No. 236, October 2008 Strategic Forum 1

Anticipating Change

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) is no stranger to controversy. Over 

the past 60 years, it has endured disputes over 

defense strategy, the role of nuclear weapons, 

the size and composition of its membership, 

and how best to respond to looming challenges 

beyond its immediate territory. Today, however, 

the Atlantic Alliance finds itself increasingly 

stressed by emerging socioeconomic and political changes among the Allies—changes that 

are fundamentally influenced by larger demographic shifts now occurring within its membership and that, taken together, will almost 

certainly hamper its collective ability to deploy 

operational forces and further strain the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. This 

paper offers a preliminary assessment of these 

trends, focusing specifically on the kinds of 

impacts that each is having, or will have, upon 

the Allies and the challenges for Alliance solidarity that may result.

Military Capacity: 

How Usable?

The most immediate trend of concern 

is already being seen within NATO’s military 

manpower base. The shift from large conscript 

forces, which were useful in the defense of 

European territory during the Cold War, toward 

smaller, all-volunteer military establishments 

with a more expeditionary focus has had different and somewhat unexpected political consequences in Europe and the United States.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) finds itself increasingly stressed by 

current and prospective demographic shifts 

within its membership that will almost certainly 

hamper its collective ability to deploy operational forces and further strain the transatlantic 

relationship in the years ahead.

NATO has shifted from large conscript 

forces, which were useful for its territorial 

defense during the Cold War, toward smaller, 

all-volunteer military establishments to carry 

out expeditionary operations. This shift has had 

different political consequences in Europe and 

the United States and has resulted in increasingly diverging views of the role of the military 

and how it contributes to security and defense.

Demographically, the gap between U.S. 

and European NATO members’ military age cohorts is widening, with the U.S. cohort increasing while the European numbers shrink. At the 

same time, diverging immigration patterns and 

shifting internal demographics could erode the 

common historic identity of the United States 

and Europe and affect the transatlantic relationship. A relatively young and growing U.S. population will contribute to its slightly enhanced 

global economic profile in 2050, while Europe’s 

aging and shrinking productive population will 

be a factor in its diminishing presence.

Finally, the world’s population and the 

locus of its economic growth will continue 

to reflect the inexorable shift away from the 

Eurocentric world that existed when NATO was 

created in 1949, leading to Europe’s rapid demographic marginalization and relative economic 

decline by 2050.

 Strategic Forum No. 236

October 2008

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

NATO’s Uncertain Future: 

Is Demography Destiny?

by Jeffrey Simon

When the Cold War ended in 1989–1990, 

the United States had an all-volunteer force 

of 2,181,000 troops, while NATO’s European 

Allies had 3,509,000 troops (roughly 60 percent 

more) under arms (see table 1). All European 

Allies—with the sole exception of the United 

Kingdom, which had an all-volunteer force 

since 1963—maintained largely conscript 

forces. During the Cold War, NATO’s main role 

was the territorial defense of Europe; it never 

engaged in expeditionary operations. Such missions only began in the early 1990s with air and 

naval operations in the Balkans and expanded 

dramatically in December 1995, when the 

Dayton Accords resulted in the deployment of a 

60,000-troop Implementation Force and followon Stabilization Force to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

After a 78-day bombing campaign against 

Serbia in 1999, NATO deployed a 50,000-troop 

Kosovo Force, 16,000 of which remain there 

today. In August 2003, NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance 

Force, which was authorized after the events 

of September 11 and the start of the U.S.-led 

Operation Enduring Freedom and now maintains 52,700 troops in Afghanistan.

Since 1989, when the former Soviet threat 

to Europe was diminishing and out-of-area 

risks were increasing, NATO’s European armed 

forces declined by more than 1.5 million troops. 

When Europe was beginning to respond to new 

risks, it had already lost roughly half a million 

troops by 1995, then another 300,000 by 1999, 

and 700,000 more by 2004; by 2008, only 

1,970,000 troops remained. At the same time, 

most of European NATO was abandoning 
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Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University. Comments may be addressed to Dr. Simon at simonj@ndu.edu.

Table 1. Comparative Trends in Defense Establishments of NATO Cold War European Members*

Strength of Defense Establishments (military) Conscription Terms (months)

 1990 1995 1999 2004 2008 1995 1999 2004 2008

United 

Kingdom 308,000 274,800 210,800 205,000 195,900 0 0 0 0

France** 550,000 502,000 421,000 347,000 301,000 (2015) 12 12 0 0

Germany 545,000 352,000 322,000 258,000 245,000 15 12 10 [130,000] 9 [55,000]

Spain** 263,000 210,000 155,000 124,000 124,000 12 12 0 0

Italy** 493,000 435,000 391,000 315,000 298,000 12 12 0 0

Netherlands 104,000 67,000 55,000 51,000 51,000 12 0 0 0

Belgium 106,000 47,000 43,000 40,000 39,000 0 0 0 0

Denmark 31,000 27,000 25,000 20,000 18,000 9 9 9 4 [5,700]

Norway 51,000 38,000 33,000 22,000 20,000 8–9 8–9 8–9 8–9 [11,000]

Portugal 87,000 78,000 72,000 39,000 41,000 N/A 7 0 0

Greece 201,000 213,000 205,000 132,000 142,000 12–36 12–36 12–36 12 [100,000]

Turkey 769,000 805,000 797,000 502,000 496,000 16–18 16–18 12–15 12–15 [391,000]

Total Force 3,509,000 3,048,800 2,729,800 2,055,000 1,970,900

Professional 1,407,300 1,408,200

Key: *Iceland and Luxembourg excluded; **for 2007, France: 100,000 Gendarmerie; Spain: 80,000 Civil Guards; Italy: 110,000 Carabinieri; N/A = not available; (#) = year; [#] = number of conscripts.

Sources: “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” NATO Press Release M–DPC–2 (1999)152, December 2, 1999, table 6; North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Staff, Defence Policy and Planning 

Division, “NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,” December 20, 2007, table 6.

Cold War and armed forces were becoming less 

visible to their publics, many European societies 

began to raise questions about their utility. This 

was particularly the case when used in unpopular expeditionary operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Additionally, as the armed forces no 

longer constituted the large voting blocks of 

earlier years, they were becoming less politically 

important to their elites. This situation has 

already become acute in Bulgaria, Hungary, 

and the Czech Republic,1

 and is becoming more 

so with the other new members, with the notable exception of Poland.

Defense versus Security

Along with, and compounded by, these 

shifts in military capacity is the reemergence 

of diverging views within the Alliance of the 

role of the military in meeting current security 

challenges. In the aftermath of 9/11, although 

the United States did create a Department of 

Homeland Security, it substantially increased 

defense expenditures, consistently allocating 

conscription and moving toward smaller, 

all-volunteer forces. By 2008, seven of NATO’s 

military establishments had become professional; of the five military establishments 

retaining conscription (because of long-held 

threat perceptions in Turkey and Greece, territorial defense traditions in Norway and Denmark, 

and Germany’s commitment to Innere Fuhrung, 

or “citizens in uniform”), conscript terms have 

shortened because of declining social support. 

In sum, in 2008, the 12 Cold War European 

NATO countries man a force roughly equivalent 

to that of the United States—about 1,400,000 

professional troops.

During the post–Cold War period, NATO 

has added 10 new members (in 1999 and 2004) 

and has extended invitations to Croatia and 

Albania for entry in 2009. The militaries of 

NATO’s new members have experienced the 

same trends as the established members (see 

table 2). As expeditionary operations had become 

the main focus of NATO’s attention, the new 

members focused on developing this capability 

and participated in NATO operations to enhance 

their admission prospects.

In 1999, the 10 militaries counted 

230,000 professionals among their 618,000 

troops. By 2004, their total force declined to 

409,000 troops, but their professional strength 

increased to 270,000. By 2008, 8 of the 10 new 

members had become totally professional (with 

only Lithuania and Estonia retaining conscription for a small part of their armed forces). As 

a result, 314,000 of their 317,000 troops were 

professional soldiers and could be counted 

toward augmenting European NATO’s potential 

deployable force.

But as European militaries have shifted 

to smaller, all-volunteer forces concentrated in 

fewer caserns, significant social and political 

consequences resulted. Public unease over the 

expeditionary use of military forces that one 

might have expected with heavy reliance upon 

young conscripts has not eased with the shift 

toward professional soldiers; if anything, those 

anxieties have increased. As defense was no 

longer the priority that it had been during the 
No. 236, October 2008 Strategic Forum 3

4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 

defense since 2004.2

 The defense budget allocations reflect the fact that the U.S. public and 

political elite continued to see the military as 

providing a significant role in the defense of the 

country. For the United States, the main lesson of 

9/11 was that emerging nonstate threats should 

be interdicted before they reach the American 

homeland, and the U.S. military has proved to be 

the best available instrument for that purpose.

In contrast, most European NATO members are increasingly focusing on internal security, not defense, as a predominant concern. Not 

only do the recent White Papers issued by the 

United Kingdom, Germany, and France reflect 

their growing internal security concerns,3

 but 

also their defense budgets, as well as those of 

other European NATO allies, seem to correspond to those perceptions. While European 

interior ministries are enlarging and playing 

more important roles in addressing security 

concerns, their defense budgets have been stagnating or decreasing.

This downward defense trend has been 

consistent among NATO’s Cold War European 

members since 1990 (see table 3) and is 

unlikely to change any time in the future. Only 

4 of the 12 Allies maintain budgets meeting the 

generally accepted 2 percent of GDP threshold: the United Kingdom and France, with allvolunteer and expeditionary capabilities and 

experience, and Greece and Turkey, with large 

conscript forces and mutual defense concerns. 

France pledges to hold its defense budget constant at 2 percent until 2012 but will reduce its 

defense establishment by 54,000 over the next 7 

years. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Spain 

have defense budgets that have declined to 1.3 

percent or lower.

When a terrorist train bombing killed 

191 and wounded more than 1,400 in Madrid 

in 2004, Spain did not want NATO to invoke 

Article 5; it increased its interior ministry budget and held defense expenditures steady at 1.2 

percent. When other NATO European members 

have faced similar challenges, they, too, have 

focused on internal security institutions, where 

NATO’s defense instruments are less relevant. 

This emphasis conforms to the traditional tendency in many parts of Europe to view terrorism as a law enforcement problem first and 

foremost, thus falling within the purview of a 

country’s police and public security apparatus, 

rather than a threat to be countered by military 

means. In sum, internal security challenges 

are becoming more relevant to European societies and political elites, an area where NATO’s 

Article 5 has a diminishing role to play. Hence, 

many European NATO members apparently see 

defense allocations as less relevant to deal with 

their security challenges.

The same stasis or downward trend has 

been evident even among NATO’s 10 new members since their accession (see table 4). Only 

Bulgaria meets the 2 percent goal, and only 

Poland and Romania come close at 1.9 percent. Despite earlier promises, some Allies—

Hungary, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic—

have clearly returned disappointing defense 

results. And this trend is not likely to change 

among NATO’s new Allies in the near future.

In marked contrast to NATO’s Cold War 

and new European members, the United States 

continues to see defense as a vital instrument to 

deal with threats. These diverging transatlantic 

views on how the military contributes to defense 

and security are likely to exert further pressure 

on European defense budgets and military forces 

and on the transatlantic relationship.

The Shrinking 

Military Age Cohort

The issues of shrinking force size and 

resource commitments, while significant in 

their own right, pale in comparison to a much 

more profound challenge: U.S. and European 

NATO members’ military service cohorts are 

moving in opposite directions.

The U.S. population of 283,230,000 

in 2000 is projected to grow to roughly 

397,063,000 in 2050.4

 During the same period, 

the U.S. median age of 35.5 is to increase only 

slightly to 36.2 in 2050.5

 Hence, the United 

Table 2. Comparative Trends in Defense Establishments of New NATO Members

Strength of Defense Establishments 

(military)

Conscription Terms 

(months)

 1995 1999 2004 2008 1995 1999 2004 2008

Hungary 68,261 52,200 30,000 20,000 12 9 6 0 (2005)

Poland 278,600 205,000 150,000

(2010) 

120,000 18 12 12 0 (2010)

Czech 

Republic 73,591 56,247 38,000 25,000 12 12 12 0 (2005)

Slovakia 52,015 45,483 30,000 18,000 12 12 9 0 (2005)

Romania 217,400 150,000 93,000 75,000 12 12 12 0 (2007)

Bulgaria 118,000 82,000 40,000 34,000 18 12 6–9 0 (2008)

Lithuania 8,000 9,850 11,450 10,000 12

[3,500] 

12

[4,000] 

12

[1,500] 

12

Latvia 4,615 5,500 4,250 4,900 12

 [1,500] 

12

[300] 

12 0 (2007)

Estonia 3,270 3,800 3,800 3,800

[2,000] 

12 12 8–11

[1,500] 

8–11

Slovenia N/A 7,800 6,900 7,000 N/A 7 0 0

Total Force* 820,000 618,000 409,000 317,000

Professional* N/A 230,000 270,000 314,700

Key: *Numbers approximate; N/A = not available; (#) = year; [#] = number of conscripts.

Sources: Jeffrey Simon, NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts on New Members and Partners, Institute for National Strategic Studies 

Occasional Paper 1 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 2005), table 4; North Atlantic Treaty Organization International 

Staff, Defence Policy and Planning Division, “NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,” December 20, 2007.
4 Strategic Forum No. 236, October 2008

Table 4. Comparative Trends in Defense 

Budgets of New NATO Members

Defense Budget as Percent of 

Gross Domestic Product

1995 1999 2004 2007

(current prices)

Hungary 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.1

Poland 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.9

Czech 

Republic 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.6

Slovakia 2.6 1.7 1.7 1.7

Romania N/A 1.8 2.0 1.9

Bulgaria 2.6 2.1 2.5 2.0

Lithuania 0.5 1.5 1.4 1.2

Latvia 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.7

Estonia 1.1 N/A 1.6 1.6

Slovenia N/A 1.5 1.7 1.7

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Staff, 

Defence Policy and Planning Division, “NATO-Russia Compendium 

of Financial and Economic Data relating to Defence,” December 

20, 2007, table 3.

