Environmental Health and Safety Issues 109

Chapter Four

Environmental Health and Safety Issues

Introduction

Following the attack on the Pentagon, the Army Medical Department faced environmental health and safety issues resulting from the explosion of Flight 77 in 

the 60-year-old building and the fire it caused. Damage was extensive in portions 

of renovated wedge 1 and in wedge 2, which had just begun to be renovated. The 

demolition and reduction of wedge 1 during its renovation had produced 332 million pounds of hazardous material, and it was feared that the fire would introduce 

more hazardous material into the environment. It was therefore necessary to determine if air quality in the rest of the Pentagon was safe, and if not, how to make 

it so. Potential dangers included toxic dust, ash, and chemicals found in burning 

wood, plastics, and other materials. Substances such as lead or asbestos contained 

in the construction materials of older buildings were also concerns. Immediate 

action was essential because on the evening of 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld had declared “that the Pentagon would be open for business the next 

day.” He wanted to let the terrorists know they had not stopped the building from 

functioning.1(ppA-65,A-68),2

The Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), a Department of Defense 

(DoD) agency that supervised everyday operations at the Pentagon, was responsible for environmental and health surveillance at the building following the attack. The agency’s Safety and Environmental Management Branch deployed a 

team of seven environmental health specialists to manage the industrial health 

and safety programs following the attack. It also hired contract personnel from 

Applied Environmental, Inc, of Reston, Virginia, who contributed expertise and 

routine support. Augmenting recovery efforts were the staff of the Pentagon Renovation Program Safety Office and environmental, health, and safety experts of 

the renovation contractors.3(p10)

Other DoD environmental health and safety experts came from the Army 

Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM), located in 
110 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, which provided a special medical augmentation response team (SMART team) for preventive medicine. Supplementing CHPPM’s team were at least 30 Air Force bioenvironmental engineers from 

Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, 

DC, and Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. Also assisting were a nuclear, biological, and chemical team from Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), 

an occupational health team from the DiLorenzo Clinic, National Guard units 

from Virginia and West Virginia, and personnel from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and the National Naval Medical Center (both in 

Bethesda, Maryland).3(p10)

Although WHS was in command, having operational control over all of the 

Pentagon, the agency let CHPPM’s SMART team, which had the technical expertise, take the lead in monitoring ambient air and sampling for contaminants.4

 The 

team’s charter was to 

Determine the levels of hazardous contamination present in and around the Pentagon; recommend mitigation of any hazards that pose a health threat to occupants and personnel conducting operations in response to their incident; and measure and assess the health impact of a wide 

range of contaminants that might be present because of the aircraft crash, the building fire, and 

subsequent damage that might adversely affect the health of building occupants.3(p11)

Commanded by Major General Lester Martinez-Lopez, CHPPM was the lead 

DoD agency dealing with health-related environmental issues. CHPPM’s mission 

was to “provide health promotion and preventive medicine leadership and services to counter environmental, occupational, and disease threats to health, fitness, 

and readiness, in support of the National Military Strategy.”5(p1-1) From his headquarters at Aberdeen, Martinez-Lopez oversaw a many-sided response involving 

skilled personnel and specialists in occupational and preventive medicine, environmental science, behavioral health, epidemiology, and medical surveillance. 

Those experts came from CHPPM’s various directorates and subordinate units 

within the Army Medical Department, the Air Force, the Navy, and the DoD. 

Martinez-Lopez and his command coordinated their efforts with the WHS.5(p1-6) 

Additional environmental health and safety experts came from the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), Arlington County Fire Department, Virginia Department of Emergency 

Management, and the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality. The presence of federal and state environmental professionals at the site provided additional expertise to assist with technical problems.3(p11)

The DoD’s emergency health and safety experts, led by the CHPPM team, conducted most of the sampling at the Pentagon, focusing on the inside of the building. After recording and analyzing the data, CHPPM forwarded it to the emergency operations centers at Aberdeen, the Pentagon’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health 

Clinic, and WHS. WHS had a representative at the Joint Operations Center at Fort 

Myer, which served as a focal point for the coordination of DoD’s efforts with 

other federal, state, and local agencies.3(pp8,9),4
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 111

US Army Center for Health Promotion and 

Preventive Medicine Organizational Listing

CHPPM COMMANDER

Deputy for Technical Services

Secretary to the General Staff Staff Judge Advocate

Safety Manager/Environmental Auditor

Coordinator

Radiation Production Officer Strategic Initiatives Office

Adjutant Acting Inspector General

Company Commander Inspector General

Sergeant Major Protocol Officer

Aide de Camp Chief, Public Affairs Office

CHIEF OF STAFF

Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management

Chief, Budget Division Chief, Human Resource Management 

Division

Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management

Automation Management Officer Chief, Document Management Division

Chief, Infrastructure Management Chief, Visual Information Division

Division

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

Chief, Property Division Chief, Public Works Division

Equipment Program Manager

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Chief, Current Operations Division Health Information Operations Division

