United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 2, 2019 Decided September 15, 2020

No. 18-5284

CASSANDRA M. MENOKEN,

APPELLANT

v.

JANET DHILLON,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:16-cv-02480)

Cassandra M. Menoken, pro se, argued the cause and filed 

the briefs for appellant.

Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, 

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney.

Matthew M. Collette and R. Craig Kitchen were on the brief 

for amicus curiae R. Craig Kitchen in support of appellant. 
2

Before: MILLETT, WILKINS, and RAO, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

RAO, Circuit Judge: Cassandra Menoken worked as an 

attorney for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) from 1982 until 2019. In 2016, Menoken filed a 

lawsuit against the EEOC alleging that the agency—in its 

capacity as her employer—had subjected her to a hostile work 

environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and had violated her rights under 

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The 

district court dismissed Menoken’s complaint in its entirety for 

failure to state a claim and subsequently denied her motion for 

reconsideration. We find that the district court erred in 

dismissing Menoken’s retaliatory hostile work environment 

claim under Title VII, as well as her interference and 

reasonable accommodation claims under the Rehabilitation 

Act. We therefore reverse and remand these claims to the 

district court. Because we conclude the district court properly

dismissed Menoken’s confidentiality and medical inquiries 

claims, we affirm that part of the district court’s order. 

I.

Menoken’s primary claim wasthat the EEOC violated Title 

VII by engaging in a multi-year pattern of harassment and 

hostility in retaliation for her filing various anti-discrimination 

and retaliation claims against the Office of Personnel 

Management (“OPM”), the Social Security Administration, 

and the Department of Health and Human Services beginning 

in 1994. Menoken alleged that the EEOC’s persistently hostile 

behavior caused her to experience and seek medical treatment 

for “depression, acute stress, severe hypertension and 

‘complex’ post-traumatic stress disorder.” Am. Compl. ¶ 21.
3

As a result of these medical conditions, Menoken sought a 

reasonable accommodation from the EEOC under the 

Rehabilitation Act, which requires that federal employers such 

as the EEOC accommodate individuals with disabilities under 

the same standards as the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. The EEOC denied

Menoken’s request for a reasonable accommodation. In her 

complaint, Menoken raised four separate claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act: First, the EEOC unlawfully denied her 

request for a reasonable accommodation for a known disability 

(“the reasonable accommodation claim”); second, the EEOC 

violated the Act’s restrictions on conducting inquiries into an 

employee’s medical condition (“the medical inquiries claim”); 

third, the EEOC violated the Act’s confidentiality 

requirements for employee medical records (“the 

confidentiality claim”); and fourth, the EEOC unlawfully 

interfered with Menoken’s attempt to exercise rights protected 

under the Act (“the interference claim”). 

The EEOC moved to dismiss Menoken’s complaint or, in 

the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court 

dismissed the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a 

claim. See Menoken v. Lipnic, 300 F. Supp. 3d 175, 190 

(D.D.C. 2018). The court allowed for refiling of the Title VII 

claim but dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claims with 

prejudice because each suffered from deficiencies that could 

not be cured through amendment. Id. at 185–90.

Menoken then filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

Rehabilitation Act claims, which the district court denied. 

Menoken v. Lipnic, 318 F. Supp. 3d 239, 241 (D.D.C. 2018)

(“Reconsideration Decision”). Among other things, Menoken 

challenged the district court’s holding that there is no 

cognizable claim for “interference” under the Rehabilitation 

Act separate and apart from a claim for reasonable 
4

accommodation. In its decision denying the motion, the court 

acknowledged the relevant statutory language of the Act 

prohibiting unlawful interference, but concluded that this 

section was treated as a retaliation provision and that Menoken 

had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. at

244–45.

This timely appeal followed. Following oral argument, the 

court ordered supplemental briefing on (1) the proper legal 

standard for an interference claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b), 

and (2) whether the amended complaint stated a claim for 

interference under the proper standard. Because Menoken was 

proceeding pro se, we appointed R. Craig Kitchen as amicus 

curiae to present arguments in support of Menoken. He has 

ably discharged those responsibilities. 