States should have an adequate cohort available 

for military service at current troop levels. In 

marked contrast, European (Cold War and new) 

NATO members6

 not only will experience population decline, but also the median age of 37.7 

in 2000 is projected to rise to 47 in 2050.7

 What 

this means is that the Europeans’ declining 

military service cohort could affect their ability 

to meet planned force levels and make it more 

difficult to modernize their smaller, expensive professional forces in the face of mounting 

health and social costs for their aging populations. Some European Allies actually may have 

to face the question of whether they will be able 

to maintain a viable military.

Among NATO’s Cold War European members (see table 5), the declining cohort and 

aging problem will be felt most acutely in Italy 

and Spain, where overall declines of 21 to 25 

percent in population are projected. As a result, 

between 2005 and 2050, Italy’s population over 

the age of 60 will increase substantially from 

25.5 to 41.6 percent, and Spain’s from 21.4 to 

39.7 percent. Although Germany, Greece, and 

Portugal have overall projected population 

declines of 10 to 15 percent, they also will experience an aging challenge. Between 2005 and 

2050, the 60-and-over population will increase 

in Greece from 23 to 36.8 percent; in Portugal 

from 22.3 to 36.3 percent; and in Germany from 

25.1 to 35 percent.8

 In all these cases, a shrinking 15- to 59-year-old cohort will find it more 

difficult to fill out military billets to maintain 

existing force levels, while the need to subsidize the increasing health care and social welfare costs of an aging population will compete 

with efforts to maintain and modernize existing armed forces. Even France and the United 

Kingdom, which have relatively more favorable 

demographics, face challenges. In 2005, both 

had 60-and-over populations of 21.1 percent; by 

2050, those French and British populations will 

be 33 and 29.4 percent, respectively.9

 In sum, 

NATO’s European Cold War members will find 

it increasingly difficult to recruit, retain, and 

modernize their military establishments.

If this situation appears challenging for 

NATO’s European Cold War–era members, it is 

even more dire for the Alliance’s new members 

(see table 6) whose populations are projected to 

experience substantial decline. Between 2005 

and 2050, Bulgaria and Estonia are projected 

to shrink to almost half their current size, facing declines of 43 and 46.1 percent, respectively. 

Bulgaria’s 60-and-over population is forecast to 

increase from 22.4 to 38 percent, and Estonia’s 

from 21.6 to 33.6 percent. Latvia, Hungary, 

and Slovenia are expected to face population 

declines of 28, 24.9, and 23.2 percent, respectively. Although their actual declines will be 

more moderate than those of Bulgaria and 

Estonia, they will face the burden of subsidizing an even larger aging population. Between 

2005 and 2050, Latvia’s 60-and-over population is projected to more than double from 22.5 

to 48 percent, Slovenia’s from 20.5 to 40.2 percent, and Hungary’s from 20.8 to 36.2 percent. 

Although the Czech Republic and Lithuania 

face lower overall population declines, they also 

share the burden of almost doubling 60-andover populations, facing increases from 20 to 

39.3 percent and 20.7 to 37.9 percent, respectively.10 Hence, NATO’s new members will find it 

even more challenging than the European Cold 

War members to retain modernized military 

establishments at their already significantly 

reduced troop levels.

In summary, the Europeans’ diminished cohort will make it increasingly difficult 

for their militaries to meet existing, already 

much smaller, all-volunteer force recruitment 

goals. Mounting health and welfare costs for 

an aging population will also compete more 

with resources necessary to modernize those 

smaller forces. Recruitment and retention pressures are already evident in Bulgaria, Hungary, 

the Czech Republic, and Romania. Declining 

European cohorts have resulted in lower intake 

standards and smaller forces and will further 

fuel the already strained transatlantic burdensharing debate.

Impact of Immigration

Any assessment of shifting demographics 

within the Alliance must consider the distinctive impact of diverging immigration patterns 

in Europe and the United States and the potential for these patterns to erode a common historic identity. As fertility declines in Europe, the 

contribution of international migration to its 

population growth is increasing in significance. 

