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i 

65–112 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–12] 

THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 2, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 2, 2011, The Status of United States Strategic Forces ....... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 2, 2011 ..................................................................................... 35 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011 

THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, United States Strategic Command ..................................................................................................................... 4 

Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .............................................................. 6 

Payne, Dr. Keith B., Commissioner, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States ...................................................................... 25 

Perry, Dr. William J., Chairman, Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States ............................................................................... 24 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert ..................................................................................... 45 

Miller, Hon. James N. ...................................................................................... 72 

Payne, Dr. Keith B. .......................................................................................... 104 

Perry, Dr. William J. ........................................................................................ 92 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 42 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 117 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 138 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 132 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 135 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 121 

(1) 

THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Welcome to the first subcommittee hearing of the 

112th Congress. I would like to commend Mr. Langevin on his leadership for the 111th Congress and congratulate Ms. Sanchez on selection as our new ranking member. 

I would also like to welcome our new members on the subcommittee: Mo Brooks, John Fleming, John Garamendi, Scott 

Rigell, Dutch Ruppersberger, Austin Scott and Betty Sutton. Glad 

to have another Ohioan on the subcommittee. 

Since we organized at the end of January, our subcommittee has 

conducted several overview briefings on various aspects of the strategic forces portfolio. Just yesterday, officials from OSD [Office of 

the Secretary of Defense] Policy and U.S. Strategic Command 

briefed Members on the administration’s nuclear policy and posture. 

Today’s hearing provides our subcommittee with the opportunity 

to review the status of U.S. strategic forces. Since last year’s strategic posture hearing a number of notable events have occurred, 

and several new policy documents have been released that affect 

our Nation’s strategic posture and which ultimately frame the administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request. 

We will hear from four distinguished witnesses. On our first 

panel we are joined by General Bob Kehler, the new Commander 

of U.S. Strategic Command; and Dr. Jim Miller, Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

I believe the committee’s oversight is further enhanced through 

additional perspectives outside of the traditional Department of Defense witnesses we usually hear from. Therefore, I asked Dr. Bill 

Perry and Dr. Jim Schlesinger, the Chairman and Vice Chairman 

of the U.S. Strategic Posture Commission, to provide their views on 

our Nation’s strategic posture and the changes that have occurred 

in the last few years. Dr. Schlesinger was unable to join us today. 

Our thoughts are with him, and I appreciate Dr. Keith Payne filling in for him. 
2 

I want to thank each of our witnesses for appearing today and 

thank them for their service and leadership. 

I will keep my comments brief to allow ample time for Members 

to ask questions; however, I would like to highlight four areas of 

concern, and I hope our witnesses will address these issues here 

today. 

First, the ink is barely dry on the New START [Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty] Treaty, and administration officials are already 

discussing further nuclear force reductions. The assumption appears to be that more arms control and deeper cuts to U.S. forces 

is desirable and puts us further down the path to a ‘‘world free of 

nuclear weapons,’’ a vision the President described in his 2009 

Prague speech. We must be careful here. The President admitted 

in that same speech that this vision is unlikely to be realized in 

our lifetimes. We should slow down, let the treaty ink be dry, and 

reassess where we are. Our security requirements should guide the 

feasibility and desirability of further reductions, not the other way 

around. 

One reason for caution is uncertainty. None of us can predict the 

future. China is ‘‘rapidly upgrading its nuclear capacity, and is trying to reach parity with Russia and the U.S.’’ Russia would have 

us trade away our missile defenses, conventional forces, and space 

capabilities to secure another arms control treaty that reduces 

their tactical nuclear weapons. 

In the last few months, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] has reaffirmed that nuclear deterrence is a core element of alliance security. In the last week, a senior South Korean official 

suggested the United States reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons 

on the Korean Peninsula for deterrence and assurance. There are 

long-term implications of a rush to reduce our nuclear forces that 

merit thoughtful consideration. 

Second, the Nuclear Posture Review and Section 1251 Report 

made several promises with respect to the modernization of our nuclear warheads, delivery systems and infrastructure. Based on 

what I have seen thus far for the fiscal year 2012 budget request, 

I am initially encouraged that the administration appears ready to 

honor these promises for the upcoming year. But there is much 

work to be done, and I remain concerned about the long-term commitment to these investments, a responsibility shared by both the 

administration and Congress. We have been handed the bill of deferred maintenance. We must be sure that these timelines are met 

and that these promises are kept. 

Third, I have seen solid progress in the administration’s implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach, PAA, for missile defense in Europe and a significant improvement in their engagement 

of Congress from where we were a year ago. This work is commendable. I met with NATO Parliamentarians and NATO officials 

just last week, and I was pleased to see how far the missile defense 

discussion in Europe has advanced from just 3 years ago. 

Some of us remain concerned, however, about the Department’s 

hedging strategy for defense of the homeland in case the long-range 

threat comes earlier or technical issues arise in the development of 

a new SM–3 interceptor. I came away from our PAA hearing last 

December believing that the Department’s hedging strategy was 
3 

hollow. I hope our witnesses can discuss the progress being made 

to add detail to the hedging strategy outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

Lastly, I would ask that our witnesses discuss what they see as 

the key challenges and opportunities in national security space. I 

am particularly concerned about the health of our space industrial 

base and our export control policies, and finding the right balance 

between protecting our national security interests and strengthening our industrial capacity. 

It goes without saying that these are challenging economic times, 

and I am certainly committed to working with the Department to 

identify efficiencies and better ways of doing business. With that 

said, we are a Nation fighting two wars, and it is our subcommittee’s responsibility to ensure our strategic forces are kept viable in 

both the good years and the bad. 

I want to thank you again for being with us today, and I look 

forward to your testimony. And with that, let me turn to my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez, for her opening comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much, 

Chairman Turner. I look forward to working with you and all the 

members of our subcommittee, and I know that we can accomplish 

a lot this year. 

I would also like to recognize and thank Mr. Langevin for his 

strong and his steady leadership on this subcommittee in the last 

Congress. 

And I want to join Mr. Turner in welcoming our witnesses to our 

first—this is our first, right?—our first strategic forces hearing of 

the 112th Congress. And we look forward to hearing from the general and from Dr. Miller to examine the strategic posture of the 

United States and our strategic forces, including our nuclear weapons programs, our missile defense systems, and our military space 

programs. 

I have already had an opportunity to meet with you and I am 

sorry, General, that you were a little delayed today, and we didn’t 

get a chance to talk, but I am sure that we will get to talk privately about some of the issues that we might have. 

I would also like to thank Dr. Perry and Dr. Payne, who provide 

their views in the context of the recommendations made by the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S. And 

I am also sorry that the Secretary could not join us today. 

In April 2009, President Obama committed to working toward a 

world free of nuclear weapons, and last year the administration 

took several important steps to implement progress toward that 

long-term vision and to provide guidance with regard to our strategic forces. 

First on the nuclear forces, the President announced his Nuclear 

Posture Review in April last year, which outlined a plan to reduce 

the role and the number of nuclear weapons, while committing to 
4 

maintaining our nuclear deterrent to reliably defend our country 

and our allies. And so that blueprint addressed the most pressing 

threats, I think, to U.S. security, the spread of nuclear weapons to 

other countries and to terrorists, and I know I worked quite a few 

years now being on this committee in trying to move part of that 

forward. 

But I am concerned that programs that underpin the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent and urgent nonproliferation efforts 

didn’t receive the fiscal year 2011 requested level of funding in the 

House-passed continuing resolution. And I know that myself and 

some of my fellow Democratic colleagues submitted to Chairman 

Ryan a letter talking to him about the concerns of those cuts and 

stressing the importance of strengthening this country’s nuclear 

threat reduction efforts, especially with the work that is carried out 

at Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories. I think those are very important efforts in order to bring 

down the risk of nuclear terrorism, and I think it also helps us to 

maintain a strong deterrent. 

So I am pleased that the administration, in particular, completed 

and that the Senate passed the New START Treaty with Russia. 

I think that was, of course, one of the most important things that 

we had on our list. It has been able to reset, I think, our relations 

with Russia. 

You know, I have a lot more in my opening statement, Mr. 

Chairman, but I do know that votes are coming up, and so I will 

submit the rest of it for the record. But I had already expressed 

to Dr. Miller yesterday some of my concerns and my questions. And 

I hope that I will get to talk to the general, too, and hopefully with 

our 5 minutes today we will get more information out of the both 

of you. So thank you for being with us. And with that I look forward to the discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. That certainly is very kind of you. 

Each of our witnesses will receive 5 minutes to give a summary 

of their opening statement, and we will then proceed for Members’ 

questions, and then we will go to our second panel. The committee 

has received your full written statements and, without objection, 

those statements will be made a part of the hearing record. 

We will begin with General Kehler. The floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General KEHLER. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

present my views on United States Strategic Command’s missions 

and priorities. 

I am privileged and humbled to appear today for the first time 

as Commander of Strategic Command. I am also pleased to appear 

with Dr. Jim Miller, a great colleague, with whom I look forward 

to working in the coming years. 

Today’s national security landscape is marked by protracted conflict, constant change, and enormous complexity. We are facing a 

significantly different operating environment than those we have 
5 

experienced in the past—an operating environment that is characterized by extraordinary technological advances; rapid changes in 

the number and type of actors; and hybrid combinations of strategies, tactics, and weapons. 

Of the threats we face, weapons of mass destruction clearly represent the greatest threat to the American people, particularly 

when pursued or possessed by violent extremists or state 

proliferators. To deal with this environment demands faster, more 

comprehensive awareness; strategic thinking; flexible planning; decentralized execution; rapid innovation; and unprecedented information sharing. 

Our mission remains clear: To detect, deter and prevent attacks 

against the United States, and to join with the other combatant 

commands to defend the Nation should deterrence fail. 

STRATCOM’s [United States Strategic Command] first priority is 

to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies. As we 

implement the New START Treaty, we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure and ready nuclear deterrent. We are also the 

strongest possible advocates in favor of the investments that are 

needed to sustain and modernize the nuclear triad and the nuclear 

weapons complex that underpins it. 

While nuclear deterrence is our number one priority, 

STRATCOM also has broader responsibilities in the 21st century. 

Ongoing operations demand our full commitment as well. So, in 

partnership with the other combatant commands, our next priority 

is to improve our plans, procedures, and capabilities to address regional problems, especially where those problems and capabilities 

cross regional boundaries. STRATCOM’s activities to synchronize 

plans and capabilities for missile defense, ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], electronic warfare, and combating weapons of mass destruction are helping to bring unity of effort to regional operations and increased effectiveness to our overall investment. 

Another priority is to improve our capabilities and operating concepts in the important civil and national security areas of space 

and cyberspace. Space is increasingly contested, congested, and 

competitive, and its importance to the United States goes far beyond national security. Ensuring uninterrupted access to space and 

space-based capabilities, improving our awareness of objects and 

activities in space, and enhancing the protection and resilience of 

our most critical systems are all essential objectives. Achieving 

those objectives demands continued investment to improve space 

situational awareness and to sustain our critical space capabilities 

while we also pursue increased opportunities with allies and commercial partners. 

Our greatest challenge in cyberspace is to improve our ability to 

operate and defend the DOD [Department of Defense] network at 

network speed, and to make our critical activities continue even in 

the face of adversary attempts to deny or disrupt them. 

STRATCOM and its sub-unified command, USCYBERCOM [United 

States Cyber Command], are working hard to improve our organizations and relationships, enhance network situational awareness 

and protection, increase our technical capacity, and develop the 

human capital we need as we look to the future. 
6 

We have much to do, but we also know today’s fiscal environment demands that we must maximize both mission effectiveness 

and taxpayer value. We will continue our efforts to identify every 

possible place where we can become more efficient as we work to 

become even more effective. 

Finally, we are committed to taking care of our warriors, our government civilians, and our families. To this end we will fully support the efforts of the services to properly train, equip, support, and 

care for our men and women, and we will work diligently to ensure 

a safe and positive work environment. 

Mr. Chairman, great challenges lie ahead, but so do great opportunities. The men and women of STRATCOM perform their difficult mission with remarkable skill and dedication every minute of 

every day. I am proud to be associated with them and look forward 

to working with you and the committee as we address the important national security issues. 

Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler, I want to apologize to you for all 

the conversation going on here, but I am trying to do the logistics 

of our votes, and this is what I have come up with: if this is acceptable hopefully to you guys, I am going to hand the gavel to Mr. 

Lamborn, who is going to preside while Dr. Miller gives his statement. Ms. Sanchez and I are going to go vote and return. During 

the period of the debate on the motion to recommit and the vote 

on the motion to recommit, we will ask our questions. Anybody else 

on the subcommittee is certainly welcome to return with us to hear 

the answers to those. We will then go and vote for the two votes 

that are remaining, and then when this subcommittee reconvenes, 

they will have their opportunity to ask their questions. 

With that, I will be seeing you in a moment. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PH.D., PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. MILLER. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, as you 

depart, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. It is a great pleasure to join the 

new Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Bob Kehler. 

As Chairman Turner alluded to, just over a year ago, DOD submitted to Congress the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, soon 

thereafter, the Nuclear Posture Review. And along with the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence, we recently submitted the 

first-ever National Security Space Strategy to complete the congressional requirement for a space posture review. 

My prepared statement summarizes the progress that we have 

made in each of these areas, and I will just touch on the highlights 

in each area. 

On nuclear issues, the administration has made significant 

progress over the past year, including ratification and entry into 

force of a New START Treaty and an updated investment plan for 

nuclear modernization. A key contribution of the New START Trea-
7 

ty is its verification regime. The U.S. and Russia will exchange initial New START databases no later than March 22nd, and this information will help us to better track the status of Russian strategic offensive arms. The treaty, as you know, allows each side to 

conduct up to 18 on-site inspections per year. These inspections 

will begin after April 5th, and our instructors are ready to go. 

DOD’s fiscal year 2012 budget reflects our commitment to sustain and to modernize our strategic delivery systems, and is the 

front end of an investment of some $125 billion over the next 10 

years. This includes sustaining the current Ohio-class submarines 

and continuing R&D [research and development] on a replacement 

submarine; sustaining the Trident II D–5 missile; preparatory 

analysis for a follow-on ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] capability to be fielded in the 2030 time frame; developing a new 

dual-capable Long-Range Standoff missile; upgrades to the B–2 to 

enhance its survivability and capabilities; and finally, the development and fielding of a new long-range nuclear-capable penetrating 

bomber, with funding starting in fiscal year 2012. 

As you know, the National Nuclear Security Administration, part of DOE [Department of Energy], has proposed spending about $88 

billion over the next 10 years to sustain our nuclear arsenal and 

to modernize infrastructure. The NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] 

identified a number of NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] facilities that are decades old and must be upgraded or replaced to ensure the reliability of our nuclear arsenal. 

And as the committee is aware, and as Ranking Member Sanchez 

alluded to, the House-proposed budget bill, H.R. 1, would cut 

NNSA funding in fiscal year 2011 by about 10 percent from the 

President’s request. Proposed cuts include over $600 million from 

the nonproliferation program, over $300 million from nuclear weapons activities, and over $100 million from nuclear naval reactors. 

If enacted, these cuts will delay needed investments, they will drive 

up program costs, they will reduce our ability to engage in nonproliferation, and they will set back our efforts to implement the 

Nuclear Posture Review. 

As we look to the future, Conventional Prompt Global Strike systems offer the possibility of being able to defeat time-urgent regional threats with rapidly executed high-precision attacks without 

having to use nuclear weapons. Such capabilities would increase 

the options available to the President. 

DOD is currently focusing in particular on conventionally armed 

long-range missile systems that would fly a non-ballistic trajectory, 

so-called boost-glide systems. Such systems could steer around 

countries to avoid overflight, and have flight trajectories clearly 

distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile]. Such systems would not be considered to be ‘‘new 

kinds of strategic offensive arms’’ for purposes of the New START 

Treaty, and so would not be accountable. DOD has proposed investing about $2 billion between now and 2016 for research and development of these types of systems. 

Turn now to missile defenses. As you know, the U.S. is currently 

protected against limited ICBM attacks, with 30 ground-based 

interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force 

Base in California. The President’s fiscal year 2012 request pro-
8 

vides a substantial investment in the defense of our homeland to 

ensure it remains viable over the long term. 

As Mr. Turner alluded to, the United States must also be wellhedged against the possibility of rapid threat developments or unexpected technical delays in U.S. missile defenses. The Department 

is in the process of finalizing and refining its hedging strategy, and 

I look forward to briefing this subcommittee on results soon at a 

classified level. 

Since the President’s announcement of the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach in September 2009, the administration has 

made substantial progress on implementation. We are on track to 

deploy all four phases of the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] and on time. The USS Monterey, a guided-missile cruiser 

equipped for ballistic missile defense, is due to depart next week 

on March 6th from its home port in Norfolk, Virginia, for a 6- 

month mission, and this is the start of Phase 1 of the EPAA. 

