NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

VICTOR K.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, K.K., J.K., V.K.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0067 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD510435

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Eric Devany

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 02-04-2021
VICTOR K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Victor K. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to J.K., K.K. and V.K. (the “Children”). 

Because Father has shown no error, we affirm.1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) first removed the 

Children from Father in July 2012 based on domestic violence, substance 

abuse, physical abuse and sexual abuse. The court found the Children 

dependent as to Father, adopted a family reunification case plan, and 

ordered DCS to provide Father with reunification services. Father initially 

refused to attend individual counseling, which he felt was unnecessary, and 

he showed little behavioral change in parent-aid meetings. 

¶3 A licensed psychologist, Dr. Al Silberman, performed a 

bonding and best-interests assessment in June 2014. Although he later 

revisited and revised his opinion, Dr. Silverman concluded the Children 

could live with Father without danger and DCS should reunite them. 

Father had shown enough progress by July 2014 for the court to return the 

Children to his physical custody as dependent children.

¶4 Four months after reunification, DCS was informed the 

Children lacked proper supervision and were exhibiting sexual behaviors. 

An older sister had also been physically violent with the Children. Other 

evidence corroborated the allegations. DCS also learned that Father was 

not providing J.K. and K.K. with their prescribed ADHD medication, with 

a report that Father was keeping the medication for himself. The court

again removed the Children from Father in October 2014.

¶5 The dependency continued. V.K. was returned to Father’s 

physical custody in December 2016, and V.K.’s dependency proceeding 

1 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights in May 2015; 

she is not a party to this appeal. 
VICTOR K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

was then dismissed. The court returned J.K. and K.K. to Father in August 

2018 as dependent children based on input from third-party service 

providers.

¶6 DCS received more allegations of abuse and neglect by Father 

in February 2019. The investigation corroborated the allegations, including 

that Father had physically abused the Children, threatened to slit their 

throats, and denied them food and medication. Father reportedly asked 

one child: “Should I kill you now? Should I strip you naked and throw you 

in the street for everyone to see? Should I just kill you all?” 

¶7 The Children were removed from Father in April 2019. 

Recognizing the length of the dependency (seven years) and lack of 

progress, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental rights to J.K. and K.K. 

on statutory grounds of abuse and neglect, fifteen months time-in-care and 

abandonment. DCS also reinstated the dependency for V.K. and moved to 

contemporaneously adjudicate V.K. dependent and terminate Father’s 

parental rights to V.K. on statutory grounds of abuse and neglect.

¶8 By then, DCS had offered Father substance-abuse treatment, 

substance-abuse testing, parent-aide services, two supervised-visitationonly parent aides, two psychological consultations, multiple psychological 

evaluations, two psychosexual evaluations, two bonding and best-interest 

assessments, two family therapists, two individual counselors, two family 

reunification teams, a child-and-family team, team decision-making 

meetings, and a family interventionalist.

¶9 A few months later, Dr. Silberman again examined the 

Children individually and diagnosed each with post-traumatic stress 

disorder (“PTSD”) stemming from Father’s physical and emotional abuse. 

Dr. Silberman concluded that reunification was not in the Children’s best 

interests and recommended no visitation for Father.

¶10 The juvenile court held an eight-day severance hearing in 

February 2020. Father was present, represented by counsel and testified on 

his own behalf. The court ultimately terminated Father’s parental rights to 

J.K. for abandonment, § 8-533(B)(1), to J.K. and K.K. for abuse and neglect, 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), and fifteen months time-in-care, § 8-533(B)(8)(c), and to 

V.K. for abuse and neglect, § 8-533(B)(2). The court also found that 

termination was in the Children’s best interests because they were 

adoptable and succeeding in their placements. Father timely appealed. We 

have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 8-235.
VICTOR K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father has a fundamental but not absolute right to custody of 

his children. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-

12 (2000). To sever the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must 

find clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground under 

A.R.S. § 8–533(B), and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 249, ¶ 12. We will affirm a 

severance order unless it is clearly erroneous. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We accept the court’s findings of 

fact unless no reasonable evidence supports them, id., and view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the order, Denise R. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 97, ¶ 20 (App. 2009). 

¶12 Father challenges the juvenile court’s finding of statutory 

grounds to terminate his parental rights to K.K. and V.K. but does not 

challenge the court’s finding of abandonment as to J.K. He contends the 

court had insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights to K.K. and 

V.K. based on abuse or neglect. He also challenges the court’s best interests

finding for all three children. 

¶13 Parental rights are terminable upon clear and convincing 

evidence, Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 7 (App. 

2016), that a “parent has neglected or willfully abused a child,” A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(2). Neglect means “the inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . 

to provide [the] child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical 

care if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to 

the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). “Abuse” means 

inflicting or allowing another to inflict “physical injury, impairment of 

bodily function or disfigurement or . . . cause serious emotional damage as 

evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward 

aggressive behavior and which emotional damage is diagnosed by a 

medical doctor or psychologist and is caused by the acts or omissions of an 

individual who has the care, custody and control of a child.” A.R.S. § 8-

201(2).

¶14 Father has shown no error with the court’s finding of abuse 

or neglect, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), and we therefore do not examine the 

remaining grounds for termination. The juvenile court was presented with 

substantial evidence of physical and emotional abuse. The court heard 

testimony that Father whipped the Children, ignored sexual misconduct 

inflicted upon them and left the Children hungry. The record also shows 

that Father threatened to kill the Children and leave them naked in the 
VICTOR K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

streets for “everyone to see.” Father’s abuse caused the Children to develop 

PTSD.

¶15 Father counters with record evidence he views as more 

favorable to his position, but this court will not reweigh the evidence or 

redetermine the credibility of the witnesses. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18 (2018). 

¶16 Father also contends the juvenile court erroneously 

concluded it “only needed to consider the events from the most recent 

return of the children and the most recent removal[,] as this ruling negated 

Father’s progress during the course of the case which [led] to the children’s 

return to Father.” We agree the court misstated the law, which does not 

limit the definition of “abuse” to events in a particular period, A.R.S. § 8-

201(2), but the error was not prejudicial. Father’s history with DCS would 

not have helped his case. And at most, the juvenile court must consider the 

risk of harm to non-abused children when terminating parental rights to 

non-abused children, unlike here. See Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 

Ariz. 224, 228-29, ¶¶ 16-22 (2020). Because the record includes substantial

evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of abuse and neglect as to 

the Children, we need not assess the court’s remaining statutory grounds.

¶17 Next, the record supports the juvenile court’s best-interest 

finding that the Children “would derive an affirmative benefit from 

termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship.” Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). If denied 

severance, the Children would have remained with a neglectful parent. 

Furthermore, the Children are adoptable and succeeding in their current 

placements. See Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 

(App. 1998). In sum, Father has shown no error in the juvenile court’s bestinterest determination.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm.