including researchers, practitioners, administrators and advocates of OJP programs. Some of the witnesses expressed support for the proposal or parts thereof; others expressed

criticisms in opposition to the proposal or parts thereof. And I suspect we’ll hear a divergence of views about OJP reorganization in

this series of hearings as well.

Mr. Chairman, I have a lot more to say, and I’d like unanimous

consent to enter the rest of this statement into the record. And

thank you for holding up the markup of the cyberterrorism bill, because that had OJP reorganizational issues in it, so that we can

hear from the witnesses on that particular issue before we take up

that bill.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott. And without objection, your

entire opening statement will be made a part of the record, as will

the opening statements of other Members, as will several submissions we’ve had of testimony of individuals who are not here today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scott follows in the Appendix]

Mr. SMITH. We especially appreciate the presence of the other

Members who are here, they being the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, and the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller. And

do they have opening statements they wish to make?

The gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, a very brief statement. You and Mr.

Scott have pretty well covered it.

You touched on duplication and overlapping in your opening

statement, and duplication and overlapping is a problem—or problems that continue to plague this city generally and this Capitol

Hill specifically.

I recall, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll say to Mr. Scott as well, back

when we were working on the welfare reform package, I was

amazed to find, Mr. Chairman, the different programs that involved a dozen different entities addressing the same problem, but

yet making separate appropriations. So I’m not suggesting that

quartet is guilty of this. [Laughter.]

I don’t mean to imply that at all.

But if duplication and overlapping are areas that need attention,

I think this hearing will serve a good purpose, and I thank you for

it.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Coble.

Does the gentleman from Florida have an opening statement?

Mr. KELLER. Mr. Chairman, my only opening statement is to

thank the witnesses for taking time to appear before us today and

look forward to hearing your testimony.

Mr. COBLE. And I failed to do that, too, Mr. Chairman. It’s good

to have the witnesses.

Mr. Chairman, I must say, I have a 4:30 meeting, so I’m going

to have to leave before too long.

Mr. SMITH. We’re just glad you’re here, present for the creation

here. Thank you, Mr. Coble.

4

Thank you, Mr. Keller.

I’ll introduce the witnesses who are here today. They are the

Honorable Deborah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice; Dr. Nolan Jones,

National Governors Association, Hall of States, Washington, DC;

the Honorable Laurie O. Robinson, former Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs; and

Mr. Ralph E. Kelly, Commissioner, Department of Juvenile Justice,

Frankfurt, KY

We welcome you all, and we’ll begin with Ms. Daniels. But let

me say at the outset, as you all were notified, we hope to keep your

testimony within 5 minutes, and there will be ample opportunity

for you to expand on that testimony during the question-and-answer period. And also, let me request that in your 5-minute statements, that you not take too much time to describe the current programs, but focus as much as possible on ways we can improve the

programs and eliminate duplication that’s the subject of the hearing.

With that, Ms. Daniels, we’ll begin with you.

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH DANIELS, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Ms. DANIELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I’m pleased to have

the opportunity to discuss with you this Administration’s efforts to

improve the structure and operations of the Office of Justice Programs. We greatly appreciate your interest and your support of our

efforts, which are a continuation of Ms. Robinson’s efforts over time

to eliminate duplication and waste, to streamline our management

and operations, to improve accountability for taxpayer dollars, and

to ensure optimal service to the public in the 21st century.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, OJP has been of fastest-growing

Federal agencies in the past decade. And in fact, you yourself mentioned that we had reached an appropriation level of over $4 billion. At this point, OJP is overseeing more than 40,000 grants, valued at over $20 billion.

However, as these new programs and funding streams were

added over the years, you’ve also noted, an effective infrastructure

was not in place to accommodate them. The result is a decentralized, inefficient, and overlapping bureaucracy that wastes valuable

government resources and significantly contributes to inefficiency

and shakes the citizens’ trust and confidence in their government

and its management.

Briefly, just to give you an idea without berating this issue: at

least four of our bureaus and one office work on domestic violence

issues: all five bureaus and at least one office address child abuse;

and at least three bureaus, and one office address juvenile drug

abuse, at least four bureaus, — almost all offices address youth violence.

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on America, improving our ability to reach local law enforcement and State law

enforcement and serve the public has taken on a new urgency.

5

To assist in safeguarding our Nation’s internal security as well

as to continue to assist in the fight against more traditional crime,

which we must continue to do, we must maximize our efficiencies,

minimize waste, and get the greatest number of dollars out to the

field as promptly as possible.

We appreciate the fact that the Members of the Subcommittee

share these goals. And as you know, Mr. Chairman, we’re recently

submitted a report to the Congress, describing our goals and our

objectives to reaching those goals in order to improve our operational effectiveness, accountability and reliability, the efficiency of

our programs, and how we serve and inform our constituencies.

I believe that we will continue these discussions that we have

begun with the field, but we’ve taken into account, in developing

our proposals, a lot of very good recommendations that have been

made from the field and from my immediate predecessor, Laurie

Robinson, who I am delighted is with us today, in trying to craft

something that is going to make us more efficient and accountable

and target our resources to maximize public benefit.

We have four basic goals in this reorganization, and they are to

improve responsiveness, assistance, and accountability to all of our

customers; to eliminate duplication and overlap, which was a great

concern expressed by Mr. Coble a moment ago; to ensure measurable grant and program outcomes; and to enhance communication,

cooperation, coordination, and efficiency.

We’ve developed a set of corresponding objectives to try to reach

these goals, and they include, first, developing a strategic plan that

reflects our statutory requirements and the mission and goals of

the President and the Attorney General. This plan will ensure

meaningful outcomes, appropriate fiscal management, and accountability.

Second, we believe that it’s necessary to amend the statutes governing OJP’s bureaus and program offices to provide that all authority for all operations at the Office of Justice Programs rests in

the Attorney General, while recognizing and meeting the need for

maintaining the integrity of the research and statistics functions

within OJP.

Third, standardizing management policies and procedures

throughout OJP and consolidating administrative offices will help

us to ensure procurement methods that are uniform, uniform policies and procedures across OJP, which in turn will assist us in

streamlining our management and producing cost savings.

Fourth, instituting an OJP-wide automated grant management

system to improve efficiency and consolidating all our information

technology services under a new chief information officer, whom

we’ve recently hired. We believe that will go a great length to improve our ability to manage grants and improve the ability of our

customers to access our services and to negotiate the maze which

is OJP.

Fifth, we want to become more retail orientated, more customer

friendly. We want to focus more on results and improving service

to our customers. This will include examining our current functions

that could be contracted out to increase efficiency, to improve our

interaction with grantees, and to maximize the utilization of taxpayer resources.

6

Sixth, we want to centralize communications within OJP to better coordinate the release of information, data, and publications,

eliminate duplication, and flag potentially contradictory findings.

Seventh, we need to improve the coordination of our legislative,

statutory, and regulatory activities and reviews by centralizing the

authority for these activities within OJP’s Office of General Counsel.

And finally, consolidating and coordinating many currently overlapping functions to reduce the duplication that results in fragmented grant programs, confusion both within OJP and out in the

field, and a misuse of taxpayer resources.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, at your request, the OJP staff has examined the programs which are administered by OJP, by other

Justice Department offices, and by other Federal departments, to

identify areas of overlap and duplication. We have compiled a great

deal of information for you, which I know will be forthcoming. I’m

sorry we could not have it to you before this movement.

But our review found that OJP administers a number of programs that share certain characteristics or purposes with other

OJP department and other Federal agency programs. But no OJP

program actually duplicates any other such program in every particular.

Most, however, share a fundamental focus, such as service to victims of crime, addressing juvenile justice issues, delinquency

issues, or improving technology, with at least one other entity either within OJP, outside OJP but within the department, or in

some other Federal agency.

However, most of these programs that are administered by OJP

have specific statutory goals and purposes that while they minimize the potential—for precise duplication of effort, they somewhat

diffuse the potential impact of our effort to assist the field, because

they are somewhat duplicative and overlapping of other programs.

To address this issue of overlap, we have worked already to collaborate with other agencies of the Department of Justice as well

as other Federal agencies on programs involving similar areas of

interest and authority.

One recent example is our serious and violent offender reentry

initiative, in which we’re collaborating with the National Institute

of Corrections within the Department of Justice. It involves a collaboration within OJP of our Office of Corrections and our Juvenile

Justice Agency, and also, the other U.S. Departments of Education,

Labor, HHS, and Housing and Urban Development.

We continue to look for areas of possible collaboration to reduce

duplication and overlap, such as this one, and to also enhance communities’ access to Federal funds. We believe this a way to address

the issues that you’ve raised today.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the terrorist attacks of September

11th, and the threat of continued terrorist activity on American

soil, have made it even more urgent that OJP streamline and coordinate its efforts, that it maximize its resources, that it improve

its services, and it collaborate extensively with other agencies of

the Federal Government. To ensure that America’s front-line defenders, our State and local public safety officers, have the reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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sources they need to protect our liberties and to safeguard the Nation’s internal security.

I assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I and the other members of our

OJP leadership team stand ready to work with the Congress to

achieve these goals. I’ve provided the Subcommittee with a more

extensive written statement, and I would ask that it be included

in the record. And I’d be pleased to respond to questions either now

or at the conclusion of this testimony, at the wish of the Committee. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Daniels follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEBORAH J. DANIELS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with you this Administration’s efforts to improve the structure

and operations of the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). We appreciate your interest

in and support for these efforts to eliminate duplication and waste, streamline our

management and operations, improve our accountability for taxpayer dollars, and

ensure optimal service to the public in the 21st Century.

OJP OVERVIEW

As you know, Mr. Chairman, OJP was established by the Justice Assistance Act

of 1984, and reauthorized in 1988, to provide federal leadership in developing the

nation’s capacity to prevent and control crime, administer justice, and assist crime

victims. Its origins go back to the 1960s, however, and a series of individual enactments over time that created the various sub-agencies of what is now OJP.

OJP strives to make the nation’s criminal and juvenile justice systems more responsive to the needs of state, local, and tribal governments and their citizens. OJP

partners with federal, state, and local agencies, as well as national and communitybased organizations, to develop, operate, and evaluate a wide range of criminal and

juvenile justice programs. To accomplish its mission, OJP administers a mix of formula and discretionary grant programs and provides targeted training and technical

assistance on ‘‘what works’’ and ‘‘best practices.’’

CURRENT OJP ORGANIZATION

OJP’s organizational structure is unique. As a result of various authorizing statutes and funding mandates by Congress, OJP currently consists of five bureaus, six

program offices, and seven administrative offices. The OJP program bureaus are:

• The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provides funding, training, and technical assistance to state and local governments to combat violent and drugrelated crime and to help improve the criminal justice system. Its programs

include the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance formula and discretionary grant programs and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grants (LLEBG) program.

• The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) collects and analyzes statistical data

on crime, criminal offenders, crime victims, and the operations of justice systems at all levels of government.

• The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) supports research and development

programs, conducts demonstrations of innovative approaches to improve

criminal justice, develops new criminal justice technologies and standards for

law enforcement equipment, and evaluates the effectiveness of OJP-supported

and other justice programs.

• The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) provides

grants and contracts to states to help them improve their juvenile justice systems and sponsors innovative research, demonstration, evaluation, statistics,

replication, technical assistance, and training programs to help improve the

nation’s understanding of and response to juvenile violence and delinquency.

• The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) administers victim compensation and

assistance grant programs created by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984

(VOCA). OVC also provides funding, training, and technical assistance to improve the nation’s response to crime victims.

8

• The Violence Against Women Office (VAWO) coordinates the Department of

Justice’s initiatives relating to violence against women and administers grant

programs to help prevent, detect, and stop violence against women.

• The Corrections Program Office (CPO) provides financial and technical assistance to state and local governments to implement corrections-related programs, including correctional facility construction and corrections-based drug

treatment programs.

• The Drug Courts Program Office (DCPO) supports the development, implementation, and improvement of drug courts through grants to local or state

governments, courts, and tribal governments, as well as through technical assistance and training.

• The Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) helps communities build

stronger, safer neighborhoods by implementing the Weed and Seed strategy,

a community-based, multi-disciplinary approach to combating crime and revitalizing crime-plagued neighborhoods.

• The Office of the Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education (OPCLEE)

provides college educational assistance and training to individuals who commit to public service in law enforcement.

• The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) currently is responsible for enhancing the capacity and capability of state and local jurisdictions to prepare

for and respond to incidents of domestic terrorism involving chemical and biological agents, radiological and explosive devices, and other weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). As you may know, the Administration is proposing transfer of ODP’s funding and functions to FEMA in 2003.

In addition, OJP’s American Indian and Alaskan Native Coordinator (AI/AN) improves outreach to tribal communities and coordinates funding, training, technical

assistance, and information dissemination to tribal governments.

REORGANIZATION EFFORTS

OJP has been one of the fastest growing federal agencies this past decade, with

its resources more than quadrupling and reaching an annual appropriation level of

over $4 billion. Today, OJP is overseeing more than 40,000 grants valued at over

$20 billion.

However, as new programs and funding streams were added to OJP over the

years, there was not appropriate planning to ensure that an effective infrastructure

was in place. The result is a decentralized, inefficient, and overlapping bureaucracy.

Under the current organizational structure, the OJP bureaus and offices often do

not communicate, coordinate, or collaborate. This has resulted in lost opportunities

for responding to crime, assisting law enforcement, and providing services to victims; and considerable frustration within the criminal justice community, as well as

within the OJP.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, efforts to reorganize OJP have been underway for

several years. In 1997, the Congress began an examination of the OJP infrastructure and the statutory framework that has shaped that infrastructure for the past

14 years. As the Congress noted in the conference report accompanying the Justice

Department’s fiscal year 1998 appropriations bill, since 1995, funding for OJP pro- grams had grown by 213 percent, from $1.1 billion to over $3.4 billion. The conferees

asked the OJP Assistant Attorney General to report on ‘‘the steps OJP has taken’’ and to recommend ‘‘additional actions’’ to ensure coordination and reduce duplication and overlap among the OJP components. Responding to that request, the OJP

Assistant Attorney General submitted a report to the Congress that presented options for improving coordination in OJP grant administration.

However, in October 1998, Congress expressed further concern about the OJP

structure and, in the conference report that accompanied the fiscal year 1999 Justice Department appropriations bill, the conferees asked the OJP Assistant Attorney

General to develop a plan for a new organizational structure for OJP. OJP’s proposed reorganization plan was submitted to the Congress in March 1999.

In November 1999, in the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2000

Justice Department appropriations bill, the Congress asked the OJP Assistant Attorney General to submit to the Congress a ‘‘formal reorganization proposal’’ to implement selected components of OJP’s March 1999 proposed reorganization plan.

Consequently, in February 2000, the proposed new structure for OJP was forwarded

to the Congress for its review. In April 2000, Congress approved the proposal. However, the former OJP leadership did not move forward to implement the new organizational structure. Thus, in 2002, OJP operates under the same structure that existed in 1997.

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CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on America, improving OJP’s ability to assist state and local law enforcement has taken on a new urgency. To assist

in safeguarding our nation’s internal security, as well as to continue to assist in the

fight against more traditional crime, OJP must maximize efficiency, minimize

waste, and identify ways to get the greatest possible number of dollars out to the

field as promptly as possible. These are the goals of Attorney General Ashcroft and

all of the current OJP leadership, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you and the

Members of this Subcommittee share those goals.

At the same time, the current Department and OJP leadership recognize that reorganization of OJP should be more than just streamlining and creating efficiencies

and coordination. Reorganization should strive to improve OJP’s overall responsiveness to the criminal justice field, states and localities, individual citizens, and Congress. Reorganization must also leverage federal funds to the greatest extent possible, in order to ensure the wise investment of taxpayer dollars.

In addition, OJP’s reorganization should meet the charge President Bush set for

federal agencies to promote ‘‘an active but limited government; one that empowers

states, cities, and citizens to make decisions; ensures results through accountability;

and promotes innovation through competition. The primary objective must be a government that is citizen centered, not bureaucracy centered; results-oriented, not

process-oriented, and market-based, actively promoting, not stifling, innovation and

competition.’’

To guide these reorganization efforts, the current OJP leadership has developed

four strategic goals. These are:

• Improve responsiveness, assistance, and accountability to all OJP customers.

• Eliminate duplication and overlap.

• Ensure measurable grant and program outcomes.

• Enhance communication, cooperation, coordination, and efficiency.

We also have developed a set of corresponding objectives to meet those goals.

These are:

1. Objective: OJP should have a strategic plan that reflects statutory requirements

and the mission and goals of the President and the Attorney General. This plan will

ensure meaningful outcomes, appropriate fiscal management, and accountability. It

also will result in improved communication, coordination, and collaboration among

the OJP components to ensure the wise investment of taxpayer dollars and provide

real progress and improvement in the criminal justice field.

2. Objective: The statutes governing OJP’s bureaus and program offices should be

amended to provide that all authority resides in the Attorney General rather than

in the Assistant Attorney General or in program heads. This consolidation would

help meet the Congressional mandate to ‘‘ensure centralized management’’ of OJP’s

activities. Congress has already taken significant steps to consolidate the administrative authority of OJP in past appropriations bill, and most recently in the USA

Patriot Act. This centralization of authority, support, and program functions would

help OJP become a collaborative, coordinated set of programs.

3. Objective: Management policies and procedures should be standardized throughout OJP. To improve organizational management and performance, the numerous

administrative offices should be consolidated. In addition, standardization would ensure uniform procurement methods, policies, and procedures across OJP, improving

and streamlining management and producing cost-savings throughout the agency.

4. Objective: An OJP-wide grant management system should be instituted. Many

OJP grants are still processed on paper. Only a handful are automated. We are

moving forward to fully automate the process and to utilize a single, comprehensive

grant management system for all grant programs. This would allow applicants to

apply on-line and for grantees to submit periodic financial and programmatic reports on-line, as well. To help accomplish this objective, we recently appointed a new

Chief Information Officer (CIO) for OJP and proposed to the Congress that all information technology services be consolidated under the CIO’s authority.

5. Objective: OJP should be ‘‘retail-oriented.’’ Instead of focusing on internal processes, hierarchy, and ‘‘stovepipes,’’ OJP should focus more on results, communication, and partnerships. We are working to eliminate internal barriers to accomplishing this objective so that OJP can be more responsive to the needs and questions of grantees, as well as the overall criminal justice, public safety, and victim

assistance fields. In addition, we also propose examining current internal OJP functions that could be contracted out to increase overall efficiency, maintain or improve

interaction with grantees, and maximize the utilization of taxpayer resources.

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6. Objective: Centralized communication should be established at OJP. Currently,

there is little internal coordination of information, data, publications, etc. This has

led to the dissemination by OJP of duplicative and even contradictory information.

To achieve more centralized communication, we have proposed centralizing the Congressional liaison, media information, and publishing functions of OJP. This would

assist in eliminating duplication and flagging contradictory findings. However, this

centralization would not affect the objectivity of research at the National Institute

of Justice or statistical collections of the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

7. Objective: Improved coordination of legislative, statutory, and regulatory activities and reviews. We have proposed centralizing authority for these activities within

OJP’s Office of General Counsel. This would result in strengthened oversight of

grantee compliance with statutory requirements, eliminate confusion in drafting

legal opinions and legislative analyses, and ensure consistent interpretations of

legal and legislative matters.

8. Objective: Consolidate and coordinate currently overlapping functions. OJP’s December 1997 report to Congress identified significant duplication of issues and

programs within OJP. Initiatives are undertaken by bureaus or program offices

without knowing of ongoing work in other parts of OJP. The 1997 report pointed

out the significant duplication that exists within OJP:

• at least 4 OJP bureaus and 1 OJP office work on domestic violence issues;

• all 5 OJP bureaus and at least 1 OJP office address child abuse:

• at least 3 OJP bureaus and 1 OJP office address juvenile drug use;

• at least 4 OJP bureaus and almost all OJP offices address youth violence.

We also recently discovered that at least 1 OJP bureau and 2 OJP offices were

working on offender re-entry programs. This duplication and overlap result in fragmented grant programs, confusion both within OJP and in the field, and a misuse

of taxpayer resources.

Therefore, we have proposed consolidating similar programs and grant activities.

For example, we have proposed moving the Drug Court Program Office (DCPO)

under the umbrella of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). While training and

technical assistance for drug courts is primarily provided by DCPO, the majority of

drug court funding is provided through BJA’s block grant programs. By consolidating drug court programs within BJA, we can better coordinate our efforts and

maximize our effectiveness in delivering these services to the field.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we recently submitted a report to the Congress describing this Administration’s goals and objectives to improve OJP’s operational effectiveness, improve OJP’s accountability, reliability, and efficiency of its programs,

and improve how OJP serves and informs its constituencies. This report also complies with instructions from Attorney General Ashcroft directing OJP to make its

grant processes more efficient and accountable, and to target its resources to maximize public benefit; and takes into consideration recommendations and suggestions

made by our partners in the field over the past several years.

ADDRESSING DUPLICATION

Mr. Chairman, I know you and this Committee are concerned about the problem

of duplication among the OJP bureaus, offices, and programs. I agree that this issue

is particularly troubling. Duplication and overlap waste valuable government resources, significantly contribute to inefficiency, and shake citizens’ trust and confidence in their government and its management.

To begin to address this problem within OJP, OJP staff have recently examined

the programs administered by OJP and by other Department offices and agencies,

and researched programs administered by other federal departments. Given the

large number of programs that OJP administers, programs were grouped in seven

broad purpose areas. These are: (1) juvenile justice and school violence; (2) family

violence and violence against women; (3) law enforcement technology and information sharing; (4) victims of crime; (5) corrections and offender management; (6) substance abuse and drug prevention, and (7) law enforcement assistance.

Our review indicated that OJP administers a number of programs that share certain characteristics or purposes. Although no program administered by OJP actually

duplicates any other such program in every particular, most do share a fundamental

focus (such as service to victims of crime, addressing the issues of juvenile justice

and delinquency, or improving technology) with at least one other. Most of the programs administered by OJP have specific statutory goals and purposes that minimize the potential for precise duplication of effort, but lead to considerable overlap.

It should be noted, for example, that the majority of activities and purposes encompassed by these programs well could fit within the broad framework of the EdVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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ward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Programs and

the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) Program. The 28 purpose areas

of the Byrne Program and the seven purpose areas of the LLEBG Program are

broad enough and flexible enough to support nearly all the initiatives and activities

authorized through other programs administered by OJP. There is even duplication

between the purpose area of the Byrne Program and LLEBG, which is why the

President’s Fiscal Year 2003 budget proposes to consolidate them into a unified Justice Assistance Program.

In the area of Juvenile Justice and School Violence (Category 1), OJP has identified several programs that have substantial similarities:

• Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Program

• Child Abuse Investigation and Prosecution

• Children’s Justice Act Tribal Grant Program

• Rural Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement

Each of these programs supports efforts to assist communities, organizations, and

agencies in preventing and responding to child abuse or child sexual abuse.

In the area of Law Enforcement Technology and Information Sharing (Category

3), OJP has identified two programs that have substantial similarities:

• Crime Laboratory Improvement Program

• Paul Coverdell Forensic Sciences Improvement Grant Program

Both programs support improvement in the capabilities and operation of state forensic labs. While the Crime Lab Improvement Program is a broad program supporting laboratory access to specialized forensic services and improving cooperation

and communication between and among jurisdictions, the Coverdell Forensic

Sciences Improvement Grant Program supports improvement in the timeliness and

quality of forensic science or medical examiner services in the states. Both of these

programs support improvements in the operational efficiency and quality of services

provided by non-federal crime laboratories.

In the area of Substance Abuse and Drug Prevention (Category 6), OJP has identified three programs that have substantial similarities:

• Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program

• Drug Prevention Demonstration Program

• Tribal Youth Program

Each of these programs supports efforts to reduce juvenile drug use or delinquency through education and counseling.

OJP also has identified one program that can be considered to be authorized by

more than one statutory provision. Funding for drug courts is authorized explicitly

by at least three provisions, and could be authorized under at least three Byrne program purpose areas.

In addition, although OJP is the primary component within the Department of

Justice (DOJ) responsible for administering grants, a number of grant programs are

administered by DOJ offices other than OJP. Most of these programs do not substantially duplicate the programs administered by OJP. There are, however, several

DOJ programs that have significant similarities in their purposes or operation when

compared with OJP programs. Examples of these include the Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS) Cops in Schools program and Innovative Community Policing grants.

Moreover, there are a number of programs administered by other federal agencies

that are similar to programs administered by OJP. In the area of Juvenile Justice

and School Violence (Category 1), these include the Department of Education’s Safe

and Drug Free Schools Program, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms’

Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program, and the Department

of Health and Human Services’ Children’s Justice Act Tribal Grant Program and

Demonstration Grants for the Prevention of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Among HighRisk Populations. OJP also has identified:

• 19 different programs that address Family Violence and Violence Against

Women (Category 2);

• 26 programs and grants that can be used for Law Enforcement Technology

and Information Sharing (Category 3);

• 14 programs for Victims of Crime (Category 4);

• 8 programs in other federal agencies in the area of Corrections and Offender

Management (Category 5);

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• 14 OJP and numerous other federal programs related to Substance Abuse and

Prevention (Category 6); and

• 33 different OJP programs in the area of general Law Enforcement Assistance (Category 7), as well as programs administered by COPS, DOJ’s Drug

Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

To address the issue of overlap, OJP has worked to collaborate with other federal

agencies on programs in areas of similar interest and authority. Examples include

the new Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative, a collaboration among

OJP, DOJ’s National Institute of Corrections, and the Departments of Education,

Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS), and Housing and Urban Development;

the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative, a collaboration among OJP’s Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Department of Education, and

HHS; and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), which involves a collaboration among OJP, the FBI, Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In

addition, to further research in the area of criminal and juvenile justice, OJP collaborates with such agencies as the National Institutes of Health and the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention. OJP continues to look for areas of possible collaboration to reduce duplication and overlap and to improve communities’ access to

federal funding.

CONCLUSION

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the threat of continued terrorist

activity on American soil have made it even more urgent that OJP streamline and

coordinate its efforts, maximize its resources, and improve its services to ensure

that America’s front line defenders, our state and local public safety officers, have

the resources they need to protect our liberties and safeguard the nation’s internal

security. In addition, we must maximize the use and availability of our resources

in the more traditional crime-fighting, victim assistance, and delinquency prevention activities that constitute remainder of OJP’s mission. I want to assure you, Mr.

Chairman, that I and the other members of the current OJP leadership stand ready

to work with the Congress to meet these goals.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Daniels.

The entire opening statements of all witnesses will be included

in the record, without objection.

Dr. Jones.

STATEMENT OF NOLAN JONES, NATIONAL GOVERNORS

ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. Let me thank you for this opportunity to appear before you.

I have submitted my written statement, as you said, for the

record, so I’ll take a few minutes just to summarize those statements pursuant to your letter of invitation.

Let me say from the beginning that the National Governors Association does not have an official policy on any of the reorganization plans. So my testimony today sort of will outline several programs, not all programs that are going to the States, such as

Byrne, SCAAP, prison grants, juvenile justice, Office of Domestic

Preparedness.

I want to talk a little bit about the necessity of coordinating all

these plans and coordinating them through the State government.

And finally, I will give some guidance that we’ve come up with for

reorganization.

The Byrne program, Mr. Chairman, that was started earlier—at

the beginning of this program, we talked about it being some two

or three decades, back in the late—early ’70’s, was called the Justice Assistance Grants Program, and it was this program that proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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duced many of the offices and institutes that are currently at OJP,

programs such as juvenile justice, community policing and many of

the drug programs, like the treatment alternative to street crime

was started with Byrne grants, just to name a few.

All of these programs are coordinated—currently, some of them

are coordinated through the Office of Justice Programs.

Later, we had programs outside of Byrne coming through the

crime bill added, such as prison grants, State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, the SCAAP program, and then later, the addition of the juvenile accountability block grant, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness.

These are programs coming to the State from different offices

within the Office of Justice Programs. Then there is the program,

the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant, which I will single out,

and talk about a few minutes.

The funds are sent directly to local governments. The States

have no role except for some minor residual funds. Most of the

States don’t know which communities get funds, how much they

will receive, what they will use them for.

This has produced frustration at the State level, where they

would like to take a holistic look at the crime problem and how the

funds are spent. This is bad for local government programs, because some of the local governments did not accept their share of

these grants and—because they couldn’t afford the match requirements. I talked with several of the States and they said, had they

known this, they would’ve been happy to try to help them with

their match requirement had they known these programs needed

match requirements.

After the two or 3 years of these program monies, and many

times these groups come to the States seeking to continue the programs, whereas they haven’t nurtured the States and gotten the

States involvement beforehand, trying to get them to accept these

programs.

Most recently, after the attacks of September 11th, but it was

even clear beforehand, many locals had been using their funds to

purchase communications equipment. What became clear was that

the equipment they were purchasing was not compatible, even with

their neighboring and surrounding jurisdictions. States had been

trying to take up the issue of providing standardizing equipment

and purchasing standardized equipment.

I’ve also heard from States who said that they had no idea of

what was going on with such programs as drug courts within the

State, the Weed and Seed program that’s within many States that

the States say that they have no involvement with, and the school

resource office, to just name a few.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that it wasn’t in many instances that

the States even wanted to control the funds of these programs they

would just like to know about them, like to be a part of them, and

would like to offer comments on these programs as they are coming

into the States.

Therefore, I would say that any reorganization plan must be in

tune with how programs are administered by the States and the

problems caused by passing money directly to local governments.

14

Of course, the programs themselves may be even legislative funded,

like LLEBG.

But what we’re saying that where possible, maybe the administration of these programs should try to coordinate as much as possible with State-level programs.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say some principles I would

say that you should keep in mind when you’re thinking about reorganization of the Office of Justice Programs.

First, number one, programs should have clear guidance for

States about application, evaluation, and accountability. Policy directives should be understood so that State officials can develop a

close relationship with our Federal partners in promoting the programs’ objectives.

Number two, rules and guidance relating to similar programs

should be consistent.

Number three, the agencies should be able to expedite the process of getting information concerning new grant programs and

technical assistance and training resources out to the appropriate

State agencies. It is important that States receive rules and guidance in a timely manner.

Number four, the agency or department, where possible, should

promote the flexible use of funds, understanding that States may

not approach a particular problem in the same manner.

And number five, finally, the agency should, where possible, facilitate cooperation between State and local jurisdictions. In providing technical assistance, our funding of programs for local government, Federal agencies must always coordinate with their appropriate State agencies.

Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer any questions, and

thanks again for this opportunity to address you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NOLAN JONES

Thank you Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to testify this afternoon. First, let

me say that I will not take a position on behalf of the National Governors Association (NGA) on any reorganization plan that has been prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (OJP). I plan to discuss how certain programs administered by OJP operate and have benefited states over the years. Furthermore, I want to focus on the need for states to coordinate all programs and

funding from the federal government to local jurisdictions and programs. The Local

Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) program is an example of a program that

by-passes states.

Over the years, there have been several programs develop to assist states in fighting crime. Among them are the Byrne Memorial Grant program, the Juvenile Justice Program, the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-In-Sentencing Grants

(VOI/TIS), the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) program, and the Office of Domestic

Preparedness Program.

EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL STATE AND

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The most essential crime fighting program over the years has been the Edward

Byrne Memorial Grant program, which is administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) in OJP. This program began with the 1968 Crime Act as a justice

assistance block grant, and evolved over the years, making grants to states for enforcing state and local laws to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system

in attacking violent crime and serious offenders. Grants provide for additional personnel, equipment, training, technical assistance, and information systems for the

apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, and detention and rehabilitating of persons

15

who violate state law, and to assist the victims of such crimes. This program, now

called the Byrne grants, has changed over the years with reauthorization and allowable uses of grant funds. In fact, many current programs now functioning as Institutes or Offices within OJP were developed and tested in states with Byrne funds.

The experimentation and innovation by states produced many significant and lasting criminal justice initiatives. For example: before there was a federal juvenile justice and delinquency prevention grant program established in the Justice Department, justice assistance block grant funds to states were used to create the first

community-based youth services bureaus for troubled youth and to establish juvenile officers in police agencies. Before federal drug treatment block grants were

available from the Department of Health and Human Services, justice assistance

block grant funds were used to develop and test drug testing protocols to screen arrestee and correctional populations and treatment programs for incarcerated drugdependent offenders.

Other initiatives that used justice assistance funding given to states by the federal government were: intensive supervision probation and alternative to prisons,

career criminal programs, and AIDS awareness training for law enforcement. Also,

subsequent Byrne Memorial grants have supported the development of management

information systems, crime statistics data collection, case tracking protocols, personnel development and training curricula, and community oriented policing. Since

the September 11th attacks, Byrne funding has enabled states to provide assistance

to first responders in equipment upgrades and technical assistance.

States have been able to experiment and promote these innovations because

Byrne funds are very flexible in their allowable use and have been measured by the

program outcomes and productivity. This is truly states serving as a laboratory in

the criminal justice system. Programs that have been successful, such as community

oriented policing, have been expanded on a national level by the federal government.

One of the best initiatives coming out of the justice assistance grant and subsequently Byrne grants program has been the advancement of planning within the

criminal justice system. The first grants called for states to do system wide planning

about criminal justice. For the first time in many states, prosecutors, police, judges

and correctional officials were brought together to discuss ways of improving the

criminal justice system. Governors appointed councils made up of individuals from

these various state and local criminal justice agencies to focus on developing better

crime fighting programs. Also, Governors established administrative staff to assist

these councils in various ways of data gathering, technical assistance, and to promote their working together effectively as a system. These are the state agencies

that distribute the Byrne grants funds in most states, which allows for innovative

crime fighting program development.

JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAM

In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act

(JJDPA) with a grant program to promote the Act’s objectives. The original objectives were twofold: to bring about the removal of status offenders from secure correctional institutions, and to assure that adult and juvenile offenders were separately confined in correctional facilities. A third objective was added to prohibit the

detention of juveniles in jails and lockups intended for adult offenders. Subsequently, a fourth objective was added that asked states to examine biases in correctional placement based on race and income. Continuous funding of the Juvenile Justice program under the JJDP Act has assisted states in meeting these objectives.

Although the program is small in the federal scheme, continued funding demonstrates that federal commitment, along with leadership by states, have helped to

meet the objectives of the Act. Currently, the JJDP Act programs are administered

by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) within the

Office of Justice Programs at the Department of Justice.

PROGRAMS IN THE 1994 CRIME BILL: VOI/TIS, JAIBG AND SCAAP

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, known as the 1994 Crime

Bill, provided assistance to states through several programs. One program was the

Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-In-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) Incentive grants

program, which provided funds to states for expanding prison bed space for violent

offenders, and to make sure that all convicted felons served the maximum sentence

imposed by the state law. This program was managed by the Corrections Program

Office within the OJP. This program was not funded for fiscal year 2002, and the

President budget does not request funding for fiscal year 2003. States used VOI/TIS

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funds to renovate and expand correctional facilitates. Many state are currently in

need of funding in this area.

The 1994 Crime Bill created a new juvenile program aimed at the violent youthful

offenders. The Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) program is

administered by OJJDP in OJP and provides block grants to states for promoting

greater accountability in the juvenile justice system. As a results, juvenile offenders

face consequences for their behavior that causes injury to persons, and loss or damage to property. JAIBG funds may be used to develop programs such as graduated

sanctions for dealing with the youthful offenders.

Another program that provides assistance to states is the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), which was enacted by the 1994 Crime bill and is administer by the Bureau of Justice Assistance at OJP. SCAAP provides assistance to

state and local governments for part of the costs of incarcerating certain criminal

aliens who are being held as a result of state and/or local charges or convictions.

No funds are provided for the program in the fiscal year 2003 President Budget

request. Funding for this program is sometimes mistaken to be a grant; however,

the funds are a partial reimbursement for the incarceration of aliens, who are the

responsibility of the federal government.

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT BLOCK GRANT (LLEBG)

The LLEBG program provides direct funding to approximately 3,500 local jurisdictions. These jurisdictions apply directly to BJA for funding to underwrite projects

designed to reduce crime and improve public safety. Most states do not know which

jurisdictions are funded. In some cases, they are notified after the funds are awarded. In some instances, states may have funded similar programs in the jurisdictions.

The lack of notification and coordination lead to inequitable allocations. It is entirely

inconsistent with all current efforts on homeland security. State governments are

in the best position to determine overall needs and to formulate statewide crime

control strategies that do not exclude one area in favor of another. Moreover, as we

all know, crime simply does not respect borders between local jurisdictions.

In addition, states are responsible for financing and administering the corrections,

courts, and in many jurisdictions, prosecution, defense, and probation functions of

the criminal justice system. In sparsely populated jurisdictions, states also support

and provide law enforcement services for rural communities. Most states provide policing for state highway systems and funds and manage laboratory, training, and

other support services for local law enforcement agencies.

Already, the majority of states pass through to local governments in excess of twothirds of their Byrne Memorial grant allocations in any given fiscal year. That is

how community policing and other local law enforcement programs got started. Most

states provide financial and other types of support for local criminal justice expenditures from other nonfederal sources. Many states contribute funds to help local governments meet federal matching requirements and continue successful program

when federal support terminates. It was reported that several local jurisdictions did

not apply for LLEBG funds because they did not have the matching funds. When

states were informed (after the fact), many said that they would have helped the

jurisdiction if they had known.

The urban centers are the principal beneficiaries of crime control program funds.

However, time and money spent on fighting crime in the nation’s cities should not

mean that rural areas are denied the crime-fighting resources that they increasingly

require. Directing the LLEBG and other funds to local jurisdictions without informing and processing the grants through states may have the net effect of focusing

the national crime agenda exclusively on urban areas while disrupting and undermining state and local cooperation in addressing crime problems overall. The federal

government should reach out and encourage state and local governments to work

together in developing solutions to their problems.

OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS (ODP)

Finally, the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, which is

in OJP, provides assistance to states to enhance their capability to prepare for and

respond to incidents of domestic terrorism. This office provides grants (without a

match) for equipment and technical assistance for state and local response agencies.

States prepare a comprehensive plan involving local responders that must be approved by ODP for funding. The events of September 11, 2001 have enhanced the

significance of this office.

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PRINCIPLES FOR REORGANIZATION

Mr. Chairman, I must emphasize again that NGA does not have a position on any

reorganization plan or the placement of any program in a federal agency or department. However, here are some suggestions about placement and program management principles to keep in mind while developing a reorganization structure.

