07 August 2013

Command and Control for

Joint Maritime Operations

Joint Publication 3-32
Intentionally Blank 
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint maritime 

operations across the range of military operations. It also describes the maritime domain; 

addresses considerations for establishing a joint force maritime component commander and 

attendant command relationships; provides principles and guidance for the planning, 

execution, and assessment of joint maritime operations; and presents considerations for 

specific maritime operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance 

of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

United States (US) military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military 

guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force 

commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It 

provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. 

It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the 

force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity 

of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant 

commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these 

commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in 

coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current 

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance 

or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified 

 
Preface 

ii JP 3-32 

by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, 

commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and 

procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 

Director, Joint Staff 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-32 

08 AUGUST 2006, CHANGE 1, 27 MAY 2008

• Added discussion of Navy’s composite warfare doctrine. 

• Added discussion of core maritime capabilities and missions. 

• Added command and control considerations for specific maritime operations 

(surface warfare, air and missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, 

strike warfare, amphibious operations, naval surface fire support, information 

operations, maritime interception operations, maritime expeditionary security 

operations, maritime homeland defense, maritime operations threat response plan, 

counterdrug. noncombatant evacuation operations, protection of shipping, and 

foreign humanitarian assistance). 

• Expanded the discussion on organizing the maritime force. 

• Expanded the discussion of joint force maritime component commander 

responsibilities. 

• Revised the discussion on boards, centers, and cells. 

• Added discussion of support to an afloat joint force air component commander. 

• Expanded the discussion of joint maritime support to multinational operations. 

• Revised the discussion on logistic support to joint maritime operations. 

• Added discussion of unmanned aircraft system. 

• Removed the discussion on communications system support. 

• Revised the discussion on movement and maneuver. 

• Revised the discussion on maritime domain awareness. 

• Modified the definitions for “aircraft carrier,” “contiguous zone,” “maritime 

domain awareness,” “maritime power projection,” “open ocean,” prevention of 

mutual interference,” “riverine operations,” “sea control operations,” “squadron,” 

“theater antisubmarine warfare commander,” and “undersea warfare.” 

• Removed the definitions for “antisubmarine warfare forces,” “area operations,” 

“at sea,” “battle force,” “defensive sea area,” “force rendezvous,” “general 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-32 

quarters,” “marine environment,” “maritime control area,” “maritime 

supremacy,” “nautical mile,” “naval base,” “on berth,” “perils of the sea,” 

“piracy,” “riverine area,” “sea surveillance,” “service group,” “service squadron,” 

and “submarine patrol area.” 

• Assumed proponency for terms “antisubmarine warfare,” “carrier air wing,” 

“carrier strike group,” “composite warfare commander,” “numbered fleet,” 

“officer in tactical command,” “submarine operating authority,” “surface action 

group,” “surface combatant,” “surface warfare,” “task component,” “task 

element,” “task force,” “task group,” and “task unit.” 

• Added definitions of “forward presence,” “global fleet station,” “global maritime 

partnership,” “maritime security operations,” and “surface warfare.” 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

 General ....................................................................................................................... I-1 

 General Approach to Command and Control ............................................................ I-2 

 Maritime Capabilities and Missions .......................................................................... I-3 

 Interrelationship with Other Joint Operations ........................................................... I-5 

 Maritime Domain ....................................................................................................... I-6 

CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZING FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

 General Organizational Options ...............................................................................II-1 

 Component Employment Considerations .................................................................II-4 

 Command Relationships and Responsibilities ..........................................................II-5 

 Organizing and Manning the Component Headquarters ..........................................II-8 

 Task Organization of Subordinate Forces ..............................................................II-11 

 Navy Composite Warfare Doctrine ........................................................................II-12 

 Multinational Considerations ..................................................................................II-12 

 Support to a Joint Force Air Component Commander Afloat ................................II-13 

CHAPTER III 

PLANNING JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

 Maritime Planning Processes and Products ............................................................ III-1 

 Integration with Joint Operation Planning Process ................................................ III-2 

 Organizing the Operational Area ............................................................................ III-2 

 Other General Planning Considerations ................................................................. III-3 

 Assessment ........................................................................................................... III-14 

 Multinational Participation ................................................................................... III-15 

CHAPTER IV 

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND OTHER OPERATIONAL-LEVEL 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIFIC MARITIME OPERATIONS 

 General .................................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Surface Warfare ...................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Air and Missile Defense ......................................................................................... IV-5 

 Antisubmarine Warfare ........................................................................................ IV-10 

 Mine Warfare ........................................................................................................ IV-14 

 Strike Warfare ....................................................................................................... IV-16 

 Amphibious Operations ........................................................................................ IV-16 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-32 

 Naval Surface Fire Support ................................................................................. .IV-17 

 Information Operations ......................................................................................... IV-17 

 Maritime Interception Operations ......................................................................... IV-18 

 Maritime Security Operations ............................................................................... IV-20 

 Maritime Expeditionary Security Operations ....................................................... IV-22 

 Maritime Homeland Defense, Defense Support of 

Civil Authorities, Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan ........................... IV-22 

 Global Maritime Partnerships, Security Cooperation, and 

Global Fleet Stations ............................................................................................. IV-24 

 Seabased Operations ............................................................................................. IV-25 

 Counterdrug Operations ........................................................................................ IV-28 

 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ................................................................. IV-28 

 Protection of Shipping .......................................................................................... IV-29 

 Maritime Pre-Positioning Force Operations ......................................................... IV-30 

 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ......................................................................... IV-31 

 Defense Support of Civil Authorities ................................................................... IV-31 

APPENDIX 

A References ................................................................................................. A-1 

B Administrative Instructions ........................................................................B-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5 

FIGURE 

I-1 Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace ............................................ I-7 

II-1 Typical Joint Force Maritime Component 

Commander Responsibilities ......................................................................II-3 

II-2 Sample Battle Rhythm .............................................................................II-10 

II-3 Generic Seven-Minute Drill Example ......................................................II-11 

III-1 Notional Intelligence Directorate Augmentation Requirements .............. III-5 

III-2 Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Targeting Functions and Responsibilities ................................................ III-7 

III-3 Environmental Considerations ............................................................... III-12 

III-4 Primary Zones Affecting Navigation and Overflight ............................. III-14 

IV-1 Notional Maritime Task Organization .................................................... 1V-2 

IV-2 Composite Warfare Commander Integration 

within the Joint Operational Area ........................................................... 1V-3 

IV-3 Examples of Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense 

Command Functions ............................................................................... 1V-7 

IV-4 Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Command Relationships 

and Functions Scheme .............................................................................. IV-8 

IV-5 Seabasing Considerations ....................................................................... IV-26 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Describes Maritime Power, the General Approach to Command and Control, 

Maritime Capabilities and Missions, Interrelationship with Other Joint 

Operations, and the Maritime Domain 

 Discusses Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations; to include Command 

Relationships and Responsibilities 

 Explains Planning for Joint Maritime Operations 

 Addresses Command and Control and other Operations Level 

Considerations for Specific Maritime Operations 

Introduction 

Naval and maritime forces 

operate on (surface), under 

(subsurface), or above (air) 

the sea. 

Maritime power, in the broadest sense, is military, 

diplomatic, and economic power or influence exerted 

through the ability to use the sea. The joint force 

commander (JFC) employs maritime power to 

influence events on land either directly through 

maritime power projection (e.g., amphibious assault) or 

indirectly through control and dominance of the 

maritime domain. 

General Approach to 

Command and Control 

Joint maritime operations (JMO) tend to be 

decentralized. The key tenets to command and control 

(C2) philosophy are the necessity of the subordinate 

commanders to execute operations independently but in 

accordance with a thorough understanding of the 

commander’s intent, and command by negation or 

mission command. 

Maritime Capabilities and 

Missions 

There are five core capabilities of US naval forces: 

forward presence, deterrence, sea control, maritime 

power projection, and maritime security. Additional 

naval capabilities include: foreign humanitarian 

assistance (FHA), strategic sealift, seabasing, and 

homeland security support. 

Interrelationship with Other 

Joint Operations 

The degree of integration and coordination between 

joint force component commanders varies depending 

on the situation. For some JMO, the joint force 

maritime component commander (JFMCC) will likely 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-32 

operate without the support of other Service component 

forces whereas for others there may be detailed 

integration between components. 

Maritime Domain The maritime domain consists of the oceans, seas, bays, 

estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above 

these, including the littorals. Maritime domain 

awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of 

anything associated with the maritime domain that 

could impact the security, safety, economy or 

environment of a nation. Obtaining and maintaining 

accurate MDA is a key enabler of an active, and 

layered maritime defense in depth, and facilitates more 

expeditious and precise actions by the JFMCC and 

subordinate commanders. 

Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

General Organizational 

Options 

Forward deployed maritime force packages are 

normally comprised of units that train together prior to 

deploying. These tailored force packages may include 

carrier strike groups (CSGs) and amphibious ready 

groups with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit. 

The JFC normally designates the forces and maritime 

assets that will be made available for tasking by the 

JFMCC, and delegates the appropriate command 

authority the JFMCC will exercise over assigned and 

attached forces and maritime assets made available for 

tasking. In cases where the JFC does not designate a 

JFMCC, the JFC may elect to directly task maritime 

forces. 

Component Employment 

Considerations 

When the JFC designates a JFMCC, the JFMCC’s 

authority and responsibility are also defined by the JFC. 

The JFC may choose to conduct operations through a 

Service component commander or, at lower echelons, a 

Service force commander. This most often happens 

when there are no other Service or multinational 

maritime capabilities provided as part of the joint force; 

and the scope of operations along with the need for 

stability, continuity, economy, and ease of long-range 

planning dictate organizational integrity of Service 

forces for conducting operations. 

Command Relationships and 

Responsibilities 

JFMCC responsibilities for integrating JMO include, 

but are not limited to, planning, coordination, 
 Executive Summary 

ix 

allocation, and tasking of JMO based on the JFC’s 

concept of operations (CONOPS) and apportionment 

decisions. The JFMCC normally exercises operational 

control (OPCON) over assigned forces and OPCON or 

tactical control (TACON) over attached forces. 

Additionally, the JFMCC may exercise TACON over 

other military capabilities and forces made available for 

tasking. Specific responsibilities that normally are 

assigned to the JFMCC are: 

 Develop a JMO plan. 

 Provide centralized direction for the allocation and 

tasking of forces/capabilities made available. 

 Make maritime apportionment recommendations to 

the JFC. 

 Provide maritime forces to other component 

commanders in accordance with JFC maritime 

apportionment decisions. 

 Control the operational-level synchronization and 

execution of JMO, as specified by the JFC. 

 Assign and coordinate target priorities within the 

assigned area of operations (AO) by synchronizing 

and integrating maneuver, mobility and movement, 

fires, and interdiction. 

 Coordinate the planning and execution of JMO with 

the other components and supporting agencies. 

Organizing and Manning the 

Component Headquarters 

The JFMCC’s staff is typically built from an existing 

Service component, numbered fleet, Marine air-ground 

task force (MAGTF), or subordinate Service force staff 

and then augmented as required. In a maritime 

headquarters two complementary methods of 

organizing people and processes exist. The first is the 

doctrinal J-code structure, which organizes people by 

the function they perform (i.e., intelligence, logistics). 

The second is a cross-functional approach that 

organizes the staff into boards, centers, cell, and 

working groups that manage specific processes or tasks 

that do not fit well under the J-code structure and 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-32 

require cross-functional participation, such as targeting, 

assessment, and information operations. 

Task Organization of 

Subordinate Forces 

Each task force (TF) is assigned a commander, and 

only the commander reports to the JFMCC. The 

commander, task force (CTF), may further subdivide 

the TF into task groups, units, and elements to exercise 

control at the tactical level. These subdivisions may be 

organized based on capabilities, missions, geography, 

or a hybrid of all three. 

Navy Composite Warfare 

Doctrine 

The commander of a task organization is its officer in 

tactical command (OTC) when the organization is 

operating independently. The OTC can assign 

command functions to other commanders in the task 

component. This is the primary means by which 

commanders for each composite warfare functional 

areas are assigned. These warfare functional areas 

typically include surface warfare (SUW), air and 

missile defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine 

warfare (MIW), strike warfare, information operations 

(IO), and others as required. When multiple warfare 

functions are assigned, the OTC also designates a 

composite warfare commander (CWC) to coordinate 

overall operations. The OTC may choose to function 

as the CWC. 

Multinational Considerations Command authority for a multinational force 

commander (MNFC) is normally negotiated between 

the participating nations and can vary from nation to 

nation. Command authority could range from OPCON, 

to TACON, to designated support relationships, to 

coordinating authority. 

Support to a Joint Force Air 

Component Commander 

Afloat 

In operations where no shore-based air operations 

center (AOC) can initially be accommodated, the 

preponderance of capability to plan, task, and control 

joint air operations may be located afloat. This is most 

likely during the initial stages of forcible entry 

operations, cases where the US desires to limit the 

presence of forces ashore, or prior to the arrival of a 

shore-based AOC. 
 Executive Summary 

xi 

Planning for Joint Maritime Operations 

Maritime Planning Processes 

and Products 

The JFMCC’s operational-level planning 

simultaneously supports the strategic and operational 

requirements of the JFC and also frames the tacticallevel requirements of subordinate commanders. The 

JFMCC’s planning is driven by the JFC’s guidance and 

intent, supports JFC staff planning efforts, and should 

be closely coordinated with component planning. The 

JFMCC management mechanism is normally via 

operation orders (OPORDs), fragmentary orders, 

operation general matter, and operation tasks. 

Integration with Joint 

Operation Planning Process 

JFMCCs and their staffs not only contribute to the 

JFC’s planning efforts but should also contribute to the 

development of other joint force components’ 

supporting plans and OPORDs. Therefore, maritime 

staffs should be well versed in the joint operation 

planning process. 

Organizing the Operational 

Area 

Commanders and their staffs should assess friendly 

factors of space, time, forces, and degree of risk 

tolerance individually and then balance them in 

combination against the ultimate or intermediate 

objective. In harmonizing friendly operational factors 

against the respective objective, all considerations, 

when possible, should start with the quantifiable factors 

of space and time (i.e., operational reach). 

Other General Planning 

Considerations 

Other general planning consideration are: intelligence, 

fires and targeting, sustainment, C2 system support, 

environmental considerations, law of the sea, and 

unmanned aircraft systems. 

Assessment The maritime assessment group is responsible for 

establishing and updating the assessment picture in 

order to create a shared situational awareness among 

the staff, subordinates, and other components. These 

assessment snapshots support decision making through 

established battle rhythm events, such as battle or 

commander’s update assessment type briefs, and make 

recommendations to either “stay the course” or change 

direction. 

Multinational Participation In a multinational environment, the operational aim for 

maritime forces is to exercise sea control, project power 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-32 

ashore, synchronize maritime operations with 

operations throughout the operational environment 

(OE), and support the MNFC’s CONOPS, intent, and 

guidance in accomplishing the multinational task force 

(MNTF) mission. As with land forces, command of 

maritime operations will normally be assigned to a 

multinational force maritime component commander 

(MNFMCC) or a designated TF. The MNFC will 

typically assign a maritime AO to the MNFMCC or 

naval TF, based upon the CONOPS. 

Command and Control and other Operational-Level Considerations for Specific 

Maritime Operations 

The United States Navy’s 

traditional and doctrinal 

warfighting configuration is 

the fleet, commanded by a 

numbered fleet commander. 

Typically, the fleet commander task-organizes assigned 

and attached forces using the Navy's administrative 

organization as its foundation. The JFMCC may subdivide the maritime AO and create subordinate TFs, 

who may in turn create further subordinate 

organizations. In each case, the establishing authority 

must designate the command authorities for each 

subordinate organization, to include support 

relationships as required. Although the CTF is 

normally the CWC, the CTF can designate a 

subordinate commander to be the CWC. CTFs will 

typically assign forces under TACON to subordinate 

commanders. 

Surface Warfare SUW encompasses operations conducted to destroy or 

neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant 

vessels. These operations typically include the 

planning and directing of surveillance of the maritime 

domain, interdiction, and strikes by aircraft and 

missiles. SUW is conducted by the surface warfare 

commander (SUWC) and the strike warfare 

commander (STWC). The SUWC will be responsible 

for defense of the strike group against surface threats. 

Air and Missile Defense Specific to maritime operations is a self-defense zone 

(SDZ). An SDZ is a missile engagement zone around 

an individual surface-to-air capable ship, allowing the 

ship freedom to take defensive action. The maritime 

force benefits from and contributes to the joint air 

defense plan using shore-based and organic airborne 

early warning, fighter aircraft, ships armed with 

surface-to-air missiles, and electronic warfare systems. 
 Executive Summary 

xiii 

The inner layer of defense for a maritime force is 

provided by a combination of point defense missiles, 

close-in weapons systems, and electronic 

countermeasures. 

Antisubmarine Warfare ASW is an operation conducted with the intention of 

denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. 

Undersea warfare (USW) operations are conducted to 

establish dominance in the undersea portion of the 

maritime domain, which permits friendly forces to 

operate throughout the OE and denies an opposing 

force the effective use of underwater systems and 

weapons. USW includes offensive and defensive 

submarine, antisubmarine, and MIW operations. The 

theater ASW commander is the commander assigned 

to develop plans and direct assigned assets to conduct 

ASW within the combatant command area of 

responsibility. The ASW commander [tactical-level] is 

responsible to the CWC for the defense of the force 

against submarine threats. 

Mine Warfare Maritime mine warfare (MIW) is divided into two basic 

subdivisions: the laying of mines to degrade the 

enemy’s capabilities to wage warfare; and the 

countering of enemy-laid mines to permit friendly 

maneuver. In most cases, MIW operations are 

conducted under the framework of a TF architecture 

with the mine warfare commander or mine 

countermeasures commander reporting directly to the 

JFMCC. 

Strike Warfare Strike operations may employ ballistic or cruise 

missiles, aircraft, naval surface fires, Marines and 

special operations forces to attack targets ashore. The 

term “strike warfare” is used in the maritime domain 

and commonly includes joint fire support, interdiction, 

strategic attack, and close air support. The STWC is 

responsible to the CWC for planning, directing, 

monitoring, and assessing maritime power projection 

ashore and may be responsible for striking surface 

targets at sea at extended ranges from the strike group. 

Amphibious Operations Amphibious operations are complex and normally 

involve all components of the joint force. The JFC and 

JFMCC should ensure that the amphibious objective 

area or operational area is shaped by CSGs and other 

maritime and joint assets in anti-access/area denial 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-32 

environments prior to the commencement of the 

amphibious operation. 

Naval Surface Fire Support Naval surface fire support (NSFS) units are normally 

OPCON to the Navy component commander or 

TACON to the JFMCC and provide direct or general 

support to other joint force components or subordinate 

forces of the JFMCC (e.g., an amphibious force). 

When supporting a landing force or other ground 

forces, a NSFS spotting team is usually attached to the 

maneuvering forces for fire support coordination 

purposes. 

Maritime Interception 

Operations 

Maritime interception operations (MIO) are efforts to 

monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in 

international waters to enforce sanctions against other 

nations such as those in support of United Nations 

Security Council resolutions and/or prevent the 

transport of restricted goods. MIO lines of authority 

should be streamlined, and must be clearly understood 

by all forces involved in the conduct of the mission. 

Maritime Security Operations Maritime security includes a collection of tasks that are 

derived from agreed-upon international law. Maritime 

security operations are those operations conducted to 

assist in establishing the conditions for security and 

protection of sovereignty in the maritime domain. 

Maritime Expeditionary 

Security Operations 

A maritime expeditionary security force (MESF) is 

organized as an adaptive security force package 

supporting the JFMCC in providing all-weather, day 

and night security in the transition from the sea base 

inland, green to brown water, and ashore. The 

maritime expeditionary security force commander is 

that officer designated to conduct MESF operations 

within a designated coastal geographic area. 

Seabased Operations A sea base provides a JFC with a scalable and mobile 

capability in the joint operations area from which to 

exercise C2 or provide strike, power projection, fire 

support, and logistics capabilities where and when 

needed. A sea base can be as small as one ship, or it 

can expand to consist of dozens of ships. During any 

operation, merchant ship activity needs to be closely 

monitored, and effective coordination and close 

cooperation between military, civilian, commercial, and 
 Executive Summary 

xv 

government organizations is required to provide for the 

necessary level of liaison and safety. 

Protection of Shipping There are multiple methods and options to protect 

shipping. One method is to conduct wide sea control 

operations that attempt to protect the waters or known 

traffic routes through which many ships pass. Another 

method is to gather merchant ships and devote 

protection assets to the convoy, requiring only localized 

supremacy. 

Maritime Pre-Positioning 

Force Operations 

A maritime pre-positioning force operation includes the 

airlift of MAGTF and Navy elements, the Navy support 

element, and naval port security units with selected 

equipment into an arrival and assembly area to join 

with equipment and supplies carried aboard maritime 

pre-positioning ships. 

Other Operational-Level 

Considerations for Specific 

Maritime Operations 

Other operational-level considerations for specific 

maritime operations include: IO, maritime homeland 

defense, defense support of civil authorities, maritime 

operational threat response plan, global maritime 

partnerships, security cooperation, global fleet stations; 

counterdrug operations; noncombatant evacuation 

operations, and FHA. 

CONCLUSION 

 This publication provides doctrine for the C2 of JMO 

across the range of military operations. It also 

describes the maritime domain; addresses 

considerations for establishing a JFMCC and attendant 

command relationships; provides principles and 

guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of 

JMO; and presents considerations for specific maritime 

operations.
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
I-1 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

1. General 

a. The terms “naval” and “maritime” forces are used throughout this publication to 

encompass Navy, Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard (USCG) personnel, weapon 

systems, and organizations. Naval and maritime forces operate on (surface), under 

(subsurface), or above (air) the sea. 

b. The maritime domain consists of the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal 

areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. Nothing in the definitions of, or 

the use of the term domain, implies or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or command and 

control (C2) of that domain. 

c. Maritime power, in the broadest sense, is military, diplomatic, and economic power 

or influence exerted through the ability to use the sea. The joint force commander (JFC) 

employs maritime power to influence events on land either directly through maritime power 

projection (e.g., amphibious assault) or indirectly through control and dominance of the 

maritime domain. Maritime power provides the JFC with many unique advantages: 

(1) Maritime forces provide a means of maintaining a global, persistent military 

presence while limiting the undesired economic or diplomatic repercussions that often 

accompany US forces based ashore. 

(2) Movement and maneuver of forces within international waters can take place 

without prior diplomatic agreement. 

