J-A23021-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

JOHN COASTON, :

:

Appellant : No. 701 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on April 3, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-02-CR-0014774-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2015

John Coaston (“Coaston”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his convictions of murder of the second degree, robbery, 

and criminal conspiracy (robbery). See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b); 

3701(a)(1); 903. We affirm.

On October 1, 2008, in the Hill District section of Pittsburgh, Justin 

Fowler (“Fowler”) was shot in the back. The shooting severed Fowler’s 

spinal cord below his shoulders, resulting in paralysis below the arms. Leila 

House (“House”) witnessed two black males wearing masks that only 

covered a portion of their faces shoot Fowler. House stated that the 

assailants then went through Fowler’s pockets and took his money. House 

called the police and later identified Coaston in a photo array as one of the 

shooters. Coaston was arrested with two other men, including Malik S. 
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Williams (“Williams”). Due to the fact that Fowler survived the shooting, 

Coaston was charged with aggravated assault. However, the charge was 

withdrawn on November 19, 2008, because Fowler was uncooperative1and 

House was afraid to testify. 

On December 28, 2011, Detective Margaret Sherwood (“Detective 

Sherwood”) responded to a call regarding a deceased person in an 

apartment. Detective Sherwood noticed a strong odor of a body 

decomposing and observed Fowler on the floor of the apartment. Detective 

Sherwood stated that Fowler’s body had decomposed and that his muscles 

had atrophied from lack of use. Detective Sherwood also observed that 

Fowler had very large bed sores and that there were flies and maggots on 

his body. Allegheny County Forensic Pathologist Dr. Beiyang Xu (“Beiyang”) 

stated that Fowler died as a result of complications of paralysis caused by a 

gunshot wound that severed his spine. Xu ruled the manner of death a 

homicide. 

On December 11, 2012, Coaston was charged with criminal homicide, 

criminal conspiracy to commit homicide, robbery, and criminal conspiracy to 

commit robbery. Coaston’s case was joined with that of Williams, who was 

facing similar charges. The case proceeded to a jury trial in April 2013. The 

jury found Coaston guilty of murder of the second degree, robbery, and 

criminal conspiracy to commit robbery. The jury acquitted Williams of all 

 

1

Fowler stated that he was going to “keep it in the streets,” and he did not 

want to be labeled a “snitch.” N.T., 4/25/13, at 196, 201.
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charges. The trial court sentenced Coaston to forty to ninety-nine years in 

prison on the murder conviction, a consecutive prison term of ten to twenty 

years on the robbery conviction, and a consecutive prison term of ten to 

twenty years on the conspiracy conviction. Coaston filed a Motion for 

Reconsideration, arguing, inter alia, that the robbery and murder sentences 

should have merged. The trial court re-sentenced Coaston to forty to 

ninety-nine years in prison for the murder conviction and a consecutive 

prison term of ten to twenty years for the conspiracy conviction. 

Coaston filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement. The 

trial court issued an Opinion.

On appeal, Coaston raises the following questions for our review:

1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict [Coaston] 

when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the assault on [Fowler] was the direct and 

substantial cause of [Fowler’s] death?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to

sustain the objection to Exhibits 6-8 (photographs)?

3. Whether [Coaston] received an illegal sentence when he was 

sentenced for both second-degree murder and criminal 

conspiracy to commit robbery, when those sentences should 

have merged for purposes of sentencing?

Brief for Appellant at 6.

In his first claim, Coaston contends that the evidence was insufficient 

to support his murder conviction. Id. at 15. Coaston argues that the 

Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that Fowler’s October 2008 gunshot 
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wound was the direct and substantial cause of his death. Id. at 15, 24. 

According to Coaston, the evidence suggested that Fowler’s death was 

caused by his failure to take care of himself, including the fact that he was 

malnourished and allegedly abused alcohol. Id. at 20-24; see also id. at 

24 (wherein Coaston claims that Fowler’s physical and mental condition was 

not so weakened, due to the injuries, that he could not take care of himself).

We apply the following standard of review when considering a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 341 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

and brackets omitted).

The Crimes Code defines murder of the second degree as follows:
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(b) Murder of the second degree.--A criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed 

while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in 

the perpetration of a felony.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).

“It is undisputed that the Commonwealth must prove a direct causal 

relationship between the acts of a defendant and the victim’s death.” 

Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 152 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “To establish criminal causation, the Commonwealth must prove 

that the defendant’s conduct was so directly and substantially linked to the 

actual result as to give rise to the imposition of criminal liability.” 

Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756, 760 (Pa. Super. 2008). In 

establishing criminal causation, the Commonwealth must fulfill a two-part 

test. See Commonwealth v. Rementer, 598 A.2d 1300, 1305 (Pa. Super. 

1991); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(a). “First, the defendant’s conduct 

must be an antecedent, but for which the result in question would not have 

occurred.” Nunn, 947 A.2d at 760; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(a)(1). “A 

victim’s death cannot be entirely attributable to other factors; rather, there 

must exist a causal connection between the conduct and the result of 

conduct; and causal connection requires something more than mere 

coincidence as to time and place.” Nunn, 947 A.2d at 760 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Fabian, 60 A.3d at 152 (stating that 

“so long as the defendant’s [conduct] started the chain of causation which 

led to the victim’s death, criminal responsibility for the crime of homicide 
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may properly be found.”) (citation omitted). “The second part of the test is 

satisfied when the victim’s death is the natural or foreseeable consequence 

of the defendant’s actions.” Nunn, 947 A.2d at 760. “[T]he results of the 

defendant’s actions cannot be so extraordinarily remote or attenuated that it 

would be unfair to hold the defendant criminally responsible.” Id.

The trial court summarized the relevant evidence as follows:

Detective [] Sherwood testified that she responded to the 

investigation of a deceased person on Chauncey Drive, 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. She noticed a strong odor of a body 

decomposing and observed [Fowler] on the floor of the 

apartment. She described numerous, used and unused, 

bandages and a wheelchair in the living area. [Fowler’s] body 

had large decubiti, bed sores, across his buttocks, hips, feet, 

shins and elbows. She knew the deceased suffered a gunshot to 

the back on October 6, 2008, and that his spinal cord was 

severed below the shoulders. ... Several decubiti were identified 

on various parts of [Fowler’s] body, and that they were caused 

by pressure on the skin that is in a position for a long time, 

which causes the skin to break down resulting in bed sores. 

Numerous gauze bandages, used and unused, were observed 

along with seeping bandages throughout the apartment. She 

observed [Fowler] to be very thin with atrophied muscles.

***

The Commonwealth called [] House, who testified that on 

October 1, 2008, she resided in the Bedford Housing 

Community, directly across from Chauncey Drive. While on the 

phone, and looking out her kitchen window, she saw a man on 

the steps in the courtyard. She observed two (2) black males 

run from a hallway to the top of a stairway. The two (2) men 

reached their hands out, [] House heard a pop and the man who 

was walking fell straight down. [Coaston] was observed going 

through [Fowler’s] pockets taking his money, after which both 

shooters fled the area. [] House made an in-court identification 

of the defendants. A prior pre-trial photo array was admitted as 

Exhibit 18, wherein ... Coaston, was identified by [] House as the 

“short one with gun” on his picture. [] House testified that she 
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was sure that [Coaston] was one of the individuals who were 

standing over the stairs shooting at [Fowler]. ...

Detective Dale Canofari testified that he took measurements and 

photographed the scene of this shooting a couple weeks after 

the death of [] Fowler. Photographs were taken from [] House’s 

kitchen window toward the area in which she had observed the 

shooting of [Fowler]. The distance from the kitchen window to 

the scene of the shooting measured 44 feet.

Detective Brian Weismantle testified that at the time of [] 

Fowler’s shooting in 2008, he responded to the scene of the 

shooting. The detective testified that he identified the red shirt 

worn by [] Fowler. ... He also verified that [] House identified [] 

Coaston in a photo array, where she wrote “short one with gun” 

and signed it. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/14, at 3-5 (citations and footnote omitted).

Additionally, Beiyang, a Forensic Pathologist with the Allegheny County 

Medical Examiner’s Office, conducted an autopsy on Fowler’s body. N.T., 

4/24/13, at 85, 87. Beiyang testified that Fowler had an “oval-shaped scar 

on the right posterior shoulder [from] the remote gunshot entrance wound.” 

Id. at 88. Beiyang stated that a projectile was left in the border of Fowler’s 

chest wall. Id. at 94-95. Beiyang asserted that the shooting caused 

Fowler’s spine to be severed between the T-1 and T-3 vertebra, which 

rendered Fowler paralyzed from the arms down. Id. at 92-94, 100. 

