```

[House Report 112-224]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

112th Congress                                            Rept. 112-224
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 1

======================================================================

 
  CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2011

                                _______
                                

               September 26, 2011.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. King of New York, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 901]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 901) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
to codify the requirement that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security maintain chemical facility anti-terrorism security 
regulations, having considered the same, report favorably 
thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as 
amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Amendment........................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................     4
Background and Need for Legislation..............................     5
Hearings.........................................................     6
Committee Consideration..........................................     7
Committee Votes..................................................    10
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    16
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    16
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    16
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    17
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
  Benefits.......................................................    17
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    18
Preemption Clarification.........................................    18
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    18
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    18
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    18
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    24
Additional Views.................................................    31

                               Amendment

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Security Authorization Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et 
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

   ``TITLE XXI--CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS

``SEC. 2101. CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall maintain, and revise as 
necessary, regulations to protect chemical facilities against terrorism 
and potential terrorist attacks. Such regulations shall include--
          ``(1) risk-based performance standards for chemical facility 
        security;
          ``(2) requirements for chemical facility security 
        vulnerability assessments; and
          ``(3) requirements for the development and implementation of 
        chemical facility site security plans.
  ``(b) Facilities Regulated.--The regulations required by subsection 
(a) shall apply to any chemical facility that the Secretary determines 
presents a high level of security risk with respect to acts of 
terrorism, except that the Secretary may not apply such regulations to 
any of the following:
          ``(1) Any facility owned or operated by the Department of 
        Defense.
          ``(2) Any facility owned or operated by the Department of 
        Energy.
          ``(3) Any facility subject to regulation by the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission.
          ``(4) Any facility regulated under chapter 701 of title 46, 
        United States Code.
          ``(5) A public water system, as such term is defined by 
        section 1401(4) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 
        300f(4)).
          ``(6) A treatment works, as such term is defined by section 
        212(2) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 
        1292(2)).
  ``(c) Security Measures.--The regulations required by subsection (a) 
shall provide that each such facility, in developing and implementing 
site security plans, be permitted to select layered security measures 
that, in combination, appropriately address the vulnerability 
assessment and the risk-based performance standards for security for 
the facility.
  ``(d) Review.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall review and approve or 
        disapprove each vulnerability assessment and site security plan 
        required under this title or by the regulations required by 
        subsection (a).
          ``(2) Standards for disapproval.--The Secretary may not 
        disapprove such a site security plan based on the presence or 
        absence of a particular security measure, but the Secretary may 
        disapprove such a site security plan if the plan fails to 
        satisfy the risk-based performance standards established by the 
        Secretary.
          ``(3) Deadline for notification.--Beginning after the 
        Secretary publishes final regulations to implement this 
        section, not later than 180 days, to the greatest extent 
        practicable, after the date on which the Secretary receives a 
        security vulnerability assessment or site security plan under 
        this title, the Secretary shall review and approve or 
        disapprove such assessment or plan and notify the covered 
        chemical facility of such approval or disapproval.
          ``(4) Notification of disapproval.--If the Secretary 
        disapproves the security vulnerability assessment or site 
        security plan submitted by a covered chemical facility under 
        this title or the implementation of a site security plan by 
        such a chemical facility, the Secretary shall provide the owner 
        or operator of the covered chemical facility a written 
        notification of the disapproval not later than 14 days after 
        the date on which the Secretary disapproves such assessment or 
        plan, that--
                  ``(A) includes a clear explanation of deficiencies in 
                the assessment, plan, or implementation of the plan; 
                and
                  ``(B) requires the owner or operator of the covered 
                chemical facility to revise the assessment or plan to 
                address any deficiencies and, by such date as the 
                Secretary determines is appropriate, to submit to the 
                Secretary the revised assessment or plan.
          ``(5) Reporting.--The Secretary shall submit to the Committee 
        on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the 
        Senate, on an annual basis, information on the number of 
        instances during the year covered by the report where the 
        Secretary determined that the 180 day notification requirement 
        under paragraph (3) was impracticable.
  ``(e) Alternative Security Programs.--The Secretary may approve any 
alternative security program established by a private sector entity or 
Federal, State, or local authority, or under another applicable law, if 
the Secretary determines that the requirements of such program meets 
the requirements of this title and any regulations issued or maintained 
pursuant to this title.
  ``(f) Security Background Checks.--In any personnel surety regulation 
issued by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary shall 
include provisions on how an owner or operator of a covered chemical 
facility can meet, in whole or in part, the requirements set forth in 
such regulations by submitting--
          ``(1) information on an employee or individual holding a 
        valid transportation security card issued under section 70105 
        of title 46, United States Code;
          ``(2) an alternate security background check conducted by a 
        private sector entity, including the owner and operator of a 
        covered chemical facility and a non-profit personnel surety 
        accrediting organization; and
          ``(3) an alternate security background check conducted under 
        another applicable law.
  ``(g) Technical Assistance to Small Businesses.--The Secretary shall 
provide technical assistance to any owner or operator of a covered 
chemical facility who requests such assistance to prepare a security 
vulnerability assessment or site security plan required under this 
title or by the regulations required by subsection (a), if the covered 
chemical facility is a small business concern, under the meaning given 
that term in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632).

``SEC. 2102. INFORMATION PROTECTION.

  ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
information developed pursuant to this title, or pursuant to the 
regulations required by section 2101(a), including vulnerability 
assessments, site security plans, and other security related 
information, records, and documents shall be given protections from 
public disclosure consistent with similar information developed by 
chemical facilities subject to regulation under section 70103 of title 
46, United States Code.
  ``(b) Sharing of Information.--
          ``(1) State and local governments.--This section does not 
        prohibit the sharing of such information, as the Secretary 
        determines appropriate, with State and local government 
        officials possessing the appropriate security clearances, 
        including emergency response providers, for the purpose of 
        carrying out this title, as long as such information may not be 
        disclosed pursuant to any State or local law.
          ``(2) Congress.--Nothing in this title shall permit or 
        authorize the withholding of information from Congress or any 
        committee or subcommittee thereof.
  ``(c) Administrative and Judicial Proceedings.--In any proceeding to 
enforce this title, vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and 
other information submitted to or obtained by the Secretary under this 
title, and related vulnerability or security information, shall be 
treated as if the information were classified material.

``SEC. 2103. ENFORCEMENT.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall audit and inspect chemical 
facilities subject to regulation under this title for the purposes of 
determining compliance with this title and the regulations required by 
section 2101(a).
  ``(b) Orders for Compliance.--If the Secretary determines that a 
chemical facility is not in compliance with this title or the 
regulations required by section 2101(a), the Secretary shall provide 
the owner or operator of the facility with written notification 
(including a clear explanation of deficiencies in the vulnerability 
assessment and site security plan) and an opportunity for consultation, 
and issue an order to comply by such date as the Secretary determines 
to be appropriate under the circumstances.
  ``(c) Civil Penalties.--Any person who violates an order issued under 
this title shall be liable for a civil penalty under section 70119(a) 
of title 46, United States Code.
  ``(d) Order To Cease Operation.--If the owner or operator of a 
chemical facility subject to regulation under this title continues to 
be in noncompliance, the Secretary may issue an order for the facility 
to cease operation until the owner or operator complies with the order.
  ``(e) Exception.--Nothing in this title confers upon any person 
except the Secretary a right of action against an owner or operator of 
a chemical facility to enforce any provision of this title.

``SEC. 2104. JOBS IMPACT.

  ``Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
title, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a 
report that, at a minimum, includes--
          ``(1) an estimate of the potential jobs created or lost 
        within the private sector as a result of the regulations 
        required under section 2101 of this title; and
          ``(2) information on feedback received from owners and 
        operators of covered chemical facilities about how the 
        regulations required under section 2101 of this title could be 
        revised to spur potential job creation or stem job losses.

``SEC. 2105. SCOPE.

  ``Nothing in this title shall be construed to supersede, amend, 
alter, or affect any Federal law that regulates the manufacture, 
distribution in commerce, use, sale, other treatment, or disposal of 
chemical substances or mixtures.

``SEC. 2106. PREEMPTION.

  ``This title shall not preclude or deny any right of any State or 
political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any regulation, 
requirement, or standard of performance with respect to chemical 
facility security that is more stringent than a regulation, 
requirement, or standard of performance required under this title, or 
otherwise impair any right or jurisdiction of any State with respect to 
chemical facilities within that State, unless there is an actual 
conflict between this title and the law of that State.

``SEC. 2107. TERMINATION.

  ``The authority provided by this title shall terminate on September 
30, 2018.

``SEC. 2108. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  ``There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry 
out this title $89,928,000 for each of fiscal years 2012 through 
2018.''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by 
adding at the end the following new items:

   ``TITLE XXI--CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS

``Sec. 2101. Chemical facility anti-terrorism security regulations.
``Sec. 2102. Information protection.
``Sec. 2103. Enforcement.
``Sec. 2104. Jobs impact.
``Sec. 2105. Scope.
``Sec. 2106. Preemption.
``Sec. 2107. Termination.
``Sec. 2108. Authorization of appropriations.''.

SEC. 3. CONFORMING REPEAL.

  (a) Repeal.--The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 
2007 (Public Law 109-295) is amended by striking section 550.
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. HARMONIZATION.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Committee on 
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the 
extent to which the security requirements under title XXI of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by this Act, have been 
harmonized with the security requirements for facilities regulated 
under chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code.

