U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–791PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

ASSESSING U.S. POLICY PRIORITIES IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 3, 2019 

Serial No. 116–24 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

TED LIEU, California 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Ranking 

Member 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

CASEY KUSTIN, Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Ewers, Elisa Catalano, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Middle East Security Program, 

Center for a New American Security ................................................................. 8 

Benaim, Daniel, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress ........................... 18 

Pletka, Danielle, Senior Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, 

American Enterprise Institute ............................................................................ 28 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 46 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 47 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 48 

Questions for the record from Representative Allred ........................................... 49 

(1) 

ASSESSING U.S. POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE 

MIDDLE EAST 

April 3, 2019 

House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and 

International Terrorism 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in Room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E. Deutch 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. This hearing will come to order. Welcome, 

everyone. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on U.S. 

policy priorities in the Middle East. I thank our witnesses for appearing today and I will start by recognizing myself for an opening 

statement. 

Thanks to our panel. Thanks for being here today. Thanks for 

the work you do for our Nation. 

At the outset of the 116th Congress and 2 years into the Trump 

administration, the United States faces a multitude of challenges 

in the Middle East. 

We just marked the eighth anniversary of the start of the war 

in Syria, which has led to the deaths of more than half a million 

people, the displacement of millions both inside Syria and in neighboring countries. 

The conflict and humanitarian crisis that it created has the potential to reshape the region literally for decades to come. Iran continues to support Bashar al-Assad and carry out its destabilizing 

activities in countries from Lebanon to Yemen to Iraq. 

Outside powers, such as Russia, use military force, economic support, and weapons sales to increase their regional influence at the 

expense of the United States. 

Libya is fractured. Yemen is ravaged by civil war, the intervention of regional States, and the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. 

While these issues receive the bulk of the headlines and media 

attention, other events and trends also deserve our focus. Tunisia’s 

nascent democracy confronts serious economic and political challenges. 

Algeria’s president submitted his resignation yesterday after two 

decades in power. The dispute splitting the Gulf Cooperation Council is at a stalemate and Israel has threats on its borders and peace 

that is still elusive. 

A youth bulge—approximately 45 percent of the Middle East is 

under 25 years old—presents a myriad of challenges and opportuni-
2 

ties in the coming decade and more than 8 years after millions took 

to the streets around the region in protest of corruption and autocracy, too many regional governments remain unaccountable to their 

people and opposed to democracy and open civil society and human 

rights. 

In the wake of these challenges the United States requires a 

well-formulated clear-eyed approach to the Middle East. Unfortunately, the administration’s policy toward the region is confusing 

and, at some points, seemingly incoherent. 

The president announced the rapid and complete withdrawal of 

U.S. troops in Syria in December with little notice given to international allies and partners on the ground. 

This decision prompted the resignation of Secretary of Defense 

Jim Mattis and Special Envoy to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk. Yet, 

the administration now plans to keep anywhere from 400 to 1,000 

troops in Syria, a number that changes in the press almost by the 

day, and U.S. long-term strategy in Syria remains elusive and ambiguous. 

In Yemen, the Trump administration has offered unstinting support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and while I recognize—understand the risks posed by the Houthis and Iranian forces in Yemen, 

the conflict has led to tens of thousands of civilian casualties. 

It has shifted focus from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and 

has worsened this horrific humanitarian crisis and catastrophe. 

Furthermore, the Trump administration has offered an inconsistent message on human rights and democratic values. At a time 

when many are questioning the American commitment to the region, the administration has too often turned a blind eye to human 

rights abuses and has equivocated in expressing support for democratic development in the Middle East. 

I believe our relationships with regional States are vital to our 

national security and to geopolitical stability. These are ties that 

are enduring and many date to the end of the Second World War. 

However, we should view our relationship with regional States 

through the prism of our own interests and values. Where do our 

priorities align? What type of actions undermine our goals and undermine U.S. values? 

We should be honest in reassessing where our interests and values diverge and identifying actions that set back our mutual objectives and in expressing our opposition when our allies and partners 

do not live up to those standards. 

Furthermore, while the Trump administration often articulates 

maximalist goals in the Middle East, it has cut the resources needed to achieve them. 

For the third straight year the Trump administration has proposed drastic cuts to our foreign affairs budget. The Fiscal Year 

2020 Trump budget request includes a 6 percent drop in funding 

for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, compared to Fiscal Year 

2019. 

This subcommittee has oversight responsibility over the NEA 

budget and I hope this hearing can help us better grasp the trends, 

the challenges, and opportunities facing the United States and the 

Middle East and help us better execute our oversight responsibility. 
3 

I also hope the witnesses will provide an honest assessment of 

recent U.S. policy and how the U.S. Government, specifically Congress, can take steps to foster a more successful approach to the 

region that secures our national interests without sacrificing the 

values that make us unique and admired around the world. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing and I now turn to Ranking 

Member Wilson for his opening statement. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Deutch. 

The complexities of the Middle East pose enduring challenges to 

U.S. interests in the region and have vexed both Republican and 

Democratic administrations alike. 

It is certainly not a region for the faint of heart. Just a cursory 

glance at the Middle East can be overwhelming. At the same time, 

I am grateful that the Trump administration has been achieving 

some important successes in such a complicated environment. 

The Trump administration has presided over the defeat of ISIS’s 

so-called caliphate. This certainly does not mean the threat from 

ISIS has been neutralized, but seizing ISIS’s territory denies the 

terrorist group both a lucrative profit stream as well as a safe 

haven from which to orchestrate attacks against the U.S. and our 

allies. 

There is no doubt that this is a major achievement that has 

made our country and world safer. President Trump rightfully 

withdrew from the flawed Iran nuclear agreement. 

The Trump administration has increased the pressure on Tehran 

to—in response to its reckless development of ballistic missiles and 

continued sponsorship of global terrorism. 

The pressure on Iran has yielded concrete dividends. U.S. sanctions have prevented Iran from delivering any oil to its Syrian client, the Assad regime, since January 2d. 

In the last 3 months of 2018, Iran was sending 66,000 barrels a 

day to Syria. The Syrian will never forget that it was the Trump 

administration that finally enforced the previous administration’s 

‘‘red line,’’ striking Assad twice for using chemical weapons against 

civilians. 

Sanctions in Iran have also affected Tehran’s sponsorship of regional terrorism. Just last week reports indicated that Iran had to 

slash payments to fighter in Syria by a third due to the pain of the 

American sanctions. 

Even employees of Hezbollah have missed paychecks and lost 

perks. The administration has also made the bold move of designated major Iranian-backed militias for terrorism including the 

Nujaba in Iraq and the brigades of Afghan and Pakistani mercenaries Iran has been exploited as cheap fodder in Syria’s bloody 

civil war. 

Under the leadership of President Trump, the dynamics of the 

Middle East appear to be shifting. His first international trip was 

to Riyadh where Gulf Cooperation Council countries along with 

other Muslim countries agreed on the need to counter extremism. 

The journey is far from complete but the step was unprecedented 

and positive. In February, the administration convened a conference in Warsaw, bringing Arab countries and Israel together to 

confront the Iranian regional threat. Notably, this came after the 

Trump administration’s relocation of the U.S. embassy in Israel to 
4 

Jerusalem, a move that many incorrectly predicted would upend 

ties between the Jewish State and its Arab neighbors. 

The Trump administration must continue to build on these 

achievements. Like Chairman Deutch, I too was concerned by the 

August 2018 decision to freeze U.S. stabilization funding to Syria 

and the 2018 decision to withdraw troops from the country. 

There is simply no substitute for U.S. leadership in the Middle 

East, especially given that Russia and Iran are more than happy 

to fill the void. 

The administration must also continue going after the Iranianbacked militias in Iraq. Some of these militias won seats in Iraq’s 

parliamentary elections in May and stand to receive U.S. taxpayer 

money sent to the Iraqi government. 

These groups include those with American blood on their hands 

such as the AAH and the Badr Organization. It is time to correct 

this long-time standing failure of U.S. policy and cutoff all armed 

groups taking orders from the mullahs in Tehran. 

There is no way to simplify the thorny challenges to the U.S. policy in the Middle East. This is a region that will unfortunately continue to trouble U.S. policymakers for years to come. 

While we may disagree on the details, I think we can all agree 

on one guiding principle. U.S. leadership and engagement in the 

Middle East is essential. 

I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses today. I yield 

back. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

I will now recognize members of the subcommittee for a 1-minute 

opening statement should they wish to make one. 

Mr. Chabot, you are recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

As a former chair of this committee, I just want to emphasize 

that the importance of U.S. engagement it is just critical. 

It really cannot be overemphasized, and I would just note that 

the chair did tag this administration with their policy being—I 

think confusing, incoherent were the terms that the gentleman 

used, and I would—I would just make the point that I think many, 

including myself, believe that the previous administration’s policies 

there were far worse from, for example—and I happened to also 

chair the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee a while back, and the previous administration was bound and determined to de-emphasize 

our role in the Middle East and pivot was the initial term they 

used to Asia. 

And then they later on called it a rebalance because pivot 

seemed a little too clear on what they were trying to do and rebalance, for whatever reason, seemed a little more politically correct. 

And, ultimately, it is questionable whether they did that or not. 

I would argue they perhaps de-emphasized both regions rather 

than strengthen us in either place, which was a mistake. 

The previous administration famously drew a red line and then 

ignored it, and we have seen untold deaths in Syria as a direct result of that policy, and probably the most disastrous thing the previous administration did was that after all the blood and treasure 

that were spent in Iraq was then to, against the advice of just 

about everybody, just pull all our troops out. 
5 

Having been there a number of times, having talked to troops 

and the leaders on the ground and our allies there, no one really 

anticipated that the administration would actually do that, but 

they did, and that left a power vacuum which then was filled by 

ISIS and we saw the horrors that occurred under the hands of 

ISIS. 

And then the administration’s response to that—yes, they ultimately did respond after they had taken over a significant portion 

of the area, especially Iraq, but also Syria. 

And then they kind of handcuffed our troops there and we were 

not really able to respond as was necessary. The current administration took those handcuffs off and we saw the demise of ISIS. 

That does not mean that we can ignore them. Some of them scattered into other areas and so we have to, I think, be very aware 

that they could still be a threat. But compared to where they were, 

we are much better off. 

So just a few points. We do need to continue to be engaged in 

the Middle East and work with our allies there. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject 

to the length limitation in the rules. 

I will now introduce our witnesses. First, Ms. Elisa Catalano 

Ewers is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center For a New American Security and a faculty lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. 

For over a decade, Ms. Catalano Ewers served in senior foreign 

policy and national security positions in the U.S. Government including as a director for the Middle East and North Africa on the 

National Security Council staff and in multiple positions at the Department of State. 

Mr. Daniel Benaim is a senior fellow at the Center for American 

Progress, researching U.S. policy in the Middle East as well as a 

visiting assistant professor at New York University’s program in 

international relations. 

He previously served as a Middle East policy advisor and foreign 

policy speech writer at the White House, the Department of State, 

and the U.S. Senate. He was also an international affairs fellow at 

the Council on Foreign Relations. 

And, finally, Ms. Danielle Pletka is senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute where she oversees the institute’s work on foreign and defense 

issues. 

She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s 

Walsh School of Foreign Service. Ms. Pletka was a long-time senior 

professional staff member for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations where she specialized in Near East and South Asia and 

where she also worked with our friend who is not here so I will 

wait until he returns to reunite the two of you. 

Thanks very much to all of our witnesses. We appreciate your 

being here. We appreciate your taking the time to offer your insight with this committee, and Ms. Catalano Ewers, I will recognize you first. 
6 

I will remind all of the witnesses to please limit your testimony 

to 5 minutes and, without objection, your prepared written statements will be made a part of the hearing record. 

Again, thanks so much, and Ms. Catalano Ewers, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CATALANO EWERS, ADJUNCT SENIOR 

FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR 

A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. Thank you. 

Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join you 

here today. I am humbled to be sitting here alongside two very respected colleagues. 

Nation States and institutions in the region have suffered severe 

blows. Some States have turned inward, like Egypt. Some have disintegrated, like Syria. And others have taken on a more aggressive 

foreign policy, like Saudi Arabia. 

Non-State actors such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have 

sought to exploit these power vacuums and multiple levels of competition are happening across the region. 

The perception of the last decade is a United States in withdrawal. Whether the perception is correct or not is no longer the 

point. This view has unsettled partners and encouraged competitors. 

What happens in the Middle East rarely stays there, whether in 

the form of clear and imminent threats, such as terrorism or proliferation, or more intractable threats, like the humanitarian crises 

that reverb inside and outside the region. 

The reality is that the United States cannot extricate itself from 

the region and should not try to. However, it could deploy itself 

smartly and more effectively. 

This administration inherited these systemic challenges. It also 

inherited strategies, some of which, like the counter ISIS campaign, has managed to pursue its success. But such campaigns 

never end with battlefield wins. 

The administration has also relied on cults of personality rather 

than statecraft. It has placed a high value on individual personal 

relations with Egypt, Saudi, and others at the expense of institutional engagement. 

It has promulgated rhetoric but also a sense of unpredictability. 

Some governments in the region may embrace the more aggressive 

posture on Iran but the Syria withdrawal announcement, the lack 

of active engagement with Iraq, and the absence at the highest 

level of U.S. diplomatic pressure in Yemen all illustrate that there 

is not a single comprehensive regional strategy on Iran. 

It has ignored bad actions from partners in pursuit of wins. The 

administration’s unwillingness to press partners when they act inconsistently with U.S. interests conveys a sense that some have a 

blank check. 

Going forward, we will need to watch for the resurgence of 

groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, the disintegration of political processes in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, the unintended escalation and 

conflict between Israel and Hezbollah or conflict in the seas around 
7 

the Arabian Peninsula, humanitarian displacement and refugee crises, repression against citizens across the region, and the consequences of unanswered economic and political grievances. 

