Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

In re Aaliyah L.H., 2013 IL App (2d) 120414

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re AALIYAH L.H., a Minor (Lacisha H., Petitioner-Appellee, v. 

Shangwé P., Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-12-0414

Filed November 25, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

On appeal from an order relating to respondent’s child support and 

daycare expenses for his daughter, the portion of the order requiring 

him to pay half of the daycare expenses in addition to child support 

was upheld, especially in view of that fact that his monthly net income 

was $3,219 and respondent’s net income was $720, but the trial court 

did err in failing to deduct respondent’s health insurance premiums for 

his group plan covering him, his child born to petitioner, and a child 

born to another woman, since the cost of the plan was the same even 

though it covered both children, and the statute does not limit the 

deduction allowed to situations where the cost is increased for 

additional children.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 10-F-349; the 

Hon. Linda E. Davenport, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and reversed in part; child support modified.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Keoini Haynes Wells, of Law Offices of Keoini Haynes Wells, of 

Evanston, for appellant.

Daniel J. Walker, Jr., of Cesario & Walker, of Hinsdale, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Zenoff and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Respondent, Shangwé P., appeals from the trial court’s order related to child support and 

daycare expenses for his daughter with petitioner, Lacisha H. On appeal, Shangwé argues that 

the trial court erred by: (1) failing to deduct health insurance premiums in calculating his net 

income; and (2) ordering him to pay half of the total daycare expenses. We affirm in part and 

reverse in part, and we modify the amount of child support from $739 per month to $642 per 

month. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The following facts are taken from the record and are not in dispute. Shangwé and Lacisha 

are the father and mother of a daughter, Aaliyah, born January 20, 2010. Pursuant to an agreed 

order entered on November 7, 2011, the parties share joint custody of their daughter, with 

Lacisha being the primary residential parent. A temporary order of support was entered at that 

time, with the issue of permanent support reserved. The trial court also ordered Shangwé to add 

Aaliyah to his health insurance obtained through his employer. Shangwé complied. The issue 

of daycare expenses was reserved. On March 12, 2012, a bench trial was held on the remaining 

issues.

¶ 4 Shangwé has another daughter, Amira, age 12, by a woman other than Lacisha. Shangwé 

was ordered to pay child support for Amira by the circuit court of Cook County. When 

calculating child support, the Cook County court deducted from his gross income all health 

insurance premiums. Under Shangwé’s family plan, the premiums were the same whether 

there was one child or two children on the plan. Thus, the premiums did not increase when 

Shangwé added Aaliyah to his plan. The premiums for Shangwé, Amira, and Aaliyah were 

$485 per month.
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¶ 5 Shangwé’s annual gross income was $74,000. Regarding the parties’ expenses for daycare 

for their daughter during their respective parenting times, Lacisha spent approximately $133 

per week and Shangwé spent approximately $30 per week.

¶ 6 At the time of trial, Lacisha worked part-time, earning approximately $200 per week; $180 

net. In addition, Lacisha was an intern and a full-time student who planned on graduating in the 

summer.

¶ 7 During argument, counsel for Lacisha argued that Shangwé should not “receive credit for 

the medical insurance premiums since he’s already gotten that deduction the first time through 

with his other child. *** [I]t adds nothing to his expenses to add to Aaliyah as an insured under 

that policy.” Counsel for Shangwé argued that nothing in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution 

of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2012)) supported the argument set forth 

by counsel for Lacisha regarding the deduction for health insurance premiums.

¶ 8 On March 12, 2012, after hearing testimony and argument, the trial court ordered that

“Shangwé may not deduct the health [i]nsurance premiums paid as he obtained a deduction for 

same of $485/mo. in [the Cook County case].” The trial court stated, “[t]he problem is 

[Shangwé] already testified [that health insurance premiums were] taken out when they set 

child support [for Amira]. So, I have to assume that was correct. *** So, I can’t do it twice.” 

The trial court found that Shangwé’s net monthly income was $3,695 and ordered that “Child 

Support is 20% or $739 per mo.” The trial court also ordered each “party to pay one-half of all 

day care expenses.” Shangwé filed his notice of appeal on April 11, 2012.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, Shangwé argues that the trial court erred by failing to deduct health insurance 

premiums in calculating his net income pursuant to section 505(a)(3)(f) of the Act. 750 ILCS 

5/505(a)(3)(f) (West 2012). Lacisha argues that the trial court properly refused to deduct health 

insurance premiums, because Shangwé incurred no cost by adding the parties’ daughter to the 

plan.