(3) Due to the reduced presence of civilians and infrastructure on or under the 

water, there is a reduced risk of friendly fire or collateral damage. While this is true on the 

open seas, there is significant civilian maritime traffic in coastal and littoral areas as well as 

in ports. In these areas risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage remains significant. 

(4) Maritime forces are mostly a self-deploying, self-sustaining, sea-based 

expeditionary force and a combined-arms team, tailored to conduct operations across the 

range of military operations. Maritime forces are manned, trained, and equipped to operate 

with limited reliance on ports or airfields. 

d. This publication provides joint doctrine for the C2 of joint maritime operations 

(JMO) and discusses the responsibilities of a joint force maritime component commander 

(JFMCC). Maritime operations include any actions performed by maritime forces to gain or 

“Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything.” 

Themistocles (524-460 B.C.) 

Athenian Politician and General 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-32 

exploit command of the sea, sea control, sea denial, or to project power from the sea. Sea 

control may include naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS), protection of 

sea lines of communications (SLOCs), air lines of communications (ALOCs), blockades, 

embargoes against economic or military shipping, and maritime interception operations 

(MIO). Maritime operations also encompass operations to locate, classify, track, and target 

surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft. In addition, amphibious operations, as a form of 

power projection, increase the commander’s options for maneuver in the littorals and forcible 

entry operations. 

e. Maritime forces participate in operations ashore through the projection of power. 

They can execute, support, or enable missions ashore by conducting forcible entry operations 

(such as an amphibious raid or assault), seabasing of assets, moving land forces into the 

operational area via sealift, providing fire and air support, and influencing operations through 

deterrence. Maritime forces also may be employed in littoral waters for the conduct of sea 

control or denial, ballistic missile defense (BMD), and support joint force or component C2 

platforms. Joint forces can support maritime operations with surveillance, logistics, fires and 

air support, and military engineering. 

f. Effective C2 of maritime operations is complex, due to the requirement to operate 

continuously in the physical domains and information environment, and by the multi-mission 

nature of most maritime platforms. The flexibility, mobility, lethality, persistence, and speed 

of maritime forces, together with the expanse and unique characteristics of the maritime 

domain, present both opportunities and challenges to the JFMCC. The adversary also may 

choose to exploit the advantages of the maritime domain, but they will face the same 

challenges. 

2. General Approach to Command and Control 

a. C2 of maritime forces is shaped by the characteristics and complexity of the maritime 

domain, and the traditions and independent culture of maritime forces. The key tenets to C2 

philosophy are the necessity of the subordinate commanders to execute operations 

independently but in accordance with a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent, 

and command by negation or mission command. Once missions and functions are assigned, 

the subordinate commander is expected to take required actions without delay, keeping the 

superior commander informed of the situation. The superior commander retains the 

authority to negate any particular action. JMO tend to be decentralized. As such, mission 

command is the preferred method of C2. 

b. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized 

execution based upon mission-type orders. Success demands that subordinate leaders at all 

echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish 

the mission. Essential to mission command is the thorough understanding of the 

commander’s intent at every level of command. Commanders issue mission-type orders 

focused on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned 

tasks. They delegate decision-making authority to subordinates wherever possible, to 

minimize detailed control and empower subordinates to take initiative and make decisions 

based on understanding of the commander’s intent rather than on constant communications. 
 Introduction 

I-3 

When JMO are decentralized and reliant on mission command, coordination and planning 

considerations should include the procedures, measures, and resources (including time) 

required to implement those plans. The JFMCC and staff should anticipate requirements for 

joint support, prioritization of operations or force elements, and extensive coordination with 

other affected components. 

3. Maritime Capabilities and Missions 

There are five core capabilities of US naval forces: forward presence, deterrence, sea 

control, maritime power projection, and maritime security. Additional naval capabilities 

include foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), strategic sealift, seabasing, and homeland 

security support. 

a. Forward Presence. Forward presence activities demonstrate US commitment to the 

region, lend credibility to US alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis 

response capability while promoting US influence, freedom of navigation, and access. Joint 

force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. The 

sustained presence of capable forces is a visible sign of US commitment to allies and 

adversaries alike. However, if forward presence fails to deter an adversary, those forces 

must be agile enough to transition rapidly to combat operations. Given their location and 

knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first that a combatant 

commander (CCDR) commits when responding to a crisis. The maritime forces forward 

operating posture serves other key functions: it provides familiarity with the operational 

environment (OE) and contributes to an understanding of the capabilities, culture, and 

behavior patterns of regional actors. Forward presence supports security assistance, security 

cooperation activities, nation assistance, foreign internal defense programs, and provides 

credible combat power (deterrence and show of force). Through seabasing and the use of the 

non-sovereign, maneuver space that is the sea, the US possesses a broad range of options, 

generally unfettered by the requirement to obtain host nation (HN) permissions and access. 

b. Deterrence. Maritime deterrent capabilities include sea-based nuclear weapons, 

forward posturing of conventional combat power in key regions, and the ability to surge 

forces tailored to meet emerging crises and defend the US homeland. The ocean provides 

maneuver space that enhances nuclear deterrent effects by making it infeasible for an 

adversary to succeed in neutralizing US nuclear capability through a preemptive attack and 

impractical to possess an effective defense against a second strike. 

c. Sea Control

(1) Sea control operations are those operations designed to secure use of the 

maritime domain by one’s own forces and to prevent its use by the enemy. Sea control is the 

essence of seapower and is a necessary ingredient in the successful accomplishment of all 

naval missions. Sea control and power projection complement one another. Sea control 

allows naval forces to close within striking distance to remove landward threats to access, 

which in turn enhances freedom of action at sea. Freedom of action at sea enables the 

projection of forces ashore. Sea control operations are the employment of naval forces, 

supported by land, air, space, cyberspace, and other forces as appropriate, in order to achieve 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-32 

military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations include destruction of enemy naval 

forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment 

of local military superiority in areas of naval operations. The vastness of the world’s oceans 

makes it impossible for even a preeminent naval power to achieve global maritime 

superiority. Thus, achieving local or regional maritime superiority may be desired by the 

JFC for a limited duration in order to accomplish specific objectives. Sea control requires 

capabilities in all aspects of the maritime domain, space, and cyberspace. It is therefore a 

joint, vice purely naval, challenge. 

(2) JMO occur in blue-, green-, and brown-water environments, each with its own 

challenges. Operations in blue water (high seas and open oceans) require forces capable of 

remaining on station for extended periods largely unrestricted by sea state and with logistics 

capability to sustain these forces indefinitely. Operations in green water (coastal waters, 

ports, and harbors) stretching seaward, require ships, amphibious ships and landing craft, and 

patrol craft with the stability and agility to operate effectively in surf, in shallows, and the 

near-shore areas of the littorals. Brown-water (navigable rivers, lakes, bays, and their 

estuaries) operations involve shallows and congested areas that constrain maneuver but do 

not subject maritime forces to extreme surf conditions. 

d. Maritime Power Projection. The US possesses the ability to project significant 

power from the sea. Power projection in and from the maritime domain includes a broad 

spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces, their logistic support, or 

to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons range of friendly forces. 

Credible power projection supports deterrence objectives and activities. Power projection 

may be accomplished by an amphibious raid or assault, attack of targets ashore (e.g., strike 

operations, close air support [CAS], naval surface fire support [NSFS], BMD), sea-control 

operations, operations conducted from a seabase or combinations of these. 

e. Maritime Security. The safety and economic security of the US depends in 

substantial part upon the secure use of the world’s oceans. Maritime security operations 

(MSO) are conducted to assist in establishing the conditions for security and protection of 

sovereignty in the maritime domain. MSO are those operations to protect maritime 

sovereignty and resources and to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, 

transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. 

Terrorists, pirates, and transnational criminals use legitimate maritime traffic to mask their 

illicit activities, threatening safety and security. Identifying, tracking, and neutralizing these 

threats and illicit activities is essential to protecting national security and the global 

economy. Additional tasks include assisting mariners in distress, participating in security 

cooperation operations with allies and partners, sharing situational awareness, and 

conducting maritime interception and law enforcement operations (LEO). MSO involves 

close coordination among governments, the private sector, international organizations, and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

For more information on MSO, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations,

and Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-10, Maritime Expeditionary Security Operations 

(MESO).
 Introduction 

I-5 

f. Strategic Sealift. Successful response to regional contingencies depends on 

sufficient strategic mobility assets in order to deploy combat forces rapidly and sustain them 

in an operational area as long as necessary to meet US military objectives. Strategic sealift 

delivers the heavy combat units and their support equipment as well as the vital sustainment 

for deployed forces. The application of strategic sealift divides into three broad categories: 

pre-positioning, surge shipping during initial mobilization, and sustainment shipping. The 

geographic combatant commander’s (GCCs) joint deployment and distribution operations 

center (JDDOC) is the primary interface with United States Transportation Command. If 

established, the joint movement center will work closely with the JDDOC to execute theater 

movement control and prioritization. A related mission, in combination with maritime 

security, is the protection of other non-strategic sealift merchant shipping. During periods of 

crisis, conflict, national emergency or war the NCAGS is the principal US resource to 

facilitate the efficient management and safe passage of merchant ships that are not 

performing strategic sealift functions. The NCAGS’ shipping coordination centers (SCCs) 

are regionally focused to support the JFC though the JFMCC in improving maritime domain 

awareness (MDA) as it relates to merchant shipping (other than strategic sealift). SCCs are 

responsible for maintaining and refining commercial shipping information within the 

common operational picture (COP). 

g. Seabasing. Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection, 

sustainment, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea without 

the reliance on land bases. It allows operational maneuver, and assured access to the joint 

force, while significantly reducing the footprint ashore, and minimizing permissions required 

to operate from HNs. Seabasing allows certain support functions to remain aboard ship until 

specifically required. With operational and logistics capabilities at sea, the sea base is able to 

operate from international waters, while providing support to the joint force on land. 

Seabasing improves freedom of action, achieved through sea control, and increases the 

maneuver options for joint forces by reducing the need to protect elements such as C2 and 

logistic nodes. 

h. Homeland Security Support. Maritime forces may also support USCG in achieving 

its homeland security missions. USCG’s competencies and resources in support of the 

National Military Strategy and other national-level defense and security strategies include 

maritime interception and interdiction operations; marine environmental protection; port 

waterways and coastal security; coastal sea control; rotary wing air intercept; combating 

terrorism; and maritime operational threat response (MOTR) plan support. 

4. Interrelationship with Other Joint Operations 

a. JMO are operations performed with maritime forces and other forces assigned, 

attached, or made available, in support of the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives, or in 

support of other components of the joint force. The JFC may designate a JFMCC to C2 a 

JMO. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and 

attached forces and forces made available for tasking. 

b. The degree of integration and coordination between joint force component 

commanders varies depending on the situation. For some JMO, the JFMCC will likely 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-32 

operate without the support of other Service component forces (e.g., submarine operations in 

blue water) whereas for others there may be detailed integration between components (e.g., 

attack of enemy submarines in port or their supporting critical infrastructures ashore). In 

other cases, tactical control (TACON) of maritime forces is delegated to other joint force 

components (e.g., CAS and strategic attack). For sea control operations, another joint force 

component may delegate TACON of forces to the JFMCC (e.g., maritime air support [MAS] 

during the conduct of surface warfare (SUW) operations). In certain cases, specification of 

operational control (OPCON) or TACON of forces may not be practical. In these cases, the 

JFC should establish a support command relationship, as required. All major operations 

generally necessitate some degree of maritime support to deploy, sustain, withdraw, and 

redeploy forces. 

c. A JFC should consider the advantages of establishing a sea base to stage or support 

joint operations. Joint seabasing reduces the footprint ashore and allows support and 

sustainment to be landed in sufficient quantities, as required, without necessarily placing it 

all in a vulnerable and essentially immobile location. Seabasing reduces the possible 

negative impact on limited infrastructure ashore and facilitates the protection of logistics 

support. Additional information related to establishing, maintaining, and operating from a 

seabase can be found in NWP 3-62M, Seabasing.

5. Maritime Domain 

JFCs, JFMCCs, and those supporting JMO require an understanding of the maritime 

domain and the capabilities of those maritime forces executing or supporting the joint 

mission. 

a. Description and Characteristics

(1) The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, 

and the airspace above these, including the littorals. Per JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Operational Environment, the littoral comprises two segments of the OE. 

First, “seaward: the area from the shore to the open ocean, which must be controlled to 

support operations ashore.” Second, “landward: the area inland from the shore that can be 

supported and defended directly from the sea.” 

(2) The maritime domain also has unique economic, diplomatic, military, and legal 

aspects (see Figure I-1). US naval forces operate in deep waters of the open ocean and other 

maritime environments including coastal areas, rivers, estuaries, and landward portions of 

the littorals, including associated airspace. In many regions of the world, rivers mark and 

define international borders and facilitate intracontinental trade. Ensuring access and 

securing these waterways are often priorities of state governments seeking to maintain 

stability and sovereignty. There are several thousand straits connecting the world’s oceans, 

but only about 200 are the most vulnerable seaway chokepoints and lines of communications 

(LOCs). Adversaries may attempt to control the use of an internationally recognized strait 

by restricting access or disrupting passage of friendly naval forces or merchant shipping. In 

the event of regional conflict, small coastal navies operating in the proximity of these straits 

can present a serious challenge to the operations of naval forces and merchant shipping. 
 Introduction 

I-7 

Diplomatic and political issues related to the maritime domain have increased as many 

nations have tried to extend their claims over offshore resources. These claims have led to 

disputes over the exact extent of maritime borders and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). 

This is highlighted in diplomatic and legal tension over some archipelagic waters and 

international straits. Naval forces may face constraints and restrictions when operating in 

territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelves claimed by coastal states. 

(3) The US currently recognizes approximately 150 navies in the world. Navies of 

the world may be categorized within a broad spectrum of demonstrated capabilities and 

political mandates. Naval capability as demonstrated projection of power may be viewed as 

global, regional, territorial, and coastal/self defense force. The great majority of the world’s 

navies are small and capable of operating only in their respective littoral waters or 

constabulary navies. Only a few navies are capable of sustained employment far from their 

countries shores. However, whether or not their navies are capable of global power 

projection, most maritime nations also maintain air forces capable of conducting operations 

over the adjacent maritime domain. This air capability should be considered while planning 

operations in the maritime domain. Likewise, the multi-mission capabilities of modern naval 

platforms and their ability to project power should be a planning consideration. Ships and 

aircraft, regardless of source (adversary, neutral, friendly) are constantly in motion, thereby 

presenting additional challenges for the operational commander to gain and maintain 

situational awareness. 

Figure I-1. Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace 

Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace

Land Territorial Sea Contiguous Zone High Seas

Deep 

Sea Bed

Exclusive Economic Zone

200 nm

Continental Shelf

B

a

s

e

l

i

n

e

Outer Space

National Airspace

24 nautical miles (nm)

12 nm

International Airspace
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-32 

(4) The physical properties of the land-sea and air-sea interfaces, some unique 

undersea properties, and the sheer vastness of the maritime domain, render the sea largely 

opaque to many sensors. It provides a hiding place for smuggling operations, submarines 

firing missiles, and conducting naval movement and maneuver. While surface ships can be 

detected by a wide range of sensors including satellite or air surveillance, it is often difficult 

to identify specific vessels as targets with sufficient certainty to engage them, especially if 

they are not radiating distinctive electromagnetic and acoustic signatures. Additionally, 

weather conditions can change rapidly, and selected characteristics such as wave height and 

sea spray may impact visibility and radar or sensor effectiveness of platforms and munitions. 

b. Maritime Domain Awareness

(1) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-41/Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13, Maritime Security Policy, directs a coordinated and 

integrated government-wide effort to enhance the security of the maritime domain through 

the National Strategy for Maritime Security. MDA is the effective understanding of 

anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, 

economy or environment of a nation. Obtaining and maintaining accurate MDA is a key 

enabler of an active and layered maritime defense in depth, and facilitates more expeditious 

and precise actions by the JFMCC and subordinate commanders. Some degree of MDA is 

also required to effectively operate as a component of the joint force. Achieving awareness 

of the maritime domain is challenging due to the vastness of the oceans and seas, the large 

volume of maritime commerce, sensor limitations, the great length of shorelines, and size of 

port areas which provide both concealment and numerous access points to the land. MDA 

requires integrating all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, open-source data, 

and information from public and private sectors, both nationally and internationally. 

(2) The primary method for information sharing, gaining situational awareness, and 

supporting collaborative planning in the maritime domain is through development and 

maintenance of a global maritime COP. Networking maritime regions and resources into a 

COP can present useful data in a form that supports a wide range of planning, decision, 

execution, and assessment requirements. This data can also support GCC requirements to 

achieve an area of responsibility (AOR)-wide, single integrated COP. The maritime data can 

range from a global “snapshot” to the detailed information required by the JFMCC and 

subordinate commanders within their specific operational area. 

c. Movement and Maneuver

(1) The JFMCC directs subordinate commanders in the execution of force-level 

operational tasks, advises the JFC of its movement, and coordinates with other components 

and interorganizational entities supporting or affected by JMO. 

(2) Operational movement and maneuver includes moving or deploying forces for 

operational advantage into an operational area and conducting maneuver for offensive or 

defensive purposes. It includes providing freedom of movement and maneuver to friendly 

forces and controlling the OE on land, on and under the sea, in the air, or in space where it 

provides an operational advantage. 
 Introduction 

I-9 

(3) Often key attributes of the JFMCCs concept of operations (CONOPS), 

movement and maneuver in the maritime domain can help gain the element of surprise and 

provide a significant advantage over adversaries, while allowing the commander to rapidly 

concentrate forces when necessary. 

(4) Movement and maneuver using maritime forces are integral to joint operations. 

During maritime operations, commanders use information and initiative to apply decisive 

force and dominate specific regions and dimensions of the environment at the chosen time 

and place. Maintaining awareness in the transition from the open ocean to littoral areas is 

key to the continuing conduct of maneuver on and from the sea. Whether done at, under, or 

from the sea, maneuver can provide significant advantages in the application of maritime 

power projection in support of joint force operations. Some of the movement details and 

schemes of maneuver are articulated in JFC and JFMCC tasking documents which include 

timing, sequencing, method, and location of entry into the assigned area of operations (AO). 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
II-1 

CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZING FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

1. General Organizational Options 

a. JFCs organize staffs and forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and 

CONOPS. Organizing the maritime force and staffs should take into account the nature of 

today’s complex global environment, technological advances in communications, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, improved weapons capabilities, 

and how multinational forces organize, train, equip, and conduct operations. Equally 

important in determining how a JFC organizes joint forces are an adversary’s nature, 

capabilities, and the OE (e.g., geography, accessibility, climate, and infrastructure). 

b. Naval command relationships are based on a philosophy of mission command 

involving centralized guidance, collaborative planning, and decentralized control and 

execution. With a long-standing practice of using mission-type orders, naval C2 practices 

are intended to achieve relative advantage through organizational ability to rapidly observe, 

orient, decide, and act. Mission-type orders enable continued operations in environments 

where communications are restricted, compromised or denied, allowing subordinates to 

exercise disciplined initiative (consistent with the higher commander’s intent) and act 

aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. 

c. Since the JFC normally designates a Service component commander to also serve as 

a functional component commander, the dual-designated Service/functional component 

commander will normally exercise OPCON as a Service component commander over their 

own Service forces, and TACON as a functional component commander over other Services 

forces made available for tasking. Navy multi-mission ships are rarely made available for 

tasking outside the maritime component, because their multi-mission capabilities will require 

them to fulfill JFMCC operational requirements. 

d. Forward deployed maritime force packages are normally comprised of units that train 

together prior to deploying. These tailored force packages may include carrier strike groups 

(CSGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit 

(MEU). Force packages can be scaled up by adding ships and capabilities, or scaled down 

into smaller surface action groups, individual ships, or special purpose forces designed to 

conduct numerous types of military operations. 

e. ARGs with embarked MEUs (ARG/MEU) are postured forward in key regions to 

support security cooperation and deterrence, or provide immediate response to crisis and 

“The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are the principal organizations that 

conduct military operations over, on, under, and adjacent to the sea, overlying 

airspace, surface, subsurface, and the ocean bottom, as well as the shoreline 

infrastructures that affect maritime operations.” 

Naval Operating Concept 2010 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-32 

contingencies. The ARG/MEU is organized, trained, and equipped to operate as a mutually 

supporting force. However, it also has the ability to conduct simultaneous, geographically 

dispersed operations; albeit with some reduced capability. 

f. The JFMCC’s staff planning process is consistent with the joint operation planning 

process (JOPP) as outlined in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. The JFMCC’s staff uses a 

synchronization process similar to a JFC’s staff to ensure coordination between subordinates. 

All levels of command have processes for analysis and assessment during execution. 

Collaboration is critical to the synchronization of planning, execution, and assessment 

processes and enables multiple echelons to work efficiently and effectively together. 

Creating timely mechanisms for systematic assessment and decision-making enable the 

entire force to rapidly adapt and leverage opportunities in complex dynamic environments. 

g. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes 

appropriate command relationships, provides coordinating instructions to optimize the 

capabilities of each subordinate, and gains synergistic effects for the joint force as a whole. 

The JFC may designate a JFMCC to facilitate unity of effort, focus, and synchronize efforts 

while providing subordinate commanders flexibility and opportunity in exercising initiative 

and maintaining the joint forces’ operational tempo. 

(1) Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and 

functional component commands and subordinate task forces (TFs) with operational 

responsibilities (see Figure II-1). The JFC normally designates the forces and maritime 

assets that will be made available for tasking by the JFMCC, and delegates the appropriate 

command authority the JFMCC will exercise over assigned and attached forces and maritime 

assets made available for tasking. Generally, these forces and maritime assets include 

navies, marines/naval infantries, special operations forces (SOF), coast guards and similar 

border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by the government, civil 

merchant marines, army/ground forces (normally when embarked), and air and air defense 

forces. Establishment of a JFMCC must not affect the command relationships between 

Service component commanders and the JFC. 

(2) In cases where the JFC does not designate a JFMCC, the JFC may elect to 

directly task maritime forces. Typically, this would occur when an operation is of limited 

duration, scope, or complexity. If this option is exercised, the JFC’s staff assists in planning 

A baseline carrier strike group consists of an aircraft carrier, carrier air wing, 

up to five surface combatants (three of which are normally land attack cruise 

missile capable), a fleet oiler, and a direct support submarine. The baseline 

amphibious ready group with embarked Marine expeditionary unit 

(ARG/MEU) includes an amphibious assault ship (LHA [amphibious assault 

ship, general purpose] or LHD [amphibious assault ship, multipurpose]), a 

LPD (amphibious transport dock), and a LSD (dock landing ship) while the 

MEU includes a command element, ground combat element, aviation combat 

element, and logistics combat element. 
Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-3 

and coordinating maritime operations for JFC approval. The JFC may elect to centralize 

selected functions (planning, coordinating, and tasking) within the staff to provide direction, 

control, and coordination of the joint force. 

