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68–224 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–86 

NOMINATION OF RYAN C. CROCKER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 8, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Crocker, Hon. Ryan C., of Washington, nominated to be Ambassador to the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ......................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

McCain, John, U.S. Senator from Arizona, statement ......................................... 4 

(III)

(1) 

NOMINATION OF RYAN C. CROCKER 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Hon. Ryan C. Crocker, of Washington, to be Ambassador to the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD– 

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Coons, 

Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, and Isakson. 

Also present: Senator John McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Thank you all very much. I apologize for being slightly tardy 

here. 

We welcome our friend and our colleague, Senator John McCain. 

We’re delighted to have him here for the purposes of making an 

introduction. 

Obviously, we’re here today to consider President Obama’s nominee for Ambassador to Afghanistan, and I think we are very 

fortunate that the President has chosen one of America’s most experienced and able diplomats to serve in Kabul, and we’re very fortunate that Ambassador Ryan Crocker has agreed to serve. 

We’re happy to welcome him again before the Foreign Relations 

Committee. As everybody knows, in his distinguished career he has 

served as ambassador to five countries, including such challenging 

posts as Pakistan, Iraq, and Lebanon; and immediately after the 

Taliban’s ouster he became charge ́ d’affaires in Afghanistan, reopening our Embassy for the first time since 1989. So this is a man 

with experience in the region and experience in these complicated 

and difficult tasks. 

I think he thought he had retired to a quiet life in academia, but 

the President had another idea, and I want to say on behalf of all 

of us how grateful we are, Ambassador Crocker, that you and your 

wife Christine were willing to agree to return to public service. 

Obviously, you will arrive in this post at a pivotal moment in the 

conflict. We have a critical planning window in front of us right 

2 

now. This is a critical moment. It’s a moment where we have the 

ability to recalibrate, if that’s what’s needed, to redefine, and to do 

the things necessary in the wake of the successes that we have had 

against al-Qaeda, which was the principal reason for being in 

Afghanistan in the first place. So in order to ensure a transition, 

I think there are a number of things that need to be thought 

through. 

Last month we held five hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan 

to examine all the assumptions guiding our strategy in the region 

and to help chart a path forward. In about 2 weeks, Secretary of 

State Clinton will testify here on the administration’s thinking and 

address congressional concerns as the President decides how many 

troops to draw down starting in July. Needless to say, I think it 

would be very helpful if this committee and the Senate can move 

very rapidly on this nomination in order to put you in place to be 

part of those deliberations. 

I’d just say very quickly—I know Senator McCain is here, so I’ll 

truncate this. But I’ll just say very quickly that I think we ought 

to be guided by certain truths here. First, while the United States 

has genuine national security interests in Afghanistan, our current 

commitment in troops and in dollars is neither proportional to our 

interest nor sustainable, in my judgment. 

Second, our military has made significant gains, clearing and 

holding in the south, but as the President has said, they’re fragile 

and reversible absent continued U.S. robust presence there. We’ve 

not yet made sufficient gains in the east, where the threat from 

insurgent groups based in Pakistan continues, and I will continue 

to beat this drum that the principal equation with respect to our 

capacity to resolve concerns in Afghanistan still lies in Pakistan 

and will lie in our ability to adjust that relationship, and indeed 

to create a regional framework with respect to this conflict. I want 

to emphasize that regional framework. 

Third, only a political settlement will resolve this. Every military 

leader has said that. There is no military solution. Reconciliation 

is not a silver bullet, but we’re going to need to support the Government of Afghanistan as it tries to engage those willing to make 

some kind of acceptable agreement. 

And finally, we need to reexamine the current plan with respect 

to the Afghan National Security Forces because there are serious 

questions about size, capability, sustainability, and I think we need 

to examine those very carefully. 

Also today, the majority on the committee is releasing a report 

regarding assistance. This is a report meant to be constructive. It’s 

a report with critical observations but observations that are made 

in the best spirit of joint cooperative effort, and we appreciate 

Administrator Shah’s responses and assistance, and we appreciate 

the administration’s cooperation with us in efforts to address the 

concerns that we have. 

The report argues that U.S. assistance needs to meet three basic 

conditions before that money is dispensed. The projects have got to 

be necessary, achievable, and sustainable. 

So over the next few months, there’s a lot on the table for the 

Congress and for the President, and Ambassador Crocker is going 

3 

to have an essential role, a critical role to play in making sure that 

we get it right. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our very distinguished nominee. 

Ambassador Crocker has returned from his well-earned retirement to again apply his unsurpassed experience at managing civilmilitary collaboration in a dynamic conflict environment. I thank 

him for his commitment and know that he will bring insight and 

informed judgment to his job in Kabul. 

This is the sixth hearing the Foreign Relations Committee has 

held related to Afghanistan during the last 2 months. We have explored not just what is happening in Afghanistan and neighboring 

Pakistan, but whether our vast expenditures in Afghanistan represent a rational allocation of our military and financial assets. 

Our geostrategic interests are threatened, not just by terrorism, 

but by debt, economic competition, energy and food prices, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and numerous other 

forces. Solving these problems will be much more difficult if we 

devote too many resources to one country that, historically, has 

frustrated nation-building experiments. 

The question the President must answer is whether we can 

achieve the most important national security goals in Afghanistan—especially preventing the Taliban from taking over the government and preventing Afghan territory from being used as a 

terrorist safe haven—at far less expense. 

Ambassador Crocker would be assuming his post coincident with 

the Obama administration’s review of Afghanistan policy that is 

anticipated to result in some level of troop reduction. This opportunity should be used to do more than just withdraw an arbitrary 

number of troops based on political expediency. Rather, the President should put forward a new plan that includes a definition of 

success in Afghanistan based on the United States vital interests 

and a sober analysis of what is possible to achieve. 

Such a plan should include an explanation of what metrics must 

be satisfied before the country is considered secure. It should also 

designate and eliminate those activities that are not intrinsic to 

our core objectives. The administration’s ambiguity on our goals 

must be eliminated in order to more effectively address our 

national security interests and convey to Afghans the continuing 

relationship we will maintain as allies in the region. 

Despite 10 years of investment and attempts to better understand the culture and the region’s actors, we remain in a cycle that 

produces relative progress but fails to deliver a secure political or 

military resolution. In Afghanistan, measuring success according to 

relative progress has very little meaning. Undoubtedly, we will 

make some progress when we are spending more than $100 billion 

per year in that country. The more important question is whether 

we have an efficient strategy for protecting our vital interests that 

does not involve massive open-ended expenditures and does not require us to have more faith than is justified in Afghan institutions. 

4 

I would appreciate hearing the nominee’s impressions of the 

Obama administration’s strategic review and of how we can improve Afghanistan’s capacity to defend and govern itself, while 

reducing our own commitment of resources. 

I applaud Ambassador Crocker’s willingness, once again, to take 

on an extremely difficult mission, and I look forward to his testimony. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

As I said previously, it is a privilege for the committee to welcome Senator McCain. As the ranking member and chair and so 

forth, back and forth on the Armed Services Committee, there’s 

nobody with more experience in these matters or who pays more 

attention to them in the Senate, and I appreciate his taking the 

time to be here to introduce Ambassador Crocker. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for your kind words, and thank you for indulging me to 

introduce this great American. 

Senator Lugar and members of the committee, it’s an honor to 

introduce the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to 

Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, a man whose stellar record of service 

precedes him and speaks for itself. 

Obviously, I join the committee in recognizing two members of 

Ambassador Crocker’s family who are joining him today, his niece 

Cameron, and of course the dedicated woman who has been by his 

side ever since they were young Foreign Service officers working together in Baghdad in 1979, Ryan’s wife, Christine. 

I understand the challenges of being a Foreign Service couple, 

and I know that Ryan could never have enjoyed as many successes 

without the support of Christine. 

Those successes make the task of introducing Ambassador 

Crocker quite easy. The U.S. Senate has had the wisdom to confirm 

him to the post of ambassador, as the chairman pointed out, five 

times already—Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Pakistan, and Iraq. And 

this is only a fraction of Ambassador Crocker’s story. 

When the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed, Ryan Crocker 

was a young officer who helped pull wounded colleagues from the 

rubble. When the United States needed to reopen our Embassy in 

Afghanistan after the Taliban were driven from power in 2001, the 

Secretary of State sent Ryan Crocker. A few years later, facing the 

same challenge in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, once 

again Ryan Crocker was the only man for the job. It is nearly 

impossible to find other American diplomats who can match his 

record. 

I had met Ambassador Crocker in his earlier posts, but where I 

really came to know him and to respect him most was during his 

amazing tour in Baghdad. It is difficult to remember just what 

Ambassador Crocker was getting himself into when he raised his 

hand to serve in 2007. The violence in Iraq was spiraling out of 

control. Dozens of civilians were being killed every day. The ethnic 

5 

and sectarian battle lines were drawn. Iraq faced the very real 

prospect of tearing apart, and America faced the horrifying possibility of being driven from the country in defeat. 

Fortunately, President Bush adopted a new policy, and of all the 

consequential decisions that he made in January 2007—the change 

of strategy, the surge of forces, the nomination of GEN David 

Petraeus—one of the most important and least appreciated was the 

nomination of Ryan Crocker as his Ambassador to Iraq. 