Although immigration is one way to increase 

the number of European cohorts available for 

military service, other demographic forces are 

pulling the United States and European NATO 

countries in different directions. Worldwide, 

the countries with the highest levels of net 

emigration annually are projected to be 

Table 3. Comparative Trends in Defense 

Budgets of NATO’s Cold War European 

Members*

Defense Budget as Percent 

of Gross Domestic Product

1990–

1994

1995–

1999

2000–

2004 2007

(average current prices)

United 

Kingdom 3.7 2.7 2.4 2.3

France 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.0

Germany 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.3

Spain 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.2

Italy 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8

Netherlands 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.5

Belgium 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.1

Denmark 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3

Norway 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.4

Portugal 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.5

Greece 3.9 4.1 3.2 2.8

Turkey 3.8 4.4 4.2 2.7

Key: *United States, Canada, and Luxembourg excluded.

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Staff, 

Defence Policy and Planning Division, “NATO-Russia Compendium 

of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,” December 

20, 2007, table 3.
No. 236, October 2008 Strategic Forum 5

China (−329,000), Mexico (−306,000), India 

(−241,000), Philippines (−180,000), Pakistan 

(−167,000), and Indonesia (−164,000).11 While 

the United States and Europe will be net receivers of international migrants, their intake composition is increasingly different. The traditional U.S. immigration pattern increasingly 

has shifted away from Europe, while Europe’s is 

increasingly shifting toward immigration from 

Muslim lands in Asia Minor, the Middle East 

and Southwest Asia, and the Maghreb. This 

could pull each side of the Atlantic in different 

directions.

The United States faces immigration 

demographics that are very different from 

Europe; its birth rate is higher, and it can 

absorb many more immigrants. From 2005 to 

2050, the United States is projected to receive 

1.1 million immigrants annually, many of 

whom are Hispanic (Spanish is rapidly becoming its second language) and Asian, whose populations will triple in size. The Hispanic population, 42 million in 2005, will rise to 128 

million in 2050, constituting 29 percent of the 

U.S. population (compared to 14 percent in 

2005 and 3.5 percent in 1960). The Asian population, 14 million in 2005, will grow to 41 million in 2050, constituting 9 percent of the U.S. 

population (compared to 5 percent in 2005 

and 0.6 percent in 1960).12 This means that 38 

percent of the U.S. population will be either 

Hispanic or Asian in 2050, compared to only 

4.1 percent in 1960.

During the same period, the internal 

demographics of NATO’s European Allies face 

drastic changes as well. Germany is projected 

to receive 150,000 immigrants annually, Italy 

139,000, the United Kingdom 130,000, and 

Spain 123,000.13 Immigration from Turkey, 

the Muslim East, and North Africa to fill labor 

shortfalls is already having an impact on intercommunal relations and security concerns. 

Since the attacks of September 11, public anxieties about an influx of Muslim populations 

into Europe have risen, sparked in part by 

numerous outbreaks of violence. Security concerns have increased since the Madrid commuter train bombings on March 11, 2004; the 

assassination of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh 

in the Netherlands in November 2004; terrorist bombings in London in July 2005; weeks of 

street violence and car bombings in France in 

October-November 2005; and widespread riots 

following the publication of cartoons offensive to some Muslims in a Danish newspaper 

in February 2006. Pew public opinion polls in 

Spain, Germany, Great Britain, France, and 

the Netherlands indicate that between 70 and 

78 percent are either somewhat or very concerned about Islamic extremism.14 While 

Muslims in the United Kingdom constitute 

roughly 3 percent of overall population (mostly 

Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), in Germany, 

4 percent (mostly Turks), in France, 8 percent 

(mostly Algerians), in Spain, 2 percent (mostly 

Moroccans), and in the Netherlands, 6.6 percent 

(mostly Indonesians, Turks, and Moroccans),15

their fertility rates are three times higher than 

non-Muslims.16 Muslim immigration has contributed to European NATO’s increasing focus 

on internal security (rather than defense) and 

will likely have an impact on Europe’s political 

relations with the external Islamic world.

While Muslim population growth resulting 

from immigration and higher fertility rates is 

clearly a factor within European NATO, it is also 

having an impact in wider Europe. During the 

same period (2005–2050), Russia’s population is 

projected to decline from 145.5 million to 104.3 

million, with Muslims approaching the majority of the population. Ukraine, facing increasing pressures in South Crimea, will decline 

from 49.6 to 29.9 million.17 Similarly, demographics in the Balkans will evidence some 

local Muslim populations (Albania, Kosovo, and 

Bosnia-Herzegovina) approaching majorities.

In summary, U.S. and Europe’s diverging and shifting internal demographics will 

likely continue to pull each side of the Atlantic 

in different directions. The U.S. reorientation 

from predominantly European to increasingly 

Hispanic and Asian will likely pull diaspora 

attention toward these regions, while Europe’s 

increasingly Muslim diaspora probably will 

draw attention in different directions.

