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SUDAN: U.S. POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 29, 2009

Serial No. 111–71

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

NOELLE LUSANE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

SHERI RICKERT, Republican Professional Staff Member 

ANTONINA KING, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Roger P. Winter (former United States Special Representative on Sudan 

to Deputy Secretary of State) .............................................................................. 6

The Honorable Richard S. Williamson, Partner, Winston & Strawn LLP 

(former Special Envoy to Sudan and Ambassador to the U.N. Commission 

on Human Rights) ................................................................................................ 13

Mr. John Prendergast, Co-founder, Enough Project ............................................. 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Roger P. Winter: Prepared statement ............................................................. 10

The Honorable Richard S. Williamson: Prepared statement ............................... 16

Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement .......................................................... 30

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Statement ............................................................................ 58

(1)

SUDAN: U.S. POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 

OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 6:20 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me first of all express my appreciation for all of 

you who have so patiently waited. It shows how important and how 

much interest there is in Sudan and the United States policy implementations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which is 

the subject for this hearing today. 

As you know, there was a chemical situation in the Longworth 

Building and, therefore, not allowing you to go in. So we fortunately were able to get here, but we don’t have everything that we 

would normally have. 

However, we will move forward. Let me first of all, welcome all 

of you here to this very important and timely hearing on Sudan. 

Let me also express my deep appreciation to the witnesses, who are 

certainly among the most knowledgeable people on Sudan. Friends 

of Sudan, this coming Friday marks the fourth anniversary of the 

untimely death our good friend, the late der John Garang. 

Let us also remember a number of other good friends who died 

on that crash, including a Commander Ali. 

Despite the many efforts made over the years to bring about a 

just and lasting peace in Sudan, the people of Sudan continue to 

suffer under the brutal dictatorship of the NCP government. The 

people of Sudan and the international community sincerely hoped 

that the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would 

bring about the much desired goal of peace and security. The hope 

and expectations of the Sudanese have been crushed repeatedly by 

a regime at war with its own people. It was just 1 year ago that 

the NCP militia burned the town of Abyei. 

For some observers and U.S. policy critics, the U.S. policy is too 

focused on punitive measures they say. The fact of the matter is 

if one looks closely at our policy over the past two decades, the U.S. 

has never disengaged in its activities. That is why we have had 

more special envoys appointed to Sudan than any other country in 

2

Africa. In the last 5 years alone we have had five different special 

envoys to Sudan. 

For those who pushed for a policy of appeasement, believing that 

there are some moderates within the NIF government, it has been 

proven wrong many times. It is important that we don’t confuse a 

policy of appeasement with that of engagement. Moreover, a policy 

of engagement without pressure will not work. 

During the 21-year civil war in South Sudan, the United States 

provided humanitarian assistance but also maintained a relationship with successive governments in Sudan. We are helping the 

people of Darfur, yet we have failed to end their suffering. We continue to push for a peace agreement in Darfur, yet we have ignored 

the plight of the 2 million displaced. In fact, the United Nations officials and some U.S. officials are saying that, since fewer people 

are being killed now, conditions have improved; there is no longer 

genocide. 

In Rwanda, an estimated 1 million people died in less than 100 

days, 15 years ago. We did not even want to call that genocide by 

its rightful name, let alone intervene to end it. And we all remember that and those of us—Mr. Smith and others that were on the 

committee—agonized during that period. I said a few years ago, if 

Rwanda was a black mark on our conscious, Darfur is a cancer that 

will destroy the moral fiber of our society. 

Unfortunately, we have some people ready to embrace the same 

criminals and killers who committed these atrocities in Darfur, 

South Sudan and other parts of the country. In fact, a man who 

led the NCP delegation to the CPA conference here in Washington 

last month is the same man who was not allowed to enter the 

United States for many years for security reasons. He is also the 

same man who engaged and helped transport the terrorists who 

were engaged in the assassination attempt of Egyptian President 

Hosni Mubarak. He had the privilege to come to the United States 

last month. 

The current regime only responds to real pressure. The Clinton 

and Bush administrations imposed comprehensive economic and 

trade sanctions over the past decade. The impact of these sanctions 

are mixed. But the Government of Sudan has survived years of 

sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations. 

However, this does not mean the sanctions did not yield positive 

results. I strongly believe that the NCP is incapable of changing its 

ideology and behavior. A regime change in Khartoum could bring 

a swift end to the crisis in Darfur, help implement the North-South 

Agreement and then the regime support to extremist terrorist 

groups. 

Another important measure we should take is the strengthening 

of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, the SPLA. The Government of South Sudan is a staunch ally of the United States. The 

SPLA is a formidable force. Strengthening the SPLA could serve as 

a guarantor for peace in Sudan and the region. The SPLA is strong 

but requires support, an air defense system, and air power. 

Moreover, we should help and strengthen other democratic forces 

in Sudan. Most important, we must not ignore the importance of 

accountability to a just and lasting peace. Without justice, there is 

no peace. 

3

I welcome our distinguished panel, Roger Winter, Richard 

Williamson, John Prendergast and Pa’gan Amum Okiech, and 

thank them for joining us today, especially Mr. Okeich for travelling all the way from Sudan to be at this hearing. 

I will dispense from reading of the bios because of time, and secondly, they are not here. They are at the other site. So, with that, 

I will now turn it over to our ranking member, Mr. Smith, for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing on the critical and timely issue of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We are again at a very sensitive period in the implementation of this agreement of peace. Not only in 

the north and south of the country, but also in Darfur and throughout the region depends on this success. The stakes in having a 

clear and coordinated U.S. policy with respect to Sudan could not 

be higher. 

We are dealing with a regime that has been in power following 

a coup d’e ́tat in Khartoum now for 20 years. And we are threatened 

with the possible unraveling of the CPA signed in 2005 in a war 

in which some 2 million Sudanese were brutally killed and 4 million displaced in the south. 

Following that aggression, General Omar Hassan Bashir turned 

his wrath on the innocent people of Darfur and has inflicted some 

300,000 to 450,000 deaths and displaced another 3 million from 

their homes. Just last evening, I am happy to say, the House 

unanimously passed a resolution recognizing the 5th year since the 

declaration by the United States Congress of genocide in Darfur. 

And, of course, it was bipartisan, and it was unanimous. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I met with President Bashir personally in Khartoum. His attitude was incredibly cold, harsh, and calculating. And his only concern, only concern in an almost 2-hour 

meeting, was in pressuring the United States to lift the sanctions. 

I asked him, Mr. President, when was the last time—let me correct that—when was the first time you visited the camps in Darfur 

and saw the unspeakable suffering that people were enduring as 

a result of your enabling of the Janjaweed? 

I have also met the deeply grieved refugees in Mukjar and 

Kalma camps. And they desperately need the United States to play 

a leadership role in rescuing them from their tragic situation. 

Therefore, we urgently need an informed coherent strategy to motivate the parties to honor their respective obligations and to implement the CPA. That strategy must be in the context of a border 

policy with respect to increasing the capacity of the Government of 

South Sudan in anticipation of the 2011 referendum. 

I and others here in Congress are actually awaiting that strategy 

from the administration, and hopefully soon they will be here to 

testify in open meeting to give us that information. It is also apparent that we cannot resolve the complex situation of the Sudan 

alone. China is recognized as the only government capable of exerting meaningful influence over the regime in Khartoum. Beijing has 

invested more than $10 billion in Sudan and imports between 60 

and 70 percent of Sudan’s total oil production, is engaging oil exploration in Sudan, and is Sudan’s most prominent and most important economic trading power. And yet China has failed to use 

4

its economic and diplomatic leverage with Sudan to compel the regime to abandon its genocidal policy in Darfur or to take meaningful steps to implement the CPA. 

As a matter of fact, it has been complicit; it has been the enabler 

in chief of genocide. And this week, I am sorry to say, at least it 

was in public if they did, as U.S. officials met with the Beijing representatives discussing monetary issues and economic issues, 

where was the discussion on Darfur and what China ought to be 

doing and could be doing, even this late in the game, if it wanted 

to mitigate some of the misery that they have had a hand in fomenting? 

Other countries and China in particular must receive a clear signal from the United States, however, that peace in Sudan is a priority. And again, I think we missed an opportunity again this week 

to clearly and unambiguously lay that before them. 

The views of our distinguished witnesses with us today, and they 

are truly distinguished witnesses, all of whom who know intimately 

the problems and have very viable solutions to recommend; they 

hopefully will be listened to not just by this committee but also by 

State Department and all players as they are involved with this 

important issue. 

So I thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I join you in apologizing 

to our distinguished panel and all here for this delay, but delay is 

not denial in this hearing, and I thank for your leadership, and we 

will go on. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Because of the lateness of the hour, I would ask other members 

who have opening statements if they would submit it for the 

record, without objection. 

And because of the lateness of the hour, we could then move into 

our first witness, who we would ask if, under the Rules of the 

House, foreign participants in many instances or representatives of 

another government or U.N. technically are briefing us. So the only 

difference is that this is—we are being briefed so that we are in 

the Rules of the House. Everything else will be the same. 

So at this time, I would ask our first witness, Pa’gan Amum 

Okiech if he would come forward and we will hear his testimony. 

Mr. Okiech, I get better as the meeting goes on.[Discussion off 

record.] 

Mr. PAYNE. Now the hearing will officially come to order. Remember, that was a briefing, just for the record again. 

And we will call the witnesses, please: Mr. Roger Winter, Mr. 

John Prendergast, and Mr. Ambassador Williamson. 

As they come forward, and they are taking their seats, I will just 

give you a little background about each one. 

Our first witness will be Mr. Roger Winter. Mr. Winter began 

work in Sudan in 1981. He served as a special representative on 

Sudan. He was a Deputy Secretary of State negotiator in Abuja on 

the failed Darfur peace agreement. He did work hard on that, 

though. 

Mr. Winter is also former assistant administrator of USAID, 

where he was a negotiator on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For over 20 years, Mr. Winter served as an executive director of the nonprofit U.S. Committee for Refugee Work in Sudan. 

5

And Mr. Winter certainly was one of the most renowned and admired experts on work with refugees. And the work that he did 

with the NGOs for those 20 years helped save the lives of many, 

many people even before he entered the government. 

