Making Peace Possible

NO. 160 | March 2020

PEACEWO

Taliban Fragmentation

FACT, FICTION, AND F

By Andrew Watkins
NO. 160 | March 2020

Making Peace Possible

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 160. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-801-2

PEACE 

PROCESSES

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Taliban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertoo

as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peace

is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated 

peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Andrew Watkins has worked in more than ten provinces of Afghanistan, most recentl

as a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He has also worked as an independent researcher, a conflict analyst and adviser to the humanitarian community, and a

liaison based with Afghan security forces

Cover photo: A soldier walks among a group of alleged Taliban fighters at a 

National Directorate of Security facility in Faizabad in September 2019. The status 

of prisoners will be a critical issue in future negotiations with the Taliban. (Photo 

by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times)
USIP.ORG 1

Content

3 The “Fragmentation” Narrative

7 Insurgent Fragmentation: Theoretical Insights

9 Evaluating Episodes of Taliban Fragmentation

11 Causes of and Constraints on Taliban Fragmentation

14 Potential Issues Attending the Peace Process

17 Recommendations
2 PEACEWOR     NO. 

Summary

The US and Afghan governments have, at various times, intentionally pursued

strategies of “divide and defeat” in an attempt to fragment and weaken the 

Taliban. These approaches have proved ineffective and, as long as peace efforts 

are being pursued, should be discontinued. Contrary to lingering narratives from

earlier eras of the Afghan conflict, the Taliban today are a relatively cohesive

insurgent group and are unlikely to fragment in the near term. This has not happened by accident: the Taliban’s leadership has consistently, at times ruthlessly, 

worked to retain and strengthen its organizational cohesion. To this day, the 

group is unwilling to cross internal “red lines” that might threaten that cohesion.

The literature on insurgency and negotiated peace suggests that only cohesive 

movements are capable of following through and enforcing peace agreements. 

Many of the feared scenarios of Taliban fragmentation, including the defection of 

“hard-liners” or mass recruitment by the Islamic State, do not correspond to current realities on the ground. Fragmentation of the Taliban is not impossible, and 

the group is certainly far from monolithic, but ideological rifts are not a sufficient 

explanation of why this has taken place in the past—or might again. 

By studying what makes the Taliban cohesive and what has caused instances 

of its fragmentation, all parties invested in an Afghan peace process might be

better equipped to negotiate with the Taliban under terms the movement would 

be willing to accept, even if it has not defined those terms publicly.
USIP.ORG 3

Since their removal from power in late 2001 and formation of a resilient insurgency, the 

Afghan Taliban have been described as comprising little more than a loose network,

disorganized, lacking hierarchy, and having “a tendency toward fragmentation.”1 For 

nearly two decades, analysts have been largely consistent in their characterization 

of the Taliban as a divided movement—despite significant evolution on the Taliban’s 

part. The concept of the Taliban’s fragmented nature, and the movement’s potential to 

fragment, helped frame an entire phase of US policy in Afghanistan. At times when th

group has outwardly displayed signs of fragmentation, including the brutal infighting 

consequent on a succession crisis, analysts and observers have pored over the details 

of factional maneuvering. Today, concerns have revived about the group’s ability to control—or even retain—its diverse membership in the face of advances in Afghanistan’s

peace process, especially its February 29 agreement with the United States. 

Yet even with renewed Western attention to the issue, few studies have collated 

various episodes of Taliban fragmentation over time, and even fewer have applied 

comparative scholarship to the questions of how and why insurgencies break apart.2

This report does both. It first reviews the political and conflict context that has shaped 

much of the policy discourse on Taliban fracture. It then concisely outlines the 

US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, left, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban group's top political leader, sign a peace agreement in Doha,

Qatar, on February 29, 2020. (Photo by Hussein Sayed/A

Analysts and 

commentators have 

raised the specter of 

Taliban fragmentation 

as a cautionary 

argument against 

pursuing the last year 

of peace process 

efforts, including the 

recent agreement 

between the 

insurgent group and 

the United States.

The “Fragmentation” Narrative
4 PEACEWOR     NO. 

theoretical literature on insurgent group fragmentation, 

relating key findings to the Taliban.  historical record

of the Taliban’s past fragmentation is compiled from 

existing reporting and research. Theoretical lenses are 

then applied to answer the following questions: Is the 

Taliban a fragmented organization today? When it has

shown evidence of fragmentation, what did that demonstrate about the group? Specifically, this report seeks to 

determine how the tendency or potential for the Taliban 

to fragment may have an impact on the group’s current 

and future participation in peace efforts.

Even as the US military and its NATO partners were

struggling to contain an increasingly resurgent Taliban 

a decade ago, a narrative had already firmly taken 

root within the international community that it might be 

possible to exploit the supposedly fragmented nature 

of the Taliban and to prevail over it with military force 

alone. This narrative was drawn in part from notions of 

disarmament and reconciliation that had been promoted, since at least 2005, by Afghanistan’s then president Hamid Karzai. The logic emanated from Americ

military counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and practice,

lauded at the time for its application in Iraq.3 From a 

COIN perspective, it stood to reason that if a number of

Taliban fighters were driven primarily by local grievances, rather than by the strict ideology that made the 

movement notorious during its Islamic Emirate regime 

(1996–2001), these members could perhaps be coaxed 

away from the insurgency. Afghans themselves have

long drawn a distinction between the movement’s ideological, fighting core and its “part-time,” inactive, and 

other more pragmatically motivated members.4

Those earliest efforts to encourage Taliban reconciliation were ineffective, but Western assessments blamed 

corruption in the nascent Afghan government, and the

underpinning idea survived.5 By 2009, the “fragmentation” narrative had gone mainstream, at times with explicit policy advice to try to “flip” the Taliban—or at least 

the “reconcilable” elements within the movement.6 The 

concept was quickly incorporated into the new Obama 

administration’s Afghanistan strategy, where, paired

with a troop surge, it became part of a complicated, 

sometimes contradictory American approach.

 More 

than half a dozen initiatives were pursued in tandem, 

with some attempting to “peel off” local Taliban commanders, while others, such as the push to establish 

a Taliban political office in Doha, seemed to be part of 

an entirely different strategy. The Obama White House

refocused on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the administration’s scattered approach to the Taliban seemed

to stem in part from perceptions of the two groups’ relationship.8

 Meanwhile, the US military surge sought to 

maximize battlefield gains to enable negotiation “from 

a position of strength,” which led to mistrust and obfuscation on the part of the Taliban during early attempts 

to directly negotiate.9

A growing consensus that the Taliban as a burgeoning

group had begun to split into factions emerged among 

international observers and policymakers. Reporting

on the Taliban began to highlight internal grappling 

between rival centers of power: several regional 

shuras, or councils, appeared to have grown to rival 

the authority of the traditional leadership’s shura based 

in Quetta, Pakistan.10 But there was little in Western 

specialists’ reporting on the Taliban to suggest these 

“growing pains” were a by-product of military pressure. Indeed, the portrait was much more one of a 

resilient, adaptive movement that had made strides in 

military professionalization and hierarchy—though as a 

“polycentric” organization, with competing authorities 

at the top.11 Yet the US military and national security 

establishment continued to speak about splitting the 

movement, not along the seams of the increasingly 

competitive leadership councils but in terms of engaging “moderate” Taliban—with regular references to the 

“Anbar Awakening” in Iraq in 2006, when a group o

Sunni sheiks rejected al-Qaeda and began to cooperate with US forces.12

For counterinsurgent forces, peace negotiations 

are often seen as a potential tool that might push 
USIP.ORG 5

insurgent groups toward fragmentation; insurgent 

fragmentation is a weakness to be exploited.13 By 

2012, as it grew apparent that talks with the Taliban 

and various reintegration initiatives had stalled despite several years of intensified US military campaigns, some openly advocated for reconciliation 

efforts to be used for that precise purpose.14 Even as 

weak results led the US and Afghan governments to

wind down the various stratagems intended to disarm 

and reconcile Taliban fighters, hints of divide and defeat methods persisted—such as the US blacklisting 

the Haqqani network without enforcing new sanctions

against the “core” Taliban membership.15

By 2015, the Taliban had violently reasserted their 

presence across the country, but a confluence of 

events—the displacement of Pakistani militants across 

the eastern border, the related emergence of an 

Islamic State (IS) satellite, and the public revelation that 

Taliban founder Mullah Omar had been dead since 

2013—sent shock waves through the movement and 

halted faltering back-channel peace talks. Observers 

speculated as to the group’s fragmented nature and 

the potential for open schisms, with some commentators again seeing opportunity in the Taliban’s internal 

discord.16 Other scholars and practitioners rightly noted 

that insurgencies and extremist groups often grow 

more violent in the aftermath of leadership transitions 

as new leaders seek to establish credibility.17 An expectation of fragmentation persisted after the death of a

second Taliban leader, Omar’s successor, Mullah Akhtar

Mansour.18 Mansour managed to corral many high-ranking dissenters back into the fold, obtaining delayed 

and reportedly begrudging oaths of allegiance, but his 

tenure remained characterized by internal polarization 

and rumors of discord.19

Taliban fighters listen to Mullah Mohammed Rasoul, unseen, the leader of a breakaway faction of the Taliban, in Farah Province, on November 3,

