WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 4th Quarter, 2001

1

Contents

AJEM ............................................................... 1

Anti-Jam GPS ............................................ 4

Director’s Corner .................................... 7

FYI ................................................................... 8

News .............................................................. 9

Smart Weapons

Training Seminar .................................10

Calendar of Events ........................... 11

WSTIAC is a DoD Information

Analysis Center Sponsored by the

Defense Technical Information

Center and Operated by IiT

Research Institute

Volume 2, Number 4

September 2001

New Model

to Evaluate Weapon Effects

and Platform Vulnerability: AJEM

By Thomas L. Wasmund

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division

T

he Advanced Joint Effectiveness Model (AJEM) gives both the platform

vulnerability/survivability analyst and the munition lethality/

effectiveness analyst a new tool with new capabilities that can provide

more realistic estimates of weapon effects against platforms. AJEM can be

used to evaluate all conventional ballistic threats against aircraft, missile,

and ground-mobile targets. It is planned to be the Department of Defense

(DoD) standard computer simulation for evaluating the lethality and terminal

effectiveness of munitions and the vulnerability of aircraft, missiles, and

ground systems. AJEM can be used during all phases of weapon system

acquisition from research, design, and development to production, test, and

evaluation.

AJEM has been jointly developed, and is continuing to be supported, by the

Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME),

the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/

AS), and the U.S. Army Research Laboratory Survivability/Lethality Analysis

Directorate (ARL/SLAD). Model development is leveraging years of effort

by all three Services and the JTCGs, and incorporates and improves upon

the capabilities of older models.

AJEM combines the elements of target geometric modeling, threat modeling,

weapon-target encounter geometries and kinematics, proximity or contact

fuzing, and damage mechanism/target interaction (penetration, fire, blast,

etc.) to determine weapon effects on target components. This is combined

with an evaluation of target system relationships (functionality, redundancies,

etc.) to determine target remaining capability or loss of function/defeat.

AJEM’s software structure consists of three separate modules. Each module

is distinct and runs as a separate process in a UNIX environment. These

modules are:

• The Graphical User Interface,

• The Encounter Module, and

• The Vulnerability/Lethality (V/L) Module.

(Continued on page 2)
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(Continued on page 3)

(Continued from page 1)

These separate processes communicate with each other as

well as share common data files that contain information

about the target description and threat, as well as output

from an analysis. The AJEM User Interface aids the analyst

in managing the various input files required for an

assessment, controls the operation of the Encounter and

Vulnerability/Lethality Modules, and provides access to a

number of tools that support an analysis. Some of these

tools include an Encounter Visualization Tool (shown in

Figure 1);

Figure 1. AJEM Encounter Visualization Tool

the BRL-CADTM modeling and visualization tool MGED,

developed and maintained by the Army Research

Laboratory (shown in Figure 2);

Figure 2. MGED released with BRL-CAD

intermediate and final results postprocessors and viewers

(final results viewer shown in Figure 3), and detailed

documentation and references on-line in HTML format. Both

the AJEM and MGED interfaces are Tool Command

Language and Toolkit (Tcl/Tk) based windowing programs

rather than hardware dependent graphic routines. This

allows the user to reconfigure the windows to suit individual

preferences by creating and using Tcl/Tk scripts; it also

provides access to all of the BRL-CAD tools.

Figure 3. AJEM Final Results Viewer

A major advantage to the AJEM user is that all endgame

and target-interaction calculations work with the same BRLCADTM geometry. A number of commercial geometry

formats can be imported into the BRL-CAD data base.

Further, the recent release of BRL-CAD 5.4 includes complete

FASTGEN primitive support. BRL-CAD 6.0 will be released

by ARL in October, 2001 and will provide a significant

increase in capability. The data base has been changed to

allow arbitrary text attributes to be assigned to objects.

Additionally, the databases will be able to contain other

arbitrary information, such as MUVES inputs, Pro/E

geometry, texture maps, etc. BRL-CAD 6.0 will be included

in AJEM V2.0.

The Encounter Module is a separate program that models

the terminal engagement of a missile with a target. It has

the ability to use various fuze models and interacts with the

BRL-CAD target description to predict warhead burst points

or missile impact locations on a target. Once the burst points

are determined, the Encounter Module provides the option

to run the Vulnerability/Lethality Module to determine target

Pk. The Encounter Visualization Tool (EVT) can read the

input and output of the Encounter Module and animate the

encounter to assist the analyst in visualizing the results of a

run (as shown in Figure 1).
WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 4th Quarter, 2001

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(Continued from page 2)

At the heart of AJEM is the Vulnerability/Lethality (V/L)

Module. It provides all of the vulnerability analysis

capabilities for API and HEI projectiles, warhead fragments

and blast, missile body hits, long rods, shaped charges,

EFPs, and behind-armor-debris. AJEM uses the U.S. Army

Research Laboratory Modular Unix-based Vulnerability

Estimation Suite (MUVES) as the V/L Module. MUVES

provides the capability to add new physics-based target

interaction models as linked libraries. One of these is the

FATEPEN penetration and damage model, which allows the

realistic analysis of fragments, projectiles, and long rods.

This model includes penetrator path deflection and the

tracing of fragment debris particles. A comparison of

traditional- and FATEPEN-predicted fragment damage with

test results is shown in Figure 4. Capabilities are being added

to FATEPEN to predict penetration and fuzing of Man

Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).

AJEM can provide more realistic predictions primarily

because it traces the actual threat path through a target

and calculates the vulnerability/lethality on the fly rather

than use precalculated vulnerability data and interpolated

results. It can be used for evaluating a single threat against

a single target or multiple threats versus single or multiple

targets. In the case of multiple threats, damage data is

realistically accumulated and the results are assessed at the

end; current models incorrectly assume an undamaged

target with each additional threat. In addition AJEM has

new target interaction capabilities that are not available in

other models, and are these are continuing to be improved.

Other target interaction models are being developed, such

as fire start and sustainment, and will be integrated into

AJEM in the near future. ♦

Figure 4. FATEPEN Damage Prediction.

Distribution of the AJEM software is limited to US Government Agencies and their contractors.

For more information, visit the AJEM website at www.ajem.com. Any questions regarding AJEM can be addressed to Mr.

Thomas Wasmund, the AJEM Model Manager, at (540) 653-8692, Dr. Paul Tanenbaum, the MUVES Model Manager, at

(410) 278-6649, or Ms. Lisa Garriques at the SURVIAC Aberdeen Satellite Office, (410) 273-7722

About the Author: Mr. Wasmund received his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Washington, and B.S. and M.S. degrees in Aerospace Engineering

from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a Senior Scientist in the Lethality and Weapons Effectiveness Branch of the Missile Systems Division, Naval Surface

Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division. He has 30 years experience in air target vulnerability analysis, testing, and technology development, primarily working with

foreign air targets and supporting missile warhead development. Mr. Wasmund is the Functional Area Coordinator for Air Targets for the Vulnerability Working

Group of JTCG/ME, a co-chair of the Vulnerability Committee of the JTCG/AS Survivability Assessment Subgroup, and the AJEM Model Manager. He may be

reached at wasmundTL@nswc.navy.mil.
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(Continued on page 5)

Anti-Jam GPS Part 1

GPS Employment In PGMs

by Mark Scott

IIT Research Institute

Background

When recently shopping in an office supply store,

I happened upon an electronic device for sale

for around $100. The device had the size and

appearance of a cell phone. Upon closer examination, I

realized I was holding a personal Global Positioning System

(GPS) receiver. These navigation devices have shrunk in

size, weight, and cost in recent years to become a garden

variety commercial product.