¶ 11 Section 505(a)(1) of the Act provides that the minimum amount of child support for two 

children is 20% of the supporting party’s net income. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West 2012).

Section 505(a)(3) of the Act defines “net income” as income from all sources, minus certain 

deductions, including, inter alia, dependent health insurance premiums (750 ILCS 

5/505(a)(3)(f) (West 2012)). The amount of child support is within the discretion of the trial 

court, and the award will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In re 

Marriage of Carlson-Urbanczyk, 2013 IL App (3d) 120731, ¶ 14. However, we review 

de novo a question of law concerning the interpretation of a statute. In re Marriage of Petersen, 

2011 IL 110984, ¶ 9.

¶ 12 The primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. 

¶ 15. The best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and 

ordinary meaning. Id. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, courts must apply the 

statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Id.

¶ 13 Section 505(a)(3)(f) of the Act provides:
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“ ‘Net income’ is defined as the total of all income from all sources, minus the 

following deductions:

* * *

(f) Dependent and individual health/hospitalization insurance premiums and 

premiums for life insurance ordered by the court to reasonably secure payment of 

ordered child support[.]” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(f) (West 2012).

¶ 14 Section 505(a)(3)(f) is clear on its face. It allows for the deduction of health insurance 

premiums for dependents, without limitation. See In re Marriage of Stone, 191 Ill. App. 3d 

172, 175 (1989). It does not indicate that the deduction can be taken only if the premium 

increases for adding the child at issue to the plan.

¶ 15 Our interpretation is consistent with Stone, where the supporting parent paid health 

insurance premiums benefitting his current wife, his other children, and the subject child. Id. at 

174-75. The trial court gave the supporting parent a deduction for only half the amount he paid 

for premiums, reasoning that only half the amount paid benefitted the child at issue. Id. at 175.

The appellate court held that the supporting parent was entitled to deduct “all 

‘health/hospitalization insurance premiums.’ ” Id. The court reasoned, “Section 505(a)(3)(f) is 

clear on its face and does not indicate that only the child’s share of the insurance premiums 

should be deducted.” Id.

¶ 16 Similarly, in this case, Shangwé is entitled to deduct the health insurance premiums he 

pays even though there is no additional cost for adding Aaliyah to his plan, which covers 

himself and his dependents. Accordingly, the trial court erred by failing to deduct Shangwé’s 

$485 monthly health insurance premiums to determine his monthly net income. Thus, the trial 

court’s finding that Shangwé’s monthly net income was $3,695 was erroneous.

¶ 17 Lacisha cites In re Marriage of Florence, 260 Ill. App. 3d 116 (1994), for the proposition 

that dependent health insurance premiums are not to be deducted from gross income unless the 

supporting parent is “paying the cost to cover his child.” In Florence, the supporting spouse 

presented no evidence at trial to support his claim that he paid dependent and individual health

insurance. Id. at 123. In this case, Shangwé presented his pay stubs and W-2s showing the 

amount paid for health insurance. Thus, Florence is distinguishable from this case.

¶ 18 In addition, Lacisha cites section 505(a)(4) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(4) (West 2012)) 

for the proposition that the legislature intended that the supporting parent is allowed the 

deduction for health insurance premiums only if there is a cost associated with covering the 

child at issue. Section 505(a)(4) provides:

“In cases where the court order provides for health/hospitalization insurance coverage 

pursuant to Section 505.2 of this Act, the premiums for that insurance, or that portion of 

the premiums for which the supporting party is responsible in the case of insurance 

provided through an employer’s health insurance plan where the employer pays a 

portion of the premiums, shall be subtracted from net income in determining the 

minimum amount of support to be ordered.” Id.
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Nothing in this section limits the deduction that section 505(a)(3)(f) allows for health 

insurance premiums for all dependents. See Stone, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 175. Thus, Lacisha’s 

argument regarding section 505(a)(4) has no merit.

¶ 19 Next, Shangwé argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay half of the total 

daycare expenses, in addition to child support. Shangwé argues that the child support 

adequately meets Aaliyah’s needs and that he lacks the ability to pay the additional amount.

Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court’s decision to order a supporting 

parent to make a contribution toward daycare in addition to paying child support in the amount 

set forth by the statutory guidelines. In re Marriage of Serna, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1054 

(1988). 

¶ 20 Shangwé notes that his basic living expenses are $2,324 per month and that, due to the trial 

court’s order, he has a personal budget deficit each month of $739. However, at the time of 

trial, Shangwé’s monthly net income was $3,210 and Lacisha’s was approximately $720.

