NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 08a0238n.06 Filed: May

6, 2008 No. 06-4607 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT United States of Amer ica, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. David L . Hammon, Sr., Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E N OR TH ERN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B e fo re : KE I TH , CLAY , a nd GI L MA N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. DAMON J. KEI TH, Circui t J u d ge. This case ar ises from a c ivil sui t filed by the United State s ( “ Go ve rnme nt” ) a g a ins t D a vi d L . H a mmo n Sr . ( “ Ha mmo n” ) t o r e du c e to j ud g me nt u np a id wag er in g e xc is e tax, p e n a lt ie s , an d in te r e s t a s s e s s me n ts f

o r tax p e r io d s e n d in g Ja n u ar y 3 1 , 1 9 86, throug h November

30, 19 8 8
. W e address the Gove rnment’s a ppeal f ollowing a

$450,869 jury verdic t and judg ment in its favor

. I n essenc e, the Gove rnment cla ims that (1) its init ial $2.39 milli on tax assessment should have been awa rded a pre sumption of accur acy , (2) Ha mmon should have bee n estopped from denying the acc urac y of the Gove rnment’s tax assessments, and (3) the district court should have a

war ded statutory

interest on the jury verdic t. Upon review, we AFF I RM in part and REV ERS E a

nd REM AN D i n p art
. I . Ba ckg round Fr om Septe m b er 1 984 to November 1988, Hammon was e ng ag ed in an illeg al g amblingNo. 064607

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am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 2

I .R. C. § 44 03 re qu ir e s b oo kma ke rs to k e e p d a ily

re c or ds sh ow ingthe g ro ss a mou nt o f a ll 1 wa g e rs fo r w hic h th e y

are lia ble . H a mmo n d id n ot m a int a in s uc h r e c or ds , thro wi ngou t hi s rec ords eve ry

thirty day s “[b] eca

use it beca

me clutter.” business. The F BI

seized written rec ords of Hammon’s business on November 20, 1988. I n 1990,

1 Hammon pled g uilty

to the information the Gove rnment filed c harg ing him with eng ag ing in a n illega l g ambling business from 1984 to 1988. I n 1995, the I RS m ade a ssessments ag ainst Hammon for unpa i d wag eringexcise tax es, pena lties, and interest for the per iods ending J anuar y 31, 1986, throug h November

30, 1988 . The a ssessments totaled $2,398,519.20, and we re ba sed on re cords seized by the FB I and I .R.C. § 4401, which imposes a two perc ent excise tax on t he g ross amount of illeg al wag ers acc epted by a person “who is e ng ag ed in the business of acc epting wag ers.” Since the n, the Go ve rnme nt l os t the se ize d re c or ds and the re fo re wa s una ble to p re se nt t

he m to su bs tanti a te the a c c ur a c y

of its a sse ssm e nts
. Hammon ent ered another plea a g ree ment in 2005, pleading g uilty to: (1) possession of
coca ine with the intent to distribute; (2) conductingan illeg al g ambling busine ss during 2003 and 2004; (3) tax evasion with respect to the Gove rnment’s 1995 wa g eringexcise tax assessment; and (4) money launder ing. Following the g uilty plea, the district c ourt sentenc ed Hammon to concurre nt sentenc es of 87 months and 60 months, and orde red H ammon to pay $2.39 milli on in restitution. The Gove rnment filed a

civil complaint ag ainst Hammon later that y ea r t o rec over ta x es owed. In the civil case , the district court denied both pa rties’ cross-motions for summar y judgme nt
on the a c c ur a c y

of the Go ve rnme nt’ s tax ass essm e nts , a s w e ll a s th e Go ve rnme nt’ s mo tio n to
rec onsider. Af

ter trial, the jur

y foun d in favor of

the Gover

nment in the amount of $450,869.00. The district court denied the Gover nment’s m otion for judgment as a matter of law a s to the amountNo. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 3 of ta xes o we d. Sub se qu e ntl y , th e Go ve rnme nt f ile d a mot ion to m od if y and cla ri fy jud g me nt i n order to specify

that the jury

awa rd did not in clude statutory interest, which the district court then de nie d. Th e Go ve rnme nt n owa pp e a ls. At is su e in the pr e se nt c a se is w he the r t his Court sh ou ld overturn the $450,869.00 jury verdic t and judg ment for taxes owed in Ha mmon’s civil case. I I . Summary

J udg ment The Gover

nment claims that the district c ourt err ed as a matter of la w in denying its motion for summary

judgme nt in its civil case by : (1) shifting the burden of proof for the ac cura cy of the tax assessment bac k to the Gover nment and (2) ref

using to find that Ha

mmon was judicially

estopped fr om d e nyingthe c or

re c tne ss o f t

he a sse ssm e nts
. A. Standard of Review The de nial of summary

judgme nt is reviewa

ble af ter a trial on the m erits where the que stion is purely a question of la w. Paschal v. Flagstar Bank , 295 F.3d 565, 572 ( 6th Cir. 2002); McPhe rson v. Kelsey , 125 F.3d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 1997)

