Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OIG-09-103 September 2009

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security 

Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

(REDACTED)

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. 

No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know,” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, 

except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary 

of Transportation. Unauthorized disclosure may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, 

public release is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520. 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

 September 11, 2009 

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the effectiveness of DHS’ Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

(TRIP). It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and 

institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1

Background..........................................................................................................................3

Results of Review ..............................................................................................................16

TRIP Has Brought Some Noteworthy Improvements to Traveler Redress Efforts......16 

TRIP Has Not Received the Technical or Executive Support It Needs to Succeed .....19 

TRIP’s Information Technology System Does Not Meet Program Needs, and 

the Program Has Not Received Support to Replace It .............................................19 

Recommendation ............................................................................................27 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................27 

TRIP Responsibilities and Authorities Are Not Clearly Defined ............................29 

Recommendations...........................................................................................32

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................33 

TRIP Does Not Always Provide Meaningful Resolutions to Redress-Seekers’

Travel Difficulties .........................................................................................................33 

TRIP’s Primary Redress Tool Does Not Assist Travelers in Many Cases ..............35 

Recommendations...........................................................................................46

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................46 

Plans for Secure Flight Promise Increased Cleared List Use, But Raise 

Other Issues ..............................................................................................................48 

Recommendations...........................................................................................51

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................52 

The Primary Redress Tool for Difficulties at Ports of Entry Is Often Effective, 

But Could Be Improved ...........................................................................................53 

Recommendations...........................................................................................57

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................57 

When Used for Redress Purposes, CBP’s Primary Lookout Over-Ride 

Should Be Characterized by More Independence.....................................................58 

Recommendation ............................................................................................59 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..................................................60 

Other Redress Resolutions to Port of Entry Difficulties Should Be Developed 

Through a More Independent Process ......................................................................60 

Recommendation ............................................................................................62 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................62 

TSA and CBP Do Not Share Information About Terrorist Watch List 

Misidentifications.....................................................................................................62 

Recommendations...........................................................................................64
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................64 

TRIP Cases for Individuals with Terrorist Screening Database Records Are

Often Resolved in a Meaningful Way......................................................................65 

Traveler Redress Efforts Have Some Important Security Weaknesses and 

Room for Privacy Improvement ...................................................................................68 

TSA’s Cleared List Is Not Subject to Necessary Security Controls ........................69 

Recommendations...........................................................................................74

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................75 

Email Submissions of Personal Information May Expose Redress-Seekers to 

Avoidable Risks .......................................................................................................76 

CBP’s Redress Case Processing System Does Not Meet Statutory Privacy 

Notification Requirements .......................................................................................77 

Recommendation ............................................................................................78 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................79 

TRIP Has Not Always Handled Redress Cases Reliably..............................................79 

TRIP Reliability Issues Have Prevented Some Redress Cases From Receiving 

Full and Appropriate Reviews..................................................................................79 

TRIP Could Do More to Set Procedures and Monitor Program Activity ................81 

Recommendations...........................................................................................86

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................86 

TRIP Case Processing Timeliness Could Be Improved................................................87 

TRIP Does Not Provide a Desirable Level of Transparency to Redress-Seekers.........89 

Recommendations...........................................................................................95

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................95 

TRIP Performance Management Could Be Improved..................................................96 

TRIP Does Not Gather Complete Data on Case Disposition...................................96 

Recommendation ............................................................................................97 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................97 

TRIP Does Not Collect Complete Data on the Timeliness of Case Processing and 

Has Not Set Related Targets ....................................................................................98 

Recommendations...........................................................................................99

Management Comments and OIG Analysis .................................................100 

TRIP Does Not Gather Information on Customer Satisfaction..............................101 

Recommendation ..........................................................................................101 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis .................................................102 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Future Considerations for Enhancing TRIP................................................................102 

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................107

Tables

Table 1: TRIP Standard Operating Procedure Analysis .............................................83 

Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection TRIP Case Statistics........................132 

Table 3: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement TRIP Case Statistics...........133 

Table 4: US-VISIT Program Office TRIP Case Statistics........................................134 

Table 5: Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties TRIP Case Statistics ...............135 

Table 6: Privacy Office TRIP Case Statistics...........................................................136 

Table 7: Transportation Security Administration TRIP Case Statistics ...................137 

Table 8: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services TRIP Case Statistics..............138 

Table 9: Department of State TRIP Case Statistics .................................................140 

Figures

Figure 1: TRIP Redress Process .................................................................................10 

Figure 2: TRIP Intake and Triage ...............................................................................12 

Figure 3: Aviation Security and Port of Entry Travel Issues......................................35 

Figure 4: TRIP Approach to Watch List Misidentifications in 

 Aviation Security Settings ..........................................................................39 

Figure 5: Distribution of Cleared List Records as of May 30, 2008...........................43 

Figure 6: TRIP Approach to Misidentifications at Ports of Entry..............................54 

Figure 7: TSA Process for Adding Records to the Cleared List.................................70 

Appendices

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.....................................................109 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report.....................................110 

Appendix C: Department of Justice Management Comments to the Final Report .125 

Appendix D: Department of State Management Comments to the Draft Report....129 

Appendix E: Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs.....129 

Appendix F: TRIP Traveler Inquiry Form..............................................................142 

Appendix G: TRIP Sample Response Letters .........................................................146 

Appendix H: TRIP Case Status Codes ....................................................................153 

Appendix I: Timeline of Significant Redress Developments ................................155

Appendix J: Major Contributors to This Report ....................................................156 

Appendix K: Report Distribution ............................................................................157 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Abbreviations

APIS Advance Passenger Information System 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CRCL Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOS Department of State 

FAQ Frequently Asked Question 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

HSA Homeland Security Act of 2002 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IT Information Technology 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OTSR Office of Transportation Security Redress 

PLOR Primary Lookout Over-Ride 

PRIV Office of Privacy 

RCI Rice-Chertoff Initiative 

RMS Redress Management System 

SCO Screening Coordination Office 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSDB Terrorist Screening Database 

DHS TRIP Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

TSC Terrorist Screening Center 

U.S.C. United States Code 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

US-VISIT United States Visitor Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 1

Executive Summary 

The Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry 

Program is a multiagency effort designed to provide fair and timely 

redress, or remedy, to travelers who have difficulties with federal 

government screening and border crossing processes. We evaluated the 

program’s effectiveness in response to a request from U.S. Representative 

Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland 

Security. Our objectives were to determine whether the Traveler Redress 

Inquiry Program is (1) collecting, processing, and safeguarding 

information as intended; (2) processing responses to individual requests in 

a timely manner; and (3) accelerating the refinement and correction of 

erroneous screening information, and contributing to screening process 

improvements. 

Unlike previous redress programs, the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

offers a central point of intake for redress-seekers who face different types 

of travel difficulties. The program also coordinates cases involving 

multiple agencies and has created a forum for redress personnel from 

different agencies to assist one another. Although the Traveler Redress 

Inquiry Program has enhanced some redress processes, several areas need 

improvement. For example, the program’s information technology system 

does not meet program needs, and the program is constrained by 

authorities and responsibilities that could be defined more clearly. 

If provided additional funding for information technology enhancements 

and adequate overall support, the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program could 

also focus on implementing improvements in a number of other areas. 

First, the program must address why it does not always provide 

meaningful solutions to redress-seekers’ travel difficulties. At present, the 

program’s redress solution for most redress-seekers does not positively 

affect their travel experience. Second, the program does not provide an 

independent review of redress petitions, but instead submits those petitions 

for exclusive consideration of offices that are the source of the grievance. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 2

Finally, Department of Homeland Security components do not share 

information about redress case results where such sharing would be 

beneficial to the redress-seeker. 

The Traveler Redress Inquiry Program could also effect positive changes 

in security, privacy, reliability, timeliness, transparency, and performance 

management. We are making 24 recommendations to address program 

challenges in these areas and suggesting other areas that require attention. 

In response to our report, the Department of Homeland Security has 

proposed plans and taken action that, once fully implemented, will reduce 

a number of the deficiencies we identified. Although the department 

concurred with most of our recommendations, a number of its proposed 

plans focus on solutions that will take more than a year to develop, rather 

than near-term corrective actions consistent with the pressing nature of the 

underlying issues. The department concurred with 20 recommendations, 

concurred in part with 1 recommendation, and did not concur with 3 

recommendations. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 3

Background 

Established in February 2007, the Department of Homeland Security 

Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) is to serve as the federal 

government’s one-stop traveler redress process for coordinating the 

review, adjudication, and response to traveler redress requests.1

 Travelers 

can use TRIP to inquire about their travel difficulties or request 

corrections to government information that may have caused the 

difficulties. Units in several federal departments—the Departments of 

Justice (DOJ), State (DOS), and DHS—support TRIP. Within DHS, the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Privacy Office 

(PRIV), Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), United States 

Visitor Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, and 

the Policy Office’s Screening Coordination Office (SCO) have roles in the 

program. Refer to Appendix E for information on participating agencies’ 

redress programs. 

Previous Government Redress Efforts 

Several government traveler redress efforts predate TRIP. TSA, CBP, 

US-VISIT, CRCL, and DOJ’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) all 

operated redress programs before TRIP was conceived. 

TSA’s redress efforts began shortly after its inception in 2002. Initially, 

TSA did not publicize its redress efforts; but in time, the administration 

publicly acknowledged its redress program and formed a separate redress 

office. In November 2004, TSA established an independent Office of 

Transportation Security Redress (OTSR). TSA advertised that OTSR 

could assist travelers with aviation screening difficulties related to 

misidentification with an individual on a government watch list or 

unwarranted placement on such a watch list. 

CBP has maintained an avenue for travelers to file complaints regarding 

inaccurate information in the electronic systems that support its border 

1

 The proper acronym for the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program is 

“DHS TRIP.” In the interest of brevity, the report hereinafter refers to the program as “TRIP.” 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 4

inspections for a number of years. These complaints were exclusively 

reviewed and processed by CBP’s Office of Field Operations until 2006, 

when CBP’s Office of Public Affairs began coordinating all customer 

complaints and inquiries through its Customer Service Center. 

US-VISIT announced its redress program, through which travelers could 

request amendments or corrections to their US-VISIT data, in April 2004.

The process later included a redress request form for travelers to complete 

and mail to the US-VISIT privacy officer. 

Prior to TRIP, CRCL provided travelers with an avenue to resolve their 

travel-related complaints. CRCL often worked with the TSC, ICE, and 

CBP to identify the source of and resolve the complainant’s travel 

difficulties. 

In early 2005, the TSC—the DOJ-administered center that maintains the 

federal government’s consolidated terrorist watch list, the Terrorist 

Screening Database (TSDB)—created an office to examine and resolve 

complaints from individuals who believed that they were incorrectly 

placed on a terrorist watch list or had been misidentified as a watch-listed 

individual. Immigration, security screening, and law enforcement 

authorities at the federal, state, and local levels use the TSDB to perform 

terrorist screening or vetting activities. 

Also in 2005, recognizing the need for a consolidated approach to 

receiving and reviewing terrorist watch list-related redress requests, the 

government convened an interagency working group to develop a redress 

memorandum of understanding to expand upon and link existing 

government watch list redress efforts. The resulting memorandum of 

understanding was signed on September 19, 2007. 

TRIP Origins and Early Program Challenges 

On January 17, 2006, Secretaries Chertoff and Rice announced jointly 

their vision for “Secure Borders and Open Doors in the Information Age.” 

Commonly referred to as the Rice-Chertoff Initiative (RCI), the statement 

called for enhancing the security benefits of traveler screening, while 

improving its efficiency and convenience to the traveler. One objective of 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 5

the RCI was to establish a “one stop” government-wide redress process to 

assist travelers who are incorrectly selected for additional screening. 

DHS worked with other federal agencies to develop a government-wide 

program to address travel-related difficulties arising in the screening 

process. In 2006 and early 2007, traveler and immigration screening 

representatives from several agencies convened to assess existing redress 

programs and procedures, and create a one-stop shop for traveler redress, 

TRIP. In developing TRIP, these officials were able to build upon prior 

redress-related efforts. They leveraged earlier progress made in 

developing an interagency process to address redress petitions related to 

the TSDB. TRIP planners also used information on previous DHS 

component redress efforts to inform discussions about how to structure 

TRIP. Ultimately, each of these existing redress programs was integrated 

into or otherwise linked to TRIP. 

Time Constraints Influenced Early Program Considerations 

TRIP faced several challenges and setbacks in its early 

development. For example, DHS officials faced significant time 

constraints when they considered how to create a one-stop shop for 

government redress. Although the RCI announcement was made 

in January 2006, DHS officials did not meet until August 2006 to 

discuss how to structure the program. In August 2006, DHS 

appointed officials from SCO, US-VISIT, and CRCL as chairs of 

an RCI Governance Board, which included officials from a number 

of other federal agencies. DHS leadership tasked the Governance 

Board with establishing the means and process for making onestop redress a reality. The Governance Board sought to do so 

within one year of the RCI announcement. As a result, DHS had 

only five months from the start of its formal planning process to 

establish a redress program. 

Time constraints reportedly led DHS decision-makers to favor 

program options they thought expedient but not always optimal. 

TSA reportedly offered to assume responsibility for day-to-day 

management and support of the TRIP effort, as TSA handled the 

largest volume of redress cases in the department and had a 

relatively large and well-established office for this purpose. DHS 

officials on the Governance Board agreed to use TSA’s existing 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 6

redress platform and organization to support the program, and 

designated TSA’s OTSR as the TRIP business owner. 

However, Governance Board members disagreed about which 

information technology (IT) application offered the most 

functionality for the least cost. TSA advocated using its Redress 

Management System (RMS), a custom-built case management 

system and web intake portal that the agency had recently 

procured. Others recommended a commercial off-the-shelf 

application that CBP used to connect with customers online and 

manage its redress caseload. Despite misgivings on the part of 

some members, the board agreed to use RMS to support TRIP’s IT 

needs, at least in part on the strength of TSA’s commitment to 

provide management for the program’s day-to-day operations. 

Initial Problems With Website Security and Domain Designation 

RMS modifications to meet TRIP multiagency intake and case 

management requirements progressed more slowly than planned, 

delaying the program’s public launch. A week before DHS was 

prepared to launch TRIP, members of the public identified security 

and privacy weaknesses in TSA’s RMS-supported redress intake 

website. Among the concerns was that the OTSR website was 

hosted on a commercial “.com” website, rather than a government 

“.gov” website, and that OTSR had not applied sufficient security 

protocols to ensure that redress-seekers’ personally identifiable 

information would not be compromised. TSA immediately 

rectified those weaknesses, and on February 13, 2007, transferred 

the OTSR intake portal to a .gov domain. On February 21, 2007, 

DHS launched TRIP from the same .gov website. 

TSA conducted an internal review of RMS system security in 

March 2007. The review identified a number of other system 

issues and recommended corrective actions related to the business 

environment, information security management, and contract 

oversight and execution. In particular, TSA’s internal reviewers 

recommended that TSA terminate its contract with the RMS 

system developers and transfer the system from the contractor’s 

servers to TSA’s. TSA acted on those recommendations and took 

RMS offline from late May to late July 2007 to transfer the system 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 7

from the contractor’s platform to one in a TSA facility. However, 

the migration from the contractor’s servers into TSA’s 

environment was not seamless. TSA had to reprogram RMS to 

bring the application up to TSA’s technology standards and 

protocols. During this time, redress-seekers were unable to submit 

redress requests online, and TRIP program staff could not enter or 

electronically monitor redress requests received by conventional 

mail or email. Refer to Appendix I for a timeline of significant 

redress developments. 

TRIP Requirements and Applicability 

TRIP is to operate according to a number of statutory, regulatory, and 

policy requirements. Several of these requirements predate the program, 

while others emerged with recent border security and traveler screening 

initiatives since the program began operating. 

With the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,

Congress directed TSA to establish a means for passengers who are 

misidentified or have been otherwise delayed or prohibited from boarding 

to correct erroneous information about them. The Act required TSA to 

develop an avenue for redress for travelers on domestic and international 

flights passing through commercial airports and other transportation 

venues.2

In 2007, Congress expanded DHS redress requirements in the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The 

Act requires DHS to establish a timely and fair appeal and redress process 

for individuals who believe that they were delayed or prohibited from 

boarding a commercial aircraft because they were wrongly identified as a 

threat.

3

 The Act also requires DHS to enable travelers to initiate this 

process at airports with a major DHS presence.4

 In addition, the Act 

mandates that DHS establish an Office of Appeals and Redress to preside 

2 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.108-458), § 4012(a)(1) and (2); codified 

at 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(G) and 44909(c)(6)(B). 

3 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), § 1606(a); codified at 

49 U.S.C. § 44926(a). 

4 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), § 1606(a); codified at 

49 U.S.C. § 44926(b)(5). 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 8

over the redress process.5 This office is to provide information to air 

carriers to reduce false positives, and requires that air carriers take action 

to identify passengers determined to have been wrongly identified as a 

threat.6

Other TRIP requirements stem from executive branch actions. The 

general expectations for TRIP were first outlined in the RCI. The two 

secretaries committed “to establish a government-wide traveler screening 

redress process to resolve questions when travelers are incorrectly selected 

for additional screening.”7

 TRIP is to realize this commitment. 

To outline TRIP parameters, on January 18, 2007, DHS issued a Privacy 

Impact Assessment and System of Records Notice for the program in the 

Federal Register. The Privacy Impact Assessment describes program 

goals, management and operational plans, program applicability, 

information collection and sharing, and information security. In addition, 

the assessment indicates that the program will provide potential redressseekers with access to frequently asked questions, and an email 

acknowledgment following receipt of their redress inquiry. Further, the 

assessment limits the collection of personally identifiable information to 

what is necessary to process redress requests. The System of Records 

Notice describes plans for TRIP, its IT system, and allowable routine uses 

of program data. 

In keeping with a one-stop approach to traveler redress, a number of new 

and existing government transportation security programs and initiatives 

have opted to use TRIP for redress. For example, in April 2008 CBP 

issued a Federal Register notice and rule related to new Western 

Hemisphere travel requirements that indicate that TRIP is an appropriate 

venue for the public to petition for related redress. In addition, TSA’s 

October 2008 final rule on Secure Flight program implementation 

indicates that TRIP will provide redress. 

5 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), § 1606(a); codified at 

49 U.S.C. § 44926(b)(1). 

6 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), § 1606(a); codified at 

49 U.S.C. § 44926(b)(3)(C). 

7

 DHS, Fact Sheet: Secure Borders and Open Doors in the Information Age, released January 17, 2006, 

available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0838.shtm 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 9

Apart from its obligation to support a growing number of DHS travel 

security programs, TRIP’s website lists a series of other program 

functions. According to the website, the program is to provide redress for 

travelers who believe that they have experienced watch list 

misidentification issues, screening problems, or have been unfairly or 

incorrectly delayed or denied boarding. The website indicates that TRIP is 

meant to apply to entry/exit program data issues, some difficulties 

encountered by foreign students and exchange visitors, trusted traveler 

programs, immigrant visa and other travel-related benefits, and passport 

issues. Travelers are also offered the opportunity to request redress in 

cases where they feel they have been discriminated against or their 

personal information has been misused. As of October 2008, TRIP had 

received 47,825 formal redress requests. Of these, it had closed 30,276, or 

63%. A number of TRIP cases remained open pending submission of 

additional documentation by redress-seekers. 

TRIP Process Overview 

TRIP serves as a central point for the intake and processing of travelrelated redress requests. There are four principal stages in the TRIP 

redress process: intake; triage; review and adjudication; and response and 

closeout. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 10

Figure 1: TRIP Redress Process

Source: OIG Analysis of TRIP Program Materials and Information 

Intake Process 

Travelers may initiate redress requests on their own or designate a 

representative, such as an attorney, to do so on their behalf. In the 

latter circumstance, travelers must sign and submit an 

authorization to release their redress information to another person. 

For the program to consider a redress case, DHS must receive a 

completed traveler inquiry form and privacy release form. In 

addition, to review and resolve some specific types of redress 

requests effectively, the program solicits redress-seekers to submit 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 11

copies of personal identifying information, such as a passport or 

driver’s license. 

The TRIP office receives redress inquiries through mail, its secure 

online portal, and email. However, redress-seekers who initiate the 

redress inquiry process online cannot submit supporting 

identifying documents through the intake portal, and generally 

provide these materials by mail or email. Information provided 

online is automatically reflected in TRIP’s RMS system, whereas 

redress inquiries and supporting materials provided by mail or 

email must be entered into RMS. Contractors working for OTSR 

typically perform this function. 

Triage Process 

TSA contractors and staff review redress request submissions for 

completeness, ensuring that the redress-seeker has signed and 

submitted a privacy release, completed a traveler inquiry form, and 

included copies of all necessary identifying documents. The 

program sends letters to redress-seekers who have submitted 

incomplete redress requests notifying them that TRIP requires 

additional information to process their cases. The program sets 

these cases aside until it receives all the necessary forms and 

information to proceed with its case review activities. 

TSA and CBP representatives review complete redress inquiries, 

determine what agencies or offices should review the case, and 

task corresponding staff to review the case. In addition to TSA 

and CBP, when appropriate, TRIP inquiries are reviewed by five 

other DHS components: ICE, CRCL, PRIV, USCIS, and USVISIT. TRIP cases are also examined by representatives of 

agencies outside of DHS, when appropriate. TRIP cases that 

pertain to a TSDB record are referred to DOJ’s TSC for watch list 

reviews. TRIP cases related to visa and passport issues are 

referred to the DOS units responsible for visa and passport-related 

data.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 12

Figure 2: TRIP Intake and Triage 

Source: OIG Analysis of TRIP Program Materials and Information 

Review and Adjudication Processes 

Once a participating agency is assigned a TRIP case, it applies its 

own internal approach to evaluate the case and determine what 

action, if any, is required. In some cases, agencies have a single 

TRIP point of contact who reviews and adjudicates cases. Other 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 13

agencies perform additional case vetting and monitoring activities 

before referring cases to other offices within the agency for final 

review and adjudication. 

TRIP cases that require review by multiple agencies are assigned a 

lead agency. In most cases, this lead role is assigned to TSA, 

whereas in other cases CBP is the designated lead. TSA is 

designated the lead when a traveler’s redress request indicates 

difficulties related to TSA and other TRIP participants. For 

multiagency cases that involve CBP but do not involve TSA, CBP 

is designated the lead agency.8

 The lead agency in multiagency 

cases is responsible for ensuring that all the necessary parties have 

had an opportunity to review the case and have taken responsive 

action when warranted. Once all involved agencies have reviewed 

and taken appropriate action to address a case, the lead agency 

closes the case record in the RMS system. 

Response and Closeout Process 

Upon completion of the review and adjudication of a case, the lead 

agency determines how to respond to the redress-seeker. All TRIP 

redress-seekers are to receive a response letter after their case has 

been closed. Most response letters are modeled after one of 

several TRIP letter templates. The lead agency for the case selects 

the appropriate response template, and the TRIP office prepares 

and sends the letter. Copies of 

 are included in Appendix G. The lead agency also updates 

case records with final comments and updates, and closes the RMS 

record.