So we appreciate you and all that you have done. 

Our second witness will be Ambassador Richard S. Williamson, 

who is a partner in the international law firm of Winston & Strawn 

LLP. Ambassador Williamson has a wide range of government experience. He recently completed an assignment as the President’s 

special envoy to Sudan. Earlier, he served in the Reagan White 

House as a special assistant to the President and deputy to the 

chief of staff and then on the White House senior staff as assistant 

to the President for intergovernmental affairs. 

His many diplomatic posts have included serving as Ambassador 

to the United Nations office in Vienna, Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Organization Affairs, Ambassador to the United 

Nations for Special Political Affairs, and Ambassador to the United 

Nations Commission on Human Rights. 

Ambassador Williamson received his B.A. cum laude from 

Princeton University and his JD from the University of Virginia 

School of Law. 

And, finally, we will have as our witness Mr. John Prendergast. 

Mr. Prendergast is co-founder of the Enough Project, an initiative 

to end genocide and crimes against humanity. During the Clinton 

administration, Mr. Prendergast was involved in a number of peace 

processes in Africa, while he directed African Affairs at the National Security Council and special envoy at the Department of 

State. 

He has authored eight books on Africa, including ‘‘Not on My 

Watch,’’ a New York Times bestseller that he co-authored with Don 

Cheadle. The co-authored work was named the NAACP nonfiction 

book of the year. 

With NBA stars Tracy McGrady and Derek Fisher, he co-founded 

the Darfur Dream Team Sisters Schools Program, which connects 

schools in the United States with schools in Darfur and refugee 

camps. And these NBA stars are the prime movers of that movement. 

He also helped create the Raise Hope for Congo campaign aimed 

at ending violence against women and girls in the Congo. 

Mr. Prendergast travels regularly to African war zones on factfinding missions, peace-making initiatives, and awareness-raising 

trips. And he has been in Vogue—what was that magazine? Vanity 

Fair. But will soon be seen, I believe, on ‘‘60 Minutes,’’ is it, Mr. 

Prendergast? Doing a ‘‘60 Minutes,’’ which will—he might mention 

to us when it will air. 

So he certainly is a person that we have a lot of respect for. He 

has done fantastic work involving high-profile people to help to 

raise awareness, which is always very helpful in issues like this. 

Mr. Winter? 

6

STATEMENT OF MR. ROGER P. WINTER (FORMER UNITED 

STATES SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON SUDAN TO DEPUTY 

SECRETARY OF STATE) 

Mr. WINTER. Yes, sir. Thank you both for having me here today. 

Since the statement has been submitted for the record, I won’t go 

through it all. I would like to make about five points, primarily 

about the South. 

First, I want to point out, although I think both of you know, 

who it is we are negotiating with when we negotiate with this National Congress Party team. 

All of these men have worked for Bashir since the coup in 1989. 

All of them have had dealings with American special envoys, however many that total of envoys has been. They know us very well. 

They are used to getting away with murder, because they have 

been able to do it with us over a long period of time. 

The team that was coming here was going to be led by Salah 

Gosh, at one point. And then it was decided that he is too much 

of a character, problematic, and he was set aside. The next one 

that was going to lead the team was Nafie Ali Nafie. Nafie Ali 

Nafie was the intelligence and security chief for the government in 

Khartoum at the time that Osama bin Laden got his start in 

Sudan. And we know what the consequences of that are. Well, they 

set him aside, and he didn’t come as the leader of that team. 

So we wound up with Ghazi, Ghazi Saladeen. Now, Ghazi 

Saladeen is a very slick character. I know him quite well because 

we dealt with him a great deal during the Nivasha negotiations. 

He has a terrible record that wasn’t sufficient to bounce him from 

leading the team that came here. 

I want to tell you just a quick story of my personal experience 

with him. When we were, at the behest of former Senator Jack 

Danforth, who was then the special envoy, in the fall of 2001 I was, 

in October and November and December, along with another gentleman from the State Department, left behind to work out the beginnings of what was going to be the process the U.S. engaged in 

that became the CPA. And, at a certain point, we got reports about 

a substantial number of killings within the Nuba Mountains in 

which we had negotiated a cease-fire agreement. 

So the two of us Americans went to see Ghazi, because he was 

the point person for President Bashir at the time. We went to 

Ghazi and we explained to him that we had reports that 22 men 

had been executed in the Nuba Mountains because of suspected 

sympathies with the SPLM. 

We presented the information we had to Ghazi. He sat there for 

a moment. He stroked his beard. And he said, ‘‘It is not a problem.’’ 

We said, ‘‘What do you mean it is not a problem? There are 22 

dead men.’’ He said, ‘‘It is not a problem. We have agreed with the 

Americans that we will have a cease-fire with the SPLA in the 

Nuba Mountains. That hasn’t changed. What has been killed are 

22 civilians. So it is not a problem.’’

This is the kind of splitting and misuse of words that these guys 

engage in with regularity. I say they are used to getting away with 

murder, and they continue to do so. 

The point I want to make is, with the kind of track record of people that the NCP has in its leadership, it is important to keep in 

7

mind that nobody in Pa’gan Amum’s SPLM has such a track 

record. There is no track record of killing people like that, executing people like that. There have been things that have happened 

during the war, but that is not the kind of thing that the SPLM 

leadership tolerates or agrees with in any way, shape, or form. 

Now, the problem I think we all see right now with the process 

that is going on under our special envoy is not engagement per se. 

We have to engage with Khartoum. It is the only way to at least 

try to make progress. The problem is we seem to be making love 

to Khartoum. That is the problem. 

What we see is an uneven process, an unequal process, in which 

we focus most of our attention on the National Congress Party. 

And there are very short times in which we actually engage with 

the SPLM or the Government of Southern Sudan in Juba. And so 

it is a very unequal thing. 

And the problem is that we seem to have a proliferation of carrots and potential carrots that we are prepared to offer to Khartoum, but where are the sticks? Where are the sticks? 

What we know and what you have heard a little earlier in this 

testimony is my belief that I can document that the National Congress Party, since this whole peace process began, has a perfect 

record: They have violated consistently 100 percent of the time the 

agreements that they have agreed to. 

And so, carrots are fine when there is proof of actual change of 

behavior. But sticks are also called for when they make an agreement with us or they make an agreement with the SPLM or any 

other reputable party and then they violate it. If there are no 

sticks, there will be no successful peace process. And I think that 

is a flaw that we are seeing in the process as it is moving forward 

right now. 

It is also the case that the way that the process is moving forward, it is under wraps. It is almost secretive. We don’t actually 

know clearly what is happening, what agreements are being made. 

It is not in the public view. 

And so, I think these are the kinds of problems that I see with 

the process right now. 

Now, there is a lot of talk about what the future of South Sudan 

would be. And there is, in the CPA itself, the issue of unity and 

the issue of possible separation. I think it is totally clear that there 

is no possibility any longer for unity if, in fact, the people of South 

Sudan actually get their choice, as they have been promised. 

I think Bashir and the National Congress Party have killed any 

possibility of unity. And the fact is, we only have perhaps 18 

months left before the referendum, and there isn’t time to make up 

for the misbehavior that they have already engaged in. 

So there are, in my view, only two options that are acceptable 

to the people of South Sudan. 

One is, by a free and fair referendum, they opt to become an 

independent state. If Khartoum continues to obstruct, as, for example, the National Congress Party in the national legislature has 

done, saying they will not enact a referendum law to empower and 

enable a referendum to actually happen, if they continue to do that 

kind of obstruction, I think what we are likely to see as the alterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:56 Apr 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072909\51658 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

native to a free and fair election is a unilateral declaration of independence by the South. 

I hope it doesn’t come to that. I hope the process actually works. 

But I don’t think we have any reason to believe the NCP will follow 

through on the referendum process. 

I would like to speak to the issue of the problems that are often 

cited and discussed in diplomatic circles, the problems of the possibility that if, in fact, the South chooses, by whatever means, for 

separation, that it will constitute a failed state. 

And that is put before us as a sort of threat, a reason to not pursue with vigor a free and fair referendum. But who really is the 

failed state? I want to talk about that for a moment. 

Now, in the case of the South, we have a government that has 

existed Pa’gan said 4 years, I count 55 months or so. In the 20 

years I was the head of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, I was involved in every human rights and humanitarian disaster in the 

world. I did the same thing as the Humanitarian Assistant Administrator for USAID. 

There was, coming into 2004 and 2005, no more destroyed place 

in the entire world, I am telling you—that is what my job was for 

25 years or so, is to know and understand—South Sudan was the 

most destroyed place in the world. And what you have in the South 

right now is terribly imperfect, but it is an improvement drastically 

of services to people, health services, education services, and a 

whole variety of things that they desperately need to reconstruct 

Southern society. 

So, if you have a government that genuinely intends to develop 

its population, then it seems to me, when we look at issues of weak 

governance, issues of corruption, issues of civil violence, and we 

contrast that with 3 million dead between the South and Darfur in 

war caused by Khartoum, we look at the corruption that Khartoum 

itself has engaged in—it controls virtually the entire economy in 

northern Sudan, at this point. And if we look at the issue of civil 

violence and recognize that much of the civil violence that occurs 

in the South, as Pa’gan Amum has indicated, is actually fostered 

and stimulated by Khartoum, then what, really, are we worrying 

about in terms of the South being a failed state? 

Yes, it has some corruption. Yes, it has some weaknesses in governments. Yes, there is some civil violence. None of those things 

are things that they desire. But the deaths of large numbers of people are something Khartoum has done. The corruption that has 

given them control of the economy of the north—all of those kinds 

of things are the policy of the National Congress Party. 

So there is a major difference. There is no comparison whatsoever between the weaknesses that there may exist in the Government of Southern Sudan and the policy of destruction and death 

that has been the way Khartoum has actually functioned. That is 

very important. 

They have come a long way in the South in 55 months from 

being the most destroyed country in the world. So don’t let people 

sell you a bill of goods that this is a government and a society that 

can’t make it. It can, and it is already better than the government 

that exists in Khartoum. 