Chief, Support Operations Division

DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH ENGINEERING

Program Manager, Water Supply 1 Program Manager, Environmental Health

Management, Program 3 Risk Assessment, Program 39

Program Manager, Surface Water and Program Manager, Air Quality 

Wastewater, Program 32 Surveillance, Program 43 

Program Manager, Hazardous and Program Manager, Deployment 

Medical Waste, Program 37 Environmental Surveillance, Program 47

Program Manager, Ground Water and Program Manager, Environmental Noise, 

Solid Waste, Program 38 Program 52

DIRECTOR, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

Program Manager, Disease and Injury Program Manager, Tri-Service Vision

Control Policy, Program 34 Conservation and Readiness, Program 63

Program Manager, Occupational and Program Manager, Hearing Conservation,

Environmental Medicine, Program 64 Program 51

(continued)
112 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

DIRECTOR, LABORATORY SCIENCES

Chief, Laboratory Information & Chief, Chromatographic Analysis Division,

Sample Management Division, Program 82

Program 72

Chief, Analytical Spectrometry Chief, Laboratory Consultants Office

Division, Program 80

Chief, Radiologic, Classic & Clinical Chief, DoD Cholinesterase Reference

Chemistry Division, Program 79 Laboratory, Program 84

Director, Toxicology

Program Manager, Toxicity Evaluation, Chief, Veterinary Medicine Division

Program 85

Program Manager, Health Effects 

Research, Program 87

DIRECTOR, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE

Program Manager, Professional Program Manager, Epidemiology, 

Medical Education, Program 11 Program 29

Program Manager, Injury Prevention, Program Manager, Medical Surveillance,

Program 12 Program 30

Program Manager, Occupational 

Health, Program 13

DIRECTOR, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SCIENCES

Program Manager, Entomological Program Manager, Industrial Hygiene

Sciences, Program 18 Field Services (Technical), Program 55

Program Manager, Radiofrequency/ Program Manager, Industrial Hygiene

Ultrasound, Program 24 Field Services (Administrative), 

 Program 55

Program Manager, Laser/Optical Program Manager, Industrial Hygiene and

Radiation, Program 25 Medical Safety Management, 

 Program 59

Program Manager, Health Physics, Program Manager, Health Hazard 

Program 26 Assessment, Program 69

Program Manager, OHMIS, Program 53 Program Manager, Ergonomics, Program

Program Manager, DOEHRS, Program 88

53

DIRECTOR, HEALTH PROMOTION AND WELLNESS

Program Manager, Readiness Resource, Program Manager, Wellness Resource,

Program 21 Program 22

Program Manager, Population Chaplain

Resource, Program 46

CHPPM Organizational Listing continued

(continued)
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 113

DIRECTOR, HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT

Program Manager, Environmental Program Manager, Health Risk CommuHealth Risk Assessment, Program 39 nication Office, Program 33

Program Manager, Deployment Chief, Agency for Toxic Substance & 

Environmental Surveillance, Disease Registry (liaison office)

Program 47

COMMANDER, USACHPPM-NORTH

Chief, Administrative Support Office Chief, Entomological Sciences Division

Chief, Industrial Hygiene Division Chief, Preventive Medicine Field Division

Chief, Environmental Health 

Engineering Division

COMMANDER, USACHPPM-SOUTH

Chief, Quality Management and Chief, Entomological Services Division

Support Division

Chief, Army Reserve Command Liaison Chief, Field Preventive Medicine Division

Office

Chief, Environmental Health Chief, Industrial Hygiene Division

Engineering Division

COMMANDER, USACHPPM-WEST

Chief, Industrial Hygiene Division Chief, Entomological Sciences Division

Chief, Environmental Health Chief, Field Preventive Medicine

Engineering Division

COMMANDER, USACHPPM-EUROPE 

Deputy Commander Chief, Department of Environmental

 Health Sciences

Operations Officer Chief, Department of Laboratory Sciences

Chief, Department of Administrative Chief, Occupational Health and 

Services Epidemiology

Headquarters Headquarters Detachment

COMMANDER, USACHPPM-PACIFIC

Director, Environmental Laboratory Chief, Preventive Medicine Division

Division

Chief, Environmental Health Sciences DoD: Department of Defense

Division

DOEHRS:Defense Occupational and Environmental Health Reporting System

OHMIS: Occupational Health Management Information System

USACHPPM: US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine

CHPPM Organizational Listing continued
114 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

Initial Response

On 9/11, Martinez-Lopez and his people went on standby when the twin towers 

at New York City’s World Trade Center were first attacked at 8:46. In preparation to support an Army medical response to New York City, Kevin Delaney, 

CHPPM’s chief of health information operations, assisted in establishing an emergency operations center at the agency’s headquarters in Aberdeen. After the assault on the Pentagon at 9:37, the unit concentrated on assembling and deploying 

a preventive medicine SMART team to help address environmental health issues 

in and around the building. Although the team was already in existence, it was 

augmented to deal with the crisis.6,7 The team ultimately consisted of

one chaplain, one social worker, one preventive medicine physician, one health physicist, 

nine environmental science officers, three sanitary engineers, two preventive medicine noncommissioned officers, ten industrial hygienists, two industrial hygiene technicians, three environmental engineers, two environmental scientists, two engineering technicians, and one 

mechanical engineer.6(p64) 

According to Colonel Paul Smith, a CHPPM occupational medicine staff officer working for the preventive medicine consultant in the Office of the Surgeon General, and Colonel Tim Mallon, CHPPM’s director of clinical medicine, 

the original government guidance covering responses to nuclear, biological, and 

chemical threats made CHPPM responsible only for providing expert advice on 

the dangers to and treatment of those coming in contact with hazardous materials. On 9/11, however, CHPPM was asked to do more: to sample air quality, test 

hazardous materials, and ultimately conduct decontamination operations in areas 

that might pose threats to health. CHPPM also was asked to send a team as soon as 

possible, and complied. While the SMART team was assembling, Colonel Smith 

called Aberdeen to urge his colleagues to send the team as soon as possible to 

initiate limited sampling of materials for contaminants, particularly toxic fumes 

resulting from the airliner’s impact and the fire it caused.8

Major Anthony Intrepido, CHPPM’s manager of industrial hygiene field services in the Directorate of Occupational Health Sciences, took a half hour to put 

together an advance hazardous materials team and depart for the Pentagon (the 

main body of the team would follow the next day). The five military and civilian 

volunteers consisted of four industrial hygienists and one operations officer, who 