I want to say just a couple of words about missile defense cooperation with Russia. Our approach on this topic starts from our 

conviction that NATO must be responsible for defense of NATO territory, and Russia should be responsible for defense of Russian territory. Our concept is to operate our respective missile defense systems independently, but to cooperate by steps such as sharing sensor data to improve the ability of both systems to defeat missile attacks by regional actors such as Iran. As President Obama has 

stated, this cooperation can happen even as we have made clear 

that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint 

system, and it will not in any way limit the United States’ or 

NATO’s missile defense capabilities. 

U.S. space capabilities allow our military to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with 

assurance. And to meet our requirements in space, DOD is requesting about $26 billion in fiscal year 2012. This includes $3.7 billion 

for satellite communications, $1.8 billion for missile warning, $1.7 

billion for a GPS [Global Positioning System] constellation, and a 

number of other investments. 

There are currently more than 22,000 trackable man-made objects in space of 10 centimeters or more, and many tens or hundreds of thousands of smaller objects, but potentially large enough 

to damage a satellite, and to deal with this increasing congestion 

in space, DOD is taking a number of steps. We are expanding sharing of space situational awareness data to increase transparency 

and cooperation. We are looking at how to transform the Joint 

Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, 

into a combined space operation center operated with international 

parties, and the administration is currently closely evaluating the 

European Union’s proposed International Code of Conduct for 

Outer Space Activities as a potentially useful set of guidelines for 

safe activity in space. 

Finally, the United States is developing a range of capabilities, 

plans, and options to deter, defend against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems. 

And I would like to make clear that while U.S. responses to interference or attack on space systems must be proportional and in ac-
9 

cordance with the law of armed conflict, our responses would not 

necessarily be limited to the space domain. 

So in conclusion, reducing strategic risks to the United States 

and sustaining key U.S. strategic capabilities are long-term challenges that will require support from a succession of administrations and Congresses. Success will clearly require developing and 

sustaining bipartisan consensus on key issues, and I am very 

pleased to have the opportunity today to continue that engagement, 

and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 72.] 

Mr. LAMBORN [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Miller, and thank you, 

General Kehler, for your testimony. We know your time is very valuable, and so we thank you for your patience and flexibility while 

we go over and vote and then come back, because we do want to 

hear your responses to our questions. So we will be in recess until 

Chairman Turner returns. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. TURNER [presiding]. Well, thank you for your patience during 

votes. We are hoping to keep this efficient and moving. That is why 

we are doing this in shifts. And I appreciate you gentlemen giving 

us your patience. 

What we will do is the ranking member and myself, we will ask 

our questions. I think we should have about 15 or 20 minutes. And 

then we will go for the next two votes and then return with the 

other Members for the purpose of addressing additional questions, 

and then turn to our second panel. 

I obviously have questions for both of you. Dr. Miller, I will start 

with you. In my opening statement I made a broad construct of the 

issues that I am concerned about, and I want to give you an opportunity to respond to those. I basically put them into three categories for the purposes of this question. 

I am very concerned, I think as are others, that the President’s 

concept of a world without nuclear weapons or going to zero can 

be a pressure for driving policy instead of the real threat or deterrent assessment driving policy. Now, that is not to say that the 

concept of a world without nuclear weapons or the concept of zero 

is not something that we all would aspire to, and it is certainly not 

to say that there isn’t room for the types of reductions that we have 

seen in New START or issues of trying to look to what is an appropriate shape of our strategic posture. But ensuring that those two 

things are disconnected, that we don’t have the pressure of going 

to zero driving these issues, is a concern, I think, that many people 

have. 

We had New START, and the Senate made clear that as we 

looked to issues of further reductions, that we had to look to Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. One of the points that I made when 

we had our conversation is that when we have a review of our deterrence, we have to have a concept of what we are deterring. We 

cannot merely do an assessment of our posture without the concept 

of what are we deterring. That means that we have to both identify 

who it is that we are deterring, and what their assets are, and 

what is necessary for deterring it. 
10 

I am aware, as we have discussed, that NATO is also undertaking a deterrence review, and I have concerns there as well that 

we not want a political deterrence review, but a real policy and 

substantive technical review of both the needs of NATO and the 

concepts of what exactly we are deterring. 

I would like for you to talk about that for a moment on the issues 

of what are we trying to deter, how do we relate, then, that to our 

actual strategic posture, and how you see the deterrence review in 

NATO unfolding. 

Secondly, as I discussed in my opening statement, I am very concerned about the concept of the hedge that was identified in the 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review; that in the Phased Adaptive Approach, there was this concept that the two-stage would be viewed 

as a hedge. We had a discussion of that in another hearing. I know 

you have additional thoughts on that, and I would like to hear 

them today. 

And I would also like your thoughts on what other reductions 

currently are you looking at from a policy perspective? As we take 

up this issue, as we look at what is currently on the table, what 

do you see ahead of us? 

Dr. Miller. 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The President has talked in the past about the next step we intend to take on arms control, so let me start there. And what he 

has said, and what we stated in the NPR as well, was that we 

would look for the next bilateral round with Russia that would deal 

with both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and both 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. As you alluded to, 

there are not exactly symmetries in each of those categories, but 

overall there is an approximate parity, and it is a useful basis to 

think about conducting the next round of negotiations. 

In terms of the process that we will undertake prior to starting 

those negotiations, step one is to do the hard look at our guidance 

and at the implications of the guidance that comes from the White 

House, that comes from the Secretary and the Chairman, that goes 

to General Kehler, and to understand the implications of any revisions in that guidance in terms of what is to be deterred by whom. 

As we conduct that work, in parallel, we will be thinking about 

what types of verification regimes will be appropriate for a negotiation or a future agreement that really addressed the full range of 

nuclear weapons: deployed, non-deployed, strategic, non-strategic. 

The implications for verification are significant and would likely go 

well beyond what we have in the New START Treaty. 

Also in parallel, we need to be consulting with our allies, and 

part of that discussion will be in the context of the defense—I am 

sorry, the Deterrence Defense Policy Review of NATO that you alluded to. And that conversation, I think, is beginning, is under 

way, as you saw when you visited. And, from our perspective, it is 

essential that we continue to stick by the principles that have guided NATO for many decades, including risk sharing and burden 

sharing, and our understanding that as long as nuclear weapons 

exist, NATO should be a nuclear alliance—just as as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear arsenal. 
11 

So these activities will be going on to some degree in parallel, but 

just as was the case with the Nuclear Posture Review, where we 

reached key conclusions on what we needed for our nuclear posture 

and what—in terms of numbers and diversity of the force and so 

on, and then took those results to give guidance to our negotiators, 

we similarly will get the guidance work done, the assessments done 

that I talked about for what is required for effective deterrence, including strategic stability, and in parallel deal with the other 

issues I alluded to, including verification, consultation with allies. 

We will take the time to get it right. 

The timeline that was given by the Senate, as you know, sir, was 

a year from the Senate ratification for us to come back with a proposal for engaging Russia on tactical nuclear weapons in particular. 

With respect to the hedge, I paid attention at our December 

hearing, and the message was well received that we had not at 

that point articulated sufficiently how the hedge will work, under 

what conditions it would be initiated, and what specific responses 

we would have. 

We have done a lot of work on it, and I have to report today that 

we are not quite there, and I would like to come back and give a 

detailed classified briefing. I would like to commit to do so in the 

next several weeks. Some of the potential triggers for invoking the 

hedge will involve classified information, and so I prefer to do that 

in a classified setting in any case. 

I can talk about the elements, but you are already familiar with 

those, including the Missile Field 2, the eight additional silos that 

are being completed. Missile Field 1 is new for this year. We are 

now going to mothball Missile Field 1 rather than, essentially, 

eliminate it, which gives the opportunity for deployment of six 

more interceptors in the future. And I understand that we need to 

explain in more detail and on a detailed time limit that we have 

the specific role of the two-stage GBI [ground-based interceptor]. I 

can tell you it continues to have a critical role in the hedge, and 

I would just ask your indulgence for several more weeks to come 

back and give details in a classified setting. 

Mr. TURNER. Before I go to General Kehler, just to restate and 

give you my concern—not necessary for you to respond at this 

point—but I am very concerned that as we begin the deterrence review, or as we begin any review to look at further reductions, that 

it be done in the context of, as I was describing, the actual ‘‘what 

is being deterred.’’ We have Russia, we have China, we have Iran, 

we have North Korea, and any concept of reducing, especially in 

Europe, the U.S. footprint or the nuclear footprint of NATO as a 

deterrence must take into consideration Russia and the over 5,000 

tactical nuclear weapons that they have that are in the area, because of course NATO is looking to deter Russia. We are looking 

to deter Russia, and China, and Iran, and North Korea. And I don’t 

think anybody thinks that the current ratio between those tactical 

nuclear weapons in Russia and what we have at present with 

NATO is an appropriate ratio. They have overwhelming numbers, 

and I think the Senate’s direction was, ‘‘address those numbers.’’ 

Get Russia to make a concession with respect to the tactical weapons. And we certainly don’t want to see just unilateral reductions 
12 

on the side of the United States without addressing what is that 

important issue of the threat of those tactical nuclear weapons. 

With respect to the hedge, of course, our continued concern is 

that with the Phased Adaptive Approach, the coverage of protection 

to the mainland United States is not to arrive until 2020. That is 

in the best-case scenario on the evolution of technology. It is possible that the threat could evolve as early, as some intelligence reports say, as 2015. That would leave a significant gap to the United 

States, and so that is why I appreciate your continued work on the 

issue of the hedge. 

General Kehler, thank you so much for your continued thoughts 

and, of course, your leadership. One item that we had a discussion 

on was the—on the triad, of looking to the Navy and the tube reductions of 20 to 16. There is continued discussion in other hearings on the Hill today. I would like your thoughts on the reduction 

of the tubes and what you see driving that, how you see it affecting 

our strategic posture, and any other thoughts you have on that. 

General KEHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, sir, let me say that, in my mind anyway, the discussion of Trident and Ohio-class replacement is really a discussion in 

the context of the need to modernize the entire triad. So first of all, 

I think it is important for us to recognize that that is one piece, 

an important piece, but a piece of the decision process that we need 

to go through. 

Second, the issue of the number of tubes is not a simple black 

and white answer. So let me just comment here for a minute. First 

of all, the issue, in my mind, is the overall number of tubes we 

wind up with at the end, not so much the number of tubes per submarine. And second, the issue is, of course, we have flexibility and 

options with how many warheads per missile per tube. So that is 

another consideration that enters into this mixture. 

Another consideration that is important to me is the overall 

number of boats and the operational flexibility that we have with 

the overall number of boats, given that some number will need to 

be in maintenance, some number will need to be in training, et 

cetera. So those and many other factors, to include a little bit of 

foresight here in looking ahead to 20 years from now an anti-submarine warfare environment that the Navy will have to operate in, 

all of those bear on the ultimate size, weight, shape, configuration 

of the follow-on to the Ohio. 

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am not overly troubled by going 

to 16 tubes. As I look at this, given that we have that kind of flexibility that I just laid out, given that this is an element of the triad, 

and given that we have some decision space here as we go forward 

to decide on the ultimate number of submarines, nothing troubles 

me operationally here to the extent that I would oppose a submarine with 16 tubes. I understand the reasons for wanting to 

have 20, I understand the arguments that were made ahead of me, 

but as I sit here today, given the totality of the discussion, I am— 

as I say, I am not overly troubled by 16. 

Now, I don’t know that the gavel has been pounded on the other 

side of the river yet with a final decision, but at this point I am 

not overly troubled by 16. 
13 

Mr. TURNER. Twenty tubes met STRATCOM’s strategic requirements? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. A troubling aspect that we have is if 20 met the requirements, and now we are looking at 16, does 16 meet the requirements? And how was it determined that 20 to 16 meets the 

requirements? 

General KEHLER. Well, I can’t comment on, sort of, the acquisition decisions that went on in the background. I don’t know what 

those decisions were. But the difference between 20 and 16, there 

was also a different number of boats in play. And so the overall difference, as I went back and looked at this, was not that significant 

in terms of tubes. 

Mr. TURNER. So you are saying 16 will meet STRATCOM’s requirements? 

General KEHLER. Sixteen will meet STRATCOM’s requirements, 

given that we are sitting here 20 years in advance. It certainly will 

meet our operational requirements given the size of the tube, the 

performance of the D–5, the ability to upload the weapons, because 

at the end of the day here, the question is, will we be able to deliver sufficient weapons with the platforms that are available? And 

this would meet our requirements just depending on the weapon 

upload. 

Mr. TURNER. And we look forward to reviewing the analysis that 

says that the difference is sufficient. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, thank you, Doctor, for being before us. 

I am going to be going to South Korea in a few weeks, and so 

I am sure I am going to be asked a lot of questions. A South Korean press report this week indicated that National Security Council WMD [weapons of mass destruction] czar Dr. Gary Samore left 

open the possibility that the U.S. might introduce tactical nuclear 

weapons on the Korean Peninsula if South Korea makes such a request. 

The NSC [National Security Council] deputy spokesman clarified 

it afterwards to say that our policy remains to support a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, and that there was no plan to change that 

policy; that tactical weapons are not necessary for the defense of 

South Korea, and that we have no plan or intention to return 

them. 

Would you clarify what our policy is with regard to forwardbased tactical nuclear weapons, and is the administration planning 

on increasing the number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons? 

Dr. MILLER. Ma’am, the policy of the administration is to continue to have the ability to forward-deploy both tactical nuclear 

weapons and strategic nuclear weapons in the form of fighter aircraft, dual-capable aircraft, and in the form of bombers. 

With respect to Korea, the clarification of the statement is exactly right. Our policy remains to support a non-nuclear Korean 

Peninsula, and the other elements that you discussed are exactly 

right as well. 
14 

What I would like to add—and this is based on past and ongoing 

conversations with our South Korean allies—is that the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains firmly over South Korea, and neither side 

believes that on-peninsula deployments are necessary to sustain 

that deterrent. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor. 

As I stated in my opening comments that New START was what 

I believe is a real change and a reengagement, if you will, with 

Russia. I asked you this yesterday, Doctor, but maybe for the 

record, and, General, if you have any comments, where do you see 

us making further progress with the Russians and—with respect to 

arms reduction, and also with respect to missile defense—considering at least in the times that I have been over there in recent 

years, they have been very anxious about our whole issue with respect to missile defense, even with the phased approach that we 

have come—again, I understand that phased approach was not because of how they viewed this. But can you talk a little bit about 

this engagement in Russia, and what are the positives, where do 

you see us going, and what we could do as Congress-people who 

work on these subjects to enhance that relationship? 

Dr. MILLER. Let me take a cut and see if General Kehler wants 

to come in as well. In addition to the internal planning that we are 

doing currently to think about future steps in arms control with respect to Russia and all the elements that I described in responding 

to Chairman Turner, under the auspices of the Tauscher-Ryabkov 

group headed by, on our side, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, we are initiating discussions on the future basis of strategic 

stability. Discussions are just getting under way. We don’t expect 

them to result in a negotiated agreement. But what we do want to 

engage the Russians on is what do things look not just in the 2010s 

and so on, but in the 2020s and forward, and what will be the basis 

of deterrence in the future. 

They clearly have expressed concerns about the future course of 

our missile defense deployments, and we have, in all venues, come 

back with a clear statement that we will not accept any limitations 

quantitatively, qualitatively, geographically, or otherwise. And so 

this is part of a conversation about how to sustain strategic stability over the long term, and I think it is an important conversation both with Russia, and different qualitatively and quantitatively, but also very important with China. We have not yet had 

the same sort of positive response in terms of willingness to have 

this discussion vis-a-vis China, and we continue to ask for that. 

On missile defense cooperation, as I said in my statement, we 

have made clear that we don’t see moving forward with a joint system, but see moving forward with the possibility of cooperation on 

separate systems. And with respect to NATO, our concept is that 

NATO would defend NATO, Russia would defend Russia, and we 

would look for opportunities to cooperate that would be mutually 

beneficial. 

The Bush administration first proposed the possible use of radar 

data from two Russian radars, one in Armavir and one in Qabala. 

We have looked at those and a couple of others as well, and we 

think that, in fact, some early-warning data from those radars 

could potentially increase the ability, improve the ability of our 
15 

Phased Adaptive Approach to intercept missiles into Europe. It is 

also possible that sensors from the United States and from our 

NATO allies could improve the ability of Russia to engage a missile 

headed toward it from Iran. 

So sharing of sensor data, I think, is the most promising initial 

area. In principle, it is possible that one side could intercept a missile that is headed for the other. If you look at the geography of 

a launch from Iran, or elsewhere for that matter, the Middle East, 

there are some trajectories that head towards Europe that pass 

over Russia, and some, conversely, that would pass over Europe on 

its way to Russia. 

So we will look to engage with them on those issues, and a 

foundational activity that we have proposed is to do a joint analysis 

that looks at the architectures and how each side’s sensors and so 

forth could assist in the ability of the other side to conduct missile 

defense intercepts. 

Our next meeting with them I will co-chair in just a couple of 

weeks, and we will look to move the ball forward on these issues. 

We think it is in both the U.S. and Russian interests to have some 

real cooperation in this area. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

General, do you have anything to add? 