Such was not always the case. In 1977, on my first job out of

college for the Instrument Division of Lear Siegler (now part

of Smiths Industries), the hardware for our in-house prototype

GPS receiver testbed occupied a rack 2 feet wide x 3 feet

deep x 5 feet tall. GPS was originally envisioned by the U.S.

Air Force as a world-wide, instantaneous navigation system

with the accuracy and long-term stability required for aircraft

missions; accordingly, early receiver specifications did not

exhibit severe size/weight constraints. The dramatic

miniaturization and cost reduction in GPS receivers, made

possible by continuing advances in electronics technology,

have opened a plethora of applications for GPS navigation,

both commercial and military—well beyond the expectations

of the system’s designers.

Among the expanding military roles of GPS is its employment

as a navigation subsystem in Precision Guided Munition

(PGM) applications. In these applications, a GPS receiver,

usually coupled with an inertial navigation system (INS), is

built into an indirect fire munition. The coupled GPS/INS

navigator gives the munition the capability to precisely (within

about 10 meters) determine its position in space and time, in

a real earth coordinate system. An onboard processor can

then compare the weapon’s actual position to its planned

trajectory (that leads to specified target coordinates) and

generate guidance corrections to null out the calculated errors.

The specified “fly to” point can be the actual coordinates of

the target; a target acquisition basket for an onboard seeker;

or a dispense point for smart submunitions.

For the case of flying to the actual target coordinates, the

PGM is referred to as a “competent” munition – the PGM is

competent to hit specified, fixed target coordinates, but does

not have the “smarts” to address significant target location

errors or a target that moves after the weapon has been

launched.

A sample of U.S. weapons that currently employ or are

planning to incorporate onboard GPS receivers include the

following PGMs by service: Navy: ERGM, Tomahawk,

HARM, Harpoon, SLAM & SLAM-ER. Air Force: EGBU-15,

P-LOCAAS. Army: Excalibur, Hornet, PGMM, GMLRS,

ATACMS. Joint Service: JSOW, JDAM & JDAM-ER, JASSM.

With this proliferating utilization of GPS in U.S. weapons,

concerns have risen over our growing dependence on GPS

for precision guidance and over the potential vulnerability

of GPS receivers to jamming—especially in weapon

applications.

This article marks the first in a two-part series addressing

anti-jam (AJ) GPS technology as it applies to PGM systems

facing potential threat jamming environments. This article

will describe the fundamental features of GPS navigation

for PGM applications. The subsequent article will describe

the essential features of GPS signal reception, the potential

GPS jamming threat, and the main thrusts in countercountermeasures that are being pursued to realize an AJ

GPS capability in current and future PGM systems.

GPS Navigation Fundamentals

GPS navigation is based on measuring ranges to satellites

in six precisely specified orbits. There are four satellites in

each orbit for a total of 24 satellites in the GPS

constellation. The orbits are at a relatively high altitude of

20,190 km, corresponding to an orbital radius of 26,560

km (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. GPS Satellite Orbit
WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 4th Quarter, 2001

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(Continued from page 4)

(Continued on page 6)

tp

The radius and orientation of the orbits are designed such

that four or more (and usually at least six) satellites are

always in view from anywhere on earth.

The GPS satellites transmit radio frequency (RF) microwave

signals in L-band around 1.5 GHz. These signals are

modulated with data and pseudo-random binary codes to

enable measurement of the signal’s propagation time from

the satellite to the weapon’s receiver. This measurement is

accomplished by comparing the binary code sequence

received from the satellite with a local replica of the code

generated at the receiver (see Figure 2). The delay in the

received code relative to the local code represents the signal

propagation time.

Since all electromagnetic radiation travels at the speed of

light (c ≈ 3 x 108 m/sec), the GPS signal propagation time

(∆tp) can be directly translated into the range (Rs) between

the satellite and the receiver: Rs = c ∆tp. The receiver also

knows precisely where the satellite was when it transmitted

the signal, based on ephemeris data encoded on the signal.