2015. In the years since, Rasoul has expressed support for a peace settlement. (Photo by A
6 PEACEWOR     NO. 

The very nature of Mansour’s death—he was killed, 

controversially, on Pakistani soil by an American drone

strike in 2016—seemed to highlight the persistence of 

a “forcing fragmentation” strategy, even if US foreign 

policy circles had dropped most public emphasis on 

intentionally fragmenting the Taliban.20 In its place, 

however, the Afghan government rigorously took up

the strategy. As late as 2017, then commander of US

forces in Afghanistan General John W. Nicholson noted

that the long-term strategy of the Afghan security forces was “fight, fracture, talk.”21 In the years after Omar’s

death was made public, sporadic clashes between the 

Taliban and pockets of the movement’s erstwhile members began to reveal evidence of Afghan government

influence—and at times outright and open support—for 

the several remaining splinter groups.22

By the time of the US troop drawdown, concluding the 

troops’ active combat role, Western scholars and practitioners had largely shifted away from advocating for a 

divide and conquer approach as Afghanistan policy discussions shifted to more feasible options under a lighter

footprint. Yet the paradigm of splitting insurgent groups 

persisted in some corners. Some continued to suggest 

the key to a political settlement lay in the Taliban’s internal divisions.23 Others hopefully pointed to the Afghan

government’s 2017 political settlement with Gulbuddin 

Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami party (HIG) as a mod

for future agreements with the Taliban.24 These hopes 

leaned on an implicit characterization of the HIG peace

deal as successfully dividing Afghanistan’s insurgency,

splitting Gulbuddin’s “reconcilable” fighters off from an 

“irreconcilable” Taliban. Afghan political figures have

said as much since Hekmatyar’s return to Afghanistan

suggesting more than once that the Taliban should 

be negotiated with along similar terms.25 But this perspective ignores the fact that HIG had always been a

rather separate and distinct movement from the Taliban, 

not a faction that was successfully “peeled off.” It also 

overlooks the vast differences in the military situation 

and political leverage of the Taliban versus the HIG, at

the time of the latter group’s settlement. 

More recently, analysts and commentators have 

raised the specter of future Taliban fragmentation—the 

potential result, in their eyes, of the group’s loss of 

control—as a cautionary argument against pursuing 

the last year of peace process efforts, including the 

February 29 agreement between the insurgent group 

and the United States.26 Ironically, the very issue skeptics highlight to warn against engaging the Taliban in 

peace efforts—namely, the group’s putative potential 

to fragment—is precisely the military objective that has 

been pursued for most of the past decade.

Concerns about fragmentation stem from a general

worry over the Taliban leadership’s ability to command and control its fighters in the event of a political 

settlement that includes a nationwide cease-fire. Even 

if Taliban leaders agree in good faith to reduce or end 

violence, will they be able to control the wide umbrella 

of fighters under their command in pockets around the 

country? More specifically, concerns have been voiced 

that the Haqqani network, a Taliban faction with a history of semi-autonomy and believed to be responsible

for many of the terror attacks against Kabul, will play 

spoiler by either defecting from the Taliban or simply 

refusing to abide by any peace deal, or that Haqqani

fighters or other Taliban hard-liners may rush to join IS 

in Afghanistan if the movement’s leadership reaches an

agreement with the US or Afghan government, in the

same way some commanders defected and pledged 

allegiance to IS in 2015.27

Yet neither of the above scenarios is strongly supported by a detailed historical recitation of the Taliban’s 

fractures or by the broader literature on fragmentation 

in insurgent groups. 
USIP.ORG 7

Insurgent Fragmentation: 

Theoretical Insights

It is crucial to distinguish the concept of fragmentation 

from that of factionalism. Often, the description “fragmented” has been applied to the Taliban rather casually, 

to refer to the organization’s loosely networked origins and the spirit of consultative decision making that 

continues to anchor the group, even as its military and 

governance hierarchies have crystallized somewhat. Yet 

fragmentation should be expressly understood as one 

of the “more significant manifestations” of factionalism: 

the splitting of an organization into politically distinct, mutually exclusive entities, whereby these entities create a 

new group, join another existing group, or side with the 

state.28 That is to say, an organization can be rife with 

factions or operate under a factionalized decision-making process and still remain relatively cohesive in its strategic aims and activity. When fragmentation does occur, 

it stems from an already factionalized group.

Studying and scrutinizing the different factions within an 

opaque organization such as the Taliban can be vital to 

interpreting behavior, extrapolating true objectives, and 

anticipating future moves. For instance, the perplexing 

and seemingly contradictory stance of the Taliban toward 

the Afghan government’s elections in 2014 is clarified by

such close scrutiny.29 That said, it is difficult to conceptualize and quantify the impacts of factionalism, even in 

studies of open political parties, and predictions based 

on a close scrutiny of factionalism in closed organizations 

are historically notoriously unreliable. Signs of factionalism should not lead to assumptions of impending fragmentation, insofar as factionalism has been a consistent 

feature of the Taliban movement and one that has not 

translated into wider or persistent fragmentation. 

In a foundational work on insurgent cohesion and fragmentation, Paul Staniland theorized that strong insurgencies have historically been rooted in two core traits. He

showed that cohesive insurgent groups possess strong 

horizontal networks that bind the organization’s leaders 

together, as well as vertical ties that keep insurgents 

plugged into the communities where they operate.30

Years later, Theo Farrell applied Staniland’s framework to 

the Taliban, illustrating that the movement possesses both 

traits.31 The Taliban’s consultative, committee-based leadership structure sustains buy-in from various commanders 

and even dissenting factions (while tribal ties continue to 

bind together core leadership circles). And the group’s

growing social development initiatives, localized recruitment, and attention to government-marginalized areas 

have only strengthened its vertical ties to communities.32

Kristen Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and

Lee Seymour dove into greater detail to conceptualize 

fragmentation, identifying three fundamental contributing factors.33 Depending on the number of distinct subgroups within an insurgency, the strength or weakness 

of the group’s institutions, and the distribution of power 

among its internal factions, a range of unique fragmenting processes can take place. 

For instance, an insurgent organization with strong 

internal discipline and exhibiting power dynamics that 

favor one faction over the others might witness fragmentation, but the model posits that the stronger faction 

would likely suppress smaller groups or subsume them, 

squashing any infighting that might result. Critically, the

scholars’ definition of distinct subgroups depends on 
8 PEACEWOR     NO. 

the lack of an acknowledged higher or central authority. 

According to this typology of insurgencies, the centrality of the Taliban’s concept or role of Amir ul-Mu’meni

(Commander of the Faithful) for most of the movement’s

history, and the prominent role the group’s Rabhari

Shura (Leadership Council) has exercised even in periods of leadership transition, indicate that the movement

is less fragmented than most insurgencies.34

Another scholar, Michael Woldermariam, demonstrated

that insurgencies are perhaps most likely to fragment 

in the event of major losses or gains on the battlefield.35 He found that insurgent groups tend to be most

cohesive during a period of enduring stalemate, as 

insurgents need to appear viable to their members (are 

not losing) but also require an external threat to remain 

vital (have not fully won).36

Following the same principle, Staniland and 

Cunningham conducted joint research into the dynamics of “side switching” or defection from an insurgent

group. One conclusion was that the state’s policies 

(manifested in its counterinsurgency efforts) were not a 

decisive driver of defections. That is to say, a counterinsurgency strategy of divide and defeat is effective only 

when the insurgency is already weak.37  more surprising finding was the lack of any strong connection between defection and ideological differences. Instead,

defections are usually grounded in the factors outlined 

above: when external events or internal dynamics 

prompt members to question the group’s capability to 

defeat threats and secure their interests. One of the 

most pronounced concerns about the Taliban today is 

the fear that hard-liners will reject a peace settlement 

on ideological grounds. This research suggests the 

fear is not well-founded.

Many conflict resolution studies point to the potential 

for groups to splinter or fragment when a peace deal is 

reached, which can lead to protracted and worsening 

violence.38 Historical reviews of insurgency suggest

that when hard-liners split from a group, their motives 

often have to do with power and pragmatism, and this 

observation is borne out in the Taliban’s own history of 

fragmentation, discussed further below.39 In the end, 

scholars agree that the groups most prone to fragmenting, because of peace talks or any other external 

prompt, are those that already lack cohesion.40

Perhaps the fundamental takeaway from the research is 

this: a cohesive insurgent group is more likely to preside 

over and implement a successful negotiation, while a 

fragmented group almost never does.41 The studies 

cited above categorize the Taliban as relatively cohesive 

compared to other modern insurgencies, regardless 

of lingering politicized narratives about the group. And

while causing the Taliban to fragment may have been a 

counterinsurgency strategy worth arguing for a decade 

ago, any peaceful resolution to Afghanistan’s conflict will

depend on a more or less unified Taliban today. 