II.

On appeal, Menoken challenges both the district court’s 

dismissal of the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims alleged 

in her complaint and its denial of her motion for 

reconsideration of the Rehabilitation Act claims. We review de 

novo the district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “accept[ing] as true all of the 

complaint’s factual allegations and draw[ing] all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff[].” Owens v. BNP Paribas, 

S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2018). As a general rule, we 

review a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration 

for abuse of discretion; however, because the district court’s 

reconsideration decision relied on a different legal theory to 

dismiss Menoken’s interference claim under the Rehabilitation 

Act, we review that claim de novo. See Dyson v. District of 

Columbia, 710 F.3d 415, 419–20 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Applying 

these standards, we consider each of Menoken’s claims in turn. 
5

A.

Menoken first contends that the district court erred by 

dismissing her retaliatory hostile work environment claim 

under Title VII. In her amended complaint, Menoken alleged

that the EEOC violated Title VII by subjecting her to a hostile 

work environment in retaliation for engaging in activity 

protected by Title VII—namely, the discrimination and 

retaliation claims Menoken had filed against various federal 

agencies over the years. 

To state a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must 

allege: “(1) [she] engaged in protected activity; (2) [she] was 

subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was 

a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse 

action.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(quoting Hairston v. Vance-Cooks, 773 F.3d 266, 275 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014)) (“Baird II”). A plaintiff may bring a “special type 

of retaliation claim based on a ‘hostile work environment’” by 

alleging a series of “individual acts that may not be actionable 

on [their] own but become actionable due to their cumulative 

effect.” Id. (cleaned up). The acts in question must be both 

“adequately linked such that they form a coherent hostile 

environment claim,” and “of such severity or pervasiveness as 

to alter the conditions of ... employment and create an abusive 

working environment.” Id. at 168–69 (cleaned up). To 

determine whether a group of alleged acts is sufficiently linked, 

courts often consider whether the acts in question “involve[d] 

the same type of employment actions, occur[ed] relatively 

frequently, and [were] perpetrated by the same managers.” Id. 

at 169. When assessing whether the acts were severe and 

pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment, a 

court considers “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 

its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, 

or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
6

interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. 

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 

Menoken pointed to events that took place between 2002 

and 2013 to support her allegations of a hostile work 

environment. She alleged that between 2002 and 2007, the 

EEOC and OPM worked together to retaliate against her and 

to undermine her pending EEOC appeals. She further alleged

a series of incidents in 2013 involving anomalies related to her 

compensation and benefits, all of which were alleged to 

involve Menoken’s supervisor, Carlton Hadden, and the 

EEOC’s human resources director, Lisa Williams. 

The district court found that the events before 2013 did not 

state a plausible hostile work environment because Menoken 

failed to allege that these events “were sufficiently linked, let 

alone [that] they should be linked with much later events in 

2013.” Menoken, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 189. We agree with the 

district court’s conclusion that the events and conduct alleged 

to have occurred between 2002 and 2007 were insufficiently 

linked to form the coherent hostile work environment 

necessary to support a retaliation claim. Cf. Baird II, 792 F.3d 

at 168–69. 

The district court then found that the allegations regarding 

problems with Menoken’s pay and benefits in 2013 “may be 

sufficiently cohesive to undergird a hostile work environment 

allegation,” but were not “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to 

have “interfere[d] with [Menoken’s] work performance.” 

Menoken, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 

23). In particular, the court noted that all of the alleged 

incidents took place while Menoken “was on voluntary leave, 

when she was performing no work to disrupt and was not in the 

workplace to suffer any hostility,” and that therefore she could 

not establish “that her ability to perform work for the EEOC 
7

was disrupted” as a result of these incidents. Id. 