                          Purpose and Summary

    In 2006, Congress recognized the vulnerability of our 
Nation's chemical infrastructure to terrorist attacks and 
authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
regulate security at our Nation's high-risk chemical 
facilities. The Department issued interim final regulations 
that became effective on June 8, 2007, and resulted in the 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). The 
legislative authority for CFATS was scheduled to sunset 
originally on October 4, 2009, but has been extended by a 
series of short-term extensions through October 4, 2011. The 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Authorization Act of 
2011, H.R. 901, provides the Secretary of Homeland Security 
with long-term authority to continue providing for performance-
based regulation to protect chemical facilities against 
terrorist attacks and maintain the progress being made by both 
the Department and the chemical facilities.
    H.R. 901 preserves the essential provisions of the original 
statute (section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub.L. 109-295) and maintains the 
existing framework of the CFATS program, requiring chemical 
facilities to conduct Security Vulnerability Assessments, 
develop Site Security Plans, and implement layered protective 
measures necessary to meet risk-based performance standards 
established by the Department. H.R. 901 codifies the 
Secretary's authority to regulate chemical facility security 
within the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and extends this 
authority for seven years--through September 30, 2018. H.R. 901 
is intended to provide long-term certainty to the Department 
and chemical facilities regarding the requirement to improve 
security at our Nation's chemical facilities while preserving 
the ability of American companies to compete, remain 
innovative, and create jobs.

                  Background and Need for Legislation

    Some chemicals can be very toxic, flammable, or explosive--
which is why terrorists may seek to use them in attacks that 
may cause mass casualties, weaken the U.S. economy, and damage 
public confidence. The vulnerability of our Nation's chemical 
infrastructure is particularly worrisome considering that many 
chemical facility sites are located near dense population 
centers.
    Congress recognized this vulnerability and, in 2006, 
through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 
of 2007 (Pub.L. 109-295), authorized the Department to regulate 
the security of high-risk chemical facilities. Given the 
diverse and wide-ranging categories of facilities subject to 
the regulations, Congress required that DHS establish ``risk-
based performance standards,'' providing flexibility for the 
facility to identify security measures tailored to each site's 
unique security challenges in order to meet the performance 
standards.
    In response, DHS issued the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards (CFATS) which became effective on June 8, 
2007. Under these regulations, high-risk chemical facilities 
are required to conduct Security Vulnerability Assessments 
(SVAs), develop Site Security Plans (SSPs), and implement 
layered protective measures necessary to meet the risk-based 
performance standards established by the Department. The 
Department places facilities into four high-risk tiers, with 
those in the highest tier subject to the most stringent 
security requirements. As a result, DHS must review and approve 
the SSPs and monitor compliance of tiered facilities.
    To date, DHS has reviewed information submitted by more 
than 39,000 chemical facilities and determined that 4,755 
facilities are high-risk and covered under CFATS. Some 
facilities have demonstrated they are taking steps to reduce 
their risk profile sufficiently so that they move to a lower 
tier or are no longer subject to regulation under this program. 
However, there is still much work to be done to secure the 
chemical sector. DHS is currently in the process of reviewing 
SSPs and performing inspections. No SSPs have been approved to-
date.
    Enactment of H.R. 901 is necessary to continue 
uninterrupted implementation of CFATS and protect U.S. citizens 
against potential terrorist attacks. The legislative authority 
for CFATS has been extended multiple times through a series of 
short-term extensions, but this piecemeal approach has created 
uncertainty for DHS and the chemical facilities when planning 
investment and security strategies to meet CFATS standards. 
Current statutory authority for CFATS is set to expire on 
October 4, 2011; language was passed by the House of 
Representatives in the FY 2012 Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act (H.R. 2017, 112th Congress) that would extend the program 
by one year. H.R. 901 provides DHS and chemical facilities with 
needed certainty, consistency, and continuity by maintaining 
the existing CFATS framework; codifying the Secretary's 
authority to regulate chemical facility security in the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002; and extending this authority for 
seven years--allowing the program to be fully implemented. H.R. 
901 preserves all of the essential elements contained in the 
original statute. The Committee intends for this legislation to 
provide for performance-based regulation to protect facilities 
against attack, without increasing current spending or imposing 
additional, burdensome and costly requirements that could slow 
or hinder progress.
    By maintaining the existing risk-based, CFATS framework, 
H.R. 901 will enable the partnership between DHS and the 
facilities to strike the right balance between strengthening 
security against terrorism while preserving this vital sector 
of our economy.

                                Hearings

    No hearings were held on H.R. 901 in the 112th Congress; 
however, the Committee has held hearings on chemical facility 
regulations.
    112th Congress
    On February 11, 2011, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies held a 
hearing entitled ``Preventing Chemical Terrorism: Building a 
Foundation of Security At Our Nation's Chemical Facilities.'' 
The Subcommittee received testimony from Hon. Rand Beers, Under 
Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, 
Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Timothy J. Scott, Chief 
Security Officer, The Dow Chemical Company, testifying on 
behalf of the American Chemistry Council; Dr. M. Sam Mannan, 
PhD, PE, CSP, Regents Professor and Director, Mary Kay O'Connor 
Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical 
Engineering, Texas A&M University System; and Mr. George S. 
Hawkins, General Manager, District of Columbia Water and Sewer 
Authority.
    111th Congress
    On June 16, 2009, the Committee on Homeland Security held a 
hearing on H.R. 2868, the ``Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 2009.'' The Committee received testimony from Mr. Philip 
Reitinger, Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and 
Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Sue 
Armstrong, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance 
Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of 
Homeland Security; Mr. Paul Baldauf, Assistant Director, 
Radiation Protection and Release Prevention, New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection; Mr. Marty Durbin, Vice 
President, Federal Affairs, American Chemistry Council; Dr. 
Neal Langerman, Principle Scientist and CEO, Advanced Chemical 
Safety, Inc.; and Mr. Martin Jeppeson, Director of Regulatory 
Affairs, California Ammonia Company.
    110th Congress
    On December 12, 2007, prior to introduction of H.R. 5577 in 
the 110th Congress, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security 
and Infrastructure Protection held a hearing on H.R. _, the 
``Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008.'' The 
Subcommittee received testimony from Col. Bob Stephan, 
Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Protection, Department of 
Homeland Security; Mr.Clyde Miller, Director, Corporate 
Security, BASF Corporation; Mr.Gerald C. Setley, Vice 
President, Region 3 Director, International Chemical Workers 
Union Council, United Food and Commercial Workers Union; Mr. 
Gary Sondermeyer, Director of Operations, New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection; and Dr. M. Sam Mannan, PhD, PE, 
CSP, Professor and Director, Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety 
Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, 
Texas A&M University System.
    109th Congress
    On June 15, 2005, prior to introduction of H.R. 5695 in the 
109th Congress, the Subcommittee on Economic Security, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing 
entitled ``Preventing Terrorist Attacks on America's Chemical 
Plants.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Robert 
Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, 
Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, 
Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George 
Washington University; Mr. Stephen Bandy, Manager, Corporate 
Safety and Security, Marathon Ashland Petroleum, LLC, 
testifying on behalf of the National Petrochemical and Refiners 
Association and the American Petroleum Institute; Mr. Marty 
Durbin, Managing Director of Security and Operations, American 
Chemistry Council; Mr. Allen Summers, President and Chief 
Executive Office, Asmark, Inc., testifying on behalf of The 
Fertilizer Institute; and Mr. Sal DePasquale, Independent 
Consultant.

                        Committee Consideration

    The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Security Technologies met on April 14, 2011, to 
consider H.R. 901, and ordered the measure to be reported to 
the Full Committee with a favorable recommendation, without 
amendment, by a roll call vote of 6 yeas and 4 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 4). The Subcommittee took the following actions:
    The following amendments were offered:

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke (#1); to insert a new 
subsection (b) in the proposed section 2010 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 entitled ``Facilities Regulated.'' and 
insert a new paragraph (3) in subsection 2102(b) entitled 
``Other Federal Agencies''; was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call 
vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 1).

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Richardson (#1); Page 2, line 
18 strike ``and''. Page 2, after line 18, insert the following: 
``(3) requirements for chemical facility process safety 
reviews; and''. Page 2, line 19, strike ``(3)'' and insert 
``(4)''.; was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 
nays (Roll Call Vote No. 2).

    An amendment offered by Mr. Richmond (#3); Page 4, after 
line 16, insert a new subsection ``(f) Employee 
Participation.''; was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 4 
yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 3).

    The Committee on Homeland Security met on June 22, 2011, to 
consider H.R. 901, and ordered the measure to be reported to 
the Full House with a favorable recommendation, amended, by 
voice vote. The Committee took the following actions:

    The Committee adopted H.R. 901, as amended by a roll call 
vote of 26 yeas and 5 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 12).
    The following amendments were offered:

    An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. 
Lungren, was AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 22 yeas and 9 
nays (Roll Call Vote No. 11).

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Thompson (#1A) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 2, 
line 76, strike subsection (b) and insert a new subsection (b) 
entitled ``Facilities Regulated.'' Page 5, after line 2, insert 
a new paragraph (3) entitled ``Other Federal Agencies''; was 
NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 9 yeas and 15 nays (Roll 
Call Vote No. 1).

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Sanchez (#1B) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 3, 
after line 22, insert three new paragraphs: ``(3) Deadline for 
Notification.''; ``(4) Notification of Disapproval.''; and 
``(5) reporting.''; was AGREED TO by voice vote.