9

Lastly, I would like to say that the SPLM, the people of the 

SPLM are democrats. I don’t mean Democrats versus Republicans. 

I mean democrats in the sense that they wish to have a democratic 

country. They respect the kind of approach to governance that is 

taken in the United States of America. 

And so, the point I want to make is that the kind of weaknesses 

that exist in the Government of South Sudan are weaknesses that 

can be overcome. And, therefore, what I would suggest—and I really suggest this Congress push on this—that, in the 18 months remaining, that what we do is embrace the South, we partner with 

them, we come alongside them, we help them overcome the weaknesses that do exist in the government. 

They want that to happen, and I am suggesting that we should 

want to have that to happen, too. Because, ultimately, fostering democracy and fostering the development of the civil population are 

in our interests. That is what we should do, and not worry too 

much about the phony stories that we hear about with regularity. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:]

10


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51658a-2.eps
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51658a-3.eps
13

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Williamson? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, 

PARTNER, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (FORMER SPECIAL 

ENVOY TO SUDAN AND AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS) 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the 

other members of the committee. I also want to thank Chairman 

Payne and Congressman Smith for your deep interest in this issue 

and your support for me during my tenure as the special envoy. 

I also want to take this opportunity to thank Pa’gan Amum, 

Roger, and John for what they have done; and note, since this 

doesn’t seem to be necessarily the view of the government at all 

times, that during my tenure the fact that the advocacy community, the human rights community, the humanitarian community 

were deeply involved, knowledgeable, and sometimes, to my regret, 

critical of me was a good thing. And the administration should be 

open to a full dialogue with these communities, who are knowledgeable, who bring different perspectives and different experiences, because it improves the process, just like a free and open dialogue 

with Members of Congress. 

The long North-South war was horrific. I will not go through the 

details of my written statement, which will be accepted in the 

record. But let me just touch on a few points. 

The North-South war was a great tragedy, and it was prosecuted 

with brutality. The United States worked with focus to try to advance the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Roger Winter and 

Charlie Snyder and others, with Special Envoy Danforth, did a heroic job, and it is a great achievement. 

But, like all agreements to end long, brutal, messy wars, it is imperfect. The 6-year implementation stage meant that both sides 

have plenty of opportunity to try to change facts on the ground to 

renegotiate aspects of it. And we have seen work that has been 

done, especially by the north, that has been destructive in that regard. 

The U.S. also has an interest in Darfur, and these are linked. If 

the CPA collapses, it is my opinion that there will be no opportunity for progress in Darfur. The CPA has several stress points, 

and the fundamental question is, does Khartoum intend to implement it? 

We recently had the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal in The 

Hague’s decision on the Abyei border. This was required because 

Khartoum did not live up to its commitment to accept the decision 

of the Abyei Border Commission. That being what it is, it is 

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both Khartoum and Juba have expressed their willingness to follow 

it. 

But there are problems that have not been fulfilled with respect 

to CPA implementation dealing with disarming militia, redeploying 

Sudan Armed Forces, the final border beyond Abyei, laws for the 

environment to be such that you can have a free and fair election 

in 2010, including laws to protect the right to assemble, and media 

protection laws for the referendum. 

The show-stopper, however, I would suggest, is the election, and 

we should be gravely concerned. That election was to take place in 

2009. It has already been postponed to April 2010. And the preparations are not proceeding apace to be able to have a free and fair 

election by that time. Most notably, the census, which was delayed 

and delayed and delayed again, came out with results that are 

questionable and have not been accepted by all the parties. 

We also should be concerned about the increase in South-South 

ethnic violence. And there are reasons to believe that some of this 

is being encouraged by forces in the north. This can make not only 

an election impossible, but further progress, which is needed for 

the people of Southern Sudan. 

Let me note that the Government of Southern Sudan is not 

blameless. They should work harder to spread the oil benefits by 

improving education and health, and certainly should take more 

steps on anti-corruption. Both sides should deal with the pipeline 

and refinery fee issues for post-2009. 

But these concerns, to me, just emphasize the need for the 

United States to show greater effectiveness and commitment to increase the capacity of the South. A stronger Southern Sudan will 

help the likelihood of CPA full implementation. And this means assisting in developing management capacity; economic development, 

including agricultural development; infrastructure; and, yes, also 

military. 

I believed while I was special envoy and continue to believe that 

assisting Southern Sudan to neutralize the aerial advantage of the 

north would be an appropriate and beneficial step. 

Again, the big issue is Khartoum’s intent. And we must accept 

that, for whatever reason, the actions of the U.S. Government in 

recent months have strengthened Omar Bashir. 

Engagement for engagement’s sake will not work. The NCP 

knows what it needs to do. It has made the conscious decision not 

to fully follow up on commitments. And the questions I would urge 

the committee to consider or to press the administration on: Is 

there a strategy? Is there contingency planning? What of our moral 

and political commitment to the people of Southern Sudan and 

Darfur? What is the return of our investment? 

I would mention to the committee that the U.S. taxpayers pay 

almost $1 billion a year in humanitarian assistance. The Government of Sudan is a wealthy government because of oil. Close to $9 

billion of oil exports a year. And one humanitarian expert estimated to me in Darfur, while we are giving $1 billion a year, the 

American taxpayers, the Government of Khartoum has given approximately $30 million, total, to help their own people. As one 

cynic said to me, how can they do this to their own people? They 

don’t consider them ‘‘their own people.’’

15

What about our national interest of regional stability? I think it 

was most shameful that, when the 13 humanitarian organizations 

were kicked out, we did not raise our voice louder or take actions 

against that breach of international humanitarian law; that we 

signed a two-page agreement that can be interpreted as accepting 

their right to do that. 

No one who knows what is going on in Darfur would make the 

assertion today that they have the same level of humanitarian assistance that they did before the March 5th action to expel those 

humanitarian groups. Yet that was the promise when we signed 

that agreement. What are we doing to make some accountability? 

I believe the President, the Vice President, the U.N. Ambassador 

care deeply and are committed. But the time is fast approaching 

where those who believe in helping the Darfuris and helping the 

Southern Sudanese cannot in good conscience remain silent. Like 

others, I hope and pray for progress, but real progress is required, 

not just talking the talk. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williamson follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Prendergast? 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-FOUNDER, 

ENOUGH PROJECT 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you, Congressmen Payne and Smith 

and Royce, for your unyielding commitment to peace and democracy in Sudan. And, unfortunately, my colleagues are clearly unwilling to speak their mind so that responsibility falls to me. 

It is interesting, here on this panel, that we have, I think, 

around 60 years of combined experience working on Sudan, negotiating with the Sudanese Government. Of course, I am the baby of 

the bunch. And up on the dais there, you three have 50 to 60 years 

of dealing with this regime in Sudan and experience with that. So 

I hope people will listen, you know, to us dinosaurs. Because, 

strangely, from many different directions all six of us have come 

to very similar conclusions about what needs to be done, and it is 

at great variance to the existing path that the current administration is taking. 

So I want to reinforce the consensus that I think exists in this 

room by saying very clearly that sustained pressure, leveraged by 

meaningful and focused sticks, is the principal tool that has moved 

the National Congress Party over the last 20 years to change its 

behavior during these long years of its authoritarian rule. So this 

substantial track record of empirical evidence of the value of real 

pressure makes the direction of U.S. diplomacy presently all the 

more questionable. 

In fact, Special Envoy Gration has stated on the record that 

‘‘right now we are looking at carrots and looking proactively to use 

them.’’ That is the wrong message to be sending to the NCP today. 

They will eat these carrots and continue with the deadly status 

quo. 

The voices of Darfurians, parenthetically, couldn’t be represented 

in this room today up on the table, but we have received some very 

interesting feedback from Darfurians in the camps, in the refugee 

camps that Congressman Royce and Congressman Payne and I 

both have been able to visit together, and Congressman Smith has 

been to himself. And they were uniformly alarmed at Special Envoy 

Gration’s visit and his message. 

He lectured them to be more positive about the future and stop 

complaining about the past. He lectured them about why they 

won’t handle or don’t handle the land tenure issue themselves. You 

know, most of them have lost their land, as Khartoum has pushed 

settlers into these villages that have been burned and destroyed 

and ethnically cleansed. So he strangely was telling them, why 

don’t they deal with these problems themselves. He lectured them 

that they should start going home to their villages now without any 

security. And he said that they shouldn’t wait to be saved, which 

was, of course, more of a jab to the coalition efforts back here in 

the United States, who has made repeated comments about the 

unhelpful nature of the anti-genocide movement here in the United 

States. 

These are disturbing messages, I think, to be sending people who 

have been on the receiving end of a genocide that continues by 

28

other means. So that is the critique, you know. And any one of us 

six people could go on all afternoon, but we need a constructive alternative, you know, to present to this present path. 

And I think in the context of the policy review that is very contentiously unfolding now today within the administration, the U.S. 

should spell out very clear goals. I think we need to be clear about 

five things. 

First, we need U.S. leadership in constructing a more effective 

Darfur peace process, using as a model the process that the previous administration was able to craft, and lead an international 

effort in bringing those peace talks, those long and protracted and 

difficult peace talks, complicated peace talks, to a conclusion. 

And the U.S. needs to play a lead role in this. We cannot continue to defer to a process that has clearly ground to a halt. And 

we need to lead in a way that not only puts us in the forefront of 

acting, but also acting multilaterally, with a support structure that 

involves and includes and builds international leverage and expertise and support—again, the same thing that Roger and company 

did in 2003, 2004, and 2005 to get the CPA negotiated. 

Secondly, we need U.S. leadership in supporting the implementation of the CPA. Now, it is very encouraging that this special envoy 

has refocused the interest of the United States Government on implementing the agreement that it helped to negotiate. But negotiating the implementation of a deal that has already been struck is 

different than what we ought to be doing, which is constructing an 

international coalition to pressure the parties to implement what 

they have already agreed. That is a very different paradigm. And 

I think we have gone down the wrong road by trying to negotiate 

every aspect of implementing an agreement that has already been 

reached. 

We need to structure clear penalties for non-implementation and 

then rally international support even if, yes, China and Russia will 

be opposed to us in the Security Council, but we need to rally international support for some consequence for non-implementation. 