We disagree with the court’s determination that the alleged 

pay and benefits-related issues in 2013 were insufficiently 

severe as a matter of law to have interfered with Menoken’s 

work performance. As an initial matter, the district court 

incorrectly maintained that incidents that took place while 

Menoken was on leave could not support a retaliatory hostile 

work environment claim. Our court has explicitly “reject[ed] a 

per se rule against considering incidents alleged to have 

occurred while an employee was physically absent from the 

workplace.” Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). Accordingly, courts should consider “any negative 

actions the employer takes during the [employee’s] absence” 

when assessing whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged a 

hostile work environment. Id. Here, Menoken alleged not only 

that Hadden engaged in conduct that resulted in anomalies in 

her payroll account, but that both Hadden and Williams 

ignored Menoken’s attempts to communicate about the 

anomalies that resulted in the denial of compensation and the 

threatened loss of health insurance. Menoken further alleged

that she “began experiencing heightened anxiety in the wake 

of” these incidents. Am. Compl. ¶ 115. These allegations did

not describe the kind of “ordinary tribulations of the 

workplace” that courts have refused to find actionable. Brooks 

v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1277–78 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(citations omitted). To the contrary, an employer’s deliberate 

attempts to affect an employee’s finances and access to 

healthcare strike us as precisely the type of conduct that “might 

have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting 

a charge of discrimination.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 

1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 

Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)) (“Baird I”). 

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s decision 
8

dismissing Menoken’s retaliatory hostile work environment 

claim under Title VII for events occurring in 2013. On remand, 

the district court may consider any additional arguments raised 

by the EEOC in favor of dismissal that the court did not 

previously reach. See EEOC Br. 33–34, 37. 

B.

Menoken next argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing her claim that the EEOC violated the Rehabilitation 

Act by refusing to grant her request for a reasonable 

accommodation. The Rehabilitation Act incorporates 

provisions of the ADA that require employers to “mak[e] 

reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (incorporated by 

reference in 29 U.S.C. § 791(f)). To state a claim for a violation 

of the Rehabilitation Act’s reasonable accommodation 

requirements, a plaintiff must allege that “(i) she was disabled 

within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (ii) her employer 

had notice of her disability; (iii) she was able to perform the 

essential functions of her job with or without reasonable 

accommodation; and (iv) her employer denied her request for 

a reasonable accommodation of that disability.” Solomon v. 

Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 

In her amended complaint, Menoken alleged that she 

suffered and sought medical treatment for physical and mental 

injuries resulting from the hostile work environment and 

sought a reasonable accommodation for those disabilities in 

2012. In particular, the complaint alleged that “[o]n or about 

September 11, 2012,” Menoken requested an appointment with 

the EEOC’s disability program manager to discuss her “need 

for a reasonable accommodation.” Am. Compl. ¶ 92. The 

complaint did not describe the precise type of accommodation 
9

Menoken requested, except to say that she “suggested several 

accommodation options in 2012.” Id. ¶ 99.

In its motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, the 

EEOC attached a copy of a form titled “Confirmation of 

Request for Reasonable Accommodation,” which was dated 

September 11, 2012, and which listed “Cassandra M. 

Menoken” as the applicant. A-068 (“Confirmation Form”). 

Under the “Type of Accommodation Requested,” the form 

indicated: “Paid leave for 6 months or until such time as my 

discrimination complaints are adjudicated (whichever is 

longer).” The EEOC also included a copy of a letter from Dr. 

Karin Huffer to the EEOC’s disability program manager dated 

September 25, 2012, which diagnosed Menoken’s medical 

condition and offered the physician’s view that “the 

accommodation that would be most effective ... would be for 

EEOC to grant leave for six months or the period that 

[Menoken’s] EEOC cases remain pending, whichever is 

longer.” A-072 (“Huffer Letter”). The EEOC argued these 

documents demonstrated that Menoken requested “indefinite 

paid leave” as an accommodation for her disability. A-052–53. 