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Richardson (#1C) to the 
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; 
In the matter proposed to be inserted as title XXI of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 by section 2 of the bill, 
redesignate sections 2104 through 2017 as sections 2105 through 
2108, respectively, insert a new section 2104, and amend the 
proposed amendment to the table of contents of such Act 
accordingly: ``Sec. 2104. Protections for Whistleblowers at 
Chemical Facilities Associated with the Risk of Chemical 
Facility Terrorist Incidents.''; was NOT AGREED TO by a roll 
call vote of 11 yeas and 16 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 2).

    An en bloc Amendment offered by Ms. Jackson Lee (#1D) to 
the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. 
Lungren; Page 5, after line 9, insert a new subsection entitled 
``(d) Security Background Checks.''
    Page 8, after line 3, insert a new section entitled ``Sec. 
4. Harmonization.'' was AGREED TO by voice vote.

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke (#1E) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 7, 
line 6, strike ``2018'' and insert ``2013''. Page 7, line 10, 
strike ``2018'' and insert ``2013''.; was NOT AGREED TO by 
voice vote.

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke (#1F) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 7, 
line 6, strike ``2018'' and insert ``2016''. Page 7, line 10, 
strike ``2018'' and insert ``2016''.; was NOT AGREED TO by a 
roll call vote of 11 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 3).

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke (#1G) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 4, 
after line 4, insert a new section entitled ``Sec. 2101A. 
Office of Chemical Facility Inspections.''; was NOT AGREED TO 
by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 
4).

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Davis (#1H) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 7, 
after line 10, insert a new section entitled ``Sec. 2108. Jobs 
Impact.''; was AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 28 yeas and 2 
nays (Roll Call Vote No. 5).

    An Amendment offered by Ms. Hochul (#1I) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 4, 
after line 4, insert a new subsection entitled ``(f) Technical 
Assistance to Small Businesses.''; was AGREED TO by a roll call 
vote of 29 yeas and 1 nay (Roll Call Vote No. 6).

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Clarke (#1J) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 5, 
after line 9, insert a new section, and redesignate 
accordingly, entitled ``Sec. 2103. Security Background Checks 
of Covered Individuals at Certain Chemical Facilities.''; was 
NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll 
Call Vote No. 7).

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Clarke (#1K) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 2, 
strike line 21 and all that follows through page 3, line 3. 
Page 4 after line 4, insert a new subsection entitled ``(f) 
Water Treatment Works and Public Water Systems.''; was NOT 
AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 19 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 8).

    An Amendment offered by Mr. Clarke (#1L) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; Page 4, 
after line 4, insert a new subsection entitled ``(f) 
Consultation.''; was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 12 
yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 9).

    An en bloc Amendment offered by Ms. Speier (#1M) to the 
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; 
Page 4, beginning on line 6, strike subsection (a) and insert a 
new subsection entitled ``(a) In General.''
    Page 6, after line 13, insert a new subsection entitled 
``(f) Delegation of Authority.''; was WITHDRAWN by unanimous 
consent.
    A unanimous consent request by Ms. Speier to withdraw her 
amendment, was not objected to.

    A Substitute Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Mr. Thompson (#2) was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call 
vote of 13 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 10).

                            Committee Votes

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the Committee to list the roll call 
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 
thereto.
    The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Security Technologies considered H.R. 901 on 
April 14, 2011, and ordered the measure reported to the House 
with a favorable recommendation, without amendment, by a roll 
call vote of 6 yeas and 4 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 4). The vote 
was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Daniel E. Lungren               Ms. Yvette D. Clarke
Mr. Tim Walberg                     Ms. Laura Richardson
Mr. Michael T. McCaul               Mr. Cedric L. Richmond
Mr. Patrick Meehan                  Mr. William R. Keating
Mr. Billy Long
Mr. Tom Marino

  An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke (#1); was NOT AGREED TO by 
a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 1). 
The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Mr. William R. Keating              Mr. Patrick Meehan
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Tom Marino

  An Amendment offered by Ms. Richardson (#2); was NOT AGREED 
TO by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 
2). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Mr. William R. Keating              Mr. Patrick Meehan
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Tom Marino

  An Amendment offered by Mr. Richmond (#3); was NOT AGREED TO 
by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 
3). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Mr. William R. Keating              Mr. Patrick Meehan
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Tom Marino

    The Committee on Homeland Security met on June 22, 2011, to 
consider H.R. 901, and ordered the measure to be reported to 
the Full House with a favorable recommendation, as amended, by 
voice vote. The Committee took the following votes:
  An Amendment offered by Mr. Thompson (#1A) to the Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was NOT 
AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 9 yeas and 15 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 1). The vote was as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Mike Rogers
Mr. Henry Cuellar                   Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Chip Cravaack
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. Patrick Meehan
                                    Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks

  An Amendment offered by Mrs. Richardson (#1C) to the 
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; 
was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 16 nays 
(Roll Call Vote No. 2). The vote was as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Mike Rogers
Mr. Henry Cuellar                   Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Paul C. Broun
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Ms. Jackie Speier                   Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Patrick Meehan
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks

  An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke (#1F) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was NOT 
AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 3). The vote was as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Lamar Smith
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Mr. Henry Cuellar                   Mr. Mike Rogers
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mr. Paul C. Broun
Ms. Jackie Speier                   Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Chip Cravaack
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. Patrick Meehan
                                    Mr. Benjamin Quayle
                                    Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks

  An Amendment offered by Ms. Clarke (#1G) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was NOT 
AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 4). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Lamar Smith
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Mr. Henry Cuellar                   Mr. Mike Rogers
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mr. Paul C. Broun
Ms. Jackie Speier                   Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Chip Cravaack
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. Patrick Meehan
                                    Mr. Benjamin Quayle
                                    Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks

  An Amendment offered by Mr. Davis (#1H) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was AGREED 
TO by a roll call vote of 28 yeas and 2 nays (Roll Call Vote 
No. 5). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Peter T. King                   Mr. Jeff Duncan
Mr. Lamar Smith                     Mr. Blake Farenthold
Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Mr. Mike Rogers
Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Paul C. Broun
Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Patrick Meehan
Mr. Benjamin Quayle
Mr. E. Scott Rigell
Mr. Billy Long
Mr. Tom Marino
Mr. Mo Brooks
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson
Ms. Loretta Sanchez
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Henry Cuellar
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke
Ms. Laura Richardson
Mr. Danny K. Davis
Mr. Brian Higgins
Ms. Jackie Speier
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond
Mr. Hansen Clarke
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul

  An Amendment offered by Ms. Hochul (#1I) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was AGREED 
TO by a roll call vote of 29 yeas and 1 nay (Roll Call Vote No. 
6). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Peter T. King                   Mr. Mike Rogers
Mr. Lamar Smith
Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Paul C. Broun
Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Patrick Meehan
Mr. Benjamin Quayle
Mr. E. Scott Rigell
Mr. Billy Long
Mr. Jeff Duncan
Mr. Tom Marino
Mr. Blake Farenthold
Mr. Mo Brooks
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson
Ms. Loretta Sanchez
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Henry Cuellar
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke
Ms. Laura Richardson
Mr. Danny K. Davis
Mr. Brian Higgins
Ms. Jackie Speier
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond
Mr. Hansen Clarke
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul

  An Amendment offered by Mr. Clarke (#1J) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was NOT 
AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 7). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Lamar Smith
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Mr. Henry Cuellar                   Mr. Mike Rogers
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Danny K. Davis                  Mr. Paul C. Broun
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Ms. Jackie Speier                   Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Patrick Meehan
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. Benjamin Quayle
                                    Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks

  An Amendment offered by Mr. Clarke (#1K) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was NOT 
AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 19 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 8). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Lamar Smith
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Mike Rogers
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Mr. Danny K. Davis                  Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mr. Paul C. Broun
Ms. Jackie Speier                   Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Chip Cravaack
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. Patrick Meehan
                                    Mr. Benjamin Quayle
                                    Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks
                                    Mr. Henry Cuellar

  An Amendment offered by Mr. Clarke (#1L) to the Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Lungren; was NOT 
AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 
Vote No. 9). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Lamar Smith
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Mr. Henry Cuellar                   Mr. Mike Rogers
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Danny K. Davis                  Mr. Paul C. Broun
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Ms. Jackie Speier                   Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Patrick Meehan
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. Benjamin Quayle
                                    Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks

  On agreeing to the Substitute to the Amendment in the Nature 
of a Substitute offered by Mr. Thompson (#2); was NOT AGREED TO 
by a roll call vote of 13 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 
10). The vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Bennie G. Thompson              Mr. Peter T. King
Ms. Loretta Sanchez                 Mr. Lamar Smith
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee              Mr. Daniel E. Lungren
Mr. Henry Cuellar                   Mr. Mike Rogers
Ms. Yvette D. Clarke                Mr. Michael T. McCaul
Ms. Laura Richardson                Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Danny K. Davis                  Mr. Paul C. Broun
Mr. Brian Higgins                   Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Ms. Jackie Speier                   Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond              Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Hansen Clarke                   Mr. Patrick Meehan
Mr. William R. Keating              Mr. Benjamin Quayle
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul              Mr. E. Scott Rigell
                                    Mr. Billy Long
                                    Mr. Jeff Duncan
                                    Mr. Tom Marino
                                    Mr. Blake Farenthold
                                    Mr. Mo Brooks

  On agreeing to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Mr. Lungren, as amended(#1); was AGREED TO by a roll 
call vote of 22 yeas and 9 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 11). The 
vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Peter T. King                   Mr. Bennie G. Thompson
Mr. Lamar Smith                     Ms. Loretta Sanchez
Mr. Daniel E. Lungren               Ms. Yvette D. Clarke
Mr. Mike Rogers                     Ms. Laura Richardson
Mr. Michael T. McCaul               Mr. Danny K. Davis
Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis                Mr. Brian Higgins
Mr. Paul C. Broun                   Ms. Jackie Speier
Mrs. Candice S. Miller              Mr. William R. Keating
Mr. Tim Walberg                     Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul
Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Patrick Meehan
Mr. Benjamin Quayle
Mr. E. Scott Rigell
Mr. Billy Long
Mr. Jeff Duncan
Mr. Tom Marino
Mr. Blake Farenthold
Mr. Mo Brooks
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Henry Cuellar
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond
Mr. Hansen Clarke

  On agreeing to H.R. 901, as amended; was AGREED TO by a roll 
call vote of 26 yeas and 5 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 12). The 
vote was as follows:

        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Peter T. King                   Mr. Bennie G. Thompson
Mr. Lamar Smith                     Ms. Loretta Sanchez
Mr. Daniel E. Lungren               Ms. Yvette D. Clarke
Mr. Mike Rogers                     Mr. Danny K. Davis
Mr. Michael T. McCaul               Mr. Brian Higgins
Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis
Mr. Paul C. Broun
Mrs. Candice S. Miller
Mr. Tim Walberg
Mr. Chip Cravaack
Mr. Patrick Meehan
Mr. Benjamin Quayle
Mr. E. Scott Rigell
Mr. Billy Long
Mr. Jeff Duncan
Mr. Tom Marino
Mr. Blake Farenthold
Mr. Mo Brooks
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Henry Cuellar
Ms. Laura Richardson
Ms. Jackie Speier
Mr. Cedric L. Richmond
Mr. Hansen Clarke
Mr. William R. Keating
Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight 
hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report.