With both satellite position and range data, the receiver

now knows that it resides somewhere on a sphere of radius

Rs, centered on the satellite.

Ranging on another satellite determines another sphere of

possible positions. The intersection of these two spheres

defines a circle of possible receiver positions. The sphere

around a third satellite will intersect this circle in two points

(see Figure 3). These two points are both possible positions

for the GPS receiver. Typically, one of the points represents

a physically unreasonable result (often outside the satellites’

orbits), and hence can be rejected, leaving a unique

navigation solution (again, see Figure 3). Hence , acquisition

of ranging signals from three satellites is theoretically

sufficient to precisely determine a receiver’s position.

The set of equations that must be solved in the processor of

a weapon’s GPS receiver to give the navigation solution

are:

Figure 2: GPS Signal propagation delay between

satellite transmitter and weapon receiver = ∆tp

The position components, (x,y,z), are in an earth-centered

inertial (ECI) cartesian coordinate frame. The satellite

position vectors are known. The ranges to the satellites are

measured by the receiver. The components of the weapon’s

position vector are to be solved for.

Figure 3. Geometric basis for GPS navigation solution. 2Dcut of the intersection of 3 imaginary spheres, intersecting in

2 points, p & q (note: 3rd sphere is centered off the page

and is not illustrated). Point p represents the nav solution,

since q is rejected as unreasonable, being nowhere near the

earth.
6

This system of simultaneous quadratic equations represents

the algebraic equivalent to the geometric navigation solution

illustrated in Figure 3. Solving the system will yield two

solutions (p & q), the valid solution being the one that is in

closer proximity to the earth’s surface; viz., p=(xw,yw,zw).

One practical obstacle must still be surmounted before the

above proposed navigation solution will yield accurate

results. The ranges to the satellites are computed based on

the propagation times of the GPS signals traveling from

satellites to receiver. The signal propagation time is

identically the delay in the received satellite signal compared

to the replica signal generated locally in the receiver. A

clock error at either the satellite or the receiver causes a

shift in the relative phase between received and local signals,

and leads to an erroneous measurement of time delay in

the received signal: 1 microsecond of error x (3 x 108 m/

sec) = 300 meters of range error.

The satellites carry redundant atomic clocks, employing

cesium and rubidium frequency standards. Not only are

these clocks very accurate (a few nanoseconds), but they

are also monitored and corrected from the ground control

station on a daily basis. Obviously, very few GPS users

could afford a similar time standard for their receivers.

The crystal time standards that are practical for

employment in receivers will inevitably introduce a bias

error into the time delay measurements. This timing error

will translate into a bias error in each of the satellite range

calculations.

Fortunately, there is a relatively easy way around this

problem. Since the clock bias is at the receiver end, the

resulting bias error (δ) is the same for the range measurement

to each satellite. The first step toward eliminating this error

is to acknowledge it as an additional unknown in the

navigation solution:

Now there are three quadratic equations in four unknowns;

viz., the three unknown weapon position coordinates, (xw,

yw, zw), and the unknown range bias error, δ. The way to

obtain a fourth equation to solve this system is to acquire

and range on a fourth satellite (the bias error will be the

same for this fourth range measurement as it was for the

first three, since it has a common source resident in the

receiver’s clock):

(Continued from page 5)

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Thus, while only three satellite range measurements are

necessary for a receiver with perfect timing, a fourth

measurement is a practical means of compensating for the

bias error associated with an affordable receiver clock.

Summary

This concludes the introduction to GPS navigation principles.