In light of all this complexity, I would offer just a number of immediate steps Congress could consider. First, Congress should exercise its powers to receive a full strategy on Iran beyond just the 

campaign of economic pressure. 

Congress should act consistent with the notion that diplomacy 

and development are tools of first resort, continue the trend of restoring budgets to the State Department and USAID, and field 

qualified Ambassadors and senior officials. 

Congress should insist that the administration pursue diplomatic 

ends, ways, and means, such as actively supporting political negotiations in Yemen and sustaining full partnership with Iraq. 

Congress should also insist that the U.S. support to partners 

comes with a firm commitment to hold partners accountable for 

their actions. This includes a full accounting into the murder of 

Jamal Khashoggi. 

The United States retains leverage but it must be exercised. Congress should continue to remind partners that the United States’ 

views on human rights violations and overall repressive policies are 

part of the continuum of regional instability, not separate from it. 

There is no shortage of bipartisan issues on which Congress can 

use the power of its own outreach, its pulpit, and its purse to support balanced and reasoned approaches. Whether it be support for 

Israel’s security while also keeping the road to peace viable or reaffirming commitments to the security of regional partners without 

conceding to proxy wars throughout the region, Congress can help 

ensure U.S. relationships are assessed honestly and in all of their 

complexity. 

I look forward to your questions, and thank you again. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Catalano Ewers follows:] 
8 

Prepared statement by 

Elisa Catalano Ewers 

Adjunct Senior Fellow 

Centerfor a New American Security 

Before the 

Center fora 

New American 

Security 

April 3, 20!9 

House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Middle East, 

North Africa, and International Terrorism 

Hearing on Assessing U.S. Policy Priorities in the Middle East 

Chairman Deutch, members of the committee, thank \'OU 

for the to discuss the topic of States' in the Middle East. I wouid like 

to offer several of current dynamics in the follow with an assessment of 

current U.S. policy and recommendations 

I. What the United States Contends with Today in the Middle East 

Two consccutiYe administrations of the United States have witnessed fundamental 

the I\'Iiddle East. Some of these changes were 

including tht)SC spt·inp;ing from the 2003 lnvasion of Others, 

to the 

by the 

the series 

across the region in 2011 that led and, 1n some cases 

had nothing directly to do with the United States. 

Nonetheless, the aggregate consequences of these and other changes have resulted in an evolving 

a.nd landscape: 

states and institl.ltions hciYC suffered serious 

relied for regional matters - such as 

like and Syria- hmT disint\:grrttcc Gl>.tsed power '\·acuutns to 

state and non~statc actors a.re "M';"'' ];,,;" and 

actors such as al Qa\:da and the Islamic State (ISfS), I Iezbollah, and 

other non-state ctctors haYe sought to exploit the vacuums and subsequent ungoverned 

political and physical 

3. These vacuums also spurred competition that is mutlHayered 

between states and across the the most notable cornp<etition 

Saudi Arabia and but "Islamist" 

lslamist" (Saudi UAE, 

as \veiL 

: Bold. 

Innovative. 

16 Bipartisan. 
9 

in terms of regional power centers has shifted more 

of the last decade is of a United States that is \Yithdrmving from its interests and its 

the region, a built on domestic war fatigue, changes in the gco-strategic 

bn•dscape fe;llur·ine a risin:g C:hirw and a reasserting Russia, the emerg-ence of U.S. energy 

any number of other factors. 

American is further eroded as 

\l.·i!ling to to the United States 

C.S. force in the region is still formidable. Current numbers are less 

from late were in the 50-60,000 range for troop numbers alone across 13 or countries and 

do%cns of missions in the region. 2 

imagined US. absence their 

diplomatic mediation beyond 

continues to pursue its Belt 

the security space. 3 

the region alongside modest forays into 

1 Bruce Jones eta!, "The New Geopolitics of the Middle East: America's role in a Changing Region," The Brookings 

Institute (October 2018 ), https:/ /www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ 

FP _20190107 ~new_geopo!itics_of_ mena_final.pdf 

7 Micah Zenko, "US Military Policy in the Middle East," Chatham House (October 2018), 

httns://www.chathamhousf'.om/sit~les/pubhcations/.rg_,_'&£Ld1f2018-10-18-us-mi!itarY::Q..Q)l~ 

thllU.'>:lllds of dollars in US. ~!.:cta·it)" !mining or th!.: bilhom 

5339b2a9db3Z 

GNAS GBG l '!II ~lCNASDC 
10 

II. Why Does It Matter Anyway? 

US. policy tO\Yard the J\1iddlc East in the last 40 was predicated on several traditional 

tu include: prcsen·ing the reliable flow global energy supplies and commercial 

tmwr,in" tlw pro!ifer<ltion of nuclear and nthcr ,,vcnnnrns of mass destruction; supporting the 

security and stability of US. partners, including and supporting 

prosperity for the region's people and defending universal human rights. 

But the two administrmions and the current one have grappled with serial regional crises 

that do not fit into one of the above interests, hut for disproportionate U.S. 

attention of war, the U.S. position changed, and to a lesser 

extent so have its interests. the now emanate as much from non-state extremist 

<Ktors like ISlS and hegemonic and such as 1 rani an proxies as from conventional 

security threats to partners' sovereignty. is as much a function of internal 

economic and failures across most the region as from \\rr...JD. Coml:•atting 

threats to the remains a priority, as docs nonproliferation. But US. vital interest as an 

(though it hasn't been eliminated). And recent years haYe sho\\'n that 

in the is of its own and more within the 

::~::~~{~:E~~:::~:~J~:~~:;;;~~~~:~i~~,; some countries, have the overall trend in job economic c<-1ualit~ the 

indicate there is little room for optimism.C' Recent protests in 

us that the powder keg that exploded in 2011 has not been spent. 

As "\vdl, a false dichotomy has emerged in recent years surrounding whether the U.S. interests in the 

truly endure. Some that the threats to t:.S. interests are than ever and 

1ht·retorc: require adoublmg~dcl\vn of l!.S. commitment, while others argue that oYcr111\'CStment the region has had devastating conset1uenccs, prompting a desire to throw the 

provcrhi~d hahy out \Vith the bathwater. 

1n such a fractious dchatc it's easy, 

supporters and warmongcrs, and the ollreran1J~\\·ar 

the middle~ 

one side as authoritarian 

truth of course lies somewhere in 

"leveraging U.S. Power in the Middle East/' Center for American Progress {October 2016), https:/ / 

www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/10/19/146283/leveraging-u-s-power-ln-the-middle-east/ 

Mara Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "America's Middle East Purgatory," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2019 

Issue), ~ww.foreigngffairs.com/grtides/middle-east~12-11/americas-middle-east-purgatory?cid=otrauthors-ian1Jarv februarv 2019-121118 

6 Rami Khouri, "Why We Should Worry About the Arab Region," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 

(February 2019}. https: //www. be lfe rcente r. org /publication /why~we~sho u ld~worry~a bout ~arab~ 

region 

GNAS ORO I y ICNASOC 
11 

towards the Middle East caution that what happens in the 1\fiddle 

in the its challenges come the door sooner or latt:r, 

of clear and imminent threats, such as or nuclear proliferation, or 

f':!ower and more intractable threats, like the humanitarian crises caused by refugee moYements that 

haYe Se\Tt-c rcyerherations inside and outside the region. 

The that the United States cannot fully extricate itself from the region and should not try to 

it could deploy itsdf in a smarter and more effective way. 

III. Where is U.S. Policy Today? 

U.S. particularly in the last t\vo years, has been marked 

and administration inherited some of the systemic chnllerrge:'!)l.itl!r1cd 

in the 

oscillates between on 

the one hand treating regional complexitie::; as (for example, U.S. support 

of the Yemeni Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to as almost a quid pro quo for 

Gulf arms and on the othl-r hand espousing grandios<: aspirations that do 

(q: .. ;-,ecrcrnrry Pompeo's 2019 Cairo speech). 

And in some cases, the administration has adopted de facto approaches that can only be 

characterized as exacerbations: 

1. Perpetuatitw a sense of unpredictability and unreliability: The perception of U.S. \Vithdrawal 

may ha\T been seeded in the prcdous administration, but heightened over the course of the 

2016 and since this administration took office. The president's propensity 

an endless or about n set of partners who do not 

their own weight, has contributed to sense of uncertainty. in tlw 

and frank tone, like the one has 

rhc,· nriv,rrcl,· cnnl•imre to harbor concerns about where the administration 

impacted by rhr· wi•lhdrm,·~l 

competitors like Russia and 

Deccrnbr,qrror1otmccment of 

it nonetheless 

anti-ISIS or 

given to spontaneous policy announcements. The decision to •vithdrmv unilaterally from the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is another such decision. It ha\'c been 

telegraphed prcyiously and cyen applauded by some partners in the but has 

highl1ghtcd questions about U.S. trustworthiness in the lonver~ tenn. 

2. Rclyino- on cults of personnlity rather than statecraft: Again, to the satishction of some regional 

leaders, the administ.n1tion has placed a high yaluc on personal relations at an individual level. 
12 

3. 

This has currency in the 1\'Iidd!c East. But these relationship::;- whether between President 

Trump and Prime Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or President a!-

Sisi- carry with them an personal benefit interest. These relationships 

also come at the of more ins1itutional statc-to"state and people 

han: in the prc,·ic>nsad,mirlistration, the c:;j~~;:~:\,';~[~~~~e~~~;:~~ and institutionally 1< may be politically fruitful in 

sncm·rerrn,nm can weaken tics between United States key regional in the 

~ts it casts them in a partisan and de-values diplomacy as "the of first resort." 

the State Departrncnt's staff continue to execute their work faithfully, their 

efforts to assert U.S. lcYcragc are undermined by a shared in the 

region that they act without the full-throated support of the This 

has senTccl to weaken U.S. influence in the region. And finally, disproportionate focus on select 

personal relationships obscures policy interests elsewhere in the region such as Tunisia, 

J\'lorocco, or Jordan, or C\'cn] .ihya, and Ira<l· 

is not without some logic given lran's 

narratiYe hdd by senior administration officials. 

that the words are matched with deeds. Yes, economic sanctions hm·e 

But, then again, decisions such as the 

en:,agcmmt with Iraq post ISIS military 

::~.~,~~~~;~;,;;~,~,~r~~~~~.,;,~~~:~:~:~~~;f;~;"~b::~~i~:e: and an over-reliance on sanctions as a tool of 

Similarly, the <tdministration has sent cnr1flirctin<' n·nhlic rrres;;ar»'S 1virh 

the Gulf states, but seems to han~ downgraded its to 

status CJ.UO ante of a cold peace bct"\vccn Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the U;\E. 

4. lonorino- had actions in pursuit of "wins": As a corollary to the president's affinity for "strong-" 

leaders, the administration's approach of seemingly to usc its naturallnTrage to press 

partners, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where they act US interests 

sense that some parlnns ha\'c a blank check from the \\?hite I louse to act with impunity. 

administration may argue thal the ad\'cnturism or missteps by regional partners are not 

important when to core U.S. interests like the counter-ISIS or counter-Iran campaigns. 

But some at minimum conflict with long-held U.S. concerns, and at worSl' 

For example, the root causes of war in Yemen arc 

and U.S. interests. But the Yemeni goYcrnment and 

have created a self-fulfilling prophecy. As the 

the ljnited Arab Emirates find their intcrycntion 

reputoJiorlS ·darna,:cd, lran increasingly sees its marginal and relatin·ly recent 

Houthis as an inexpcnsiYc means of exploiting the instability to secure 

7 Center for a New American Security, "A Realistic Path for Progress on Iran," (January 2019), https:// 

www.cnas.org/pub!ications/reports/a-rea!istic-path-for-progress-on-iran 

CNAS ORG I '# &CNASDG 
13 

strategic advantage (l\'Cf Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and in turn, the United States. ~The U.S. still 

hrings value to partners in the~ Middle r-<,ast, and that affords the United States the opportunity to 

express concerns ·when warranted, and press for changes in approach when required. 

IV. Recommendations for Where Policy and Congress Could Go 

~fiddle East policy has no shortage of 

months and years the States, and 

of groups like ISIS and 

surmortcd noli11ical processes in Syria, 

corJfli.ctl>et\J"CCIO Israel and Hczbollah, 

displacement crises and refugee "~;,;~~·;·;;;~·~~f:,:,"~';';; Yemen; the en-r-incrcasing usc rcpressin! means a~ 

the consequences of unanswered economic and 

there are a number of immediate steps Congress could 

1. Congress should hold the administration to account for a complete Iran strategy. The 

administration's (ran is focused primarily on its economic And \Yhilc 

Iran remains relati\·dy to Jts current commitments 

The economic mount (whether or can 

rn c;''~,l a\~:;~e~~:~~~'~;;l,;;~,i~as eel~;;' f~f'c~·~r~c,:n t question); Iran, 

fc\~~~~~~e'~:~c 1l~~~;;~,7,;~~ a:c~~.,~~r~ the US' of ;h to abandon its 

2. Congress should act consistent with the notion that diplomacy and development are tools 

of first resort.9 This includ1.:s trend of restoring budgels to the State: Department 

and to the US. Agency for but also consistently exercising O\'ersigbt 

of and positive for those and policy 

m;,~~~i~~~:~:~~.~:~~~u:~:~~ means that o\'crsight powers to insist that the ;"H diplomatic \vays, means, and ends. Just a few areas \\.'here diplomatic efforts 

could he 

8 Nicholas Heras and Elisa Catalano Ewers, "Congressional Action on Yemen Isn't Only About Yemen," Center for a 

New American Security (February 2019), https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/h-j-res-37-

congressiona!-action-on-yemen-isnt-only-about-yemen 

William Burns, "The lost Art of American Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs (March 2019), .b.!:t.Qru 

WW.1~ign.Qff.Q.i.L'hCQJ1119rtLde.sl2019-03-27/loit·art-american-diplomacy 

CNAS ORG I '# @QNASOC 
14 

)fll!m. The reality remains that the 

United most Jcyeragc to bring to bear on the Yemeni goyernment and the 

Saudi-led coalition. lt must continue to press the parties to the CN's efforts 

allow for humanitarian relief, and Yemr.:ni groups to 

long-standirrg c:onflicts through a political process. docs not mean 

conceding to Houthi disproportionate control. And also does not mean abandoning the 

real threats the I {outhi n1ilitias have posed to waterways and to Saudi But it must 

press partners to ~1bandon Y.cro sum formulations for political resolution also taking 

concrete steps to defend and disrupt missile threats on land and sea. 

ro;;,·hrh· {1!1· im'7aom• .in !mo. Sust:-lining a full with Ira(\ is in C.S .interests across 

economiC, cmmt<cr-tcrronsm,, pc>llltcal Reclucing Iraq to a 

Iranian asset ignores the benefits of to build strong and reliable rekttionslltips 

with all clements of Iraq's political and civil 

rn«nty, '"'"'g""' should ensure that we field the 

in the U.S. kit: that means m<>fi•·mi<wowJiifiecl 

ambassadors and senior officials at the State Departn1cnt. 

