### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00716- CV
Hyd i Wa ll, App e lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. FM 3072 44, H ONO RAB LE JOH N K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N Hy di Wa ll a

p p e a ls a ju d g me n t t e r

mi n a ti n g th e p ar e n t- c h il d r e lati o n s h ip w it

h her
c hil dr e n W. C.C . a

nd T. C. In f

our is su es, sh e c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y fa ili ngto str ic tly c on str ue the langua g e of

he r a ff ida vit re lin qu ish ing he r pa

re nta l ri g hts in a

mann e r t hat w ou ld permit her to r evoke th e relinquishment; by ref using to he ar e vidence that her a ffidavit of
re lin qu ish me nt w a s o bta ine d b y fr a ud , d ur e ss, un du e inf

lue nc e , o r c oe rc ion ; and

by fa ili ngto se t a hear ing on he r motion for newtrial. Be cause the district court err ed by failing to c onduct a he aring pursuant to sec tion 263.405(d) of the f amily code, w e aba

te the appe al and inst ruct the district c ourt to conduct a he aringconsistent with the statute and our opinion.2

P roce dural Hi story

Although the issues raised by W al l d o not require a discussion of the a lleg ations supporting the depar

tment ’s p et ition, a brief c hronolog y of the litigation is useful. On November 6, 2003, the department filed a suit aff ecting the par ent-c hild relationship seeking termination of the pare nt-chi l d re lationship between Wall and he r childre n W.C .C. and T.C. After Wall’s retained
c o u n s e l w a s p e r

m i t t e d t o w i t h dr aw , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rta p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l t o r e p r e s e n tW a l l
. In September 2004, Wall filed a reque st f or a jury trial. On Oc tober 15, Wall and her counsel attended a mediation with the depa rtment, and Wall signe d a docume nt enti t l ed “Mother’ s Affidavit of Relinquishment of P are ntal Rights to the Texas Depa rtment of Protec tive and Regulatory Service s.” This is a three- pag e docume nt in which Wall st ates that she ha s decide d that termination of her pare ntal rig hts is in t he best intere st of her children, that she voluntar ily and per manently relinquishes those rig hts, and that she would like the depar tment to place the children for adoption. W all and the depar tment also entere d into a rule 11 a g ree ment in which the d ep ar t ment ag ree d to “place the children w ith the f

irst of three friends or

family members named by

Wall who completes a positive home study .” Unde r the ag ree ment, if none of the individuals named by Wall qualified to adopt the
c hil dr e n, the de pa

rtme nt w ou ld p la c e the c hil dr e n e lse wh e re . T he a g re e me nt b e g ins by re c iti ngthat:
HYDI WAL Lis signing today

an Irre vocable Affidavit of Relinq u i s h m en t to the children [W.C .C.] and [T.C. ] , naming the Depa rtment of F amily

and Protec tive Service s (“the D epar

tment”) Sole Mana g ing Conser vator of the children.
Wit hin hour s o f s igningthe af fidavit and rule 11 ag ree ment, Wall contacted he r attorne y and expressed her

desire to r evoke the relinquishment of her pare ntal rig hts.3 The following day , Wall filed an aff idavit attempting to re voke the r elinquishment of he r p are nta l r ig hts and

a mot ion to va c a te the ru le 11 a g re e me nt. Th e a ff ida vit do e s n ot e xpla in Wal l’ s mo tiv a tio n in re vo kin g the re lin qu ish me nt o f h e r p are nta l r ig hts bu t si mpl y state s th a t it

is he r “ de sir e ” to d o s o. W all ’s mo ti on to v a c a te the ru le 11 a g re e me nt i s n ot i n th e re c or d b ut i s ref lected on t h e d i s t rict cour t’s docket she et. Wall’s reque st to vacate the rule 11 a g ree ment and revoke the relinquishment of her pare ntal rig hts was denied at a hea ring on October

22. An orde r terminating the par ent-c hild relationship was sig ned by the district court on Nove mber 1. Wall ti mely

filed a motion for new trial but e ncounter ed some difficulty setting the motion for a hea

ring . She filed a pe tition fo r a w rit of mandamus on January 5, 2005, raising essentially

the same issues a s in this appeal. The pe tition for a writ of manda mus was denied.
Discussion I n her first and second issues, Wall conte nds that the district court e rre d by ref using to a llo w h e r t o r e vo ke the re lin qu ish ment of he r p are nta l r ig hts . Se c tio n 1 61 .1 03 (e ) o f t he fa mil y code g overns whe n an af