The Age Factor

Another phenomenon, closely connected to 

immigration, is that of aging. While a relatively 

young and growing U.S. population will be a 

factor in its slightly enhanced global economic 

profile in 2050, Europe’s aging and shrinking productive population will contribute to its 

diminishing presence.

Within Europe’s NATO members, the link 

between aging and productivity will be especially acute. Europe’s fertility rates remain low 

(decreasing from 1.9 in the mid-1980s to 1.4) 

and are projected to decline over the next 

decade;18 its active working population will 

decline from 331 million to 243 million.19

Hence, fewer productive people will need to 

devote more resources to provide health and 

social services to an aging European population. 

Table 5. Selected NATO European Member Population, 2000–2050 (medium variant)

Population (thousands) Difference

 2000 2050 Absolute Percentage

United Kingdom 59,415 58,933 −482 −0.8

France 59,200 63,100 +3,900 +6.6

Germany 82,017 70,805 −11,212 −13.7

Spain 39,910 31,282 −8,629 −21.6

Italy 57,530 42,962 −14,568 −25.3

Netherlands 15,868 15,845 −18 −0.1

Belgium 10,249 9,583 −667 −6.5

Denmark 5,320 5,080 −240 −4.5

Portugal 10,016 9,006 −1,010 −10.1

Greece 10,610 8,983 −1,627 −15.3

Turkey 66,700 98,800 +32,100 +48.1

Total w/o France and Turkey 290,935 252,479 −38,453 −13.2

Total w/ France and Turkey (416,835) (414,379) −2,457 −0.6

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Council, World Demographic Trends: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Report E/CN.9/2001/4, 

tables 4, 6.
6 Strategic Forum No. 236, October 2008

be roughly equal to that of the United States and 

twice that of the EU 15. Internal demographic 

factors and external global shifts increasingly 

will draw the attention of the United States 

away from its traditional European focus. 

Europe’s rapid demographic marginalization 

and diminishing social, economic, and political 

weight will mean that it will no longer be the 

“center” of the world or of U.S. attention.

Is Demography Destiny?

As the French philosopher August Comte 

suggested in his now-famous formula, a society’s demographic inheritance can indeed be 

a decisive factor in its fate. And what is true 

for countries is no less true for alliances. The 

future of the Alliance is increasingly challenged by a range of problems that are fundamentally rooted in its social demography, 

and these problems will very likely continue to 

divide both sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance’s 

future is being influenced by Europe’s shifting 

from large conscript armed forces to smaller, 

all-volunteer forces and by diverging transatlantic views on the military’s role in providing defense and security. In addition, as the 

Alliance advances toward the middle of the 21st

century, increasing U.S.-European demographic 

divergences will likely continue, reflecting the 

shrinking European population cohort available for defense establishments; altered immigration patterns will further loosen traditional 

social ties; aging European populations will 

As a result, according to some estimates, the 

share of the gross world product (GWP) of the 

15 European Union (EU 15) members as of 

1995 will decline from roughly 22 percent in 

2003 to 12 percent in 2050.20 Europe’s aging 

population will comprise a shrinking portion of 

the global population with resulting economic, 

social, and security consequences.

In marked contrast to Europe, the U.S. 

population will actually increase during the 

same time. Due to higher fertility rates (2.1) 

and immigration flows, the median age of the 

U.S. population (35.5 in 2003) will rise only 

slightly (36.2 in 2050),21 and its active working population will actually increase from 269 

million in 2003 to 355 million in 2050. And 

according to some estimates, the U.S. share of 

GWP is projected to increase from roughly 23 

percent now to 26 percent in 2050.22 In other 

words, the U.S. experience will significantly 

diverge from that of Europe. This factor, combined with immigration patterns noted earlier, 

could also have a dramatic effect on its identity and political orientation. While Europe will 

remain important to the United States, Asia and 

Latin America will be gaining in relative economic, social, and domestic political importance. These trends, too, are likely to have an 

impact on the transatlantic relationship and 

the Alliance’s future as we move toward the 

mid-21st century.

Demographic and 

Economic Marginalization

Finally, there is a global reality to be 

considered: The world’s population will continue to reflect the inexorable shift away from 

the Eurocentric world that existed when NATO 

was created in 1949 to the rapid demographiceconomic marginalization of Europe by 2050.

