United States Senate 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Rob Portman, Chairman

Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member

Review of U.S. State Department 

Grants to OneVoice

STAFF REPORT 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INVESTIGATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 
Review of U.S. State Department Grants to OneVoice

Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. 1

BACKGROUND............................................................................................................. 2

A. State Department Foreign Assistance Grant Programs ................................... 2

B. Subcommittee Investigation............................................................................... 3

C. State Department Grants in Israel and Palestinian Territories ...................... 5

DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................ 5

I. OneVoice Israel Fully Complied with the Terms of the State Department 

Grants.................................................................................................................. 6

A. The Grantee......................................................................................................... 6

B. OneVoice Grant Proposal and Approval ............................................................ 7

C. OneVoice Activity Conducted During the State Department Grant Period..... 9

D. The Role of 270 Strategies ................................................................................ 10

II. During the Grant Period, OneVoice Crafted a Political Strategy to Defeat the 

Netanyahu-Led Coalition ................................................................................. 12

III. The State Department Failed to Adequately Guard Against the Risk of 

OneVoice Using Government-Funded Resources for Political Purposes........ 14

A. State Department Vetting During the OneVoice Grant Application Process 14

B. State Department Oversight During the Grant Period .................................. 16

C. Lack of State Department Response to OneVoice Political Plans Developed 

During the Grant Period................................................................................... 17

IV. OneVoice Engaged in Political Activity After the Grant Period Using 

Resources Funded in Part by the State Department Grant ........................... 19

A. OneVoice Partnership with V15....................................................................... 19

B. OneVoice Continued to Use Resources Built Using State Department Funds

........................................................................................................................... 22

C. PeaceWorks Returned Contributions and Created a New Non-Profit Based on 

Concerns About 501(c)(3) Funding for Political Activity................................. 24

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 26
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On December 2, 2014, at the urging of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 

the Israeli Knesset voted to schedule new national parliamentary elections for 

March 2015. Within weeks, an international organization known as the OneVoice 

Movement absorbed and funded an Israeli group named Victory15 or “V15” and 

launched a multimillion-dollar grassroots campaign in Israel. The campaign’s goal 

was to elect “anybody but Bibi [Netanyahu]” by mobilizing center-left voters.1 The

Israeli and Palestinian arms of OneVoice, OneVoice Israel (OVI), and OneVoice 

Palestine (OVP), received more than $300,000 in grants from the U.S. State 

Department to support peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine over a 14-

month grant period ending in November 2014.2 In February 2015, the 

Subcommittee initiated an inquiry concerning the connection, if any, between 

OneVoice’s State Department grant funds and V15’s political activity. This report 

outlines the findings from that investigation.

The Subcommittee concludes: 

• OneVoice Israel fully complied with the terms of its State Department grants. 

OneVoice designed and executed a grassroots and media campaign to 

promote public support for Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations for the 

Department, as it said it would. Under the grant, OneVoice expanded its 

social media presence, built a larger voter database, and hired an American 

political consulting firm to train its activists and executives in grassroots 

organizing methods in support of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 

• The Subcommittee found no evidence that OneVoice spent grant funds to 

influence the 2015 Israeli elections. Soon after the grant period ended, 

however, OneVoice used the campaign infrastructure and resources built, in 

part, with State Department grants funds to support V15. In service of V15, 

OneVoice deployed its social media platform, which more than doubled 

during the State Department grant period; used its database of voter contact 

information, including email addresses, which OVI expanded during the 

 

1 Interview with Michele Dastin van-Rijn, U.S. Dep’t of State, Cultural Affairs Officer of the U.S. 

Embassy in Tel Aviv (Sept. 17, 2015) (hereinafter “Dastin van-Rijn Interview”); Hilo Glazer, AntiBibi Group V15 Learns that What Works in Chicago Doesn't Work in Israel, HAARETZ (Mar. 21, 

2015), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.648045. 2 See App. 000006 (Letter from PeaceWorks Foundation to the Subcommittee (Mar. 11, 2015)). For 

clarity, this report uses the term “OneVoice” to describe the OneVoice Movement as a whole—

including its parent organization, the PeaceWorks Foundation, a U.S. 501(c)(3) not-for-profit based 

in New York. We use the terms OVI and OVP to describe actions specific to OneVoice’s Israeli and 

Palestinian affiliates. 
2 

grant period; and enlisted its network of trained activists, many of whom 

were recruited or trained under the grant, to support and recruit for V15. 

This pivot to electoral politics was consistent with a strategic plan developed 

by OneVoice leadership and emailed to State Department officials during the 

grant period. The State Department diplomat who received the plan told the 

Subcommittee that he never reviewed it. 

• OneVoice’s use of government-funded resources for political purposes was not 

prohibited by the grant agreement because the State Department placed no 

limitations on the post-grant use of those resources. Despite OneVoice’s 

previous political activism in the 2013 Israeli election, the Department failed 

to take any steps to guard against the risk that OneVoice could engage in 

political activities using State-funded grassroots campaign infrastructure

after the grant period.

BACKGROUND

A. State Department Foreign Assistance Grant Programs

The State Department supplies foreign assistance through, among other 

means, direct awards to nongovernmental organizations abroad. Such grants have 

become “increasingly critical” to the State Department’s mission in recent years.3 

In 2014, the State Department obligated more than $1.8 billion for approximately 

17,000 grants and cooperative agreements worldwide.4 The bulk of the money—

nearly $1.6 billion—was awarded to U.S.-based entities, but the vast majority of 

grants programs (some 13,000 of them) are implemented overseas.5 The average 

overseas award for State Department grantees is roughly $15,000.6

Federal law and State Department guidance prescribe the requirements and 

best practices that oversight personnel must follow to safeguard taxpayer dollars

and to help prevent waste, fraud, and abuse related to federal contracts and 

grants.7 During the timeframe of the OneVoice awards at issue in this report, the 

State Department grant oversight process was governed by an unconsolidated set of 

 

3 Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Department of State: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 

on Foreign Relations, Subcomm. on State Dept. and USAID Management, Int’l Operations, and 

Bilateral Int’l Development, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of Steve A. Linick, Inspector General for 

the U.S. Dep’t of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors).

4 See Email U.S. Dep’t of State, Congressional Advisor, Bureau of Legislative Affairs (figures for 

fiscal year) (July 1, 2015) (on file with Subcommittee).

5 Id. 6 Id. 7 U.S. Dep’t of State, AUD-CG-14-31, Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Administration and 

Oversight of Contracts and Grants within the Bureau of African Affairs (2014).
3 

guidance documents called the Grants Policy Directives. The Grants Policy 

Directives addressed monitoring and mitigation of high-risk grants, grant close-out 

procedures, and pre-award procedures. On March 15, 2015, following the criticism 

detailed below, however, the State Department consolidated the Grants Policy 

Directives into a single, more accessible document for its grant officers.8

Over the past five years, the State Department has been the subject of 

numerous internal reviews and at least one external audit of the effectiveness of its 

grant oversight. In response to a request from Senator McCaskill, for example, the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a detailed audit of State’s 

internal controls of its grant management in July 2014. Based on a study of more 

than 61 grants from around the globe, GAO concluded that “State has not 

consistently implemented the risk analysis and documentation of internal controls 

required by grants management policies and guidance, a fact that weakens 

assurance that grant funds are used as intended.”9 Specifically, in more than 80% 

of the grants reviewed, GAO found that State officials either failed to look for risks 

at all or skipped “key elements of the risk identification process, such as a review of 

the recipient’s financial systems and internal controls.”10 GAO further reported 

that State failed to assess or mitigate the risks of more than half of those grants for 

which it identified at least partial risk.11 GAO concluded that “grants officials have 

not adhered consistently to State’s policies about identifying, assessing, and 

mitigating risks associated with the grants we reviewed.”12 The State Department 

concurred with three specific recommendations concerning risk assessment, 

maintenance of required documentation, and status updates regarding grant 

controls.13 

B. Subcommittee Investigation

In February 2015, the Subcommittee initiated an inquiry concerning the 

connection, if any, between OneVoice’s State Department grant funds and V15’s

political activity. The Subcommittee sought to determine whether OneVoice 

entities—and by extension their 501(c)(3) parent organization, PeaceWorks 

Network Foundation (PeaceWorks)—participated in political activity in Israel, 

including through V15, using State Department grant funds. 