3. Congress should insist that U.S. support to partners does not come with a blank check, 

but with a finn con1mitn1ent to hold partners accountable for their actions. The United 

States still provides an to the nothing else, its 

any other 

relations arc example 

Lebanese of stat~.:, or diplomatic escalation with Canada, or continued 

that disregard the devastating, deadly impact on ci\~iJian populations, The 

diplomatic powers, privately and publicly when to curb the most pro·blemalic •oflhctse 

instincts. And in the case of the murder of Jamal ''""""'ogg<,u>ll);l e" 

<'It least an objective examination and 

information, so as to draw its independent COJ1Ch.Jstc>ns. to vocalize the 

need to protect journalists and free and pc<Kcful expression everywhere. 

Congress can uscfnl role in 

partners that not have a to ways that a\rrt~o 1 ~;::;~~~~~,:~·n~v~:~il~~: ,-alucs and interests, Ancl beyond SmlCli Arabia, such leyeragc should a1 

partners not to exaccrhate conditions in hy extension, or to reconsider 

scnsit!\-c survciilancc technologies that repressive means. Congress can 

bipartisan approach to the region that docs not create room for partners to choose one oyer 

10 Derek Chollet and II an Goldenberg, "the United States Should Give Saudi Arabia a Choice," Foreign Policy 

{November 2018), Https:/ /Forelgnpollcy.Com/2018/11/30/Saudi~Arabia-Shou!d~Be-Given-A-Choice-Stop-theSurprises-or-Suffer-the-Consequences-Mbs-Khashoggi/ 

' GNAS ORG I '!tl ''CNASDC 
15 

that further 

Priorittiziogins'titutiolnalltzcd tics 0\Trt)<ctS<mal 

national stn-1tcgy reganling friends 

4. Congress should continue to usc its voice and its convening authority to caution against 

actions that are inconsistent with U.S. values and interests. The United States should not 

consider the dissolution of parl"nt:rships in the rcgituo;n:;·t: :,\~':~~i~~;';~~,~~~::;l;:',~~:,; interests. But our policy can and should assess its rc 

Consulting and partnl'rs 

is critical to remind partners 1he United States views human rights \·iolations and 

polic-ies as part of the continuum of regional instability. It is worthwhile 

the United States retains those characteristics and values that defined its rise to 

leadership as a singular superpower in the last century. 

\X1

hile there may be need for healthy domestic discussion about what 

cxception,alism takes in 10day's world, 11 the United States remains l!1 lts 

and spirit, and ca;1 still model that approach both to its friends and its 

need not be :rero-sum, but rather a t-ealistic and achievable that 

can be consistently. Congress can keep such a 

check an) that partners nrc acting with impunity against 

values, 

This 

11 Jake Sul!ivan1 "What Donald Trump and Dick Cheney Got Wrong About America," The At! antic (January/February 

2019 ), https:/ /www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/yes-america-can-sti!!-!ead-the-world/5 76427/ 

CNAS ORG I ., iilCNASDC 
16 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Ms. Catalano Ewers. 

Mr. Benaim, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BENAIM, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR 

AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. BENAIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity and invitation to testify. 

I start from the premise that no party and no president has monopoly on wisdom or wishful thinking, on success or failure, least 

of all in this region that has thwarted so many good intentions. 

There are no easy choices, but there are better and worse ones, 

in my mind, and better and worse outcomes to expect as a result. 

The retaking of the last ISIS-held villages in Syria, a bipartisan 

project started by one president and finished by another, shows 

that U.S. leadership can still tackle major regional challenges. 

But other developments make clear the need for congressional 

oversight and tough questions in service of bringing out the best 

policies to serve the country’s interest. 

That starts with making sure that ISIS cannot come back, Iran 

cannot acquire a nuclear weapon or hurt our allies, protecting our 

ally, Israel, and key partners. 

But I would argue that these goals cannot be cleanly separated 

from the destabilization and radicalization due to ongoing regional 

conflicts and deficits outlined over the years in the Arab Human 

Development Reports. 

Two years in, I am worried that the current approach will leave 

the Middle East’s conflicts deeper and the region less stable, more 

dangerous, and more likely to require U.S. resources and attention 

for years to come. 

Two years in, I would say the record is decidedly mixed. I think 

the Trump administration deserves credit for seeing through the 

military campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 

But I am worried that they are under investing in the aftermath. 

They have sought to reorient Middle East policy around Iran but 

have yet to offer a realistic path to reconcile maximalist goals and 

rhetoric with minimal investment beyond sanctions to create the 

conditions for progress. 

They have sought to restore regional partnerships that the chairman spoke of earlier. But they have done so too often by offering 

a blank check to Saudi Arabia and giving rulers impunity for 

abuses at home and destabilizing moves abroad. 

This committee has held, I thought, commendable hearings on 

the subject of Yemen and I agree with the need to use legislation 

to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen and to send a clear signal and give leverage to people pushing for peace to turn a ceasefire into peace talks—while still fighting al-Qaeda and helping 

Saudi Arabia defend its territory against Houthi missiles. 

Tools and process also matter to outcomes, and I worry also 

about a systematic downgrading and even dismantling of diplomacy 

and development, leading to uneven and overly personalized approaches that seem to be hurting what should be broad bipartisan 

support for key partnerships. 
17 

Instead, in brief, I would enhance civilian engagement post-ISIS 

in Iraq and Syria. I would reset the terms for a partnership and 

cooperation with Saudi Arabia and demand more responsible action. 

I would vote to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen in service 

of a larger peace, which is a bigger project than simply voting on 

U.S. support. 

I would demand an Iran strategy with realistic objectives, and I 

would protect U.S. diplomacy and development and seek to restore 

human rights as a U.S. policy priority. 

It is not easy, but it is essential to engage with not just States 

and rulers but societies who will be drivers for long-term stability 

or instability. 

I thank you for having me and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Benaim follows:] 
18 

Prepared Testimony 

Daniel Benaim 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 

on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism 

"Assessing U.S. Policy Priorities in the Middle East" 

April3, 2019 

Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, members of the committee, it is my honor to testify 

before you. No party or president has a monopoly on wisdom or wishful thinking, on success or 

failure. It is in that spirit that I offer the below assessment. 

The retaking of the last Islamic State-held villages in Syria- in a campaign designed and 

launched by one administration and completed by the next- shows that U.S. leadership can still 

tackle regional challenges. But other recent developments make clear the need for Congressional 

oversight and action to deliver more responsible policies to advance U.S. priorities. 

Two years in, the current administration's record is decidedly mixed. It has sustained the antiISIS military campaign, while underinvesting in its aftermath. It has sought to reorient 

America's Middle East policy to focus on countering Iran, but has yet to offer a realistic path to 

reconcile maximalist goals and rhetoric with relatively minimal efforts to change the equation 

beyond sanctions. It has worked to restore frayed regional partnerships, but too often outsourced 

regional developments to partners while granting impunity for destabilizing moves and domestic 

repression. It has also undercut U.S. influence by systematically downgrading diplomacy and 

development tools, contributing to an uneven, hyper-personalized approach at the expense of 

expertise, civilian capacity, transparency, and bipartisan support for key relationships. 

Such an approach- unquestioning embrace of complicated partners, escalating tensions without 

realistic goals, and shortchanging civilian power, U.S. values, and conflict resolution- may yield 

near-term tactical gains, but is unlikely to succeed on its own terms. It is far more likely a recipe 

to exacerbate the region's underlying divides and deficits, create conflict, and leave behind a less 

stable and more dangerous Middle East. Part of Congress' role is to ask tough questions and 

bring forth a better strategy. Among those it should ask now are: Will a "blank check" to Saudi 

Arabia and others serve U.S. interests in the long term? What is the end game with Iran beyond 

continuing to apply the tool of sanctions? And how can we hope to prevent crises or exert 

influence while slashing support for diplomacy and development? 

A sounder approach would enhance civilian engagement to help prevent ISIS from returning. It 

would put greater emphasis on containing and resolving rather than inflaming the region's 

divides. It would seek a partnership model that pairs U.S. reassurance with demands for greater 

responsibility, including regional conflict resolution and curbing domestic repression. It would 

seek to contain Iran's malign behavior with partners, but do so within the context of a strategy 

that better matches ends and means and leaves open a peaceful path. And it would reinvest in 

the civilian tools of American power to engage societies as well as states- not simply to counter 

ISIS or Iran, but to address a broader range of long-term internal drivers of instability. 

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Regional Trends 

The Middle East today is confronting several layers of interlocking competition that feed intense 

polarization and fragmentation. Regional players, sub-state and non-state groups, and outside 

powers all vie for power, intervene in each other's affairs, and test the limits of a weakened 

system. Behind these changes are lingering questions about U.S. intentions and staying power, 

as the perception of a U.S. "long goodbye" encourages others to fill the void. 

Intense Saudi-Iranian competition pits a bloc of Sunni states, backed by the United States and 

quietly aligned with Israel, against a diverse Iranian-Jed "resistance axis" featuring Syria's 

regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and Shia militias. This rivalry has fastened itself onto local 

conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere as Iran exploits societal divides and governance gaps to 

cultivate proxies. Countries have put more energy into proxy conflict than peacemaking or 

rebuilding afterwards, and the people of the region's neglected battlegrounds have paid a steep 

price. Meanwhile, a deep and growing rift has opened up over the character and leadership of 

the Sunni world, with Turkey and Qatar on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 

and Egypt on the other. The split has divided America's regional partners into rival camps 

instead of uniting them to counter Iran. Both of these conflicts have been intensified by the 

ascent to power of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), who has introduced a 

confrontational, risk-tolerant, and expeditionary foreign policy. 

Many regional actors are testing the limits. Turkey has carved out a safe zone inside Syria. Iraqi 

Kurds attempted a unilateral independence referendum. Gulf countries are fighting a mutually 

damaging information war ofweaponized hacks and leaks. Iranian-backed Houthis have 

launched anti-ship missiles. Israel has bombed Iranian and Hezbollah positions inside Syria. 

Some regional maneuvering has been positive. Countries are forging new partnerships on 

Mediterranean energy, Red Sea infrastmcture, and even counterterrorism in Sinai. Gulf states 

have cemented quiet security partnerships with Israel and taken public steps to normalize ties. 

Great power competition is also returning. Russia aims to build on rescuing Syrian President 

Bashar al-Assad to make a bid for regional leadership as a counterweight to America. China, too, 

is deepening its investments and pledging billions in loans and aid. Both countries have joined 

several regional powers in jockeying for footholds across the Red Sea in the Hom of Africa. 

Bubbling beneath these changes are bottom-up pressures too often overlooked since 2011. While 

revolutionary fervor has lapsed into disillusionment in many places, protests in Algeria and 

Sudan remind us that many of the same political and economic deficits remain, driving a crisis of 

political legitimacy across the region. Autocratic repression is resurgent, increasingly 

unconstrained and assisted by cutting-edge technologies. Many leaders are also stoking 

nationalism to forge internal cohesion. Climate change is another underappreciated contributor 

to unrest. From drought in Yemen and Gaza's unsafe water supply to displaced Syrian farmers 

to the massive dam Ethiopia is building upstream from Egypt, the intersection of nature and 

national security appears poised to drive unrest in the years ahead. All of these trends contribute 

to the complexities of addressing the key U.S. priorities discussed below. 

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20 

Iraq and Eastern Syria: Mission Incomplete 

The Trump Administration deserves credit for continuing the campaign plan launched in late 

2014, which mobilized a 70-nation coalition that worked "by, with, and through" local partners 

to defeat ISIS. Today, the group holds no territory in Iraq or Syria. However, the U.S. 

Intelligence Community's Worldwide Threat Assessment found that "thousands" ofiSIS fighters 

remain in Iraq and Syria, where they will "exploit any reduction in CT pressure" to rebuild and 

"seek to exploit Sunni grievances, societal instability, and stretched security forces to regain 

territory in Iraq and Syria in the long term." The U.S. strategic imperative is shifting in both 

countries from retaking ISIS-held territory to leaving behind political and security arrangements 

that minimize the odds that ISIS can return. 

Iraq in particular is a place where America should sustain and even broaden its engagement. Iraq 

remains on the frontlines of three interlocking struggles: first, to defeat genocidal terrorists like 

ISIS; second, to prevent Iran and its proxies from dominating the region; and finally, to show 

that different sects and ethnicities can still live peacefully together in today's Middle East. 

America has a stake in all three, as well as longstanding security partnerships with Iraq's central 

government and Kurdish Peshmerga. An Iraq that finds realistic political and security solutions 

can be a vital building block of a stable Middle East and more coherent U.S. strategy. 