General KEHLER. Congresswoman Sanchez, I do. I would just add 

that over the years—since the end of the Cold War in particular, 

but even prior to that—we have found that there is extraordinary 

value in having military-to-military contact with the Russians at 

all levels on lots of issues. We find that those engagements typically lead to better understanding, they lead to less confusion at 

some times and, as we look to the future, we see a lot of opportunities here that we might be able to engage more with the Russians 

at a mil-to-mil level on a wide variety of issues. 

In addition, as Dr. Miller said, there have been some initiatives. 

You know, the Secretary of Defense visited China recently and, 

similarly we see some value there in military-to-military contact. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Because of the time constraints, I am going to hold on to my 

questions, and maybe we will allow the chance for the others to 

ask, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Thank you so much. 

We are going to adjourn. Before we do, I do have one issue I 

want to clarify first with respect to the questions I was asking. 

It is my understanding that the NATO deterrence review could 

recommend a reduction in the U.S. nuclear weapons that are in 

Europe. I want to make certain I am not walking away with a misunderstanding on that. If the gentleman at this time would correct 

me if I am mistaken? 

Then, coupled with that, my concern being I would expect, and 

I think the Senate’s direction would expect, that if that were to 

occur, that it would be done in conjunction with a concession or reduction overall in the Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Gentlemen? 

Dr. MILLER. Chairman Turner, I would not want to prejudge 

what the outcome of the review would be. We have views, obvi-
16 

ously, within the administration about its future direction, both its 

focus and desired outcomes, but—— 

Mr. TURNER. You would not disagree that it could recommend reductions? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. And then ergo to my statement, I would hope that 

would occur within the context of reductions and concessions in tactical nuclear weapons from Russia. 

Gentlemen, with that we are going to adjourn for these two 

votes, and then we will be returning for questions from the other 

Members. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. TURNER. I call the subcommittee back to order. 

We will begin our round of questioning, 5 minutes, to Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope the questions 

I am going to bring forth haven’t already been asked, because I 

missed some of our meeting with our truncated schedule here. 

General Kehler, and hopefully this isn’t going to become an issue, 

but press reports suggest that some in our administration would 

like to sign on to the European Union’s Code of Conduct concerning 

space. What are the advantages and disadvantages of signing on to 

such a code, what national security considerations should the Department take into account as it reviews such a proposal, and 

would this Code of Conduct require any changes in U.S. policy or 

approaches to space? 

And I know you are dealing with STRATCOM right now, but you 

obviously have an extensive space background when you were in 

Colorado Springs, and we thank you for your service in that capacity as well. 

General KEHLER. Congressman, let me just set the scene for a 

second. In 1957, there was essentially one object on orbit, and it 

was Sputnik. Here we are in 2011, and we catalog well over 20,000 

objects. It depends on the day whether it is 20,000 or 21,000 or 

22,000, but the number is growing. There are objects there beyond 

what we are able to maintain in our catalog that NASA has estimated probably 10 times the number of objects are there than what 

we actually see. So this issue of space becoming more congested is 

a real issue. 

There are some rules that exist today, but they are very broad, 

and our view, at least at STRATCOM, is that it is time for us to 

embrace this issue in some way. Now, there are caveats that have 

to be added to this, of course, and there are operational considerations that we would have to make sure that are being taken account of as we go forward. 

But my view is that it is time for us to have this engagement. 

It is time for us to be on the road of looking at what makes sense 

in terms of best practices. Whether we call that a code of conduct 

or whether we actually embrace the EU Code of Conduct is something we are working and making our inputs known in the policy 

world. But fundamentally our view at STRATCOM is that we 

should be on this road looking to put appropriate rules of the road 

in place that will help us and will actually help everyone. 
17 

This is consistent with our new national space policy, it is consistent with the new National Security Space Strategy, and operationally we think it is consistent with the plans that we have as 

well. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

Now, for either or both of you, when the White House announced 

the European Phased Adaptive Approach in 2009, it said the new 

approach was based upon an assumption that the long-range missile threat was ‘‘slower to develop.’’ However, several Defense officials, including Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, have recently 

expressed concern about the pace of Iran’s ICBM and nuclear developments. 

So my question is this: Are you concerned that Iran’s missile and 

nuclear programs are developing faster than the Intelligence Community previously assessed? 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Lamborn, I believe when I testified here in December, I talked through the then intelligence assessment portions 

which have been made public. I talked about the possibility of an 

Iranian long-range missile capability by 2015. So, in fact, we have 

seen Iran continue to pursue its missile program, including 

through the space launch system Safir and others. We have seen 

advances in that program, and we have seen them continue to pursue their nuclear program and at least providing the option to go 

to a nuclear weapons capability and not foreclosing that. 

So, I would say if anything since the time of that decision, concerns have been reinforced and to some degree heightened, and 

that is one of the reasons that we continue to look in detail at what 

the appropriate hedge should be with respect to missile defense. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I would add that in the 30 days I have 

been in command, the first set of questions that I started to ask 

about this were, do we have the flexibility to pursue the hedge 

strategy; and the answer is, yes, we are making progress in sensors. We have made progress in sensors. In fact, the modifications 

that have been made to some of our early-warning radars are now 

complete. There are others now in progress to be in a better position sensor-wise to understand and characterize the threat if it 

were to emerge. 

Of course, we are continuing to build GBIs, so there is flexibility 

there for a decision process that would respond to a hedge. There 

is work going on for the two-stage GBI. There are other things in 

trail here. MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is looking at how they 

would position what they call an IDT [In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal], or it is a way to get information to an interceptor that helps the interceptor if it is out of radar 

ranges, et cetera, et cetera. They are looking at where they might 

position additional IDTs. 

So I think I am comfortable from a military perspective that the 

pieces are in place that give the decisionmakers an ability to hedge 

if, in fact, this threat emerges sooner. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you both. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First I want to welcome our witnesses here today. Thank you for 

your testimony. 
18 

Before I begin, I just wanted to mention how much I enjoyed 

working with my colleague Chairman Turner on the Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces in the last Congress. I had the privilege of 

chairing the subcommittee, and I want to say how grateful I am 

for the opportunity to continue to serve on the subcommittee this 

year with you, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, and while also getting a chance to focus more on our national cyber efforts as now the ranking member on the Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. 

So, with that, let me turn to a cyber question. General Kehler, 

Dr. Miller, as we all know, STRATCOM has direct authority over 

the new Cyber Command that stood up last year, as you were talking about in your opening statements, and one of the concerns that 

we have had is about the proper authorities for the military in 

cyberspace. We recognize right now that of the range of threats 

that are facing the Nation, cyber threats are among the most serious. 

Clearly the NSA [National Security Agency] and CYBERCOM 

are both very capable entities for our intelligence and military 

issues, but many of the threats that we face today as a Nation are 

to civilian-critical infrastructure, such as our electric power grid or 

our financial system. 

My question is if we were undergoing a cyber 9/11 attack, what 

is the capacity of the Department to assist with the defense of nationally critical systems, and how is the Department’s efforts to 

work more closely with DHS [Department of Homeland Security] 

evolving? 

General KEHLER. Sir, let me begin by saying there has been a 

lot of progress made over the last couple of years to bring focus inside the Department for sure regarding cyber. The stand-up of 

CYBERCOM, by combining other pieces from throughout the Department, has been a big step forward. Getting it to full operational 

capability, although there is certainly much more to be done, was 

a significant step forward. Positioning at Fort Meade, which is the 

center of gravity—center of excellence for the country, really—for 

cyber-related activities, was a positive step. So there is progress 

being made. 

I believe that the memorandum of agreement that was signed between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security that begins to outline the relationship between the 

two Departments in just such a scenario has been particularly significant. 

There is more work to be done. If you are asking on any given 

day, what is the capacity of the Department to be helpful, there are 

capabilities the Department has. How the capabilities are wielded 

in terms of relationships elsewhere in the government and sort of 

defense support to civil authorities and all of the relationships we 

have carved out elsewhere in our military, those steps are still, 

many of them, in progress. So those are high on our to-do list to 

continue to work our way forward. 

Certainly the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense], Secretary Lynn, 

has become a real leader in all of this area. He has been very vocal 

about our need to go forward. And I would tell you, while progress 

has been made, there is much more to do. 
19 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I agree. My concern is that were there a cyber 

9/11 attack under way, that we haven’t worked these things out 

yet, and although we might have the ability to stop it, we don’t yet 

have the authorities worked out as to how that would happen. And 

my concern is the left hand wouldn’t know what the right hand is 

doing, and we would be doing great danger, putting the Nation at 

great risk, by not having those authorities in place. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I would just add, my view of this is that 

some of those are now in place. The MOA certainly helps us a great 

deal, but they are not all in place. I think I would describe this as 

still very much a work in progress. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me go to another question before my time 

runs out. 

General Kehler, Dr. Miller, yesterday in our science and technology posture hearing on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

Subcommittee, Secretary Lemnios, head of the DOD Research & 

Engineering, brought up some of the more promising emerging 

technologies in the field of hypersonics and directed energy, from 

new efforts to Prompt Global Strike, to Airborne Laser. Both of 

these topics have strategic ties. 

Can you comment on what work is being done to evolve these 

technologies into operational concepts and systems under 

USSTRATCOM, and what makes the Department view these technologies as potential game changers? 

General KEHLER. I will make a comment, and then Dr. Miller 

may want to say something as well. 

But from a STRATCOM perspective, sir, first of all, on directed 

energy, of course, some work continues in terms of directed energy 

and missile defense efforts. That has been curtailed significantly, 

but we have some interest in what is residual in that activity. 

Regarding hypersonics, of course, we also have development efforts under way for what we are calling Conventional Prompt Global Strike, and there is some promising work that has gone on, and 

more to do, that would perhaps give us a real advantage here in 

small numbers for specific targets to give to the President some options to go after some kinds of targets conventionally that we do 

not have that option today. So both of those are very promising to 

us from those two standpoints, sir. 

Dr. MILLER. If I could just add very briefly, as I mentioned be- fore, the Department is spending about $2 billion over the next 5 

years on the hypersonics, in particular on the Conventional Prompt 

Global Strike boost-glide vehicle, and we do see a lot of promise 

there from a policy and operational perspective. 

With respect to lasers, with the conclusion that the Airborne 

Laser didn’t have real operational utility given its limitations, it 

and other activities went together into a laser R&D program that 

is $100 million a year-plus, and there are a number of promising 

technologies across a range of applications, including missile defense and others. 

If I could add just very quickly on the earlier question, and I 

apologize for doing this, but I just wanted to add to General 

Kehler’s answer on cyber that, in addition to having the authority 

to protect its own networks, that the Defense Department is assigned responsibility for working with the defense industrial base, 
20 

one of the 18 critical infrastructure categories, and we are working 

closely with DHS now to look at how the capabilities of the Department can be brought to bear to support DHS in protection of other 

critical infrastructure. 

As you know, but I just want to have on the record, the President 

does have emergency authority to direct DOD to defend the Nation 

as part of the defense support to civil authorities against a cyber 

or any other attack. We are in internal conversations in the administration now about how to do that more effectively and whether 

new authorities and legislation is needed, and look forward to joining your subcommittee and the other Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee in a couple of weeks with General Alexander 

to discuss. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Well, I am encouraged by that answer. 

Both of you, I want to thank you for your testimony, and I look 

forward to following up, particularly on the directed energy issue 

as well. 

As I have often said, with the growing threats that the Nation 

faces from ballistic missile issues, we are not adequately going to 

be able to defend the Nation with kinetic weapons alone. The game 

changer will really come through directed energy, and the more we 

can do to support that work, the better. 

So thank you both for your testimony, your work and, with that, 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. I just want to echo what Mr. Langevin just said. 

Great comments. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Miller, the first question is for you. You may not be able to 

answer it. It may make you uncomfortable. But this gets back to 

South Korea. We know the conservative politicians there have for 

some time wanted to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to the 

peninsula, so we know recent DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic 

of Korea] actions haven’t driven that desire out of the blue from 

some elements of South Korean politics. But I guess what is shocking to me is that a White House official both believes that we 

would reintroduce and encourages such a request of tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. 

So my question is, what was he thinking? 

Dr. MILLER. Obviously I can’t answer that first person. I did 

have a chance to talk to Gary Samore, and I can tell you that he 

is fully on board with the clarification that was issued, and he was 

fully on board with the fact that I commented and intended to also 

say and make absolutely clear that the U.S. nuclear umbrella continues to extend to South Korea, and that neither side believes that 

that requires the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. I can tell you he is 100 percent behind what the clarification of this policy is. 

Mr. LARSEN. Did anybody tell Samore he should say less? Because he ought to. 

Back to something you might be able to answer directly, speaking for yourself. It has to do with the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The 2010 appropriation was over $300 million; the fiscal 
21 

year 2011 request was over $550 million. Obviously, this increase 

for funding reflects the administration’s success in securing promises from former Soviet bloc countries to remove and return highly 

enriched uranium by 2012. 

But we are in this continuing resolution world right now, and I 

would like you, if you can, help us understand what would happen 

to our efforts in Belarus, Poland, Vietnam and other countries and 

their ability to follow through on these 2012 commitments, and 

help them follow through on these 2012 commitments if, in fact, we 

ended up with something less than what the administration requested for 2011? 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Larsen, we would have to make some very, very 

difficult choices. What I would like to do, if I can, is take this for 

the record and come back and give you specific answers, given that 

we are partway through the year in execution at a lower level than 

we had hoped, and I would like to describe what have been the effects so far and then what would be the consequences if it continued for the duration of the year. 

I can give some general comments, but I think it would be preferable to give details on it. I would be happy to do it on a countryby-country basis and to answer very swiftly. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 117.] 

Mr. LARSEN. That would be great, and I think it would be very 

helpful, because it is not so much that it is this administration’s 

policy, it is just a generally good idea to get to these countries and 

get our hands on this HEU [highly enriched uranium], get it behind a good lock and then destroy it. I am very concerned we are 

not going to be able to do that, much less than what happens to 

the 2012 request as we move forward in the appropriations process. 

General Kehler, again, congratulations. It has been an exciting 

30 days for you, I am sure. But something that we have on this 

committee considered over the last several years, and, Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask the ranking member, too, we might want 

to either do a hearing or do something in a different setting on the 

space situational awareness. We have been tracking that and 

pressing that for the last several years for a lot of reasons. 

Given what is in the budget for 2012, what are the most important steps that you can tell us about here that you are taking with 

regards to space situational awareness? 

General KEHLER. Congressman, there are two critical components that are continued in this budget that is before you today 

that will contribute to space situational awareness. One is a way 

to better fuse the existing data from the existing sensors, make 

better use of the sensors that we have, and bring that information 

together out at Vandenberg in what is our Joint Space Operations 

Center. At the same time as we go down that road, I think we have 

a great opportunity here to look very carefully with our allies and 

commercial partners and others to see how they can continue to 

contribute to that pool of data and our overall understanding of 

what is there. 

Over the last year, or almost two now, STRATCOM has been 

pursuing a program that was actually recommended by Congress 

that was originally called the Commercial and Foreign Entities 
22 

Program. What that has resulted in now is a much better way to 

share situational information with other entities, to include commercial partners that have now signed up and are much more freely providing information about their platforms. So that frees up our 

sensors and our computing power to go after things that maybe we 

don’t know as much about. 

So that is very helpful. So it is how the data is exposed, how we 

make use of it. And how we include partners in all of that, I think, 

is something that is critically important and something we will 

need to continue to push. Some of that is contained in this budget. 

The other thing is sensors. Even with sharing other information, 

and even with the better use of the sensors we have, we will need 

some sensors positioned in other places, and that is contained in 

the budget as well. 

So those two things are in the budget. They are important, both 

of those, to us. And overall, I think you are right: the issue of situational awareness for space is very high on our priority list. And, by 

the way, it is for cyberspace as well, and it is not unlike the same 

issues that we are working for space. So cyber situational awareness, I think if General Alexander was here from CYBERCOM, he 

would leap up at this point and say, same for cyberspace, because 

that is a high priority for us in both of these places. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just quickly, I gather from your answer that, in 

fact, we could have a much more complex conversation about this 

perhaps in a different setting. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate your comment on space situational 

awareness. In fact, this subcommittee has been working on issues 

of having 101 sessions, if you will, briefings that are not in the context of committee hearings for the purposes of really just straight 

education and subject matter information for the Members. 

Mr. Larsen, I am very proud to say, you get a gold star. I think 

you have been probably in the best attendance of everybody, and 

I appreciate that. 

Mr. LARSEN. If I may, Mr. Chairman, after last year’s markup, 

I made a commitment to you that I would. 

Mr. TURNER. There you go. Wonderful. Space is next Friday, so 

I am certain your star will not diminish. I look forward to that. Dr. 

Payne, whom we have next, and Dr. Roberts have both presented 

at those, and we greatly appreciated their participation. 

Gentleman, we are going to end here, but I am going to give you 

an opportunity if there is anything that you would like to say in 

closing or to clarify in the discussion, I want to give you the opportunity to add anything to your comments. 

Dr. MILLER. I will say three things very quickly. 

First, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today, 

and to your 101 sessions, and look forward to having our people 

continue those and want to be available to answer any additional 

questions that you and the subcommittee or larger committee have 

as well. 

Second, I look forward to coming back specifically for a classified 

discussion on hedge and what our thinking is in that regard. We 

had by chance bumped into the combatant commander for North-
23 

ern Command in the anteroom, and I think we are well aligned on 

having the conversations—internal conversations—closed down 

that we need to move forward there. 

Third, I want to thank you and the subcommittee and committee 

for support of both sides of President Obama’s vision, including the 

arms control side, and also including the investments and, again, 

say that it is critical to this administration that we get the funding 

necessary to support our strategic nuclear delivery systems and, 

again, DOD speaking for the DOE funding line, the funding for 

NNSA to continues nonproliferation and its weapons work as well 

for fiscal year 2011. Thank you very much. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, just let me add my thanks. We 

know that the subcommittee has a lot of issues on its plate, and 

we are pledged to come back at any time that you want to continue 

these discussions further. 

Typically combatant commanders don’t say much about investment and needs to support budgets, but I must add my voice to Dr. 

Miller here. In the first 30 days, I have told my staff that what I 

wanted to do was get all the way around the nuclear weapons complex. I didn’t make it. I got about half of the way through, but I 

will get through the rest of it within the next couple of weeks. 

I must say that my assessment is that the investment that is 

planned for them is definitely needed, and it underpins all of our 

other deterrence activities. If the weapons are not safe and effective and secure, I think we don’t have a leg to stand on. So I would 

encourage support for that part of the investment as well, even 

though that is not directly in our portfolio. 

Mr. TURNER. General, thank you for those comments. Thank you 

both. Thank you for your service. 

We will now go to our second panel, which will be Dr. Bill Perry 

and Dr. Keith Payne. 

Gentleman, while you are getting situated, let me begin my welcome to you. I want to provide you a warm welcome to Dr. Perry 

and Dr. Payne. 

As I mentioned earlier, I believe that the committee’s oversight 

is further enhanced through additional perspectives outside of the 

traditional Pentagon witnesses that we usually hear from. Therefore, I have asked Dr. Bill Perry and Dr. Jim Schlesinger, the 

Chairman and Vice Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Posture Commission, to provide their views. Dr. Schlesinger, as I stated earlier, 

was unable to join us today, and I appreciate Dr. Keith Payne filling in for him. 

I greatly appreciate also your participation, as we mentioned 

prior, in our 101 sessions where the committee is doing an overview of this subject matter. 

Dr. Perry, I greatly appreciate you being here and all of your 

service and insight. We look forward to your statement, and I will 

recognize you now. 
24 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you. I have a rather extensive written testimony which I have submitted, which I would like to submit for the 

record. 

You know, in 2009, Congress—— 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Perry, they are going to turn your microphone 

on here, I believe. 

Dr. PERRY. In 2009, the Congress appointed our bipartisan Commission. We met for a year, and we ended up with a report. We 

have reported about a year ago to the Congress on that report. It 

was a bipartisan Commission and ended up with, amazingly, a consensus report with only one exception that had to do with the 

CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] treaty. 

I reviewed the statement that I made to Congress last year, and 

I stand by that statement, and my written testimony reflects that 

fact with a few updates, and the updates primarily reflect the new 

events and, most notably, the Nuclear Posture Review, which was 

finished since then. So my oral statement, I am only going to highlight a few of the important points. 

First, the threat has indeed changed since the Cold War with 

much less risk of a nuclear exchange, but a greater risk of nuclear 

terrorism. Therefore, to safeguard our security, we must continue 

to support the military programs and maintain an adequate deterrence force. At the same time, we need to support those programs 

that guard us against nuclear terrorism. They fall into two categories, basically: military programs, of which the BMD [ballistic 

missile defense] program is the primary example, and nonmilitary 

programs, which are international in nature, which prevent proliferation. 

Considering those two different kinds of programs, when I was 

the Secretary of Defense, I referred to those as the need to lead but 

hedge; lead in the international programs that prevented proliferation, but hedging by maintaining an adequate deterrence in case 

stopping proliferation failed. 

The leading has been supported, really, by the last five administrations through treaties: the START Treaty, the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty, the Moscow Treaty and, most recently, the New 

START Treaty. 

The deterrence, which is the hedge part of that, was the major 

subject of the report we wrote. We recommended how to maintain 

the deterrence in the future. I am happy to report that, in my judgment, the Nuclear Posture Review largely accepted the recommendations that we made in our report. 

We argued that as a matter of policy we should clarify how we 

are going to use nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review 

used somewhat different language than we used, but nevertheless 

did have an important clarification, and it also, as we recommended, made strong assurances to our allies. 

Secondly, we argued strongly that we should maintain the safety, 

security, reliability, and effectiveness of our deterrence force; do 

that through maintaining a robust three laboratories, through 
25 

maintaining a Stockpile Stewardship Program and Life Extension 

Program, and undertake the program to make a transformation of 

our two facilities at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge. One of them is plutonium; the other one is uranium. All of those are in the Nuclear 

Posture Review, and all of them have been funded, so I am quite 

pleased with the follow-up on our treaty there. 

In terms of the leading, we recommended strongly actions to reverse proliferation in North Korea and Iran, and I am sorry to report that nothing useful has happened in either of those cases. 

They still maintain threats—I would say greater threats—than at 

the time we wrote our report. 

We recommended that there be a treaty, an arms treaty, with 

Russia with modest reductions, and the New START Treaty essentially was compatible with what we had recommended there. We 

then also said beyond that we should consider follow-on treaties 

which dealt specifically with the danger of tactical nuclear weapons. 

We recommended a strong strategic dialogue with Russia and 

other nuclear powers. That has gotten under way. We recommended continuing to maintain the strength of the Threat Reduction Program. And on the nature of the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty, we had a split report on that—half of us recommending in favor of doing it, half of us recommending against it— 

but all of us recommending steps that the Senate should take to 

reconsider the treaty. 

Finally, we recommended the strengthening of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency and adding to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty the additional protocols to strengthen them. 

Mr. Chairman, that summarizes briefly what I thought were the 

highlights of the report and how it compared to the Nuclear Posture Review. My bottom line is that I am very pleased that the Nuclear Posture Review was very, I think, quite compatible with the 

recommendations we made, with only a few very minor exceptions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry can be found in the Appendix on page 92.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Dr. Perry. 

Dr. Payne. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH B. PAYNE, COMMISSIONER, CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF 

THE UNITED STATES 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here 

today, particularly in the company of Secretary Perry who did such 

a wonderful job leading the Commission. So, thank you, sir. 

And as you noted, Mr. Chairman, I am pinch-hitting for Dr. 

Schlesinger today. I know we all wish he could be here, and we all 

wish him the very best. 

I would like to make a brief opening remark and then submit the 

article from which I drew those remarks for the record. I will take 

just a moment to identify a few of the Commission’s basic recommendations and then identify the potential challenges to the 

U.S. strategic nuclear force posture as I see them. 

The bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission offered numerous recommendations to reduce what we called the nu-
26 

clear danger. For example, to reduce the nuclear danger, the Commission recommended a conscious effort to balance diplomatic 

measures to reduce the number of nuclear weapons with the necessary measures to deter attacks and to assure allies of their security. Despite the occasional friction between U.S. diplomatic and 

deterrence efforts, Republican and Democratic administrations for 

five decades have sought just such a balance. 

The Commission also emphasized that the United States must 

maintain a viable nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future to support the national goals of deterrence and assurance. The Commission did not try to identify the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence and assurance. This omission was not 

a mistake; it was in recognition of the fact that these force requirements can change rapidly because they are driven by many fluid 

factors. 

Rather than selecting an inherently transient right number of 

nuclear weapons, the Commission highlighted the need for a flexible and resilient force posture to support deterrence and assurance 

across a shifting landscape of threats and contexts. 

We noted, in particular, that the importance of flexibility and resilience in the force posture will increase as U.S. forces decline in 

numbers. This emphasis on the need for flexibility and resilience 

in our force structure is the primary reason the Commission recommended that the administration maintain the strategic triad of 

bombers, ICBMs and sea-based missiles. 

Finally, in recognition of the fact that deterrence may prove unreliable, the Commission also concluded that the United States 

must design its strategic forces not only for deterrence, but also to 

help defend against an attack if deterrence fails. This defensive 

goal includes the requirements for missile defense against regional 

aggressors and limited long-range missile threats. We specifically 

urged that U.S. defenses against long-range missiles become capable against more complex limited threats as they mature. 

In light of these Commission recommendations, my foremost concern is that U.S. nuclear policy appears to be departing from a balance between diplomatic and deterrence measures to reduce the 

nuclear danger. Specifically, the goal of nuclear reductions appears 

to have been given precedence, and the resultant imbalance could 

undermine our future capabilities to deter, to assure and to defend. 

What is the basis for my concern? The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, a highly commendable report in many respects, for the first 

time places atop the U.S. nuclear agenda international nonproliferation efforts ‘‘as a critical element of our effort to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons,’’ and that is quoting from 

the NPR. This prioritization appears self-consciously to depart from 

the carefully balanced dual tracks of the past 50 years. 

The administration assurances that the U.S. will maintain an effective nuclear deterrent certainly are welcome, but at the end of 

the day, if a top U.S. policy priority is international nonproliferation efforts and movement toward nuclear zero, there will be unavoidable trade-offs made at the expense of the U.S. forces important for deterrence, assurance and defense. 

This is not an academic concern over a few policy words. The administration links qualitative limits and numeric reductions in U.S. 
27 

nuclear forces to progress in nonproliferation and the movement toward nuclear zero. Qualitative limitations and further reductions 

in our forces, however, can reduce their flexibility and their resilience, undermining our national goals of deterrence and assurance. 

This is the trade-off that continues to need careful balance. 

The Commission specifically cautioned against pursuing nuclear 

reductions at the expense of the resilience of our forces, in part because policies that undermine credible deterrence and assurance 

could actually provoke nuclear proliferation, not prevent it. 

The U.S. defensive programs may also be undermined by the administration’s self-described nuclear policy agenda. Russian officials and some American commentators now claim that qualitative 

and quantitative restraints on U.S. strategic defenses are necessary 

for any further negotiated nuclear reductions. 

With international nonproliferation efforts and movement toward 

nuclear zero at the top of the U.S. nuclear agenda, as defined in 

the Nuclear Posture Review, the pursuit of nuclear reductions at 

the expense of U.S. missile defenses could ultimately be deemed an 

acceptable trade-off. That certainly is the Russian demand. 

My final related concern is the possibility that new policy guidance could attempt to drive deep reductions in U.S. forces by redefining deterrence in minimalist terms, thereby lowering the force 

requirements deemed adequate for deterrence. For over five decades, Republican and Democratic administrations have consistently 

rejected minimum deterrence as inadequate and dangerous. Yet 

many proponents of nuclear zero now again advocate new Presidential guidance that adopts minimum deterrence as a way to justify deep reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. 

Adopting a minimum definition of deterrence may help to justify 

the elimination of the triad and U.S. nuclear reductions down to 

500 weapons, but it would do so at the expense of flexibility and 

resilience and, thus, the effectiveness of our forces for deterrence 

and assurance. Again, the Commission specifically cautioned 

against such nuclear reductions and emphasized that new Presidential guidance should ‘‘be informed by assessments of what is 

needed for deterrence and assurance.’’ Any new guidance that 

adopts minimum deterrence could easily increase the nuclear danger by undermining credible U.S. deterrence and by pushing 

friends and allies toward nuclear proliferation. 

In summary, I am concerned about the apparent imbalance in 

the administration’s announced nuclear agenda and the possibility 

that new policy guidance may adopt long-rejected minimum deterrence standards as a route to deep nuclear reductions. The Commission’s unanimous recommendations for (1) a balance in priorities; (2) the maintenance of a flexible and resilient strategic force 

posture; and (3) improving U.S. strategic defensive capabilities—indeed, against missile threats of all ranges—those recommendations, I believe, remain useful and pertinent. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne can be found in the Appendix on page 104.] 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, thank you for your comments and for 

your input. This is very helpful, as we take in consideration the 

prior testimony, to get your perspective. 
28 

Dr. Perry, I want to again commend you for the Strategic Posture Commission. Everyone looks to the report from that Commission as a great perspective on both the policy issues that we need 

to look for in decisionmaking, but also some of the substantive 

guidance, I think, that you are absolutely correct went into the 

NPR and then, further, into START. I think it is a great perspective for us to continue to look to. 

I have basically two questions that have a couple multiple parts. 

I am going to ask you the first one with a couple of parts to it. But 

the first is about overall general cuts. The second is on the tactical 

nuclear weapons in Europe. 

So the first question is, could you please describe in more detail 

the guidance that would have to be rewritten to warrant deeper 

cuts in our nuclear arsenal? What are some of the consequences or 

dangers associated with downgrading our deterrence requirements? 

Does this mean downgrading from a counterforce to a countervailing strategy? Could such a move hurt the credibility and flexibility of our deterrent? That would be the first question. I will give 

you both an opportunity to answer, and then I would like to discuss 

the tactical weapons in Europe. 

Dr. Perry. 

Dr. PERRY. You wanted to do the first question first? 

Mr. TURNER. If you would, yes. 

Dr. PERRY. My present view, Mr. Chairman, is that our cuts for 

the foreseeable future should be aligned with the cuts made by 

Russia, and if they are willing to go to deeper cuts, we should be 

willing to go to deeper cuts as well. That will be true up until such 

time as those cuts begin to approach the level of the other nuclear 

powers. That is a short answer to the question. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. 

Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

According to official unclassified and declassified reports, there 

are different general categories of opponents’ targets that the U.S. 

tries to hold at risk for deterrence purposes. Categories are nuclear 

forces, leadership, other military capabilities, and war-supporting 

industrial and economic facilities, according to the unclassified official government statements to that effect. 

Over time, as the Commission noted, Presidential guidance has 

adjusted U.S. emphasis on these categories, which can then change 

the numbers and types of weapons the military requires to fulfill 

that guidance. In theory, to get to low force requirements, new 

guidance could lower the force standards deemed adequate for deterrence. New guidance could simply eliminate nuclear requirements to hold one or more of those categories of targets that I identified at risk for deterrence purposes. 

We have seen something like this in the past. In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense McNamara declared that U.S. deterrence requirements could be met by threatening 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of the Soviet industrial base. That was the 

assured destruction capability that was deemed adequate for deterrence. Secretary McNamara subsequently said that one of the reasons for choosing that type of threat as a declaratory policy was because it allowed him to hold numbers of forces very low, because 
29 

the lethality of nuclear weapons is such that it is not a large number of nuclear weapons necessary to hold those kinds of targets at 

risk, population and industry. 

So some have now suggested going back to a McNamara-type assured destruction threat—deterrent threat—with an emphasis on 

only a few industrial-type targets as the way to get numbers of 

force requirements, the number of forces and the requirements 

down. 

For five decades, I should note that no Republican or Democratic 

administration has accepted that kind of minimum deterrence 

standard for U.S. forces, and for very good reasons. The primary 

reason is because revising the U.S. definition of requirements down 

for deterrence doesn’t mean that the actual requirements for deterrence go down. The actual deterrence requirements are driven by 

what our opponents think, not by our goal to reduce numbers. 

I think Harold Brown put it best when he said for deterrence to 

prevent war as effectively as possible, it is critical that the United 

States can threaten what the opponents value, wherever that leads 

us. 

So, with that, I would note there are at least a handful of fundamental reasons for rejecting any efforts to go back to a minimum 

deterrence definition of force requirements, and each of these reasons follows because those kinds of force requirements, minimum 

deterrence force requirements, create an inflexible straitjacket for 

the President. 

But, one, going down to very low numbers associated with minimum deterrence is unlikely to be credible to deter attacks on us 

or our allies, at least on some occasions. Enemies may not believe 

that threat on occasion, or that threat may not be suitable to address what the opponent actually values on other occasions, violating Harold Brown’s dictum. In either case, minimum deterrence 

will fail to prevent war. 

Two, minimum deterrence standards will undercut our ability to 

assure our allies and friends, and it will lead some of them to seek 

their own independent nuclear capabilities; i.e., it is likely to promote nuclear proliferation. 

Three, these types of minimum force standards associated with 

minimum deterrence will also ease the problems for opponents who 

seek to counter or get around our deterrence strategies. They are 

actually likely to encourage challenges to deterrence. 

Four, minimum deterrence that focuses on population and civilians, civilian centers, are both illegal and immoral as a targeting 

policy. We cannot intentionally threaten civilian populations and 

targets for deterrence purposes. 

Lastly, minimum deterrence standards offer little flexibility or 

resilience, so that when the future unfolds in a threatening fashion, 

we don’t have the flexibility or the resilience to respond as necessary to deter war and to assure our allies. 

It is basically those reasons that I have just identified, those 

handful of reasons, why no Democratic or Republican administration for five decades has accepted a minimum deterrence approach 

to force sizing. 