Figure II-1. Typical Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Responsibilities 

Typical Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Responsibilities



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





















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

Develop a joint maritime operations plan to best support joint force objectives.

Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/capabilities 

made available.

Request forces of other component commanders when necessary for the 

accomplishment of the maritime mission.

Make maritime apportionment recommendations to the joint force commander (JFC).

Provide maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with JFC 

maritime apportionment decisions.

Control the operational level synchronization and execution of joint maritime 

operations, as specified by the JFC, to include adjusting targets and tasks for 

available joint capabilities/forces. The JFC and affected component commanders 

will be notified, as appropriate, if the joint force maritime component commander 

(JFMCC) changes the planned joint maritime operations during execution.

Act as supported commander within the assigned area of operations (AO).

Assign and coordinate target priorities within the assigned AO by synchronizing and 

integrating maneuver, mobility and movement, fires, and interdiction. The JFMCC 

nominates targets located within the maritime AO to the joint targeting process that 

may potentially require action by another component commander’s assigned 

forces.

Evaluate results of maritime operations and forward assessments to the JFC in 

support of the overall effort.

Support JFC information operations with assigned assets, when directed.

Function as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the JFC.

Perform other functions, as directed by the JFC.

Establish a personnel recovery coordination cell to account for and report the status 

of isolated personnel and to coordinate and control maritime component personnel 

recovery events; and, if directed by the JFC, establish a separate joint personnel 

recovery center for the same purpose in support of a joint recovery event.

Coordinate the planning and execution of joint maritime operations with the other 

components and supporting agencies.

Integrate the JFMCC’s communications systems and resources into the theaters 

networked communications system architecture, or common operational picture, 

and synchronize JFMCC’s critical voice and data requirements. Ensure these 

communications systems requirements, coordination issues, and capabilities are 

integrated in the joint planning and execution process.
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-32 

2. Component Employment Considerations 

a. Weighing Options. When the JFC designates a JFMCC, the JFMCC’s authority and 

responsibility are also defined by the JFC. The following are some considerations for 

establishing JFMCC authorities, responsibilities, and timing: 

(1) Planning. There is a need for detailed, coordinated, concurrent, and parallel 

planning. While JFMCC integrated planning is focused primarily on employment, the 

JFMCC may also be tasked to integrate planning of multi-Service maritime forces for 

deployment, transition, redeployment, or reconstitution at a level subordinate to that of the 

JFC. 

(2) Duration. The projected length of an operation should be of sufficient duration 

to warrant the establishment of a JFMCC. The decision to establish a JFMCC should also 

consider the time required for additional personnel and staff sourcing and training, the 

establishment of C2 alterations, and necessary communications system support architecture 

upgrades. 

(3) Maritime Perspective. The JFC desires the focused maritime expertise of a 

JFMCC and staff to enhance the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of JMO. 

(4) JFC Span of Control. When task complexities, JFC staff organizational or 

resource limitations and environmental intricacies limit the JFC’s effective span of control, 

empowering functional components can provide the flexibility and initiative required for 

success. 

(5) Timing. To permit the JFMCC to fully participate in planning and to maximize 

unity of effort, the decision to establish and designate a JFMCC should occur well before the 

concept development phase of the operation or campaign plan. JFMCC representatives 

should be identified and involved in planning as early as possible. 

b. Service Component Command

(1) All joint forces include Service component commands to address administrative 

and logistic support for Service forces. The JFC may choose to conduct operations through a 

Service component commander or, at lower echelons, a Service force commander. This 

most often happens when there are no other Service or multinational maritime capabilities 

provided as part of the joint force; and the scope of operations along with the need for 

stability, continuity, economy, and ease of long-range planning dictate organizational 

integrity of Service forces for conducting operations. 

(2) An Navy component commander (NCC) assigned to a CCDR consists of the 

NCC and the Navy forces (NAVFOR) that have been assigned to that CCDR. A Marine 

component command assigned to a CCDR consists of the Marine component commander 

and the Marine forces that have been assigned to that CCDR. When a Service command is 

designated as the naval or maritime component to multiple CCDRs, the commander and only 

those specific forces assigned to that particular CCDR are under the combatant command 

(CCMD) (command authority) of that particular CCDR. 
Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-5 

(3) In instances where an NCC is not assigned, NAVFOR may be attached as a 

Navy Service component through the request for forces process. When attached, this Navy 

Service component includes NAVFOR, a designated commander, and appropriate command 

element. 

c. Selecting a Commander. The JFC establishing a functional component command 

has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander 

with the preponderance of forces to be tasked, and the ability to C2 those forces will be 

designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider 

the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities 

in selecting a commander. In the maritime domain, especially the littorals, circumstances 

may dictate that a Marine Corps or Coast Guard officer be designated the JFMCC. 

3. Command Relationships and Responsibilities 

a. Command Relationships Applicable to the Joint Force Maritime Component 

Commander

(1) JFMCC responsibilities for integrating JMO include, but are not limited to, 

planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of JMO based on the JFC’s CONOPS and 

apportionment decisions. Specific responsibilities that normally are assigned to the JFMCC 

are included in Figure II-1. 

(2) The JFC establishes the authority and command relationships of the JFMCC. 

The JFMCC normally exercises OPCON over assigned forces and OPCON or TACON over 

attached forces. Additionally, the JFMCC may exercise TACON over other military 

capabilities and forces made available for tasking. Regardless of organizational and 

command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders are 

responsible for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces: 

internal administration, training, logistics and Service-unique intelligence operations. The 

JFMCC should be aware of all such Service-specific responsibilities. 

b. Area of Operations

(1) When a JFMCC is established, the JFC will normally designate an AO. JFCs 

establish maritime AOs to decentralize execution of maritime component operations, allow 

rapid maneuver, and provide the ability to fight at extended ranges. The size, shape, and 

positioning of land or maritime AOs will be based on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or 

maritime commander’s requirements to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. 

The AO can be dynamic and evolve as the operation or campaign matures. It should be of 

sufficient size to allow for movement, maneuver, and employment of weapons systems, 

effective utilization of warfighting capabilities, and provide operational depth for logistics 

and force protection (FP). Within the AO, the JFMCC establishes subordinate maneuver 

space that allows for independent yet supporting operations of subordinate elements while 

enabling the synchronized and effective employment of forces across all components. The 

AO may not encompass the entire littoral area; however, it should be large enough for the 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-32 

JFMCC to accomplish the mission and protect the maritime force. The AO may include air, 

land, and sea. 

(2) When the JFC designates a maritime AO, the JFMCC is the supported 

commander within the AO. As supported commander, the JFMCC integrates and 

synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate integration and synchronization, 

JFMCC has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within the 

AO. 

(3) In coordination with the JFMCC, other commanders designated by the JFC to 

execute theater- or joint operations area (JOA)- wide functions have the latitude to plan and 

execute these JFC- prioritized operations within the maritime AO. Commanders executing 

such a mission must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects. If those operations 

would have adverse impact within the maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the 

JOA-wide functions shall readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the JFMCC, or consult 

with the JFC for resolution. 

c. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Functions. The JFMCC executes 

the operational functions discussed below and can functionally organize to accomplish 

missions. 

(1) Command and Control. The JFMCC commands assigned and attached 

forces, prepares supporting plans to the JFC operation plans (OPLANs), and executes 

operations as directed by the JFC. Upon JFC approval of the JFMCC’s CONOPS or scheme 

of maneuver, the JFMCC exercises specified authority and direction over forces in the 

accomplishment of the assigned mission. The JFMCC assigns tasks and operating areas, 

prioritizes and allocates resources, manages risk, and publishes operational and daily tasking 

orders for the execution of maritime operational activity. The JFMCC also maintains liaison 

with other components and the joint force headquarters (HQ) to provide JFMCC 

representation as required to provide timely coordination and achieve unity of effort. 

For more information on the C2 function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

(a) Planning. The JFMCC assists the JFC in planning, preparation of 

OPLANs, and associated estimates of the situation. JFMCCs planning responsibilities 

include: 

1. Develop a maritime supporting plan to best support joint force 

CONOPS and objectives, as assigned. 

2. Develop maritime courses of action (COAs) within the framework of 

the JFC-assigned objective or mission, the forces available, and the commanders intent. 

3. Coordinate planning with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting, and 

multinational HQ. 

4. Determine forces required and coordinate deployment planning in 

support of the selected COAs. 
Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-7 

5. Coordinate the planning and execution of maneuver operations with 

other missions. 

(b) The JFMCC makes recommendations to the JFC on the employment, 

support, coordination, and assessment of maritime forces. Such recommendations should 

include: 

1. Maritime force structure requirements. 

2. Integration and employment of multinational maritime forces. 

3. Priorities of effort. 

4. Operational limitations. 

5. Intelligence collection priorities. 

6. Space support. 

7. Cyberspace operations. 

8. Assessment of JMO to include measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and 

measures of performance (MOPs). 

(c) Coordination and Deconfliction. Where and when appropriate, the 

JFMCC makes coordination and deconfliction recommendations to the JFC, to include 

airspace management, land-space management, waterspace management (WSM), fire 

support coordination measures, target priorities, electromagnetic spectrum management, 

cyberspace operations, interorganizational coordination, and liaison requirements. 

(2) Intelligence. Understanding the OE is fundamental to joint operations. 

JFMCC input to provide the maritime perspective of the OE is crucial. Intelligence should 

be sufficiently detailed and timely to satisfy the commanders decision-making needs. The 

JFMCC provides a unique complement of sensors and sensor fusion capability to support 

joint requirements and advocates for the use of other component and national assets to 

provide optimum support to maritime operations. Sonar capabilities and the ability to 

relocate surveillance and reconnaissance assets may provide additional options to the JFC. 

Close coordination with other component commanders and the communications system 

directorate of a joint staff (J-6) early in joint planning is essential to aligning architectures 

with platform and sensor employment plans to optimize intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems 

throughout the joint force. The complexity of operating in the maritime domain require a 

baseline of organic ISR in addition to any joint forces and capabilities allocated to maintain 

MDA and to succeed in military operations. NCCs typically retain OPCON of organic ISR 

capabilities (manned and unmanned) to enable MDA and fully support the integrated 

employment of maritime capabilities. 

For more information on the intelligence function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-32 

(3) Movement and Maneuver. The JFMCC is responsible for the movement and 

maneuver of assigned and attached forces. The JFMCC makes recommendations to the JFC 

regarding sealift and seabasing, the movement of supporting forces, and coordination of the 

movement or maneuver of other component forces through the maritime AO. 

For more information on the movement and maneuver function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(4) Fires. The JFMCC is responsible for the planning and employment of 

operational fires within the assigned AO, both in terms of developing and integrating 

multidimensional attacks on the adversary’s centers of gravity (COGs) and in terms of 

shaping the JFMCC’s AO. 

For more information on the fires function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(5) Protection. The protection function focuses on preserving the maritime forces’ 

fighting potential in four primary ways: active defensive measures, passive defensive 

measures, the application of technology and procedures, and emergency management and 

response. As the mission requires, the protection function also extends to encompass 

protection of US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; 

and interorganizational partners. The JFMCC is responsible for all aspects of protection and 

maritime FP within the assigned AO. FP is part of each mission assigned to maritime forces 

and includes antiterrorism, physical security, and personal security. The GCC exercises 

TACON for FP of all Department of Defense (DOD) forces in the AOR and stipulates how 

the TACON for FP of NAVFOR is delegated. The delegation of TACON for FP is most 

commonly done along, but is not limited to, Service or functional component lines, or 

geographically determined sectors. 

(6) Sustainment. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services 

necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and 

redeployment of the force. The JFMCC makes recommendations concerning the distribution 

of material and services commensurate with priorities developed for JFMCC operations. A 

GCC may delegate responsibility for a common support capability to the JFMCC. The 

JFMCC will usually coordinate sustainment delivery for all forces operating from a sea base. 

For more guidance on the sustainment function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 4-0,

Joint Logistics.

4. Organizing and Manning the Component Headquarters 

a. The component HQ, organization and staffing, will differ depending upon the 

mission, environment, existing and potential adversaries, nature of the crisis (e.g., tsunami, 

cyclone, earthquake), time available, and desired end state. The JFMCC’s staff is typically 

built from an existing Service component, numbered fleet, Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF), or subordinate Service force staff and then augmented as required. The 

commander should drive the formation process and consider the following factors: 

(1) What are the specified and implied tasks? 
Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-9 

(2) Does the staff need subject matter expertise augmentation to effectively 

perform the assigned mission? 

(3) What is the desired and expected timeline for augmentees to arrive at the staff 

or to become available via reachback support from remote locations? 

(4) What mitigating actions has the staff taken to fill short-term gaps until required 

expert augmentees arrive? 

(5) If employing a forward command element (afloat or ashore), have specific 

requirements, responsibilities, and synchronization mechanisms for the split staff been 

designated? 

(6) During split-staff operations, how will the commander’s decisions and guidance 

be shared with the portion of the staff not physically located with the commander? 

(7) Who on the staff is responsible for establishing and promulgating the battle 

rhythm (Figure II-2)? 

b. In a maritime HQ two complementary methods of organizing people and 

processes exist. The first is the doctrinal J-code structure, which organizes people by the 

function they perform (i.e., intelligence, logistics). The second is a cross-functional 

approach that organizes the staff into boards, centers, cell, and working groups that manage 

specific processes or tasks that do not fit well under the J-code structure and require crossfunctional participation, such as targeting, assessment, and information operations (IO). The 

fast pace of military operations and cross-talk needed to support an operational-level 

command has made the cross-functional approach the preferred manner of organization, 

while maintaining the doctrinal roles of the J-code structure. The maritime operations center 

(MOC) can be thought of as a loosely-bound network of staff entities overlaying the J-code 

structure. If a Navy component or numbered fleet commander is designated as the JFMCC, 

their existing staff or MOC will normally form the nucleus of the JFMCC staff or MOC. 

The formalized addition of this cross-functional network to the doctrinal J-code 

organizational structure is what constitutes the MOC. The MOC’s focus is on operational 

tasks and activities (vice fleet management or support). It must be recognized, however, that 

when a commander establishes a MOC, the traditional staff code organization does not 

disappear. Indeed, the doctrinal J-code directorates are the foundation of the MOC. They 

supply the manpower, expertise, and facilities needed by the MOC to function. As a 

practical matter, the commander establishes and maintains only those boards, centers, cells, 

and working groups that enhance planning and decision making within the HQ. A fires cell, 

for example, is likely not required during a disaster relief operation. The commander 

establishes, modifies, and dissolves these functional entities as the needs of the command 

evolve. 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-32 

The generic seven-minute drill (Figure II-3) is a tool to aid participants in understanding key 

information about the meeting and focus their participation in an efficient and productive 

manner. Key elements include the purpose, inputs, outputs, important members, and timelines. 

c. MOCs provide an organizational framework through which maritime commanders 

may exercise operational-level C2. 

d. Liaison elements from and to other joint force and Service components are also 

considerations in composition and required infrastructure. Joint force command 

relationships, the nature of the mission, and standing Service agreements help determine 

Figure II-2. Sample Battle Rhythm 

Sample Battle Rhythm

2400

1200

1800 0600

FUOPS, MPG

FUOPS, MPG

JFC VTC

JFMCC Targeting 

Guidance to CTFs

Release JFMCC 

Intentions Message

FUOPS Brief to JFMCC and 

Draft Intentions Message

JFMCC Situation Report 

and JPERSTAT Due

JFMCC Daily 

VTC with CTFs

Watch Turnover Watch Turnover

JFMCC MECB





Refine 96-120 hours concepts 

based on JFC guidance

Refine 96-120 hours targeting





Develop 96-120 hours 

concepts based on 

JFC guidance

Plan 96-120 hours 

targeting





Updates 96-120 hour 

operations, key 

decisions, CCIR, and 

deep operations

Receive JFC guidance







Review 24-72 hours targets

Refine 72-96 hours targets

Review future targeting guidance

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CTFs commander, task forces

FUOPS future operations

JFC joint force commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JPERSTAT joint personnel status and casualty report

MECB maritime effects coordination board

MPG maritime planning group

VTC video teleconferencing

Legend
Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-11 

liaison manning requirements. For more information on Navy MOCs, see Navy Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center. 

5. Task Organization of Subordinate Forces 

a. The JFMCC normally delegates the authority to plan and execute tactical missions to 

subordinate TF or task group commanders. This enables the JFMCC to focus attention on 

the operational level and empowers subordinate commanders to employ their forces to 

support the commander’s intent. Individual platforms are assigned or attached to these 

subordinate TFs. Each TF is assigned a commander, and only the commander reports to the 

JFMCC. The commander, task force (CTF), may further subdivide the TF into task groups, 

units, and elements to exercise control at the tactical level. These subdivisions may be 

organized based on capabilities, missions, geography, or a hybrid of all three. Only a 

commander with OPCON or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operational 

command can assign or attach units to subcomponents in the task organization structure. 

b. The MAGTF is the Marine Corps’ principal organizational construct for conducting 

missions across the range of military operations. MAGTFs provide CCDRs with scalable, 

versatile expeditionary force able to assure allies, deter potential adversaries, provide 

persistent US presence with little or no footprint ashore, and respond to broad range of 

contingency, crisis, and conflict situations. They are balanced combined arms force 

packages containing organic command, ground, aviation, and logistics elements. A single 

commander leads and coordinates this combined-arms team through all phases of 

Figure II-3. Generic Seven-Minute Drill Example 

Generic Seven-Minute Drill Example

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Descriptive and unique

2. Who receives, compiles, and delivers information

3. Allocation of resources (time and facilities), 

and any collaborative tool requirements

4. Brief description of the requirement

5. Staff sections and/or 

required to provide products (once approved by chief of staff, these become specified 

tasks)

6. Suspense date-time group for inputs

7. Products and links to other staff organizations

8. When outputs will be available

9. Who has to attend (task to staff to provide reps)

Name of board or cell:

Lead J code:

When/where does it meet in battle rhythm?:

Purpose:

Inputs required from:

When?

Output/process/product:

Time of delivery:

Membership codes:

boards, centers, cells, and working groups 

Boards, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups Validation

“Seven Minute Drill”
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-32 

deployment and employment. As the name indicates, MAGTFs are organized for the 

specific tasks at hand and specifically tailored by mission for rapid deployment by air and/or 

sea. 

6. Navy Composite Warfare Doctrine 

a. The officer in tactical command (OTC) is the senior officer present eligible to assume 

command, or the officer to whom the senior officer has delegated tactical command. The 

OTC is responsible for the tactical force deployment and action. The commander of a task 

organization is its OTC when the organization is operating independently. When task 

organizations at the same echelon operate with each other, the mutual agreement of the task 

organization commanders (often based on seniority) or the common superior define the 

command relationships that will exist between the commanders. The OTC can assign 

command functions to other commanders in the task component. This is the primary means 

by which commanders for each composite warfare functional areas are assigned. These 

warfare functional areas typically include SUW, air and missile defense (AMD), 

antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare (MIW), strike warfare (STW), IO, and others as 

required. 

b. When warfare functions are assigned to subordinate commanders, it is assumed that 

the necessary authority for command, control, direction, and coordination required for the 

execution of that function is delegated with it. When multiple warfare functions (e.g., AMD, 

ASW, IO, and SUW) are assigned, the OTC also designates a composite warfare commander 

(CWC) to coordinate overall operations. The OTC may choose to function as the CWC. 

While acknowledged in joint doctrine, the OTC and CWC are Navy and NATO unique 

constructs. Joint community understanding of these C2 constructs is important when 

coordinating or working with maritime forces. The OTC controls CWC and subordinate 

warfare commander’s actions through “command by negation”. Allied maritime procedures 

and instructions use the term “command by veto” to mean the same thing. Command by 

negation acknowledges that in many aspects of often distributed and dispersed maritime 

warfare, it is necessary to pre-plan the actions of a force to an assessed threat and delegate 

some warfare functions to subordinate commanders. Once such functions are delegated, the 

subordinate commander is to take the required action without delay, always keeping the OTC 

informed of the situation. The CWC orchestrates operations to counter threats to the force, 

while the OTC retains close control of power projection and specific sea control operations. 

Each CWC focuses on its surveillance, classification, identification, and engagement areas 

(CIEAs) and vital areas. OTCs who are also CTFs have the concurrent responsibility for 

supporting the JFMCC’s planning for maritime operations. Although assignment of various 

warfare commanders will allow control of different capabilities on a single platform by 

multiple commanders, only one commander may exercise TACON for the ship’s movements 

and maneuver. 

For additional information on composite warfare doctrine, see Chapter IV, “Command and 

Control and Other Operational-Level Consideration for Specific Maritime Operation;” 

NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Doctrine; and Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-1, Allied 

Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures. 
Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-13 

7. Multinational Considerations 

Command authority for a multinational force commander (MNFC) is normally 

negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command 

authority could range from OPCON, to TACON, to designated support relationships, to 

coordinating authority. The US, particularly the US Navy, frequently operates as an element 

of a NATO force and routinely uses NATO doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(ratified by the US via standardization agreements [STANAGs]) to guide those operations. 

For overarching doctrine on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations. For additional information on NATO maritime operations, see Allied Joint 

Publication (AJP) 3.1, Allied Joint Maritime Operations.