We should treat Iraq as more than an arena for zero-sum competition with Iran. Instead, the U.S. 

should offer military and civilian engagement that helps Iraq for its own sake and in so doing 

offers what Iran cannot: a training mission that treats Iraqis as military partners and not militia 

proxies; a broader vision for civilian cooperation to help Iraq do more to stabilize liberated areas 

and address citizens' grievances; diplomacy to help Baghdad and Iraqi Kurds coexist inside Iraq; 

international leadership that reintegrates Iraq into the Arab fold alongside Saudi Arabia and 

Jordan; and a political agenda that aligns with Iraqis' own desire to build sovereign institutions. 

Success starts with showing up to help address Iraq's non-military challenges post-ISIS. On my 

three visits over the past 18 months, I heard persistently that the U.S. needs more dedicated 

senior-level contact to motivate Iraqi leaders eager for U.S. political support. So far, neither 

Iraq's government nor the international community has done nearly enough to create the 

conditions for 1.8 million displaced Iraqis to return home. Also, Iraq and Iran share a long border 

and many close ties, and treating Iraq purely as an aU-or-nothing proxy battle with Iran will be 

unsuccessful. It leads Iraqis to view us with suspicion, and risks backfiring at the expense of 

Iraq's stability or the U.S. counterterrorism platform. A smarter approach is to push back hard 

when necessary, but try instead to harness Iraqi nationalism to build sovereign institutions as a 

bulwark. Finally, we should remember that Iraqi politicians are sensitive to the words and 

perceived slights of American leaders and can express their discontent by voting in parliament to 

withdraw Iraq's invitation to U.S. troops- a major setback that can and should be avoided. 

In Syria, the political and security terrain is even more complex. In the western half of the 

country, the picture is clarifying as Assad continues his crushing effort to consolidate power, 

causing immense suffering as Hezbollah and Iran seek to create a new front against Israel. It is in 

eastern Syria where the United States is most directly involved. The United States, France, and 

the U.K. deployed troops to train and equip the local Syrian Democratic Forces to defeat ISIS. 

3 
21 

This created a U.S.-protected zone of influence in eastern Syria. However, in 2018 the Trump 

administration froze and then terminated stabilization aid and then announced a U.S. withdrawal 

by tweet in December, surprising both local partners and deployed allies. Since then, an erratic, 

confusing push and pull of policy pronouncements has created uncertainty about U.S. strategy, 

timeline, intentions, and reliability. The most recent iteration suggests that four hundred U.S. 

troops will remain in northeastern and southeastern Syria into 2020. 

Syria offers no easy answers. Having squandered hard-won leverage to set the terms for what 

comes next alongside local partners, the United States must now play a diminished hand. It 

needs to continue counterterrorism partnerships with SDF fighters against an ongoing ISIS 

insurgency; urge Arab-Kurdish cohesion as the SDF negotiates future autonomy with Assad; halt 

further Turkish military incursion; steady allies jolted by U.S. unsteadiness; and ready itselffor a 

streamlined military presence and eventual full departure. All of this is made harder by the 

decision to freeze stabilization funds last year and request none for the year ahead -funds which 

could help support both U.S. political objectives and force protection. What happens next in 

eastern Syria is a chance to influence the broader question of Syria's future, a process in which 

the United States should be engaged. Significant questions for oversight include not only the 

substance and soundness of the overall strategy, but both the legal rational behind two small U.S. 

expeditionary deployments in different parts of Syria and plans to protect them. 

Finally, America can do better than to ban entry from entire countries or shut our doors to 

refugees. Just 62 Syrian refugees were admitted in FY2018, a 99.5% drop from FY2016. The 

U.S. should be proud of its humanitarian aid overseas. However, it is practically feasible and 

morally necessary to lead by example at home and safely welcome Syrian and Iraqi refugees. 

Regional Partnerships: Reassurance and Responsibility 

The administration has made a concerted effort to deepen U.S. support for longstanding regional 

partners, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. Such partnerships hold the promise of 

lightening America's load, but they also present dilemmas when partners diverge from U.S. 

goals and draw upon or even enlist U.S. support to act contrary to our interests or values. 

The centerpiece of the Trump's administration's regional strategy and its Arab partner of first 

resort has been Saudi Arabia and its Crown Prince, Mohamed Bin Salman. He is spearheading 

dramatic societal and economic change at home, a ruthless crackdown ahead of royal succession, 

and a more activist foreign policy. Leadership on both sides today hopes to expand cooperation 

in areas as diverse as Mideast peace, arms sales, counter-extremism, and even nuclear power. 

A pattern of destabilizing Saudi policies has also emerged that raises questions about trajectory, 

priorities, and judgment. Each seems to have been enabled by lack of U.S. push back or even 

encouragement at the highest levels. Days after President Trump made Riyadh his first overseas 

destination, Saudi Arabia led a blockade of Qatar, which hosts U.S. Central Command, bursting 

open a divide among U.S. partners with no end in sight. In November 2017, Saudi Arabia 

reportedly held Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri against his will. In August 2018, Saudi 

Arabia expelled Canada's ambassador over mild human rights criticisms. Remarkably, the U.S. 

declined to support Canada. All of this helped set the stage for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a 

4 
22 

legal U.S. resident, an act for which there can be no impunity. The United States should insist on 

full and transparent accounting and that all involved face appropriate consequences. 

At the same time, the ongoing Saudi-led, U.S.-supported bombing campaign in Yemen has 

descended into the world's most pressing humanitarian crisis. Both the full committee and the 

Middle East subcommittee have heard insightful testimony on this topic in recent months. I 

share the view that Congress should act to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen and work to 

turn a shaky ceasefire into a broader diplomatic solution. This alone will not end Yemen's 

fighting and should be paired with intensive humanitarian effort, continued counterterrorism 

operations against AI Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and a renewed commitment to assist Gulf 

partners defending their ten-itory against unacceptable Houthi missile and UA V attacks. 

The U.S. has more leverage than it realizes- and reigning in reckless or divisive actions by 

partners is part of denying Iran opportunities to expand its influence. It is time to reassert that 

leverage and reset the terms of U.S. Saudi relations to chart a more responsible path forward with 

broader support. A bipartisan strategic review would be one such path. The goal should be to 

move past false choices between punitive teardown and unconditional embrace to consider more 

fully how the U.S. can and should seek to shape Saudi behavior and what that means for future 

cooperation, such as the sale of offensive weaponry and the export of sensitive nuclear 

technologies. These are not mere commercial exports. They are strategic decisions with 

implications for regional and U.S. security and should be treated as such. 

In the U.S.-Egypt relationship, President Trump has shifted the tenor of relations, but done so in 

part by breaking with longstanding bipartisan commitment to champion human rights. As 

President Sisi prepares to travel to Washington, warm presidential ties have translated into 

modest improvements in cooperation. Egypt is receiving U.S. security assistance and purchasing 

Apache Helicopters to fight the Islamic State in Sinai, but tangible military-to-military 

cooperation rem~tins tightly circumscribed. While security aid has held constant, Economic 

Support Funds have dwindled, meaning that Egypt's economic reforms have not received 

significant U.S. support. There has not been a confirmed U.S. ambassador in Cairo in nearly two 

years. Meanwhile, Egypt's stifling of dissent is unabated as President Sisi's supporters advance 

constitutional amendments to keep him in office until 2034, without any U.S. comment. Egypt's 

repression represents a strategic liability to the United States- as well as a moral challengebecause it undermines long term efforts to defeat violent extremists in the battle of ideas and 

lessens Egypt's chances of rediscovering the intellectual and societal dynamism of its past. 

While the administration secured the release of Aya Hegazy, other dual citizens such as Mustafa 

Kassem and thousands of Egyptians remain jailed. Too often the administration has stood silent. 

U.S.-Israel relations are a different case. Strong support for Israel remains overwhelmingly 

bipartisan, reflected in votes for missile defense systems like Iron Dome and the record-breaking 

security aid package negotiated in 2016. The current administration's views on Iran align more 

closely with Prime Minister Netanyahu's, and it has taken steps popular with Israelis such as 

moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and breaking with U.S. policy and precedent to recognize 

Israel's claim to the Golan Heights. Arab response has been muted, but such moves- as well as 

declaring Jerusalem "off the table" and Israeli leaders' suggestion that Golan annexation is a 

prelude to the same in the West Bank- risk undermining Israel's Arab partnerships. 

5 
23 

The current administration professes to be developing a plan for Mideast peace, which remains 

necessary for both Israel's survival as a Jewish, democratic state and Palestinians' aspirations 

and rights. This is a worthy objective. But conditions are not ripe on either side now and more 

action is needed to preserve the possibility of peace in the future. That means maintaining 

constructive ties with Palestinians. In short order, along with the steps referenced above, 

America also closed the PLO's Washington office, folded the mission dedicated to Palestinian 

outreach into the U.S. Embassy to Israel, cut aid to Palestinian refugees, and shut down the work 

of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in the West Bank, including 

longstanding partnerships with local hospitals. Steps like these undercut America's position to 

broker peace and are unlikely to coerce Palestinians into accepting whatever deal is put forward. 

They close doors that all sides benefit from keeping open. Finally, I am concerned that, in Israel 

and the United States, the bilateral relationship has been weaponized as a political wedge issue in 

ways that risk eroding long-term bipartisan support in search of short-term political advantage. 

Iran: Choices Ahead 

The Trump Administration has made aggressive pushback against Iran its regional priority. 

Though "maximum pressure," it aims to transform the Iran's longstanding behavior, if not the 

regime itself. The administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a 

functioning nuclear deal between the world's great powers and Iran, which took unprecedented 

steps to address Iran's single greatest threat to U.S. security. The administration has re-imposed 

sanctions on Iran and listed twelve maximalist demands, from ceasing development of missiles 

to severing ties with its regional proxies to withdrawing its forces entirely from Syria. Despite 

alienating European allies, sanctions have indeed badly hurt Iran's economy, dropping oil 

exports from about 2.5 million barrels per day to just over I million. As Director of National 

Intelligence Dan Coats Congressional testimony made clear, Iran's malign behavior 

overwhelmingly persists despite sanctions. There are some anecdotal reports of cuts in spending 

to Iran's proxies in Lebanon and Syria. However, the notion that economic pressure alone can 

coerce Iran to curtail its regional spending warrants skepticism given Iran's past behavior and 

relatively small estimated defense budget compared to its neighbors. 

The crucial unanswered questions remain what the administration is actually trying to achieve 

and how it will connect sanctions pressure to larger objectives. One answer is to apply pressure 

for its own sake indefinitely, in hopes of weakening Iran's hand regionally. Another goal, usually 

but not always left implicit, is regime change -unpredictable in its outcome, and unlikely to 

happen absent military intervention or major bloodshed. The declared goal of forcing Iran into a 

more comprehensive deal would be a welcome prospect but extraordinarily difficult due to both 

Iran's refusal to pay twice for the same U.S. concessions and the likely unbridgeable gap 

between current U.S. demands and what Iran would willingly concede even under far greater 

pressure. In the meantime, Iran may at any time resume the enrichment it foreswore under the 

deal America left, putting us on the path to confrontation. Congress should push the 

administration to explain what it realistically hopes to achieve and whether it believes the tools 

available will accomplish it. The stakes are high. Mistakes along this path risk sliding into 

conflict. 

6 
24 

Investing in Diplomacy and Development Tools and Championing Human Rights 

Whatever priorities America sets for itself in the Middle East, it will need all the elements of 

U.S. power-both military and civilian- to exercise influence on complex terrain. Regrettably, 

the current administration has set about dismantling America's diplomatic and development tools 

in ways that do lasting damage. lt was no coincidence that, when journalist Jamal Khashoggi 

was killed by Saudi agents in Turkey, America had no confirmed ambassador in either Riyadh or 

Ankara. Acting officials do vital work every day. But U.S. influence is undercut when, twentysix months in, this administration still has not named ambassadors to Egypt, Jordan, or Turkey. 

After failing to resolve a Congressional hold, the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs 

Bureau still lacks a confirmed Assistant Secretary. These gaps in leadership are just one 

symptom of a deeper unraveling of America's diplomatic and development ties. The United 

States is shuttering its West Bank USAID mission and consolidating an independent mission to 

the Palestinians. In southern Iraq, it evacuated U.S. Consulate Basra in response to security 

threats. It froze and then zeroed out U.S. stabilization aid to eastern Syria. 

These losses do lasting harm to our ability to engage broadly and deeply with these countries and 

their societies- and to bring institutional memory and local expertise to inform high-level 

relationships. Instead, Middle Eastern ties risk becoming hyper-personalized, transactional, and 

constrained in the hands of the president and a few close aides. While America's military 

footprint in the region remains broadly unchanged, a shrinking footprint for diplomacy and 

development risks creating a worst-of-both-worlds imbalance where America pays for costly 

hardware and deployments to fight wars but not the far cbeaper tools to prevent them. 

The other systematic downgrading has been of U.S. support for human rights in the Middle East. 

Few regions have been as challenging terrain for reconciling near-term interests with enduring 

universal values. But for all the frustrations and inconsistencies, the knowledge that the United 

States might stand up for its values has at times acted as a brake on rulers' worst excesses. 

Though officials deserve credit for efforts to free unjustly jailed dual citizens and in some cases 

for raising these issues in closed settings, the prevailing trend is outright impunity for repression. 

Policy Recommendations 

Sustain Military Support and Deepen Civilian Engagement in Iraq. This includes a 

narrowly-defined military mission to train Iraqi forces and Kurdish Peshmerga; more 

dedicated high-level channels to Iraqi leaders, and a U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad; 

demands for greater effort from Iraq's government and donors to stabilize areas liberated 

from ISIS; and an approach to competition that draws on Iraqis' desire for sovereign 

institutions as a bulwark against Iran's domination. 

Clarify the Mission and Restore Stabilization Aid in Eastern Syria: The first step for 

the United States is to reach an internal decision and definitively clarify its time line, 

missions, and intentions to its partners on the ground. Congress should demand clarity on 

this as well, in closed session if needed. In contemplating a longer timeline, Congress 

should also press the administration to restore stabilization funding for northeast Syria. 