 

8 Interview with the U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (hereinafter “GAO Interview”) (June 4, 2015), 

see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Procurement Executive, Federal Assistance Policy Directive 

(Mar. 15, 2015).

9 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-14-635, State Department: Implementation of Grants 

Policies Needs Better Oversight 12-13 (2014).

10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. 
4 

On March 3, 2015, the Subcommittee requested documents concerning any 

funding provided by PeaceWorks to V15 between July 1, 2013 and the date of the 

subpoena, as well as any communication between PeaceWorks and the U.S. 

government concerning V15.14 On May 22, 2015, the Subcommittee issued requests 

to the State Department seeking information on State employees involved in the 

award and oversight of grants to OneVoice entities and any files or communications 

relating to those grants.15 The Subcommittee later requested Grants Policy 

Directives issued by the State Department Office of the Procurement Executive 

effective during 2013.16

The State Department was unable to produce all documents responsive to the 

Subcommittee’s requests due to its failure to retain complete email records of 

Michael Ratney, who served as U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem during the award 

and oversight of the OneVoice grants. The Subcommittee discovered this retention 

problem because one important email exchange between OneVoice and Mr. 

Ratney—described in Part III.C—was produced to the Subcommittee only by 

OneVoice. After conducting additional searches, the Department informed the 

Subcommittee that it was unable to locate any responsive emails from Mr. Ratney’s 

inbox or sent mail.17 Mr. Ratney later elaborated, “[A]t times I deleted emails with 

attachments I didn’t need in order to maintain my inbox under the storage limit.”18 

There was an option to archive emails to stay below storage limits, but Mr. Ratney 

stated that he “did not know [he] was required to archive routine emails.”19 

Beginning in April 2015 and continuing through November 2015, 

Subcommittee majority and minority staff jointly conducted interviews and 

briefings with Josh Nerpel, PeaceWorks Executive Director; Michele Dastin vanRijn, State Department grant officer for the grant to OneVoice Israel; a senior 

official in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs for the State Department, and Mr. 

Ratney. The Subcommittee also spoke with representatives from the GAO 

regarding its audit of State Department grant management.20

 

14 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Subpoena to Ambassador Marc Ginsberg, The 

PeaceWorks Network Foundation (Mar. 3, 2015).

15 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Letter to Secretary John Kerry, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (May 22, 2015).

16 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Letter to Secretary John Kerry, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Dec. 11, 2015).

17 Call with U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Legislative Affairs (Dec. 18, 2015).

18 Call with U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Legislative Affairs (June 28, 2015).

19 Id. 20 GAO Interview.
5 

C. State Department Grants in Israel and Palestinian Territories

State Department grants in Israel and the Palestinian Territories fall within 

the purview of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA). The NEA Bureau issued 

two grants to OneVoice as part of a program titled “Investing in People in The 

Middle East and North Africa.”21 The program’s stated purpose is “[t]o support 

programs, projects and activities to include (but are not limited to) cultural, 

educational, alumni, information and media efforts in the Middle East and North 

Africa” by focusing on “active promotion of projects which promote mutual 

understanding and invest in people.”22 

In each of the past five years, the NEA Bureau authorized between $28 

million and $36 million in grants and loans in Israel and the Palestinian 

Territories.23 From 2011 through 2014, combined spending in both Israel and the 

Palestinian Territories under the Investing in People program ranged from $1.6 

million to $3 million annually.24 Funds spent in Israel under the program reached 

their peak in 2013—the year the OneVoice awards were initially approved. That 

year “Investing in People” included 16 cooperative agreements in Israel for a wide 

range of recipients, for a total of $1.4 million; the average award was $75,000.25 

DISCUSSION

The Subcommittee’s investigation concludes that OneVoice Israel complied 

with the terms of its State Department grants and did not directly use grant funds 

to influence the 2015 Israeli elections. But as described in Parts IV and VI of this 

report, within days after the grant period ended, OneVoice deployed the campaign 

infrastructure and resources created using grant funds to support an antiNetanyahu political campaign called V15. That use of government-funded 

resources for political purposes was permitted by the grant because the State 

Department failed to adequately guard against the risk that campaign resources 

could be repurposed in that manner—as described in Parts II and IV. 

 

21 U.S. Dep’t of State, Mission Statement of Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,

http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 

22 Id. 23 USAspending.gov (last visited on June 25, 2015). 24 Investing in People in the Middle East and North Africa spending totals for Israel and the 

Palestinian Territory by year: $3,123,645 in 2011; $2,381,711 in 2012; $2,726,592 in 2013; and 

1,625,534 in 2014. USAspending.gov (last visited June 25, 2015).

25 Id. 
6 

I. OneVoice Israel Fully Complied with the Terms of the State 

Department Grants

Over a nine-month period in 2013 through 2014, the State Department 

disbursed grant funds to OneVoice Israel and OneVoice Palestine, two arms of the 

“OneVoice Movement” spearheaded by a U.S. nonprofit organization called The 

PeaceWorks Network Foundation. The OneVoice Movement’s stated aim is to 

promote grassroots activism among Israelis and Palestinians in support of the twostate solution to the enduring conflict in that region. The purpose of the State 

Department’s funding was to promote a public-diplomacy campaign in support of 

U.S.-led peace negotiations. With the help of an American political consulting firm, 

OneVoice used the money to fund advertising, volunteer recruitment, campus 

outreach, and the formation of a social media network to promote the two-state 

solution. 

A. The Grantee

OneVoice Israel (OVI) and OneVoice Palestine (OVP) are controlled by a U.S. 

nonprofit organization called The PeaceWorks Network Foundation.26 PeaceWorks 

is incorporated in New York as a nonprofit corporation and is recognized as a 

charitable organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Its 

stated aim is to “amplify the voices of the silent majority of moderates who wish for 

peace and prosperity” in Israel and Palestine.27 The “OneVoice Movement” is the 

“flagship initiative” of PeaceWorks. The stated aim of OneVoice is to “amplify[y] the 

voice of mainstream Israelis and Palestinians, empowering them to propel their 

elected representatives toward the two-state solution.”28 OneVoice’s principal 

mode of operation has been fostering “grassroots activism”—recruiting and training 

of activists, hosting public events, and lobbying public officials—in Israel and the 

Palestinian Territories.

OVI and OVP are separately incorporated as nonprofit entities outside the 

United States, and each has a board of directors. During the time period reviewed 

by the Subcommittee, PeaceWorks supervised all significant decisions by OVI and 

OVP. The OneVoice Movement is PeaceWorks’ main public-facing initiative and 

brand, and since 2003, PeaceWorks has supplied the vast majority of funding for the 

OneVoice Movement (including OVI and OVP).29 PeaceWorks also effectively 

controlled OneVoice’s budget. PeaceWorks chief financial officer conducted monthly 

reviews of the OVI and OVP budgets and approved (or disapproved) particular line 

 

26 Interview with PeaceWorks Network Foundation Executive Director Josh Nerpel (Apr. 22, 2015) 

(hereinafter “Nerpel Interview”).