packed and loaded instruments that measured a variety of contaminants with instant results, and other equipment to measure the building’s air quality by detecting the presence of gases, aldehydes, and volatile organic compounds. They also 

packed whatever protective gear they could find. At 1300, the team left Aberdeen 

in a pickup truck and drove to the Pentagon, spending the trip brain-storming 

about what to do when they got there. At about 1500, they arrived at the crash 

site.9 

At the Pentagon Major Intrepido and his team encountered a chaotic situation 

with no clear indication about where they should report. Stopped frequently and 

asked to identify themselves and their destination, the group got through every 

checkpoint by showing their identification cards and saying they “were just DoD’s 
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 115

hazmat team.” Finally they linked up with an Army Medical Department cell at 

the DiLorenzo Clinic in the basement of the Pentagon.9

Intrepido and his team then began sampling in the center court, where there 

was a lot of smoke, and outside the southwest entrance, the site of the fire and 

the great plume of smoke it generated. Using detector tubes and direct reading 

instruments, they monitored for chemicals and combustible products that might 

be harmful to recovery workers in the area and to personnel in offices close to the 

crash site: aldehydes, carbon monoxide, particulates, volatile organics, and other 

chemicals. They felt under pressure to ascertain immediate health threats because 

of rumors that Pentagon employees were to return to work in the building the next 

day.5(p365),9

Having rushed to the Pentagon with insufficient personal protective equipment 

of their own, the advance team had to use abandoned face masks that others had 

laid aside at the scene. The lack of defensive gear was worrisome: it was unknown 

on the evening of 9/11 if the plane had chemical, biological, or radiological agents 

on board. The plane had not burned up in one big fireball, and aircraft parts were 

strewn about along with unused jet fuel.9

While Intrepido’s team focused on toxic materials, WRAMC’s nuclear, biological, and chemical response team, which had arrived about 1400, ran tests of 

its own. The group’s members initially served as litter bearers until 1730, when 

they received permission from Defense Protective Service (the Pentagons’ police force) to begin surveying for nuclear, chemical, and biological contaminants. 

WRAMC’s team consisted of doctors, nurses, enlisted soldiers, an environmental 

science officer, and a nuclear medicine specialist. In addition to conducting surveys, the team was capable as well of providing nuclear, chemical, or biological 

casualty care. They used a radiation meter in the courtyard but did no further 

biological or chemical testing on 9/11.10–13

Occupational health personnel from the DiLorenzo Clinic also began work on 

the afternoon of 9/11. A team of seven occupational health nurses and two ancillary support personnel, under the leadership of Joe Balinas, an occupational 

medicine physician’s assistant at DiLorenzo and coordinator for indoor air quality 

programs in the Pentagon, supported the overall effort by using their ecological 

knowledge of the Pentagon to assist environmental experts in seeing that the building was clean and safe enough for people to reenter. Normally, the Occupational 

Medicine Department was concerned with the building’s heating, air conditioning, and ventilating systems and their effect on the health of its occupants. The age 

of those systems was a major reason for the recent renovations. The Department’s 

secondary mission was to work with hygienists and environmentalists in identifying health hazards and in recommending remedial action. Balinas coordinated his 

activities with CHPPM’s environmental medicine team.8,14

These environmental and occupational health personnel worked against the 

clock to determine if the Pentagon was safe for workers to return the next day. 

Assistant Chief James Schwartz of the Arlington County Fire Department, in accordance with the wishes of President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, 

had decided to allow workers back into the undamaged parts of the Pentagon on 
116 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

12 September, even though smoke was still billowing from the ruptured building 

and the recovery of bodies was underway. Because there was a clear and significant risk to the soldiers and civilian employees slated to return, the decision to 

have them do so had to have been a conscious one, thought Colonel Mallon. The 

political consequences of closing the building were so great that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and President Bush were willing to take the risk of reoccupying 

the building without confirmation that it was safe.8

“It’s a monumental task to assess a building this size in such short order and 

to say that it was completely safe to reenter,” said Colonel Mallon, and to provide a definitive answer in one day was impossible. However, Mallon, Smith, 

and the other environment experts believed that initial samples on 9/11 revealed 

little of risk in most areas, even if some areas were heavily contaminated with 

lead, asbestos, dioxin, and other materials, and the building would need extensive 

cleaning. On 12 September, employees returned to work in offices in areas that 

appeared safe, but sampling continued (a more thorough assessment would occur 

later once this initial data could be reviewed). The team anticipated that the complete sampling effort would take between 2 and 3 weeks of daytime, nighttime, 

and weekend work to provide the information needed to formulate a response if 

heavy contamination of a hazardous material appeared.8

Sampling Efforts

On 12 September, the main body of the preventive medicine SMART team and 

a smaller contingent from CHPPM’s office at Fort George C Meade, Maryland, 

converged on the Pentagon, where they joined forces at 1100 with the advance 

team from Aberdeen. The Fort Meade unit’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Laurie Cummings, became leader of the effort, which by then also included other 

DoD environmental health and safety experts.5(ppviii,4-2),15

At a meeting called by WHS that day, DoD civilian, military, and contractor environmental safety and health personnel began selecting areas 

for sampling. Not every office in the Pentagon was included; those on the 

edge of the impact area had been closed off. Checking other work spaces 

would be done on a statistical basis; sampling and cleaning efforts would 

start in the most damaged sections and progress to the least, and offices 

closest to the damaged areas with the greatest number of employees would 

have priority. Specifically, unoccupied offices on the fifth floor closest to 

the crash site (corridors 2 and 6) would receive immediate attention. Occupied offices farthest from the crash site would be sampled and cleaned 

last. Samples would be taken from soldiers on guard duty in and around 

the crash site. Staff from CHPPM and WHS (including contractors) would 

work as a cadre to conduct sampling concurrently on all floors of the Pentagon. CHPPM’s team would review their own sampling data along with 