7 
25 

End U.S. Support to the Saudi-Led Bombing Campaign in Yemen. The United 

States should cease support to a military campaign that has contributed to the world's 

worst humanitarian crisis. It should redouble efforts to expand the current ceasefire into a 

peace process. Counterterrorism strikes should continue. The U.S. should redouble 

efforts to help partners defend their territory against Houthi missiles and UA V. 

With Saudi Arabia, Restore Oversight and Seek to Rebalance Relations: Congress 

should press the administration, including through a bipartisan strategic review, to update 

the terms ofU.S.-Saudi cooperation to better advance regional stability and curtail forms 

of cooperation that do not. Congress should exercise vigorous oversight of sales of 

offensive weapons; exports of sensitive nuclear technology; and private security 

contractors and intelligence firms involved in repression and abuses. A confirmed, 

empowered U.S. ambassador is vital to put relations on a firmer foundation. 

Support Israel's Security on a Bipartisan Basis, But Keep Open a Path Peace: U.S. 

support for both Israel's security and a two-state solution still represents Israel's best path 

to survive as a Jewish democracy. Shuttering America's longstanding points of contact 

with Palestinian leaders and society makes peace harder, not easier. Using relations as a 

partisan wedge issue in either country risks reducing broad support over time. 

• With Iran, Encourage a Realistic Strategy that Matches Ends and Means: The 

current Iran policy has squandered the JCPOA to pair maximalist goals with sanctions 

pressure insufficient to bring about fundamental changes. Oversight should include 

tough questions on the administration's goals and how it plans to match ends and means. 

• Protect U.S. Diplomacy and Development Tools: Reject proposed budget cuts and 

work with administration and Senate colleagues to ensure nomination and confirmation 

of ambassadors to key posts. Work to restore diplomatic and development programs. 

Congress and the administration should seek opportunities to broaden relations beyond 

heads-of-state and close associates to include entire governments and societies. 

Restore Human Rights as a US Policy Priority. For all the challenges and friction 

these issues may cause, America should not abandon its efforts to champion universal 

rights and political and economic reform in the Middle East. U.S. leaders should 

continue to raise human rights challenges with regional partners, in public and in private. 

Where the administration refuses to do so, Congress has a special responsibility to be 

heard. Congress should also make the moral and practical case to reverse discriminatory 

travel policies and safely admit well-vetted Syrian refugees. 

I thank the committee for the opportunity to testify and look forward to your questions. 

8 
26 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Benaim. 

Ms. Pletka, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MS. PLETKA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Ms. PLETKA. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wilson, and members of the 

committee, it is always an honor to testify before this committee. 

If I may, I would like to suggest an amendment to the question 

you pose in this hearing. You ask what are U.S. policy priorities 

in the Middle East, and that question really cannot be answered 

without asking what the United States seeks to achieve in the region. 

If our only interest is the immediate suppression of ISIS, our 

leaders should feel free to declare mission accomplished. But for 

those of us who recognize that ISIS is the fourth iteration of what 

used to be called al-Qaeda in Iraq and that it will be back, sooner 

or later, the truth is that our mission is far from accomplished. 

Indeed, it seems right to question what our mission actually is, 

not just in Syria but throughout the region. The real question before us is what is the just and lasting end game for the United 

States in the Middle East. 

We can talk about Syria, and we will, or Iraq or Iran or Yemen 

or Saudi Arabia in endless detail. I promise. And your members 

can offer more legislation disincentivizing terrorism, incentivizing 

cooperation with U.S. allies, arming good guys, sanctioning bad 

guys. 

But without an end game, our policies are nothing more than 

this year’s tactics. What should the end game be? To my mind, the 

right question to ask is how future presidents of the United States 

can avoid being drawn into Middle Eastern conflicts. 

The problems of the Middle East are national; they are sectarian, 

regional, political, and economic in nature. Some have suggested 

that the right thing to do is to ignore them and let the people of 

the region sort them out. After all, why does who governs Yemen 

or Syria matter in Florida or South Carolina? 

And the answer is, for the most part, it does not until it does. 

Because we so often wait for a problem to become a crisis, those 

in the Middle East who are suffering under tyranny or inequality 

or discrimination or privation seek solutions that do have an impact on us. 

Think of the people of Syria turning to ISIS or the Shi’ites of 

Yemen turning to the Houthis or the people of Iran turning to the 

ayatollahs. Problems that were smaller and manageable become 

unmanageable challenges to U.S. interests and security. 

The region attracts Salafi jihadis, outside powers, and sundry 

bad actors because it is rife with opportunity and the question before us whether we want to continue to give them those opportunities. 

Every time we decide to do so, Americans are put in harm’s way. 

Every time we decided Iran does not matter, Hezbollah does not 

matter or Shi’ites get what they deserve or Saudis deserve to be 

threatened or southern Yemenis do not deserve access to their nation’s wealth or Libyans are somehow ungovernable or Muslims are 
27 

uninterested in democracy, we open the door to those who offer to 

resolve those problems for the region. 

So what should our policies be? In Lebanon, we need to end the 

fiction that the government is independent of Hezbollah, a terrorist 

group. Any other nation in that situation would not be allowed to 

have a U.S.-designated terrorist group sitting in the cabinet and 

itself avoid designation as a State sponsor. 

We need to more aggressively pinpoint Hezbollah financiers and 

supporters. We need to be more sure that the Lebanese armed 

forces has absolutely no relationship with Hezbollah. I am certainly 

not sure of that. 

In Syria, we definitely need to support Syrian democratic forces 

and oppose the reinstatement of the Assad regime. We need to 

keep the Russians out. We need to penalize the Iranians as strongly as possible for their involvement in Iraq. 

As my colleague said, we need to end the involvement of the popular mobilization forces in the Iraqi government and we need to 

compete with the Iranians on the ground. In Saudi, we need to demand the end to imprisonment and targeting of political dissidents 

and move toward a peace process in Yemen, understanding that 

that is a two-sided problem. We need to lean on the Iranians for 

perpetuating that conflict as well. 

We need to signal to Saudi Arabia that global arms sales are contingent on improvement in its rights and military records, but to 

do that, we need to work with our allies to ensure that they do not 

back fill where we pull out. 

In Yemen, we definitely need to recognize the complexity of the 

situation on the ground and bring both parties to the table. We also 

need to remember al-Qaeda and ISIS are not defeated in Yemen. 

That is a battle that we need to work with our Arab allies to continue in our own national security interests. 

And on Iran, we need to begin to answer the questions that underpin the Trump administration’s very successful sanctions campaign. What is the aim of that campaign? 

Is it regime change or is it something else? Those are legitimate 

questions to ask. Salafi jihadi groups, including ISIS and others, 

need to—we need to be clear these groups remain resilient. 

When they leave Syria, Iraq, and, I hope, Yemen, they have 

opened beachheads in Africa and in Southeast Asia. 

I am going to finish in a second. But, you know, there are just 

so many challenges in the region. I did not list half of them. We 

have not talked about Algeria or Libya or Egypt or Israel and the 

Palestinians. 

Our priority should be getting our strategy right rather than constantly addressing the most recent crisis. We can do a lot of good 

in the Middle East. It is really time we think about both the challenges and the opportunities. 

Thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:] 
28 

A. ... ENTERPRISE 

... l AMERICAN 

~ INSTITUTE 

House Commillee on Foreign Am1irs 

Subconnnillee on the tvliddlc !:.·:as!. North i\l]·ica and International Terrorism 

On Assessing US Policy Priorities in the Middle East 

Daniellc Plctlm 

Senior Vice President Foreign and Defense Policy 

April 3, 2019 

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan. nonprofit, 50l(c)(3) educational organization and dnes 

not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed in this testimony are those ofthe author. 
29 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wilson, Members of the Committee, 

It is always an honor to testify before this Committee, and I'm grateful for the request to 

speak on this important topic. 

If I may, I'd like to suggest an amendment to the question you pose in this hearing: You ask, 

"What are U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East?" That question cannot be answered 

without asking what the United States seeks to achieve in the region. If our only interest is 

the immediate suppression of ISIS, our leaders should feel free to declare "Mission 

Accomplished" for the few weeks or months in which that mission will, briefly, have been 

done. But for those of us who recognize that ISIS is the fourth iteration of al Qaeda in Iraq, 

and that, because of the current shape of the resolution of hostilities in Syria, it will be back 

in one form or another, sooner or later, the truth is that our mission is far from 

accomplished. Indeed, it seems right to question what our mission actually is, not just in 

Syria, but throughout the region. The real question before us is "what is the just and lasting 

endgame for the United States in the Middle East?" 

We can talk about Syria, or Iraq, or Iran, or Yemen or Saudi Arabia in endless detail. And 

your members can offer more legislation disincentivizing terrorism or incentivizing 

cooperation with U.S. allies, or arming good guys and sanctioning bad guys; but without an 

end game, our policies are nothing more than this year's tactics. Every single president of 

the United States since the end of World War II has been entangled in a crisis in the Middle 

East for a crisis he did not expect when he was elected. Are we going to continue to be 

surprised every decade? Are we going to keep pretending we're winning when we're not? 

What should our endgame be? To my mind, the right question to ask is how future 

presidents of the United States can avoid being drawn into Middle Eastern conflicts. There is 

no simple answer, as, notwithstanding the protestations of some, the problems of the 

region are national, sectarian, regional, political, and economic in nature. Some have 

suggested that the right thing is to ignore these conflicts and let the people of the region 

work them out, if necessary with the attendant death and destruction. After all, why does 

who governs Syria or Yemen or Iraq impact life in Florida or South Carolina? 

The answer is that for the most part, it doesn't, at least not immediately. But because the 

United States too often waits for a problem to become a crisis, those in the Middle East who 

are suffering under tyranny, or inequality, or discrimination seek solutions that do have an 

impact on the United States. Think of the people of Syria turning to ISIS. Or the Shiites of 

Yemen turning to the Houthis. Or the people of Iran turning to the Ayatollahs. Problems 

that were smaller and manageable become unmanageable challenges to U.S. interests and 

security. 

The region attracts Salafi-jihadis, outside powers, and sundry bad actors because it is rife 

with opportunity, and the question before us is whether we want to continue to give them 

those opportunities. Every time we decide to do so, Americans are put in harm's way. Every 

time we decide Iran doesn't matter, or Hezbollah doesn't matter, or Shiites get what they 

deserve, or Saudis deserve to be threatened, or southern Yemen is don't deserve access to 

their nation's wealth, or Libyans are somehow ungovernable, or Muslims are uninterested 

in democracy, we open the door to those who seek somehow to resolve these problems. 
30 

What should our policies be? 

In Lebanon, to end the fiction that the government is independent of Hezbollah. Any 

other nation in that situation would not be allowed to have a U.S.-designated 

terrorist group sitting in the cabinet, and avoid designation itself as a state sponsor. 

o To more aggressively pinpoint Hezbollah financiers and supporters within 

Lebanon, and to isolate them through financial and travel sanctions. 

o To cut off US assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces until there is 

conclusive proof there is no cooperation between the LAF and Hezbollah .

1 

• In Syria, to support Syrian Democratic Forces and oppose the reinstatement of the 

Assad regime, and to support a diplomatic process committed to creating a 

transitional government for Syria; to oppose Russian intervention in Syria and to 

penalize all Iranian involvement in Syria. To keep a sufficient number of U.S. troops 

in the country to ensure terror groups are defeated and that the Assad regime does 

not return to the wholesale murder of its people. 2 

• In Iraq, to end all involvement of the Popular Mobilization Forces, or Hash'd al Shabi, 

in the Iraqi government; and to provide sufficient support, incentives and 

disincentives to ensure the limitation of Iranian reach. 3 

In Saudi Arabia, to demand the end to the imprisonment and targeting of political 

dissidents; and to move towards a peace process in Yemen, providing Iran ends all 

support for Houthi groups, themselves on the way to becoming yet another 

Hezbollah.4 

o To signal to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that global arms sales are 

contingent on improvements in its rights and military records, and to attempt 

to secure through diplomacy a consensus on this issue. 

• In Yemen, to recognize the complexity of the political situation on the ground, and to 

impose substantial pressures on both the Iranian-backed Houthis and Saudi-backed 

parties to come to a dialogue that begins to address the drivers of conflict in Yemen. 5 

o To understand that al Qaeda and ISIS groups remain in the country, and that 

continued cooperation with Arab allies to disrupt those groups remains a 

priority. 

• In Iran, to begin to answer the question underpinning the Trump administration's 

extraordinarily successful sanctions campaign, including, beyond the possible 

renegotiation of the JCPOA, what the aim behind global sanctions actually is.6 

1 Oanielle Pletka, "Lebanon and Iraq: After the elections," testimony before the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, May 22, 2018, http://www.aei.org/oublication/testimony-lebanon-and-iraq-after-the-elections/. 2 Fred Kagan, "Isolationists won in Syria, but internationals can prevail," The Hill, December 26, 2018, 

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/422864-isolationists-won-in-syria-but-internationalists-can-prevail. 

3 Kenneth Pollack, "Iraq gets a government-and it was worth the wait," The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 

2018, http:!lwww.aei.org/publication/irag-gets-a-government-and-it-was-worth-the-wait/. 4 Danielle Pletka, "Turn Saudi Arabia into a trusted partner in Middle East conflict," The Hill, November 4, 2018, 

http:lfwww.aei.org/publication/turn-saudi-arabia-into-trusted-partner-in-middle-east-conflict/. 

5 Katherine Zimmerman, "Testimony: Taking the lead back in Yemen," testimony before the House Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, March 6, 2019, 

http://www.aei.org/publication/testimony-taking-the-lead-back-in-yemen/. 

6 Michael Rubin, "Putting American security first in the post-JCPOA order," testimony before the House 

Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security," June 6, 2018, 

http://www.aei.org/publication!testimony-putting-american-security-first-in-the-post-jcpoa-order/. 
31 

o To press the Trump administration as to whether it has a "regime change" 

strategy in Iran, and if so, who its desired candidates are to replace the 

existing Islamic Republic's government.? 

o To push back more aggressively on Iran's disruptive interference and arms 

exports and terrorist support throughout the region, including in Iraq, Syria, 

Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere. 