Additional Efforts to Reduce Traveler Difficulties 

TRIP is not the sole option for the public to address difficulties they face 

while travelling. TRIP is designed to respond to past difficulties that 

travelers have brought to DHS’ attention so that those adverse experiences 

are not repeated. Other government programs offer more proactive 

8

 ICE is responsible for coordination with TSC in multiagency cases for which CBP is the designated lead 

agency.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 14

approaches. In addition, the commercial aviation sector offers a private 

sector alternative to TRIP. 

Proactive DHS Approaches to Reduce Additional Traveler Inspection 

CBP has a number of traveler-based programs to expedite the 

border crossing process. CBP programs such as Global Entry, 

NEXUS, the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid 

Inspection, and Free and Secure Trade programs are fee-based and 

offer memberships for low-risk travelers after they submit to a 

vetting process. Once travelers are enrolled in one of these 

programs, they are offered expedited border crossing, but they are 

still subject to random or selective secondary inspections. 

CBP also takes proactive steps to address traveler 

misidentifications. Travelers are often referred to secondary 

inspections when seeking entry into the United States because they 

are believed to be a match to a “lookout” in TECS. These 

lookouts, which are generated by a number of federal agencies, 

relate to the past violation or suspicion of violation of various laws 

and border crossing requirements. In some cases, however, TECS 

lookouts contain limited biographical information on lookout 

targets, and individuals who are not the intended target are 

subjected to secondary inspections, mainly due to the similarity of 

their biographical information. To ensure that travelers who are 

not the intended lookout target are not repeatedly referred to 

secondary inspections, CBP created a Primary Lookout Over-Ride 

(PLOR) feature in TECS. CBP officers began using PLORs in 

2006, and are now required to create lookout overrides in all cases 

of secondary inspections in which the traveler is determined not to 

be the intended lookout that prompted the additional scrutiny. 

In another effort to reduce traveler difficulties, TSA has 

collaborated with the private sector to develop its Registered 

Traveler program. The program provides expedited passenger 

screening for prequalified travelers by using dedicated security 

lanes. Although the program provides travelers with a means to 

reduce airport travel difficulties, it does not screen participants 

against the watch lists. By late January 2009, the Registered 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 15

Traveler program was operational at 20 airports and had 188,858 

active participants. 

Terrorist Screening Center’s Terrorist Encounter Review Process 

Assists Frequently Encountered Travelers 

The TSC, which manages the federal government’s consolidated 

terrorist watch list, has also established a process to aid individuals 

who are subjected to additional security scrutiny. In 2008, the 

TSC initiated a Terrorist Encounter Review Process to analyze and 

review the TSDB records of watch-listed individuals who are 

frequently encountered by the government. TSC “encounters” are 

reported contacts by local, state, and federal law enforcement 

personnel with individuals listed in the TSDB. Under the Terrorist 

Encounter Review Process, the TSC reviews TSDB records to 

ensure that targeted individuals warrant continued placement on 

the terrorist watch list. The TSC also examines these records to 

ensure that they contain current and accurate information, and to 

determine whether any additional information could be added to 

the records to reduce misidentifications in the future. 

Private Sector Efforts Help Reduce Traveler Difficulties 

A number of commercial air carriers have developed programs to 

reduce traveler difficulties associated with terrorist watch lists. For 

several years, a number of major air carriers have maintained lists 

of precleared passengers determined not to be a match to terrorist 

watch lists. DHS’ Secretary officially recognized these passenger 

preclearance programs in 2008. In April 2008, the Secretary 

announced that DHS had authorized commercial air carriers to 

capture and store passenger dates of birth to help reduce the 

number of watch list misidentifications. Participating air carriers 

are now required to make preclearance program benefits available 

to all passengers, regardless of their frequent flier or air carrier 

rewards program enrollment status. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 16

Results of Review 

TRIP Has Brought Some Noteworthy Improvements to Traveler 

Redress Efforts

TRIP has brought some noteworthy improvements to government traveler 

redress efforts. TRIP provides for centralized intake of redress requests 

and multiagency case review and coordination, and has assembled expert 

staff from participating agencies. 

TRIP Offers a Central Point of Intake for Redress-Seekers With 

Travel Difficulties 

TRIP’s centralized intake of redress requests benefits the public 

and eases government efforts to respond to redress requests. It 

assists the public by removing much of the guesswork about where 

to seek assistance. The program offers a single point of contact for 

information and redress related to travel screening difficulties at 

air, land, and sea ports of entry, and transportation hubs. Past 

redress efforts placed the onus on travelers to identify the proper 

agency and redress venue. TRIP shifts this responsibility to the 

government. This is a valuable change, because redress cases 

frequently involve information from agencies that travelers may 

not realize were associated with their travel difficulties. 

TRIP Permits Redress-Seekers to Address Multiple Travel Issues 

At Once

TRIP’s centralized intake portal permits travelers to address 

multiple travel difficulties at once by allowing travelers to start the 

review of several travel-related difficulties. In the past, persons 

having difficulties in aviation security settings, as well as entering 

the country at ports of entry, might have required redress support 

from both TSA and CBP, and had to submit separate redress 

claims to each agency. TRIP eliminates some of this 

inconvenience and cost. Multiagency redress requests filed 

through TRIP call for the redress-seeker to submit one set of 

supporting documents. Redress-seekers with multiple travel issues 

no longer incur additional costs associated with multiple filings, 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 17

such as extra postage, copying or scanning, or notary fees. TRIP’s 

consolidated intake approach unburdens the redress-seeker from 

trying to determine what to send, to which agency, and with what 

specific requirements. TRIP fulfills the aim stated in its privacy 

impact assessment of simplifying the process for travelers wishing 

to submit a redress request. 

TRIP’s Consolidated Intake Approach Provides Economies for 

Travelers and the Government

The availability of a centralized portal for traveler redress also 

eases the burden on the government. Members of the public often 

address their grievances to public-facing government 

representatives who have little or no direct involvement in the 

redress process. In the past, these government representatives 

might have had to devote significant time to research which 

government agency was best situated to address the traveler’s 

complaints. TRIP removes some of this obligation from publicfacing staff, by offering a single place to direct travelers with 

complaints. 

TRIP’s consolidated approach to intake may also benefit the 

government by reducing the number of misdirected or duplicative 

redress requests received by different agencies. In the past, a 

number of travelers experiencing screening difficulties submitted 

complaints to multiple agencies, perhaps because they had 

difficulty identifying the most appropriate office to address their 

concerns. TRIP affords redress-seekers greater assurance that their 

issues will be reviewed by the appropriate agency. Redress 

officials perceive that the number of duplicative traveler redress 

filings with different agencies has declined as a result. 

TRIP Coordinates Redress Cases Involving Multiple Agencies

An advantage of TRIP compared to previous efforts is that it offers 

multiagency review and coordination of redress cases. This is 

helpful because traveler difficulties are sometimes associated with 

multiple agencies. For example, a traveler who has been referred 

to secondary inspection by CBP may be the subject of lookouts 

from multiple agencies. In other cases, one agency cannot 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 18

effectively resolve a traveler’s issue until another agency has 

provided certain information. DOS, for instance, may need to 

receive confirmation from USCIS on whether a traveler was 

granted legal permanent resident status before it can remove what 

may be an outdated visa overstay ineligibility from DOS’ consular 

lookout records. 

To address these types of issues effectively, each applicable 

agency must review the case, share information, and take 

appropriate action to address the underlying complaint. This type 

of case coordination was not common in the past. Some redress 

officials said that before TRIP began operating, they often had 

difficulty obtaining the information they needed to address redress 

requests from other agencies. Redress inquiries that relate to 

multiple agencies are now distributed to all concerned agencies for 

their review through TRIP. With TRIP, agencies have access to 

shared information on the case and the opportunity to 

communicate about it using common terms of reference. 

TRIP case coordination activities represent an important step in 

government redress efforts. Since TRIP became operational, 

thousands of redress-seekers have benefitted from multiagency 

reviews of their travel issues. As of October 2008, 5,256 TRIP 

cases had been reviewed by multiple agencies. Refer to 

Appendix E for information on participating agencies’ redress 

programs. 

Redress Personnel From Agencies Participating in TRIP Serve as 

Resources for One Another 

While redress representatives from multiple agencies have come 

together to support TRIP case processing, their association has 

produced intangible benefits external to TRIP. TRIP has fostered 

information sharing and exchange between agency redress 

representatives, where little or no contact had existed before. 

Several DHS components that participate in TRIP continue to 

maintain their own redress intake channels. Because the 

underlying cause of a traveler’s difficulties is not always apparent 

to the traveler, these components sometimes receive misdirected 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 19

complaints that they cannot resolve. In the past, some redress staff 

in these components reported that they did not know how to 

address misdirected complaints and inquiries. In some cases, they 

had no redress point of contact in agencies they believed were 

better suited to address the traveler’s issue, and sought assistance 

from inappropriate sources. 

With the multiagency coordination efforts surrounding TRIP, 

redress staff now have access to redress points of contact in ten 

government agencies and offices. These points of contact help 

redress representatives channel misdirected redress requests. They 

also serve as technical resources and facilitators to address 

questions outside of the redress process. Several agency 

representatives told us that they were able to leverage their redress 

contacts in other agencies to assist them in other important aspects 

of their work. In other instances, redress points of contact have 

provided insight into their organizations, and linked staff with 

other offices and points of contact in their agency. 

TRIP Has Not Received the Technical or Executive Support It 

Needs to Succeed 

TRIP has not received required support in two areas. First, the program’s 

primary IT system does not meet key requirements and functional 

capabilities. Efforts by the program manager and others to modify or 

replace this IT system have been unsuccessful. Second, the program does 

not have clearly established lines of operational authority to all 

participating units. As a result, TRIP cannot guarantee effective handling 

of its customers’ redress cases. 

TRIP’s Information Technology System Does Not Meet Program 

Needs, and the Program Has Not Received Support to Replace It 

TRIP’s primary IT system is RMS, a customized case management 

system. TSA originally developed RMS for its redress program 

prior to TRIP. Later, RMS was modified to accommodate TRIP’s 

multiagency case processing demands. Since then, DHS has 

performed two separate IT assessments that identified high-level 

system requirements for TRIP. In its current form, however, RMS 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 20

does not address all of the key program requirements or functional 

capabilities identified in those assessments. In particular, RMS 

does not have the case management and workflow, document 

management, interoperability, and reporting features that TRIP 

requires.

RMS Case Management and Workflow Features Do Not Meet 

TRIP Requirements

TRIP receives redress inquiries related to many different traveland screening-related complaints. As a result, different redress 

cases require review and action by different agencies. Given this 

requirement, TRIP redress personnel need access to a system with 

effective case management and workflow features. That is, they 

need a system that enables them to assign and prioritize cases, 

view assignments, determine case history information, and receive 

notifications of case and assignment status changes, as well as case 

disposition information. 

RMS has some case management and workflow features, but they 

do not fully meet user requirements. RMS users have access to 

some case history information, which is reflected in brief notes that 

users can add to the case record. Users can also access the 

system’s audit log, which reflects when changes were made to 

information in a case record, what changes were made, and what 

user made the change. RMS also permits users to assign tasks to 

other users and to comment on the tasks. Users can view 

information on assigned tasks and task status for any given record.

Users can also view all open tasks assigned to them in a separate 

window in the system. These features notwithstanding, limitations 

in RMS’ case management and workflow capabilities prevent users 

from readily assessing all of the information they need about their 

caseloads and related case processing milestones. 

RMS users cannot, for instance, send or receive alerts or 

notifications of actions taken or required in a case. Redress staff 

who assign case tasks do not receive any system notification when 

the tasks are received or completed, nor do they have any means of 

readily tracking the status of tasks they assigned to others. As a 

result, the TRIP program office relies on certain staff to manually 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 21

track and follow up on cases that appear to be languishing. This 

activity is time consuming, and diminishes the ability of staff to 

address other priorities. 

Because of RMS’ inability to send or receive alerts and 

notifications, virtually all RMS users we spoke with observed that 

case coordination takes place outside of RMS by other means, 

usually via email or telephone. However, such improvised 

approaches are not being consistently followed across program 

offices. Most users we spoke with said that RMS needs a more 

viable means to communicate about cases within the system. One 

user relied solely on the previous case reviewer sending an email 

message before taking any action to review a case. This and other 

improvised notifications outside of RMS reflect the need for more 

effective system communication tools surrounding case 

management. 

Users are also unable to use the system to prioritize their workload. 

The system’s presentation of case records and assigned tasks is 

static, and cannot be adjusted to suit user needs better. Although 

managers identify some cases for expedited processing, RMS case 

records cannot be sorted with ease to identify and prioritize these 

actions. Newly assigned tasks that have not been reviewed are 

indistinguishable from older task assignments that have been 

reviewed. Because many redress staff also perform other duties, 

some do not log into RMS more than once a week and cannot 

always identify newly assigned tasks as a result. Users cannot sort 

or readily identify RMS tasks using other helpful criteria. For 

example, they cannot easily select or identify tasks associated with 

particular kinds of cases or task assignments that are simply 

overdue. This limits their ability to focus on overdue tasks and 

contributed to the case processing environment we observed during 

our field work; an environment in which almost 800 open cases 

were associated with task assignments that had been pending for 

more than six months. 

This situation is aggravated by redress managers’ and supervisors’ 

inability to view or adjust individual user RMS task assignments to 

respond to backlogs and redistribute case work without difficulty.

Task assignments are easily accessible to the assigned user but 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 22

more difficult for other users to monitor. Managers and 

supervisors do not have access to a list of open tasks assigned to 

subordinates in RMS. Nor can they readily edit or reassign tasks.

RMS does not permit all redress managers to shift tasks from one 

user to another to respond to case processing delays, extended 

employee absences, or staff departures. 

RMS Document Management Capabilities Are Limited

TRIP requires redress-seekers to submit intake forms and typically 

needs copies of identifying documents to process their cases. As 

such, effective document management tools are necessary. 

Redress-seekers begin the redress process by submitting a redress 

intake form. When redress-seekers apply for redress online 

through the program’s intake portal, their redress intake form 

information is automatically integrated into RMS. A copy of the 

online traveler inquiry form is in Appendix F. Other redressseekers mail or email their intake forms to the TRIP office. TRIP 

program staff must then append these intake forms, along with 

copies of identifying documents, to case records in RMS. RMS 

permits them to link the documents to existing redress cases. 

RMS’ primary document management limitation is that it does not 

permit online redress-seekers to submit electronic copies of their 

identifying documents directly to the system. This is inconvenient 

for redress-seekers and costly for the program. Online redressseekers must go through more steps to submit their requests. It is 

also burdensome for the government, as contractors and program 

staff must dedicate time to create electronic copies of materials for 

inclusion in RMS because the redress-seekers cannot. This manual 

process also introduces a measure of ineffectiveness and risk, as 

copies of identifying documents could be linked to the wrong case 

record or not scanned into the system at all. RMS’ document 

management limitations have contributed to an intake backlog that 

reduces the program’s case processing timeliness. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 23

RMS Interoperability Issues Create Additional Work and 

Inefficiencies

Several agencies that participate in TRIP have established separate 

redress case management systems. Staff in these agencies use 

other IT systems to perform TRIP tasks as well as other functions.

Several agencies use alternative case management systems, for 

example, to track complaints and inquiries they receive directly 

from the public or from other government sources. Several key 

program participants including CBP, USCIS, CRCL, and ICE, 

maintain or have created such systems. A few of these systems 

predate TRIP. Given this operating environment and the key roles 

that these other agencies have in TRIP, it would be beneficial for 

TRIP’s IT system to be compatible and capable of sharing 

information with the other agency systems. However, RMS does 

not permit this type of sharing. 

RMS’ limitations have an effect on redress staff outside of TSA. 

Many are required to enter redress case information manually from 

RMS into their systems every time a new TRIP case is assigned. 

After performing what amounts to duplicate data entry, they are 

also responsible for updating and revising case information in two 

systems. In addition to being inefficient, these activities expose 

the program to increased risk of data entry errors or accidental 

omissions. 

TRIP and its users would benefit from a case management system 

that can directly connect with or export data to systems used by 

other redress offices. This kind of interconnectivity has the 

potential to reduce or eliminate redundant data entry. It could also 

improve the integrity and consistency of redress data maintained in 

these different systems. 

RMS Has Limited Reporting Features

RMS has some limited reporting features, but they do not satisfy 

program needs, according to redress personnel. RMS can generate 

eight different types of reports on case status, assigned user, and 

reported travel difficulty. These reports can be customized to 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 24

some degree. Case status reports can, for example, be developed 

for a particular agency or user. 

Nonetheless, the system does not have a number of standardized 

and ad hoc reporting capabilities that could improve the 

transparency of case workflow, trends, and timeliness. Redress 

staff in several agencies decried RMS’ limited reporting 

capabilities. TRIP staff indicated that they could serve redressseekers better with a more comprehensive system with ad hoc

reporting and trend analysis capabilities. RMS does not have an 

automated reporting function that users can set to generate reports 

at predetermined intervals. RMS users cannot design new types of 

reports without programming support, nor can they prepare them 

on an ad hoc basis through the system. Moreover, system users do 

not have access to trend analysis tools to help identify changes in 

processing dynamics and recognize complaint activity patterns. 

Such features could provide redress officials with more insight into 

their operations, and help improve the handling of redress 

petitions.

Program staff compensate for RMS’ limited reporting capabilities 

by developing their own reports outside of RMS. Some produce 

ad hoc reports, while others rely on manual tallies to report on case 

activity. The most detailed and extensive TRIP report is issued by 

SCO. SCO prepares and disseminates weekly reports on TRIP 

activity that highlight the length of time cases have been in 

process, redress-seekers’ identified travel difficulties, and 

participant case assignments. To prepare these reports, SCO staff 

extract data from RMS, convert select data fields to a different 

format, and execute a series of cross-tabulations. Because this 

process is time intensive, SCO has dedicated a half of a 

contractor’s time to prepare these reports. SCO makes these 

reports available to TRIP redress officials through an online portal. 

The TRIP program office develops its own reports reflecting 

program activity in certain areas. However, program staff are 

sometimes unable to extract the data required for these reports 

from RMS, and in other cases, RMS does not contain the needed 

data. Consequently, many of these reports are based on manual 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 25

tallies by program staff. Some of the methods program staff use to 

compile statistics are inexact and unverifiable. 

Other program participants such as CBP, ICE, and CRCL also 

prepare their own reports because they are unable to use RMS 

effectively for this purpose. Users gather the data for their reports 

from the RMS data entered into their own systems and 

spreadsheets, paper records, and manual tallies. Some program 

staff prepare reports using simple aggregate counts of certain kinds 

of cases or case activities, while others report on specific types of 

referrals and case dispositions, often preparing customized reports 

in response to specific requests for information. 

TRIP redress personnel devote significant effort to developing 

work-around solutions to needs that RMS does not satisfy. Despite 

these efforts, program staff acknowledge they are unable to 

maintain a complete operating picture for the program or 

accurately identify processing and caseload trends in all cases. 

Although DHS indicated that TRIP will seek to identify areas that 

need additional support and collect information on lessons learned 

about the screening and redress process, the department does not 

because of RMS’ limitations. Staff acquainted with the system and 

its reporting capabilities indicate that it would be very difficult to 

modify RMS to gather and report this kind of information. 

Finally, RMS does not provide redress managers with a 

customizable display of key program indicators to enable them to 

monitor performance statistics and processing issues, such as 

overdue cases that require attention. Without this type of 

reporting, redress managers cannot easily monitor TRIP’s 

effectiveness, set benchmarks for success, or identify needed 

improvements. 

TRIP Faces Obstacles to Replacing RMS

Redress managers believe that TRIP needs a new IT system, but 

the program had not received the necessary support to move 

forward with plans to replace RMS at the time of our field work. 

TSA managers we spoke with acknowledged that RMS does not 

meet user needs, and one redress official outside of TSA described 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 26

the system as “cumbersome and disjointed.” Program staff and 

system users in several other agencies said that RMS does not meet 

their needs and interferes with their productivity and effectiveness, 

and that TRIP would benefit greatly from a new and improved IT 

system. Faced with these shortcomings, system users have 

resorted to more time-intensive and less reliable alternatives, or 

have simply given up on addressing shortcomings. 

RMS would be difficult to modify to meet all of the program’s 

needs. The system was originally built to address TSA’s particular 

redress needs, not DHS’ needs as a whole. It was created by 

system developers using customized programming code, and those 

programmers are no longer under contract with TSA to support the 

system. After TSA terminated the developers’ contract, the system 

was moved into an operating environment for which it was not 

designed. The TSA personnel and contractors currently 

responsible for RMS’ maintenance and repair said that the system 

is somewhat fragile as a result. Because the system was developed 

using customized code and current staff are not as familiar with the 

underlying code as the system developers, code changes to address 

emerging program needs sometimes have unintended negative 

effects on other parts of the system. Major changes to the RMS 

could, therefore, prove difficult to implement. 

Commercially available, off-the-shelf products could address 

program requirements more effectively. When TSA examined 

enterprise-wide case management system solutions in 2008, it 

identified three commercial off-the-shelf products that fully met 

program requirements. However, TRIP’s program office had been 

unsuccessful in obtaining funding to upgrade or replace RMS for 

several years. The office requested funding for a replacement 

system in its FY 2008, 2009, and 2010 budget requests. The 

FY 2008 and 2009 requests were denied, and the FY 2010 request 

was pending at the time of our field work. The department should 

take action to remedy this situation. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 27

Recommendation

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary for the 

Transportation Security Administration: 

Recommendation #1: Replace TRIP’s current case management 

system with a system that fully meets the program’s functional 

requirements for case management and workflow, document 

management, interoperability, and reporting. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated DHS’ written comments and have made changes to 

the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of DHS’ 

written response to the report’s recommendations and our analysis 

of the response follows each recommendation. A copy of DHS’ 

response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B. We also 

received written comments from DOJ and DOS and made changes 

to the report in response to those comments. Copies of the DOJ 

and DOS responses, in their entirety, are included in Appendix C 

and D respectively. DOJ’s response to this redacted version of the 

report is slightly different from its response to the Sensitive 

Security Information version of this report. In addition, we 

received technical comments from SCO, TSA, CBP, US-VISIT, 

PRIV, DOJ, the TSC, and DOS, and have incorporated some 

associated changes into the report. In response to the comments 

we received, we withdrew Recommendation #14 and revised 

Recommendation #20. We appreciate the comments and 

contributions made by each entity. 