fidavit of re linquishm ent may be re voked:
The re linquishm ent i n an affidavit that desig nates the D epar tment of Protective a

nd Reg ulatory

Service s or a licensed child place ment ag ency to serve a s the manag ing conser vator is irre vocable . A re linquishm ent in any other affidavit of r elinquishment is revoca ble unless it expressly

provides for

a stated pe riod of time not to e x cee d 60 day s after the date of

its ex ecution.
Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 61 .1 03 (e ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 4- 05 ); see also Martinez v . Texas De p’t of Pr ote c tiv e an d R e

gu lator ySe rv s. , 116 S.W .3d 266, 271-72 (Te x . App.—El Paso 2003, pet. denied) (d e sig natio n o f d e pa

rtme nt a s ma

na g ing c on se rv a tor e ff

e c tiv e ly wa ive s r ig ht o f r e vo c a tio n) . Wa ll4

points to l ang uag e in her aff idavit in which she desig nates the depar tment “ to car e for

the Children
and to pla c e the Chi ldr e n for a do pti on .” She argue s th a t th e langua g e of he r a ff ida vit and the statut e should be strictly

construed, that her a ffidavit does not expli citly desig nate the de partment “mana g ing c onservator,” a nd there fore , her a ffidavit is revoc able under t he st atute. See Te x. F a m. Code Ann. § 161.103(e ).

We ag ree that termination proce edi n g s should rece ive strict scrutiny and that the statutes g overningsuch proceeding s are to be st rictly construed in favor of t he par ent. See H ollick

v . S mi th , 685 S.W .2d 18, 20-21 (Te x . 1 9 8 5 ). Howe ver, w e will not categ orica lly ignor e the irrevoc able nature of a

relinquishment of par ental rig hts to the department sim p l y b ec ause an aff idavit lacks the mag ic words “ manag ing c onservator. ” W e s t rictly scrutinize the lang uag e of Wall’s affidavit to det er m i n e wh ether it reflec ts her intent to desig nate the de partment mana g ing
c on se rv a tor

of he r ch ild re n. Wal l’ s af

fi davit c le arl y and

re pe a te dly

state s th a t Wa ll i s p e rm ane ntl y relinquishing he r rig hts to her childre n and that the de partment “ will assume responsibility for [the] Child re n , ” “car e for

the Children,” a

nd “plac e the Children f or adoption.” O nly

as mana g ing
c on se rv a tor

wo uld the de pa rtme nt h a ve the a

uth or ity to p la c e the c hil dr e n f

or a do pti on . T he a ff

ida vit also rec ites that the depa

rtment was a lrea dy t h e temporar y manag ing c onservator of the c hildren befor e the relinquishment. Viewingthe af fidavit as a w hole, the only meaning ful construc tion is t hat Wall int ended to de signate the depa rtment as mana g ing c onservator. This intent is further r efle cted by the lang uag e of the rule 11 a g ree ment that Wall “i s s i gning toda y an Irre vocable Affidavit . . .
namin g the [de pa

rtme nt] So le Mana g ingCon se rv a tor of the c hil dr e n. ” B e c a

us e we ho ld t

hat Wa ll desig nated the depar

tment as manag ing c onservator in her a ffidavit, she e ffe ctively waived he r rig htAl t h o u gh J udg e Dietz signe d the final judg ment in this case, Judge Coving ton presided 1 ov e r t he he a ri ngon

Wal l’ s mo tio n a

nd a ff ida vit re vo kin g he r r e lin qu ish me nt of he r p are nta l r ig hts
. 5 to revoke the re linquishm ent of he r par ental rig hts. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 1 6 1 .103(e) ; Martinez , 116 S.W .3d at 271-72. Wall’s first and se cond issues ar e over ruled. I n her th i rd i s s u e, Wall contends that J udg e Coving ton failed or ref used to hea

r 1 proff ere d evidenc e that Wall’s relinquish m en t o f her pa renta l rig hts was obtained throug h fra ud, duress, undue influence , or coe rcion. Wall does not cite any portion of the re cord in support of he r claim, and she has not included the motion acc ompanying her affidavit revoking he r re linquishm ent
o f p ar en t al r i g h t s i n t h e r ec o rd
. Ha v i n g ca re fu l l y re v i ew edt h e r ec o rd , i n cl u d i n g t h e s i x -p age transcr ipt o f th e h e ar in g o n Wa ll ’ s mo ti o n , w e f in d n o a tt e mp t b y Wa ll to o f f e r e v id e n c e of fr aud dure ss, un du e inf

lue nc e , o r c oe rc ion . Wa ll’ s o nly c on te nti on

a t th a t he ari ngwa s th a t he r a ff ida vit
was revoca

ble because it did not contain pre cise languag e desig nating the depa rtment as mana g ing
conser vator. B eca

use the re cord doe s not support W all’s evide n t i ary contention, we ove rrule he r third issue. I n her fourth and final issue, Wall conte nds that the district c ourt err ed by failing or ref using to hold a hearing on her moti on for new trial. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 2 63 .4 05 (d ) ( Wes t 2002). As such, the district court did not make the require d deter minations of (1) whe ther Wall’s motion for new tria l should be g rante d, (2) whe ther her claim of indige nce should be sustained, and (3) whe ther he r appe al is frivolous. Se e id
.

We f ir st n ote that th e fa ilure to c omp ly wi th s e c tio n 2 63 .4 05 doe s n ot d e pr ive thi s Court of jurisdiction over the a ppeal. S e e I n r e T

. A

. C

. W. , 143 S.W .3d 249, 250-51 (Tex. App.—San6

An tonio 20 04 , n o p e t.) ; In reS. J .C. , 1 24 S.W. 3d

23 7, 24 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 3, pe t. de nie d) ; In re M

.G.D. , 1 08 S.W. 3d

50 8, 51 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; In re T.C. , No. 07-03-0077- CV, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 6012, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo J uly 15, 2003, no pet.) (not de signated for publication). We also ca nnot conclude that Wall has waived this issue by failing to obtain a setting on her motion. I t is appare nt fr o m t h e re cord that W all’s counse l
c on ta c te d sev e ra l memb e rs of the c ourt a dmi nis tr a tor ’s sta ff , r e qu e sti ng

a se tti ngon the mot ion

bo th by ph on e and

fa c sim ile c or

re sp on de nc e . Thi s was all that w a s r e qu ir e d und e r t he Tr a vis County District Court local rules. See ge nerally Travis County Civ. Dist. C t. L oc. R. ch. 2. The lang uag e of section 263.405(d) of the family

code makes a he aringon a motion for ne w trial mandatory

in a termination ca se. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405( d) (“ trial court sh a ll h old a he ari ng ” ); In re M

.G.D. , 10 8 S.W. 3d a t 51 6. B ut the statut e do e s n ot s ay wh a t sh ou ld happen w hen a tr ial court fa ils to comply with this mandatory provision. In re M .G.D. , 108 S.W .3d at 516. The department contends that the di strict court’s f ailure to hold a he aringresulted in Wall’s mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l be ing ov e rr ule d by op e ra

tio n of law . I t ci te s Maddox v . Departme nt of Protectiveand Regulatory Serv ices , 45 S.W .3d 210, 214 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.), for the proposition that a mot ion for new t rial under section 263.405 of the f amily code ma y be over ruled by operation of l aw. I mportantly , Maddox inv olv e d a mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l fi le d by the de pa rtme nt, and section 263.405 is not discussed in the opinion. Se e id . at 212. I t is not at all clear that section 263.405 applies to a motion for new trial filed by the depar tment or that the rules of civil proce dure g ener ally g overningmotions for new trial a pply to motions filed under

th i s s p ec i fi c family

code provision. Howeve r, we need not de cide whe ther Wall’s motion was overruled by operation of law7

beca use Wall’s contention is limi ted to the trial cour t’s fa i l u re t o hold a hea

ring
. See Te x. F a m. Code Ann. § 263.405(d)
.

The San Antonio c ourt of appea ls r ece ntly decide d a simil ar issue in I n r e T

. A

. C

. W. , 143 S.W .3 d

2 4 9
. I nth a t c a s e , a

f a th e r ti me ly f il e d a mo ti o nf o r n e w tr ia l c h a ll e n g in g a

ju d g ment terminating his pa

renta l rig hts. Id
. at 250. The father did not file his statement of points of appe al within the s tatutory fiftee n-day deadline as require d by section 263.405(b) of the fa mily code. Id
. A hea ri n g w a s h e ld o n th e mo ti o n f o r n e w tr ia l, b u t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id n ot make any deter minations reg ardingthe motion for new tria l, indigenc e, or w hether the points of appea l were frivolous. Id . The c ourt of appeals observed that “it appe ars f rom the re cord that the trial court questioned its jurisdiction to m ake a ruling under se ction 263.405(d) be cause of the untimeliness of [t he fathe r’s] statement of points on appeal.” Id . T he c ourt of a pp e a ls h e ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

did have jur isdiction and should have made the s tatutory deter minations pursuant to section 263.405(d) of t he fa mily code. Id
. a t 25 1. Ac c or din g ly , the c ourt a bate d the a

pp e a l and re mand e d th e c a se so t h at t h e trial court c ould make the statutory deter mination of whether

the father’s a

ppeal wa s frivolous. Id . (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §263.405( d)(3) ).