• On Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS, al Qaeda and others, to understand that these 

groups remain resilient, have embraced new tactics and are aggressively coopting 

new supporters and establishing new beachheads in Africa, South and Southeast 

Asia.8 9 

o Both the Trump and Obama administration persisted in following whack-amole tactics against Salafi-jihadis, failing to understand the enduring power 

of this ideology or the tactical nature of the engagement. We can never kill 

enough jihadis to end these movements, and recognizing that, need to begin 

to recalibrate both our legal strategy and our understanding of the 

movement's appeal, such as it is. Only by denying opportunity and territory 

to these groups are we going to make headway against them. 10 

o Trumpeting an end to the caliphate promises the same future 

embarrassment to the Trump administration that trumpeting the end of al 

Qaeda in Iraq did. The question of our victory is not a political one, however, 

and should be explored in conjunction with the executive branch to begin to 

look at new ways to preempt rather than simply react to Salafi-jihadis. 

There are many more challenges in the region, whether in Algeria, Libya, and Egypt, or 

between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Our priority should be in getting a long term 

strategy right rather than constantly addressing the most recent crisis. In addition, our 

priority should be on problems that might be solved, rather than the perpetual headline 

seeking that has characterized, for example, the peace process. 

The United States can do a lot of good in the Middle East. It's high time we think about both 

dealing with challenges and creating opportunities. 

Thank you. 

7 Michael Rubin, "What will Iran's looming civil war look like?" The National Interest, December 15, 2018, 

http://www.aei.org/publication/what-will-irans-looming-civil-war-look-like/. 

8 Katherine Zimmerman, "Terrorism, tactics, and transformation: The West vs Salafi-jihadi movement," 

American Enterprise Institute, November 15, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/terrorism-tactics-andtransformation-the-west-vs-the-salafi-iihadi-movement/. 

9 Emily Estelle, "The Islamic State is not defeated in Syria. Or anywhere else. Look at Africa," AE/deas, 

December 20, · 2018, https://www .aei .erg/publication/the-islamic-state-is-not-defeated-in-syria-or-anywhereelse-look-at-africa/. 

1

° Katherine Zimmerman, "Trump doubles down on failed counterterror policy," The Wall StreetJournal, 

February 19, 2019, http://www.aei.org/publication/trump-doubles-down-on-failed-counterterror-policy/. 
32 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Ms. Pletka. 

Thanks to all of our witnesses for your excellent testimony. I 

will—I will begin the questions. 

Ms. Pletka, I will actually—I will accept your premise for the 

hearing. What do we seek to achieve? What is our mission? I am 

going to ask those questions about Syria because that is the place 

where so many of these issues in the region come together. 

The Syrian policy and—Mr. Chabot, I was referring only to the 

Syria policy in my opening comments—but the Syria policy I do 

find confusing. 

I noticed many of us the decision to pull back our military presence and to declare ISIS defeated, depending upon how you characterize it—the end of the caliphate—we all acknowledge that ISIS 

can come back—that the fighters are—that they are still fighters— 

that they could take back territory in months. 

So as we make those pronouncements are not we turning our 

back on the SDF and then are we relying on shaky talks with Turkey to prevent a military incursion? 

We have got the stagnant peace process that we hope results in 

the ejection of foreign forces. But Iran continues to cement its position in Syria, which poses a threat there and to our allies. 

And, Ms. Pletka, you said our goal in Syria ought to be to keep 

the Russians—to keep the Russians out and to prevent Assad from 

holding power. It looks like we failed on both counts. 

I do not want to see the U.S. in an unending war. But our current policy seems to simply perpetuate chaos and instability. What 

should it look like, Ms. Pletka, to your question? 

What should our mission—how should we be defining our mission in Syria, since it is not clear that that has been defined or, 

ultimately, what we are doing to accomplish that mission? 

Ms. PLETKA. Thank you for being amendable to the question. 

It is the important one to ask. What we need to achieve in Syria 

is a lasting and secure government that rests on the authority of 

the Syrian people. That should be the end game in Syria. 

If we know what that end game is, we can begin to work toward 

it. I think there are ways, but I agree with you, they do involve 

the continued commitment of U.S. troops. 

You said absolutely rightly that there is a coincidence of the 

moral and the strategic imperative. Martin Indyk and I said the 

exact same thing to the Obama Administration. People like you 

and people like me were ignored when we said that when this problem was eminently solvable. 

It is much harder now. But we need to recognize that through 

proxies, if we continue with train and equip, if we leave troops on 

the ground, if we use the territory that has already been liberated, 

and if we are committed to the notion that Assad cannot remain 

and therefore that we must work with the Syrian people to find an 

alternative government to which we can lend some credibility and 

authority along with the current liberated Syrian people, we will 

begin at that moment to understand how we can build the blocks 

toward that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. 
33 

Mr. Benaim, what role does—I mean, you talked about the need 

to focus on our values and human rights need to be a U.S. policy 

priority. I agree with you. 

That should be the case, I would argue, through the entire region. What happens when it is not viewed that way? How does that 

impact our ability to succeed in Syria or to hold our allies together 

as we confront Iran, for example? 

Mr. BENAIM. Well, thank you very much for the question. 

I think what happens when human rights are not respected is 

you see a growing trend of impunity where one regime’s actions 

embolden another and that is certainly the case. I think that it is 

a tragedy that Bashar al-Assad has been able to do what he has 

been able to do in the western half of Syria. And to see what has 

happened and his efforts to consolidate power in western Syria is 

to have regrets about that. 

I think from where we stand today, it seems to me that Assad 

is likely to remain in power in Damascus and that no configuration 

of forces is well positioned to remove him in the near term. 

In eastern Syria, however, there is a real live dynamic process 

underway and a U.S. opportunity for—a U.S. opportunity to shape 

the terms of the rest of Syria over territory where the U.S. has exercised a security guarantee and protected a group of people who 

have fought very ably against ISIS and are still figuring out the 

terms of their readmission into Syria. 

And I would think about how to use that leverage in that time, 

even having squandered some of it and already announcing a departure. I would think about how to use that to shape meaningful 

autonomy in eastern Syria and changing western Syria as well as 

possible. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. 

Ms. Catalano, just a really quick answer before I turn it over to 

Mr. Wilson. If we leaned in more to the American value of human 

rights as we interacted with Saudi Arabia, would it change Saudi 

behavior? 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. I think the short answer is it does not 

matter whether it changes Saudi behavior in the near term or in 

the longer term. It needs to be talked about. 

This is part and parcel of what relationships with friends include 

and that sometimes is a hard conversation, and when we do not include that in our consistent and constant engagement with Saudi 

Arabia, we send the signal that it is something the United States 

does not care about. 

And so to the extent that it has to be part of how we approach 

our engagement our relationships, it is vital to do. I would argue 

it probably does on the margins have impact over time, as long as 

we look at it as a constant and strategic element of our discourse. 

Mr. DEUTCH. OK. And I know we will get to talk more about 

that. 

Mr. Wilson, you are recognized. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of 

you for being here today. 

Ms. Pletka, last May I was grateful to lead the congressional delegation with the opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, the 

capital of Israel. 
34 

At the same time, policymakers and analysts suggested that such 

a move would result in major negative consequences for the region. 

What have been the consequences? 

Ms. PLETKA. All of the warnings that were made about the region lighting on fire, about all of the Arabs who had moved closer 

to Israel in concert with—in concert with Israel’s efforts against 

Iran actually did not do as was predicted. 

There was certainly some pro forma reactions from Arab States, 

much stronger reactions from Palestinians and from the Iranians, 

from Lebanon and from Syria. 

But I think that in terms of what many predicted, frankly, at a 

certain moment I was not sure either. The reaction was very, very 

different than it would have been 10 years ago or 20 years ago or 

30 years ago. 

That is a remarkable change in the Middle East. 

Mr. WILSON. And it is great to see that Congress had authorized 

this back in 1994, and so it has been achieved. 

And Ms. Ewers and Mr. Benaim, one of the—it is disappointing 

to see the electoral gains that Hezbollah and its allies made last 

May and by Hezbollah’s control over the health ministry in the new 

Lebanese government. 

It is clear that the U.S. strategy to counter Hezbollah’s influence 

in Lebanon has not been as successful as it needs to be. What 

changes do you see need to be made to have greater success in 

countering Hezbollah in Lebanon and what role would any U.S. assistance have in the revised strategy? 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. Thank you, Congressman. I think part of 

what I will say is do no harm. How do you—how do we ensure that 

Hezbollah and Iran continue to use Lebanon for whatever nefarious 

activity you want to list, whether it be a position from which to 

threaten Israel or to continue to foment instability in Syria? 

To detach entirely from our engagement from Lebanon, I believe, 

would be a fundamental mistake. I think it is difficult but not impossible to be able to find those areas, whether it be in supporting 

institutions that demonstrate that they are not completely owned 

subsidiaries of Hezbollah inside of Lebanon and to cultivate relationships with opposition groups and political leaders inside the 

system. 

It will be a long, long game. It will not have results overnight. 

But it is one where the United States and, more importantly, its 

Arab partners in the region have an interest in ensuring that Lebanon is not completely ceded to Iran. 

Mr. BENAIM. I mean, I think first and foremost we have to support a strong Israeli military deterrent against Hezbollah. 

What they are able to do inside Lebanon, they have gained a 

great deal of power and I think that we should strongly sanction 

Hezbollah as we have and I think that we should look for areas of 

the Lebanese armed forces that we can work with. 

But I think taking our ball and going home—what we have to 

do is engage and compete here. Show up places and act, because 

ceding the entire country to Iran and Hezbollah only puts us in a 

weaker position, I think, ultimately. 
35 

Mr. WILSON. And I was grateful, Ms. Pletka. You actually cited 

the Hezbollah influence in Lebanon earlier. What is your view of 

how we can counter this? 

Ms. PLETKA. I agree with my colleagues. I do not think the right 

thing to do was to turn around and simply give up on Lebanon, although I think Hezbollah and Iranian influence has grown very, 

very dramatically. 

We need to be a little bit more honest with ourselves about the 

influence that Hezbollah has inside the government and in the Lebanese armed forces and in the Lebanese banking system. 

Our Treasury Department has been after the Central Bank for 

some time but not with complete success, and the reality is that 

for as long as we are willing to look away because we want to preserve some goodness in Lebanon that is separate from Hezbollah 

and Iran, the more we make excuses for certain sectors of the government that Hezbollah then uses to finance itself and to arm itself 

and to extend its power throughout the country. 

So it is a real challenge. We need to compete and we need to use 

our leverage a lot more than we currently are. 

Mr. WILSON. And I have had the opportunity to visit Beirut and 

Lebanon itself. What an extraordinary country it has been and can 

be in the future. 

And so I appreciate each of you having a positive proposal on 

how we can help restore what was an extraordinary country back 

to what it should be. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Malinowski, you are recognized. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When then current administration took office in 2017, President 

Trump made his trip to Saudi Arabia, changed a bunch of policies. 

He met with the king of Bahrain and he said that Bahrain would 

not have to worry anymore about strains in our relationship over 

human rights. 

Resumed arms sales to that country. Resumed arms sales that 

had been suspended to Saudi Arabia over the use of those arms in 

the war in Yemen. 

A question to any of you—what signal did that send to the region 

about our commitment to human rights and the post-Arab Spring 

Middle East? 

Mr. BENAIM. I think that the signal that it sent was a fairly clear 

one of impunity and it was—the literal words that he used were, 

‘‘You will not have a problem anymore.’’ 

And it is striking that the hands that held that glowing orb in 

Riyadh went back to their own countries and in fairly short order 

in Saudi launched the Qatar blockade, a policy that has divided 

U.S. partners; in Bahrain, went back and arrested, I think, 300 

people from the village of Isa Qassim, the major opposition leader; 

and in Egypt, went back and signed a restrictive civil society law 

that had been sitting on the president’s desk for 6 months. 

Now, I think on these questions of how to think about U.S. influence over authoritarians in the Middle East, we have to keep two 

truths in mind: one of which is that each of these authoritarians 

is dealing with their own internal dynamic and is domestically 
36 

driven, in many ways; but we set the conditions externally and the 

dynamics in which they act. And I think when you see a set of 

steps like that in rapid order, what you are seeing is the effect of 

a green light. 

It is not to suggest that had we done nothing they would have, 

you know, acted very differently or been more—much more virtuous. But I think you do see a real calculable effect of impunity 

there. 

Ms. PLETKA. If I may, you certainly—you know—I think you 

know full well what the signal was that was sent and I think that 

the countries in the region got it as well. 

Unfortunately, we have been sending that signal for a long time. 

The reality is cutting off the Bahrainis, punishing the Saudis, was 

the end of the process that should have been paid attention to long 

ago. The Obama Administration and even the Bush and previous 

administrations have not paid attention. 

There was a minority government in Bahrain. The majority Shi 

’ites are oppressed. The United States has done almost nothing to 

stand with them and has ceded that ground to the Iranians over 

decades. 

The fact is we have our Fifth Fleet there. The fact is that we 

have forces in Qatar and this also causes us to make concessions 

to the kind of governance that we see that we ought to be pushing 

against. 

It is not—it is not just—it is not just Donald Trump. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Oh, I would agree with you. Nothing is quite 

that simple. I would suggest there is a slight difference between 

the inconsistency of our previous approach and the tremendous 

consistency of our current approach. 

Let me ask you the follow-on question, though, because I think 

this is an interesting part of the dynamic. Does that signal help us 

or hurt us with respect to Iran? 