I’m sure that if you asked Ambassador Crocker, he will say he 

was just doing his part to serve his country where and when he 

was needed most. Heroes always say that. The truth is, what 

Ambassador Crocker accomplished in Iraq was nothing short of a 

miracle. General Petraeus has obviously received huge praise for 

the role he played in Iraq, and he deserves every bit of it. But as 

General Petraeus would be the first to affirm, our military strategy 

in Iraq would never have worked without Ryan Crocker’s constant, 

dogged, and tireless leadership of our political strategy. 

Ambassador Crocker put the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on a 

counterinsurgency footing. He established a seamless partnership 

with General Petraeus and his military leaders which set the 

standard for civil-military partnerships at every level of our effort 

across Iraq. He also established a relationship of trust with Prime 

Minister Maliki and his government, and then used that relationship to push, prod, encourage, and support the Iraqis in saving 

their country. 

Throughout this struggle, as rockets smashed into his office in 

Baghdad, Ryan Crocker performed his duties with courage, poise 

under pressure, a unique ability to marry strategic vision with tactical effectiveness, and a relentless work ethic that literally almost 

killed him. 

I commend the President for recognizing that there is no better 

man for the job of Ambassador to Afghanistan than Ryan Crocker. 

I also commend Ambassador Crocker for again answering his country’s call to service. In Afghanistan today, a new generation of 

Americans, both military personnel and civilians, is writing the inspiring next chapter to the history of our great Nation. The challenge for all of us, in our time of service, is to strive to be equal 

to these heroic fellow Americans. 

In nominating Ryan Crocker as Ambassador to Afghanistan, the 

President has chosen a man who is worthy of the service and sacrifice of those he must lead. I hope all of you will reach a similar 

judgment and vote him out of committee quickly so that the full 

Senate can confirm Ambassador Crocker as rapidly as possible. 

And I’d like to finally add, I think that the chairman and ranking member and others would agree with me. We’ve had the great 

privilege of having so many outstanding Americans serve in our 

diplomatic service in our State Department, and Americans probably are not appreciative of the enormous sacrifices they make. 

There is no greater example of that kind of service and sacrifice 

than the man whose nomination is before you today. 

I thank the chairman, and I apologize for the length of my opening statement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator McCain, no apology needed at all. 

I think it’s a very important statement. I appreciate the fact, both 

6 

the length and the thought that went into it. I think it’s very helpful to the committee. It’s important for the record, and I think it 

really states in a very articulate, clear way the assets that Ambassador Crocker brings to this task. And I think it’s important that 

you’ve said those things and I’ve said those things so that the message goes clear to President Karzai, to President Zardari, to others 

in the region that this is a serious person that we all have confidence in and brings a great deal of experience. So I think your 

introduction was, frankly, superb and really welcome. Thank you. 

Ambassador Crocker, you’re flying alone now, but you’ve done 

that a lot. So we are delighted to welcome your testimony and you 

to the committee. 

You know how it works. If you want to put your full statement 

in the record as if read in full, it will be placed there. If you want 

to summarize, we can then have a good dialogue and look forward 

to the questions. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, OF WASHINGTON, TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Lugar, members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to become 

U.S. Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. And I’m 

very grateful to Senator McCain for his most generous introduction 

and for his recognition of the Foreign Service, my colleagues that 

over the years have labored hard on behalf of America’s vital interests and sometimes paid the ultimate price. 

I am also grateful to the President and to Secretary Clinton for 

placing their trust in me. If confirmed, I look forward to cooperating with you to advance America’s interests in Afghanistan. 

I had the privilege of opening the Embassy in Kabul in January 

2002. As you noted, I worked closely with President Karzai in those 

early days and developed respect for his commitment to a stable, 

unified Afghanistan. If confirmed, I look forward to renewing our 

relationship and working together toward that vision. 

I also had the honor of serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from 2004–07, which developed my understanding of the region and which, if confirmed, I hope will be a useful asset as we 

work with our regional and international partners. 

As you know, our core goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to deny it safe haven in 

those countries. Osama bin Laden’s death is an important step, but 

much work remains to be done to ensure that al-Qaeda can never 

again threaten us from Afghanistan, with the Taliban providing 

safe haven. 

Our efforts to pursue this goal are focused on three mutually reinforcing surges—military, civilian, and diplomatic—all aimed at 

stabilizing Afghanistan so it will not become a safe haven for terrorists again. 

The military and civilian surges that President Obama announced in 2009 have stolen momentum from the Taliban-led insurgency. Today, more than 1,100 U.S. civilian experts are serving 

alongside our troops to help establish the conditions for a sustainVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:08 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 NOM TEXT HEARINGS\N060811AM.TX
7 

able and irreversible transition of security responsibility to the 

Afghan Government. If confirmed, it will be an enormous privilege 

to serve with these courageous and committed Americans. 

Working together with the Government of Afghanistan and our 

coalition partners, we have made significant progress. But as you 

have noted, as the President has noted, this progress is still fragile 

and reversible. Enormous challenges remain: governance; rule of 

law, including corruption, which undermines the credibility of the 

Afghan state; narcotics; sustainable economic development, including employment, increased revenues, along with the capacity for 

the government to provide basic services such as education and 

health care. Failure in some of these areas can mean failure of the 

state and the creation of an environment in which our strategic enemies can regroup. Making progress on these issues has been hard, 

and it will go on being hard, but hard does not mean impossible. 

As Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, we walked away from 

Afghanistan once in 1989 with disastrous consequences. We cannot 

afford to do so again. 

Ultimately, all of this will be an Afghan responsibility, realized 

through a responsible transition. A key U.S. priority in Afghanistan is supporting the Afghan-led transition process that was 

agreed upon by the Afghans and NATO–ISAF partners at the 

November 2010 NATO summit at Lisbon. This process will enable 

Afghans to systematically assume full responsibility for their security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. 

The transition process will begin this July with the transfer of 

lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces 

in seven provinces and municipalities, which I understand contain 

roughly one-quarter of the Afghan population. If confirmed, I will 

work hand in hand with our military partners, as I did as the U.S. 

Ambassador in Iraq, to continue this responsible, conditions-based 

transition to an Afghan security lead. 

Alongside this transition process, the Afghan Government has 

launched a peace effort to reconcile insurgents. President Karzai 

formed a High Peace Council that includes representatives from 

across Afghanistan. The United States supports this Afghan effort. 

Over the last 2 years, we both have laid out our unambiguous redlines for reconciliation with the insurgents: renounce violence; 

abandon their alliance with al-Qaeda; and abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan and its protections for all Afghans, including 

women. Those are necessary outcomes of any negotiation. If former 

militants are willing to meet these redlines, they would then be 

able to participate in the political life of the country. 

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will work closely with Ambassador 

Grossman, our Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ambassador Munter in Pakistan, among others, to continue our efforts to build support for an Afghan-led reconciliation 

process. I will maintain our efforts to support Afghanistan’s longterm reconstruction, sustainable economic development, and the 

strengthening of key Afghan institutions critical to ensuring that 

transition is sustainable and irreversible. 

We do look forward to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan 

and have initiated negotiations on a long-term Strategic Partnership Declaration with the Afghan Government in March of this 

8 

year. This political framework document will help normalize our relationship and provide a roadmap for our political, economic, and 

security cooperation. We respect Afghanistan’s proud history of 

independence, and we do not seek any permanent military bases in 

their country or a presence that would be a threat to any of 

Afghanistan’s neighbors. 

In closing, I want to thank this committee for the support it has 

provided and continues to provide for the vital work of the U.S. 

mission in Afghanistan. As you know, Mr. Chairman, you have 

held a series of useful hearings over the past several months to examine our policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and, if confirmed, I 

will listen to your guidance and continue a dialogue with Congress 

on our progress on the ground. And in that context, I would note 

that I’ve just received a copy of the report you cite. So if confirmed, 

I think I know where that dialogue is going to begin. 

I will also ensure that the precious U.S. taxpayer resources being 

used in Afghanistan are applied effectively, transparently, and 

with an eye toward the long-term sustainability of these efforts by 

the Afghans themselves. 

As the Secretary said in her February 18 speech at the Asia Society, ‘‘The United States is not walking away from the region. We 

will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Our commitment is real 

and it is enduring.’’ As we approach the 10th anniversary of the 

horrible attacks of September 11, it is a time to remember those 

who died that day and to honor the sacrifices that so many Americans have made, military and civilian, to ensure that Afghanistan 

never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists from which they 

can attack America. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to become U.S. 

Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I am grateful to the President 

and to Secretary Clinton for placing their trust in me. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working closely with you to advance America’s interests in Afghanistan. 

I had the privilege of opening the Embassy in Kabul in January 2002. I worked 

closely with President Karzai in those early days and developed a great deal of respect for his commitment to a stable, unified Afghanistan. If confirmed, I look forward to renewing our relationship and working together to help the Afghans realize 

our shared vision for the future of their country, one that is free, secure, democratic, 

and can stand on its own feet, and plot its own course toward its destiny. I also 

had the honor of serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from 2004–07, which 

developed my understanding of the region and, which, if confirmed, I hope will be 

a useful asset as we work with our regional and international partners towards a 

stable Afghanistan. 

As you know, our core goal in Afghanistan, and Pakistan, is to disrupt, dismantle, 

and defeat al-Qaeda, and to deny it safe haven in those countries. Our efforts to 

pursue this goal are focused on three mutually reinforcing surges—military, civilian, 

and diplomatic. Osama bin Laden’s death is an important step toward achieving this 

objective, but much work remains to be done to ensure that al-Qaeda can never 

again threaten us from Afghanistan with the Taliban providing safe haven. 