WHS’s results. It would be necessary to collaborate with the FBI’s hazardous material response unit because the area immediately surrounding the 

aircraft’s impact (corridors 4 and 5, and parts of corridors 2 and 6) was 
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 117

under the FBI’s direct control. WHS would brief environmental leaders 

daily on data and conclusions.2,3(p11),5,15,16(p2),17

In sampling the Pentagon’s interior, environmental safety and health experts 

under the leadership of CHPPM’s team had three basic objectives: (1) to identify 

possible exposures to people who had remained in the building, such as security 

guards and maintenance workers; (2) to identify possible exposures to the soldiers engaged in search and recovery efforts; and (3) to determine the degree of 

possible contamination in the undamaged areas of the building that were being 

reoccupied. The sampling teams focused on aircraft parts, building materials, jet 

fuel, and flammable commodities in these materials. Using a variety of devices 

that included direct-reading instruments, detector tubes, and a mobile contamination detector machine, with both high- and low-volume air sampling as well 

as surface wipes, to measure, sort, and identify likely impurities, they created a 

contamination profile of every floor in the building. The data enabled the team to 

assess probable health risks to persons working inside the building, such as FBI 

forensics specialists and soldiers at the crash site, where recovery operations, engineering operations, and mortuary affairs were ongoing. Sampling went on for 2 

weeks. In the end, the preventive medicine team found low amounts of volatile organic compounds, hydrocarbons, metals, asbestos, lead, and other contaminants, 

but there was a noticeable drop in contamination levels after cleaning. There was 

also a smell of death as team members worked on the top floors near the crash site. 

The work was continual and debilitating. Later in the week, a biological detector 

system became available—a trailer mounted on a Humvee that collected air and 

monitored its quality.)2,5(pp3-65,3-66),13 

During the 2-week sampling effort, special attention was paid to soldiers of the 

3d Infantry Regiment (Old Guard). The sampling team closely observed 85 soldiers who had served as guards inside the Pentagon and at the crash site during recovery efforts, conducting blood tests for lead and taking air samples in the areas 

they occupied, in order to record and analyze possible health threats from burning 

aircraft fuel and other contaminants such as asbestos dust dislodged by the impact 

and explosion. “These samples ensured air quality levels were within acceptable 

limits and aided in decisions for work rest–cycles of recovery operation teams,” 

said Master Sergeant Roberto Rolon, a CHPPM team member.18(p15)

The sampling group had to contend with a number of obstacles. The fire at the 

Pentagon, for example, burned until the afternoon of 12 September. The hallways 

of the building were filled with smoke, and as a result the air quality was poor. 

High levels of carbon monoxide were reported. Fires in the wooden attic were 

spreading from wedge to wedge, and portions of the building were cordoned off. 

Puddles of water from the fire hoses throughout the structure made moving around 

difficult. Also, many team members had never been in the Pentagon before, did 

not use available maps, and were unaware that the rings sometimes had dead ends. 

Worse, tight security caused team members to stand in long lines to obtain badges 

or enter various portions of the building.6(p3),9

As they worked, industrial health personnel, like others involved in the response, confronted such challenges as working 18-hour days for more than 2 
118 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

weeks, covering each shift, forming teams from groups of people who had not 

previously worked together, and making sure each specialist found his or her 

“niche.” Some members had little experience doing the sampling assessments, 

while others had been doing the work for 20 or 30 years. Working through the 

Pentagon bureaucracy and getting their data out to external colleagues also was 

difficult. The group also had to deal with workers worried about the effects of the 

environment on pregnancies, or concerned about returning to ash-strewn offices. 

A lot of informal mentoring occurred.9

By the second week, personnel from offices near the impact site that were still 

intact were allowed back into the rooms to get their belongings. Before they could 

enter, however, a CHPPM team member had to take samples to make sure the area 

was safe, which involved wiping surfaces and sending the samples out for analysis. 

Finally, before entering their work spaces, the employees received respirators.15

Sampling Analysis and Results

Navy laboratory technicians from the Uniformed Services University of the 

Health Sciences’ Department of Preventive Medicine and Biometrics provided 

on-site field analysis to the Army and the EPA1 to help analyze samples quickly. 

Also, a Navy Chemical Detection Command unit was at the Pentagon from 14 to 

25 September assisting with assessments. Beginning on 15 September, the unit 

received augmentation from Navy industrial hygiene personnel from the National 

Naval Medical Center. The Navy personnel worked in shifts, 24 hours a day for 

several days, and produced more than 120 analyzed collections of volatile material, mainly jet fuel. The team also tested for asbestos. In less than an hour, results 

from the Navy laboratories were sent to the EPA and other organizations to help 

determine when it would be safe to resume search and recovery efforts in the offices tested.3(pp10,11),18(pp10,11) 

CHPPM personnel in Aberdeen, however, performed the bulk of analysis. David Morrow and Kenneth Williams, laboratory consultants in CHPPM’s Laboratory Consultants Office of the Laboratory Sciences Directorate, coordinated delivery of samples to Aberdeen, consulted with on-site personnel about the best 

analytic methods and procedures to use, and provided analysis results back to 

on-site personnel every day. To minimize the delay between sample collection, 

sample logging, and analysis, they at first ordered one shipment a day from the 

Pentagon, and later two shipments: one at 0800 in the morning and another late at 

night. Helicopters picked up the samples from the Pentagon and transported them 

to the laboratories at Aberdeen. Laboratory personnel collected the samples from 

a central location at Aberdeen once a day. This routine highlighted the importance 

of logistics and coordination.19

The Laboratory Consultants Office also decided which analyses should be done 

in-house and which should be contracted out. Commercial laboratories were able 

to do routine analyses on a day-to-day basis, but only CHPPM and Navy laboratories could analyze masses of data from the attack and return the results within a 
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 119

32-hour period to the EPA and other organizations that would determine when it 

would be safe to resume search and recovery efforts in the impact area. The military had the personnel and the work hours necessary to do the job.19

Laboring 16 hours a day, CHPPM’s chemists analyzed samples for contaminants from 12 September to early November. They found little asbestos and lead, 

and nonthreatening levels of semivolatile organic compounds, a toxic residue 

that remains after all other materials have evaporated from boiling petroleum. 