27 See PeaceWorks Network Foundation Form 990 (2013).

28 App. 000477 (PWF00000916).

29 Nerpel Interview. 
7 

items.30 With this financial control came considerable control over programming 

and messaging.31

B. OneVoice Grant Proposal and Approval

OVI submitted its final grant proposal to the Embassy in Tel Aviv on 

September 13, 2013.32 This final application described the goals and mission of the 

grant, but omitted a costly paid media campaign included in earlier versions of the 

proposal.33 The request detailed how OVI would execute a grassroots campaign in 

conjunction with Secretary of State John Kerry’s effort to sustain negotiations 

between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. OneVoice explained it would use the 

grant money to launch an expansive media strategy, conduct grassroots 

mobilization, and activate its network of “elite influencers and trusted public 

figures” to disseminate the message.34 While it broadly sketched a messaging and 

communications strategy, the OneVoice proposal also focused on mobilizing a group 

of activists to spread and amplify its message—and State agreed that “mobilization” 

was key.35 OneVoice emphasized its plans to expand its social media presence,36

train young Israelis and Palestinians through its “Youth Leadership Program,”37

and use its existing network of OVI youth chapters as a “springboard” for further 

grassroots activity.38 

The State Department approved the OVI proposal and cooperative agreement 

in September 2013.39 The award authorized spending to “defray the costs of a 

multifaceted campaign by OVI that will engage Israelis and mobilize them to 

actively support the resumption of peace negotiations and a two-state solution to 

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”40 The grant period called for a campaign that 

would run from “October 15, 2013 to July 15, 2014, regardless of the outcome of the 

negotiations that began at the end of July 2013.”41 The campaign was to proceed on 

three parallel tracks described by OVI: 

(1) A combination of public relations, advertising, and social media; 

(2) A cogent, scalable, and highly visible grassroots campaign; and 

 

30 Id. 31 See Letter from PeaceWorks Foundation to the Subcommittee (Mar. 11, 2015); Nerpel Interview.

32 App. 000009 (PWF00001241).

33 See App. 000012-000073 (STATE000056).

34 App. 000013 (STATE000057).

35 App. 000014 (STATE000058).

36 App. 000020 (STATE000064).

37 App. 000018 (STATE000062).

38 Id. 39 App. 000312 (STATE000327).

40 App. 000439 (STATE000044). 41 Id. 
8 

(3) Through seeding in of elite influencers and respected voices that 

can reinforce the message and momentum produced by the grassroots 

and media work. The grant will specifically fund campaign outreach, 

training for volunteers, campus organizers, and social media platforms 

and efforts to engage elite opinion makers to advocate for a two-state 

solution.42

The total grant amount to OneVoice was $349,276.43 Because the grants took 

the form of cooperative agreements, OVI was required to provide its own funds for 

some portions of the program, and the State Department was required to be 

substantially involved. State Department funds helped support a variety of OVI

personnel. More than 50% of the U.S. government’s financial contribution went to 

pay portions of the salaries and benefits of OVI employees and toward payments for 

grassroots consultants; State Department funds helped pay the salaries and 

benefits for the executive director, four regional coordinators, grassroots canvassing 

teams, and data-entry personnel. The four trained regional coordinators “served as 

field organizers and liaisons, orchestrating the canvassing component of this 

campaign.”44

In addition, the State Department provided $40,000 to OneVoice to retain a 

U.S. consulting firm called 270 Strategies to help design grassroots operations for 

both OVI and OVP.45 OVI explained in its final proposal that “270 Strategies will 

be hired to train OneVoice Israel staff using their best-in-class metrics-based micro 

targeting method of grassroots organizing, and tailored to the needs on the ground 

as dictated and overseen by our Israeli staff.”46

In tandem with the OVI grant, the State Department also provided funds to 

OVI’s sister organization, OneVoice Palestine. The funds provided to OVP paid for 

personnel and items similar to those listed above for OVI. OVP submitted its final 

proposal to the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem on September 2, 2013 and requested—

and received—$115,776 to pay for personnel, two regional coordinators, and data 

entry support.

 

42 Id. 43 Id. 44 App. 000024 (STATE00068).

45 270 Strategies is a political consulting company founded by 2008 and 2012 Obama campaign 

veterans Jeremy Bird and Mitch Stewart. Each started out by doing organizing for then-candidate 

Obama in a battleground state in the 2008 primaries (South Carolina and Iowa, respectively), then 

earned positions in the senior staff of the 2012 campaign. Philip Bump, The Eternal and Irresistible 

Appeal of Obama Campaign Experience, WASH. POST, (July 24, 2014), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/24/the-eternal-and-irresistible-appeal-ofobama-campaign-experience/.

46 App. 000061 (STATE00118).
9 

C. OneVoice Activity Conducted During the State Department 

Grant Period

OVI’s initial goal was to engage 150,000 to 200,000 Israelis through 

signatures and other calls to action.47 It greatly exceeded those expectations. OVI’s 

final report to the State Department, on January 30, 2015, reported that it 

“engaged 345,721 Israelis through online signatures and pledges of support for the 

movement.”48 More than 1.3 million Israelis were exposed to OVI’s “Peace, It Also 

Pays Off” media campaign across the country. And the top five social media posts 

by OVI during the funding period reached over 400,529 individuals. Cumulatively, 

the campaign and its message reached about 2.14 million people through billboards, 

advertisements, and news coverage.49 In addition, OVI hosted a series of “town 

halls” and “caucus events” featuring prominent Israeli politicians, including Yitzhak 

Hertzog, leader of the Labor party, and Tzipi Livi, leader of the Hatnuah party.50 

At least one Likud Knesset member also spoke at one OVI event.51 

OVI also focused heavily on expanding its social media capacity—something 

both it and the State Department valued. Social media outreach, for example, was 

included as a key metric for success of the campaign in OVI’s proposal.52 And when 

State provisionally approved the funding for OVI, “Social Media activities 

associated with the grassroots campaign” were singled out as a requirement of the 

grant.53 For OVI, social media was a way to reach a targeted audience of young 

people with the Youth Leadership Program and expand its messaging footprint.54 

By the time the grant ended, 58,985 individuals “liked” OVI’s Facebook page, 

representing an increase of 32,334 “likes” since the grant period began.55 

In September 2014, OneVoice selected a third-party to evaluate its 

performance under the grant, as required by the State Department. Dr. Maya 

Kahanoff, a lecturer in the Swiss Center Graduate Program for Conflict Research 

and Resolution and a research fellow at the Truman Institute for the Advancement 

of Peace at Hebrew University, submitted a Final Evaluation Report on OVI 

activities under the State Department grant.56 The report stated that OVI 

programs “were valuable for the participants, inspiring them to be actively involved 

 

47 App. 000020 (STATE00064).

48 App. 000082 (STATE00109).

49 Id.; App. 000082-000083 (STATE00109-110).

50 App. 000106 (STATE000146).

51 Id.; App. 000148 (CDP-2015-2-0000610); App. 000151-000159 (PWF00003281-89).

52 App. 000060 (STATE00104).

53 App. 000163 (PWF00001225).

54 App. 000082 (STATE00109).

55 Id. 56 See App. 000115 (STATE000009). 
10

in promoting peaceful resolution of the conflict, specifically the two-state solution.”57 

The report also stated that OVI activities succeeded in “strengthening the moderate 

camp—an important goal in itself, considering the increasing burnout and hostility 

met by peace activists in Israeli society.”58 The report did not suggest OVI had not 

met the full expectations of the State Department. 

D. The Role of 270 Strategies

Before the grant, PeaceWorks leadership expressed concerns about the ability 

of OVI personnel to plan a sophisticated grassroots organizing campaign.59 

Executive Director Josh Nerpel expressed his “concern[] that there is no one in 

either OVI or OVP that necessarily knows how to put together a [grassroots] plan 

like this.”60 Mr. Nerpel recommended seeking expert help from 270 Strategies, a 

consulting firm that he considered to be “the best grassroots organizing firm in the 

United States or anywhere else.”61 With the State Department’s approval, OVI 

hired 270 Strategies as its principal consultant for implementation of the grant.62 

The firm would receive $40,000 in grant funds to advise OneVoice, with the vast 

majority of its services devoted to OVI. 