Causing the Taliban to fragment may have been a counterinsurgency strategy worth arguing for a decade 

ago, any peaceful resolution to Afghanistan’s conflict will depend on a more or less unified Taliban today.
USIP.ORG 9

Evaluating Episodes of 

Taliban Fragmentation

When have the Taliban shown evidence of fragmenting? The tumultuous events of 2015 have already been 

mentioned, but that was not the first year to record 

signs that the Taliban’s internal factionalism might be 

inching closer toward fragmentation. Indeed, leading 

Western specialists on the movement logged evidence 

of growing factionalism as early as 2007. Without becoming “mutually exclusive” or outright rejecting Mullah 

Omar’s authority, figures and factions began to emerge 

that could be interpreted as “politically distinct.”42

In the decade before the American intervention of 2001,

the Taliban had developed a hierarchical structure that 

was absent in many other mujahideen armed groups of 

the time. That said, the group survived mass displacement and effective disbandment during the US military’s 

initial invasion in part because its hierarchy, and the 

way it functioned, was so loosely organized.43 Rooted in

what Staniland and Farrell have termed the horizontally 

networked relationships of the Taliban, consisting of 

personalized ties between top leaders and numerous 

mahaz (or “front”) commanders in the field, in its early 

insurgency years the organization demanded little and 

permitted a great deal from members fighting against 

the still nascent Afghan security forces.44 As long a

obedience in core marching orders and precepts was 

demonstrated, local commanders were often implicitly 

permitted to pursue their own interests, even if they 

were contrary to aims of leaders in Quetta.45

Yet amid this atmosphere of permissiveness-in-obedience, Taliban leaders showed willingness to take the 

harshest possible measures to prevent any slide from 

factionalism into fragmentation. It helped the group that 

its leadership core was tightly knit among key tribal 

constituencies of southern Pashtuns, a feature that has 

remained largely true even as the movement’s organizational structure has taken much firmer shape and 

its membership has diversified across the country.46

Earliest reports of internal tensions took on a distinctly tribal nature, in particular the struggle to harness 

resources from narcotics production, yet conflicts were 

managed by distinctly tribal modalities of dispute resolution enforced by the Taliban’s hierarchy.47

In 2007 the Taliban reached a turning point when the 

group’s senior military commander, Mullah Dadullah, 

was killed in a raid by NATO special forces. Dadullah

was notoriously ruthless, having controversially introduced suicide bombings to the conflict, and had taken 

an unorthodox stance by actively engaging with the 

Western press, including making provocative statements of support for al-Qaeda. Reports of Dadullah’s

death hinted that he had been betrayed, corresponding with rumors of antipathy among other leaders.48

The eventual death or arrest of three other senior figures during this period, and the Taliban’s later actions 

against commanders considered to have “gone rogue,” 

added to suspicion of behind-the-scenes internecine 

struggles.49 In any case, it was several years before 

another Taliban commander came into the public spotlight for disagreeing with the central leadership—even 

as it became increasingly clear that alternative centers 

of power were emerging within the group.50
10 PEACEWOR     NO. 

Meanwhile, Mullah Omar’s deputies—first Abdul Ghani

Baradar, then, after Baradar’s arrest by Pakistani security forces, Aktar Mansour—began implementing a wave

of reforms in an attempt to institutionalize the movement.51 According to the trio of scholars who modeled

fragmentation, strengthened institutionalization—manifested not only in harsh discipline or the elimination 

of threats to the group’s unity but also in more robust 

organizational bodies and committees—can impede 

fragmentation. This may partially explain why the group 

held together from 2009 to 2013, even in the face of 

increasingly direct involvement by Pakistan’s intelligence service, the growing tendency of Taliban leaders 

to resist Pakistani control by seeking sanctuary and 

funding elsewhere, and the complications brought on 

by having multiple sources of funding and authority.52

As the group’s expansion risked increased factionalism,

the organization’s top leaders were preemptively tightening the screws of cohesion: the focus of institutionalization in these years was predominantly military, and 

the Taliban’s fixation on battlefield adaptation incidentally strengthened its horizontal networks. 53

By 2012, there were signs that growing factionalism 

was leading to fragmentation. Amid broader wrangling

between the shuras over financing and operations, 

tensions escalated between top military commander 

Mullah Zakir and deputy Amir Mansour, eventually

resulting in Zakir’s demotion. Moreover, a faction was 

appearing to distance itself and emerging as a distinct group: claims had occasionally surfaced from the 

Mullah Dadullah Feda’i Mahaz, or “Sacrificing Front,” 

ever since the slain Dadullah’s younger brother had 

adopted his namesake and his command. The younger 

“Mansour Dadullah” was demoted and punished by the 

Taliban for disobedience, and thereafter his followers 

made the occasional claim of brutal attacks—including 

on a former Taliban minister and High Peace Counci

member.54 There was no evidence at the time that the 

Mullah Dadullah Front had entirely separated itself from 

the Taliban, but by 2013 the splinter group appeared to 

have split once more: under a commander Najibullah, 

the Feda’i Mahaz actively began to seek publicity, 

carrying out brutal high-profile killings.55 By 2014, a 

spokesperson was claiming that the Feda’i Mahaz 

opposed the Taliban’s stance on peace talks, mocking 

the group as a “Qatari militia.”56 At a strategic level,

the Taliban failed to respond in a unified fashion to the 

Afghan government’s 2014 elections, with subsequent

reporting by international observers pointing to disparate agendas and approaches among the group’s 

regional commands.57

Disagreements over the use of violence, discordant 

political stances on peace talks and Pakistani patronage, and raw power struggles had all been fomenting 

for several years before the perfect storm of 2015 

broke, comprising the leaked news of Omar’s death, 

the ensuing succession struggle, and the emergence 

of the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). These 

crises, the resulting fragmentation, and the Taliban’s 

fierce reprisals against splinter factions have been well 

documented elsewhere.58 Yet the trend toward fragmentation was strongly evinced in the earlier episodes 

outlined above, materializing well before the events of 

2015 changed the complexion of the Taliban’s organization. What actually happened in 2015? Why did the 

Taliban fragment the way it did, and, just as important, 

why had it largely resumed its pre-2015 cohesiveness 

less than a year later?
USIP.ORG 11

Causes of and Constraint

on Taliban Fragmentation

The presumption among many close observers, even 

to this day, is that the Taliban’s cohesion is directly tied 

to the ideological fulcrum of the movement: unwavering 

loyalty to the amir.59 Accordingly, as suspicions grew that

Omar might have long been dead, this ideological commitment deteriorated along with members’ trust, dissolving completely, among some, as soon as news broke 

of his death and the cover-up. But does this hypothesis, 

that Taliban cohesion was driven by loyalty to an absolute leader, hold true in the historical record? 

There is reason to question this assumption, based on 

events well before and well after the near schism of 

2015. The string of senior-level deaths and arrests in 

2006 and 2007 that hinted at competitive backstabbing; 

the rampant criminality and notorious brutality among 

field commanders, in contravention of the amir’s issued 

guidance; some figures’ cultivation of financial resources and external relationships that ran contrary to the 

agenda of the amir’s shura in Quetta—all took place 

well before Omar’s death, before suspicion, deception, 

and fighters’ faltering faith could be blamed for eroded cohesion. Similarly, if ideology-driven fealty is what 

held (and holds) the movement together, how was it 

that Mansour, the same individual accused of betraying 

and abusing Taliban loyalty, was able to prevent the 

group’s complete fragmentation, coercing and corralling 

so many members back into the group in short order? 

An Afghan man reads newspaper headlines on August 1, 2015, about the new leader of the Taliban, Mullah Aktar Mansour, and former leader Mul

Omar, whose death had been kept secret for more than two years. (Photo by Rahmat Gul/A
12 PEACEWOR     NO. 

Finally, some observers have characterized the current 

amir, Haibatullah Akhunzada, as relatively weak; in hi

first year, many openly worried that Sirajuddin Haqqani

would subvert the movement with Pakistani support.60

These predictions have not been borne out, revealing 

the current amir’s standing to be more complex; he 

has increasingly deferred to rule by committee, a style 

that has reaffirmed the group’s traditionally consultative 

decision-making process and solidified the horizontal 

network of its leadership.61 An attempt on Haibatullah’

life (or at least the killing of his brother, a cleric in 

Quetta) in August 2019 appeared to barely affect the

movement; such an affront to the core of the Taliban’s 

bond might have been expected to trigger a more 

visible response.62 Meanwhile, the movement’s ideological cause has been largely forsaken by international ulema (bodies of Muslim scholars), even by some 

previously supportive imams based in the Persian Gulf 

and Pakistan.63 The Taliban’s ideal of absolute loyalty 

appears, on close inspection, to have been historically 

quite conditional. 

Others have raised the possibility that ongoing peace 

talks, rather than a break in the ideological commitment 

to the amir, were the divisive issue that led to 2015’s 

fragmentation within the group.64 It is true that a cadre 

of dissatisfied hard-liners defected to IS from Taliban 

ranks, but these members were mostly localized in 

pockets of eastern provinces.65 Ultimately, the movement’s most prominent ideological opponents of peace 

talks did not openly split from the group, despite a full 

year of tension and dysfunction within the leadership. 

Indeed, the highest-ranking defector from the Taliban 

in 2015, Mullah Rasoul, later announced that he was in

favor of a peaceful settlement.66 Moreover, the highest-ranking leader publicly known to oppose talks in 

earlier years, Mullah Qayum Zakir, who never broke 

with the group, was promoted back into upper echelons of leadership after years of pariah status, at the 

same time that leadership shuras affirmed their latest 

consensus in favor of peace talks in January 2020.67

A more theoretical framework can provide a fuller answer to the question why the Taliban fragmented when

and how it did. Of the several reasons why factionalism 

grew within the movement, one was the shift in the 

origins and distribution of external support and resources. Beginning around 2009, resources began to be 

dispersed more evenly across the leadership shuras 

in Quetta, Peshawar, Miran Shah, Mashad, and “the 

North.”68 Per Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour’s triad of

fragmentation factors, the more even distribution of power that resulted made fragmentation all the more likely. 

In fact, their model predicts the precise kind of crisis the 

Taliban endured in 2015, involving “new organizations 

that arise to challenge members of the institution, and/or 

existing members that defect from it.”69 Woldermariam’s 

theory also outlines the Taliban’s dilemma of a decade 

ago: an insurgency’s major battlefield gains are likely 

to drive wedges between its factions. As the Taliban

expanded their reach across the country, changing the 

way the movement connected to new local communities 

at the same time that its internal hierarchy was evolving, 

the organization effectively experienced growing pains. 