Beiyang testified that multiple locations on Fowler’s body had deep decubitus 

ulcerations, commonly known as pressure sores or bed sores, which were a 

natural consequence of paralysis. Id. at 88-89, 102. Beiyang indicated that 

even though Fowler did not take care of himself, the ulcerations would have 

eventually developed because of his paralysis. Id. at 102, 104-05, 108. 
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Beiyang stated that Fowler only weighed 92 pounds at the time his body was 

found, and that the low weight may have been caused by loss of muscle 

mass, normal atrophy, and decomposition of the body. Id. at 103-05, 111. 

Beiyang testified that while the alcohol level in Fowler’s body was consistent 

with decomposition, he could not tell what Fowler’s blood alcohol level was 

at the time of his death. Id. at 109-13; see also id. at 113 (wherein 

Beiyang testified that no drugs were found in Fowler’s body, but that drugs 

dissipate over time). Beiyang confirmed that the ulcerations, caused by 

gunshot wounds that led to paralysis, resulted in Fowler’s death. Id. at 99-

100. Beiyang determined the cause of death to be a homicide. Id. at 100, 

107.

Based upon the foregoing evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, we conclude that Coaston’s actions were the “but for” 

cause of Fowler’s death. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 660 A.2d 68, 

70-71 (Pa. Super. 1995) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to support 

appellant’s murder conviction where appellant assaulted a man, which 

caused subdural hematomas, leading to the victim’s eventual death due to 

pneumonia); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 416 A.2d 560, 562 (Pa. 

Super. 1979) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the 

murder conviction where appellant stabbed the victim, which caused 

paralysis and eventually an infection from bed sores that killed the victim 

one and one-half years after the stabbing). Indeed, Coaston’s argument 
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that Fowler did not take care of himself was not such an independent and 

intervening act as to break the chain of causation. See Cartagena, 416 

A.2d at 563 (stating that the fact the victim did not cooperate in treating his 

bed sores was “not such an intervening and independent act sufficient to 

break the chain of causation or events between the stabbing and the 

death.”). Because Fowler’s death was a foreseeable and natural 

consequence of Coaston’s actions, we conclude that the evidence was 

sufficient to support Coaston’s murder conviction.

In his second claim, Coaston contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting photographs of Fowler’s dead body. Brief for 

Appellant at 25. Coaston argues that while the photographs were redacted, 

they were so graphic that they unduly prejudiced him at trial. Id. at 25, 27-

28, 31; see also id. at 28-29 (wherein Coaston states that the pictures 

depicted Fowler’s body when the police found him, and Fowler’s body on the 

medical examiner’s table). Coaston claims that Beiyang was capable of 

explaining the cause and manner of death without the admission of 

photographs. Id. at 26, 31. Coaston asserts that he is entitled to a new 

trial without the admission of the photographs. Id. at 31.

Our standard of review regarding the admission of photographs of a 

homicide victim is as follows:

We will affirm a trial court’s admission of photographs absent an 

abuse of discretion. ...
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When considering the admissibility of photographs of a homicide 

victim, which by their very nature can be unpleasant, disturbing, 

and even brutal, the trial court must engage in a two-step 

analysis:

First a [trial] court must determine whether the photograph is 

inflammatory. If not, it may be admitted if it has relevance and 

can assist the jury’s understanding of the facts. If the 

photograph is inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether 

or not the photographs are of such essential evidentiary value 

that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the 

minds and passions of the jurors.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1033-34 (Pa. 2012) (citations 

omitted). 

Here, the Commonwealth sought to introduce various photographs of 

the victim at the apartment and during the autopsy. N.T., 4/24/13, at 4-7. 

The trial court excluded many of the photographs because they were too 

graphic and inflammatory. Id. at 5, 9-10, 15-16. However, the trial court 

allowed the Commonwealth to introduce three photographs (Exhibits 6, 7, 

and 8) of Fowler to show the ulcerations on his body, which the 

Commonwealth argued were the cause of his death. Id. at 10, 21, 23-26; 

see also id. at 10, 11-12, 18-19 (wherein the Commonwealth argued that 

the photos were relevant to show Fowler’s ulcerations were the cause of his 

death). Due to the graphic nature of the photographs, the Commonwealth 

was required to redact two of the photographs deemed admissible. Id. at 

18-21.