1. Programs should have clear guidance for states about application, evaluation

and accountability. Policy directives should be understood so that state officials can develop a close relationship with their federal partners in promoting the program’s objectives.

2. Rules and guidance relating to similar programs should be consistent.

3. The agency should be able to expedite the process of getting information concerning new grant programs and technical assistance and training resources

out to the appropriate state agencies. It is important that states receive rules

and guidance in a timely manner.

4. The agency should, where possible, promote the flexible use of funds understanding that states may not approach a particular problem in the same

manner.

5. The agency should, where possible, facilitate cooperation between state and

local jurisdictions. In providing technical assistance or funding of programs

for local governments, federal agencies must always coordinate with the appropriate state agencies. There should not be any direct assistance to local

governments or agencies without state coordination.

Mr. Chairman: Again thank you for this opportunity to testify. I will be happy

to answer questions at the appropriate time.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Dr. Jones.

Ms. Robinson.

STATEMENT OF LAURIE ROBINSON, FORMER ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Ms. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott, Mr. Chabot, and Mr.

Keller, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here this

afternoon.

I had the opportunity and the privilege to serve for nearly 7

years as Assistant Attorney General of OJP and, as the Chairman

has noted, during that time the budget increased from $800 million

a year to over $4 billion. Pretty massive growth.

From my experience, it is clear that OJP’s structure and the fact

of more than 60 separate funding streams does hinder its ability

to advance a coordinated program that is effective and that is free

of duplication. So I commend all of you for addressing this issue.

I think that the goal of ensuring responsiveness to principles of

good government and sound management is one that all of us, regardless of party, can share.

I should state at the outset that I am a very enthusiastic supporter of the Federal criminal justice assistance program. I think

it has a tremendously important leadership role to play in helping

provide States and localities with ideas, with technical assistance,

with funding to address crime.

What, then, are the real problems, the core problems? In contrast

to the Law Enforcement Assistant Administration, LEAA, program

back in the 1970’s, which was an integrated organization with

clear, functional divisions, centralized authority and very few funding streams, OJP has operated, as we’re hearing this afternoon,

with decentralized policymaking and enormous statutory overlap in

the responsibilities that each of these offices have.

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This structure has created problems that include difficulty in developing a corporate vision of how to advance the agency’s mission,

often overlapping substantive initiatives, as we’ve heard, and a

maze-like structure that is very daunting for State and local customers to follow through.

All of this together results in lost opportunities for responding to

crime, most basically. And what’s needed is to move OJP to a more

cohesive, centralized management structure comprised of coherent

components with distinct functions that share a common mission.

As we’ve heard this afternoon, a few steps have been taken. In

1998, Congress, for the first time, gave the Assistant Attorney General all programmatic grant-making authority within the agency

and also directed the development of the reorganization plan that

was sent to Congress in 1999.

That report’s goals, if I can touch on these for a moment, reflect

what I think are Management 101 principles of achieving coordination: consolidate program work by topic; place all of the research

in one component, all the statistics in another; centralize authorities; reduce the number of separate decision-makers, i.e., the presidential appointees; set up a one-stop shop information point of OJP

customers; and create some kind of geographically based operation,

what we called State desks, like an Iowa desk. For example, to

handle all of the grant management and monitoring for that particular State.

Now, there’s no magic about these particular organizational

boxes that we suggested. But what is important are underlying

principles of an integrated, centrally managed organization.

Let me offer five specific recommendations, and I have additional

ones in my written statement, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would encourage you all to review carefully the proposals

that already have been advanced, including the 1999 report and

the proposals Assistant Attorney General Daniels has recently released.

Second, I would encourage you to look at a two-pronged legislative action plan on a faster track to give the Assistant Attorney

General at OJP any additional statutory authority needed now to

achieve consolidations in streamlining. But then, on a longer term

track, I would encourage to consider developing from the ground up

a new Federal criminal justice assistance program. And here I

would urge you to look back at the 1968 Safe Streets Act that created LEAA for the structure of a much simpler program with very

few funding streams.

Third, I think it’s important to recognize the fundamental difference between program work and research and statistics, as you

proceed. While it’s important to work to integrate knowledge-building functions into program development—in fact, I think it’s essential—it’s also crucial to maintain the integrity of research work so

that the findings are viewed as credible and objective.

And finally, I would say, Mr. Chairman, the importance of recognizing that changing a huge program like this is tough work. In addition to the challenges of a long-standing bureaucracy, you will be

bombarded, if you haven’t been already, by dozens of interest

groups. I think these are well-intentioned, but often, I would say,

they are deeply invested in the status quo of existing agency relaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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1 It is worth noting, however, that, even with the current high levels of federal grant assistance, federal support constitutes only 4% of state and local spending relating to crime.

tionships and perhaps less interested in the broad oversight questions that the Subcommittee is tackling, namely, how to make an

overall government program like this the best that it can be.

So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here. And

I would say that despite these challenges, the gravest mistake

would be to sidestep the need for change altogether. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Robinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAURIE O. ROBINSON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk about coordination and duplication issues relating to the Justice Department’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP).

The size and scope of the federal criminal justice assistance program—charged

with responsibility for effective stewardship of substantial criminal and juvenile justice initiatives—is enormous: During the nearly seven years (1993–2000) I served

as Assistant Attorney General for OJP, the agency’s annual budget grew from $800

million to over $4 billion. In the year I departed, OJP was administering some

42,000 grants totaling over $23 billion.

From my experience, however, it is clear that OJP’s unusual and unwieldy structure—coupled with the more than 60 often overlapping funding streams it administers—hinders its ability to advance a rational, integrated, customer-friendly program to help states and localities fight crime. For that reason, I commend the Subcommittee for addressing this issue. The goal of ensuring responsiveness to principles of good government and sound management is one all of us, regardless of

party, can share.

REFLECTING ON HISTORY

Criminal justice in the United States has historically been, and still remains

today, largely a state and local enterprise. While the federal government has remained a somewhat limited partner, its involvement in assisting state and local

criminal justice has grown dramatically over the past four decades, from origins in

1965 in a small Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA)—with an annual

budget of just $7.5 million—to the multi-billion-dollar Office of Justice Programs

today.1

Over its nearly four decades and across many Administrations, the program has

provided leadership on an issue—crime—that is as central as any to the foundations

of a civil society. These contributions range from the work of the Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration (LEAA) in the l970s in professionalizing law enforcement

through LEEP (the Law Enforcement Education Program); to development of bulletproof vests and forensic applications of DNA technology in the 1980s; to communitybased initiatives like Weed & Seed and drug courts in the 1990s.

During my tenure as Assistant Attorney General, on my way over to Main Justice

every day, I used to pass the National Archives building and ponder the quote on

the front that reads, ‘‘What is Past is Prologue.’’ Prompted by that, in the summer

of 1996, I invited past leaders of the federal assistance program to join me in Washington for a day to reflect on their own experiences and share their best thinking

on the program’s future directions. Representation included individuals from both

Republican and Democratic administrations and from virtually every era since 1965.

Two themes emerged that day: First, that despite the different periods of the program they represented, the participants shared a common optimism and belief that

the federal government can make a difference in helping states and localities address the problems of crime affecting our country. And, second, that virtually all

attendees, across both parties, believed OJP should be reorganized as a single agency under one presidential appointee, with an integrated program, a ‘‘customer service’’ model, and strong emphasis on knowledge building through research and statistics. That recommendation on a hot July day six years ago served as a catalyst in

our efforts to start exploring what we could do, through structural change, to make

the federal criminal justice assistance program of today more effective and stronger.

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INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

Three preliminary points: First, from my own experience in working 30 years in

the criminal justice field, I should state at the outset that I am a very strong supporter of the federal law enforcement/criminal justice assistance program. It is my

view that the federal government has a significant—and unique—role to play in providing impetus, leadership, and resources to assist state and local governments in

addressing crime problems and to help move forward the ‘‘state of the art’’ in criminal and juvenile justice. The federal government is uniquely positioned, in my opinion, to build knowledge through research and statistical work and to provide funding and technical assistance to develop, test, evaluate, and replicate innovative approaches to preventing and controlling crime—in sum, to provide leadership as an

innovator and catalyst in this important area of public policy.

Second, whatever the need for structural changes and streamlining at OJP—and

there is great need for both—it is important to recognize that the agency’s career ranks include a great many motivated and knowledgeable professionals who are

dedicated to the agency’s work and have made significant contributions toward the

mission of reducing crime in this country.

And third, in approaching the issue of OJP’s future structure, it is important to

recognize that, in fundamental ways, program work differs from research and statistics functions. While looking for ways to achieve needed consolidation and centralization across OJP, it is crucial, as well, to preserve sufficient arms length relationships to ensure that research and statistics work is viewed as objective, credible,

and not politically driven. A natural tension clearly exists between integrating

knowledge-building functions into the agency’s program development side, on the

one hand, and ensuring that their integrity is maintained and some independence

preserved, on the other. This requires careful balancing.

WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS?

In contrast to the LEAA program in the 1970s—an integrated organization with

clear functional divisions, centralized authority, and a limited number of funding

streams—OJP has evolved over time to operate with six presidential appointees

(probably unique across the government in such a small agency), decentralization

of policymaking and administrative responsibilities, and enormous statutory overlap

in mission and responsibilities among its many bureaus and offices. Thinking of the

U.S. Army slogan ‘‘Be all that you can be,’’ it is clear that the federal criminal justice assistance program today is not ‘‘all that it can be.’’

The program’s decentralized structure has created problems that play out principally in four areas:

• Difficulty in developing a ‘‘corporate vision’’ for advancing the mission of the

agency: Despite the tremendous amount of money that Congress has put into

state and local criminal justice, it is difficult, under OJP’s structure, to implement a comprehensive plan for directing funds at key problems. Multiple offices and bureaus have pieces of responsibility, for example, in addressing

issues like drugs or gangs. Mounting one comprehensive, integrated program

to address these problems requires greater centralization of authorities and

a change in the culture of balkanized turf that currently exists in OJP;

• Often overlapping, substantive criminal justice program initiatives administered by the presidentially appointed heads of those program components:

OJP’s history provides too many examples of individual ‘‘fiefdoms’’ operating

independently, uncoordinated in their work, and frequently competitive (or, at

times, in ‘‘open warfare’’ with each other). During my tenure at OJP, we put

tremendous energy into effecting better coordination through staff working

groups, inter-bureau planning efforts, and other devices. However, despite

good intentions, these efforts were not enough. Fundamental problems remain. As I described in a 1997 report to Congress, for example, four OJP bureaus and one office worked on corrections; five bureaus were addressing hate

crimes; four bureaus and one office were tackling domestic violence, five bureaus and one office were addressing child abuse, and, for a period of years,

it seemed every OJP entity was addressing youth violence. In some instances,

a specialized function—e.g., statistics collection by BJS—accounts for the involvement of a bureau or office (and it is critical to OJP’s mission that this

niche be filled). But even accounting for that, enormous programmatic overlap

remains, causing confusion to the field and potentially defusing the impact of

limited grant dollars. Even where functional responsibilities appear to be

clearly assigned, they are not: the Bureau of Justice Assistance has funded

program evaluations; the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) runs a grant proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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gram; a full research and statistics operation exists in the Office of Juvenile

Justice & Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)—separate from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and BJS; law enforcement-related programs are run

by BJA, the COPS Office, the Police Corps Office, NIJ, and OJJDP—and this

list could go on! And too often in the past, the work of individual bureaus

rests on the individual interests of those at the helm, rather than being parts

of an overall, coordinated plan.

• Need for more effective means for resolving internal management issues:

Again, because of decentralized authorities (including in administrative areas,

like personnel) and the presence of a large number of presidential appointees

in a small agency, if conflicts arise over internal management issues, they are

often difficult to resolve. Good management in that situation rests on the diplomacy, ‘‘people skills,’’ and personalities of the individuals involved; that is

not a sound way to manage an agency responsible for billions of taxpayer dollars;

• A confusing labyrinthine structure presents a daunting challenge for state and

local officials and criminal justice professionals: OJP is a difficult organization to navigate—even with the help of a good Web site, programs plans and

other guides. During my time as Assistant Attorney General, I conducted a

number of constituency focus groups. Over and over, criminal and juvenile

justice practitioners and state and local officials articulated frustrations concerning the absence of a central point of contact. The state or local agency

administrator in search of funding for a particular initiative may find it necessary to contact each bureau or office of OJP individually to determine the

most promising source of support for the effort.

What is the impact of all this? Most fundamentally, it comes down to lost opportunities for responding to crime, such as working to

• Quickly respond to emerging crime challenges (e.g., like methamphetamine);

• Target comprehensive help to a particular jurisdiction facing special needs;

• Amass resources to undertake the important scientific process of demonstrating and evaluating new ideas—with evaluation considered at the front

end of program development; and

• Fund programs grounded in research about ‘‘what works.’’

What is needed is to move OJP from a confusing, decentralized agency to a more

cohesive centralized management structure comprised of coherent components with

distinct functions and competencies that share a common mission.

HAVE ANY STEPS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS?

In fiscal year 1998 Congress, through the appropriations process, directed OJP’s

Assistant Attorney General to report on the extent of coordination within the agency

and steps being take to reduce duplication. I submitted a report in December, 1997

to Congress describing the steps that were being taken to reduce fragmentation and

develop coordination strategies—such as joint publication of bureau program plans,

coordination working groups, and more frequent cross-OJP leadership meetings. The

report also spelled out options for potential remedial action, including amendment

of OJP’s statutes to consolidate grant-making in the assistant attorney general and,

more radically, authorization of a new integrated federal criminal justice assistance

program.

In October, 1998, as part of the fiscal year 1999 appropriations for the Department of Justice, Congress directed OJP’s assistant attorney general to develop a

plan for a new organizational structure for OJP ‘‘. . . with streamlined, consolidated authorities.’’ In addition, it amended OJP’s statutes to place programmatic

grant-making authority for the first time in the assistant attorney general. In response to the directive, OJP conducted outreach to over 50 constituent organizations

and practitioners and consulted with persons with the Department, OJP and its bureaus. A report detailing a proposed reorganization was submitted to Congress on

March 10, 1999.

A MORE RATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The goals of the reorganization plan submitted to Congress in 1999 were, in many

ways, simple. They reflected basic ‘‘Management 101’’ principles of accountability,

defined lines of authority, and clarity in definition of component functions. Specifically, the report recommended:

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• Consolidating programmatic work by topical area to avoid duplication and

overlap and provide focused thinking—and policy leadership—on key issues

(e.g., administering all corrections grants in one office);

• Placing all research in one component and all statistical work in another;

• Centralizing authorities;

• Reducing the number of presidential appointees so there are not six separate

decision makers and policymakers in one small agency;

• Setting up a ‘‘one stop shop’’ point of contact in OJP for state and local practitioners to provide information about best practices and available publications,

technical assistance, training, and grants—in sum, to serve as a ‘‘traffic cop’’ or ‘‘triage point’’ in helping customers access help from throughout OJP; and

• Creating ‘‘state desks’’ for grant management to handle grant monitoring and

provide customer assistance on a geographically-organized basis (e.g., an

‘‘Iowa desk’’ where Des Moines’ mayor can learn about all the OJP funding

coming into his state). I understand that Assistant Attorney General Deborah

Daniels and BJA Director Richard Nedelkoff are moving ahead to structure

BJA to set up grant management on a state-by-state basis. I applaud that.

However, this needs to be done OJP-wide. Right now, as an illustration, 10

or 12 different OJP staffers separately travel to one New Hampshire state

agency to monitor grants there. This makes no sense.

There is no particular magic about the specific organizational boxes we suggested

in the March ’99 report or the names we gave them. What is important, however,

are the underlying principles of an integrated, centrally managed organization that

they reflect.

POTENTIAL NEXT STEPS

The job of overhauling an agency’s structure is daunting. Bureaucracies resist

change and are skilled in slowing its pace. Interest groups are frequently invested

in the status quo and many receiving substantial funding through long-established

relationships with agency staff. Many practitioners express concerns about organizational change, fearing that attention to their issue area will be diminished. But even

recognizing those hurdles, attention to the problems—and action—is needed.

Where to start? Let me share several recommendations:

• Review the specific proposals, and the commentary supporting them, that have

already been advanced, including the March ’99 report and the recommendations Assistant Attorney General Daniels recently announced. The 1999 report, for example, addresses at some length steps that could be taken to better integrate research into the overall agency mission, while still preserving

the integrity of research and statistical work;

• Reach out to experienced state and local practitioners—preferably front line

people who are not necessarily current direct OJP grantees—as well as representatives from the academic research community and other past leaders of

the federal assistance program over the last four decades for their perspectives;

• Undertake a legislative action plan consisting of two steps: First, on a faster

track, provide OJP’s Assistant Attorney General with additional statutory authority to continue consolidation of subject area offices and administrative authorities for areas like personnel. Second, on a longer term track, consider the

option of developing—from the ground up—a new federal criminal justice assistance program. Here I would recommend you go back to the original 1968

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Pub. L. 90–351 (Jun. 19, 1968))

to look at the potential structure of a much simpler federal assistance program with limited funding streams and clear division of authorities.

• As you proceed, I would also recommend focusing particular attention on funding streams and OJP work in the area of technology. This may be the area

of the single greatest confusion in the field about what funding streams exist,

how they fit with each other, and how to access them. Right now, that work

is scattered through a number of OJP’s bureaus and offices.

• Keep in mind the importance of maintaining centers of leadership/knowledge

in key practice areas. Practitioners need to feel they have a home ‘‘point of

contact’’ in a large federal program—staff who understand and are knowledgeable about their issues and who are responsive to their needs. This is

true whether for law enforcement professionals, corrections, the courts, victim

assistance providers, or juvenile justice practitioners. This is an important

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part of ensuring that OJP is a truly customer-oriented agency. And there are

effective ways to provide this kind of ‘‘home’’ within the agency in different

areas and yet still operate under a much more cohesive and rational structure.

• Recognize the natural tensions in a federal program of this kind: Throughout

the history of the federal criminal justice assistance program, healthy tensions have existed: For example, over who makes decisions on funding (Federal agency officials in Washington, based on knowledge about ‘‘what works’’?

Or people ‘‘on the ground’’ at the state and local level who see, close at hand,

their real needs?); and between states and localities (Should all funding to cities and counties be passed through the state?). These debates are part of the

backdrop for the federal criminal justice assistance program, as they have

been for nearly 40 years. Important values are represented by each ‘‘side.’’ Resolving those issues will continue, as in the past, to require delicate balancing.

• Examine the impact that ‘‘earmarking’’ has had on the federal assistance program in recent years. Discretionary grant funding is critical if the federal

criminal justice assistance program is going to test innovations and evaluate

the results—probably a uniquely federal function. Yet, in recent years, most

of the central discretionary grant programs for both criminal justice and juvenile justice in OJP have been Congressionally earmarked for specific projects.

While many of the programs funded through this process are worthy ones, the

extent of earmarking has diminished greatly the agency’s capacity to fulfill

central pieces of its statutorily created mission.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present views to the Subcommittee about the federal criminal justice assistance program. Despite the challenges in tackling the set of issues before you, the gravest mistake, in my view,

would be to sidestep the need for change altogether.

I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the Subcommittee Members

may have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Robinson.

Mr. Kelly.

STATEMENT OF RALPH E. KELLY, COMMISSIONER,

DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, FRANKFURT, KY

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Dr. Ralph E. Kelly, and I’m the commissioner of Juvenile Justice for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. One of the great

things about being last whenever you make a presentation is that

you can decide what you shouldn’t repeat and say again.

And even though—one of the differences, I think, in my testimony this afternoon, is that I’m a consumer of services on behalf

of the State of Kentucky. And my major concern is, in whatever reorganization takes place, is keeping a strong and effective Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).

I go back 35 years in this business, and I can remember the early

days of Law Enforcement Assisrtance Administration (LEAA) and

the beginning of funding coming down from the Federal Government. And I can also remember back in those days that juvenile

justice issues were never, ever paid attention too.

Yet, when juvenile crime began to rise to the proportions that it

was several years ago, we all began to pay more attention. And

many States took the initiative to separate their juvenile justice

programs from either the larger adult correctional system or the

larger sometimes overburdened child welfare system. And, New

Jersey under Governor Whitman’s leadership, and Florida and

North Carolina and, of course, Kentucky and Ohio and Nebraska

are just a few that have gone to separate juvenile justice systems

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because they recognize the need to have a system that paid greater

attention to juvenile justice issues.

Juvenile Justice is not a subcomponent of correction, although we

do share some of the same issues. But it can’t be viewed as just

another correctional kind of thing. And so our concern, people in

my position around the country and certainly the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, is that whatever reorganization

occurs, that it needs to pay attention to having a separate system

of juvenile justice, because with reorganization comes reduction

sometimes in the abilities to sustain a comprehensive system of

support and assistance that is currently available. Many members

of the juvenile justice field believe that one of OJJDP’s strength is

that includes within its operational structure all the key functions

needed to support them in their work: demonstration; training;

technical assistance; and above and beyond, research and evaluation.

The reorganization plan put forth so far seems to fly in the face

of this.

Effective research and evaluation must involve—must involve— the coordination and direction of the practice and operation varies.

You simply can’t have good research unless it is somehow linked

to the field itself. I mean, what’s the point of having research if it

doesn’t help you change programs and make programs go in different directions? That’s the whole purpose of evaluation.

Research cannot be accomplished in a vacuum, nor can it be effective without a complete understanding of the day-to-day issues

facing juvenile justice practitioners. Research and evaluation must

be coordinated with the many functions of OJJDP to make it viable, effective, and meaningful.

Now I, like any manager in government, don’t like to see duplication, overlapping programs, and waste of taxpayers’ dollars. And

certainly, as a head of an agency in he State of Kentucky, I work

every day to make sure that we coordinate and make sure we don’t

have that kind of overlapping. But one of the things I would implore you to consider, as you consider various reorganization proposals, is that juvenile justice over the last decade has made significant changes to the effect that juvenile crime has gone down.

To send a message to the juvenile justice field that you need not

have a separate agency of some type or separate approach at the

Federal level to help us move ahead is the wrong message to send.

Somewhere along the line, I think that we can deal with the duplication of effort, we can deal with the overlapping, we can deal

with the other things that both the current Assistant Attorney

General and the former Assistant Attorney General have pointed

out, which certainly will make some sense.

But I believe that we have to do that in such a way that we protect the ability of the juvenile justice focus at the Federal level we

at the State level depend upon and need, and not so much in terms

of dollars and cents, but more so in terms of technical assistance,

research and evaluation, and demonstration. Certainly, OJJDP and

Kentucky were great partners when we came into being as a separate department in Kentucky. We had a consent decree from the

Civil Rights Division of Justice, which we had to adhere to and get

into compliance with. And it was the tremendous assistance from

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OJJDP that helped guide us and provided us technical assistance

in making many of those changes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RALPH E. KELLY

Members of the Subcommittee, good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity

to speak to you about the juvenile justice system and my experiences in Kentucky

over the past 5 ° years. My name is Dr. Ralph E. Kelly, and I am the Commissioner

of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

It’s an honor and a pleasure to offer my thoughts to you as you consider ways

to improve the federal role in juvenile justice and delinquency prevention.

I fully support the federal responsibility in juvenile justice as you have affirmed

in the ’purpose’ section of H.R. 1900, which you passed last year:

‘‘to support State and local programs that prevent juvenile involvement in delinquent behavior, to encourage accountability for acts of juvenile delinquency, and

to assist State and local governments in addressing juvenile crime through technical assistance, research, training, evaluation and dissemination of information.’’

The juvenile court was founded one hundred years ago. Over the course of this

century of progress there have been many positive developments in the juvenile justice field.

In the last quarter century, probably the most significant improvement has come

in the area of implementing protections to make sure young people who come in contact with law enforcement do not become victims of abuse or assaults or other maltreatment.

In the past 30 years, in which I have had direct experience as a state juvenile

justice administrator, I have seen much progress in the partnership between federal

and state efforts, more coordination and communication between federal and state

officials, and much more constructive research and information on effective strategies and approaches.

The challenges facing our juvenile justice system heading into the next century

are multi-faceted. Although the juvenile violent crime arrest rate is declining and

is at its lowest level in many years, the consensus is that it is still too high. The

increase in the arrest rates for girls and young juvenile offenders has changed the

composition of violent offenders entering the system. Also, the number of offenders

entering the system with multiple mental health problems has been dramatic.

Recent research gives us a compelling picture that the better we are able to intervene at earlier ages the better we will be at reducing incidences of both delinquency

and victimization. For instance, we know that juveniles who are known to the juvenile justice system before attaining 13 years of age are responsible for a disproportionate share of serous crimes and violence. Also, there is a significant connection

between child maltreatment and juvenile delinquency. We know that people who experience any type of maltreatment in childhood are more likely than people who

were not maltreated to be arrested later in life.

At the same time there is a growing body of research demonstrating the effectiveness of community based delinquency prevention strategies such as mentoring, family therapy, and prenatal and infancy home visitation programs.

Our experience in Kentucky is illustrative. Over the past 5 years we have made

a concerted effort to develop a comprehensive system that has seen much success.

We are proud of the progress we have made. Here are some examples:

Early intervention—we fund more than 100 early intervention and prevention

programs in the counties with the highest number of juvenile arrest.

Alternatives to incarceration—Through our Title II and Title V grants, along with

state general fund dollars, we have developed a significant number of alternatives

to detention programs.

Our graduated sanctions and intensive in home services, along with a growing

treatment foster home program has reduced our need for expensive residential beds.

As a result, during my administration, we have seen a significant drop in violent

crime among juveniles.

This progress could not have been possible without the Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention.

OJJDP has been an ally of ours every step along our path to establishing our current system which ranks as one of the best in the country, I’m proud to say.

26

Although we struggled a few years ago to come into compliance with the OJJDP

regulations, we have eliminated the number of status offenders illegally in detention

and eliminated any juvenile from being held in a jail.

In Kentucky, it was OJJDP that provided valuable support, technical assistance,

research, and funding to launch us in this direction and to sustain our progress.

Over the years we have come to rely on OJJDP as an active and integral partner

in the multi year process we instituted to transform our system. Kentucky went

from a state facing many challenges to a model to hold up across the nation as exemplary of what is possible with a clear focus, unambiguous goals, and federal support and leadership.

I am concerned that the reorganization being considered today would lessen the

ability of this office to offer the level of support we have come to expect and appreciate in our state.

Without OJJDP at our side these past few years we never would have been able

to achieve the progress we have seen. If that support is diminished my fear is the

progress will be much harder to sustain or even may stop altogether. That would

be a tragedy.

While Kentucky will do our utmost to continue to make improvements, I worry

about other states and communities. If the progress stops in other communities, perhaps in places that have not seen the success we have seen, or that do not have

institutions in place to carry on, or that are only just beginning to put in place proper systemic changes; in these places there may be tragic consequences without the

support of a comprehensive organization such as OJJDP.

It would be tragic if effective, community-based alternatives to incarceration

would wither from lack of support, or if newly implemented strategies for prevention

would end for lack of resources, support, or federal guidance or technical assistance.

My concern is that with reorganization comes reduction in the ability to sustain

a comprehensive system of support and assistance that is available now, and that

is so desperately needed in the field.

Many members of the juvenile justice field believe that one of OJJDP strengths

is that it includes within its operational structure all of the key functions needed

to support them in their work—e.g. demonstration, training and technical assistance, research, evaluation, data, and publications. The reorganization plan put forward by both this administration and the previous one, seems to fly in the face of

this position. Effective research and evaluation must involve the coordination and

direction of the practice and operational areas. Research cannot be accomplished in

a vacuum nor can it be effective without a complete understanding of the day to

issues facing Juvenile Justice Practitioners. Research and evaluation must be coordinated with the many functions of OJJDP to make it viable, effective, and meaningful to the field.

If, as is being proposed, these functions will be split up between different offices,

and no longer housed within OJJDP, it will create fragmentation and lessen coordination, which would seem to be at odds with the purpose of the reorganization.

By dismantling a strong and effective federal agency you will also be sending a

disheartening message to the field. The message will be that the federal government

no longer sees juvenile crime as a priority but rather only as another sub group of

adult crime.

To summarize, let me assure you, I am one who is fully committed to do my utmost to support you in your efforts to continue to improve the system.

The challenges to the field are many and varied. We must continue to seek better

and more effective ways to reduce juvenile crime and to prevent children and young

people from engaging in delinquency in the first place.

I am concerned, however, that the proposed reorganization would not bring the

desired results. A comprehensive approach fostered by OJJDP has served us well

in recent years. Dividing some functions among many different offices is a recipe

for disorganization and ineffectiveness, and generally will weaken the Juvenile Justice effort at the federal level. I urge you to consider keeping a strong and united

focus on juvenile delinquency through the OJJDP.

Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to working with you as

we continue to strive to achieve our goals of reducing juvenile delinquency. Our children deserve no less.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

Ms. Daniels, let me address my initial questions to you first. And

actually, on this first one, I might ask you to respond and also Ms.

Robinson to respond as well, and that is that you are aware of the

suggestion that we transfer the Office of Domestic Preparedness to

27

FEMA, out of the Department of Justice, and I expressed the concerns that I think are the Committee’s concerns in my opening

statement. Would you agree with those concerns about the transfer

of that department out of DOJ?

Ms. DANIELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. I know

this is something that has raised concerns on the part of some

Members, and I’m happy to have the opportunity to address it.

First of all, we’re very pleased with the work that the Office for

Domestic Preparedness has done. It’s a very young entity. It was— it only really began its functions in 1998. And it has collaborated

very closely with FEMA and many other Federal agencies in attempting to serve the needs of training and equipping first responders around the country.

Now, the Justice Department’s primary mission is that of law enforcement. And so, our primary focus must always be on law enforcement.

There are, however, tens of millions of first responders throughout the country, from law enforcement to medical technicians to

public works employees to firefighters. So there is a vast panoply

of entities needing to be served.

The Office of—— Mr. SMITH. So, let me—I’m not sure I understand your answer.

Do you have concerns about that proposed transfer or not?

Ms. DANIELS. No, sir. Actually—— Mr. SMITH. You don’t. Okay. That answers my question—— Ms. DANIELS. The purpose of this hearing is to address issues

such as duplication and overlap, and I think the very purpose of

the proposal in the 2003 budget request from the President is to

minimize duplication and overlap by centralizing first responder

training, as opposed as to prevention, disruption, intervention, investigation training.

Mr. SMITH. I want to get back to that in just a minute.

Ms. Robinson, what about you? Do you have concerns about that

proposed transfer?

Ms. ROBINSON. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. One of the nice things

about being outside government is you can have your own opinions

and proceed. [Laughter.]

I’m concerned about it for a couple of reasons. And, admittedly,

I’m not there on the front lines in government at this point. But

understanding the culture of law enforcement is a very key aspect

of making that office’s work effective.

I set up that office in 1998. I worked directly with them because

it was such a priority area for Congress and for the department.

And I worry about FEMA’s ability to engage effectively with

18,000 State and local law enforcement agencies. FEMA’s normal

approach, as I understand it, is working through governors. Governors don’t control local law enforcement. And that would be the

first point.

And the second point, it seems to me in the post-9-11 era, when

State and local law enforcement is trying so hard to engage more

closely with Federal law enforcement, the FBI and others, moving

this program out of the Department of Justice to me, as an individual, does not make sense.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Robinson.

28

Ms. Daniels, let me go back to your testimony. You make the

point, which is amazing, that in 2002, OJP operates under the

same structure that existed in 1997. That’s fairly incredible to me

that there haven’t been some changes or improvements, given all

the proposals that have been made. As Mr. Scott pointed out in his

opening statement, in fact, I think the budget’s gone from $1.5 bil- lion to $4 billion during that same period of time.

You mentioned in your opening statement eight objectives that

ought to be met. The obvious question is, when do you think any

of those objectives are going to be implemented?

Ms. DANIELS. Mr. Chairman, actually some of them are well underway. We think that many of the things we are attempting to do,

we can actually accomplish, short of, for example, statutory change.

There are some things that I’ve mentioned that require that.

But for example, at this point, given the current statutory setting

in which we find ourselves after the passage, in particular, of the

Patriot Act, the Assistant Attorney General now can control the

functions of all of OJP to the extent that we can address such

things as standardizing our management practices.

I think it was Dr. Jones who mentioned that there’s this disparity in similar programs across subentities within OJP. We are

now capable and are moving toward standardizing our grant application process, standardizing our grant monitoring, standardizing

our evaluation processes, such that we can achieve many of these

things, and I think can move forward to do so.

There will be certain structural changes that we’ll want to move

forward in collaboration with this Subcommittee on, and we’d like

to continue to work with you toward that end. There are various

things that we can do now.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Daniels.

Let me say to the Members who are present that we will have

a second round of questions. And with that, I’ll recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for his questions.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Robinson, you mentioned LEAA?

Ms. ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Were you describing that as a good or a bad model?

Ms. ROBINSON. I think that looking back at the 1968 Safe Streets

Act as a starting point is a good thing to do. It doesn’t mean, in

any way, that we should buy into every aspect of it, but I do think

that going back to essentials—in 1974, the juvenile justice delinquency act was passed, so that, too, could be looked at.

So it’s a question of going back to original building blocks.

Mr. SCOTT. You mentioned the idea of a State desk. Let me let

the others comment on whether that’s a good idea or a bad idea.

Anybody have a comment on the idea of having a State desk

within—for each State?

Mr. JONES. From a State perspective, at least it seems that the

States would have a place that they could get information, and

wouldn’t have to sort of doing a lot of shopping around the offices

and things, so that would be sort of a coordinating force. I’m not

sort of endorsing it one way or the other, but just for an answer

I would say that at least when they call, if the desk is set up appropriately, so that they could give answers to all kinds of quesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
29

tions and understand all the kinds of funding streams that come

down from and come to each station, it might be an appropriate

thing that should be looked into. I don’t know. That’s not an endorsement, however.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me, while you’re answering, Dr. Jones, let

me clarify your testimony. You were somewhat critical of the funding coming directly from the Federal to the local without any coordination, comments, by the State governments. You indicated—

let me make sure I’ve got this right—that you’re not asking to run

those programs or redirect the money, but you would like an opportunity to comment so the money is being used as effectively as possible. Is that accurate?

Mr. JONES. And in some instances, according to the program, we

would say that the funding perhaps should come through the

States, because it could be directed more to the appropriate entity,

where it’s—we want to go or add State money to it appropriately.

So that would depend upon the type of program.

Mr. SCOTT. Ms. Daniels, you indicated computerization of the—

to help you track the grants. You had 40,000 grants. Are you suggesting that they’re not tracked now by computer?

Ms. DANIELS. Actually, Congressman, we have a situation in

which while we can track financially pretty well by computer, and

we can track what’s happening with the money; we have a good

system for that. We don’t have as good a system for tracking for

what’s happening with the programs.

And, I might suggest that with respect to your prior question, if

we can clean up some of these problems, we will have less of a

problem with the constituency out there trying to negotiate a very

difficult system. So we think that if we can clarify some of those

things, there will be less of a problem, although we do agree that

we should coordinate our monitoring as well, whether it’s geographically or subject matter, but coordinate grant monitoring.

Finally, I think——

Mr. SCOTT. How do you evaluate the programs if you’re not

tracking them? How do you evaluate the programs to know whether or not people wasted the money?

Ms. DANIELS. Well, you know, that’s a very good question, Congressman.

Mr. SCOTT. I’m not sure I want to get the answer.

Ms. DANIELS. And that’s, I think, an ongoing problem.

What we are doing now is utilizing the Government Performance

and Results Act to build in at the front end of all our outgoing

grants, solicitations and grant awards, a baseline measurement

and then an ongoing measurement, so that we’ll be able to determine outcomes, because we really believe that we ought to be sending more money to fund what works. And we’ll have to take that

money from somewhere, and the idea would be to take it from

things that are not working so well or to improve the things that

are not working so well.

I’d also suggest that one of the things that may help Dr. Jones

and the State constituency is that the Attorney General has begun,

in 2001, and we’ll be doing this annually—sending out a report to

the States, because it is really problem that the States don’t know

30

what money is coming into their State. And this will help them be

more informed on that issue.

Mr. SCOTT. One of the problems on duplication is that some of

the root causes of some problems—like drug abuse, teen pregnancy,

dropout prevention, crime—have the same root causes, so some

programs would naturally fit in any of those categories. So, to some

extent, there has to be some, I imagine, some overlap.

I had one other question for Ms. Daniels, that is on the prison

transition programs, transitioning people out of prison. Virginia,

right now, is cutting many of those programs, because our budget

is in such a mess. What opportunities are there for Federal funding

of those programs?

Ms. DANIELS. Congressman, we’re pretty excited about our reentry program, so I’m pleased that you asked the question, and

thank you for that.

We—this is, we think, an unprecedented way to approach providing and making accessible Federal funding to communities

while assisting them in building sustainable programs. I think

that’s been a conundrum that has faced the Federal Government

and State and local governments for years.

What we have done is, actually, a number of things. First, we’ve

pooled some funds among the Federal partners. Secondly, we have

created a Web site that directs potential grant applicants to broader availability of funding that is ongoing funding that they can use

to set up something that might be more sustainable. And then we

are going to assist them in identifying the things that they really

have ongoing in their communities but which are not done in a collaborative fashion, so that they really are stovepiped and don’t

complement each other.

And by bringing all those things together, we think they can create a sustainable program. We can direct them to the Federal funding that they need. And in the long run, they can achieve some

very good results.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller, is recognized for his

questions.

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Daniels, let me ask you, who is the head, currently, of the

COPS program?

Ms. DANIELS. Carl Peed from the great State of Virginia, as a

matter of fact, I might say to Mr. Scott. Carl Peed is a former sheriff from Virginia, and he and I worked very closely to collaborate.

As you know, COPS is not part of OJP, but we work very closely

together.

Mr. KELLER. Do you think it should be part of OJP?

Ms. DANIELS. Carl and I are—we do a lot of things that are very

similar. And we are coming to recognize how many of those things

there are.

OJP, actually, collaborates with COPS probably to a far greater

degree than most people know. We do—we manage many of their

grant programs. We provide financial monitoring for them and assist them with those functions so that we can reduce overhead

costs.

31

Mr. KELLER. Is part of this reorganization to put COPS under

OJP?

Ms. DANIELS. No, sir. Our reorganization proposal does not address COPS.

Mr. KELLER. Okay. Let me switch gears and ask you about an

announcement today from Attorney General Ashcroft about the formation of the National Security Coordination Council of the Department of Justice. The President’s budget described the responsibilities of this council as coordinating all functions of the Department of Justice relating to national security, particularly the department’s effort to combat terrorism directed against the United

States. And he announced that you, as the Assistant Attorney General for this Office of Justice Programs, would serve on the council.