That is how we lead, that is how this agreement might have a 

chance of being implemented. 

Third, we need U.S. leadership in supporting the democratic 

transformation of Sudan, by supporting the electoral process of 

course, but also by providing institutional support to opposition 

parties, building their capacity, and to civil society organizations 

and to the Government of Southern Sudan in building its abilities 

and capacities to govern people effectively in the South. 

Fourth, we need U.S. leadership, of course, as just to reinforce 

all my colleagues and everything anyone has said, and particularly 

what Pa’gan Amum said. We need U.S. leadership in preparation 

for the South’s referendum in 2011, which will be a make-or-break 

process for the future, not just in the South but in the entire country. 

And, fifth, we need U.S. leadership in support of accountability. 

The ICC indictment of President Bashir is a crucial opportunity to 

begin the process of ending this cycle of impunity that has fueled 

the crimes against humanity that we have seen throughout the 

South and in Darfur repeated over and over again. 

29

There is a very troubling tendency, I believe, of our current special envoy to focus on the future to the exclusion of the past. That 

is a code word that is heard very clearly in Khartoum, quite frankly. And ignoring what has happened in Darfur and what has happened in the South and sweeping it under the rug will ensure the 

return of these kinds of crimes. 

The essential word that I would repeat throughout these goals is 

U.S. leadership—multilaterally and, when necessary, unilaterally. 

That will be the enormously influential ingredient in a successful 

transformation, I think, to peace and democracy in Sudan. 

But here is the bottom line, and I want to reinforce it. Success 

will require greater leverage that what presently exists in Sudan 

today and the international community. The debate that is going 

on now within the U.S. Government rests in part, in large part, on 

the degree to which incentives or pressures ought to be favored instruments for changing the behavior of the regime in Khartoum, 

the Darfur rebels, and the GOSS and SPLM. 

It is the view, I think, unanimously of this panel and you three 

congressmen and the activist organizations that we stay all in close 

contact with and, in some cases, represent that the way forward 

should involve deeper diplomatic engagement. No one disagrees 

with that. So it isn’t like those that are supporting pressure are 

against engagement. We all want deeper U.S. diplomatic engagement in Sudan. But it is engagement that is rooted in multilateral 

pressures and the credible threat of significant consequences for 

policies or actions by the Sudanese parties that undermine peace 

efforts and lead to worsening humanitarian conditions. 

I think if the U.S. appears more interested in negotiating the implementation of the CPA, again, to reinforce that point, instead of 

marshalling the international coalition to pressure the parties to 

implement the agreement, that will send a dangerous signal that 

it is all for sale, that it can all be rewritten, like the Ethiopia-Eritrea agreement. 

So, ultimately, success will require the construction of credible 

and effective processes that allow for the achievement of U.S. goals, 

that requires us to get out in front of this glaring failure of building a process in Darfur, and construct, out of the existing elements, 

a new revitalized process that has a real chance of ending Darfur’s 

crisis. 

And we need to intensify these efforts on the CPA and back these 

efforts with the construction of a clear, multilateral consequence for 

violations or non-implementations of the deal. That is my message; 

I think that is all of our messages. There must be consequences for 

committing atrocities like genocide and what kinds of crimes occurred in the South and for anyone who undermines peace. An incentive-only strategy, like the one that is being envisioned, will 

guarantee failure. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Let me thank the three of you very much for very 

thorough testimony. 

And I understand that Ambassador Williamson will have to leave 

in 5 or 10 minutes or so. So what I might do is direct maybe a 

question to him and then ask our other two members if they have 

a question specifically for him, and then we will ask questions to 

the other witnesses. 

But I just would certainly like to make clear that it is an attitudinal problem of the Government of Khartoum. I have heard people 

say, ‘‘Well, Congressman Payne, you bring race in, and members of 

the Government of Khartoum are blacker than you in complexion, 

and therefore how can you say race is an issue?’’ And it is certainly 

not race, it is attitude, a feeling of superiority. It is sort of, ‘‘We 

are the chosen people in Khartoum, and those Darfurians came up 

from central Africa some time. And they are different, of course. 

We are certainly different from the ethnic groups in the South.’’

And so the problem, as I said to the chairman of the League of 

Arab States, is that there happens to be a feeling of superiority 

that, to me, really drives this deformed government in Khartoum. 

Because if you feel that you are better than your subjects, so to 

speak, then you will never feel that they have a right to justice. 

It is just that simple. And until that situation changes, the government’s attitude won’t change, so we will just have to do things, 

maybe, to change the government. 

The other thing—I do agree that it is convenient for the government to allow the world to feed their people, as it has been mentioned. Year-in and year-out, billions of dollars go. What is the incentive for bringing the Sudanese back to their lands and having 

to rebuild and having to support the people in Darfur and in other 

areas in dispute? And so, there is very little incentive for the Government of Sudan to come up with a solution. And that is sad, because we really have a tough job in front of us. 

But let me just ask, Ambassador at this point in time, what suggestions would you make—not saying if you were still the ambassador or the special envoy, but let me just say, what would you do 

at this time? What would be your major points? 

And, secondly, I would like to say that I really appreciated the 

cooperation that you showed and afforded me on my travels in 

Sudan when we were in places at the same time, where the administration didn’t want me and felt you shouldn’t be there with me, 

but we just happened to be there. And you welcomed me just in 

open arms, which I really appreciated. 

And also, let me say, Mr. Winter, when you gave truthful testimony, in spite of your position that, you know, there was a feeling 

that maybe you shouldn’t have told the whole truth and nothing 

but the truth. So I really commend both of you. 

So, Ambassador, could you just maybe give us some points before 

you have to leave? And then I will turn it over to my colleagues. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you. And I apologize. Based on 

the earlier timing, I made commitments back home in Chicago tomorrow morning, and the last flight will require me to leave. So, 

my apologies. 

37

Second, I would just like to comment, if I could, Mr. Chairman, 

on your analysis, which I think has truth to it, with respect to a 

feeling of superiority. 

However, I would subscribe to the views expressed by Professor 

Benjamin Valentino from Dartmouth in his book, ‘‘Mass Murder 

and Genocide in the 20th Century,’’ in which he concludes that, 

while often there have been arenas of ethnic clashes and ethnic differences, ultimately those differences had been exploited in the 

20th century by powerful people dealing with their most difficult 

problem: To stay in power. And that at least one perspective about 

the tragedies in the South and in Darfur would reflect on Professor 

Valentino’s views. 

Second, look, special envoy is a very difficult job. There is no simple answer. There is not a simple white hat/black hat situation, et 

cetera. Second, I, based on my exposure, I have confidence that the 

current special envoy is a very decent man. So I preface that because it is easier to be a critic on the sidelines, as I have seen from 

when both Roger and John would criticize me from time to time. 

Mr. PAYNE. I did, too. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, you did, too, Mr. Chairman. I will 

give you credit, yes. I don’t want to leave you out. But, as I said 

earlier, I think that is good for the process, and it helped me do 

a better job. 

I do think the concern is that President Bashir has been 

strengthened, and that will perhaps embolden Khartoum not to 

fully live up to commitments, which has been a pattern in the past. 

My view is not dissimilar to the prescription laid out by John 

Prendergast, that you have to accept that change is not going to 

happen just because you are talking. Engagement is not a strategy; 

it is a tactic. And the strategy has to be to change the game, because the party knows its self-interests and has decided to act in 

a particular way. 

And experience shows that the offer of incentives alone is insufficient to change the incentives. So you must be prepared to take 

other sorts of steps, not only yourself but the others who say they 

care and are committed and concerned, and cannot let one or two 

countries thwart you because their agenda might be driven by oil 

or something else. 

Then I would just go back to the list of items I mentioned that 

I think we can more robust in helping strengthening the South. 

Economically, in management capability, there are some very talented people in the South, but it is a relatively small group that 

are trying to do anything. In my written testimony, I say take one, 

two, three, four dozen of the talented people and have the United 

States bring them to our management and business schools for 12 

months. Help them build systems. 

And, on economic development, while humanitarian aid is important, Ameerah Haq, the coordinator of humanitarian assistance for 

the U.N. In Sudan, has said, ‘‘You know, you could cut back on 

that. Let’s start to develop their capacity for themselves.’’

And, finally, Mr. Chairman, a strong SPLA, a strong Southern 

army, will both help deter abuse from the north now and, after 

2011, allow the South to be a full partner with the north if the deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:56 Apr 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072909\51658 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cision is unity, and, if it is not unity, allow them to prosper as an 

independent country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Williamson—and let me say, all of you, tremendous 

testimonies. And, you know, George Santayana once said that 

those who don’t learn the lessons from the past are condemned to 

repeat them. And all three of you, we have three gentlemen who 

have learned lessons that, if are not heeded by the administration 

and by our new special envoy, I think could be, and I think you 

would agree, absolutely catastrophic in terms of what will happen. 

And, you know, Mr. Winter, when you mentioned that 100 percent of the time the National Congress has not honored its commitment—and you certainly were right there. You were part of that 

negotiating team. You received me so well when I went there, and 

I do thank you for that. 

Now, I know you have to leave, Ambassador Williamson, so let 

me just say a couple of things, questions. 

And I just would say for the panel, when Ambassador Williamson 

headed up our delegation to the U.N. Human Rights Commission 

in Geneva, I joined him there for approximately a week. And he 

worked overtime, night and day, to get our European friends, some 

of our African Union friends, and others to join in on the resolution. And the pushback, as people were being slaughtered, of not 

doing anything, of looking askance was appalling. 

And I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, that there—you know, it is 

almost like compassion fatigue or empathy fatigue that sets in. I 

remember when Mengistu was doing his hard, horrific deeds, the 

second time around, when the second famine occurred, people were 

saying, ‘‘Oh, we have been there. Wasn’t that resolved? Let’s move 

on, turn the page.’’ And we can’t have that, obviously. 

And I think Pa’gan Amum made some very chilling suggestions 

or observations. He admonished us not to reward the National Congress for nothing. But he also said there is an escalation, the 

alarming situation, and actually put a number on it, 79,000 AK–

47s. And we have heard numbers, but I hadn’t heard that number. 

Perhaps you all had, but I had not. 