The movement had expanded to the point that wholesale organizational adaptation, while necessary, left it 

less cohesive and vulnerable to external shocks. 

The theories discussed in the previous section also 

explain how the Taliban recouped a measure of organizational unity so effectively despite these strains.  study

by Charles Mahoney that explored instances in which

insurgent groups fragment found a simple explanation: 

the surviving faction was almost always the biggest 

and the best resourced.70 As Staniland corroborated,

a well-resourced insurgent group is bound to be more 

cohesive. Even amid the fracas of 2015, the Taliban’s 

credibility was boosted under Mansour’s leadership 

after the provincial capital of Kunduz briefly fell, the most 

dramatic military achievement of the group since before 

2001.71 Woldermariam’s study also applies: a group often 

remains cohesive so long as an obvious, serious external 

threat remains—and it retains the perceived capacity to 

ensure its members’ survival and further their interests.72
USIP.ORG 13

Finally, Staniland’s finding on cohesive groups requiring a strong horizontal network of ties is critical. It is not 

the ideal of loyalty to an amir that constitutes the core 

strength of these horizontal ties but the very nature of the 

Taliban’s mahaz structure (multiple fronts), and its continued relevance, that have made and keep the group so 

cohesive. The mahaz structure lacks intermediary ranks 

that might separate top figures from field commanders, 

operates via the direct collection and distribution of funds, 

serves as the predominant recruitment mechanism for the 

movement’s fighters, and functions through personalized 

relationships among the leadership. This structure has 

kept the movement intact despite the external pressures 

and internal factionalism, tribal tensions, and national 

expansion it has faced over several decades. 

There was a period, just before the fractious year of 

2015, when the Taliban’s institutional reforms appeared 

to have replaced its informal mahaz structure, down to 

the fundamental order of its military chain of command.73

Yet in the years since, the movement has returned to 

the reliability of mahaz networks even as it has institutionalized at a steady pace, a concurrent approach that 

has somewhat confounded Afghanistan watchers.74 This

organizational contradiction may have come about as a 

result of the Taliban’s forays into military centralization, 

which proved highly contentious and may have been at 

the root of faltering cohesion within the movement. This 

was likely because full military professionalization of the 

movement would have removed the benefits the mahaz 

system affords to each individual in the movement’s leadership. By preserving the mahaz structure, the Taliban’s 

leadership remains cohesive, and the organization has 

instead increased institutionalization through its civilian-oriented commissions and positions for governance, 

casualty recording and prevention, and information and 

media operations, including internal messaging and 

guidance. This practice has strengthened what Staniland 

describes as the vertical ties between insurgents and the 

communities that host them. Efforts by the central leadership to impose greater command and control measures have stopped short of destabilizing the resilient, 

cohesive horizontal network that, as in the insurgency’s 

earliest days, still grants the movement’s diverse local 

outlets a great deal of leeway on many issues. 

Insider reports of internal factionalism, and even concerns 

about the existential impact of the peace process, should 

not skew expectations toward the Taliban’s impending 

fragmentation. The Taliban’s leadership has always kept 

a sharp watch on the group’s unity, both real and perceived, and this tendency has only intensified since 2015. 

In this light, Haibatullah’s deferential leadership style,

characterized by some observers as a weakness, can 

be seen as a restoration of and emphasis on consensus 

rule—very much in the style of Mullah Omar in his later 

years. Many of the group’s public stances and policies, 

most of its mass communications, and its very few identifiable core objectives suggest a movement intent on 

preserving its unity as a cohesive armed force.75 When it 

comes to the most contentious issues, such as peace, the 

Taliban remain steadfastly attentive to how developments 

might threaten the movement’s organizational cohesion—evidenced in how the leadership quickly restarted 

combat operations after the three-day Eid cease-fire in 

June 2018 and rejected further cease-fires thereafter.76

And despite reports detailing rifts in the movement over

peace, suspected "anti-peace" figures remained silent for 

more than a year of careful deliberations on each step of 

talks with the United States, playing a game of "wait and 

see." Hiccups in those talks, rather than highlighting spoilers within Taliban ranks, were resolved at each turn

In light of the historical record and the relevant scholarship, and despite politically charged narratives and 

the movement’s loosely organized origins, the Taliban 

should be characterized as a relatively cohesive, rather 

than fragmented, group.77

The Taliban’s leadership has always kept a sharp watch on the group’s unity, 

both real and perceived, and this tendency has only intensified since 2015.
14 PEACEWOR     NO. 

Potential Issues Attending

the Peace Process

According to the existing literature on peace negotiations, that the Taliban can be considered more a cohesive organization than a fragmented one is good news

for peace efforts. As has become increasingly apparent

during the talks underway over the past year, a unified 

Taliban leadership is more likely to be able to deliver 

and implement a deal.78

A cautionary note is raised by the research suggesting that peace deals can fragment insurgent groups.

Academic studies are concerning but unsatisfyingly

unclear on this point; most historical case studies of 

insurgencies that “splinter” or fragment while negotiating 

peace have focused on insurgencies in a much weaker 

negotiating position and hence are not immediately relevant to Afghanistan’s current context, where the Taliban

hold a large percentage of the country’s rural territory.79

The only firm research conclusion about cohesive insurgencies is that they are generally less likely to fragment 

as a result of dramatic external developments.

Specific to the Taliban, then, if the continuation of the 

peace process were to bring about fragmentation, 

what form might it take? There have been three primary 

possibilities raised by observers: mass defections to 

the local IS branch, factions such as the Haqqani network declaring independence, or dissatisfied individuals and commanders simply defecting from the group.

The Taliban appear fixated on securing a political 

settlement to the conflict that explicitly avoids the last 

scenario by refusing to partake in particular peace 

initiatives that might damage the organization’s 

cohesion (rejection of comprehensive nationwide 

cease-fires and a resumption of violence days after 

signing the February 29 agreement with the United 

States are perhaps the most notable examples).80

The group’s messaging has remained consistently 

oriented along a narrative of victory, and its “red lines” 

seem to mark off what the group’s leadership believes 

the rank and file will find acceptable. Relatedly, and to

the point of whole factions splitting from the movement, Taliban leadership has increasingly consulted 

the top ranks at critical moments during negotiations 

with the United States.81 Many commentators on the 

Afghan conflict have pointed to the contradiction

of the Taliban’s bellicose rhetoric and occasionally 

shocking acts of violence even as the organization’s 

members sat with US representatives, ostensibly

discussing peace. Some, including many Afghans,

have suggested this contradiction shows the Taliban 

are negotiating in bad faith.82 But the Taliban’s insistence on continued violence, even in the final days 

before signing a peace agreement, is perfectly logical—if preserving unity (and preventing fragmentation) 

is understood to be one of their top priorities. 

Likewise, particular concerns that the Haqqani network

might resist a political settlement, perhaps because of 

its ties with global jihadist groups, ignore how integrated the network’s leadership has become with the 

Taliban since its leader Sirajuddin was promoted to 

deputy amir in 2015. Yes, the network is tribally distinct 

and stems from a different organizational history, but 

these factors and Sirajuddin’s simmering tensions with 

other leaders in the movement notwithstanding, the 
USIP.ORG 15

Taliban and the Haqqanis equally benefit at present

from their current cohesion—both structurally and 

individually. By some estimates, the Haqqanis make

up 15 percent of the Taliban’s total fighting power and 

control key logistical pipelines for terror attacks in 

Kabul.83 Yet their organic support base is geographically limited to a few provinces in a single region, without 

a single urban center. Currently, their leader holds sway

over an insurgency that appears poised to return to 

authority and legitimacy on a scale that might surpass 

the Taliban’s emirate era of the 1990s; on its own, this 

network would be existentially dependent on Pakistani 

support at a time of political uncertainty. Very few of the 

historical or theoretical criteria for defection or fragmentation apply to the current Taliban-Haqqani relationship, as evidenced by Sirajuddin Haqqani’s nam

appearing as the author of a New York Times op-ed 

outlining the Taliban’s vision for peace.84

Regarding the fear that, once a peace deal is reached,

fighters or whole factions could declare allegiance 

to ISKP, there is a historical precedent. However, the

context of the global phenomenon of IS in 2014–15, 

and the excitement it generated, is impossible to 

ignore. Since then, while ISKP has remained resilient, it 

has also failed to cultivate a broader following among 

Afghan communities, in part owing to its brutality and

blatant attempts to sow sectarian division; suffered 

the combined pressure of concentrated US, Afghan,

and Taliban military campaigns; and recently lost an 

enormous deal of credibility in the territorial loss of its 

original stronghold of Nangarhar Province. 

It is also impossible to discuss Taliban fighters potentially defecting to IS in the event of a peace deal, as 

is often assumed, without reviewing the context of 

how the Taliban have reacted to such defections in 

Afghanistan's Taliban delegation arrives for the signing of a peace settlement between the Taliban and the United States in Doha, Qatar, on February

29, 2020.. (Photo by Hussein Sayed/A
16 PEACEWOR     NO. 

the past.85 There is a common thread in the Taliban’s 

historical response to defections: other defectors were 

largely left alone, from individuals residing in Kabul 

serving peace efforts in various capacities to Mullah 

Rasoul, who is now in Pakistan under the watchful eye

of state security forces—yet every former Taliban member who has pledged allegiance or joined forces with 

the Islamic State affiliate has been ruthlessly targeted.86

Most citations of ISKP’s former Taliban membership 

neglect to mention that many of the original defectors, 

nearly all of whom joined in 2015, are dead—if not at 

the Taliban’s hand, then at the hands of US or Afghan

forces. And critically, these references almost always

ignore evidence that defectors were often already 

outcast from the Taliban in some way, from high-profile 

Mansour Dadullah to the common fighter in Nangarhar 

who confessed to committing murder as his reason for 

defecting.87 Even the northern faction of the Taliban 

that pledged itself to the Islamic State in 2018 had originally been a network of pro-government militias, having 

long since defected from allegiance to Afghanistan’s

vice president, Rashid Dostum.8

If the Taliban do begin to fragment amid a continuing 

peace process, it is not likely to be as the result of 

any peace agreement the group would willingly sign. 