The issue ra ised by

Wall is that the district court should ha ve held a hear ing on he r motion for new tria l. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263
. 4 0 5(d)( 1). We ag ree that the hea ring was mandatory

and t h at t he trial c ourt err ed by failing to hold a hear ing. Se e id ; I n r e T

. A

. C

. W. , 143 S.W. 3d a t 25 1; In re M

.G.D. , 108 S.W .3d at 516. I n her brief, W all asks t hat we reve rse the judgment a nd order the district court to set the under ly ing c ase f

or trial. We do not c onclude that the f ailure to hold a he aringon a motion for8

new tria l should result in the rever sal of the judg ment itself. Our opinion in an analog ous criminal appea l provides some g uidance . I n Ma ssi ng ill v . S tat e , w e he ld t

hat a de fe nd ant wa s d e pr ive d o f h is constitutional right to counse l during the time in which h e was to file motions for ne w trial
c ha lle ng ing his c on vic tio n in two se pa rate c a us e s. 8 S. W.3 d 7 33 , 7 37 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 99 , p e t.
re f’ d) . Ci tin g pr ior

c a se law a

nd ru le of a pp e llate pr oc e dure 44 .4 , we he ld t hat th e a pp ro pr ia te
reme dy wa s to a

b a te th e p r o c e e d in g f

o r th e d is tr ic t c o u rt t o h o ld a h e ar in g o nth e d e f

endant’ s motions for new trial. Id . at 738. We explained that the appea l w as abate d and the ca se re manded to t he dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r a he ari ngon

the mot ion s:
I f the district cour

t gr ants the motions, appellant’s appe als will be dis missed. I f the motions are over

ruled, the r ecor d will be suppl em en t ed and the parties will be pe rm itt e d to br ie f a

ny iss ue s r e la tin g to t

he ov e rr uli ngof the mot ion s.
Id . at 738-39 (f

ootnote omitted). We must not aff

irm or reverse a district cour t’s judgme nt if the district court’s e rror (1) pr events the pr oper pr esentation of the case t o the court of appeals, and ( 2) the district cour t can
c o r r e c ti t s a c t i o no r

f a i l u r e t o a c t
. T e x. R
. A p p . P
. 4 4
. 4 ( a )
. U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t an c e s , w e mus t direc t the trial court to cor rec t the err or and the n proce ed as if the err or had not oc curred. Id . at 44.4(b). As in Ma ssi ng ill , the appr opriate r emedy for the district c o u rt ’s failure to hold a hear ing on Wall’s moti on for new trial is to abate the appea l a nd instruct the district c ourt to hold a hea ring pursuant to sec tion 263.405(d). See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 4 4. 4( b) ; Ma ssi ng ill , 8 S.W .3d at 738-39; see
a l s o I n r e T

. A

. C

. W. , 143 S.W .3d at 251. The district c ourt is dire cted to set a hea ring for a date no la te r t ha n 4 5 d ay s a ft e r t

he date of thi s o pin ion . A t th is h e ari ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt wi ll p e rm it Wa llAn order gra nting a motion for new t rial i s g ener ally not review able on a ppeal. See W

ilkins 2 v . M e tho dis t H

e alt h Ca re Sy s. , 160 S.W .3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005).

9 to introduce e vidence , if any , that the re linquishm ent of he r par ental rig hts to W .C.C. and T.C. was not voluntary . I f the district cour t gr ants Wall’s moti on for ne w t rial, Wall’s appea l will be dismiss ed. I f the trial c ourt overr ules the motion, the rec ord will be supplemented a nd the par ties 2 will be permitted to brief any issues rela t i n g t o t h e hea ring and the de terminations made by the district court p u rs u an t to section 263.405(d). The supplemental re cord a nd any briefingby

the p ar t i es s h al l b e f

i l edwi t h t h e c o u rt n o l at er t h an 4 5 d ay s af

t er t h e d at e o f t h e h ea ri n g.
Conclusion We o ve rr

ule Wal l’ s f

ir st t hr e e iss ue s. B e c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d b y fa ili ngto hold a hea

ring pursuant to sec tion 263.405(d), we sustain Wall’s fourth issue. The appe al is abate d and the c ase r emande d to the district c ourt for further proce eding s consistent with section 263.405(d) and our opinion.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Filed: August 25, 2005