The military and civilian surges that President Obama announced in 2009 have 

stolen momentum from the Taliban-led insurgency. Today, more than 1,100 U.S. 

civilian experts are serving alongside our troops to help establish the conditions for 

a sustainable and irreversible transition of security responsibility to the Afghan 

Government. 

9 

Working together with the Government of Afghanistan and our coalition partners, 

including many Muslim majority nations, we have made significant progress, but 

this progress is still fragile and reversible. Enormous challenges remain: governance; rule of law, including corruption, which undermines economic growth and the 

credibility of the Afghan state; narcotics; sustainable economic development, including adequate employment opportunities, increased revenues along with the capacity 

for the government to provide basic services, such as education and health care. 

Failure in some of these areas can mean failure of the state and the creation of an 

environment in which our strategic enemies can regroup. Making progress on these 

issues has been hard, and it will go on being hard. But hard does not mean hopeless. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, we walked away from Afghanistan once in 1989 with disastrous consequences. We cannot afford to do so again. 

Ultimately, all of this will be an Afghan responsibility, realized through a responsible transition. A key U.S. priority in Afghanistan is supporting the Afghan-led 

transition process that was agreed upon by the Afghans and NATO–ISAF partners 

at the November 2010 NATO summit at Lisbon. This process will enable Afghans 

to systematically resume full responsibility for their security across Afghanistan by 

the end of 2014. President Karzai has repeatedly, and understandably, requested 

that the United States and our partners and allies phase out parallel structures and 

move to less intrusive forms of assistance that enable the Afghans take control of 

their own future. We support that goal and appreciate President Karzai’s March 22 

speech announcing the start of transition. 

This transition process will begin this July with the transfer of lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces in seven provinces and municipalities, which contain roughly 25 percent of the Afghan population. If confirmed, 

I will work hand in hand with our military partners, as I did as the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, to continue this responsible, conditions-based transition to Afghan security lead, which is a major priority for President Karzai. 

Alongside this transition process, the Afghan Government has launched a peace 

effort to reconcile insurgents. President Karzai made a good start by convening a 

broad-based Peace Jirga last June that set out a framework for national reconciliation. He then formed a High Peace Council that includes representatives from 

across Afghanistan. Council leaders are holding meetings in key provinces throughout the country with tribal leaders, civil society, women, and villagers to hear their 

hopes and concerns for a reconciliation process. They are working to form local councils to begin engaging the insurgents and the broader community. 

The United States supports this Afghan effort. Over the past 2 years, we both 

have laid out our unambiguous redlines for reconciliation with the insurgents: renounce violence; abandon their alliance with al-Qaeda; and abide by the constitution 

of Afghanistan and its protections for all Afghans, including women. Those are necessary outcomes of any negotiation. This is the price for reaching a political resolution and bringing an end to the military actions that are targeting the insurgency’s 

leadership and decimating its ranks. If former militants are willing to meet these 

redlines, they would then be able to participate in the political life of the country 

under their constitution. 

As transition proceeds and Afghan leadership strengthens across the country, a 

process of political reconciliation will become increasingly viable. In turn, successful 

reconciliation will reduce the threat to the Afghan Government, making transition 

more sustainable. If confirmed, I will work closely with Ambassador Grossman, our 

Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ambassador Munter in 

Pakistan among others, to continue our efforts to build support for an Afghan-led 

reconciliation process. I will maintain our efforts to support Afghanistan’s long-term 

reconstruction, sustainable economic development, and strengthening of key Afghan 

institutions critical to ensuring that transition is sustainable and irreversible. 

The United States and our partners will continue to support the Afghan Government and a durable responsible political settlement. Toward that end, we initiated 

negotiations on a long-term Strategic Partnership Declaration with the Afghan Government in March 2011. This political framework document will help normalize our 

relationship with the Afghan Government, and provide a roadmap for our long-term 

political, economic, and security cooperation. In no way should our enduring commitment be misunderstood as a desire by America or our allies to occupy Afghanistan 

against the will of its people. We respect Afghans’ proud history of independence, 

and we do not seek any permanent American military bases in their country—or 

a presence that would be a threat to any of Afghanistan’s neighbors. 

In closing, I want to thank this committee for the support it has provided and 

continues to provide for the vital work of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. You have 

held a series of useful hearings over the past month to examine our policy in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan and, if confirmed, I will listen to your guidance and conVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:08 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 NOM TEXT HEARINGS\N060811AM.TX
10 

tinue a discussion with Congress on our progress on the ground. I will also ensure 

that the precious U.S. taxpayer resources being used in Afghanistan are applied 

effectively, transparently, and with an eye toward the long-term sustainability of 

these efforts by the Afghans themselves. 

As the Secretary said in her February 18 speech at the Asia Society, ‘‘The United 

States is not walking away from the region. We will not repeat the mistakes of the 

past. Our commitment is real and it is enduring.’’ As we approach the 10th anniversary of the heinous attacks of September 11, it is a time to remember those who 

died that day and to honor the sacrifices that so many Americans have made, military and civilian, to ensure that Afghanistan never becomes a safe haven for terrorists from which they can attack America. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward to your 

questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker. 

I want to come back—that last sentence sort of hit me, and I 

want to come back to it in a minute. But let me say, first of all, 

that I support and agree with the transition process that will begin 

this July with the lead responsibility going to Afghan security 

forces in seven provinces, representing the somewhat roughly 25 

percent of the Afghan population. Clearly, the Taliban are trying 

to disrupt that with their increased violence in the last days, targeting some of the governors and high-level officials. 

I also am particularly supportive of the Afghan-initiated peace 

process, the reconciliation President Karzai has initiated with his 

broad-based jirga last year and the things coming out of it that you 

have mentioned in your testimony. 

My concern is a little bit in sort of pinning down our own definitions here and the breadth of what you’ve said, and particularly 

this sort of notion, ensure that Afghanistan never becomes a safe 

haven for terrorists from which they can attack America. 

I think we have to really kind of bear in on this question of what 

that really entails. What is a safe haven, and how much guarantee 

is there? To the degree there’s a safe haven, if that’s what we’re 

worried about, and we want to spend dollars most efficiently, the 

safe haven is in the western part of Pakistan. We’re spending $120 

billion in a country where there is no safe haven and about $2.8 

billion where there is a safe haven. 

The Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura, Lashkar-e-Taiba, 

Jaish-e-Muhammad, these folks are the problem, and they’re the 

ones responsible for most of the violence that’s taking place in 

Afghanistan. 

So I think the question is how do we get this right? I mean, what 

I saw in RC East when I was there a few weeks ago convinced me 

that if all we do is the current paradigm where attacks are 

launched out of the western part of Pakistan, we’re not going to 

find a very successful road here. I’d like you to comment on that. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are very 

important points. I have said in testimony before this committee 

during that brief but happy interlude when I was out of the Service 

that you cannot really succeed in Afghanistan without a fair measure of success in Pakistan. That’s why I think your legislation, the 

Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, a multiyear commitment, was so 

important. 

These are hard problems to solve. I wrestled with them as 

Ambassador to Pakistan. I had numerous meetings, as you’ve had, 

11 

with the Pakistani leadership to press on the Quetta Shura, on the 

Haqqani Network, and clearly with the most limited of results. 

So again, I think that is why the administration has been right 

in talking about the two nations together and having Ambassador 

Grossman now succeeding Ambassador Holbrooke so that you do 

have an approach that crosses the borders, because certainly that’s 

what the militants are doing. 

How to crack that conundrum? Sir, I know you have made huge 

efforts, as has Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Grossman in recent 

weeks. We’ll have to see whether the Pakistanis do take these 

actions. And as I noted in my statement, I look forward to working 

with Ambassador Munter, as well as Ambassador Grossman, 

because we face a common problem. 

The last thing I’d say, Mr. Chairman, is, quite frankly, the reason that most of the problem is in Pakistan and not in Afghanistan 

at this time is because we are in Afghanistan. And as we go 

through a responsible transition, it I think has to be, as the President and others have said, conditions-based to ensure that as we 

draw down our forces—and I’m keenly aware from my consultations of the mood both here on the Hill and publicly, there has to 

be transition. But at the end of the day, we have to be sure that 

the safe haven doesn’t then relocate from Pakistan to Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. The question is, Does it take 

150,000 troops to guarantee that doesn’t happen? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, that’s again a question 

that the President will be seized of. I am not part of those deliberations or consultations, and indeed—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s an unfair question. It’s a question that’s 

on the table. I want to put the question to you, but I understand 

you’re not part of those deliberations now, so I don’t expect you to 

answer it today. 

But let me ask you this. In your testimony you say enormous 

challenges remain: governance; rule of law, including corruption 

which undermines economic growth, credibility of the Afghan state; 

narcotics; sustainable economic development, including adequate 

employment opportunities, increased revenues, along with the 

capacity for the government to provide basic services; education; 

health care. Failure in some of these areas can mean failure of the 

state and the creation of an environment in which our strategic 

enemies can regroup. 

Can you narrow that down for us? Which of those areas means 

failure of the state and are essential to the accomplishment of our 

goal? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think clearly the issues of governance, 

rule of law and corruption have to improve if Afghanistan is to go 

forward as a stable state charting its own destiny. 