CHPPM technicians had monitored the organic vapors for the semivolatiles and 

other chemicals because the Pentagon’s basement was filled with unburned fuel 

as well as water and other chemicals from fire suppressants. CHPPM sent samples 

to an EPA laboratory in Mississippi to test for dioxin because its own equipment 

was unable to detect it.19

Four of CHPPM’s Laboratory Sciences Directorate divisions were responsible 

for sample analysis. They were the Analytic Spectrometry Division; the Chromatographic Analysis Division; the Radiologic, Classic, and Clinical Chemistry 

Division; and the Laboratory Information and Sample Management Division. The 

Analytic Spectrometry Division analyzed air, surface wipes, and drinking water 

from the Pentagon for contamination by heavy metal and volatile organic compounds. The Chromatographic Analysis Division used nine different analytical 

procedures to sample air and drinking water for contaminants. The Radiologic, 

Classic, and Clinical Chemistry Division gave top priority to the analysis of asbestos contamination. Later, much of the process involved in asbestos identification was contracted out.5(pp3-42,3-45,3-48) The divisions conducted analysis and data 

reporting within 24 hours of the samples’ arrival. This quick turnaround allowed 

on-site environmental teams to quickly identify those areas of the Pentagon that 

posed a health hazard to workers.The Laboratory Information and Sample Management Division provided administrative and technical services to the laboratories. It received, processed, distributed, and tracked samples and maintained a 

database of analytical reports. It also developed and managed analytical contracts 

for analyses that exceeded CHPPM’s ability to undertake. In all, the Laboratory 

Sciences Directorate’s “laboratories analyzed 1,498 air, water, and surface samples for greater than 1,900 contaminants in fifteen days and reported ninety-four 

percent of the results [with]in thirty-two hours.”5(p3-39)

Only 14 of 319 wipe samples for asbestos and 31 of 497 wipe samples for 

lead showed evidence of baseline contamination. All of the 163 air samples for 

asbestos and 133 air samples for lead were within acceptable EPA health standards. Although air samples from air returns and exhaust vents with visible soot, 

especially on the fifth floor, revealed traces of asbestos and lead, those samples 

were likewise far below EPA occupational exposure limits. Other contaminants 

sampled were well within acceptable health standards. The overall results indicated no significant risk to Pentagon employees.3(p13),5(pp3-65,3-66),8

WHS contractor Applied Environmental, Inc, screened for dioxins, furans, and 

polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). PCBs become hazardous when they burn. Surface wipe samples done before and after cleaning detected traces of the substances, 
120 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

but CHPPM’s analysts concluded that they posed no risk to Pentagon employees.3(p13)

Mold, which can cause asthma, allergic reactions, and other respiratory ailments, became a problem several days after the attack because of the amount 

of water used to put out the fire. At least 15 strains of mold were isolated at 

the Pentagon. Using Department of Housing and Urban Development standards, 

cleanup staff worked to keep “indoor mold levels to no more than fifteen percent 

of outdoor levels.”3(pp13,14)

TABLE 4-1

Numbers, Types, and Results of Samples Collected 

During Pentagon Sampling After 9/11 By the US Army 

Center for Health Promotion and Preventive 

Medicine Using Direct Reading Instruments* 

Samples Samples Samples

Sample Type Collected Above Standard Below Standard

Direct reading

Carbon monoxide 318 0 318

Formaldehyde 272 0 272

Hydrogen sulfide 316 0 316

Lower explosive limit 131 0 131

Photo ionization detection 279 0 279

Oxygen 318 0 318

Respirable dust 130 0 130

Volatile organic compounds 46 0 46

Air

Aldehyde 21 0 21

Aromatic hydrocarbons 18 0 18

Asbestos 163 0 163

Metals 109 0 109

Lead 133 0 133

Industrial hygiene polynuclear 

aromatic hydrocarbons 6 0 6

Polynuclear aromatic

hydrocarbons 3 0 3

Silica 14 0 14

*Not including all of the data from the initial sampling done on the evening of the 11th. 

Adapted from: US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. Environmental 

and Occupational Health Surveillance and Assessment of the Pentagon Following the 11 September 

2001 Terrorist Attack 11–28 September 2001. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: USACHPPM; nd. 

Pentagon report 57-LH-7426-02: 6, Table 1A. 
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 121

Additional Environmental Concerns

While industrial hygienists performed floor-by-floor analyses of the Pentagon, 

radiation detection experts from CHPPM’s preventive medicine SMART team 

conducted an extensive radiological survey of the impact area, the courtyard, and 

the building’s interior adjacent to the crash site. Captain Ricardo Reyes, a nuclear 

medical science officer, arrived at the Pentagon on the morning of the 12th to 

survey for possible radiological contaminants from the airplane or depleted uranium from the aircraft’s counterweights. Upon arrival, he received a briefing by 