Despite often repeated rumors that the siting of the 

Taliban’s political office in Doha caused widespread 

resentment among the group’s rank and file, the 2019 

appointment of movement heavyweight Mullah Baradar 

to head the political office ensured continued cohesion: 

it rebalanced the power of various factions within the 

group.89 If the group witnesses fragmentation (either 

on a factional or an individual scale), it is most likely to 

do so for the same reasons that have been identified 

in the past. Contrary to assumptions about ideological

differences, fighters’ habituation to violence, or greed 

stemming from the wartime economy, the Taliban are 

likely to fragment only if leadership loses the capacity 

and credibility to provide for the survival and further the 

interests of the movement’s members, if the basis of its 

support and sanctuary shifts in fundamental ways, or 

if the military course of the conflict leads to significant 

territorial gains or losses. This suggests that any potential fragmentation has much more to do with the content 

of an agreement than the fact that the Taliban might sign 

an agreement at all. And if the first phase of the current

process, the bilateral agreement between the US and 

Taliban signed on February 29, is any indication, the 

Taliban have not been pressured to—and are not yet in 

any near-term danger of—crossing the internal red lines 

that might threaten the group’s cohesion.90

This report does not deny the potential for the Taliban to 

fragment in the future, as the movement has before on 

occasion: factional differences may boil over as the conflict impacts internal dynamics, and significant changes 

to the group’s organizational structure and institutions 

could prompt crises of confidence among leaders or 

individual members. Rather, it has sought to provide a

firm theoretical framework, rooted in historical analysis, 

to clearly outline and understand the phenomenon. 

The Taliban are likely to fragment only if leadership loses the capacity and credibility to provide for the 

survival and further the interests of the movement’s members, if the basis of its support and sanctuary shifts 

in fundamental ways, or if the military course of the conflict leads to significant territorial gains or losses.
USIP.ORG 17

Recommendation

The Taliban constitute a relatively cohesive insurgent 

movement, as has been the case for most of the group’s 

history. This cohesion bodes well, the research literature 

indicates, for the Taliban to be able to enforce the terms 

of their agreement with the United States, as well as any 

eventual settlement that might result from intra-Afghan

negotiations. Any future Taliban fragmentation would likely

result from changes in the group’s organizational structure, either changes that altered its institutional strength 

or changes that shifted the balance of power among 

different factions. Another cause of fragmentation could

be developments, in conflict or during the evolving peace 

process, that sharply reduce members’ appraisal of the 

group’s ability to protect them and advance their interests. 

The group’s own preoccupation with preserving unity and preventing fragmentation provides insight into 

Taliban “red lines” for intra-Afghan negotiations. The

group has been notably vague on most key issues that 

can be expected to arise during discussions of a potential power-sharing agreement. At the very least, Afgha

government negotiators and international mediators 

might use the baseline of “preserving organizational 

cohesion” to explore the Taliban’s limits of compromise. 

The more cohesive an insurgent group, the more likely 

it will be able to enforce any peace-related agreements 

it signs. Intra-Afghan negotiations with the Taliban

should take into account the factors that contribute to 

an insurgent group’s cohesion—and as much as possible, accommodate and encourage continued cohesion, 

until later stages of a peace process are achieved. Such 

encouragement should include the Afghan government,

the United States, and other allies ceasing any existing 

attempts to sow discord or encourage factionalism within the Taliban’s leadership—which would mark a signal 

departure from historically periodic attempts to encourage or highlight the group’s fragmentation.

Taliban cohesion can be indirectly encouraged in 

subtler ways, as well. Indirect means could include 

initiatives or measures intended to pacify or include resistant factions within the Taliban. One instance where 

this may have already occurred is the confidence-building measure of prisoner release, which included the 

high-profile Anas Haqqani, brother of the Taliban’s deputy amir, Sirajuddin Haqqani. However, such initiati

could prove counterproductive if pursued in an attempt 

to divide the group.
18 PEACEWOR     NO. 

Notes

1. Quoted in Theo Farrell and Michael Semple, “Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a Decade of War,” Briefing Paper, Roy

United Services Institute, January 31, 2017, www.rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_bp_ready_for_peace.pdf.

2. The most prominent exception is Theo Farrell, “Unbeatable: Social Resources, Military Adaptation, and the Afghan Taliban

Texas National Security Review 1, no. 3 (May 2018), which applies scholarship outlined in this report to the closely related topic 

of Taliban cohesion and resilience. 

3. See Christa Case Bryant and Carol Huang, “Petraeus: What I Learned in Iraq, and How It Applies to Afghanistan,” Chr

Science Monitor, April 22, 2009, www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2009/0422/petraeus-what-i-learned-in-iraq-and-how-i

-applies-to-afghanistan.

4. These “subtypes” of Taliban members are comprehensively covered in Thomas Johnson, Taliban Narratives: The Use and 

Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). While these are popularly acknowledged 

categories of Taliban membership, to date, such groupings best serve to explain the extent and intensity of local or individual 

involvement in Taliban activities, rather than as indicators of factionalism or the potential for movement fragmentation.

5. On the “moral and financial bankruptcy” of the Afghan government’s initial disarmament program, see Kate Clark, “Graft an

Remilitarisation:A Look Back at Efforts to Disarm, Demobilise, Reconcile and Reintegrate,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Jul

2018, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/graft-and-remilitarisation-a-look-back-at-efforts-to-disarm-demobilise-reconcile-and-reintegrate.

6. See Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, “Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 20

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2009-07-01/flipping-taliban.

7. See John Bew et al., “Talking to the Taliban: Hope over History?,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Politi

Violence, King’s College London, July 2013, www.icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/ICSR-Report-Talking-to-the-Taliban

-over-History.pdf.

8. See Bew et al., “Talking to the Taliban,” as well as Peter Baker and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan War Debate Now Leans to Focus on A

Qaeda,” New York Times, October 7, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/world/asia/08prexy.html. Some research encouraged 

revisiting mistaken assumptions about the Taliban’s relationship with al-Qaeda, which may have inadvertently encouraged the 

administration’s schismatic approach to the conflict; see Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, “Separating the Taliban

from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan,” Center for International Cooperation, New York University, February 20

https://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf. 

9. On the US surge, see Matt Waldman, “Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban: The Feasibility and Risks of Negotiations,

Special Report no. 256, United States Institute of Peace, October 2010, www.usip.org/publications/2010/10/dangerous-liaison

-afghan-taliban. One example of the Taliban’s mistrust (and subsequent stalling) involved sending an imposter to represent the 

movement in talks with the Afghan government; see Joshua Partlow, “Negotiator for Taliban Was an Impostor, Afghan Officials Say,

Washington Post, November 23, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/23/AR2010112300075.html

10. For an overview of these shuras’ rise, see Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan: Taliban’s Organization and Structure,” Landinfo

August 23, 2017, www.landinfo.no/asset/3589/1/3589_1.pdf. Giustozzi’s body of work covers different aspects of dynamics

between the Taliban’s leadership factions, in particular regarding the military side of the organization. See, most recently, The 

Taliban at War: 2001–2018 (London: Hurst, 2019), especially chaps. 3–4

11. Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013

12. Representative of these references is commentary by Richard Miniter and Sebestyén Gorka, “How Iraq Could Win the Wa

Afghanistan,” The New Atlanticist (blog), Atlantic Council, December 3, 2009, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/

-iraq-could-win-the-war-in-afghanistan.

13. This sentiment was explicitly spelled out by US defense officials in Helene Cooper, “Dreaming of Splitting the Taliban,” New Yor

Times, March 7, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/weekinreview/08COOPER.html. It is just as explicitly outlined in Danie

Byman, “Talking with Insurgents:  Guide for the Perplexed,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009): 127–29, and in Audre

Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2009), 71. It should be noted there were skeptical voices within US national security circles questioning this 
USIP.ORG 19

narrative; one example was Carter Malkasian and Jerry Meyerle, “How Is Afghanistan Different from Al Anbar?,” CNA, Fe

2009, www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0020107.A1.pd

14. See Institute for the Study of War, “Reconciliation with the Taliban: Fracturing the Insurgency,” June 13, 2012, www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reconciliation-taliban-fracturing-insurgency. For details indicating that the Afghan government’s approach to 2010 talks with the Taliban included a desire to fracture the movement, including the specific targeting of the Haqqa

network for fragmentation, see Kathy Gannon, “Three Taliban Leaders Hold Secret Talks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai

Associated Press, October 31, 2010

15. See Bew et al., "Talking to the Taliban," 39.

16. Some of the most prescient analyses of the Taliban’s fragmentation, including forecasting of the group’s likelihood to weather its 

post-Omar succession crisis, came from Borhan Osman, “Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the Post-Omar Taliban,” Afghanistan

Analysts Network, November 24, 2015, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/toward-fragmentation-mappin

-the-post-omar-taleban. Another perspective skeptical of an existential fragmentation narrative is found in Anthony Cordesma

“The Afghan Campaign and the Death of Mullah Omar,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2, 2

www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-campaign-and-death-mullah-omar. Two examples of bullish attitudes in US policy thinking are 

found in Tom Rogan, “The Taliban’s Vulnerability and the Ways America Can Exploit It,” National Review, August 5, 20

www.nationalreview.com/2015/08/american-taliban-strategy-mullah-omar-death; and Steven Metz, “Taliban Fracture Opens 

Window of Opportunity for Afghanistan,” World Politics Review, November 13, 2015, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1721

/taliban-fracture-opens-window-of-opportunity-for-afghanistan. 