The focus of 270 Strategies’ work for OVI under the grant was twofold: 

providing grassroots campaign training and advising OVI on the building of an 

activist/voter contact database. Using the 2012 U.S. presidential election as a case 

study, 270 Strategies instructed OVI and its activists on the core elements of 

grassroots organizing. “Well-trained, empowered leaders are the key to success,” 

the training presentation stated. Central to this training program was learning 

how to identify and contact a targeted group of citizens, and then motivate them to 

participate in a specific activity: voting, political canvassing, sharing a message via 

social media, phone-banking, or other forms of activism.63 270 Strategies 

emphasized the need to focus early on “build[ing] capacity to execute these 

strategies,”64 starting with “building and engaging a list of people.”65 

The firm recommended that OneVoice use the “snowflake” model of 

organizing, in which each activist “acts as a multiplier” by recruiting, training, and 

engaging others.66 270 noted that, with this model, “[a]ctivity grows exponentially” 

 

57 App. 000118 (STATE000012). 

58 Id. 59 See App. 000165 (PWF00005348).

60 Id. 61 Nerpel Interview. 270 Strategies had no experience working in Israel.

62 Id.; App. 000023 (STATE000067).

63 See App. 000168 (STATE00156).

64 App. 000173 (STATE000161); App. 000164 (STATE000164) (“Core capacity-building”).

65 App. 000172 (STATE00160).

66 App. 000184 (STATE00172); App. 000188 (STATE00176).
11

in the “months leading up to GOTV [get-out-the-vote].”67 Consistent with the 

snowflake model, the 270 Strategies training program was designed to be taught by 

OVI employees to existing activists and new recruits within their network. In the 

first quarterly report, OVI stated that it used the training it received from 270 

Strategies to train members of the Youth Leadership Program to further expand 

their network of engaged activists, particularly college students.68

In addition to providing training, 270 Strategies provided detailed advice to 

OVI on how to structure and build its grassroots contact database. Mr. Nerpel 

stated that 270 Strategies “was engaged to do an analysis of the grassroots program 

to ensure that it was as effective as it could be,” including strategies for “collecting 

data about supporters.”69 Recognizing that “[i]n grassroots organizing, the 

centralized tracking of volunteers/members is immensely important,”70 270 

Strategies wrote a memorandum to OneVoice that presented different software and 

platform recommendations to store and retrieve OVI and OVP’s data of potential 

volunteers and supporters. The memo noted that building an effective database, 

and merging OVI’s and OVP’s existing data into that database, “will give OneVoice 

the ability to build volunteer profiles to determine who is more likely to take the 

next step up on OneVoice’s ladder of engagement.”71

Over the course of the grant, relying on 270 Strategies’ advice, OneVoice 

increased its data collection through those townhalls and other fora. According to 

OneVoice, these events were used to build voter lists.72 In an unsuccessful May 

2014 grant application seeking supplemental funds for OVP, OneVoice explained 

that it uses public events to “build voter registration” and grow its database of 

activists and supporters.73 

The townhalls held during OVI and OVP events were used for this type of 

recruitment activity.74 OVI held seven townhall meetings “from November to 

December on seven campuses, resulting in the recruitment of 700 students.”75 Mr. 

Nerpel confirmed that throughout the grant period, OVI used “sign up cards that 

had people’s names and contact information” at its events, and that this information 

was entered into a central database. It is clear that OneVoice successfully built its 

contact database during the grant period.76 Mr. Nerpel stated that it was OVI’s 

 

67 App. 000187 (STATE00175).

68 App. 000095 (STATE00135); App. 000109 (STATE00149).

69 Nerpel Interview.

70 See App. 000237-000245 (PWF00022215-00021410).

71 App. 000237 (PWF00022215).

72 Nerpel Interview.

73 App. 000254 (PWF00021578); App. 000258 (PWF00021582).

74 See App. 0000093-0000098 (STATE000133-0001638).

75 App. 000094 (STATE000134).

76 See App. 000262 (PWF00022106).
12

plan that the data collected during the grant was “subsequently going to be used for 

the overall objectives of OneVoice after the grant period ended.”77

II. During the Grant Period, OneVoice Crafted a Political Strategy to 

Defeat the Netanyahu-Led Coalition

The peace talks initiated by Secretary Kerry ended in late April 2014.78 

Shortly afterward—and half-way through the State Department grant period—

OneVoice leadership began preparing for the next Israeli election. The 

Subcommittee’s investigation revealed that, during the grant period, OneVoice 

developed a political strategy designed to defeat the incumbent Israeli government. 

That strategy relied on grassroots voter outreach and mobilization using campaign 

infrastructure built, in part, with State Department funds. 

One month after the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations broke down, the CEO of 

PeaceWorks, former Ambassador Marc Ginsberg, circulated a “roadmap strategy” 

memo to OneVoice senior leadership. The memo explains that OneVoice has “made 

substantial progress rebuilding a communications and social media foundation.”79 

It also notes that 270 Strategies “has become an essential partner” by providing “an 

organizing/advocacy training structure OV has not had in some time.”80 270 

Strategies’ work for OneVoice had paid dividends, the memo states, in the form of a 

better trained corps of young activists and a “HUGE Jump in [OVI and OVP’s] 

social media presence.”81 The memo calls for expanding OneVoice’s partnership 

with 270 Strategies to strengthen grassroots organizing capacity,82 hiring a 

“politically savvy leader for OVI,” and conducting polling to refine OneVoice’s 

messaging.83 According to the memo, those resources would be deployed to disrupt 

the Netanyahu-led coalition by pushing for the “defection” of “center/center-left 

political parties.”84 The “Definition of Success” would be “forcing the [Netanyahuled] coalition to collapse” and “preventing a right wing coalition from winning the 

 

77 Nerpel Interview.

78 Jodi Rudoren & Isabel Kershner, Arc of a Failed Deal: How Nine Months of Mideast Talks Ended 

in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/world/middleeast/arc-ofa-failed-deal-how-nine-months-of-mideast-talks-ended-in-dissarray.html. Notwithstanding those 

efforts, negotiations failed and discontinued.

79 App. 000265 (PWF00021301).

80 App. 000271 PWF00021467 (“You can see the results already in the social media growth we have 

witnessed in both OVP and OVI.”).

81 App. 000272 PWF00021468.

82 Id. The memo notes that “270 considers [OneVoice] to be an optimum ‘post Obama’ era laboratory 

to deploy its newest organizational techniques.”

83 Id. 

84 App. 000273 (PWF00021469).
13

next election prompted by the coalition collapse.”85 The target timeframe for this 

initiative was “no later than” summer of 2015.86 

OneVoice refined this strategic plan over the course of several months. By 

August 2014, OneVoice leadership circulated a revised, “finalized AND 

APPROVED” strategy memo framed around a top strategic objective: 

SHIFT SUPPORT WITHIN THE KNESSET AWAY FROM 

LIKUD/RIGHT WING COALITION BY ADVOCATING TO 

‘SWING’ CENTRIST VOTER’S [sic] POLICIES AND SUPPORT 

POLITICAL CANDIDATES WHO EMBRACE AN EXPEDITED 

NEGOTIATION TOWARD A [TWO-STATE SOLUTION] AND 

THE END OF SETTLEMENT EXPANSION.87

In an email to OneVoice board members, Mr. Ginsberg noted OVI had 

already paved the way for this effort by “[o]verhauling our grassroots strategy.”88 

“[W]ith the help of 270 Strategies,” he explained, “we have put in place a new 

approach that is best-in-class globally” and “allows us to identify key constituencies 

who are receptive to our message, and rapidly build databases of supporters and 

potential supporters.”89 These capacities were built using State Department funds

— with no restrictions on how OVI’s grant-funded resources could be used after the 

grant. 

 OneVoice leadership recognized as early as August 2014 that “[a]n election in 

Israel is now scheduled for 2017 but it is clear that this coalition may collapse 

earlier.”90 As described by its CEO, OneVoice’s objective was to use its grassroots-

 

85 Id. 86 Track 3 proposes that OneVoice prepare a “charter” setting forth terms for a final two-state 

solution agreement and possibly “[s]ubmit[] the charter to a vote of the Israeli and Palestinian 

publics.” Unlike Tracks 1 and 2, this proposal did not reappear in future versions of the OneVoice 

strategic “roadmap” plan. App. 000274 (PWF00021470). 