That sounds to me—and when Mr. Winter talks about, you know, 

the free and fair ballot will probably lead to an independent state 

or a declaration, it sounds to me like Khartoum is getting ready to 

begin or initiate new hostilities. You know, it seems to me we are 

asleep at the switch. 

And you put it in a way that couldn’t be more dramatic. I think 

our policy is one of making nice with dictatorships, whether it be 

Tehran, Havana, Hanoi, Beijing, name the area, even Pyongyang. 

We talk tough. What are we really doing? But here you said we are 

making love with the Khartoum Government. That takes it to a 

new level, in terms of accommodation and appeasement, which I 

think will have catastrophic results. 

Is it your view on this escalation, Ambassador Williamson—are 

you hearing the same things in terms of an arming that could very 

39

quickly become open hostilities over and above what we already 

see, obviously, in places like Darfur? 

Mr. WILLIAMSON. I think there are contingencies being planned 

that, if they are forced into corners, violence could be spread that 

would be devastating. 

And let me also, if I could, sir, comment on your reference to the 

concern of possible empathy fatigue or compassion fatigue. I visited 

refugee camps in Latin America, Asia, Africa—not as many as 

Roger Winter. But I guarantee that most people, if they visit those 

camps today, will not come back and say, ‘‘It is not as bad as I 

thought it would be.’’ They would say it is horrific, unacceptable, 

and we must act. 

Mr. SMITH. Do I have time for another question or do you have 

to leave? 

Mr. PAYNE. I need to leave. And we want to give Mr. Royce a 

chance. 

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to let Ambassador Williamson catch his 

flight. He is going to miss his flight if he doesn’t leave. And I will 

just have one question for Mr. Prendergast. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Okay, thank you very much. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. There was hope that the international arrest warrant against the Sudanese President, against Bashir, would be the 

first step toward a pretty aggressive stance against Khartoum. 

That has not happened. And we heard Scott Gration’s remarks, or 

at least read them, of his Oslo speech, in which he said that Bashir 

would be held accountable in due time. 

And we have heard that same principle-versus-pragmatism arguments when Charles Taylor was escaping his indictment. He was 

living in cushy luxury in Nigeria at the time. And I remember 

those of us that pushed that indictment against the countervailing 

strategy that, basically, it would make a political settlement more 

difficult. 

Now, in point of fact, by getting Charles Taylor in front of The 

Hague, it seems to me that we have gotten stability, much more 

stability in Liberia than we ever would have had had we not made 

an example of him. But, you know, in this case, the political settlement argument would seem to be, on the face of it, bankrupt just 

by the fact that there isn’t any Darfur peace process to protect in 

this case. So it sort of removes that argument. 

But I was just going to ask you—you know, the administration 

has decided it will not make Bashir’s arrest warrant a priority. In 

their view, an arrest strategy mode will lock them out of negotiations. 

So, talk a little bit about the principle-versus-pragmatism argument. Are justice and the end of violence in Sudan mutually exclusive, in your view? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yeah, thank you for that thoughtful question, 

Congressman Royce. 

I think we see over and over again people advance the argument 

that justice and peace somehow are incompatible. And I have taken 

now eight trips to Darfur since the genocide began, and I cannot 

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held towns or living in refugee camps in Chad who do not believe 

that peace is not possible without justice. In other words, justice 

is an essential element of peace, because if we don’t break this 

cycle of impunity that we always talk about with some measure, 

some consequence, some cost to the commission of genocide, we are 

going to get more of it. It is just human nature. The river will flow 

in that direction. 

So I think we need to maintain that focus on the arrest warrant. 

Congress can be very helpful in enunciating that as a very important objective of U.S. policy, accountability and justice for what has 

happened and what is happening in Sudan. And we need to, at a 

minimum, as a step toward seeing that arrest warrant executed, at 

least, at the very least, isolate the person who has been indicted 

by the ICC, President Bashir. 

And remember, before someone can argue to you, ‘‘Well, we need 

to meet with him to be able to forward the peace process,’’ he was 

not materially involved in the peace process related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the North-South peace deal. That 

was a Vice President Taha-led negotiation with a number of people 

in Khartoum that were instrumental in eventually making the decision to sign on the dotted line. 

So I think that, again, using a rigorous study of empirical evidence of what this regime moves in response to—and this is one 

heck of a sword of Damocles that we can hold over their head to 

get some modification or moderation in their behavior. It is foolish, 

in fact, diplomatically foolish, to take it off the table, as we seem 

to have taken it off the table rhetorically. 

I would simply footnote all that by saying, at the end of the day, 

the Sudan policy review has not yet been finalized. So Congress 

and the activists have a tremendous chance now, at this moment, 

to weigh in with Secretary Clinton, to weigh in with Vice President 

Biden, with Ambassador Rice, all of these people who—and the 

President himself—all these people who, during the campaign and 

in their previous jobs, were strident advocates in support of this accountability, were strident advocates even in support of military action in Darfur, which isn’t even what the activists or anyone is asking for. 

We are just asking for principled engagement and pressure on 

this regime. We just want people who have made their careers in 

part on principle to live up to the rhetoric that they enunciated 

during their campaigns, during their tenures in the Senate, during 

their previous positions. And if they did so, I think we would get 

substantial movement in Sudan forward, as we all hoped the day 

after—well, some of us hoped—the day after the election in November we would see come to fruition in Sudan. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, John. 

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank Ambassador Williamson in his absence. We were in 

two different meetings on health reform, and I know the chairman 

has been in some of those meetings as well. So thank you for your 

indulgence. 

41

I just have two quick questions. 

Ambassador Winter, what is your estimation of how many people 

were killed in Sudan over the period of time when the genocide was 

declared? 

Mr. WINTER. If you are talking about just Darfur, I think the accepted number now is in the range of 400,000. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And then overall? 

Mr. WINTER. We did in 1998 and then updated it subsequently 

using demographers who had retired from USAID, a very careful 

study and a publication that documents about 21⁄2 million people 

who died during the course of the Southern war. You take 21⁄2 million, add 400,000, you are talking about 3 million people who didn’t 

need to die but did under the auspices of the Khartoum government. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Prendergast, do you agree with those 

numbers? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Without any question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is the CPA, at this time, July 29, 2009, hanging in the balance? And is there any future for the CPA? Mr. Winter and then Mr. Prendergast. 

Mr. WINTER. I think there is a future for the CPA. The question 

is, what is that future? 

And, from my perspective, the key to everything at this point—

you weren’t here when I said before—is the issue of the referendum. There are all kinds of other aspects, and I am not making light of them. But, ultimately, at this point in time, the difference between future war and future peace, to me, is producing 

and implementing a viable, free and fair referendum. 

It is my view that Khartoum has killed the possibility of unity 

in a free and fair referendum by their behavior. And there isn’t 

enough time over the next 18 months to suddenly make unity attractive when they have made it so horribly unattractive. 

And so, from my perspective, if, in fact, Khartoum frustrates the 

timely implementation of a free and fair election, it is very possible 

that the South will declare independence. They would be justified 

to do it, in my view, because they have been following and pursuing the full implementation of the CPA, and it is Khartoum that 

has not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I believe that opportunities lost may be lost 

forever. So let me ask this question of both Mr. Prendergast—and 

you were eloquently speaking to Mr. Royce’s question. I think you 

partly answered it. 

What can the administration, the United Nations, and maybe 

separately this Congress, since we are one of the three branches of 

government and have been able to characterize over the years and 

act sometimes unilaterally in terms of actions that Congress can 

take, what can we take as we sit here today? 

I will start with Mr. Prendergast first. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, the big question mark in getting to 

where Roger is talking about getting, to the referendum in 2011, 

is what the result will be of the now 6-month long policy review 

of the current administration. And I think if the result is that the 

administration pursues an incentives-only strategy with this govVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:56 Apr 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072909\51658 HFA PsN: SHIRL
42

ernment in trying to achieve our policy objectives, we guarantee 

failure. 

And so, what the Congress urgently can do now—and we don’t 

really even need a 12- or 24- or 36-month plan because there is a 

1-month plan, there is a 2-week plan, which is weighing in very 

constructively with the principals in the administration who will sit 

around the table at some point in the very near future in a National Security Council meeting, and they will arbitrate and deliberate over the memo in front of them about what U.S. policy should 

be. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. At the United Nations? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. At the National Security Council of the 

United States Government. So, James Jones will be there——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Oh, the National Security Council of the 

U.S.——

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Exactly. Vice President Biden will be there, 

Secretary Clinton will be there, and Ambassador Rice will be there. 

It hasn’t yet risen to that level yet. They have been debating this 

policy now strenuously at the deputies level. 

And so we need the people who have been champions of Darfur, 

champions of Southern Sudan throughout their Senate careers, 

throughout their private-sector careers in the case of Susan Rice, 

to be front and center in that meeting, representing a policy that 

I think will potentially be the game-changer in whether or not we 

see peace and stability come to Sudan. And that would be a policy 

that focuses on using a balanced collection of carrots and sticks, not 

an incentives-only policy, but a collection of carrots and sticks with 

credible, significant consequences for the obstruction of peace and 

for the destruction of human life. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Winter? 

Thank you very much, Mr. Prendergast. 

Mr. WINTER. I would say that we need to recognize that there 

are significant problems in the South that relate to the issues of 

corruption and weakness in governance and civil violence. 

It is time for us to surge, in terms of our involvement in the 

South. I think by increasing, escalating our presence, coming side 

by side with people in the Government of South Sudan, for example, to bolster their capacity—I wouldn’t send them out, like Rich 

suggested, send them to the United States. That is not the point. 

We need to send our people there so they get the on-the-job training, they have an American sitting next to them that helps them 

in terms of improving their financial management skills and those 

kinds of things. 

That surge on our part is something that I think this Congress 

could play a key role in precipitating and, if necessary, financing 

to some degree. I think if we did that, it would be a big stabilizer 

of the situation in the South and will actually prevent violence in 

the long run, and it will make them successful. 