In response, Menoken filed a declaration (attached to her 

opposition to the EEOC’s motion) in which she “den[ied] 

EEOC’s assertion that [she] requested ‘indefinite’ paid leave,” 

and averred that she had also “suggested as an accommodation 

that alternative arrangements be made for [her then-pending] 

OPM appeals or that [she] be temporarily reassigned to another 

position.” A-109. 

In analyzing the reasonable accommodation claim, the 

district court noted the absence of allegations in the complaint 

about the precise accommodation Menoken requested, but 

explained that it could consider both the Confirmation Form 

and the Huffer Letter in connection with the EEOC’s motion 

to dismiss because both were “documents ‘upon which the 
10

plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies.’” Menoken, 300 F. 

Supp. 3d at 186 (quoting Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. 

Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119–20 (D.D.C. 2011)). The 

district court found that “[b]y their clear terms,” both 

documents “asked for paid leave for so long as Ms. Menoken’s 

then-current EEO complaints were pending.” Id. Accordingly, 

the court held that Menoken failed to allege she was a 

“qualified individual” because “the very accommodation [she] 

requested was to not perform the necessary functions of her 

position for so long as her EEO charges were pending, which 

is the exact opposite of showing that she was qualified to 

perform her job with an accommodation.” Id. The court further 

held that Menoken’s request for “paid leave for an extended 

period of unknown duration was not reasonable” as a matter of 

law. Id. at 187. Accordingly, it dismissed the claim with 

prejudice. 

We hold the district court erred by treating the 

Confirmation Form and Huffer Letter as definitive proof that 

the only accommodation Menoken sought was “an uncertain 

and indefinite amount of paid leave.” Id. at 186. On their face, 

these documents reflect only that at one point in the reasonable 

accommodation process Menoken proposed paid leave as one 

accommodation option. She alleged, however, that she 

“suggested several accommodation options in 2012,” Am. 

Compl. ¶ 99, and filed a declaration averring that she had also 

proposed temporary reassignment or an alternative appeals 

process as possible accommodations, A-109. 

In considering claims dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 

we accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in a plaintiff’s favor. Owens, 897 F.3d at 

272. Applying this standard, the district court erred by relying 

on two documents outside the complaint as dispositive 

evidence of the nature of Menoken’s accommodation request. 
11

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the 

reasonable accommodation claim and remand for further 

consideration of Menoken’s reasonable accommodation 

allegations. 

C.

Menoken also contends the district court erred by 

dismissing her claim that the EEOC unlawfully interfered with 

her exercise of rights protected under the Rehabilitation Act. In 

its initial decision granting the EEOC’s motion to dismiss, the 

district court held that unlawful interference “is not cognizable 

as a separate claim under [the Rehabilitation Act],” and that a 

plaintiff may challenge only a wrongful denial of a reasonable 

accommodation request, not the sufficiency of the process

relating to such a request. Menoken, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 188. 

In her motion for reconsideration, Menoken argued the 

district court erred in its finding that the Rehabilitation Act 

does not recognize an interference claim “‘separate and 

distinct’ from a claim alleging failure to reasonably 

accommodate.” A-155. She pointed to a distinct provision of 

the ADA that covers interference specifically, see 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(b) (incorporated by reference in 29 U.S.C. § 791(f)), 

and argued that her complaint stated an independent claim for 

interference with the exercise of her statutorily protected right 

to seek a reasonable accommodation. 

In denying the motion for reconsideration, the district court 

acknowledged that 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) makes it unlawful for 

a federal employer “to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere 

with any individual” in the exercise or enjoyment of “any right 

granted” under the statute. Reconsideration Decision, 318 F.