While DHS concurred with the majority of our recommendations, 

a number of the department’s proposed corrective actions will not 

be implemented for some time. These plans will be helpful in the 

future, but our analysis reflected a need for near-term actions to 

provide critical operational improvements and enhanced 

management oversight. We have closed two recommendations 

because we are satisfied that DHS has taken corrective actions to 

address them, and withdrew one recommendation in response to 

comments we received. Our remaining 21 recommendations are 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 28

open. Of these, three are unresolved because DHS did not concur 

with our recommendation or did not propose appropriate actions to 

begin addressing it. 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 1. In its 

response, DHS management said that efforts are underway to 

replace RMS with a system that would address TRIP user 

requirements in the areas of case management, reporting, privacy, 

and internal controls. In May and June 2008, TSA collected IT 

requirements from TRIP users. In August 2008, DHS coordinated 

a review of TRIP operations that focused on a strategy to replace 

RMS. TSA identified funds in its FY 2009 budget to replace 

RMS, and DHS provided a line item of $1.3 million for TRIP in its 

FY 2010 budget, including $556,088 to replace RMS with a new 

case management system. 

OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the intent of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. 

This recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation that demonstrates the procurement, development, 

and deployment of a replacement TRIP case management system. 

This documentation must also establish that the replacement 

system meets the functional requirements we identified for TRIP 

case management and workflow, document management, 

interoperability, and reporting. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 29

TRIP Responsibilities and Authorities Are Not Clearly Defined 

The ten federal agencies and offices that participate in TRIP have a 

central role in the redress process. Each entity reviews and 

adjudicates redress cases, and helps prepare responses to individual 

redress-seekers. In many instances, the program relies on case 

review and reporting activities by several agencies to address a 

single redress petition fully. Consequently, TRIP requires the 

cooperation and support of all participating entities to operate 

effectively. Overall, these agencies and offices have worked well 

together and supported the broader aims of the TRIP effort. This 

has not always been the case, however, and efforts to advance 

larger program interests have been hampered by an unclear and 

incomplete authority, adjudication, and reporting structure. 

The program has no clear authority to promote effective 

participation by the ten participating agencies and offices. These 

agencies and offices are only responsible for committing resources 

to perform a subset of redress activities related to terrorism watch 

lists. Otherwise, none of the agencies and offices supporting TRIP 

are formally bound by any written agreement, arrangement, or 

directive to commit resources on an ongoing basis or to perform 

any related case activities. Furthermore, there is no memorandum 

of agreement or understanding among the participants on how to 

handle, process, or communicate on case status or disposition. 

Three entities within DHS have informal authority regarding 

certain aspects of the program, but these authorities do not cover 

the program as a whole. Strategic oversight and direction for TRIP 

is generally seen as the province of the RCI Governance Board and 

the board’s chair, the Director of DHS’ SCO. The Governance 

Board consists of representatives from a number of the 

participating agencies and offices who convene to discuss highlevel program considerations. The board has no formal authority 

over the program, however, or any charter or codified decisionmaking process. 

In addition to serving as the chair of the Governance Board, the 

SCO Director is responsible for coordinating DHS screening 

initiatives and programs, and developing DHS screening policies.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 30

Although the SCO Director does not have a direct line of authority 

to the TRIP program manager or participants, SCO’s role on the 

Governance Board and in DHS-level screening coordination and 

policy development contributes to a sense among participating 

staff that SCO is in a position of authority. The breadth of SCO’s 

responsibilities and its modest staff size, however, limit its 

managerial engagement with TRIP to providing strategic direction 

and occasionally intervening in significant disagreements between 

participating agencies. 

The third entity is TSA’s OTSR. Its Director serves as TRIP’s 

program manager and operational leader. TSA is the business 

owner for TRIP, and, according to SCO, OTSR’s Director is 

responsible for “the health of the program at large.” While OTSR 

has operational responsibility for the program, it does not have 

authority over all aspects of program operations. OTSR has direct 

authority over TSA redress staff who are responsible for the bulk 

of TRIP’s case intake and triage activities, part of the process for 

providing formal responses to redress-seekers, and some of TRIP’s 

case review and adjudication efforts. However, OTSR has no 

authority over DHS components’ or other agencies’ redress 

personnel involved in the TRIP process. As other agencies engage 

in some triage activities, are central to much of the case review and 

adjudication process, and are key in processing responses to 

redress-seekers, OTSR is unable to provide operational 

management of the entire program. 

This discrepancy between OTSR’s responsibilities and operational 

authorities places the office in an awkward position. For example, 

the OTSR Director’s signature appears on virtually all TRIP letter 

responses to redress-seekers. These letters advise redress-seekers 

that DHS has completed its review of their case and made 

appropriate changes or corrections to underlying data or 

information when necessary. Although the Director provides these 

assurances, he is in no position to ensure that they are true or 

accurate.

A number of redress representatives indicated that limits on 

OTSR’s operational authority have contributed to program 

challenges. For one, TRIP redress staff acknowledged that having 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 31

the office within TSA has exposed it to internal TSA pressures.

Pressures on the program are intensified by TSA’s control of the 

TRIP program office budget. At times, TSA management interests 

have driven TRIP action in ways that had significant effects on 

other agencies’ redress efforts. For example, in 2007 TSA’s 

Assistant Secretary unilaterally decided to take TRIP’s case 

management system offline and transfer the system to servers at 

TSA headquarters. TSA’s Assistant Secretary sought to improve 

the security and privacy capabilities of the case management 

system, but did not consult first with other agencies that relied on 

the system before doing so. As the system was offline for more 

than two months, this decision had a significant effect on other 

agencies’ redress efforts. 

In addition, according to redress personnel in several agencies, the 

TRIP program manager is regarded as a peer rather than an 

executive agent possessing operational authority over the program. 

As a result, these agencies do not always respond promptly to the 

TRIP program manager’s requests for action. On occasion, 

participating agencies have rejected the TRIP program manager’s 

requests entirely. 

The absence of formal agreements or clear operational authority 

has also resulted in some unreliable and fluctuating support from 

participating agencies. These agencies made a number of informal 

commitments to TRIP during the program’s planning and 

development process. Some agencies agreed to provide staff and 

financial support to TRIP but have not consistently delivered on 

these commitments. For example, CBP was to provide a full-time 

subject matter expert to the TRIP program office to help triage 

redress cases. The program operated for several months without a 

CBP detailee onsite, and during another period CBP provided an 

onsite detailee only a few days a week. CBP’s detailee to the TRIP 

program office is responsible for determining the underlying basis 

for some redress-seekers’ travel difficulties and performs an 

important triage function in determining what other offices and 

agencies may need to review a case. As a result, CBP’s 

inconsistent staff commitments may have adversely affected 

redress efforts by other participating agencies and slowed overall 

redress case processing. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 32

Participating components outside of TSA have not supported TRIP 

on a consistent and satisfactory basis. Nine agencies and offices 

outside of TSA agreed to provide funds to the program in 2007. 

According to OTSR, three of these entities did not provide any 

funds to the program despite their commitment. As we noted 

earlier, outside agencies participating in the program have not 

always honored staff support commitments either. 

Managers in several participating offices do not appear to place 

much emphasis on addressing TRIP cases, and support for TRIP 

has varied. Several agencies and offices have devoted only one 

employee to TRIP efforts on a part-time basis. Faced with 

competing priorities, some employees have spent little time on 

TRIP-related work, which has contributed to a redress case 

processing backlog. In these cases, we learned that agency 

managers had not monitored or sought reporting on employees’ 

progress in completing TRIP case work. 

Without clear TRIP operational authorities and responsibilities, 

some participating agencies’ program support has flagged. TRIP’s 

success depends on the cooperation and support of agencies and 

offices that have no set responsibilities or clear accountability for 

the quality or extent of their participation in the program. DHS 

should articulate the authorities available to TRIP managers and 

the responsibilities of participating agencies. Moreover, to ensure 

that TRIP is managed consistent with departmental interests rather 

than those of a single agency, DHS must provide independent 

funding for the program. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for the 

Transportation Security Administration: 

Recommendation #2: Define and communicate strategic and 

operational management roles for TRIP, and participant and 

program manager responsibilities, roles, and authorities. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 33

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office:

Recommendation #3: Seek independent funding for TRIP 

through a line item in the department’s budget or that of one of its 

components. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 2. The 

department indicated that SCO will lead the effort to document 

TRIP strategic and operational management responsibilities, roles, 

and authorities, in consultation with TRIP participants for approval 

by the RCI Governance Board. DHS plans to approve and 

distribute a signed DHS informational memorandum on these 

topics by the first quarter of FY 2010. 

OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the intent of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. 

This recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation that clearly defines TRIP’s strategic and 

operational management roles, to include participant and program 

manager responsibilities, roles, and authorities. 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 3. DHS 

management noted that the DHS FY 2010 budget contains an 

independent line item of $1.3 million for TRIP. 

OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ actions fully responsive to the 

intent of this recommendation, which is resolved and closed. 

TRIP Does Not Always Provide Meaningful Resolutions to 

Redress-Seekers’ Travel Difficulties 

To be successful and responsive, TRIP must provide redress-seekers with 

meaningful results that have appreciable benefits. To do so, TRIP must 

resolve the travel difficulties it claims it can. The TRIP website advises 

travelers that the program can assist them with resolving a range of travel 

difficulties. Our review of redress results revealed that those claims are 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 34

overstated. While TRIP offers effective solutions to some traveler issues, 

it does not address other difficulties effectively, including the most 

common—watch list misidentifications in aviation security settings.

TRIP’s inability to provide meaningful solutions in this area could damage 

the program’s credibility. 

To deliver meaningful results, a redress process requires independent and 

impartial judgment in reviewing cases. Most TRIP cases are reviewed by 

staff outside the traveler screening and vetting units that are the most 

common source of travel difficulties and subsequent complaints. This 

independence gives redress staff greater latitude to make determinations 

that may be critical of or effectively reverse decisions made by screeners, 

inspectors, or investigators. However, the disposition of two important 

types of redress cases is left to the source of the original determination that 

redress-seekers are petitioning to reverse. 

Most Redress Cases Relate to Two Types of Underlying Issues 

TRIP redress inquiries stem from many different adverse travel 

experiences. Those experiences are the product of a range of 

underlying issues that TRIP is intended to address. Nevertheless, 

most TRIP cases relate to two types of underlying issues. Redressseekers may have been inconvenienced because they were (1) 

misidentified with or (2) correctly matched to government data 

used by screening agencies. 

The overwhelming majority of TRIP cases relate to traveler 

difficulties in an aviation security setting or at a U.S. port of entry. 

TSA is charged with traveler screening in aviation settings, while 

CBP is responsible for screening and admissibility determinations 

at ports of entry. In aviation security settings, redress-seekers 

generally petition to address instances in which they perceive they 

were either misidentified with or correctly matched to a record on 

a terrorist watch list. At ports of entry, redress-seekers may have 

been misidentified with or correctly matched to a record in one of 

many government systems, including the terrorist watch list. 

Consequently, both TSA and CBP process redress cases that relate 

to misidentifications and terrorist watch list matches. Because 

CBP uses data from a number of other government systems to 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 35

inform its screening and admissibility decisions, CBP also receives 

redress cases related to correct matches to data in other systems. 

To resolve issues related to correct matches to records in 

government systems, CBP and TSA refer redress cases to the 

agencies that maintain those systems. When a redress case 

pertains to a correct match to the terrorist watch list, for example, 

TSA and CBP refer the case to TSC, which maintains the federal 

government’s consolidated terrorist watch list, or TSDB. A 

number of TSA and CBP-related redress cases may not pertain to 

data in government systems as both agencies employ other 

techniques in identifying individuals for additional security 

scrutiny. TSA, for example, uses behavioral indicators and 

random selection techniques to identify passengers for additional 

screening.

Figure 3: Aviation Security and Port of Entry Travel Issues

Source: OIG Analysis 

TRIP’s Primary Redress Tool Does Not Assist Travelers in

Many Cases 

Most TRIP redress requests stem from watch list misidentifications 

in commercial aviation security settings. TRIP’s primary redress 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 36

tool to address these misidentifications is the cleared list. Redressseekers, however, rarely benefit from TSA’s efforts to add them to 

the cleared list, as air carriers seldom use the list. TSA could do 

more to promote use of the list. 

Watch List Misidentifications Related to Commercial Aviation 

Security Are the Principal Source of TRIP Redress Requests

TSA works with air carriers to identify individuals believed to pose 

a threat to commercial aviation security. To identify these 

individuals, the federal government has developed two watch lists, 

the No Fly and Selectee lists. These lists are subsets of the larger 

TSDB discussed earlier in this report. Individuals on the No Fly 

list are prevented from boarding an aircraft, while those who match 

the Selectee list are subjected to additional security screening. 

Under the present procedures for terrorist watch list vetting, a large 

number of air travelers are identified as possible matches to TSA’s 

No Fly or Selectee list. The vast majority of travelers identified as 

a possible match to these lists are ultimately determined not to be 

the individuals of interest. These initial misidentifications are 

referred to as false positives. 

TSA requires air carriers to vet passenger data against the No Fly 

and Selectee lists and identify possible matches for additional 

scrutiny. For security reasons, TSA provides air carriers with little 

information about individuals on the No Fly and Selectee lists.

The watch lists that TSA makes available to the air carriers contain 

only first names, last names, and dates of birth. For their part, air 

carriers collect limited information about passengers during the 

reservation process. Because reservation information generally did 

not include dates of birth, air carriers made initial determinations 

about whether a traveler is a possible match to the watch lists 

exclusively based on first and last name information. This 

approach yields a large number of false positives. 

False positives are costly to passengers, air carriers, and the 

government. Misidentified passengers cannot select seats or print 

a boarding pass until their identifying information is verified by an 

air carrier representative. For frequent travelers, these delays may 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 37

be very inconvenient. Air carriers incur additional costs when a 

passenger who could otherwise check in online or use an airport 

ticket kiosk is directed to a ticket agent for identity verification.

Meanwhile, the federal government expends time and resources 

reviewing and correcting false positives. When air carriers cannot 

definitively distinguish between a traveler and a No Fly or Selectee 

list record, they contact TSA for assistance. Because many of 

these calls pertain to false positives, TSA staff expend time 

reviewing information on passengers who pose no threat. 

False positives adversely affect the traveling public, air carriers, 

and government because they occur in large numbers on a daily 

basis. In April 2008, DHS’ Secretary observed, “one major air 

carrier has reported roughly 9,000 false positives every day.”9

From August 2008 to October 2008, seven major U.S. air carriers 

reported that they diverted 476,094 passengers, or an average of 

more than 5,100 per day, to ticket counters because of watch list 

misidentifications. Most false positives inconvenience passengers 

and air carriers alone and are not brought to TSA’s attention.

Nevertheless, even the small percentage of false positives that 

prompt the air carriers to contact TSA are significant in number. 

In June 2008, about of the approximately calls TSA 

received from air carriers concerning possible passenger matches 

to the No Fly or Selectee list were false positives. 

Most TRIP petitioners seek resolution of watch list 

misidentification issues that came to their attention in an aviation 

setting. During the first seven months of 2008, 72% of TRIP 

petitioners indicated that their travel difficulties occurred in an 

aviation security setting. TRIP does not seek to determine 

definitively the underlying source of these petitioners’ travel 

difficulties in most cases; rather, it assumes that their difficulties 

stem from either their inclusion on the No Fly or Selectee list or 

their misidentification as someone on these lists. Because very 

few redress-seekers positively match the No Fly or Selectee list, 

most redress-seekers were likely to have been misidentified during 

the watch list vetting process. 

9

 http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1209473895546.shtm. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 38

TRIP’s Primary Tool to Address Watch List Misidentifications—

the Cleared List—Is Often Ineffective Because Air Carriers Use It 

Sparingly

TRIP advertises that it “can help travelers work to resolve” watch 

list misidentifications that arise in aviation settings. The TRIP 

website indicates that the program “is a central gateway to address 

watch list misidentification issues.”10 It also indicates that the 

program can assist in the resolution of travel issues that stem from 

watch list misidentifications, such as being unable “to print a 

boarding pass from an air carrier ticketing kiosk or from the 

Internet....”11

Despite the website’s declarations about the program’s ability to 

address watch list misidentifications, TRIP’s primary redress tool 

for this purpose—the cleared list—does not assist travelers in 

many cases. TRIP’s primary approach to resolve aviation-related 

watch list misidentifications is to create a cleared list record for the 

misidentified individual. TSA, in turn, provides the cleared list to 

air carriers to use in vetting passengers against the No Fly and 

Selectee lists. 

10 http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/gc_1169676919316.shtm. 

11 http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/gc_1169699418061.shtm. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 39

Figure 4: TRIP Approach to Watch List Misidentifications in 

Aviation Security Settings 

Aviation Security Settings

(TSA)

Terrorist Watch List 

Related

Misidentified Correctly Matched

Cleared List TSC Review

Source: OIG Analysis 

The cleared list’s shortcomings and continued watch list 

misidentifications do not occur because of a lack of effort or 

attention. TSA has devoted significant time and resources to 

maintain the cleared list. TSA staff vet biographical information 

against the No Fly and Selectee lists, and sometimes refer this 

information for further checks by the TSC. TSA then populates 

the cleared list with the vetted biographical information. In some 

cases TSA enters this information in both TRIP’s case 

management system and the cleared list itself. By June 2008, 

program staff had added biographical information on almost 

71,000 individuals to the cleared list. TSA has also invested in IT 

resources to support cleared list programming and maintenance, 

and to ensure that air carriers have access to updated versions of 

the cleared list. 

Many misidentifications occur because air carriers’ use of the 

cleared list is very limited. TSA requires air carriers to review 

identifying documents for all passengers identified as a possible 

No Fly or Selectee list match regardless of cleared list status. Most 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 40

air carriers accomplish this through in-person identity verification 

checks, although some permit passengers to scan identifying 

documents at airport kiosks. Passengers identified as possible 

watch list matches are not permitted to print boarding passes 

online, and are generally unable to do so at an airport kiosk. This 

is the most common traveler inconvenience associated with watch 

list vetting, and travelers on the cleared list are rarely able to avoid 

it. This occurs because air carriers must review identifying 

documents for all individuals who are a possible watch list match, 

regardless of whether their identifying information more closely 

matches a record on the cleared list. 

Usually, air carrier representatives are able to rule out watch list 

misidentifications when passengers present themselves at a ticket 

counter and provide additional information, such as their date of 

birth. In exceptional cases, should a passenger’s name and date of 

birth match a record on the No Fly or Selectee list, air carriers may 

use the cleared list to assist them in ruling out the match. Air 

carriers can use the extensive identifying information on the 

cleared list to identify passengers who, despite similar identifying 

information to a watch list record, have successfully completed the 

redress process and been determined not to be the focus of a watch 

list record. Nonetheless, a number of air carriers do not use this 

information. When air carrier representatives are unable to rule 

out a watch list match, they contact TSA to make a final 

determination on whether an individual is the intended target of a 

watch list record. 

Air carriers use the cleared list sparingly, and in some cases not at 

all. In September 2008, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) reported that representatives from 4 of 14 air carriers 

surveyed said that their air carrier did not use the cleared list.

Eleven air carriers indicated that individuals on the cleared list still 

must check in at a ticket counter.12

We spoke with representatives of five major air carriers and 

reviewed materials related to two more. We also discussed the 

12 GAO, Aviation Security – TSA Is Enhancing Its Oversight of Air Carrier Efforts to Identify Passengers 

on the No Fly and Selectee Lists, but Expects Ultimate Solution To Be Implementation of Secure Flight,

GAO-08-992, September 2008, p. 50. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 41

practices of 14 other air carriers with TSA. Of these 21 air 

carriers, only 1 used the cleared list to assist it in ruling out 

possible watch list matches in the process of initially vetting 

reservation data. Three others used the cleared list to assist in 

ruling out false positives at the ticket counter when a passenger’s 

name and date of birth were identical or very similar to those in a 

No Fly or Selectee record. Representatives from two major air 

carriers acknowledged that they did not use the cleared list at all. 

TSA Bears Some Responsibility for Air Carriers’ Limited Use of 

the Cleared List

Although TSA maintains and distributes the cleared list so air 

carriers can use it to reduce the incidence of false positives, TSA 

has created a regulatory environment that contradicts this aim. In 

addition, the cleared list that air carriers receive is not a complete 

list of all cleared individuals, but a subset of those who currently

match the No Fly or Selectee list. 

While TSA has placed intense pressure on air carriers to ensure 

that they identify possible watch list matches, it has created a 

regulatory environment that places little emphasis on clearing 

misidentified passengers. TSA’s guidance to air carriers on 

matching passenger data to the No Fly and Selectee lists itemizes 

specific matching requirements, and TSA has studied and tested air 

carriers’ effectiveness in identifying passengers who match watch 

list records. When TSA has learned that an air carrier failed to 

identify a passenger who is on the No Fly or Selectee list, the air 

carrier has been fined. 

By contrast, TSA’s security directives require air carriers to use the 

cleared list but do not stipulate how. TSA guidance mandates that 

air carriers have verifiable systems that use the cleared list to clear 

individuals. However, TSA has never sought to verify that such 

systems are in place. TSA transportation security inspectors said 

that they knew of air carriers that did not use the cleared list, but 

these air carriers have not been sanctioned or penalized. TSA’s 

pressure on air carriers not to miss watch-listed passengers exceeds 

its pressure on them to use the cleared list to reduce false positives. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 42

Moreover, TSA has constrained air carriers’ access to the full 

cleared list. In so doing, TSA excludes information on some 

individuals who air carriers would be able to clear more easily. 

Rather than giving air carriers access to all records on the cleared 

list, TSA gives them access to a subset of records: permanent and 

active records. 

TSA considers a cleared list record permanent when at the time of 

the traveler’s redress request, the traveler’s record is a match to a 

No Fly or Selectee list record on the basis of last name, first name, 

and date of birth. TSA works with the TSC to vet all subjects of 

permanent cleared list records to ensure that, despite the similarity 

of their identifying information, they are not the intended target of 

a watch list record. TSA considers a cleared list record active 

when the record has a last name and first initial that match the last 

name and first initial on a current No Fly or Selectee record. TSA 

also considers cleared list records active when the record has a first 

name and last name that, when reversed, match the first name and 

last name of a current No Fly or Selectee record. TSA considers 

the remaining cleared list records inactive. 

TSA considers most cleared list records inactive and does not 

provide them to air carriers. TSA had almost 71,000 cleared list 

records as of May 30, 2008. Of these, TSA protocols rendered 

approximately 45,391, or 64%, inactive. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 43

Figure 5: Distribution of Cleared List Records as of May 30, 2008 

* Figures do not add up to 100% due to rounding error.

Source: OIG Analysis of Cleared List Records 

Air carriers use a range of matching techniques to determine 

whether a traveler is a possible match to the No Fly or Selectee list.

An April 2008 TSA security directive requires air carriers to use 

 name-matching protocols when comparing passenger data to 

information on the No Fly and Selectee lists. Some air carriers 

perform additional watch list checks on passenger data, including 

checks that account for common alternative spellings of certain 

names, as well as phonetic variations of name spellings. 