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that, my recommendation was to continue to reduce numbers compatible with 
30 

those of Russia. On the question of deterrence, one has to first ask, 

whom are we deterring? I would argue the answer is Russia, because all other cases are lesser-included cases at this time. At the 

present numbers and foreseeable numbers in the future, Russia is 

the only one that has enough nuclear weapons to be an issue here. 

And the next question is deterring what? Russia does not have 

a conventional capability today capable of threatening either the 

United States or Europe. So all we can be talking about is deterring Russia’s nuclear weapons. 

Therefore, that is why my answer—assuming those points, my 

answer talked about making the reductions in terms of bilateral reductions with Russia. This is the background for that point. 

Mr. TURNER. Turning, then, to my second question, Dr. Perry, 

that is a great transition to my second question, and what we have 

learned today in our discussion is that NATO is currently undertaking a deterrence review, and in that deterrence review they will 

be looking at all components of NATO’s presence, both our nuclear 

capability, our missile defense capability and conventional. 

It is a concern that the deterrence review proceed within context, 

as you said, Dr. Perry, to what is being deterred—that being Russia and, of course, their significant nuclear arsenal. 

There is concern that there might be a recommendation in the 

deterrence review for a reduction in the U.S. nuclear force presence 

in Europe without achieving concessions from Russia of the number of tactical nuclear weapons that it currently has. For purposes 

of discussion, we know that they have in excess of 3,800. Perhaps 

they have as many as 5,000. The U.S. has a very minimal number 

in conjunction with our NATO commitment. 

Do you think it would be wrong for us to do that? Because it 

would seem to me that if there is going to be corresponding reductions, that we should be seeking reductions from the Russians, and 

I think that is certainly the guidance the Senate had given in 

adopting New START. 

I would like both of your thoughts. 

Dr. Perry. 

Dr. PERRY. I would like to give you a two-pronged answer to that 

question. First of all, I do not think we need nuclear weapons in 

Europe to deter Russia from an attack, or any other country from 

an attack on Europe. The nuclear weapons we have on our submarines, for example, are perfectly adequate for providing that deterrence. 

But there is a substantial political issue involved, and the political issue, the reason we have nuclear weapons in Europe in the 

first place, is not because the rest of our weapons are not capable 

of deterrence, but because, during the cold war at least, our allies 

in Europe felt more assured when we had nuclear weapons in Europe. That is why they were deployed there in the first place. 

Today the issue is a little different. The issue is the Russians in 

the meantime have built a large number of nuclear weapons, and 

we keep our nuclear weapons there as somewhat of a political leverage for dealing with an ultimate treaty in which we may get 

Russia and the United States to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. My own view is it would be desirable if both the United States 

and Russia would eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, but I see it 
31 

as very difficult to arrive at that conclusion if we were to simply 

eliminate all of our tactical nuclear weapons unilaterally. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

The Russian position certainly is that all U.S. tactical nuclear 

weapons must be returned to the United States before they will engage in negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. I see some real 

problems with that, because if they are withdrawn now back to 

U.S. territory, it is hard to imagine them ever going back. And 

even if U.S. tactical nuclear weapons aren’t necessary to deter Russia now, we don’t know that the future is going to be so friendly. 

So I am very concerned about the idea of deciding that our tactical nuclear weapons serve no deterrence role now; therefore, we 

can bring them back, because the future has a way of turning out 

in some ways darker than we anticipate on many occasions, and I 

think we need that flexibility to be able to be prepared for future 

events that may be less happy than we would otherwise expect. 

The second point is that, in addition to ‘‘we may need them for 

deterrence purposes in the future,’’ is that many of our allies see 

our nuclear weapons there as important for their assurance. It is 

what in some cases helps to keep them from deciding they will pursue an alternative to extended nuclear deterrence. 

Therefore, this isn’t just a deterrence issue. In fact, I think it is 

primarily, at the present time, an issue of how do you assure allies 

so they themselves remain comfortable within the alliance and in 

a non-nuclear status. We know, because before the Commission a 

number of the allies we had a chance to speak with said ‘‘these 

weapons in Europe are important to us for the demonstration of extended deterrence.’’ 

So I would be very reluctant to see the U.S. do anything unilaterally along those lines. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With regard to minimum deterrence, Dr. Payne, would you include the current administration as one of those who has rejected 

minimum deterrence? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

I would also note in your testimony you talk about the governor 

of Tokyo arguing at some point that Japan may look to its own 

independent nuclear deterrent. 

I was in Japan a few years ago on a CODEL [congressional delegation] and having lunch with some folks from the Diet, and this 

was at least 3 years ago, and they were arguing then that they 

should have an independent nuclear deterrent. There are some 

folks in Japan who believe they ought to have an independent nuclear deterrent regardless of who the administration is, and regardless of assurances that we have about extended deterrence for Asia. 

So I just think that is just some context here. 

But there are some things about the NPR that I know you all 

looked at, and I would like to get your views, both, on the NPR’s 

negative assurance policy and where the administration did make 

a slight adjustment on the negative assurance policy. 
32 

I would like to, first Dr. Perry and then Dr. Payne, get your 

thoughts on the advantages of this negative assurance policy, how 

you see it playing out, how has it played out, has it not played out 

at all and, perhaps, the disadvantages of what the current negative 

assurance policy is. 

Dr. Perry, can you start? 

Dr. PERRY. The short answer is I thought that the Nuclear Posture Review’s negative assurance policy was a positive step forward. 

Mr. LARSEN. Do you have a longer answer? We are not used to 

short answers around here. I am sorry. You know how it is. 

Dr. PERRY. I think it is important that one of the main points 

of the negative assurance policy is to have the minimum incentive 

for other nations to build nuclear weapons. 

A negative assurance policy doesn’t guarantee that, but it is a 

useful step in that direction. And so that is why I would view this 

as a positive step forward. So, basically, I am in favor of that. I 

thought we had a pretty good negative assurance policy before. I 

think this is an improvement. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Dr. Perry. 

Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. I also supported the language that the Commission 

put out with regard to negative assurance policy, and I was glad 

to see that the NPR didn’t vary from that very much. The changes 

in the NPR with regard to the negative assurance policies are, I 

think, minor. And, in fact, when Secretary Clinton later amplified 

it by saying if BW [biological weapons] is ever used against the 

United States, all bets are on the table, I thought that it was a useful elaboration. And so with that type of understanding, I thought 

the changes were minimal, and I thought that was a good thing. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. With regards to—and Dr. Payne, this goes to 

your point perhaps—well, one of your points in your testimony, oral 

and written—is that the President stated that the role of nuclear 

weapons will be reduced in U.S. national security policy. And to 

that end the NPR declares that non-nuclear elements will take on 

a greater share of the deterrence burden. 

Should we interpret that as a desire to substitute conventional 

for nuclear capabilities in deterrence? 

Dr. PAYNE. Well, the 2001 nuclear posture said exactly the same 

thing. This wasn’t a great departure from what had been set up before. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sounds like it was no departure. 

Dr. PAYNE. In that case there was no departure, sir. And I 

agreed with that at the time. So I, again, didn’t have any challenge 

whatsoever to that kind of statement in the Nuclear Posture Review. Where deterrence can be serviced by conventional forces, we 

should certainly have the conventional forces available to do just 

that. 

Mr. LARSEN. I guess I gathered from your written and oral testimony that this turning down in temperature or moving away from 

a nuclear deterrence was a bad thing, and it might be a bad thing. 

I am just trying to square that with your testimony. 
33 

Dr. PAYNE. Fair enough, sir. The point I was making isn’t that 

moving toward conventional forces for deterrence when possible is 

the wrong way to go. I think that is the right way to go. 

The point that I was making with regard to the NPR statement 

was the NPR language that says moving towards international and 

nonproliferation goals as a step toward nuclear zero is now the 

highest priority. It is the top priority. That is what the NPR says. 

Whereas in the past the United States, every Democratic and Republican administration has balanced those priorities. 

I don’t have a concern that we move toward conventional deterrence when that fits, and when that is suitable, and when we can 

get appropriate deterrent effects from conventional forces. My concern is that the trade-offs that will have to be made if the top priority is, in fact, toward nuclear—international nonproliferation is 

moving towards nuclear zero, because there will be trade-offs made 

with regard to our assurance, our deterrence, and our defensive capabilities if that is the operative top priority. That is my concern. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Dr. Perry, obviously you have been chewing 

on this question longer than I have certainly. Do you have a response to Dr. Payne’s comments with regards to this? 

Dr. PERRY. I generally agree with Dr. Payne’s comments on 

there. I might say that the main subject of dialogue, even controversy, within the Commission was not whether there should be 

a balance. Everybody agreed there should be a balance. It was just 

how to weigh that balance. And some members favored weighing 

the proliferation issues more strongly than the deterrence issues 

and vice versa, and that had to do with which they thought was 

the more pressing threat to the United States. But they all agreed, 

I think we all agreed, on the importance of having the balance. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. Thank you. Thank you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. I am going to end with one question that is really 

asking both of you for a commercial. The Commission made recommendations about the investment into our nuclear infrastructure and NNSA. Some of that investment is at risk in this discussion that we are having on budget cuts nationally. As we look to 

the continuing resolution process where we have not yet funded the 

government for this year, there are many reductions that are hitting areas that they should not; for example, our national security 

and national defense. 

Since we have had deferred maintenance, a long period of time 

where we did not put the money in that we should have, we are 

now in a situation where we have to put more money in, and some 

are seeing that money as huge increases that perhaps we could 

find savings in. I would love just if each of you could pause for a 

moment and give us some guidance, give Congress some guidance 

as to how important that funding is for NNSA; what you saw, Dr. 

Perry, in the Commission of our disinvestment, and, Dr. Payne, 

what you see as the threat if we don’t respond. Gentlemen. 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will speak for myself 

first, but I really think I will be speaking for the Commission when 

I say this, which is that we regarded it extremely important to 

maintain a robust program at all three nuclear laboratories, the 

hiring and retaining of key people, the supporting of the Stockpile 
34 

Stewardship Program, the supporting of the Life Extension Program. 

Beyond that, we believe that the plutonium facilities at Los Alamos ought to be renewed, and that the uranium facilities at Oak 

Ridge ought to be renewed. In the report, if my memory is right, 

we said that those could be done sequentially, in which case the 

plutonium should have the first priority, and the uranium should 

be done after that, but we did argue that both of them should be 

renewed. 

I would defer to Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. This, again, is another area where the Commission 

was unanimous in the support for essentially fixing the problems 

that NNSA confronts. You mention the commercial. Chairman Turner, it is like the old commercial, you can either pay me now or 

pay me more later. I think our recommendation was to do it now 

as opposed to having to pay more later. 

I was encouraged to see the letter from the three lab directors 

who said that they thought the budgets that came out of the 1251 

Report and the administration’s commitment were quite acceptable 

to fulfill those goals and to fix the problem. So I would hate to see, 

and I am sure Secretary Perry would hate to see, movement away 

from that solution that we seemed like we almost have in hand for 

that problem. 

The only other point I would add, and the Commission report 

noted this a bit as well, is we also have industrial infrastructure 

challenges in front of us. Just making sure that the United States, 

for example, can produce large solid rocket motors, I think, is a 

very important goal, and it is something that is going to need attention in the near future. So there are NNSA challenges, but 

there are also industrial challenges that need to be tended to. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, with that I will ask if you have any 

closing comments. 

Dr. PERRY. I do not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. PAYNE. I just have one, and I will make it short, and that 

goes back to Congressman Larsen’s question, do I believe that this 

administration pursues a minimum deterrence policy, and I said 

no. I don’t believe this administration pursues a minimum deterrence policy. The concern that I reflected in my remarks is my fear 

that, given the priorities identified in the NPR, we could see that 

coming. And I would hope that we would pay great attention to 

avoid that as every past Republican and Democratic administration 

has avoided it. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Payne, Dr. Perry, thank you so much. Thank 

you for all your contributions. And, Dr. Perry, I must tell you that 

Kari Bingen, our professional staff member, had just commented 

that she could listen to you for hours. And I know we all could, and 

we would learn so much. So thank you for coming and participating, and thank you for your record. Very good. 

[Whereupon, at 5:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 2, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 2, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 2, 2011 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Dr. MILLER. First, because as you know the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

(GTRI) is a Department of Energy effort led by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), my response to your question is based on NNSA’s input. Assuming that a full-year continuing resolution is passed in April 2011, and that the 

GTRI is funded at approximately $450 million, the GTRI still would be able to remove all highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Ukraine, Mexico, and Belarus by 

April 2012. However, if Congress continues to pass shorter-term, continuing resolutions (CR), the GTRI will not be able to complete the Belarus shipment of 280 kilograms (enough for more than 10 nuclear weapons) on time. Also, because of the CR, 

the GTRI has already been forced to delay long-lead procurement and preparation 

activities for HEU shipments from Poland, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, and Hungary due 

to lack of funding, which will likely delay these shipments from Fiscal Year (FY) 

2012 to FY 2013. Delays to the removal of HEU from Uzbekistan may require extensions of NNSA’s material protection, control, and accounting efforts at two facilities, 

putting further financial pressure on that program. In addition, to keep the fouryear HEU removal schedule as close to the established timeline as possible, the 

GTRI has had to reduce funding significantly for converting reactors from HEU to 

low-enriched uranium fuel, developing a domestic Mo-99 isotope production capability, and improving radiological security. The GTRI will eventually need the full 

FY 2011 funding to avoid further delays in shipments, conversions, and security upgrades. [See page 21.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 2, 2011 

(121) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the nuclear realm? 

China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear forces while we decrease ours. 

How does our strategic posture account for the uncertainty that China may further 

build up its forces and seek (or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia? 

General KEHLER. China has a long-standing ‘‘No First Use’’ policy regarding nuclear weapons. China’s modernization of their nuclear forces is in line with this policy, with their nuclear arsenal designed to be a sufficient and effective deterrent to 

foreign use (specifically the U.S. and Russia) of nuclear weapons against China. At 

this time, China doesn’t appear to seek to expand their nuclear arsenal beyond what 

they perceive as a credible deterrent and is unlikely to attempt to match numbers 

of nuclear weapons or warheads with either the U.S. or Russia. 

Mr. TURNER. Does the Obama Administration have plans to review and revise the 

nation’s nuclear strategy and/or guidance on the roles and missions of nuclear weapons, which was last revised nearly ten years ago by the Bush Administration? Have 

your organizations been given any direction to look at changes or the impact of 

changes to U.S. nuclear strategy or guidance? Have your organizations been given 

any direction to look at nuclear force reductions below New START levels? 

General KEHLER. USSTRATCOM’s current focus is on implementing New START. 

The current administration has indicated its desire to review and revise the nation’s 

nuclear strategy and guidance on the roles and missions of nuclear weapons, and 

we expect to be a full participant in that process. Currently, USSTRATCOM has not 

yet been given any direction to look at changes to, or impacts of changes to, U.S. 

nuclear strategy or guidance, nor has USSTRATCOM been given any direction to 

look at nuclear force reductions below New START levels. 

Mr. TURNER. Were the reduced force levels agreed to in New START—1,550 warheads and 700 deployed (800 total) strategic delivery vehicles—the lowest levels 

that STRATCOM could accept while still meeting current targeting and planning 

guidance? If the United States were to consider further reductions, how would the 

nation’s nuclear strategy or guidance have to change? 

General KEHLER. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons? 

General KEHLER. I fully support the approach outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review. Further reductions must continue to strengthen the deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-a`-vis Russia and China, and the assurance 

of our allies and partners. In addition, we must invest to ensure a safe, secure, and 

effective deterrent through full implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the NPR, as codified in the 3113 (Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan) and 2151 reports. 

Mr. TURNER. The Navy has briefed the committee on its plans to design the 

SSBN(X) submarine with only 16 ballistic missile tubes. However, as stated in the 

Administration’s unclassified summary of the Section 1251 Report to Congress 

which accompanied the delivery of the New START Treaty to the Senate in May 

2010, ‘‘The Secretary of Defense, based on recommendations from the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, has established a baseline nuclear force structure that fully supports U.S. 

security requirements and conforms to the New START limits . . . The United 

States will reduce the number of SLBM launchers (launch tubes) from 24 to 20 per 

SSBN . . .’’ This was reaffirmed in the Administration’s February 16, 2011 update 

to the Section 1251 report, ‘‘(U) Fixing the SLBM tubes at 20 rather than 24 deployed launches per SSBN will stabilize the number of strategic submarines to be 

maintained and will facilitate Navy planning for the OHIO-class submarine replacement.’’ In your testimony on March 2, you stated, ‘‘The issue of the number of tubes 

is not a simple black and white answer,’’ but then went on to testify that, ‘‘Sixteen 

will meet STRATCOM’s requirements.’’ 

• Can you please clarify your remarks on how 16 missile tubes on 12 SSBN(X) 

platforms meets mission requirements when the committee was told last May 
122 

and again on February 16, 2011, that the U.S. would reduce the number of 

SLBM launchers (launch tubes) from 24 to 20 per SSBN. What has changed? • What specific changes in nuclear deterrence requirements, changes in nuclear 

strategy, or changes in planning assumptions have allowed STRATCOM to support a further reduction in SSBN missile tubes from 20 to 16? • The SSBN(X) is expected to have a service life of over 60 years. The threat and 

strategic environment can change significantly over the course of 60 years. 