Given that the President’s budget proposal would zero out all the

counterterrorism grant funding at the Office of Justice Programs

and transfer that function to FEMA, what will be your responsibilities on the council?

Ms. DANIELS. I appreciate that question, Mr. Keller, because I

think there is a misunderstanding about what OJP can continue to

do in this area.

We do a number of things with respect to counterterrorism. We

do State and local anti-terrorism training in the area of prevention,

disruption, intervention, prosecution of terrorism. That is a separate function from the Office for Domestic Preparedness, which

does first responder training; what do you do when it’s already hit,

and what do you do at the scene, and how do you deal with the

scene?

What we will be doing is continuing to actually increase our

training throughout the Department of Justice, and that’s through

OJP and its various components, through COPS and through other

entities, including the FBI, of course, to increase our prevention,

disruption, investigation functions. We’ll be doing additional research. We already do a substantial amount of technological research to try to adapt technologies to this particular use.

And NIJ’s Office of Science and Technology will continue to do

that in close collaboration with those out in the field.

Mr. KELLER. So even though the money has been transferred to

FEMA, you still think you’ve got a role to play on this council and

have valuable advice for them?

Ms. DANIELS. Only the first responder activities are to be transferred to FEMA. We also are very involved in information and intelligence sharing through the regional information system—I’m

sorry, the regional information-sharing system, which is a close

partnership with State and local law enforcement.

So there are a number of things that the Office of Justice Programs continues to do, not to mention the Department of Justice

as a whole——

Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman from Florida yield for a

minute?

Mr. KELLER. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Daniels, I just wanted to make sure I understood.

32

I thought that the Administration was proposing to zero out all

counterterrorism funding with OJP. And if that’s the case—that is

not the case?

Ms. DANIELS. No, sir. There is a single office, whose funding

would be moved to FEMA and actually enhanced once it’s over

there, and that’s the Office for Domestic Preparedness, which specifically is first responder training and equipping grants.

Mr. SMITH. So they’re not zeroing out the funding for the

counterterrorism?

Ms. DANIELS. No, sir. The other aspects of what we do.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you, Mr. Keller.

Mr. KELLER. Ms. Robinson, let me just ask you, since you used

to be in charge there at OJP, what do you think about this idea

of keeping the COPS program kind of independent there and not

under OJP? Is that a good idea or a bad idea or are you indifferent

one way or the other?

Ms. ROBINSON. Well, I saw the COPS office do some tremendous

work over a number of years in really getting community policing

established around the country. I think I would go back to my recommendation that as we look down the road, to create—I would

urge you to consider creating a new integrated Federal assistance

program that all of these pieces eventually should be together.

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Ms. Robinson.

And, Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Keller.

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, now the Ranking

Member of the Subcommittee, is recognized for her questions.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank you for what I think is a very important hearing.

It’s particularly important because we are the authorizing Committee, and I noticed that a report was submitted to the appropriators, Ms. Daniels, on January 29th, 2002. I believe we have a

copy, but I hope the same sense of importance is given to the authorizing Committee.

I’m not sure if I agree with the reorganizational plan, and I was

sharing my concerns with the Chairman. I am not sure, though I

know that White House budget reflects the reorganization plan, I’m

not sure whether the appropriators’ response—obviously, they are

securing a report that they asked for. But I am concerned as to

whether they will then proceed in an amending forum—to take this

plan and make it a reality without the combined insight of the authorizers that have been working—I guess with the responsibilities

of the Department of Justice throughout its tenure. That’s what we

do, the Judiciary Committee. So I hope that reflects on the record.

And I’ll proceed to say that I raised some of the concerns of those

who oppose the reorganizational plan, though I am very comfortable with the concept of competency, efficiency, and effectiveness, which I know that you’re concerned about with your particular office. And I assume that is the concern of those who want

to reorganize.

But I do know that you still have the responsibility of reviewing

the particular budgets of both your bureaus and programs. Is that

my understanding?

Ms. DANIELS. Yes, ma’am.

33

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so my assumption is that when you review those budgets, you obviously would look, with your expertise

and Ms. Robinson’s expertise, would look for conflicts, duplication,

in those circumstances.

So I put that on the record, and I’m going to proceed with my

questions. I do have one yes or no question for you.

I noticed your Office for Victims of Crime. What happened with

the New York victims fund? Did that not come—because I know

there is a special master. Did that come under your office?

Ms. DANIELS. Actually, that’s being handled by the Civil Division

within the Department of Justice. Our——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Was that a decision by the Attorney General

or was—wasn’t your department the normal department for that?

Ms. DANIELS. Well, not really, Congresswoman. It’s not a grant

program, as our agency is accustomed to dealing with. This is really a—it involves a special master who is going to ascertain in negotiation with people who are punitive plaintiffs in potential lawsuits.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you did not lose power by that——

Ms. DANIELS. Oh, no.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I don’t need you to defend it. That’s okay. I

just wanted to make sure that was not a losing of power. You are

in a grant arena with respect to the victims issues; is that my understanding?

Ms. DANIELS. Don’t mind at all. Thank you.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me then proceed with my question to

Commissioner Kelly. I have the same interests that you have dealing with juvenile justice issues.

When I first came to Congress, we spent about a year traveling

across the country, visiting with States about their emphasis in juvenile programs. We visited those States that had ‘‘three strikes,

you’re out’’ at the juvenile level, incarcerating juveniles with adults

and those issues, and hopefully we made a difference.

In this reorganizational potential plan, I would ask you the question, though this is not exactly how they proposed it, what do you

see as a value to having the juvenile justice program and research

of juvenile issues combined together? There is a separate entity

that deals with research. Would it be helpful to put research of juvenile issues along with juvenile justice programmatic dollars together?

Mr. KELLY. Well, I believe currently, Congresswoman, that research is part of OJJDP’s current mandate. And although I’m not

a researcher per se—but I’ve had enough experience in doing research and reading research to understand fully that you’ve got to

have a very clear linkage between the field and the research effort.

It would do Kentucky no good, for example—we have State police

keep statistics and do research, mental health does research, child

welfare does research, and a host of other agencies in State government. It would make no sense to put that all into one department

of State government called the research and evaluation department, because it would lose sight of research being focused on what

the needs of juvenile justice are, for example, because research and

evaluation, the benefit of it, is to tweak programs, and to make

programs more effective. That’s why today we’ve been a victim of

34

bad practice—in the past were we haven’t really paid attention to

research.

And I think over the last decade, many of our State legislatures,

particularly the one in Kentucky, is concentrating now on saying,

‘‘Prove to me that this is effective.’’ Well, if I’m going to prove it

to you, then I’ve got to be able to have a research piece that is viable and that is effective. And having it someplace out there is not

always the best way to do it.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You need the practical along with the research, so that you can feed off of each other.

Mr. KELLY. Otherwise the researchers don’t know what to concentrate on. I mean, research is pure in one respect. But on the

other side of the coin, you’ve got to have a field for the practice.

And most researchers are not practice people. I mean, very rarely

do you get somebody in academia who has come up through the

ranks and earned their doctorate degree, but they also worked in

the field at one time; that’s a rare thing. Most academicians are not

people who know the fields. They’ve got to have the benefit of that

relationship with people doing the practice every day.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

There’ll be a second round?

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Jones, in your testimony, you mentioned five suggestions that you had. What I’d really like to know is what duplication did you have in mind that would address those five suggestions toward?

Mr. JONES. I would love to get back to the field and talk to some

of the State people and get back to you, to get you a more coherent

answer. I couldn’t sort of come up at the top my head with some

at this point in time.

But we were talking basically about how the programs come to

the State and whether they come from different areas. And some

of the similar things that Ms. Daniels was talking about, where

we—when we were asked for certain accountability, certain guidance that this was clear about it, that the agencies were clear with

what they wanted, that there was consistency with one or the other

who was given similar grants to the States. That’s the kind of

thing that we had in mind.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, on those five suggestions, it seems to me that

there was an overlap between them and the suggestions or objectives, I guess, that Ms. Daniels had and some of the suggestions

that Ms. Robinson had. When we talk about duplication and the

need to make these programs more responsive, do you feel that

there is room for shall we say substantial improvement within the

OJP area?

Mr. JONES. Well, yes, in terms of organization, I would say—I’d

have to say yes, in terms of that there should be some kind of improvement in that area.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you.

Ms. Robinson, let me go to you, if I may. Again, I have a habit

of reading everybody’s testimony, so my questions usually are

based upon that. I thought it was remarkable the meeting that you

called in 1996, now 6 years ago, where you pulled in people from

35

various agencies, departments, Republicans, Democrats, everybody,

and there was unanimous agreement on the need to make OJP

more efficient, more responsive, and more effective. And yet, really

nothing has been done since then. And that’s over two administrations, so we can be bipartisan in that, to some extent, as well.

But what’s been the problem? Why have we not made the improvements we should have concerning the great expansion of the

number of programs? And what can be done to implement the suggestions that you have and the others have today?

Ms. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, I think that, as I alluded to in my

oral statement, that bringing change in a large program like this

is just very, very difficult. There are Members up here, to be candid, who are invested in different funding streams, who care deeply

about them. There are people in the field—and that’s as it should

be. It’s a very complex area, criminal and juvenile justice. It obviously requires a great deal of thought to approach the question of

how to organize it in a way that it is rational and effective and can

get the mission accomplished.

Mr. SMITH. Let me—I meant to further add—and, by the way, I

think I was wrong when I said ‘‘over two administrations.’’ This

Administration is actually trying to change things for the better, in

my judgment.

But you mentioned a report detailing proposed reorganization

that was submitted to Congress in 1999, so we’ve had the blueprints, we’ve had the outlines, we’ve had the proposals, and still

haven’t done much.

Ms. ROBINSON. Well, actually, maybe I look at the world more

optimistically. I think we at least have gotten proposals out there.

In the fall of 2000, Congress, through the appropriations statute

for the Department of Justice, did put its imprimatur on several

parts of the reorganization: the State desks, organizing the offices

by topic, and having one central information point. And they asked

the department to proceed with those plans.

Through that—I left as Assistant Attorney General in February

of 2000. And in the following months, before the Administration

ended, there were planning groups and reports put out, but no concrete steps, as I understand it, were taken. And at that point, the

Administration changed.

I’m encouraged by——

Mr. SMITH. Are you more optimistic now?

Ms. ROBINSON. I am optimistic that it’s getting attention from

Ms. Daniels and others, yes. And I know that tackling this kind of

thing is difficult. There are very many legitimate concerns and interests about the juvenile area, about how to deal with victims of

crime, about the research and statistics, ensuring that they remain

credible and objective. So it’s not a simple process, but it is one

that needs to be tackled.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Robinson.

Mr. Kelly, let me direct my last question to you, and I think it

comes, appropriately enough, after the remarks by Ms. Robinson.

And that is that there’s an acknowledgement that a lot of these

programs are worthwhile. At the same time, I hope you would

admit that there’s probably duplication and inefficiency in these

programs as well.

36

And I got the feeling, in your testimony, you were trying to walk

a very fine line between saying that there was—what you couldn’t

say, that there was no duplication, and yet making a case for the

programs themselves.

In fact, though, don’t you feel that there is duplication? Isn’t

there fairly substantial room for improvement in the way these

programs are run, administered, and implemented?

Mr. KELLY. After reading the testimony of Ms. Daniels and Laurie Robinson, I’m sure there is duplication. I’d be shocked, the size

of the Justice Department, if there wasn’t duplication.

So I’d be the first one to say that we certainly want to try and

correct as much duplication and get the greatest bounce for our

buck as possible.

The thing I want to see is that, as we look to change the system,

to avoid the overlapping, the duplication, and the lack of coordination, that we protect the viability of an agency in State government—in Federal Government that focuses on juvenile justice

issues. That’s paramount.

If we do that, then we lose, I’m afraid, many of the gains that

we’ve made in keeping the focus on the need of juvenile justice.

And like I said earlier, there are many, many States have begun

to see and make changes so that juvenile justice has a single focus

in their State by making it a separate department, a separate

agency.

And I think there’s a way to eliminate much of the duplication

and keep that focus there. And obviously, I don’t know as much

about OJP as Ms. Daniels and Ms. Robinson, but I’m sure there’s

got to be a way, if one is committed, to the fact that there’s got to

be a juvenile justice focus.

Mr. SMITH. I think that makes it unanimous that there’s room

for improvement, there’s too much duplication, and we should

eliminate that, but eliminate that by keeping the worthwhile programs, too.

Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

Ms. Jackson Lee, do you have any more questions?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would like a second round, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SMITH. Excuse me?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would like to—— Mr. SMITH. Okay. The gentlewoman is recognized for her questions.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelly, just to comment, the Members of this Committee,

most of them are lawyers and will have a tendency to cross-examine. When they do that, you don’t have to agree with us. [Laughter.]

I will just comment that’s all——

Mr. SMITH. It’s too late. He already agreed. [Laughter.]

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I was trying to interject or object, but I knew

that we were in a hearing.

I will just add, for the record, that all change is not progress.

We have a common interest, though, and that is, of course, the

juvenile justice issues. But I have a common—not a common, but

a perspective of this particular program. I think Ms. Daniels and

Ms. Robinson probably had one of the better or best jobs in governVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.000 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
37

ment or, at least, in the Department of Justice. Why do I say that?

Because your particular area was an area that was very people-directed and orientated, if you will. The different areas, both bureaus

and programs, really related to outside the beltway. And I applaud

you for your commitment to what these particular disparate programs and bureaus stand for.

So that’s why I make an argument that I will review the proposal but all may not be good to merge and to, if you will, diminish

the independence of these particular areas.

For example, the victims programs, the Violence Against

Women—who are now very concerned that with merger or with

combining you, lessen their prominence on some of their issues.

And, Mr. Kelly, Commissioner Kelly, I would commend to you

the perspective of that with respect to juvenile justice issues. We

have come a mighty long way with juvenile justice issues, and my

Ranking Member, Mr. Scott, started with me—he was here before

me. But we were into the ‘‘three strikes, you’re out,’’ we were into

locking them up; that was the call of the day. And I do believe that

this particular program and bureau has helped to give grants to

help local communities be more openminded and more creative

with how they deal with juvenile issues.

So I am not enthusiastic about the approach. And let me raise

these questions, then, to Ms. Robinson: What about my perspective,

the kind of presence that these particular bureaus have had to

have, as relates to Violence Against Women, Office for State and

Local Domestic Preparedness, the—I guess I’m going over the

ones—let me look at the ones—the Bureau of Justice Assistance,

Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Institute of Justice, Office of

Juvenile—and then Office for Victims of Crime. And then the program offices, I was reading them as well.

But they had topical substance to them, and I think that’s important to the communities to be able to understand that these are important.

Ms. ROBINSON. Yes, I absolutely agree with you. And in my written testimony, one of the points that I made was that it is important to preserve what I called kind of centers of leadership, policy,

knowledge around areas like domestic violence, law enforcement,

corrections, and that list could go on.

But there are ways of structuring the program that can make

them work more closely together, more effectively together. But I

in no way recommend eliminating focus in these important issues.

And I would also, back on your first comment, say it was the best

job in government anyone could have.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I can imagine.

Have you read the January 29th, 2002, proposed reorganizational plan? Have you had that before you?

Ms. ROBINSON. Yes, I have.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you giving us any opinion on that?

Ms. ROBINSON. I have not commented in detail on it. It has many

consistent themes, but I’d have to go back and look to——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you’re not—this is—your testimony is not

a seal of approval on this proposal.

38

Ms. ROBINSON. No, but I would say that the general principles

annunciated in it are very consistent with what I was trying to forward, and that I would support them.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But there are many ways of getting toward

your principles?

Ms. ROBINSON. Absolutely.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. With respect to the merger or movement of

the Office for Domestic Preparedness, let me offer a counterproposal. I believe that the purpose with first responders, particularly police, have a great basis in the Department of Justice, just

as police, law enforcement. I am well-aware of the greatness of

FEMA.

I have as a resident of Texas, as my State, know that we could

not have survived over the past couple of years without the excellent work of our FEMA directors, plural, and their staff.

But FEMA is a fluid organization. It moves with the tide. It goes

to emergency and crisis areas. And I don’t understand the reasoning, except for another budget line to FEMA, that would have

taken a law enforcement-directed effort out of the Department of

Justice and moved to FEMA.

Ms. Daniels?

Ms. DANIELS. Thank you, Congresswoman. And I appreciate you

bringing that up.

You may recall that FEMA actually started as the civil defense

agency in the Cold War days. And times changed, and it needed

to be a fluid agency, and it became more of a natural disaster agency.

I think everyone agrees, including the director of FEMA, that

FEMA now needs to undergo, in light of the terrorist threat to this

country, a certain mission shift in order to effectively do this. I

would simply say that the purpose of this is to consolidate a lot of

activities that are geared in many agencies toward first response

training into a single agency. The idea is to consolidate those

things. We’ll continue to collaborate closely with FEMA and other

agencies, as we all must under the current threatening circumstances.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, maybe that—and I thank the Chairman

for his indulgence.

Maybe that was where we should start first, which is the reordering and the understanding of where Governor Ryan is going and

where the Administration is going on reordering our fight against

terrorism.

FEMA has—it did start that way. But we’ve known it in current

years and decades as hurricanes, storms and various other type

natural disasters.

So, you know, this kind of lateral movement doesn’t give us a

sense that the mission is prominent. It’s moving little pieces. And

I’d be interested in a more unified focus of what we’re doing.

But I appreciate your explanation of that.

Mr. Chairman, I would just simply close my line of questioning

by saying two points. Part of the fallout of the mergers, the Violence Against Women Office’s advocates being very concerned that

they will be, if you will, diminished in status. And they’re looking

to be put outside the Department of Justice, and I don’t know if

39

that’s always the best approach. But they are frightened that they

will lose their status, and that’s why I’m concerned about the reorganizational plan.

And then, lastly, I would say that I’m delighted that Dr. Jones

is here. I’m a great advocate of States. But likewise, coming from

local government, I would make the point that I am a proponent

of getting grants directly to local entities who can utilize the dollars quickly and benefit neighborhoods and blocks and cities and

various small entities where the people actually are.

With that, I’ll yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. Daniels, I want to follow up briefly on what the Congresswoman just mentioned as an issue, and that was proposed, by some

people, transfer of the Office of Violence Against Women outside of

OJP.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I’m sorry, I didn’t hear you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. The question I asked Ms. Daniels was that you had

made reference to the Office of Violence Against Women, and some

have proposed transferring that out of OJP.

And I was going to ask Ms. Daniels if she supported or opposed

that proposal.

Ms. DANIELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate the opportunity to address this issue, because

I want to make it very clear that in no way does our proposal for

reorganization suggest any change in terms of the Violence Against

Women Office. We think it has a very important function and

should continue as an entity within the Office of Justice Programs.

Having said that, I would reemphasize the last part of that statement. We think there are a lot of synergies between the Violence

Against Women Office and a number of the other operations that

we have at OJP. And it’s essential to us that the Violence Against

Women Office work very closely with the juvenile justice office,

with the Office for Victims of Crime.

Those three in particular do a lot of work in protecting victims

of child abuse, children who have witnessed violence between

adults and that sort of thing. And we think that it is essential that

they work very closely together. Moving VAWO out would make

that difficult.

And we also enjoy a number of economies of scale on the basis

of the work that we do closely together.

Mr. SMITH. So, Ms. Daniels, the answer to my question was that

that is not in your proposal?

Ms. DANIELS. It is not in our proposal to either merge it with

anything else in OJP——

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Ms. DANIELS [continuing]. Or certainly not to move it out.

Mr. SMITH. Transfer it out. Okay.

Speaking of transfers, Ms. Robinson, tell me whether you are

supportive of or opposed to transferring the Office of Science and

Technology to OJP.

Ms. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, you mean out of NIJ?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, correct.

Ms. ROBINSON. That’s an issue that I did not have to tackle during my tenure as Assistant Attorney General. But sitting outside

40

government, as I do now, there are many things that do make

sense about such a transfer.

One of the things I’d reflect on, and I was very familiar with the

work of the office during my time there, is that much of it is technical assistance like in its nature. And whether that should belong

in a research institute I think is a very good and open question.

Secondly, and I did mention this in my written statement, if

there is any area across criminal justice where there is confusion

in the field about the different funding streams, and how to access

them, it is in the area of technology. And having some greater combination of that and, I would say, reporting directly to the Assistant Attorney General, makes a lot of sense. But at least to combine

those together.

Right now, BJS, BJA, NIJ, various offices and the COPS office

have parts of the technology issue. There is such potential there.

It is so important that trying to get a greater handle on comprehensive integrated work with States and localities on technology

is really crucial.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Robinson.

Let me ask you, which I probably should have asked you personally first, you’re down as a former Assistant Attorney General. You

ought to be a consultant. And I’m sure that Ms. Daniels would welcome that.

What do you do now? We know what you were a former of. Are

you practicing law now?

Ms. ROBINSON. I am more than a ‘‘former.’’ I’m currently senior

fellow with the University of Pennsylvania’s Jerry Lee Center of

Criminology here in Washington, working on crime policy issues

and happy to be of whatever assistance.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Well, thank you all for your testimony today.

It was very helpful, very useful. And as you know, this begins

the—this is the first part of a three-part series on the general subject of oversight, which we think is so important, both to the Committee and to Congress.

So thank you again. And I thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee, for being

the Ranking Member.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(41)

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS:

EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in

Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The Subcommittee will come to order, and the first

thing to do is to thank our witnesses for their patience. I think you

all know we had a markup in the full Judiciary Committee and it

just was finished and that is why we are running about 30 minutes

late. However, if you think this was bad, the alternative was meeting at 2:30 this afternoon, so you are probably grateful to go on

now, even if we are running a little bit late.

I have to also say that when we get to your testimony, I’m going

to be very strict about the 5-minute rule, which in the past I have

not been, and the reason for that is, first, that we’re expecting a

vote in about 40 minutes and I’d like to get as much done as we

can before then, and second of all, several Members have luncheon

commitments starting at 12 or 12:30, so we are going to try to expedite and adhere to the rules as much as possible.

I appreciate the attendance of all the Members who are here and

I will recognize myself and other Members for opening statements

and then we’ll proceed.

Today, the Crime Subcommittee holds our second hearing on the

Justice Department grant programs administered primarily by the

Office of Justice Programs. We are here to examine the quality of

evaluations of the effectiveness of over $4 billion of Federal grant

funds for State and local law enforcement officials.

The use of Federal grant funds to accomplish law enforcement

objectives is subject to legal requirements that determine whether

those objectives are achieved. Regular evaluations using valid

methodologies are essential to the President and Congress in assessing where Federal resources can be used most effectively.

The Office of Justice Programs was established to provide funds

for State and local governments to develop innovative ways to fight

crime. Evaluations of the programs are essential to determine what

works and what doesn’t.

In recent years, evaluations seem to have become less important

as Congress began to earmark certain programs and other programs became politically charged. We will examine the manageVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.001 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
42

ment and evaluation procedures at OJP to determine whether

grant programs are being operated as they were intended by Congress and whether the programs are effective in reducing crime.

The goal of this hearing is to gather information about OJP’s performance and how Congress might assist the OJP. The Committee

on the Judiciary is responsible for oversight of all Justice Department grant programs, including those administered by OJP and

the Office of Community Policing Services, COPS. It is our responsibility to ensure that taxpayers’ dollars are being wisely spent.

To that end, this Committee has begun to examine studies and

evaluations prepared by the agency regarding these programs. It

has become apparent that the evaluations and data collected by

OJP left many unanswered questions. The testimony provided at

this hearing will help the Committee to determine how and when

OJP should apply performance standards to measure the effectiveness of grants and grant programs.

Since Federal funds will continue to be provided to State and

local governments for crime prevention programs, it is reasonable

for Congress to require accountability from OJP for grant management. It is also appropriate that Congress require OJP to establish

criteria for distributing grants as well as for measuring the effectiveness of grants. Congress should be able to answer questions

from taxpayers about who has received Federal dollars and how

those Federal dollars improved communities by reducing crime.

That concludes my opening statement. The gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member, Mr. Scott, is recognized for his.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you

in convening the second oversight hearing in the series of hearings

you have scheduled on the Office of Justice Programs. At our hearing this past Tuesday, we focused on the issue of duplication of programs in OJP and heard varying views on the need for consolidation of programs versus the need for continued and even further

separation of programs in OJP.

I suspect, Mr. Chairman, that we may hear more of the same

today with respect to whether a particular program operates better

in a consolidated context or in a separate program, and from what

we have heard so far, I am beginning to think that some of the

issue of the value of consolidation versus separation may be in the

eye of the beholder and that we may do better to focus on ways to

ensure that OJP operations achieve their legislated purposes and

mandates and not worry so much about their organizational structure.

I don’t form to serve to prevent or hamper substance, but we also

don’t want to focus on changing the organizational structure if the

real problem is failure of the people responsible for oversight of the

programs to implement appropriate management, monitoring, and

evaluation. No matter what the organizational structure we have,

if we don’t enforce it, it won’t be effective.

Mr. Chairman, the issue of today is evaluation of effectiveness of

programs funded through OJP. Frankly, I’m not as concerned

about the organizational structure of OJP as I am concerned about

funding effective programs and not wasting money on programs

which do not work. We know, for example, that some prevention

programs are effective in reducing crime, so effective, in fact, that

43

they save more money than they cost. Other programs are called

prevention programs or they’re popular, so they get funding, but,

in fact, they have no effect at all on crime. Evaluations will help

us know the right programs to fund, and this is more important

than the organizational structure.

So, Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to the testimony of the

witnesses on the question of how much of the problem is form as

opposed to failing to implement the proper management, monitoring, and evaluation to ensure program effectiveness. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

Are there other Members who wish to make opening statements?

[No response.]

Mr. SMITH. If not, let me introduce the witnesses. They are

David B. Muhlhausen, political analyst, Center for Data Analysis,

The Heritage Foundation of Washington, D.C.; The Honorable John

Cary Bittick, president, National Sheriff’s Association, Washington,

D.C.; Laurie Ekstrand, director, Justice Issues, General Accounting

Office in Washington, D.C.; and the Honorable David B. Mitchell,

executive director, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court

Judges, Reno, Nevada.

We welcome you all, look forward to your testimony. We’ll look

forward first to hearing from Mr. Muhlhausen. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN, POLICY ANALYST,

CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, of course, my

name is David Muhlhausen and I’m a policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation specializing in crime policy and program evaluation. In beginning my testimony, I must emphasize that the views

I express are entirely my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. With

that understanding, I am honored to be asked by the Subcommittee

on Crime to testify today on reforming the evaluation process at

the Office of Justice Programs.

In 1996, Congress directed the Attorney General to conduct a review of State and local crime prevention programs funded by the

Department of Justice. The resulting report by the University of

Maryland examined 500 evaluations of crime prevention programs.

Of particular interest, the report concluded that policing activities

with clear strategies of targeting crime risk factors, such as highcrime hot spots, can be effective in reducing crime. The report also

noted that many of the Department of Justice crime prevention

programs either were evaluated as ineffective or escaped scrutiny

altogether. The report called on Congress to devote more resources

to evaluating crime programs.

It is still the case that Congress needs to mandate that the Office

of Justice Programs needs to evaluate its programs and disseminate its findings to the public. For instance, or exactly, by determining impact evaluation, I mean a study design to measure a program’s outcomes on the social conditions that it is intended to improve.

44

1Lawrence Sherman, Denise Gottfredson, Doris Mackenzie, John Eck, Peter Rueter, and

Shawn Bushway, University of Maryland Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, PreTo improve the ability of OJP to evaluate the effectiveness of its

programs, Congress should take the following steps: First, Congress needs to specifically direct OJP to measure the effect of crime

reduction programs. Second, recipients of OJP grants should be required to demonstrate through scientific means the effectiveness of

their programs; before grants are awarded, applicants need to develop a clear plan on how they are going to use the funds to prevent crime; a system to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of

the grants must be in place before the awarding of funds; and

third, as originally proposed by the University of Maryland report,

a minimum of 10 percent of OJP grant funding should be earmarked for evaluations.

In conclusion, impact evaluations offer significant benefits for society because they measure how programs affect the social conditions they are designed to improve. Impact evaluations offer two

improvements over process evaluations that agencies typically

produce.

First, impact evaluations reduce uncertainty in deciding which

programs should be funded. Funding only those programs that are

effective will save taxpayer funds by freeing up resources for programs that actually work. If an OJP program is found to be ineffective, then its elimination has only a limited effect on its intended

beneficiaries. An ineffective program does not make your constituents safer. In fact, continuing an ineffective program can harm

grant recipients because of their continued participation wastes

time and resources that could be better spent elsewhere.

Second, impact evaluations can improve the quality of public debate about the factors that are responsible for various social problems. Too often, when a community receives Federal funding and

crime simultaneously declines, it is asserted that the funding

caused the decline. Simply observing that the crime rates dropped

when Federal grants flowed to a particular community does not

help us understand the reasons why crime rates declined. Socioeconomic factors need to be considered in understanding why crime

rates change.

To accomplish this task, Congress should boost the ability of OJP

to conduct its evaluations. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Muhlhausen.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Muhlhausen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN

Mr. Chairman, my name is David Muhlhausen. I am a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis specializing in crime policy and program

evaluation. In beginning my testimony I must emphasize that the views I express

are entirely my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. With that understanding, I am honored to be

asked by the Subcommittee on Crime, to testify today on reforming the evaluation

process at the Office of Justice Programs (OJP).

EVALUATIONS OF CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAMS

In 1996, Congress directed the U.S. Attorney General to conduct a review of state

and local crime-prevention programs funded by the U.S. Department of Justice

(DOJ). The resulting 1997 report by the University of Maryland looked at 500 evaluations of the crime-prevention programs.1 While the study did not evaluate specific

45

venting Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997). 2Lawrence W. Sherman, ‘‘Policing for Crime Prevention,’’ in Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime, p. 37. 3Lawrence W. Sherman and David Weisburd, ‘‘General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in

Crime ‘Hot Spots’: A Randomized, Controlled Trial,’’ Justice Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1995), pp.

625–648; Lawrence Sherman, James Shaw, and Dennis P. Rogan, The Kansas City Gun Experi- ment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, January 1995); and Susan E. Martin and Lawrence W. Sherman, ‘‘Selective Apprehension: A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders,’’ Criminology, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1986), pp. 155–

173; and Allan F. Abrahamse, Patricia A. Ebener, Peter A Greenwood, Nora Fitzgerald, and

Thomas E. Kosin, ‘‘An Experimental Evaluation of the Phoenix repeat Offender Program,’’ Justice Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1991), pp. 141–168. 4 Anthony A. Braga, David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William

Spelman, and Francis Gajewski, ‘‘Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment,’’ Criminology, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1999), pp. 541–580. 5 Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring, and Anne Morrison Piehl, ‘‘ProblemOriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s Operation

Ceasefire,’’ Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2001), pp. 195–225. 6Lawrence W. Sherman, ‘‘Policing for Crime Prevention,’’ in Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime, p. 37. 7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., pp. 41–42. 9Lawrence Sherman, ‘‘Conclusion: The Effectiveness of Local Crime Prevention Funding,’’ in

Sherman et al., Preventing Crime, p. 1. 10Lawrence Sherman et al., Preventing Crime.

programs, it reviewed scientific studies of programs and judged them on their scientific merit. Congress can use this report as a starting point for identifying effective and ineffective programs.

What Works

Given my time constraints, I will concentrate on the 1997 report’s findings on

what works in policing. Policing activities with clear strategies of targeting crimerisk factors are effective in reducing crime.2 Some effective strategies include: (1)

targeting crime ‘‘hot spots,’’ (2) targeting illegal possession of firearms by criminals,

and (3) the proactive targeting of repeat offenders, which increases the likelihood

of the arrest and incarceration of dangerous criminals.3 When the police develop

clear strategies, they can make a difference in reducing crime.

The 1997 report suggested that problem-oriented policing is a promising approach.

Since the report was published, new evaluations, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), have become available which indicate that some types of problem-oriented policing are effective in reducing crime. A 1999 randomized study

found that where specific plans developed to reduce crime in Jersey City, such as

aggressive order maintenance and changes to the physical environment, produced

significant reductions in crime.4 Another study, published in 2001, found that Boston’s Operation Ceasefire led to a dramatic drop in the number of the city’s youth

homicides.5 Operation Ceasefire successfully reduced youth homicides by targeting

a small number of chronically offending youth gang members.

What we have learned from problem-oriented policing and other policing strategies is that local law enforcement can make a difference. Developing a clear plan

for using local resources to solve problems is more effective than having local law

enforcement agencies spend federal dollars.

What Doesn’t Work

The 1997 report concluded that neighborhood watches where volunteers watch

their neighborhoods in an effort to deter criminals are ineffective.6 In addition, community policing with no clear strategy for targeting crime-risk factors has been ineffective in reducing crime.7 While the federal government has encouraged community

policing the report states, ‘‘there is no evidence that community policing per se reduces crime without a clear focus on a crime risk factor objective.’’ 8

What’s Unknown

The 1997 report noted that many of DOJ’s crime-prevention programs either were

evaluated as ineffective or escaped scrutiny altogether. It added: ‘‘By scientific

standards, there are very few ‘programs of proven effectiveness.’ ’’ 9 The 1997 report

called for Congress to devote more resources to evaluating crime prevention programs.10 Yet Congress still has not given sufficient attention to this request to ensure that federally funded crime prevention efforts are in fact preventing crime. It

is still the case that our understanding of which OJP programs work can be significantly increased through the use of evaluation research.

46

11David B. Muhlhausen, ‘‘Do Community Oriented Policing Services Grants Affect Violent

Crime Rates?’’ Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report No. CDA01–05, May 25,

2002. 12Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., ‘‘Bush: Don’t Cut COPS,’’ The Baltimore Sun, April 16, 2001,

p. A7. 13David B. Muhlhausen, ‘‘Do Community Oriented Policing Services Grants Affect Violent

Crime Rates?’’ 14 Jihong ‘‘Solomon’’ Zhao and Quint Thurman, ‘‘A National Evaluation of the Effect of COPS

Grants on Crime From 1994 to 1999,’’ University of Nebraska at Omaha, December 2001. 15See Quint Thurman’s vita at http://www.cj.swt.edu/Thurman/VITAswt..htm (February 19,

2002). 16 Jihong ‘‘Solomon’’ Zhao and Quint Thurman, ‘‘A National Evaluation of the Effect of COPS

Grants on Crime From 1994 to 1999.’’ The narrowly-focused grants, which Zhao and Thurman

call innovative grants, fund specific activities that address such problems as gang violence, domestic violence, and illegal youth firearms possession. 17Senator Joseph R. Biden, Press release, December 5, 2001, at http://biden.senate.gov/biden/

press/release/01/12/2001C05740.html (February 19, 2002). 18 Jihong ‘‘Solomon’’ Zhao and Quint Thurman, ‘‘A National Evaluation of the Effect of COPS

Grants on Crime From 1994 to 1999,’’ p. 6. 19 Ibid., p. 11, Table 1. 20 Ibid.

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION’S RELATED RESEARCH

The Heritage Foundation has recently begun to evaluate the effectiveness of federal programs. While The Heritage Foundation has not individually studied OJP

grants, its evaluation of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

has shed light on the program’s success.11 Some observers claim that the COPS program is a proven success because crime has declined every year since the program’s creation.12 This assertion does not account for the fact that the nation’s violent

crime rate began to decline before the program was created.

In May 2001, The Heritage Foundation published an impact evaluation of COPS,

which found that grants to hire additional officers and purchase technology were ineffective in reducing violent crime.13 The analysis suggests that simply continuing

funding for the COPS program will be ineffective in reducing violent crime.

In contrast to hiring and redeployment grants, which were not shown to be effective, the analysis found that COPS grants which were targeted on reducing specific

problems—like domestic violence, youth firearm violence, and gangs—were some- what effective in reducing violent crime. Narrowly focused COPS grants are intended to help law enforcement agencies tackle specific problems, while COPS hiring and redeployment grants are intended simply to pay for operational costs of police departments. The Heritage Foundation analysis builds on research that shows

how the police are deployed is more important in reducing crime than the number

of officers funded.

RESEARCH BY THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Approximately six months after the publication of The Heritage Foundation COPS

evaluation, the University of Nebraska at Omaha published a federally funded evaluation of COPS.14 The University of Nebraska report was financed through a COPS office grant of over $116,000.15

The University of Nebraska study found that two types of COPS grants—hiring

and narrowly focused grants—reduced crime rates in cities with populations over

10,000.16 The study also found that redeployment grants failed to reduce crime. In

addition, for cities between 1,000 and 10,000 residents, the study shows that COPS

hiring grants are associated with an increase in violent and property crime while

redeployment grants are associated with an increase property crime. The results of

the COPS-funded study have been used to support claims about the program’s effectiveness.17

The University of Nebraska study was critical of research that did not ‘‘control

for extraneous factors that may be correlated with both increases in the number of

police officers and increases in crime rates, such as local politics, or fluctuation in

the local economy of cities.’’ 18 Unfortunately, data limitations did not permit the authors to make significant improvements to the existing research. For example, citylevel data for five out of six socioeconomic variables in the study was not available

on a yearly basis.19 Instead of using data for each year between 1994 and 1999, the

following control variables were held constant at 1990 levels: minority population

percent, single parent household percent, young people percent, homeownership percent, and percent of people in the same house since 1985.20

Given that the University of Nebraska study covers the period 1994 to 1999, the

use of data exclusively from 1990 for most of their control variables is inappropriate

47

21 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, P25–1095. 22 Calculations based on Table 2 in Sidra Lea Gifford, ‘‘Justice Expenditure and Employment

in the United States, 1999,’’ Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, February 2002, NCJ 191746,

(U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs). 23The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103–322, 108 STAT.

1813.

and likely to reduce the validity of the findings. Holding control variables constant

at 1990 levels ignores important changes that occurred on a yearly basis between

1994 to 1999. For example, from 1990 to 1999, the nation’s minority population

grew from 24.3 percent to 28.1 percent of the total population.21 The University of

Nebraska study’s use of 1990 data means that it cannot account for many of the

important changes during the last decade that influenced crime rates.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the University of Nebraska analysis is that

state and local law enforcement efforts are assumed not to influence crime rates.