8. Support to a Joint Force Air Component Commander Afloat 

In operations where no shore-based air operations center (AOC) can initially be 

accommodated, the preponderance of capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations 

may be located afloat. This is most likely during the initial stages of forcible entry 

operations, cases where the US desires to limit the presence of forces ashore, or prior to the 

arrival of a shore-based AOC. Ideally, these operations will be of limited scope and/or short 

duration, as the ships capable of supporting these operations have limited communications 

infrastructure, workspace, berthing, and other facilities to host AOC and liaison officer 

(LNO) personnel. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

PLANNING JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

1. Maritime Planning Processes and Products 

a. Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of 

command. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of 

national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a 

specified end state. Planning begins with the end state in mind, providing a unifying purpose 

around which actions and resources are focused. Military planning is a comprehensive 

process that enables commanders and staffs at all levels and in all services to make informed 

decisions, solve complex problems, and ultimately accomplish assigned missions. The 

JFMCC’s operational-level planning simultaneously supports the strategic and operational 

requirements of the JFC and also frames the tactical-level requirements of subordinate 

commanders. The JFMCC’s planning is driven by the JFC’s guidance and intent, supports 

JFC staff planning efforts, and should be closely coordinated with component planning. In 

conducting joint operation planning, commanders and staff blend operational art, operational 

design, and the JOPP in complementary fashion as part of the overall process that produces 

the eventual plan or order that drives the joint operation. JOPP is an orderly, analytical 

process that consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and 

compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. Through 

JOPP, planners effectively translate the commanders planning guidance into a feasible COA 

and CONOPS by which the joint force can achieve its assigned mission and military end 

state. It involves simultaneous efforts to address near-term and far-term operations, and 

should be flexible enough to adjust to dynamic unforeseen situations and new taskings. 

b. Most maritime platforms are multi-mission capable and are routinely multi-tasked to 

support different missions and warfare commanders. JFMCC, OTC, and CWCs and their 

staffs should be able to recognize and prioritize requirements, address conflicts and 

limitations, and integrate the various capabilities of assigned and attached forces and those 

made available for tasking. However, it is important to understand the implications of multimission tasking (e.g., ASW, STW, CAS, MAS, sea control) on individual platforms and 

personnel. Factoring these implications into decision making, especially regarding command 

relationships and employment, is paramount. Specific capabilities of a single multi-mission 

ship, or other maritime force, may be in direct support of one unit or warfare commander, 

“A 19th-century sailor would be bewildered by a modern warship, but regardless of 

the appearance of ships, there is one element, the most important of all, that 

remains unchanged - the man himself. Human nature in all the changing years 

has altered but little. It is the human element in warfare which may, if understood 

by the commander, prove to be the only way of converting an impossibility into a 

successful reality. With trained men and proper materials, the commander’s task 

is reduced to the preparation of good plans.” 

War Instructions, US Navy, 1944 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-32 

while other capabilities inherent to that same platform are in general support of another. 

Another complication is that this often diverse tasking can change significantly and rapidly, 

as events in this complex environment unfold. The JFMCC manages these shifts in tasking 

and delineates how to provide this varied simultaneous support to sometimes geographically 

separated forces. The JFMCC management mechanism is normally via operation orders 

(OPORDs), fragmentary orders, operation general matter, and operation tasks (OPTASKs). 

This guidance and direction are normally updated daily, but may be modified more 

frequently (i.e., hourly). These directives should incorporate the JFC’s intent, support 

approved subordinate CONOPS, consider requests prompted by the dynamics of the OE, 

work within the required operations tempo, and frame the daily operational planning 

conducted by the JFMCC’s staff and assigned forces. 

c. The maritime planning process assists commanders and their staffs in analyzing the 

OE and distilling information in order to provide the commander a coherent framework to 

support decisions. The process, which parallels the JOPP, is thorough and helps apply 

clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional expertise. It provides commanders and their 

staffs a means to organize planning activities, transmit plans to tactical forces, and share a 

critical common understanding of the mission. Interaction among various planning steps 

allows a concurrent, coordinated effort and the flexibility required to make efficient use of 

available time. It also facilitates continuous information sharing. 

2. Integration with Joint Operation Planning Process 

JFMCCs and their staffs not only contribute to the JFC’s planning efforts but should 

also contribute to the development of other joint force components’ supporting plans and 

OPORDs. Therefore, maritime staffs should be well versed in the JOPP; the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122 Series, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System; CJCSM 3130 Series, Adaptive Planning and Execution, JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning; approved joint terminology; and the 

amphibious planning process contained in JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. Multinational 

operations are the norm in the maritime domain, and multinational procedures (e.g., NATO 

STANAGs and ratified AJPs) may impact the maritime component’s battle rhythm and 

processes more so than other joint force components. Therefore, maritime staffs may need to 

refer to NATO publications, such as AJP-3.1, Allied Joint Maritime Operations, AJP-3.3.3, 

Air Maritime Co-ordination, Maritime Tactical Publication-01, Multinational Maritime 

Tactical Instructions and Procedures, and Maritime Procedural Publication-01, 

Multinational Maritime Voice Reporting Procedures. 

3. Organizing the Operational Area 

a. Commanders and their staffs should assess friendly factors of space, time, forces, and 

degree of risk tolerance individually and then balance them in combination against the 

ultimate or intermediate objective. The balancing of operational factors versus objective in a 

major operation is determined by the framework of a campaign. Any serious disconnect or 

mismatch between the ultimate or intermediate objective and the corresponding space-timeforce factors might complicate and possibly endanger the success of the operation. If the 

imbalance cannot be resolved, then the objective should be changed and brought into 
Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-3 

harmony with the operational factors. This process is complicated and time consuming. It is 

more an art than a science. In practice, operational factors will rarely be completely, or even 

approximately, in harmony with one another or with the assigned objective. 

b. In harmonizing friendly operational factors against the respective objective, all 

considerations, when possible, should start with the quantifiable factors of space and time 

(i.e., operational reach). The factor of time is more dynamic and changeable than the factor 

of space. Normally, the factors of space and time can be calculated with a high degree of 

confidence. On the other hand, the factor of force is often difficult to evaluate properly 

because of the presence of many elements that are hard or impossible to quantify. A 

significant change in any of these factors will invariably disturb the overall balance and 

require a reassessment of all the factors. Hence, the process remains dynamic and the 

commander should remain alert to detect changes that require reassessment. 

c. The factors of space and force in a maritime AO can be balanced by reducing the 

number or scale of the military objectives to be accomplished. For example, limiting efforts 

to obtain sea control to a much smaller area or to specific physical media (e.g., surface and 

air but not subsurface, or surface and subsurface but not air), increasing the number or 

combat potential of the JFMCC, or reducing the number of ships/aircraft employed in 

support of other components can achieve this aim. The factors of space and time can also be 

brought into balance by operating from shorter lines of operation, employing highly mobile 

forces, deploying maritime forces closer to the scene of potential conflict; pre-positioning 

weapons/equipment and logistical supplies, reducing the size of the operating area, limiting 

efforts to obtaining temporary instead of permanent sea control in a given area, achieving 

operational surprise, conducting military deception, or accepting larger risks. 

4. Other General Planning Considerations 

a. Intelligence. The senior intelligence officers of the maritime component should 

know their commands intelligence and information requirements and be aware of the priority 

intelligence requirements (PIRs) of the higher, adjacent, and supporting and subordinate 

commands, as well as national-level intelligence requirements. JIPOE is the analytical 

process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, 

estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the commander’s decision-making 

process. The process is used to analyze the physical domains (air, land, maritime, and 

space); the information environment (which includes cyberspace); political, military, 

economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems; and all other relevant aspects of 

the OE; and to determine an adversary’s capabilities to operate within that environment. 

JIPOE products are used to prepare staff estimates, define the OE, describe the impact of the 

OE on adversary and friendly forces, evaluate the capabilities of adversary forces operating 

in the OE, and determine and describe potential adversary objectives, COGs, critical 

vulnerabilities, decision points, COAs, and civilian activities that might impact military 

operations. The JIPOE effort must be fully coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with 

the separate intelligence preparation of the battlespace efforts of the component commands 

and Service intelligence centers. Additionally, JIPOE relies heavily on inputs from several 

related, specialized efforts, such as geospatial intelligence preparation of the environment 

and medical intelligence preparation of the OE. All staff elements of the joint force and 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-32 

component commands fully participate in the JIPOE effort by providing information and 

data relative to their staff areas of expertise. However, JFCs and their subordinate 

commanders are the key players in planning and guiding the intelligence effort, and JIPOE 

plays a critical role in maximizing efficient intelligence operations, determining an 

acceptable COA, and developing a CONOPS. Commanders should integrate the JIPOE 

process and products into the joint forces planning, execution, and assessment efforts. The 

process can be applied to the full range of joint military operations (to include civil 

considerations) and to each level of war. The JIPOE process is described in detail in 

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

(1) The JFMCC staff develops a specific collection strategy and posture for each 

operation to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), PIRs, and 

other requirements. JFMCC is also responsible for intelligence support of subordinate forces 

and intelligence support tasks directed by higher authority. The JFMCC defines tacticallevel intelligence responsibilities and prioritizes maritime-related intelligence requirements 

of tactical forces. The overall intelligence goal is to provide the JFMCC and maritime forces 

with accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence to support an understanding of the area of 

influence and area of interest. 

(2) The size and composition of the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) for 

the JFMCC’s staff is dependent upon the joint force maritime component command 

organization and scope of the operation. Intelligence requirements include access to 

national, theater, and tactical intelligence systems/data; core analysis capability; ability to 

provide indications and warnings; ISR collection management skills; targeting capability; 

and systems and administrative support. 

(3) When a Service component commander is designated as a JFMCC, the core 

intelligence staff normally assumes additional responsibility for operational-level 

intelligence matters. This can be a significant expansion of the scope of work required to 

support operational-level staff requirements and decision making, and may require 

augmentation of the JFMCC’s J-2. Augmentation considerations include the nature of the 

contingency, specific additional skills required to execute the mission, depth of intelligence 

capability in the existing staff, and additional volume and type of intelligence products 

required. Figure III-1 reflects skill sets that are typically required to augment the JFMCC’s 

intelligence staff. 

b. Fires and Targeting

(1) The JFMCC plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and executes joint fires to create 

lethal or nonlethal effects in order to set the conditions for success in the maritime AO. The 

JFMCC’s focus is on shaping those opponent formations, functions, facilities, and operations 

that could impact the JFMCC’s AO. In addition to providing fires from organic sources, the 

JFMCC is responsible for synchronizing and integrating all movement and maneuver, fires, 

and interdiction in support of operations within the maritime AO. Fires typically produce 

destructive effects; however, various nonlethal means (such as electronic attack) can be 

employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This function encompasses the 

fires associated with a number of tasks, missions, and processes, including: 
Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-5 

(a) Conduct Joint Targeting. This is the process of selecting and prioritizing 

targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of command 

objectives, operational requirements, and capabilities. 

(b) Provide Joint Fire Support. This task includes joint fires that assist joint 

forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. 

(c) Countering Air and Missile Threats. This task integrates offensive and 

defensive operations and capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority 

and FP. These operations are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both 

before and after launch. 

(d) Interdict Enemy Capabilities. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or 

destroys the enemy’s military surface capabilities before they can be used effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve their objectives. 

(e) Conduct Strategic Attack. This task includes offensive action against 

targets whether military, political, economic, or others which are selected specifically in 

order to achieve strategic objectives. 

(f) Employ information-related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or 

usurp the adversaries decision-making processes. 

Figure III-1. Notional Intelligence Directorate Augmentation Requirements 

Notional Intelligence Directorate Augmentation Requirements





























Joint targeting systems analysts and weaponeers

Special security administrators

Cryptologic resource coordinators and signals-intelligence analysis

Collection management personnel

Intelligence analysts

Imagery exploitation analysts

Geospatial information analysts

Intelligence liaison officers (representing each component command and Service)

Production and dissemination personnel as required (multinational)

Foreign disclosure personnel

System administrators to assist with component and multinational support

Unmanned vehicles support and other intelligence collection platform 

operators/interpreters

National intelligence support team

Joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-32 

(g) Assess the Results of Employing Fires. This task includes assessing the 

effectiveness and performance of fires as well as their contribution to the larger operation or 

objective. 

(2) Fires from maritime platforms can create a range of effects and are a critical 

component of maritime power projection. Examples of maritime fires employed against 

targets ashore or over land include interdiction, CAS, suppression of enemy air defenses, 

counterair (offensive and defensive), and NSFS (direct and general). 

(3) The use of fires is one of the principal means of shaping the JFMCC’s AO. 

Information-related capabilities employed to affect adversary information and information 

systems, are integral to this process. The JFMCC’s interests are those adversary forces, 

functions, facilities, and operations that impact plans and operations. 

(4) Joint interdiction operations are a key focus for JFMCC’s fires. Fires from 

maritime assets may be major active elements of interdiction. The key attributes in the JFC’s 

joint interdiction operations are the flexibility, maneuverability and speed of fires assets. 

Additional information on maritime interdiction can be found in JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

(5) Concentrated fires, even from dispersed forces, are possible because of the 

maneuverability of forces and the extended range of their fires. The JFMCC’s resources for 

fires encompass forces assigned by the JFC and may include sea- or shore-based aircraft 

including fixed- or rotary-wing assigned to theater naval forces, MAGTF, or other aircraft 

made available for tasking; armed and attack helicopters; surface- and subsurface-launched 

cruise missiles and torpedoes; surface gunnery, including NSFS; surface-, subsurface- and 

air-launched mines; air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, SOF, and unmanned vehicles. 

(6) Constant coordination between fires elements will be required.The technical 

nature of various maritime fires and weapons systems (e.g., programming, guidance, and 

control procedures) and the fact that a single platform’s multiple systems may be supporting 

numerous commanders in geographically separated areas, and the resultant often complex 

command relationships, including the nature of support (e.g., direct, general). The JFMCC 

synchronizes operational fires and C2 by the active participation of the strike and NSFS cell, 

supporting arms coordination center, and landing force fire support planners, where 

available, in the planning and targeting processes. Specific JFMCC targeting functions and 

responsibilities are listed in Figure III-2. 

(7) Land and maritime force commanders normally use a four-phase targeting 

process known as the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) for fires planning, execution, 

and interface with the joint targeting cycle. D3A incorporates the same fundamental 

functions of the joint target cycle. The D3A methodology facilitates synchronizing 

maneuver, intelligence, and fire support. D3A is not driven by the battle rhythm associated 

with joint air operations. Components strike targets within their AO with organic 

capabilities. If the maritime force has insufficient organic assets to strike a target within the 

maritime AO, or if a maritime target is outside the maritime AO, the targets can be 

nominated for joint targeting and/or prosecution by another component’s assigned forces. 

Likewise, the maritime force will routinely offer excess strike assets for use in joint missions 
Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-7 

and/or as required by other components. As part of deliberate targeting, the maritime 

operational commander will coordinate target nominations for the joint target list, no strike 

list, restricted target list, and maritime prioritized target list for organic strikes in the 

maritime AO. Use of organic capabilities can help to ensure the maritime operational 

commander’s decision cycle is inside the adversary’s. Time sensitive targets (TSTs) and 

targets of opportunity are usually fleeting with very small windows for weapon engagement. 

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Targeting Functions and Responsibilities

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Conduct target development.

Advise the joint force commander (JFC) on the application of maritime 

operational fires. 

Identify maritime fires support requirements to other components.

Provide apportionment recommendations to the JFC. 

Recommend joint force maritime component command assets for JFC allocation. 

Advise on joint fires asset distribution and priority of forces. 

Develop priorities, timing, and effects for interdiction within the joint force 

maritime component commander’s (JFMCC's) area of operations (AO). 

Develop JFMCC targeting guidance and priorities. 

Develop a prioritized target nomination list for inclusion in the joint target list, 

restricted target list, and the no-strike list. 

Nominate targets for inclusion on the JFC’s time-sensitive target (TST) list and 

maintain their own lists of high priority targets.

Provide appropriate representation to the JFC's joint fires element (JFE) and joint 

targeting coordination board when established.

Consolidate and nominate deconflicted and prioritized targets for inclusion in the 

joint integrated prioritized target list.

Provide timely and accurate reporting to the JFE in support of joint operations 

assessment.

Provide tactical and operational assessment to the JFE for incorporation into the 

JFC’s overall assessment efforts.

Coordinate components dynamic targeting via established procedures.

Integrate and deconflict JFMCC fires activity with the JFC and other component 

commanders or forces. 

Plan, coordinate, and supervise the execution of deep supporting fire operations 

within the maritime AO. 

Coordinate with designated airspace control authorities for all planned airspace 

requirements. 

Staff and man the time-sensitive strike branch in the assigned operations cell and 

ensure TST activity is in accordance with the JFC’s TST guidance. Figure III-2. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Targeting Functions and 

Responsibilities 

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Targeting Functions and Responsibilities

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Conduct target development.

Advise the joint force commander (JFC) on the application of maritime 

operational fires. 

Identify maritime fires support requirements to other components.

Provide apportionment recommendations to the JFC. 

Recommend joint force maritime component command assets for JFC allocation. 

Advise on joint fires asset distribution and priority of forces. 

Develop priorities, timing, and effects for interdiction within the joint force 

maritime component commander’s (JFMCC's) area of operations (AO). 

Develop JFMCC targeting guidance and priorities. 

Develop a prioritized target nomination list for inclusion in the joint target list, 

restricted target list, and the no-strike list. 

Nominate targets for inclusion on the JFC’s time-sensitive target (TST) list and 

maintain their own lists of high priority targets.

Provide appropriate representation to the JFC's joint fires element (JFE) and joint 

targeting coordination board when established.

Consolidate and nominate deconflicted and prioritized targets for inclusion in the 

joint integrated prioritized target list.

Provide timely and accurate reporting to the JFE in support of joint operations 

assessment.

Provide tactical and operational assessment to the JFE for incorporation into the 

JFC’s overall assessment efforts.

Coordinate components dynamic targeting via established procedures.

Integrate and deconflict JFMCC fires activity with the JFC and other component 

commanders or forces. 

Plan, coordinate, and supervise the execution of deep supporting fire operations 

within the maritime AO. 

Coordinate with designated airspace control authorities for all planned airspace 

requirements. 

Staff and man the time-sensitive strike branch in the assigned operations cell and 

ensure TST activity is in accordance with the JFC’s TST guidance.
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-32 

Commanders and their staffs, in coordination with joint components and other departments 

and agencies, develop dynamic targeting guidance, which should include priorities and 

guidance for dynamic targeting and identification of requirements by subordinates; 

prioritization of targets, including TSTs; guidance for acquisition; TST type and description; 

desired result; approval authority; acceptable risk; and action against the targets. The 

commander should articulate risk tolerance sufficiently to let on-scene commanders 

understand his intent when dynamic targeting requires accelerated coordination. The 

JFMCC and staff must ensure that dynamic targeting is understood and rehearsed. 

Components will nominate candidate TSTs, high-payoff targets, and high-value targets 

during deliberate targeting. 

For more information on fires and targeting in the maritime domain, see JP 3-60, Joint 

Targeting, and NWP 3-09, Navy Fire Support. 

c. Sustainment

(1) The sea remains the principal transport medium for large, heavy, and bulky 

items, as well as large volume requirements. Therefore, maritime logistics capabilities are an 

important consideration in the development of the JFC’s concept of logistics support. The 

availability of shipping and the ability to transfer supplies ashore, to include the use of joint 

logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) capabilities, may influence where and when military 

operations take place. Additionally, SLOCs and ALOCs may be considered a critical 

vulnerability and will require continual assessment and protection. The military sealift and 

merchant marine vessels, which transport the preponderance of the joint force’s materiel, 

remain dependent upon secure ports and airfields in a potential objective area. The sealift 

operated by our multinational partners varies in its capabilities, while interagency, 

international organizations, and NGOs are unlikely to possess any form of organic sealift. 

(2) Each Service is responsible for logistic support of its own forces, except as 

otherwise provided for by agreement with other departments or agencies, multinational 

partners, or by assignment to a common, joint, or cross-servicing provider. The JFMCC will 

usually assume logistic coordination responsibilities for all Services and forces operating 

from a sea base. 

(3) Service component forces are often required to provide significant levels of 

JOA-wide common-user logistics (CUL) support to other Service components, multinational 

partners, and other organizations (such as other governmental organizations and NGOs). For 

the Navy JOA-wide CUL support requirements are normally provided by the parent fleet 

commanders (i.e., Commander, US Fleet Forces Command and Commander, US Pacific 

Fleet). However, these requirements are carried out under the auspices of an NCC or a 

numbered fleet commander and are not a JFMCC’s responsibility. US Marine Corps forces 

may also provide limited CUL support to other Service component forces. 

(4) Authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFMCC’s command authority. 

However, a CCDR may delegate the authority for the planning, execution and/or 

management of as many common support capabilities to subordinate commanders as 

required to accomplish the subordinate commander’s objectives. The CCDR must formally 
Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-9 

delineate this delegated directive authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC, 

Service component commander, or DOD agency. In addition, the JFMCC’s CUL authority 

can be derived from the use of short-term inter-Service support agreements between the 

Service components. 

(5) With this limited CUL authority, the JFMCC can direct CUL support to be 

provided between Service component units. Operations-focused CUL support is separate 

and distinct from JOA-wide CUL requirements. This operations-focused CUL can include 

temporary task organization or the development of support relationships of selected logistic 

units. The JFMCC’s logistic staff monitors and assesses these operations and should 

coordinate action to prevent conflict or interference with GCC-directed JOA-wide CUL 

requirements. 

(6) Among other functions, the JFMCC’s staff coordinates logistics movements 

and plans to minimize the maneuvers and time required to support resupply of forces at sea. 

In general, the JFMCC’s logistics center manages by exception only. Routine 

administrative, personnel, and logistics management are the responsibility of the JFC and 

subordinate Service and component commands. 

(7) The ability to conduct at-sea transfer of people and materiel, for both ship-toship and ship-to-shore purposes, is a key enabler for deploying, employing, and sustaining 

joint forces. The foundation of this capability is provided by amphibious ships, aircraft 

carriers, and military sealift ships. Resources that have reached an initial operating 

capability like the high-speed intratheater connectors, enhanced surface and air connectors, 

improved maritime pre-positioning capabilities, and integrated naval logistics should be 

considered when planning operations and allocating forces. When employed in combination, 

these capabilities enhance access by reducing the joint force’s reliance on ports and airfields 

in the operational area. Maritime forces have integral logistic support capabilities, including 

repair and medical facilities that provide individual maritime units and TFs autonomy and 

the ability to operate for extended periods at considerable distance from shore support. 

(8) As crisis, contingency, and major operations result in more demand on existing 

facilities and increased operational tempo, existing shore-based infrastructure may become 

inadequate to meet the needed level of support for the increased numbers of units afloat and 

to Navy and Marine Corps units ashore. The naval advanced logistics support sites and 

naval forward logistic sites should be expanded to assist in providing required additional 

support. That expansion is accomplished through the Navy’s advanced base functional 

components (ABFCs). ABFCs are preplanned modular units that provide a variety of 

functional capabilities to extend the logistic infrastructure supporting naval expeditionary 

operations. Because of this they can be used to extend shore-based infrastructure as much or 

as little as needed. 

(9) The following provides a non-exhaustive checklist of the JFMCC’s logistic 

planning considerations: 

(a) Logistic plans should be integrated with CCDR annexes as well as JFC, 

Service component, and multinational partner logistic plans. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-32 

(b) Logistic personnel must be involved early in the staff planning and 

undertake an analysis of the logistic support capabilities required for each of the COAs being 

considered. 

(c) CUL requirements must be properly planned and coordinated with JFCdirected CUL requirements. 

(d) Logistic personnel should recommend the location and accessibility of key 

supply points. 

(10) The JFMCC is not routinely the lead for JFC-level logistic boards and centers. 

The JFMCC logistic directorate normally participates on those boards, centers and working 

groups of critical importance to the success of the maritime portion of the campaign. The 

theater joint transportation board and the joint movement center, which are transportationrelated, may have significant impact on the maritime operations and are examples of higherlevel logistic boards on which the JFMCC participates. Among other functions, the 

JFMCC’s staff coordinates and directs logistic plans and movements of assets to minimize 

the time required to support resupply of forces at sea. Other boards and centers of significant 

importance to the JFMCC include the joint material priorities and allocation board and the 

joint petroleum office. For proper focus, JFMCC participation on these boards should be 

treated as separate and distinct from the Service component participation on these same 

boards and centers. 

(11) The JFMCC does not normally convene separate joint logistic boards and 

centers except when needed to coordinate critical CUL support within the JFMCC’s AO. 

Possible JFMCC-established boards and centers may include a movement center and 

materials priorities allocation board. 

(12) A JFMCC-level joint movement center is built on the lead Service movement 

control agency and includes staff members from the other Services. The movement center 

facilitates coordination and prioritization of movement within the JFMCC’s AO, is 

subordinate to the JFC’s joint movement center, and analyzes and prioritizes maritime 

component movement requirements. 

(13) A JFMCC’s materials priorities allocation board performs similar functions for 

critical supply items. The JFMCC can combine the two centers/boards into one distribution 

management center. The JFMCC, in any case, must ensure that the capability exists to 

adequately control movement and cross-level critical logistic resources. 

(14) The JFMCC’s logistic center focuses on key logistic issues that may have an 

adverse effect on the maritime portion of the joint campaign and in general manages by 

exception only. 

d. Command and Control Systems Support

(1) The existing joint theater communications system (TCS) is directed, 

established, and managed at the CCMD level and provides theater-wide voice and data 

connectivity between all components and elements. The TCS and nonstandard commercial 
Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-11 

systems address unique communications connectivity requirements to provide the 

appropriate interface between components, multinational forces, interorganizational partners, 

and C2 that facilitates execution of assigned missions. Tactical communications are phased 

in and established as specified in the OPLAN or OPORD being executed. 

(2) Sensors are key elements in the JFC’s communications architecture, with 

national, theater, and organic component systems all serving as nodes in a joint sensing 

network. Sensor capability resident in the joint maritime force may support the joint force 

collection plan and may be integrated into the joint data network. Sensor tasking procedures, 

allocation of collection assets, and product dissemination should be determined early in the 

planning process, clearly defined in supporting plans and tactical procedures, and should be 

adaptable to changing requirements. The JFMCC’s staff should access theater and national 

sensor products to enhance situational awareness, facilitate targeting, and augment organic 

operational assessment capabilities. 

(3) The JFMCC’s J-6 provides communications system functional expertise to the 

JFMCC. The J-6 staff’s role is to focus on key communications issues that can have an 

adverse effect on the JFMCC portion of the campaign, electromagnetic spectrum 

management, and interference deconfliction. Routine communications system management 

is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate component commands. Communications 

system hardware is normally a Service component responsibility. However, the JFMCC 

designates specific force communications functions on an exception basis. Only 

communications issues affecting the conduct of the operational mission are of concern to the 

JFMCC’s J-6. Guidance to supporting commanders is provided in formal standard operating 

procedures and OPTASKs. 

e. Protection. The JFMCC is responsible to the JFC for all aspects of maritime FP. 

The JFMCC creates FP plans and sets priorities for the forces. FP is a function routinely 

conducted by maritime forces and essential to mission accomplishment. 

f. Environmental Considerations

(1) Environmental considerations should be integrated into planning for maritime 

operations and are included in annex L (Environmental Considerations), as part of the 

OPLAN. To the extent practicable and consistent with mission accomplishment, 

commanders should take environmental factors into account during planning, execution, and 

conclusion of an operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that may be 

different from the normal practices of the member nations and obtain agreement from 

participating nations. Besides agreeing on common goals and objectives for the operation, 

commanders of participating multinational forces should reach some understanding on 

environmental protection measures during the operation. Failure to accomplish this may 

result in misunderstandings, decreased interoperability, and a failure to develop and 

implement a successful environmental annex and plan for the operation. Additionally, the 

failure to consider environmental impacts on the HN could result in an erosion of support, or 

acceptance of the operation at home and abroad. Environmental considerations may include 

those listed in Figure III-3. 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-32 

(2) Weather has a significant impact on maritime operations and may influence a 

commander’s decision making. Seasonal fluctuations in weather may have strategic 

significance. Flight operations, amphibious landings, and sonar performance may be made 

more difficult by high sea states and extreme high or low temperatures. Adverse conditions 

may also be used to advantage. A submarine, for example, may use poor sonar conditions to 

avoid detection. The mobility of maritime forces may allow them to move to an operating 

area where conditions are more favorable. An aircraft carrier may, for instance, seek out and 

exploit a localized open window in otherwise poor visibility to continue flight operations. 

This may be a particularly significant capability when shore-based aircraft are weatherbound. Characteristics such as wave height, precipitation, and sea spray impact visibility and 

radar/sensor effectiveness for platforms and munitions. Ducting, a phenomenon that allows 

radar energy to travel extended distances within a few hundred feet of the sea surface (under 

certain conditions), can have a major impact on tactical planning and force positioning. 

g. Law of the Sea

(1) The oceans of the world traditionally have been classified under the broad 

headings of internal waters, territorial seas, and high seas. Airspace has been divided into 

national and international airspace. In the latter half of the 20th century, new concepts 

evolved, such as the EEZ and archipelagic waters, that dramatically expanded the 

jurisdictional claims of coastal and island nations over wide expanses of the oceans 

previously regarded as high seas. The phenomenon of expanding maritime jurisdiction and 

the rush to extend the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and beyond were the subject of 

international negotiation from 1973 through 1982 in the course of the Third United Nations 

Figure III-3. Environmental Considerations 
Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-13 

Conference on the Law of the Sea. That conference produced the 1982 United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which came into effect on 16 November 

1994. In 1983, the US announced that it would neither sign nor ratify the 1982 UNCLOS 

due to fundamental flaws in its deep seabed mining provisions. Further negotiations resulted 

in an additional agreement regarding Part XI, which replaced the original deep seabed 

mining provisions. This agreement contains legally binding changes to the 1982 UNCLOS 

and is to be applied and interpreted together with the Convention as a single treaty. As of the 

date of this publication the Senate has not ratified this treaty. 

(2) Although the US is not a party to UNCLOS, it considers the navigation and 

overflight provisions therein reflective of customary international law and thus acts in 

accordance with UNCLOS, except for the deep seabed mining provisions. President 

Reagan’s 10 March 1983 Oceans Policy Statement provides: first, the US is prepared to 

accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the 

oceans [in the UNCLOS]—such as navigation and overflight. In this respect, the US will 

recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the 

Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the US and others under international law 

are recognized by such coastal states. Second, the US will exercise and assert its navigation 

and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with 

the balance of interests reflected in the Convention. The US will not, however, acquiesce in 

unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international 

community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. 

(3) The legal classifications (“regimes”) of ocean and airspace areas directly affect 

maritime operations by determining the degree of control that a coastal nation may exercise 

over the conduct of foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating within these 

areas. The nature of these regimes, particularly the extent of coastal nation control exercised 

in those areas, is set forth in the succeeding paragraphs. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

2005.1-M, Maritime Claims Reference Manual, contains a listing of the ocean claims of 

coastal nations. Figure III-4 presents a brief summary of the primary zones affecting 

navigation and overflight. 

h. Unmanned Aircraft System. While the C2 processes for unmanned aircraft systems 

(UASs) are similar to those for manned assets, several characteristics of UASs can make C2 

particularly challenging: 

(1) UAS communication links are generally more critical than those required for 

manned systems. In the event of lost communications, a manned aircraft will typically press 

with the mission or return safely to a home base or alternate field. Although UASs can be 

programmed to return to base upon loss of communication, they rely on a nearly continuous 

stream of communications (for both flight control and payload) to successfully complete a 

mission. Therefore, communications security, and specifically bandwidth protection (from 

both friendly interference and adversary action) is imperative. 

(2) UASs may be capable of transferring control of the aircraft or payloads to 

multiple operators while airborne. Close coordination amongst all potential operators is 

required. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-32 

(3) Most larger UASs have considerably longer endurance times than comparable 

manned systems. Commanders and their staffs should exploit this capability when tasking 

UAS assets. 

(4) Compliance with the airspace control order is critical as unmanned aircraft 

cannot see and avoid other aircraft, generally have small radar and visual signatures and may 

not have identification, friend, or foe capability. 

5. Assessment 

a. Assessment is a process that evaluates changes in the OE and measures progress of 

the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the OE 

and the progress of operations; compare them to their initial visualization, understanding, 

and intent; and adjust operations based on this analysis. Staffs monitor key factors that can 

influence operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. 

Normally, the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), assisted by the J-2 and the plans 

directorate of a joint staff (J-5), is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. 

Various elements of the JFC’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations 

and future planning. They are supported by a cross-functional group in the MOC. Within 

the MOC, the maritime assessment group (MAG) hosts assessment battle rhythm events and 

develops assessment products. A MAG is composed of a small permanent assessment staff 

augmented by personnel from the core joint staff areas (intelligence, logistics, etc.) and other 

functional sections (fires, staff judge advocate, public affairs, IO, etc.) as required. The 

MAG may also include non-military personnel as appropriate to provide the necessary input 

and analysis assistance regarding diplomatic, political, military, economic, social, 

information, and infrastructure systems within the OE. 

Figure III-4. Primary Zones Affecting Navigation and Overflight 
Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-15 

b. Assessment representatives should be active participants in developing and refining 

effects for MOEs and MOPs as well as visual displays of assessment to portray progress of 

the operation. 

c. The MAG develops the assessment collection plan in concert with the J-2, J-3, and 

J-5. This plan includes locally produced products that help to organize incoming data for 

analysis based on information requirements and coordination instructions for conducting 

evaluations in concert with other staff organizations. The MAG provides assessment 

information to support J-3 and J-5 planning efforts and recommendations on whether to 

proceed on course with the current plan or adjust the plan based on execution to date. 

d. The assessment process is used to plan, gather, analyze, and interpret MOE data, 

assessment information from the JFC’s staff, other component and staff assessments, and 

current operations to determine impact on the CONOPS, compliance with commander’s 

intent, and progress on achieving objectives. The MAG is responsible for establishing and 

updating the assessment picture in order to create a shared situational awareness among the 

staff, subordinates, and other components. These assessment snapshots support decision 

making through established battle rhythm events, such as battle or commander’s update 

assessment type briefs, and make recommendations to either “stay the course” or change 

direction. Assessment efforts are continuous and integrated throughout MOC activities. 

e. The JFMCC’s MAG should analyze the JFC’s desired effects and objectives, develop 

MOEs and MOPs that apply to the JFMCC, ask for clarifications if necessary, and then 

integrate assessment measures and activities into the plan. Then ensure any developed 

MOEs and MOE indicators are consistent with, and not contrary to the JFC’s desired effects 

and objectives. 

f. Throughout planning and execution the MAG should be prepared to identify new, 

desired, or undesired effects. By the time the commander has approved a COA, the MAG 

should have developed tentative MOEs, sent them to subordinate elements to vet, and 

addressed and mitigated any inconsistencies. Once the effects, measures, and indicators have 

been finalized, they should be compared to current CONOPS, CCIRs, and any developed 

decision support matrices to ensure they are consistent with critical information requirements 

and anticipated decisions. 

6. Multinational Participation 

a. In a multinational environment, the operational aim for maritime forces is to exercise 

sea control, project power ashore, synchronize maritime operations with operations 

throughout the OE, and support the MNFC’s CONOPS, intent, and guidance in 

accomplishing the multinational task force mission. Maritime forces are primarily navies, 

however, they may include landing forces, maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, 

or other forces charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea that may 

have the ability to rapidly transition between types of operations. As with land forces, 

command of maritime operations will normally be assigned to a multinational force maritime 

component commander (MNFMCC) or a designated TF. The MNFC will typically assign a 

maritime AO to the MNFMCC or naval TF, based upon the CONOPS. The MNFC will also 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-32 

establish supported and supporting relationships, as required to assist in prioritizing actions, 

assist in establishing the main effort, and to establish formal command/coordination channels 

between the components for a specific operation/mission or phase. A key aspect of maritime 

operations will be sustainability. The following factors will impact the sustainability of 

maritime operations: available surface ships (combat and amphibious); available submarine 

assets; maintenance; supply; and storage facilities. 

b. Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command personnel can provide 

assistance to the commander in understanding political and military considerations; 

language, culture and sovereignty; legal considerations and civil infrastructure of partner 

nations (PNs) and potential HNs. 

For more information on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND OTHER OPERATIONAL-LEVEL 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIFIC MARITIME OPERATIONS 

1. General 

a. While this chapter is not intended as a primer on the conduct of specific maritime 

operations, due to the complexities of the OE and the required integration and coordination 

between elements of the joint force, a discussion of selected aspects of specific maritime 

operations is deemed essential to foster understanding and enhance unified action. The 

following provides a common baseline for all elements of the joint force to better enable 

joint planning and facilitate effective JMO. 

b. The United States Navy’s traditional and doctrinal warfighting configuration is the 

fleet, commanded by a numbered fleet commander. Typically, the fleet commander taskorganizes assigned and attached forces using the Navy’s administrative organization as its 

foundation. This is a historical organizational framework from which extensive warfare 

doctrine flows. (See Figure IV-1.) 

c. The JFMCC may sub-divide the maritime AO and create subordinate TFs, who may 

in turn create further subordinate organizations. In each case, the establishing authority must 

designate the command authorities for each subordinate organization, to include support 

relationships as required. Although the CTF is normally the CWC, the CTF can designate a 

subordinate commander to be the CWC. CTFs will typically assign forces under TACON to 

subordinate commanders. A CTF who has OPCON can designate a support command 

authority between two or more subordinate force commanders. 

d. Although a CWC and subordinate warfare and functional group commanders can be 

assigned in many different ways, for ease of discussion this publication will use composite 

warfare in the typical context of a strike group comprising multiple varied and multi-mission 

platforms. 

2. Surface Warfare 

a. SUW encompasses operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval 

surface forces and merchant vessels. These operations typically include the planning and 

directing of surveillance of the maritime domain, interdiction, and strikes by aircraft and 

missiles. To facilitate management and promote common understanding, standard 

“It is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate actions, 

consistent with US law, treaties, and other international agreements to which the 

United States is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United 

States by the President, to enhance the security of and protect US interests in the 

Maritime Domain...” 

President George W. Bush 

December 21, 2004 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-32 

terminology and definitions are used to describe important areas in the maritime AO. The 

areas described in Figure IV-2 should be clearly delineated in SUW plans, boundaries 

defined, and specific preplanned responses designated to occur when contacts are present. 

These designated areas should appear on the COP at tactical and operational levels. JFMCC 

allocation of capabilities between TFs, assignment of TF responsibilities, maneuver areas, 

and specific tasking will significantly affect planning for placement of these areas and SUW 

planning in general. 

b. Effective fighting requires aggressive sensor and combat systems management. 

Effective sensor and combat systems management includes proper modes for sensors and 

weapons systems; rapid target designation and assignment of targets to weapons systems; use 

of standard commands and procedures; the ability to launch one’s own weapon first and then 

exploit the tactical advantage gained as the opponent is forced into a defensive posture 

(subject to rules of engagement [ROE]); employment of sensors to support battle damage 

assessment; reattack as necessary; designation of a backup system (if available) for each 

engagement to achieve a higher probability of kill; and consideration of employment of 

weapons as well as maneuver for defensive countermeasures. 

Figure IV-1. Notional Maritime Task Organization 

Notional Maritime Task Organization

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

Legend

Navy Component 

Commander

Warfare Commanders

On-Scene Commanders

Joint Force 

Commander

Numbered Fleet 

Commander JFACC JFLCC JFMCC

Task Force Task Force

JFSOCC

Task Force Task Force

Task Group Task Group

Task Unit Task Unit

Task Element Task Element

Strategic Level

Operational Level

Tactical Level

Combatant

Commander
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-3 

c. Tactical Level Surface Warfare Command and Control. Surface warfare is 

conducted by the surface warfare commander (SUWC) and the strike warfare commander 

(STWC). The SUWC will be responsible for defense of the strike group against surface 

threats. Surface warfare at extended ranges from friendly forces may be assigned to either 

the SUWC or the STWC. The SUWC typically will: 

(1) Exercise TACON of assigned SUW units, including stationing, maneuvering, 

and engagement. 

(2) Identify requirements for SUW air support to CWC. 

(3) Establish joining and control procedures for SUW aircraft keeping the air and 

missile defense commander (AMDC) and appropriate airspace control agencies informed, in 

accordance with the AMDC’s directives. 

(4) Order organic strike group aircraft launch and tasking to counter hostile surface 

contacts. 

Figure IV-2. Composite Warfare Commander Integration within the Joint Operations Area 

Composite Warfare Commander Integration within 

the Joint Operations Area

Legend

AO area of operations

CWC composite warfare commander

GCC geographic combatant commander

JFC joint force commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

TF CDR task force commander

Maritime AO

(JFMCC/TF CDR) Operating 

Area

Sea

Land

Operating 

Area

Vital

Area

CWC

2

CWC

1

Classification, Identification, 

Engagement Area

Surveillance 

Area

Joint 

Operations 

Area

(JFC)

Area of Responsibility (GCC)
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-32 

d. The SUWC is responsible to the CWC for force action against surface threats. This 

includes directing MAS and air interdiction of maritime targets (AIMT) within the CIEA. 

The SUWC collects, evaluates, and disseminates SUW surveillance information, and plans, 

directs, monitors, and assesses the employment of SUW resources. 

For more information on MAS and AIMT, see NTTP 3-20.8/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.74, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare. 

e. Typically the SUWC will be embarked in an aircraft carrier, nuclear (CVN), 

amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA), amphibious assault ship (multipurpose) 

(LHD) or, if possible, in a ship equipped with a robust Global C2 System-Maritime and 

cryptologic capabilities to facilitate surface contact management. Due to SUW expertise and 

Surveillance area—The area in the operational environment that extends out 

to a range equal to the ability of a systematic observation of sensors to 

detect any aircraft or vessel of possible military concern. The dimensions of 

the surveillance area are a function of strike group organic surveillance 

capabilities, indications and warnings sensors, and available theater and 

national assets. 

Classification, identification, and engagement area (CIEA)—The CIEA is the 

area within the surveillance area (and surrounding the vital area [VA]) in 

which all contacts should be classified, identified, monitored and, if 

necessary, escorted, or engaged. The goal is not to destroy all contacts in 

the CIEA, but rather to make decisions about actions necessary to mitigate 

the risk that the contact poses. The CIEA typically extends from the outer 

edge of the VA to the outer edge of where surface warfare forces effectively 

monitor the operational environment. It is a function of friendly force 

assets/capabilities and reaction time, threat speed, the warfare commander’s 

desired decision time, and the size of the VA. 

Vital area (VA)—The VA is normally centered on a designated area or ship to 

be defended. The VA typically extends from the center of a defended asset 

to a distance equal to or greater than the expected threat’s weapons release 

range (WRR). The intent is to engage threats prior to them breaching the 

perimeter of the VA. The size of the VA is strictly a function of the 

anticipated threat. In some operating environments, such as the littorals, 

engaging threats prior to their breaching the VA is not possible because 

operations are required within the WRR of potential threats. Preplanned 

responses should include measures for when contacts are initially detected 

within the VA. 

Note: When the aforementioned areas conflict with joint force commander 

(JFC) established airspace control areas, boundaries will be as coordinated 

between the joint force maritime component commander and joint force air 

component commander, or as directed by the JFC and implemented by the 

JFC’s airspace control authority. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-5 

experience, a destroyer squadron commander will normally be assigned duties as the SUWC 

for a CSG. Typically, there is not a destroyer squadron staff assigned to an ARG; therefore, 

SUWC duties will usually be assigned to the amphibious squadron commander or the 

commanding officer of the amphibious commander’s flagship. The SUWC’s staff should be 

augmented by aviation community representatives, including attack, airborne early warning, 

ship-based SUW helicopter, and land-based maritime patrol personnel. 

3. Air and Missile Defense 

a. The JFC, JFMCC, and other component commanders should plan and document 

preauthorized response actions and delegated command functions in order to enable tactical 

force commander execution of decentralized operations in the manner expected. The JFC 

determines the most appropriate command relationships for the component forces made 

available for counterair. Regardless of the command relationship, all counterair forces are 

subject to the ROE, airspace control, weapons control measures, and fire control orders 

established by the joint force air component commander (JFACC), area air defense 

commander (AADC), or airspace control authority (ACA) as approved by the JFC. 

Additionally, the AADC will be granted the necessary command authority to deconflict and 

control engagements and to exercise real-time battle management. 

b. For AMD, engagement zones are often established. The zones’ designations include 

who has authority to engage threats and dimensions based upon the capabilities of organic 

assets. Additional information on engagement zones can be found in JP 3-01, Countering 

Air and Missile Threats. Specific to maritime operations is a self-defense zone (SDZ). An 

SDZ is a missile engagement zone around an individual surface-to-air capable ship, allowing 

the ship freedom to take defensive action. The default SDZ is a cylinder around the ship 

with a 10 nautical mile radius, though each ship’s SDZ will be tailored based upon surfaceto-air missile capabilities. 

c. The maritime force benefits from and contributes to the joint air defense plan using 

shore-based and organic airborne early warning, fighter aircraft, ships armed with surface-toair missiles, and electronic warfare systems. The inner layer of defense for a maritime force 

is provided by a combination of point defense missiles, close-in weapons systems, and 

electronic countermeasures. 

d. When the JFC organizes the joint force, in addition to a JFACC, the JFC also 

normally designates an AADC (for defensive counterair [DCA]) and an ACA (for joint 

airspace control). Normally, the JFC designates the same individual as the JFACC, AADC, 

and ACA, because the three functions are so integral to one another. However, if the 

situation dictates, the JFC may designate an AADC and/or ACA separate from the JFACC. 

In that case, the JFC must clearly establish the command relationships of the JFC and the 

JFACC to the AADC and the ACA. 

(1) The JFC designates an AADC with the authority to plan, coordinate, and 

integrate overall joint force DCA operations. The AADC normally is the component 

commander with the preponderance of AMD capability and the C2 and intelligence 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-32 

capability to plan, coordinate, and execute integrated AMD operations, including real-time 

battle management. 

(2) The JFC will define the command relationships between the AADC and other 

joint force component commanders. Components will provide representatives, as 

appropriate, to the AADC’s HQ to provide both specific weapon systems expertise and 

broader mission expertise. 