What planning assumptions—both nuclear and nonnuclear—are being made? 

How do they affect the number of missile tubes per hull and what sensitivity 

analysis has been done? 

General KEHLER. The Nuclear Posture Review affirmed the unique value of each 

Triad leg, and while New START sets overall limits, the treaty does not dictate how 

either party balances its forces across delivery platforms. We must consider every 

platform investment in terms of its impact on the aggregate. The 1251 report specifically addresses the current Ohio-class fleet and funding requirements through 

2021. The Ohio Replacement fleet will not begin service until approximately 2029— 

beyond the lifetime of New START. 

The planned 12 Ohio-Replacement SSBNs with a 16 missile tube configuration 

provides the operational flexibility and responsiveness necessary across a range of 

scenarios. Additional tubes would provide marginal potential benefits in a subset of 

possible scenarios, but their absence will not detract from the fleet’s required operational effectiveness. Furthermore, we must remember that the total number of 

launchers, size and disposition of each triad leg, stealth capabilities, total warheads 

available, the number of boats we can keep at sea at any given time, and potential 

to adjust acquisition programs are all factors to be considered in shaping the future 

force. 

USSTRATCOM does not support a reduction in Ohio-class missile tubes from 20 

to 16 in today’s environment. If the strategic environment deteriorated today, our 

only option to increase the number of deployed SLBM weapons is to upload weapons, which is limited by the number of tubes/SSBN. However, during the procurement period for the Ohio-Replacement Program (ORP) SSBNs, we will retain the 

option to build more SSBNs into the 2030s. Furthermore, at the same time the Department is considering the ORP, the Air Force is beginning to consider strategic 

bomber and ICBM replacement options—both of which could result in programs 

sized differently from the current force structure. All of these decisions lie in the 

years ahead, as future strategic environment, policy, and capabilities of the Triad 

will ultimately determine how many ORP SSBNs, new bombers, and new ICBMs 

are required. 

It is not possible to know what the strategic environment will be throughout the 

life of the Ohio-Replacement SSBN. While a 20 tube configuration provides marginally greater flexibility for a subset of targeting and hedging scenarios, 16 tubes provide sufficient flexibility and responsiveness to meet National requirements across 

a range of scenarios. The capability differences between a 16 and 20 tube configuration would only be relevant in a significantly deteriorated strategic environment. In 

that event, the inherent flexibility of the Triad would allow us to compensate with 

hedging strategies over the short term, while additional force structure (SSBNs, 

ICBMs, Bombers) enhancements would be a longer term solution. Again, we also 

have time to decide if additional submarines, beyond the planned 12 boats, will be 

required. 

Mr. TURNER. By law, the STRATCOM Commander is required to review the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile prepared by the directors of the 

nuclear weapons laboratories, and provide his own annual assessment. To the extent you can provide an unclassified discussion, please describe your current assessment of the nuclear stockpile and our deployed nuclear forces. As we look ahead, 

what concerns you most about the stockpile and weapons complex, and what impacts could these concerns have on STRATCOM’s ability to meet its mission requirements? 

General KEHLER. Based on CDRUSSTRATCOM 9 Nov 2010 assessment, our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective. 

I am concerned about our ability to maintain long term confidence in the military 

effectiveness and reliability of an aging stockpile due to shortfalls in warhead surveillance and infrastructure capabilities. I am also concerned with the potential 

backlog of life extension programs and sequencing. The resources requested in the 

FY2011 and 2012 budget requests are critical to ensuring a safe, secure, and effective stockpile. 

Mr. TURNER. The Administration has requested $564 million in military construction authority to support the recapitalization of the STRATCOM Headquarters at 

Offutt AFB. Considering the significant investment to construct a new head-
123 

quarters, what assessment was done regarding the possibility of moving this headquarters function to another location? 

General KEHLER. While no formal assessment of alternative locations was done, 

Offutt AFB meets all of our location requirements for executing our nuclear command and control and other missions. Moving the STRATCOM C2 facility to another military installation would incur significant relocation costs and disrupt our 

uniquely trained and experienced workforce. The USSTRATCOM MILCON requirement is for the recapitalization of a facility for an existing mission at our current 

location. The primary purpose is to provide modern command and control across a 

diverse and complex mission set of national importance. 

Mr. TURNER. In the proposed construction of a new STRATCOM headquarters at 

Offutt AFB, NE, CYBERCOM has an embedded presence to support operations. 

Considering CYBERCOM remains an emerging component of the national strategy 

whose final composition and organization has yet to be determined, there is concern 

about incorporating the requirements of CYBERCOM elements at Offutt AFB. The 

Air Force is the force provider for STRATCOM and responsible for developing the 

construction requirements for the new facility. 

As the force provider for STRATCOM, what has the Air Force done to assess the 

necessity to provide infrastructure at Offutt AFB for CYBERCOM? What consideration has been given to deferring the construction of this function until a final decision is reached on the final disposition of CYBERCOM? 

General KEHLER. USSTRATCOM’s Command and Control Facility requirements 

are distinctly separate and independent of the CYBERCOM Mission. While cyber 

planning is conducted at USSTRATCOM, executing operations and monitoring and 

defending the GIG is conducted at CYBERCOM’s HQ, located in Fort Meade, MD. 

No additional ‘‘cyber’’ infrastructure is required or planned for the new 

USSTRATCOM Command and Control facility. 

USSTRATCOM has not received specific infrastructure requirements from the Air 

Force for CYBERCOM, nor are we anticipating any. The IT infrastructure in the 

new C2 Facility has been sized to support maintaining cyber networks, as part of 

our UCP mission and integrating this SA with our other UCP missions. Therefore, 

USSTRATCOM specific CYBERCOM elements are negligible and do not impact the 

proposed MILCON project of the USSTRATCOM Replacement Facility. 

Mr. TURNER. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the nuclear realm? 

China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear forces while we decrease ours. 

How does our strategic posture account for the uncertainty that China may further 

build up its forces and seek (or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia? 

Dr. MILLER. China’s official policy toward nuclear deterrence continues to focus 

on maintaining a nuclear force structure able to survive attack and respond with 

sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy. China has consistently asserted that it adheres to a ‘‘no-first-use’’ policy, stating it would use nuclear 

forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. There is some ambiguity 

about the conditions under which China’s no-first-use policy would or would not 

apply, but there has been no indication that national leaders plan to revise the doctrine. China will likely continue to invest considerable resources to maintain limited 

nuclear deterrence with regard to the United States, also referred to by some PRC 

writers as a ‘‘sufficient and effective’’ deterrent. Since China views nuclear deterrence as critical to its national security, it is likely to continue to invest in technology and systems to ensure the military can deliver a damaging retaliatory nuclear strike. 

The pace and scope of China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal, both quantitatively and qualitatively, combined with the lack of transparency, underscores the 

importance of ensuring strategic stability in U.S. relations with China, as well as 

with the other nuclear powers. Russia remains the only peer of the United States 

in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities; China’s nuclear arsenal remains much 

smaller than those of Russia and the United States. Fundamental changes in the 

international security environment in recent years—including the growth of 

unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries—enable us to fulfill our objectives for 

deterrence and stability at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced 

reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policies 

and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet today’s most pressing 

security challenges. Any future nuclear reductions must be accomplished in the context of strengthening deterrence against potential regional adversaries, enhancing 

strategic stability vis-a`-vis Russia and China, and maintaining assurance of our Allies and partners. 
124 

The United States is pursuing high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic stability 

with China aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationship. During his visit to Beijing in January 2011, Secretary Gates communicated the U.S. desire to initiate a Strategic Security Dialogue. A U.S.-China dialogue will improve our means of communication to help reduce risk and mistrust 

and to begin building the confidence and mutual understanding necessary for enhanced relations and stability. 

Mr. TURNER. Does the Obama Administration have plans to review and revise the 

nation’s nuclear strategy and/or guidance on the roles and missions of nuclear weapons, which was last revised nearly ten years ago by the Bush Administration? Have 

your organizations been given any direction to look at changes or the impact of 

changes to U.S. nuclear strategy or guidance? Have your organizations been given 

any direction to look at nuclear force reductions below New START levels? 

Dr. MILLER. During 2009–2010, the Department of Defense, in consultation with 

the Departments of State and Energy, conducted the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 

required by Congress pursuant to Section 1070 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Under the statute, the NPR was directed to review 

a range of elements that included the role of nuclear forces in U.S. military strategy, 

planning, and programming; and the relationship among U.S. nuclear deterrence 

policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives. The 2010 NPR report focuses 

on key objectives of nuclear weapons polices and posture, and serves as a roadmap 

for implementing President Obama’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. 

A key part of implementing the NPR, as with previous such reviews, is the revision of detailed Presidential and Departmental guidance, and the subsequent modification of operational plans. That effort is now beginning. As an initial step, the 

Department of Defense will analyze potential changes in targeting requirements 

and force postures. Potential changes will be assessed according to how they meet 

key objectives outlined in the NPR, including reducing the role of nuclear weapons, 

sustaining strategic deterrence and stability, strengthening regional deterrence, and 

assuring U.S. Allies and partners. The analysis of potential revisions to guidance 

and planning will take account of commitments made in the NPR. The analysis will 

also consider possible changes to force structure that would be associated with different types of reductions. And, it will consider possible changes to nuclear deterrence strategies associated with changes in the security environment, as well as the 

potential contributions of non-nuclear strike capabilities to strategic deterrence. 

Presidents have traditionally conducted such an analysis and have provided updated 

planning guidance to the Department of Defense. 

As stated in the NPR, the United States intends to pursue further reductions in 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia, including both deployed 

and non-deployed nuclear weapons. When complete, the analysis of targeting requirements and force postures will support the formulation of post-New START 

Treaty arms control objectives. We intend to consider future reductions in a manner 

that supports the commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance of our Allies 

and partners. 

Mr. TURNER. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons? 

Dr. MILLER. As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, the 

United States intends to pursue further reductions in strategic and non-strategic 

nuclear weapons with Russia, including both deployed and non-deployed nuclear 

weapons. We intend to consider future reductions in the numbers of deployed and 

non-deployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, and the associated 

changes in Russian forces and other variables that would be required to do so in 

a manner that supports the commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance. A 

number of factors, identified below, will influence the magnitude and pace of future 

reductions in U.S. nuclear forces below those established in the New START Treaty. 

Any plans to reduce the strategic nuclear forces of the United States below the levels prescribed in the New START Treaty will be reported to Congress pursuant to 

Section 1079 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. 

Three overarching factors will affect potential future reductions to the Nation’s 

nuclear arsenal. First, reductions must occur in the context of the NPR-directed 

goals of strengthening deterrence against potential regional adversaries, enhancing 

strategic stability vis-a`-vis Russia and China, and maintaining assurance of our Allies and partners. This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; continued improvements in U.S., Allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in strategic and nonstrategic weapons; and close consultations with Allies and partners. Second, implementation of the National Nuclear Se-
125 

curity Administration’s Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the NPR, and summarized in the Fiscal Year 

2012 Annual Update to the report pursuant to Section 1251 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, will allow the United States to shift from 

retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or 

geopolitical surprise toward a greater reliance on infrastructure, allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments are essential to facilitating any 

reductions while sustaining deterrence under the New START Treaty and beyond. 

Lastly, the size and composition of Russia’s nuclear forces will remain a significant 

factor in determining how much and how fast the United States is prepared to reduce its forces; therefore, we will place importance on Russia joining us as we move 

to lower levels. 

Mr. TURNER. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the nuclear realm? 

China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear forces while we decrease ours. 

How does our strategic posture account for the uncertainty that China may further 

build up its forces and seek (or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia? 

Dr. PERRY. It is difficult to assess China’s intentions, as it remains quite opaque 

on both its nuclear posture strategy and doctrine. At a minimum, China undoubtedly believes it is important to maintain a nuclear deterrent that remains credible 

well into the future. It appears to be addressing the vulnerability of its older-generation fixed silo-based ICBMs through the deployment of road-mobile ICBMs and 

submarine-based ballistic missiles. It also appears to be addressing the ability of its 

warheads to penetrate missile defenses through the development of multiple warhead technology and I would imagine other penetration aids as well. The fact that 

China appears to maintain its nuclear warheads separate from its missile delivery 

systems suggests that it does not put a premium on swift nuclear response, which 

accords with its doctrine. I believe that greater clarity on China’s part as to its intentions, strategy, and doctrine would contribute to greater understanding and reduce the chances for misunderstanding between the world’s two largest economies. 

I would note that Defense Secretary Gates has tried several times in his service 

under both Presidents Bush and Obama to encourage China to be more open on 

these issues, so it has not been for lack of trying on our part that its intentions remain uncertain. 

I believe it unlikely that China would seek to attain nuclear parity with the 

United States and Russia given that both we and the Russians would detect such 

an attempt long before China could achieve such status. Both Russia and especially 

the United States would undoubtedly respond vigorously to such a challenge. Given 

Russia and our much broader experiences and capabilities in the strategic nuclear 

arena, such a Chinese gamble would run the real risk that China would be worse 

off than if it had not tried. Because the United States has a substantially larger 

nuclear arsenal than China, much greater strategic nuclear technical know-how, an 

active production line of the most technologically sophisticated and capable SLBMs 

in the world, I think China would be very ill-advised to make such a challenge, and 

I believe it is unlikely to try. We also can maintain flexibility by ensuring that future START-type agreements are of limited duration, with the ability to extend 

them if circumstances permit. This, and the ‘‘supreme national interests’’ clause that 

has been a feature of SALT II, START I, and New START, provide useful additional 

flexibility for the United States that should also ‘‘deter’’ China from seriously considering a ‘‘sprint to nuclear parity’’ in the years ahead. 

Mr. TURNER. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons? 

Dr. PERRY. Any such comprehensive nuclear arms treaty (CNAT), which by including tactical nuclear weapons would move beyond just strategic weapons, should 

be consistent with U.S. national security requirements. I believe that any reduction 

of U.S. hedge weapons, i.e., non-deployed warheads, would be greatly facilitated by 

a successful and verifiable resolution of the tactical nuclear weapons issue. We 

should also be confident that we would not require larger numbers of weapons to 

account for strategic uncertainties, such as the deployment of a Russian or Chinese 

missile defense that would call into question the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. An additional way to hedge would be to ensure that, as in the previous response, the United States only consider CNAT agreements of appropriately limited 

duration, and not of unlimited duration, until such time that the international order 

is conducive for more enduring agreements. I believe that a ratified and enforced 

CTBT would also reduce any strategic uncertainty we or the global community 

might have about possible developments of strategic warheads by any state. I believe we have an important strategic advantage over China in strategic weapon 
126 

technology that would be very difficult for China to overcome in the presence of a 

CTBT. 

Mr. TURNER. The Strategic Posture Commission observed the nuclear weapons infrastructure was ‘‘decrepit’’ and the intellectual infrastructure was in trouble. Do the 

Administration’s modernization plans address these concerns? How would you 

prioritize these plans and what remains your most significant concern? 

Dr. PERRY. I believed that the Administration’s nuclear weapons infrastructure 

plans as they existed when the SPRC released its report in May 2009 were acceptable, although they did run some risks. With the additional funding that the Administration has added since that time, my remaining concerns are quite satisfied. I remained concerned about the long-term viability of the intellectual infrastructure of 

the nuclear weapons enterprise and believe we should take appropriate steps to ensure we continue to have the necessary scientific and policy expertise required to 

meet future challenges. These issues are more in the educational policy than the 

technical realm, but they require our ongoing attention. The Strategic Posture Review Commission unanimously agreed in its report about the need for a stronger 

intellectual infrastructure to support our strategic posture, and I would be surprised 

if the views of the Commission members have changed on this score—mine certainly 

have not. 

Mr. TURNER. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the nuclear realm? 

China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear forces while we decrease ours. 

How does our strategic posture account for the uncertainty that China may further 

build up its forces and seek (or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia? 

Dr. PAYNE. Chinese military doctrine integrates nuclear weapons into an overall 

strategy called ‘‘active defense.’’ The Chinese declaratory policy of ‘‘no first use’’ of 

nuclear weapons includes ambiguities that appear to allow first use in a future conflict. Indeed, official, open Chinese doctrinal documents talk about ‘‘adjusting’’ the 

nuclear use threshold in the event of war in a manner that would allow pre-emptive 

use of nuclear weapons. According to available open sources, Chinese intentions 

with regard to its nuclear forces and doctrine are twofold. First, China would like 

to use nuclear weapons to help deter the United States and others from interfering 

with its efforts to expand its political-military influence throughout Asia. In short, 

the goal is to deter the United States and others from responding forcefully to politico-military initiatives that China may decide to undertake in the region. Second, 

China sees nuclear weapons as potentially contributing in the event of war to the 

goal of defeating U.S. force projection capabilities that otherwise could help to defeat 

Chinese arms in the region. The Chinese nuclear modernization program has been 

in process for decades in line with these two goals, and shows no sign of abating. 