Because the criteria that TSA uses to identify permanent and active 

cleared list records are not aligned with air carrier watch list 

matching protocols, air carriers do not receive cleared list 

information on some cleared travelers who are possible matches to 

the watch lists. For example, TSA requires air carriers to consider 

individuals possible watch list matches if their names match to 

names on a No Fly or Selectee list record 

. However, TSA does not 

consider cleared list records that match No Fly or Selectee list 

records on the same grounds to be active records, and does not 

share them with the air carriers. Thus, 

 who completed the redress process and was added to 

the cleared list, will be identified by air carriers as a possible watch 

list match to a No Fly list record but the air 

carriers will not have access to her cleared list record because TSA 

considers it inactive. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 44

These abstract differences in watch list matching protocols have a 

practical effect on air carriers’ ability to clear passengers. Some 

inactive cleared list records match the No Fly and Selectee lists 

when air carrier matching protocols are used. Therefore, when air 

carriers identify passengers with inactive cleared list records as 

possible watch list matches, they have no way of knowing that 

those passengers have already been cleared by TSA. 

To determine the effect of this inconsistency in TSA’s approach to 

watch list matching, we matched inactive cleared list records from 

May 30, 2008, to No Fly and Selectee records from the same date. 

We used the matching routines that TSA requires air carriers to use 

when vetting passenger data to identify inactive records that air 

carriers could have used to clear passengers. Our research 

revealed that 2,904 inactive cleared list records—6.4% of inactive 

cleared list records—were a match to the No Fly or Selectee list 

using the matching routines TSA requires air carriers to use. If any 

of these individuals on the cleared list had attempted to fly on 

May 30, 2008, they would have been identified by their air carrier 

as a possible watch list match. When air carrier representatives 

consulted the cleared list to rule them out as a match, however, 

they would not have found them because the abbreviated version 

of the cleared list that TSA provided did not include their cleared 

list record. 

TSA representatives told us that they do not share the full cleared 

list with the air carriers for two reasons. First, they are concerned 

about air carriers’ ability to regularly access and process the entire 

cleared list. At the time of our fieldwork, however, air carriers 

were already successfully downloading a larger data set than the 

cleared list—the Selectee list—from TSA on a regular basis. Air 

carriers should be able to download and process the full cleared list 

as well. 

Second, TSA officials said that several years ago they learned that 

an air carrier used the cleared list to vet passenger data in the same 

way it used the No Fly and Selectee lists. This meant that all 

individuals on the cleared list were allegedly required to report to a 

ticket counter for an identity check, regardless of whether they 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 45

matched a No Fly or Selectee record. Essentially, this air carrier 

allegedly penalized cleared passengers for being on the cleared list.

TSA representatives indicated that the air carrier in question used 

the cleared list in this manner because it had tied the cleared list to 

the same programming code it associated with the No Fly and 

Selectee lists. The air carrier reportedly did not have the IT 

programming resources to develop a new, more productive way to 

use the cleared list in the passenger watch list vetting process. In 

the future, TSA should respond to such cases by working with the 

air carrier in question to resolve the matter, rather than using such 

cases to determine whether to provide the full cleared list to air 

carriers.

Aggrieved travelers invest time and resources submitting 

information to TSA that TSA, in turn, expends time and resources 

entering into the cleared list. However, these efforts rarely benefit 

travelers due to the air carriers’ limited application of the cleared 

list. Air carriers could apply the cleared list in a comprehensive 

way if TSA reshaped the regulatory environment, and provided 

them with either the full cleared list or a more substantial portion 

of it. 

While TSA could do more to encourage use of the cleared list to 

rule out possible watch list matches, the air carriers have taken 

independent action to reduce false positives. Several air carriers 

concerned about the volume of false positives created their own 

passenger preclearance programs. As noted earlier, these 

preclearance programs typically pair frequent flier or air carrier 

rewards program data with passenger reservation information to 

help rule out possible watch list matches. Some air carriers have 

invested significant resources in their preclearance programs, and 

these efforts are commendable. 

Nevertheless, enrollment in air carrier passenger preclearance 

programs is not an optimal solution for a number of travelers 

inconvenienced by frequent watch list misidentifications. Many 

passengers do not have the option of enrolling in a preclearance 

program because their air carrier does not have such a program. A 

passenger who flies on an air carrier with a preclearance program 

must be enrolled in that air carrier’s program to receive benefits. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 46

Consequently, many frequent travelers would have to enroll in a 

number of preclearance programs to receive benefits every time 

they fly. 

TSA could leverage the cleared list more in implementing air 

carrier passenger preclearance programs, but it has not done so. 

DHS’ authorization of air carrier preclearance programs could 

have provided for air carriers to collect redress control numbers, 

and thus link records to the cleared list, but it did not. We 

encourage TSA to study this option should full implementation of 

the Secure Flight program, discussed in the following section, be 

delayed.

In the meantime, TSA could help reduce the incidence of false 

positives by communicating clearer requirements for air carriers’ 

use of the cleared list, establishing a monitoring regime to enforce 

compliance with those requirements, and providing air carriers 

with more of the cleared list. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #4: Revise aviation security directives to 

specify how air carriers are to use the cleared list, and develop and 

apply inspection protocols that monitor air carriers’ use of the 

cleared list. 

Recommendation #5: Provide more of the cleared list to air 

carriers, at minimum ensuring that they receive all cleared list 

records that match the current No Fly and Selectee lists using all 

required matching routines. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with Recommendation 4. In 

its response, DHS management acknowledged commercial air 

carriers’ financial challenges and competing requirements for their 

investments, particularly related to their IT systems and Secure 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 47

Flight program requirements. DHS said that rather than revising 

aviation security directives, TSA will implement Secure Flight to 

perform watch list and cleared list matching. Further, DHS 

indicated it would revise the Transportation Security Inspection 

Handbook to define inspection protocols to monitor both cleared 

list and other No-Fly list requirements. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ comments were not responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which remains unresolved and open.

Although TSA has maintained the cleared list for more than four 

years, it has yet to provide guidance to the airlines on how to use it.

Aviation security directives distributed to air carriers include No 

Fly and Selectee watch list requirements, but do not provide 

guidance on cleared list use. While Secure Flight employs the 

cleared list in its passenger vetting process, Secure Flight is not 

scheduled to vet all domestic air passengers until the end of 2010.

TSA should pursue necessary regulatory changes now so that 

passengers on the cleared list can obtain meaningful relief in the 

interim. TSA guidance and specifications for air carriers’ cleared 

list use need not focus on standards that will require air carriers to 

modify their IT systems. However, TSA requirements in this area 

could prompt some air carriers to speed their transition to Secure 

Flight.

This recommendation will remain open until TSA revises its 

aviation security directives to provide air carriers with guidance 

and specifications on use of the cleared list, and modifies its 

inspection protocols to monitor compliance with these guidelines. 

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with Recommendation 5.

DHS management said that its current sharing practices are 

designed to provide air carriers with data needed to effectively 

perform watch list matching. According to DHS, inactive cleared 

list records are not provided to air carriers in order to aid watch list 

matching. When the watch listed record causing the 

misidentification has been removed from the No-Fly and Selectee 

lists, the corresponding cleared list record becomes inactive. 

Further, DHS officials said that air carriers cite the costs of IT 

system modifications as a reason for not using more of the cleared 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 48

list. DHS said that our analysis of the expanded cleared list use 

resulting in a 6.5% performance improvement is not a sufficient 

incentive for air carriers to make the necessary IT investments for 

full cleared list use. DHS also indicated that the implementation of 

Secure Flight by the end of 2010 makes this recommendation 

unnecessary.

OIG Analysis: DHS’ comments were not responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which remains unresolved and open. We 

highlighted the differences between TSA’s criteria for identifying 

permanent and active cleared list records, and its watch list 

matching protocols, and discussed the effect this has on air 

carriers’ ability to clear passengers. Air carriers’ receive and 

process TSA’s Selectee list, which at the time of our field work 

was longer than the full cleared list. Therefore, air carriers are not 

likely to require significant IT system modifications to receive 

more of the cleared list. As Secure Flight is not expected to vet all 

domestic passengers until the end of 2010, TSA should take the 

steps necessary to share more of the cleared list with air carriers 

now. This recommendation will remain open until TSA provides 

air carriers all cleared list records that match current No Fly and 

Selectee lists using all required matching routines. 

Plans for Secure Flight Promise Increased Cleared List Use 

But Raise Other Issues 

TSA asserts that use of the cleared list will improve with the 

expansion of the Secure Flight program. Whereas most air carriers 

are currently responsible for vetting domestic passengers against 

the No Fly and Selectee lists, TSA began assuming this 

responsibility in January 2009 under the Secure Flight program.

TSA maintains that Secure Flight will provide more thorough and 

uniform vetting of air carrier passenger data, thereby reducing 

threats to aviation. TSA also holds that Secure Flight will reduce 

the incidence of false positive matches to the No Fly and Selectee 

lists.

The Secure Flight program vets air carrier passenger data against 

the No Fly and Selectee lists in a three-stage process. The first 

stage of the process is automated, while the remaining two stages 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 49

involve manual vetting by government analysts. The Secure Flight 

program will use the cleared list in each of these vetting stages. 

Once the Secure Flight program receives air carrier passenger data 

and performs initial automated vetting of these data against the No 

Fly and Selectee lists, it checks potential No Fly and Selectee 

matches against the cleared list. Passengers who are initially 

identified as a potential watch list match but are also an exact 

match to a cleared list record are cleared by Secure Flight and not 

subjected to any special security screening. Secure Flight analysts 

manually vet potential watch list matches that remain after this 

process is complete. TSA reported that the cleared list would be 

available to these analysts to assist them in ruling out some 

remaining possible watch list matches. 

If Secure Flight plans are properly implemented, the program will 

increase the overall use of the cleared list. These plans, however, 

raise other concerns related to the cleared list and redress of 

traveler grievances. 

According to the Secure Flight Final Rule, all domestic air carriers 

will be required to collect additional information on passengers. 

Whereas air carriers collected only passenger names under past 

requirements, the new rule requires them to collect passengers’ 

dates of birth, gender, and, when available, redress control 

numbers. TRIP assigns a redress control number to redress cases 

for tracking purposes. Secure Flight uses these redress control 

numbers to link travelers to cleared list records. Secure Flight’s 

automated passenger data vetting process does not consider a 

passenger record a cleared list match unless the passenger’s 

information is an exact match to the first name, last name, and date 

of birth of a cleared list record and includes the corresponding 

redress control number. 

This approach poses two significant challenges. First, it is 

unreasonable to expect people on the cleared list to supply redress 

control numbers to air carriers during the reservation process.

Travelers who petitioned for redress before October 2007 never 

received redress control numbers. Redress-seekers who received 

redress control numbers since then have not been advised to retain 

the number after completing the redress process. During our 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 50

fieldwork, TRIP had not advised redress-seekers that their redress 

control numbers could help them avoid future watch list 

misidentifications. 

Second, at the time of our fieldwork the cleared list did not contain 

redress control numbers, and TSA may experience difficulties 

linking cleared list records to redress control numbers. Redress 

control numbers are maintained in TRIP’s RMS. However, during 

our field work there was no direct link between RMS and the 

cleared list, and RMS did not contain reliable information on 

whether a cleared list record was created in response to a given 

redress request. In addition, some cleared list records may be 

associated with multiple redress control numbers because the same 

cleared individual may have submitted multiple redress requests. 

At the time of our fieldwork, TSA had yet to develop a plan to 

address these issues. 

Secure Flight plans also suggest that the program will use the 

cleared list less extensively than is advisable. According to Secure 

Flight plans, the program is to receive only the active and 

permanent subsets of the cleared list. By using only these subsets 

for vetting purposes, Secure Flight limits the number of possible 

watch list matches it can rule out. 

Secure Flight applies complex algorithms to matching passenger 

data to No Fly and Selectee records. 

Secure Flight has set a high standard for determining whether a 

passenger is on the cleared list.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 51

 Minor data issues 

associated with air carrier reservation systems or data entry errors 

on the part of TRIP redress staff could also work against clearedlisted individuals’ prospects of being cleared. 

Secure Flight’s 

 will prevent some aggrieved individuals 

from receiving effective redress. This requirement is unnecessary, 

and contrasts with Secure Flight’s approach to watch list matching. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #6: Develop and implement a plan for the 

Office of Transportation Security Redress to address Secure Flight 

requirements that, at minimum, provide for notifying current 

redress applicants that their redress control numbers may be useful 

in future air carrier reservations, and establishes how TSA will 

incorporate redress control numbers into the cleared list. 

Recommendation #7: Use all cleared list records to assist in 

ruling out all possible passenger data matches to the watch lists 

identified through Secure Flight, and evaluate options for applying 

matching thresholds for cleared list matches to account for possible 

cleared-list passenger data entry errors. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 52

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 6. DHS 

management advised that all cleared list records have been updated 

with redress control numbers. As of January 2009, OTSR provides 

the cleared list to Secure Flight daily. Secure Flight and OTSR are 

coordinating a letter to redress applicants who filed before October 

2006 to provide them with a redress control number and 

information on its intended use. TSA plans to send these letters by 

the end of the 4th quarter of FY 2009.

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are partially responsive to 

this recommendation, which is resolved and open. Although TSA 

will send letters with redress control numbers to those redress 

seekers who filed for redress prior to October 2006, TSA should 

also seek to alert any subsequent redress-seekers of the potential 

benefit of retaining and using their redress control numbers when 

making future air travel reservations. Further, in order to fully 

comply with our recommendation, TSA must develop a means of 

advising pending and future redress-seekers of how they can use 

their redress control numbers. This recommendation will remain 

open until TSA demonstrates to us that it has provided all of the 

notifications described above.

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 7. As of 

January 2009, Secure Flight receives and uses the full cleared list, 

and employs matching algorithms to identify exact and near 

matches to the cleared list. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ actions are responsive to this 

recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open until TSA has provided 

documentation that Secure Flight is using the full cleared list, and 

employing the algorithms to identify near matches to the cleared 

list matches to account for possible cleared-list passenger data 

entry errors. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 53

The Primary Redress Tool for Difficulties at Ports of Entry Is Often 

Effective, but Could Be Improved 

The second largest group of TRIP redress requests pertains to 

difficulties at U.S. ports of entry. Twenty-eight percent of TRIP 

redress-seekers who submitted complaints during the first seven 

months of 2008 indicated that their travel issues related to a port of 

entry. CBP’s primary instrument to address related difficulties is 

the PLOR. CBP creates PLORs for travelers who are subjected to 

secondary inspections upon entering the country because they have 

been misidentified as someone of interest to the government. 

PLORs provide meaningful assistance to many travelers, but have 

some limitations. 

Many travelers who enter the United States are required to submit 

to secondary inspections by CBP officers. Travelers may be 

directed to secondary inspections based on observations by CBP 

officers at primary inspection stations, in response to a CBP 

intelligence-driven operation, or because their identifying 

information matches a lookout in TECS. These lookouts, which 

are generated by a number of federal agencies, relate to a past 

violation or suspicion of violation of various laws and border 

crossing requirements. 

Sometimes travelers selected for secondary inspections based on a 

TECS lookout are not the lookout’s intended target. This is 

because some TECS lookouts contain limited biographical 

information on the target, and a number of travelers may match the 

lookout’s limited biographical profile. While those travelers are 

subjected to secondary inspections because of the lookout, many 

are not its intended target. Secondary inspections may take more 

than a half an hour and frequently involve separating the subject of 

the inspection from family members. Secondary inspections 

resulting from lookout misidentifications, therefore, represent a 

major inconvenience to travelers. 

When, following a secondary inspection, a CBP officer determines 

that a traveler is not the intended focus of a TECS lookout, the 

officer is to create a PLOR in TECS. The PLOR is designed to 

override the TECS lookout that prompted the traveler’s secondary 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 54

inspection automatically. When the traveler passes through a port 

of entry in the future, that TECS lookout will not prompt officers 

to refer the traveler to secondary inspection again.13 By creating 

PLORs, CBP lowers the incidence of repeat traveler 

misidentifications, reduces traveler inconvenience, and enables 

CBP to focus its resources on more likely security risks. As of 

May 2008, CBP had created approximately 150,000 active PLORs. 

These PLORs, in turn, enabled CBP officers to forgo secondary 

inspections of misidentified travelers 156,740 times. 

Figure 6: TRIP Approach to Misidentifications at Ports of Entry 

Source: OIG Analysis

13 A traveler with a PLOR record may, however, be referred to secondary inspection for other reasons. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 55

Primary Lookout Over-Ride Limitations

CBP’s PLOR efforts reduce the likelihood that travelers will be 

repeatedly misidentified. However, three PLOR program security 

precautions create the possibility that travelers will continue to be 

misidentified. 

To address this issue, CBP developed a notification system 

whereby the PLOR record owner—usually the CBP officer who 

created the original PLOR—is advised of any changes to the 

underlying TECS lookout for which the PLOR was created. PLOR 

record owners then have the opportunity to review changes made 

to the TECS lookout to determine whether the associated PLOR is 

still appropriate. If the PLOR is still appropriate, the record owner 

must revise and re-submit the PLOR. This approach is helpful but 

imperfect. For example, PLOR record owners may not always 

review and reactivate PLORs to address updated TECS lookouts 

when appropriate. In other cases, PLOR record owners may not 

heed notifications. When CBP officers transfer from a port of 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 56

entry, they are to reassign their PLOR record ownership to other 

staff at the port of entry. CBP representatives acknowledge, 

however, that this does not always occur, and note that some 

lookout notifications may be unattended to as a result. 

Finally, PLORs are not used to the extent needed to inform air 

carriers about international passengers bound for the United States.

In the past, air carriers were solely responsible for vetting 

passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee lists. CBP 

is now in the process of assuming responsibility for 

communicating watch list vetting results for all international 

passengers bound for the United States to air carriers through its 

interactive Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). Under 

this arrangement, CBP provides instructions to air carriers about 

the proper handling of a passenger based on the agency’s 

passenger data checks against the No Fly and Selectee lists. CBP 

may advise an air carrier that a passenger should be prevented 

from boarding a U.S.-bound aircraft, subjected to additional 

security screening, or cleared to board after undergoing standard 

security screening. 

CBP uses PLOR information to assist in vetting APIS data. CBP 

overlays PLOR information on top of its No Fly and Selectee 

match results in APIS so that passengers CBP has ruled out as 

watch list matches in the past are not prevented from boarding an 

aircraft. When a passenger is a possible Selectee list match but has 

a PLOR overriding a past terrorist watch list lookout, CBP 

instructs the air carrier to clear the passenger for boarding without 

any supplementary security screening. When a passenger is 

identified as a possible No Fly list match, but has a PLOR for a 

past terrorist watch list lookout, CBP alerts the air carrier to treat 

the passenger as a selectee and subjects the passenger to additional 

security screening unless TSA over-rides this determination. 

CBP’s practices in this latter case do not account properly for the 

traveler’s PLOR and undercut its value as a redress benefit.

PLORs generally reflect CBP officers’ face-to-face determination 

following an interview process that an individual is not the subject 

of a lookout. As such, PLORs should be regarded as having a high 

degree of reliability. CBP’s APIS protocols related to No Fly list 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 57

matches, however, partially discount the integrity of CBP officers’ 

judgment to create a PLOR. 

CBP’s current practice counteracts the aims of the redress process. 

Passengers who have been misidentified as a No Fly list match 

have no alternative but to submit to additional security screening 

prior to every U.S.-bound international flight. These passengers 

are permitted to board international flights after they have 

undergone CBP’s redress process, but continue to be unnecessarily 

singled out for additional security attention every time they do. 

CBP should improve its PLOR program by monitoring PLOR 

record owner activity more closely and more fully leveraging 

PLORs in the APIS watch list vetting process. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Commissioner for U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection:

Recommendation #8: Establish a process to monitor the currency 

of Primary Lookout Over-Ride record owner status, and institute 

periodic inspections to determine whether record owner 

notifications about changes made to an underlying subject record 

are acted on appropriately. 

We recommend that the Commissioner for U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary for 

the Transportation Security Administration: 

Recommendation #9: End the practice of singling out passengers 

with terrorist watch list lookout-related Primary Lookout OverRides for selectee security screening when they are identified as 

possible No Fly list matches during Advance Passenger 

Information System vetting. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 8. DHS 

management said that a process is in place to send notifications to 

the responsible officer for disconnected PLORs that require 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 58

attention. CBP field offices monitor a daily report on disconnected 

PLORs, and these daily reports are also actively reviewed by CBP 

headquarters personnel. In addition, CBP conducts an annual 

nationwide review of all PLORs. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ actions are fully responsive to this 

recommendation, which is resolved and closed. 

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with Recommendation 9.

DHS described CBP’s screening of travelers arriving in and 

departing from the United States using APIS and TECS as 

temporary. Secure Flight will assume all No Fly and Selectee 

watch list matching for international flights by the 1st quarter of FY 

2011.

OIG Analysis: DHS’ comments are not responsive to the intent of 

this recommendation, which remains unresolved and open. We 

recommended that CBP end the practice of advising air carriers to 

treat passengers identified as possible No Fly list matches as 

Selectees when their association with a No Fly list record has 

already been ruled out in a face-to-face CBP interview. Because 

this can be achieved now through a change to the IT protocols 

underpinning APIS’ interface with air carriers, there is no cause to 

wait until FY 2011 for action. This recommendation will remain 

open until DHS can establish that it has made the proper 

adjustments to its APIS IT protocols. 

When Used for Redress Purposes, CBP’s Primary Lookout Over-Ride 

Should Be Characterized by More Independence 

CBP creates many PLORs at ports of entry before travelers have 

sought redress. Because CBP does not advise misidentified 

travelers who have undergone secondary screening that a PLOR 

has been created for them in TECS, some travelers pursue redress 

after CBP has already created a PLOR record for them. 

In other cases, CBP finds that misidentified travelers who have 

filed for redress do not have a PLOR on record. In January 2007, 

CBP mandated that its officers create PLORs for all misidentified 

individuals who undergo secondary inspections. Consequently, 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 59

most of these redress cases result from an officer’s failure to 

comply with this policy. CBP redress officials forward these kinds 

of complaints to CBP field offices for resolution and await 

notification that the field offices have taken appropriate action in 

response to the complaint. CBP field offices, in turn, sometimes 

rely on the officers who failed to create a PLOR to rectify this past 

omission. 

This approach provides no guarantee that an impartial review of 

the redress complaint will occur. Instead, it ensures that the offices 

that initially acted on the TECS lookout and were the source of the 

redress-seeker’s travel difficulties will also be the final arbiters of 

whether the basis for the traveler’s secondary inspection is 

overridden. Staff outside of field offices should make these types 

of determinations with input from field office personnel. 