The statistical model used by the researchers only considers the effect that federal

funding has on crime rates. The impact of omitting state and local expenditures can

be seen by examining the size of the COPS program in comparison to state and local

police expenditures. During the period of 1994–1999, the COPS program had a combined budget of $6.9 billion, while during the same period state and local governments devoted over $280 billion for police agencies.22 For every $1 spent on COPS,

over $40 was spent by state and local governments for police protection.

An alternative approach can be found in The Heritage Foundation study where

the statistical model accounts for state and local policing. In order to take account

of the state and local expenditures, The Heritage Foundation used county-level data,

which has more complete information on local spending (and important socioeconomic factors that are available on a yearly basis). The Heritage Foundation

study found that state and local police expenditures significantly reduce crime. The

approach taken in the University of Nebraska study tends to bias the results towards a finding that COPS is more effective than the program may be.

WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD DO

Advancing the evaluation capability of OJP is important to the promotion of public safety. Congress should take the following steps to improve the evaluation of OJP

programs: (1) mandate impact evaluations, (2) require grant recipients to collect

data and evaluate their programs, (3) make NIJ an independent agency within OJP,

(4) reserve 10 percent of all OJP grant funding for impact evaluations and have the

agency review the research design before approving grants. These steps are explained more fully in the sections below.

Mandate Impact Evaluations

If Congress wants OJP to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs, it will have

to mandate it. There is no substitute for Congress making its intentions clear. Congress must specifically direct OJP to measure the effect of its programs on crime.

Too frequently, process evaluations, which answer questions about the operation

of a program and service delivery, are substituted for impact evaluations. Process

measures that report how much funding was dispersed and how many people were

served are not measures of a program’s effectiveness in improving the targeted social condition.

A case in point is the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994

which required an evaluation of the COPS program. The law suggested that the effectiveness of COPS in reducing crime should be evaluated, but the law left open

the possibility of the Department of Justice not doing an impact evaluation.23 The

resulting Nation Evaluation of the COPS Program failed to determine the program’s

effectiveness in reducing crime. Instead, the study looked at process measures, such

as how many officers were hired. Some of the study’s findings were informative. For

example, the study concluded that a program goal of adding 100,000 additional officers would not be met. However important questions about the program’s effectiveness were never even considered.

The National Evaluation of the COPS Program and the University of Nebraska

studies illustrate a larger problem with bureaucracies. In general, given the opportunity, bureaucracies will emphasize those aspects of administrative operations that

put them in the best light. In cases where they are forced into measuring their effectiveness, bureaucracies will tend to conduct process evaluations or studies designed

to produce the most favorable results. From an administrator’s perspective, process

data are the most readily available type of information about a program, so it receives the closest attention.

48

24 42 USC 9801 et seq. For more information, see http://www2.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/hsb/

hsreac/legis.htm. (March 3, 2002). 25 Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, Appendix A, February 2001, at http://

www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2731&sequence=33 (April 16, 2001). 26This recommendation was made originally by Professor Lawrence Sherman, now with the

University of Pennsylvania. See Sherman et al., Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t,

What’s Promising. 27Peter H. Rossi, Howard E. Freeman, and Mark W. Lipsey, Evaluation: A Systematic Approach, (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 309–310.

To counteract the natural tendency to avoid impact evaluations by government

agencies, Congress should clearly mandate OJP to evaluate the impact of its programs on crime rates. An example of this type of legislative language mandating

an impact evaluation is contained in the Coats Human Services Amendments of

1998.24 The amendment specifically mandates a randomized impact evaluation of

Head Start. Today, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is moving

toward determining if Head Start is an effective program based on rigorous social

science methods. Without the congressional mandate, it is very likely that the HHS

research would be more process-oriented rather than focused on the impact of Head

Start.

Require Grant Recipients to Evaluate Their Federally Funded Programs

Recipients of OJP grants should be required to demonstrate through scientific

means the effect that the programs have had on crime. Anecdotal examples or measures other than actual changes in crime should not be substituted for rigorous impact evaluations that include control variables.25

First, before grants are awarded, applicants need to develop a clear plan on how

they intend to use the funds to prevent crime. Second, a system to measure and

evaluate the effectiveness of the grants must be in place before the awarding of

funds. Third, after the funds have been spent, the OJP-funded activities should be

evaluated for their effect on crime. Finally, the results of the evaluation should be

submitted to OJP for dissemination to Congress and the public.

To summarize these steps: Devise a plan that includes measuring the outcomes

of the plan. Implement the plan. Then evaluate the program. Plan. Implement.

Evaluate. If grantees cannot take these responsible steps, then they should not receive federal funding.

Make NIJ an Independent Agency Within OJP

NIJ is uniquely situated to be the impact evaluation arm of the Justice Department. To become an independent and truly effective agency, NIJ’s budget needs to

be directly funded. Currently, NIJ’s budget is derived from contributions from its

sister bureaus within OJP. NIJ’s ability to objectively evaluate OJP programs is seriously jeopardized, because NIJ could suffer budget retaliations if the agency’s findings are not favorable to its sister agencies. Direct funding of NIJ will help inoculate

it from pressure not to evaluate the effectiveness of OJP programs.

Reserve 10 Percent of All OJP Funding for Impact Evaluations

As originally proposed by the University of Maryland report, a minimum of 10

percent of OJP grant funding should be earmarked for impact evaluations.26 The

implementation of these impact evaluations should be done through a mix of inhouse NIJ studies and out-source grants to academic researchers and independent

research firms.

Determining the impact of a program requires a rigorous study design. The net

outcomes of a program can be determined when the conditions of the intervention

group are compared to a similar group that has not received the intervention. Studies based on experimental design, or random assignment, are preferred because

their results are less ambiguous.

Because the criminal justice system operates in the context of legal constraints— namely, individual rights and due process—true random experiments are frequently

impossible. In these cases, quasi-experimental designs are required, where the intervention and control groups are selected nonrandomly, but some controls are used

to minimize threats to the validity of the findings.27 The inclusion of proper control

variables is crucial to the validity of findings of studies that are not based on random assignment.

CONCLUSION

Impact evaluations offer significant benefits for society because they measure how

programs effect the social conditions they are designed to improve. Impact evaluations offer two improvements over the process evaluations that agencies typically

49

28 Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, Appendix A, February 2001, at http://

www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2731&sequence=33 (April 16, 2001).

produce. First, impact evaluations reduce uncertainty in deciding which programs

should be funded. Funding only effective programs will save taxpayer funds by freeing up resources for programs that actually work. If an OJP program is found to

be ineffective, then its elimination has only a limited effect on the intended beneficiaries, because the program failed to reduce crime. An ineffective crime reduction

program does not make your constituents safer. In fact, continuing an ineffective

program can harm grant recipients because their continued participation wastes

time and resources that could be better spent elsewhere.

Second, impact evaluations can improve the quality of public debate about the factors that are responsible for various social problems. Too often when a city receives

federal funding and crime simultaneously declines, it is asserted that the funding

caused the decline. Simply observing that the crime rates dropped when federal

grants flowed to a particular community does not help us understand the reasons

why crime rates declined. As the Congressional Budget Office has noted, socioeconomic factors need to be considered in understanding why crime rates change.28

Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick.

STATEMENT OF JOHN CARY BITTICK, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL

SHERIFF’S ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BITTICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m Sheriff John Cary

Bittick from Georgia and I appear before you as President of the

National Sheriff’s Association. The National Sheriff’s Association is

surprised and deeply concerned about the proposal by OMB to

eliminate the Office of Domestic Preparedness at the U.S. Department of Justice and to shift these responsibilities to the Federal

Emergency Management Agency.

This is a time when the American people need continuity and coordination, not the disruption of unnecessary reorganization. For

this reason, I appear before you today to add the voice of the nation’s sheriffs to other law enforcement organizations that likewise

oppose this OMB proposal. While we appreciate the efforts of OMB

to consolidate functions and enhance efficiency, this proposal would

unintentionally undermine the efforts of American law enforcement.

I will submit for the record a formal resolution adopted by the

National Sheriff’s Association last week in which we set forth the

reasons for opposition for this proposed reorganization. Let me explain each of these reasons for opposition to the OMB proposal.

Sheriffs have worked with the Department of Justice on funding

for anti-crime efforts since the Safe Streets Act of 1968. Over these

34 years, the Department of Justice has established expertise that

cannot be replicated by an agency that is new to law enforcement.

Nothing more need be said here, but it is apparent that there is

no substitute for these 34 years of relationships and experience.

The sheriffs of our nation applaud your courage and leadership

in passing the Patriot Act, but we are confused by the OMB proposal since it seems to repeal sections of the Patriot Act even before some of those provisions have been implemented. For example,

the OMB proposal seems to rewrite sections 1005 and 1014, which

direct the Attorney General, not FEMA, to make grant to sheriffs

for first responders, terrorism prevention, and anti-terrorism training.

Look at the record of terrorist attacks around the globe. Terrorists attack with automatic weapons, bombs, and often take hosVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.001 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
50

tages. Side by side with Federal law enforcement, we will face

these terrorists, most probably with deadly weapons. We will never

ask nor can we expect our fire, EMS, or health personnel to face

gunfire, explosives, or other deadly assaults. That is the job of the

police and sheriffs and it is ours alone.

Once the threat has been addressed and public safety has been

restored, only then is it possible to turn the scene over to FEMA

agencies. To do anything else would be contrary to a sheriff’s oath

of office and contrary to the laws of his State. To subordinate our

crisis response to FEMA would compromise the statutory obligation

of law enforcement officials to protect their community.

Mr. Chairman, we are grateful that your Committee has rightfully acknowledged that this is the reality of both policy and practices across the nation. I quote from the Subcommittee on Crime’s

views and estimates on the budget. ‘‘The Committee is concerned

that FEMA is not the appropriate agency for these responses. A

terrorist attack is a criminal event, not a national disaster.’’

The prevention, detection, and apprehension of terrorists are law

enforcement functions. It is not appropriate for training or coordination to be assigned to the FEMA regime where there are no such

responsibilities. If there were to be another terrorist attack, responding to the immediate crisis would be a law enforcement responsibility. Sheriffs and police chiefs are shocked that OMB would

propose that FEMA should assume responsibility in these areas,

where there is neither experience nor legal authority to act.

Perhaps most confusing is the contradiction of the January 2001

CLECs Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of

Operations Plan, known as the CONPLAN, which states, ‘‘Crisis

management is predominately a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources

needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may

include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence,

surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support such as agent identification,

search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited

decontamination. In addition to the traditional law enforcement

missions, crisis management also includes assurance of public safety and health.’’

Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62, and 63 direct the Attorney General, not FEMA, to assume the lead responsibility for the

Federal Government. It is the U.S. Department of Justice, not

FEMA, that serves as the central agency in a crisis.

Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick, are you getting to the end of your testimony?

Mr. BITTICK. Just about, sir.

Mr. SMITH. You can’t see that red light because a water pitcher

is in the way, but——

Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. I am just about through it.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. You had me worried when I saw six more

pages, so—— [Laughter.]

Mr. BITTICK. No, that is mostly notes. I apologize.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

51

Mr. BITTICK. At this time of national crisis, sheriffs want to support the efforts of the President and Governor Ridge. However, we

cannot support the OMB recommendation to remove the Office of

Domestic Preparedness from the U.S. Department of Justice and

transfer this function from FEMA. While this plan may appear to

serve the interest of efficiency, it fails to recognize the reality of

law enforcement responsibilities at the time of a terrorist attack.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by offering my assurances that

the National Sheriff’s Association strongly endorses the words of

your Committee, and I quote, ‘‘A case has neither been made for

current proposed transfer of the Office of Domestic Preparedness

nor for the prior transfer of the National Domestic Preparedness

Office.’’ Thank you, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick, it was worth waiting for that endorsement. Thank you. [Laughter.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bittick follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN CARY BITTICK

INTRODUCTION:

Mr. Chairman, I am Sheriff John Cary Bittick and I appear before you as President of the National Sheriffs Association. The National Sheriffs’ Association is surprised and deeply concerned about the proposal by OMB to eliminate the Office of

Domestic Preparedness (ODP) at the U.S. Department of Justice, and to shift these

responsibilities to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

This is a time when the American people need continuity and coordination, not

the disruption of unnecessary reorganization. For this reason, I appear before you

today to add the voice of the Nation’s Sheriffs to other law enforcement organizations that likewise oppose this OMB proposal. While we appreciate the efforts of

OMB to consolidate functions and enhance efficiency, this proposal would unintentionally undermine the efforts of American law enforcement.

I will submit for the record a formal resolution adopted by the National Sheriffs’

Association last week, in which we set forth the reasons for our opposition to the

proposed reorganization.

Let me explain each of the reasons for our opposition to the OMB proposal:

Experience With Counterterrorism:

Sheriffs have worked with the Department of Justice on funding for anti-crime

efforts since the Safe Streets Act of 1968. Over these 34 years, the Department of

Justice has established expertise that cannot be replicated by an agency that is new

to law enforcement. Nothing more need be said here, as it is apparent that there

is no substitute for these 34 years of relationships and experience.

Contradiction of the Patriot Act:

The Sheriffs of our Nation applaud your courage and leadership in passing the

Patriot Act. But we are confused by the OMB proposal, since it seems to repeal sections of the Patriot Act even before some of those provisions have been implemented. For example, the OMB proposal seems to re-write Sections 1005 and 1014,

which direct the Attorney General, not FEMA, to make grant to Sheriffs for first

responders, terrorism prevention and anti-terrorism training.

Law Enforcement Responds to a Deadly Threat, Not FEMA Agencies:

Look at the record of terrorist attacks around the globe. Terrorists attack with

automatic weapons, bombs, and often take hostages. Side-by-side with Federal law

enforcement, we will face the terrorists, most probably with deadly weapons. We

will never ask nor can we expect our Fire, EMS or Health personnel to face gunfire,

explosives or other deadly assaults. That is the job of police and sheriffs, and it is

ours alone. Once the threat has been addressed and public safety has been restored,

only then it is possible to turn over the scene to the FEMA agencies. To do anything

else would be contrary to a Sheriff’s oath of office and contrary to the laws of the

States. To subordinate our crisis response to FEMA would compromise the statutory

obligation of law enforcement officials to protect their communities. Mr. Chairman,

we are grateful that your committee has rightly acknowledged that this is the reality of both policy and practices across the Nation.

52

1 House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime. ‘‘Amended Views and Estimates’’ 2 January 2001 United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan

‘‘The Committee is concerned that FEMA is not the appropriate agency for

these responsibilities. A terrorist attack is a criminal event, not a natural disaster.’’ 1

FEMA Role is Limited to Consequences Management:

The prevention, detection and apprehension of terrorists are law enforcement

functions, and it is not appropriate for training and coordination to be assigned to

the FEMA regime, where there are no such responsibilities. If there were to be is

another terrorist attack, responding to the immediate crisis would be a law enforcement responsibility. Sheriffs and Chiefs of Police are shocked that OMB would propose that FEMA should assume responsibility in these areas, where there is neither

experience nor legal authority to act. Perhaps most confusing is the contradiction

of the January 2001 United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism

Concept of Operations Plan, known as the CONPLAN, which states:

‘‘Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement function and includes

measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident,

a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations,

forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support missions, such as

agent identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and

limited decontamination. In addition to the traditional law enforcement missions, crisis management also includes assurance of public health and safety.’’ 2

Contradiction of Presidential Decision Directives:

Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62 and 63 direct the Attorney General, not

FEMA, to assume lead responsibility for the Federal Government. It is the U.S. Department of Justice, and not FEMA, that serves as the central agency in a crisis.

This is what our local laws now reflect and this is how our personnel have been

trained. The Nation’s Sheriffs and Police have established operational agreements

with ODP and the FBI at the Department of Justice, and we should not be asked

to scrap all of our policies, plans, and agreements so that we can work under the

authority of an agency that has no law enforcement role.

Disruption of Current Programs Threatens the Public:

Last year, the House raised the funding for the ODP from $250 Million to $650

Million, and we are now engaged in the planning for allocation of these funds to

law enforcement. Just as we are launching these new programs, OMB would have

us terminate the effort and move everything over to FEMA. The disruption that

such a shift would cause is nothing less than catastrophic at a time when the safety

of the American people is at risk. As elected Sheriffs sworn to protect the public,

we cannot support a recommendation that may cause enormous disruption and a

potential hiatus during this period of unprecedented threats to pubic safety in

America.

Department of Justice Should be Commended:

The National Sheriffs’ Association believes that Congress should commend the Attorney General, the FBI and ODP for a job well done, and not consider the transfer

of their duties to agencies that lack the experience, training and authority to get

the job done. As directed by Congress, the Department of Justice has worked with

all 50 states on preparedness plans, and I am advised that 44 have been received.

Relying upon decades of experience with review and approval of such State plans,

ODP has already approved 40 of these State Strategy documents. I asked the Department of Justice to provide me with a listing of what they have done to assist

law enforcement and first responders, and I am pleased to submit these figures for

the record.

53

1 House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime. ‘‘Amended Views and Estimates’’

CONCLUSIONS:

For all the reasons set forth here, the National Sheriffs’ Association commends

the Committee for your position that these functions must remain at the Department of Justice.

‘‘The Department of Justice is clearly authorized to provide grants to states and

locals for crisis and consequence management training, equipment and technical

assistance. FEMA does not appear to have the same authorization. More importantly, FEMA is not in the business of crisis management and the Department

of Justice is. Because of the primacy of crisis management, the Department of

Justice has been designated the lead agency in establishing a single entity to

oversee both crisis and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack.’’ 1

At this time of national crisis, Sheriffs want to support the efforts of the President

and Governor Ridge. However, we cannot support the OMB recommendation to remove the Office of Domestic Preparedness from the U.S. Department of Justice and

transfer this function to FEMA. While this plan may appear to serve the interests

54

1 House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime. ‘‘Amended Views and Estimates’’

of efficiency, it fails to recognize the reality of law enforcement responsibilities at

the time of a terrorist attack. This sort of forced consolidation can only lead to confusion, and that is not what our Nation needs right now.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by offering my assurance that the National Sheriffs’ Association strongly endorses the words of your Committee,

‘‘A case has neither been made for the current proposed transfer of the Office

of Domestic Preparedness nor for the prior transfer of the National Domestic

Preparedness Office. Accordingly, the Committee believes it would be appropriate to direct the $3.5 billion to the Department of Justice for coordination,

training, technical assistance and equipment for state and local first responders.’’ 1

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Ekstrand.

STATEMENT OF LAURIE EKSTRAND, DIRECTOR, JUSTICE

ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. EKSTRAND. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman and Members of

the Subcommittee, as you know, during the last 5 years, GAO has

reported on a number of programs run by OJP bureaus and offices.

One overarching theme over these reviews is the need for improvement in monitoring and evaluating their grant programs.

Monitoring and evaluation identify whether programs are operating as intended, whether they are reaching those who should be

served, and ultimately whether they are making a difference in the

fight against crime and delinquency, and these are major elements

of assessing results. Our recent work has focused on the Bureau of

Justice Assistance, the Violence Against Women Office, the Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Executive Office of Weed and Seed, and the Drug Court program.

Let me start by discussing our findings concerning monitoring.

Site visits, phone contacts, and reviews of grantee progress reports

are all examples of the kinds of monitoring activities that are intended to ensure that grants are spent as they are supposed to be.

Since 1996, we have testified and reported on grant monitoring

problems in some of OJP’s bureaus. Most recently, we reported that

grant files for discretionary awards granted by OJJDP, VAWO, and

under BJA’s Byrne program did not always contain required documentation of monitoring activities. As a result, neither OJP,

OJJDP, VAWO, BJA, nor we were able to determine what level of

monitoring had occurred.

These are problems similar to those we identified in 1996 testimony on OJJDP and in a 1999 report on the Weed and Seed program. OJP itself has identified similar problems, and the DOJ Inspector General has recently declared OJP grant management a

major management challenge.

Now let me turn to impact evaluations. These are studies that

are intended to assess the impact of a program compared to what

might have happened—had the program never existed. They are

not easy to design and carry out, but they are vital to determining

whether a program works or not.

At the request of Senators Sessions and Grassley, we recently reviewed the soundness of the sole Byrne grant impact evaluation

and three VAWO impact evaluations that were undertaken since

1995. We found the Byrne evaluation to be well designed and imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.001 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
55

plemented. However, all three VAWO impact evaluations suffer

from major sampling and design problems that compromise their

ability to provide definitive results. Data collection and analytic

problems were also evident. We are releasing this report today in

conjunction with this hearing.

We also recently reported on the soundness of ten impact evaluations of OJJDP funded programs. Of the five that had passed the

early stages, two had design issues and three had experienced data

collection problems that could also compromise the validity of their

findings.

Finally, our preliminary review of an effort to design a national

impact evaluation to assess the effectiveness of Drug Court programs is showing that that effort has not yielded its intended evaluation plan. A new national impact evaluation effort for Drug

Courts is planned, but it is unlikely that it will provide the needed

information on results until 2007.

OJP is a $4 billion operation. We have not reviewed all of OJP’s

program areas, but our work to date raises serious questions about

the quantity and the quality of information OJP has available to

gauge results. In relation to monitoring and evaluation, OJP has

plans to reorganize and to develop a new management information

system and cites these as the foundation for positive changes in

grants management. Reorganization and information systems are

only tools and they are only as good as the management that

wields them. Commitment to improvement and oversight is needed

to ensure progress.

Chairman Smith, we are looking forward to starting work on a

broad review of the National Institute of Justice’s impact evaluations as you have requested as part of your oversight. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Ekstrand.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ekstrand follows:]

56

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURIE E. EKSTRAND

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Mr. SMITH. Judge Mitchell.

STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MITCHELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT

JUDGES, RENO, NV

Judge MITCHELL. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Scott, and

Members of the Subcommittee, the National Council of Juvenile

and Family Court Judges appreciates the opportunity to testify at

your request on the proposed reorganization of the Justice Department’s Office of Justice Programs.

The National Council addressed this issue in the past at the request of the Subcommittee and will respond in the future to assist

71

the Committee in its review of this topic. The subject of the reorganization and the impact we anticipate it having on the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the programs administered by OJJDP, and the juvenile and family courts of the nation

makes us anxious to discuss this matter.

My name is David B. Mitchell. To my rear and with me today

is Judge Ernestine Gray, the Chief Judge of the Juvenile Court in

Orleans Parish in New Orleans, Louisiana. Judge Gray is President of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,

the nation’s oldest and largest voluntary organization of judges. I

am the Executive Director of the National Council. I assumed that

position on January 3, 2002, after serving 17 years in the State of

Maryland as a trial judge on a court of general jurisdiction.

I appreciate the need for organization and elimination of duplicative efforts that prove ineffective and wasteful and waste precious

public resources. I came from the private sector to the court and

now return to that venue. Those experiences make me quite conscious of duplication, lack of efficiency, the customer, and above all,

the bottom line.

The National Council does not take a position on the need to reorganize OJP relative to the questions of line of authority or Presidential appointments or the process of centralization of the process

of management. We certainly are sympathetic to the espoused

goals.

I struggle with the notion of what I could say today to convey the

concerns of juvenile court judges with the concept of reorganization

of OJP and why it sends shock waves through us. The juvenile

court in your districts represents an entire court system whose jurisdiction encompasses so much more than criminal acts by children, yet that limited work of the court appears as the only concept

of what we do.

Judges in juvenile court address challenging determinations of

whether a child is dependent because of the acts of his caretaker,

the issues of abuse and neglect. We determine whether this child

should be placed back with that caretaker, a relative, or into the

foster care system because of abuse or neglect. Difficult decisions

such as determination of parental rights are daily experiences of

juvenile court judges. We decide adoptions and emergency medical

procedures for children.

The work of the court is not limited to criminal behavior. We

work with children to prevent them becoming disaffected, sullen,

and angry because of violence perpetrated upon them. Young people who commit violent acts today too often trace the origin of that

anger toward society back to their experiences as abused children.

Each judge faces children whose life facts shock the conscience. We

see children, as I did, where visitation arrangements for the incarcerated child and parents involved producing all in guard under

court because all were in custody.

I am not confident that the Bureau of Justice Statistics or any

other entity that we are discussing today will devote its energy to

research and analysis of children justice matters, that is juvenile

justice matters, in competition with the need to focus on crime by

adults. Crime will rule the day and consideration of justice for chilVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.001 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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dren, juveniles, will receive short shrift. It has always been that

way. It will not change despite assurances to the contrary.

It is true today as it was under LEAA in the 1960’s that the

horse that eats all the oats in the barn is the criminal justice system. Juvenile justice matters are not as important in the minds of

many as the latest information on what criminals do and why they

do it.

We implore you to leave OJJDP inviolate in this process because

juvenile justice, justice for children, is so much more than adult

criminal behavior. The analysis and treatment of children must receive support from this body and not be carved up in the name of

efficiency.

We submitted more lengthy remarks, which I request at this

time be inserted into the record, and thank you, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Judge Mitchell. Without objection, both

the complete testimony of yourself and the other witnesses will be

inserted into the record, as well as the resolution that Sheriff

Bittick mentioned in his testimony, as well.

Judge MITCHELL. We appreciate that.

[The prepared statement of Judge Mitchell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MITCHELL

CHAIRMAN SMITH, MR. SCOTT, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, THE

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES (‘‘NATIONAL COUNCIL’’) IS PLEASED TO TESTIFY TODAY ON THE PROPOSED

REORGANIZATION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S OFFICE OF JUSTICE

PROGRAMS (‘‘OJP’’).

MY NAME IS DAVID MITCHELL. I AM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES. FOR 17

YEARS, PRIOR TO JOINING THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, I WAS A JUDGE IN THE BALTIMORE CITY CIRCUIT COURT, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND. I SERVED AS THE JUDGE-IN-CHARGE OF THE COURT’S

JUVENILE DIVISION FROM 1984 TO 1995.

ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, I THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE EFFECT THAT THIS

REORGANIZATION WOULD HAVE ON OJP AND ITS PROGRAM OFFICES, INCLUDING THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (‘‘OJJDP’’).

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IS THE LARGEST ORGANIZATION OF JUDGES

THAT DEALS WITH JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FAMILY VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, AND CHILD SUPPORT.

OUR MEMBERS COME FROM 49 STATES, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

AND SEVERAL TERRITORIES.

FROM THE FOUNDING OF NCJFCJ IN 1937, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL

ASSISTANCE HAVE BEEN AMONG THE ORGANIZATION’S MOST IMPORTANT

MISSIONS. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IS THE ONLY ORGANIZATION THAT

PROVIDES THE VAST ARRAY OF TRAINING PROGRAMS NEEDED BY JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES AND EMPLOYEES OF THEIR RELATED

ORGANIZATIONS. NO SINGLE STATE IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THIS

TRAINING. IN A TYPICAL YEAR, TRAINING SPONSORED, CO-SPONSORED

OR ASSISTED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IS PROVIDED TO MORE THAN

20,000 INDIVIDUALS. MANY OF OUR OVER 150 TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE

ASSISTED BY FEDERAL GRANT FUNDING.

OVER 100 YEARS AGO, THE FIRST JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT WAS

ESTABLISHED IN RECOGNITION THAT THE REALM OF CRIME AND CRIMINALS IS A WORLD APART FROM THAT OF DELINQUENCY AND CHILDREN.

WHILE THE LINES BETWEEN THESE WORLDS HAVE BEGUN TO BLUR IN

THE LAST DECADE, ALL OF THE REFORMS THAT HAVE PASSED IN THE

STATES TO EXPAND THE JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS OVER JUVENILES HAVE AFFECTED LESS THAN 3% OF THE WORKLOAD OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE STILL 1.7

MILLION COURT CASES REMAINING IN THAT SYSTEM, PLUS A HUGE AND

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GROWING WORKLOAD OF ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN, A POPULATION THAT THOSE CONCERNED WITH CRIME AND CRIMINALS SELDOM,

IF EVER, ADDRESS.

THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM OFTEN PRESENTS SOCIETY WITH ITS

LAST MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO TURN A JUVENILE AWAY FROM A

CAREER OF CRIME. IT IS FOR THAT OVERARCHING REASON THAT THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM DIFFERS FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

IN ITS MISSION AND APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE JUVENILES THAT

COME WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION.

IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH ITS MISSION, THE JUVENILE AND FAMILY

COURTS OF THE NATION DIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE NATIONAL COUNCIL DEPEND ON THE FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WITH FUNDS APPROPRIATED BY YOU

AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. THIS ASSISTANCE HAS ENABLED

US TO MAKE IMMEASURABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LAST DECADE

DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF OUR NATION’S CHILDREN AND FAMILIES. WE AND OUR CONSTITUENTS ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR THIS ASSISTANCE.

THE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATED

BY CONGRESS HAVE TO CONTINUE TO BE REASONED, TARGETED, MONITORED AND EVALUATED. TO DO SO, THE PERSONS STRUCTURING, MONITORING, AND EVALUATING THESE PROGRAMS MUST BE COMPLETELY

CONVERSANT WITH THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE THAT UNDERLIES THE

RATIONALE AND STRUCTURE OF JUVENILE AND NOT CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

THE CONTINUING AND GROWING NEED FOR THIS ASSISTANCE SHAPES

MY TESTIMONY TODAY. WHILE THE NATIONAL COUNCIL SUPPORTS THE

OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE REORGANIZATION, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

HAS DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF OJP ON ITS PROGRAM OFFICES.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAS FOLLOWED THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND BELIEVE THAT IN ITS CURRENT FORM IT

WILL SERIOUSLY ERODE THE FOCUS ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY ISSUES

MANDATED BY THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

ACT OF 1974 AND OTHER ACTS THAT HAVE A SPECIFIC PROGRAM EMPHASIS. UNDER THE REORGANIZATION, VITAL EXPERTISE AND FOCUS WILL

BE LOST, AND THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THAT IS BEING PROVIDED

TODAY WILL BE GREATLY ERODED.

OUR MEMBERS HAVE GAINED SUBSTANTIAL VALUE FROM THE CURRENT INTEGRATION OF SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTIONS WITHIN OJJDP INCLUDING BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH; STATISTICS; PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT; TESTING AND DEMONSTRATION; EVALUATION; TRAINING;

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE; AND REPLICATION AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION. IT IS NOT EFFICIENT FOR US TO HAVE TO GO TO THREE (OR

MORE) OJP OFFICES IN THE FUTURE WHEN WE ARE ABLE TO ACCESS

THE FULL RANGE OF SERVICES FROM ONE OFFICE NOW.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE THAT EXISTS WITHIN OJP TODAY

WAS CREATED BECAUSE CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THAT IMPORTANT

ISSUES LIKE JUVENILE CRIME, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND VICTIMS

RIGHTS WERE NOT RECEIVING THE PRIORITY AND ATTENTION THEY

MERITED. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE WAS TO CREATE SPECIALIZED

OFFICES WITHIN THE LARGER AGENCY, STAFFED BY PROGRAM EXPERTS

AND HEADED BY PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES TO PROVIDE ACCOUNTABILITY AND VISIBILITY.

IT IS BECAUSE THE REORGANIZATION PLAN DIVIDES THE AGENCY BY

FUNCTIONS RATHER THAN BY PROGRAM SUBJECT MATTER THAT THERE

WILL BE DILUTED EMPHASIS ON CRITICAL SPECIALIZED SUBJECT AREAS

LIKE JUVENILE JUSTICE. TO THE EXTENT DUPLICATION IN PROGRAMS IS

OF CONCERN, DUPLICATION CAN BE SOLVED IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE

AREA BY TRANSFERRING THE DUPLICATIVE PROGRAMS TO THE OJJDP

WHERE THE JUVENILE JUSTICE EXPERTISE CURRENTLY RESIDES.

IN CONCLUSION, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY

COURT JUDGES HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION,

TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, OR STATISTICS TO ANY OTHER

OFFICE OR BUREAU OUTSIDE OJJDP. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A TRANSFER WOULD BE:

74

• LESS EFFICIENT FOR PRACTITIONERS SEEKING FEDERAL SERVICES

AND FUNDING;

• LESS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING EMPHASIS AND EXISTING

FUNDING FOR SPECIALIZED SUBJECT MATTERS LIKE JUVENILE

CRIME, CHILD ABUSE, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE;

ANY PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF OJP NEEDS THOROUGH STUDY IN

THE HOUSE AND SENATE AUTHORIZING COMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEES BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS TAKEN. AT YOUR REQUEST, WE ARE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR

APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE.

Mr. SMITH. May I ask you all if you can give very brief responses

to my questions just so we can get through as many questions as

possible, and Mr. Muhlhausen, let me begin with you.

First of all, I want to ask you what you think the essential elements are of a credible evaluation and whether those elements

were in the evaluations that were made, for example, by the University of Nebraska, by the Heritage Foundation, and by the Thurmond Study, as well.

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. All right. I believe that some of the essential

elements, the best studies include a random assignment of the

treatment groups and the control groups. Unfortunately, the COPS

office, after 7 years, failed to set up a study to evaluate its own effectiveness, even though Congress did instruct the Department of

Justice to evaluate the program in the 1994 crime bill. In that case,

we cannot do a random assignment. You have to take cases where

money flowed to different areas and control for various factors that

account. You need to build in proper controls.

For instance, the Heritage study controlled for the efforts of

State and local law enforcement agencies and accounts for socioeconomic factors that changed during the COPS office’s first four

to 5 years, while the University of Nebraska study did not control

for efforts of State and local officers and it just assumed that Federal funding only fights crime.

And also, the socio-economic data was held constant. Most of the

data was held constant in 1990. For instance, throughout the country, the minority population has grown from 24 percent to 28 percent from 1990 to 1999 and the University of Nebraska report fails

to account for this.

Mr. SMITH. What do you think that OJP should require of the

grant recipients in order to be able to evaluate the programs?

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. It should require grant recipients to—and

these are major grant recipients—to evaluate their own programs.

First, when they apply for funding, if it’s a juvenile prevention program, they should have some system set up in place before the program is started that they know how they are going to evaluate the

program. They should look at kids who receive the treatment and

compare them to kids who did not, and if they cannot do random

assignment, they need to control for several factors that could influence the child’s recidivism, and when the evaluation is over, it

needs to be submitted to Congress and that data needs to be available for other people to scrutinize.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Muhlhausen.

Sheriff Bittick, you mentioned in your written testimony, I believe in your oral testimony, as well, that you thought it was a disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.001 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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ruption to move the Office of Domestic Preparedness to FEMA, but

would you elaborate just briefly on that?

Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. One of my concerns, one of our concerns

here is that the money, if we move that money now at this time,

that some—there’s a myriad of things that could happen here.

FEMA has historically had little or no relationship with law enforcement and our concern is that FEMA is response oriented and

that if the money is moved now, law enforcement is concerned with

prevention and detection and FEMA has and is responsive to—not

responsive to law enforcement in the past.

I can just think of a recent incident in Georgia with the

crematoriums, where we’ve requested assistance from FEMA and

not been able to get that assistance, and so we’ve got some concerns with how FEMA reacts to us.

Mr. SMITH. Sheriff Bittick, another question is that you have,

and your department have been connected to a number of grant

programs. What kind of evaluation has OJP made of the grant programs that you’re involved with?

Mr. BITTICK. I can think of one circumstance just right off the

top of my head, Mr. Chairman, where we’ve been required to do a

domestic preparedness plan, a State—each State has been required

to do a domestic preparedness plan, and with that plan, what’s

happened is the Georgia emergency management unit has worked

with the local emergency management directors like myself and the

sheriffs and we’ve each prepared a plan which has been thorough

and comprehensive to turn into the State and they’ve done a State

plan, and I think some 44 of those plans have been done.

I personally have also received grant funding from the Byrne

grant money and those grants are regularly evaluated by the Georgia Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Ekstrand, my time is up. I have a number of questions for

you and a few for Judge Mitchell, as well, but I’ll save them for

the next round and yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott,

for his questions.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Muhlhausen, you mentioned the COPS program. Do you

know anything about the study of Project EXILE and whether or

not that has been effective in reducing crime?

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. I have not read any specific evaluations,

though I do believe that it’s a program that should be evaluated

before funding of it expanded across the country.

Mr. SCOTT. Sheriff Bittick, what experience do you know that

FEMA has in law enforcement issues like training, arrest procedures, and things like that?

Mr. BITTICK. I know of very little experience that FEMA has

with law enforcement issues. They generally work with emergency

management personnel, such as fire fighters or ambulance persons,

people.

Mr. SCOTT. Would that be a problem in moving the functions to

FEMA?

Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. Obviously, this relationship that we’ve got

with Justice is built on the fact that you have law enforcement people dealing with law enforcement people.

76

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Ms. Ekstrand, you mentioned the difference

between monitoring evaluations to see if they are spending the

money the way they said they were going to spend the money and

impact evaluation, did the program make a difference. What kind

of evaluations are you aware of about criminal justice initiatives

like mandatory minimums, increasing sentences that may go from

20 years up, like the three strikes and you’re out kind of things?

Do you know of any evaluations of those kinds of initiatives, the

sentencing, incarceration initiatives, as opposed to programs that

would prevent crime before they occur?

Ms. EKSTRAND. There have been some evaluations, but we have

not reviewed them.

Mr. SCOTT. Of what?

Ms. EKSTRAND. There have been some evaluations looking at

mandatory minimum sentences and trying to assess the relationship between mandatory minimums and other more severe sentencing strategies and crime rates. It’s very, very difficult to do

that kind of assessment because there are so many other factors

in the environment that can affect crime rates—age cohorts, layoffs, booming economy, all kinds of different measures that could

also have an impact. So they’re very difficult to do.

Mr. SCOTT. The ones that have been—and you said you haven’t

reviewed the ones that have——

Ms. EKSTRAND. We have not reviewed the studies in that area.

Mr. SCOTT. Would this be part of the evaluation if we did more

impact evaluation?

Ms. EKSTRAND. We intend to look at a broad picture of what the

National Institute of Justice is doing in relation to impact evaluation. We’re anticipating that they would have funded some studies

along those lines and so they would be potentially included in this

new work.

Mr. SCOTT. Judge Mitchell, what OJP programs were you aware

of when you were a State court judge, or were you aware of any?

Judge MITCHELL. Well, that’s a difficult question to answer because I was a member of the Board of Trustees of the National

Council for 7 years while I was a State trial court judge. I was,

therefore, very much aware of a number of the Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention programs as it affected the organization of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court

Judges.

Mr. SCOTT. And were any of those programs evaluated to determine which ones worked and which ones didn’t?