. Where the denial of summary judgme nt is based on a qu es t ion of law, this Court review s the dec ision de novo

. McM ullen v. Me ijer, Inc. , 355 F.3d 485, 489 ( 6th Cir. 2004). The a lloc ation of the burde n of proof is ge nera lly

a question of law

. Fuji Kogyo Co. v. Pacific Bay I

nt’l , 4 6 1 F. 3 d

6 7 5 , 6 8 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Fi rst Te nn . Ban k Nat . Ass ’n v . B arre to , 268 F.3d 319, 326 (6th Cir. 2001)). When the questi on is whether a presumption has been re butted, fac tual issues are re v i ewed for c lear err or. United States v. W alton , 909 F.2d 915, 919 ( 6th Cir. 1990). Mer e g ener al denials, howeve r, are considere d questions of law a nd there fore revie wed de

novo . W illiams v. United States , 4 6 F
. 3 d 1 1 3 2 , 1 9 9 5 WL 2 1 4 3 1 , * 4 ( 6 th Ci r . Ja n. 19, 1995)No. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 4 (unpublished) (“ Where a mere g ener al denial of corr ectne ss i s o ff

ere d, without supporting documentar

y evidenc e, the f

inding of failure to rebut is one made as a matter of law , and thus, ca n be re viewed de novo .”). A district court’s a

pplication of judicial estoppel is re viewed de novo

. Browning v. Levy , 283 F.3d 761, 775 ( 6th Cir. 2002). Be ca u s e “‘ [ p ] l ea a g ree ments are contra ctual in nature ’” a nd the interpre tation of contracts ar e questions of law , “a district c ourt’s construc tion of a plea ag ree ment pr e se nts a qu e sti on of law w hic h th is [C]o ur

t r e vie ws de novo .” Uni ted States v. Fitch , 282 F.3d 3 6 4 , 3 6 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Robison , 924 F.2d 612, 613 ( 6th Cir. 1991)). B. Burden of Proof The Gove rnment conte sts the district court’s d etermination that the Government bor e the burden of proving the ac cura cy

of its tax assessment ag ainst Hammon. I n g ener al, the Gove rnment is awar ded an initial presumption of cor rec tness for its assessment, plac ing the burden of disproving such assessments on the taxpay er. Un ite d Stat es v. B esa se , 623 F.2d 463, 465 ( 6th Cir. 1980). The Gover nment, howeve r, “c an neve r re st its case on an a ssessment that lacks a minimal evidentiary foundation.” W

alton , 909 F.2d at 919. Where a ta x pay er must make a “neg ative asse rtion,” i.e., a sh ow ing that the ta xpay e r did no t in fa c t earn inc ome that th e I RS c la ims he e arn e d, “ [r]e a so na ble denials of the a ssessment’s validity have suf fice d in s u ch ca s es to shift the burden ba ck to the g overnme nt.” Be

sa se , 6 23 F .2 d at 46 5; accord W alton , 9 09 F .2 d at 91 8. Th is C ir c uit ’s ‘r e a so na ble de nia l’ ru le wa s c re a te d to a vo id i nf ri ng ing up on a taxpay e r’ s F if th A me ndme nt p ri vil e g e a g a ins t self-inc rimination. Be

sa se , 623 F.2d at 466. Thus, wher e a taxpay er is f ace d with the “imprac ticality and inequity ” of proving a neg ativeNo. 064607

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. Pag e 5
asser tion, the burden place d on the taxpay er is conside rably lessened. Id. a t 46 5; accord W alton , 909 F .2 d at 918 -1 9. Va g ue and g e ne ra l de nia ls o f t

he a c c ur a c y

of the Go ve rnme nt’ s a sse ssm e nt, howeve r, ar e insuffic ient to constitute a rea sonable de nial. W alton , 909 F .2 d at 9 22 (a

“ va g ue de nia l, wh ic h w a s mo dif

ie d momen ts later

wh e n [th e ta xpay e r] a c kn ow le dg e d th a t B I RA did ow e him $2 4, 00 0, wa s c e rt a inl y

no t su ff ic ie nt t o me e t th e de fe nd ant’ s b ur de n o f p ro du c tio n” ); W illiams , 1995 WL 21 43 1, a t *4 (t

he ta xpay e r’ s “ g e ne ra l de nia l of the a c c ur a c y

of the a sse ssm e nt i s in su ff

ic ie nt t o rebut the pr esumption of corr ectne ss as a matter of law.” ). He re , th e Go ve rnme nt co nte nd s tha t H a mmo n’ s te sti mony wa s to o v a g ue and

c on c lus or

y to
c on sti tut e a

re a so na ble de nia l and

jus tif y sh if ti ng th e burd e n o f p ro of

ba c k o nto the Go ve rnme nt. Hammon ar g ued, duringthe district court he aring , that he would have neede d to have e arne d $1.6 milli on per month in order to me rit the $2.39 milli on in ta x es assessed by the Gover

nment, which
wa s c a lc ulate d a s tw o perc ent of Ha mmo n’ s mo nth ly

sa lary . A s to the a c tua l amou nt e arn e d in J anuar y 1986, Hammon testified: Q. I n J anuar

y of 1986, did y ou acc ept during the month of J anuar y , 1 9 8 6 , $1 mil lio n o r $ 2 mi lli on

in b e ts? A. No . N o, sir , I

did no t. Q. Ho w m

uc h d id you

a c c e pt? A
. I c an ’ tr e a l l y t e l l yo ul e g i t i m a t e l y. Q. Why

can’ t y ou rea lly

tell me leg itimately ? Iwant y ou to be leg itimate. A. I t’ s 2 0 y e ars a g o, Numbe r 1. An d ho w c ou ld I po ssi bly re me mbe r w hat I did 20 y e ars a g o? And

the numbe rs are ou tr a g e ou s. Q. Why

are the numbe rs ou tr a g e ou s? Why wo uld y ou sa y that? A. Be cause it’s a million dol lars, million plus in one month, that’ s $250,000 a we e k. Th a t’ s a

lot of mon e y . N o, Ine ve r d id t hat ki nd of – in that –

. . . Q. Did y ou ever

ag ain see the re cords that we re se ized? A. No, sir.

. . .No. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 6 Q. Did y ou ever ask in this lawsuit to see the re cords that we re se ized? A. Ye s, sir

– y e s.

. . . Q. After

that, did y ou ever

see the rec ords that wer e seized? A. No, sir.

. . . Q. Well, Mr. Ha m m on, let me ask y ou this. W hat kind of bets did y ou acc ept during , let’s say , J anuar

y of 1986? A. I t was a longtime to go ba ck and r eally – not enoug h to be conf

used. Q. Wel l – A. I n 1986, I– Itook some bets, a thousand or two a g ame.

. . . A. Ihave a

lot of g uy s that bet $50 a g ame. F ro m th is t e sti mony , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d th at be c a

us e Ha mmo n “ fa c e s sp e c ia l pr ob le ms challeng ing the acc urac y of t he asse ssments as the United States lost or ref uses to deliver the seized
re c or ds us e d to c a lc ulate the a mou nt of the a sse ssm e nt, ” Ha mmo n’ s tes tim on y me t th e re a so na ble denial re quirement. United States v. Hamm on , No. 1:05-CV-2282, 2006 WL2468357, at *3 (N.D

. Ohio Aug . 25, 2006) (unpublished). Whether Hammon met the s t an d ard f or a r easona

ble denial is a que stion of fac t, and the district court did not clea rly err in finding that Hammon had suc ce ed ed i n s hifting the burden of proof ba ck to the Government. Although rea sonable mi nds could diffe r, Hammon’s testimony was not vag ue or c onclusory ; Hammon’s denial was based on his perc eption of the proba ble inacc urac y of a c alculation of w hat the Gove rnment cla imed he had be en making as a bookmaker seve nteen y ear s ear lier. Since the G overnme nt had lost all recor ds upon which its assessment was based, it wa s imp ra c tic a l and

ine qu ita ble to r e qu ir e Ha

mmo n to pr od

uc e do c ume nts or

oth e r e vid e nc e to p ro ve his neg ative asse rtion. Moreove r, “[b]ecause of its unique opportunity

t o j u d ge the de meanor

of wi t n esses, we acc ord par ticular de fer ence to the district court’s finding s based on a ssessments ofNo. 064607

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am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 7
cre dibilit y .” W

alton , 909 F.2d at 919 (re ly ing on the di strict court’s finding of fac t that the taxpay er had fa iled to meet his burden r eg ardingthe ac cura cy of the tax assessments at issue). The Gove rnment fur

ther c ontends that the district court e rre d in findin g t h at Hammon’s testimony constituted a reasonable denial because , acc ording to the Gover nment, his testimony

was contra dicted by

(1) a dmissions in his 2005 plea ag ree ment and (2) the 2005 re s t i t ution order. As stated above , such finding s of fa ct ar e re viewed f or cle ar e rror . “A f

actua l finding wi l l only

be clea r ly e r r o n e o u s w h e n , a lt

h o u g h th e r e ma

y b e e v id e n c e to s u

p p o rt it , th e r e v ie w in g c o u rt o nthe entire evidence is left with the def inite and firm convic tion that a mistake has bee n committed.” United Sta t es v. Oliver , 3 9 7 F. 3 d 3 6 9 , 3 7 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. NavarroCamacho , 186 F.3d 701, 705 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). “Where t h er e are two permissible views of the evidenc e, the f

actf inder’s c hoice betwee n them cannot be clea rly err oneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessem er , 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S. C t. 1504, 84 L . Ed. 2d 518 (1985). The e vidence highlig hted by the Gover

nment is insuff

icient to me rit reve rsal for c lear err or. F ir st, the Go ve rnme nt c la ims that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in f ind ingthat H a mmo n ma de a re a so na ble denial of a ccu ra cy

of the Gove rnment’s tax assessment bec ause H ammon’s 2005 plea a g ree ment direc tly contra dicted his later testimony