The basis for obtaining a position fix with GPS is the

receiver’s acquisition of the signals transmitted from the

satellite constellation. It is the acquisition and tracking of

these signals that permits a receiver to range on the known

positions of the GPS satellites. In a subsequent bulletin, Part

2 of this article will address the characteristics of the GPS

signals, reception of these signals, the potential jamming

threats, and the anti-jam features that are emerging

specifically to address applications of GPS aimed at

precision guided weapons. ♦

About the Author Mark Scott received B.S. and M.S. degrees in

Electrical Engineering from Michigan State University in 1974 and

1976 respectively. From 1977 to 1982 he was employed by the

Instrument Division of Lear Siegler, Inc., working on tactical avionics

systems. From 1982 to 1984 he was employed by IIT Research Institute,

performing countermeasure/counter-countermeasure (CM/CCM)

analyses on air defense radars. From 1984 to 1987 he was with

Harris Corporation working on airborne data links, after which he

rejoined IITRI. His current research interests include sensor/

countermeasure performance analysis, signal processing, and sensor

fusion for smart weapons, multisensor seekers, survivability suites,

and C3I applications. Mr. Scott is a member of IEEE, the IEEE

Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society, and the Association of

Old Crows.
WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 4th Quarter, 2001

7

Director/Chief Scientist’s Corner

A View from Washington

by Dr. Wes Kitchens

T

he world has changed. The events that up to now we only saw on TV broadcast from other countries were brought much

closer to home on 11 September 2001. The devastation and loss of life that occurred in New York, Washington, DC,

and Pennsylvania will necessarily lead to major changes in our Nation’s approach to internal security and homeland

defense. Hopefully, the United States and the rest of the world will become a safer place to live as a result of the actions that

will now be taken to eliminate terrorists throughout the world. We now need to consider how we can dedicate our personal

efforts to help ensure that this won’t happen again. For those of you directly affected by this tragedy, my family and I offer our

thoughts and prayers to you, your families and friends.

This issue of the WSTIAC Newsletter features an article by Mr. Tom Wasmund, Naval Surface Warfare Center – Dahlgren

Division, that discusses the Advanced Joint Effectiveness Model (AJEM). AJEM is a new DoD model that can be used to make

realistic estimates of weapons effects against aircraft, missiles and ground-mobile targets. This model leverages many years

of effort by all three Services and the Joint Technical Coordinating Groups and incorporates and improves on the capabilities

of a number of older models. AJEM is available to DoD Users through SURVIAC; see the www.ajem.com web site for

information on model availability.

This issue of the WSTIAC Newsletter also features a technical article on the Global Positioning System (GPS), contributed by

Mr. Mark Scott, a Senior Science Advisor at the IIT Research Institute. This is the first of a multi-part series that will discuss AntiJam GPS technology. Such technology is being incorporated in GPS receivers on-board precision-guided munitions to project

them against jamming.

 We welcome your feedback about the WSTIAC Newsletter and solicit your suggestions for future topics you would like to see

included. You can reach me by Email at wkitchens@iitri.org or by phone at (703) 933-3317. ♦

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s

Comments on CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

“And it seems to me that it’s important to underline that when people deal with intelligence

information and make it available to people who are not cleared for that classified

information, the effect is to reduce the chances that the United States government has to

track down and deal with the people who have perpetrated the attacks on the United States

and killed so many Americans.

Second, when classified information dealing with operations is provided to people who

are not cleared for that classified information, the inevitable effect is that the lives of men

and women in uniform are put at risk.” ♦
8

Check our website at

http://iac.dtic.mil/wstiac/

FYI... The WSTIAC Newsletter is the current

awareness publication of the Weapon

Systems Technology Information Analysis

Center (WSTIAC). WSTIAC, a

Department of Defense (DoD) Information

Analysis Center (IAC), is administratively

managed by the Defense Information

Systems Agency (DISA), Defense

Technical Information Center (DTIC) under

the DoD IAC Program. The Contracting

Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR)

for WSTIAC is Mr. H. Jack Taylor, ODUSD

(S&T), Defense Pentagon, Washington,

D.C. 20301-3080, (703) 588-7405. IIT

Research Institute operates WSTIAC,

which services Government, industry, and

academia as a Center of Excellence in

Weapon Systems Technology.