           New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and 
                            Tax Expenditures

     In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds that 
H.R. 901, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Authorization 
Act of 2011, would result in no new or increased budget 
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or 
revenues.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

     The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared 
by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to 
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, July 6, 2011.
Hon. Peter T. King,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 901, the Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act of 2011.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason 
Wheelock.
            Sincerely,
                                        Robert A. Sunshine,
                              (For Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director).
    Enclosure.

H.R. 901--Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act of 2011

    H.R. 901 would extend through fiscal year 2018 the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) authority to regulate 
security at certain chemical facilities in the United States. 
Under this authority, which under current law is set to expire 
in October, DHS runs the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards (CFATS) program. Under CFATS, DHS collects and 
reviews information from chemical facilities in the United 
States to determine which facilities present a security risk. 
Facilities determined to present a high level of security risk 
are then required to develop a Site Security Plan (SSP). DHS in 
turn conducts inspections to validate the adequacy of a 
facility's SSP and their compliance with it.
    H.R. 901 would authorize $90 million annually for CFATS 
over the 2012-2018 period. That amount is equal to the $90 
million provided in 2011 for the program. CBO estimates that 
implementing this legislation would cost $361 million over the 
2012-2016 period and about $260 million in subsequent years, 
assuming the appropriation of the specified amounts.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                         -------------------------------------------------------
                                                            2012     2013     2014     2015     2016   2012-2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Authorization Level.....................................       90       90       90       90       90       450
Estimated Outlays.......................................       32       64       87       89       89       361
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    H.R. 901 could result in the collection of additional civil 
penalties, which are recorded as revenues and deposited in the 
Treasury; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. However, 
CBO estimates that such collections would be minimal and the 
effect on revenues would be insignificant. Enacting the bill 
would not affect direct spending.
    H.R. 901 would extend intergovernmental and private-sector 
mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA), on owners and operators of public and private 
facilities where certain chemicals are present. Requirements on 
those owners and operators to assess the vulnerability of their 
facilities to a terrorist incident and to prepare and implement 
facility security plans would be mandates. Based on information 
from DHS and industry sources, CBO estimates that the aggregate 
costs of complying with the mandates would be small and would 
fall below the annual thresholds established in UMRA for 
intergovernmental and private-sector mandates ($71 million and 
$142 million, respectively, in 2011, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
    On June 15, 2011, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 
908, the Full Implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Act, as ordered reported by the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce on May 26, 2011. Both H.R. 901 
and H.R. 908 would authorize nearly $90 million for CFATS, and 
CBO estimates that spending under the two bills would be the 
same. In addition, CBO determined that the bill would extend 
the same mandates as H.R. 901.
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jason Wheelock 
(for the federal costs), Melissa Merrell (for the 
intergovernmental impact), and Paige Piper/Bach (for the 
private-sector impact). The estimate was approved by Theresa 
Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 901 contains the following 
general performance goals and objectives, including outcome 
related goals and objectives authorized.
    The performance goals and objectives of H.R. 901 are to 
extend the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism standards authority 
enacted under the FY 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act.

   Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
                                Benefits

    In compliance with rule XXI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the rule 
XXI.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.

                        Preemption Clarification

    In compliance with section 423 of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974, requiring the report of any Committee on a bill or 
joint resolution to include a statement on the extent to which 
the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt State, 
local, or Tribal law, the Committee finds the following. While 
the Committee believes H.R. 901, as reported, does not preempt 
any State, local, or Tribal law--Section 2106 does allow for 
preemption should such actual conflict exist.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

     The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate 
to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation

Section 1.   Short Title.
    This section provides that the bill may be cited as the 
``Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Authorization Act 
of 2011.''

Sec. 2.   Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Regulations.

    This section adds a new title, the ``Title XXI--Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Regulations'' to the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 and includes the following provisions:

    TITLE XXI--CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS

        Sec. 2101.   Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security 
        Regulations.
    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
maintain security regulations for high-risk chemical 
facilities. These regulations must establish ``risk-based 
performance standards'' and require facilities to prepare 
Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVAs) that identify 
facility security vulnerabilities, and develop and implement 
Site Security Plans (SSPs). This section codifies the key 
elements of the existing Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards (CFATS) framework that should be maintained. The 
Committee does not intend for the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to reissue existing regulations; but provides 
the Department the flexibility to revise them within the 
existing framework if changes are necessary.
    Importantly, H.R. 901 requires risk-based performance 
standards instead of a prescriptive approach, providing diverse 
facilities with the appropriate discretion and flexibility to 
design site-specific security measures. The Committee believes 
that the security measures taken to comply with the risk-based 
performance standards may differ from facility to facility. 
Under this section, facilities may select a combination of 
security measures tailored to their unique circumstances that 
together meet the security performance requirements. While the 
Department cannot dictate that a particular security measure be 
used, it sets the performance standards. Upon request, the 
Secretary is required to provide technical assistance to small 
businesses developing SVAs and SSPs.
    The Committee is aware that the Department recently revised 
the tiering assignments for approximately ten percent of the 
facilities covered under CFATS due to an error in the risk 
assessment modeling. Recognizing modeling processes can often 
be complicated and fall victim to a variety of errors, 
especially in the context of terrorism where there is very 
little historical data, as compared to natural catastrophes, 
the Committee believes it is imperative for the CFATS risk 
assessment model to be validated--including inputs, processes, 
and outputs--in order to increase its credibility and minimize 
future errors. The Committee directs the Department to report 
on how it has validated, or plans to validate, the model and 
prevent future errors of a similar nature. Additionally, the 
Committee believes that there should be internal controls to 
detect anomalies based on human or other error in a timely 
manner.
    After final regulations are published, the Secretary must 
approve or disapprove SVAs and SSPs within 180 days of receipt, 
to the extent practicable, and notify the facility of the 
outcome. If an SVA or SSP is disapproved, the Secretary has 14 
days to provide the facility a written explanation for the 
disapproval and a date by which the facility is required to 
revise the SVA or SSP. The Committee expects DHS to make a good 
faith effort to provide a timely review of the assessments and 
plans, and notify facilities within the designated timeframe. 
However, the Committee recognizes that chemical facilities 
regulated under this Title are very diverse and the content and 
quality of the SVAs and SSPs may vary greatly. Additional time 
may be warranted for certain facilities in order to reach a 
successful outcome. The Committee expects DHS to continue 
working collaboratively with the facilities to provide 
appropriate guidance and ensure their SVAs and SSPs meet DHS 
security requirements. This section also requires the Secretary 
to submit an annual report to Congress indicating the number of 
instances the 180 day notification requirement was not met.
    This section allows the Secretary to accept, in whole or in 
part, an alternate security program, prepared by the facility 
for another reason, such as complying with another law or an 
industry-wide security program, as long as it provides an 
equivalent level of security by meeting the regulatory 
requirements issued or maintained by this title.
    Under this section, the Secretary is also required to 
describe, in any personnel surety regulations, the information 
that will be required from a facility for acceptance of 
alternate security background checks. The Committee intends to 
promote comparability and reciprocity across credentialing and 
screening programs and believes DHS should enable chemical 
facilities to leverage other existing background check 
programs, such as the Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential (TWIC) or private sector programs, as part of the 
identity, legal authorization to work, and criminal history 
background checks they perform to meet personnel surety 
requirements of this title. The Committee does not intend for 
DHS to require TWICs for persons accessing chemical facilities 
not regulated under the Marine Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA), nor that such facilities be equipped with TWIC readers. 
Instead, facilities should have the option to recognize TWIC or 
other background check programs--so long as these programs are 
verified as described below.