CHPPM’s preventive medicine team. After obtaining a clearance from the FBI to 

enter the site, he and a soldier assistant used direct reading instruments to assess 

radiation levels. With two meters going at all times, they began taking samples on 

the Pentagon’s west side at the edge of the crash site, where wooden supports had 

been placed to keep the building from collapsing. They surveyed evidence such 

as airplane parts being carried out of the building in bags by FBI personnel. When 

the FBI stopped bringing out parts, Captain Reyes and the soldier moved into the 

building and surveyed corridors 3, 2, 1, 10, 9, 8, and 7, in that order, on all floors, 

and rings A to E. They also surveyed the courtyard. Sampling all these areas took 

24 hours. As Captain Reyes went up and down floors, he observed lots of water 

damage, soldiers on guard duty wearing masks, ropes across corridors 2 and 7 to 

prevent people from going into the crash area, heavy smoke damage on the top 

floors, skin and hair embedded into metal, and children’s sandals. He would never 

forget the smell of death. The smell got into his clothes and hair, which he washed 

twice when he got home. The results of his surveys showed no radioactive material beyond normal readings and no depleted uranium.2,5(p3-33),20

Drinking water was another environmental concern. Members of CHPPM’s 

water supply management program tested the Pentagon’s drinking water supplies 

for contamination from airplane fuel or from back-flow as a result of lowered 

water pressure levels due to heavy water use by the fire department. Results met 

EPA drinking water standards.3(p17),5(p3-23),16(p31),19

CHPPM also inspected for chemical and biological warfare agents. None were detected by a hand-held monitor on 16–17 September. On 21 September, the Biological Defense Research Directorate Operations of the Naval Medical Research Center 

collected 25 samples from the Pentagon and its parking lots. All of the screenings 

for plague, anthrax, smallpox, botulism, and tularemia proved negative.3(p17)

Environmental Efforts of Other Agencies

The EPA took the lead among the other federal and state occupational health 

and safety agencies that performed sampling activities. Emergency responders 

from the agency’s region 111(3) worked with the FBI, DoD, and local environmental authorities from 11 through 29 September taking air, water, and debris 

samples from the work zone of recovery workers, around the perimeter of the 

Pentagon, and in and around Washington DC to ensure the safety of rescue and 

recovery personnel, Pentagon employees, and nearby residents. With the exception of the recovery zone, EPA left sampling the inside of the Pentagon to CHPPM 
122 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

personnel. The EPA documented and examined its results.1(pA-68),3(pp15,16),21 

EPA staff sampled these areas for asbestos, volatile organic chemicals, and 

other chemicals. They took a total of 244 air samples, 146 asbestos samples (133 

air, 8 bulk [ash/debris], and 5 wipe samples), 78 silica samples, 22 lead samples, 

and 7 volatile organic chemical samples. Although one bulk sample contained 

over 1% of asbestos, all other samples contained none or were below regulatory 

limits. Samples for silica, lead, and volatile organic chemicals also presented no 

problems.21(pp1-2)

After canvassing off-site air quality for smoke, particulate matter, volatile organic chemicals, and other chemicals, the EPA reported that “all data collected 

from these stations were at levels typical of urban air pollution, and no influence 

from the fire was detected.” The results of sampling runoff water from fire hoses 

and from the debris-collecting area in the north parking lot indicated that the levels of contamination were “below levels of concern for short term exposure for 

human health.” Debris and ash specimens from inside the building revealed high 

concentrations of metals. The EPA asserted, however, that “short term exposure 

and limited routes of contact have minimized any potential for harm.” Most of 

this debris became landfill and did not contaminate the environment. In addition, workers on the debris piles wore respirators and protective clothing.21(p2) For 

its part, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality reported that “hourly 

average air pollution monitoring data from all air monitoring stations [in] the 

Washington area showed only typical low levels of pollution during September 

11 and 12.”3(p16)

To protect the health of FBI evidence response team members as they gathered 

materials inside the Pentagon, a member of the FBI’s hazardous materials response 

unit accompanied them into the building. This specialist used a photoionization 

detector to search for volatile organic compounds and a four-gas detector to measure concentrations of oxygen, hydrogen sulfide, and carbon monoxide. Because 

he sampled only the area where evidence collectors were working, sampling “was 

not indicative of the overall environmental conditions at the site or inside the Pentagon.” For example, because the FBI searched for the plane’s black box recorder 

in an area where fires were still burning, carbon monoxide levels were high. To 

reduce levels of carbon monoxide and allow recovery efforts to continue in areas 

that were still burning, the FBI team used air blowers provided by the fire department. The hazardous materials team did not keep a thorough record of its data or 

analyze its results.3(p16)

As a major urban fire department, Arlington County carried instruments for measuring oxygen, lower explosive limits, and volatile organic compounds to safeguard 

its own personnel. Like the FBI’s monitoring activities, Arlington’s efforts were 

not intended to document ambient air levels but to protect rescue workers.3(p16)

Coordination/Command and Control/Communications

Because of the number of military, federal, and state environmental health and 

safety agencies engaged in sampling and air monitoring, coordination of these 
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 123

efforts was a challenge. The Army’s sampling and remediation plans for inside 

the Pentagon, the EPA’s plan for the support zone and areas outside the Pentagon, 

and efforts to safeguard the health of FBI and Arlington Country rescue workers 

helped to delineate spheres of activity. CHPPM’s emergency operations center at 

the DiLorenzo Clinic and the Joint Operations Center at Fort Myer served as focal 

points for coordinating hazardous materials activities with other organizations. In 

addition, the WHS daily briefings on the environmental situation helped with the 

exchange of information and data results.4

Nevertheless, coordination of the military effort became difficult because of 

uncertainty about the lead agent and lines of authority. Although nominally the 

WHS, the agency responsible for the operation of the Pentagon, was the lead, 

WHS gave CHPPM the lead inside the building because of its technical expertise. Also, CHPPM’s team fell under the DiLorenzo Clinic’s deputy commander as the senior Army medical officer on site. Dr Lisa Block, a WRAMC 