WSTIAC Director: Dr. Wes Kitchens

703.933.3317,

Email: wkitchens@iitri.org

Database Inquiries: Vakare Valaitis

703.933.3362

Email: vvalaitis@iitri.org

Internet: http://iac.dtic.mil/wstiac/

All data and information herein

reported are believed to be reliable;

however, no warrant, expressed or

implied, is to be construed as to the

accuracy or the completeness of the

information presented. The view,

opinion, and findings contained in this

publication are those of the author(s)

and should not be construed as an

official Agency position, policy, or

decision, unless so designated by other

official documentation.

Publications from the National Academy of Sciences

REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE AIR FORCE HYPERSONIC TECHNOLOGY

PROGRAM

Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology

Program, National Research Council, 76 pages, 1998.

This study was undertaken in response to a request by the U.S. Air Force that the

National Research Council (NRC) examine whether the technologies that underlie

the concept of a hypersonic, air-launched, air-breathing, hydrocarbon-fueled

missile with speeds up to Mach 81 can be demonstrated in time to be initially

operational by 2015. To conduct the study, the NRC appointed the Committee on

Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program, under

the auspices of the Air Force Science and Technology Board.

Availability http://www.nap.edu/catalog/6195.html

NAVAL MINE WARFARE: OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CHALLENGES FOR

NAVAL FORCES (2001)

Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications

Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Studies Board, National Research

Council, 171 pages, 2001.

The Naval Studies Board conducted a mine warfare assessment that examined

issues related to both countermine and future sea mining capabilities. The committee

evaluated present and future threats to deep sea and littoral operations involving

mines; reviewed current R&D programs aimed at providing the fleet with improved

capabilities; and studied the status of present sea mine stockpile and mine delivery

systems with specific emphasis on that part of the littoral region that extends from

a sea depth of 40 ft. to 200 ft. across the beach.

Availability: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10176.html

NAVAL FORCES’ CAPABILITY FOR THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

Committee for Naval Forces’ Capability for Theater Missile Defense, Naval Studies

Board, National Research Council, 204 pages, 2001.

The Navy and Marine Corps have acknowledged a shift in warfare from

operations on the open seas to operations in and adjacent to littoral areas. This

shift in warfare location presents many technical and operational challenges to

naval forces in power projection, the most notable of which may be an increase

in the land-based threat to the forces engaged in such operations. Both theater

ballistic missile defense and cruise missile defense including anti-ship cruise

missile defense and over land cruise missile defense are important emerging

military capabilities that are inherently necessary if naval forces are to execute

missions in littoral areas.

Availability: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10105.html

ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES TO REPLACE ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES

Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines,

Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, Office of International Affairs,

National Research Council, 140 pages, 2001.

The Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

was asked to identify and examine possible tactics, technologies and operational

concepts that could provide advantages similar to APL; suggest a near-term

alternative technology, weapon or combination of systems and describe how these

technologies could be used consistently with current tactical doctrine. This report is

the result of that study.

Availability: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10071.html
WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 4th Quarter, 2001

9

JDAM Marries Up with Super Hornet

PEO Strike Weapons and Unmanned Aviation

Naval Air Systems Command

Public Affairs Department

The first guided launch of a Joint Direct Attack Munition

(JDAM) from an F/A-18E Super Hornet scored a direct hit

to its target Aug. 29 at the Naval Air Systems Command

Weapons Division China Lake, Calif., test range.

Released from the F/A-18E flying at 550 knots at 7000

feet, the JDAM demonstrated the effectiveness of mating its

guidance kit to a BLU-109 warhead — a 2000-pound hard

target penetrator. The weapon slammed home, knocking

out the Howitzer target.

Super Hornet pilot was Cdr. Ed Gassie from the NAVAIR

Weapons Division Weapons Test Squadron located at China

Lake.