For more information on the AADC, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

e. When the NCC is designated as the JFMCC ,the JFMCC exercises OPCON of 

maritime forces to include multi-mission BMD ships. The JFMCC may retain command of 

multi-mission ships with BMD capability or transfer OPCON or TACON of multi-mission 

ships with BMD capability to a subordinate CTF. Typically, the CTF integrates AMD when 

designated. Figure IV-3 contains examples of BMD command functions a JFMCC may 

assign to a CTF. 

f. In the case of maritime air defense regions, the JFMCC may recommend establishing 

a regional air defense commander (RADC) and a person to fill this position, normally a CTF, 

to the JFC via the AADC. 

g. The AADC, as the supported commander for BMD operations, receives support from 

other components. The JFMCC operating in support of the AADC for BMD activities 

prepares maritime BMD capable forces for possible requests for JFMCC support. Figure IV4 is a visual representation of how a JFC and JFMCC may delegate command relationships 

and assign command functions for the achievement of BMD mission operational objectives. 

h. BMD across the boundary of a GCC’s AOR typically is a theater-level operation, 

with the GCC of the targeted AOR normally the supported commander. Cross-AOR ballistic 

missile threats are the basis for global planning. Commander, United States Strategic 

Command is responsible for synchronizing planning for global missile defense and will do 

so in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate US 

Government departments and agencies. Synchronizing and coordination responsibilities, 

however, do not include authority to execute or direct operations for cross-AOR BMD 

operations. Each GCC is responsible for BMD in its AOR. Command relationships between 

GCCs for cross-AOR BMD that address specific AOR threats, international agreements, and 

partner-nation support requirements are defined by the Secretary of Defense. The JFC’s plan 

should discuss the GCC’s support command relationship for the AOR. JFMCC assets that 

are BMD capable may be tasked to support this effort. 

i. Tactical level maritime AMD C2. The AMDC: 

(1) Recommends RADC/sector air defense commander assignments to the CWC 

for submission to/approval by the OTC or JFMCC for follow-on submission to AADC for 

JFC approval. 

(2) Exercises TACON, including stationing and maneuvering of assigned surface 

AMD capable units. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-7 

(3) Exercises command by negation over all AMD actions initiated by other units 

of the force. 

(4) Coordinates and orders the launch and station of alert AMD aircraft. 

(5) Coordinates movements of friendly aircraft within the air surveillance area in 

cooperation with the ACA. 

(6) Establishes joining procedures for aircraft assigned DCA missions. 

(7) Assigns stations, sectors, and/or patrolling areas, and designates air control 

units for aircraft assigned DCA missions, keeping ACA informed. 

Figure IV-3. Examples of Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense Command Functions
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-32 

(8) In coordination with the ACA, establishes and promulgates the identification 

safety range and safety sectors for all friendly aircraft and any special areas or zones 

established for aircraft safety and identification, or to prevent mutual interference. 

j. The AMDC is responsible to the CWC for defense of the force against air and 

ballistic missile threats unless a separate BMD commander has been designated. The 

AMDC is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating AMD surveillance 

information to the CWC and the force, and also plans, directs, monitors, and assesses the 

employment of AMD resources. 

k. The AMDC should be supported by a command center capable of providing 

sufficient tactical awareness to manage AMD for the force. The AMDC should normally be 

assigned on the most capable or experienced AMD ship that provides this level of support. 

Capable ship classes include CG [guided-missile cruiser], DDG [guided-missile destroyer], 

CVN, LCC [amphibious command ship], LHA, LHD, or LPD [amphibious transport dock]-

17. Any component LNOs required, such as an Army air defense artillery fire control 

officer, would normally embark on the same ship as the AMDC. 

Figure IV-4. Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Command Relationships and Functions 

Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Command Relationships 

and Functions

AO area of operations

BMD ballistic missile defense

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized

Legend

operational control

operational control/tactical control

support

DIRLAUTH

BMD command functions

* If activated and in place within the AO, BMD command functions would be 

assigned to commander, task force integrated air and missile defense.

Joint Force Air 

Component 

Commander

Supported

Regional Air 

Defense 

Commander

Area Air 

Defense 

Commander

Commander, 

Task Force

1*

Commander, 

Task Force

2

Commander, 

Task Force ....

Support

Forces assigned

Forces 

assigned

Forces 

assigned

Forces 

assigned

DIRLAUTH

Joint Force Maritime 

Component 

Commander

Supporting

Joint Force

Commander
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-9 

l. Platform selection should maximize use of the C2 systems available within the force 

(e.g., Aegis). Physical space limitations, numbers of watchstanders and their training, the 

operating environment (e.g., emission control restrictions), and additional command 

responsibilities should also be used to determine the most capable ship and commander for 

duties as AMDC. 

m. The alternate AMDC should be assigned to a second AMD ship’s commanding 

officer not already assigned warfare or functional group command responsibilities. Similar 

criteria as discussed for the AMDC should be used when selecting the alternate AMDC. 

For additional information regarding AMD, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile 

Threats. 

4. Antisubmarine Warfare 

a. Control of the undersea portion of the operational area is vital to the success of joint 

operations. A principal threat comes from enemy submarines. A single un-located 

submarine could create a significant operational, diplomatic, or economic impact. To 

counter this threat, the JFC will coordinate, and when required, integrate assets from the joint 

force to conduct ASW during all phases of the joint operation or campaign. ASW is an 

operation conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. 

b. Although often viewed as a Navy-only mission, the JFMCC may utilize a variety of 

joint forces and capabilities (air, land, maritime, space, and special operations) to facilitate or 

conduct ASW. At the operational level of war, ASW will have joint implications. In 

particular, given the nature of the operating environment, the size of the area to be covered, 

and the requirement to find, fix, track, target, and engage enemy submarines, the use of 

persistent national and joint ISR is one of the essential resources to ASW mission 

accomplishment. For example, the monitoring, tracking, and engagement of enemy 

submarines in port or transiting on the ocean surface may be effectively accomplished by 

non-Navy aircraft, UASs, broad area maritime surveillance, or other joint assets. 

c. While the JFC is responsible for ASW planning inside the JOA, coordination of 

ASW plans and activities with commands outside the JOA will be essential and may require 

close coordination with other government departments and agencies, multinational partners, 

and HNs. 

d. Undersea warfare (USW) operations are conducted to establish dominance in the 

undersea portion of the maritime domain, which permits friendly forces to operate 

throughout the OE and denies an opposing force the effective use of underwater systems and 

weapons. USW includes offensive and defensive submarine, antisubmarine, and MIW 

operations. 

e. ASW is a subset of USW. ASW missions are typically centrally planned under the 

direction of the JFMCC or a NCC and executed in a decentralized manner in support of the 

JFC’s CONOPS. ASW is extremely complex, requiring the coordination and integration of 

multiple platforms and systems in order to mitigate the risks posed by enemy submarines. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-32 

ASW planning should include consideration of the submarine threat, OE, force planning, 

ISR, communications systems, and C2. 

f. Because it is difficult to detect and track submarines operating underwater, a thorough 

understanding of the OE is a key tenet of success. Intelligence efforts should focus on the 

physical attributes of specific enemy platforms, their supporting physical and C2 

infrastructure, and past and anticipated employment patterns. Only after a thorough analysis 

of the physical environment and adversary systems, planners may be able to properly 

develop the CONOPS. 

g. The physical characteristics of the maritime domain have a significant impact on 

ASW execution. The highly variable acoustic properties of the underwater environment will 

impact the ability to detect identify, track, and engage enemy submarines. Factors that may 

affect these properties include surface shipping (including that of the joint force and 

commercial shipping), inherent environmental noise and oceanographic properties, and 

seasonal weather patterns. Acoustic sensor placement will be highly dependent on the 

acoustic properties of the waterspace. Because acoustics will not be the sole detection 

capability, an environmental assessment will be required to identify the requirements for 

non-acoustic detection systems (such as satellite imagery). 

h. ASW may require joint and combined forces and capabilities. Maritime forces must 

be identified early to account for long transit times. Initial force planning considerations 

should include utilization of pre-positioned capabilities, early deployment of surface and 

subsurface forces, and reassignment of forward deployed forces to the ASW operation. 

Early presence of joint forces may be essential in seizing the initiative. 

i. The objective of ASW operations is to assist in the establishment or maintenance of 

maritime superiority by denying enemy submarine influence in the operational area. This is 

accomplished through detection, identification, tracking, and engagement of enemy 

submarines. Unlocated enemy submarines often have the most influence in the JOA, 

possibly affecting fleet maneuver and commercial shipping operations. The JFC should 

designate enemy submarines as TSTs and develop and implement a comprehensive plan to 

reduce this threat. The operational key to limiting the threat of un-located submarines is to 

focus the ASW effort to hold enemy submarines at risk and secure friendly maneuver areas. 

j. ASW efforts focused on enemy bases and littoral chokepoints can prevent enemy 

submarines from entering open ocean areas and deny them much of the maritime 

environment. Neutralizing enemy submarines prior to getting underway, by planned 

targeting of enemy naval facilities and disrupting critical infrastructure supporting submarine 

operations is the most effective defense against the enemy submarine threat. Dynamic 

targeting of enemy submarines may also be possible when the enemy submarine remains on 

the surface. However, if permitted to enter open ocean areas and submerge, the level of 

effort required to neutralize the submarine threat increases significantly. 

k. Protection of surface units or commercial shipping may require ASW emphasis near 

operating areas, SLOCs, chokepoints, friendly and neutral ports, or other critical areas. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-11 

l. Detection of submarines can have a significant impact on maritime operations. Even 

if engagement of enemy submarines is prevented by ROE or other considerations, the ability 

to track enemy submarine movement will shrink the area of influence to the known location 

of the submarine. The integration of intelligence and operations is essential to the conduct of 

ASW. 

m. The theater antisubmarine warfare commander (TASWC) should maintain direct 

liaison with the joint intelligence center. Successful ASW prosecution requires fusing 

intelligence, oceanographic data, surveillance, cueing, multiple sensors, sensor technologies, 

and coordination between multiple platforms and staffs. Joint and national ISR capabilities 

must be incorporated into this process. 

n. Sensor employment should be thoroughly analyzed and carefully integrated into the 

CONOPS. Planners must take into consideration the acoustic properties of the operating 

environment. Sensor platforms should be placed to optimize sensor performance while 

minimizing the threat to the sensor platform. Acoustics are not the sole detection and 

tracking mechanism. ISR planning should emphasize that all joint sensors, including those 

not historically associated with ASW, may provide information for application at both the 

operational and tactical levels of war. 

o. ISR visualization through a common operating picture will maximize MDA and 

enhance ASW execution. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the uncertainty 

inherent in ASW operations is taken into consideration; distinction must be made between 

suspected location of unlocated submarines and known submarine positions. 

p. A survivable, networked joint communications system is essential to facilitate ISR, 

coordinate multi-platform execution, manage the waterspace, and prevent friendly fire. 

Information connectivity, exchange, and integration at all levels can help maximize MDA 

and mission accomplishment. 

q. Each GCC operates TASWCs, through the NCC. Each NCC appoints submarine 

operating authorities (SUBOPAUTHs). The TASWC and SUBOPAUTH closely coordinate 

submarine operations. In some cases, the TASWC and SUBOPAUTH responsibilities may 

be shared by a single commander. 

r. Theater ASW Commander. The TASWC is the commander assigned to develop 

plans and direct assigned assets to conduct ASW within the CCMD AOR. The TASWC may 

exercise either OPCON or TACON of assigned and attached assets. When tasked to support 

a JFC during an operation, the TASWC is normally designated as a TF or task group 

commander subordinate to the JFMCC. The TASWC conducts ASW operations as 

permitted by ROE. The TASWC remains responsible to the GCC, outside the subordinate 

JFC’s JOA. The JFC may assign forces directly to the TASWC, or to the JFMCC. The 

TASWC also directly supports other maritime commanders (i.e., strike group commanders) 

in the conduct of tactical ASW and typically provides ASW support to afloat forces as they 

transit through or operate in the AOR. The TASWC should promulgate the WSM and 

prevention of mutual interference (PMI) elements in effect. As changes to elements of WSM 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-32 

and PMI are promulgated by the SUBOPAUTH, the TASWC should promptly disseminate 

that information to the force. 

s. Submarine Operating Authority. The SUBOPAUTH is the Navy commander 

responsible for ensuring safety, PMI, providing WSM, and controlling the submarine 

broadcast for assigned submarines within a designated operational area. The SUBOPAUTH 

may exercise either OPCON or TACON of assigned and attached assets. Within their 

operational area, SUBOPAUTHs employ WSM to permit the rapid and effective engagement 

of hostile submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines. Similar 

to fire support coordination measures on land, WSM may facilitate reducing or eliminating 

coordination requirements for the engagement of undersea targets or impose requirements for 

specific coordination before engagement of targets. Along with other control measures, 

WSM and associated procedures help ensure that surface and air fires do not jeopardize 

submarine safety or interfere with other attack means. PMI is waterspace allocation and 

procedures designed to prevent submerged collision between friendly submarines, between 

submarines and friendly surface ships’ towed bodies, and between submarines and any other 

underwater event. To effectively employ all available ASW forces and prevent interference 

with US and multinational submarine forces, the TASWC and SUBOPAUTH must closely 

coordinate WSM and PMI issues and planning. 

t. Tactical Level ASW Command and Control. The antisubmarine warfare 

commander (ASWC) is responsible to the CWC for the defense of the force against 

submarine threats. The ASWC is normally authorized direct liaison with the SUBOPAUTH 

and TASWC for the purposes of sharing ASW information and coordination. The ASWC is 

responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating antisubmarine surveillance 

information to the CWC and the force, and also plans, directs, monitors, and assesses the 

employment of antisubmarine resources. The ASWC: 

(1) Exercises TACON of assigned surface ASW units and aircraft whose primary 

mission is ASW, including stationing, maneuvering, and contact prosecution. 

(2) Identifies requirements for nonorganic ASW air support to CWC. Establishes 

the requirements for organic ASW air support. 

(3) Provides water space management recommendations to CWC. 

(4) Issues specific instructions to all friendly units to prevent mutual interference 

between submarines in support, towed array surface ships, and all other friendly units. 

(5) Orders the launch and employment of alert aircraft to counter the submarine 

threat. 

u. The ASW command center should support temporary installation of acoustic and 

non-acoustic sensor performance prediction systems tailored to reinforce ASW search 

operations. Typically, a destroyer squadron commodore embarked on the CWC’s flagship is 

the ASWC. The ASWC’s staff is augmented with representatives of the fixed-wing and 

rotary-wing ASW communities, and naval oceanographic analysis team personnel. When 

ASW is assigned as the primary mission of submarines operating with a naval force, and if 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-13 

the ASWC is also designated as submarine operations coordination authority, a qualified 

submarine officer may be assigned to the ASWC to act as submarine element coordinator to 

achieve required coordination. 

v. The alternate ASWC should also be assigned to a destroyer squadron commodore if 

one is available (e.g., dual carrier operations). If one is not available, an ASW ship’s 

commanding officer not already assigned warfare or functional group command 

responsibilities should be assigned as the alternate ASWC. Similar criteria as those 

discussed for the ASWC should be used when selecting the alternate ASWC. 

5. Mine Warfare 

a. Maritime MIW is divided into two basic subdivisions: the laying of mines to degrade 

the enemy’s capabilities to wage warfare; and the countering of enemy-laid mines to permit 

friendly maneuver. Environmental considerations play an important role in MIW. Mine 

cases, mine sensors, target signals, and mine countermeasures (MCM) systems are all 

affected to some extent by a large number of environmental factors. The basic decisions to 

hunt or sweep, and subsequent equipment and techniques, are based on an assessment of the 

environment. 

b. Maritime mining is used to support the broad tasks of establishing and maintaining 

control of essential sea areas. Mines may be employed either offensively or defensively to 

restrict the movement of surface ships and submarines. They can be used alone to deny free 

access to ports, harbors, and rivers, as well as movement through SLOCs. Sea mines can 

also be used as a force multiplier to augment other military assets and reduce the surface and 

submarine threat. 

c. MCM includes all actions undertaken to prevent enemy mines from altering friendly 

forces’ maritime plans, operations, or maneuver. MCM reduces the threat and effects of 

enemy-laid sea mines on friendly naval force and seaborne logistic force access to and transit 

of selected waterways. Mine countermeasure operations (MCMOPS) are divided into two 

broad areas: offensive and defensive MCM. 

(1) Offensive MCM. The most effective means for countering a mine threat is to 

prevent the laying of mines, a problem that may require cross-component coordination 

across the joint force. Offensive MCM destroys enemy mine manufacturing and storage 

facilities or mine laying platforms before the mines are laid. Although an adjunct of MIW, 

these operations are not normally conducted by MIW forces. Therefore, staff MCM planners 

nominate enemy mine layer, mine storage and, ultimately, mine production facilities and 

assets up through the JFMCC targeting group for inclusion on joint target lists. 

(2) Defensive MCM. Defensive countermeasures are designed to counter mines 

once they have been laid. Some measures are undertaken following the termination of 

conflict solely to eliminate or reduce the threat to shipping posed by residual sea mines. 

However, most defensive MCMOPS are undertaken during conflict to support (enable) other 

maritime operations. Defensive MCM includes passive and active MCM. 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-32 

(a) Passive MCM reduces the threat from emplaced mines without physically 

attacking the mine itself through reduction of ship susceptibility to mine actuation. Three 

primary passive measures are practiced: localization of the threat, detection and avoidance of 

the minefield, and risk reduction. 

1. Localization of the threat engenders the establishment of a system of 

transit routes, referred to as Q-routes, which will be used by all ships to minimize exposure 

in potentially mined waters. Establishment of transit routes should be one of the first steps 

taken by MCM planners, if the routes have not been previously designated, to minimize 

exposure of shipping and permit concentration of active MCM efforts. Minehunting and 

minesweeping are time consuming operations performed by forces (ships and helicopters) 

that require localized air and maritime superiority in which to operate. The JFC may need to 

allocate significant maritime and air forces to protect the MCM force and to prevent the 

enemy from re-seeding areas already cleared of mines. 

2. Detection and avoidance of minefields can be accomplished by 

exploiting intelligence information or organic MCM forces. When the location has been 

established, shipping may be routed around the area. 

3. Risk reduction is primarily practiced by individual ships rather than 

planned and executed by MCM forces. Risk may be reduced by controlling the degree of 

potential interaction with a mine sensor. Against contact mines, a reduction in draft and 

posting additional lookouts can reduce the number of mines with which the ship’s hull might 

strike. Influence mines can be denied the required activation signals by controlling the 

ship’s emissions. Use of on-board magnetic field reduction equipment or external 

degaussing, silencing a ship to minimize radiated noise, or using minimum speeds to reduce 

pressure signature are examples of operational risk reduction. Other types of risk reduction 

involve the enhancement of ship survivability in the event of mine detonation. 

(b) Active MCM are applied when passive measures alone cannot protect 

traffic. This entails physical interference with the explosive functioning of the mine or 

actually destroying it. Minehunting and minesweeping are the primary techniques employed 

in active MCM. Both require detailed intelligence and extensive planning by the MCM 

commander (MCMC) to counter the threat effectively. 

d. Planning and execution of MIW operations, both MCM and mining, require detailed 

subject matter expertise. For most operations requiring dedicated MCM assets, Commander, 

Navy Mine and ASW Command, one of the three MCM squadron commanders, or one of 

the forward-based mine division commanding officers will act as the MCMC. For smallscale operations or those operations employing a single type of MCM asset, the commanding 

officer or officer in charge from an airborne MCM squadron or explosive ordnance disposal 

(EOD) mobile unit or detachment may be assigned as the MCMC. When assigned as the 

mine warfare commander (MIWC), the MCMC is also responsible for planning and 

executing mining operations. When no MIWC is assigned under the JFMCC, responsibility 

for planning and executing naval mining operations usually rests with the CWC. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-15 

e. The command organization and relationships involving MIW forces will vary for 

each operation or exercise. In most cases, MIW operations are conducted under the 

framework of a TF architecture with the MIWC or MCMC reporting directly to the JFMCC. 

MIW can also be executed under the supported-supporting concept (e.g., the MCMC, 

operating as MCM TF commander can be assigned as a supporting commander to the 

amphibious TF commander in support of an amphibious assault). 

For additional information regarding MIW, see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine 

Warfare for Joint Operations. 

6. Strike Warfare 

a. Strike operations may employ ballistic or cruise missiles, aircraft, naval surface fires, 

Marines and SOF to attack targets ashore. The term “strike warfare” is used in the maritime 

domain and commonly includes joint fire support, interdiction, strategic attack, and CAS. 

Amphibious operations may involve extensive application of STW capabilities, while 

amphibious raids are also a form of strike operations. 

b. STW may be conducted by ballistic and cruise missile carrying submarines, aircraft 

carrier strike aircraft, surface action groups of one or more naval surface vessels with 

Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs), naval surface gunnery, rotary-winged aircraft, 

UAS, and amphibious assault ships. Integration of TLAMs with strike aircraft in the same 

attack requires close coordination between the airspace coordinating authority, JFACC, 

JFMCC, and possibly the joint force land component commander to deconflict airspace and 

target selection. In openly hostile situations, extensive strike operations and offensive 

application of sea control warfare tasks, particularly with respect to mines and submarines, 

will be employed to gain access. An important element of gaining access includes 

neutralizing advanced anti-ship cruise missiles prior to surface forces coming within their 

range. Long-range, high-speed and maneuvering characteristics of such missiles make inflight defeat challenging, necessitating strike operations to neutralize adversary launch 

platforms. 

c. The STWC is responsible to the CWC for planning, directing, monitoring, and 

assessing maritime power projection ashore and may be responsible for striking surface 

targets at sea at extended ranges from the strike group. The STWC normally exercises 

TACON of assigned STW assets. Typically, the STWC does not plan or direct TLAM 

missions. The STWC integrates or coordinates carrier air wing (CVW) resources with 

TLAM missions via the launch area coordinator and Tomahawk strike coordinator. The 

STWC coordinates NSFS missions via the NSFS coordinator. The STWC is responsible for 

identifying requirements for nonorganic STW air support. 

d. The STWC should have direct access to the CWC, key strike planning personnel, and 

the intelligence center. Typically, a CVW commander embarked on the CWC’s flagship is 

the STWC for CSGs. The amphibious squadron commodore is normally the STWC for 

ARGs. The staff of the STWC should include air wing representation from each of the 

different capability areas, cruise missile and NSFS officer augmentation, and intelligence 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-32 

support. The STWC will normally provide LNOs to the JFACC as part of the naval and 

amphibious liaison element. 