Detective Sherwood testified that Exhibits 6 and 7 showed the 

condition of Fowler’s body when it was found on December 28, 2011. Id. at 
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70. Specifically, Detective Sherwood stated that the photographs displayed 

the ulcerations on Fowler’s body. Id. 73-75, 79-80. Beiyang testified that 

Exhibit 8 was an autopsy photograph that depicted various ulcerations on 

Fowler’s body. Id. at 91-92. Beiyang stated that the ulcerations were the 

cause of Fowler’s death. Id. at 99-100.

The trial court gave the following instruction with regard to the 

photographs:

You saw some exhibits. Your recollection will control, and I don’t 

need to look it up, but there were several photos of [Fowler]. I 

believe 6, 7, and 8 may have been the numbers, but at any rate, 

you saw some photographs that were admitted into evidence for 

the purpose of showing the nature of the wounds, that [Fowler] 

had and showing conditions of the scene of the alleged crime 

which may help you understand the testimony of witnesses who 

testified about these events.

It is not pleasant – and they were not pleasant photographs to 

look at. You should not let those photographs stir your emotions 

to the prejudice of the defendants in this case.

Your verdict must be based on a rational and fair consideration 

of all of the evidence and not on passion or prejudice against the 

defendants, the Commonwealth, or anyone else connected with 

this case.

Again, they were only designed and offered for the purpose of 

helping explain what the situation was at the time, even though 

they were – I don’t know the proper word; unpleasant is putting 

it mildly I would say.

N.T., 4/26/13, at 107-08.

Here, despite the gruesome nature of the photographs, they were 

probative in that they assisted the jury in understanding the circumstances 

and cause of Fowler’s death. See Commonwealth v. Rush, 646 A.2d 557, 
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560 (Pa. 1994) (stating that “the condition of the victim’s body provides 

evidence of the assailant’s intent, and, even where the body’s condition can 

be described through testimony from a medical examiner, such testimony 

does not obviate the admissibility of photographs.”). Indeed, the trial court 

carefully considered each photograph offered, and only admitted certain 

photographs to aid the jury’s understanding of Fowler’s death in light of 

Coaston’s defense. With regard to the prejudicial impact that Coaston may 

have sustained, the trial court provided a cautionary instruction designed to 

ameliorate bias in the minds of the jury and remind them of their duty to 

serve in an impartial manner. See N.T., 4/26/13, at 107-08; see also 

Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 853 (Pa. 2014) (stating that it 

is presumed that the jury will follow a trial court’s instructions). In light of 

the probative value of each photograph, and the trial court’s cautionary 

instruction, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the photographs.2 See Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 

1339, 1347 (Pa. Super. 1992) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting photographs of the deceased victim, even though the 

photographs were assumed to be inflammatory, because the trial court 

issued a cautionary instruction warning the jury that they should not let the 

photographs “stir up [their] emotions.”); see also Commonwealth v. 

Spell, 28 A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. 2011) (noting that an appropriate 

 

2 After review, the cases cited by Coaston do not support his claim for relief.
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instruction regarding photographs of a homicide victim can minimize the 

danger of inflaming the jury).

In his final claim, Coaston contends that the trial court imposed an 

illegal sentence because his sentences for murder and conspiracy should 

have merged. Brief for Appellant at 32, 38, 41. Coaston points out that the 

jury was instructed that he could be found guilty of murder under a theory of 

accomplice liability, and the jury made no finding as to the theory under 

which Coaston was convicted. Id. at 32-33, 37-38, 40-41. Coaston argues 

that the definition of conspiracy is similar to accomplice liability, and 

therefore the sentences should have been merged. Id. at 32, 38.

“A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes 

raises a challenge to the legality of the sentence.” Commonwealth v. 

Quintua, 56 A.3d 399, 400 (Pa. Super. 2012). “Therefore, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id.

Whether offenses merge at sentencing implicates Section 9765 of the 

Sentencing Code, which provides the following:

§ 9765. Merger of sentences

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes 

arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements 

of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the 

other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the 

court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded 

offense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765.
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Here, the jury convicted Coaston of murder of the second degree and 

criminal conspiracy to commit robbery. Pointedly, these crimes are distinct 

criminal acts and the statutory elements of murder of the second degree are 

plainly different from the elements of criminal conspiracy to commit robbery. 

See Commonwealth v. Szakal, 50 A.3d 210, 214 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(noting that “the crime of criminal conspiracy to commit robbery did not 

merge with the crime of second degree murder for sentencing purposes.”); 

see also Quintua, 56 A.3d at 401 (stating that “there is no merger if each 

offense requires proof of an element the other does not.”). Thus, the trial 

court properly determined that the sentences should not merge.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2015