17. See several practitioners and experts quoted in Sami Yousafzai, “The Taliban Turn on Each Other, but That May Not Be Good 

News,” Daily Beast, November 15, 2015, www.thedailybeast.com/the-taliban-turn-on-each-other-but-that-may-not-be-good-news.

18. See quoted specialists in Jessica Donati and Habib Khan Totakhil, “Taliban Reels from Leader’s Death in U.S. Drone Strike,” Wal

Street Journal, May 23, 2016, www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-reels-from-leaders-death-in-u-s-drone-strike-1464008252. Also see analysis noting the negatives of insurgent group fragmentation in Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Why the Death of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour

Won’t Bring Peace to Afghanistan,” Vox, June 21, 2016, www.vox.com/2016/6/21/11988948/afghanistan-mullah-mansour-taliban.

19. Background on Mansour’s era can be found in Mona Kanwal Sheikh and Amina Khan, “Prospects of a Settlement with the

Afghan Taliban: Exit, Peace and Governance from the Taliban Perspective,” DIIS Report no. 2019:01, Danish Institute fo

Security Studies, 2019, 29–31, https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/2635559/DIIS_Report_2019_1_Final.pdf. Also see Borhan Osman’

in-depth analysis in “Taleban in Transition: How Mansur’s Death and Haibatullah’s Ascension May Affect the War (and Peace

Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 27, 2016, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/taleban-in-transition-h

-mansurs-death-and-hibatullahs-ascension-may-affect-the-war-and-peace; and “Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar 

Taleban,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 24, 2015, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-pea

/toward-fragmentation-mapping-the-post-omar-taleban.

20. Former senior State Department adviser Barnett Rubin dryly pointed out the flawed logic in presuming Mansour’s killing might cause

the Taliban to fragment and weaken to the point it would seek to negotiate: “So far, the Taliban do not seem to have interpreted the 

assassination of their leader as an outstretched hand for peace” (“An Assassination That Could Bring War or Peace,” New Yorke

June 4, 2016, www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-the-u-s-strike-on-the-taliban-means-for-peace-in-afghanistan).

21. Brian Dodwell and Don Rassler, “A View from the CT Foxhole: General John W. Nicholson, Commander Resolute Support

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 2 (February 2017).

22. See Jessica Donati and Habib Khan Totakhil, “Afghan Government Secretly Fosters Taliban Splinter Groups,” Wall Street Journal

May 22, 2016, www.wsj.com/articles/in-afghanistan-a-secret-plan-pays-off-the-taliban-1463964545; and Taimoor Shah, Rod

Norland, and Jawad Sukhanyar, “Afghan Government Quietly Aids Breakaway Taliban Faction,” New York Times, June 19, 2017

www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-faction-renouncers.html.

23. Senior former American defense officials have testified to the US Senate Armed Services Committee as recently as Februa

2020, explicitly advocating a strategy of pressuring the Taliban to the point that it weakens and fragments. See, among others, 

Colin F. Jackson’s testimony on February 11, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jackson_02-11-20.pdf.

24. On Hekmatyar’s reconciliation, see Bradley Klapper, “Afghan Warlord Peace Deal Could Be a Model for the Taliban, Sugges

Kerry,” Associated Press, October 5, 2016

25. See quoted officials, including Hekmatyar himself, in Andrew E. Kramer, “Once-Feared Warlord Is Still Causing Trouble, but Talki

Peace,” New York Times, March 4, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/asia/afghanistan-gulbuddin-hekmatyar.html. See also 

Barnett Rubin, “Hard Choices for Peace in Afghanistan,” New Yorker, October 18, 2016, www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/

-choices-for-peace-in-afghanistan. 
20 PEACEWOR     NO. 

26. On the strain peace could bring to the Taliban’s integrity, one example of exaggerated claims can be found in Hugh Tomlinson

and Haroon Janjua, “Taliban Hardliners Turn to Isis over US Peace Deal,” The Times (London), August 27, 2019, www.theti

.co.uk/article/taliban-hardliners-turn-to-isis-over-us-peace-deal-dbqxf3nwr. It must be noted that the narrative of “catastrophic 

Taliban fragmentation will occur, if current peace efforts continue” is put forth by the highest levels of the Afghan government.

Also see “A Conversation with National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib of Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Rel

October 1, 2019, www.cfr.org/event/conversation-national-security-advisor-hamdullah-mohib-afghanistan-0. The Afghan government’s recent resistance to US-driven peace efforts is well explored in Thomas Ruttig and Martine van Bijlert, “US-Taleban Talks

An Imminent Agreement without Peace?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 30, 2019, www.afghanistan-analysts.o

/reports/war-and-peace/us-taleban-talks-an-imminent-agreement-without-peace.

27. See Melissa Skorka, “Afghanistan Endgame, Part One: Is Sirajuddin Haqqani Ready for Peace?,” Asia Unbound (blog), Counci

Foreign Relations, August 14, 2019, www.cfr.org/blog/afghanistan-endgame-part-one-sirajuddin-haqqani-ready-peace. On fighter

joining IS, see quotes in Pamela Constable and Karen DeYoung, “The U.S. Is Nearing a Deal with the Taliban. But Another Majo

Threat Looms in Afghanistan: The Islamic State,” Washington Post, August 21, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacif

/the-us-is-nearing-a-deal-with-the-taliban-but-another-major-threat-looms-in-afghanistan-the-islamic-state/2019/08/20/ff129358-c35d

-11e9-8bf7-cde2d9e09055_story.html. Less of a concern to Western officials focused on counterterrorism, but also a clear worry in 

terms of future Taliban fragmentation, is simply the possibility of rank and file bleeding off into independent banditry and crime. 

28. This distinction between factionalism and fragmenting is made explicitly by Michael Woldermariam, Insurgent Fragmentation in the 

Horn of Africa: Rebellion and its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 6. Fragmentation is also referred to i

some of the literature on civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorist groups by the term “splintering,” especially when it comes to peace 

negotiations and the potential for “spoilers.” One helpful reference is Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 68–69. For consistency’s sake,

this report refers exclusively to “fragmentation,” which is understood to be the same as the “splintering” referred to elsewhere. 

29. See Michael Semple, “The Taliban’s View of the 2014 Elections,” Peace Brief no. 165, United States Institute of Peace, January 

30, 2014, www.usip.org/publications/2014/01/talibans-view-2014-elections; and Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014

Elections in Afghanistan,” Peaceworks report no. 94, United States Institute of Peace, February 2014, www.usip.org/publication

/2014/04/taliban-and-2014-elections-afghanistan.

30. Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), chap. 3.

31. Farrell, “Unbeatable.”

32. The story of Afghan communities shifting to Taliban influence and control in light of government marginalization or misdeeds

spans well over a decade. For a seminal account, see Anand Gopal, No Good Men among the Living: America, the Taliban, and

the War through Afghan Eyes (New York: Metropolitan, 2014). The Taliban’s evolution in local governance has been thoroughly covered by Ashley Jackson, “Life under the Taliban Shadow Government,” Overseas Development Institute, June 2018,

www.odi.org/publications/11144-life-under-taliban-shadow-government; and Ashley Jackson and Rahmatullah Amiri, “Insurge

Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Makes Policy,” Peaceworks report no. 153, United States Institute of Peace, November 2019

www.usip.org/publications/2019/11/insurgent-bureaucracy-how-taliban-makes-policy.

33. Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour, “A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, a

Infighting in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (June 2012).

34. Amir ul-Mu’menin is the title of the Afghan Taliban’s Supreme Leader, held by the group’s founder Mullah Mohammad Om

from the 1990s until his death sometime in 2013. For Taliban views on the amir, see Michael Semple, “Rhetoric, Ideology and

Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement,” Peaceworks report no. 102, United States Institute of Peace, December 2014, 

www.usip.org/publications/2015/01/rhetoric-ideology-and-organizational-structure-taliban-movement.

35. Woldermariam, Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa, 33–37.

36. Woldermariam, Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa, 38.

37. Paul Staniland and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defectio

and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (February 2012): 16–40

38. See Cale Salih and Stephen Gray, “Group Cohesion and Peace Processes,” Peace Brief no. 230, United States Institute of Peace

September 2017, www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/group-cohesion-and-peace-processes; Audrey Kurth Cronin, “When Shoul

We Talk to Terrorists?,” Special Report no. 240, May 2010, www.usip.org/publications/2010/05/when-should-we-talk-terrorists;

and Victor Asal, “Why Split?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (2001). See also a quantitative survey by Colin P. Clarke a

Christopher Paul, “From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved

through Negotiations,” Rand Corporation, 2014, www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR469.htl. A great deal of the wor
USIP.ORG 21

“splintering” or fragmentation resulting from peace negotiations draws on Stephen John Stedman’s seminal article, “Spoiler 

Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 5–53.

39. Cronin notes this is particularly true when a group has transitioned away from a more ideological identity and has entered 

phase of territorial acquisition and the exercise of political power—a clear outline of the Taliban’s evolution in the past decade. 

Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 40–44

40. Salih and Gray, “Group Cohesion and Peace Processes.”

41. A thorough summary of scholarship on the topic can be found in Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee 

M. Seymour, “The Problem with Fragmented Insurgencies,” Washington Post, May 13, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/news

/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/13/the-problem-with-fragmented-insurgencies. 

42. Among many clear-sighted analyses of the Taliban that noted the movement was far from monolithic in this era, see Ana

Gopal, “Who Are the Taliban?,” The Nation, December 3, 2008, www.thenation.com/article/archive/who-are-taliban

43. For background on organizational structure during this period, see Giustozzi, The Taliban at War, chap. 1. Further exploration of 

the group’s resurgence and regrouping is found in Seth Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,

International Security 32, no. 4 (2008). On the hierarchy of the group’s earlier era, see Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations a

War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), chap. 8

44. Refer to Farrell’s “Unbeatable,” in which he adapts Staniland’s framework of insurgent group cohesion to the Taliban. See als

Farrell and Semple, “Ready for Peace?

45. This permissiveness—or perhaps more accurately phrased, the Taliban leadership’s reluctance and tendency to avoid asking 

its members to perform or endure in a way that might garner resistance, thereby cultivating an image of member obedience 

via omission of hard asks—has been a consistent trait on display even during the movement’s Islamic Emirate era of the 1990s. 

Counternarcotics expert David Mansfield has written about this power dynamic governing Taliban policies, using the group’s

2001 ban on opium cultivation as a case study, in A State Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan (London: Hurst,

2016), especially chap. 6. 

46. On the tribal ties that bind the Taliban’s leadership together, see Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taleban?,” Afghanis

Analysts Network, April 2010, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/20100624TR-HowTr

AretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf. For the evolution in the organization since then, with a focus on civilian governance, refer to Jackso

and Amiri, “Insurgent Bureaucracy.

47. In addition to Ruttig, “How Tribal Are the Taleban?,” see retrospectives in Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban

War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013).

48. For details hinting at insider “betrayal” in Dadullah’s death, see Taimoor Shah and Carlotta Gall, “Key Taliban Leader Is Killed

in Afghanistan in Joint Operation,” New York Times, May 14, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/05/14/world/asia/14afghan.html. For

more on tensions between Dadullah and other Taliban figures, see Tom Coghlan, “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History,”

Decoding the New Taliban, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (London: Hurst, 2007), 138–39. For a retrospective analysis of these dynamics

see Thomas Ruttig, “The Mulla Dadullah Front:A Search for Clues,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 22, 2

www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-mulla-dadullah-front-a-search-for-clues.

49. For more on suspicions surrounding not only Dadullah’s death, but referencing three other top-level leaders (including Mullah 

Obaidullah, the former Taliban defense minister who was the first major figure to be arrested by Pakistani security forces, in 2007), 

see Ron Moreau, “Meet the Taliban’s New Chief,” Newsweek, July 24, 2009, www.newsweek.com/meet-talibans-new-chief-81727

50. On the emergence of rival regional shuras, see Giustozzi, The Taliban at War, chap. 3.

51. On Baradar’s style of management (and Mansour’s thereafter), see Moreau, “Meet the Taliban’s New Chief,” or a concise summary (and ramifications thereof) in Jackson, “Life under the Taliban Shadow Government.” Also see again Jackson and Amir

“Insurgent Bureaucracy,” for the latest and perhaps most comprehensive work on the Taliban’s organizational structure. For 

detail on the formalized written code(s) meant to more strictly govern the behavior of Taliban field commanders, see Kate Clark,

“The Layha: Calling the Taleban to Account,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 4, 2011, www.afghanistan-analysts.or

/special-reports/the-layha-calling-the-taleban-to-account.

52. Additional context on these evolving dynamics can be found in Claudio Franco, “The Evolving Taleban: Changes in 

Insurgency’s DNA,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 19, 2013, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-pe

/the-evolving-taleban-changes-in-the-insurgencys-dna.

53. For an overview with the implications for Taliban centralization, see Farrell, “Unbeatable,” 70. Rahmatullah Amiri details th

implementation of a formal military structure on top of the existing mahaz system (“Helmand: The Chain of Chiefdoms Unravels
22 PEACEWOR     NO. 

Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 11, 2016, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/helmand-2-the-chain-of-chiefdoms-unravels). Fo

an additional case of a small insurgent group (the Tora Bora group) attempting to differentiate and declare its independence 

from the Taliban only to be subsumed by the group’s leadership (reflecting its centralizing agenda), see, “The Other Side—

Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to Talks,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 

www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/200907-AAN-Report-Ruttig-The-Other-Side.p

54. See Ruttig, “The Mulla Dadullah Front.”

55. See Sami Yousefzai, “Mullah Najibullah: Too Radical for the Taliban,” Newsweek, August 30, 2013, www.newsweek.com/2013/

/30/mullah-najibullah-too-radical-taliban-237894.html. Also see Emma Graham-Harrison, “Taliban Splinter Group Says It Kille

British-Swedish Reporter Nils Horner,” The Guardian, March 12, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/12/taliban-splint

-group-british-swedish-reporter-nils-horner.

56. Abubakar Siddique and Ahmad Takal, “Taliban Infighting Escalating in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Radio Free Europe/

Liberty, May 30, 2014, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-infighting/25404677.html.

57. See Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan,” Conflict, Security & Development 16 (2016

58. For a summary of these issues and the Taliban’s response, with links to detailed resources, see Andrew Watkins, “Taliban

Fragmentation:  Figment of Your Imagination?,” War on the Rocks, September 4, 2019, www.warontherocks.com/2019/09/taliba

-fragmentation-a-figment-of-your-imagination.

59. See Semple, “Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure.

60. On Haibatullah’s weakness, see Farrell and Semple, “Ready for Peace?” Also see Antonio Giustozzi, “Do the Taliban Hav

Appetite for Reconciliation with Kabul?,” Center for Research and Policy Analysis, March 19, 2018, www.crpaweb.org/s

-post/2018/03/20/Do-the-Taliban-Have-any-Appetite-for-Reconciliation-with-Kabul-Antonio-Giustozzi. On concerns of Haq

dominance, see Mujib Mashal, “Haqqanis Steering Deadlier Taliban in Afghanistan, Officials Say,” New York Times, May 8, 2016

www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/world/asia/haqqanis-steering-deadlier-taliban-in-afghanistan-officials-say.html.

61. Of particular note recently were reports of the group’s weeks-long internal consultations over talks with the United States in 

January 2020, during which members of the Taliban political office in Doha traveled to Pakistan, briefed several shuras on 

the American demand for some form of “reduction in violence,” only for leadership to confer with their mahaz commanders,

regroup, and deliberate. See Mujib Mashal and Taimoor Shah, “Taliban Offer to Reduce Violence in Afghanistan Ahead of De

with U.S.,” New York Times, January 16, 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-agreement.html.

62. Sami Yousafzai and Shereena Qazi, “Brother of Afghan Taliban Leader Killed in Pakistan Mosque Blast,” Al Jazeera, August 16

2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/brother-afghan-taliban-leader-killed-pakistan-mosque-blast-190816143737376.html.

63. See Mohammad Al-Kinani, “Islamic scholars plead for Afghanistan peace, stability,” Arab News, July 11, 2018, www.arabnews.c

/node/1337181/saudi-arabia. Another conference with a similar message to the Taliban took place in Jakarta earlier in May 2018,

with scholars from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia attending—despite public Taliban admonishments.

64. For a persuasive analysis of the specific timing of events in 2015, including leaks about Mullah Omar’s death and quietly held 

peace talk sessions, see Graeme Smith, “Taliban Factionalism Rises after Mullah Omar’s Death,” International Crisis Group

August 13, 2015, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/taliban-factionalism-rises-after-mullah-omar-s-death

65. See again Osman, “Toward Fragmentation?”; and “Descent into Chaos: Why Did Nangarhar Turn into an IS Hub?,” Afghanist

Analysts Network, September 27, 2016, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/descent-into-chaos-why-di

-nangarhar-turn-into-an-is-hub.

66. See J. P. Lawrence, “Taliban vs. Taliban Clash in Afghanistan’s West Leaves 40 Dead,” Stars and Stripes, November 2, 2018

www.stripes.com/news/taliban-vs-taliban-clash-in-afghanistan-s-west-leaves-40-dead-1.554808. Mullah Rasoul’s departure from

the Taliban is the most complex of any case, not only because of his high profile and strong tribal ties in leadership but also for the 

tightly confined geographic scope of his active followers, which in recent years had dwindled to a single valley in Herat Province,

and for convincing reports that Rasoul, or at least a good deal of his faction, was actively cooperating with the Afghan government

On this, see Donati and Totakhil, “Afghan Government Secretly Fosters Taliban Splinter Groups.” Notably, many of these followers

rejoined the Taliban’s ranks in January 2020, after one of Rasoul’s top commanders was killed in a mystifying US drone strike.

67. On Zakir’s resistance to talks, see Margherita Stancati, Habib Khan Totakhil, and Saeed Shah, “Afghan Taliban’s Chief Milita

Commander Steps Down,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-talibans-chief-military-command

-steps-down-1398617150. On his re-ascendance to the group’s highest ranks, see “Taliban Leadership Appoints Mullah Qayum

Zakir against Key Military Position,” Afghan Islamic Press, January 4, 2020, http://afghanislamicpress.com/en/subscribe

.php?id=86972.

68. See Giustozzi, “Afghanistan: Taliban’s Organization and Structure.
USIP.ORG 23

69. Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour, “A Plague of Initials,” 277. This conclusion is further bolstered by the nuanced work o

Henning Tamm, “Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors Affect Insurgent Cohe

International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 4 (December 2016). 