There is, in fact, little uncertainty that China intends to continue the modernization 

of its nuclear and conventional forces to meet the strategic goals as described. U.S. 

efforts to gain greater transparency with regard to China’s nuclear forces or a formal agreement to limit/reduce China’s forces have failed in the past and will likely 

fail in the future to the extent that China judges increased transparency or limitations to interfere with these strategic goals. The apparent direction of the U.S. nuclear strategic posture toward deeper nuclear reductions, reduced flexibility, fewer 

options and the avoidance of missile defense capabilities vis-a`-vis China’s strategic 

forces will help ease the difficulties for China to meet its strategic force goals. 

Mr. TURNER. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons? 

Dr. PAYNE. To be prudent, the conditions necessary for further significant reductions in our deployed forces or hedges would be: 1) either the establishment of a 

global collective security system with authority and power capable of reliably and 

effectively protecting the security of all countries; or, 2) the dramatic peaceful transformation of the world political order to such a extent that U.S. leaders and others 

can reliably conclude that the threats and prospective threats facing the United 

States and allies will be limited to such an extent that minimum U.S. deterrence 

capabilities will be adequate to protect the United States and assure allies. I see 

no evidence to suggest that either of these conditions is emerging. 

Mr. TURNER. The Strategic Posture Commission observed the nuclear weapons infrastructure was ‘‘decrepit’’ and the intellectual infrastructure was in trouble. Do the 

Administration’s modernization plans address these concerns? How would you 

prioritize these plans and what remains your most significant concern? 

Dr. PAYNE. With regard to the weapons infrastructure, I defer to the Laboratory 

Directors who have stated that the level of support to which the administration has 

committed in the 1251 Report update appears adequate. Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, has testified (March 30, SASC) that 

he is concerned about possible reductions below the 1251 baseline in coming budg-
127 

ets. He emphasized the need to sustain focus and budgets over several decades and 

that, ‘‘a national commitment and stable funding to go with it are essential elements’’ for retaining the highly-skilled work force necessary. 

I have two related concerns. First, senior administration officials have stated publicly and explicitly that the administration is undertaking a review of U.S. nuclear 

requirements, including a targeting review, for the specific purpose of supporting 

the ‘‘next round of nuclear reductions’’ by developing ‘‘options for further reductions 

in our current nuclear stockpile.’’ U.S. force requirements, however, should not be 

driven by the pursuit of further numeric reductions and arms control negotiations, 

per se, but by the strategic goals those forces are intended to serve. In this case, 

those goals are the deterrence of threats to the United States, the extended deterrence of threats to allies, the assurance of allies, and the defense of the United 

States and its allies. It is not difficult to rationalize lower force requirements if the 

priority goal used to measure U.S. force adequacy is movement to lower force numbers. It may, however, be much more difficult if the priority goals of U.S. strategic 

forces and requirements are deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance and defense. Unless the metrics for judging the adequacy of U.S. forces include these priority goals—as has been the case with every Democratic and Republican administration for over five decades—we should not expect U.S. forces to be adequate to support those goals. 

Second, if the administration indeed places numeric reductions and arms control 

negotiations as the priority goals to measure the value and adequacy of U.S. forces 

and requirements, the availability of the U.S. intellectual and industrial capabilities 

necessary to sustain these forces is likely to wither further. This will simply be the 

result of informed career choices by talented people who will take into account the 

priorities of the U.S. agenda and the related allocation of resources—the appearance 

of declining prioritization and uncertain budgets for the U.S. nuclear infrastructure 

will not be a helpful basis for recruitment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the relationship between non-proliferation, arms control 

and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to Germany, Japan and Turkey)? 

General KEHLER. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the security relationships we maintain with our allies are critical in deterring potential threats and also 

serve nonproliferation goals—demonstrating to neighboring states that the pursuit 

of nuclear weapons will undermine their goal of achieving military or political advantages, and reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear deterrent capabilities. U.S. nuclear weapons have played an essential role in extending deterrence to our allies. 

In Europe, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements, has contributed to Alliance cohesion and provided reassurance to allied and partners who feel exposed to regional threats. In Asia, the 

United States maintains extended deterrence through bilateral alliances, security 

relationships, and through forward military presence and security guarantees. The 

deterrent the U.S. extends to its allies relies in part on the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces and policy. The pursuit of arms control efforts—including New 

START, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty strengthens our ability to reinforce the non-proliferation regime by visibly 

addressing our NPT commitments. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The FY12 budget begins to look at whether we should replace the 

ALCM. What is the impetus behind building a new ALCM and have you estimated 

the costs yet? 

General KEHLER. The ALCM is reaching end of life in the mid to late 2020s. The 

department has begun the formal process to determine the requirement, replacement capability, and cost options. We will have more fidelity on this issue over the 

coming year. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What assurances can you make that we are making progress toward the goal of deploying cost-operationally effective missile defense technology? 

General KEHLER. I am confident we are deploying a cost and operationally effective system based upon real-world operations such as Operation Burnt Frost. Theater High Altitude Area Defense testing is providing confidence with 7 of 7 successful shoot downs. Another element, the SM–3, a cornerstone of the Phased Adaptive 

Approach has demonstrated 20 of 24 successful intercepts. We are committed to 

seeking every efficiency possible. For example, the use of Aegis Ashore demonstrates 

the transfer of proven missile defense technology into different operational basing 

modes. With each generation of interceptor lot buys we are seeing the benefits of 
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production lessons learned and best practices which is reducing the cost per interceptor. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we on track to respond as soon as we are able to threats as 

they develop? Are you concerned that the threat from Iran and North Korea are developing faster than the intelligence community anticipated? 

General KEHLER. We currently have sufficient missile defense elements protecting 

the homeland from a limited Iranian or North Korean attack. I am confident our 

investment in missile defense research and development provides adequate flexibility against unanticipated threats, and the Phased Adaptive Approach provides a 

flexible strategy to address these threats should they emerge. We are constantly assessing each element in our missile defense program for options to accelerate capability across a range of scenarios and a hedge strategy will be completed soon. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the main challenges for the newly created CYBERCOM, 

and how will these be addressed? 

General KEHLER. Tasked to secure the DoD’s networks, U.S. Cyber Command 

faces significant capacity, capability, and policy challenges. Specifically, U.S. Cyber 

Command faces a shortfall of cyber force capacity to plan, operate, and defend our 

networks and ensure freedom of action and maneuver in cyberspace. While they 

have begun to take advantage of significant efficiencies in designing and managing 

our information technology architecture, the sheer scale of DoD networks makes 

configuration management and common awareness of activities a significant challenge. Finally, there are still a number of policy and procedural issues to resolve 

to ensure we can effectively partner with the interagency, private sector, and allies 

to confront cyber threats. 

In order to best manage risk, ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action, and develop integrated capabilities in cyberspace, U.S. Cyber Command is actively implementing five strategic initiatives: 

• Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that 

DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential in its military, intelligence, and business operations 

• Employ new defense operating concepts, including active cyber defense, to protect DoD networks and systems 

• Partner closely with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the 

private sector to enable a whole-of-government strategy and a nationally integrated approach to cybersecurity 

• Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to enable 

information sharing and strengthen collective cyber security. 

• Leverage the nation’s ingenuity by recruiting and retaining an exceptional cyber 

workforce and enabling rapid technological innovation 

U.S. Cyber Command’s synergy with National Security Agency/Central Security 

Service’s (NSA/CSS) infrastructure and expertise provides a significant advantage 

in this task. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What would the benefits and drawbacks be of acceding to the European Union proposed Code of Conduct for Space? 

General KEHLER. I agree in principle with the pursuit of voluntary guidelines and 

international norms that promote standards, safe and responsible operations, and 

a sustainable space domain. Any such guidelines or norms of behavior should enhance the security, safety, and sustainability of all outer space activities. 

USSTRATCOM is working with the Joint Staff to conduct an Operations Assessment of the Code to identify potential impacts or risks to military space operations 

now and in the future. The assessment will be completed by 31 May. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the relationship between non-proliferation, arms control 

and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to Germany, Japan and Turkey)? 

Dr. MILLER. Non-proliferation, arms control, and extended deterrence can and 

should be mutually reinforcing to support global strategic stability. 

Arms control relates to non-proliferation through the important role it plays in 

the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The cornerstone of this regime, 

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is built on a basic 

bargain—countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament; countries 

without nuclear weapons will not acquire them; and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. Arms control efforts are concrete steps that nuclear weapons 

States can take to fulfill the first tenet of that bargain, captured in Article VI of 

the NPT, to make progress toward disarmament. Toward that end, ratification of 

the New START Treaty with Russia is a significant achievement of the world’s two 

largest nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear arms, build trust, promote stability, 

and meet their obligations under the NPT. These actions highlight the non-compliance of States such as Iran and North Korea and can help garner support from the 
129 

rest of the international community to condemn the actions of non-compliant States 

and work toward continued strength of the non-proliferation regime. 

Extended deterrence supports non-proliferation by promoting confidence among 

U.S. Allies, including Germany, Japan, and Turkey—and especially those countries 

technically capable of developing and possessing nuclear weapons—that the United 

States is committed to their security and that obtaining nuclear weapons is, therefore, unnecessary and not in their national interests. In turn, U.S. extended deterrence commitments are reinforced by reductions in nuclear weapons. The consultative processes of well-constructed arms control agreements increase transparency 

and promote stability among participating States. Collectively, these efforts diminish the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and demonstrate U.S. 

progress in moving step-by-step toward their elimination. 

Extended deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation work synergistically to 

strengthen deterrence, enhance strategic stability, and assure our Allies and partners of the U.S. commitment to their defense and the improvement of international 

security broadly. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The FY12 budget begins to look at whether we should replace the 

ALCM. What is the impetus behind building a new ALCM and have you estimated 

the costs yet? 

Dr. MILLER. The Department of Defense is committed to continued Long-Range 

Stand-Off (LRSO) missile capability, which provides an important capability for existing long-range aircraft and calls for future long-range aircraft capability to deliver 

weapons, even in the event of significant advances in air defenses by potential adversaries. The Air Force has programmed $0.9 billion for research, development, 

test, and evaluation over the next five years for the development of the LRSO. At 

this time, we do not have a program cost estimate, although we expect to have program costs defined by 4th quarter of Fiscal Year 2013. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What assurances can you make that we are making progress toward the goal of deploying cost-operationally effective missile defense technology? 

Dr. MILLER. The Administration is committed to deploying capabilities that have 

been proven effective under extensive testing and assessment and are affordable 

over the long term. 

To strengthen the testing program, a number of steps are being taken. This commitment reflected our assessment that it is no longer necessary to pursue a highrisk acquisition strategy that simultaneously develops and deploys new systems. 

The Integrated Master Test Plan announced in June 2009, and updated every six 

months since that time, reflects the Missile Defense Agency’s new approach. This 

program sets out test activities over the full course of each system’s development, 

not just two years into the future as was the case under the former program. These 

activities include a comprehensive set of ground and flight tests designed to demonstrate operational performance and validate models used to support an evaluation 

of system effectiveness. 

To ensure adequate oversight of the missile defense program, DoD has enhanced 

the roles and responsibilities of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). Established in March 2007, the MDEB provides oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode involving all missile defense stakeholders in DoD and some from outside DoD. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we on track to respond as soon as we are able to threats as 

they develop? Are you concerned that the threat from Iran and North Korea are developing faster than the intelligence community anticipated? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, we are on track to respond to ballistic missile threats as they 

develop. Our current ballistic missile defense posture already protects us against the 

potential emergence of an Iranian or North Korean ICBM threat. 

Although there is some uncertainty about when and how the ICBM threat to the 

U.S. homeland will mature, the Administration is taking several steps to maintain 

and improve the protection of the homeland from the potential ICBM threat posed 

by Iran and North Korea. These steps include the continued procurement of groundbased interceptors (GBIs), the procurement and deployment of additional sensors, 

and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications 

(C2BMC) system. 

We are also taking steps to hedge against the possibility that threats might evolve 

more rapidly than planned capability enhancements, or that those capability enhancements may be delayed for technical reasons. The Administration is completing 

construction of eight additional silos at Missile Field Two in Fort Greely, Alaska, 

and continuing development and testing of the two-stage GBI. Additionally, six silos 

in Missile Field One at Fort Greely will be placed in a storage mode for possible 

upgrade for operational use in the future. The Administration is considering addi-
130 

tional steps to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture, and we will brief this subcommittee on the results in a classified setting. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the main challenges for the newly created CYBERCOM, 

and how will these be addressed? 

Dr. MILLER. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), as a newly organized subunified command, is working to address several challenges in order to meet the 

Command’s mission requirements. 

A key challenge is developing a command and control structure that balances the 

global operations and defense responsibilities of USCYBERCOM with the responsibilities and requirements of the regional combatant commanders. USCYBERCOM 

is working with the Joint Staff and several regional combatant commands to explore 

alternative approaches, and identify the most effective command and control structures. 

In terms of capacity, USCYBERCOM is focused on building the cyber force. This 

involves recruiting new talent; training, credentialing, and certifying the cyber 

workforce; and retaining the right force for the future. 

In terms of capability, USCYBERCOM is focused on improving situational awareness and security of own networks. In order to do this, DOD must provide effective 

configuration management of legacy systems and hunt effectively on our own networks, while working toward developing a single DOD enterprise, thereby providing 

a more agile and active defense for our information systems. 

In the policy arena, USCYBERCOM is working with the Department’s Cyber Policy Office to address the concern that DoD’s networks ride on a global commercial 

infrastructure that is inherently vulnerable and open to intrusion, denial, destruction, and exploitation. To secure DoD systems and the information and systems of 

the Defense Industrial Base more effectively, USCYBERCOM and DoD are working 

with our interagency partners to improve information sharing with, and the cybersecurity of, the private sector, our Allies/partners, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you give us an update on where the Administration is with 

regard to export control reform and how this will affect the space industry? 

Dr. MILLER. We are making significant progress toward reforming the U.S. export 

control system in order to make it more effective, efficient, and transparent. Our 

reform effort is being conducted in three phases and focuses on the ‘‘four singles’’ 

of export control reform: a single control list, a single licensing agency, a single export enforcement coordination center, and a single U.S. Government-wide electronic 

information technology (IT) licensing system. We have completed important regulatory changes to encryption and dual-national controls in Phase I, and Phase II activities are well underway. For example, we have been making significant progress 

toward the creation of a single control list. The Department of Defense has taken 

the lead in rewriting the U.S. Munitions List (USML), including Category XV, which 

deals with spacecraft. We will also begin revising and ‘‘tiering’’ dual-use controls in 

the near future so that the USML and the Commodities Control List (CCL) can be 

merged into one. On the single IT system, the Department has been designated as 

the Executive Agent for the new U.S. Government-wide export licensing system that 

will be based on DoD’s USXPORTS system. We are working with the Departments 

of Commerce and State to establish connectivity with the USXPORTS system. The 

Executive Order establishing the Enforcement Coordination Center was signed by 

the President in November 2010, and efforts are underway to establish the Center. 

We have not completed our rewrite of controls on spacecraft in the USML; therefore, I cannot provide a detailed assessment at this time of the impacts on the U.S. 

space industry. However, consistent with our overall approach to export control reform, I expect that we will propose ‘‘higher fences around fewer items,’’ and increase 

transparency and predictability, so that the U.S. space industry will be able to compete globally more efficiently. We are well aware that current U.S. law limits the 

flexibility of the President in this area. I look forward to working with Congress on 

any legislative changes that may be required to implement proposed changes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What would the benefits and drawbacks be of acceding to the European Union proposed Code of Conduct for Space? 

Dr. MILLER. There are many potential benefits to the EU’s proposed international 

Code of Conduct for Space. The proposed international Code of Conduct calls on subscribing states to refrain from activities that create long-lived debris and to notify 

certain space activities, including those that might risk creating debris. Space debris 

is a growing concern for all space-faring nations. 

Another benefit is that the EU’s proposed international Code of Conduct reinforces key space norms that the U.S. Government has already endorsed, including 

pre-launch notifications under the Hague Code of Conduct, UN Debris Mitigation 

Standards, and safety of flight practices to share collision warning information. 
131 

Additionally, the EU’s proposed international Code of Conduct explicitly recognizes nations’ inherent right of self-defense. This preserves considerable flexibility 

to implement the National Security Space Strategy, issued by the Department of 

Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Code of Conduct 

would not constrain either the development of the full range of space capabilities, 

nor the ability of the United States to conduct necessary operations in crisis or war. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the relationship between non-proliferation, arms control 

and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to Germany, Japan and Turkey)? 

Dr. PERRY. All three of these areas are important components of broader U.S. 

strategic posture. Turkey, and especially Germany and Japan, have the potential to 

become nuclear weapons powers rather quickly were they to decide to do so. However, under extended deterrence, U.S. security assurances, including nuclear assurances, virtually eliminate any incentives they or our other allies and friends may 

have to acquire their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Without a policy of extended 

deterrence we would face a highly proliferated nuclear world, a world that would 

be much more unstable than we face today. Arms control relates to extended deterrence by reassuring our allies and friends that the potential Russian nuclear threat 

is bounded, thus fostering a climate of cooperation that these countries, most of 

whom lie much closer to Russia than does the United States, very much support, 

given the dangers they fear could arise if U.S.-Russian relations grew tense and hostile. 