Supp. 3d at 244 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b)) (emphasis 

added). But the court then concluded that section 12203(b) “is 
12

treated as a retaliation provision in this jurisdiction,” and that 

Menoken’s complaint failed to plausibly allege that the EEOC 

retaliated against her for exercising her right to request a 

reasonable accommodation. Id. (citing Doak v. Johnson, 798 

F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 

Our court has not previously addressed the proper standard 

for analyzing interference claims under section 12203(b). We 

ordered supplemental briefing from the parties and the courtappointed amicus on this question, and now conclude that the 

district court erred by treating section 12203(b) as an antiretaliation provision. This conclusion is compelled by a 

straightforward reading of the statute, which includes separate 

provisions prohibiting retaliation and interference. Section 

12203(a)—titled “Retaliation”—proscribes retaliation on the 

basis of statutorily protected activity, while section 12203(b)—

titled “Interference, coercion, or intimidation”—prohibits 

“coerc[ion], intimidat[ion], threat[s], or interfer[ence] with” an 

employee in the exercise of statutorily protected rights.1 The 

1

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)–(b) provides in full:

(a) Retaliation

No person shall discriminate against any individual because 

such individual has opposed any act or practice made 

unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a 

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 

interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, 

or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or 

on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any 

other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right 

granted or protected by this chapter.
13

statute’s text and structure reinforce that retaliation and 

interference are distinct protections. It would unnecessarily 

render section 12203(b) surplusage if we were to treat it as 

nothing more than another prohibition on retaliation. See, e.g., 

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“We are 

reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.” 

(citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Having determined that section 12203(b) does not operate 

as a retaliation provision subject to Title VII’s burden-shifting 

framework, the question that follows is what framework courts 

should apply when analyzing interference claims under section 

12203(b). The parties offer different answers to that question. 

Amicus, joined by Menoken, contends that we should adopt the 

standards for section 12203(b) claims endorsed by the Seventh 

Circuit in Frakes v. Peoria School District No. 150, 872 F.3d 

545 (7th Cir. 2017), and the Ninth Circuit in Brown v. City of 

Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2003). Br. of Amicus Curiae 

8–9. Both courts concluded that interference claims under the 

ADA should draw on case law interpreting and applying the 

anti-interference provision of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),

42 U.S.C. § 3617,2 which uses language identical to section 

12203(b). See Frakes, 872 F.3d at 550; Brown, 336 F.3d at 

1191.

The EEOC, on the other hand, argues that we should “adopt 

a standard that tracks the specific statutory language” of section 

2

42 U.S.C. § 3617 provides:

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 

interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or 

on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account 

of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the 

exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by 

section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
14

12203(b) by requiring plaintiffs to allege “that the employer (1) 

coerced, intimidated, threatened, or interfered with any 

individual (2) (a) in the exercise or enjoyment of, or (b) on 

account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or (c) on 

account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other 

individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, (3) any right granted 

or protected by this chapter.” EEOC Supp. Br. 4. To provide 

substance to that standard, the EEOC urges us to look not only 

to case law interpreting the FHA, but also to cases analyzing 

interference claims under the National Labor Relations Act 

(“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., and the Family Medical 

Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. 

There is significant overlap in the tests advocated by the 

parties. The primary substantive difference is that the test 

advocated by amicus and Menoken requires plaintiffs to allege 

an employer’s discriminatory intent, see Frakes, 872 F.3d at 

551, while the EEOC’s proposed framework directs courts to 

focus on how a reasonable employee would have understood 

the employer’s action. The parties otherwise seem to agree on 

the basic elements of a section 12203(b) claim, and both also 

cite the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown for the proposition 

that the term “interfere” under section 12203(b) cannot be 

construed “so broad[ly] as to prohibit any action whatsoever 

[that] in any way hinders a member of a protected class.” 

Brown, 336 F.3d at 1192 (cleaned up). Compare EEOC Supp. 

Br. 8 with Br. of Amicus Curiae 9.

We need not adopt a particular standard for section 

12203(b) claims in this case, nor determine the precise 

requirements for actionable interference under the statute, 

because Menoken’s complaint when read as a whole stated a 

claim for unlawful interference under either proposed standard. 