Judge MITCHELL. I was not aware of that procedure then. I’m becoming aware now that there, of course, is a requirement for evaluation for our programs. We welcome that process, I want to say

that clearly for the record, and there have been some evaluations

of the work that we have done. We also would welcome any constructive comments——

Mr. SCOTT. But what is the status of those—tell us a little bit

about those evaluations, which programs came out well, which

didn’t, what elements there may be of good programs.

Judge MITCHELL. I cannot give you that information at this time,

but I will be more than happy to supply that to you.

77

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Can somebody, if we set 10 percent aside for

evaluations, can somebody say what we should use that money for?

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Congressman Scott, I think the money should

be used to examine the major programs that the Office of Justice

Programs funds. For instance, we need to know more about what

prevents delinquency. Frequently in the research, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention sponsored a book-length

report and looked at 56 evaluations of various delinquency prevention programs, and of those 56 evaluations, only nine looked at

whether or not official acts of crime were actually prevented. Other

measures were whether or not the teachers thought the person behaved better.

It’s more important to find out if future acts of crime were prevented than somebody’s opinion, because I think we need to make

sure that the evaluations are done right, and then once you find

out when something works, then you can replicate it on a larger

scale.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller, is recognized for his

questions.

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sheriff, let me start with you. I know the gist of your testimony

was not to shift the Office of Domestic Preparedness from Justice

to FEMA, but let me ask you a line of questions on another subject.

Do you receive back in Georgia, any funding from the COPS program?

Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. I don’t personally, but—and I can explain

why, but other agencies do.

Mr. KELLER. Tell me why you don’t personally.

Mr. BITTICK. There’s a matching grant requirement that comes

along with the COPS funding——

Mr. KELLER. Right.

Mr. BITTICK [continuing]. And my commissioners have been reluctant to participate in the matching grant.

Mr. KELLER. So when the—in other words, when the funding

runs out after 3 years, you would have that obligation to pick up

their salaries and you all don’t know if you have the money to do

that?

Mr. BITTICK. And they’ve been reluctant for some reason over the

years too.

Mr. KELLER. Do you know how your fellow sheriffs and chiefs of

police think about the COPS program?

Mr. BITTICK. I know that there have been a lot of participation

Statewide in the COPS program and there have been a lot of officers that have been added to the street because of the COPS program.

Mr. KELLER. What do you think of the program? Think it’s a

good program or a program——

Mr. BITTICK. Yes, sir. I think it’s been an excellent program for

putting law enforcement officers on the street. Obviously, if you’ve

got four corners of a street and there are cops on three of those

four corners, the crime is not going to be committed on those three

corners.

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Mr. KELLER. Okay. Mr. Muhlhausen, let me ask you, and I’m a

big fan of The Heritage Foundation, let me just say that, and I appreciate all the good work you all do, but I see a kind of a split

in opinion between what you all think of the effectiveness of the

COPS program and what the sheriffs and chiefs of police back in

Orlando, Florida, think about it. They think the world of it.

They think it’s a good program, and I think the gist of your report is while there’s as lot of folks that think that, you think that

reduction in crime rate may not necessarily be due to the additional cops. Some folks think that the reduction in crime rate is

due to additional cops. Other experts think it’s due to the economy

being stronger, so there’s less crime, and still others think there’s

been a decline in crack cocaine-related crimes and that resulted in

the reduced crime rate since 1994. What do you attribute the decrease in the crime rate since 1994 to?

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Well, I can assure you that it had little to do

with the COPS program. I do believe that the economy helped and

other factors going on. But one of the most important things I

think we need to recognize as distinguishing what types of policies

work, it is more important what the officer does than whether or

not he’s funded from Washington, D.C. I think that targeting crime

hot spots is effective.

The National Institute of Justice has recently sponsored some

evaluations of problem oriented policing in Jersey City and Boston

and these programs, the officers went in, identified problems going

on. They attacked the problem, went after it, and crime went down.

It is more important what the officers do with their time than how

many you hire. It’s deployment versus numbers.

Mr. KELLER. You’re familiar with the broken windows theory—— Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. KELLER [continuing]. That Professor Wilson and others, that

Rudy Giuliani kind of employed that practice in—along with they

had a police department there—that they put a significant amount

of police officers in a crime hot spot and crime went down. But if

you wouldn’t have the officers in the first place, you couldn’t put

them in that hot spot, right?

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Well, it is a fundamental role of State and

local governments to fill this position—— Mr. KELLER. Sure.

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN [continuing]. And I think that what happened

with the COPS program, a lot of the money was used for supplanting. For instance, the process evaluation of the program by

National Institute of Justice says that, at most, 57,000 officers

were hired. That’s the most optimistic example. It’s well under the

100,000 goal that it was supposed to reach.

Mr. KELLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Keller.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized for his

questions.

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. Mitchell, or Judge Mitchell, I wanted to thank you for your

testimony today and for being here. I really feel that you have the

most important job there is in the court system and it’s one that

is not often recognized. You’ve got one of the most difficult one, and

79

both in the dependency area and in delinquency area, and probably

the decisions you make in the dependency area are even more difficult than the delinquency area.

I wanted to ask you about your testimony. I certainly concur, I

think, with the sentiment of the Subcommittee that each of the

programs ought to be rigorously assessed, and indeed, I offered an

amendment last year to the Justice Department bill that required

grant applications to have an assessment device in it and that became part of the Justice Department bill. But I’m still not sure

that I get the gist of the concern over the reorganization. Certainly,

on the surface, having an office devoted to a particular area with

its own director with a certain status connotes a priority in that

area, yet there are, it seems to me, great inefficiencies in the way

the DOJ grant process works now.

For one thing, I frequently have communities asking what funding opportunities there are, whether it is the juvenile courts or

whether it is probation departments or local community-based organizations and they are scatted throughout Justice. They are actually scattered throughout many other departments, as well. And

just even finding out what grant opportunities are out there is a

hurdle and there does seem to be duplication of effort, and even

worse, the left hand not always knowing what the right hand is

doing or working on.

Is there a way that these inefficiencies can be attacked and yet

preserving the real priority on juvenile justice and juvenile dependency issues?

Judge MITCHELL. I believe there is. I believe the National Council supports that process. We want communities to know what is

available and what are opportunities to combat crime in their communities as well as improve the system of delivery of service within

the juvenile justice process.

Duplication is something we all abhor, as well as waste, and we

ought to continually examine our procedures as well as the process

of the Office of Juvenile Justice or any OJP process to determine

where there are efficiencies that we can import. We do not oppose

that process. We speak to the phrase of remaining inviolate for the

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. We are not

saying, leave it as it is and don’t touch it ever. There are efficiencies that obviously can be implemented and should be. We don’t

oppose that.

What we are—our point is that when you deal with, for example,

statistical gathering and analysis, it goes beyond crime issues to

also deal with the issue of the impact of violence within the family

upon children and it deals with the issues of the effectiveness of

child abuse programs that we implement in terms of being able to

improve outcomes, improve results, and save money in the long

run, as well as deal with saving the lives of those children.

We support those kinds of efforts, of the core issues of research,

development, training of judges, which is supported by the Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Training of other

professionals should remain within the ambit of the Office of Juvenile Justice as opposed to being scattered throughout the Department in other areas.

80

Mr. SCHIFF. Is there a potential problem, though, even in areas

of research or statistics where you might have the office focused on

juvenile justice issues pursuing research along the lines of recidivism among early offenders, and then you have another research

project going on in another part of Justice that focuses on violent

offenders and some of the causes of their violent behavior and the

one is not aware of the work the other is doing. They both come

back to a common conclusion, potentially, or worse, you don’t find

a common conclusion because they’re being undertaken separate

parts of Justice and not coordinating with each other.

Judge MITCHELL. We certainly support a concept of communication and coordination. We do not support a concept of the elimination of the research and statistical analysis capability within

OJJDP, transfer it to other entities within the Office of Justice Programs. There is no reason why the left hand should not know what

the right hand is doing. That seems like a management issue. That

seems like an internal organizational structure process, and it

seems like there should be some level of coordination of the gathering of the information, the dissemination of that information,

even the analysis of that information. There is no—I just don’t see

it possible to have a justifiable excuse for not being in a position

to discuss the issues at the time of the development of the script,

the plan, as well as the preparation of the report.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Schiff, are you finished? Do you want to squeeze

in one more question? I couldn’t tell if you were finished or not.

Mr. SCHIFF. No. The red light is on. I appreciate your——

Mr. SMITH. All right. Thank you, Mr. Schiff.

Let me recognize myself for questions, and Ms. Ekstrand, first,

I want to say we appreciate what the GAO does. You’re sort of an

objective official calling it as you see it, which is always helpful to

Congress.

You have evaluated a number of discretionary grant programs,

and what I would like to do is read you five of them and ask you

to grade them for me, if you will. These are the Bureau of Justice

Assistance, Violence Against Women, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, Executive Office of Weed and Seed, and

Drug Courts program offices. If you can, just very briefly say why

you are grading them high or low. Are you comfortable with doing

that, or——

Ms. EKSTRAND. Not very, but——

Mr. SMITH. Well, I shouldn’t have given you that as a matter of

fact. [Laughter.]

Ms. EKSTRAND. First, let me say that we have only looked at part

of the role of the grants management and not the whole picture,

but in terms of monitoring——

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Ms. EKSTRAND [continuing]. We probably would give a poor grade

to all of these except the Executive Office of Weed and Seed and

we’d ask for maybe a pass on that one since we looked at them in

1999. They have indicated that they’ve made some changes for improvement and we have not been back to visit them. But the first

three, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Violence Against

Women Office, and OJJDP, we have looked at very recently, and

81

as we just indicated, have found some fairly substantial problems

in relation to—— Mr. SMITH. That’s why you give them a poor rating, okay. Just

the answer I was looking for. Thank you for saying that.

In regard to the evaluation methods used by OJP, at least in the

past, what do they leave to be desired?

Ms. EKSTRAND. We found in many cases it didn’t look like

enough up-front planning had been done in terms of how to collect

the data. In some cases, for example, there was a plan to collect

data from schools and local law enforcement, but when it came

time to do that, all of those plans fell through, which perhaps indicates that they weren’t solid enough to start with.

But a major problem, and Mr. Muhlhausen alluded to it, as well,

is that many of these studies are designed with a lack of any kind

of comparison base, and without that, we can’t really ferret out

what the program contributed to any change versus what all the

other things in the environment might have contributed to change.

Mr. SMITH. So not good methodology, among other things.

Ms. EKSTRAND. Methodology is weak.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Good. What do you think that we should be requiring from grant recipients in the way of data or information

that would help us evaluate those programs?

Ms. EKSTRAND. It’s difficult to make a blanket statement because

so many of the grant programs are so different, but right now in

the monitoring reports, a lot of what gets reported is in narrative

and it’s very hard to roll that up to say anything across programs.

It does seem like asking them for basic output and outcome information would be a good step in the right direction. At least having

very basic information about what they’re accomplishing would

help.

Mr. SMITH. Do you feel that sometimes the OJP skews the results of their evaluations just to justify the continuation of those

programs?

Ms. EKSTRAND. I honestly don’t think that we found any evidence

of that. In fact, if anything, we might say that they had rather

loose controls over their grantees, their research grantees.

Mr. SMITH. You just released, what, today or yesterday, a new

GAO report on Justice impact evaluations. One Byrne evaluation

was rigorous, all reviewed, Violence Against Women Office evaluations were problematic. Maybe that says it all. Anything you want

to add to that title?

Ms. EKSTRAND. Only that the problems were, you know, just as

we talked about, lack of control group, poor data collection and

analysis, you know, the one Byrne evaluation was very solid, but

I would point out that there was only one impact evaluation for a

very large program.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Ekstrand.

Judge Mitchell, a couple of questions for you. You mentioned you

had concerns about the reorganization proposal. Were you referring

to the past reorganization proposal of a year or two ago or were you

referring to the current Administration’s proposal?

Judge MITCHELL. The current Administration proposal.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. But that hasn’t been completely released yet,

so you haven’t seen all the details, have you?

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Judge MITCHELL. No, we have not, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. So we’ll hopefully evaluate that and maybe

that’ll reflect some of the recommendations that you and others

have made.

Judge MITCHELL. We would look at that and make comments at

that time.

Mr. SMITH. I assume that you do feel, though, that all grant programs need to be assessed, need to be evaluated, and need to be

looked at in the light of whether they’re effective and whether the

taxpayers are getting their money’s worth?

Judge MITCHELL. Absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. I don’t have any

other questions.

Mr. Scott, do you have any other questions?

Mr. SCOTT. No, thank you.

Mr. SMITH. If not, then thank you all for your testimony. It’s

been very, very helpful and we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(83)

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS:

WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE

THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in Room

2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. SMITH. I think we are going to start. The Subcommittee on

Crime will come to order. It is, of course, that the Ranking Member

Mr. Scott is not here. He is actually on his way. We expect him to

be here in 5 minutes, and with his agreement, I am going to go on

and make my opening statement and then wait for his arrival.

I will have to confess to you all that part of this is an effort to

allow Members, which, I guess, means Mr. Scott and me, to get on

an airplane before too much longer this afternoon. But because the

House has already adjourned for the day, that is why unfortunately

we are probably going to have a pretty sparse attendance by other

Members.

But let me recognize myself for purposes of an opening statement. Today the Crime Subcommittee holds its third in a series of

oversight hearings to look at the administration of law enforcement

grants by the Office of Justice programs, OJP, especially grants to

State and local agencies that resulted in mismanagement or have

been used for questionable purposes. Of particular interest to the

Subcommittee are grants under the local law enforcement block

grant program and the burn formula grant program administered

by the Office of Justice programs.

Another major grant program we will examine today is the Community Oriented Policing Services, or COPS program. This program was established during the Clinton Administration with a

stated goal of putting 100,000 new police officers on the street by

fiscal year 2000. The COPS office is a separate entity within the

Justice Department and administers its grants apart from OJP.

According to the Congressional research service, the COPS pro- gram has been awarded more than $8 billion since 1992. As we will

hear, the expenditure of billions of tax dollars for the COPS program has had mixed results. The COPS program has encouraged

community policing by increasing officer levels, but it is not come

without controversy.

There are questions about the actual number of COPS funded positions that have been added by local police departments. This

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points to two major problems with the COPS program: The failure

of local governments to hire new officers instead of using the Federal funds to pay for officers previously funded locally; and the failure to retain COPS-funded officers and redeploy officers on to the

street. More troublesome than the low retention rates of COPS officers after this significant investment of Federal dollars is the

amount of mismanagement, waste, and, in a few cases, fraud that

has occurred in the COPS program.

Programs, simply have failed to demonstrate a clear impact on

the reduction of crime as was pointed out by the witness from the

Heritage Foundation last week.

The President’s budget for 2003 also reflects the concern for the

overall effectiveness of the COPS program. The President has recommended that a significant level of COPS funding be redirected

to address the needs of our Nation’s State and local law enforcement officers who assist in counterterrorism and homeland security

measures. The purpose of this hearing is, first, to identify some of

the past problems with grant programs administered by both OJP

and the COPS office; and second, to explore ways to correct these

problems and to ensure that Federal law enforcement funds are

used effectively to address both the traditional and expanded mission of our State and local law enforcement agencies.

Now, that concludes my opening statement. I am glad that the

Ranking Member has arrived, and Mr. Scott is recognized for his

opening statement.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you waiting

to the exact minute that—as soon as I could get here, and I apologize for being late and appreciate you accommodating the schedule.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you in convening

a third oversight hearing on the Office of Justice Programs. In the

prior hearings, we were told about OJP’s duplication and ineffectiveness. We are now getting down to brass tacks, getting them to

tell us where their fraud waste and abuse is. Mr. Chairman, while

we are looking at these issues, I am continuing to hear from a

growing spectrum of OJP customers that they are concerned about

the prospects of OJP operations losing their independence.

I have two letters from the social science organizations expressing their support for looking at streamlining operations, but their

concerns that did not go so far as to jeopardize the independence

of the statistical and research functions, and I would like to have

these letters made a part of the record.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, they will be made a part of the

record.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly think we

should identify and eliminate clear fraud and abuse and other

kinds of wastes, but like duplication and effectiveness, what is

waste, fraud or abuse may be, in a large part, in the eye of the beholder. What I am hearing is that there is concern that some of the

cures we may be proposing may be worse than the disease. So I

look forward to the testimony of the witnesses for additional light

they may share on the issues of pros and cons of the OJP reorganizational proposals. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Let me introduce the witnesses. They are the honorable Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General,

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U.S. Department of Justice; Tracy A. Henke, principal deputy assistant attorney general, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Mr. Karl Peed, director, COPS program, U.S. Department of Justice. And Ms. Bonnie Campbell, former director, Violence Against Women Office, Office of Justice Programs.

Mr. SMITH. And we welcome you all, look forward to your testimony, and Mr. Fine, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. FINE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Scott, Members of the Subcommittee on Crime, thank you for inviting me to

testify about the Office of the Inspector General’s oversight of grant

programs in the Department of Justice. The amount of grants

awarded by the Department has grown rapidly over the last several years to nearly $5 billion, almost 20 percent of the Department’s total budget.

In recognition of this growth, the last 3 years the OIG has listed

grant management as one of the Department’s top 10 management

challenges. The OIG has conducted numerous audits and informations related to the grants issued by COPS and OJP. We have also

investigated a variety of fraud allegations involving Department

grant funds.

In my remarks this afternoon, I will discuss the work of the OIG

in reviewing COPS and OJP grant programs, and describe examples of our recent audits and investigations. I also will offer some

general observations about oversight of COPS and OJP grants.

With regard to COPS in 1999, we issued two reports summarizing the results from our first 2 years of auditing COPS grants.

There are 149 audits up to that time identified approximately $52

million in questioned costs and approximately $71 million in funds

that could be better used or 24 percent of the total funds awarded

to the 149 grantees.

Among our findings were that most auditees either could not

demonstrate that they had redeployed officers or could not demonstrate that they had a system in place to track the redeployment

of officers into community policing. A large percentage of auditees

also showed indicators of using Federal funds to supplant local

funding instead of using grant funds to supplement local funding.

In the second report in 1999, we reviewed the overall administration of the program by COPS. Among other findings, we determined that many grantees did not submit the required program

monitoring and financial reports, and that COPS on-sight monitoring reviews did not consistently cover all grant conditions.

We also concluded the deficiencies found in the on-site reviews

were not adequately followed up on or corrected. Since our 1999 reports, we have issued an additional 185 audit reports on COPS

grants. These audits identified more than $63 million in questioned

costs and $32 million in funds to better use. Our audits contain

some findings similar to those discussed in our 1999 report. For example, the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department

received a COPS grant to hire 56 civilians and purchase equipment

that was to result in the redeployment of 364 officer positions. Despite our repeated requests, the DC Police Department was unable

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to provide us with its deployment plan or with an accurate list of

all civilians who were reported to have been hired with COPS

grant funds. We therefore questioned more than $6 million based

on these grant violations.

Another continuing issue is COPS’ monitoring of corrective actions to our audit findings. We are concerned by the length of time

it has taken the COPS office to respond to our findings and recommendations. For example, in September 1998 we issued a report

on the police department in Oxford, Michigan. We found that Oxford violated the nonsupplanting requirement and failed to maintain the locally required staffing level. As a result, we questioned

$177,000 that Oxford had been reimbursed and recommended

deobligating $370,000 in remaining grant funds.

In February 2000, we received correspondence from COPS stating that the Oxford Police Department had been disbanded. However, despite repeated requests and the passage of 3 years since we

made the recommendations, we have not received documents demonstrating that any of the funds in question have been returned or

that the remaining grant funds have been deobligated.

Mr. Peed, the new director of COPS, has expressed his interest

in addressing the untimely audit follow-up and resolution process.

He expressed it again today to me. We are encouraged by this, although we remain concerned about the length of time involved for

corrective action to take place. Of the 155 completed audit reports

with open recommendations, 94 were issued more than 2 years ago.

Over the years, the OIG has audited a variety of OJP grant programs, which I describe in my written statement. The OIG also has

several ongoing reviews that are relevant to the administration of

OJP and COPS.

In January 2002, we began an audit examining whether administrative activities and grant functions could be streamlined in OJP

and COPS. Because of the possible duplication of efforts, particularly in developing grant criteria, awarding grants, monitoring

grants and following up on audits, we plan to assess whether activities and functions can be improved or combined to increase

operational efficiency.

In addition, the OIG will soon issue an audit of OJP’s State and

Local Domestic Preparedness Support grant program, which provides money to State and local police and fire departments who

serve as first responders in most emergencies. We are finding that

these grant funds were not awarded quickly and that grantees

were slow to spend available money.

In addition to audits and inspections of grant programs, the OIG

investigates allegations of misconduct, fraud, waste or abuse in the

Department, including grant programs. Examples of such cases include an OIG investigation, which led to the arrest and conviction

of a former Missouri chief of police who had falsified COPS paperwork to claim he hired and paid one additional officer, when, in

fact, he used the grant money to pay his own salary, including a

$6,000 annual raise.

In another case, a town clerk in North Carolina submitted a

fraudulent COPS grant application and received grant funds that

he transferred to his own use, even though the town did not have

a police department.

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I want to make several observations about continuing concerns

regarding COPS and OJP grants. More aggressive oversight. We

have found that monitoring activities were not being documented

in grant files; on-site inspections did not include visits to project

sites; financial and progress reports were not submitted or not submitted timely; and grant managers were not reviewing carefully

the information they received. We believe that COPS and OJP need

to better monitor their grantees by performing more site visits and

by more fully reviewing grantee financial and programmatic status

reports.

Increased emphasis on timely corrective action: In addition,

COPS and OJP should require prompt corrective action on OIG

audit findings. Many of the reports remain open for far too long.

We believe the COPS and OJP should take more aggressive and

more timely corrective action against grantees who did not comply

with grant terms.

In sum, we believe that COPS and OJP need to focus more attention on thorough monitoring of grant awards, ensuring that grant

requirements are met; and pursuing a corrective action when the

requirements are not met. While we have seen some improvement

in these areas, we believe that these programs need continuing

scrutiny and oversight. That concludes my statement, and I would

be pleased to answer any questions.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Fine.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Scott, and Members of the Subcommittee on Crime:

Thank you for inviting me to testify about the work of the Office of the Inspector

General (OIG) in auditing and investigating grant programs in the Department of

Justice (Department). The number and amount of grants the Department awards

have grown rapidly, increasing from $849 million in 1994 to nearly $5 billion in

each of the past five years. Grants now account for almost 20 percent of the Department’s total budget. They are primarily awarded by the Department’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP).

Over the years, the OIG has conducted numerous audits and inspections relating

to the grants issued by these two Department components. In addition, we have investigated a variety of fraud allegations involving Department grant funds.

In my remarks this morning, I will first discuss the work of the OIG in reviewing

COPS and OJP grant programs by briefly describing several of our recent audits

and inspections. In addition, I will highlight several ongoing OIG reviews in COPS

and OJP. Next, I will provide examples of OIG investigations of fraud in these programs. Finally, I will offer several general observations about the COPS and OJP

grant programs based on our audits, inspections, and investigations.

I. OIG AUDITS OF COPS GRANTS

The COPS grant program was created by the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Law Act of 1994, which authorized the Attorney General to implement over

six years an $8.8 billion grant program for state and local law enforcement agencies

to hire or redeploy 100,000 additional officers to perform community policing. The

Department established the COPS Office in 1994 to administer the grant program

and advance community policing throughout the country.

The OIG has been involved with the COPS program in various advisory and oversight capacities since its inception. Before grants were awarded, we reviewed program announcements and grant application kits. Since COPS began dispersing

grants, we have completed more than 330 audits of grant recipients.

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1Police Hiring and Redeployment Grants, Summary of Audit Findings and Recommendations

October 1996—September 1998 (Audit Report No. 99–14, issued April 1999). 2 ‘‘Questioned costs’’ are expenditures that do not comply with legal, regulatory, or contractual

requirements, are not supported by adequate documentation at the time of the audit, or are unnecessary or unreasonable. Questioned costs may be remedied by offset, waiver, recovery of

funds, or the provision of supporting documentation. ‘‘Funds to better use’’ are expenditures that

would be better used if management acts on and implements our audit recommendations. 3Management and Administration of the Community Oriented Policing Services Grant Program (Audit Report No. 99–21, issued July 1999).

A. OIG’s 1999 Summary Report and Audit of the COPS Office

In April 1999, the OIG issued a report summarizing the audits it conducted during its first two years of auditing COPS grant recipients.1 During fiscal years (FY)

1997 and 1998, the OIG performed 149 grant audits of COPS and OJP hiring and

redeployment grants totaling $511 million, or about 10 percent of the $5 billion in

grants COPS had obligated up to that time.

Our individual audits focused on: (1) the allowability of grant expenditures; (2)

whether local matching funds were previously budgeted for law enforcement; (3) the

implementation or enhancement of community policing activities; (4) hiring efforts

to fill vacant officer positions; (5) plans to retain officer positions at grant completion; (6) grantee reporting; and (7) analyses of supplanting issues.

Our audits identified weaknesses in each of these areas. For the 149 grant audits, we identified approximately $52 million in questioned costs and approximately $71

million in funds that could be better used.2 Our dollar-related findings amounted

to 24 percent of the total funds awarded to the 149 grantees.

Among the findings of our April 1999 report:

• Approximately half of the grantees we audited included unallowable costs in

their claims for reimbursement.

• Most auditees either could not demonstrate that they redeployed officers or

could not demonstrate that they had a system in place to track the redeployment of officers into community policing.

• A large percentage of auditees showed indicators of using federal funds to

supplant local funding instead of using grant funds to supplement local funding. When grantees use grant funds to replace local funds rather than to hire

new officers, additional officers are not added to the nation’s streets to perform community policing. Instead, federal funds are used to pay for existing

police officers. We found that grantees budgeted for decreases in local positions after receiving COPS grants, used COPS funds to pay for local officers

already on board, did not fill vacancies promptly, or did not meet the requirements of providing matching funds.

• A majority of auditees either did not develop a good-faith plan to retain officer

positions or said they would not retain the officer positions at the conclusion

of the grant.

• More than three-quarters either failed to submit COPS initial reports, annual

reports, officer progress reports, or submitted them late.

• Over 90 percent did not submit all required Financial Status Reports or submitted them late.

In July 1999, we issued another audit report describing our review of the COPS

Office’s overall administration of the grant program.3 We evaluated: (1) COPS’ ability to meet the stated goal of putting 100,000 additional police officers on the street,

(2) COPS’ monitoring of grantees, and (3) the quality of the guidance COPS provided to grantees to assist them in implementing essential grant requirements.

We found that COPS grants would not result in 100,000 additional officers on the

streets by the end of FY 2000. We attributed this shortfall to various factors, including law enforcement agencies not accepting grant funds, grantees terminating many

grants, grantees not being able to demonstrate they had or would redeploy officers

from administrative duties to the streets, and indications that COPS grant funds

were used to supplant local funds, which could result in fewer additional officers on

the street.

We also determined that many grantees did not submit the required program

monitoring and financial reports and that COPS’ on-site monitoring reviews did not

consistently cover all grant conditions. Moreover, we concluded that COPS and OJP

did not adequately follow up on deficiencies found in on-site reviews to ensure that

the deficiencies were corrected.

In response to our July 1999 audit, the COPS Office and OJP agreed with many

of our recommendations and reported that they had created specific monitoring diviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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sions dedicated to grant-monitoring efforts. The COPS Office, however, disagreed

with many of the findings in our individual grant reports and appealed them to the

Deputy Attorney General. In August 1999, the Department hired a mediator to resolve the dispute, using a sample of 40 OIG findings. In the vast majority of the

sampled issues, either the mediator found or COPS concluded that the grantees

were in violation of grant conditions.

G. Recent OIG Audits of COPS Grants

Since our 1999 reports, the OIG has issued an additional 185 audit reports of COPS hiring and redeployment grants. These audits identified more than $63.9 million in questioned costs and $32.2 million in funds to better use. Our audits contained some findings similar to those discussed in our April 1999 summary report,

such as grant recipients:

• Not hiring and retaining additional officers, and using federal funds to supplant local funds

For example, our audit of the El Paso, Texas, Police Department found that it violated COPS’ non-supplanting requirement. We found that the El Paso Police Department did not increase its police force by the 231 officers funded by the COPS grants

and did not retain the required number of officer positions. We questioned more

than $7 million paid to the grantee.

• Including unallowable or unsupported costs in reimbursement requests

Our audit of COPS grants made to the City of Camden, New Jersey, found excess

police officer salary and fringe benefit costs in Camden’s reimbursement requests.

We questioned more than $1 million for these grant violations.

• Not demonstrating redeployment of officers to community policing.

The District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) received a redeployment grant to hire 56 civilians and purchase equipment that was to result

in the total redeployment of 364 officer positions. Despite our repeated requests, the

MPD was unable to provide the OIG with its redeployment plan or with a complete

and accurate list of all grant-funded civilians who were reported to have been hired

with COPS grant funds. We questioned more than $6 million based on these grant

violations.

In our judgment, based on our recent audit work, the Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) grant program continues to be the COPS Office’s highest

risk program. The MORE grants fund technology or the hiring of civilians to allow

existing officers to be redeployed from administrative activities to community policing. Although grants under the MORE program are intended to last for one year,

we found numerous instances where COPS extended grant periods several additional years. For example, when police departments buy computers or mobile data

terminals and fail to install them in a timely manner, they may become obsolete

by the time they are operational. Importantly, we rarely found that MORE grant

recipients could demonstrate that they had redeployed the required number of officers to community policing as a result of the MORE grants.

We continue to believe that the COPS Office’s on-site monitoring efforts can be

improved. Depending on the size of the grantee, COPS site visits are usually one

to two days in length and concentrate mainly on the grantee’s community policing

activities, rather than on ensuring that grant requirements are met, including hiring, budgeting, and tracking redeployment.

Another continuing issue is the COPS Office’s monitoring of corrective actions to

our audit findings. In the past, we have been concerned by the length of time it has

taken the COPS Office to respond to our findings and recommendations.

For example, in September 1998 we issued a report on the Oxford Emergency

Safety Authority (OESA) in Oxford, Michigan. We found that Oxford violated the

COPS grant non-supplanting requirement and failed to maintain the locally required staffing level. As a result, we questioned $177,920 that the grantee had been

reimbursed at the time of the audit and recommended deobligation of $370,108 in

remaining grant funds. In addition, we recommended that the COPS Office

deobligate redeployment grant funds of $46,875 if the OESA failed to develop the

grant-required redeployment plan within 60 days of the report date.

In February 2000, we received correspondence from the COPS Office stating that

the grantee’s police department had been disbanded and that the COPS Office

agreed that the OESA violated the grant’s non-supplanting requirement. Accordingly, the COPS Office suspended funding of the COPS grants associated with the

OESA. However, despite repeated requests and the passage of three years since we

made the recommendations, we have not received any documents demonstrating

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that any of the funds in question have been returned or that the remaining grant

funds have been deobligated.

We also have seen that the COPS Office has sometimes not taken aggressive action against grantees for grant violations. Leniency in the administration of the

grant program, and failure to take timely action when the grantee does not comply

with the grant conditions, can encourage other grantees to ignore or circumvent program requirements. As the responsible program office, COPS is the OIG’s primary

point of contact on tracking corrective action by grant recipients. While we recognize

that there may be instances where prompt corrective action cannot always be

achieved, many of our audit reports contain findings and recommendations that

could have been addressed quite some time ago.

In September 2001, we informed Carl Peed, the new Director of COPS, that approximately 170 COPS grant audit reports were still open and that the COPS Office

had not responded to many of these reports for more than a year. In October 2001,

Director Peed advised us that he would dedicate additional staff to audit resolution

activities. In addition, Director Peed has contacted OIG staff and expressed interest

in addressing the untimely audit follow-up and resolution process. However, our

auditors report that many recent responses from COPS provided information that

could not be used to close the audit reports. While we are encouraged by the increased awareness and actions on COPS’ part related to our open audit findings,

we remain concerned about the length of time involved for corrective action to take

place. Of the 155 audit reports currently open, 94 of the reports were issued more

than two years ago.

IV. OIG AUDITS OF OJP GRANTS

OJP, established in 1988, administers approximately $4 billion in grant programs

each year. OJP consists of five bureaus and six program offices that administer a

myriad of grant programs designed to reduce crime, improve the criminal justice

system, and assist crime victims.

Over the years, the OIG has audited a variety of OJP grant programs. We describe below several of our more recent reviews.

1. State Criminal Alien Assistance Grant Program (SCAAP)

Under the SCAAP program, OJP provides grants to state and local governments to help defray the cost of incarcerating undocumented criminal aliens

convicted of state or local felonies. In an audit report issued in May 2000,

we found that OJP had overcompensated state applicants approximately

$19.3 million for unallowable inmate costs and ineligible inmates who were

included in grant applications. We found that OJP’s methodology for compensating states was over-inclusive and needed improvement, because OJP

overpaid states for many inmates whose immigration status was unknown.

OJP relied on the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to determine the immigration status of inmates, but INS files were not complete,

current, or accurate. We recommended that OJP should improve its methodology for compensating applicants for inmates whose immigration status is

unknown by the INS.

2. Combined DNA Index System

The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) is a national DNA information

repository maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that allows state and local crime laboratories to store and compare DNA profiles

from crime-scene evidence and convicted offenders. The goal of the system

is to match case evidence to other previously unrelated cases or to persons

already convicted of other crimes. Our audit report on the CODIS system,

issued in September 2001, reviewed the FBI’s implementation and management of CODIS. It also examined awards dispensed by the National Institute of Justice—a component of OJP—of Laboratory Improvement Program

grants totaling $30.7 million to improve the capacity and capability of forensic laboratories in performing forensic DNA testing. We found that the

grantees generally complied with the matching fund and indirect cost requirements; however, we noted some areas that OJP could improve to ensure that grantees met the requirements of the grant awards. For example,

we saw that OJP did not require one grantee to provide matching funds, as

required by law.

3. Safefutures: Partnerships to Reduce Youth Violence and Delinquency

Partnerships to Reduce Youth Violence and Delinquency (Safefutures) is

a five-year demonstration grant program administered by OJP to help six

competitively selected communities reduce juvenile delinquency. OJP’s Office

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of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) administers the

grants. The grants help communities implement a continuum of care consisting of prevention, intervention, treatment, and graduated sanctions programs for at-risk and delinquent youth. Each grantee can receive up to $1.4

million per year, for a total of about $7 million, to implement nine specific

programs and help reform its existing service delivery system. Total program

costs are expected to be about $42 million. Our audit report, issued in April

1999, found that OJJDP program managers were not adhering to the grantmonitoring plans, and their monitoring efforts were neither consistent nor

consistently documented. As a result, we found it difficult to determine the

level of monitoring that actually occurred. We found that a lack of current

policies and procedures, unclear expectations, and insufficient accountability

contributed to the monitoring problems.

In addition, we found weak controls over fiscal monitoring of the program.

Quarterly financial reports, which often were untimely and inaccurate, were

not reviewed or corrected routinely. Based on our review of a grantee in Boston, for example, we found that the OJP’s Office of the Comptroller lacked

a systematic approach to follow up on identified deficiencies. Additionally,

grantees did not submit financial reports by fund source, even though they

were required to account for each source separately. We found that incomplete official grant files were a continuing problem. All of the files reviewed

by the OIG in this audit were missing some of the required documents that

were needed to record the activity of each grant.

4. Management of the OJP Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Program

The RISS project was established to help state and local law enforcement

agencies identify and target criminal activity that extends across jurisdictions. At the time of our audit in 1998, six RISS projects serve member

agencies in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Canadian provinces. These projects are funded through grants provided by

OJP.

Our audit found that the RISS program could save $3.2 million annually

by consolidating overhead and management positions from six locations into

one. Each of the six RISS projects generally offered the same services to

member agencies. Further, the structure and operations of the projects were

virtually identical, including the methods by which services were provided

to member agencies. In FY 1997, the individual databases maintained by

each project were consolidated into a single database, known as RISSNET

II, to allow sharing of information. We concluded that staffing levels could

be reduced with implementation of RISSNET II because the new system allowed each member agency to directly input and access information without

going through their local RISS project.

This audit also found that OJP did not ensure that the RISS projects operated according to grant requirements. For example, RISS projects inappropriately spent more than $300,000 on computer hardware upgrades, lunches

at conferences, over-reimbursing a local law enforcement agency, and unnecessary travel expenses.

5. Residential Substance Abuse Treatment for State Prisoners Formula Grant

(RSAT) Program

The OIG Inspections Division reviewed RSAT grants in six states from

March 1999 through June 1999 and issued a summary report in September

2000. The purpose of the RSAT grant program is to develop or enhance residential drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs for adult and juvenile

offenders in state and local correctional facilities. Funding for RSAT grants

from FY 1996 through FY 2002 has ranged from $27 million to $63 million.

OIG site visits assessed the states’ adherence to grant guidance and progress

toward implementing residential substance abuse treatment programs.

The OJP Corrections Program Office (CPO) is responsible for this program. In the September 2000 summary report, we concluded that the CPO’s

monitoring and oversight of the grant program needed strengthening. States

received grant funds through a formula grant. The states had responsibility

for monitoring any sub-awards and providing the required monitoring reports to the CPO. We found that the CPO was not diligent in ensuring that

states provided the required reports (such as financial status reports, semiannual progress reports, and individual project reports) on the use of grant

funds and the progress of projects. We found that all six RSAT grantees did

not submit accurate or timely reports. These reports are an important tool

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to help managers and grant monitors determine if grantees are meeting program objectives and financial commitments. We found that even when states

provided the reports, the quality of the CPO review was not consistent. Further, the CPO failed to ensure that conflicting or missing information in a

state’s reports are clarified or obtained.

We found that the CPO conducted limited site visits, citing insufficient

staff resources. When visits were conducted, subgrantees—the organizations

that actually implement the projects or programs—were not targeted and

visits were generally limited to the state office designated to receive grant

awards. Therefore, the CPO did not assess the actual programs for compliance with grant requirements. We also found that on-site monitoring reports

were not completed or included in the official grant file.

Finally, we found that the CPO’s overall record keeping needed improvement. Official grant files were missing applications, award documents, state

reports, and CPO site visit reports so that the life cycle of a state’s grant

compliance could not be tracked readily.

VI. ONGOING OIG REVIEWS OF COPS AND OJP GRANT PROGRAMS

The OIG has several ongoing reviews that are relevant to the administration of

COPS and OJP grants. In January 2002 we began an audit examining whether administrative activities and grant functions could be streamlined in OJP and COPS.