    The Committee recognizes that background checks to identify 
individuals with terrorist ties is an inherently governmental 
function and several existing Federal government programs 
achieve this by vetting individuals against the Terrorist 
Screening Database (TSDB). To limit duplicative efforts, the 
Committee intends for DHS to share and reuse results from other 
governmental programs that conduct equivalent vetting against 
the TSDB, such as the TWIC program. The Committee believes 
that, for security purposes, in order for DHS to reuse such 
vetting results to meet any personnel surety requirements 
issued pursuant to this title, DHS may need to verify the 
active enrollment in the accepted alternate security background 
check. The Committee intends to provide DHS the flexibility 
needed to leverage alternate security background checks, such 
as the TWIC program, as they fully mature. The Committee 
expects DHS to ensure the process is minimally burdensome on 
facilities and individuals while also identifying security 
gaps. The Committee supports the activities of the working 
group composed of representatives from the Transportation 
Security Administration, the DHS Screening Coordination Office, 
the National Protection and Programs Directorate, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, and the DHS Office of General Counsel with the aim 
of aligning relevant personnel surety programs and urges the 
working group to receive feedback from the regulated 
communities and report back to the Committee on its 
recommendations.
    This section specifies that the regulations maintained by 
this title do not apply to any facility owned or operated by 
the Departments of Defense or Energy; any facility regulated by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); any facility regulated 
under the MTSA; and facilities defined as a water system or 
wastewater treatment works.
    While this section upholds the exemption from CFATS for 
facilities subject to regulation by the NRC, the Committee 
intends for this exemption to apply only to facilities where 
the NRC already imposes significant security requirements and 
regulates the safety and security of most of the facility. The 
Committee does not intend for the NRC exemption to apply to 
facilities that house just a few small radioactive sources or 
to portions of facilities not subject to NRC security 
requirements. The Committee supports the formal establishment 
of the memorandum of understanding between DHS and the NRC to 
help define the types of facilities that are wholly or 
partially exempt from CFATS because of NRC regulatory 
authority, and to establish processes for identifying those 
facilities. The Committee also urges completion of the NRC 
study comparing CFATS security standards to security measures 
at NRC-regulated facilities and encourages the NRC to address 
any gaps in NRC requirements, if any are found.
    This section also preserves the exemption from CFATS for 
MTSA-regulated facilities. The Committee is aware that some 
port facilities have chemicals of interest onsite above 
threshold quantities. The Committee intends to ensure that 
high-risk chemical facilities that are potentially subject to 
both CFATS and MTSA are not saddled with duplicative or 
conflicting requirements and that high-risk chemical facilities 
with commensurate risk are subject to equivalent and 
appropriate security requirements, regardless of the regulatory 
regime under which they are captured. While there are 
similarities between the programs, there are significant 
differences between the requirements of each regime. The 
Committee encourages the U.S. Coast Guard and the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate to maintain an active and 
thorough effort to examine both regulatory regimes, identify 
opportunities for harmonization, and take appropriate action to 
close any security gaps. The Committee recognizes the formal 
establishment of the DHS CFATS-MTSA Working Group that is 
conducting an ongoing, full regulatory review of the two 
security regimes and has taken initial positive steps to 
coordinate activities. The Committee urges this work to 
continue in order to inform recommendations for any statutory 
changes that might be needed to MTSA or CFATS legislative 
authorities.
    This section maintains the exemption from CFATS for 
drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities. The 
Committee recognizes that the water sector is prioritized among 
the nation's critical infrastructures--so vital that damage to, 
or destruction of, drinking water or wastewater treatment 
utilities by terrorist attack could have a debilitating effect 
on homeland security and public health. The Committee notes 
that terrorist attacks on these facilities could come in many 
forms, including: physical attacks (such as the release of 
toxic gaseous chemicals); biological or chemical contamination; 
and cyber attacks. Assessing and addressing the vulnerabilities 
of these facilities to terrorist attack should form the basis 
of any strategy to secure this critical infrastructure and 
reduce the risks to these facilities, with chemical security as 
an essential element.
    Many facilities have made security improvements since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but the Committee 
recognizes there are still no mandatory Federal standards that 
govern the security of water infrastructure. While DHS' 
engagement with the water sector has grown given its 
responsibilities to secure the Nation's critical 
infrastructure, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
remains the lead Federal agency for protecting drinking water 
and wastewater utility systems. However, EPA has not been given 
authority by Congress to establish a risk-informed, performance 
based security program like CFATS for the protection of the 
water sector and, with respect to wastewater treatment 
facilities, no federal agency has been conferred the authority 
to review security plans, set security standards, or require 
implementation of security measures.
    While the Committee did not include language to govern 
chemical security at drinking water and wastewater treatment 
facilities in H.R. 901 due to the imminent expiration of the 
CFATS authority and the foremost need to ensure the CFATS 
regulations remain in place to allow the program to mature and 
continue uninterrupted, the Committee acknowledges a Federal 
role in promoting security at drinking water and wastewater 
treatment facilities. Therefore, the Committee is committed to 
working with the Administration, appropriate authorizing 
committees, and other stakeholders to address this significant 
security concern. The Committee intends to continue its 
examination of chemical security gaps with a view to 
identifying solutions that improve security and minimize the 
risks to homeland security, public health, and the economy, 
while reducing duplication and regulatory burdens. 
Specifically, the Committee intends to investigate: how 
chemical security will fit into the broader context of 
legislative efforts to comprehensively improve security at 
drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities without 
creating the potential for duplication; the distributed and 
diverse nature of ownership (Federal, non-Federal government, 
and private) of these facilities; and the need for greater 
clarity with regard to the roles and responsibilities of DHS 
and EPA.
    The Committee encourages the Department to work with EPA in 
addressing ongoing security gaps at drinking water and 
wastewater treatment facilities. Furthermore, the Committee 
encourages the Department to report back to the Committee on 
the scope and nature of these security gaps, including 
potential approaches to enhance chemical security, and any 
recommended changes in legislative authorities that are needed.
            Sec. 2102.   Information Protection.
    This section requires information developed under CFATS to 
be protected, from unauthorized public disclosure, consistent 
with protections under the MTSA. In administrative and judicial 
proceedings, CFATS-related information will be treated as if 
classified. In addition, this section allows for information 
sharing with appropriate State and local government officials, 
but only as long as the protected information cannot be 
disclosed under any State or local law, and also specifies that 
DHS cannot withhold such information from Congress. The 
Committee believes that the Department may continue to use the 
existing ``Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information'' 
regime for safeguarding protected information as it was 
designed to have minimal burden on regulated facilities while 
achieving real protection of information that might be useful 
to terrorists. The Committee does not intend to preclude 
efforts by the Department to align this information protection 
regime with others, as long as the requirements of this title 
are still met and the security of protected information is not 
compromised in doing so.
            Sec. 2103.   Enforcement.
    This section requires the Secretary to audit and inspect 
facilities to determine compliance. If a facility is found not 
to be in compliance with this Title, the Secretary must 
communicate in writing the deficiencies in the vulnerability 
assessment and site security plan, provide an opportunity for 
consultation, and issue an order requiring compliance by an 
appropriate date (See notification requirements in section 
2101). If a facility violates a written order, it will be 
liable for a civil penalty. If a facility continues to be in 
non-compliance, the Secretary may issue an order to cease 
operations until the owner or operator of the facility 
complies. This section also prohibits third-party rights of 
action against a facility to enforce this Title.
            Sec. 2104.   Jobs Impact.
    This section requires the Secretary to submit an annual 
report to Congress that provides an estimate of the potential 
private sector jobs created or lost as a result of the chemical 
security regulations maintained by this Title and any feedback 
received from chemical facilities on changes to the regulations 
they believe might spur job creation or stem job loss. The 
Committee intends this report to provide additional context to 
inform discussions on chemical security regulations going 
forward. The Committee believes the CFATS regulations need to 
be viewed not only in the context of their role in ensuring the 
security of the Homeland against terrorist attacks, but also in 
the context of the economy in general and job creation 
specifically. The Committee intends for the Department to 
strike the appropriate balance between securing the Nation 
while preserving this vital sector of the economy, and ensure 
the overall benefits of the chemical security regulations 
outweigh their costs.
            Sec. 2105.   Scope.
    This section specifies that this Title is not intended to 
affect or modify other Federal laws that govern chemical 
manufacturing, transportation, use, sale, disposal, etc. 
            Sec. 2106.   Preemption.
    This section allows for regulations, requirements, or 
standards maintained under this Title to preempt State or local 
government regulations, requirements or standards only when 
there is an ``actual conflict'' between them.
            Sec. 2107.   Termination.
    This section establishes a seven-year sunset of the 
Department's authority to maintain security regulations for 
high-risk chemical facilities. The Committee intends to provide 
DHS and chemical facilities with the long-term certainty and 
stability needed to complete a full cycle of compliance, assess 
the program's effectiveness at reducing terrorism risks, and 
make informed improvements. The Committee believes the current 
piecemeal approach of short-term extensions of the CFATS 
authority creates regulatory uncertainty for DHS and chemical 
facilities that runs counter to the Committee's intent--to 
ensure that investments made today are optimized to improve our 
Nation's security for tomorrow and the long-term. The seven-
year sunset does not preclude the Committee from conducting on-
going CFATS oversight or developing additional legislation as 
necessary.
            Sec. 2108.   Authorization of Appropriations.
    This section authorizes $89.9 million for each fiscal year 
2012 through 2018 to carry out the requirements of this Act.

Sec. 3.   Conforming Repeal.

    This section strikes Section 550 of the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. 109-295) on 
the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 4.   Harmonization.

    This section requires the Secretary to submit to Congress a 
report within six months after enactment on the extent to which 
CFATS security requirements have been harmonized with the 
security requirements imposed on ports pursuant to the MTSA. 