This SPLM and this GOSS are fundamentally democrats. They 

want a democratic government. Khartoum is disinterested in any 

such thing. In the South, they want the development of their population. That is what we should want. And we should capture the 

next 18 months and after that to help them strengthen their capacity to manage the petroleum sector, for example, to increase their 

43

ability to detect corruption and fraud and such things and prosecute that, to bolster the policing capacity of the government so it 

can intervene properly, appropriately in terms of communal violence, which is a significant problem. 

There are many issues like that that we could assist with which 

would help stabilize the South, show Khartoum that this referendum, this new future for the South is actually going to happen. 

We are the only ones that can come alongside them with enough 

‘‘oomph’’ to actually make that kind of difference. We should not 

worry so much about appeasing the North, but make a major effort 

in strengthening the South. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So every step they make, we make a step with 

them? 

Mr. WINTER. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

We have been joined by Mr. Ellison, and I yield to him at this 

time. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And let me thank the panelists, as well. It is good to see you all. 

A few questions. First of all, I have a trip planned to Darfur on 

August 4th, and so this hearing comes at an extremely timely moment. 

Could you, Mr. Prendergast, give the committee—and, again, I 

know you have already talked about this. Forgive me for getting 

here late. We had double hearings going on. 

Can you give us the latest on the humanitarian condition of people in Darfur? What are we looking at right now? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I think what we are seeing is a very slow and 

steady deterioration. You know, we saw—and this gets to the heart 

of this big debate about whether or not it is genocide. You know, 

we saw the mass ethnic cleansing campaigns in 2003 to 2005 

where most of the villages of the particular groups that were targeted—the Fur and the Zaghawa and the Masalit—were burned. 

So they were gone. Those villages had been destroyed, and those 

people are now in camps. 

So, in those camps—and part of what some of us believe and 

have contended is genocide by attrition, or genocide by other 

means, is then the turning on and off of the tap of the humanitarian aid tap in many different ways. It is not just expelling 

NGOs. It is also, ‘‘Oh, this area, by the way, is a red zone for the 

next 2 weeks.’’ So there is no delivery of humanitarian assistance 

to these areas for a while, and then suddenly people’s nutritional 

level goes down. You see the beginnings of outbreaks of particular 

diseases, et cetera, et cetera. Then suddenly it is not a red zone 

anymore and the agencies can rush back in. So you get that tactic 

and a number of other approaches to undermining the nutritional 

and health status of people in the camps and breaking their spirit. 

And the biggest spirit-breaker and attempted spirit-breaker is a 

policy, I think, which is—and the ICC clearly agrees, in the indictment of President Bashir—is a policy of support for security elements, both official and unofficial, in other words military and 

paramilitary, of rape as a tool of war, rape as a tool of social control. 

44

It is clearly in every empirical effort to collect evidence or data 

about rapes, and often NGOs that do that are expelled. So we don’t 

know, in a lot of places, what is going on, but we have an anecdotal 

evidence that it is one of the highest rates of sexual violence in the 

world. 

So with all of these factors, we are seeing, I think, the very slow, 

steady deterioration of people’s capacities to cope with the conditions in these camps in long-term displaced environments. 

Mr. WINTER. Could I——

Mr. ELLISON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WINTER [continuing]. Suggest that some of the approaches 

being taken by the special envoy could take us in precisely the 

wrong direction. We have the minutes of meetings that he had with 

various groups of NGOs and U.N. and other international officials 

in which he is saying very forcefully: Substantial returns of displaced Darfuris must begin before the end of this year. 

NGOs and others are unitedly saying the conditions are not right 

for that, to actually force them out of camps or do whatever you 

need to do to pressure them to return. So this is an artificial goal 

line that he is setting when the realities on the ground cannot 

properly cater for that. We could actually make the situation worse 

if we went down that track. 

Mr. ELLISON. Yeah. And I may need to get with you gentlemen 

more after the hearing, because I don’t think the chairman is going 

to let me talk forever. But I do want to see if you could offer some 

views on just two more topics, which I will state right up front. 

I have been hearing and reading about greater levels of violence 

in the South. I am interested in hearing about that. 

And I am also curious to know, what about the political solution? 

Ultimately, you know, the solution is not more aid, it is not more 

aid workers. Ultimately, the solution is a political resolution in 

which the Sudanese people come to an agreement about how to 

solve their problems and live together. Could you talk about the 

North-South agreement and then the Khartoum Darfuri agreement? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. You were just there. Do you want to talk 

about the levels of violence? 

Mr. WINTER. Yeah, let me tell you how this kind of stuff comes 

about. Khartoum fosters instability. Their policies foster it. The 

most violent or, I should say, volatile place in all of Sudan, in my 

view, is this place called Abyei, which was burned to the ground 

in May of last year. All right? These people remarkably come back, 

the civilians. They all ran away. Now the largest number of them 

are back. 

How do they destabilize the population? There are lots of ways. 

Some of it is pure violence. The very people who burned the place 

down in May of last year, the officers of that 31st Brigade that did 

that, they almost all got promoted. They are right up the street 

from Abyei now, hundreds and hundreds of those same guys that 

did that. So there is an ever-present threat that this is going to 

happen again, for example. 

Or let’s take a less directly violent kind of approach that Khartoum uses. After the arbitration process began, there was supposed 

to be a budget. It is provided for in the CPA that there be an Abyei 

45

administration that is supposed to provide services to the people, 

because, for the last 3 years, President Bashir wouldn’t advance 

the requirements of the Abyei protocol, and there was no governance there at all. So there is supposed to be a government there. 

That government was supposed to operate on a fiscal year that 

began last October. They never got an appropriation. To this day, 

there is not an approved budget for that government to function. 

They did get a little bit of an advance from the government, but 

fundamentally none of the employees of the Abyei administration 

have been paid since January. 

This is the kind of, by presence and by dereliction of duty in 

terms of supporting the government structures in the South and in 

Abyei, this is the kind of way Khartoum destabilize the population. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. And I will take the second question about political solutions. 

I think that the CPA, this Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and 

the North-South deal demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt 

that a political solution in Sudan is possible if we pursue it diligently in a sustained basis, using the leverage of the United States, 

working with other countries around the world as partners, to 

bring about a peace for particular areas of the country. We need 

an all-Sudan solution focused on peace and stability. 

But to speak to the two biggest conflict zones of the country, 

Darfur and the South, very quickly—first, Darfur. We talked a little bit about this throughout the hearing, but to really kind of focus 

it, it requires a more effective peace process than there presently 

exits. 

The thing that has been going on in Doha has bled along now 

for quite some time, and it is a continuation of other processes that 

have really yielded no fruit. And, strangely, the United States, 

after having led the North-South peace process, having built an 

international coalition to bring about one of the great achievements, I think, of the Bush administration in foreign policy, we 

then didn’t do the same thing for Darfur. 

And now the Obama administration hasn’t begun with that kind 

of an objective. We basically deferred to the Arab League and deferred to other actors who are in the driver’s seat right now and 

allowed for this process to continue. And there is no reason why we 

shouldn’t be working intensively with all those partners, but the 

current process will not yield a deal, and everyone believes it, especially Darfuris. 

So the U.S., very respectfully—and everyone is pretty much waiting for us to do this anyway, just like they waited for us to do it 

in the North-South deal, is to get involved and lead the construction of a more effective process that involves all of the current players but arranges it in a way, just like we did in the North-South 

deal, where everyone has a particular role to play. Someone has to 

quarterback this; someone has to grab the ball under the center 

and diagram the play and make sure we can march downfield to 

get to the goal line. 

That is just the way peace processes work. When I worked in the 

previous administration and the Clinton administration, that is 

how you do it. You build a strategy, you get the partners together, 

and you move the ball down the field, one play at a time. And you 

46

are thinking five plays ahead, but you have to play out the existing 

one. 

So the U.S. needs to lead the construction of that process. I don’t 

know why the last administration and this administration hasn’t 

decided to do that. 

With the CPA, I think it is very clear to all of us in this room, 

up there on your dais and down here, those that are testifying, that 

it is one thing—and the U.S. has gone down a road now in the last 

few months of attempting to negotiate the implementation of the 

provisions of the North-South deal. And that is, I think, a problematic approach. 

They have already made a deal. Everyone has agreed to respecting that deal, as we saw with the latest example of the Abyei report on the drawing of the boundary, which the SPLM and the 

Government of Southern Sudan accepted even though it had altered the original judgment. But the U.S. rather should be leading 

an international effort to build clear consequences for non-implementation. 

We have 11⁄2 years left. It is literally the sprint to the finish line 

of this marathon. And if there are going to be additional major diversions away from that course that is set now by the agreement 

that both parties have signed and committed over and over to, if 

there is not a consequence for diverting from that path, by whoever 

it is, whether it is the SPLM or the National Congress Party, 

whether it is the Government of Southern Sudan or the regime in 

Khartoum, then we will fail. Then that agreement will not be implemented, and we will see a return to war between the North and 

the South. 

There needs to be international multilateral consequences for the 

obstruction of implementation of that deal. That is the role of the 

United States Government right now. 

Mr. ELLISON. Is the work that General Gration is doing now 

helping to provide a basis for the kind of structure that you have 

just identified? Or are we heading in the wrong direction? I am not 

asking you to comment on him professionally, because everybody——

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yeah, I understand. 

Mr. PAYNE. Oh, you can comment like you have been. You can 

feel free to comment. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Okay. He goaded me. Look at him. 

Mr. PAYNE. Call it unprofessional. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, I think that—first of all, I think what 

General Gration has brought is quite a significant energy. He has 

direct access to the President and to the key actors in the White 

House. And he is absolutely committed to seeing a solution in 

Sudan. 

I believe, after extensive discussions with him—and we have had 

it out in his office many times—that he has just made an incorrect 

policy analysis and, thus, a direction for U.S. Government policy in 

Sudan. 

And that is why I believe we ought to be and Congress ought to 

be investing in attempting to influence the Sudan policy review 

that the United States Government is currently engaged in, because that, then, will be the marching orders for General Gration. 

47

And it is up to Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice and Vice 

President Biden and the President himself to weigh in on the basis 

of their principles and what they have said throughout the last 10 

years of their careers about issues related to Sudan in different 

fora over and over again, so that we can see a policy that is rooted 

in what I think is a very different view than General Gration has 

of what will influence the parties to actually make the compromises 

necessary to bring about peace in Sudan. 