In 1950, the world population stood at 

2.519 billion; shortly after NATO’s 50th anniversary in 2000, the world population stood at 

6.057 billion. Over those 50 years, the North 

American (including Canada) share of world 

population of 172 million (or 6.8 percent share) 

grew to 314 million (or 5.2 percent). In marked 

contrast to North America, although the population of the 25 member nations of the EU 

(the EU 25 as of 2004)—350 million (at 13.9 

percent)—had grown to 452 million, this represented a decline to 7.5 percent of the world 

population. In effect, Europe registered a significant demographic marginalization within 

the world.23

Over the next decades, Europe’s demographic marginalization will become more 

rapid and will result in relative economic 

decline. If NATO still exists in 2050, it will do 

so in a world with a population projected to 

be 9.322 billion. The North American population is projected at 438 million (or 4.7 percent) with a 26 percent share of GWP; the EU 

25, forecast as down from 452 million to 431 

million (or 4.6 percent), is projected to only 

share slightly more than 12 percent of the GWP. 

Significantly, thanks to an increasingly nonEuropean diaspora, U.S. political attention 

will shift away from Europe and toward Latin 

America and Asia as these areas become more 

important. The population of Latin America 

and the Caribbean, which stood at 519 million 

in 2000 (up from 167 million in 1950), is projected to surpass Europe by more than 30 percent in 2050, with a population of 806 million 

(or 8.6 percent).

In Asia, China counted 1.275 billion in 

2000 (up from 554.8 million in 1950) and is 

projected to be at 1.462 billion in 2050 (or 15.7 

percent). During the same period, India’s population of 1 billion in 2000 (up from 357.6 

million in 1950) is projected to be 1.57 billion 

(or 16.8 percent of the world population) in 

2050.24 The two countries together will comprise 

32.5 percent of the total world population and 

will play a larger role in the world economy. 

China’s 25 percent share of GWP in 2050 will 

Table 6. New NATO Members: Projected Population Trends, 2000–2050 (medium variant)

Population (thousands) Difference

 2000 2050 Absolute Percentage

Hungary 9,968 7,486 −2,481 −24.9

Poland 38,605 33,370 −5,235 −13.6

Czech Republic 10,272 8,429 −1.842 −17.9

Slovakia 5,399 4,674 −724 −13.4

Romania 22,438 18,150 −4,288 −19.1

Bulgaria 7,949 4,531 −3,419 −43.0

Lithuania 3,696 2,989 −707 −19.1

Latvia 2,421 1,744 −677 −28.0

Estonia 1,393 752 −642 −46.1

Slovenia 1,988 1,527 −461 −23.2

Total 104,129 83,652 −20,476 −19.7

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Council, World Demographic Trends: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Report E/CN.9/2001/4, table 6.
No. 236, October 2008 Strategic Forum 7

compete with defense for ever scarcer resources; 

and the changing global population mix will 

reflect Europe’s demographic marginalization 

and relative economic decline.

How will the diminishing overall “weight” 

of the “West” affect both Europe’s and the U.S. 

positions and roles in the world? How relevant 

will NATO be to U.S. and European interests in 

2050? Will the trends discussed above loosen 

further or actually undermine Article 5, the 

transatlantic foundation of the past half-century, or could these trends conceivably foster a 

sober Euroatlantic community discussion that 

could ignite the spark to seek a newly defined 

mutual security organization that could pull 

both sides of the Atlantic together to fend off the 

outside world?

No one can answer these questions in any 

definitive way. What is clear is that as Europe’s 

60-and-over population expands and as NATO 

approaches its 60th anniversary in 2009, these 

social, economic, and demographic factors need 

to be consciously weighed by the Alliance as it 

looks ahead to writing a new Strategic Concept. 

A reexamination of the 1949 Washington Treaty 

and an assessment of how NATO responded 

successfully to 20th-century world challenges 

might be in order as the basis to explore how 

the Washington Treaty might be refocused, 

updated, and/or recast to deal with the greatly 

transformed world of the mid-21st century. If 

in fact NATO’s Article 5 has less relevance in a 

21st-century world, and if internal security concerns are becoming more pertinent to Europe 

than external defense, NATO’s overriding task 

should be to identify what, if any, transatlantic interests remain—be they international 

terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, regional conflicts and failed states, 

transnational crime, energy and cyber security, migration, pandemic disease, or global 

warming—and how the Alliance can best act 

with common purpose in light of them. Without 

such concerted action, it is hard to foresee 

how demography will not prove to be NATO’s 

Achilles’ heel.

Notes

1

 Interviews with senior Bulgarian, Hungarian, and 

Czech defense officials in Sofia, Bulgaria, and Washington, DC, 

on April 26, 2007, June 3, 2008, and June 17, 2008.

2

 North Atlantic Treaty Organization International 

Staff, Defence Policy and Planning Division, “NATO-Russia 

Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to 

Defence,” December 20, 2007, table 3, “Defence Expenditures 

as Percent of Gross Domestic Product,” available at <www.

nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p050609.pdf>.