87 App. 000277 (PWF00020780) (capitalization in original). According to a letter from PeaceWorks 

Foundation counsel, this strategic plan was “rejected” by the PeaceWorks board on October 24, 2014, 

and Mr. Ginsberg transitioned from CEO to a consultant for the organization. Letter from 

PeaceWorks Foundation to the Subcommittee (June 28, 2016). However, contemporaneous 

communications from Mr. Ginsberg indicated that the plan was merely “postponed since the funding 

needs are too great right now.” He continued, “Nevertheless, [the plan] still remains viable and the 

fundraising environment will determine its viability.” App. 000468 (PWF00028649). The plan 

continued to be emailed within PeaceWorks through December 9, 2014. App. 000475 

(PWF000030713). OneVoice’s fundraising environment and budget changed significantly after the 

election was called. See App. 000473 (PWF000014309), App. 000459 (PWF000011653).

88 App. 000288 (PWF00020768). 

89 Id. 90 App. 000461 (PWF00026653).
14

organizing resources to become a decisive influence in the next election.91 To be 

clear, OneVoice’s planned use of its grant-funded resources for political activities

was not explicitly prohibited by the State Department’s grant terms. OneVoice’s 

agreement with the Department did not prohibit it from using tools intended for 

public diplomacy as political tools after the grant. 

III. The State Department Failed to Adequately Guard Against the Risk 

of OneVoice Using Government-Funded Resources for Political 

Purposes

The Subcommittee finds that the State Department failed to adequately 

guard against the risk that resources built with government grants would be 

deployed for political purposes. Despite OneVoice’s previous political activity in the 

2013 Israeli election, the State Department failed to conduct any assessment of the 

risk that, were an election called, OneVoice would continue its political activities 

using State-funded resources. Nor did OneVoice’s grant agreements prohibit such 

involvement. Moreover, the Department did not assess the risks involved in

providing funds to OneVoice to create a grassroots campaign infrastructure—

including voter contact information, trained networks of organizers and activists, 

and a social media platform—that might later be converted into political tools. 

A. State Department Vetting During the OneVoice Grant 

Application Process

OneVoice was candid with the State Department regarding its past political 

involvement. As part of the proposal, for example, OneVoice provided a “Brand & 

Track Record” section detailing the organization’s prior campaigns and programs, 

including a section entitled “Israeli Elections & Coalition Formation.” The section 

detailed how, less than six months before seeking State Department funds, OVI had 

operated a grassroots campaign in the 2013 Israeli parliamentary elections to help 

“increase[e] the number of center-left seats in the [Israeli] Knesset”—which it 

described as one of its “Strategic Milestones.”92 

OneVoice’s track record of involvement in Israeli elections did not deter the 

State Department from making the grants.93 In a staff briefing, a senior official in 

the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, stated that “it would not be right” for the past 

 

91 Id. (“[OneVoice must be] ready to move voices at that time in a way that can have an impact on 

political campaigns—OneVoice needs to become not just a social movement but one that compels 

political change.”).

92 App. 000296 (PWF00025581).

93 Dastin van-Rijn Interview. 
15

political experience of a possible grantee to be taken into consideration.94 At the 

same time, however, the senior official stated that influencing foreign elections is a 

“red line” that State grantees cannot cross. The senior official stated that grantees 

are aware of this “red line” because it would be included in the grant contract or 

cooperative agreement.95 But no such provision was included in the OVI or OVP 

agreements with the State Department, and neither agreement contemplated 

electoral activism by OVI or OVP. 

Notwithstanding the comments made by a senior official in the NEA Bureau, 

in an interview with Subcommittee staff, Ms. van-Rijn indicated that past political 

experience and political activity is, in fact, taken into consideration when vetting 

possible grantees.96 Ms. van-Rijn said that she and her colleagues discussed 

whether OVI was too far to the “left” to execute the grant’s goals of targeting a 

broad base of citizens, but saw no “red flags” associated with OVI’s political 

record.97 Ms. van-Rijn further stated that her concerns had been assuaged because 

OneVoice had, in the past, included representatives from all parties, including farright parties, in policy debates.98 Ms. van-Rijn stated that she did not believe 

OneVoice was “party-focused.”99 Instead, it appears that State’s concerns focused 

primarily on whether OneVoice actually had the capacity to undertake an ambitious 

public diplomacy campaign.100 

Notably, the documents provided by the State Department contain no 

evidence that any grant officers conducted any risk assessment associated with OVI 

or OVP. The State Department normally keeps a grant file for each grant or 

cooperative agreement to document key grant activities, including any risk 

assessment, risk mitigation plans, monitoring plans, and close-out procedures.101 

The grant files for OVI and OVP provided by the State Department contain no 

 

94 Briefing with a Senior Official, U.S. Dep’t of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs (June 6, 2015) (hereinafter “Senior NEA Official Briefing”).

95 Senior NEA Official Briefing. 96 Dastin van-Rijn Interview. Mr. Ratney likewise stated that the State Department would consider 

the political associations of a prospective grantee and a make a “judgment call” concerning whether 

it was too political. Interview with Michael Ratney, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Consul General in 

Jerusalem (Nov. 9, 2015) (hereinafter Ratney Interview).

97 A red flag, in the words of van-Rijn, would be a grantee with an “antagonistic relationship with the 

government.” Dastin van-Rijn Interview. 

98 Id. 99 Id. 100 One former OneVoice employee who worked at the U.S. State Department at the time of the grant 

proposal wrote to Ms. van-Rijn and other State officials: “[OneVoice] admit[s] they have relatively 

few Israelis and Palestinian followers on the ground . . . I wonder if this particular campaign has as 

much to do with raising the profile of OneVoice as affecting the peace process.” App. 000297 

(STATE00997).

101 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Procurement Executive, Grants Policy Directive (GPD) 23, 

Rev. 2, “Federal Assistance File Folder, Form DC-4012.” App. 000302 (STATE-2015-2-0001674).
16

mention of the risks presented by the grants, including the risk that governmentfunded campaign resources could be used for overt political activities. Additionally, 

there is no evidence that any risk mitigation plans associated with the political 

nature of the grantee’s previous conduct—or any other risks—were designed or 

implemented. 

B. State Department Oversight During the Grant Period 

The State Department monitored OneVoice’s compliance with its cooperative 

agreements during the grant period. OneVoice Palestine’s award specifications 

stated that the “[U.S.] Consulate and OVP will consult regularly on the 

development and implementation of the program. OVP will develop procedure(s) for 

regularly consulting with and providing updates to the Consulate/PD Jerusalem.”102 

OneVoice Israel’s award specifications did not contain a clause directing OVI to 

“consult regularly” on the development and implementation of its program; they 

did, however, have requirements that OVI submit regular progress reports 

containing “significant activities of the period and how the activities reflect progress 

toward achieving goals/objectives” and “any problems/challenges in implementing 

the program and a corrective action plan,” among other items.103

Accordingly, there were regular meetings between State officials and grantee 

representatives, including some 26 meetings or events recorded by the U.S. 

embassy that were held between various officials and OneVoice.104 In one instance, 

State Department officials expressed concern about the messaging or slogans used 

by OneVoice. Specifically, OVP’s launch event had used unapproved messaging on 

banners and other promotional materials, including messages “proclaiming 

Jerusalem to be the holy capital of Palestine and calling for an end to 

settlements.” 105 In an email to the Executive Director of OVP on December 3, 2013, 

the Cultural Affairs Officer for the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem106 restated the 

ground rules that “the Consulate General has substantial involvement in this 

project, which includes consulting on and approving youth initiatives and other 

OVP activities BEFORE they happen.”107 In response, OVP took steps to ensure 

that future messaging was approved by senior OneVoice leadership and the State 

Department. In another instance, State officials asked that OVI not include 

information on a program outside the activities the State Department funded under

the OVI grant, related to the Knesset, in its regular reports. When OneVoice 

started reporting on the Political Watchdog program—which trained activists on 

 

102 App. 000316 (STATE000331).

103 App. 000445 (STATE000050).

104 App. 000320 (STATE000002).

105 App. 000322 (PWF00001593).

106 Id. 107 App. 000323 (PWF00001594).
17

the Israeli legislative process—in its quarterly reports to the State Department, 

OVI’s Executive Director informed PeaceWorks leadership that State “asked not to 

be involved in [the Political Watchdog Program], as they cannot take direct steps to 

influence the parliament of another country. They only want to hear limited 

reporting on this activity.”108

C. Lack of State Department Response to OneVoice Political 

Plans Developed During the Grant Period 

All three of the State Department officials that the Subcommittee 

interviewed stated they first learned of OneVoice’s planned political activity when 

they read news accounts concerning its “partnership” with V15.109 The 

Subcommittee asked two State Department officials—a senior official with the NEA 

Bureau and former Consul General Ratney—what the State Department would 

have done if, during the grant period, OneVoice had informed State officials that it 

was planning to launch an anti-Netanyahu campaign to coincide with the next 

election. Consul General Ratney initially responded that it would have been a “red 

flag” and State would have stopped the grant if it had known OneVoice was making 

such plans during the grant period. To do otherwise would have been “crazy,” Mr. 