. His 2005 plea ag ree ment, howeve r, only stipulated that he willfully attempted to eva de and de feat the excise tax due, not that the $2.39 million figure was
a c c ur a te . T he a

pp lic a ble se c tio n o f t

he ple a a g re e me nt s ta te s: On September 29, 1995, HAMMON was assessed by the I nternal R ev enue Service approxi m ately

$2.39 milli on in wag eringexcise tax es as a conseque nce of failing to reg ister hi s g ambling enterpr ise with the I RS, and failing to obtain the $500 occupational wag eringstamp and failing to pa y monthly excise tax es of two pe rce nt of g ross wag ers acce pted by his illega l g ambling business from on or about JanuaryNo. 064607

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am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 8 1, 2986 throug h on or about Nove mber 30, 1988.

On J uly 8, 1996, the I RS filed f

eder al tax liens totaling a

pproxi mately

$2.39 milli on. F ro m No ve mbe r 19 88 thr ou g h Se pte mbe r 26 , 20 04 , HA MMO N, wi llf ull y attempted to eva de and de feat the pay ment of a la

rg e par t of the excise tax due and o wi n g by him to the United States of Americ a for the ca lendar

y ear s 1986 through 19 88 in the a mou

nt of a pp ro xima te ly

$2 .3 9 mi lli on

by tr ans fe rr ingtit le to r e a l e state he ow ne d in to t

he name of a no min e e , by a tte mpt ing to p ur c ha se a c on do min ium

in such a ma nner that his name would not be re veale d on the public re cord, by cashing chec ks at a ba

r rather than at a ba

nk, and by

transac ting business in ca sh rather then [sic ] by us ing ba nk a c c ounts
. As the district court c oncluded, this plea a g ree ment included only an ad mission t hat Hammon willfully avoided taxes assesse d ag ainst h im, not that the $2.39 mil lion was an a ccur ate f igur e. United States v. Ham mon , No. 1:05-CV-2282, 2006 WL 2587534, at *3-4 (N .D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2006) (unpublished). At most, the plea ag ree ment is ambiguous a s to whether H ammon admitted that the $2.39 milli on assessment was acc urate
. Given the g ener al pre sumption t hat “[a]mbiguities in a plea ag ree ment must be construed a g ainst the g overnme nt,” the district cour t did not err in f

inding that Hammon made a

rea sonable de nial despite his 2005 plea ag ree ment. Fitch , 282 F.3d at 367 (quoting United St ates v. Randolph , 2 30 F .3 d 2 43 , 2 48 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ); accord U nited States v. De brecze ny , 69 F. App’ x 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublis hed) (“The g overnme nt is held to a hig her standa rd beca use of its role a s the draf

ter of the plea

ag ree ment and bec ause it is seen a s possessing the upper hand and e x pertise in the ba rg aining proce ss.”). The Gove rnment also alleg es that the district court clea rly err ed in finding that Hammon had made a “re asonable denial” be cause the 2005 re stitut ion order in his cr iminal case ma ndated that Hammon “pa

y the total criminal monetar y penalt i es ,” including $2.39 milli on in restitution. Ho we v er, the restitution order doe s not clear ly state that the $2.39 million penalty was for taxesNo. 064607

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am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 9
ow e d. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

the re sti tut ion

or de r w e re fo r ta xes ow e d, the se nte nc ing c ourt did no t ba se the fig ure on a

ny thing other than t he Government’s unli tigated assertion that $2.39 milli on was the
corr ect amount. Restit ution orders in cr iminal procee dings f or t ax evasion do not preclude future suits over the ac cura cy

of such a ssessments. Hickm an v. C.I.R. , 183 F.3d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that “althoug h the district court may have based its orde r of restitution upon a g overnme nt witness’[s] estimate of the ta x es due f rom [the tax pay er], the orde r did not purport to be an exact and
c omp re he ns ive de te rm inatio n of wh a t [ the ta xpay e r] owe d th e I RS.” ). Thus , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did not clear ly

err in acc ording less weig ht to the 2005 restitution or der a nd finding that Hammon made

a re a so na ble de nia l of

the Go ve rnme nt’ s tax ass e ssm e nt. We, theref

ore, A FF I RM the district court’s denia l of sum mary judgme nt beca

use the district
c ourt did no t e rr on e ou sly

a c c or d th e burd e n o f p ro of to t he Go ve rnme nt. C. Judicial Estoppel T h e G o v e r

n me n t ar g u e s th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r r e d in f in d in g th a t H a mmon was not judicially estopped fr om denying the acc urac y of the Gover nment’s assessments. J udicial estoppel is an equitable doc trine that “is utiliz ed in order to pr eser ve ‘the integ rity

of the c ourts by

preve nting

a party from abusing the judicial proce ss throug h cy nical g amesmanship.’” Browning v. Levy , 283 F. 3 d 7 6 1 , 7 7 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g TeledyneIndus., Inc . v. NLRB , 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 19 90 ))