Further, Shangwé paid $376 per month for service on his debt, and $390 per month in 

deductions taken from his check were voluntary. Each party lived with family members and 

did not pay rent. Lacisha paid approximately $532 per month for daycare and Shangwé paid 

approximately $120 per month. In light of this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused 

its discretion by ordering Shangwé to pay half of the total daycare expenses.1

¶ 21 Shangwé argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to consider the 

statutory factors that a trial court may consider when deviating from the statutory guidelines.

See 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) (West 2012). However, Shangwé raises this issue for the first time 

on appeal. Nothing in the record indicates that Shangwé argued that having to pay half the total 

cost of daycare would be a deviation from the statutory guidelines or that the trial court should 

consider the factors set forth in section 505(a)(2). Thus, Shangwé has forfeited this issue on 

appeal by failing to raise it before the trial court. Einstein v. Nijim, 358 Ill. App. 3d 263, 275 

(2005) (an issue regarding daycare expenses was forfeited on appeal because the appellant 

failed to raise the issue before the trial court).

¶ 22 Shangwé cites Serna, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1051, for the proposition that “the circuit court has 

discretion to require an obligor to make a contribution to daycare in addition to regular child 

support after considering all relevant factors [pursuant to section 505(a)(2)].” Even if Shangwé 

had not forfeited his argument regarding section 505(a)(2), Serna does not stand for this 

proposition. In Serna, the supporting parent argued on appeal that “the day-care costs should 

be considered as part of the figure computed according to the guidelines.” Id. at 1054. The 

nonsupporting parent argued that “the division of day-care expenses was a decision within the 

discretion of the trial court.” Id. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in dividing the daycare costs between the parties without applying the factors set 

 1

We also note that Shangwé’s total monthly expenses will now be lower because we modify 

Shangwé’s child support obligation from $739 per month to $642 per month. Infra ¶ 25.
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forth in section 505(a)(2) to the facts of the case. Id.

2 Thus, even if Shangwé had not forfeited 

the issue, Serna would not have aided him with his argument that the trial court was required to 

apply the factors set forth in section 505(a)(2).

¶ 23 In addition, Shangwé cites Fedun v. Kuczek, 155 Ill. App. 3d 798 (1987), for the 

proposition that his overall financial resources and needs must be considered together with the 

fact that Aaliyah’s needs are adequately met by his regular child support obligation. In Fedun, 

the trial court modified child support after finding a substantial change in circumstances based 

on an increase in the supporting parent’s income and the fact that the child had grown older and 

the cost of living had risen. Id. at 802. The appellate court then modified the award from $325 

per month to $300. Id. at 802-03. The court reasoned that $325 per month was excessive 

considering: all of the additional expenses the supporting parent was ordered to pay compared 

to his net income; the fact that the custodial parent failed to provide sufficient evidence 

regarding the child’s needs; and that the child and the custodial parent maintained a higher 

standard of living than during the parties’ marriage. Id. at 802-04. In this case, Shangwé does

not challenge the trial court’s award of child support set forth by the statutory guidelines; 

instead, he challenges the trial court’s order that he contribute to an additional expense.

Further, unlike in Fedun, Shangwé does not allege that Lacisha failed to provide sufficient 

evidence regarding the actual cost of daycare; the cost is not at issue in this case. The order 

regarding daycare expenses is prospective only. In addition, Shangwé makes no argument 

regarding Aaliyah’s and Lacisha’s standard of living. Thus, Fedun is distinguishable from this 

case.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s order requiring Shangwé to 

pay half of all daycare expenses. We reverse the portion of the trial court’s order failing to 

deduct health insurance premiums in calculating Shangwé’s net income. Had the trial court 

properly deducted Shangwé’s $485 monthly health insurance premiums to determine his 

monthly net income, it would have determined that the amount was $3,210. Thus, after 

calculating 20% of Shangwé’s proper net income we modify the amount of Shangwé’s child 

support obligation from $739 per month to $642 per month, pursuant to our authority under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).

¶ 26 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; child support modified.

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We note that, during the pendency of this case, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 97-941 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (adding 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2.5)), which specifically addresses childcare in addition 

to other expenses the court may order a parent to contribute to. Section 505(a)(2.5) provides, in part:

“The court, in its discretion, in addition to setting child support pursuant to the guidelines 

and factors, may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage 

to contribute to the following expenses, if determined by the court to be reasonable:

***

(b) child care[.]” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2.5)(b) (West 2012).