DHS is required to offer aggrieved travelers a “fair” redress 

process.14 Impartial and objective review and adjudication of 

redress petitions is an essential part of any fair redress process. A 

process that relies exclusively on the review and consideration of 

redress claims by the office that was the source of the traveler’s 

grievance is not fair. CBP should modify its redress process in this 

area to provide for independent review without compromising 

security.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Commissioner for U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection:

Recommendation #10: Ensure that final determinations on 

whether to create a Primary Lookout Over-Ride in response to a 

redress complaint reside with employees unaffiliated with field 

offices that made the original screening or admissibility 

determination. 

14 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), § 1606(a); codified 

at 49 U.S.C. § 44926(a). 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 60

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 10. DHS 

management indicated that CBP prefers to implement PLORs at 

the location where the secondary inspection took place. 

Procedures are now in place, however, for CBP’s redress unit to 

review, coordinate, and implement a PLOR for redress inquiries 

under specific circumstances. The redress unit now reviews, in 

coordination with CBP PLOR managers, redress cases in which the 

field office did not implement a PLOR to determine whether it 

might be appropriate to overturn that field determination. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ actions are responsive to this 

recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open until CBP provides evidence 

that its redress staff have expanded their redress case outcome 

reviews to include all redress cases with unfavorable field office 

determinations. 

Other Redress Resolutions to Port of Entry Difficulties Should Be 

Developed Through a More Independent Process 

In addition to creating PLORs, redress personnel take other actions 

to address traveler difficulties at U.S. ports of entry. Redress staff 

sometimes address traveler difficulties at ports of entry by making 

changes to the underlying data that CBP uses to determine whether 

to admit travelers into the country and how to screen or inspect 

them. CBP enforces more than 400 laws at the border, and relies 

on information from other federal agencies to assist it in enforcing 

these laws. Much of this assistance is provided through lookouts 

in TECS, most of which are based on information from other 

agencies.

When a traveler’s information matches a TECS lookout, CBP 

officers refer to associated action codes to determine whether, for 

example, to arrest the traveler or refer him or her to a secondary 

inspection. In some cases, these TECS lookouts identify the 

intended target of the lookout but are based on inaccurate or 

outdated information. In other cases, the lookout is appropriate, 

but the action code and accompanying CBP response are not. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 61

TRIP receives redress requests from travelers who were properly 

identified as the target of a lookout but believe they were 

improperly singled out or subjected to unfair treatment. TRIP 

reviews in these cases focus on the underlying data that were the 

basis for the TECS lookout and associated action code. Redress 

cases of this type are brought to the attention of the agencies that 

created or prompted the creation of the lookout. 

In many cases, agency staff have the benefit of clear guidelines to 

determine whether a corresponding lookout should be removed. In 

the past, DOS, for example, prompted the creation of TECS 

lookouts that improperly targeted individuals who lost their 

passports when the lookouts should have focused on the lost 

documents. In such cases, DOS’ TRIP staff can correct the 

misdirected lookout so it targets the lost passport rather than the 

individual who lost it. TRIP redress requests have prompted the 

removal or correction of many such lookouts. 

TRIP reviews of redress claims should be free from bias and 

conflicts of interest, or the potential appearance of either. DHS’ 

current approach to reviewing redress cases related to law 

enforcement lookouts does not meet this standard. Accordingly, 

the department should amend its approach to these cases to provide 

independent review or oversight of redress case determinations. In 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 62

so doing, DHS should continue to ensure that cases are reviewed 

by knowledgeable staff capable of making informed 

determinations that do not undermine ongoing investigations. 

Recommendation

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office:

Recommendation #11: Develop and implement a process for the

independent review and adjudication of redress cases related to 

DHS criminal investigations. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 11. DHS 

management said that corrective action will take place in 

coordination with its definition of authorities, roles, and 

responsibilities for redress participants. DHS aims to complete this 

activity by the 1st quarter of FY 2010. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open until we receive confirmation 

that DHS has developed and implemented an independent review 

and adjudication process for redress cases related to DHS criminal 

investigations.

TSA and CBP Do Not Share Information About Terrorist Watch List 

Misidentifications 

TSA and CBP both collect and use information on individuals 

misidentified as watch list matches. TSA maintains a cleared list 

to resolve watch list misidentifications, and CBP creates PLORs. 

However, the two components do not share related information 

about redress results, even though sharing this information could 

reduce screening difficulties for misidentified travelers. TSA has 

provided the cleared list to CBP, but CBP has not used it. CBP 

does not share information with TSA on individuals it has assigned 

a PLOR in response to watch list misidentifications. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 63

Both components could use the other’s data on watch list 

misidentifications, but neither agency has done so. TSA could use 

CBP’s watch list PLOR data when it assumes responsibility for 

domestic air carrier passenger vetting under the Secure Flight 

program. Secure Flight could use CBP data to help rule out some 

possible No Fly and Selectee list passenger data matches. For 

example, when a passenger’s data are only a remote match to a 

selectee record but an exact match to a traveler CBP has assigned a 

PLOR for a watch list-related lookout, Secure Flight could clear 

the passenger. 

For its part, CBP could use TSA’s cleared list to assist in vetting 

international passengers through APIS. CBP currently uses PLOR 

information to rule out possible No Fly and Selectee matches 

identified during its initial vetting of APIS passenger data. It could 

use cleared list data for the same purpose. CBP could use the 

cleared list for these purposes if it requires air carriers to submit 

redress control numbers in their APIS data submissions. Once 

redress control numbers are added to the cleared list, CBP would 

be able to use these control numbers to match cleared list records 

to APIS information, and clear passengers. 

CBP could use other information from TSA to reduce watch list 

misidentifications as well. Air carrier personnel contact TSA’s 

Office of Intelligence for a final determination on how to handle 

possible watch list matches that CBP has identified through APIS.

TSA’s Office of Intelligence gathers information about the 

passenger from air carrier representatives and reviews APIS data 

before advising the air carrier whether to permit the passenger to 

board the aircraft or whether to perform additional security 

screening. TSA’s Office of Intelligence clears passengers 

identified as possible watch list matches by CBP of the time. 

Although TSA advises air carriers that the passenger is not a watch 

list match, it has no means of advising the CBP officers who 

process the passenger upon arrival in the United States, that the 

passenger is not the intended target of a watch list lookout in 

TECS. As a result, CBP officers are likely to refer the passenger—

whom TSA has already determined is not on the No Fly or 

Selectee list—to secondary inspection. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 64

This bifurcated approach inconveniences travelers and air carriers 

and leads to government inefficiencies. Under the current 

arrangement, DHS components are using screening and vetting 

resources to evaluate individuals whom another DHS component 

has already ruled out as a security threat. CBP and TSA should 

take action to remedy this situation. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #12: Use TECS Primary Lookout Over-Rides 

related to terrorist watch list lookouts to help rule out possible No 

Fly and Selectee list matches identified through the Secure Flight 

program’s automated passenger data vetting process. 

We recommend that the Commissioner for U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection:

Recommendation #13: Use the Transportation Security 

Administration’s cleared list data to assist in ruling out possible 

No Fly and Selectee list matches identified in Advance Passenger 

Information System vetting. 

Withdrawn Recommendation #14: Create a procedure for 

officers at ports of entry to learn whether Transportation Security 

Administration Office of Intelligence analysts have ruled out 

passengers as the target of a watch list lookout. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 12. DHS 

management said that Secure Flight analysts use TECS 

information to help them rule out possible watch list matches as 

part of their manual review process. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ actions are partially responsive to this 

recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 65

recommendation will remain open until TSA provides an 

indication that Secure Flight analysts specifically consider PLOR 

information in TECS records when ruling out possible No Fly and 

Selectee list matches identified through the Secure Flight 

program’s automated passenger data vetting process. 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 13. DHS 

management said TSA will review and modify its processes for 

using the cleared list by the 4th quarter of FY 2009. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open until we receive documentation 

that CBP uses the cleared list to rule out possible No Fly and 

Selectee matches identified in APIS vetting. 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 14, and 

provided CBP procedures for notifying officers at ports of entry 

when passengers who are a target of a watch list lookout have been 

ruled out. 

OIG Analysis: CBP’s procedures fully address our draft report 

recommendation. Because the procedures were in place at the time 

of our fieldwork, we withdrew this recommendation. 

TRIP Cases for Individuals With Terrorist Screening Database 

Records Are Often Resolved in a Meaningful Way 

TRIP redress-seekers who experience aviation-related difficulties 

or difficulties at a port of entry may be listed in the TSDB. This is 

sometimes the case for TRIP petitioners seeking relief for domestic 

aviation-related travel issues, because the No Fly and Selectee lists 

that commercial air carriers use to vet passengers are derived from 

the TSDB.15 Similarly, some TRIP redress-seekers who have been 

subjected to additional security screening or denied entry at U.S. 

ports of entry had these experiences because of TSDB-related 

lookouts in TECS. However, only a small percentage of TRIP 

15 For more information on the relationship between the TSDB and the No Fly and Selectee Lists, see DHS 

OIG, Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation, OIG-09-64, May 2009. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 66

petitioners with either type of travel difficulty are actually listed in 

the TSDB. 

TRIP refers cases from petitioners who match to a TSDB record or 

have identifying information that appear to be very similar to a 

TSDB record to the TSC. Although DHS received 30,292 redress 

requests through TRIP during FY 2008, it referred only 

 to the TSC. These cases represent a small percentage of 

the overall TRIP caseload, but they are important to the 

government’s effort to identify known or reasonably suspected 

terrorists. TSC considers related redress efforts to be “one of the 

key quality control mechanisms for information in the TSDB.”16

The TSC has devoted significant resources and attention to redress 

requests by establishing an independent unit within the center. The 

TSC has adopted detailed procedures for reviewing and 

adjudicating cases brought to its attention, and has ensured that its 

redress personnel have access to the information they need to 

evaluate cases. 

To ensure that all multiagency redress officials with TSDB cases 

have access to required information, the TSC helped create a 

multiagency memorandum of understanding on watch list redress. 

The memorandum describes redress process requirements for 

agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

Central Intelligence Agency that nominate individuals for 

placement in the TSDB. Under the agreement, nominating 

agencies are required to review and update information used to 

support the nomination of the complainant to the TSDB, and 

forward this information to the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence’s National Counterterrorism Center along with a 

recommendation to retain, modify, or delete the corresponding 

TSDB record. This center gathers information from the 

intelligence community, evaluates the nominating agency’s 

recommendation, and provides an independent recommendation to 

the TSC on whether the complainant meets criteria for inclusion in 

the TSDB or the associated No Fly and Selectee lists. The TSC 

16 TSC, TSC Redress SOP, Version 2.1, June 2007, p. 1. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 67

uses these recommendations and other information to make a final 

determination on the matter. 

TSC’s Redress Office also reviews redress cases on misidentified 

individuals whose identifying information is very similar to the 

information in a TSDB record. In these cases, TSC reviews the 

corresponding TSDB record to ensure that it is valid and satisfies 

the criteria for inclusion in the TSDB. It then determines whether 

additional information can be added to the TSDB record or records 

in other government systems to reduce the likelihood of future 

misidentifications.17

The TSC has pursued redress in a rigorous and deliberative way, 

and devoted significant resources to the effort. The TSC has 

established specific redress case processing requirements in its 34-

page standard operating procedure. A 2007 DOJ OIG review 

determined that the TSC Redress Office fully complies with its 

operating procedures.18

Owing to its extensive interagency case coordination efforts and 

scrutiny of redress case information, TSC redress case processing 

averages 57 days.19 TSC’s Redress Office is comparatively large, 

enabling it to focus more time and resources on individual cases.

TSC’s Redress Office has staff fully dedicated to vetting, 

reviewing, and adjudicating redress cases. By contrast, TSA’s 

OTSR, which is responsible for TRIP intake as well as TSA 

redress case review, has only six full-time employees. 

The TSC’s intensive consideration of TSDB-related redress cases 

frequently provides meaningful results for redress-seekers. TSC’s 

Redress Office sometimes determines that redress-seekers are 

appropriately placed in the TSDB. Often, TSC responds to redress 

requests by changing redress-seekers’ TSDB status. In 

17 “Memorandum of Understanding on Terrorist Watchlist Redress Procedures,” September 19, 2007, p. 9. 

18 DOJ OIG, Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 07-41, September 2007, 

pp. xviii-xix. 

19 Ibid., p. xix. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 68

 TSC modified the redress-seekers’ 

TSDB record, often downgrading the status from No Fly to 

Selectee or removing the record from the Selectee list. However, 

these downgraded or removed records continue to be maintained in 

the TSDB. 

These TSDB changes translate into significant travel benefits for 

redress-seekers. Travelers who are removed from the TSDB may 

recover the privilege of boarding an aircraft, experience less 

intensive security screening, and enjoy a more seamless check-in 

process at airports. They may be permitted to enter the United 

States following previous denials, and avoid the delays and 

inconvenience associated with repeated secondary inspections. 

Traveler Redress Efforts Have Important Security Weaknesses 

and Room for Privacy Improvement 

Security and privacy safeguards are essential when handling personally 

identifiable information, and are important to the integrity of the TRIP 

program. Security controls are necessary because TRIP identifies and 

clears individuals who are not the intended target of lookouts and watch 

list records, and then shares this information with other government 

agencies and the private sector for use in ruling out possible matches. 

Processing errors could result in clearing individuals with a connection to 

a lookout or terrorist watch list record and expose our Nation to serious 

threats. 

Privacy safeguards are important to protecting redress-seekers’ personal 

information and maintaining public trust in the program. TRIP redressseekers should have assurance that TRIP applies sound information 

collection, use, handling, and dissemination practices when they submit 

sensitive personal information such as dates of birth and copies of 

passports or drivers’ licenses to the program. In addition, participating 

federal agencies must comply with the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 

§552a) and the E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347) assessment and 

reporting requirements related to personally identifiable information in 

government data collection systems. According to DHS policy, related 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 69

privacy protections apply to U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, 

visitors, and aliens.20

We identified three security and privacy weaknesses in TRIP. First, 

appropriate security controls were not in place for TSA’s cleared list. 

Second, redress-seekers’ emailed submissions to TRIP may have been 

exposed to a higher risk of compromise than desirable. Finally, the 

redress case management system CBP uses to monitor TRIP cases was not 

compliant with requirements in the Privacy Act and E-Government Act.

TSA’s Cleared List Is Not Subject to Necessary Security Controls 

TSA’s processes for adding records to and maintaining the cleared 

list could allow for the inclusion of some individuals on the cleared 

list who are the subject of a No Fly or Selectee list record. This 

weakness exists because of noncompliance with program 

procedures and the need for more controls on updating and 

maintaining cleared list records. 

Adding records to the cleared list is a multistep process applied in 

different types of cases. Before redress-seekers are added to the 

cleared list, TRIP personnel confirm that their redress record 

contains complete redress inquiry form information and clear 

copies of identification documents. When redress staff confirm 

that the redress record is complete, they are to compare the redressseeker’s information against No Fly and Selectee list records to 

identify possible matches. 

When the comparison indicates that the redress-seeker is not a 

match to either watch list, TSA adds the individual to the cleared 

list. However, when the comparison reveals a match to either list, 

TSA refers the matter to TSC for review and adjudication of the 

individual’s watch list status. In some instances, TSC determines 

that the redress-seeker’s information matches a watch list record 

but is not the intended watch list target, and TSA adds the 

individual to the cleared list. In other cases, TSC determines that 

the government does not have information to support the redress20 DHS Privacy Office, Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum Number 2007-1: DHS Privacy Policy 

Regarding Collection, Use, Retention, and Dissemination of Information on Non-U.S. Persons 

(as amended), January 7, 2009, p. 2. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 70

seeker’s continued placement on the No Fly or Selectee list and 

removes the individual from one of the lists. TSA adds records for 

these individuals to the cleared list as well. 

Figure 7: TSA Process for Adding Records to the Cleared List 

Redress-Seeker Information Checked 

Against No Fly and Selectee Watch Lists

Refer to TSC for 

Review and Adjudication

Removed from the 

TSDB

Downgraded: 

Removed from 

No Fly / Selectee List

Positive match to watch list record?

No Yes

Remain on 

No Fly or 

Selectee 

List

Added to 

Cleared List

Appropriate Listing

Source: OIG Analysis of TRIP Program Materials, RMS, and Cleared List Data 

Data from RMS, TRIP’s case management system, indicate that 

program personnel have not always followed proper procedures 

when adding records to the cleared list. According to TSA’s 

procedures, redress staff are to review incoming redress requests to 

ensure that copies of required identifying documents are included 

before adding related records to the cleared list. TRIP gathers 

these copies to authenticate the identity of the redress petitioner.

The program examines redress-seekers’ identifying documents as a 

security check on submissions to reduce the likelihood that 

fraudulent identities are added to the cleared list. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 71

TSA has not always complied with its procedures in this area. We 

identified more than 200 cases in RMS in which TSA had added 

redress-seekers’ information to the cleared list without first 

ensuring that required identifying documents were submitted. In 

these cases, the program has no assurance that the records added to 

the cleared list refer to the individuals who submitted the redress 

petition, or even refer to actual individuals. Such shortcomings 

demonstrate the need for more prudent adherence to internal 

controls. If left uncorrected, they represent a risk to commercial 

aviation security. 

TSA’s process for adding records to the cleared list also has some 

weaknesses. TSA adds records to the cleared list in two ways: by 

electronically adding sets of RMS records to the list, or by 

manually entering these records directly onto the cleared list. Both 

processes have potential for human error, and both need more 

controls to ensure that individuals who are the focus of watch list 

records are not erroneously added to the cleared list. 

System Users Can Easily Bypass the Watch List Match 

Notification to Add Records to the Cleared List

TSA redress staff create most cleared list records by electronically 

adding records to the cleared list from RMS. Generally, these 

records are added on a weekly basis, and sometimes accumulate in 

the hundreds. When TSA staff attempt to add records 

electronically, the IT program that adds records first checks the 

RMS records against the No Fly and Selectee lists for that day. 

When any RMS records exactly match a No Fly or Selectee record 

based on first initial, last name, and date of birth, the system 

notifies the system user of the match. Redress staff are to delete 

matching records from those to be added to the cleared list and 

refer the record to the TSC for further review. 

However, OTSR has not always referred matching RMS records to 

the TSC. TSA redress personnel have used their assessment of 

how information in redress submissions compares to information 

in watch list records to rule out possible matches. After TSA 

redress personnel rule out possible matches in this way, they add 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 72

the redress-seeker’s information to the cleared list without the 

TSC’s review. This approach is troubling because TSA redress 

personnel do not have access to the range of intelligence systems 

or training necessary to make these determinations effectively. 

TSA redress staff’s ability to bypass the watch list match 

notification and add RMS records to the cleared list that match 

watch list records by clicking the “Continue” button following the 

match results notification is also a concern. The Continue button is 

the same button that users would click to add RMS records to the 

cleared list if they were not notified of a watch list match. The 

process for adding records to the cleared list does not provide any 

other automated security checks and does not require a thirdperson check or additional approval before system users add RMS 

records to the cleared list. Consequently, TSA redress staff could 

inadvertently add individuals believed to be a threat to commercial 

aviation security to the cleared list. 

To mitigate these vulnerabilities, TRIP has limited the number of 

staff authorized to add RMS records to the cleared list. This 

limitation on staff access provides some control over the process, 

but we believe the risk to the integrity of the cleared list warrants 

additional security measures or process steps. TSA should develop 

a proven technical solution and intelligence analyst review process, 

rather than continue to rely on human operators who do not have 

the benefit of proper training or access to needed intelligence 

systems. 

The Practice of Manually Adding Records to the Cleared List Also 

Poses Several Risks

TSA redress staff also add a substantial number of records to the 

cleared list by manually entering information directly into the list. 

One redress office employee reported that she manually added 

more than 500 records to the cleared list in a four-and-a-half month 

period. These manual additions pose several risks. First, manual 

additions may include inconsistencies with information submitted 

by redress-seekers that is captured in RMS. For example, 

personnel who manually enter a record in the cleared list may 

inadvertently transpose letters in the redress-seeker’s name or omit 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 73

a digit in a driver’s license number. In addition, there are few 

controls on manual entries. 

TRIP limits the number of users with privileges to manually enter 

information into the cleared list. However, for manual additions to 

the cleared list, there is no process to ensure that users have first 

checked the individual they are adding to the cleared list against 

the watch lists. Nor is there reliable case-specific information in 

an individual’s RMS record to indicate whether the record was 

manually added to the cleared list. Therefore, it is not possible to 

determine whether all redress-seekers who should have been added 

to the cleared list have been added. OTSR needs to enhance its 

tracking and documentation procedures for manually adding 

records to the cleared list. 

Cleared List Maintenance Is the Source of Security Weaknesses

While security limitations are evident in TSA’s approach to adding 

records to the cleared list, the cleared list’s most serious security 

weakness relates to its maintenance. TSA checks individuals 

against the watch lists when they are added to the cleared list, but 

TSA has not checked the cleared list against the No Fly or Selectee 

list frequently enough to ensure that individuals on the cleared list 

had not been subsequently added to one of the watch lists. 

TSA has a process to perform watch list checks against the cleared 

list electronically, but has not regularly used this process. TRIP 

office officials said that TSA began performing these checks on a 

monthly basis in August 2008. However, because the No Fly and 

Selectee Lists are updated most weekdays, individuals who pose a 

threat to aviation could be on the cleared list for an entire month 

before being removed. 

The addition of individuals on the cleared list to the Selectee list is 

not hypothetical.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 74

TSA’s approaches to adding records to the cleared list and 

maintaining the list do not ensure the list’s integrity and create 

potentially serious security risks. TSA needs to address these 

security weaknesses immediately. Such action is particularly 

pressing with the expanded use of the cleared list under the Secure 

Flight program. To increase the integrity and security of the 

cleared list, TSA should ensure that intelligence analysts review all 

redress records that match watch lists records, both before and 

after these records have been added to the cleared list. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #15: Enhance internal controls on the 

electronic and manual processes for adding records to the cleared 

list, ensure that all records considered for addition to the cleared 

list are subject to identity document verification checks before 

addition, and conduct intelligence analyst reviews of all possible 

watch list matches before related redress records are added to the 

cleared list. 

Recommendation #16: Automatically compare the cleared list 

against the No Fly and Selectee lists when changes are made to any 

list, and institute a process whereby intelligence analysts 

immediately review matching cleared list records for possible 

removal from the cleared list or refer them to the Terrorist 

Screening Center. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 75

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 15. DHS 

plans to revise TRIP standard operating procedures to include 

internal controls for the manual addition of names to the cleared 

list. DHS noted that it has included funds in its TRIP FY 2010 

budget to hire a full-time vetting analyst to review redress records 

that match the No Fly or Selectee list. DHS also plans to add a 

related internal control mechanism to the requirements for its 

replacement case management system. DHS intends to institute 

updated standard operating procedures by the 1st quarter of 

FY 2010, to hire a vetting analyst by the 3rd quarter of FY 2010, 

and to implement its new case management system by the 2nd

quarter of FY 2011. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. However, 

the timelines DHS has proposed for taking corrective measures are 

inconsistent with the urgent need for action in this area. DHS 

should take immediate steps to address the security and integrity 

issues presented by the current handling of the cleared list. 