In other words, when we give the impression that we are no 

longer even inconsistently going to press the Saudis, the Emiratis, 

the Egyptians, on human rights, torture, women, living within 

their constitutions, allowing public protest, et cetera, how does it 

affect our ability to reach out to the Iranian people and to promote 

whether you want to call it reform, regime change, or respect for 

human rights, the kind of change that we all want to see in that 

country? 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. I am happy—I am happy to start. 

I think it is demoralizing to populations who are looking for signals from the international community—not just from the United 

States but, more broadly, that acknowledge their legitimate grievances. 

And so for a population like that of Iran, it simply underscores 

what the United States is not willing to engage on and that is the 

wellbeing of the people. 

I would also add to that that it continues to assist the regime in 

Iran to do what it does best, which is exploit grievances not just 

inside of Iran but outside of it, right. 

So when you look at Yemen, when you look at Bahrain, when 

you look at Iraq, when you look at Syria, the lack of consistency 

and the way the United States talks about the values of human 
37 

rights allows those communities that are disenfranchised to become 

much more exploitable by Iran relatively cheaply and with little effort. 

Mr. BENAIM. I think it also undercuts the message that—supposedly being sent to the Iranian people that we care about their 

human rights and their wellbeing. 

It sometimes seems as though human rights are a weapon that 

you use against your enemy in the way that they are applied rather than something that we should support to make our partners 

stronger and more durable and viable over time. 

So I think there is that as well, and I mean, the nature of Iranian influence—the reason that it has grown—is their ability to exploit these kinds of rifts, fault lines, societal grievances, to make 

proxies out of minorities within countries that—or even majorities 

that—have not been treated well. 

So I think even just on the basic idea of containing Iran, a policy 

that abjures human rights, we should be clear that it does earn 

good will from leaders. Leaders appreciate not having to answer 

these questions. And that is exactly why we should ask them. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Malinowski. 

Mr. Zeldin, you are recognized. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this 

hearing, and I guess kind of building off of this exchange that was 

just happening but, you know, taking in a couple of other directions, I was critical of the entry into the Iran nuclear deal. There 

might be a diversity of opinion among today’s speakers. Thank you 

to today’s witnesses for being here. 

At the time, I was outspoken about the need to tackle Iran’s 

other non-nuclear bad activities because the leverage that brought 

the Iranians to the table—they wanted the sanctions relief. When 

we negotiated away the sanctions relief in entering the Iran nuclear deal there was a lot that we were not negotiating. 

But before I get to a couple of the human rights issues, I just 

wanted to ask a question, and this applies regardless of whether 

you are the strongest supporter of the Iran nuclear deal or the biggest critic of the Iran nuclear deal. 

Regardless, there is still an issue with regard—with respect to 

the sunset provisions, with the verification regime, and the non-nuclear bad activities. 

But specifically with regard to the first two, anything that the 

witnesses can add? Whether you support the deal or not, there is 

an issue with regards to sunset provisions and the verification regime. 

Path forward for U.S. foreign policy? 

Mr. BENAIM. I think, you know, you negotiate the best deal that 

you can get. And whether you oppose it or not, there were indeed 

provisions that over time would allow the Iranians very slowly to 

begin enriching again. 

There are some provisions of the deal that extend permanently 

and the fact is that the visibility and verification under the deal 

is far greater than under any other equivalent agreement and 

would continue indefinitely. 

These are unsatisfying answers to many, I realize that. 
38 

Mr. ZELDIN. In all fairness, I mean, with all due respect, I, as 

a Member of Congress, I have not read the verification. This side 

deal that was entered into with IAEA and Iran has not even been 

provided to Congress. 

When John Kerry was here sitting in your seat, I asked him if 

he had read the verification deal between the IAEA and Iran and 

he said no. He said he had been briefed on it. 

So it is hard to defend the verification regime to enforce the Iran 

nuclear deal. I do not know of a single Member of Congress who 

has even seen it. 

Mr. BENAIM. I cannot speak to the details of that particular 

verification. 

Mr. ZELDIN. What about the sunset provisions that do exist? 

What do you recommend as far as a path forward if we were to be 

able to re-enter negotiations? 

Mr. BENAIM. I think—I think it is the right question. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Excuse me, Mr. Benaim. Can you pull the mic in 

front a little closer, please? 

Mr. BENAIM. Oh, yes, absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Great. 

Mr. BENAIM. Is that better? 

It is exactly the right question because, ultimately, whether you 

supported this deal or opposed it, what we are trying to do here 

is accumulate pressure toward an end. 

Pressure is not the goal. The goal is a change in Iranian behavior. The nuclear question is the single—as our allies told us, when 

Iran was one to 3 months away from a nuclear break out, this is 

the single question that can take every other issue and turbo 

charge it and put a nuclear deterrent behind it or lead the United 

States into war. 

Now, I think it is going to be hard to re-enter this agreement because we are going to ask Iran to buy the same horse twice, essentially, to make concessions for things that we did not deliver the 

last time. 

But I think it is going to be necessary to try to offer more to get 

more time, because you are right, we need more time. We need 

longer restrictions and that may, frankly, require offering more in 

return. 

But I think that is what we need to do because there are not 

other choices. Eventually, Iran will start to enrich again, absent an 

agreement, and we need a new and better deal. 

Mr. ZELDIN. And we are running a little short on time and I 

want to hear from you with regards to their LGBT issues that we 

are seeing in the Middle East. We are reading about the new news 

today from Brunei. 

Congressman Cicilline and I have been involved in an effort with 

regard to Chechnya. It is all over the world. So I want you to be 

able to speak about LGBT and the human rights. 

But I would just also offer there has been a lot of misinformation 

that has gone on all around the world as it relates to Iran’s behavior as it relates the IR–6s, IR–8s, access to military sites, acquiring 

heavy water, and more. 

But we only have a limited amount of time. Is there anything 

that you can add specifically, continuing the conversation that you 
39 

had with Mr. Malinowski about this—I mean, there is growing bipartisan concern here in Congress with regards to criminalizing in 

the worst ways the LGBT community around the world and including Iran and elsewhere? 

Mr. BENAIM. I think it is a terrific question and I am delighted 

that you asked it. I am in the process of doing research on this 

topic with a group of graduate students at NYU. 

These are human rights. They should be part of human rights. 

When we talk about human rights anywhere, we should be talking 

about these issues as well. And we may disagree about marriage 

or other things. But we can all agree on stoning to death. We can 

all agree that somebody whose life is in danger for their orientation 

should be able to gain humanitarian parole. These are the kinds 

of things that we can and should work on, in some places quietly 

because they create a backlash that can be disadvantageous to the 

people involved. 

But I think it is a bold and important area and I am delighted 

to see it gain bipartisan support and have a degree of policy continuity going forward. Because I think it is part of the future of 

human rights. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, for lack of time I will have to yield back to the 

chair. Thank you. 

Mr. DEUTCH. OK. Thanks. 

Mr. Trone, you are recognized. 

Mr. TRONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This week marks the sixth month anniversary since Jamal 

Khashoggi was murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. 

Our own intelligence community has indicated the Crown Prince, 

Mohammad bin Salman, has been responsible of the murder. We 

all could agree this is unacceptable. It goes against all notions of 

human rights and dignity. 

I have been disappointed by President Trump’s response, which 

is basically no response. What should Congress be doing to ensure 

Saudi leadership does not take away the message that they are 

free to kill dissidents, use diplomatic cover to do so, and how do 

we send a clear message to the kingdom we cannot tolerate these 

actions? 

Let us start on the left and work our way across. 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 

I think what Congress has been doing to date is exactly what it 

needs to continue to do, and more, keeping the spotlight on this. 

Despite the fact that the administration is less interested in talking about this in a full-throated way, particularly publicly, leaves 

this body with some of that work and I think that this Congress 

needs to continue to demand the information that it demanded last 

week from Secretary Pompeo, which means full transparency with 

respect to the information that is available, and whatever continues to become available with respect to the murder of Jamal 

Khashoggi. 

I think this needs to be scrutinized. I think, based on your judgments of that information, there could be discussion about an independent investigation that goes beyond what was started by the 

U.N. earlier this year, but I think keeping conversation both pub-
40 

licly and, of course, privately when Members of Congress as well 

as the administration talks to the Saudi government about why 

this is so fundamentally against U.S. interests. 

Mr. BENAIM. I agree. We need a full accounting. We need a full 

accounting and no impunity, and I think the clearest and most important message to send is that this kind of thing affects the entire 

nature of the partnership. 

This goes to basic questions of judgment and I think that this is 

part and parcel of other reckless moves that we have seen require 

a broader review of all sorts of cooperation that we would engage 

in with an ally where we respected their judgement. But, in this 

case, we might have to think twice about including offensive weaponry and nuclear cooperation and U.S. security and intelligence 

firms that have worked with Saudi as well. 

Mr. TRONE. Do you think we should discontinue those efforts? 

Mr. BENAIM. No, I think we should take a careful look at each 

one and figure out which is appropriate and which is not. I think 

that with Saudi Arabia we have to be careful to both send a message of impunity and not tear down the relationship as a whole. 

But I think on offensive weaponry there certainly are things that 

we should pull back on. 

Mr. TRONE. But if we coach—if we coach the discussion regarding 

aimed at that one individual—not at the kingdom itself but the individual—that did this act that we are setting up to rule the kingdom for the next 50 years, would not it be better to bite the bullet 

now? 

Mr. BENAIM. It is a very good question and it is a very complicated question, and I think we should follow the law where it 

takes us here in terms of a full and transparent accounting in 

whatever legal sanction exists there. 

And I think when it comes to somebody who may rule a country 

for 50 years, we should look for the possibility to treat it as a country and get that country to be incentivized to behave more responsibly. 

You have got your hands around the core of dilemma—the crux 

of the dilemma, which is that singling out a person risks giving impunity and singling out a person risks damaging a relationship for 

half a century. 

And I think we should follow the law. Follow the Magnitsky Act. 

Let the law goes where it takes us and demand a full investigation 

with no impunity. 

Ms. PLETKA. First I would like to welcome back everybody who 

I really, really missed during the Obama Administration and your 

support for democracy and human freedom. 

Where were you? 

Second of all, Jamal Khashoggi did not deserve to be murdered 

by anybody. But I want to really underscore the point that he is 

not the only person who has been murdered by his government, 

right, that we have ignored for the last decade, whether it is our 

friends in Egypt. 

And you want to talk about LGBT rights? How much money do 

we give Egypt? We do not give any money to Saudi Arabia. What 

about our NATO ally, Turkey, that is so excited about the Jamal 
41 

Khashoggi murder that they are leaking to us all of their intelligence about surveillance on the Saudi consulate. 

And yet, it is the country with the most journalists in prison of 

any country in the world—the country that we just had to cutoff 

F–35 purchases to because they are buying an S–400 air defense 

system from the Russians. 

What I am trying to say is not that we should excuse the murder 

of Jamal Khashoggi or that we should not investigate it to its fullest. What I am saying is that if those are our standards, then let 

them be our standards about everything and everybody. 

You will have my support. 

Mr. TRONE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Cicilline, you are recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

calling this hearing to examine U.S. policy in what is truly a very 

important region of the world, and thank you to our witnesses for 

sharing your insights. 

I think, like many members of this committee, I am deeply concerned about the lack of clarity, the contradictions, and the dangerous decisions that have been offered as a substitute for cohesive 

policy toward the Middle East and North Africa by this administration. 

On issue after issue, we see a truly alarming lack of strategy or 

clear priorities. In Syria, we are leaving 1 minute, staying the next. 

The administration’s unilateral actions vis-a-vis Israel have caused 

considerable concern regarding the prospect for peace and a twoState solution. 

In Saudi Arabia, the administration embraces a crown prince 

who is believed to have had a journalist hacked to death. In 

Yemen, the administration supports a military operation that furthers a conflict with catastrophic humanitarian consequences. 

In Iraq, millions of dollars in foreign assistance has been redirected from established aid institutions to instead fund religious organizations with little oversight or transparency. 

The administration unilaterally pulled out the Iran nuclear deal 

with no plan to stem Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and so it goes on 

and on. Throughout the region we see no coherent strategy or policy. It seems that the administration lurches from one half-baked 

idea to the next with dire and sometimes deadly consequences. 

So I do think this is an opportunity for Congress and this committee in particular to hold the administration to account and to 

ensure that some coherent strategy is actually developed and implemented. 

So I would first like to ask a broad question, because there has 

been a lot of discussion about our values, and I am just wondering 

whether the witnesses believe that this administration’s de-emphasis of human rights, which I think most objective observers would 

say is a fact, that whether or not that has harmed our image in 

this region of the world? Has it reduced our leverage? 

Because we all remain very concerned about what it means to 

America’s leadership in the world and our ability to kind of exercise real influence in the Middle East. 
42 

But I am wondering whether your view is that this de-emphasis, 

which seems very clear and noticed by leaders around the world 

whether that is in fact happening. I will start with you, if I may, 

Ms. Catalano Ewers. 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. Thank you very much for the question. 

I think the de-emphasis has harmed our leverage to the extent 

that those partners who are perhaps quite content to not have it 

be part of the conversation, it is a freebie, right. 

It allows them to continue to take these actions, whether it be 

the arrests of journalists or of oppositionists or actions more severe 

like assassinations. The fact that this administration has not found 

it necessary both privately and diplomatically as well as publicly 

to keep this as part of the discussion. 

It is not a zero sum. It is not the only issue we talk to partners 

about. But that it is not consistently raised suggests to these leaders that we do not care and in fact they can act with impunity. 

And so I think it has—it has eroded leverage unnecessarily. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Benaim? 

Mr. BENAIM. I think that is exactly right. I think that is exactly 

right. I think that this is something that they do not want to talk 

about and sometimes they have convinced their publics not to trust 

us about. 

So I do not think it is as clear cut, as everywhere we go, when 

we talk about this, publics cheer. There is nationalism in many of 

these countries. It is an underrated force at work in places like 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, and criticizing the government can 

lead to that kind of backlash. 

But I think what is important is that it gives governments pause 

engaging in these kinds of activities to know that we just might 

show up and actually exercise our values. 