occupational health expert, was responsible for overseeing occupational health 

at DiLorenzo. Yet WHS had operational control over all of the Pentagon, including the DiLorenzo Clinic. In addition, because of the Pentagon’s location and 

the sensitivity of the response, CHPPM’s team received direct missions from 

the Army surgeon general, the North Atlantic Regional Medical Command, the 

Army Operations Center, and the deputy assistant secretary of the Army for 

environment, safety, and occupational health. This situation sometimes led to 

confusion about who was in charge and resulted in delays in communicating 

information.4,22

CHPPM had to work through the bureaucracy to get messages out. Delaney, 

the agency’s chief of health information operations, kept Pentagon employees 

informed about CHPPM’s activities by forwarding updates and messages to the 

DiLorenzo Clinic for distribution throughout the building. Meanwhile, CHPPM’s 

emergency operations center in DiLorenzo’s Industrial Health Section developed 

health risk assessment guidelines for Pentagon employees on protective measures 

to follow when they returned to work.2,7,22 The DiLorenzo Clinic helped CHPPM to 

distribute health guidelines to Pentagon employees. On 16 September, DiLorenzo 

issued CHPPM’s recommendations regarding air quality in the building:

Odors from the fire are to be expected, and pose no health hazards. Symptoms, such as mild 

irritation of the eyes, nose, and throat, are very common in this type of environment. However, 

if you do experience more significant or worrisome symptoms, you should leave the area 

immediately and seek medical care. Some persons, such as those with asthma or other lung 

disease, and pregnant women, may be more sensitive and should seek additional advice from 

the health clinic. If you have any concerns about working in the Pentagon and how it relates to 

your health, please contact the DiLorenzo Tricare and Civilian Occupational Health Clinic.2

CHPPM was also concerned about the medical and technical accuracy of 

information in building circulars whose distribution was a WHS responsibility. 

Through a combination of diplomacy and persistence, Delaney succeeded most of 

the time in giving medical personnel the last word on any message with medical 

implications.7
124 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

Decontamination Efforts

CHPPM also provided field support to the decontamination efforts of the national medical response team task force, a unit under the US Department of Health 

and Human Services that is activated when a national disaster is declared. The 

response team set up three decontamination corridors and three medical tents at 

the Pentagon. CHPPM oversaw the contractor doing facility decontamination and 

provided technical expertise on assessment of potential hazards from chemical 

exposure related to the 9/11 attack. Recovery workers, including soldiers who 

aided the FBI in retrieving debris and body parts, underwent decontamination at 

the Pentagon. Some of the fire and rescue teams underwent decontamination and 

medical assessments at their own fire stations.1(ppA-61,A-68),5(p3-19) 

Site Safety and Security Issues

Safety and security efforts at the Pentagon affected the environmental program. 

From day one, environmental safety officers were concerned about the numbers 

and movement of people at the Pentagon site. Thousands of workers evacuated 

the building on 9/11, but hundreds of others remained to help in the rescue effort. 

Numerous fire, rescue, and medical personnel also entered the Pentagon grounds. 

To keep unauthorized persons out of the area, Arlington County Fire Chief Edward Plaugher, who had appointed Assistant Chief Schwartz as the incident commander for the 10 days of the Pentagon fire and rescue operation, had ordered a 

2,000-foot chain-link fence constructed around the outer perimeter early on 11 

September. This barrier did not go up, however, until the following day. By midafternoon of 9/11 the number of professionals and volunteers on site had grown to 

more than 3,000. There were numerous incidents of people, including firefighters, 

moving throughout the area without proper personal protective equipment and 

safety gear. Having no authority over the activities of the countless responders, 

industrial hygienists and occupational health workers worried about hazardous 

materials and contaminating substances in the air and on surfaces.1(pp6,A-65–A-69)

There were other security problems as well. On 9/11 and the days that followed, 

official visitors sometimes presented a risk. Although some visitors, such as Major General James T Jackson, Military District of Washington commander, tried 

to set an example by complying with rules for minimum protective clothing and 

equipment, others were unprepared and created problems. Also, people seeking to 

rescue personal items and confidential papers from their Pentagon offices were in 

danger of becoming contaminated. Some requests for retrieval of material were 

based on issues of national security. Each was reviewed by the Joint Operations 

Center in conjunction with incident commander Schwartz’s representative, who 

determined the structural soundness and safety of the area. If the request was approved, retrieval took place during the next work day.1(ppA-67,A-68)

On 13 September, the Arlington County Fire Department began holding daily 

meetings at the Pentagon on such safety issues as decontamination procedures, 

the minimum acceptable protective clothing and equipment, and the use of res-
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 125

pirators. The meetings emphasized the need for individuals to take personal responsibility and the necessity to prohibit dangerous activities such as refueling 

vehicles and generators while motors were running. Representatives from about 

20 organizations, including the DoD, attended those meetings.1(pA-67)

Some environmental and health agencies pressed for all responders, regardless of assignment, to follow strict standards, including wearing Tyvek (DuPont, 

Wilmington, DE) suits, which provide the best protection under the most severe 

conditions. Not all organizations involved in air monitoring, however, wanted 

to follow these precautions. The incident commander, for example, tried to keep 

his people safe without everyone having to wear Tyvek suits, which could produce heat stress. He ordered responders to observe thorough personal decontamination measures, and search and recovery teams to clean their equipment every 

night.1(pA-68)

Summary

The Army’s success in responding to environmental issues following the attack 

on the Pentagon resulted from hard work and training—typical attributes of the 

military, and a work ethic encouraged in its civilian employees. Training such as 

CHPPM’s risk communication courses and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s classes on humanitarian assistance, exercises, and previous missions 

enabled military–civilian volunteer teams to practice the organizational structure 

of a response. CHPPM and WHS staff labored around the clock to ensure that the 

Pentagon was safe for employees. Industrial hygienists formed teams to sample air 

quality, test hazardous materials, and conduct decontamination operations in areas 

that posed threats to health. CHPPM chemists at Aberdeen performed thousands 

of tests on samples of material from the building and its environs, and returned 

their analyses quickly during the first few days when concern was at the greatest. 