7. Amphibious Operations 

Amphibious operations are complex and normally involve all components of the joint 

force. It is typified by close integration of forces trained, organized, and equipped for 

different combat functions. The JFC and JFMCC should ensure that the amphibious 

objective area or operational area is shaped by CSGs and other maritime and joint assets in 

anti-access/area denial environments prior to the commencement of the amphibious 

operation. Shaping operations include establishing maritime and air superiority, which is 

necessary for the amphibious operation to occur. The supporting relationship between the 

CSGs and other joint forces conducting the shaping operations and the amphibious force 

should be determined and provided in an establishing directive. Fundamental principles and 

guidance on the planning and execution of amphibious operations, to include command 

relationships and logistic support requirements are contained in JP 3-02, Amphibious 

Operations. Doctrine for the embarkation and debarkation of the landing force conducting 

amphibious operations can be found in JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and 

Debarkation. NATO doctrine ratified by the US can be found in AJP-3.1, Allied Joint

Maritime Operations. Additional allied tactics, techniques, and procedures can be found in 

ATP-8, Amphibious Operations. 

8. Naval Surface Fire Support 

a. NSFS units are normally OPCON to the NCC or TACON to the JFMCC and provide 

direct or general support to other joint force components or subordinate forces of the JFMCC 

(e.g., an amphibious force). When supporting a landing force or other ground forces, an 

NSFS spotting team is usually attached to the maneuvering forces for fire support 

coordination purposes. 

b. For NSFS of an amphibious assault, when the number of ships permits, each assault 

battalion will be assigned a ship in direct support. The ship delivers fires in the zone of fire 

(ZF), which normally corresponds to the zone of action of the supported unit. When 

possible, ships capable of performing simultaneous missions will be given multiple direct 

support missions to allow for maximum support to the landing force. 

c. A ship in general support attacks targets in the ZF which correspond to the zone of 

action of the supported unit. Prearranged fires are delivered in accordance with a schedule of 

fires published in the amphibious TF OPORD and the NSFS plan in the landing force 

OPORD. Fires may also be allocated to a subordinate unit for a specific mission(s). Upon 

completion of the mission(s), the ship reverts to general support. Ships in general support 

are paired with regimental-sized units or larger. 

9. Information Operations 

a. IO planning occurs at the operational level (e.g., JFMCC, NCC) while execution 

occurs at the tactical level normally under the direction of a strike group or ARG 

commander. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-17 

b. The JFMCC plans actions in the information environment that disrupt and degrade 

adversary decision making and C2 systems, while protecting their own decision making and 

C2 systems. The JFMCC sets the conditions and creates the environment to allow tactical 

units to successfully execute IO tasks. The IO cell focuses on a range of disciplines and 

functions to develop a coordinated IO plan. The IO cell consists of the IO cell lead and 

subject matter experts on the use of information-related capabilities to achieve the 

commanders information related objectives. Communications between the JFC and the 

JFMCC may be difficult because of the geographic separation of the commands. The 

JFMCC should normally send a LNO to the JFC’s IO cell to facilitate communications and 

provide details on employment of maritime IO forces and capabilities. Upon receipt and 

analysis of the JFC’s mission statement, the IO planning cell must pass any details of 

ongoing IO themes and shaping efforts to the JFC and other component commanders’ IO 

planners. The LNO can be instrumental in providing the IO cell with the necessary 

information, and assistance where required. 

c. Tactical Level Information Operations Command and Control. The IO warfare 

commander is responsible to the CWC to shape and assess the information environment; 

achieve and maintain information superiority; develop and execute IO plans in support of 

CWC objectives; and support other warfare commanders. 

For additional information regarding IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations, and 

NTTP 3-13.1, Theater and Campaign Information Operations Planning. 

10. Maritime Interception Operations 

a. MIO are efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international waters 

to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in support of United Nations Security 

Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods. Boarding 

teams of Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and specialized law enforcement personnel are 

trained in the techniques of visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) to conduct MIO 

worldwide. These boardings are used for specific missions based on authorities, laws, and 

jurisdiction. US warships may be tasked to conduct MIO or to provide support to embarked 

forces tasked with conducting boardings that are beyond the capability of normal ship’s force 

VBSS teams. As in any operation, commanders considering opposed or noncompliant 

boardings (NCBs) must have timely intelligence of the threat and associated degree of risk 

and weigh this against the benefits of apprehension and capabilities of the forces to be 

employed. 

b. MIO lines of authority should be streamlined, and must be clearly understood by all 

forces involved in the conduct of the mission. The command structure selected may vary but 

typically will include some form of a support relationship, with the embarked forces being 

the supported command and other forces being in a supporting role; not withstanding that the 

maritime interception operations commander (MIOC) continues to be the officer assigned to 

command the operation (i.e., maintain TACON). 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-32 

c. Expanded MIO are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of 

Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related 

material that pose an imminent threat to the US and its allies. 

d. Historically, MIO is a peacetime measure designed to enforce embargoes sanctioned 

by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), national authority, or other regional 

organization. However, the line between peacetime MIO and belligerent rights during 

international armed conflict can become blurred. Purely peacetime MIO share many 

operational characteristics with the exercise of belligerent rights; however, they are 

conceptually different. The use of lethal force is closely controlled during MIO and is used 

only where necessary as a measure of last resort when all other means of embargo 

enforcement, to include nonlethal means, have failed. The recognized sanctioning body 

establishes the provisions of MIO (e.g., in a UNSCR). After a CCDR responsible for 

conducting MIO is designated, an OPORD is issued that conforms to the resolution. The 

NCC may issue AO specific OPTASK supplements that address: 

(1) The materials to be identified, tracked, diverted, or seized. 

(2) The disposition of identified goods that are not to enter or leave a specified 

nation. 

(3) The types of suspect vessels expected to transit the operational area. 

(4) The questions to ask the suspect vessel during boarding. 

(5) The criteria for diversion. 

(6) The percentages of cargo that should be searched on each type of ship. 

(7) ROE. 

(8) The criteria used for classifying contacts and determining cleared vessels from 

possible sanction violators. 

(9) The reporting procedures for initial contact report, boarding summaries, 

challenge summaries, diversion reports, and after action reports. 

e. The conduct of MIO missions is based upon the concept of assessing the physical 

characteristics and level of resistance anticipated or known to exist on the unit to be boarded 

versus the abilities of the boarding team. Boarding are characterized as compliant boarding, 

NCB, and opposed boarding. When embarking on a suspect vessel via helicopter insertion 

during an NCB or when opposed specially trained and equipped forces are required. Each 

boarding is unique and inherently risky. A compliant boarding can quickly degrade into an 

NCB or opposed situation for a variety of reasons, a significant planning factor. 

f. Traditionally the primary mechanism for initiation of MIO has been through a 

UNSCR; however, other authorizations include the consent of a coastal state or flag state, the 

consent of the master of a vessel, an interception as a condition of port entry, the belligerent 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-19 

right of visit and search, the interception of a stateless vessel, or an interception made 

pursuant to the right of self-defense. The authority to engage in MIO is based on 

international law and is given by the UNSC, national authority, or other regional authority. 

Once it is decided the US will participate in an operation, authorization for US forces to 

conduct MIO missions is initiated by the Secretary of Defense after approval by the 

President. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff designates the appropriate CCDR to 

perform MIO based on the geographic location of operations. Depending on the nature and 

location of the threat, national level leadership of federal departments and agencies other 

than DOD may participate in the development and approval of courses of action to respond 

to maritime threats through the MOTR plan. MOTR is a component plan of the national 

strategy for maritime security. The US is party to Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

agreements with a number of other countries. These PSI agreements, entered into in 

furtherance of UNSCR 1540, provide legal authority for the parties to board each other’s 

vessels when such vessels are suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. In response to WMD proliferation in 

the maritime domain, DOD conducts MIO in accordance with the standing Maritime 

Counterproliferation Interdiction Execute Order. 

g. USCG law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) may be embarked on various vessels 

for boardings associated with MIO, specifically, for counterdrug (CD) operations against 

drugs coming into the US. Law enforcement in accordance with Title 14, US Code, Section 

89, gives the USCG statutory authority to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, 

searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the US has 

jurisdiction for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of the laws of the US. 

MIO by warships is authorized under international law to support international policy 

objectives. Navy ships carrying LEDETs support federal law enforcement efforts, but Navy 

and other DOD personnel are generally prohibited from direct involvement in law 

enforcement activity, such as boarding in conjunction with LEO, arrest, or seizure. Such 

personnel may fill support functions including damage control, gas-free engineering, liquid 

load transfer, use of warning shots and/or disabling fire (while under USCG TACON), 

jettisoned contraband recovery, and interpreting. CD operations and alien migrant 

interdiction operations are examples of LEO. LEO by USCG personnel, including LEDETs, 

are governed by the USCG Commandant, United States Coast Guard, Instruction M16247.1, 

Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM). The USCG MLEM includes detailed 

guidance with respect to legal authorities and policy (including USCG use of force policy) 

for USCG law enforcement missions. 

h. Tactical Level MIO Command and Control. As directed by the JFMCC, the 

MIOC or OTC will normally be designated as the primary authority for VBSS within the AO 

and gives the authority to conduct boardings, designates the supporting ships, air assets, and 

support teams (e.g., LEDET, EOD, and search and rescue), provides all available intelligence 

products, assigns communications frequencies required, and designates the on-scene 

commander (OSC) who will exercise TACON of the VBSS operation. The MIOC or OTC 

may assume the responsibilities of OSC and exercise TACON of all the forces and assets. 

The OSC assumes TACON, conducts surveillance, maintains accurate position data, and 

provides essential elements of information on the suspect vessel. The OSC reports progress 

of the operation to the MIOC and decides whether to go ahead with the mission or abort. 
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 3-32 

For further information on MIO, see NTTP 3-07.11, Maritime Interception Operations. 

11. Maritime Security Operations 

a. Maritime security includes a collection of tasks that are derived from agreed-upon 

international law. MSO are those operations conducted to assist in establishing the 

conditions for security and protection of sovereignty in the maritime domain. Examples of 

MSO include missions to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, 

transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. 

These tasks include assisting mariners in distress, participating in security cooperation 

operations with allies and partners, sharing situational awareness, and conducting maritime 

interception and LEO. MSO involve close coordination among governments, the private 

sector, international organizations, and NGOs. 

b. Maritime forces, acting in concert with other joint and multinational forces, other 

government departments and agencies, and law enforcement agencies employ the following 

options in response to maritime threats: increased surveillance and tracking, MIO, LEO, 

expanded MIO, and environmental defense operations. 

c. Piracy. International law has long recognized a general duty of all nations to 

cooperate in the repression of piracy. Piracy is an international crime consisting of illegal 

acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or 

passengers of a private ship or aircraft beyond the territorial sea of another nation against 

another ship or aircraft or persons and property on board (depredation is the act of 

plundering, robbing, or pillaging). In international law, piracy is a crime that can be 

committed only on or over the high seas, EEZ, and contiguous zone, and in other places 

beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation. The same acts (e.g., armed robbery, hostage 

taking, kidnapping, extortion) committed in the internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic 

waters, or national airspace of a nation do not constitute piracy in international law but are, 

instead, crimes within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the littoral nation. 

d. Only warships, military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and 

identifiable as being in governmental service may seize a pirate ship or aircraft. A pirate 

vessel or aircraft, and all persons on board, seized and detained by a US vessel or aircraft 

should be taken, sent, or directed to the nearest port or airfield and delivered to appropriate 

law enforcement authorities for disposition, as directed by higher authority. 

e. If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit by a warship or military aircraft 

proceeds from the contiguous zone, EEZ, high seas, or international airspace, into the 

territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace of another country, every effort 

should be made to obtain the consent of the nation having sovereignty over the territorial sea, 

archipelagic waters, or superjacent airspace to continue pursuit. The inviolability of the 

territorial integrity of sovereign nations makes the decision of a warship or military aircraft 

to continue pursuit into these areas without such consent a serious matter. However, in 

extraordinary circumstances where life and limb is imperiled and contact cannot be 

established in a timely manner with the coastal nation, or the coastal nation is unable or 

unwilling to act, pursuit may continue into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-21 

airspace. US commanders should consult applicable standing ROE and OPORDs for 

specific guidance. Pursuit must be broken off immediately upon request of the coastal 

nation, and, in any event, the right to seize the pirate vessel or aircraft and to try the pirates 

devolves on the nation to which the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, or airspace belong. 

f. Pursuit of a pirate vessel or aircraft through or over international straits overlapped by 

territorial seas or through archipelagic sea lanes or air routes may proceed with or without 

the consent of the coastal nation or nations, provided the pursuit is expeditious and direct and 

the transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage rights of others are not unreasonably 

constrained in the process. 

g. Tactical Level Maritime Security Operations Command and Control. C2 

considerations for MSO vary depending upon the nature of the mission although they 

parallel those for MIO. VBSS tactics will typically be employed during these missions. 

12. Maritime Expeditionary Security Operations 

A maritime expeditionary security force (MESF) is organized as an adaptive security 

force package supporting the JFMCC in providing all-weather, day and night security in the 

transition from the sea base inland, green to brown water, and ashore. The maritime 

expeditionary security force commander (MESFC) is that officer designated to conduct 

MESF operations within a designated coastal geographic area. The MESFC usually 

exercises OPCON over assigned MESF units, as directed, and may delegate TACON of 

these forces for coastal sea control and harbor operations to subordinate commanders. 

Control of forces will typically be further delegated to a seaward security officer (typically 

for riverine operations, port security unit operations, and salvage services) and a landward 

security officer (for EOD, maritime civil affairs and security training, and naval construction 

services). 

For further information on MESO, see NWP 3-10, Maritime Expeditionary Security 

Operations. 

13. Maritime Homeland Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Maritime 

Operational Threat Response Plan 

a. Homeland Defense. Securing the maritime approaches is essential to keeping the 

homeland safe. DOD maritime assets must be able to detect, identify, localize, evaluate, 

sort, and when warranted, intercept or interdict threats to prevent or defeat an attack. This is 

a complex task as adversaries may not be easily differentiated from normal maritime activity, 

and any disruption of commercial trade may have economic and financial implications 

domestically and internationally. It is also critical for DOD to maintain unrestricted freedom 

of movement to ensure the ability to deploy forces overseas. Responding to unpredictable 

transnational threats requires coordination across the US Government to prevent attacks on 

the homeland. Coordination and interoperability with federal, state, tribal, and law 

enforcement agencies (LEAs), particularly the USCG, US Customs and Border Protection, 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are important in this effort due to overlapping 

authorities, responsibilities and potential simultaneous presence of response assets for 
Chapter IV 

IV-22 JP 3-32 

maritime operations in the conduct of homeland defense (HD). Additionally, sharing of 

information and cooperation with multinational partners in regards to global maritime 

activities will greatly assist in the early detection and subsequent interception of maritime 

threats. 

b. Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations include support of US civil 

authorities for major disasters, emergencies, civil disturbance operations, designated defense 

support of civilian law enforcement authorities, and domestic special events. 

c. DOD, through the relevant CCDR, is prepared to respond to maritime threats from 

the forward regions to the homeland. DOD maritime forces support an active layered 

defense through extensive operations in the forward regions, coupled with a high state of 

readiness and scalability to varying threat conditions in the maritime approaches and 

homeland. DOD plays the lead role in a maritime HD construct, where DOD is identified as 

the federal agency with lead responsibility whether it is by discovery of a threat during 

normal operations, which requires immediate action, or through the protocols established by 

the MOTR Plan. These protocols are based on existing law, desired US Government 

outcome, greatest potential magnitude of the threat, response capabilities required, asset 

availability, and authority to act. During a DOD HD operation, USCG assets may also be 

under the control of a CCDR to defeat the threat to the homeland. Conversely, if it is 

determined to be a Department of Homeland Security mission, US Navy assets could come 

under TACON of the USCG. 

d. The National Strategy for Maritime Security and the MOTR Plan are directed in the 

NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy. The MOTR Plan establishes the protocols to 

achieve coordinated, unified, timely and effective planning and execution by various 

departments and agencies of the US Government. The MOTR plan addresses the full range 

of maritime security threats to the homeland including nation-state military threats; piracy; 

state/non-state criminal, unlawful or hostile acts such as smuggling; threat vessels with cargo 

or personnel requiring investigation and disposition. 

e. The MOTR plan predesignates US Government departments and agencies with lead 

responsibilities, clarifies interagency roles and responsibilities, and establishes protocols and 

procedures that are utilized for a coordinated response to achieve the US Government’s 

desired outcome for a particular threat. 

f. The MOTR protocols and procedures allow rapid response to short-notice (pop-up) 

threats and require interagency partners to begin coordination activities (i.e., MOTR 

conference calls) at the earliest possible opportunity when one of the following triggers are 

met: 

(1) Any specific terrorist or state threat exists, and US response action is or could 

be imminent. 

(2) More than one US Government department or agency has become substantially 

involved in responding to the threat. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-23 

(3) The agency or department either lacks the capability, capacity, or jurisdiction to 

address the threat. 

(4) Upon resolving the threat, the initial responding US Government department or 

agency cannot execute the disposition of cargo, people, or vessels acting under its own 

authority. 

(5) The threat poses a potential adverse effect on the foreign affairs of the US. 

g. The MOTR coordination process is conducted through a virtual network of 

interagency national and operational command centers. This coordination process is the key 

element in determining which agency is the right choice for leading the US Government 

response and what other departments and agencies are needed to support the response effort. 

Additionally, the MOTR protocols include a process for transition of the lead from one 

agency to another and dispute resolution (i.e., if the US Government desired outcome cannot 

be resolved at the lower levels of government, the characterization of a particular threat 

could ultimately be elevated for resolution by higher authority). At the tactical level, it is 

important to realize that the MOTR process exists not only to achieve a US Government 

desired outcome, but to coordinate and assist in bringing additional capabilities to bear on a 

threat. 

h. Additionally, MOTR presents guiding principles that apply to all agencies at all times 

and sets the basic standards for interagency actions to overcome maritime threats to the US. 

i. Successful MOTR execution is fundamentally reliant on the operational intelligence 

linkage. This linkage is optimized through ongoing efforts to achieve MDA. 

For additional information regarding HD, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and for more 

information on DSCA see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. More information 

on the different authorities and requirements between USCG Title 14, USC, and USN Title 

10, USC, during maritime operations can also be found in both publications. 

14. Global Maritime Partnerships, Security Cooperation, and Global Fleet Stations 

a. Global maritime partnerships, security cooperation and global fleet stations represent 

the overarching framework by which the US Government fosters and sustains cooperative 

relationships with international maritime partners. In concert with other Services, other US 

Government departments and agencies, NGOs, and private industry, the Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Coast Guard address mutual maritime concerns such as freedom of navigation, 

the safe flow of commerce, deterrence of terrorism, and protection of the oceans’ resources 

in a voluntary, informal, and nonbinding capacity. Global fleet stations are an enabler of the 

global maritime partnership initiative. US maritime forces engage with like-minded nations 

to enhance security and governance. This is normally accomplished through mutual security 

training to expand the number of maritime professionals, assist nations in developing 

maritime awareness, infrastructure, law enforcement expertise, and the ability to respond to 

maritime threats and challenges. Building partner capacity and capability is achieved 

through information exchange, training and exercise opportunities, multinational operations, 

and interoperability enhancements. 
Chapter IV 

IV-24 JP 3-32 

b. Naval forces provide the means of maintaining a global military presence while 

limiting the undesired economic, social, political, or diplomatic repercussions that often 

accompany US forces based ashore. Culturally aware forward deployed naval forces can 

provide a stabilizing influence on regional actors and can prevent or limit conflict. Forward 

naval forces provide US policy makers a range of options for influencing events while 

minimizing the risk of being drawn into a crisis or protracted entanglement. 

c. Theater security cooperation tasks may include the use of maritime civil affairs, 

riverine, construction, EOD, mobile diving, intelligence, logistics, medical, and training 

resources. Maritime forces may also employ security cooperation MAGTFs to build partner 

capacity and enhance civil-military operations. The USCG’s deployable operations group, 

comprised mostly of maritime safety and security teams with specific, specialized training, 

brings together various specialized incident response, law enforcement and security teams 

into adaptive force packages for surge operations which can deploy in advance of a potential 

conflict to conduct prevention activities or after a conflict has ensued to compliment 

conventional forces and contribute to establishing and sustaining stability. 

d. Global fleet stations, such as the Africa Partnership Station initially deployed in 

2007, have been established to support the GCC’s security cooperation and engagement 

activities. They are best described as highly visible, positively engaged, persistent sea bases 

of operations from which to interact with PN military and civilian populations and the global 

maritime community. 

e. Domestic civil law enforcement and port security expertise are uniquely valuable 

today as CCDRs work to build foreign nation capacity for security and governance. In 

recent years, CCDRs have requested USCG forces to conduct interception and antipiracy 

operations, foreign liaison, and other supporting tasks. 

15. Seabased Operations 

a. A sea base provides a JFC with a scalable and mobile capability in the JOA from 

which to exercise C2 or provide strike, power projection, fire support, and logistics 

capabilities where and when needed. A sea base can be as small as one ship, or it can expand 

to consist of dozens of ships. Seabasing minimizes the need to place vulnerable assets 

ashore and a sea base can be established without reliance on HN support. A sea base may be 

composed of forces drawn from each joint force component. Seabasing is predicated on the 

ability to attain local maritime superiority. Discrete and tailored, sea-based forces are often 

deemed preferable among the local populace and government as a less obtrusive support 

option compared to having foreign troops on the ground in their country. 

b. Command and Control of Seabased Operations. The command relationships 

established to conduct operations from the sea base are shaped by the mission requirements 

and will follow established joint doctrine command relationships. The sea base will typically 

be aligned under the JFMCC or the NCC. The JFMCC may designate a subordinate OTC to 

enable delegation of seabasing tasks as needed to manage the span of control commensurate 

to the mission(s) assigned, size, scope, threat environment, and availability of forces. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-25 

c. Other Considerations for Seabased Operations. An overriding objective of 

seabased operations is to position scalable, tailorable, and employable maritime or joint 

forces at sea within the JOA to seize the initiative in order to respond to mission tasking. 

Accordingly, the end state is the point in time when a commander determines that sufficient 

personnel and equipment resources have closed on the operational area in preparation to 

carry out assigned tasks. It is the responsibility of the JFMCC to coordinate with a JFC to 

ensure the seabasing time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) and request for forces 

requirements are integrated with the overall TPFDD, to enable support to all components of 

the sea base. 

d. Determine that seabasing will or will not be used to meet mission objectives. 

Consider all tools available to meet commander’s intent. Be cognizant of the principles and 

limitations of seabasing and how they may apply to meeting operational objectives. 