The Amended Complaint described a “10 year pattern of 

hostile and adverse treatment rooted in [the EEOC’s] 
15

antagonism towards [Menoken’s]” protected activities under 

Title VII. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. Menoken alleged that, as a result 

of this persistently hostile behavior by her employer, she 

suffered significant physical and mental injuries, including 

“depression, acute stress, severe hypertension and ‘complex’ 

post-traumatic stress disorder.” Id. ¶ 21. Accordingly, she 

alleged that she exercised her statutorily protected right to 

request that her employer provide a reasonable accommodation 

for her disability. Id. ¶¶ 25, 92–100. Menoken maintained that 

although the EEOC official responsible for handling this 

request was “aware[] of [Menoken’s] weakened state, 

medically and emotionally,” id. ¶ 97, the agency did not engage 

in good faith to determine what accommodation might be 

appropriate. Instead, Menoken alleged, the EEOC deliberately 

delayed processing her request, id. ¶¶ 94–95, and then sought 

to leverage her need for an accommodation to “extract legal 

concessions to benefit EEOC”—namely, by offering to 

“‘grant’ her reasonable accommodation request on the 

condition that [she] execute a ‘general release’ absolving 

EEOC of liability with respect to any claims arising from her 

employment,” id. ¶¶ 96–97. Menoken further alleged that she 

refused to accept this offer, which she viewed as “outrageous 

and predatory,” id. ¶ 97, but nonetheless “suggested several 

accommodation options”—all of which the EEOC rejected, 

“offering no alternatives,” id. ¶ 99. 

Reading the complaint as a whole and affording Menoken 

the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we find these 

allegations sufficient to state a claim for unlawful interference. 

As an initial matter, there is no dispute the complaint alleged

that Menoken engaged in statutorily protected activity by 

requesting a reasonable accommodation for a disability, or that 

she was actively engaged in asserting those rights at the time 

the alleged interference occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b). 

On the facts alleged at the pleading stage, we also find the 
16

EEOC’s efforts to delay processing Menoken’s reasonable 

accommodation request and to persuade her to accept a 

settlement offer as a condition of granting her requested 

accommodation constituted at least a plausible claim of 

actionable interference with Menoken’s rights under the 

Rehabilitation Act. 

The EEOC argues that accepting Menoken’s allegations 

would require us to adopt an expansive interpretation of 

“interference” that “would conflict with the requirement that 

both employers and accommodation-seeking employees 

engage in a ‘flexible give-and-take ... so that together they can 

determine what accommodation would enable the employee to 

keep working.’” EEOC Supp. Br. 7–8 (quoting Ward v. 

McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). We share the 

EEOC’s concerns about construing interference in such a way 

as to undermine the iterative reasonable accommodation 

process, and we are mindful of the need to avoid reading 

section 12203(b) so broadly that it would “prohibit any action 

whatsoever [that] in any way hinders a member of a protected 

class.” Brown, 336 F.3d at 1192 (cleaned up). Our disposition 

of this case should not be read to suggest that allegations of a 

delay or a proposed settlement offer during the reasonable 

accommodation process necessarily amount to unlawful 

interference. Rather, our conclusion follows from reading “the 

allegations of the complaint as a whole.” Matrixx Initiatives, 

Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 47 (2011). Giving Menoken 

the benefit of reasonable inferences, the complaint described

the nature of her disability, the EEOC’s persistent and 

intentional efforts to undermine her exercise of statutorily 

protected rights, and the EEOC’s apparent failure to engage 

with Menoken in good faith to identify a reasonable 

accommodation. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of the interference claim and remand for further 

consideration of Menoken’s interference allegations.
17

D.