To ensure the integrity of the cleared list, TSA standard operating 

procedures must include identity document verification of all 

records before they are added to the cleared list. These procedures 

must also include internal controls for electronic and manual 

cleared list additions. Additionally, TSA should ensure that 

intelligence analysts review all redress records that match watch 

lists records before and after these records have been added to the 

cleared list. This recommendation will remain open until we 

receive documentation that demonstrates that the controls 

discussed above are put in place. 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 16. DHS 

management said that TSA will use its Colorado Springs 

Operations Center’s vetting engine to vet watch lists records 

against the cleared list and have a vetting analyst review possible 

matches. DHS reported that this vetting analyst position is funded 

in the TRIP FY 2010 budget. OTSR will maintain responsibility 

for referring cases to the TSC. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 76

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open.

Nevertheless, it is unclear when DHS plans to institute corrective 

measures in response to this recommendation. Because current 

practices present significant security weaknesses, DHS should take 

action in this area now. 

To increase the integrity and security of the cleared list, TSA must 

establish a procedure for determining whether to remove potential 

watch list matches from the cleared list or refer them to the TSC. 

This recommendation will remain open until TSA provides us with 

its plans to automatically compare the cleared list against No Fly 

and Selectee lists when any changes are made to any list. TSA 

must provide information about its process for an intelligence 

analyst to immediately review cleared list records that match to the 

No Fly or Selectee lists. Further, TSA must provide 

documentation on the process it intends to use at its Colorado 

Springs Operations Center for automatically vetting the cleared list 

against the No Fly and Selectee lists when any changes are made to 

any list, and clearly define TSA’s process to either remove the 

redress record from the cleared list or refer it to the TSC. Finally, 

TSA must demonstrate that it has instituted intelligence analyst 

review of all redress records that match watch lists records, both 

before and after these records have been added to the cleared list. 

Until we receive evidence of all of the above, this recommendation 

will remain open. 

Email Submissions of Personal Information May Expose RedressSeekers to Avoidable Risks 

TRIP offers redress-seekers three options for submitting travel 

inquiries and supporting identifying information: its secure online 

portal, conventional mail, and email. However, TRIP redressseekers who initiate requests online can submit copies of 

identifying documents, such as passports and drivers’ licenses, 

only by mail or email. 

The TRIP website assures the public that the program takes 

precautions to protect redress-seekers’ personally identifiable 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 77

information. For example, TSA has established system security 

features and protocols to protect the TRIP website and the 

information in its case management system. However, one of the 

program’s options for gathering information from redressseekers—email—potentially exposes the information to risk of 

interception by third parties. 

However, because TRIP’s IT system is not able to receive copies 

of identifying documents via its secure online portal, the program 

has few alternatives. Previously, TRIP officials ruled out faxes as 

an option for submitting copies of identifying documents because 

faxed information was frequently transmitted with insufficient 

clarity for program use. Email submissions are the only alternative 

to conventional mail, and TRIP officials have opted to receive 

requests by email to maximize the public’s access to redress 

services and benefits. 

We encourage TRIP officials to reevaluate the program’s practice 

of receiving personally identifiable information by unencrypted 

email in the future, when it has the capability of receiving such 

documents through its secure online portal. 

CBP’s Redress Case Processing System Does Not Meet Statutory 

Privacy Notification Requirements 

Two laws govern federal protection of personally identifiable 

information, the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 

2002. The Privacy Act requires federal agencies that maintain 

personally identifiable information, retrievable by a personal 

identifier within a system of records, to publish a related System of 

Records Notice in the Federal Register. The notice is to include a 

description of the system and the records contained within it, their 

uses, and information on how individuals may request access to 

records about them. Agencies are required to publish these notices 

before the system of records becomes operational.21

The E-Government Act requires federal agencies to conduct and 

publish Privacy Impact Assessments for all systems that collect, 

21 OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I, § 4(c). 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 78

maintain, or share personally identifiable information on members 

of the public.22 Government agencies are to complete Privacy 

Impact Assessments before they develop or procure related IT 

systems. These impact assessments provide notice to the public, 

among other things, of the collection, use, retention, and sharing of 

information maintained within government systems. 

CBP processes TRIP redress cases using its redress-related IT case 

management system. CBP redress staff enter redress case 

information from TRIP’s RMS into CBP’s system on all TRIP 

cases that CBP processes. This case information includes 

addresses; dates of birth; drivers’ license and passport numbers; 

travel information; heights; weights; hair and eye colors; and 

copies of identifying documents. CBP staff can electronically 

retrieve this information from its case management system using 

identifying information such as a redress case number or date of 

birth. CBP’s redress case management system is therefore a 

system of records under the Privacy Act, and an IT system covered 

by the E-Government Act.

The redress case management system that CBP uses to monitor 

TRIP cases is not compliant with requirements of the Privacy Act

or E-Government Act. CBP is required to issue both a notice and 

an impact assessment for its redress case management system, but 

has not done so. Consequently, TRIP redress-seekers do not have 

access to a full statement of how the government handles their 

personal information. Because CBP has operated and maintained 

this system for more than two years, we believe that CBP should 

issue the proper notices as soon as possible. 

Recommendation

We recommend that the Commissioner for U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection:

Recommendation #17: Develop and promptly publish the 

required System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact 

Assessment for its redress case management system. 

22 E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L.107-347), § 208; codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 79

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 17. DHS 

management indicated CBP is drafting both a Privacy Impact 

Assessment and a System of Records Notice for its redress case 

management system. 

OIG Analysis: We consider DHS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the intent of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. 

This recommendation will remain open until we are able to 

confirm that DHS has published these items.

TRIP Has Not Always Handled Redress Cases Reliably 

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007

requires DHS, through TRIP, to maintain a fair redress process.23 To be 

fair, a redress process must apply uniformly to different redress-seekers 

with similar complaints, and must be implemented consistently over time. 

TRIP Reliability Issues Have Prevented Some Redress Cases From 

Receiving Full and Appropriate Reviews 

Uniform and consistent case processing is required if TRIP is to 

ensure that redress cases receive appropriate consideration.

However, TRIP case processing has not always met these 

requirements. For example, program difficulties begin with its 

intake and triage of cases, and extend to its practices when closing 

cases. To process incoming cases properly, TRIP staff must enter 

case information into RMS and link scanned copies of pertinent 

identifying documents to the proper redress case in the system. 

After cases have been entered into RMS, TRIP staff examine the 

redress inquiry, identify the proper agency to review and respond 

to the inquiry, and refer the case to that agency’s attention.

However, this has not always occurred. TRIP intake and triage 

errors have created case processing delays and sometimes 

23 49 U.S.C. 44926(a). 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 80

prevented redress-seekers from receiving proper review and 

resolution of their complaint. 

TRIP office staff reported deficiencies in the quality of intake and 

triage of incoming redress complaints. TRIP relies primarily on 

contractors to perform intake activities and make initial case triage 

recommendations. In early 2008, TRIP staff reviewing 

contractors’ work revealed a significant number of errors. 

Contractors had reportedly entered redress-seekers’ information 

incorrectly into RMS. In some instances, contractors had failed to 

add identifying documents to the proper RMS record or directed 

cases to the wrong agency. As a result, TRIP redress providers in 

other agencies reported receiving misdirected cases. 

To address this situation, in April 2008, the TRIP office 

implemented quality assurance checks on 100% of new cases 

added to RMS by contractors. In subsequent months, the program 

office reduced the percentage of new cases it submitted to quality 

checks, but it still submits more than 50% of cases to the scrutiny 

of at least two TRIP staff. Although the TRIP office has taken 

steps to improve the intake and triage of cases, many past cases 

have not received appropriate agency reviews or adjudication. 

TRIP uses information supplied by redress-seekers to triage cases.

Much of this information is captured in check boxes on the TRIP 

intake form, and also in redress-seeker case narratives. Redressseekers may select one or more check boxes on the TRIP intake 

form to describe their travel difficulties. TRIP designed each 

check box to refer to a travel issue associated with a specific 

agency’s screening data or activity. For example, all cases in 

which travelers report that they have been repeatedly referred for 

secondary screening by CBP are intended to be referred to CBP for 

review.

In practice, however, a significant percentage of TRIP cases have 

not been referred to the appropriate agencies. We identified 2,275 

TRIP cases that had not been referred to or handled by the intended 

agency before they were closed. These cases represented 5% of 

the total number of closed cases in RMS as of October 2008. The 

program was more successful in properly referring some types of 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 81

cases than others. About 48% of the cases intended for PRIV, 

CRCL, and US-VISIT were referred to those offices before being 

closed.

Other redress cases may not be processed as intended because 

TRIP does not use a uniform version of its intake form. The intake 

form presented to redress-seekers filing inquiries online has 17 

check boxes to describe different adverse travel experiences.

However, the intake form on the TRIP website that redress-seekers 

can print, complete, and submit by mail omits one check box for 

one of the two options related to US-VISIT issues. Refer to 

Appendix F for the complete TRIP intake form. 

The program does not ensure that redress cases are referred to the 

appropriate office, and program officials have closed cases before 

all involved redress officials completed their reviews. TRIP has 

data on the dates that 23,055 redress cases were closed. Of these, 

2,420, or more than 10%, were closed before all of the associated 

case review and adjudication tasks had been addressed. Many of 

these cases were closed a significant amount of time before all 

tasks had been completed. TRIP closed 1,605 cases more than 30 

days before all associated tasks were completed. 

TRIP Could Do More to Set Procedures and Monitor Program 

Activity

For TRIP to offer consistent service and responsive case 

resolution, staff affiliated with the program must process cases in a 

repeatable and deliberate manner. As TRIP is a multiagency 

program with participants in a number of locations, the 

repeatability of program operations depends on well-documented 

procedures, clear guidance, and effective monitoring. Despite 

these operational requirements, TRIP has been slow to develop 

detailed guidance, sound procedures, or effective quality assurance 

measures to support consistent case handling. 

TRIP participants reported receiving little written guidance from 

the TRIP office or DHS’ SCO. A number of TRIP participants 

indicated that the only written information they received about the 

program was a user manual for RMS. Much of the information 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 82

participants acquired about the program and related processing 

guidelines has been communicated orally. Several participants 

referred to periodic TRIP user group meetings as a useful forum 

for exchange of operational and procedural issues. Chaired by the 

TRIP program manager, user group meetings are held to update 

redress personnel on TRIP developments, identify program 

requirements, and discuss case processing challenges and best 

practices for resolving redress process issues. Some redress staff 

value user group sessions, but others spoke of difficulties attending 

them and indicated that they rarely join the meetings. One redress 

representative was not aware that such meetings occurred. 

TRIP Standard Operating Procedures Are Incomplete

Although user group sessions help provide procedural guidance to 

some program participants, they are not an effective substitute for 

written procedures. The TRIP program manager and Governance 

Board members have stressed the importance of written program 

procedures and have asked all participating agencies to prepare 

standard operating procedures that describe their approach to TRIP 

case processing. These standard operating procedures were 

developed slowly, however. And as of October 2008—more than 

a year-and-a-half after the program became operational—one 

participating component had yet to develop even preliminary 

versions of their TRIP-specific procedures, and two others had not 

finalized its procedures. 

Existing TRIP procedures do not describe important redress office 

functions. Three operating procedures, for example, do not discuss 

a process or any associated requirements for responding to redressseekers. Most TRIP standard operating procedures do not describe 

the process of creating a case file for a new case or what the file 

should contain. Although redress staff in almost all participating 

agencies indicated that they received and processed requests for 

expedited redress case review, only one agency mentioned these 

cases in its operating procedures. 

We reviewed available operating procedures to determine the 

extent to which each addressed key redress office functions: intake 

and triage; coordination and prioritization; review and 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 83

adjudication; and closeout, response, and reporting.24 When 

considering whether an operating procedure fully described the 

agency’s intake and triage activities, for example, we examined 

whether the procedures described how the agency receives TRIP 

cases, what its information or documentation requirements are for 

accepting a case, how it assigns cases, and what its requirements 

are for creating a case file. We did not evaluate agency procedures 

for functions they do not perform. Table 1 reflects our analysis of 

participating agencies’ procedures. 

Table 1: TRIP Standard Operating Procedure Analysis 

Redress Office 

Functions

Participating TRIP Agency / Department SOP

TSA

CBP

ICE

CRCL

Privacy

US-VISIT

CIS

DOS

TSC

Redress Office 

Functions







N/A

No draft or final TRIP-specific SOP

SOP does not address element

SOP partially addresses element

 SOP fully addresses element

N/A This element reflects redress steps and 

procedures specific to TRIP 

participants.

Intake & Triage 

KEY





Coordination & Prioritization

Review & Adjudication

Close Out, Response & Reporting

Source: OIG Analysis of TRIP Participants’ Operating Procedures 

Because existing TRIP operating procedures do not fully outline 

functional requirements, agencies will find it difficult to respond to 

future TRIP inquiries in the same way they did in the past. Several 

participating agencies have placed their procedural institutional 

knowledge in a few staff, rather than documenting those 

procedures. Without detailed procedures, participating agencies 

cannot ensure the consistent handling of redress cases when 

current redress staff leave. Detailed standard operating procedures 

24 The redress office functions we used to evaluate operating procedures include functions associated with 

the four redress processing stages discussed earlier in the report, as well as coordination, prioritization, and 

reporting activities. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 84

could also benefit existing staff. Some redress staff we met 

acknowledged uncertainty about important steps in the process and 

told us that they engaged in less-than-optimal practices. A few 

redress staff indicated, for instance, that they did not do anything 

to alert others reviewing a case when they had completed and 

closed related case assignments, so the cases were unattended for 

long periods. 

TRIP needs more defined standard operating procedures in another 

important respect as well: It has no defined expectations or 

procedures to evaluate redress claims related to several new DHS 

initiatives that single out TRIP as their redress avenue. For 

instance, federal regulations related to the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative and the Electronic System for Traveler 

Authorization have designated TRIP as the redress provider for 

those initiatives. TRIP, however, does not advertise on its website 

that it offers redress services in these cases, and it is unclear how 

redress-seekers should communicate related concerns on the TRIP 

intake form. Moreover, TRIP has not determined how to process 

these types of cases, to what office it would channel related 

inquiries, what redress solution it can offer, or to what aspects of 

the initiatives redress inquiries are likely to pertain. The TRIP 

program manager indicated that this has occurred in part because 

the office has generally received little or no advanced notice about 

announcements that expand TRIP coverage to new initiatives. 

Quality Assurance Efforts Need Further Development

Quality assurance activities can provide a check on program 

processing and ensure consistency in case handling. As noted 

earlier in this section, TRIP now performs quality assurance 

activities as part of its intake and triage of cases. SCO, TSA, and 

CBP redress staff examine case status information and follow up 

with users on outstanding case assignments. These are positive 

efforts, but they do not provide checks on the full range of case 

activities. TRIP quality assurance efforts to date are not sufficient 

and need further development. 

One measure of the inadequacy of current TRIP quality assurance 

measures is the volume of apparent errors in the program’s case 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 85

management system. TRIP case management data contains many 

inconsistencies and anomalies that would benefit from quality 

assurance checks. For example, in addition to cases not always 

being fully reviewed by all intended agencies before closure, many 

cases are closed with no indication of when closure occurred. In 

October 2008, RMS had 3,369 closed records without 

corresponding closure dates. Without this basic information, TRIP 

cannot determine how long it took to process these cases. 

TRIP case management data also suggest that the program has not 

always communicated with redress-seekers about missing, 

incomplete, or unreadable submissions. In October 2008, the 

program had 8,121 cases that it either closed due to insufficient 

paperwork or had pending paperwork for more than 6 months. 

However, TRIP had issued only 1,950 letters to redress-seekers 

advising them that the program needed additional information to 

process their case. As a result, at least 76% of redress-seekers who 

should have been notified through TRIP were not told that their 

redress petitions were incomplete. 

RMS data reveal inconsistencies in another key area as well. The 

case management system contains a field for the date when an 

individual’s electronic record is added to the cleared list.

According to TRIP staff, the system captures the date that the 

records were checked against the No Fly and Selectee lists and 

automatically populates the cleared list date field with this 

information. When an individual matches the No Fly or Selectee 

lists, TRIP personnel are responsible for deleting this information 

from the cleared list date field. Our review of RMS data revealed 

that program staff had not always done so. We identified 12 

records for individuals that RMS indicated were a match to the No 

Fly or Selectee list that also had a cleared list date, suggesting that 

they had been added improperly to the cleared list. However, 

when we examined whether these records were added to the 

cleared list, we learned that they were not. 

While additional quality assurance measures are needed, some of 

TRIP’s shortcomings may be attributable to limitations in other 

areas. Redress staff could benefit from using standard operating 

procedures to evaluate case processing information in RMS to 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 86

ensure that cases are reviewed in a specified and deliberate 

manner. Limits on RMS users’ ability to generate ad hoc reports 

based on system data may also prevent the program from doing 

more in this area. 

Nevertheless, the program can take a number of near-term steps to 

expand its quality assurance measures. We suggest that TRIP 

build upon previous recommendations contained in a draft quality 

assurance plan developed by DHS’ original contractor for the RCI 

one-stop redress effort. This 2007 plan describes quality assurance 

checks on the accuracy of case assignments, case processing 

timeliness, spot checks on responses to email inquiries, regular 

reviews of web content, and analysis of repeat TRIP cases to 

determine what prompted individuals to petition more than once.

We believe that DHS should implement these and other quality 

assurance measures described in the plan. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for the 

Transportation Security Administration: 

Recommendation #18: Prepare and revise TRIP-specific standard 

operating procedures that describe all redress office requirements 

in intake and triage; coordination and prioritization; review and 

adjudication; and closeout, response and reporting. 

Recommendation #19: Devise and institute quality assurance 

checks using the 2007 draft TRIP quality assurance plan as a 

resource.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 18. DHS 

management will direct redress participants to update standard 

operating procedures to address all case processing steps. DHS 

expects to complete these updates by the 4th quarter of 2009.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 87

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of TRIPspecific procedures that define all redress office requirements in 

the areas of intake and triage; coordination and prioritization; 

review and adjudication; and closeout, response and reporting. 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 19. SCO 

officials will review the draft quality assurance plan and, in 

consultation with other DHS components, make appropriate 

revisions. DHS management indicated it would perform quality 

assurance checks at the end of FY 2009, and implement a quality 

assurance plan with the new case management system by the 2nd

quarter of FY 2011. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. Quality 

assurance is important for effective management oversight, and 

can assist in identifying critical program improvements. DHS 

should not wait until the 2nd quarter of 2011 to develop and 

implement a quality assurance plan. This recommendation will 

remain open until we receive evidence that DHS has instituted a 

quality assurance plan similar to the 2007 draft quality assurance 

plan for current program activities. 

TRIP Case Processing Timeliness Could Be Improved 

TRIP case processing is subject to avoidable delays in the intake and case 

review processes. During our fieldwork, TRIP experienced case intake 

delays related to the receipt and processing of copies of identifying 

documents. The redress office held incoming redress requests for 

extended periods before entering them into RMS, performing triage 

activities, or reviewing the requests for action. In September 2008, 

TRIP’s email intake processing backlog was five-months long, and its 

mail intake processing was behind by more than one month. At the time, 

DHS had not started case review work on some redress cases that the 

office received in April 2008. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 88

Because the program does not maintain reliable information on the date 

that individual case records are received, it is difficult to determine the 

effect of intake delays on overall case processing. Data on the time 

associated with other case processing stages, however, suggest that intake 

delays may have doubled, tripled, or even quadrupled overall response 

time to many redress requests. 

As cases proceed past intake, inefficiencies in case review activities 

amplify the effect of these initial delays. As noted earlier, a number of 

redress offices that participate in TRIP enter and track case information in 

their own case management systems. Case review activities are 

sometimes suspended for a time before redress staff in these offices 

manually enter TRIP case information into their systems. In other 

instances, redress cases remain idle even after program staff issue case 

task assignments because the recipients of those tasks are not notified that 

new cases are assigned for review. Delays also arise when redress staff 

responsible for reviewing a case are unable to do so in a timely manner 

because of competing obligations. 

Due to limitations in historical redress data, it is difficult to assess the 

effect of these delays on processing times for all types of cases. 

Nevertheless, there is sufficient data to determine that processing times 

have worsened for TSA-specific cases since TRIP became operational. 

TSA collected case processing time statistics before it assumed TRIP 

responsibilities, and reported that it processed cases in an average of ten 

days from September to November 2006. By contrast, the same TSA-only 

redress cases took an average of 18 days to process in May 2008. 

Although redress case processing has slowed for some cases since TRIP 

began operating, the program made modest strides in reducing triage, 

review, adjudication, and response times during the first six months of 

2008. We examined data on the timeliness of these processing stages for 

three cohorts of incoming cases. It took the program more than four 

months to close 17% of cases received in January 2008. TRIP showed 

slight improvement, with 15% of March 2008 cases taking more than four 

months to close. TRIP’s handling of cases received in May 2008 

improved further; only 13% of these cases remained open after four 

months.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 89

Recommended IT system improvements could reduce the program’s 

intake backlog by eliminating the need for program staff to enter 

identifying documents into RMS. Other IT enhancements in case 

management and interoperability could also speed case processing. In the 

near term, greater clarity about participating agencies’ case processing 

responsibilities could improve case handling by redress staff who have 

competing obligations. The extent of TRIP case processing delays 

underscores the urgency and need for DHS action. 

TRIP Does Not Provide a Desirable Level of Transparency to 

Redress-Seekers

Redress-seekers submit petitions to TRIP to remedy difficulties they 

believe they have faced as a result of government actions. According to 

DHS’ Privacy Office and Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, 

the redress process is designed to help restore redress-seekers’ confidence 

in the government and the integrity of its actions. Clear and transparent 

communication can help petitioners understand how their case has been 

handled, and provide assurance that it has been addressed appropriately.

Transparency about the redress process and its results can also favorably 

affect redress-seekers’ view of the government’s ability to resolve travel 

difficulties. The program must balance this interest in transparency with 

security needs, however, and should not disclose information that would 

compromise national security. 

Letter responses to redress-seekers are one of TRIP’s primary means of 

communication with the public. These responses are not as transparent as 

they could be about the basis for travelers’ difficulties or government 

actions to address them. TRIP generally provides its customers with 

minimal information about the government’s review or adjudication of 

their inquiries. With few exceptions, redress-seekers receive response 

letters that do not reveal the basis for their travel difficulties, the action the 

government took to address those difficulties, or other steps that they may 

take to help themselves in the future. This ultimately leaves travelers 

without a clear understanding of how their travel difficulty arose, whether 

they are likely to face future problems, and what course of action they 

might take next. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 90

After TRIP closes a case, the program office uses a set of template 

responses for different types of travel difficulties when preparing letters to 

redress-seekers. Redress officials refer to most of these templates as 

Glomar letters, in reference to a court decision that supported the 

government’s position that it may neither confirm nor deny that it has 

related records or information in cases of national security.25

DHS’ approach to communication with redress-seekers is the product of 

an interest in protecting national security and law enforcement information 

from disclosure. TRIP letter responses are designed to prevent recipients 

from learning whether they are the subject of an active law enforcement 

investigation or a terrorist watch list record. Copies 

 are included in Appendix G. 