. Al tho ug h the re is “ no se t fo rm ula fo r a sse ssi ng wh e n ju dic ia l e sto pp e l sh ou ld a pp ly ,” c ourt s consider w hether : (1) a pa rty ’s later position is clea

rly inconsistent with its earlier position; (2) the pa rt y ha s su c c e e de d in

pe rs ua din g a cou rt to acce pt t hat pa rt y ’s e arl ie r p os iti on ; and

(3 ) t he pa rt y advanc ing a

n inconsistent positi on wou l d gain an unf air a dvantag e if a llowed to proce ed with theNo. 064607

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am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 10 argument. In re Commonwealth Institutional Sec. , 394 F.3d 401, 406 ( 6th Cir. 2005). We h a ve no te d, ho we ve r, tha t ju di cia l est op pe l mu st b e “ a pp lie d w ithc a

uti on to a vo id impinging on the truth-see king function of t he court beca use t he doctrine prec ludes a c ontradictory p o s it io nw it

h o u t e xa mi n in g th e tr

u th o f e it h e r s tate me n t.” Teledyne , 9 11 F .2 d at 12 18 ; se e als o Pa tri ot Cin e ma s, In c . v . Ge n. Cinema s C orp ., 834 F.2d 208, 212 ( 1st Cir. 1987) (noting that the specific require ments of judicial estoppel “ are rathe r vague and va ry from state to stat e and from circ uit to c ir c u it , ” an d

th a t “ s o me c ir c u it s an d

ju r is d ic ti o n s h a v e n e v e r

r e c o g n iz e d

th e d o c tr ine ”) (c itatio ns and

int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) . T o li mit

the do c tr ine ’s a

pp lic a tio n, we have he ld that judicial estoppel applies only when a party attempts to take “a

posi t i o n i n co n s i stent with one
succe ssfully and unequivoca lly asser ted by that same party in a n ear lier pr o ce ed i ng .” W arda v. Comm’r , 1 5 F .3 d 5 33 , 5 38 (6 th C ir . 1 99 4) . Jud ic ia l e sto pp e l is therefore gen e ra lly lim ite d to circ umstances whe re a

party asser ts a position in l itigation that is adopted by the court , gai n s an advanta g e throug h that asser tion, and then attempts to assert a clea rly opposite p o s ition in a later proce eding

. I n W arda , th is C ourt a

pp lie d judi c ia l est op pe l bec a us e War da

fi rs t pe rs ua de d a

state pr ob a te
c ourt that tit le to he r fathe r’ s land wa s ri g htf ull y he rs , and the n in a la te r f e de ra l c a se a tte mpt e d to persua de the tax court that title to the same land w as vested in he r son. Id. at 539. We concluded that ju dic ia l e sto pp e l wa s a pp ro pr ia te be c a

us e War da ha d g a ine d an a dv anta g e by a c hie vin g su c c e ss with a position that necessa rily prec luded the truth of he r later inconsistent positi on. Se e id

. I n the pre sent ca se, howe ver, H ammon did not “succe ssfully and unequivoc ally ” asse rt that the $2 .3 9 mi lli on

a sse ssm e nt wa s a c c ur a te in t he c ri min a l pr oc e e din g , n or did his a dmi ssi on

of g uil tNo. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 11 fo r t ax evasion ne cessa

rily prec lude him from later disputing the amount of the Gover nment’s assessment. The exact dollar amount of tax owed was not an element of the off ense that Hammon
was c harg ed with in the cr iminal procee ding, a nd the lang uag e of the pl ea a g ree ment failed to make
c le ar t hat H a mmo n w a s c on c e din g a g re e me nt w iththe a c c ur a c y of the I RS’ s a sse ssm e nt. Fur thermore , beca

use the Gove rnment dra fted the plea ag ree ment, it c ould ha ve made c lear that Hammon was stipulating to the numeric al ac cura cy of the tax assessment. I t nonetheless fa iled to do so. The lang uag e of the plea a g ree ment states that Hammon p led g uilty to avoiding ta x es “a s s es s edb y

t h e go v e r n m e n t i n t h e a m o u n to f ap p ro x i m at el y $ 2
. 3 9 m i l l i o n . ” T h i s l an gu age confirms only