CHPPM headquarters issued guidelines on minimum exposure to contaminants 

and safety in the workplace. 

The operation became triservice, with Navy and Air Force environmental experts 

working with CHPPM personnel in conducting an all-inclusive environmental 

analysis of the Pentagon site. The North Atlantic Regional Medical Command 

also sent a WRAMC team of nuclear, biological, and chemical health specialists 

to the building on 9/11. The WRAMC team coordinated activities with CHPPM’s 

radiation team in surveying the impact area and the building’s interior for possible radiological contaminants. The DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic provided 

occupational and preventive medicine professionals. Its industrial health specialists helped identify health hazards and recommended actions to protect building 

staff. Other participants who monitored air quality, and in some cases conducted 

decontamination operations, were the EPA, the FBI, the Department of Health 

and Human Services’ national medical response team, and federal and state occupational health and safety teams. Environmental activities were synchronized 

with WHS, the manager of the Pentagon building, which had its own industrial 

hygiene staff of mostly contractors.1(pA-68),5(pp1-2,3-7,3-19),17,23(ppii,3) Under CHPPM’s 
126 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

leadership, DoD industrial hygienists supported a multidisciplinary force that 

evaluated health risks associated with the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. Their 

efforts in ensuring that the building was a safe place in which to work were highly 

successful. 
Environmental Health and Safety Issues 127

References

Unless otherwise stated, transcripts of interviews and copies of documents used in this 

chapter can be found at the Office of the Surgeon General Medical History Office, Fort 

Sam Houston, Texas.

1. Titan Systems Corporation. Arlington County After-Action Report on the Response to 

the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon. Arlington, VA: Titan Systems Corporation; 2002.

2. US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. USACHPPM Web 

site. Available at: chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/main/PR33-01PENTAGON.html. Accessed 13 and 16 September 2001.

3. Embrey EP. Environmental Health Response to the September 11, 2001, Attack on the 

Pentagon. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 15 January 2004: 8–16.

4. Mallon T (Colonel, formerly, Director of Clinical Preventive Medicine, US Army 

Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine). Telephone interview by CondonRall ME; 23 January 2006.

5. US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. Annual Historical 

Report Army Medical Department Activities. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: USACHPPM; 2001. RCS–Med 41 (R4), 

6. Wells JD, Egerton WE, Cummings LA, et al. The US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine response to the Pentagon attack: a multipronged preventionbased approach. Mil Med. 2002;167:64–67.

7. Delaney K (Chief of Health Information Operations, Aberdeen Proving Ground). Interview by Glisson B; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 22 April 2002. 

8. Mallon T (Lieutenant Colonel, Director of Clinical Preventive Medicine, US Army 

Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine) and Smith P (Colonel, Occupational Medicine Staff Officer, Office of The Surgeon General). Interview by Glisson B; 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 24 April 2002.

9. Intrepido A (Major, Program Manager, Industrial Hygiene Field Services, US Army 

Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine). Interview by Glisson B; Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, MD; 24 April 2002.

10. Dunn M (Colonel, Commander, Walter Reed Health Care System). Interview by Cox 

DR; Washington, DC; 21 February 2002. 

11. McGill D (Captain, Deputy Director of Military Operations and Training, Walter 

Reed Army Medical Center). Interview by Cox DR; Washington, DC; 5 March 2002.

12. Timboe H (Major General, Commander, North Atlantic Regional Medical Command). Interview by Cox DR; Washington, DC; 5 March 2002.
128 Attack on the Pentagon: The Medical Response to 9/11

13. US Terrorist Attack Update to TSG. Daily briefing to the US Army Surgeon General 

on the medical response to 9/11. 121700 Sep01 D+1. 

14. Balinas J (Occupational Medicine Physician Assistant, DiLorenzo Clinic). Interview 

by Cox DR; Arlington, VA; 12 October 2001.

15. Cook L (Industrial Hygienist, Industrial Hygiene Field Services, US Army Center 

for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine). Interview by Glisson B; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 24 April 2002.

16. US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. Environmental 

and Occupational Health Surveillance and Assessment of the Pentagon Following the 11 

September 2001 Terrorist Attack 11–28 September 2001. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: 

USACHPPM; nd. Pentagon report 57-LH-7426-02. 

17. Intrepido A (Major, Program Manager, Industrial Hygiene Field Services, US Army 

Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine). Interview by Condon-Rall ME; 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 27 February 2004.

18. September 11, USU answers the call. USU Medicine. 2002(winter):8–16.

19. Morrow D (Chief Laboratory Consultant, US Army Center for Health Promotion and 

Preventive Medicine); Williams K (Laboratory Consultant, USACHPPM). Interview by 

Glisson B; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 24 April 2002.

20. Reyes R (Captain, Nuclear Medical Science Officer, US Army Center for Health 

Promotion and Preventive Medicine). Interview by Glisson B; Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

MD; 24 April 2002.

21. US Environmental Protection Agency. US Environmental Protection Agency Region 

III October 9, 2001: Summary of Environmental Monitoring Operations at the Pentagon. 

Available at: http: www.epa.gov/wtc/pentagon-air-sampling.htm. Accessed May 6, 2003.

22. E-mail, John J Resta, USACHPPM, to Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, 19 January 06.

23. North Atlantic Regional Medical Command historical summary: ii, 3. Unpublished 

document.