While OJP historically has administered the Department’s grant programs, the

COPS Office was created in 1994 as a separate, single function grant-making agency. Because of possible duplication of efforts in COPS and OJP—particularly in developing grant criteria, awarding grants, monitoring grants, and following up on audits—we plan to assess whether activities and functions can be improved or combined to increase operational efficiency.

In addition, the OIG will soon issue an audit of OJP’s State and Local Domestic

Preparedness Support Grant Program. This review is especially timely given the

emphasis on homeland security since the September 11 terrorist attacks and the

critical role state and local agencies play as ‘‘first responders’’ in such crises. Under

this 1998 program, OJP awards grants to help state and local police and fire departments obtain training and equipment to respond to acts of terrorism. The OJP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is responsible for implementing the program.

In this audit, we reviewed ODP operations and performed on-site reviews at 13

grantees and 3 training organizations. We found that since inception of the program, grant funds were not awarded quickly and grantees were very slow to spend

available monies. We found that as of January 15, 2002, more than half of the total

funds ($250 million) appropriated for the grant program from FY 1998 through FY

2001 still had not been awarded. In addition, more than $60 million in grant funds

that were awarded was still unspent by the grantees. Further, we found that nearly

$1 million in equipment purchased with Department grants was unavailable for use

because grantees did not properly distribute the equipment, could not locate it, or

had been inadequately trained on how to operate it.

Finally, we are in the final stages of an audit of OJP’s Convicted Offender DNA

Sample Backlog Reduction Grant Program. In early 2001, state and local DNA laboratories estimated that, at the end of 2000, they held over 745,000 convicted offender DNA samples that had been collected and were awaiting analysis. To aid in

reducing the backlog of convicted offender DNA samples, OJP’s National Institute

of Justice (NIJ) administers a grant program that dispensed approximately $14.5

million to 21 states in FY 2000. States used the funds to hire contractor laboratories

to analyze their convicted offender DNA samples so that backlogged DNA profiles

could be entered into the National DNA Index System, part of the network of state

and local DNA profile databases maintained by the FBI. Our audit examined NIJ’s

oversight of the grant program and whether the program was helping states reduce

and eliminate their backlogs of convicted offender DNA samples.

VII. OIG INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT GRANT PROGRAMS

In addition to OIG audits and inspections of grant programs, the OIG’s Investigations Division investigates allegations of misconduct, fraud, waste, or abuse in Department programs, including grant programs. Within the Investigations Division,

the OIG has established a Fraud Detection Office to investigate fraud in Department operations. Although the number of allegations of fraud in Department grant

programs that we have substantiated is not large in comparison to the number of

grants awarded by the Department, we have found some fraud in the use of grant

funds. Examples of cases that we have substantiated include:

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• An OIG investigation led to the arrest and conviction of a former Missouri

chief of police for false statements and theft. The OIG established that the

former police chief in Novinger, Missouri, falsified COPS Universal Hiring

Grant paperwork to claim he hired and paid one additional officer when, in

fact, he used the grant to pay his own salary, including a $6,000 annual raise.

When confronted by OIG special agents, the former police chief admitted falsifying grant applications. He was sentenced on January 3, 2002, to two

years’ probation and ordered to pay $53,190 in restitution.

• A former acting chief of the Town of Navajo Department of Law Enforcement

was convicted at trial in the District of New Mexico on charges of wire fraud.

He was sentenced to 30 months’ incarceration and ordered to pay $102,877

in restitution. A joint investigation by the OIG’s Fraud Detection Office and

the FBI determined that the acting chief fraudulently applied for and received a COPS Problem-Solving Partnership Grant to establish a ‘‘Crime

Busters’’ program targeting burglaries. The acting chief diverted more than $100,000 in grant funds to personal use by making illegal sub-awards to

members of his immediate family, who used some of the money to purchase

a used pickup truck and other vehicles.

• As a result of an OIG investigation, the Clerk of a North Carolina town pleaded guilty to submitting a fraudulent COPS grant application and receiving

COPS funds—which he transferred to his own use—even though the town did

not have a police department. The Clerk was sentenced to 12 months’ incarceration and ordered to pay $24,692 in restitution as a result of the OIG’s investigation.

• Based on an investigation by the OIG’s Fraud Detection Office and the North

Carolina Governor’s Crime Commission, Hoke County repaid the state of North Carolina $93,467 in Byrne Formula grant funds awarded by the Department. The county manager was alleged to have purposefully submitted

false documentation relating to police vehicle purchases under the grant and

then diverted the funds to other uses. Although no proof of intent to defraud

was sustained, the supplanted funds were recovered and returned to the

state.

It is important to point out that the COPS Office has cooperated fully with

our investigative efforts and in several cases has referred suspicious activities

by grantees to the OIG. In addition, we have conducted joint training programs with COPS officials to ensure that OIG agents are familiar with COPS

program requirements.

V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Based on our oversight work, we have several continuing concerns and recommendations regarding COPS and OJP grant programs:

• Monitoring. Grant monitoring is an essential management tool to ensure that

grantees are properly expending funds and that the objectives of the grant

program are being implemented. Generally, each grant manager is required

to prepare a monitoring plan that includes on-site visits, review of financial

and progress reports, telephonic contacts, and review of audit reports. In

some cases, however, we found that monitoring activities were not being documented in grant files, reports for on-site visits were not prepared, on-site inspections did not include visits to project sites, financial and progress reports

were not submitted or not submitted timely, and grant managers were not

reviewing carefully the information they received. As a result, grant managers failed to catch inconsistent or incorrect information on project activities.

We believe that COPS and OJP need to better monitor their grantees by performing more site visits and by reviewing more aggressively grantee financial

and programmatic status reports.

• Failure to Adequately Review Grant Applications. In one significant OIG investigation in the SCAAP grant program, we saw an undue emphasis by some

program managers on dispensing grant funds without sufficient regard to ensuring that grantees met eligibility standards. Our investigation of fraud allegations in SCAAP found that OJP employees failed to apply eligibility rules

in making the FY 1999 award of more than $500 million. OJP managers told

us they felt pressured to award SCAAP funds before the close of the fiscal

year, so rather than examine the FY 1999 data they used FY 1998 submissions as the basis for re-awards. Our investigation also found that OJP did

not ensure that key program eligibility requirements had been checked. Specifically, OJP did not check to ensure that an alien’s minimum period of inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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carceration had been met, which is a key trigger to award or denial of SCAAP

funds. We have encountered a few similar problems in some of our audits of

COPS grants, where grant finds were dispersed by the COPS Office without

adequate review of grantee applications.

• More Aggressive and Timely Corrective Action. As discussed earlier, COPS

and OJP should require prompt corrective action on OIG audit findings. Although we have seen improvement in the responsiveness of the COPS Office

to resolving our audit findings, many of the reports remain open for far too

long. We believe that COPS and OJP should take more aggressive and more

timely corrective action against grantees who do not comply with grant terms.

The sense among some grantees is that COPS and OJP rarely require repayment of funds, even when the grantees do not comply with the grant terms.

Stricter enforcement of grant terms would send a strong deterrent message

that failure to comply with program guidelines will result in the Department

seeking repayment of the funds.

In sum, the COPS Office and OJP administer many important and valuable grant

programs. But the rapid growth of grant funds in the Department brings with it

the increased risk that these funds could be wastefully or fraudulently used. We believe that COPS and OJP need to focus more attention on thorough monitoring of

grant awards, ensuring that grant requirements are met, and pursuing timely and

aggressive corrective action when the grant requirements are not met. While we

have seen some improvement in these areas, we believe that these programs need

continued scrutiny and oversight.

This concludes my written statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Henke.

STATEMENT OF TRACY A. HENKE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Ms. HENKE. Chairman Smith, Congressman Scott, I am pleased

to have the opportunity to discuss this Administration’s efforts to

improve the operations and management of the Office of Justice

Programs. Last week, Assistant Attorney General Deborah Daniels

appeared before this Subcommittee to describe the Administration’s

efforts to streamline OJP structure and operations, eliminate duplication and overlap and maximize efficiency.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I would like to describe our efforts to

measure the effectiveness of the programs we find, meeting the

goals of the Government Performance Results Act and to implement recommendations resulting from Inspector General and General Accounting Office audits.

I first want to assure this Subcommittee that the OJP leadership

team is committed to the effective and efficient utilization of taxpayer dollars so that we can make real progress and improvement

in the criminal justice field. As President Bush has directed all

Federal agencies, we are working to ensure through accountability

that OJP is results-oriented, not process-oriented. One part of this

effort is an increased emphasis on evaluation to measure the results of the programs we fund and to focus OJP resources on what

works.

Through evaluation and the wide dissemination of evaluation results, OJP strides to ensure that criminal justice policymakers at

all levels of government, in the field, those of us in the executive

branch and those in Congress have the critical information they

need to make the decisions on how best to invest limited public dollars.

At OJP we have taken several steps to build evaluations into our

programming. First, we now require evaluation components in all

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OJP discretionary programs and are setting aside 10 percent of

program funding for that purpose. Second, we now make participation in a national or local program evaluation a part of the grant

conditions for every OJP discretionary grant recipient. Third, we

are working with the State agencies that administer OJP formula

grants to ensure that all programs supported with block grant

funding have evaluation components.

We know that our performance measurement activities do not yet

fully capture the impact of our programs nationally, but the clangs

I have mentioned on our evaluation efforts will now focus our evaluation activities on outcomes, not outputs. At OJP, our emphasis

is not on measuring process but on determining impacts and results.

Because we want to concentrate on results, last year for the first

time ever, OJP also prepared a report summarizing OJP and COPS

formula and discretionary grants awarded to each State during the

fiscal year. This information was made available to every Governor,

every U.S. Attorney, every U.S. Senator and every U.S. Representative to serve as a tool for future planning and resource allocation.

This will be an annual report that we provide.

In addition, this year we will be adding crime statistic information on that State and also national information so it can see how

it compares nationally. As you are aware, OJP’s programs and

evaluation efforts have been the subject of several recent reviews

by the General Accounting Office, including one released last week.

These reviews have raised serious concerns, primarily in two areas:

monitoring and evaluation.

While we have not yet had the opportunity to fully review the

GAO report released last week, you may be sure that we have and

will continue to carefully assess all of GAO’s recommendations so

that we can ensure the sound design of OJP evaluations and have

confidence that we are accurately measuring program effectiveness.

OJP has already taken a number of steps to improve our evaluations and grant monitoring process. For example, as a result of the

GAO recommendation, our executive office for Weed and Seed is

working with the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Justice Research and Research Association to improve data collection, and to

work with local sites to more accurately measure the effectiveness

of the Weed and Seed strategy. To further improve the accountability of OJP’s grant management and monitoring efforts, we recently hired a chief information officer who is working to create a

comprehensive grant management system for the entire agency.

This will greatly increase the efficiency of our grant monitoring

process by, for instance, fining grantees who are late in submitting

required reports or that fail to comply with grant conditions.

In addition to taking corrective actions in response to GAO reviews, OJP has already implemented, or is working to implement

recommendations resulting from annual audits of OJP’s financial

management that are conducted by the Office of the Inspector General. For example, we have upgraded our financial management

software and improved the security of our databases. To further

improve the effectiveness and operations of OJP programs, we are

also working to meet the mandates of the Government Performance

Results Act. As you know, GPRA requires Federal agencies to reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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quire standards measuring the performance and effectiveness of

their programs. For each OJP program, we set goals and measure

our performance in meeting those goals.

In addition, starting last fall, we require all OJP grant solicitations to include at least one GPRA performance result or outcome

measure. Our goal is to put grantees on notice that performance

and results are OJP requirements.

This Administration firmly believes that if we are to hold our

grantees accountable for their spending, OJP also must be held to

high standards of accountability regarding the stewardship of public funds. Through these and other efforts, OJP is working to ensure the effective use of grant funds, prevent fraud and abuse and

measure the impact of the programs we fund. We appreciate the

Subcommittee’s continued interest in eliminating duplication and

waste and improving the operations of Federal grant programs. We

look forward to working with you to accomplish our mutual goals.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Henke.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Henke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TRACY A. HENKE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss this Administration’s efforts to improve the operations and

management of the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). We appreciate this Subcommittee’s continued interest in eliminating duplication and waste and in improving the operations of federal grant programs.

Last week, Assistant Attorney General Deborah Daniels appeared before this Subcommittee to describe the Administration’s efforts to streamline OJP’s structure and

operations, eliminate duplication and overlap, and maximize efficiency. Today, Mr.

Chairman, I would like to describe our efforts to measure the effectiveness of the

programs we fund to ensure the wise investment of taxpayer dollars, to meet the

goals of the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, and to implement recommendations resulting from Inspector General (IG) and General Accounting Office (GAO) audits.

MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

This Administration has a new vision for the role of the federal government in

providing criminal justice assistance. Part of that new vision is an increased emphasis on measuring the results of the programs we fund and on focusing OJP resources on ‘‘what works.’’ OJP is committed to increased analyses of what works and

what doesn’t so that criminal justice policy makers at all levels of government—including those in the field, those of us in the Executive Branch, and the Congress—

can better decide how to invest limited public dollars.

To this end, we now require evaluation components in all OJP discretionary grant

programs and are setting aside 10 percent of program funding to ensure evaluations

are built into OJP programs from the outset. Moreover, OJP discretionary grant recipients now are required, as part of their grant conditions, to participate in a national or local program evaluation. In addition, we are working with the state agencies that administer OJP formula grants to ensure that all programs supported with

block grant funding have evaluation components so that the effectiveness of these

programs also will be measured.

The results of these evaluations will build on the significant body of research that

has already been completed—or is underway—on a wide variety of OJP and other

Department of Justice (DOJ) programs. As you know, Mr. Chairman, one of the

principal missions for our National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is to perform evaluations of the OJP and other criminal justice programs. Over the past several years,

NIJ has undertaken a total of 24 major evaluations of OJP programs. Seven of these

have been completed, and another 17 are currently underway. NIJ also has completed evaluations of three programs supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), and is currently evaluating COPS’ School Resource

Officer Program. In addition, six NIJ evaluations are in the planning stages, including an evaluation of aspects of Project Safe Neighborhoods, the Administration’s

major gun violence reduction initiative.

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Results from completed evaluations are already having an impact on OJP policy

and programs. For example, results from NIJ evaluations of implementation of the

STOP (Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors) Violence Against Women program demonstrated the importance of coordinated community responses and the impact of victims’ services in response to the serious problem of violence against

women. The STOP evaluations showed that increasing numbers of women victims

of violence are now being served and more perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence are now being arrested and convicted as a result of STOP programming. Results from this evaluation have led to numerous program modifications, such as: additional requirements for further collaborations among law enforcement, prosecutors, victims service providers, and others in the community; funding for specific

types of program activities; increased flexibility in distribution of funds; an expanded time frame for spending STOP dollars; increased funding for sexual assault

projects; projects for women from under-served communities; and efforts to develop

better data for further evaluation.

Other NIJ evaluations also have shown the positive impact OJP programs can

have. For example, an NIJ evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed showed that the

program resulted in improved law enforcement efforts, including increases in arrests

and convictions, and new levels of cooperation among law enforcement, area residents, prosecutors, and social services personnel. As you know, Mr. Chairman, Weed

and Seed is a community-based, multi-agency strategy that helps communities combat crime and revitalize crime-plagued neighborhoods. In addition to reducing crime

and increasing collaboration, the evaluation also showed that Weed and Seed contributed to the development of innovative crime control approaches, including crosstraining of patrol officers in community policing and enforcement, use of civil remedies in neighborhood conflicts, application of new technologies, and inclusion of

non-traditional partners in strategic planning and program development. Because of

the success of the Weed and Seed strategy, Weed and Seed programs have expanded

to almost 300 communities throughout America, and the Administration plans to expand the number of Weed and Seed programs in operation in Fiscal Year 2003.

Evaluations also have revealed programs or approaches that are not effective. In

cooperation with OJP’s Corrections Program Office, NIJ has supported a number of

evaluations of correctional boot camps. These programs use a military-style, boot

camp approach to rehabilitating offenders who would otherwise be incarcerated in

a traditional correctional facility. Results from a multi-site NIJ evaluation found no

consistent differences in recidivism between adult boot camp graduates and comparison groups of offenders with normal prison sentences. As a result of these findings, OJP no longer funds correctional boot camps.

The OJP leadership is committed to continuing to use the results of research and

evaluation to measure the effectiveness of the programs we fund and to ensure that

federal taxpayer dollars are invested both wisely and well. If we are to hold our

grantees accountable for their spending, OJP also must be held to high standards

of accountability regarding the stewardship of public funds. In addition, Mr. Chairman, this Administration will focus its evaluations on measuring outcomes not outputs. Our emphasis is not on measuring process, but on determining impact and results.

IMPLEMENTING IG AND GAO RECOMMENDATIONS

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, OJP’s programs and evaluation efforts have

been the subject of several recent reviews by the General Accounting Office (GAO).

In addition, each year the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General

(IG) conducts audits of OJP’s financial management. These reviews and audits have

resulted in a number of GAO and IG recommendations for improvement in OJP programs and management, which OJP either has implemented or is working to implement.

GAO’s reviews have raised concerns primarily in two areas: monitoring and evaluation. I have already described this Administration’s absolute commitment to performing evaluations to gauge the effectiveness and impact of OJP programs. We are

no less committed, Mr. Chairman, to ensuring that those evaluations are grounded

in sound research methodology. The OJP leadership is reviewing the GAO report

released last week on impact evaluations of a number of Byrne and Violence Against

Women Office (VAWO) programs. You may be sure that we will carefully assess

GAO’s recommendations and work to ensure the sound design of OJP evaluations

so that we can be sure we have accurate measures of program effectiveness. As Assistant Attorney General Daniels stated before this Subcommittee last week, we will

use the most recent GAO report as an important tool to improve the quality of our

evaluations and to design programs to achieve greater impact. We have already

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agreed to assess the five impact evaluations in their formative stages, as the GAO

recommended.

OJP also is working to address problems GAO has identified in evaluation studies

of OJP funded drug court programs. As a result of our interactions with GAO auditors during their review, we are aware of the concerns they have raised. However,

because GAO has not yet issued its report on this matter, we have not seen GAO’s

recommendations for corrective action. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, you may be

sure that we will carefully assess the GAO’s recommendations and work diligently

to ensure that we have accurate methods of determining drug courts’ impact and

effectiveness. We will, of course, thoroughly respond to GAO’s specific recommendations as soon as it releases its report.

OJP has already implemented a number of corrective actions in response to other

GAO reports. For example, GAO examined OJP’s Weed and Seed program and recommended that the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) develop additional

performance measures to better track program outcomes. To meet this recommendation, EOWS has taken a number of steps:

First, it worked with the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Justice Research

and Statistics Association (JRSA) to develop surveys that could be fielded in Weed

and Seed sites to measure crime victimizations. The survey is currently being tested

in several Weed and Seed sites before refinement and eventual dissemination to all

sites. Over time, the survey will provide a more accurate and objective measure of

crime reductions resulting from Weed and Seed strategy implementation.

Second, EOWS commissioned the principal investigator for the National Process

Evaluation of Weed and Seed, which was conducted in 1995, to develop a guide to

help individual sites evaluate the impact of their Weed and Seed strategies. The

guide was developed and distributed to Weed and Seed sites in February at the

2002 Application Kit Workshop.

Third, EOWS included GPRA forms in the FY 2002 Weed and Seed Application

Kits for continuation and competitive funding. The forms, which must be filed as

part of the grant application, request information on how sites will use OJP grants

to leverage funding from other federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private

organizations, to maximize the impact of taxpayer dollars. In addition, the forms require the submission of drug arrest data, which JRSA will use as part of a data

collection effort to measure Weed and Seed’s impact on drug use and related crime.

Another GAO review of our discretionary grant programs recommended that

OJP’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and Violence Against Women Office

(VAWO) improve documentation of grant monitoring efforts. To address this problem, BJA expanded its grants tracking system to include grantee contacts; developed and implemented a rating system to determine the need for on-site visits to

grantees; developed a monitoring plan for all grantees that is updated monthly; implemented standardized procedures for documenting on-site monitoring visits; instituted a policy that a desk review be conducted twice each year for all grants; and

developed more specific guidance for grantees on completing progress reports to ensure that more specific performance data is obtained. VAWO also has developed a

management information system that, when fully implemented, will track the submission of progress and financial status reports to flag grantees that are delinquent

in meeting reporting requirements.

In addition to these efforts, OJP’s new Chief Information Officer is working to

identify all automated systems within OJP as the first step in creating a comprehensive grant management system for the entire agency. This will ensure consistency in grant management policies and procedures throughout OJP and serve

as a tool to better measure the performance of OJP grantees.

Further, OJP has already taken corrective actions that respond to all the recommendations for improved financial grants management resulting from the Annual

Financial Statement Audits for FY 1999 and 2000 conducted by the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General. For example, the Office of the Comptroller

(OC) revised its policies to use a more appropriate methodology for recording audit

adjustments. OC also updated procedures to validate the results of the year-end

closing process and prior year adjustments and to ensure the accuracy of general

ledger balances. In addition, OC upgraded its financial management software to address a number of other IG recommendations. Further, to address security concerns

raised by the IG, OC conducted a risk assessment of its Financial Management Information System and took a number of steps to ensure that unauthorized users

cannot obtain access to the system and to provide backups in the event of a system

failure. The FY 2001 audit has not yet been conducted.

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MEETING GPRA GOALS

To further improve the effectiveness and operations of OJP programs, we are also

working to meet the mandates of the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA)

of 1993. As you know, Mr. Chairman, GPRA requires federal agencies to establish

standards measuring the performance and effectiveness of their programs by: (1)

identifying annual goals and measures for program activities; (2) describing strategies and resources needed to achieve goals; and (3) identifying the means through

which performance data are verified and validated.

OJP’s strategy for accomplishing its mission and developing its GPRA performance measures are based on Goals 3 and 8 in the Department of Justice Strategic

Plan. Goal 3 is to prevent and reduce crime and violence by assisting state, tribal,

local, and community-based programs. Goal 8 is to ensure professionalism, excellence, accountability, and integrity in the management and conduct of Department

of Justice activities and programs.

To reach these goals, OJP has developed strategic objectives in six areas. The following describes these objectives and related OJP program activity for each one in

Fiscal Year 2001.

—Law enforcement/public safety—Improve the crime-fighting and criminal justice

administration capabilities of state, tribal, and local governments.

In FY 2001, OJP’s Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) provided

counterterrorism training in the identification, detection, and management of incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction to a total of 19,175 state and local

emergency response personnel. This exceeded ODP’s FY 2001 target of providing

training to 13,000 first responders.

Under the Grants to Combat Violent Crimes Against Women on Campus program,

the Violence Against Women Office (VAWO) awarded FY 2001 funding to 26 campuses across the country to adopt violent crimes against women programs, matching

the FY 2001 target of 26. In FY 2001, VAWO also funded 30 legal services organizations (matching the FY 2001 target of 30) and 73 victim services organizations (exceeding the FY 2001 target of 70) to provide civil legal assistance to victims of domestic violence.

In FY 2001, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) restructured its Convicted Offender DNA Backlog Reduction Program to better serve states submitting offender

DNA data and to take full advantage of economies of scale. This program is helping

states to reduce the backlog of convicted offender DNA samples awaiting analysis

and entry into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). As you may know, Mr.

Chairman, CODIS can help solve old crimes and prevent new ones from occurring

by matching crime scene evidence with stored DNA samples. By pooling several

smaller groups of state DNA samples into larger batches, NIJ was able to reduce

the cost to DNA vendor labs for analysis of convicted offender DNA samples by

about 30 percent, for a savings of more than $2.5 million nationwide.

—Juvenile justice—Reduce youth crime and victimization through assistance that

emphasizes both enforcement and prevention.

In FY 2001, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)

exceeded its targets in several areas. Programs supported through OJJDP’s Juvenile

Mentoring Program (JUMP) enrolled 17,721 youth in programs that provide wholesome adult role models as mentors to keep young people in school and out of trouble. This exceeded OJJDP’s FY 2001 nationwide target of 14,000 enrolled youth. In

addition, OJJDP provided technical assistance to 4,624 jurisdictions, exceeding its

goal of 2,500 jurisdictions, and trained 62,356 practitioners in implementing promising juvenile justice practices, exceeding the FY 2001 target of 40,000.

—Drug abuse—Break the cycle of drugs and violence by reducing the demand for

and use and trafficking of illegal drugs.

By the end of FY 2001, 10,546 offenders had either completed or begun treatment

as a result of funding for prison-based treatment programs supported through OJP’s

Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) for State Prisoners Program. This

exceeds the FY 2001 target of 7,293 offenders in treatment.

OJP’s Drug Court Program Office (DCPO) funded the implementation of 49 new

drug courts, just one short of its FY 2001 target of 50. The remaining drug court

was funded early in FY 2002. In addition, to further build drug court capacity at

the state and local level, DCPO implemented a comprehensive four-step strategy

that guides its efforts to help communities implement drug courts. The four steps

include:

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• Providing direct funding to local courts to implement or enhance a drug court;

• Providing an array of training and technical assistance opportunities to implement best practices;

• Supporting the evaluation of drug courts to demonstrate effectiveness; and

• Partnering with the drug court field to integrate the drug court movement

into the mainstream court system.

—Victims of crime—Uphold the rights of and improve services to America’s crime

victims.

The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) met its two principal goals for its National

Academy initiative: (1) to develop a comprehensive, research-based course of academic instruction providing current and cutting-edge knowledge about victim assistance and the field of victimology; and (2) to encourage the adaptation and integration of victim services instruction into institutions of higher learning and other

venues. Because of OVC’s leadership in this area, over the past few years, the National Academy has educated and offered graduate and undergraduate academic

credit to almost 1,700 victim service professionals, including federal victim-witness

coordinators. In 2001, 250 people attended the National Victim Assistance Academy,

with one-third of those receiving academic credit for Academy attendance.

—Community services—Support innovative, cooperative community-based programs

aimed at reducing crime and violence and promoting resolution of racial tension.

In FY 2001, the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) reviewed over 103

applications for Official Recognition. Official recognition is important in that it validates a site’s strategy and coalition development and makes it eligible to apply for

Weed and Seed grant funding. In FY 2001, EOWS awarded 215 grants to a combination of new and continuation sites. Many of these sites saw significant improvements as a result of Weed and Seed strategy implementation. For example, as a result of stepped up ‘‘weeding’’ efforts in the Edison neighborhood of Kalamazoo,

Michigan, law enforcement officials seized illegal drugs worth over $500,000, almost

double the amount seized in the entire City of Kalamazoo the previous year. Weed

and Seed participants also removed of hundreds of junk autos from the Edison

neighborhood’s streets to improve the neighborhood environment.

—Grant management—Develop and maintain grant management accountability

mechanisms to ensure proper disbursement and monitoring of funds.

In FY 2001, OJP managed $5.9 billion in new resources—most of which were disbursed in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts. As the number

and complexity of OJP’s programs have grown, so has the need to more carefully

account for, award, and monitor billions of taxpayer dollars. OJP addressed this

grant-related management challenge, which was also identified by the DOJ Office

of the Inspector General, by developing and implementing an automated grants

management system. When operational throughout OJP, this system will allow OJP

to electronically track and process grants from initial application to closeout. This

paperless system will allow grantees to receive and submit applications and receive

awards electronically, which will reduce the paperwork required by the grantees,

speed the award of grant funds, and standardize the grant award process across

OJP.

Also during FY 2001, the Office of the Comptroller’s Monitoring Division conducted financial reviews of 1,604 grants, exceeding its FY 2001 target of 1,600.

These reviews assist grantees in managing their federal funds and also reveal any

specialized training or assistance the grantee may need. The results of financial

monitoring are used in OJP’s nationwide Regional Financial Management Training

Seminars, which provide training to law enforcement officers, OJP program monitors, and grant recipients on how to avoid grant financial problems. In FY 2001,

97 percent of the approximately 2,700 recipients of Financial Training reported they

were satisfied with the training they received, exceeding the target for FY 2001 by

2 percent.

OJP will continue to use the guidance provided through GPRA to set annual goals

for its programs, measure performance, and verify results.

CONCLUSION

Through these and other efforts, Mr. Chairman, OJP is working to ensure the effective use of grant funds, prevent fraud and abuse, and measure the impact of the

programs we fund. This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would welcome

101

the opportunity to answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may

have.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Peed.

STATEMENT OF CARL PEED, DIRECTOR, COPS PROGRAM, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. PEED. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Scott, good afternoon. I

am very pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the Office

of Community Police Organizations, or COPS. For me, it has not

been only a career, but a way of life. My father, grandfather, father-in-law, brother and brother-in-law have all served in law enforcement. I served 25 years in Fairfax County Sheriff’s Office, the

last 10 as a sheriff. Most recently, I served as Virginia’s director

of Juvenile Justice. As a result of this legacy of law enforcement

service, I am proud to be in an organization whose mission is to

reduce crime and advance community policing by supporting State

and local law enforcement.

I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from the Office

of Justice programs and the Inspector General. COPS enjoys a

strong working relationship with both of these components. In fact,

both offices are part of our comprehensive strategy. COPS takes seriously its commitment to support State and local law enforcement.

We also take seriously our obligation to the American taxpayer. To

safeguard the investment made by Congress and the American

public, COPS has developed a comprehensive monitoring strategy

to ensure that all COPS 32,700 grants are being implemented within the statutory guidelines set forth under the 1994 Crime Act as

well as grant program guidelines.

This includes progress reports, on-site visits, comprehensive desk

reviews, they can check and regular audits from the office of the

Inspector General. As you know, COPS is a product of a bipartisan

effort to invest in the safety of our Nation’s neighborhoods. More

than two-thirds of the law enforcement agencies in the Nation have

utilized COPS funding to advance community policing, make our

schools safer and purchase time-saving technology.

Shortly after September 11th, Attorney General John Ashcroft

called for a national neighborhood watch to combat terrorism. Two

months ago, President Bush announced the USA Freedom Corps,

a key element of which is the volunteers and policeman service.

The President and Attorney General are correct in trying to harness the tremendous benefits that can be derived from a strong

partnership between law enforcement and informing an engaged

community.

Local law enforcement agencies practiced in community policing

long ago recognized these benefits and have worked successfully in

their communities to fight crime. The community policing philosophy fund by COPS has been a great assistance in our fight on

crime. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 86 percent of

law enforcement agencies now practice community policing, and the

number of community policing officers increased 400 percent between 1997 and 1999. In addition to increasing the number of community policing officers on the beat and in our schools, COPS continues to respond to the pressing technology needs of American law

enforcement.

102

More than 1 billion in COPS technology funding has enabled

4,000 State and local law enforcement agencies to purchase state

of the art crime-fighting technology. This technology not only assists law enforcement in combatting traditional crime. It is also enabled law enforcement to meet the many new challenges they have

confronted since September 11th.

For example, Austin, Texas received a COPS grant to create a

311 nonemergency phone system that became fully operational just

days after the terrorist attack. Citizens responded by calling 311

for information rather than flooding the 911 system with calls.

Ed Harris, Austin Police Department’s director of emergency

communication said 311 saved us from not only having our 911 system swamped, but saved our systems who had emergencies, such

as heart attack and crimes in progress, from getting a busy signal.

311 has been a miracle.

In addition to funding for crime-fighting technology, we provide

training and technical assistance on innovative crime reduction

strategies, ranging from community policing training to ending racial profiling, and since September 11th to focusing on terrorism.

This vital law enforcement training has provided throughout our

national network of regional community policing institutes and has

been delivered to over 170,000 law enforcement officials and community leaders.

Additionally, COPS has contributed to combatting crime and disorder in native American communities across the Nation with 171

million funding to 241 Federally recognized tribes. Similarly, COPS

has dedicated 223 million in resources to battle the proliferation of

methamphetamine . One of the things law enforcement officials

have truly appreciated about the COPS program is its flexibility

and user friendliness. The President’s 2003 budget enhances flexibility through the creation of a new 800 million justice systems

grant program. COPS has the flexibility to meet the public safety

needs of big cities, small towns and everything in between. We

have made user friendliness a top priority by simplifying our application process and by giving chiefs, mayors and sheriffs just one

point of contact to do all the business at the COPS office.

We look forward to providing continued funding, flexibility and

efficiency to State and local law enforcement in the future. Since

September 11th, America has gained an even greater appreciation

for the men and women in uniform. I was reminded of this when

I attended the memorial service for Officer John Perry to represent

the COPS’ office and show our solidarity with the NYPD and all

those in law enforcement.

On the day he was to turn in his retirement papers, officer Perry

gave his life protecting others at the World Trade Center. His body

was recovered from Ground Zero just last week.

Thank you for giving me opportunity to testify about the contributions COPS has made to American law enforcement. Each day

I come to the COPS office, I am reminded that service in the men

and women in uniform, like Officer Perry, and his colleagues, have

selflessly given to this Nation. I am happy to answer any questions,

and I ask that I may submit my full statement for the record.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Peed.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peed follows:]

103

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL PEED

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott and members of the subcommittee:

I am very pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services—or COPS. For me law enforcement has not simply been

a career, it’s been a way of life. My father, grandfather, father-in-law, brother, and

brother-in-law have all served in law enforcement. I served 25 years in the Fairfax

County Sheriff’s Department, the last ten as the Sheriff. Most recently, I served as

Virginia’s Director of Juvenile Justice. As a result of this legacy of law enforcement

service, I am proud to lead an organization whose mission it is to reduce crime and

advance community policing by supporting state and local law enforcement.

I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from the Office of Justice Programs and the Office of the Inspector General. COPS enjoys a strong working relationship with both of these components of the Department of Justice. In fact, both

offices are part of our comprehensive grant-monitoring strategy.

COPS takes seriously its commitment to support state and local law enforcement.

We also take seriously our obligation to the American taxpayer. To safeguard the

investment made by Congress and the American public, COPS has developed a comprehensive monitoring strategy to ensure that all of COPS 32,700 grants are being

implemented within the statutory guidelines set forth under the 1994 Crime Act as

well as grant program guidelines. This includes yearly progress reports, financial

monitoring by the Office of the Comptroller, and regular audits from the Office of

the Inspector General, as well as on-site visits and comprehensive desk reviews. Office based desk reviews are intended to provide grant monitoring oversight to a specific and large population of grantees that may never qualify for an on-site monitoring visit due to their location and/or amount of grant funding. Desk reviews include collecting, gathering, and reviewing grant documentation and are a way to

reach out to grantees to ensure that they adhere to compliance standards.

As you know, COPS is the product of a bipartisan effort to invest in the safety

of our nation’s neighborhoods. More than two-thirds of the law enforcement agencies

in the nation have utilized COPS funding to advance community policing, make our

schools safer, and purchase time saving technology.

Shortly after September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft called for a national

neighborhood watch to combat terrorism. Six weeks ago in his State of the Union

Address, President Bush announced the USA Freedom Corps, a key element of

which is the Volunteers in Policing Service or VIPS. President Bush and Attorney

General Ashcroft are correct in trying to harness the tremendous benefits that can

be derived from a strong partnership between law enforcement and an informed and

engaged community. Local law enforcement agencies practicing community policing,

long ago recognized these benefits, and have worked successfully with their communities to fight crime.

Congress has made a significant investment in community policing through $8.6

billion in COPS grants since 1994. The community policing philosophy funded by

COPS has been of great assistance in our fight on crime. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 86% of law enforcement agencies now practice community policing and the number of community policing officers increased by 400% between 1997

and 1999.

In addition to increasing the number of community policing officers on the beat

and in our schools, COPS continues to respond to the pressing technology needs of

American law enforcement. More than $1 billion in COPS technology funding has

enabled 4,000 state and local law enforcement agencies to purchase state-of-the-art,

crime fighting technology. This technology not only assists law enforcement in combating traditional crime, it has also enabled law enforcement to meet the many new

challenges they confront since September 11.

For example, Austin, Texas received a COPS grant to create a 311 non-emergency

phone system that became fully operational just days after the terrorist attacks.

Citizens responded by calling 311 for information, rather than flooding the 911 system with calls. Ed Harris, Austin Police Department’s Director of Emergency Communications said, ‘‘311 saved us from not only having our 911 center swamped, but

saved our citizens who had true emergencies, such as heart attacks and crimes in

progress, from getting a busy signal. 311 has been a miracle.’’

Like Austin, the City of Chicago used COPS grants to enhance public safety. With

COPS funds, the Chicago Police Department deployed a web-based data management system called Community and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting

(CLEAR). The CLEAR technology contributes to operational readiness, intelligence

gathering, and target hardening by providing access to real time data from emergency rooms, universities, public housing, motor vehicles, and other criminal justice

system data.

104

The system was put to use after the terrorist attacks of September 11, when the

Chicago Police Department was able to immediately map and analyze the locations

of 2500 critical facilities and then effectively deploy officers to those locations.

In addition to funding for crime-fighting technology, the COPS Office also supports the creation of new strategies to reduce crime and increase public safety and

provides training and technical assistance on these new strategies. This vital law

enforcement training is provided through our national network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) and has been delivered to over 170,000 law enforcement officials and community leaders.

One of these institutes, located at Wichita State University, delivers essential

training on law enforcement intelligence integration and community policing. In December 2001, this institute delivered a training program entitled ‘‘Integrating Law

Enforcement Intelligence and Community Policing’’. This training program was established to focus on issues such as assessing possible terrorist targets, identifying

individuals and groups who might be involved in terrorist acts, and developing and

sharing terrorism related intelligence. At the request of the FBI, this training was

recently delivered at their academy in Quantico.

COPS has also sought to address critical issues that relate to police integrity,

such as use of force and racial profiling. Recognizing that excessive use of force and

racial profiling—which is when law enforcement uses race or ethnicity, rather than

behavior—undermines community trust, and is a barrier to community policing,

COPS has developed model problem solving programs, technical assistance initiatives, and police integrity training that is being delivered to law enforcement and

community members throughout the nation.

Additionally, COPS has contributed to combating crime and disorder in Native

American communities across the Nation with over $171 million in funding to 241

federally recognized tribes. Similarly, COPS has dedicated $223 million in resources

to battle the proliferation of methamphetamine.

One of the things law enforcement officials have truly appreciated about the

COPS program is its flexibility. The President’s 2003 Budget enhances flexibility

through the creation of a new $800 million Justice Assistance Grant program. In

this Nation, there are a wide array of crime problems affecting communities of all

shapes and sizes. COPS has the flexibility to meet the public safety needs of big

cities, small towns, and everything in between. Local chiefs, sheriffs, and mayors get

officers to implement programs they deem necessary in their communities. We look

forward to providing continued funding and flexibility to state and local law enforcement in the future.