Finally, we hold that the district court properly dismissed 

Menoken’s medical inquiries and confidentiality claims under 

the Rehabilitation Act and that the court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying her request for reconsideration of these 

claims. The Act prohibits covered entities, including the 

EEOC, from “mak[ing] inquiries of an employee as to whether 

such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the 

nature or severity of the disability, unless such ... inquiry is 

shown to be job-related and consistent with business 

necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (incorporated by 

reference in 29 U.S.C. § 791(f)). The statute further provides 

that “information obtained regarding the medical condition or 

history of [an employee]” must be “treated as a confidential 

medical record.” Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B), (4)(C). Menoken 

alleged that the EEOC violated these provisions by 

“monitoring, and making public, [her] confidential medical 

information.” Am. Compl. at 20. Specifically, Menoken 

contended that “in or around early 2014, EEOC arranged for a 

stranger, not employed by the government, to repeatedly access 

and review medical information in [her] [Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs (“OWCP”)] file” and the EEOC 

lacked a “legitimate business justification” for this action. Id. 

¶¶ 43–47. The district court dismissed both the confidentiality 

and medical inquiries claims, explaining that the complaint 

contained no factual allegations suggesting that the EEOC 

accessed Menoken’s OWCP file as part of an unlawful inquiry 

into her medical condition. 

To state a claim for an unlawful medical inquiry, a plaintiff 

must allege that the employer in fact conducted an 

impermissible “inquiry into [the plaintiff’s] medical 

condition.” Doe v. USPS, 317 F.3d 339, 343–44 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). Menoken’s complaint contained no such allegation. The 
18

only allegations that pertained to a medical inquiry by the 

EEOC were those relating to Menoken’s request for a 

reasonable accommodation in 2012. As the district court 

explained, Menoken did not allege that the EEOC’s attempt to 

access her OWCP files in 2014 bore any relation to its 

consideration of her reasonable accommodation request more 

than a year earlier. See Menoken, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 188. Even 

if she had alleged the files were accessed in connection with 

the accommodation request, such allegation alone would not 

create a plausible inference that the EEOC engaged in an 

unlawful inquiry. To the contrary, the Rehabilitation Act makes 

clear that employers may conduct “inquiries into the ability of 

an employee to perform job-related functions.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(d)(4)(B). Because the complaint lacks any factual 

allegations suggesting the EEOC attempted to access these 

files to conduct an impermissible disability-related inquiry, this 

claim must fail. See Doe, 317 F.3d at 345 (explaining that the

Rehabilitation Act’s medical inquiries and confidentiality 

provisions apply where an employer is “trying to determine 

whether [the employee] was unable to perform the functions of 

[her] position” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

For similar reasons, Menoken’s confidentiality claim must 

be dismissed. The Rehabilitation Act’s confidentiality 

requirements attach to employee medical information that is 

obtained in the course of a permissible medical inquiry. 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(4)(B)–(C). As already explained, however, 

Menoken failed to allege that the EEOC obtained her medical 

records in the course of an inquiry into her medical condition. 

Moreover, Menoken alleged that the files in question were 

obtained by OWCP in connection with her occupational injury 

claim in March 2014. Thus, the statutory obligation to treat 

Menoken’s files “as a confidential medical record” rested with 

OWCP, not the EEOC.
19

In her motion for reconsideration, Menoken argued the 

district court erred by treating her medical inquiries and 

confidentiality claims as “‘tied’ to her reasonable 

accommodation claim.” A-158. In its decision denying the 

motion for reconsideration, however, the district court 

explained that it had “analyzed [Menoken’s] ‘confidentiality’ 

and ... unlawful access’ claims separate and apart from her 

‘reasonable accommodation’ claim,” and that Menoken had 

therefore “offer[ed] nothing to warrant reconsideration.” 

Reconsideration Decision, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 243. We agree 

that the district court in its initial decision analyzed the 

sufficiency of the confidentiality and medical inquiries claims 

independently of the reasonable accommodation claim. See 

Menoken, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 184–89. Therefore, we find no 

abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to grant 

reconsideration of these claims.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

order dismissing Menoken’s confidentiality and medical 

inquiries claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the court’s 

order denying reconsideration of those claims. We reverse the 

district court’s order dismissing Menoken’s retaliatory hostile 

work environment claim under Title VII, and her reasonable 

accommodation and interference claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act, and remand these claims for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.