The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying, then, that taming corruption is 

essential to our capacity to achieve our goal of preventing strategic 

enemies from regrouping? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think corruption, Mr. Chairman, and I 

draw on my Iraq experience here, corruption totally unchecked 

becomes, as prominent Iraqis put it, a second insurgency. It undermines the confidence on the part of the people in their government, 

and it makes groups like the Taliban look attractive. 

12 

Mr. Chairman, we’re not out to clearly create a shining city on 

a hill. That’s not going to happen. That would apply to all of these 

sectors I’ve mentioned. But there needs to be progress. We went 

through the same thing in Iraq. We chipped away at it. Over time, 

we got them to take some measureable, if partial, steps on the 

issue of corruption so that you have a situation in Iraq today that 

is not, again, a city on a hill, but where they have a good chance 

of carrying forward without U.S. forces on the ground. 

It’s the same kind of dynamic that I think we have to go through 

in Afghanistan, not to solve these problems—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that billions of dollars coming from 

America that are spent through contractors which don’t have adequate oversight contributes to corruption? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s certainly something I’m going to take 

a careful look at, Mr. Chairman. I have met with the State Department’s inspector general. They, as you know, did a recent report. 

We have your staff report. I have spoken to colleagues in government. It’s clear that there is a need for more contracting officer 

representatives. State and AID recognize this. There have been initiatives that you’re aware of and that the staff report notes USAID 

forward, the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative, the 

military’s Operation Transparency. 

So I think there clearly have been problems. I think equally 

clearly there is a recognition that we have to be a part of the solution, not a part of the problem, and I’m encouraged by what I’ve 

heard of the steps that have been taken. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Crocker, this committee has discussed, as you have in your opening statement, the possibility of 

passing to the Afghans control over military and police functions, 

presumably for seven provinces or about 25 percent of Afghanistan, 

with the thought of this as the first of such large transitions in the 

next few years, hopefully occurring before 2014. 

I want to ask, however, about the whole conduct of the Afghan 

state and really how the budget of Afghanistan is put together, in 

other words, how its obligations are paid for. Now, in the case of 

the military and the police, the training has been paid for largely, 

if not completely, by the United States and its allies, and the sustenance of all of that will be expensive. 

But beyond that, enlighten us a little bit more about commerce 

in Afghanistan. That is, how do ordinary people make a living? 

What kind of industries are there? What sort of investment has 

been coming into the country or has been generated by any profits 

or success? 

The reason I ask this question is that many stories about 

Afghanistan’s economy indicate that the income coming into that 

government is pretty low given the ambitions of Afghans and the 

United States and its allies, which causes the resources required 

in maintaining some level of security to constitute a significant expense. But with regard to civil society and the economy moving forward, thoughts have come even from President Karzai himself in 

personal visits with Members of Congress that Afghanistan has remarkable natural resources that might be found, extracted, and 

sold to others in due course, but that this will require a considerVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:08 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 NOM TEXT HEARINGS\N060811AM.TX
13 

able amount of investment and a security environment in which 

the safety of investors can be better guaranteed. Of course, many 

of the investors may or may not be friends of ours, or may have 

very different foreign policy views. 

Now, I don’t mean to make the question impossibly complex, but 

as you survey the scene, how is Afghanistan going to raise revenue? And second, if Afghanistan is not able to raise revenue, are 

you in your preparation for this ambassadorship working with the 

State Department or other officials on some estimates as to what 

obligations the United States may have for many years to come? 

I don’t mean solely our expenditures related to our military’s continuing involvement there in the near future. Instead, I’m focusing 

on the long run, as some with whom we’ve raised this question in 

previous hearings have said, as a matter of common sense, that our 

obligations will last for a long time, for a decade or even decades. 

This really has to be an important part of our calculations as 

Members of Congress working with the administration now on 5- 

or 10-year budget plans for the United States. This could be a 

major factor, and if we do not get it right, it could have very grave 

consequences for Afghanistan or their expectations that the American support might be forthcoming. 

Can you discuss this general area? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. It is a very important and, as you note in your question, a very complex set of issues. 

And again, at this point I have, shall we say, an imperfect understanding of exactly how Afghanistan works, having not yet been 

confirmed and not having gotten out there. But I did note employment and economic development because I think these are critical 

factors. 

How does the economy work now? Services are an important 

part. Agriculture is an important part. I am told that the agricultural sector accounts for 80 percent of employment in Afghanistan, 

which is why I think we have to continue to support its development in a reasonable way that leads to, again, ultimately an 

Afghan capacity to carry forward. 

Senator LUGAR. What part of that is drugs as opposed to legitimate crops? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I’m talking about the part that isn’t 

drugs, primarily wheat. We would certainly like to see them move 

into, as they want to do, higher yield products such as fruit and 

pomegranates, which Afghanistan used to be famous for and which 

provide a better return to the farmer actually, I’m told, than 

poppies. 

But based on what I know, I think the administration is right 

in dealing with the narcotics issue, not to emphasize, as we tried 

at one point, the eradication but alternatives, economic alternatives 

that cause Afghans themselves to turn away from these kinds of 

things. 

I’d make a couple of other brief points on the Afghan economy. 

As you know, there are substantial mineral resources over the 

longer term. These can be a significant benefit to the state, but this 

will take time for them to develop and, as you point out, it’s going 

to require security conditions. The development of a robust private 

sector is going to be important, and I am pleased to learn that 

14 

OPEC is significantly engaged in Afghanistan, working on upward 

of 50 projects. I would like to see United States private investment 

come into Afghanistan. I worked hard on that in Iraq with some 

success. 

Customs revenues have to pick up, and I know there is a major 

effort underway where our trainers, mainly from the Department 

of Homeland Security, are working side by side with the Afghan 

border police. Corruption gets into this, too, but they’ve got to increase their revenues. 

The final point I’d make is Afghanistan is a country centrally 

located in an important region. I think the Afghan-Pakistan Trade 

and Transit Agreement was a very important step. I understand 

that President Karzai will be visiting Islamabad in just a few days 

time, I think the day after tomorrow, which is good in and of itself. 

Obviously, the leaders of the two countries talk through their 

issues. 

But I understand one of the objectives is to lay out the actual implementation of this agreement, because Afghanistan as a trade 

and transit center through Pakistan, into India, up into the former 

Soviet Republics to the north, with Iran, I think all of that can provide a major difference for Afghans’ economic future. 

Senator LUGAR. My time is expired, but I just want to underline 

I think it’s a remarkable fact you presented, that 80 percent of the 

employment of Afghanistan is in agriculture. That is huge, and 

success in this area is obviously paramount. But I get back to the 

fact that while perhaps eventually the Congress or the public will 

have a better idea of the budget of Afghanistan, most estimates 

analyzing Afghanistan’s budget indicate that the government’s revenues are a very, very small percentage of its obligations, both 

from a security standpoint as well as the commercial standpoint 

that we’re talking about. 

So I get back to my problem, and that is how long a stream of 

income from the United States going to Afghanistan is going to be 

required. If assistance to Afghanistan at current levels is not forthcoming in the future, is it likely that the economy and the security 

situation there will collapse, causing Afghanistan to be back to 

square one again regardless of any success we achieve in the meantime in providing some security there? 

But I thank you again for at least that discussion, and as you 

get out there you will have more to say. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar. 

I’ll recognize Senator Casey, and I’m also going to pass the gavel 

to Senator Casey because I need to go to another committee. 

Ambassador Crocker, I hope you’ll forgive me for that, but I appreciate your testimony this morning. As I said earlier, we’re going 

to try to move your nomination as rapidly as we can, hopefully 

have a business meeting in short order and get the full Senate to 

move on it. We look forward to getting you there, and I thank you 

again for coming in and for your willingness to do this. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thanks 

for this hearing. 

15 

Ambassador Crocker, it’s great to see you again, and we’re so 

grateful for your public service and your willingness to commit 

yourself to yet another very difficult assignment. But I know that 

you’re not only prepared but I have confidence, total confidence 

that you’ll be confirmed, and you should be confirmed because we 

need you there, we need you on the ground. 

I wanted to raise a couple of questions with you. And again, I’d 

also commend the commitment that your family makes when you 

take on a tough assignment like this. 

But I wanted to bring you back to a meeting that you and I had, 

and I’ve spoken about this a number of times, but I think I keep 

coming back to it because I think it has a lot of relevance to not 

just our policy in Afghanistan but where we are now this year, this 

summer, making some difficult decisions, the Congress, the administration, and the American people. 

And I start with the setting. It was in Iraq, and it was a small 

group of people, and you were there. It was in August 2007. And 

I was complaining at the time, very bluntly, about the language 

that was used to describe progress in Iraq, victory and defeat, win 

or lose, all language which I thought was not only inappropriate 

but, frankly, sometimes misleading, I hope not deliberately so, at 

the time in Washington. I won’t cast blame on who used the language, but a lot of folks did, and it was wrong. It was wrong then; 

I think it’s wrong now. 

And I asked you at the time what language do you think is appropriate to the mission, and you gave a very cogent answer. But 

what I remember most about it was that you said two words, sustainable stability, which has stayed with me ever since. 

So I ask you, in light of this mission which is, frankly in my 

judgment, more complicated, as difficult as Iraq was, a different set 

of priorities, and frankly a different set of challenges in Afghanistan. But I ask it in light of some of the real numbers that folks 

in Pennsylvania live with, and I know comparable numbers around 

the country. 