Mr. WINTER. Let me just say, I think he is on a very steep learning curve. He has been here, what, 5 months? The guys that he is 

dealing with in Khartoum have all been together with each other 

for 20 years. They know us very well. They don’t have a steep 

learning curve. They read us very well. 

Mr. ELLISON. You know, as I am trying to put my hands around 

the issue, I am sort of analogizing it to the work that you see Senator Mitchell doing in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It appears as 

though he is, sort of, putting foundation blocks in place so that he 

can get to a point of negotiation. And it sounds to me as though 

this same—there may not be a parallel structure going on. Do you 

understand what I am—yeah. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. What I am concerned about, at least in these 

first few months, George Mitchell had a running start there from 

3 days after, I think, the inauguration. So he has been in there 

longer. However, I don’t believe that the United States has made 

a decision—which, again, back to the policy review, what is the 

U.S. policy? And that is what Congress can influence. I don’t believe the United States has made a decision to take the lead in constructing a revitalized peace process in Darfur. 

General Gration can’t make that call. The United States Government has to decide that is our role. We have failed up till now for 

7 years or 6 years, since 2003, to do anything of any meaning or 

consequence for those people in Darfur on the political front. This 

is now time for us to lead. Now go ahead, General Gration, and do 

it. That has to be done. 

And then on the other side, on the CPA thing, I really do think 

it is a—I am not sure if you think I am on the right track here, 

Roger. Again, I think it is very laudable that General Gration has 

taken a great interest in CPA implementation. He brought the parties here to Washington, to his credit. He is indefatigable. He 

works all the time. He is traveling everywhere. 

But he has made a decision to attempt to go down—there are two 

paths you can choose, I think, in this regard, very simplistically 

and crudely. One path is you negotiate the terms of implementation. The other path is you build a coalition to demand that the 

parties implement the deal they signed. That is two different ways 

of going about business. 

And I believe that he is going down the prior road, even though 

we still have the chance to address that through the Sudan policy 

review. So I just think he has made an incorrect choice, but on the 

basis of goodwill. 

Mr. ELLISON. Can I ask a separate question off the subject? 

Again, I want to give full appreciation for the circumstances within 

Sudan. I know that there are real problems there, and I am confident of that. But Sudan is a country that is on the United States 

48

list of state sponsors of terrorism. And I just want to ask you, if 

you know, do you know if Sudan is engaged in activity that could 

legally be defined as terrorism beyond its own borders? 

Do you understand my question? And ‘‘I don’t know’’ is a perfectly acceptable answer. But if you do know, I would be happy to 

hear what your thoughts are. 

Mr. WINTER. I don’t know. 

I would say that we have a number of sanction-like mechanisms 

in place. Some of them—for example, the idea that we don’t have 

an Ambassador and we don’t have a fully functioning Embassy in 

Khartoum—are really fraudulent. There are sanctions that we can 

speak to. I don’t know how to speak to the issue of the state sponsors of terrorism. 

Mr. ELLISON. Well, the Sudan is on that list, the United States 

list. And what I am just trying to ascertain is, you know, I mean, 

if a country, any country in the world, has certain problem, let’s 

address those problems. If it does not have other problems, let’s not 

address those problems. I mean, do you understand? I am just trying to be precise. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Very, very good point. I get it. And it is a crucially important element of the strategy debate that is ongoing 

within the Obama administration. And I personally witnessed it 

when I worked in the National Security Council, even 15 or whatever it has been now, 10 years ago, that this was a live, hot-wire 

issue. 

It is clear that, after September 11, after some very significant 

representations were made publicly and privately by the United 

States and the Sudanese Government, the NCP, watching what 

was going on in Afghanistan, that they made some substantial alterations in their behavior. It had followed a number of years 

where bin Laden had been kicked out and a number of al-Qaeda 

operatives had been dismantled and taken out. 

But they have retained relationships with some of the organizations that remain of great interest to the United States and have 

dismantled and severed their relationships with others. And you 

can get, I think, a more pointed briefing from the State Department’s counterterrorism person before you leave, just so you can 

get the specifics. I mean, I would be glad to talk to you afterwards 

about it. 

But, secondly and more importantly, there is a relevant, actionable consequence for this strange evolving relationship between the 

United States and Sudan on the terrorism front. Because, 10 years 

ago, we were locked in this quite difficult relationship with Sudan 

with respect to terrorism, where we were actively monitoring their 

direct involvement in operations that led to all kinds of different 

actions, including the assassination attempt of President Mubarak 

and many other things around the world. 

Today it is a very different relationship, as you know. There is 

a great deal of cooperation between the United States and the intelligence services within the Sudanese Government, overseen by 

Salah Gosh, the architect of the John Dewey policy in Darfur. And 

so, it complicates, I think—it has complicated the Bush administration’s policies. It is complicating the Obama administration’s debate 

over its policy. 

49

And I had the fortune to be in a meeting with President Obama 

and a few Senators on the day that he rolled out General Gration 

as his special envoy before the press came in. And it was a robust 

discussion about where the policy ought to go, and I thought President Obama got it completely right. It just hasn’t been implemented the way he said it yet, because the policy hasn’t been made 

yet. 

But there was an interesting exchange between a couple of the 

Senators who are on the Intelligence Committee in the Senate, and 

they said to President Obama very clearly, ‘‘The level to which the 

Government of Sudan is offering the United States Government actionable and important intelligence for our counterterrorism efforts 

globally is overstated. And please do not allow that line of reasoning to pollute your decision-making with respect to what we 

ought to be doing in Sudan. Don’t let the counterterrorism imperative undermine the moral imperative of the United States Government’s need to engage, again, with the kind of instruments that 

will actually influence behavior, that will bring about peace in that 

country.’’ And I thought that was quite interesting. 

So there are a lot of things that Roger and I, as civilians now, 

wouldn’t have access to, in terms of intelligence. But we have been 

around the block enough times to know where things are and 

where the bodies are buried, particularly. And it is an extremely 

complicating factor, because on the one hand the Sudanese Government is cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism, 

but on the other hand they retain relationships with certain groups 

which we are much more concerned about globally with respect to 

our counterterrorism imperatives. 

So that is why they remain on the list. And they remain on the 

list because Congress has been very strong in saying, don’t remove 

these very specific penalties or pressures until we see real changes 

in behavior across the board. 

Mr. ELLISON. And, you know, I don’t know what my opinion is 

on this thing; I am still thinking about it. But I do think that it 

is legitimate for a country to say, ‘‘Because of your human rights 

record, we are going to take this particular posture with you.’’ But 

let’s do it for the reason that we are doing it and not have a bunch 

of other stuff hanging out there. 

So, I guess, it was just a question. You answered it pretty well. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Yeah, I think it is pretty clear that the same characters that are 

in place now were in place when they had a cozy relationship with 

Osama bin Laden. I mean, anyone who has followed this, Ghazi 

Salah al-Addin was the one who took the perpetrators of the murder attempt on Mubarak to Addis and, when the plan was foiled, 

personally escorted them by plane to Iran, or got them out of 

Sudan. And so he is the same guy that led and has cooperated with 

the person who is responsible for 9/11, the most dastardly act on 

our country. Those people are murderers, no doubt about it. Salah 

Gosh was head of security. 

And you tell me that, all of a sudden, they love America? You 

tell me they are giving you information that is going to nail Osama 

50

bin Laden? You know, they are bad, but they are not that bad. And 

so, anyone who buys that, you know, is certainly being deceived. 

But it takes time, as you have mentioned. You know, our special 

envoy has been on the job for 5 months. And I agree with you, he 

has more energy and he is meeting and he is doing all that. However, those guys have been in place for 20, 30 years. They made 

Turabi sound like he was the worst guy in the world, so they said, 

‘‘Look, we are saving the world. We are going to put Turabi in jail.’’ 

Right? So he is in jail, and Bashir still reigns, because he says—

you know, and we bought it. Well, Bashir has to be better than 

Turabi. 

So it is a learning curve, and I just hope that we don’t have our 

pockets totally picked while this curve is being learned. Because we 

are losing in Sudan every day, there is no question about it, there 

is no doubt about it. 

Not one person has been brought up on charges who participated 

in these acts in Sudan. They are still in the same positions. And 

when people go to Khartoum, they are going to meet them, and 

they are going to have some wine with them, and they will have 

champagne in the nice hotels, and they will sell them a bill of 

goods because that is what they do. And they do it well. 

And we tried to caution—I was at that meeting with the new 

envoy before he left—‘‘Be careful, they are slick.’’ Right. So what 

happened? Zoom. You know. 

And even with the negotiations—four times in Khartoum, a half 

a day in Juba once, maybe a couple more days there at another 

point in time. But how are you going to have negotiations with the 

South, Darfur, and the Government of Khartoum when you spend 

all your time in Khartoum? And then you leave Khartoum, come 

to the States, and then go to China. What is that all about? I wonder what kind of concessions—because China is the big guy on the 

block. If they want to see changes, China will make the changes. 

They can push Bashir, and they really refuse to do so. 

And so, I think that my question is, have either of you had the 

opportunity to dialogue with the Senate? Senator Kerry heads up 

this issue in the Senate. What is your assessment of what is going 

on over there? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I think Senator Kerry is faithfully supporting 

the Obama administration’s direction in Sudan. And he has been 

a very strong supporter of General Gration. And there will be a 

hearing tomorrow morning, which will be very, very different than 

the hearing we had today. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, you know, we couldn’t get the General to testify 

because we are only a subcommittee, and therefore he was not allowed to testify. Of course, the Assistant Secretary can’t testify, because you have a special envoy; therefore, he can’t testify. Not that 

there is anything wrong you two. 

Go ahead, John. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, I think, you know, the good news is that 

there are some very strong voices on Sudan in the Senate, just like 

there are here, on body sides of the aisle. And I think that the 

chairman and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Africa, 

your counterparts in the Senate, Feingold and Isakson, are fanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:56 Apr 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072909\51658 HFA PsN: SHIRL
51

tastic on these issues. They are very, very committed, just like you 

two are. 