Since September 11th, America has gained an even greater appreciation for the

men and women of law enforcement. I was reminded of this when I attended the

memorial service for Officer John Perry to represent the COPS Office and show our

solidarity with the NYPD and all those in law enforcement. On the day he was to

turn in his retirement papers, Officer Perry gave his life protecting others at the

World Trade Center. His body was recovered from Ground Zero just last week.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today about the contributions

COPS has made to American law enforcement. Each day I come to the COPS Office

I am reminded of the service the men and women in uniform—like Officer Perry

and his colleagues—have selflessly dedicated to this Nation.

I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Campbell.

STATEMENT OF BONNIE CAMPBELL, FORMER DIRECTOR, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

Ms. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Scott, good

afternoon. Congress has recently passed, on both the Senate and

House sides, bills to create a Statutory Violence Against Women office in the U.S. Department of Justice. This, in my view, is a wonderful development. One that can help further the progress already

made since the Violence Against Women Act passed in 1994 and

following its reauthorization in 2000.

As you know, the passage of the VAWA in 1994 was the catalyst

for the administrative creation of the Violence Against Women Office. I was fortunate to have served as its first director. The creVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
105

ation of the Violence Against Women Office had an enormous impact on the work done in the States to address domestic violence,

stalking and sexual assault.

For the first time, a clear voice of leadership was heard coming

from the Federal Government. That voice, the voice of the Violence

Against Women Office, lent guidance and support to the courts,

prosecutors, law enforcement officers and victim service organizations engaged in reducing the impact of violence against women.

Immediately following the President’s announcement of the creation of the Violence Against Women Office, I was asked by numerous State leaders, including governors and attorneys general, to

come to their jurisdictions, to help initiate and guide their new initiatives in response to the challenge of the VAWA. I cannot convey

how hungry they were for guidance and help from our office. What

they needed went far beyond grant funding. They wanted real help

in interpreting and implementing the new Federal laws regarding

inner-State crimes of domestic violence and stalking. They wanted

my help as the liaison to other components of the Justice Department, such as the U.S. attorneys offices and the INS, which were

also involved in the implementation and enforcement of VAWA.

They looked to us for guidance in the form of AG memos and departmental policies, to figure out how to implement VAWA in the

context of existing State law.

As the director of the office, I learned that simply cutting a check

was not enough to meet and support the needs of the State players

engaged in carrying out the mandates of the Federal Act. Grantees

needed policy guidance, help in the implementation and interpretation of law and assistance in identifying the best practices and protocols in use around the country. The Violence Against Women Office has worked hard, frankly harder than we have a right to expect, and continues to work hard to meet the various needs of the

grantees.

The policy implementation and programmatic guidance demanded of the Violence Against Women Office by the grantees is

answered by Congress’s passage of bills that would create a statutory Violence Against Women Office. I and all others doing work

to respond to domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking and trafficking across the country thank you for recognizing the importance

of creating a permanent office to undertake the duties I have described above.

I know that the differences between the Senate and House versions of these two bills raises the question of the placement of this

statutory office. This is a very significant issue for Congress to undertake. The Senate version creates an independent office within

the main area of justice. The House version is silent on the issue

of placement and may therefore suggest that the Violence Against

Women Office remain in the Office of Justice programs.

Let me discuss this issue from my experience as the former director of the Violence Against Women Office. The Violence Against

Women Office has responsibilities that go far beyond the simple act

of writing checks to grantees. The VAWA’s substantive laws create

responsibilities, as I have outlined, within the office, to assist

grantees in carrying out the clear purpose and conditions of the violence against women act.

106

Additionally, that Federal law in both its 1994 and 2000 incarnations creates new Federal crimes and significant protections for immigrant victims of domestic violence, tracking and sexual assault.

Those changes in substantive law require expertise and coordination within the Department of Justice in order to ensure that they

are carried out properly. A grant-focused office does not have the

clout within DOJ, nor the authority to take on this crucial work.

Let me give you two examples of policy and implementation work

that occurred during my tenure as director of the Violence Against

Women Office.

The full faith and credit provision of the VAWA, the original

VAWA and its later amendments, requires States to enforce sister

jurisdictions protection orders. In order to carry out this provision,

State courts and law enforcement have to build partnerships with

the U.S. attorneys offices. Additionally, the department had to promulgate implementation guidelines and policies to guide the work

of the States.

As director, I had to coordinate a continuum of work, ranging

from the award of grants to jurisdictions, pilot testing protocols for

implementation of the full faith and credit mandate, to developing

agreements among other interested DOJ entities like the U.S. attorneys office. I had to also coordinate efforts with the Office of Policy Development and Main Justice and the Office of Legislative Affairs as amendments to the full faith and credit provisions arose

in the VAWA reauthorization of 2000. Even the Attorney General

became involved in this process when she issued memoranda offering guidance as to the interpretation of the full faith and credit

provision.

The enforcement of out-of-State protection orders has greatly improved in the past 5 years. Grant money alone, however, could not

have made those improvements happen. The policy and implementation activities of the Violence Against Women Office were significant contributions to the success of this process.

Similarly, when the original VAWA created new access to the immigration petition process for battered immigrant women, the Violence Against Women Office was there helping the INS to interpret, implement and enact these provisions. We help the INS understand the importance of having a specialized office to receive

VAWA self-petitions.

That office now exists in Vermont, and I am proud of the role our

office played in getting that set up. What I hope is becoming clear

through my testimony is that compacting grant offices together

isn’t necessarily the best way to make programs effective and efficient and expert at what they are doing. The States supported the

Violence Against Women Act because they were looking for leadership and partnership, not just financial support, which I will grant

they do appreciate.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Campbell, are you getting to the end of your remarks?

Ms. CAMPBELL. I am.

Mr. SMITH. You are a couple minutes over and I would like to

keep us on schedule, if we could.

Ms. CAMPBELL. I would be happy to stop and insert them as—

.

107

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Without objection, all of your complete opening

statements will be made a part of the record, as well your written

testimony you submitted to us earlier.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Campbell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BONNIE J. CAMPBELL

Congress has recently passed, both on the Senate and House sides, bills to create

a statutory Violence Against Women Office in the U.S. Department of Justice. This

is a wonderful development, one that can help further the progress already made

since the Violence Against Women Act passed in 1994 and following its reauthorization in 2000.

As you know, the passage of VAWA in 1994 was the catalyst for the administrative creation of the Violence Against Women Office. I served as its first Director.

The creation of VAWO had an enormous impact on the work done in the States to

address domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault. For the first time, a clear

voice of leadership was heard coming from the federal government. That voice—the

voice of the Violence Against Women Office—lent guidance and support to the

courts, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and victim service organizations engaged in reducing the impact of violence against women.

Immediately following the President’s announcement of the creation of VAWO, I

was asked by numerous state leaders, including Governors and Attorneys General,

to come to their jurisdictions, to help initiate and guide their new initiatives in response to the challenge of VAWA. I cannot convey how hungry they were for guidance and help from VAWO. What they needed went far beyond grant funding. They

wanted real help in interpreting and implementing the new federal laws regarding

interstate crimes of domestic violence and stalking. They wanted my help as a liaison to other components of the Justice Department, such as the U.S. Attorneys Offices and the INS, which were also involved in the implementation and enforcement

of VAWA. They looked to us for guidance, in the form of AG memos and departmental policies, to figure out how to implement VAWA in the context of existing

state law.

As the Director of VAWO, I learned that simply cutting a check was not enough

to meet and support the needs of the State players engaged in carrying out the

mandates of VAWA. Grantees needed policy guidance, help in the implementation

and interpretation of law, and assistance in identifying the best practices and protocols in use around the country. VAWO has worked hard, and continues to work

hard, to meet the various needs of the grantees.

The policy, implementation, and programmatic guidance demanded of VAWO by

the grantees is answered by Congress’ passage of bills that would create a statutory

Violence Against Women Office. I—and all others doing work to respond to domestic

violence, sexual assault, stalking, and trafficking across the country—thank you for

recognizing the importance of creating a permanent office to undertake the duties

I’ve described above.

I know that the differences between the Senate and House versions of these two

bills raises the question of the placement of this statutory Office. This is a very significant issue for Congress to undertake. The Senate version creates an independent

Office within the main area of Justice. The House version is silent on the issue of

placement, and may therefore suggest that the Violence Against Women Office remain in the Office of Justice Programs. Let me address this issue from my experience as the former Director of VAWO.

The Violence Against Women Office has responsibilities that go far beyond the

simple act of writing checks to grantees. VAWA’s substantive laws create responsibilities (as I’ve outlined earlier) within VAWO to assist grantees in carrying out

the clear purpose areas and conditions of VAWA. Additionally, VAWA, in both its

1994 and 2000 incarnations, creates new federal crimes and significant protections

for immigrant victims of domestic violence, trafficking, and sexual assault. Those

changes in substantive law require expertise and coordination within the Department of Justice in order to ensure that they are carried out properly. A grants-focused Office does not have the clout within DOJ nor the authority to take on this

crucial work.

Let me give you two examples of policy and implementation work that occurred

during my tenure as Director of VAWO.

The Full Faith and Credit provision of VAWA 1994 (and its amendment in 2000)

requires states to enforce sister jurisdictions’ protection orders. In order to carry out

this provision, state courts and law enforcement had to build partnerships with the

U.S. Attorneys Office. Additionally, the Department had to promulgate implementaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
108

tion guidelines and policies to guide the work of the States. As Director, I had to

coordinate a continuum of work, ranging from the award of grants to jurisdictions

pilot-testing protocols for implementation of the Full Faith and Credit mandate, to

developing agreements among other, interested DOJ entities (like the U.S. Attorneys Office). I had to also coordinate efforts with the Office of Policy Development

in Main Justice and the Office of Legislative Affairs (as amendments to the FFC

provision arose in the VAWA reauthorization of 2000). Even the Attorney General

became involved in this process, when she issued memoranda offering guidance as

to the interpretation of the FFC provision.

The enforcement of out of state protection orders has greatly improved in the past

five years. Grant money alone could not have made those improvements happen.

The policy and implementation activities of VAWO were significant contributions to

the success of this process.

Similarly, when VAWA 1994 created new access to the immigration petition process for battered immigrant women, VAWO was there, helping the INS to interpret,

implement, and enact these provision. We helped the INS understand the importance of having a specialized office to receive VAWA self-petitions; that office now

exists in Vermont and I am proud of the role our office played n getting that set

up.

What I hope is becoming clear through my testimony is that compacting grant offices together isn’t necessarily the best way to make programs effective and efficient

and expert at what they are doing. The States supported the VAWA because they

were looking for leadership and partnership, not just financial support. Congress

was very careful and deliberate in crafting the laws and grant programs that constitute the work of VAWO; they have many special conditions and purpose areas

included in the statutory language to ensure that grant money is well spent, efficiently spent, and spent in a way that will serve victims of domestic violence, sexual

assault, stalking, and trafficking. If you consolidate the VAWA funding streams

with other OJP funding streams, you will pit the purpose areas of VAWA against

the differing, and sometimes conflicting, purpose areas of the other OJP programs.

Congress, in defining VAWA’s provisions so exactly, said that subject matter expertise was crucial in carrying out the meaning of the statute. Let us have a Violence

Against Women Office that has ALL of that expertise and capacity.

The Senate version would create an independent Office in Main Justice. That is

incredibly crucial to the policy and implementation functions I’ve described above.

If you believe that Violence Against Women is a serious issue, then give it the priority and authority it needs to do its work. At the same time, I ask that you include

the House language describing the responsibilities and authority of the Director. It

is important to have these duties articulated clearly. The combination of these two

elements of the two bills will give you just what you need—an Office capable of advancing the legal protections and rights of the Violence Against Women Act together

with an Office capable of funding that work.

Let us continue to use leadership to change the culture.

Mr. SMITH. I have a couple questions, all of which have to do

with the COPS program and Mr. Fine, I would like to direct my

initial questions to you, and I am tempted to follow up on Mr.

Scott’s use of the word whether some of these problems might be

in the eye of the beholder, which is biblical. And there is another

biblical reference to ‘‘thy eye is full of light,’’ meaning full of understanding.

So the question is which are you? Is it in the eye of the beholder,

or are you full of understanding when it comes to some of these

problems with the COPS program? And let me ask you a couple of

questions in that regard.

The first, as you mentioned a while ago in your verbal testimony,

you said in regard to the COPS program, that deficiencies were not

corrected; and then in the various audits that we read, both about

the OJP and the COPS programs, you used phrases like questioned

costs, unsupported cost and funds that could be put to better use.

You mentioned some examples, but I specifically would be interested in hearing more about what deficiencies were not corrected.

What were you specifically referring to then?

109

Mr. FINE. We found that in many cases, the response to our findings was a paper exercise and that the COPS program did not take

sufficient action to either bring the grantee in compliance, to offset

the funds, to recoup the funds or to waive the funds. We found that

there had to be a hard-nosed approach to this, but instead, it was

back and forth, back and forth without bringing it to resolution,

and that was the main concern that we had.

And these funds, when we questioned them, many times there

was the initial questioning of our work, but in the end when it was

accepted, we still did not reach resolution or the audit findings.

That is what most concerned us.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you about one other COPS problem and

that deals with the computer security system that you found you

had concerns about, and I wondered what corrective actions have

been taken and if you still have the same concerns you did.

Mr. FINE. Computer security is a very important issue, we find

that throughout the department. We had concerns about the COPS

offices policies on passwords, for example, for disabling accounts for

separated employees, for warning banners on all servers, for account lockout options, administrator account privileges, a whole

range of security issues that we found were not being taken. We

have been told that they have been taken, and we have not done

a follow-up review on that, but it is an important issue that needs

to be addressed on a constant basis. We are finding these kinds of

problems throughout the department, and we found it in COPS as

well.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Fine.

Ms. Henke, let me address a couple questions to you. The first

is who decides the National Institute of Justice would be evaluating some of these OJP programs? And do you think that we need

more evaluations than just those done by the National Institute of

Justice?

Ms. HENKE. First of all, sir, evaluations is an important component and responsibility of the National Institute of Justice, and

that has been determined in working with Congress. As far as

whether or not evaluations beyond the National Institute of Justice

should occur, they do occur. We do encourage them to occur to ensure that the findings and the research and the methodology that

we use at the National Institute of Justice is sound.

Mr. SMITH. And therefore the answer to my question is, are there

more evaluations that are going to take place other than by the

National Institute of Justice?

Ms. HENKE. Certainly, yes.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. The other is do you feel that the proposed reorganization of OJP will be beneficial? Do you think it will reduce

some of the waste or some of the mismanagement of funds that we

see?

Ms. HENKE. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Those are good short answers and I appreciate it,

thank you.

Mr. Peed, let me address the question about COPS to you, and

that is, what specific steps are being taken by your office to address some of the problems that Mr. Fine and others have found

in their audits?

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Mr. PEED. Mr. Chairman, I have been here about 6 months and

28 years experience working in large law enforcement organizations. I think it takes leadership and I think it takes accountability, accountability not only of our employees, but also the grantees. We have an IG unit, or at least when I was director of Justice,

I created an IG unit. I consolidated our monitoring compliance division, our audit functions, our hotline complaints and our investigations under one leader, so that we made sure that we addressed

all those issues that Mr. Fine is raising today.

In the COPS office we take monitoring very seriously. We have

a comprehensive monitoring strategy. We have yearly progress reports and quarterly reports. We use financial reports, and we depend upon the Office of Comptroller and the Inspector General to

help us in many issues.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Peed, my question was what specific steps are

you taking?

Mr. PEED. Okay. I take it very seriously, and what I have done

is basically I have taken not only a personal interest in it, but I

review every IG audit that comes into our agency. I underline and

highlight the issues of concern. I bring it to the attention of our executive management team, and I made a visit to Mr. Fine’s office

along with our local counsel and our assistant director for monitoring and compliance to, again, show my interest and support for

making sure that we address all of those issues.

In addition, personally called some of the auditors in the field to

talk about those issues. What I intend to do also is to develop a

more aggressive approach about inquiring to the localities to meet

deadlines and make sure we get the information to respond to the

IG concerns. Sometimes the chiefs or the localities don’t provide the

information as quickly as they can, and I intend to be much more

aggressive in pursuing that documentation to resolve those cases.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Peed.

Ms. Campbell, a question for you about the COPS—not COPS

program, but about the Violence Against Women’s office. Part of

the problem with the COPS program, as I understand it, is it was

a separate office within the Department, and that has resulted in

a lot of the concerns that many of us have. Why wouldn’t the same

concerns arise if we put the violence against Women’s office as a

separate entity as well? It seems to me if we have problems with

one, we would have problems with the other.

Ms. CAMPBELL. Well, I don’t know that I would make the assumption that the same errors would be made. In fact, as I read

the various GAO reports evaluating the Violence Against Women

Act, most of the concerns had to do with OJP-wide problems rather

than problems specific to the Violence Against Women office.

I would also point out that—.

Mr. SMITH. I wasn’t talking about concerns about the Violence

Against Women Office. I was talking about the proposal to make

it separate as the COPS program was separate and other problems

related to the COPS—. Ms. CAMPBELL. That is my point, that the concerns that were

raised against the violence against women office were mostly related to OJP. So I don’t know that evaluating COPS versus being

within OJP is the proper distinction. But I would make the point

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that, for example, both the FBI and the DEA have grants programs, and no one would seriously think of folding them into OJP,

because the Violence Against Women Act specifically identified systemic changes, changes in the Federal law that have a profound

impact on State governments, on State law enforcement, and I

think that just writing a check won’t cut it.

So much of what we did had to do with defining the policy, helping to interpret the law, get the word out, which I can’t see being

done if you are simply a grants office.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Campbell. Let me give Mr.

Fine the last word on my last question. And which is, do you

think—and I don’t know the answer myself, that is why I was asking you—do you think it would be a good idea or not be a good idea

to the Office of Violence Against Women as a separate entity like

we have done with COPS?

Mr. FINE. Well, that is a hard question. We haven’t done work

recently in the Violence Against Women Office. So I can’t answer

specifically about the record of that office. Having a single purpose

entity would focus attention on a problem. I would caution and

would be concerned about whether there would be problems of duplication, coordination, communication, and before that happened

and before there was a proliferation of single-issue offices, I would

think very carefully about it.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Fine. Thank you all for answering my questions and the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott,

is recognized for his.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You asked many of the

questions that I had to ask. So I will just ask a couple of questions

to Mr. Fine.

In your audit you showed—found a lot of problems with audits.

Did I understand you to say that you audited 300 grants?

Mr. FINE. 330 COPS grants, correct.

Mr. SCOTT. And they were a total of how many?

Mr. FINE. There were a total of how many grants?

Mr. SCOTT. Thousands.

Mr. FINE. 10, 20,000—30,000. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. How did you select the 300? Were there any indicia

of problems there, or were they just randomly selected?

Mr. FINE. Initially the COPS office would refer cases of concern,

cases that they thought there would be a problem. We also picked

ones, picked other ones, additional ones that we thought would—

should be audited. We tried to have a mix of large and small—.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I guess that answers my question. We can’t—

we should not extrapolate the problems of the 300 to the 30,000.

Mr. FINE. No. I don’t think you could point-by-point extrapolate

and say it is going to be the same percentages. We were concerned

about the scope of the problem, the breadth of the problem, the

amount of the problem we were finding, even in the ones we had

picked. So we didn’t think there would be reason to think that the

problems were confined solely to these grantees that we picked, but

you are right that you could not statistically extrapolate.

Mr. SCOTT. You mentioned the fact that some were supplanting,

notwithstanding the direction not to supplant. Is that a problem in

other grant programs?

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Mr. FINE. Supplanting is a difficult issue to address. I know the

GAO has done studies on it and they have found in other programs

supplanting as well. We found about 40 percent of the grantees had

a problem with supplanting in the COPS program. So I would

guess that it is not limited to the COPS program, but that is where

the majority of our work has been done.

Mr. SCOTT. Now, the waste and problems with the audit, would

they be cured with a different—would it be improved with a different structure or are these just inherent problems that any grant

program would suffer?

Mr. FINE. Grant programs need to be carefully monitored. They

need to have careful scrutiny. Whether the COPS program would

have less problems if they were streamlined or consolidated with

OJP, that is a difficult question to answer. We are currently doing

an audit to try and determine whether consolidation and streamlining might prevent some of the problems that we are finding.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if you streamline, would you have less oversight

or more oversight?

Mr. FINE. It depends how strong an oversight body there is in

the consolidated entity and how carefully and concentrated an effort they make on that. You could have fewer problems if they had

a very thorough and aggressive monitoring effort, or you could have

more problems if they didn’t take it seriously.

Mr. SCOTT. Ms. Henke, you mentioned evaluations. You require,

as a condition of getting a grant, the fact that in evaluation of the

program has to take place. Is that right?

Ms. HENKE. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. Did I understand you to say that that is an NIJ evaluation or some independent evaluation?

Ms. HENKE. A combination of both.

Mr. SCOTT. And how long has this requirement been there?

Ms. HENKE. We just put this requirement in place last fall.

Mr. SCOTT. So do you have any evaluations back yet?

Ms. HENKE. No, sir we do not, not on the new process that we

put in place.

Mr. SCOTT. Have programs previously been evaluated, whether it

was required or not?

Ms. HENKE. Yes, sir, some have.

Mr. SCOTT. So a few?

Ms. HENKE. I can’t give you a specific number, but whether it be

the GAO or other independent evaluations or some through NIJ,

they have occurred.

Mr. SCOTT. And when you get these evaluations, will you store

them away where no one can find them? Or will they be available

so someone could benefit from the evaluations?

Ms. HENKE. Sir, we want to widely disseminate the information.

That is something that OJP, and especially the new leadership,

takes very seriously. It is one of the reasons why we established

our State reports, which I am not certain if you have seen, but we

have done State reports—individual State reports. For instance, I

have the State of Virginia here and we break down and provide

once again to every governor, U.S. attorney, House Member, Senator, a list—the total amount of money received from OJP and

COPS, as well as every single grantee in your State, and that

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should hopefully help determine future resource allocation. Because

in addition, what we are going to add to it this year is the statistic

section. So a comparison can be done by the State on these are the

resources that the State is getting, but this is where we rank nationally.

Mr. SCOTT. Did you say OJP in COPS or OJP and COPS?

Ms. HENKE. This is OJP and COPS.

Mr. SCOTT. So you have all the OJP grants to the Commonwealth

of Virginia listed there?

Ms. HENKE. Right. And it is also available on our Web site.

Mr. SCOTT. And in a few months we should have evaluations of

all of those programs to see whether or not the taxpayer got the

money’s worth?

Ms. HENKE. No, not necessarily, sir. Evaluations take a period of

time, and so to say that we are going to have them in a couple of

months, no. Evaluations, we have to first gather the information,

and that is why we have as part of our grantee requirements specific things, specific information they should gather, a combination

of both outputs and outcomes so we can comply both with GPRA

requirements as well as to determine what works, so then we can

widely disseminate the information to the field.

Mr. SCOTT. Now, will the evaluations be somehow evaluated to

help us determine what elements of programs are helpful? Will the

NIJ be doing that?

Ms. HENKE. Sir, NIJ, that is something that, once again, we are

certainly working on but, yes, we want NIJ to be informed in the

evaluation. We also are not afraid to have outside entities also

evaluate, and whether it be GAO or the IG or other charities. I

know the Heritage Foundation testified pertaining to some evaluations that they have done.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, we look forward to that, because in a lot of initiatives that frankly waste the taxpayers’ money and a lot of other

ones, we get more than our money’s worth. So we need to know

what to do.

Ms. HENKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. My last question, I guess, is to Ms. Campbell. You

got cut off. Did you have anything more that you wanted to add?

Ms. CAMPBELL. Yes. I was hoping someone would give me the opportunity to say that, since you have before you two different options, at least two different options for creating a statutory office

at the Department of Justice. I thought I would share my opinion,

probably as informed as anyone, since I did spend some time at the

Violence Against Women Office.

The Senate version creates an independent office in Main Justice, and from my perspective, that is very important, because policy, by and large, is not done in OJP. I lived in both places. I initially was at Main Justice reporting to the associate and then

moved to OJP, and I can tell you there is an enormous difference.

You just don’t have the clout if you are not in main justice to deal

with the offices where major policy decisions are made, and not to

be unkind to the folks from OJP because the situation was exactly

the same when I was there, but here we are discussing the future

of the Violence Against Women Office, and the director of that office is not at the table.

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I think that is unusual in any other forum. It happens when I

was there. It is happening now. If that individual were a Senate

confirmed presidential appointee, I think that person would be here

having this discussion with you, I also like the House language

which delineates the responsibilities of the director of office, and I

think together we had a wonderful opportunity to create an office

with the capacity to do all that Congress seemed to expect of it

when the Violence Against Women Office was passed originally and

reauthorized in 2000.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Ms. Henke, I have one final

question for you, and this goes to what actions OJP takes when you

have a grantee or a program manager who has failed to provide

you with proper documentation upon which—or which you can use

to make evaluations? What do you do when you don’t get cooperation from the grantees or the program managers?

Ms. HENKE. Well, first of all from our grantees, sir, we have instituted several different things. For instance, if our grantees have

not submitted, for instance, their financial reports, they cannot

draw down on future funds. Their funds are frozen until they comply. As far as with OJP staff—.

Mr. SMITH. Just on that one score, so there are instances where

you have frozen funds?

Ms. HENKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. From uncooperative respondees?

Ms. HENKE. From grantees who are not in compliance with submitting. Yes, sir, we have. As far as individual staff, that is part

of their individual performance evaluation as far as their employment at OJP in ensuring that they are doing their job. And supervisors hold the individual program managers accountable.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I am not sure that that is really enough of a

sanction or enough of an incentive for individuals to change their

behavior, depending on what is done with those performance recommendations or standards.

Ms. HENKE. Sir, we are instituting several different things to ensure that, first of all, our grantees comply as well as ensuring internally at OJP the proper paperwork documentation and monitoring is done. On our financial monitoring, we are doing semiannual internal audits to make sure that the information is there.

We are instituting new evaluations. We are going to be in negotiations with our union to move forward.

Mr. SMITH. It sounds to me like you are making some efforts.

Mr. Fine, do you think the efforts are sufficient to try to get us

back on course to be able to make evaluations that are complete

and detailed?

Mr. FINE. I think there has been some improvement. I don’t

think they are where they need to be in terms of careful monitoring

of the financial statements, the progress reports and the aggressive, effective action when grantees are not in compliance. They try

to bring them in compliance, which is a good effort. But when they

are not in compliance, you have to take a firm line with that and

we would like to see a more aggressive and firmer line taken with

both programs.

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Mr. SMITH. Good. That concludes our questions. We would like

to submit some additional questions to you—I’m sorry; I did not see

Ms. Jackson Lee arrive. We would like, after we conclude, to submit some additional questions to you all and if you could respond

within 7 days, that would be appreciated.

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for

questions.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have not heard your testimony, I will not

prolong this. But I thank Ms. Campbell for her presence here

today, since I am very interested in the Violence Against Women

Office, and to ensure that some of the thrust of combining some of

the programs does not cause loss of status and prominence and recognition as well as the ability to do the job. And in the course of

answering that, would you then also add for me any thoughts that

you have about waste and fraud that is either to be avoided by the

suggested combining or whether or not you sense that there is any

and that we have a serious enough problem that we have to address it from some of the proposals that have been presented.

Ms. CAMPBELL. Well, I certainly do not think there is any waste

or fraud in the work of the Violence Against Women Office. People

across the Justice Department worked very hard to get that very

substantial grants program up and running.

I will tell you is that over the years, I lamented and to be extraordinary steps to try to get more staff. I do think many of the

criticisms are legitimate, perhaps about program monitoring and so

forth, but we were simply understaffed, and that is one of the concerns I have about leaving the office within OJP. Otherwise, if we

had had an independent office with statutory authority headed by

a Senate-confirmed presidential appointee, decisions about staffing

could have been made according to the need that exists within that

office, not necessarily across the whole of OJP, which is rather

vast.

I did have the opportunity to state that I have looked at the Senate version and the House version of creating a statutory office,

and I feel very strongly from my experience, having been both at

Main Justice originally when I took the position as director, and

then in OJP later, that if you are in OJP, you just do not have the

clout to be at the table when major decisions are made that affect

women who are victims of violence. They do not do policy. And I

am very concerned that there is already a dismantling of the policy

development team within the Violence Against Women Office. The

money is nice. Clearly, you hear from the field how much they appreciate the support that Republicans and Democrats have given

the Violence Against Women funding.

But they look for so much more. They look for partnership with

us. They look for leadership. They look for the bully pulpit. I know

you saw me in Texas more than once talking about the importance

of this issue. They look for interpretation of the statute, which is

complicated. Just to give one example: In order to properly analyze

the full faith and credit provision, which requires States to honor

protective orders from other States, you have to consider the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the interplay there. The

UCCJA which most States have adopted, it is very complicated

stuff. You just cannot have somebody whose main job it is to make

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sure the money gets out the door and that it is properly spent handling or asking questions about that.

What if the Dallas Police Department calls a State desk which

is being proposed and says I have a battered woman with a police

officer and a protective order from Iowa. What shall I do with it?

You do not have time to say, well, gee, I will get back to you in

3 or 4 days.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You need interpretation. You support the Senate version?

Ms. CAMPBELL. I support the Senate version in terms of the

placement of the office in Main Justice, but I think the House version delineates the responsibilities of that office. I think that is

helpful.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate that. Mr. Peed, with the COPS

program of which I am a strong advocate for that, might I just find

out, are you comfortable with the gist of what is planned for the

COPS program? It is my understanding that it is being moved.

Mr. PEED. I do not know. I haven’t had any specific information

about it being moved. In the 2003 budget, there was no recommendation that it be moved.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you are happy with its present structure?

Mr. PEED. I am working just fine there, and if anything develops,

I will be happy wherever I am organized.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mrs. Jackson Lee. And thank you all

again for your testimony today. It is very, very helpful and we appreciate your being here. As you all know, this is a third in a series

of three hearings on the general subject of oversight of the OJP.

All three hearings have add up to a great deal of good information

for us to consider as we go forward with the authorization process.

Thank you all again. And the Subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(117)

A P P E N D I X

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

MARCH 5, 2002

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. SCOTT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you in convening this oversight

hearing on the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), United States Department of Justice (DOJ). We are all aware of the important role the Office of Justice Programs

plays in administering its more than fifty grant programs for the benefit of state

and local law enforcement, juvenile justice, victims of crime and others.

OJP’s organizational structure is unique. It has developed over the years as a direct response to Congressional funding, including earmarks and other mandates.

The bureaus, offices and programs in OJP are numerous and complex in their design and operation. The substantive functions of the bureaus are vested by law in

their directors, rather than the Attorney General or the OJP Assistant Attorney

General. These statutes have provided that the directors have final authority over

all grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts awarded by their respective agencies. As a result, OJP operates to a large degree as a network of independent agencies which share a common infrastructure. Funding for OJP programs exceed $4 billion annually, up from $1.1 billion in 1995.

As a result of this rapid growth in size and complexity of operation, inefficiencies,

duplications, and difficulties began to be noted by some of those observing or negotiating the maze of grant, research, and technical assistance programs under OJP.

So, in 1997, Congress, through the appropriations process, directed OJP and DOJ

to develop a proposal for reorganization which would clarify and streamline its operations. On March 10, 1999, DOJ responded with a report which proposed changes

to the present OJP structure in an effort to accomplish these objectives. It proposed

various changes, such as focusing authority in the Assistant Attorney General for

OJP through the elimination of presidentially appointed bureau chiefs, eliminating

some bureaus, consolidating some program offices, and consolidating all research

within NIJ.

During the oversight hearing, we heard from a variety of ‘‘customers’’ of OJP, including researchers, practitioners, administrators and advocates of OJP programs.

Two of the seven witnesses expressed support for the proposal or parts thereof; the

others expressed criticisms and opposition to the proposal or parts thereof. I expect

that we will hear a divergence of views on the issue of OJP reorganization in this

series of hearings, as well.

One of the issues I want to focus on during the hearings, Mr. Chairman, is from

where we are hearing concerns and proposals as well as what we are hearing. Certainly, it is appropriate for Congress, through its appropriations process, to raise

issues about efficiencies wherever there are duplications in program focus and complexities in operations. And certainly DOJ has to respond to directives in its appropriations to address such concerns. As the authorizers, have to look at the questions

raised and the proposals for solutions to make a determination as to whether

changes are needed, and if so what changes. One thing we learned from the hearing

was that the interest in reorganization was not coming from a wide berth of the

customers or users of OJP programs and services, and this was taken into account

in considering what should be done on the reorganization proposals.

The primary concerns expressed during the hearings were from researchers who

thought that consolidation of the research activities of the bureaus under NIJ would

improve efficiencies as well quality in research products. However, other researchers

and customers of the bureaus disagreed that either efficiency or quality would imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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prove when the history of dedicated research and researchers connected to the particular subject area in OJP was taken into account. Indeed, their concern was that

consolidation into a general research context with general researcher might jeopardize the high level of quality in research the field had become accustomed to from

the particular bureau or office. We heard the same kind of concerns expressed by

customers of services and assistance from a system of dedicated bureaus or offices

as to what problems could arise from going to a more general service operation in

OJP capacity. As a result of what we heard, we, as the authorizing entity, did not

feel at the time that the proposals were justified or that further action was needed

on them. We addressed a great part of the concern with how the funds were managed by requiring approval of all bureau and office budgets by the Director of OJP

before they can become operative. That requirement remains today.

And, Mr, Chairman, I note that while we are considering possible elimination of

duplications and complexities in operations under OJP, we are also looking at further separations of OJP functions to improve program functions. For example, we

have a proposal from the Administration to separate out of OJP the Office on Domestic Preparedness and send it to FEMA. I know you have raised questions about

what, and how it, is to be done, and I expect that we might want hold some hearings on the issue. I am also aware of the bi-partisan effort in the Senate, and now

in the general DOJ reauthorization bill, to separate out of OJP entirely the VAWA

Office. And, of course, Mr. Chairman, there is the provision in your Cyber Security

Enhancement bill, requested by the science and technology community, to separate

the Office on Science and Technology out of NIJ, though it will remain in OJP. I

asked at our Subcommittee markup last week that we take a look at this during

this hearing as a part of the OJP reorganization issues on the whole, before proceeding to full committee markup on it. I suspect that all of these proposals recognize the effectiveness, and other values, of separate operation of important functions

in OJP, despite suggestions of duplications or inefficiencies.

So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the issues and concerns about,

as well as the need for, OJP reorganization. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is an important oversight opportunity for

this committee and the Office of Justice Programs (‘‘OJP’’) because it allows us to

examine, once again, the reorganization plan for the OJP.

An oversight hearing was held by this body on July 22, 1999, regarding a plan

submitted by DOJ pursuant to the Appropriations language in the Conference Report that accompanied the 1999 DOJ Appropriations Act. Since that hearing, however, OJP has not moved forward with the implementation of the new organizational structure. As a result, OJP’s structure has remained essentially the same,

and so have my concerns.

The OJP is the principal federal grant-making agency that supports state and

local law enforcement. The objective of the reorganization plan, as indicated in the

January 29 report from OJP, is to streamline the operations of the Office into a centralized administration structure.

The new organizational structure seeks to address duplication and overlap in the

performance of OJP by consolidating agency programs and administrative functions.

Currently, the OJP consists of five bureaus, which include the Bureau of Justice

Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the Office for Victims of

Crime.

There are six program offices which include the Violence Against Women Office,

the Corrections Program Office, the Drug Courts Program Office, the Executive

Weed and Seed, the Office of the Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education and

the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. There is also an

American Indian and Alaska Native Affairs Office as well as six administrative offices.

The reorganization plan proposes that the OJP be comprised of a centralized

structure that includes a research institute, a statistical office, four program offices

and six administrative offices.

I applaud the efforts of the OJP to reorganize to make its operations more ‘‘userfriendly.’’ More so than ever, we must constantly refine our methods of providing

service to the law enforcement community especially as we deal in a world that is

dependent on technology. The new organization plan is a step in the right direction.

119

However, I must agree with some of the concerns that have been raised by the

advocacy groups and crime prevention groups concerning some of the suggested

changes in the OJP structure. I am concerned that some changes, in the name of

efficiency, may not be as effective.

After various school violence tragedies and the contentious juvenile justice debate,

I believe that we must pay special attention to the needs of the juvenile justice system. Some witnesses here today have expressed concern about the reorganization

of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (‘‘OJJDP’’).

I share their concern about this new plan, especially as it pertains to the consolidation of all of the research into one National Institute of Justice. This may send

an erroneous message to practitioners in the field that juvenile justice is no longer

a high priority if it no longer has a distinct research component.

Also of importance to me is the administration of programs and grants under the

Violence Against Women Act. VAWA is not just a grant program and we must ensure that policy making functions will still be viable.

I hope that this hearing will give us a clearer picture of the steps OJP intends

to take in this reorganization effort and their effects on various programs. I look

forward to the testimony of the witnesses and I hope that we come to some resolution of the OJJDP and VAWA issues.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAY BILCHIK, PRESIDENT/CEO, THE CHILD WELFARE

LEAGUE OF AMERICA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

My name is Shay Bilchik and I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of

the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA). CWLA is the nation’s oldest and largest membership-based child welfare organization, with over 1,170 member agencies

and organizations nationwide, committed to engaging people everywhere in promoting the well-being of children, youth, and their families, and protecting every

child from harm. I am pleased to have the opportunity to submit this written testimony on the issue of the proposed Office of Justice Programs Reorganization Plan.

During my tenure as the Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and in my current capacity as President/CEO of the

Child Welfare League of America, I have had the opportunity to discuss the component parts and overarching tenets of the Plan with a broad range of professional

colleagues, including practitioners, researchers, service providers, and advocates in

the areas of juvenile justice, child welfare, mental health, juvenile detention and

corrections, and substance abuse. My testimony is a reflection of that invaluable

input and my 25 years of professional experience.