Seabasing may contribute to the commander’s operational objectives by using the sea as 

maneuver space; leveraging forward presence and joint interdependence; protecting 

joint/multinational force operations; providing scalable, responsive joint power projection; 

sustaining joint force operations from the sea; expanding access options and reducing 

dependence on land bases; and creating uncertainty for adversaries. Some seabasing 

considerations are included in Figure IV-5. 

e. Once a decision has been made to establish a sea base and to define the capabilities 

and capacities that must be present in the sea base to meet commander’s intent, the following 

questions should be addressed: 

(1) What surveillance and FP capabilities are required in order to achieve and 

maintain access within the air and surface environments and to enable freedom of movement 

and maneuver for all seabasing lines of operation in support of mission objectives? 

(2) What surveillance and FP capabilities are required within the maritime 

environment to extend naval defensive capabilities throughout the JOA to protect joint forces 

operating at sea and ashore? 

(3) What detection and FP capabilities are required in order to provide adequate 

defense against attacks by naval surface forces, submarines, small boats, and asymmetric 

terrorist or suicide attacks from surface craft and swimmers? 

(4) In the event of mines, what capabilities are required to detect, identify, 

neutralize, or clear mines to ensure maneuver access across key littoral approaches? 

f. In order to determine if conditions have been met that no longer require seabasing 

capabilities or applications, the following questions should be posed and answered: 

(1) Are aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) and/or seaports of debarkation (SPOD) 

capable of supporting continued military deployment, employment, sustainment, and 

reconstitution? 

(2) Is FP sufficient? 
Chapter IV 

IV-26 JP 3-32 

(3) Is there an internal transportation network available? 

(4) Post APOD and/or SPOD establishment operations ashore may warrant the sea 

base remain. Will throughput be sufficient to support operational needs? 

(5) Does the sea base provide additional flexibility, security, or additional 

distribution capability? 

g. JFMCC’s C2 tasks include: 

(1) Planning and executing the support of required plans for assigned missions. 

(2) Coordinating planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational 

HQ, as required. 

(3) Developing maritime COAs within the framework of a JFC-assigned objective 

or mission, forces available, and the commander’s intent. 

(4) Determining maritime forces required and available and coordinating 

deployment planning in support of the selected COAs.

(5) Developing and integrating the maritime component communications systems 

architecture and plans that support the JFC’s operational requirements. 

(6) Directing and controlling the execution of operations conducted by maritime 

forces. 

h. The information infrastructure for the sea base will be an integral part of the larger 

joint C2 infrastructure. It is the underlying foundation that enables the free flow of 

Figure IV-5. Seabasing Considerations 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-27 

information throughout all levels of the command structure. The sea base information 

infrastructure should provide an interoperable and scalable integrated C2 infrastructure 

supporting a common, standardized set of joint and multinational C2 capabilities, integrated 

applications, and hardware. The information infrastructure should enhance the ability to 

rapidly activate and deploy a sea base with a common package that can sustain operations for 

the duration of the contingency, support efficient routing of distributed C2 through 

collaborative networks, and decrease the lag between deployment and full operational 

capabilities. 

i. The command relationships established to conduct operations from the sea base are 

shaped by the mission requirements and should follow established joint doctrine. A JFC can 

C2 operations through subordinate joint TFs, Service components, functional components, or 

a combination of Service and functional components. The sea base will typically be aligned 

under the JFMCC when assigned. The JFMCC is responsible for operational C2 and is the 

single focal point for integrating and synchronizing maritime operations. 

j. Seabasing of SOF encompasses a wide spectrum of activities. Naval special warfare 

(NSW) forces to include NSW combatant craft have the capability to rendezvous with ships 

at sea via parachute. 

For more information refer to NTTP 3-07.11.1, Surface Ships in Support of Naval Special 

Warfare Operations.

16. Counterdrug Operations 

a. GCCs are responsible for planning and executing DOD CD operations within their 

AORs. DOD supports federal, state, and local LEAs in their effort to disrupt the transport 

and/or transfer of illegal drugs into the US. CD is a high priority national security and 

international cooperation mission, with DOD functions and responsibilities based on 

statutory authority. The Armed Forces of the US also assists our PNs in their CD efforts. 

b. The C2 relationships established for CD operations will vary based on the 

environments in which they are conducted. Considering that most CD operations are in 

support of either PNs or LEAs, it is important to remember that even though command of US 

military forces will remain within DOD, the overall control of the mission may be 

determined by a lead federal agency or agreements with foreign authorities. 

c. Joint maritime forces can play an important role in ISR, interdiction, lift, and 

sustainment operations 

For additional information regarding CD operations, see JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug 

Operations. 

17. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 

Joint maritime forces, especially amphibious forces, are often used to conduct 

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). This is primarily due to their forward 

deployed posture; ability to maintain forces afloat, thus not taxing the infrastructure ashore 
Chapter IV 

IV-28 JP 3-32 

or raising tensions around the US mission or toward US presence; an ability to provide 

additional forces should the security situation warrant; their self-sustainability, and the 

ability to transition to other types of operations or provide access for the deployment of other 

forces. Additional information on NEOs may be found in JP 3-68, Noncombatant 

Evacuation Operations.

18. Protection of Shipping 

a. There are multiple methods and options to protect shipping. One method is to 

conduct wide sea control operations that attempt to protect the waters or known traffic routes 

through which many ships pass. Another method is to gather merchant ships and devote 

protection assets to the convoy, requiring only localized supremacy. Both constructs can be 

used within wider sea control operations if resources permit. When there is a severe risk to 

maritime trade, convoying is a method of reducing the scale of the sea control problem that 

has, in the past, proved effective. If shipping is gathered in convoys, the area and time over 

which sea control must be exercised for their protection is reduced to a minimum. 

Convoying complicates the attacker’s task and concentrates escorting forces to enhance the 

effectiveness of protection. However, convoying is less likely to deceive the enemy or deny 

the enemy intelligence about the position of friendly shipping. It presents the enemy a much 

more localized and lucrative target. It is also disruptive to trade. The strategic or operational 

decision to convoy requires careful weighing of advantages, disadvantages, and the 

opportunities for drawing the enemy into decisive action. 

b. During any operation, merchant ship activity needs to be closely monitored, and 

effective coordination and close cooperation between military, civilian, commercial, and 

government organizations is required to provide for the necessary level of liaison and safety. 

In certain situations, maritime forces may be called upon to protect ships of any nationality 

carrying cargoes of interest to the US and its allies. NATO created the NCAGS that 

established an organization and procedures to provide continuous near real-time situational 

awareness of merchant shipping in support of maritime HD and the forward deployed 

theater/operational commanders. NCAGS provide accurate and timely merchant vessel 

information and advice on the deconfliction and protection of the vessels in the AOR. The 

NCAGS mission bridges the gap between operational forces and merchant shipping by 

providing a framework for communicating directions, advisories, concerns, and information. 

The range of options is designed to allow flexibility in tailoring NCAGS policy to the 

particular requirements and situation in the NCAGS area. In its simplest form, NCAGS is 

another tool to support the operational commander’s overall sea control mission requirement, 

directed and managed as any other warfare mission area asset. 

c. NCAGS doctrine has evolved with the changing threat posed both on merchant 

shipping and by merchant shipping in the context of regional operations and maritime HD. 

This doctrine addresses both the traditional protection and control of shipping in a region and 

the emerging requirement of maritime HD, where merchant shipping may be either the 

protagonist, or target, requiring the establishment of communications to increase maritime 

situational awareness of merchant shipping. NCAGS doctrine applies to maritime HD, 

contingency support, and general economic shipping. Maritime HD support encompasses 

assisting the USCG and fleet commanders with increasing MDA by contributing to the 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-29 

production of a COP relating to merchant shipping within the territorial seas and EEZ waters 

surrounding the US, its territories, and interests. Types of contingency support shipping 

include naval vessels of the Military Sealift Command, shipping operated or chartered by the 

US Government to support naval operations or to meet US policy objectives, crisis response 

shipping, and relief shipping chartered by government departments or agencies. Types of 

economic shipping include vessels engaged in normal commercial trade worldwide, 

regardless of flag or ownership, or such other shipping that is not under the control or 

direction of the US Government. 

d. Specific to maritime HD operations in the United States Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) AOR, the USCG is the lead Department of Homeland Security agency 

for maritime security. The MOCs work jointly with the USCG maritime intelligence fusion 

centers to form the joint maritime information fusion center. The MOCs are responsible to 

assist in improving MDA by providing positional information of merchant vessels operating 

in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 

19. Maritime Pre-Positioning Force Operations 

a. A maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) operation includes the airlift of MAGTF and 

Navy elements, the Navy support element, and naval port security units with selected 

equipment into an arrival and assembly area to join with equipment and supplies carried 

aboard maritime pre-positioning ships. An MPF operation may consist of one ship 

interacting with a forward-deployed MEU; a maritime pre-positioning ships squadron 

(MPSRON) and a Marine expeditionary brigade fly-in echelon; or a Marine expeditionary 

force falling in on the MPSRONs. The MPF is one component of the Marine Corps’ rapid 

response capability triad, which also includes the air contingency MAGTF and forwarddeployed amphibious forces. 

b. An MPF is a temporary organization comprised of a MAGTF with assigned naval 

forces under the MAGTF command element, and an MPSRON, NAVFOR, and naval forces 

under the command of the commander, maritime pre-positioned force (CMPF). The 

command relationship established between the MAGTF commander and the CMPF is a key 

decision. It should provide for unity of effort, simplicity, and flexibility across the MPF 

operation phases. It should be clearly defined and based upon an assessment of mission 

requirements. The support relationship is normally established between the CMPF and 

MAGTF commander. For MPF operations, the Navy support element would consist of Navy 

Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) forces actually off-loading the 

MAGTF cargo and interfacing between the MPSRON vessels and the deployed MEU. For 

the MAGTF, NAVELSG forces support the loading and unloading of cargo and passengers. 

If JLOTS becomes part of the sustainment or assault follow-on echelon operations, 

NAVELSG forces will be providing logistics support in many areas. 

For additional information regarding maritime pre-positioning operations, see Marine 

Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-32/NTTP 3-02.3M, Maritime Prepositioning 

Force Operations, and JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations. 
Chapter IV 

IV-30 JP 3-32 

20. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 

Maritime forces can provide speed of reaction, operational maneuver, and assured 

access while significantly reducing the footprint ashore and minimizing the permissions 

required to operate from the HN. Forward deployed ARGs with an embarked MEU provide 

immediate national response in support of humanitarian and natural-disaster relief 

operations. This includes MAGTF response teams, platoon-sized elements capable of 

detecting a wide range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. Other 

forward deployed maritime units, including CSGs, individual ships or cutters, and deployed 

US naval construction force units may provide more limited immediate relief support, 

including airlift support, personnel recovery, engineering capabilities such as bridging and 

debris removal, and providing a secure platform for staging or rest and recuperation until a 

larger force arrives. US Navy ships can provide a safe and accessible location for the JFC’s 

HQ, provide seabasing support to the joint force, and have a limited ability to produce and 

distribute electrical power and clean water. Riverine forces, expeditionary training teams, 

hospital ships, expeditionary medical facilities and forward deployable preventive medicine 

units are other US Navy assets that can be tailored to support FHA missions. The Marine 

Corps MPF is another resource strategically located around the world that may respond to a 

regional crisis that involve FHA and disaster relief. These ships have the capability to purify 

water and transfer it ashore. Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants transfer capability is also 

available. 

21. Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

Humanitarian tasks also are included in DSCA. In response to request for assistance 

from civil authorities, maritime forces can support whole-of-government responses to 

domestic emergencies. 

For more information on DSCA, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-32 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. General 

a. NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy. 

b. The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. 

c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

d. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

e. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

f. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

g. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

h. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

i. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. 

j. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction. 

k. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

l. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

m. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. 

n. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

o. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

p. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

q. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

r. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-32 

s. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

t. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

u. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 

v. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

w. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. 

x. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

y. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. 

z. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

aa. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

bb. JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System. 

cc. JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations. 

dd. JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations. 

ee. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS). 

ff. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations. 

gg. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

3. Multi-Service Publications 

a. Field Manual 90-41/Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-1A/NWP 5-02/AFTTP(I) 

3-2.21, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) 

Liaison Operations. 

b. NTTP 3-20.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.74, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare. 

c. NTTP 3-02.3M/ MCWP 3-32, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.

d. NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7, Seabasing.

4. Navy Publications 

a. NTTP 3-13.1, Theater and Campaign Information Operations. 

b. NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center. 
 References 

A-3 

c. NTTP 4-01.4, Underway Replenishment. 

d. NTTP 4-02.1, Medical Logistics. 

e. NTTP 4-02.2, Patient Movement. 

f. NTTP 4-02.7, Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Environment. 

g. NTTP 4-04.1, Seabee Operations in the MAGTF. 

h. NTRP 4-10.1, Naval Conventional Ordnance Management. 

i. NWP 2-01, Intelligence Support to Naval Operations. 

j. NWP 3-09, Navy Fire Support. 

k. NWP 3-10, Maritime Expeditionary Security Operations (MESO). 

l. NWP 3-13, Navy Information Operations. 

m. NWP 3-15 Series, Mine Warfare. 

n. NWP 3-20 Series, Surface Warfare. 

o. NWP 3-21 Series, Antisubmarine Warfare. 

p. NWP 3-32, Command and Control of Maritime Forces at the Operational Level of 

War. 

q. NWP 4-01, Naval Transportation. 

r. NWP 4-01.1, Navy Advanced Base Logistics Operations. 

s. NWP 4-08, Naval Supply Operations. 

t. NWP 4-09 Rev A, Other Logistic Services. 

u. NWP 4-11, Environmental Protection. 

v. NWP 5-01 Rev A, Naval Operational Planning. 

 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint 

Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting 

Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 

23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, 

and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Navy. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for 

this publication is the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-32, 08 August 2006, Change 1, 27 May 2008, 

Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and 

Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support 

Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes 

to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD 

Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, 

and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security 

Program: Protection of Classified Information. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-32 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the CCMDs, 

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign 

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, 

Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, 

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the CCMDs and Services. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AADC area air defense commander 

ABFC advanced base functional component 

ACA airspace control authority 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

AIMT air interdiction of maritime targets 

AJP allied joint publication 

ALOC air line of communications 

AMD air and missile defense 

AMDC air and missile defense commander 

AO area of operations 

AOC air operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

ARG amphibious ready group 

ASW antisubmarine warfare 

ASWC antisubmarine warfare commander 

ATP allied tactical publication 

BMD ballistic missile defense 

C2 command and control 

CAS close air support 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CCMD combatant command 

CD counterdrug 

CIEA classification, identification, and engagement area 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CMPF commander, maritime pre-positioned force 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

CONOPS concept of operations 

COP common operational picture 

CSG carrier strike group 

CTF commander, task force 

CUL common-user logistics 

CVN aircraft carrier, nuclear 

CVW carrier air wing 

CWC composite warfare commander 

D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess 

DCA defensive counterair 

DOD Department of Defense 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-32 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

EEZ exclusive economic zone 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FP force protection 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

HQ headquarters 

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff 

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

JDDOC joint deployment and distribution operations center 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore 

JMO joint maritime operations 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

LEA law enforcement agency 

LEDET law enforcement detachment (USCG) 

LEO law enforcement operations 

LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose) 

LHD amphibious assault ship (multipurpose) 

LNO liaison officer 

LOC line of communications 

MAG maritime assessment group 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MAS maritime air support 

MCM mine countermeasures 

MCMC mine countermeasures commander 
Glossary 

GL-3 

MCMOPS mine countermeasures operations 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MDA maritime domain awareness 

MESF maritime expeditionary security force 

MESFC maritime expeditionary security force commander 

MESO maritime expeditionary security operations 

MEU Marine expeditionary unit 

MIO maritime interception operations 

MIOC maritime interception operations commander 

MIW mine warfare 

MIWC mine warfare commander 

MLEM Maritime Law Enforcement Manual 

MNFC multinational force commander 

MNFMCC multinational force maritime component commander 

MOC maritime operations center 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

MOTR maritime operational threat response 

MPF maritime pre-positioning force 

MPSRON maritime pre-positioning ships squadron 

MSO maritime security operations 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NAVFOR Navy forces 

NCAGS naval cooperation and guidance for shipping 

NCB noncompliant boarding 

NCC Navy component commander 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NSFS naval surface fire support 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OE operational environment 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPTASK operation task 

OSC on-scene commander 

OTC officer in tactical command 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PMI prevention of mutual interference 

PN partner nation 

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-32 

RADC regional air defense commander 

ROE rules of engagement 

SCC shipping coordination center 

SDZ self-defense zone 

SLOC sea line of communications 

SOF special operations forces 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO) 

STW strike warfare 

STWC strike warfare commander 

SUBOPAUTH submarine operating authority 

SUW surface warfare 

SUWC surface warfare commander 

TACON tactical control 

TASWC theater antisubmarine warfare commander 

TCS theater communications system 

TF task force 

TLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile 

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data 

TST time-sensitive target 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

UNSC United Nations Security Council 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USW undersea warfare 

VBSS visit, board, search, and seizure 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WSM waterspace management 

ZF zone of fire 
GL-5 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

aircraft carrier. A warship designed to support and operate aircraft, engage in attacks on 

targets afloat or ashore, and engage in sustained operations in support of other forces. 

Also called CV or CVN. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

antisubmarine warfare. Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the 

effective use of submarines. Also called ASW. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

antisubmarine warfare forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

area operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

at sea. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

battle force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

carrier air wing. Two or more aircraft squadrons formed under one commander for 

administrative and tactical control of operations from a carrier. Also called CVW. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

carrier strike group. A standing naval task group consisting of a carrier, embarked air 

wing, surface combatants, and submarines as assigned in direct support, operating in 

mutual support with the task of destroying hostile submarine, surface, and air forces 

within the group's assigned operational area and striking at targets along hostile shore 

lines or projecting power inland. Also called CSG. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

composite warfare commander. An officer to whom the officer in tactical command of a 

naval task organization may delegate authority to conduct some or all of the offensive 

and defensive functions of the force. Also called CWC. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

contiguous zone. 1. A maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea that may not extend 

beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 

is measured. 2. The zone of the ocean extending 3-12 nautical miles from the United 

States coastline. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

defensive sea area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

force rendezvous. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

forward presence. Maintaining forward-deployed or stationed forces overseas to demonstrate 

national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and enhance the ability 

to respond quickly to contingencies. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-32 

general quarters. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

global fleet station. A persistent sea base of operations from which to interact with partner 

nation military and civilian populations and the global maritime community. Also 

called GFS. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

global maritime partnership. An approach to cooperation among maritime nations with a 

shared stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas. Also 

called GMP. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

marine environment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

maritime control area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

maritime domain. The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace 

above these, including the littorals. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-32) 

maritime domain awareness. The effective understanding of anything associated with the 

maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a 

nation. Also called MDA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

maritime forces. Forces that operate on, under, or above the sea to gain or exploit 

command of the sea, sea control, or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-32) 

maritime power projection. Power projection in and from the maritime environment, 

including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or 

logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’ 

range of friendly forces. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

maritime security operations. Those operations to protect maritime sovereignty and 

resources and to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational 

crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. Also called 

MSO. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

maritime superiority. That degree of dominance of one force over another that permits the 

conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and air 

forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-32) 

maritime supremacy. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nautical mile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

naval base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

naval operation. 1. A naval action (or the performance of a naval mission) that may be 

strategic, operational, tactical, logistic, or training. 2. The process of carrying on or 

training for naval combat in order to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-32.) 

numbered fleet. A major tactical unit of the Navy immediately subordinate to a major fleet 

command and comprising various task forces, elements, groups, and units for the 

purpose of prosecuting specific naval operations. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

officer in tactical command. In maritime usage, the senior officer present eligible to 

assume command, or the officer to whom the senior officer has delegated tactical 

command. Also called OTC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as 

the source JP.) 

on berth. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

open ocean. Ocean limit defined as greater than 12 nautical miles from shore, as compared 

with high seas that are over 200 nautical miles from shore. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

perils of the sea. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

piracy. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

prevention of mutual interference. In submarine operations, procedures established to 

prevent submerged collisions between friendly submarines, between submarines and 

friendly surface ship towed bodies and arrays, and between submarines and any other 

hazards to submerged navigation. Also called PMI. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

riverine area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

riverine operations. Operations conducted by forces organized to cope with and exploit 

the unique characteristics of a riverine area, to locate and destroy hostile forces, and/or 

to achieve or maintain control of the riverine area. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

sea control operations. The employment of forces to destroy enemy naval forces, suppress 

enemy sea commerce, protect vital sea lanes, and establish local military superiority in 

vital sea areas. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

sea surveillance. None. Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

service group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-32 

service squadron. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

squadron. 1. An organization consisting of two or more divisions of ships, or two or more 

divisions (Navy) or flights of aircraft. 2. A basic administrative aviation unit of the 

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. 3. Battalion-sized ground or aviation units. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

submarine operating authority. The naval commander exercising operational control of 

submarines. Also called SUBOPAUTH. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 

with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

submarine patrol area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

surface action group. A temporary or standing organization of combatant ships, other than 

carriers, tailored for a specific tactical mission. Also called SAG. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

surface combatant. A ship constructed and armed for combat use with the capability to 

conduct operations in multiple maritime roles against air, surface and subsurface 

threats, and land targets. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as the 

source JP.) 

surface warfare. That portion of maritime warfare in which operations are conducted to 

destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels. Also called 

SUW. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

task component. A subdivision of a fleet, task force, task group, or task unit, organized by 

the respective commander or by higher authority for the accomplishment of specific 

tasks. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

task element. A component of a naval task unit organized by the commander of a task unit or 

higher authority. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as the source JP.) 

task force. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher 

authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. Also called TF. (Approved 

for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

task group. A component of naval task force organized by the commander of a task force or 

higher authority. Also called TG. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-

32 as the source JP.) 

task unit. A component of a naval task group organized by the commander of a task group 

or higher authority. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-32 as the 

source JP.) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

theater antisubmarine warfare commander. A Navy commander assigned to develop 

plans and direct assigned and attached assets for the conduct of antisubmarine 

warfare within an operational area. Also called TASWC. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

undersea warfare. Military operations conducted to establish and maintain control of the 

undersea portion of the maritime domain. Also called USW. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

waterspace management. The allocation of waterspace in terms of antisubmarine warfare 

attack procedures to permit the rapid and effective engagement of hostile submarines 

while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines. Also called WSM. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-32) 

 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development









JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first

draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

J adjudicates FC comment

matrix

FC joint working group

oint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS)

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins

24-27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years

after publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #1 - Initiation













Joint doctrine development

community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint

Publication (JP) 3-32 Operations