And I really think that, you know, again, if anything is going to 

work, just like it did with the Clinton administration, just like it 

did with the Bush administration—unfortunately, here we are 

again—Congress is going to have to weigh in with principle in 

pressing and pushing another new administration to not be fooled 

again, to not make the kind of mistakes that people keep making 

with respect to this regime in Khartoum. 

So, I mean, that is the hope, is that the subcommittees of these 

two International Relations and Foreign Relations Committees will 

lead the charge and muster enough of a coalition on both sides of 

the aisle. Because this remains a bipartisan issue, fantastically. I 

mean, you saw it today, two Republicans and one Democrat sitting 

here. You don’t even know which one is which, because we are all 

saying pretty much—we are reinforcing each other’s messages. And 

you guys up there are reinforcing each other’s messages. 

And that is our hope for these U.S. policies. We are going to have 

to take that hopefully accumulated experience and deliver it, at 

least let it be heard by Secretary Clinton, let it be heard by Ambassador Rice, let it be heard especially by Vice President Biden who 

was so strident in his Senate career and in his campaign and has 

disappeared on this issue. And he needs to show up at that principals’ committee meeting when they have it on Sudan, and he 

needs to be a voice at the table for a principled policy. 

Mr. WINTER. Yeah, I would just add that I think we have some 

erosion in the Senate, because now we have at least two Republican Senators who also, as did Kerry, go simply to Khartoum and 

Darfur and never approach the South. And that is the kind of pattern that I would not like to see expanded in any way. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you yield? 

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Smith and then——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am not going to ask any—if he would just 

yield for just a moment, I just want to reaffirm that the South is 

very important. And many of us, Mr. Chairman, are going to try 

and go back to Sudan and never leave out any part of the country. 

I think we should go everywhere. 

And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me say, we are joined at the hip on this. And I think it is 

important that we say this: There is no politics in this, absolutely 

none. There is no separation, Republican or Democrat. And that is 

the way it was when I was chairman of this committee and chair 

of the Human Rights Committee for 6 years before that. We always 

spoke out. And Mr. Payne was on that committee and was ranking, 

and now I am ranking on this. 

So I hope everyone here understands that, that we—I wish, 

frankly, that the three of you, four counting the Secretary General, 

could present your testimony. Because in the written form it is 

powerful, but the way you have conveyed it here today, the NSC 

needs to hear it. 

So my hope is that—I mean, we will convey your testimonies to 

all of the principals and say, you have got to look at this and take 

52

the time to understand that the collective wisdom of the four of you 

cannot go unheeded. 

You know, I have been in Congress 29 years, and I am shocked—

shocked—how, so often, some of the best and the brightest, executive branch and congressional, miss by a mile all of the alarms and 

the warning signals, early warning signals, that are out there. 

I will never forget when General Dallaire—and we knew about 

that soon after he made his, you know, the so-called fax that went 

to the United Nations, that there was something that could have 

been mitigated and maybe stopped completely, and that was the 

terrible genocide against the Rwandan people. That was under the 

Clinton administration. 

And while under the Bush administration, Bush I, we had early 

warning information that when the declaration of independence occurred in the former Yugoslavia, of Slovenia, Bosnia, and Croatia, 

that Serbia, Milosevic would quickly turn his guns and his hate toward those countries. 

And Larry Eagleburger, you know, number two at the State Department, former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, spent time in Belgrade. Never thought it would escalate to the killing fields and the 

genocide in Srebrenica and elsewhere that occurred. 

And Mr. Winter mentioned earlier two possible outcomes: A vote, 

a plebiscite that leads to independence; or a unilateral declaration. 

I am very concerned that, if we are not careful, that will trigger 

a whole new renewed fighting, and we will have the best and the 

brightest here on Capitol Hill saying, ‘‘Now, how did that happen?’’

You have given us, I think, the early warning that we need to 

more robustly be engaging the 79,000 AK–47s that are being strategically placed among people who could use them to great harm. 

And that may be an underestimation; who knows? And I would be 

interested in knowing what you know about that. That sounds like 

an order of battle that is being placed for, you know, a terrible 

bloodletting. So I would appreciate your thoughts on that. 

And in terms of a referendum, 2010, which is now the date that 

slipped—I guess no one has a month. 

Mr. WINTER. January 2011. 

Mr. SMITH. Say it again? 

Mr. WINTER. The referendum is scheduled for January 2011. 

Mr. SMITH. 2011, okay. Now, can the logistics be accomplished? 

You know, the IDPs, the census that would be required, all of that, 

is that enough time to get it together? 

And if you would talk about the early warning. How do we prevent what would be an unmitigated disaster if we don’t heed your 

warnings and tell the people in our own Government, all carrots, 

no sticks—and all three of you have said that—you know, is the 

path to disaster? 

Mr. WINTER. I think we have the time to put in place the architecture we need to do a referendum. The question is, will the enabling legislation be adopted in the Parliament in Khartoum? Which 

they already say they refuse to do. All right? 

So the pattern, just as with regular elections and every other 

thing that they really don’t want to do, is ultimately not to decline 

it absolutely, but just to delay and then delay further and delay 

further. That is, I would suspect, a likely thing, which, of course, 

53

raises ultimately that possibility of a unilateral declaration if they 

don’t get the opportunity do what the CPA guarantees them. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Plan A is delay. Because that is the easiest 

and that is the one that, you know, diplomats buy into because 

then maybe we can work this and maybe we can negotiate that. 

Plan B is the 79,000 AK–47s. Plan B is what I think we just 

need to understand the empirical evidence of the last 20 years 

demonstrates, and that is that this regime has used a policy of supporting paramilitary units, of supporting militias to fight its conflicts in the periphery of the country, in the South and the Southwest and in the West in Darfur. 

Whether it is called Murahaleen, as Pa’gan was talking about 

earlier, or whether it is call the Janjaweed today in Darfur, whether it is the Nuer militia in Southeast Sudan in the early 1990s that 

led to what may have been the bloodiest period of conflict in Sudan’s history, they consistently use the same approach, which is—

and it is a very effective one—of, if it ain’t broken, don’t fix it, keep 

doing it. 

And so, what is the upshot? If there is no consequence for that, 

if the Government of Sudan can go ahead and just distribute these 

kinds of weapons and then throw the match on the gasoline and 

say, ‘‘Look at those Southerners, they can’t govern themselves; we 

had better not have that referendum now, let’s delay it,’’ if we 

allow that to happen, as they increasingly—and it is the same 

thing as the first month of the genocide we saw. People were like, 

‘‘Wait a minute, isn’t this ancient interethnic tribal violence?’’ No, 

it is a government strategy aimed at dividing and destroying opposition for a political objective: Maintaining power by any means 

necessary. That is what it is. 

So we just need to understand it, get in front of it. And then 

what to do about it? Because I don’t want to just make the critique 

and then not say it. There has to be consequences for this kind of 

behavior at the end of the day. And that requires difficult diplomatic engagement with a number of countries, including Beijing 

and Moscow, to talk about, ‘‘Okay, what are these consequences 

going to be?’’

And if we can’t do it through the United Nations Security Council, if two-fifths of the permanent members of the Security Council 

will refuse and veto anything we do or obstruct—which I don’t believe they will; I think they will stand down and abstain—then we 

need to build the disgraced phrase, ‘‘coalition of the willing,’’ who 

are willing to say, ‘‘Okay, if the Government of Southern Sudan, if 

the Darfur rebel movement, if the Government of Sudan—whoever 

it is—undermines peace and security in the country, they will be 

on the receiving end of the following set of escalating consequences.’’

That is the way we are going to get some measure of progress 

toward peace and democracy in Sudan, I think. 

Mr. PAYNE. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am fine, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. 

Well, let me certainly thank the witnesses for this very interesting hearing. Always the passion that you have has been really 

54

a breath of fresh air, to know that we still have people on the fighting line. 

Let me also thank the audience, who—you know, this hearing 

was supposed to be at 3:30, and with all of the problems that we 

had, it shows the interest that you have to be here after 8 o’clock. 

No cameras, no Voice of America, no C–SPAN, simply interest. And 

so I know we are on the right side. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Members, too. 

Mr. PAYNE. Members, too. Oh, no question about it, which—I am 

going to bring that up in the CBC next week to say, ‘‘There were 

no cameras, and she came back.’’

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And came back. 

Mr. PAYNE. And came back. I know we are on the right track 

now. 

But it shows the interest. It certainly is very difficult—if there 

were solutions, there would not have been a special envoy. Ever 

since I have been in Congress, I remember at least 1995 was the 

first one, when my former colleague became a special envoy, Congressman Harry Johnson. Maybe it was later than that. But we 

went through Johnson and Natsios and Danforth and the head of 

the World Bank, Zoellick. 

And, I mean, the difference in Sudan, when my colleague asked 

the question about special envoys, there has been a base for the 

new special envoy to open up to see where the last one left off, because we have consistently, for a decade or 15 years, have had a 

special envoy dealing with Sudan, which, I mean, believe it or not, 

is as important an issue as the Israel-Palestinian effort is. 

This is the first special envoy that has been appointed in 7, 8, 

or 10 years. Bush II had no special envoy to deal with the issue. 

But during that whole time, every President has had a special 

envoy since I can remember, from Clinton to Bush, on Sudan, 

whether it is Darfur or the CPA. And so there is no excuse, you 

are not reinventing the wheel with our new special envoy. You 

have volumes of information to review, and so you don’t have to 

recreate the will Senator George Mitchell was recreating. He was 

starting from scratch. The envoys are here. 

And so I just hope that the administration can get on the same 

page. As we mentioned, President Obama said that the decision on 

the expelling of the 13 international workers and three NGOs 

should be reversed. Secretary Clinton said it should be reversed. 

The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. said it should be reversed. Yet 

the special envoy went and, in direct contradiction to all of that, 

signed an agreement that said it doesn’t have to be reversed. 

So one thing, for sure, is that there has to be one page as it relates to the other one, because those guys will pick one off against 

the other. Nontheless, you have Vice President Joe Biden, who supported my resolution of a no-fly zone. He was the only one in the 

Senate who said, if a plane went in to bomb with those drones 

again, take the planes in, he is with them. Now, you can’t be any 

stronger than that. But, now, again, where is the beef? 

The meeting is the adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 8:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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