The Department shall include any future plans for harmonization 
and a timeline for implementation of these plans. The Committee 
supports the Department's efforts to harmonize the two security 
regimes in order to limit duplicative requirements and address 
any security gaps. The Committee intends for the report to aid 
in identifying whether legislative changes to the MTSA or CFATS 
authorities are needed to achieve appropriate harmonization or 
whether sufficient changes can be made within the existing 
regulatory frameworks.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is 
as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
     * * * * * * *

    TITLE XXI--CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS

Sec. 2101. Chemical facility anti-terrorism security regulations.
Sec. 2102. Information protection.
Sec. 2103. Enforcement.
Sec. 2104. Jobs Impact.
Sec. 2105. Scope.
Sec. 2106. Preemption.
Sec. 2107. Termination.
Sec. 2108. Authorization of appropriations.
     * * * * * * *

    TITLE XXI--CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS

SEC. 2101. CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary shall maintain, and revise as 
necessary, regulations to protect chemical facilities against 
terrorism and potential terrorist attacks. Such regulations 
shall include--
          (1) risk-based performance standards for chemical 
        facility security;
          (2) requirements for chemical facility security 
        vulnerability assessments; and
          (3) requirements for the development and 
        implementation of chemical facility site security 
        plans.
  (b) Facilities Regulated.--The regulations required by 
subsection (a) shall apply to any chemical facility that the 
Secretary determines presents a high level of security risk 
with respect to acts of terrorism, except that the Secretary 
may not apply such regulations to any of the following:
          (1) Any facility owned or operated by the Department 
        of Defense.
          (2) Any facility owned or operated by the Department 
        of Energy.
          (3) Any facility subject to regulation by the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission.
          (4) Any facility regulated under chapter 701 of title 
        46, United States Code.
          (5) A public water system, as such term is defined by 
        section 1401(4) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 
        U.S.C. 300f(4)).
          (6) A treatment works, as such term is defined by 
        section 212(2) of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
        Act (33 U.S.C. 1292(2)).
  (c) Security Measures.--The regulations required by 
subsection (a) shall provide that each such facility, in 
developing and implementing site security plans, be permitted 
to select layered security measures that, in combination, 
appropriately address the vulnerability assessment and the 
risk-based performance standards for security for the facility.
  (d) Review.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary shall review and 
        approve or disapprove each vulnerability assessment and 
        site security plan required under this title or by the 
        regulations required by subsection (a).
          (2) Standards for disapproval.--The Secretary may not 
        disapprove such a site security plan based on the 
        presence or absence of a particular security measure, 
        but the Secretary may disapprove such a site security 
        plan if the plan fails to satisfy the risk-based 
        performance standards established by the Secretary.
          (3) Deadline for notification.--Beginning after the 
        Secretary publishes final regulations to implement this 
        section, not later than 180 days, to the greatest 
        extent practicable, after the date on which the 
        Secretary receives a security vulnerability assessment 
        or site security plan under this title, the Secretary 
        shall review and approve or disapprove such assessment 
        or plan and notify the covered chemical facility of 
        such approval or disapproval.
          (4) Notification of disapproval.--If the Secretary 
        disapproves the security vulnerability assessment or 
        site security plan submitted by a covered chemical 
        facility under this title or the implementation of a 
        site security plan by such a chemical facility, the 
        Secretary shall provide the owner or operator of the 
        covered chemical facility a written notification of the 
        disapproval not later than 14 days after the date on 
        which the Secretary disapproves such assessment or 
        plan, that--
                  (A) includes a clear explanation of 
                deficiencies in the assessment, plan, or 
                implementation of the plan; and
                  (B) requires the owner or operator of the 
                covered chemical facility to revise the 
                assessment or plan to address any deficiencies 
                and, by such date as the Secretary determines 
                is appropriate, to submit to the Secretary the 
                revised assessment or plan.
          (5) Reporting.--The Secretary shall submit to the 
        Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 
        and Government Affairs of the Senate, on an annual 
        basis, information on the number of instances during 
        the year covered by the report where the Secretary 
        determined that the 180 day notification requirement 
        under paragraph (3) was impracticable.
  (e) Alternative Security Programs.--The Secretary may approve 
any alternative security program established by a private 
sector entity or Federal, State, or local authority, or under 
another applicable law, if the Secretary determines that the 
requirements of such program meets the requirements of this 
title and any regulations issued or maintained pursuant to this 
title.
  (f) Security Background Checks.--In any personnel surety 
regulation issued by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a), 
the Secretary shall include provisions on how an owner or 
operator of a covered chemical facility can meet, in whole or 
in part, the requirements set forth in such regulations by 
submitting--
          (1) information on an employee or individual holding 
        a valid transportation security card issued under 
        section 70105 of title 46, United States Code;
          (2) an alternate security background check conducted 
        by a private sector entity, including the owner and 
        operator of a covered chemical facility and a non-
        profit personnel surety accrediting organization; and
          (3) an alternate security background check conducted 
        under another applicable law.
  (g) Technical Assistance to Small Businesses.--The Secretary 
shall provide technical assistance to any owner or operator of 
a covered chemical facility who requests such assistance to 
prepare a security vulnerability assessment or site security 
plan required under this title or by the regulations required 
by subsection (a), if the covered chemical facility is a small 
business concern, under the meaning given that term in section 
3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632).

SEC. 2102. INFORMATION PROTECTION.

  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
information developed pursuant to this title, or pursuant to 
the regulations required by section 2101(a), including 
vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other 
security related information, records, and documents shall be 
given protections from public disclosure consistent with 
similar information developed by chemical facilities subject to 
regulation under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code.
  (b) Sharing of Information.--
          (1) State and local governments.--This section does 
        not prohibit the sharing of such information, as the 
        Secretary determines appropriate, with State and local 
        government officials possessing the appropriate 
        security clearances, including emergency response 
        providers, for the purpose of carrying out this title, 
        as long as such information may not be disclosed 
        pursuant to any State or local law.
          (2) Congress.--Nothing in this title shall permit or 
        authorize the withholding of information from Congress 
        or any committee or subcommittee thereof.
  (c) Administrative and Judicial Proceedings.--In any 
proceeding to enforce this title, vulnerability assessments, 
site security plans, and other information submitted to or 
obtained by the Secretary under this title, and related 
vulnerability or security information, shall be treated as if 
the information were classified material.

SEC. 2103. ENFORCEMENT.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary shall audit and inspect 
chemical facilities subject to regulation under this title for 
the purposes of determining compliance with this title and the 
regulations required by section 2101(a).
  (b) Orders for Compliance.--If the Secretary determines that 
a chemical facility is not in compliance with this title or the 
regulations required by section 2101(a), the Secretary shall 
provide the owner or operator of the facility with written 
notification (including a clear explanation of deficiencies in 
the vulnerability assessment and site security plan) and an 
opportunity for consultation, and issue an order to comply by 
such date as the Secretary determines to be appropriate under 
the circumstances.
  (c) Civil Penalties.--Any person who violates an order issued 
under this title shall be liable for a civil penalty under 
section 70119(a) of title 46, United States Code.
  (d) Order To Cease Operation.--If the owner or operator of a 
chemical facility subject to regulation under this title 
continues to be in noncompliance, the Secretary may issue an 
order for the facility to cease operation until the owner or 
operator complies with the order.
  (e) Exception.--Nothing in this title confers upon any person 
except the Secretary a right of action against an owner or 
operator of a chemical facility to enforce any provision of 
this title.

SEC. 2104. JOBS IMPACT.

  Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
this title, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit 
to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that, at a minimum, 
includes--
          (1) an estimate of the potential jobs created or lost 
        within the private sector as a result of the 
        regulations required under section 2101 of this title; 
        and
          (2) information on feedback received from owners and 
        operators of covered chemical facilities about how the 
        regulations required under section 2101 of this title 
        could be revised to spur potential job creation or stem 
        job losses.

SEC. 2105. SCOPE.

  Nothing in this title shall be construed to supersede, amend, 
alter, or affect any Federal law that regulates the 
manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, sale, other 
treatment, or disposal of chemical substances or mixtures.

SEC. 2106. PREEMPTION.

  This title shall not preclude or deny any right of any State 
or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any 
regulation, requirement, or standard of performance with 
respect to chemical facility security that is more stringent 
than a regulation, requirement, or standard of performance 
required under this title, or otherwise impair any right or 
jurisdiction of any State with respect to chemical facilities 
within that State, unless there is an actual conflict between 
this title and the law of that State.

SEC. 2107. TERMINATION.

  The authority provided by this title shall terminate on 
September 30, 2018.

SEC. 2108. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to 
carry out this title $89,928,000 for each of fiscal years 2012 
through 2018.
                              ----------                              

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                      TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS

  [Sec. 550. (a) No later than six months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
issue interim final regulations establishing risk-based 
performance standards for security of chemical facilities and 
requiring vulnerability assessments and the development and 
implementation of site security plans for chemical facilities: 
Provided, That such regulations shall apply to chemical 
facilities that, in the discretion of the Secretary, present 
high levels of security risk: Provided further, That such 
regulations shall permit each such facility, in developing and 
implementing site security plans, to select layered security 
measures that, in combination, appropriately address the 
vulnerability assessment and the risk-based performance 
standards for security for the facility: Provided further, That 
the Secretary may not disapprove a site security plan submitted 
under this section based on the presence or absence of a 
particular security measure, but the Secretary may disapprove a 
site security plan if the plan fails to satisfy the risk-based 
performance standards established by this section: Provided 
further, That the Secretary may approve alternative security 
programs established by private sector entities, Federal, 
State, or local authorities, or other applicable laws if the 
Secretary determines that the requirements of such programs 
meet the requirements of this section and the interim 
regulations: Provided further, That the Secretary shall review 
and approve each vulnerability assessment and site security 
plan required under this section: Provided further, That the 
Secretary shall not apply regulations issued pursuant to this 
section to facilities regulated pursuant to the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-295, as 
amended; Public Water Systems, as defined by section 1401 of 
the Safe Drinking Water Act, Public Law 93-523, as amended; 
Treatment Works as defined in section 212 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, Public Law 92-500, as amended; any 
facility owned or operated by the Department of Defense or the 
Department of Energy, or any facility subject to regulation by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
  [(b) Interim regulations issued under this section shall 
apply until the effective date of interim or final regulations 
promulgated under other laws that establish requirements and 
standards referred to in subsection (a) and expressly supersede 
this section: Provided, That the authority provided by this 
section shall terminate on October 4, 2011.