the fact of the Go ve rnme nt’ s a sse ssm e nt, no t it s accurac y . The Gove rnment next arg ues Hammon should not have be en allowe d to contest the a ccur acy of the a ssessment beca

use he stipulated to a ba se offe nse level of 22. For a base offe nse level of 22 to apply , the offe nse at issue must have r esulted in a tax loss of bet we en $ 1 an d $2.5 milli on. Ha mmo n’ s st ipu la tio n to the of fe ns e le ve l, h ow e ve r, wa s n ot n e c e ssa ri ly inc on sis te nt w ithhis po sit ion that the $2 .3 9 mil lio n ta x a sse ssm e nt w a s in a c c ur a te , a nd his a g re e me nt t o a

ra ng e of los s betwee n $1 and $2.5 million hardly evince s an unambiguous i ntent to conce de the accur acy of the Gover nment’s assessment. Rathe r, his ag re e me nt s im p ly e v in c e s a s e ttlement of the cr iminal charg es ag ainst him based upon offe nse leve l 22. Th e Go ve rnme nt a lso fa ile d to de mon str a te that th e se nte nc ingc ourt acce pted the ac cura cy of the I RS assessment—the second pr ong of the judicial e stoppel test. Although an admission in a g uil ty ple a mig ht s a tis fy

the jud ic ia l a c c e pta

nc e fa c tor of the jud ic ia l est op pe l te st, see Lowery v

. Sto v all , 92 F .3 d 219 , 224 -2 5 (4t h Cir. 19 96 ), the se nte nc ingc ourt in t he pr e se nt c a se did

no t a dd re ss,No. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 12 much less ac cept, the a ccur acy of the I RS’s tax a ssessment. We the ref ore cannot conclude that the sentenc ing c ourt “a cce pted” Ha mmon’s “ea

rlier position.” F in a ll y , it is n o t c le ar

f r o m t h e r e c o r d th a t H a mm o ng a in e d

an y u n f a ir a d v an ta g e b y

being al l o we d t o co n t es tt h e a cc u ra cy

o f t h e G o v ern m en t ’s as s es s m en ti nt h e c i v i l p ro ce ed i n g. Al t h o u gh the cour t in the criminal proce eding noted that Hammon had taken re sponsibili ty for his cr ime, the Gover nment has fa iled to point to any evidenc e in the rec ord showing that Hammon re ceive d any advanta g e on that basis. The court did not g rant Hammon a downward departure for acce ptance of responsibility , nor did it sugg est that it was g iving Hammon any cre dit be cause he had c oncede d that the do lla r a mou nt o f t he a sse ssm e nt w a s a c c ur a te . A nd the re is no qu est ion th a t, i n th e c ivi l pro c e e d in g b e f

o r e u s , th e G o v e r

n me n t w a s a ll o w e d to f

u ll y li ti g a te th e is s u e o f th e a mo u n t of the assessment and pres en t any and all evide nce to the jur y as to both the plea a g ree ment and the
acc urac y of the e arlier

assessment. The district court ther efor e did not err in finding that Hammon
wa s n ot j ud ic ia lly

e sto pp e d f

ro m de nyingthe a c c ur a c y of the Go ve rnme nt’ s a sse ssm e nts
. I I I . J ury I nstructions Additionally , the Gover

nment claims that the district court e rre d (1) by instructing the jury that the Gover

nment bore the burden of proving the ac cura cy

of its assessments, and (2) by failing to instruct the jury

that it was requir ed to find that Hammon’s li ability to the Unit ed S tates wa s no less than $1 million. A. Standard of Review Disputes reg arding jury

instructions are que stions of law that are revie wed de novo

. W illiam

e xre l. H ar t v . P ain t V

all e yLoc al S c h. Di st. , 400 F.3d 360, 365 (6th Cir. 2005)

. The ref usal to g iveNo. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 13
a re quested instruction is revie wed f or abuse of discre tion. Id. B. Burden of Proof The Gove rnment’s a

rg ument that the ju

r y in structions err oneously

place d the burde n of proof on the Gover

nment is essentially

the same a s its ea

rlier claim that the district court e rre d in finding the Gover nment bore the burden of proving the ac cura cy

of its assessments. As explained above, the district c ourt did not err in that de termination. There fore , the district court’s jury instruction on the burde n of proof

was not in err or.