We have—we’re at 70 right now killed in action. Sixty-nine is the 

last number I saw, but it could actually be now 70, which is about 

a third of where we were with regard to Iraq. We fell just short 

of 200 there, 197, 198, depending on what accounts you read. So 

we’re about a third of the killed in action as we were in Iraq in 

Afghanistan now. The wounded numbers, my numbers in Pennsylvania are 455 in Afghanistan, 1,233 in Iraq. So again, about a third 

of the number in Iraq as it relates to the wounded. 

And I guess what people want to know, taxpayers want to know, 

certainly the families that have loved and lost, families that are 

contributing at a minimum the time and the sacrifice of their loved 

ones, is what is the mission and therefore what is the goal? And 

I’d ask you to comment on that in light of the discussion we had 

in 2007. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do clearly recall that conversation. That was shortly before the September 2007 

hearings that General Petraeus and I took part in, and again, as 

you may recall from that conversation, I was not among those who 

have ever used the words ‘‘winning’’ or ‘‘victory,’’ not then, not now, 

not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan. 

16 

Sustainable stability were words or a concept that I stood by 

then and would stand by now in the case of Iraq. Another way to 

put it is good enough governance, governance that is good enough 

to ensure that the country doesn’t degenerate back into a safe 

haven for al-Qaeda, and that’s what I was attempting to get at in 

my conversation with Chairman Kerry, I think before you arrived, 

that there is no intention that I see in any of my consultations 

here, I certainly don’t come with such an intention to produce the 

perfect society. We can’t. But I think by judicious use of resources 

and conditions-based redeployments and transfers of responsibility 

as will begin this July, we can get to that sustainable stability. 

I have always been and always will be frank and open with this 

committee. It’s my responsibility as an official if you so choose to 

make me one again, but even as a citizen. As I look at Afghanistan’s past, the 50 years of relative tranquility from, say, 1928 to 

1978, Afghanistan did require outside assistance, and we provided 

some very important contributions to their economic development 

that are still favorably remembered through the Point 4 program, 

which later became USAID. 

So in my—well, again, I’m not well informed enough to lay this 

out as a thoroughly considered view, but I would anticipate—and 

this gets a bit at what Senator Lugar was touching on—that beyond 2014 there will be a requirement for outside assistance from 

the international community, and I think part of our obligation is 

being sure that the international community continues to understand that they have a great deal at stake here. This is not an 

American problem only or an American obligation. 

But that, in short, is how I would view it, getting—and it’s going 

to be incremental. It’s going to be kind of issue by issue, case by 

case as to what sustainable stability and good enough governance 

is going to look like, but that certainly is what I see as my responsibility. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I’m over on my time, but I’ll ask you 

a second round about how we measure that, and I think that’s also 

something a lot of the American people are concerned about. 

Senator Menendez. 

Oh, I’m sorry. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. I thought I moved up one in seniority. That’s 

OK. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Ben Cardin, State of Maryland, Class of 

2006. 

Senator CARDIN. Ambassador Crocker, first of all, thank you very 

much for your service. You have served our Nation with great distinction, and I thank you for that, and I thank you for your willingness to come back into public service. I can think of no one 

who is more qualified for the position than you in a very tough 

situation. 

As everyone is suggesting, Afghanistan needs to change, its 

United States role in Afghanistan needs to change. We could talk 

about the military aspects and the fact that we are looking toward 

a redeployment of our combat troops starting in the next month or 

two, and that we expect that we might be able to accelerate that 

considering the current status of terrorist organizations operating 

in the region. 

17 

Now, having said that, I want to concentrate on the other part 

of our role. We have had our military presence, but we also have 

had an effort to provide economic development assistance to the 

people of Afghanistan. Now, I know you just recently got the report 

that was commissioned by this committee, but let me just share 

with you some observations that should not be a surprise. 

It’s rather critical of the efficiency of the deliverance of our aid 

to accomplish any long-term economic stability for the people of 

Afghanistan. It also questions as to whether we really are operating with a leadership team in Afghanistan that can deliver the 

type of economic promise for the people; and probably worse than 

that, that we’re creating an arbitrary economic activity in the country based upon a war economy that will not be sustainable, and 

that we are, in fact, creating an inflationary situation within 

Afghanistan that will cause a serious problem as we transition to 

a country that can take care of itself, admittedly with international 

assistance. I don’t deny the long-term need for humanitarian and 

economic assistance to the people of Afghanistan. 

My question is one of how you see your role as the Ambassador 

to assist us in being able to evaluate how we can transition the 

United States role and be as helpful as we can so the Afghans can 

take care of their own people and that we have at least a strategic 

ally in our war against terror. How do you see using the information that you have learned or will learn or know from the region 

to assist in helping us, the United States Senate, in transitioning 

to the next phase in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. It’s clearly an important question. I see my responsibilities at a number of levels. 

First, it is ensuring that we are properly organized as a civilian 

mission, as an embassy, to ensure that our assistance is accountable and it is effective, and effective for me means it’s got to be 

about transition, building Afghan capacity, helping the Afghans 

again carry forward without assistance at this scale in the future. 

So I know that Administrator Shah and Deputy Secretary Nides 

have provided some responses already to this report. I have not 

had the chance to go through it in depth, but I know it will be useful to me if I’m confirmed out at post looking at how we’re structured and deployed, looking at our programs and being sure they’re 

effective, again to this end of sustainable stability, with the 

Afghans increasingly taking the lead. So, you know, obligation 

begins at home within the Embassy. 

The second thing that I clearly would be focusing on is developing a partnership with the Afghan Government. Our programs 

have to support their vision and have to be sustainable by them, 

and I know that we already have in place several mechanisms, formal mechanisms that focus on transition. This is a major concern 

of President Karzai. He has chosen Ashraf Ghani, who I also came 

to know in my early days in Afghanistan, to head this up from his 

side precisely so that we don’t create that unsustainable wartime 

economy. 

I understand that USAID and other donors have already taken 

steps, for example, to ensure that they are not inflating salaries. 

I think that would be very important. For example, the worst thing 

we could do I think is be competing with the Afghan Government 

18 

for talent. It needs all it can get and a lot more to function as a 

government. So that would be another key part of it. 

It’s their country, and how it moves forward is ultimately their 

responsibility. I want to establish myself as a reliable partner but 

keeping the emphasis on sustainable development and transition, 

which is what they themselves seek. 

And third, I would say again this will have to be in consultation 

with Ambassador Grossman and others. We have a lot of international partners engaged in Afghanistan, NATO and non-NATO. 

The United Nations plays an important role, the special representative to the Secretary General. Staffan de Mistura performed that 

role in Iraq, and I cooperated closely with him there. I look forward 

to doing the same in Afghanistan. 

As I said earlier in a slightly different context, Afghanistan is not 

a uniquely American problem. It is a threat to international peace 

and security and requires an ongoing international commitment. So 

what role I play in that is still something to be sorted out, but 

clearly I believe I will have a role to play. I hope that gives you 

some sense of—— 

Senator CARDIN. I thank you for your answer. I think it’s going 

to be a real challenge because we’re not necessarily paying salaries 

or competing with the Afghan Government. We’re paying salaries 

that look like we’re giving just cash bonuses well above reasonable 

salaries to make friends with Afghans, which ends up supporting 

a corrupt system. 

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, I’m here out of respect for you as a person and 

the role you’ve played in much of our foreign policy. I know we had 

an extensive conversation in our office. General Petraeus has asked 

that we support efforts in Afghanistan through this fighting season, and I think people, generally speaking, have been willing to 

do that. But I think you sensed certainly in our conversation, but 

probably among numbers of people here, we’re expecting pretty 

dramatic changes at the end of this fighting season and expect and 

know that you will help guide those changes into a different place. 

All of us know the model that we have in Afghanistan is not sustainable for multiple reasons that we’ve talked about again in 

detail in private, and I’m just here to thank you today for your willingness to do this. I don’t know why you’d come back and do this 

other than you’re a great American, and we thank you for that. 

And again, without belaboring, I know there’s numbers of questions that we can ask you that you cannot answer yet, but I think 

you all know there’s a great degree of—it’s not impatience—a great 

degree of us knowing that what we’re doing there is not sustainable that is greatly changing the character of the country that your 

knowledge there hopefully will help us do, and the partnership that 

doesn’t exist the way that it should in Pakistan also. But again, we 

thank you for that. I look forward to talking to you on the ground 

in Afghanistan, and I thank you for your willingness to do this. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

19 

And, Ambassador, let me pile on with everybody else. You’re 

clearly a national treasure here, and we’re happy to see that you 

are going over into that part of the world. 

I think my major concern—and you and I had the opportunity to 

discuss this when you visited with me—is how we define our strategic objectives in Afghanistan and how that matches up with what 

we are able to actually accomplish in a cost-benefit way. I think 

this is one thing you’re hearing from a lot of people right now. 

How much do we actually need to achieve in Afghanistan with 

respect to our national interest? How much do people want to 

achieve that may be above what we need to and are we getting into 

this area of nation-building? How much can we achieve? And how 

much of that actually benefits our strategic objectives? That’s what 

I’ve been struggling with for more than a year now. 

I don’t know if you saw the column that Peggy Noonan wrote recently for the Wall Street Journal. It’s been a few weeks. I don’t 

have it in front of me, but she clearly is not a radical. She was one 

of the bright lights of the Reagan administration in which I was 

very proud to serve. One of the strong comments that she was 

making was if there is any nation in the world that needs nationbuilding right now, it’s the United States of America. And when 

we’re putting hundreds of billions of dollars into infrastructure in 

another country, it should only be done if we can articulate a vital 

national interest because we, quite frankly, need to be doing a lot 

more of that here. 