Ratney explained, given the State Department’s sensitivities about “messaging.”110 

The senior official in the NEA Bureau responded that State likely would have ended 

the grant and the decision would have “gone up the chain, likely to the 

Ambassador.”111 

The record is clear, however, that OneVoice did inform at least two State 

Department officials of its political plans, and it did so during the grant period. The 

Department took no action in response, although it is unclear whether the officials 

in receipt of the plans reviewed them. In September 2014, three months before the 

grant period was scheduled to end but after the final payment of U.S. funds to 

OneVoice Israel on August 25, 2014, Mr. Ginsberg exchanged a number of emails 

with Consul General Ratney, then the second-highest-ranking American diplomat 

in the region.112 In that exchange, Mr. Ginsberg said he was in the process of 

obtaining final PeaceWorks board approval of a “major strategy directed at centrist 

Israelis” after “quietly bouncing ideas off a lot of folks, including Martin [Indyk] in 

its preparation.”113 Mr. Ginsberg indicated that he did not “expect much help from 

the USG [United States Government] in its final phase,” but offered to share the 

 

108 App. 000324 (PWF00002756).

109 Dastin van-Rijn Interview; Senior NEA Official Briefing; Ratney Interview. 

110 Ratney Interview. 111 Senior NEA Official Briefing. 112 See App. 000331-000333 (PWF00027568-00027570).

113 Id. 
18

strategy “for friendship sake.”114 Mr. Ratney responded that he would “love to take 

a look at the strategy.”115 

The proposal sent to Mr. Ratney, “A Strategic Plan to Mobilize Centrist 

Israeli & Palestinian,” was the culmination of months of work and presented a “bold 

and definable” political option to “[l]aunch a major strategic campaign that could 

shift a key portion of the Israeli and Palestinian electorates in a direction that 

would marginalize the extremists on either side,” according to Mr. Ginsberg’s 

email.116 The proposal outlined the political goals of OneVoice in the next Israeli 

election, which was yet to be scheduled: “The [center-left] bloc has not been able to 

unify around a common message, a common agenda, or a strong leader. Our aim is 

to strengthen the bloc, rather than any one party, [and] in tandem weaken 

Netanyahu and his right wing parties.”117 Additionally, the proposal listed seven 

“Specific Israeli Tactical Objectives.”118 The second objective was clear: “Shift 

support within the Knesset from a Likud-centric coalition to a center left coalition 

through public education and grassroots mobilization initiatives.”119

When presented with Mr. Ginsberg’s September 2014 email and “Strategic 

Plan” during an interview, Mr. Ratney told the Subcommittee that he remembered 

the email but is “quite sure” he did not read the attachment, nor did he respond to 

Mr. Ginsberg.120 (The State Department could not locate any record of Mr. Ratney’s 

email exchange with Mr. Ginsberg on this issue, but email records produced by 

OneVoice included no response from Mr. Ratney.) Mr. Ratney also noted that Mr. 

Ginsberg had sent the email as the grant period was “winding down.” 

Mr. Ginsberg also sent an executive summary of OneVoice’s proposed 

strategy to Frank Lowenstein, then a senior adviser for Middle East strategy who 

would eventually replace Ambassador Indyk as the Special Envoy for IsraeliPalestinian Negotiations on October 14, 2014. The executive summary provided to 

Mr. Lowenstein highlighted the three phases mentioned above, including the fact 

that “270 Strategies has been quietly working with our Israeli and Palestinian staff 

for over a year to lay the groundwork for this new strategy.”121 Unlike the complete 

plan, the executive summary did not mention Prime Minister Netanyahu or any 

political party by name or outline efforts to defeat the Likud-led government. In 

 

114 Id. 115 Id. This email chain was not produced to the Subcommittee by the State Department, despite 

being responsive to the Subcommittee’s document request. The Department later told the 

Subcommittee it was unable to find the email chain because it was not retained. 

116 App. 000336 (PWF00027573).

117 App. 000338 (PWF00027575).

118 App. 000340 (PWF00027577).

119 Id. 120 Ratney Interview. 121 App. 000353 (CDP-2015-2-0000053).
19

fact, the summary explicitly stated that “We will not directly support individual 

candidates or political parties in Israel or Palestine” (emphasis in original).122

IV. OneVoice Engaged in Political Activity After the Grant Period Using 

Resources Funded in Part by the State Department Grant

After Israeli elections were called following the collapse of peace negotiations, 

and after the State Department grant period ended, OneVoice shifted its focus to 

influencing the electoral outcome by working to defeat incumbent Prime Minister 

Netanyahu. Planning for this effort began during the period when OneVoice was 

still a State Department grantee. OneVoice did not use State Department funds 

directly for political activities, or seek State Department grants in anticipation of 

the Israeli elections, but it did use the campaign infrastructure and resources that 

it had built, in part, with State Department funds to support a campaign to defeat 

Prime Minister Netanyahu in the 2015 elections. 

A. OneVoice Partnership with V15

As explained above, the State Department made its final payment of grant 

funds to OVI on August 25, 2014, and the grant period ended on November 30, 

2014.123 In December 2014, the OneVoice Movement began managing a grassroots 

campaign targeting Prime Minister Netanyahu—consistent with the strategic plan 

prepared and approved by OVI leadership during the State Department grant 

period.124 The campaign described in this section, known as V15, was designed to 

weaken the Likud-centered governing coalition and (in the words of OVI’s Executive 

Director) “to take [Netanyahu] down” in the 2015 elections.125 According to the 

 

122 App. 000354 (CDP-2015-2-0000054).

123 OVP, however, still had an outstanding payment of nearly $10,000 due from State when elections 

were called. After additional review, the consulate ultimately decided not to make the final payment 

to OVP on the ground that certain of its activities did not comply with the terms of the grant. 

According to the grant officer in an email to OVP’s Executive Director, the consulate had “no record 

that OVP communicated its activities for fourth quarter (e.g., August 1, 2014 to November 1, 2014), 

nor were [political department] staff invited to attend any of the activities for monitoring purposes.” 

App. 000360 (CDP-2015-2-0000745). 124 See App. 000362 (PWF00028801).

125 Ronan Farrow Daily, Interview with Polly Bronstein and Nimrod Dweck, MSNBC (Nov. 7, 2014), 

http://www.msnbc.com/shift/watch/netanyahu-opposition-interviewed-post-defeat-414929475753 

(“We feel that the Prime Minister of Israel is not representing all of Israel; it doesn’t even feel that 

he is the Prime Minister of all of us and he’s made us more confident that we are continuing this 

fight of ours to take him down next time.”). Far from disassociating itself with these comments, 

OneVoice posted this interview on its Facebook page, praising “V15’s historic GOTV campaign.” 

OneVoice Movement Facebook Page (Mar. 19, 2015), 

https://www.facebook.com/onevoice.movement/?fref=ts. 
20

State Department grant officer for OVI, Ms. van-Rijn, V15’s political goal was 

simple: Elect “anybody but Bibi.”126

On December 2, 2014, three days after the State Department grant period 

ended for OVI, the Knesset voted to dissolve the governing coalition and schedule 

new elections on March 17, 2015.127 OneVoice promptly sent John Lyndon, the 

Chief Operating Officer of the OneVoice Movement,128 to Israel on December 15, 

2014, to determine how to execute the strategic plan it had crafted over the past 

seven months.129 An immediate challenge was optical: As OVI previously 

contemplated, its strategic plan “must ... [b]e unveiled in Israel (not the US) as an 

Israeli-centric plan.”130 OneVoice decided that the best option would be to partner 

with a home-grown political movement. Mr. Lyndon reported to PeaceWorks’ 

leadership that he had discovered a loosely formed group of activists called “V15” or 

“Victory-2015.”131 V15’s mission was to replace the Netanyahu government. 

Specifically, Mr. Lyndon wrote that V15’s goal was “[f]ounding a center-left 

government” by “pressuring center-left block leaders to prevent them from joining a 

coalition with the right wing parties headed by Netanyahu and Bennet.”132 V15 

considered itself a “genuine authentic grassroots initiative designed for the sole 

purpose of replacing the current government with a pro-peace center-left 

coalition.”133 Less than a week later, OVI and V15 entered into partnership 

 

126 Dastin Interview; Roy Arad, The Obama Campaign Strategist Who Could Break the Israeli 

Elections Wide Open, HAARETZ, (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-election2015/.premium-1.639158. 

127 Times of Israel Staff, Knesset Votes to Dissolve; New Elections Called for March 1, TIMES OF 

ISRAEL (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/new-elections-called-for-march-17-2015/. 

128 App. 000373 (PWF00030274).

129 App. 000378 (PWF00015337).

130 See Email from Amb. Ginsberg to Martin Indyk (Oct. 14, 2014) (“If the Plan is going to have any 

conceivable chance of getting off the ground, it must: Be unveiled in Israel (not the US) as an Israelicentric plan (if otherwise, it just opens us up to needless Israeli criticism)).” App. 000467 

(PWF00028797). Further, OVI’s strategic plan written by Mr. Ginsberg stated: “[T]he staff is acutely 

aware that it must be seen as an Israeli enterprise: MANAGED AND IMPLEMENTED not from 

foreign shores, but as an indigenous operation.” App. 000340 (PWF00027577) (emphasis in original).

131 In this email, Lyndon provided only a brief summary, stating he “was anxious not to put a lot of 

sensitive stuff in email, as instructed.” App. 000378 (PWF00015337). Because Lyndon refused to 

participate in an interview with this Subcommittee, it is unclear what he deliberately left out of the 

email or who instructed him to remain cryptic. Lyndon also identified other potential partners 

including Mohammad Darwashe, the Co-Executive Director of the Givat Haviva Institute and the 

former Co-Executive Director of the Abraham Fund, which also received State Department grants 

totaling more than one million dollars since 2010. See Grants SNEAAB14GR055 & 

SLMAQM10GR082.

132 App. 000385 (PWF00002342).

133 App. 000387 (PWF00002344).
21

through a formal agreement, under which V15 would become a wholly-owned 

project of OVI.134 

Once absorbed by OneVoice, V15 had no further independent organizational 

existence. There was no legal entity known as V15 in Israel or the United States.135 

V15 had no separate bank account.136 For that reason, donors to V15 had three 

options: (1) contribute to the PeaceWorks Foundation and earmark that 

contribution for the V15 effort; (2) contribute to OneVoice Europe and earmark the 

contribution; or (3) contribute directly to OVI.137 Under the terms of the agreement, 

V15 would bring its five-person staff onto the OVI payroll, and the two erstwhile 

leaders of V15 would be considered outside consultants to OVI. All employment 

decisions for the V15 campaign were approved by OVI management. Polly 

Bronstein, who had taken over as Executive Director of OVI in July 2014, would 

manage the V15 communications portfolio as well as the political and Israeli 

partnerships of the campaign. Mara Lee, OneVoice’s International Organizing 

Director, would oversee V15’s grassroots, voter data, and GOTV efforts. The V15 

founder-consultants both reported to Ms. Bronstein and Ms. Lee.138 

Despite being an OVI project, V15 would remain a separate brand. 

Reflecting the concern that the campaign could not be viewed as controlled from 

outside Israel, the draft agreement stated that OneVoice would not hide its 

involvement with V15, but “as far as the public is concerned V15 is a separate 

brand.”139 The V15 brand would be retained to “capitalise on the organic, 

grassroots and dynamic resonance that [the V15 founders] have quickly created.”140 

The terms of this partnership agreement remained nonpublic until late January 

2015, when pressure from the Israeli press forced PeaceWorks and OneVoice Israel 

to clarify the scope and nature of the V15 partnership to U.S. donors.141 The Israeli 

newspaper Haaretz reported that V15 had a clear political aim: “V15 is trying to 

replace Israel’s government.”142

This campaign was consistent with the strategic plan prepared and approved 

by OVI leadership during the State Department grant period. While the 

 

134 Nerpel Interview; App. 000393 (PWF00003961).

135 Nerpel Interview.

136 Id. 137 Id. 138 App. 000389 (PWF00002280).

139 App. 000397 (PWF00003965).

140 App. 000399 (PWF00009665). 141 OneVoice Israel Partners with V15 to Change Status Quo, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 27, 2015), 

http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/onevoice-israel-partners-with-v15-to-change-status-quo300026229.html. 

142 Roy Arad, The Obama Campaign Strategist Who Could Break the Israeli Elections Wide Open, 

HAARETZ (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-election-2015/.premium-1.639158. 
22

Subcommittee has found no evidence that State Department funds were used by 

OVI directly to influence the March 2015 elections, the record shows that OVI used 

resources built and funded in part by State Department funds during the grant 

period to support the launch and operation of V15.

B. OneVoice Continued to Use Resources Built Using State 

Department Funds

OVI’s grant period ended on November 30, 2014, two days before the Israeli 

elections were called. However, the third-party review of the OVI grant required by 

the State Department concluded that, during the grant period, “foundations were 

laid for continued activity [by OVI] even after the end of the project—many young 

people were recruited for further activity, groups of activists were formed, and 

structures were created for future activities of this kind.”143 The Subcommittee’s 

investigation has found that OVI used these “foundations”—including newly trained 

activists, voter lists, an expanded social media platform, and strengthened 

grassroots expertise—for the V15 campaign after the grant period concluded. As 

soon as the elections were called on December 2, OneVoice began deploying the 

grassroots organizing apparatus that it built substantially with U.S. taxpayer 

dollars.

First, OneVoice’s existing “alumni network” provided activists ready to 

support and recruit for V15.144 In a December 22, 2014 email, a 270 Strategies 

senior manager who consulted for OneVoice during the grant period explained that 

OVI would “use the activists we have to put out the campaign and giv[e] people call 

to actions around the campaign, one of which will be joining V15 as an activist.”145 

In several email exchanges, OneVoice recognized that it had previously invested in 

training people in grassroots mobilization—as the State Department grant 

required146—and this was the time to activate them.147 For example, the founder of 

OneVoice exhorted senior staff of the organization: “We trained a bunch of people. 

NOW IS THE TIME TO RECRUIT THEM TO JOIN THE EFFORT!”148 During an 

interview with the Subcommittee, Mr. Nerpel stated that he was unaware of any 

concerns within OneVoice about using activists trained under the State Department 

grant to support the V15 campaign.149

Second, the V15 campaign used OVI’s database of voter contact information, 

including email addresses, which OVI expanded during the grant period. As 

 

143 App. 000125 (STATE00019). 144 App. 000379 (PWF00015338).

145 App. 000404 (PWF00012311).

146 App. 000074 (PWF00001036).

147 App. 000412 (PWF00015093).

148 Id. 149 Nerpel Interview.
23

explained above, during the grant period, OVI routinely collected contact 

information from Israelis who, for example, attended OneVoice townhalls or made 

online support pledges, and compiled this information in a voter contact database. 

OVI reported its collection of this information as evidence of the success of the State 

Department grant.150 In an interview with the Subcommittee, Mr. Nerpel stated

that one objective of this information gathering process was not to compile 

information that could directly affect the next Israeli election; instead, “the objective 

was that [the names] were used to support the Israeli government and ... the 

Palestinian government through the Consulate grant to support a two state 

solution. Those names were subsequently going to be used for the overall objectives 

of OneVoice after the grant period ended.”151 However, when the time came and the 

election was called, OVI used the same database to disseminate V15 messages 

calling for “changing the government” and invitations to V15 events.152 

The Subcommittee specifically asked Mr. Nerpel whether the voter database 

built during the grant period was in any way separate from the lists used by V15. 