The government’s rationale for withholding information on an individual’s 

watch list status is reflected in its filings in an ongoing case in which the 

plaintiffs are seeking access to terrorist watch list records about 

themselves. In a July 2007 declaration in Rahman v. Chertoff, the U.S. 

Attorney General argued that any government acknowledgement about an 

individual’s watch list status could threaten national security. The 

Attorney General asserted that national security could be harmed if 

individuals who were the intended target of a watch list record were 

informed of their watch list status, because they could take precautions 

against surveillance, alter their activities or appearance to avoid detection, 

or place federal agents at risk.26 The Attorney General also opposed 

disclosures about watch list status to those who are not on the list on the 

following grounds:

National security could be harmed if the government were to 

disclose that one individual is not the subject of a watch list 

record, but resist watch list status disclosures to another 

individual who is the target of a watch list record. Doing so 

25 Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 26 Declaration of Alberto R. Gonzales, Rahman, v. Chertoff, Case No. 05 C 3671 (N.D. Il. July 23, 2007). 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 91

would reveal to the latter that he or she is the target of such a 

record.27

National security could be harmed if the government were to 

disclose that an individual is not the subject of a terrorism 

investigation, because “terrorist groups could [use this 

information to] manipulate the system to determine which of 

their members are not under investigation and ... have a greater 

chance of carrying out a terrorist operation.”28

In explaining the rationale for TRIP’s approach to its letter responses to 

redress-seekers, DHS representatives referred us to the Attorney General’s 

declaration cited above and provided similar justifications based on the 

same logic. However, this logic has two important limitations as it relates 

to letter responses to certain kinds of redress-seekers. 

Travelers on the No Fly and Selectee Lists Can Already Infer Their Status

Some redress-seekers with complaints about their treatment in aviation 

settings can already infer their watch list status. An individual’s status on 

the No Fly list is apparent to anyone on the list when he or she attempts to 

fly within or to the United States, as the individual is denied boarding an 

aircraft. 

Some redress-seekers who are on the Selectee list can also infer their 

status when they fly. Travelers on the Selectee list are subject to 

additional security screening by TSA. Undergoing such screening alone, 

however, is not sufficient to indicate whether one is on the Selectee list, as 

TSA uses other criteria to determine which passengers receive additional 

security scrutiny. The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

selects some passengers for additional screening based on information 

about their flight arrangements and travel plans. TSA Behavioral 

Detection Officers select other passengers for additional screening based 

on their actions in the airport. A number of others are selected at random.

Although there are other reasons why a passenger may be subjected to 

27 Ibid., pp. 5, 8. 28 Ibid., pp. 4, 8. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 92

secondary screening, attentive passengers can reasonably infer whether 

they are on the Selectee list. 

A passenger’s inability to print a boarding pass online or at an airport 

ticket kiosk is an indicator that the passenger might be on the Selectee 

list.29 When such passengers are required to show identification to an air 

carrier representative at a ticket counter and subsequently receive 

additional security screening from TSA before boarding, they can 

reasonably infer that they are on the Selectee list. 

TSA provides much of this information on its website. TSA has 

advertised, for example, that passengers who are unable to print boarding 

passes online are considered possible watch list matches.30 So while DHS 

and DOJ have expressed concerns about directly or indirectly revealing 

watch list status in redress response letters, air carriers’ application of TSA 

security protocols provides the information passengers need to infer their 

status without an official acknowledgement. Notwithstanding that some 

passengers can currently infer their watch list status, DOJ has advised that 

official disclosure of an individual’s watch list status could nonetheless 

have a harmful effect on ongoing counterterrorism investigations, and 

intelligence sources and methods. DOJ representatives also emphasize 

that courts of law have often drawn a distinction between official 

confirmation and inference in a number of related past rulings.31

Government transparency on individuals’ watch list status remains at issue 

in the court case we discussed earlier, Rahman v. Chertoff. Pending the 

outcome of related aspects of this case, we are not recommending further 

transparency on No Fly and Selectee list status in TRIP response letters. 

29 At least one air carrier permits travelers on the Selectee list to print out their boarding passes at airport 

kiosks, but unlike other passengers, they must first scan a driver’s license or passport. 

30 http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/checkpoint_reduce_hassle.shtm. 

31 Stein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1259 (7th Cir. 1981) quoting Alfred A. Knopfv. Colby, 509 

F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975); Terkel v. AT&T, 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 915 (N.D. Il. 2006).
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 93

Many Redress Matters Are Unrelated to Law Enforcement Action or 

Watch List Status

Many redress cases involve matters unrelated to law enforcement 

investigations or watch list status, such as allegations of civil rights 

violations or questions of immigration status. As the government 

discloses information about these matters in other circumstances, it should 

also do so in the redress process. DHS’ current rationale for withholding 

law enforcement and watch list-related disclosures should not govern 

disclosures in these matters. 

Redress-seekers often indicate on intake forms that they believe that the 

government has violated their privacy or civil rights during travel. The 

responsive reviews that DHS’ PRIV and CRCL conduct, and the final case 

determinations they make in response to these assertions, generally do not 

have a law enforcement dimension. Therefore, no viable rationale exists 

as to why TRIP cannot note in its letter responses what actions these 

components took after reviewing such cases. 

TRIP Letter Disclosures Are More Restrictive Than Information Provided 

by Other Government Sources

Many redress cases pertain to matters that the government would disclose 

in other instances, but does not in response to TRIP inquiries. For 

example, a number of TRIP cases relate to visa and other immigration 

benefits status questions. DHS and DOS openly and regularly provide 

individuals with information on their visa and immigration benefits status.

However, when a TRIP redress case hinges on the petitioner’s visa or 

immigration benefit status, the program will not acknowledge to the 

redress-seeker that the travel difficulties arise from visa or benefit status 

issues.

In some instances, redress-seekers could take preemptive action to resolve 

future travel difficulties, but the program does not advise them of the steps 

necessary to do so. Some redress-seekers’ travel difficulties are the 

product of visa overstay lookouts that are in place because they did not 

return their I-94 Arrival-Departure Record form to immigration 

authorities upon departing the United States. CBP can delete this type of 

lookout after redress-seekers supply evidence that they did not overstay 

their visa and were not in the country after their visa expired. TRIP 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 94

response letters to these redress-seekers do not advise them that their 

travel difficulties are related to a perceived past visa overstay or what 

information they can submit to CBP to eliminate the associated lookout. 

Only a fraction of redress-seekers are the subject of a watch list record or 

law enforcement investigation. Yet TRIP’s approach to responding to 

them is based on the blanket application of a rationale that is singularly 

focused on the protection of law enforcement and watch list information. 

TRIP has applied this rationale too broadly in its communications with 

redress-seekers, and the result is a customer response process that is not as 

transparent and effective as it could be. TRIP could provide more 

information to redress-seekers without compromising national security. 

To its credit, TRIP recently revised its response letters to redress-seekers 

who have had difficulties in aviation security settings. These new letters 

advise redress-seekers to enroll in air carrier passenger preclearance 

programs as an additional measure to improve their travel experience. 

Program Transparency Is Further Diminished by Unfulfilled Expectations

TRIP has created expectations about transparency that it does not fulfill. 

DHS websites have cultivated expectations that redress-seekers will learn 

the source of their travel difficulties. As of November 2008, the public 

could access the TRIP web page by clicking the phrase “Are you on a 

watch list?” on TSA’s website. Similarly, a past DHS website link to the 

TRIP web page read, “Find out if I am on a travel watch list.” In doing so, 

DHS has created false expectation that TRIP will reveal whether redressseekers are on a watch list. 

Forthright communications with redress-seekers are vital to TRIP’s 

success and necessary for the public’s trust. Without more transparent 

communication with redress-seekers, public confidence and participation 

in the program could decline. Redress responses should assure redressseekers that the government has acted fairly and reasonably in addressing 

their request. To the extent possible, these responses should provide 

information about the basis for their travel difficulty, the nature of the 

government’s review, and the steps taken to rectify the underlying issue, 

without compromising matters of national security. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 95

Recommendation

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office, in consultation with participating agencies and DHS 

components: 

Revised Recommendation #20: Develop and apply TRIP 

response letter templates that more fully acknowledge the basis for 

traveler difficulties, note what actions the government took to 

review the case, and address the underlying cause for the travel 

difficulty; but do so without compromising law enforcement 

investigations or revealing redress-seekers’ status in the TSDB. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS officials partially concurred with 

Recommendation 20 in its original form. We revised the 

recommendation in response to technical and formal comments on 

our draft, and anticipate full DHS concurrence with the 

recommendation in its current form. 

DHS managers disagreed that persons on the Selectee list can 

determine their watch list status, and noted that they have an 

obligation to coordinate the development of some redress letter 

responses with the TSC. DHS said that it will engage interagency 

partners to consider redrafting redress letter response templates. 

The revised templates are to state that DHS can neither confirm 

nor deny watch list placement; identify underlying traveler 

inconveniences in cases not related to terrorist watch list or law 

enforcement investigations; detail steps taken to resolve non-watch 

list or law enforcement cases; and, for cases outside of DHS’ 

purview, refer cases to the appropriate agency, after consultation 

with the agency’s redress office to ensure a referral would not 

negatively impact an ongoing law enforcement investigation. DHS 

officials expect to complete this review by the 1st quarter of 

FY 2010. 

OIG Analysis: DHS did not fully concur with this 

recommendation in its original form. In response to concerns 

raised by DHS and DOJ, we modified the recommendation and 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 96

some of the preceding text in the report. In its current form, this 

recommendation is intended to provide redress-seekers more 

information on the processing and disposition of redress cases that 

are not related to the watch lists or law enforcement investigations. 

However, DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to this 

recommendation as revised. The recommendation is resolved and 

will remain open until DHS provides us with revised redress 

templates for such redress cases. 

TRIP Performance Management Could Be Improved 

Performance management activities help programs monitor operational 

efficiency and the achievement of desired results. TRIP tracks 

performance statistics related to the timeliness of case processing, the 

status of task assignments, and the types of travel difficulties that redressseekers indicate they have experienced. The program also compiles data 

on the volume of new cases it receives and how these cases are filed, that 

is, by mail or email. 

TRIP tracks some performance measures and monitors related program 

data, but it could make improvements in this area. In particular, TRIP 

could improve its collection and reporting of case dispositions, case 

processing timeliness, and customer satisfaction. These improvements 

would help TRIP demonstrate its ability to meet the objectives for which it 

was established. 

TRIP Does Not Gather Complete Data on Case Disposition 

Although TRIP collects a significant amount of information on 

case disposition, this information is not as complete or meaningful 

as it could be. TRIP’s primary case management system, RMS, 

has 17 different case status codes to indicate how a case has been 

closed. Appendix H contains a list of RMS case status codes.

Case disposition information the program collects generally 

indicates which participating agency closed a case but does not 

indicate what actions the government took to resolve the redressseeker’s difficulties. For example, there is no way to determine 

readily from TRIP case data whether a redress-seeker’s concerns 

were addressed by correcting data in a biometric identification 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 97

system, deleting a particular type of lookout in a border-crossing 

information system, or overriding a lookout in the system. In 

many cases, it is not possible to determine whether the government 

took any action to address a redress-seeker’s concerns. 

In addition, the program does not have a means of collecting 

information on multiple case dispositions that apply to a single 

case. Many TRIP redress cases require involvement by multiple 

agencies, and several agencies may take action to address a single 

redress-seeker’s difficulties. RMS, however, captures information 

on only one disposition per case. Without information on other 

case results, it is difficult to determine how successful the program 

is at meeting its primary aims. TRIP should be able to determine 

and report on all redress case dispositions and actions taken to 

resolve redress-seekers’ concerns. 

Recommendation

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office, in consultation with participating agencies and DHS 

components: 

Recommendation #21: Develop TRIP case disposition reporting 

categories that reflect the full range of government efforts to 

resolve redress-seekers’ travel difficulties, and report on this 

information on a regular basis. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 21. DHS 

management said TRIP reporting categories are being reformatted 

and will implement revised categories as part of its new case 

management system no later than the 2nd quarter of FY 2011. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ comments are responsive to the intent of the 

recommendation, which is resolved and open. DHS’ proposed 

future plans are partially responsive to this recommendation, but 

do not include any discussion of disposition reporting.

Furthermore, DHS should take action now to revise its current case 

disposition categories and procedures. This recommendation will 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 98

remain open until we receive documentation related to both nearand long-term plans in this area. We will examine this 

documentation to ensure that revised case disposition categories 

reflect the full range of government efforts to resolve redressseekers’ travel difficulties, and include procedures to report this 

information on a regular basis. 

TRIP Does Not Collect Complete Data on the Timeliness of Case 

Processing and Has Not Set Related Targets 

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

of 2007 requires TRIP to provide timely redress.32 However, TRIP 

has no effective means of monitoring or evaluating the timeliness 

of its case processing efforts to determine whether it is meeting its 

mandate. 

TRIP does not gather all of the information it needs to determine 

how long it takes to process and close cases. Delays in TRIP’s 

intake process can extend as long as five months. Accordingly, the 

intake process absorbs a significant amount of the time between 

DHS’ receipt of a completed redress petition and its response to 

the redress-seeker. Current TRIP data on case processing times, 

however, do not account for the time that cases remain in the 

intake process. This is because TRIP does not capture information 

on the date that DHS first received completed redress petitions.

This information is not available in TRIP’s electronic case 

management records and is not always available in its paper case 

files. Instead, the program computes processing times starting 

with the date that complete case information was first entered into 

RMS. As a result, past TRIP reports on case processing times have 

understated the overall time the program takes to close redress 

cases.

Targets are an essential part of any performance management 

system; they enable managers to determine whether a program is 

meeting performance aims. Such targets could be applied to 

overall TRIP case processing timeliness, but have not. Variations 

32 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), § 1606(a); codified 

at 49 U.S.C. § 44926(a). 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 99

in processing times for different types of cases, and fluctuations in 

processing times at different stages in the process, complicate 

establishing overall TRIP case processing timeliness targets. TRIP 

could overcome these challenges by first establishing timeliness 

targets for participating agencies to perform their case review and 

adjudication activities. As the case review and adjudication 

process involves more research and consideration for some 

agencies than for others, it may be appropriate for these targets to 

vary by agency. The program could also establish timeliness 

targets for different stages in the redress process. TRIP could, for 

example, create targets for each of the four principal stages in the 

redress process: intake, triage, review and adjudication, and 

response and closeout. 

Although SCO has participated in working group sessions to 

identify timeliness targets, TRIP does not have targets for overall 

case processing time, processing times for any stage in the redress 

process, or for any agency’s review and adjudication of cases.

Combined with complete case intake data, such targets could be 

used to help redress managers identify case processing bottlenecks 

and make informed decisions about allocating resources. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #22: Collect individual TRIP redress case 

information on the date completed redress petitions are received, 

and use this information to calculate overall TRIP case processing 

times. 

We recommend that the Director of the Screening Coordination 

Office, in consultation with representatives of other participating 

agencies and DHS components:

Recommendation #23: Develop timeliness targets for each 

redress processing stage, and case review and processing activities 

for each participating agency and DHS component; and report to 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 100

participating agencies regularly on the achievement of these 

targets. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 22. DHS 

management indicated this recommendation would be added to the 

requirements list for its new case management system which will 

be implemented by the 2nd quarter of FY 2011. SCO and TSA will 

update standard operating procedures to record the receipt of 

redress petitions and date of RMS entry. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. DHS plans 

to collect information on the date completed redress petitions are 

first received in TRIP’s future case management system are 

laudable. It will also be important for this system to use this date 

in calculating overall TRIP response times. In the meantime, DHS 

can improve its performance in this area by recording the date that 

case materials are received on the materials themselves. This 

recommendation will remain open until we are provided evidence 

that TRIP is documenting and tracking the date it receives 

completed redress petitions, and using this information to calculate 

overall TRIP case processing times. 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 23. DHS 

management said it expects to establish separate timeliness targets 

for misidentifications and non-misidentification cases. DHS 

indicated that this recommendation would be added to the 

requirements list for its new case management system which is to 

be implemented by the 2nd quarter of FY 2011. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. DHS’ 

proposed solution does not clearly provide for regular reporting to 

participant agencies on the achievement of timeliness targets; a 

prerequisite for closing this recommendation. It is essential that 

DHS effectively monitor and accurately report on the timeliness of 

TRIP’s current operations. This recommendation will remain open 

until we receive evidence that DHS has developed timeliness 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 101

targets for each redress processing stage, to include the case review 

and processing activities for each participating agency and DHS 

component; and reports to participating agencies regularly on the 

achievement of these targets. This documentation should reflect 

near-term efforts in this area as well as future plans. 

TRIP Does Not Gather Information on Customer Satisfaction 

Initial plans in 2007 called for TRIP to collect customer service 

comments. An early plan stressed the value of customers’ 

comments and indicated that TRIP would gather opinions on the 

quality of the TRIP website, timeliness of case processing, and 

effectiveness of the program’s response to redress-seekers’ 

difficulties. 

Despite its original plan to collect customer comments, TRIP has 

not established any procedure to gather customer satisfaction 

information. The program does not solicit information on redressseekers’ experience through surveys, focus groups, or any other 

customer response instrument. 

Customer comments could help managers identify areas that need 

improvement and direct resources to address customer concerns. 

They could also provide redress-seekers an opportunity to 

communicate their experiences and expectations about the program 

and their overall level of satisfaction. This information can serve 

as a valuable baseline to evaluate program successes and 

challenges, and the program’s overall effect on those subject to 

government-related travel difficulties. 

Recommendation

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration, in consultation with the Director of the 

Screening Coordination Office: 

Recommendation #24: Collect and report on redress-seeker 

impressions of the TRIP website, different aspects of the redress 

experience, and their overall satisfaction with the program, with 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 102

the aim of using this information to identify areas for 

improvement. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS Response: DHS concurred with Recommendation 24. DHS 

management said that the new case management system, to be 

implemented by the 4th quarter of FY 2011, will collect 

information from redress-seekers through web-based surveys and 

other means. 

OIG Analysis: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the intent 

of this recommendation, which is resolved and open. The solution 

DHS has proposed is appropriate, and will be helpful in the future. 

However, DHS should not delay action in this area until the end of 

FY 2010. DHS should take immediate steps to gather and report 

on redress-seeker impressions of different aspects of the program. 

This recommendation will remain open until we receive 

documentation that demonstrates the collection and reporting of 

redress-seeker feedback concerning the TRIP website, different 

aspects of the redress experience, and overall program satisfaction. 

This documentation should reflect immediate efforts in this area as 

well as future plans. 

Future Considerations for Enhancing TRIP 

Previous report sections identify areas for TRIP improvement and present 

recommendations to effect positive changes in those areas. DHS should 

undertake these near- and long-term corrective actions immediately. In 

this section, we discuss other, less pressing respects in which the program 

could be improved. In particular, we describe possible enhancements in 

program accessibility and TRIP’s influence on screening process 

improvements. DHS should consider improvements in these areas only 

after it has addressed the more urgent needs described earlier in the report. 

Access to TRIP Could Be Expanded 

Daily, the U.S. government applies traveler screening and security 

measures to millions of people from around the world, in a host of 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 103

locations in the United States and abroad. TSA screens more than 

2 million passengers a day at domestic airports, while CBP 

processes approximately 1.13 million travelers through U.S. ports 

of entry on a daily basis. Travelers with grievances may reside 

anywhere and come from a full range of cultural and linguistic 

backgrounds. To be available to the diverse and geographically 

dispersed population with grievances about U.S. government 

screening and security measures, TRIP redress services must be 

highly accessible. 

We identified three ways that TRIP could increase accessibility to 

make its services more readily available to a larger proportion of 

those with screening and security grievances. 

Improve and Expand Dissemination of Program Information

First, TRIP could expand and improve information on its website. 

The website currently provides basic information on TRIP and 

responses to some questions that travelers may ask, such as who 

should use the program and how petitioners’ information is used. 

The website also includes hyperlinks to websites for some of the 

traveler screening programs and activities on which people can 

submit redress requests through TRIP. However, the TRIP website 

does not provide information on or links to all of the screening 

programs and initiatives for which TRIP is to provide redress. Nor 

does it provide a frequently asked question (FAQ) feature to help 

travelers understand TRIP in greater depth. 

Early program plans called for TRIP to have a more expansive and 

informative website for travelers. Participants in TRIP’s early 

development in 2006 stressed the value of a FAQ feature and 

created a draft set of answers to 47 questions for the website.

TRIP’s program manager advised these participants that a final 

version of the FAQs would appear on the TRIP website, but it has 

not. The absence of FAQs from the TRIP website is at odds with 

other program statements as well. The TRIP brochure distributed 

at airports and DHS’ TRIP Privacy Impact Assessment both refer 

the public to FAQs on TRIP’s website. The absence of FAQs on 

the TRIP website is also puzzling because the program’s original 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 104

IT system development contract was amended to include a 

requirement for the developer to add FAQs to the website. 

By adding features to its website to address redress-seekers’ 

questions, TRIP may be able to reduce its workload and satisfy 

traveler concerns. TRIP receives about 200 general travel inquiries 

by email per week. TSA’s general customer service hotline 

responds to approximately 1,200 calls a month regarding redress. 

In addition to reducing the volume of these inquiries, increased 

information on what to expect in the screening and border crossing 

processes may address some travelers’ misconceptions that might 

otherwise lead them to submit a formal redress petition. 

Returns on website revisions could be significant. CBP’s primary 

redress case intake unit, the Customer Service Center, uses 

interactive FAQs to address traveler questions. CBP website users 

can submit travel inquiries to CBP’s Customer Service Center only 

when a FAQ does not address their questions. This approach has 

reduced the number of queries the center receives. Whereas CBP’s 

travel FAQs were accessed 176,021 times in September 2008, only 

2,391 questions were subsequently submitted to CBP. 

Expand Accessibility To Non-English-Speaking Persons

TRIP could be more accessible to non-English-speaking persons. 

TRIP has issued brochures about the program in English and 

Spanish, but its website and intake form are available only in 

English. This English-only approach may exclude a significant 

number of aggrieved travelers and complicate the redress process 

for many others. Almost 10% of TRIP redress requests originate 

from petitioners who reside outside of the United States. Hundreds 

of other potential redress petitioners may never learn of the 

program because program materials are unavailable in their native 

language. In other cases, those with limited English reading and 

writing proficiency may have to enlist the assistance of others to 

complete the redress process, adding inconvenience and potentially 

cost to their grievances about contacts with the U.S. government. 