  [(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and 
subsection (b), information developed under this section, 
including vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and 
other security related information, records, and documents 
shall be given protections from public disclosure consistent 
with similar information developed by chemical facilities 
subject to regulation under section 70103 of title 46, United 
States Code: Provided, That this subsection does not prohibit 
the sharing of such information, as the Secretary deems 
appropriate, with State and local government officials 
possessing the necessary security clearances, including law 
enforcement officials and first responders, for the purpose of 
carrying out this section, provided that such information may 
not be disclosed pursuant to any State or local law: Provided 
further, That in any proceeding to enforce this section, 
vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other 
information submitted to or obtained by the Secretary under 
this section, and related vulnerability or security 
information, shall be treated as if the information were 
classified material.
  [(d) Any person who violates an order issued under this 
section shall be liable for a civil penalty under section 
70119(a) of title 46, United States Code: Provided, That 
nothing in this section confers upon any person except the 
Secretary a right of action against an owner or operator of a 
chemical facility to enforce any provision of this section.
  [(e) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall audit and 
inspect chemical facilities for the purposes of determining 
compliance with the regulations issued pursuant to this 
section.
  [(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede, 
amend, alter, or affect any Federal law that regulates the 
manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, sale, other 
treatment, or disposal of chemical substances or mixtures.
  [(g) If the Secretary determines that a chemical facility is 
not in compliance with this section, the Secretary shall 
provide the owner or operator with written notification 
(including a clear explanation of deficiencies in the 
vulnerability assessment and site security plan) and 
opportunity for consultation, and issue an order to comply by 
such date as the Secretary determines to be appropriate under 
the circumstances: Provided, That if the owner or operator 
continues to be in noncompliance, the Secretary may issue an 
order for the facility to cease operation, until the owner or 
operator complies with the order.
  [(h) This section shall not preclude or deny any right of any 
State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any 
regulation, requirement, or standard of performance with 
respect to chemical facility security that is more stringent 
than a regulation, requirement, or standard of performance 
issued under this section, or otherwise impair any right or 
jurisdiction of any State with respect to chemical facilities 
within that State, unless there is an actual conflict between 
this section and the law of that State.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    We, the undersigned Democratic Members of the Committee on 
Homeland Security, support the reauthorization of the Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act program, as administered 
by the Department of Homeland Security, and submit the 
following additional views.

                               BACKGROUND

    As discussed in the report, with the enactment of section 
550 of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations 
Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295), Congress granted DHS, for the first 
time, authority to issue regulations relating to the security 
of the Nation's chemical sector. Section 550, however, 
expressly exempted certain facilities from the authorized 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, 
which were issued as interim final regulations on April 4, 
2007. We would note that since enactment of the 2007 DHS 
Appropriations Act, the following categories of facilities have 
been explicitly exempted from the CFATS regulation: facilities 
that are regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard pursuant to the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA); drinking water and 
wastewater treatment facilities (as defined by section 1401 of 
the Safe Drinking Water Act and section 212 of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the 
``Clean Water Act'', respectively)); facilities owned or 
operated by the Departments of Defense and Energy; and certain 
facilities subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC).
    Section 550 of the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act was enacted 
as a short-term grant of authority to allow DHS to begin moving 
forward with the design and publication of regulations for the 
chemical sector while congressional authorizers worked out 
policy and jurisdictional differences to pass comprehensive 
CFATS authorization legislation. For five years, enactment of 
comprehensive CFATS authorization legislation has been elusive. 
In the absence of a comprehensive CFATS bill, Congress has 
repeatedly extended the section 550 authority in appropriations 
bills. DHS' authority to regulate security in the chemical 
sector is scheduled to expire at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 
2011 unless legislation to extend authority is enacted.
    Committee Democrats have a longstanding record of 
supporting this novel regulation which, in recognition of the 
diversity of the chemical sector, sets forth a series of risk-
based, performance-based standards that are to be met by 
facilities that hold threshold quantities of chemicals that 
would be of interest to terrorists. We would note that in the 
110th Congress, then-Chairman Thompson was able to work 
effectively with the Committees on Energy and Commerce (then-
Chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA)) and Transportation and 
Infrastructure (then-Chairman James Oberstar (D-MN)) to 
introduce comprehensive chemical security legislation. H.R. 
2868, the ``Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009,'' was 
approved by the House on November 6, 2009 by a vote of 230 to 
193. One of the key areas of distinctions between H.R. 2868 and 
prior attempts at enacting comprehensive CFATS legislation was 
with regards to the regulation of drinking water and wastewater 
facilities for security. Whereas the 109th and 110th Congress 
bills (H.R. 5695 and H.R. 5577 respectively) granted DHS 
regulatory authority over these facilities, H.R. 2868 granted 
regulatory authority for security to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the existing regulator for the safety 
of drinking water and wastewater facilities. Subsequently, 
witnesses representing DHS and EPA testified in support of the 
regulatory approach in H.R. 2868.
    This Congress, Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, 
and Security Technologies (CIPST) Subcommittee Chairman Rep. 
Dan Lungren (R-CA) introduced H.R. 901, a bill largely modeled 
after the language carried in the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act. 
We would note that with the exception of H.R. 901, each 
comprehensive CFATS bill advanced by the Committee since 2006 
has included provisions to close the water and wastewater 
security gap.

                FULL COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 901

    On Wednesday, June 22, 2011, at the Full Committee mark up 
of H.R. 901, Democratic Members of the Committee on Homeland 
Security submitted twelve amendments to improve the underlying 
bill.
    Committee Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS) offered 
an amendment in the nature of a substitute (Thompson 
substitute) that would have replaced the measure under 
consideration with a comprehensive authorization of the CFATS 
program. The Thompson Substitute was based on H.R. 2868, the 
only freestanding CFATS authorization bill to have been 
approved by the House. H.R. 2868, approved by the 111th 
Congress by a vote of 230 to 193, was the result of Committee 
oversight, years of bipartisan discussions, and extensive 
engagement of facility operators and other effected 
stakeholders. Like H.R. 2868, the Thompson Substitute sought to 
codify and enhance large sections of CFATS risk-based, 
performance-based regulation that has gained acceptance in 
Congress and the regulated community since 2007. Further, the 
Thompson Substitute also sought to leverage a recognized ``best 
practice'' in the chemical sector to ``reduce the consequences 
of a terrorist attack'' for facilities and their surrounding 
communities by conducting assessments as part of their Security 
Vulnerability Assessments. The Committee has received testimony 
that facilities which voluntarily perform these assessments, 
sometimes called ``inherently safer technology'' or ``IST'' 
assessments, often discover that reducing risk is not only good 
for homeland security but the business' operations. 
Additionally, the amendment included provisions to protect 
whistleblowers, enhance worker security training, and allow 
citizens to bring actions against DHS in the event that DHS 
fails to enforce this security law. During consideration of 
this amendment, Committee Ranking Member Thompson argued that 
this substitute offered more predictability and protections to 
the regulated community than the underlying measure insofar as 
it sets forth, with specificity, timelines, notification, and 
redress for the facilities. This amendment was defeated by a 
vote of 12 to 18.
    We are pleased that, for the first time in the 112th 
Congress, amendments offered by Committee Democrats were 
accepted. Specifically, the following five amendments were 
accepted:
     An amendment, authored by Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-
CA), sought to provide greater transparency and predictability 
to owners and operators of regulated chemical facilities. 
Specifically, it required DHS, to the greatest extent 
practicable, to review and issue an approval or disapproval for 
any Security Vulnerability Assessment or Site Security Plan 
submitted by a facility operator within 180 days of receiving 
it. In the event that DHS disapproves a Security Vulnerability 
Assessment or Site Security Plan, the Department would be 
required to provide a written notification that, among other 
things, sets forth the deficiencies in the submission, not 
later than 14 days after the decision is made. To foster close 
adherence to these requirements, the amendment required the 
Department to report to Congress, on an annual basis, on the 
specific circumstances where it found that to meet the 180-day 
requirement would be impracticable. We would note that, at the 
time of the mark up, the Department had not approved a single 
Site Security Plan submitted by a regulated facility. This 
amendment was approved by voice vote.
     Two amendments, offered en bloc by Rep. Sheila 
Jackson Lee (D-TX), sought to foster a streamlining of chemical 
security regulatory activity at DHS and the leveraging of 
security enhancements by regulated facilities. The first 
amendment required the Secretary of Homeland Security to report 
on the progress of efforts to harmonize the CFATS program with 
the Maritime Security Transportation Act (MTSA) program, as 
administered by Coast Guard. The second amendment directed DHS, 
in any CFATS rule governing personnel surety, to set forth how 
a facility can meet the requirements, in whole or in part, by 
submitting: (1) information on employees with valid 
Transportation Worker Identification Credentials; (2) 
information on compliance with an alternate security background 
check, including those undertaken by a non-profit personnel 
surety accrediting organization; and (3) information on 
compliance with a personnel surety requirement under another 
law. Both amendments are predicated on the view that, wherever 
possible, facilities should not be subjected to redundant or 
even conflicting requirements. We believe that the second 
amendment, in particular, has the potential of resulting in a 
savings of time and money for facility operators and their 
workers. These amendments were approved by voice vote.