Mr. Nerpel answered that his understanding was that there was only “one 

database” within OVI and “all of the information is fed into the same database,” 

including “any names that were collected during” the State grant period.153 Indeed, 

one State Department employee on OneVoice’s listserv received V15 emails even 

though she never signed up for them.154 Mr. Nerpel also stated that the database 

OVI later used during its cooperation with V15 would have included data collected 

“from 2002 through today.”155 

Third, OVI’s social media platform, which more than doubled during the 

State Department grant period, was also used to advertise V15’s activities. The 

growth of OneVoice’s Facebook page during the State Department grant was one of 

its key “Metrics of Success.”156 By the end of the grant period, OneVoice boasted the 

“single biggest pre-existing social media capacity” in Israel.157 OVI later used that 

online presence to promote the V15 campaign, as OVI widely shared V15 Facebook 

posts on its own page.158

 

150 App. 000420 (STATE000285).

151 Nerpel Interview.

152 Id. 153 Id. 154 Dastin van-Rijn Interview.

155 Nerpel Interview.

156 App. 000020 (STATE00064).

157 App. 000433 (PWF00012953).

158 OneVoiceIsrael Facebook Page, (Mar. 3, 2015), 

https://www.facebook.com/kol.echad/photos/a.124660947558205.17051.114627791894854/965917796

765845/?type=3&theater.
24

Finally, throughout the grant period and for two months into the V15 

campaign, OneVoice held itself out publicly as a “partner” of the State Department 

and the U.S. Embassy-Tel Aviv, including on its website and annual reports to 

donors. On its website, OneVoice noted that its “partnerships reflect[] the 

validation our work on the ground has received from like-minded organizations.”159 

OneVoice also cited its relationship with State in donor pitches to raise additional 

funds.160 In an interview with the Subcommittee, however, Mr. Nerpel stated that 

“[w]hether the reference to the State Department added credibility in the minds of 

the donors I don’t know.”161 After press accounts surfaced about V15’s political 

activity and its link to a former State Department grantee, the State Department 

ordered OneVoice to delete U.S. government branding and references from its 

website and future communications.162

As mentioned previously, none of the OVI activity described above was 

barred by the grant terms set by the State Department.163 The grant specifications 

for OVI and OVP did not impose limitations on activity outside the scope and time 

period of the grants. As Ms. van-Rijn explained, for larger grants the State 

Department strove to create sustainability for recipient activities beyond the life of 

the grant.164 Nor was OVI’s use of resources created or expanded during the grant 

period a violation of existing State Department policy or regulations concerning 

investments made with grant funding. 

C. PeaceWorks Returned Contributions and Created a New NonProfit Based on Concerns About 501(c)(3) Funding for Political 

Activity

From December 31, 2014 to January 29, 2015, PeaceWorks contributed 

$995,000 to OVI for the benefit of V15 efforts. As news coverage of V15 increased, 

PeaceWorks became concerned about the U.S. tax law implications of OVI’s political

work.165 PeaceWorks was a 501(c)(3) charitable organization, as required by the 

State Department’s cooperative agreement. 166 But in December 2014, OneVoice 

 

159 OneVoice Movement: Our Partners, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20140914054913/http://www.onevoicemovement.org/partners/ (recorded 

Jan. 10, 2014, last visited on Apr. 28, 2016). 160 PeaceWorks had State Department branding on its website, and donor solicitations also 

highlighted the partnership with State. App. 000434 (PWF000027895) (Amb. Ginsberg wrote, “Can 

you help me out? Kerry’s staff blessed this as the best communications strategy presented to 

them. This is serious stuff now.”).

161 Nerpel Interview.

162 See App. 000436-000437 (PWF00000017-18).

163 See App. 000439 (STATE00044).

164 Dastin van-Rijn Interview.

165 See App. 000448 (PWF00009481); Nerpel Interview.

166 “Under the Internal Revenue Code, all section 501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely prohibited 

from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of (or 
25

officials discussed “sceptisim that a GOTV effort with this level of messaging 

specificity RE: center-left could be funded by a 501 c3.”167 In February 2015, 

PeaceWorks created a new non-profit entity to direct political efforts. On February 

3, 2015, Peaceworks Action was incorporated in Delaware and declared itself as taxexempt under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.168 

PeaceWorks then shifted money between itself, its new 501(c)(4) entity, and 

OVI. On February 6, 2015, PeaceWorks informed OVI that it was rescinding all 

donations since December 2, 2014, “which might have supported foreign political 

campaign activity.”169 As a result, $995,000 was returned to PeaceWorks. Those 

funds (and more) were then replenished by the two PeaceWorks entities.170 After 

the creation of the new 501(c)(4), there were discussions among Mr. Nerpel and 270 

Strategies consultants about which entity could properly fund specific activities—

such as polling questions and online videos.171 Based on case-by-case 

determinations made primarily by Mr. Nerpel, PeaceWorks Foundation and 

PeaceWorks Action each contributed additional money to OVI for the benefit of 

V15.172 The final budget for all of OneVoice’s projects during the 2015 election 

included roughly $3 million in 501(c)(3) funds and more than $4 million in 501(c)(4) 

funds for the benefit of OVI and the V15 initiative.173 To put those amounts in 

perspective, the total budget for all parties seeking office in the 2015 Israeli 

elections came to approximately $51 million.174 

 

in opposition to) any candidate for elective public office. Contributions to political campaign funds or 

public statements of position (verbal or written) made on behalf of the organization in favor of or in 

opposition to any candidate for public office violate the prohibition against political campaign 

activity. Violating this prohibition may result in denial or revocation of tax-exempt status and the 

imposition of certain excise taxes. Certain activities or expenditures may not be prohibited 

depending on the facts and circumstances. For example, certain voter education activities (including 

presenting public forums and publishing voter education guides) conducted in a non-partisan 

manner do not constitute prohibited political campaign activity. In addition, other activities intended 

to encourage people to participate in the electoral process, such as voter registration and get-out-thevote drives, would not be prohibited political campaign activity if conducted in a non-partisan 

manner.” Internal Revenue Serv., The Restriction of Political Campaign Intervention by Section 

501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Organizations (last updated Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-%26-

Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/The-Restriction-of-Political-Campaign-Intervention-bySection-501(c)(3)-Tax-Exempt-Organizations.

167 App. 000451 (PWF00002335).

168 App. 000004 (Letter from PeaceWorks Foundation to the Subcommittee (Mar. 11, 2015)).

169 App. 000003.

170 App. 000004; App. 000453 (PWF000015693). 171 App. 000454 (PWF000011993).

172 Nerpel Interview.

173 App. 000459 (PWF000011653).

174 Dimi Reider, The Real Reason Nobody Minds that American Money Deeply Influences Israeli 

Politics, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/02/27/the-real-reasonnobody-minds-that-american-money-deeply-influences-israeli-politics/. 
26

CONCLUSION 

OneVoice Israel’s conduct fully complied with the terms of its agreements 

with the State Department and governing grant guidelines. The experience under 

the OneVoice grants, however, reveals the ease with which recipient organizations 

can repurpose certain public-diplomacy resources for political activities. 

The State Department failed to foresee and guard against that risk from the 

outset. OneVoice was forthright with the Department about its political activity in 

2013, and it was also clear that OneVoice would use grant funds to build or enhance 

resources that might be applied to political activities. OneVoice’s 2013 grant 

proposal called for using the funds for standard tools of a modern political 

campaign, including a voter/activist contact database, a trained grassroots network, 

and a large social media presence. Immediately after the grant period ended, 

OneVoice deployed those grant-funded resources as part of the V15 campaign to 

defeat Prime Minister Netanyahu in 2015. Despite the fact that influencing a 

foreign election is across a “red line” for U.S. grantees,175 all of this activity was 

permissible under Department guidelines and the terms of the grants. 

 

175 Senior NEA Official Briefing.