3

 The United Kingdom White Paper sees “no major conventional threats . . . but the threat from proliferation and 

international terrorism remains very real. [Hence] defence 

forces must support Home defence and security in support of 

the Home Office and civil authorities . . . achieved though Joint 

Regional Liaison Officers to protect our citizens at home.” 

Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White 

Paper (London: Ministry of Defence, December 2003), 3, 9. 

The German White Paper portrays internal and external security becoming increasingly interwoven, arguing that “the need 

for the protection of the population and of the infrastructure 

has increased in importance as a result of the growing threat 

that terrorist attacks pose to German territory” and calling for 

“expanding the Constitutional framework for the deployment 

of the armed forces.” White Paper 2006 on German Security 

Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: Federal 

Ministry of Defence, 2006), 9, 57. The French White Paper 

claims “the traditional distinction between internal and external security has lost its relevance,” adding that uncertainty 

requires the ability to anticipate and take decisions autonomously. Hence, it calls for increased expenditures for intelligence and establishing a new Defence and National Security 

Council. The French White Paper on Defence and National 

Security (Paris: President of the Republic, 2008), 5, 11, 16.

4

 United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council, 

World Demographic Trends: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, UN Report E/CN.9/2001/4, table 4, “Countries with 

a Population of 50 Million or More, 1950, 2000, and 2050 

(Medium Variant)” (New York: UN, 2004), 17. A recent Pew 

Research Center Report projects similar trends for the United 

States, showing an increase from 296 million in 2005 to 438 

million in 2050. See Jeffrey S. Passel and D’ Vera Cohn, U.S. 

Population Projections: 2005–2050 (Washington, DC: Pew 

Research Center, February 11, 2008), 8.

5

 Calculations of University of Michigan demographer 

Bill Frey cited in “Half a Billion Americans?—Demography 

and the West,” The Economist (London), August 24, 2002, 22.

6

 With the notable exceptions of Turkey and France, 

which project population increases, and the United Kingdom 

and Netherlands, which fundamentally remain unchanged.

7 World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, UN 

Report ST/ESA/SER.A/261/ES (New York: UN, 2007), 9. These 

figures are similar to median age (the age that divides the older 

and younger halves of the population) calculations. In Europe 

in 2002, the median age was 38 years; by 2050, it will be 51. 

In Germany, it will be 53; in Italy, 57. See Peter G. Peterson, 

“The Global Impact of a ‘Gray Dawn,’” Heritage Lectures No. 

729 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, February 26, 

2002), 4.

8

 Jack A. Goldstone, “Flash Points and Tipping Points: 

Security Implications of Global Population Changes, 2005–

2025,” paper presented to the Conference on Population 

Changes and Global Security, Berlin, Germany, November 13, 

2006, table 5, 47.

9

 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, 13.

12 See Passel and Cohn, figure 6, “Population by Race 

and Ethnicity, Actual and Projected: 1960, 2005, and 2050,” 9.

13 Ibid.

14 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Islamic Extremism: 

Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics

(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, July 2005), 3. These 

figures also held in 2006. See Pew Global Attitudes Project, 

Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About 

Religious and Cultural Identity (Washington, DC: Pew 

Research Center, July 2006), 5.

15 An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of 

Europe (Washington, DC: The Pew Forum, October 2005), 

3; and Maarten Alders, “Forecasting the Population with a 

Foreign Background in the Netherlands,” Paper for the Joint 

Eurostat–United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 

Work Session on Demographic Projections, Vienna, September 

21–23, 2005, 6.

16 Omer Taspinar argued in 2003 that the Muslim birth 

rate in Europe is three times higher than for non-Muslims, and 

that if current trends continue, the Muslim population in Europe 

will nearly double by 2015, while the non-Muslim population will 

shrink by 3.5 percent. See Europe’s Muslim Street (Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), available at <www.brookings.

edu/opinions/2003/03middleeast_taspinar.aspx?p=1>.

17 World Demographic Trends: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, 20.

18 “Half a Billion Americans?—Demography and the 

West,” 22.

19 John Vinocur, “A Gloomy Scenario for Europe’s 

Economy,” International Herald Tribune, May 14, 2003.

20 Ibid.

21 “Half a Billion Americans?—Demography and the West.”

22 Ibid.

23 See Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll, “The 

Political Demography of the World System, 2000–2050,” 

Population Council Working Paper No. 213, 2006, table 1, 

“Population and Population Change by Major Country and 

Region, 1950–2050,” 31.

24 See World Demographic Trends: Report of the 

Secretary-General, table 1, “Estimated and Projected 

Population of the World, Major Development Groups and Major 

Areas, 1950, 2000, and 2050,” and table 4, “Countries with 

a Population of 50 Million or More, 1950, 2000, and 2050 

(Medium Variant),” 9, 17.

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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

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James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
8 Strategic Forum No. 236, October 2008

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