Lt. Cdr. Don Simmons, JDAM Chief Systems Engineer,

applauded the weapon’s effectiveness stating, “This is

another weapon that fully exploits the capabilities of the

Super Hornet giving it unparalleled lethality in adverse

weather.”

The JDAM has been used successfully by the U.S. Navy

and Air Force during combat operations. ♦

Hypersonic Scramjet Projectile Flies

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Office of Public Affairs

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

announced today the first-ever successful free flight of a

hypersonic projectile powered by a supersonic combustion

ramjet (scramjet) engine burning hydrocarbon fuel. The

projectile is a four-inch diameter, 20-percent scale model

of a conceptual missile. On July 26, GASL Inc., of

Ronkonkoma, N.Y., fired the scramjet projectile out of a

large gun at the Air Force’s Arnold Engineering Development

Center, Arnold AFB, Tenn. The test is an important step

towards the realization of flight at hypersonic speeds.

The test was the second of two successful launches, the first

occurring on June 20. Together, these tests demonstrate that

scramjet engines will provide enough thrust to power a freeflying vehicle.

The tests used Arnold Engineering Development Center’s

two-stage light gas gun to accelerate the projectile to the

flight condition through a 130-foot long gun barrel. The

projectile experienced peak acceleration of approximately

10,000 Gs, and was launched from the gun at Mach 7.1.

Arnold’s G-Range facility is the only range in the country

capable of providing the low-acceleration loads required

to launch the projectile. After the titanium projectile was

launched, it used its scramjet engine to cover a distance

of 260 feet in slightly over 30 milliseconds.

Scramjet engines provide propulsion at speeds above

Mach 5 by capturing atmospheric air to burn on-board

fuel. These air-breathing engines are more efficient than

rocket motors for hypersonic propulsion, and will ultimately

allow the possibility of longer duration flight with greater

payload. Applications for such engines include powering

long-range hypersonic missiles, gun-launched kinetic

energy weapons, and access to space vehicles. In order

to operate, scramjet engines must first be traveling at

hypersonic speed. An accepted approach to reach scramjet

takeover speeds is to attach the scramjet to a rocket booster

as a first stage and then operate the scramjet once the

rocket has increased the speed sufficiently. ♦

MLRS and Army TACMS/Bat Merge

By Skip Vaughn

Precision Fires. That’s the new short name for what used

to be two separate project offices: MLRS and Army

TACMS/Bat. The Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems

Project Office was formed Aug. 6 from the merger of the

Multiple Launch Rocket System and Army Tactical Missile

Systems/Bat offices.

This project that stands up today is going to have dramatic

impact on the future of our Army,” Brig. Gen. John Holly,

the program executive officer for tactical missiles, said

during the deactivation/activation ceremony that morning

in Bob Jones Auditorium.

Col. Craig Naudain, the former MLRS project manager,

assumed the reins for Precision Fires. We are and will be

the center for excellence in the world in production and

development, sustainment and fielding of these weapon

systems,” Naudain said.

Col. Kelley Griswold, the former Army TACMS/Bat project

manager, will become director of information technology

and special programs for the Program Executive Office

for Tactical Missiles. “I’m extremely proud to have been a

part of the Army TACMS/Bat team,” Griswold said.

Reprinted from the Redstone Rocket, — 15-Aug-2001 ♦
10

For a complete brochure for the Huntsville course and/or on-site course

information, contact Mrs. Shirley Hardy, Seminar Administrator, at (256) 382-4756

or by e-mail: shardy@iitri.org

is pleased to announce the 2002 schedule for its

Smart Weapons Training Seminar

LOCATION: Huntsville, Alabama

 26-28 February 2002

23-25 April 2002

18-20 June 2002

20-22 August 2002

Also offering ON-SITE Courses at YOUR LOCATION

Seminar Scope:

The Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC) developed this 2-1/2 day Smart Weapons Training

Seminar to provide a comprehensive understanding of smart weapons and related technologies. This seminar is aimed at

providing general knowledge about smart weapons technology and a source of current information on selected U.S. and

foreign smart weapons, to include system description, concept of employment, performance status.