Time is short obviously, but could you please articulate your view 

of the strategic interest of the United States in Afghanistan and 

how the current military policy can help to bring us to an endpoint 

in that strategic objective? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. That is, of course, 

the essential question. As I said in my statement, and as the President and others have said, our ultimate strategic objective is to disrupt, dismantle, defeat al-Qaeda, and in the Afghan context to 

ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes what it was before 

9/11, an area in which al-Qaeda can reconstitute itself under protection of like-minded elements. 

Senator WEBB. I watched your opening statement from my office, 

and I don’t disagree with the objective. But you can pretty well 

fight international terrorism without remaking an entire societal 

structure. Wouldn’t you agree? And I know—I watched your comment about how they are not in Afghanistan now because they are 

in Pakistan—because we’re in Afghanistan, et cetera. But you can 

end up in that region playing ‘‘whack-a-mole.’’ 

So the real question is what is the ultimate objective with all of 

these ground forces and all these infrastructure programs in terms 

of the long-term advantage? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, an important and multifaceted 

issue. What we’ve seen with the additional forces and the effort to 

carry the fight into enemy strongholds is, I think, tangible progress 

in security on the ground in the south and the west. 

This has to transition, and again we’re seeing a transition of 

seven provinces and districts to Afghan control, to sustainable 

Afghan control. So I think you can already see what we’re trying 

to do: province by province, district by district, establish the condiVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:08 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 NOM TEXT HEARINGS\N060811AM.TX
20 

tions where the Afghan Government can take over and hold 

ground. And you’re absolutely right, you don’t have to build a 

whole nation, I think, to achieve that. 

Senator WEBB. International terrorism and guerilla warfare in 

general is intrinsically mobile. I fought a guerilla war in Vietnam, 

and I’ve written about this for a long time. So securing one particular area—I don’t say this critically but out of concern for where 

this policy is going it doesn’t necessarily guarantee that you’ve reduced the capability of those kinds of forces. They’re mobile, they 

move. The reason that they’re international in scope is that they 

do not align themselves with any particular governmental structure. I just want to lay that out as an area of continuing concern. 

I want to ask you one more question in the time that we have. 

I mentioned to you when you visited my office, and that is we tend 

to speak of the conciliators in this region simply along the Pakistan-Afghanistan-India axis, when I believe there is a role here 

that China could play if they would step up to the mat and be a 

little more overt in their willingness to participate in these types 

of solutions. They’re clearly going to benefit if there’s more stability 

in the region. What are your thoughts on that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s a great point, Senator. That’s—as we 

talk about the three elements of our strategy, the third one is very 

much involved in regional engagement. And I would join you in 

including China in that discussion. 

The Chinese, as you are aware, have the copper concession in 

Afghanistan. OK, that’s great. You can only really make that pay 

off for you if the conditions on the ground permit its extraction and 

its transport. 

Senator WEBB. They also have a long relationship with Pakistan. 

I know there are some people who would say that’s overstated, but 

clearly they do, and in fact when Chairman Kerry returned here 

from Pakistan, that same day while we’re sitting here in a hearing 

the Prime Minister of Pakistan immediately made a state visit to 

China and was welcomed and then stated that China was Pakistan’s greatest friend. 

I wish you the best. I am grateful that you are undertaking this, 

and I look forward to visiting you and perhaps continue our discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Ambassador Crocker, I join my 

colleagues in thanking you for your willingness to continue to serve 

the country, and I think I certainly stand ready, and I’m sure all 

of us do, to be helpful to you as you take on this new assignment. 

I know that you haven’t had a chance to review the report that 

was released this morning from the committee, but I think it does 

provide a renewed perspective on how difficult the challenges are 

in Afghanistan, particularly the civilian challenges, and much of 

that has been discussed by others here. 

But the report certainly underscores the need for our reconstruction projects in Afghanistan to be necessary, achievable, and sustainable. And I know there have been some concerns about the 

projects undertaken under the CERP program. I certainly share 

21 

concerns about how those dollars are distributed. And I, like others, have called for a number of steps to try and address more 

accountability in Afghanistan. 

I’m very pleased to see the overhaul of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, something that I thought also 

was long overdue; the appointment of the senior civilian representative to serve as a counterpart to the military commander there. 

And I wonder—I know you haven’t gotten on the ground there, 

but I wonder if you can assess at this stage what difference that 

might be making in Afghanistan and what you would expect your 

relationship as Ambassador to be with those two civilian counterparts there. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. I join you in a concern for accountability. I was Ambassador in Iraq, as you know, 

and I think we all learned a lot of hard lessons. 

I would hope to see those lessons being applied now in Afghanistan, and I think they are through some of the initiatives you note 

and others that I mentioned earlier, the USAID Forward Initiative, 

Operation Transparency that the military runs, the joint militaryUSAID vetting mechanism for contractors, the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan Initiative, and so forth. 

One of my first consultations was with the State inspector general. I had a very close working relationship with the head of 

SIGAR in Iraq, Stuart Bowen, who I have a lot of regard for. So 

again, I’m pleased that SIGAR seems to be moving forward with 

real capability, and if confirmed I look forward to welcoming the 

GAO, which I understand plans to set up a permanent staff in the 

fall. 

I think all of these institutions—the State IG, the USAID 

Regional Inspector General, SIGAR, the GAO—all have an important responsibility in ensuring oversight and accountability. And 

you know the phrase, ‘‘we’re here to help.’’ Well, sometimes help 

can be painful. But in my experience in Iraq, I found that kind of 

oversight to be absolutely essential going forward, and I will certainly, if confirmed, employ the same approach in Afghanistan. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And are there experiences from your time in 

Iraq that you think can be helpful in terms of coordinating all 

these efforts? Because for those of us looking at what’s going on on 

the ground, as you point out, there are a lot of people there trying 

to address oversight and accountability, but how is all of that getting coordinated? We know we have General Petraeus on the military side, but is there a similar command structure on the civilian 

side, and who is responsible? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you for that question because it is 

an important one, Senator. Basically, there are two and only two 

U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, as there were in Iraq, one military and one civilian. The civilian commander is the U.S. Ambassador, and I would like to say that as I have consulted and read 

in, I think Ambassador Eikenberry has done an amazing job in the 

swift ramp-up of the civilian presence in ensuring that it has been 

done in an orderly and organized manner. 

Obviously, if confirmed, I will need to make my own assessments. But my sense is he has handled a huge challenge with great 

care, thoughtfulness, and ability. 

22 

There are microcoordination issues, and this may be what you 

were referring to. I have an obligation to see that the entire U.S. 

mission is effectively carrying out its various roles. I also want to 

be sure that the accountability element of this, the different inspection agencies are themselves coordinated. We had to wrestle with 

this a bit in Iraq so that we did not have different inspectors inspecting the same thing and not working in coordination. 

There’s also, of course, a whole military inspection apparatus 

which also has to be woven into this. So as I did in Iraq, again I 

have a responsibility of seeing that the whole mission is operating 

effectively, and again I give huge credit to Ambassador Eikenberry 

that, if confirmed, I have the sense I’m going to be inheriting a 

going concern, but also on the specific issue that our accountability 

and oversight mechanisms are working as a team and not in isolation or competition with each other. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Casey. I’ll join the other 

members of this committee in thanking Ambassador Crocker and 

your family for your willingness to come out of retirement and take 

on yet again another vital mission for the United States, this time 

in Kabul. And I’m very encouraged by your successful previous 

service in Iraq and the very difficult circumstances that you negotiated there. 

I was concerned on my one visit to Afghanistan as a relatively 

new Senator to hear repeatedly about our generational commitment to the stability and security of the nation of Afghanistan. In 

your opening testimony you cited Secretary Gates’ comment that 

we walked away from Afghanistan in 1989 with disastrous consequences and we cannot afford to do so again, and I think in the 

previous questions by Senator Lugar and others a number of us are 

trying to get at the question if we’re not going to walk away, how 

long are we going to stay, and at what level? 

And there is a lot of focus on the immediate decision about a 

drawdown, but I’m really equally, if not more, interested in the 

post-2014 structure and what it looks like, and was very surprised 

to hear in-country assertions that we were committed to sustaining 

a more than 300,000-member Afghan National Security Force, 

which meant paying for it, and to a sustained U.S. military presence for the foreseeable future, a decade or more. 

You also made a comment that we are not seeking permanent 

military bases in Afghanistan, and I wondered, just as my first 

question, if you’d comment on the importance of achieving a United 

States-Afghan strategic—excuse me—a U.S.—in Iraq you achieved 

a strategic agreement that allowed for long-term stabilization. 

What importance is there in Afghanistan to our having a long-term 

United States or coalition military presence? Where do you think 

we are headed in terms of retaining strategic regional abilities? 

And how sustainable do you really think, past 2014, assistance required to support a 300,000 ANSF really is? 

A few questions, right? Nothing really difficult at all. These are 

shared questions that I think many of us are confronting. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, they certainly are the mega questions, and they’re important ones. They’re ones, if confirmed, I’ll be 

23 

very much focused on since I would expect to be out there for a couple of years. And I’m not ducking by saying that I just don’t know 

the answer now. 

You know, I do think that we have an interest, again, in ensuring that the country doesn’t backslide, that it just does not again 

become an al-Qaeda safe haven. I think we all would share that. 

