DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Audit of Airport Passenger and 

Checked Baggage Screening Performance 

(Unclassified Summary) 

OIG-08-25 February 2008
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

February 14, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Transportation Security 

Administration’s procedures, equipment, and supervision to ensure that Transportation 

Security Officers are able to prevent threat items from being introduced into the sterile 

areas and checked baggage systems of the nation’s airports. It is based on interviews 

with Transportation Security Officers and Transportation Security Administration 

officials, direct observations, field testing, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is 

our hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical 

operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation 

of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Background 

We conducted unannounced, covert testing at eight domestic 

airports, from late May 2007 through August 2007. Because the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed 

explosives trace portals in a number of airports for operational use, 

and is continuing to test Whole Body Imagers (WBI) in a pilot 

program at one airport, we included locations that were using these 

technologies when we made our airport selections. 

Our purpose in testing was to determine whether: (1) the 

Transportation Security Administration’s screening procedures and 

standards are adequate; (2) Transportation Security Officers are 

following those screening procedures and standards; and (3) 

aviation security screening equipment and technologies are 

functioning properly and as intended. 

Our screening checkpoint tests included attempts to pass from the 

public area of each selected airport to the sterile area through the 

passenger screening checkpoint carrying weapons and simulated 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs). For our checked baggage 

tests, we introduced bags containing simulated IEDs into the 

baggage system at each airport we visited. 

Specifically, a “test” at a passenger screening checkpoint was 

defined as one tester attempting to take one threat object through 

the checkpoint into the sterile area undetected on his or her body or 

in his or her carry-on bag. A “test” at a checked bag screening 

location was defined as one or two testers introducing a bag with a 

simulated IED inside it into the checked baggage system. 

A “pass” occurred if the threat object was identified by screening 

personnel and prevented from being carried into the sterile area 

through the screening checkpoint or being put into the baggage 

system downstream from the checked baggage screening location. 

A “fail” occurred when the threat object was not detected at the 

screening checkpoint, or the checked bag was cleared for flight. 

Audit of Airport Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Performance 

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Results of Audit 

The number of tests conducted, the names of the airports tested, 

and the quantitative and qualitative results of our testing are 

classified. We have shared that information with the Department, 

the Transportation Security Administration, and appropriate 

congressional committees. 

As a result of our testing, we made six recommendations to TSA, 

which concurred with all of them. When fully implemented, these 

recommendations will improve an already strong passenger and 

checked baggage screening process. 

We gave a copy of our draft report to TSA for review and 

comment. The unclassified portion of TSA’s response to our draft 

report is summarized below. 

TSA’s Response 

The security of the nation’s aviation system is a collaboration of 

public and private sector elements working together to provide 

effective protection for travelers and the flow of goods. This 

coordinated effort to protect the aviation system is designed to 

defeat threats, reduce vulnerabilities, minimize the consequences 

of, and expedite the recovery from attacks that might occur. TSA 

screening of persons and property continues to be a vital and 

successful element of the overall aviation security system. The 

effectiveness of TSA screening is due to the layered approach to 

aviation security, greater emphasis on unpredictable screening 

methods, and systematic improvements implemented in the 

screening process. 

The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security 

recognizes that our Nation cannot envision or prepare for every 

potential threat. The National Strategy accepts a certain level of 

risk as a permanent condition. Managing the security risk requires 

a prioritization of resources and the diversification of protective 

responsibilities among all of our Nation’s homeland security 

partners. The passenger screening system is structured with the 

knowledge that there are vulnerabilities in the system; however, 

the vulnerabilities vary in degree and TSA’s risk-based approach 

effectively addresses those that could lead to catastrophic events. 

TSA passenger and baggage screening, collectively, is one of 19 

interlinked layers of security protecting aviation. Each and every 

Audit of Airport Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Performance 

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one of these 19 security layers is important and strong; linked 

together, they are effective and formidable. The reinforced, 

multiple security layers create a system of which the whole is 

greater than the sum of its parts. The 9/11 Commission recognized 

the importance of a layered security system given that no single 

security measure is foolproof. 

As part of its role in the layered security system, TSA is enhancing 

the effectiveness of screening by expanding the unpredictability of 

screening measures. TSA has instituted a proactive approach to 

screening by changing what we do, how we do it, where we do it, 

and how often. TSA constantly reviews and implements changes 

to specific screening techniques, TSO interactions with travelers, 

and the level of resources needed to detect hostile intent. 

TSA recognizes the value of covert testing and uses the results to 

make operational decisions. In April 2007, TSA established the 

Aviation Screening Assessment Program to create a more 

systematic framework to assess the effectiveness of the screening 

process and provide statistically sound data. This program 

performed thousands of covert tests at airports nationwide in 2007. 

Under separate training programs, TSA conducts over a thousand 

covert tests for IED’s and almost 70,000 electronic image tests— 

every day. Together with the results of covert testing performed by 

TSA’s Office of Inspection, TSA is able to analyze statistically 

sound data to better identify which aspects of the screening process 

need to be strengthened or revised. 

TSA already has a number of initiatives underway to address 

OIG’s findings and satisfy its recommendations. For example, 

TSA’s Office of Security Operations is considering additional 

levels of procedural unpredictability to complicate and disrupt 

terrorist plans. TSA’s Office of Security Technology recently 

purchased Advanced Technology x-ray systems which will provide 

high definition x-ray images and multiple viewing angles along 

with some automated detection capabilities. These systems will be 

deployed in 2008. TSA is continuing the testing of WBI 

technology and filters, which was the subject of testing by the 

OIG. 

The most significant change to TSA screening operations is 

expected to be implemented at multiple Category X airports in 

2008. TSA will be introducing an improved screening checkpoint 

that focuses on three initiatives: (1) improving hostile intent 

detection by reducing routine travel “noise” and focusing on 

telltale behavior; (2) deploying proven technology to screen for 

Audit of Airport Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Performance 

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explosives on passengers and carry-on bags; and (3) reducing 

congestion and engaging passengers at more points in the 

journey—directly or indirectly. 

Although OIG covert testing focused only on the single security 

layer of passenger and baggage screening, TSA values OIG’s 

covert testing results and finds its recommendations useful. OIG’s 

testing of passenger and baggage screening demonstrates that a 

concerted effort may target any one layer. 

Audit of Airport Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Performance 

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Appendix A 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration 

Transportation Security Administration, Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

Audit of Airport Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening Performance 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web 

site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of 

criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

•	 Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: 

Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.