70. Charles W. Mahoney, “Splinters and Schisms: Rebel Group Fragmentation and the Durability of Insurgencies,” Terrorism a

Political Violence 32, no. 2 (November 2017).

71. Joseph Goldstein, “Taliban’s New Leader Strengthens His Hold with Intrigue and Battlefield Victory,” New York Times, October 4

2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/world/asia/kunduz-fall-validates-mullah-akhtar-muhammad-mansour-talibans-new-leader.html.

72. Woldermariam, Insurgent Fragmentation, 34–40. 

73. For one instance detailing the extent to which new Taliban structures were sidelining the mahaz, see Amiri, “Helmand: Th

Chain of Chiefdoms Unravels.

74. This is not an original observation, but the dual tracks of traditional and newly institutionalized structures continue to puzzle observers 

of the movement. In “Insurgent Bureaucracy,” Jackson and Amiri note that this balance has probably proven successful owing to the

reality that military priorities remain predominant, and that in practice, a Taliban commander may override the functions or decisions of 

a centrally reporting committee fairly easily. For an exploration of what he terms the Taliban’s current institutional “mix of decentralization and centralization,” see Borhan Osman, “A Negotiated End to the Afghan Conflict: The Taliban’s Perspective,” Peaceworks repo

no. 137, United States Institute of Peace, June 2018, www.usip.org/publications/2018/06/negotiated-end-afghan-conflict.

75. Borhan Osman has consistently identified this need as a guiding principle of the group, further emphasized since 2015: “Osman 

said the negotiations have been slowed in part by the Taliban’s need to ensure that their relative unity and cohesiveness, protected in the face of 18 years of military pressure, doesn’t fracture now” (Mujib Mashal, “In Afghanistan, the Endgame Remains 

Difficult Balancing Act in a Region on Edge,” New York Times, August 8, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/world/a

/afghanistan-taliban-camp-david.html.) See the Taliban’s own messaging even during the finalization of the US-Taliban agreement, in statements titled “Political and Military unity of Islamic Emirate” (February 24, 2020) and “Message of Esteemed Amir ul

Mumineen, Sheikh-ul-Hadith Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, regarding Termination of Occupation Agreement with the Uni

States” (February 29, 2020) on the Voice of Jihad website.

76. For examples of the Taliban’s protection of its own cohesion, from the emirate era, see note 46 on Mansfield, A State Built on Sand. 

On the cease-fire, see Kate Clark, “The Eid Ceasefire: Allowing Afghans to Imagine Their Country at Peace,” Afghanistan An

Network, June 19, 2018, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-eid-ceasefire-allowing-afghans-to-imagine-their-country-at-peace. On 

the aftermath, note the Taliban’s consistency in rejecting any form of cease-fire in more than a year of direct talks with the United 

States since then—lest further cease-fires tempt fighters into more fraternizing with pro-Afghan government elements of society,

weakening the group’s cohesion. For more, see Watkins, “Taliban Fragmentation.” 

77. In fact, in early 2015, before events that summer would openly rock the group, Paul Staniland wrote an op-ed on the different kinds of 

insurgency, and used the Afghan Taliban as an example of the strongest, most integrated category; see Staniland, “Every Insurgency

Is Different,” New York Times, February 15, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/opinion/every-insurgency-is-different.html. 

78. J. P. Lawrence, “Experts:  Unified Taliban Could Bolster Peace Talks in Afghanistan,” Stars and Stripes, June 22, 201

www.stripes.com/experts-a-unified-taliban-could-bolster-peace-talks-in-afghanistan-1.587125. 

79. These cases, covered in several sources cited earlier, prominently include the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and th

Palestinian Authority. They are, however, difficult to compare with the Taliban’s current position

80. See Secunder Kermani, “Afghan Conflict: Taliban to Resume Attacking Local Forces after Deal with US,” BBC News, March

2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51691947.

81. See Mashal and Shah, “Taliban Offer to Reduce Violence in Afghanistan

82. See Pamela Constable, “Afghans Voice Fears That the U.S. Is Undercutting Them in Deal with the Taliban,” Washington Pos

August 17, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-fears-mount-that-the-us-is-undercutting-them-in-deal-with-the-taliba

/2019/08/17/f4c7839e-c061-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html. Also see Sarah McCammon and Susannah George, “Denyin

Contradiction, Taliban Leaders Say Violence Remains Their Path to Peace,” National Public Radio, December 28, 2019, www.

.org/2019/12/28/792088729/denying-contradiction-taliban-leaders-say-violence-remains-their-path-to-peace.

83. A somewhat more recent estimate of Haqqani network fighting strength can be found in Giustozzi, “Do the Taliban.” For mo

on the group’s profile, see Frud Bezhan, “Suicide Bombings, Arab Fighters, and Pakistani Asset: Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Legacy

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 4, 2018, www.rferl.org/a/jalaluddin-haqqani-s-deadly-legacy-continues-to-sha

-the-war-in-afghanistan/29471611.html.

84. The integration of Sirajuddin Haqqani and his base into the Taliban’s leadership structure, despite whatever factionalism exists,

was emphatically demonstrated by Haqqani’s New York Times op-ed, which purported to speak for the whole of the Taliban to a
24 PEACEWOR     NO. 

global audience in unprecedented fashion (“What We, the Taliban, Want,” New York Times, February 20, 2020, www.nytimes.

com/2020/02/20/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-war-haqqani.html). This PR move could well have been intended as a rebuttal to

those who view the Haqqani network as an independent spoiler of peace efforts

85. For one example of assumed defections, see Claire Parker, “The Islamic State Is Far from Defeated. Here’s What You Need t

Know about Its Affiliate in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 19, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08

/islamic-state-is-far-defeated-heres-what-you-need-know-about-its-affiliate-afghanistan. 

86. It should be noted that non-IS defectors from the Taliban have also been targeted and killed on occasion, though often under 

opaque circumstances. For a thorough review of the antipathy between the Afghan Taliban and IS, see Amira Jadoon, Nakiss

Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, “Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,” 

Sentinel (West Point) 11, no. 4 (April 2018). For an overview and bottom line, see Watkins, “Taliban Fragmentation.”

87. For an interview with said fighter, see Abdul Qadir Sediqi and Ahmad Sultan, “Taliban, U.S. pact in Afghanistan Could Bo

Islamic State,” Reuters, August 15, 2019, www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-08-15/taliban-us-pact-in-afghanistan-cou

-boost-islamic-state.

88. Najim Rahim and Rod Norland, “Taliban Surge Routs ISIS in Northern Afghanistan,” New York Times, August 1, 

www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-isis.html. 

89. Occasionally, these rumors of dissatisfaction with Doha-based Taliban come from the Afghan president himself. In Davos in

January 2020, President Ghani described the Doha Taliban as “investors,” with “four or five wives.” See Shadi Khan Saif, “In 

Davos, Ghani Urges Taliban to Shun Violence,” Anadolu Agency, January 22, 2020, www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/in-dav

-ghani-urges-taliban-to-shun-violence/1710652.

90. This point has been made by, among others, Laurel Miller, the former US Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan

at a panel discussion at the United States Institute of Peace: “Peace for Afghanistan: What Has Changed?,” September 13, 201

www.usip.org/events/peace-afghanistan-what-has-changed. 
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is a national, 

nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by Congress

and dedicated to the proposition that a world without 

violent conflict is possible, practical, and essential for US 

and global security. In conflict zones abroad, the Institute 

works with local partners to prevent, mitigate, and resolve 

violent conflict. To reduce future crises and the need for 

costly interventions, USIP works with governments and civil 

societies to help their countries solve their own problems 

peacefully. The Institute provides expertise, training, 

analysis, and support to those who are working to build a 

more peaceful, inclusive world.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, DC • George E. Moose 

Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansl

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University Scho

Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adju

Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. K

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Profes

of International Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Direc

International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, Geor

Mason University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zir

Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washingto

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State • Mark T. Esper, Secretary of Defense • Frederick J. Roegge, Vice Admiral, US Navy; President, National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President & CEO, United Stat

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS

Since its inception in 1991, the United States Institute of Peace Press has published hundreds of influential 

books, reports, and briefs on the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. All our books and reports arise from research and fieldwork sponsored by the Institute’s many

programs, and the Press is committed to expanding the reach of the Institute’s work by continuing to publish significant and sustainable publications for practitioners, scholars, diplomats, and students. Each work 

undergoes thorough peer review by external subject experts to ensure that the research and conclusions 

are balanced, relevant, and sound.
2301 Constitution Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

202.457.1700

www.USIP.org

Making Peace Possible

NO. 160 | March 2020

The US and Afghan governments have, at various times, intentionally pursued strategies of

“divide and defeat” in an attempt to fragment and weaken the Taliban. Yet contrary to lingering 

narratives from earlier eras of the Afghan conflict, the Taliban today are a relatively cohesive

insurgent group and are unlikely to fragment in the near term. By studying what makes the 

Taliban cohesive and what has caused instances of its fragmentation, all parties invested in 

an Afghan peace process might be better equipped to negotiate with the Taliban under terms

the movement would be willing to accept, even if it has not defined those terms publicly.

• Understanding Resistance to Inclusive Peace Processes by Esra Cuhadar

(Peaceworks, March 2020)

• The “Green Diamond”: Coffee and Conflict in the Central African Republic by 

Fiona Mangan, Igor Acko, and Manal Taha (Special Report, February 202

• Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach by Martha 

Crenshaw (Peaceworks, February 2020

• The Intersection of Investment and Conflict in Myanmar by Priscilla Clapp

(Special Report, February 2020

• A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula by Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia

M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Y

Yun (Peaceworks, February 2020)

OTHER USIP PUBLICATIONS