C. Li ability of At L east $1 Million As stated above , the dist ri ct cour t’s failure to give a jury instruction and spec ial interrog atories that the jury was require d to f ind that H ammon’s tax l iabilities were no le ss than $1 milli on is reviewe d for a buse of discr etion. “A tria l court has br oad discre tion in drafti n g jury instructions and does not abuse its discretion unless the jury ch ar ge ‘f ail s to acc urate ly

ref lect the law.’” Un ite d S

tat es v . B e aty , 2 4 5 F. 3 d

6 1 7 , 6 2 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g United St ates v. Layne , 19 2 F .3 d 5 56 , 5 74 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ). I nd e e d, a jud g me nt w ill on ly be re ve rs e d if “ the ins tr uc tio ns , viewed as a whole, wer e confusing, misl eading , or pre judicial.” Id. at 6 2 2 (q u o t i n g United States v. Harrod , 168 F.3d 887, 892 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). Th e Go ve rnme nt c on te nd s th a t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d by a c c or din g no pr e c lus ive e ff e c t to the 2005 plea ag ree ment which resulted in sente ncing Hammon base d on an assumed ta x loss of at le a st $1 mil lio n. I n e sse nc e , the Go ve rnme nt argue s that Ha mmo n sh ou ld have b een colla te ra lly estopped fr om presentingevidenc e that he ow ed less than $1 million i n taxes. Col latera l estoppel is applicable to issues litigated in criminal ca ses, eve n if by virtue of a g uilty plea. Gray v . Comm’r ,No. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 14

The 2005 plea

ag ree ment stipulated that Hammon would “not re quest a sente nce lowe r 2 than the advisory

SentencingGuidelines ra ng e.” T he base offe nse leve l awar ded wa s 22, which corr esponds to a tax loss of more than $1,000,000. U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1. Although this is evidenc e that Hammon may

have ow ed the Gove rnment more tha n $1,000,000 in unpaid taxes, thi s issue was not fully

litigated, a

nd the plea a g ree ment does not evince a cle ar intent on the pa rt of Ha mmo n to se ttl e the qu e sti on of the a c c ur a c y

of the ta x ass e ssm e nt. 7 0 8 F. 2 d 2 4 3 , 246 (6th Cir. 1983). “The doctrine of collater al estoppel ope rate s when thre e require ments are met: (1) the issue in the c urre nt action and the p ri o r ac tion are ide ntical; (2) the issue was a ctually

litigated; a

nd (3) the issue w as nec essar y and es s ential to the judg ment on the merits.” Be aty , 245 F.3d at 624. Her e, collate ral estoppel is ina pplicable beca

use the issue in the criminal ac tion differe d from the issue in the cur

rent suit. I n Hammon’s cr imi n al ca s e, the que stion was whether Hammon
a v o id e d taxe s d

u e . T h e a c c u r a c y o f th e I RS ’ s a s s e s s me n ts w a s n o t n e c e s s ar y an d e s s e n ti a l to the cri mi n a l c a s e . I n c o n tr a s t, th e c iv il c a s e c e n te r s o n th e a c c u r a c y o f th e G o v e r n me n t’ s tax 2 assessment, a que stion that was neither c losely nor cle arly

evalua t ed during Hammon’s cr iminal proce eding s. The district cour t’ s ref usal to instruct the jury

that they must find Hammon’s tax liability to be at lea st $1 milli on, there fore , did not inaccur ately ref lect the law . Moreove r, it is not evident that the Gove rnment wa s substantially prejudice d by

the re fu s al to give the re quested ins tr uc tio n, a s th e Go ve rnme nt w a s sti ll a llo we d to pr e se nt e vid e nc e of Ha mmo n’ s p le a

a g re e me nt, along with a

ny other evidentiar

y support for the acc urac y of its a ssessment. The district c ourt thus did not abuse its discretion in ref using to issue the G overnme nt’s proposed jury instructions on H a m m o n ’ s m i n i m u m l i a

b i l i t y. I V. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of L awNo. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 15 Th e G o v e r

n m e n t a l s o c o n t e s t s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s d e n i a l o f i t s m o t i o n f o r j ud g me nt a s a matter of la

w. A. Standard of Review The de nial of a motion for judg ment as a matter of law(“JMOL ”) or a re newe d motion for judgme nt as a matter

of law is re viewed de novo

. H.C. Smith Invs., L.L.C. v. Outboard Marine Co. , 37 7 F .3 d 6 45 , 65 0 (6 th Cir

. 20 04 ). A JMOL may be g ra nte d wh e re “ the c ourt fi nd s that a re a so na ble jury would not have a l eg ally sufficie nt evidentiar y basis to find for the [ non-moving ] party .” F ed. R. Civ. P . 50(a) (1). The re is no leg ally sufficie nt evidentiary

basis for a

particula r finding if “the fac ts a re sufficie ntly clea

r that the law re quires a pa rticular r esult,” W

eisgram v. M

arley , 5 28 U. S. 440, 448, 120 S. Ct
. 1 0 1 1 , 1 4 5 L . Ed. 2d 958 (2000) ( quoting 9A C. Wrig ht & A. Miller, F eder al Pr a c tic e & Pr oc e dure § 2 52 1, 24 0 ( 2d e d. 19 95 )) , o r “ if in v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the non- moving pa rty , there is no ge nuine issue of mate ri al fa ct fo r t he jury , and
rea sonable minds could come to but one c onclusion, in f avor of the moving party .” Gray v . Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc

. , 263 F.3d 595, 598 ( 6th Cir. 2001). B. Discussion The Gove rnment conte nds it is entit led to judgme nt as a matter of law on H ammon’s tax
a sse ssm e nt b e c a

us e (1 ) H a mmo n f

a ile d to pr e se nt s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to c on sti tut e a “ re a so na ble d en i al ” of the Governme nt’s tax assessments and (2) the district c ourt err ed in not finding that Ha mmo n w a s ju dic ia lly

e sto pp e d f

ro m de nyingthe a c c ur a c y of the Go ve rnme nt’ s tax ass e ssm e nts
. Both of the Gover

nment’s concerns as to the suffic iency of Hammon’s denial and the district c ourt’s ref usal to a pply the doctrine of

judicial estoppel wer e discussed above . Be cause Hammon pre sentedNo. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 16 sufficie nt evidence under the circ umstances to constitute a r easona ble denial a

nd the district court did not err in re fusing to ap p l y j u d i ci al estoppel, the district cour t did not err in re fusing to gr ant J MOLto the Gover

nment afte r the jury fo u n d Ha m m on liable for tax es in the amount of $450,369.00. V. Statut or y I nte re st Finally , the Gover

nment claims that it is entitl ed t o s t atutory interest on the jury

awa rd pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6601. A. Standard of Review Questions of statutory

interpre tation are revie wed de novo

. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. H igh Sch. Athletic Ass’n , 459 F.3d 676, 680 ( 6th Cir. 2006), c e r t. denied , 127 S. Ct . 1912 (2007). L ikewise, the a

war d of intere st on a judg ment is reviewe d de novo if that deter mination is based on statutory interpre tation or leg al analy sis. Bangert Bros

. Constr. Co., Inc. v . Kiewit W . Co. , 310 F.3d 1278, 1297 (10th Cir. 2002). B. Discussion Section 6601(a) of the Interna l Revenue Code require s that “[i] f any amount of tax im posed [by the I nte rn a l Re ve nu e Cod e ] is n ot p a id o n o r b e fo re the la st d a te pr e sc ri be d f or pa y me nt, int e re st
on su c h amou

nt .
. . sh a ll b e pa id f

or the pe ri od

fr om s uc h la st d a te to t

he date pa id. ” Th a t in te re st
acc rues from the date of assessment to the date of pay ment. Un ite d S

tat es v . S ar ub in , 507 F.3d 811, 814-15 (4th Cir. 2007). B eca use the amount o f i n t er est is a matter of law, not of e vidence , the Gover nment does not have to assert or pr ove the amount of interest at trial. Id. a t 81 5; United States v. Schroe der , 900 F .2 d 114 4, 11 50 n. 5 (7t h Cir. 19 90 ); Ghandour v. United States , 37 Fe d. Cl. 121,No. 064607

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . D av id L . H

am mo n, Sr

. Pag e 17 124 n.11 (1997). The jury verdic t form re ad: “We, the Jury . . . find t h e i s s u es i n this case in fa vor of the plaintiff, the United States of A meri ca , an d ag ainst defe ndant, David L . Hammon, Sr., and a war d taxes, penalties and intere st to the plaintiff in the amount of: . . . .” The district cour t determined that be c a us e “ the jur

y ve rd ic t e xplic itl y c on te mpl a te d pe na lti e s and int e re st in a dd iti on to [H a mmo n’ s] tax l iability ,” ther e wa s no need to modify the jury awa rd to include intere st. Howeve r, the district court c onfused the issue of fact determined by the j ury with the issue of law to be deter mined by the
c o u rt
. T h e i s s u e o f

f a c tw a s t h e a c c u r a c y a n d

a c tu a l a m o u n to f

H a m m o n ’ s a s s e s s e d

t a x l i a b i l i t y, wh ic h in c lud e d th e int e re st fr om e a c h o f t he 35 mon ths fo r w hic h a n a sse ssm e nt w a s ma de a g a ins t Ha mmo n. I n c on tr a st, the Go ve rnme nt i s st a tut or ily e nti tle d to a di ffe re nt t y pe of int e re st, unassessed inte re s t , wh i ch accr ued fr om the September 29, 1995, a ssessment date until the

a sse ssm e nts are pa id. 26 U. S.C. § 6 60 1; Sa ru bin , 507 F.3d at 815 (intere st pursuant to § 6601 may be collec ted in addition t o t h e amount aw arde d in a common law a ction to collect taxes owed). Thus, the district c ourt’s interpre tation of the jury verdic t and re fusal to awa rd intere st was incorr ect
as a matter of law. We the ref ore AFF I RM the jury verdic t, but we REVERSE a s to the aw ar d of interest pursua

nt to 26 U.S.C . § 6601 and REMAND f or the e ntry

of jud gm ent t o include such int e re st.