Objective:

The seminar’s objective is to inform materiel and combat developers, systems analysts, scientists, engineers, managers and

business developers about smart weapons, to include:

• State of the art of representative U.S. and foreign smart weapons systems;

• Employment concepts;

• Smart weapons related systems, subsystems, and technologies; and

• Technology trends.

Seminar Sponsors:

• DUSD (S&T) Weapons Systems Directorate

• Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

About the Seminar:

This seminar was originally developed for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It has

proven to be enormously popular with attendees from both government and industry. The seminar is updated annually to include

current information about the latest technology and capability upgrades being made to representative U.S. and foreign smart

weapon systems.
WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 4th Quarter, 2001

11

Calendar of Events

Upcoming Conferences and Courses

23-24 October 2001

5th NDIA Space Policy & Architecture Conference

“The Changing Face of Space” From Capabilities to

Personnel to Future Systems

Reston, VA

For additional information:

http://register.ndia.org/interview/

register.ndia?~Brochure~234

28-30 October 2001

IEEE NANO First IEEE Conference on Nanotechnology

Maui, HI

For additional information:

http://www.mein.nagoya-u.ac.jp/IEEE-NANO/

28-31 October 2001

8th Annual AOC International Symposium and Convention

Washington, DC

For additional information:

Voice: 888-OLD-CROW or 703.549.1600, Fax

703.549.2589

Email: bnelms@crows.org

http://www.crows.org

29-31 October 2001

International Space Symposium

Washington, DC

For additional information:

http://www.spacesymposium.org

29 October - 2 November 2001

6th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference (EWC)

Bay Point Marriott Resort and Conference Center

Panama City FL

For additional information:

Email: adekleine@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/

register.ndia?~Brochure~270

29 October - 3 November 2001

2001 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent

Robots and Systems

Maui, HI

For additional information:

http://www.icra-iros.com/iros2001/

5-8 November 2001

Short Course

Radar Cross Section Reduction

Atlanta, GA

For additional information:

Voice: 404.385.3502, Fax: 404.894.7398

Email: conted@gatech.edu

http://www.conted.gatech.edu

13-15 November 2001

ISR/Time-Critical Targeting Conference

Langley AFB, VA

For additional information:

Voice: 888-OLD-CROW or 703.549.1600, Fax

703.549.2589

Email: bnelms@crows.org

http://www.crows.org

26-28 November 2001

2001 TACOM APBI

Dearborn, MI

For additional information:

http://register.ndia.org/interview/

register.ndia?~Brochure~252

26-29 November 2001

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education

Conference I/ITSEC

Orange County Convention Center

Orlando FL

For additional information:

Email: bmcdaniel@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/

register.ndia?~Brochure~225

20-25 January 2002

IEEE 15th International Conference on Micro Electro

Mechanical Systems (MEMS)

MGM Grand Hotel

Las Vegas NV

For additional information:

Email: kkcline@pmmiconferences.com

26-28 February 2002

Smart Weapons Training Seminar

Huntsville AL

For additional information call:

Shirley Hardy 256.382.4756

3-4 April 2002

TechTrends 2002

Leveraging Science & Technology Opportunities

Baltimore, MD

For additional information:

http://register.ndia.org/interview/

register.ndia?~Brochure~2950

11-15 May 2002

IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation

Crystal Gateway Marriott Hotel

Washington DC

For additional information:

http://www.icra-iros.com/icra2002/index.html
12

215 Wynn Drive, Suite 101

Huntsville, AL 35805

1901 N. Beauregard Street, Suite 400

Alexandria, VA 22311

Inside this issue...

AJEM

Anti-Jam GPS

Director’s Corner

FYI

News

Smart Weapons Training Seminar

Calendar of Events

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