     By a recorded vote of 28 to 2, the Committee 
approved an amendment, authored by Rep. Danny K. Davis (D-IL), 
that required DHS to report to Congress within one year of 
enactment of this measure and annually thereafter on: (1) the 
estimated impact on employment of the CFATS regulations; and 
(2) any information from regulated facilities on how the CFATS 
regulation could be revised to foster job growth or prevent job 
losses. As the national unemployment rate remains stubbornly 
high, we believe that it is important that DHS be aware of what 
impact the implementation of this regulation could have on the 
workers and the operations of the regulated facilities.
     An amendment, offered by Rep. Kathleen Hochul (D-
NY), required DHS to provide technical assistance to any 
facility that qualifies as a small business concern under the 
Small Business Act and requests such assistance to meet the 
requirements of this novel regulatory program. This amendment 
acknowledges the fact that not all chemical facilities have the 
in-house resources or expertise to complete a Security 
Vulnerability Assessment or Site Security Plan. It also 
recognizes that producing a SecurityVulnerability Assessment 
and Site Security Plan is often a complex and costly endeavor. We 
believe that small businesses, as the engine of our national economy, 
should not be forced to choose between hiring expensive consultants or 
adding to their workforce. This amendment was approved by a vote of 29 
to 1.
    Committee Democrats offered six other amendments at the 
Full Committee mark up. We are disappointed that none of those 
amendments, as discussed herein, were accepted:
     CIPST Subcommittee Ranking Member Clarke (D-NY) 
offered two amendments to shorten the length of authorization 
for the CFATS program from seven years. The first amendment 
would have shortened the authorization period from 2018 to 
2013; it was defeated by voice vote. The second amendment would 
have shortened the authorization period from 2018 to 2016; it 
was rejected by a vote of 11 to 18. At the mark up, we 
expressed the view that it would be imprudent to authorize the 
CFATS program for seven years when the program has not been 
fully implemented, the inspector workforce is not fully in 
place, and not even one facility has received final approval 
from DHS on its Site Security Plan. While we commend the 
Department for taking swift action to establish the program, we 
recognize that the CFATS program is not yet mature and, as 
such, DHS has experienced some missteps.\1\ We believe that the 
establishment of a regular rhythm of reauthorization is 
critical to the program's success. Through such a process, 
Congress can effectuate its oversight findings and adjust 
programmatic resources, as needed. We would also note that both 
amendments would have significantly lowered the total cost of 
the legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\For instance, just prior to the June 22nd mark up, the Committee 
was informed by DHS that anomalies surrounding the assessment tool used 
for designating facilities on risk-based tiers had been detected. 
Subsequently, DHS reevaluated about 10% of the regulated population and 
determined, ultimately, that all the effected facilities were in proper 
tiers, would be placed in a lower tier, or, in the case of roughly 100 
facilities, were found to have insufficient risk to be regulated under 
the program. Previously, DHS determined that it had provided wages to a 
number of CFATS inspectors, deployed around the Nation, at an incorrect 
rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Committee Ranking Member Thompson offered an 
amendment that would have eliminated most of the exemptions 
established under section 550 of the 2007 DHS Appropriations 
Act. In the case of drinking water and wastewater facilities, 
the EPA would be responsible for establishing a parallel 
security program to DHS's CFATS program, and, in the case of 
facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
Coast Guard, the responsibility for issuing parallel security 
regulations would be delegated to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the Coast Guard, respectively. This amendment, 
which would have addressed the water and wastewater security 
gap and brought other at-risk facilities under parallel 
security systems, was rejected by a vote of 9 to 15.
     Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 
Communications (EPRC) Subcommittee Ranking Member Laura 
Richardson (D-CA) offered an amendment that would have directed 
DHS to establish a process for whisteblowers at chemical 
facilities to keep their identities confidential. It would have 
prohibited chemical facility owners and operators from 
retaliating against an employee who discloses violations of the 
CFATS regulations, testifies before the government, or refuses 
to participate in activities they reasonably believe violate 
the law, after notifying their employer. It also outlined a 
procedure for whisteblowers to file a complaint if they allege 
they have experienced discrimination based upon their 
whistleblower activities. We believe that the men and women who 
work in the chemical sector have special knowledge which is 
critical to the identification of security vulnerabilities 
within their facilities. We believe that it is imperative 
employees are protected, should they report violations or 
vulnerabilities through appropriate channels. This amendment 
was rejected by a vote of 11 to 16.
     CIPST Subcommittee Ranking Member Clarke (D-NY) 
offered an amendment that would have authorized the Office of 
Chemical Facility Inspections. It also included specifications 
on the qualifications and the selection process for this 
program office's director. Every CFATS authorization bill 
advanced by the Committee since 2006 has specifically 
authorized this office to ensure that the program could be 
managed effectively and efficiently. We believe this amendment 
would have enhanced this Committee's oversight capabilities and 
accountability for this program office; we would note that this 
program office has been in operation since the 2007 DHS 
Appropriation Act and is referred to as ``Infrastructure 
Security Compliance Division.'' We recognize that the CFATS 
program cannot run itself and is in need of a standing program 
office to provide day-to-day administrative leadership and 
resources to implement this novel program. This amendment was 
rejected by a vote of 11 to 18.
     Rep. Hansen Clarke (D-MI) authored three 
amendments to improve the underlying bill. The first amendment 
directed DHS to establish personnel surety regulations for 
facilities that provide worker protections. Specifically, the 
amendment set forth the scope of the background check and 
directed DHS to require facilities to establish redress and 
reconsideration processes for employees who are subject to 
adverse employment actions, as a result of a CFATS-required 
background check. The amendment also sought to restrict the use 
and maintenance of information gathered in these background 
investigations. This amendment was rejected by a vote of 12 to 
18.
     The second amendment offered by Rep. Clarke (D-MI) 
would have directed the President to delegate to the EPA the 
authority to issue CFATS regulations for drinking water and 
wastewater facilities and directed the EPA to provide technical 
assistance to any affected facilities. We recognize that many 
water and wastewater facilities are owned and operated by 
public authorities and, therefore, they may have limited 
resources to comply with the CFATS regulation. The water and 
wastewater security gap has been of major concern to DHS under 
both the Bush and Obama Administrations. In fact, after 
enactment of section 550, then-DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 
was among the first to acknowledge the water and wastewater 
security gap when, speaking at the 2007 Chemical Sector 
Security Summit, he stated ``[A]s comprehensive as we're trying 
to be, there remains one gap in our system of regulation, and 
that has to do with certain kinds of chemicals that are held at 
water treatment plants and wastewater plants.''\2\ This 
amendment was rejected by a vote of 11 to 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Michael Chertoff, DHS Secretary, speaking before the 2007 
Chemical Sector Security Summit, June 12, 2007 @ http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/speeches/sp_1181830119723.shtm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     The third amendment offered by Rep. Clarke (D-MI) 
would have directed DHS to consult with the EPA in establishing 
chemical facilities anti-terrorism standards regulations on 
various subjects, including which substances should be 
designated as substances of concern, methods to reduce the 
consequences of terrorist attacks and how to minimize paperwork 
for overlapping issues. We believe that this amendment would 
have helped foster greater collaboration between DHS and EPA, 
in furtherance of a more secure Nation. This amendment was 
rejected by a vote of 12 to 18.

                 SUBCOMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 901

    On April 14, 2011, during consideration of H.R. 901 by the 
CIPST Subcommittee, Committee Democrats offered three targeted 
amendments to improve the underlying measure. All three were 
rejected. They are as follows:
     An amendment, offered by CIPST Subcommittee 
Ranking Member Clarke (D-NY), to close the drinking water and 
wastewater security gap created by the 2007 DHS Appropriations 
Act and require that the regulatory authority over these 
facilities be delegated to the EPA. We would note that at that 
mark up, CIPST Subcommittee Chairman Lungren, after stating his 
opposition to this amendment, explained that he remains 
concerned that there may be security gaps with respect to the 
water and wastewater sectors and pledged to hold specific 
hearings on this security risk and, if necessary, work with 
CIPST Subcommittee Ranking Member Clarke on future legislation 
to address this matter.
     An amendment, offered by EPRC Subcommittee Ranking 
Member Richardson (D-CA), to require facilities deemed to be 
highest risk to undertake product safety reviews, an industry 
best practice according to testimony received by the Committee.
     An amendment, offered by Rep. Cedric Richmond (D-
LA), to ensure that each facility that is required to undertake 
a Security Vulnerability Assessment and Site Security Plan 
includes employees in the development of these critical 
documents. We believe that the participation of on-the-ground 
employees will help make facility submissions more 
comprehensive and responsive to the security risks at that 
facility.
                                   Bennie G. Thompson.
                                   Loretta Sanchez.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Henry Cuellar.
                                   Yvette D. Clarke.
                                   Laura Richardson.
                                   Danny K. Davis.
                                   Brian Higgins.
                                   Jackie Speier.
                                   Cedric L. Richmond.
                                   Hansen Clarke.
                                   William R. Keating.
                                   Kathleen C. Hochul.

                                  
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