Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1508-DR-1250 | April 28, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

J. Michael Katz 

Goodman Katz & Scheele 

Highland, Indiana 

Adam J. Sedia 

Rubino Ruman Crosmer & Polen 

Dyer, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Debra Lynch Dubovich 

Levy & Dubovich 

Merrillville, Indiana 

Lynn F. Hammond 

Valparaiso, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gregory Reasons, 

Appellant-Respondent, 

v. 

Joanne Reasons, 

Appellee-Petitioner. 

April 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

45A03-1508-DR-1250 

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Elizabeth F. 

Tavitas, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

45D03-1211-DR-927 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
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Case Summary 

[1] Twenty-four days before the final hearing in his divorce case, Gregory Reasons 

(“Husband”) was notified that his attorney would be moving to withdraw from 

representing him. Husband filed a motion to continue the final hearing, 

claiming that he needed more time to retain a different attorney. The trial court 

denied the motion, and Husband appeals. Because Husband had sufficient time 

to find a new attorney if he so desired, because the hearing had already been 

continued six times over the course of two years, and for the other reasons 

stated below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 

it denied Husband's motion. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On November 14, 2012, Susan Reasons (“Wife”) filed a petition to dissolve her 

marriage to Husband. Husband was served a month later, but his attorney did 

not enter an appearance on his behalf until April 2013. That August, 

Husband’s attorney asked that the matter be set for a final hearing, and the trial 

court scheduled the hearing for September 16, 2013. Because the couple’s only 

child was an adult, the hearing was to be limited to property issues. 

[3] A few days before the hearing, for reasons not specified in the record, the court 

continued the matter until October 15, 2013. On October 10, 2013, Wife 

moved for a continuance for medical reasons. The trial court granted the 

motion and reset the hearing for February 11, 2014. The parties appeared in 
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court that day but jointly requested an additional continuance, and the trial 

court rescheduled the matter for June 23, 2014. Shortly before the new hearing 

date, the parties again made an agreed request for a continuance, and the 

hearing was set for September 4, 2014. 

[4] On August 8, 2014, Husband’s attorney filed a motion to continue, explaining 

that she would be in the middle of a murder trial on the day set for hearing. 

The trial court granted the motion and set a new hearing date of October 21, 

2014. Then, on October 15, 2014, Husband’s attorney requested another 

continuance because the murder trial had been pushed back and again 

conflicted with the dissolution hearing. The trial court reset the matter for 

January 13, 2015. 

[5] On December 19, 2014, twenty-four days before the hearing, Husband was 

notified that his attorney wished to withdraw from the case. That same day, his 

attorney sent him a letter to the same effect. The letter stated, in part: 

Please be advised that due to our irretrievably broken 

attorney/client relationship, this letter shall serve as notice that I 

intend to request permission from the Court to withdraw my 

representation of you in the above-captioned matter within the 

next ten (10) days. 

If my withdrawal is granted, please be advised that you must 

enter your appearance pro se, meaning you are representing 

yourself, or, secure the services of another attorney, whom you 

advised you have already consulted. As a reminder, a Final 

Hearing is scheduled for Tuesday, January 13, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. 

Said Hearing will take place at the Lake Superior Court located 
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at 15 West 4th Avenue, Gary, Indiana 46402. Your attendance 

will be required at said Hearing, so please conduct yourself 

accordingly. 

Appellant’s App. p. 55. 

[6] On December 23, 2014, Husband personally filed a motion to continue, 

explaining that “[h]is attorney wishes to withdraw her representation” and 

asserting that he “does not have adequate time to find legal representation 

before the current hearing scheduled for January 13th, 2015.” Id. at 53. He also 

filed a CCS Entry Form that stated, “Filing motion of continuation due to 

defendant’s attorney leaving case.” Id. at 51. 

[7] On January 2, 2015, Husband’s attorney filed her petition to withdraw, stating 

that Husband had been notified of her intent and that he “has consulted with 

other counsel[.]” Id. at 54. She attached a copy of her December 19, 2014 

letter to the petition. On January 6, 2015, the trial court wrote “Motion 

Denied” on the CCS Entry Form that Husband had filed along with his motion 

to continue. Id. at 51. However, no corresponding entry was made on the 

CCS, and Husband did not receive notice of the denial at any time before the 

final hearing. On January 12, 2015, one day before the hearing, the trial court 

granted Husband’s attorney’s petition to withdraw. 