As you are aware, in 1997 the Congress took the first of several steps toward developing a new organizational structure for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP),

initiating an examination of the OJP infrastructure and the statutory framework

that has shaped that infrastructure for the past 14 years. The Assistant Attorney

General for OJP was asked to submit a report that ‘‘outlines the steps OJP has

taken and which recommends additional actions to ensure coordination and reduce

the possibility of duplication and overlap among the various OJP divisions.’’ The primary functions and responsibilities of the five bureaus, six program offices, and

seven administrative support offices of OJP include administration and management of formula and discretionary programs; funding, management and delivery of

training and technical assistance; collection and analysis of statistics; to generate

and conduct research and evaluation of programs and projects; monitoring of grantfunded programs and projects; and dissemination of information. The proposed OJP

reorganization plan is based on OJP’s analysis of these functions and responsibilities and represents a thoughtful approach to improving the management and administrative structure of OJP. The Plan would go a long way in achieving the goal

of establishing an organization that reflects one ‘‘corporate vision’’, eliminates duplication and overlap in efforts across OJP, and institutes a coherent organizational

structure that serves all of OJP’s constituencies. The current proposal recognizes the

most critical problem that currently contributes to duplication of effort, confusion in

the field, and a lack of coordination of OJP activities—that of the absence of a centralized management structure. I concur with the strategy to vest overall authority

in the Attorney General and for the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) to carry out

OJP’s program authority under the general authority and delegation of the Attorney

General. This single, important step, giving the AAG for OJP both final grant approval authority and line authority over OJP program Bureaus will help coordinate

programs and resolve existing management issues. The objective of adopting standVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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ardized management policies and procedures will be well served by this single action. This would result in significant improvements, such as the implementation of

an OJP-wide automated, state-of-the-art, grant management system. While there

are other elements of the Plan that would assist in realizing the articulated goals

of the OJP reorganization, the effort goes too far in some respects. It is in this regard that the reorganization plan before you would have a deleterious effect on some

of the constituencies served by the Bureaus and Offices of OJP, particularly with

regard to constituencies served by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention (OJJDP).

The present strategies which are proposed to achieve the objective to ‘‘consolidate

and coordinate currently overlapping functions’’ includes strategies to consolidate all

OJP research and evaluation activities in the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and

all statistical functions in the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), whether criminal

or juvenile justice system related. Additionally, the objective of ‘‘centralized communication’’ contemplates creation of a ‘‘Publishing Central’’ office, which would oversee the timing and management of the distribution of all OJP publications. While

these components of the reorganization plan support the belief that the needs of the

criminal justice field are best met through an organization that can provide a full

range of support, the plan fails to recognize that the juvenile justice system is a separate system of justice and not a subset or component of the criminal justice system.

The field of juvenile justice has a different set of practitioners who have very different needs that reflect a unique juvenile justice practice in state and local jurisdiction across the country. The reorganization plan fails to take into account that OJP

administers programs that impact these two unique, but interrelated systems. Consequently, a plan to reorganize OJP primarily by function will serve, in my opinion,

to fragment juvenile justice programming to the detriment of both the concept of

a separate justice system for children and the needs of juvenile justice practitioners

across the country. The ultimate loser would be the nation’s children.

There are a number of strengths to the current organization of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) that should be retained in the

new OJP structure. Currently, OJJDP is an integrated office focusing on all aspects

of juvenile justice, including program development and demonstration, research and

evaluation, statistics, juvenile justice information and publications, training and

technical assistance and direct Federal-State relationships involved with juvenile

justice planning and programming through formula and discretionary grants. These

strengths are already achieving many of the articulated goals of the OJP Reorganization Plan for the juvenile justice field. It is critical to understand that despite

vigorous debate and restructuring of juvenile justice systems in states across the

country over the past decade, the juvenile justice system remains a viable, civilbased justice system that is separate from the criminal justice system in every state.

It has a distinct history, mandate, and jurisprudence. The system deals with youth

not only as criminal and noncriminal (status) offenders but also as victims of abuse

and neglect, and as dependents. Also, unlike the criminal justice system, the juvenile justice system has critical linkages to a unique set of other state and local systems, including child welfare, mental health, child protection, social services, and

education.

The functional approach recommended in the current OJP Reorganization Plan

runs the risk of creating a lack of attention, focus, receptivity, and proper interpretation of research, statistics, demonstration projects, and subsequent program replication in the juvenile justice system, and would ultimately be harmful to our

unique and distinct system of juvenile justice.

The strong synergistic relationship between statistics, research and evaluation,

and program development and demonstration is a unique and beneficial aspect of

the current OJJDP organizational structure. One of this Bureau’s significant accomplishments has been to integrate these functions so that research and evaluation

findings inform program development and identified program needs guide research

agendas in practical and beneficial ways. OJJDP’s success in integrating research

and evaluation, program development, training and technical assistance, and information dissemination, has long been recognized and applauded in many quarters,

including the Congress. The fragmentation of these functions through a functionbased reorganization would be highly disruptive and harmful to the juvenile justice

system.

With regard to serving information needs, the current OJJDP integrated program

structure means that juvenile justice practitioners at the state, local, and federal

levels can access a single source of information for all juvenile justice matters. That

is a great advantage to the broad juvenile justice field. Centralizing all OJP research and evaluation in NIJ and statistics in BJS, while perhaps more efficient for

the broader research and statistics communities would, ironically, be less efficient

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for the primary consumers of OJJDP’s work. The practitioners’ needs in this regard

should be served first—as should the children, youth, families and systems of care

they serve—and they are best served through an integrated juvenile justice program.

OJJDP is an example of how an office can grow to serve its state, local, and private sector constituents when nurtured in an environment providing for daily interaction between research, evaluation and statistics; program development and demonstration; training and technical assistance; replication; and information dissemination—all contributing to and learning from its formula/block grant component. It

also serves as an example of how issue areas, when developed in this kind of integrated program office, can grow in the same way: restitution into balanced and restorative justice; gang research into a comprehensive national gang program with

a National Youth Gang Center; parole into intensive aftercare; and analysis of program research and statistics into comprehensive community based approaches, such

as OJJDP’s Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders. These are but a few examples of the positive products that this existing integrated office approach has yielded. It is therefore my recommendation that the

current Reorganization Plan be modified to recognize and maintain an integrated,

full-service juvenile justice program. As the OJP Plan currently stands, the reorganization would create a confusing and onerous process that would not adequately

serve the important field of juvenile justice. It would, instead, create a confusing bureaucracy consisting of splintered points of contact and functions for juvenile justice

practitioners, a result directly contrary to the goals of the OJP Reorganization effort. This change would be a disservice to both juvenile justice practitioners and policy makers. Let me walk you through the confusing maze that juvenile justice practitioners would face under the current Reorganization Plan:

• go to Bureau of Justice Statistics to obtain information on juvenile justice statistics;

• go to National Institute of Justice to obtain information on research and program evaluation;

• go to Formula Grants/State Desk to apply for formula and block grants;

• go to the OJP Grant Administration Unit on grant monitoring and compliance

matters;

• go to the Office of Juvenile Justice Programs to seek policy guidance on formula and block grants and to apply for demonstration funding

• go to the Office of State and Local Information Transfer to obtain information

on a variety of topics, such as effective programs and to determine the availability of training and technical assistance; and

• back to Office of Juvenile Justice Programs to receive the training and technical assistance.

I must strongly advocate for the preservation of the current structure that allows

OJP and OJJDP to build the knowledge about the distinct and separate juvenile justice system and the developmental pathways our children and youth follow into delinquency, including the prevention systems and services that are essential for longterm crime reduction and healthy, productive adults. The contrary notion expressed

in the current proposal demonstrates a lack of understanding of the fundamental

differences between the juvenile and criminal justice systems. This point is illustrated by the position articulated in the current Reorganization Plan that a consolidated research function within NIJ can address the continuity of offending between

teen and adult years. This narrow area of focus relates to less than 10 percent of

juvenile offenders, and to none of our at-risk children and youth or those who are

victims of child abuse and neglect. We need to learn more about these populations

through targeted research and evaluation funding. This perspective further supports

the need to maintain separate juvenile and criminal justice programs that are responsive to the needs of these separate and distinct systems and their respective

constituencies. At the same time, OJP should use its program authority to ensure

communication, coordination, and cooperation in overlapping areas, such as the impact of transferring juveniles to the criminal justice system.

As OJP Assistant Attorney General, Deborah J. Daniels, stated on November 27,

2001, the reorganization effort is designed ‘‘to improve [OJP’s] operational efficiency,

improve the accountability, reliability and efficiency of our grant programs, and improve our ability to serve and inform our constituencies.’’

The existence of a separate and distinct juvenile justice system began with the

creation of the first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois over 100 years ago. Its

goal was to protect the rights of children through a mix of accountability and treatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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ment for this distinct population. This court became the prototype for juvenile courts

across the country. Currently, there exists a national network of State Juvenile Justice agencies, State Advisory Groups, and State Juvenile Specialists (which have

grown from the Congressional affirmation of this need through the Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974) and thousands of local agencies and courts

dedicated to juvenile justice and serving the needs of the millions of delinquent and

status offenders, abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. These organizations

and individuals have been partnering effectively with OJJDP to maintain and

strengthen the basic services and protections youth need to benefit from their experience in the juvenile justice system. I am hopeful that the critical recommendations

put forth in my testimony can be adopted to preserve the distinct and unique needs

of the juvenile justice system and thereby achieve the desired outcomes articulated

by the Assistant Attorney General. The Reorganization of OJP must contribute to,

not interrupt, the tremendous advances in knowledge of ‘‘what works’’ in serving our

children’s needs and the significant reductions in juvenile delinquency that we have

witnessed over the past decade. Our Nation’s children, youth, families, and communities deserve nothing less.

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

MARCH 5, 2002

RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM LAURIE O. ROBINSON, FORMER

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

1. What do you think is the biggest impediment to effective administration

of OJP?

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The biggest impediment to effective administration of OJP is the existence of so

many historically semi-independent components—with statutorily overlapping jurisdiction, presidentially appointed directors, and a longstanding culture in the bureaus that reinforces balkanization.

2. In your experience, if Congress could do just one thing to improve operations at OJP, what would it be?

As I indicated in my testimony, I would start over and develop a federal criminal

justice assistance program ‘‘from the ground up.’’ That would help ensure a more

rationally based and easy-to-access program for state and local customers. Short of

taking that radical a step, the one thing I would encourage Congress to do is eliminate the statutory provision that makes the bureau heads presidential appointments. That PAS status—combined with the longstanding history of final grantmaking authority resting with the bureau heads—has created over many years an

organization too often fraught with ‘‘sibling rivalries’’ and separate agendas, rather

than an agency with the capacity to implement a comprehensive, coherent vision.

3. You were the Assistant Attorney General when the Office of Domestic

Preparedness was created. Could you describe the operations of that office

and the contributions it makes to counterterrorism training for this Subcommittee?

The Office of Domestic Preparedness—initially called the Office of State and Local

Domestic Preparedness Support—was set up in OJP in 1998. It is charged with assisting state and local law enforcement, fire, and emergency services personnel with

planning for, and response to, events involving weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons, as well as more conventional explosives).

ODP’s budget has grown dramatically over the four years of its existence. Its work

is focused on training, exercises, technical assistance, and provision of equipment

grants. Importantly, it has—in coordination with the FBI, FEMA and others— worked directly with each state to help them develop threat and vulnerability plans

and look at current capabilities and gaps. Completion of these plans is a prerequisite to their receiving equipment grants. ODP also runs a training center in

Anniston, Alabama (which was opened in June of 1998), which is the only live chemical agent training facility in the world. It also funds and coordinates a training consortium of four first responder training centers around the country—at Texas A&M,

the Nevada Test Site, New Mexico Tech, and Louisiana State University. Finally,

ODP has played a central role in planning and carrying out exercises, which are

a crucial part of domestic preparedness. The TOPOFF exercise in the spring of 2000

won wide praise, for example, for its involvement of not only federal agencies, but

state and local players.

4. Do you think it has been effective to have the COPS program administered outside of the Office of Justice Programs?

The COPS Office has undertaken tremendously important work over the past

eight years in encouraging adoption of community policing across the country, and,

during my tenure at the Department, I worked very closely with the individuals

who headed that office, including former Police Chiefs Joe Brann and Tom Frazier.

As we look down the road to the future of the federal criminal justice assistance

program, it would make most sense to integrate OJP and COPS together into a new

organization, so that their work can be better coordinated. What is important, however, is—if that should happen down the road—that a COPS-type office be maintained. State and local law enforcement need a central ‘‘home’’ within the Department of Justice that can serve as a center of leadership—and be knowledgeable

about, and responsive to, their needs. After all, when the original federal criminal

justice assistance program was created in 1968, state and local law enforcement

were perhaps its key constituents. As LEAA and OJP grew and evolved over succeeding years, the agency was probably not as attentive to that constituency as it

might have been.

5. There have been proposals to transfer the Violence Against Women office outside of the Office of Justice Programs. What type of problems do

you think this creates, if any?

Moving the grant-making operation of the Violence Against Women office elsewhere in the Department of Justice is a mistake. There are two reasons for this.

First, ensuring sound fiscal stewardship of grant dollars requires an experienced

grant-making operation. Having a small office elsewhere in DOJ handle all its own

grants will be a recipe for down-the-road audit and other problems. Second, from

a substantive standpoint, the grant-making to state and local governments needs to

be integrally tied in with all the other work on domestic violence and state and local

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criminal justice generally being funded out of OJP. Further, the National Institute

of Justice and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have worked closely with VAWO on

domestic violence issues. I am not convinced those crucial research and statistics tieins would continue if VAWO were moved elsewhere. The coordination, I suspect

from experience, would be haphazard at best.

Moving the policy functions of VAWO elsewhere in the Department would be less

problematic, but—from the experience we had with such a ‘‘divided office’’ between

1995 and 1999—that raises a different set of coordination problems.

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MARCH 7, 2002

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RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM JOHN CARY BITTICK, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SHERIFF’S ASSOCIATION

1. Can you explain how the Office of Domestic Preparedness performs

counterterrorism exercises? Can you provide an evaluation of these

counterterrorism exercises from a law enforcement perspective?

To my understanding, the Office of Domestic Preparedness is actively engaged in

exercises. In 2000, the ODP National Exercise Program conducted the Top Officials

(TOPOFF) exercise. TOPOFF was the largest exercise of its kind and involved a

chemical and biological attack simulation in two separate cities in the United

States. In the spring of next year, TOPOFF II is scheduled to further test and exercise the government’s capabilities.

Beyond the TOPOFF exercises, ODP has conducted 93 exercises across the Nation

at all levels of government. It is estimated that ODP will complete 220 exercises

in FY 2002. In conjunction with the Department of Energy, ODP has established

a Center for Exercise Excellence at the Nevada Test Site. The Center is a national

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WMD exercise-training program which assists state and local emergency response

agencies with the planning and conduct of domestic preparedness exercises.

2. In your capacity as a law enforcement officer you have substantial experience in dealing with crisis situations and crime scenes. What would be

the duties of law enforcement in a crisis situation—such as a bomb exploding or a release of hazardous material?

The duties of law enforcement in a crisis are vast. The sheriff and his deputies

are the true first responders. They will arrive at the scene after the first emergency

calls and establish a command center. Second, firefighters and EMS technicians will

respond to care for the sick and injured. After local assets are exhausted, state and

federal resources will be brought to the scene. Federal assistance in a chemical or

biological attack is several hours away and that leaves the sheriff virtually alone

to accept responsibility and control the scene.

Sheriffs’ have a multidimensional response to an attack. They will have to care

for the victims and their families, secure the crime scene, deal with media and press

distractions, protect firefighters and EMS technicians from secondary devices, establish command and control, mobilize the disaster plan and coordinate all support efforts.

3. In your testimony you state,‘‘This is a time when the American people

need continuity and coordination, not the disruption of unnecessary reorganization.’’

The move of ODP to FEMA will cause significant disruption. As you know, the

ODP budget was increased to $250 million last year. ODP is currently engaged in

the planning for allocation of funds and has been working with the states to complete the state plans. Just as ODP is moving funds, the OMB proposal would have

them shudder operations and transfer them to FEMA. In our view, FEMA will have

a significant learning curve to overcome as they deal with law enforcement for the

first time. This move would dismantle the only agency within the federal government that is providing coordinated support and expertise to responders. It can’t help

but cause a massive disruption that would hinder the ability of law enforcement to

meet our sworn obligations.

4. This committee has received suggestions that state and local officials

have complained about the performance of ODP and this has been given

as one reason for the switch to FEMA. Has your organization ever complained about the performance of the Office of Domestic Preparedness to

anyone in Federal Government? What is your opinion of ODP?

NSA has an excellent working relation with ODP, OJP and the entire Department

of Justice. We work very closely with ODP to ensure that sheriffs are prepared to

fulfill their responsibilities in the event of an attack within their jurisdiction. To my

knowledge, NSA has never had a reason to complain about ODP, as we find them

to be one of the most responsive agencies in the federal government.

5. Has the proposed shift of counter terrorism training and grant responsibility to FEMA resulted in any confusion for first responders who are currently receiving training from ODP?

NSA is very confused by the potential for a move to FEMA. This proposal has

greatly concerned local law enforcement because FEMA to this point has been unresponsive to law enforcement despite promises made by high-level officials to the contrary. FEMA has not returned phone calls and ignored an invitation to speak to

NSA’s Domestic Preparedness Committee about the potential move of ODP to

FEMA. FEMA has made no outreach efforts to be proactive in addressing law enforcement concerns.

6. Is there a match requirement to receive grants and training from ODP?

Congress has not required matching grants funds for the programs under ODP.

In our view, that is the strength of the domestic preparedness grant programs in

the Department of Justice. It is our understanding that FEMA may intend to add

a matching requirement to the program should it be transferred. NSA would oppose

the matching requirement, as many sheriffs would be unable to participate in the

grant program if matching funds are a condition of the grant.

7. What has been your experience with FEMA in providing counterterrorism training or consequence management? What about with crisis

management? Did FEMA participate in the TOPOFF exercises?

I understand that FEMA reluctantly participated in TOPOFF; joining the exercise

only in the final stages of the planning. FEMA does not provide counter-terrorism

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training to law enforcement. That has been the congressionally mandated role of the

U.S. Department of Justice. FEMA does not traditionally engage in crisis management. FEMA arrives at a disaster to deal with the consequences and aftermath not

the crisis. A terrorist attack is a criminal event, not a natural disaster. The first

response to such an incident is always crisis management not consequence management. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement function and includes

measures to identify, acquire and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate,

prevent and resolve a threat or act of terrorism. Crisis management is clearly the

role of the Department of Justice, not FEMA.

RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN, POLICY

ANALYST, CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Anwser to Question 1:

In some cases, it might be possible to get an accurate assessment of effectiveness

from an agency evaluating itself. However, agencies funding their own evaluations

can be in the position to practice undue influence that may jeopardize the accuracy

of the findings. For example, the findings of evaluations that were assigned through

a noncompetitive process may be suspect. The agency funding an evaluation of itself

may select an evaluator who is likely to produce the results desired by the agency.

To add credibility to evaluations of Office of Justice Programs, Congress should

transform the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) into the Justice Department’s chief

evaluation agency. Elevating NIJ to a position similar to the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will help make NIJ an independent agency. NIJ should

have the authority and the necessary budget to evaluate OJP and other Justice Department programs.

Not only should NIJ conduct its own evaluations, but also the agency should be

able to fund evaluations by academics and other professionals. These out-sourced

evaluations should be awarded on a competitive basis. Further, all NIJ evaluations

should be subject to a peer review. The peer review group should consist of academics and professionals with a strong background in evaluation research and

criminal justice. In addition, the data and final results of the evaluation should be

published by NIJ, regardless of the findings. Either way, Congress needs to know

what works and what does not work.

Anwser to Question 2:

In order to remedy the problematic tendency of bureaucracies to produce impact

evaluations designed to generate favorable results, Congress could make NIJ an

independent agency with its own authority to evaluated OJP programs. Agencies

should be barred from evaluating their own programs. An additional way for Congress to ensure that OJP programs are properly evaluated is to mandate that NIJ

conduct evaluations that fulfill high standards of scientific research.

Some basic indicators of a good evaluation include (1) the use of comparison or

control groups, (2) random assignment, (3) the use of control variables to account

for various factors that influence the social condition that the program is designed

to improve, and (3) peer review and dissemination of data used in the evaluation.

The use of comparison groups assists the evaluator in determining the impact of a

program by comparing the condition of the intervention group with an equivalent

comparison group. The best way to construct intervention and comparison groups

is through the use of random assignment. Random assignment allows the evaluator

to test for differences between the intervention and control groups that are due to

the intervention and not due to discrepancies between the groups. When random assignment is not possible and selection bias is not present, then evaluators should

control for as many variables as possible that can influence the difference in outcomes between the intervention and control groups. Last, peer review allows for a

panel of social scientists to judge the evaluation on its scientific merits and allow

other researchers the opportunity to conduct additional analysis.

Anwser to Question 3:

Briefings on the progress of congressionally mandated evaluations will help ensure that the researchers are fulfilling Congress’ intent. The initial stages of any

evaluation are crucial to the content of the final report. In these early stages, the

types of questions asked and how to measure the program’s impact will be decided.

At this point, Congress would benefit from a briefing on how the evaluators intend

to measure the impact of the program. During this briefing, Congress can make sure

that the evaluators are designing a study that will produce an impact evaluation

and not a process evaluation.

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1 42 USC 9801 et seq. For more information, see http://www2.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/hsb/

hsreac/legis.htm. (March 3, 2002). 2This application was obtained from http://www.usdoj.gov/cops/pdf gpa/uhp/uhp—pdfs/

e022k0060.pdf (December 1, 2001). 3Peter H. Rossi, Howard E. Freeman, and Mark Lipsey, Evaluation: A Systematic Approach, (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 118.

Anwser to Question 4:

The Coats Human Services Amendments of 1998 provided clear guidelines of how

Head Start should be evaluated.1 The amendment specifically mandated four components that are critical to determining the impact of Head Start on improving the

lives of children served by it. First, the Department of Health and Human Services

(HHS) is required to appoint a panel of experts in program evaluation and early

childhood education. This panel is given the authority to recommend the proper

methodological designs and scientific techniques needed to measure the impact of

Head Start. Second, Congress specifically instructed HHS that the evaluation must

examine the impact of Head Start programs in increasing the social competence and

school readiness of children. Third, the progress of Head Start participants is to be

compared to a comparable group of children who did not participate in Head Start.

Comparing Head Start children to non-Head Start participants is essential to determining the impact of Head Start. If the program is effective, Head Start participants should experience greater gains in school readiness than non-participants.

Fourth, Congress required that the study’s design be based on random assignment.

Studies based on random assignment, or experimental design, are preferred because

their results are less ambiguous. Random assignment allows the evaluator to test

for differences between the experimental and control groups that are due to the

intervention and not due to discrepancies between the groups. While the Head Start

impact evaluation has yet to be completed, Congress has set in motion a process

that will help determine the program’s effectiveness. Similar types of congressional

mandates for OJP to evaluate its programs would constitute a substantial improvement.

Anwser to Question 5:

In my studies of the COPS program, I have not found any requirements that

grantees provide data to the COPS offices to allow for the evaluation of performance. The COPS grant application process appears to have little regard for setting

up a system to measure performance. For example, the application form used for

the 2000 Universal Hiring Program (UHP) grants is only four pages long. 2 Absent

from the application is any indication that data will be collected for evaluative purposes.

Anwser to Question 6:

A requirement that OJP receive a needs assessment, a proposed evaluation, and

an agreement to collect performance-related data from grantees prior to grant approval would be a substantial improvement in accountability. Requiring grantees to

conduct a needs assessment prior to grant approval will help grantees identify the

problems that the OJP funding will address and develop a clear strategy to help

ensure that funding is put to its most effective use. A needs assessment is defined

as a study that answers questions about the social problems a program is intended

to improve. 3 The needs assessment should specifically identify how OJP funding

will be used to reduce crime. OJP should be required to use the information contained in the needs assessment to judge the merit of the grant application.

A panel of experts appointed by NIJ should review the proposed evaluation. The

panel should assess the evaluation proposal for its adherence to rigorous social

science standards. To improve the quality of the proposed evaluations, the panel

should have the authority to recommend to OJP that the proposals be accepted or

rejected. To insure the integrity of the process, the recommendations of the panel

should be publicly available through the Internet.

Requiring that grantees agree to collect relevant evaluation data before grant approval will significantly improve data collection for OJP. A system to measure and

evaluate the effectiveness of OJP grants should be in place before the awarding of

funds. After the funds have been spent, the OJP funded activities should be evaluated for their effectiveness in reducing crime. To help ensure integrity, OJP-related

evaluations should be done by the National Institute of Justice.

Anwser to Question 7:

While there are a few NIJ-sponsored impact evaluations that are important to informing policy makers about what works in criminal justice policy, NIJ has not been

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4For examples of good impact evaluations, see Anthony A. Braga, David L. Weisburd, Elin

J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William Spelman, and Francis Gajewski, ‘‘Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment,’’ Criminology,

Vol. 37, No. 3 (1999), pp. 541–580 and Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring,

and Anne Morrison Piehl, ‘‘Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire,’’ Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 38,

No. 3 (2001), pp. 195–225. 5Laurie E. Ekstrand, ‘‘Justice Impact Evaluations: One Byrne Formula Evaluation Was Rigorous; All Reviewed Violence Against Women Office Evaluations Were Problematic,’’ Report to

Congressional Requesters, GAO–02–309, (U.S. General Accounting Office, March 2002).

effective in managing performance evaluations. 4 As the recent General Accounting

(GAO) report demonstrates, NIJ evaluations are too frequently process-oriented. 5

When impact evaluations have been done, the GAO found that most of the studies

were of such poor design that the findings were unreliable.

To improve ability of NIJ to produce rigorous impact evaluations, Congress’ plan

to reorganize OJP should consider the following step. First, NIJ should become an

independent agency with its own budget. NIJ should have the ability to evaluate

programs without the permission of other OJP agencies. This change will help insulate NIJ from pressure to not rigorously evaluate the impact of OJP programs. Second, Congress should specifically set the criteria for how the research will be conducted. Impact evaluations should use comparison groups and control for factors

that may influence the evaluated program’s outcomes. Third, NIJ should have an

adequate budget to evaluate OJP programs.

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RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM LAURIE E. EKSTRAND, DIRECTOR,

JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

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MARCH 14, 2002

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RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

April 16, 2002

The Honorable Lamar Smith

Chairman

Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and

Homeland Security

Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for inviting me to testify at the Subcommittee’s March 14, 2002, oversight hearing about the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) reviews of grant programs in the Department of Justice, specifically the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services (COPS) and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP).

As I discussed at the hearing, the OIG has conducted numerous audits and inspections related to grants issued by COPS and OJP. In addition, we have investigated a variety of fraud allegations involving improper use of Department grant

funds. We will continue to provide oversight in the important area of grant management in the years ahead, and we appreciate your interest in our work.

In response to your March 21, 2002, letter, I enclose answers to the Subcommittee’s additional questions for the record. I can be reached at 514–3435 if you have

any further questions.

Sincerely,

Glenn A. Fine

Inspector General

Enclosure

1. In a recent Semi-Annual Report to Congress your office noted that a few

years ago the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) stopped processing reports

under the Single Audit Act of 1996 for COPS-related grants in a dispute

over reimbursement. As a result, a backlog developed. Has this matter been

resolved and what corrective was taken to resolve it?

Yes, the matter has been resolved. The OJP agreed to process the COPS Office’s

Single Audit Act reports.

2. Mr. Fine, based on your experience with the COPS program, can you

point to any specific reasons why COPS grants are so high risk? Is it because it is a separate office within Justice or are there other reasons?

There are several reasons why we believe COPS grants are high-risk grants.

First, according to the COPS Office, a large number of its grantees are first-time

recipients of federal grant monies. Inexperienced grantees may not know COPS’ program requirements or understand basic grant management requirements. Second,

these grants often are awarded to small communities that do not have sophisticated

financial systems or structures to administer the grant.

Third, we believe that the COPS MORE grant program is inherently a high-risk

program. MORE grants fund technology to free up existing officers for community

policing. Through the end of fiscal year 2002, we estimate that the COPS Office will

have awarded in excess of $1 billion in MORE grants. In our audits, we rarely find

that MORE grant recipients can demonstrate that they have redeployed the required number of officers to community policing. Further, we frequently find that

MORE grants, which were intended to last for a period of one year, are extended

for several additional years because grantees have not implemented the technologies

purchased with the grant funds. Such extensions increase the likelihood that technology may become obsolete by the time it becomes operational.

3. In your statement (at p. 6) you express concern about the length of time

it takes to resolve COPS grant audit reports and you recommend that the

COPS Office should take more aggressive and timely action. You also state

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that stricter enforcement should be taken. Does that mean collection actions by the Department and U.S. Attorneys or other similar measures?

Yes. When grantees are found to be non-compliant, they should be given a reasonable time frame in which to become compliant. If this does not occur, however, we

believe a demand letter should be sent to the grantee from COPS. If a demand letter

does not bring about necessary action by the grantee, referral for collection to the

Department or U.S. Attorneys should be initiated. Too often we find that grant program offices are reluctant to pursue this course of action. We believe that aggressive

enforcement action is needed when grantees do not comply with the terms of the

grant in a timely fashion.

4. When the use of grant funds are brought into question by your office or

the Office of Justice Programs what steps are normally taken to resolve

these questions?

The OIG works with the applicable grant program office to resolve our findings,

including dollar-related findings. The applicable program office is responsible, in

turn, for working with the grantee. The grant office’s first option is to bring the

grantee into compliance with grant requirements. This process is generally very

paper intensive and time consuming. During this process, the grantee is usually provided grant extensions to allow it time to demonstrate compliance. We find that

grantees also are frequently allowed to continue to draw grant funds during this period. In our judgment, this practice does not sufficiently hold grantees accountable

for their lack of compliance.

5. What steps, if any, does your office or the Department take to seek reimbursement or collection of OJP or COPS funds misused by grantees?

The OIG does not have the authority to directly seek reimbursement or collection

of federal funds from grantees. We report ‘‘questioned costs’’ and ‘‘funds to better

use’’ in accordance with the Inspector General Act. The decision to seek reimbursement or collection of funds is a management decision made by the program offices

and the Department. The program office contacts the grant recipient and asks it to

provide necessary documentation to address the OIG’s findings. This process can

take an extended period of time. Options available to the Department include temporarily withholding cash payments pending correction of the deficiency; disallowing

all or part of the cost of the activity or action not in compliance; wholly or partly

suspending or terminating the current award; and withholding further awards for

the project or program. As a practical matter, we have found that the program office

usually only demands repayment of grant funds in response to OIG findings as a

last resort. According to OJP, once a debt has been established it gives the grantee

several chances to repay the debt before referring the matter for collection.

6. Did you randomly select COPS and OJP grantees for audits? If so,

wouldn’t you expect to find the same percentage of ‘‘questioned costs’’ and

‘‘funds to better use’’ across all grant programs? Your auditors found that

24 percent of the funds audited fell into these categories. If you applied the

24 percent figure across all grants, that would be more than a billion dollars, not including amounts subject to further investigation for fraud and/

or criminal prosecution. So isn’t possible that the amount of fraud, waste,

and abuse in the system could be well over a billion dollars?

Our audits were not selected randomly. About one-half of our COPS audits were

referred to us by the COPS office, primarily because of indications of grantee noncompliance. The remaining audits are selected by us based on the size, location, and

risk of the grantee. We therefore cannot statistically extrapolate the findings in our

audits of grantees to the entire universe of grantees. That said, in general our findings in audits selected by us and audits referred to us by the COPS Office do not

appear to show great variances. Although we cannot say for certain what percentage

of total grant funds would fall into the categories ‘‘questioned costs’’ or ‘‘funds to better use,’’ based on our experience we would expect it to be a very significant amount.

RESPONSES TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM CARL PEED, DIRECTOR, COPS

OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. The Inspector General’s Office has devoted a significant amount of its

time and resources in oversight of the COPS program. Among all of the Department’s federal grant programs, by far the largest amount of questioned

and unsupported costs have been found with COPS grants. Why do you

think this is the case?

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• COPS has put in place a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to monitor more than 32,700 grants.

• First, we require every agency to submit yearly progress reports on the implementation of their COPS grant(s).

• Second, through our COPS Count process, we contact each grantee on a yearly basis to monitor and ensure that implementation and compliance are consistent with the terms and conditions of their grants.

• Third, we do more intensive monitoring for high-risk grantees, which includes

comprehensive desk reviews of programmatic and financial reports as well as

on-site visits.

• Fourth, the Office of the Comptroller assists COPS in financially monitoring

COPS grantees.

• Fifth, the Office of the Inspector General includes as part of its regular audits

of COPS grantees those agencies COPS perceives to be most at-risk.

In addition, the COPS Office vets all proposed grant lists through the Civil Rights

Division, Office of Civil Rights, Office of the Inspector General Investigations Division, and all United States Attorneys. This pre-award vetting process allows the

COPS Office to be aware of any pending investigations or potential compliance

issues prior to making new grant awards.

At least one person is assigned to every state to answer any questions a grantee

may have and ensure that grant compliance is met. With all of these monitoring

activities, any irregularities and problems are referred to the appropriate division

for further action, resolution, and recourse.

We appreciate the role that the OIG audits play as part of our comprehensive

monitoring strategy. With over 32,700 active COPS grants, we depend on the OIG

to help monitor our grantees. In fact, the COPS Office refers many of these grants

to the OIG for audits.

The OIG audit findings, however, do not necessarily reflect grant violations by our

grantees. First, questioned costs are only allegations—grantees usually provide documents to support the costs. Second, our reviews show that a high percentage of

audited grantees are not in violation of their grant requirements. As a result of the

high number of OIG audit findings from COPS grants, the Department previously

hired an independent arbitrator to review a random sample of OIG audit findings

from COPS grants. The arbitrator determined that approximately 38% of those findings were not accurate.

When the OIG’s audit findings are accurate, the COPS Office takes enforcement

action to ensure that grant violations are fully remedied.

1. Two findings of the OIG set forth in his most recent report to Congress

related to the processing of Single Audits of grants and computer security

within the COPS Office. You have heard both the IG and the Deputy Attorney General’s testimony on these matters. Do you agree with their views

on the resolution of them?

The Single Audit issue has been resolved between COPS and OJP. Single Audits

are performed by OJP.

COPS addressed the OIG’s computer security concerns shortly after their 2000 report was released. We strengthened our security measures by developing and implementing multiple written policies to improve internal controls to address specific circumstances like:

• Accounts that have never been logged into for a specific period of time.

• Accounts after a staff person leaves or is on extended leave.

• COPS has also finalized and implemented a written policy and procedure to

address the auditing option, and the Security Event Log ‘‘Do Not Overwrite

Events’’ option.

COPS continues to take the issue of computer security very seriously to safeguard

our computer system against security violations.

1. Two of the biggest problems of abuse with the COPS grant program are

the use of federal funds to supplant the pay of officers not hired under the

COPS program and the low retention rate of police officers after the COPS

funds expire. What is your recommendation for addressing these two problems?

COPS takes allegations of supplanting very seriously and devotes a great deal of

resources to preventing and investigating it. In all the reviews we conduct of COPS

grants, we have not discovered widespread supplanting. When we do discover supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:30 Jul 02, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CRIME\030502\78061.002 HJUD3 PsN: HJUD3
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planting, we require the grantee to repay the supplanted funds or to hire new officers with local funds.

COPS takes retention very seriously and monitors it closely. During the application process and again upon accepting a COPS grant award, the chief government

executive and chief law enforcement official both sign documents to attest to their

understanding of the requirements of the grant, including the retention of the officer

positions. A recent report conducted by the COPS office as part of our comprehensive monitoring strategy indicates that 92% of grantees are retaining their COPS

officers with local funds. The 1999 Inspector General report included a random survey of 191 COPS grantees, which confirmed that 96 percent of those surveyed intended to retain their additional COPS officers with state or local resources. Grantees that demonstrate severe fiscal distress, however, can be exempted from the retention requirement.

We will continue to make monitoring supplanting and retention violations a priority in the future.

2. The President’s Budget for FY 2003 recommends redirecting a significant

amount of COPS funding into a new Justice Assistance Grant Program. Do

you support this shift of funding and what steps will you take to prevent

some of the waste and mismanagement that has occurred with the COPS

grant program?

The President’s FY03 budget redirects funds to address new and critical Administration priorities, including counterterrorism. I support the President’s budget. The

President’s budget includes $800 million for a new Justice Assistance Grant program. Although this grant is listed in the COPS budget, the budget directs it to be

administered by the Office of Justice Programs. The COPS FY03 budget request

continues to fund community policing development activities, technology grants,

methamphetamine grants, and police integrity. We will vigorously monitor these

grant programs next year.

3. Again, in reference to the audit findings of the OIG, how many of these

audits, especially with regard to questioned and unsupported costs listed

in the most recent Inspector General’s Seminannual Reports to Congress

remain unresolved and what actions is your office taking to resolve them?

To date, COPS has just two unresolved OIG audits. We have made resolving and

closing IG audits a top priority. Currently, approximately 72% of COPS staff are involved in grant monitoring to safeguard the taxpayer’s investment against misuse.

Some of the remedies we have taken include suspending grantee funds, recovering

misused grant funds and/or prohibiting the grantee from obtaining future COPS

grants.

We work closely with the IG on these audits and the IG plays an important role

in our comprehensive grant monitoring strategy, which includes: yearly progress reports from grantees on the implementation of their COPS grant(s); contacting each

grantee on a yearly basis to monitor and ensure that implementation and compliance are consistent with the terms and conditions of their grants; intensive monitoring for high-risk grantees, which includes comprehensive desk reviews of programmatic and financial reports as well as on-site visits; the Office of the Comptroller assists COPS in financially monitoring COPS grantees; the Office of the Inspector General includes as part of its regular audits of COPS grantees those agencies COPS perceives to be most at-risk.

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[NOTE: Additional material submitted for the Hearing Record is

not reprinted here but is on file with the House Judiciary Committee. The material referred to is listed below.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs—

United States General Accounting Office—The Honorable Bob

Schaffer, House of Representatives, Juvenile Justice: Better

Documentation of Discretionary Grant Monitoring Is Needed

(October 2001, GAO–02–65)

United States General Accounting Office—Report to the Honorable Bob Schaffer, House of Representatives, Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting Requirements for Discretionary and

Formula Grantees and Concerns About Evaluation Studies

(October 2001, GAO–02–23)

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United States General Accounting Office—Report to Congressional Requesters, Justice Discretionary Grants: Byrne Program and Violence Against Women Office Grant Monitoring

Should Be Better Documented (November 2001, GAO–02–25)

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