The trick is how do you do it, how much does it cost, and how long 

does it take? And these are questions that my colleagues and I will 

have to work on, and we’re accountable to you as you ask them. 

I do think, as we saw in Iraq, that by going in big, you can then 

come out small. Now, Iraq has oil, and it always helps to have oil, 

moving aside the corruption issue there. They can pay for a lot of 

things that the Afghans can’t. 

I do think the Strategic Partnership Declaration process is important, as the Strategic Framework Agreement was in Iraq. It lets 

both countries kind of know where they want to move in the 

future. Obviously, the SPD is going to look different than the 

Strategic Framework Agreement in Iraq, but I think broadly speaking it’s intended to serve the same purpose. 

In terms of the ultimate end state for Afghan National Security 

Forces, the target is to, as you know, is to have the police and army 

combined at the 300,000 level by this October. To me, that is not 

a number that’s engraved in stone and it would never change. I 

think, again—and I’m speculating here. I mean, we just have to see 

how circumstances develop over time, as this first transition of 

seven districts and provinces takes place, how they do. And farther 

down the road, 2014, 2015, the Afghans may decide that they 

really don’t need a security force of this size. 

Senator COONS. Another key factor to the sustainable progress in 

Iraq was the not just reconciliation but the reintegration of more 

than 100,000 through the Sons of Iraq program. So far, reintegration of the Taliban is going quite slowly. It isn’t proceeding at anything like the pace you and others were able to accomplish in Iraq. 

Do you think reintegration is going to be critical? Because, 

frankly, the size of the Afghan National Security Force required is 

partly directly correlated to the size of the ongoing insurgency or 

Taliban or other extremist activity. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s a great question, Senator, because 

you’re right, and we haven’t talked that much about this so far. 

The Afghans are focused on two elements to bring this insurgency 

to an end. One is reconciliation, kind of big R, and then the other 

reintegration, which I guess would be little R. Both I think are premised on a concept we would all share, which is that you can’t kill 

your way out of an insurgency. There has to be ultimately a political solution. 

I think reintegration is part of it. I’m told that there are some 

2,500 former insurgents that are either processed or in process. It’s 

an Afghan process, of course, and I think Afghan capacity is again 

an issue here about how fast they can move. 

There is another element that I think is significant, and that is 

the Afghan local police initiative, not quite like the Sons of Iraq. 

The Sons of Iraq, as you remember, was a pretty varied group. 

Some of them were former insurgents, some were not. The Afghan 

local police initiative focuses on individuals who want to stand up 

24 

for their community and who were not part of the insurgency. I 

think their numbers are 6,000, and I’ve been advised that we expect to be able to continue to expand that possibly to 10,000 by 

September. 

Again, in the lessons learned category, the Sons of Iraq were 

never tied to the Iraqi Government until quite late in the process, 

when the Prime Minister made some undertakings to incorporate 

some into the security services and provide civilian employment for 

others. The Afghan local police have started out linked to the Ministry of Interior. So you’ve got all three of those in play, all three 

Afghan supported and Afghan led, which I believe is important. 

Clearly, we’d like to see the reintegration process move more 

quickly, and if confirmed, that is something that will have my focus 

because it can be a very—as it was in Iraq, it can be a very important component of a broader process. 

But unlike Iraq, I think the ultimate solution will come through 

a successful reconciliation process, and we’ll see what effect the 

death of Osama bin Laden might have on Taliban leadership attitudes, to what extent the linkage is personal rather than institutional. I don’t think we know the answer to that yet, but it is going 

to be a very important question. 

Senator COONS. Thank you for your answers, Ambassador. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

I’d ask our distinguished ranking member, Senator Lugar, do you 

have a second round? 

I wanted to ask one question. I know Senator Shaheen might 

also have a followup, as well as if Senator Coons does. 

Just one quick question, and we can amplify this, or I should say 

you can amplify this, Ambassador Crocker, with written responses. 

But I wanted to ask you a related question about the set of questions I asked you about how the American people view the mission 

and the goals and how we define it. 

One way to analyze that not just for Members of Congress but 

for the American people is to have metrics, measurements, reporting that we know we’ve had in place. There’s probably a good debate about whether they’re adequate enough. We learned a lot in 

the conflict in Iraq about how difficult that can be to measure and 

to report, but I think we’ve got to have metrics like that in place. 

I want to get your assessment of kind of where we are with that 

and how you view that, similar to what Senator Shaheen talked 

about with regard to accountability and having some reporting so 

that as people analyze the policy and debate it, they have some 

way to measure progress. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It’s an important point, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, I think it’s part of that accountability process that Senator Shaheen was alluding to, how do you measure progress. And 

as you point out, that can be hard in certain areas. In other areas, 

I think it’s easier. 

In education, for example, we know how many Afghan kids are 

in school, over 7 million, 21⁄2 million of whom are girls. And again, 

as we consider our costs and our options, I just would like to take 

a minute, with your permission, to comment on girls and women 

in Afghanistan. 

25 

One of the first things USAID did when we reopened the 

Embassy in January 2002 was to start educational programs for 

girls who were completely shut out of the educational system, as 

you know, under the Taliban. And in the middle of January 2002, 

on a freezing day, I took then-Senator Biden to visit a girls’ school 

that we had just established. We visited a first grade class that 

had girls whose ages ranged from 6 to 12 because the 12-year-olds 

had become of school age when the Taliban took over. 

And I remember asking a 12-year-old whether it bothered her at 

all to be kind of in there with the little kids, and she said I am 

just so happy to have the chance for an education. I was touched 

at the time, and I still am. 

As we consider, again, hard options, it certainly is my intention 

to see that there would be nothing in my recommendations and 

nothing in policy decisions over which I might have input or control 

that would put at risk half the population of Afghanistan, the girls 

and women who still face some significant challenges but who are 

in school, in business, and in government. 

So I’m sorry for a slight digression, but again, it does touch at 

metrics. I think these are things we can measure, and I take the 

point. I mean, I’m not far along into this to be able to give you 

large quantities of statistics, and not everything is measureable 

that way. But I take the point that that which can be measured 

and metricized should be, so the American people and the Congress 

have a sense of what is actually happening out there. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, and thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker, for that commitment, because that’s exactly what I 

was going to ask as we talk about the potential for reconciliation 

and reintegration of the Taliban, how do we ensure that women’s 

rights aren’t traded away in any negotiations. And I think for all 

of us who have watched what’s happened in Afghanistan, one of 

the biggest concerns as I think about what happens after the 

United States leaves is what happens to half of the population, who 

is women. So I very much appreciate your commitment to ensure 

that those rights are protected. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Casey. If I might, just one 

last question, to take us back to I think the very first point Chairman Kerry raised about Pakistan and the disproportionate or significantly different investment we’re making in prosecuting the war 

in Afghanistan and then trying to sustain this uneven partnership, 

relationship, whatever it is with the people of Pakistan. 

As a former Ambassador to Pakistan, I just wanted to ask your 

advice or input on how you see the prospects of our ever being successful in persuading the Pakistanis to change their relentless 

focus on India as the primary source of threat to their nation and 

instead throw in their lot more decisively with us in the war on extremism, particularly against the Quetta Shura in North Waziristan and against LET, and what initiatives you think we can or 

should be taking to engage New Delhi in this and in helping realign the strategic calculus of the Pakistanis. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. I would imagine that 

my colleagues from Legislative Affairs would say you’re not the 

26 

nominee for Pakistan, so be careful, but I was the Ambassador to 

Pakistan, and it is an important question. 

The Pakistanis, of course, have been engaged against militants 

on their soil, and they have lost a very large number of forces fighting them. So it’s not like they’re not doing anything. But the problems of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura, 

as you note, persist. 

Just in recent weeks since the death of bin Laden, of course, 

we’ve had a number of senior visitors who have engaged the Pakistanis, including the chairman, as well as Secretary Clinton, Admiral Mullen, and Marc Grossman, and they have made some statements. It’s clearly going to be important for them to follow through 

on them. 

With respect to India, I’m pleased to see from my possible future 

perspective in Afghanistan that the dialogue between the foreign 

secretaries of the two nations has resumed. I think that’s an important step. I hope they sustain it and they broaden it because 

clearly the degree to which India and Pakistan start to see some 

capacity to work together, it’s to the benefit of the region, and it’s 

to the benefit of us. But again, that falls to the purview of others, 

particularly as it relates to India. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. Thank you for your input, and thank 

you for your willingness to take on this vital mission. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

Ambassador Crocker, I’m going to be leaving. I’m going to be 

turning the gavel over to Senator Menendez. He will be the next 

questioner. But we’re grateful for your service, and thank you for 

the testimony today. 

And with that, I’ll turn to Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your past service, and for your 

willingness to continue serving. We had a good discussion when 

you came to my office, and I would like to pursue some of the 

things we discussed at that time. 

I know you don’t determine war strategy, but I do wonder what 

your role will be as Ambassador in terms of informing Congress 

about where we’re at. I’m one of those who believe that we would 

be more successful in Afghanistan by reducing our troop presence 

in the south and continuing support for institution-building in the 

north. It seems to me that a counterinsurgency strategy, which is 

where we fight insurgents to give the government time to gather 

the wherewithal to stand up for itself, defend itself and govern 

itself might be a worthwhile policy if we had a solid partner in this 

regard, which in my view we do not. 

That present policy has had an enormous toll on American lives 

and on American treasure, and I don’t think we’ve won the hearts 

and minds. 