[8] Husband appeared for the hearing the next day without counsel. When the 

court informed him that his motion to continue had been denied, he reiterated 

his request, explaining that he had spoken to some attorneys and had been told 
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that “there was no way they could properly present a case in that amount of 

time.” Tr. p. 2. The trial court asked Wife’s attorney what her position was, 

and she said that the hearing should go forward as scheduled because there had 

already been many continuances, including the two recently requested by 

Husband’s attorney, and because the dispute was limited to property division 

and did not involve children. The trial court decided to proceed with the 

hearing, noting that “this matter has been pending for quite some time” and 

that “[Husband] has been granted several Motions to Continue.” Id. at 4. 

Husband continued to press for additional time, and the court again asked 

Wife’s attorney what her position was. Wife’s attorney said, “I attempted to 

have a conversation with him regarding this continuance and he was very 

obstreperous and I had to say, thank you very much and goodbye.” Id. at 6. 

Having heard that, the court reaffirmed its decision that the hearing would 

proceed as scheduled. 

[9] The trial court issued its decree of dissolution on April 21, 2015. Husband, 

believing that the trial court’s ultimate division of property would have been 

different if the final hearing had been continued, now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

[10] Husband contends that twenty-four days was not enough time for him to retain 

replacement counsel, that the trial court therefore should have granted his 

motion to continue the final hearing, and that we should vacate the decree of 
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dissolution and remand this matter for a new final hearing.1

 Whether to grant 

or deny a motion to continue a trial is a decision that our trial rules specifically 

leave to the discretion of the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 53.5. Accordingly, we 

will reverse such a ruling only if we find that the trial court has abused that 

discretion, that is, reached a conclusion that is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts or the reasonable and probable deductions which may be 

drawn therefrom. Hess v. Hess, 679 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 

Applying this deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying Husband’s motion. 

[11] Several facts weigh in favor of the trial court’s decision. First, when Husband 

filed his motion, the case had been pending for more than two years, in part 

because Husband did not have his attorney enter an appearance until four 

months after he was served. Second, the final hearing had already been 

continued six times, including twice on motions by Husband’s attorney and 

twice on agreed motions. Third, absent extraordinary circumstances not 

present here, twenty-four days is enough time to retain a new attorney and 

prepare for a straightforward, one-hour property-division hearing. Fourth, the 

December 19, 2014 letter written by Husband’s former attorney, which was 

attached to her petition to withdraw, indicated that Husband had already 

“consulted” with other counsel. Fifth, Husband did not identify any of the 

other attorneys with whom he spoke, the dates on which he spoke with them, 

 

1

 Husband does not appeal the trial court’s decision to grant his attorney’s petition to withdraw. 
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or the dates on which they allegedly refused to represent him without a 

continuance. Sixth, Wife’s attorney told the trial court that she had attempted 

to discuss the need for a continuance with Husband and that Husband had been 

“very obstreperous.” Under these circumstances, the trial court acted well 

within its discretion when it denied Husband’s request to postpone the final 

hearing for a seventh time. 

[12] Husband relies on Hess, where we held that a trial court abused its discretion by 

denying a continuance after the husband’s attorney withdrew just five days 

before a dissolution hearing. 679 N.E.2d at 154-55.2

 We found it significant 

that “the denial of the continuance deprived Husband of counsel at the most 

crucial stage in the proceedings, the dissolution hearing itself.” Id. at 155. In 

this case, Husband was also without counsel at the final hearing, but we find 

that the difference between five days and twenty-four days is substantial enough 

to distinguish the two cases. In addition, the dissolution in Hess involved a 

child-custody determination, whereas this dissolution was limited to the 

division of property. Finally, nothing in the record in Hess showed that the 

husband “could foresee that counsel would withdraw at such a late hour.” Id. 

Here, on the other hand, we know that Husband had already consulted with 

other counsel when his attorney wrote to him that she intended to withdraw. 

 

2

 We said “four days,” but the hearing was set for March 13, and the attorney withdrew on March 8. Hess, 

679 N.E.2d at 154. 
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[13] Husband also makes much of the fact that he was not notified until the day of 

the final hearing that his motion to continue had been denied. He would have 

us hold that, absent notice of the denial, he was entitled to assume that his 

motion had been or would be granted. He cites no authority in support of this 

proposition, and we are aware of none. To the contrary, all parties to litigation, 

represented or not, should plan to proceed as scheduled unless specifically told 

otherwise. 

[14] Affirmed. 

Barnes, J., and Mathias, J., concur.