Now, the natural by-product of mixing principle and prudence is 

inconsistency. It is what happens. It is part of balancing our various interests. 

But the fact that we care and the fact that we show up really 

does constrain behavior in ways that I think are meaningful. 

So I think it is less about our influence with populations than 

our leverage to work on things we care about. And, ultimately it 

is about the value of these partnerships and the ability of our partners to hold up as durable partners and not find ourselves in the 

kind of situation we do with Saudi Arabia where their domestic repression makes them a less valuable partner for the things we 

need to do together. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And is that problem exacerbated when the president of the United States in fact describes the free press as enemies of the people, questions the legitimacy of election outcomes, 

attacks the rule of law in this country, or the independence of the 

judiciary or undermines law enforcement? 

It seems really difficult for the United States to be an effective 

powerful advocate for democracy, rule of law, self-governance, 

frankly, when we have a president of the United States who is saying things which undermine those very institutions we are trying 

to promote. 

How can Congress respond to that in an effective way if there is 

any way? Or am I just being overly sensitive? 
43 

Mr. BENAIM. I think you have described the problem admirably 

and I think you have, hopefully, opportunities to vote on all sorts 

of matters pertaining to the promotion of and preservation of various democratic institutions and reform and revitalization of them 

in this country. 

And it is outside of my expertise that I have been brought to discuss before the committee. But I think it is all very deeply connected. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman, you are recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. We have spent several hundred hours 

in this room, now maybe several thousand hours in this room, trying to discuss what policies would prevent Iran from getting its 

hands on a nuclear weapon. 

I would like to discuss preventing Saudi Arabia from getting its 

hands on a nuclear weapon, because as I have said all too graphically and all too often, if you cannot trust a regime with a bone 

saw, you should not trust them with nuclear weapons. 

Now, the Emirates entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement 

with the United States with all the controls. But they are going forward, apparently, with nuclear power. I do not know if this is within the expertise of any of our panellists. 

Are the Emiratis going forward with generating nuclear power 

and does it make any economic sense, given that they are on a peninsula that produces far more natural gas than it consumes and 

therefore that natural gas is either flared or, at great expense, liquefied? 

So does it make sense if you are on the Arabian Peninsula to 

generate electricity with nuclear power the way the Emiratis say 

they are going to do? 

Anybody have an answer? 

Ms. PLETKA. It depends what your attitude toward nuclear power 

is as an environmental issue. Certainly—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. I have never—the Green New Deal is a major motivating factor in many places. Probably not Dubai. 

Ms. PLETKA. I have not spoken to them about that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So assume that—I mean, obviously, there is some 

reputational plus for saying we are not emitting greenhouse gases. 

There is a minus for saying we are using nuclear power. Nobody 

ever got the Sierra Club award by building a nuclear power plant. 

Assume that they are indifferent for their worldwide image and on 

the carbon issue. 

Ms. PLETKA. I actually think it is a very interesting area of questioning and I think it is an important area for Congress to pursue. 

The United—the United—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. OK. If there is—if there is anybody that can get 

us an answer for the record, that would be helpful—— 

Ms. PLETKA. I would be happy—— 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Because I know these questions are 

coming out of left or right field. 

So, now, one question that answers itself. Saudi Arabia could 

enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with us with all the 

controls that the Emiratis agreed to. They are balking at that be-
44 

cause they want the capacity to do more than generate electricity 

with nuclear power. 

Does this inference or anything else cause you to think that the 

Saudis would like to have the capacity to move toward a nuclear 

weapon, should they later make the decision to go forward? 

I will start with—yes. 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. Thank you, Congressman. 

I will start with the end of that question and then—and then add 

a couple of points. I am not sure that I would infer directly that 

the desire to not adhere to the same kind of agreement that the 

UAE already has with the United States on civil nuclear energy is 

directly attributable to Saudi Arabia’s desire to maintain the ability to develop a nuclear weapon at some point. 

I think it has as much to do with issues of sovereignty, certainly, 

Saudi Arabia’s desire to not telegraph that it gets a shorter deal 

than Iran. 

And so I think there are other considerations. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I would point out, the deal Iran gets is significant limits on its nuclear program and enemy status with the 

United States. They get both of that. 

So to say that will they get to have a few centrifuges, they get 

centrifuges and if there is any sanction that we can put on them 

that we have not legislated, yes, that should be our next market. 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. I wholly concur, Congressman. 

But I think from the perspective of the Saudi government—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS [continuing]. There is this perception that 

if Iran has any indigenous enrichment capability, then the Saudis 

would not concede to giving that up just as a matter of practice. 

Now, I think when we come back to the discussion of a 1–2–3 

agreement with Saudi Arabia, what we need to keep in mind is 

what is in the primary U.S. interest and that is that agreement in 

various forms, and I am not an expert in this particular area, but 

I can say that we need to demand that commitment that abides by 

normative standards and—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I see my time is—— 

Ms. CATALANO EWERS. Sorry. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. And I do want to bring up one thing. 

The administration has issued seven licenses under Part 810 to 

allow the transfer of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and Congress has not one millimeter of knowledge as to what is in it. That 

is a departure from the—from not only practice but law. 

And I hope this committee joins with my committee, which is the 

Nonproliferation Committee, among other things, in demanding 

that we get those Part 810 licenses. And it is simply absurd for the 

administration to say yes, Congress has a role with regard to nuclear cooperation agreements so we will figure out a way to transfer nuclear technology to the Saudis without having such an agreement. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much. 

I thank the witnesses and all of the members for being here 

today. Witnesses, thanks for your testimony. 
45 

Members to the subcommittee may have some additional questions for you. We ask that you respond in writing to any of those 

questions. 

I request my colleagues—to my colleagues that any witness questions be submitted to the subcommittee clerk within five business 

days on a whole range of issues that we will be touching on over 

the rest of this Congress—our alliances and security and democracy and terrorism and human rights, and so many others. 

Thanks for helping to set the stage for what comes next. 

And with that, this committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
46 

APPENDIX 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASillNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee ou the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism 

Ted Deutch (D-FL), Chairman 

April 3, 2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held 

by the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism in Room 2172 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Wednesday, April3, 2019 

2:00pm 

Assessing U.S. Policy Priorities in the Middle East 

Ms. Elisa Catalano Ewers 

Adjunct Senior Fellow 

Middle East Security Program 

Center for a New American Security 

Mr. Daniel Benaim 

Senior Fellow 

Center for American Progress 

Visiting Assistant Professor 

Program in International Relations 

New York University 

Ms. Danielle Pletka 

Senior Vice President 

Foreign and Defense Policy Studies 

American Enterprise Institute 

By Direction of the Chairman 
47 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ___ Mi_,_d<L_te_E_ast,_:_M_o_m_•_A;:.!fti_·ca,-'-an-d_In_te_m_atto_·_n_a_l T._.,.,_•n_·s_m __ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date, __ __:Oc:411:..::'0.:::3/.c.::1.::.9 __ ~Room __ _::2:::1.:c72=---

Starting Time 2:36PM Ending Time 3:45PM 

ecesses (__to_j (__to _j (__to_j(__to_j(__to_j (__to_j 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Theodore E. Deutch 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open S~ion 0 Exeeutive ~sed) Session D 

Televised [l] 

TITLE OF BEARING: 

Assessing U.S. Policy Priorities in the Middle East 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See Attached 

E!eetronically Reeord~taped) 0 

Stenographic Record W 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an • if they are not members offo/1 committee.) 

NIA 

BEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [2] NoD 

(If "no", please list below and incJude title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any stotements submitted for the record.) 

QFR- Rep. Colin Allred 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE----

or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 3._·4_5_PM __ 

Subdommittee Staff Associate 
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

SUBCOMMinEE ON TilE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 

PR£SENT MEMBER PRESENT MEMBER 

X Theodore E. Deutch, FL X Joe Wilson, SC 

Gerald E. Connolly, VA X Steve Chabot, OH 

X David Cicilline, Rl Adam Kinzinger,lL 

X Ted Lieu, CA X Lee Zeldin, NY 

X Colin Allred, TX Brian J. Mast, FL -- X Tom Malinowski, NJ 

X David Trone, MA 1---- Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Guy Reschenthaler, PA 

~---~erman,CA 

William Keating, MA --

X Steve Watkins, KS 

X Juan Vargas, CA 
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Questions: 

Questions for the Record from Representative Colin Allred 

Assessing U.S. Policy Priorities in the Middle East 

April 3, 2019 

"To All Witnesses: 

I. The current Administration has announced plans to pull out of Syria. 

Answers: 

a. How can the U.S. do so in a way that does not endanger our Kurdish-Syrian 

allies? 

b. What problems could arise should the U.S. leave Syria precipitously? 

c. How can the U.S. work to support the Syrian people change their government?" 

Mr. Daniel Benaim: 

How can the U.S. do so in a way that does not endanger our Kurdish-Syrian allies? 

Congressman, I thank you for these insightful questions. The best way to pull out without 

endangering Syrian-Kurdish (and Arab) partners in fighting ISIS is to use the leverage of a U.S. 

troop presence and diplomatic support to let locals negotiate their future autonomy and 

protections within Syria. The President's announcement- notwithstanding subsequent reversals 

-makes that harder. But that remains the best hope from where we stand today: to use however 

much time the United States has left on the ground and however much leverage that provides to 

allow locals to negotiate for their future. I believe President Trump has gravely mishandled the 

implementation of this policy. My hope, however, is that the remaining troop presence and 

assertive U.S. diplomacy can still help 1) provide sufficient guarantees regarding Turkey's 

legitimate security concerns and intense diplomatic pressure to prevent a full-scale Turkish 

military incursion into SDF-held areas; 2) help local Kurdish and Arab forces hang together to 

win a degree of autonomy, as mentioned; and 3) to continue working with them to fight ISIS 

even as conditions shift. 

What problems could arise should the U.S. leave Syria precipitously? 

While few favor a permanent U.S. deployment in eastern Syria, several problems could arise 

from a precipitous, ill-considered approach to pulling out. To be clear, some of these might 

happen even if the U.S. stays- but leaving the wrong way heightens the risk of: 

Turkish military incursion, to fill the security vacuum and- as Turkey has done further 

west- carve out a zone inside Syria's Turkish border, at the expense of local actors. 

Internal SDF divides in which local Kurdish and Arab groups, played against one another 

by Damascus or outside powers, descend into conflict and displacement, leaving space 

for ISIS to reconstitute. 
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ISIS resurgence. There are already signs of an insurgency underway. A too-hasty U.S. 

departure, one that leaves counterterrorism partners twisting in the wind and consumed 

with their own fates, risks creating conditions favorable to ISIS' return. 

Brutal reconquest of eastern Syria by Assad. Another terrible prospect would be the 

Assad regime and its external backers and militias attempting to retake eastern Syria by 

force- leading to fresh rounds of bloodshed and mass displacement. While there is 

reason to hope that both sides would pursue a negotiated solution instead, there are no 

guarantees. 

Reputational damage. While "credibility" is rarely a good reason for major policy 

choices, the fact is that the President's hasty, uneven, impulsive-seeming, since-reversed 

policy announcement by tweet raised questions for partners like the Iraqi Kurds whether 

they could be next and whether the United States remains a reliable partner. 

How can the U.S. work to support the Syrian people change their government? 

The question of how the United States can work with the Syrian people to change their 

government has been an immensely difficult one since the first brave Syrian protestors went 

peacefully to the streets in the spring of 20 II. As Assad brutally reconsolidates his power in 

western Syria, and that part of the country's future clarities, it is even more difficult now. From 

where things stand today, it is hard to see what constellation of actors- either the war-weary 

Syrian people or outside backers- retains both the will and the capacity to forcibly change the 

Syrian government. That does not mean the United States should abandon all hope of a better 

future for everyday Syrians- or even of significant constitutional reforms and other changes as 

Syria's grim picture clarifies. Nor does it mean a headlong rush to reward Assad for his 

brutality. It does mean that the goal of outright regime change in Syria should be subordinated to 

more immediate considerations, including the humanitarian plight of the people on the ground. 

Ms. Elisa Catalano Ewers: 

In order to have a comprehensive U.S. strategy for Syria that preserves U.S. efforts against ISIS' 

territory and serves U.S. interests, it will be important that the United States continue to maintain 

a modest, residual U.S. military presence inside northern and eastern Syria, working with 

European allies in the area, to support the work of local Syrian partner forces who continue to 

provide security and stability and prevent the re-emergence ofiSIS. Uncertainty around this 

continued presence, however modest, is complicating calculations of those partners- while 

encouraging challengers and adversaries operating in the zone in northern and eastern Syria. 

Clarity in conveying its strategy would serve the U.S. and its allies in this dynamic. Such clarity 

should include a long enough time horizon and sufficient enough forces along with enablers to 

continue to provide the necessary support partners on the ground need. 

Because the U.S. has maintained operational control over this area of northern and eastern Syria 

that includes key natural resources of the country, it holds natural leverage. The Syria regime and 

its allies also seek to control these valuable resources. The U.S. could use this leverage to 

continue to act towards and press for progress in the political process that does not normalize 

Assad and his regime and seeks to preserve some elements of the Geneva process. In addition to 
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keeping a residual force in the area to maintain this leverage, the U.S. should consider how to 

increase economic support for reconstruction in northern and eastern Syria, working with 

partners to fund and execute it. The U.S. staying in the fight in a strategically smart and modest 

way sets an example for partners also to invest in the reconstruction of this area of Syria, and 

continues to support local partners to rebuild and govern while providing de facto support against 

threats from an ISIS reemergence and other regional aggressions. 

Such a policy would maximize the ability to combine such leverage and operational control over 

territory to negotiate an acceptable political end state. It will reassure allies and partners. It keeps 

pressure on Russia to do its part to facilitate an acceptable end to the conflict, including a 

possible workable transition from Assad through the Geneva process. 

Ms. Pletka did not submit a response in time for printing.