So give me a sense. Do you believe that we’re making sustainable 

progress in the south? I know that we’re clearing and holding, but 

after that, it will not be sustainable for us to be able to stay. What 

happens in the follow-on? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator, and thank you also 

for the time you gave me in your office. That was very valuable to 

me in trying to get my mind around the big issues. 

27 

We, as you point out, are successfully clearing and holding in the 

south and the west. We’re also going to be transitioning seven 

provinces and districts in the month of July to Afghan security control, and I don’t have the list right in front of me, but some of those 

are in these areas, as I understand it. 

It will be an important step because that ultimately is our goal 

and their goal for the entire nation. They are assured that they can 

do this. What I understand from my briefings is that we are confident that they have the capabilities in these seven districts to do 

it. And if successful, that will be a not bad start to the transition 

that we and they are committed to, to cover the whole country. 

Senator MENENDEZ. What role will you play in helping to win 

over Pashtuns and other groups in the south? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, at this stage in the process, I cannot answer that with exact certainty because it will be part of a 

process of consultation with others who are involved in this matter, 

in particular Ambassador Grossman, who is both a friend and a 

colleague. 

That said, as the Afghans move toward a concentrated reconciliation effort, I would certainly see a role for the Embassy in working closely, as we already do, with Pashtuns in the south. My position in Iraq was basically that we would talk to anybody who would 

talk to us and not ask a lot of questions as we entered those conversations, at least initially. Now, whether I can get away with this 

in Afghanistan or not, I don’t know. But I do think it’s important 

that we know what southern Pashtuns are thinking, as it is important we know what northern Tajiks and Hezaras and so forth are 

all looking at, especially as a tricky reconciliation process moves 

forward. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me turn to a field that I do think 

you do have a lot to say about, and that is what is the continuing 

use of U.S. taxpayer dollars for an assistance mission. My understanding is that the President’s goal is to reportedly shift from a 

military mission to an assistance mission in Afghanistan, and that 

that mission is to help rebuild lives and institutions to create a 

functioning government. We’ve done this before, but we’ve done 

this with more committed partners, from my perspective. 

From 2002 to 2010, we have spent $19 billion in assistance, and 

much of which is not sustainable is subject to endemic corruption. 

I know that there is a report about to be released suggesting that 

we have had only limited success, and this huge attempt at nationbuilding may not survive an American withdrawal, which is a real 

concern to me. 

Is this a good use of U.S. taxpayer dollars? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think we have had some significant successes with our assistance. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Could you put on your microphone? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sorry. I think we have had some significant successes with our assistance, and I understand the report 

touches on some of those—that would certainly include education— 

we were talking about before you came in, and the provision of 

basic health services. What I can tell you, Senator, is that I am 

committed to ensuring that the assistance we provide (a) makes an 

28 

important positive difference, (b) can be implemented, and (c) can 

be sustained. 

I would agree personally with the three basic conditions that I 

saw in the report, which I haven’t had the chance to fully study, 

that our assistance projects should be necessary, achievable and 

sustainable. I know that Administrator Shah and Deputy Secretary 

Nides have responded on behalf of their respective offices. They are 

the ones to speak authoritatively on the matter. But I can tell you 

that if I am confirmed, I mean going forward, our assistance has 

to make a difference and it has to be sustainable to build capacity. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You say we have some successes. Quantify 

for me in the context of $19 billion what is success. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, I think clearly in education, which 

was an early priority for us, the success of getting over 7 million 

kids into school, 21⁄2 of those being girls, that would be a metric 

of success. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If we put a dollar figure on that, what would 

that be? Do we have any sense of that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I can certainly get that for you. 

[In answer to the above question, a written reply from Ambassador Crocker follows:] 

Since 2002, $685m has been spent on education in Afghanistan, or roughly 3.6 

percent of the total budget. Please know that while this figure is derived from 

USAID and State funding, this figure does not include DOD funding being spent 

on education programs in Afghanistan. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If you could get it to us, I’d appreciate it, because I’d consider that a success, but I don’t think that’s $19 billion, and this is—I’d admonish the audience that we appreciate 

your attendance, but we’re not subject to comments. 

I’m going to support your nomination. That’s not the issue. My 

point is that you’re going to be in a role that is, yes, diplomacy, yes, 

foreign policy, and I hope you look at it as a fiduciary to the American taxpayer, because right now I do not believe that we are being 

good fiduciaries to the American taxpayer. Do you believe that the 

Karzai government is doing what it needs to do to be an effective, 

honest, and transparent partner? 

Ambassador CROCKER. There are several elements, again, to a 

very important question. I’ll start with the last. I noted in my 

statement that I got to Kabul in the beginning of January 2002, 

just about 10 days after President Karzai had been named by the 

Bonn Conference as chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority, 

and I worked very closely with him during those early days. 

I believe he is committed to a unified, stable Afghanistan, and 

I look forward to renewing that relationship. I’m certainly going to 

make every effort as the Ambassador to have a productive working 

relationship with the head of state to which I’m accredited. 

Have we had differences? Are there things that we wish he 

would or would not have done? Are there things that he wishes we 

would or would not have done? Of course there are. One key issue 

is corruption. For the sake of the State of Afghanistan, the Afghan 

Government is going to have to do more. We wrestled with the 

same thing in Iraq, and you don’t get positive change overnight. 

But Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq expressed an awareness of the 

29 

problem, and incrementally some steps were taken. We have seen 

President Karzai make the same commitments. 

Words do count. Deeds count for more. But I would start, if confirmed, from the assumption that we do have partners in the 

Afghan Government. That is certainly what I hear in my consultations. Some effective gubernatorial appointments in the provinces, 

some increasingly effective members of the Karzai Cabinet, that’s 

a critical part of capacity-building and transition. I would see that 

as, again, a key responsibility to help them develop that capacity. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’ll just say that when I see the reports, both public and private, about where our money has gone, 

where the corruption is, and I see Karzai talk about the United 

States as an occupying force, I have real problems having American 

lives shed and having American treasure continuing to be shed. My 

understanding is that for that FY 2002 to 2010, we spent $672 million on education. That’s far from $19 billion of success. 

One last question before I turn it over to Senator Risch. 

What is the United States position and your position on the 

efforts to alter the U.N.’s 1,267 list of persons associated with the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda? Under the proposed plans, I understand 

that two separate lists would be created, one for each militant organization, and this separation would likely provide the Afghan 

Government with a much greater say over which Taliban would be 

on the new list and possibly allow them to remove more than 100 

people from the 450-person list that presently exists, providing 

them with freedom to travel and access to the banking system. 

Do you support that effort, which would ultimately decide who 

stays on the list and who gets off, and are you concerned that 

potentially dangerous individuals can be removed from the list? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, this is one of many issues, 

frankly, that I am not fully briefed or fully up to speed on. I’m 

aware of it. Again, the policy of the administration has been that 

for reconciliation to take place, insurgents, the Taliban, have to 

renounce violence, break with al-Qaeda and agree to respect the 

Afghan Constitution. I can’t speak for the administration on this 

matter because I don’t know if they have a position. 

I would be concerned about individuals who have a record of 

extremist violence against us and against the Afghans having freedom of movement and an ability to kind of do whatever they want. 

But again, I cannot be authoritative on that matter. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I look forward to pursuing that with you 

because I’m concerned about where we’re headed with these lists. 

Senator Risch. 

Thank you for your answers. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Mr. Crocker, first of all, thank you for what you do for America. 

Certainly, your qualifications are impeccable here for this job. I can 

tell you this, I don’t envy what you’re about to take on. I’ve been 

following this hearing electronically because I’ve had other things 

going, but let me just say that I share some of the skepticism 

that—in fact, that’s probably an understatement. I share a lot of 

the skepticism that’s been expressed here this morning. 

This is a messy situation that isn’t getting any better, and since 

I’ve been elected to the U.S. Senate, people back home keep asking 

30 

me what’s going to happen, how is this going to end, what kind of 

progress is being made there. Certainly militarily we’ve done well, 

I believe, but beyond that, this is very, very difficult, and to articulate what our objectives are and what our goals are and how this 

is going to end with us achieving those is very, very difficult to 

grasp, let alone to convey to the American people. 

So I wish you well. The problems here are very, very significant, 

and I’m glad you’re the one that’s going there because I think that 

you’re the right person to do this job. 

But again, I’m very skeptical about how we’re going to be able 

to end this. So, thank you. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. I’m under no allusions of the difficulty of the challenge. If Iraq was hard, and it was 

hard, Afghanistan in many respects is harder. All I can promise to 

you and the other members is that if confirmed, I will give you an 

honest assessment of what conditions and situations are, what are 

achievable ways forward, and what may not be achievable. That 

much I certainly undertake to do. 

Senator RISCH. And I appreciate that, and I think your observation regarding Iraq and Afghanistan is appropriate. Too often people try to compare the two, and it’s a comparison of apples and 

oranges. What we’re trying to give to the Afghan people and have 

worked at for 10 years and given them in blood, sweat, and tears, 

you really, really wonder whether they want what we’re trying to 

give them. And if they don’t want what we’re trying to give them, 

it’s not going to work. So that’s kind of where I am on it. 

Thank you very much again for your service. I wish you well, 

take care of yourself over there. Thank you very much. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

With that, seeing no other members, the record will remain open 

for 48 hours. We ask the Ambassador to respond to any questions 

as expeditiously as possible so we can move the nomination. 

And with that, this hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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