TRIP’s English-only approach to redress is in part an outgrowth of 

staff limitations. The program does not have the necessary staff to 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 105

review and process redress petitions that include travel narratives 

written in languages other than English. After the program takes 

steps to enact basic improvements in its management and case 

processing activities, it should evaluate options for extending 

redress support to non-English-speaking persons. In so doing, 

TRIP should study other DHS programs with multilingual 

accessibility and explore ways of leveraging those resources. For 

example, a number of TRIP participants offer multilingual 

accessibility for their programs. US-VISIT publishes brochures in 

10 languages, CBP’s Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

brochures are available in 13 languages, and ICE’s Student and 

Exchange Visitor Program’s outreach materials appear in 6 

languages. CBP’s website is available in English and Spanish, its 

Global Entry online applications are accessible in English and 

French, and its Customer Service Center employs Spanishspeaking telephone representatives. 

Alternative Access to Program Information Should Be Explored

TRIP could provide alternative modes of access to program and 

case status information. Redress-seekers currently have limited 

options for submitting TRIP redress requests. They are 

encouraged to submit their requests through TRIP’s secure online 

portal and either mail or email their supporting documentation to 

TRIP separately. Alternatively, redress-seekers can obtain a 

redress request form and mail or email it to the program along with 

supporting documentation. 

Most difficulties that prompt people to apply for redress through 

TRIP occur at U.S. airports and ports of entry. Travelers at these 

locations also generally have the identifying document information 

that TRIP needs to process their redress cases. For these reasons, 

airports and ports of entry are desirable locations for travelers to 

start the redress process. DHS provides some information to 

travelers about the redress process at those locations; TRIP has 

issued brochures to TSA and CBP personnel at airports and ports 

of entry and made them available to air carrier representatives to 

distribute to aggrieved travelers. However, it does not provide 

redress-seekers with a direct means of initiating the redress process 

at these locations. To capitalize on the opportunity for travelers to 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 106

begin the redress process, DHS should consider installing or 

leveraging existing kiosks or using DHS staff already on site to 

collect redress forms and information. 

In addition, TRIP currently provides no means for redress-seekers 

to have live contact with people familiar with the redress process 

or their redress case status. Public and private sector customer 

service surveys indicate that customers value the personal contact 

and dynamic exchange available through live contacts with service 

representatives. Customer service operations in public and private 

sector settings frequently rely on call centers to provide this type of 

live exchange. TRIP clients may benefit from a similar approach. 

TRIP Could Do More to Identify Possible Screening Process 

Improvements

TRIP could help identify possible screening and border security 

process improvements. It could use the data it collects from 

travelers’ redress requests to determine which aspects of the 

screening processes cause travelers the greatest consternation and 

are the source of most complaints. Meanwhile, it could use data on 

general traveler inquiries to inform DHS communication strategies 

on its travel and screening programs. 

TRIP has done some limited work to identify screening process 

improvements, but has not undertaken a regular, deliberate effort 

in this area. In April and May 2008, the TRIP program office used 

case intake data to assess the effect of the DHS Secretary’s 

announcement about air carrier passenger prescreening programs 

on the volume of government redress petitions. In another 

instance, TRIP participants observed that a number of redress cases 

stemmed from data issues related to a particular kind of visa, and 

took proactive measures to resolve the problem for all visa holders. 

Similarly, ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 

redress representative said that he had used TRIP case information 

to identify and correct larger data entry error patterns in the 

system, which had caused international students unwarranted 

difficulties upon return to the United States. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 107

TRIP must do more in this area if it is to fulfill DHS’ public 

declarations about the program’s role in fostering screening 

process improvements. TRIP’s Privacy Impact Assessment and 

System of Records Notice both indicate that it will use redress data 

to assist DHS in identifying aspects of the screening process that 

need improvement. However, TRIP does not perform the type of 

systematic data analysis required to identify emerging trends in 

redress complaints. Nor does it have a process to relay information 

about complaint patterns to other agency or DHS screening 

managers. We encourage TRIP managers to consider these 

innovations.

Conclusion 

TRIP has been operational for almost two years. During that time, it has 

effected several improvements in traveler redress efforts across the federal 

government. Nonetheless, as with many new programs, it has room for 

improvement. 

TRIP will not be able to realize these improvements unless the department 

takes steps to reinforce the IT, organizational, and financial supports to the 

program. DHS must also take immediate action to provide for redress that 

is more meaningful to retain public confidence and trust in the program. 

TRIP needs other key improvements in its security, privacy, reliability, 

timeliness, and performance management. Once the program overcomes 

challenges in these areas, it should seek to address accessibility issues and 

leverage redress data more effectively to improve screening processes. 

TRIP offers the promise of more effective government engagement with 

the traveling public. Redress-seekers submitting petitions through TRIP 

are advised that the program will assist them with their travel difficulties. 

Under present circumstances, however, redress-seekers generally do not 

benefit from their participation in TRIP. Their cases often languish for 

extended periods and are handled inconsistently. Sometimes their cases 

are not brought to the attention of the appropriate agency. In other 

instances, cases are closed before all indicated agencies have had a chance 

to review them. Even when cases are properly reviewed, they do not 

usually produce meaningful results for redress-seekers. In most cases, 

government actions in a redress case do not improve redress-seekers’ 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 108

travel experiences. After the redress process has been completed, TRIP 

provides little information about the basis for redress-seekers’ travel 

difficulties, the action the government took to address it, or what other 

steps redress-seekers may take to help themselves in the future. Finally, at 

no point in the process does TRIP gather customer comments on the 

quality of its services. 

DHS faces substantial challenges in realizing TRIP’s full potential. We 

have made many recommendations to help the department overcome these 

challenges. Taken together, the challenges may be daunting, but DHS 

must dedicate itself to addressing each of them if it is to comply with its 

statutory obligation to provide fair and timely traveler redress. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 109

We conducted this review in response to a request from U.S. 

Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Homeland 

Security Committee. Our objectives were to determine whether the 

Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) was (1) collecting, processing, 

and safeguarding information as intended; (2) processing responses to 

individual requests in a timely manner; and (3) accelerating the refinement 

and correction of erroneous screening information, and contributing to 

screening process improvements. 

We conducted our fieldwork from March 2008 to September 2008. 

During this period, we conducted more than 50 interviews. We met with 

staff from nine DHS components: TSA, CBP, CRCL, ICE, Office of 

General Counsel, PRIV, SCO, USCIS, and US-VISIT. We also met with 

officials from the departments of Justice and State and the National 

Counterterrorism Center, and interviewed industry trade representatives, 

as well as representatives of five U.S. air carriers. 

We performed extensive document review and analysis. We reviewed 

redress-related testimony, and public declarations about TRIP. We 

reviewed laws and regulations related to DHS redress efforts, as well as 

pertinent studies by the GAO and DOJ’s Office of Inspector General. We 

examined related DHS and DOJ directives, agreements, policy, and 

procedures. In addition, we analyzed information in TRIP’s redress 

management system, information from the No Fly and Selectee lists, and 

program performance statistics. 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for 

Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 110
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 111
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 112
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 113
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 114
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 115
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 116
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 117
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 118
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 119
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 120
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 121
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 122
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 123
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 124
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix C 

Department of Justice Management Comments to the Final Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 125
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix C 

Department of Justice Management Comments to the Final Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 126
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix C 

Department of Justice Management Comments to the Final Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 127
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix C 

Department of Justice Management Comments to the Final Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 128
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix D 

Department of State Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 129
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix D 

Department of State Management Comments to the Draft Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 130
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 131

TRIP Participant Redress Program Summaries 

Federal agencies and offices in three Cabinet-level departments support 

TRIP. This appendix provides information on redress programs and 

activities for the agencies and offices that participate in TRIP, as well as 

associated case statistics. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CBP is responsible for protecting the integrity of the Nation’s 

borders while facilitating legitimate trade and travel into the 

United States. CBP receives most of its redress requests through 

TRIP, but also receives a number of requests directly. CBP redress 

cases generally pertain to the treatment of travelers at ports of 

entry. Related complaints often focus on repeated secondary 

inspections by CBP officers, other delays entering the country, and 

denials of entry. Other complaints pertain to CBP’s trusted 

traveler programs, screening efforts, and the basis for its 

admissibility determinations. 

Two CBP offices participate in TRIP: its Office of Public Affairs, 

and Office of Field Operations. CBP’s Office of Public Affairs’ 

Customer Service Center provides CBP redress case intake and 

triage services, while two units within the Office of Field 

Operations review and adjudicate redress requests. In addition, an 

Office of Field Operations representative at the TRIP office triages 

all TRIP redress requests related to ports of entry to ensure that 

they are referred to all appropriate agencies. CBP representatives 

participate in the RCI Governance Board and attend TRIP user 

group sessions. Seven CBP employees focus on TRIP redress 

cases.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 132

Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

1,521

21

1,874

4,012

7,428

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

CBP Participation in TRIP 

Case Status

Total Cases*

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Closed - No Paperwork

Pending Paperwork

Related Cases

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICE is responsible for enforcing a broad array of criminal and 

immigration laws. ICE combats criminals seeking to exploit 

vulnerabilities in our immigration system, our financial networks, 

along our border, and at federal facilities. ICE also apprehends, 

detains, and removes immigration violators. 

TRIP is ICE’s sole intake process for traveler redress inquiries. 

ICE redress cases most often relate to lookouts law enforcement 

agencies have placed in TECS pursuant to a criminal investigation 

and the secondary inspections that these lookouts sometimes 

prompt. Other ICE redress cases relate to student visa program 

data or information entered into immigration systems related to 

alien removals. 

Two ICE divisions participate in TRIP: the Office of 

Investigations, and Detention and Removal Operations. Within 

ICE’s Office of Investigation, two units address TRIP cases. The 

Office of Investigation’s Information Disclosure Unit coordinates 

the review and adjudication of ICE-related cases linked to criminal 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 133

investigations. It is also TRIP’s liaison with criminal investigators 

in other agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Service, and refers a 

number of cases to DOJ’s TSC and coordinates with it on TRIP 

responses. The Office of Investigations’ Student and Exchange 

Visitor Program Office and ICE’s Detention and Removal 

Operations review and adjudicate TRIP cases related to their 

activities and data. 

ICE representatives participate in the RCI Governance Board and 

attend TRIP user group sessions. ICE employees are 

responsible for the review and adjudication of TRIP redress cases. 

Table 3: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

24

15

245

1,220

1,504

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

ICE Participation in TRIP 

Related Cases

Case Status

Pending Paperwork

Closed - No Paperwork

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Total Cases*

National Preparedness and Protection Programs Directorate

United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

Program Office

The US-VISIT program office collects and records foreign 

nationals’ biographic and biometric information upon entry to and 

exit from the United States. US-VISIT-related redress requests can 

be submitted through TRIP or directly to the US-VISIT program 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 134

office. The redress requests US-VISIT receives through TRIP 

generally pertain to fingerprinting quality issues, mismatches 

between biometric and biographical information, and lookouts in 

the immigration system that houses biometric data. 

US-VISIT participated in initial planning and implementation of 

TRIP, and its Director served as one of the RCI Governance 

Board’s original chairs. US-VISIT participates in the review and 

adjudication of redress cases and attends RCI Governance Board 

and TRIP user group meetings. One staff person in the US-VISIT 

Privacy Office is responsible for managing the Program Office’s 

TRIP caseload. 

Table 4: US-VISIT Program Office TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

27

1

53

176

257

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

US-VISIT Participation in TRIP 

Related Cases

Case Status

Pending Paperwork

Closed - No Paperwork

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Total Cases*

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

CRCL advises DHS leadership on civil rights and civil liberties 

matters, directs the department’s equal employment opportunity 

programs, and investigates civil rights and civil liberties-related 

complaints. Most allegations of DHS violations of civil rights and 

civil liberties are reported to CRCL directly. Others are referred to 

CRCL through TRIP. CRCL redress requests are varied, and 

include complaints about inappropriate pat-downs during the 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 135

screening process, poor holding facility conditions at ports of 

entry, and security requirements that do not fully account for 

travelers’ religious traditions and practices. The office employs an 

investigative threshold and does not investigate every case it 

receives.

CRCL was one of the original sponsors of the TRIP effort, and 

provided contract and staff support for the RCI Governance Board 

through the end of 2006. The CRCL Director was one of three 

original chairs of the Governance Board. CRCL remains an active 

member of the Governance Board and participates in TRIP user 

group meetings. The office’s primary ongoing engagement with 

TRIP is through the review and adjudication of redress requests.

One CRCL employee reviews and adjudicates TRIP cases. 

Table 5: Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

37

39

394

494

964

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

CRCL Participation in TRIP 

Related Cases

Case Status

Pending Paperwork

Closed - No Paperwork

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Total Cases*

Privacy Office

PRIV seeks to minimize DHS’ effect on individual privacy while 

supporting attainment of DHS objectives. PRIV is the 

department’s steward in navigating the various laws, executive 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 136

orders, and court decisions related to the collection, use, and 

disclosure of personal and departmental information. 

The office receives redress cases both independently and through 

TRIP. TRIP redress-seekers often communicate privacy concerns 

in the context of concerns about misidentification, possible watch 

list matches, and allegations of officer misconduct. 

PRIV provided privacy policy guidance and oversight for TRIP in 

its early development. It continues to participate in the RCI 

Governance Board and attends TRIP user group meetings. PRIV 

reviews and adjudicates redress cases. One PRIV staff member is 

assigned to TRIP case processing. Other staff oversee this work 

and have participated in the development of the office’s standard 

operating procedures for TRIP. 

Table 6: Privacy Office TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

50

3

706

838

1,597

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

Privacy Office TRIP Participation

Related Cases

Case Status

Pending Paperwork

Closed - No Paperwork

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Total Cases*

Transportation Security Administration

TSA is responsible for the security of the Nation’s transportation 

network, including highways, mass transit systems, ports, and 

airports. TRIP is TSA’s conduit for formal traveler redress 

complaints. Most TSA redress cases relate to terrorist watch list 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 137

misidentifications. Some requests relate to individuals who have 

been correctly identified as being on a watch list, while others 

pertain to allegations of screener misconduct or difficulties with 

TSA security programs. 

TSA is TRIP’s business owner, the owner and architect of its 

primary case management system, and its operational lead. TSA is 

also an integral part of the RCI Governance Board. 

OTSR, a unit in TSA’s Office of Special Counselor, performs most 

TRIP activities. OTSR’s Director serves as the TRIP program 

manager and presides over the TRIP user group sessions. OTSR is 

responsible for all TRIP intake activities; performs case triage, 

review, and adjudication on the bulk of TRIP cases; and prepares 

and transmits most of the program’s formal responses to redressseekers. OTSR performs these functions with a staff of six and the 

support of three contractors. 

Table 7: Transportation Security Administration

TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

9,137

1,563

885

26,312

37,897

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

TSA Participation in TRIP 

Related Cases

Case Status

Pending Paperwork

Closed - No Paperwork

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Total Cases*
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 138

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

USCIS administers immigration and citizenship benefits, and 

adjudicates benefits status filings related to employment 

authorizations, asylum and refugee status, international adoption, 

and citizenship. USCIS has an expansive customer service 

network but receives formal traveler redress requests primarily 

through TRIP. In most cases, USCIS plays a supporting role in 

determining the source of redress-seekers’ travel difficulties. In 

some instances, however, redress-seekers’ travel difficulties arise 

from inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or duplication of USCIS 

immigration records. 

USCIS participates in RCI Governance Board sessions. One 

employee in a unit of USCIS’ Information and Customer Service 

Division generally performs USCIS case review and adjudication 

activities for TRIP. 

Table 8: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

17

0

49

47

113

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

USCIS Participation in TRIP 

Related Cases

Case Status

Pending Paperwork

Closed - No Paperwork

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Total Cases*
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 139

Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Terrorist Screening Center

The TSC maintains the government’s consolidated database of 

known and reasonably suspected terrorists, the TSDB. The TSC 

makes information in the database available to federal, state, local, 

and tribal government entities for screening and security purposes.

Most TSC redress cases stem from a TRIP redress inquiry, 

although the TSC has received case referrals from other sources. 

TSC redress cases are typically petitions for removal from a 

terrorist watch list. Other cases relate to individuals who are an 

exceptionally close match to a watch list record but not its intended 

target. 

The TSC has engaged in terrorist watch list-related redress 

activities for several years. The TSC was the primary architect of 

an interagency memorandum of understanding on terrorist watch 

list redress that was completed and signed in 2007. The TSC has 

an independent unit dedicated to reviewing and adjudicating 

redress cases. The TSC’s Redress Office has staff. TRIP 

case statistics are not available for the TSC’s participation in the 

program because TRIP’s IT system, RMS, does not clearly identify 

cases that the program has referred to the TSC. 

Department of State 

Bureau of Consular Affairs

The Bureau of Consular Affairs is responsible for protecting the 

lives and interests of U.S. citizens abroad, providing passports to 

U.S. citizens, and adjudicating and issuing visas to noncitizens for 

both permanent and temporary entry into the United States. The 

Bureau of Consular Affairs receives redress requests directly, as 

well as through TRIP. TRIP redress requests referred to this office 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 140

generally concern outdated or inaccurate subject or passport 

lookouts in TECS. 

Two units within the Bureau of Consular Affairs participate in 

TRIP: the Passport Services Directorate and the Office of Visa 

Services. Consular Affairs representatives were active in early 

RCI Governance Board discussions. Thirteen Consular Affairs 

employees review and adjudicate TRIP redress cases on a limited, 

part-time basis. 

Table 9: Department of State TRIP Case Statistics 

Number

6

0

167

261

434

* Includes cases in which other agencies and 

offices also participated.

Source: OIG Analysis of RMS Data, October 2008.

DOS Participation in TRIP 

Related Cases

Case Status

Pending Paperwork

Closed - No Paperwork

Active - In Process

Closed - Processed

Total Cases*

Other Federal Agencies 

Several other federal agencies participate in the review and 

adjudication of TRIP redress cases. Their involvement in the 

process is coordinated through one of two agencies. Most TRIP 

case review and adjudication activities related to law enforcement 

matters are coordinated through ICE. ICE works with the U.S. 

Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of 

Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, among other law 

enforcement agencies, to review and adjudicate related redress 

petitions.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix E 

Summary of Participating Agency and Office Redress Programs 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 141

DOJ’s TSC works with the National Counterterrorism Center to 

coordinate redress case review and evaluation activities for 

elements of the Intelligence Community. The FBI, Central 

Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency, among 

other Intelligence Community members, provide information and 

recommendations to address redress petitions related to terrorist 

watch lists. 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix F 

TRIP Traveler Inquiry Form 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 142
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix F 

TRIP Traveler Inquiry Form 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 143
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix F 

TRIP Traveler Inquiry Form 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 144
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix F 

TRIP Traveler Inquiry Form 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 145
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix G 

TRIP Sample Response Letters 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 146
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix G 

TRIP Sample Response Letters 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 147
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix G 

TRIP Sample Response Letters 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 148
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix G 

TRIP Sample Response Letters 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 149
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix G 

TRIP Sample Response Letters 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 150
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix G 

TRIP Sample Response Letters 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 151
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix G 

TRIP Sample Response Letters 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 152
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix H 

TRIP Case Status Codes 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 153

RMS Status Code Case Status

Pending Paperwork Pending Paperwork

No Paperwork Closed - No Paperwork

In Process In Process

Selectee Match Active - In Process

No Fly Match Active - In Process

Closed: Misidentified Closed - Processed

Closed: Positive Selectee Closed - Processed

Closed: Positive No Fly Closed - Processed

Closed: Downgraded Closed - Processed

Closed: Removed from Watch List Closed - Processed

Closed: Federal Law Enforcement Officer Closed - Processed

Legacy Record Closed - Processed

In Process: Multiple Components Active - In Process

Non-TRIP Related Closed - Processed

Received (CBP Desk) Active - In Process

Transferred to Other Agency Active - In Process

Received (CBP Office of Public Affairs) Active - In Process

In Process Active - In Process

Closed / Letter Sent Closed - Processed

Reopened Active - In Process

Requested Additional Information Pending Paperwork

Transferred to Other Agency (CBP Headquarters) Active - In Process

Assigned Active - In Process

Closed Closed - Processed

Pending Active - In Process

Closed: No Action Closed - Processed

Closed: Data Corrected Closed - Processed

All Participating Agencies / Offices

TSA

CBP

ICE

US-VISIT
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix H 

TRIP Case Status Codes 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 154

RMS Status Code Case Status

In Process Active - In Process

Closed Closed - Processed

In Process Active - In Process

Closed Closed - Processed

Notify Subject to Make an INFO Pass Appointment Active - In Process

Background Check Active - In Process

Pending: Waiting for Additional Information / Documents Pending Paperwork

Pending: Within Processing Times Pending Paperwork

Closed: Status Granted Closed - Processed

Closed: Status Denied Closed - Processed

In Process Active - In Process

Closed Closed - Processed

DOS

USCIS

Privacy Office

CRCL

Source: RMS User Functionality Guide, October 2007; and OIG Analysis of October 2008 RMS 

Data.
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix I 

Timeline of Significant Redress Developments 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 155

November 2004 TSA establishes OTSR 

2005 TSC initiates interagency watch list redress 

discussions

January 17, 2006 RCI announcement 

August 17, 2006 First meeting of RCI Governance Board 

October 6, 2006 TSA RMS system launch (precursor to TRIP RMS) 

December 21, 2006 CBP mandates use of PLOR at ports of entry in 

response to misidentifications 

February 13, 2007 Reports of security issues with TSA RMS website 

February 13, 2007 TSA RMS transitioned to TRIP website 

February 21, 2007 TRIP launched 

May 23, 2007 RMS and TRIP online portal taken offline for 

reprogramming

July 31, 2007 RMS and TRIP online portal relaunched on 

TSA-approved platform 

September 19, 2007 Interagency Redress Memorandum of 

Understanding signed 

December 10, 2007 OTSR designated DHS Office of Appeals and 

Redress

April 28, 2008 Secretary Chertoff announces air carrier eligibility 

to establish passenger preclearance programs 

October 28, 2008 TSA issues Secure Flight Program Final Rule 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix J 

Major Contributors To This Report 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 156

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspector General 

Justin H. Brown, Senior Inspector and Team Leader, Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

Anne Ford, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector 

General, Office of Inspections 

Jordan Brafman, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspector General, Office of Inspections 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix K 

Report Distribution 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 157

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Acting Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

Acting Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security 

Administration 

Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Director of the Screening Coordination Office 

Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate 

Director, US-VISIT 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Policy Office-OIG Liaison 

TSA Audit Liaison 

CBP Audit Liaison 

ICE Audit Liaison 

USCIS Audit Liaison 

U.S. Department of Justice

Director, Terrorist Screening Center 

FBI Inspection Division Liaison 

DOJ GAO/OIG Liaison 
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix K 

Report Distribution 

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR part 1520. No part 

of this record may be disclosed to persons without a “need to know” as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except 

with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of 

Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public 

disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part 1520.

Page 158

U.S. Department of State

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

 DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

 Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

 Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.