Finally, arms control and non-proliferation are linked in several ways. The United 

States and Russia are both obligated under Article VI of the NPT to work toward 

nuclear disarmament, offering our allies, and all countries the prospect of ultimate 

freedom from nuclear threats at some point in the distant future. U.S. participation 

in the arms control process thus gives these countries important additional incentives to cooperate with the United States in our non-proliferation efforts, working 

together to block the transfer of nuclear-related technologies and equipment to countries seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities. Effective non-proliferation strategies, 

supporting verification agreements, and monitoring technologies, also reassure the 

United States and Russia that they do not need to develop or build additional nuclear weapons to guard against new nuclear-armed states. As Russia and the U.S. 

have similar non-proliferation interests, progress and cooperation in both arms control and non-proliferation helps contribute to greater trust and improved relations 

between the two countries, helping to set conditions for future work on tactical and 

non-deployed nuclear weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the relationship between non-proliferation, arms control 

and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to Germany, Japan and Turkey)? 

Dr. PAYNE. The relationship among non-proliferation, arms control and extended 

deterrence is the subject of considerable controversy. Despite numerous confident 

claims with regard to this relationship, there are few basic facts that allow for confident claims to be made reasonably. For example, the frequent confident claim that 

further bilateral or multilateral agreements to reduce nuclear weapons among the 

nuclear states will contribute significantly to non-proliferation is highly speculative. 

There is no convincing evidence to support the expectation that a strengthened nonproliferation norm will emerge from such agreements and empower more effective 

global non-proliferation efforts. Despite the many confident claims of this linkage, 

there is insufficient evidence to conclude that these represent reasonable expectations. Indeed, the deep reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons 

since the end of the Cold War seem to have had no such positive effect and the potential reduction in the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent will 

incentivize proliferation in some cases. 

There are, however, some basic facts in this regard that can be highlighted. First, 

some U.S. allies, notably those who face significant threats, including nuclear 

threats, or who see the potential for greatly increased nuclear threats in their regions, have expressed increasing concerns about the future credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. They understandably see negative implications for their 

security in the potential degradation of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

Some of these allies, implicitly or explicitly, have indicated that they do see the U.S. 

focus on nuclear force reductions and movement toward nuclear zero as contributing 

to the prospective degradation of U.S. credibility, and thus to the degradation of 

their own security. One option that these allies may consider if they no longer can 

rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security is the acquisition of their own 

independent nuclear deterrent forces. Some Japanese and South Korean commentators and officials have pointed to this possibility. 

There are internal debates along these lines within allied countries and baring 

some dramatic new threat developments, of the countries identified in the question, 

my opinion is that we are unlikely to see this concern and consequence in Germany. 
132 

The prospects are, I suspect, somewhat higher for Japan and Turkey given the 

threats and emerging threats these two allies face. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the ratifying of the New 

START treaty, one of which was whether or not the treaty affected our ability to 

deploy missile defenses in Europe. There are media reports suggesting that Russia 

is apparently determined to make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclearweapon curbs contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses 

in Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START if 

the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you were directed to deploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will it be before such a system were 

operation, and in your opinion, what will be Russia’s response regarding their commitment to New START? 

General KEHLER. U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for synchronizing planning for global missile defense, in coordination with other combatant commands and 

the services, but we do not serve as the force provider of missile defense assets. The 

President has already directed the deployment of missile defense assets to Europe 

in coordination with our NATO allies. U.S. Strategic Command fully supports this 

effort. Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) should be complete by late 2011 and provide an initial defensive capability against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles using the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 weapon 

system with SM–3 IA interceptors and forward-based AN/TPY–2 and SPY–1 radars. 

The United States clearly stated on 7 April 2010 that our ‘‘missile defense systems 

are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia’’ and that ‘‘The United 

States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in 

order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.’’ I look forward to any role 

USSTRATCOM may play in ongoing cooperation with our Russian partners. 

Mr. FRANKS. When the Phased Adaptive Approach was first introduced, deadlines 

for each phase were set under the impression that long-range missile threats were 

‘‘slow to develop.’’ Recently you made remarks that suggest North Korea’s ICBM and 

nuclear developments are proceeding faster than expected. This raises concerns that 

the PAA will not be available to defend against long-range ICBMs before North 

Korea develops this capability. 

In the interim, there must be a hedging strategy. Please identify the hedging 

strategy you will pursue to defend our Nation’s Homeland in the event that North 

Korea or another rogue nation acquires ICBM capability earlier than expected or 

if the new Next Generation Aegis Missile has technical problems. Particularly, does 

the GMD two stage interceptor remain a realistic and flexible hedge against these 

advancing threats? Also, what is the timeline for a decision on this strategy? 

Furthermore, do you have an assessment of other nations’ timeline of achieving 

ICBM and nuclear capabilities able to threaten our homeland, particularly Iran’s 

program. 

If not, what is being done to make an accurate assessment of their developments? 

General KEHLER. The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM 

attacks. The United States has 30 deployed ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and 

is continuing improvements in the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system 

to address potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities. The United States already possesses the capability to counter the projected 

threat from North Korea and Iran. 

Any decision to deploy elements of the hedge will be based on a combination of 

factors such as threat advancements or delays in SM–3 test progress. I am confident 

of the intelligence community assessments of timelines for threat development. As 

an adaptive strategy, the Phased Adaptive Approach is tailored to respond to adversary development, and has the inherent flexibility to meet unanticipated Iranian 

threats. The Department is in the process of finalizing and refining its hedge strategy, and will return to brief this subcommittee on the results in a classified setting 

in the next several weeks. 

Mr. FRANKS. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the ratifying of the New 

START treaty, one of which was whether or not the treaty affected our ability to 

deploy missile defenses in Europe. There are media reports suggesting that Russia 

is apparently determined to make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclearweapon curbs contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses 

in Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START if 

the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you were directed to de-
133 

ploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will it be before such a system were 

operation, and in your opinion, what will be Russia’s response regarding their commitment to New START? 

Dr. MILLER. The USS MONTEREY, a guided missile cruiser equipped for ballistic 

missile defense, will deploy in a few days to the Mediterranean Sea for a six-month 

mission. This is the start of Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA). As soon as the MONTEREY arrives on station, it will provide initial operational missile defense capabilities in Europe. 

I do not expect any particular Russian response to the deployment of the USS 

MONTEREY. Russia’s stated concerns about the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) have focused on Phases 3 and 4, planned for 2018 and 2020 respectively. Both before and after the ratification of New START, various U.S. interlocutors have explained to their Russian counterparts that the EPAA will not pose a 

threat to Russia’s offensive missile forces. 

Because the EPAA does not threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent, I do not believe 

that Russia will have any reason to withdraw, or threaten to withdraw, from the 

New START Treaty. 

Mr. FRANKS. When the Phased Adaptive Approach was first introduced, deadlines 

for each phase were set under the impression that long-range missile threats were 

‘‘slow to develop.’’ Recently you made remarks that suggest North Korea’s ICBM and 

nuclear developments are proceeding faster than expected. This raises concerns that 

the PAA will not be available to defend against long-range ICBMs before North 

Korea develops this capability. 

In the interim, there must be a hedging strategy. Please identify the hedging 

strategy you will pursue to defend our Nation’s Homeland in the event that North 

Korea or another rogue nation acquires ICBM capability earlier than expected or 

if the new Next Generation Aegis Missile has technical problems. Particularly, does 

the GMD two stage interceptor remain a realistic and flexible hedge against these 

advancing threats? Also, what is the timeline for a decision on this strategy? 

Furthermore, do you have an assessment of other nations’ timeline of achieving 

ICBM and nuclear capabilities able to threaten our homeland, particularly Iran’s 

program. 

If not, what is being done to make an accurate assessment of their developments? 

Dr. MILLER. The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks. The United States has 30 deployed ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and is 

continuing improvements in the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system to 

address potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities. 

The United States already possesses the capability to counter the projected threat 

from North Korea and Iran. The Intelligence Community continues to assess and 

evaluate Iranian and North Korean progress toward achieving ICBM and nuclear 

capabilities that could threaten the U.S. homeland. 

The Department is in the process of finalizing and refining its hedge strategy, and 

we will be pleased to brief this subcommittee on the results in a classified setting 

when it is complete. 

Mr. FRANKS. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the ratifying of the New 

START treaty, one of which was whether or not the treaty affected our ability to 

deploy missile defenses in Europe. There are media reports suggesting that Russia 

is apparently determined to make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclearweapon curbs contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses 

in Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START if 

the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you were directed to deploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will it be before such a system were 

operation, and in your opinion, what will be Russia’s response regarding their commitment to New START? 

Dr. PERRY. The key to understanding Russia’s edginess about U.S. strategic missile defenses is to recognize that Russia is strongly committed to maintaining a 

credible nuclear deterrent, just as is the United States, especially given Russia’s 

substantial conventional military and technological inferiority compared to the 

United States and the status that their nuclear arsenal gives them on the world 

stage. Accordingly, Russia becomes uneasy in the face of external developments that 

have the potential to diminish the credibility of their nuclear deterrent. This of 

course does not mean that the United States should not deploy strategic missile defenses appropriate to our needs—I continue to support the deployment of a missile 

defense shield to defend against limited threats from countries like Iran or North 

Korea. The need for missile defenses in Europe is related to defending our allies and 

friends in that area from ballistic missile threats and I support the Phased Adaptive 

Approach (PAA) strategy. The PAA timetable for deployments in Europe appears realistic to me. 
134 

Russia will likely express uneasiness about this deployment unless we are able 

to negotiate a level of missile defense cooperation in PAA development that is acceptable to both the United States and Russia, and I believe that we should try to 

achieve such cooperation. However, Russia remains strongly interested in limiting 

U.S. strategic offensive forces and would be unlikely to withdraw from New START 

unless convinced that U.S. missile defense deployments would pose so substantial 

a threat to Russia’s own deterrent force that it would need to increase its strategic 

nuclear force as a counter-move. 

I would also note that if the roles were reversed, and Russia—or China, for that 

matter—was deploying significant levels of modern strategic defenses, the United 

States would likely feel uneasy in a similar manner about possible substantial Russian or Chinese strategic defense deployments. Russia and the United States do not 

see eye-to-eye on the subject of missile defenses, and I support the U.S. position, 

but I believe it is incorrect to impute dark designs to Russia’s expressed concerns 

on this subject. They are determined to maintain a credible strategic nuclear deterrent, and so are we. 

Finally, I would direct anyone interested in this subject to the language on strategic missile defense of the 2009 report of the Strategic Posture Review Commission, 

which the Commission unanimously supported and which remains as valid today as 

it was in 2009: 

For more than a decade the development of U.S. ballistic missile defenses has 

been guided by the principles of (1) protecting against limited strikes while (2) 

taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic 

stability. These remain sound guiding principles. Defenses sufficient to sow 

doubts in Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their deterrents could lead 

them to take actions that increase the threat to the United States and its allies 

and friends. Both Russia and China have expressed concerns. Current U.S. 

plans for missile defense should not call into question the viability of Russia’s 

nuclear deterrent. China sees its concerns as more immediate, given the much 

smaller size of its nuclear force. U.S. assessments indicate that a significant 

operational impact on the Chinese deterrent would require a larger and more 

capable defense than the United States has plans to construct, but China may 

already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment 

of the U.S. missile defense program. 

America’s Strategic Posture, Report of the Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States, United States Institute of Peace 

Press, 2009, p. 32. 

The United States should absolutely deploy the missile defenses we need, but we 

would run important and unnecessary risks if we deployed, or seemed seriously interested in deploying, defenses in excess of that needed to defend against limited 

threats. 

Mr. FRANKS. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the ratifying of the New 

START treaty, one of which was whether or not the treaty affected our ability to 

deploy missile defenses in Europe. There are media reports suggesting that Russia 

is apparently determined to make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclearweapon curbs contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses 

in Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START if 

the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you were directed to deploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will it be before such a system were 

operation, and in your opinion, what will be Russia’s response regarding their commitment to New START? 

Dr. PAYNE. I defer to DOD officials with the responsibility for missile defense research, development and deployment for estimates of the timelines involved for the 

deployment of the four phases of the PAA. The linkage between U.S. missile defense 

deployment and the Russian commitment to New START is open to informed comment. 

Russian officials see the U.S. desire for New START implementation and for further arms control agreements as the leverage necessary to gain some level of control 

over the U.S. missile defense program. They seek to exploit U.S. fears by threatening to withdraw from New START if U.S. missile defense threatens their nuclear 

deterrent capabilities and to exploit U.S. hopes for further nuclear reductions in 

order to secure limits on U.S. missile defenses and the transfer of U.S. missile defense technical know-how to Russia. This is why Russian officials have linked Russian implementation of New START and the potential for limitations on Russian 

tactical nuclear weapons to U.S. concessions on U.S. missile defense programs and 

possible U.S. conventional strategic weapons programs (Prompt Global Strike). Specifically, Russian officials have warned that no further arms control progress will 
135 

be possible unless the United States agrees to a joint missile defense system with 

Russia or accepts geographical, technical, and operational restrictions on U.S. missile defense capabilities. 

My expectation, however, is that Russia sees New START as greatly in its interest. Russian leaders have now repeatedly stated that New START demands reductions only by the United States—a point made by New START critics in 2010. Russia 

apparently will require years to build up its forces to reach New Start limits. Consequently, Russia ultimately will not withdraw from the treaty even if the U.S. goes 

forward in a measured way with all four phases of its missile defense program. 

Rather, the Russian hope is that its linkage of New START and further arms control possibilities to limits on U.S. missile defense, complemented by the vocal repetition of this linkage by domestic American critics of U.S. missile defense, will be sufficient to secure its desired limits on U.S. missile defense. For Russia, the existence 

of negotiations alone may serve this purpose; an agreement may be unnecessary. 

Russian officials will push hard and vocally on this linkage, but hope to achieve 

their goals short of being pressed to the point of actually withdrawing from New 

START. In the past, Soviet leaders engaged in this same type of highly-visible negotiating hardball with President Reagan. They were dissatisfied with U.S. actions regarding INF and following many similar threats, withdrew from negotiations. But 

President Reagan remained firm in response and the Soviets soon returned to negotiations. 

With regard to future limitations on Russian tactical nuclear weapons, my expectation is that Russia will not agree to any significant limitations on its tactical nuclear forces if the U.S. demands an associated intrusive monitoring and verification 

regime. Given the state of Russia’s conventional defensive capabilities and the limited prospect for serious Russian military reform, tactical nuclear weapons will remain the centerpiece of Russia’s defensive strategies vis-a`-vis NATO, China and others. Consequently, Russian officials may seek to trade some modest increase in 

transparency and nominal, largely unverifiable, numeric limitations on its tactical 

nuclear weapons in exchange for geographical, technical, and operational restrictions on U.S. missile defense capabilities. But, if pressed for an agreement that requires effective verification and deep reductions in Russia’s tactical nuclear forces, 

Russia is unlikely to agree even if the United States is willing to concede to Russia’s 

preferred limits on U.S. missile defense. Russia is unlikely to accept such an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons under virtually any plausible conditions, which is 

why New START is not likely to prove to be, as was advertised, the first step toward a verifiable, equitable agreement on tactical nuclear weapons. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. General Kehler, in your submitted testimony you address industrial base concerns in respect to space requirements and explain that, ‘‘Many suppliers struggle to remain competitive as demand for highly specialized components 

and existing export controls reduce their customers to a niche government market.’’ 

I couldn’t agree more. Our decades-old system for export controls is largely a Cold 

War legacy that is preventing high tech industries from selling less sensitive items 

that are readily available in other industrialized countries. 

Dr. Miller indicated there are more than 60 nations and government consortia 

currently operating satellites, and the United States share of worldwide satellite 

manufacturing has dropped from approximately 65 percent in 1997 to approximately 

30 percent in 2008. 

I also think it’s important to note that many companies in Europe and elsewhere 

tout their satellites and components as ‘‘ITAR-free.’’ 

Eliminating unnecessary controls will make us more competitive, create jobs, and 

boost exports. 

This committee actually worked to include a Section in the FY10 NDAA conference report that required an assessment of which technologies may be candidates 

for removal from the U.S. Munitions list as well as the implications of doing so, but 

this report has been delayed by over a year. 

What is the status of the 1248 report? Can you speak a little about the urgency 

for reforming our outdated system in a way that both makes sense from both a security and economic standpoint? How can we actively promote the sale of capabilities 

developed by U.S. companies to partner nations? 

General KEHLER. I understand that the final ‘‘1248 Report’’ or ‘‘Risk Assessment 

of U.S. Space Export Control Policy’’ is in coordination between the Departments of 

Defense and State. The final report was originally delayed to ensure congruence 

with the National Space Policy, which has since been completed and released. 
136 

USSTRATCOM has reviewed this document and provided feedback to the Joint 

Staff. 

One of the defining characteristics of today’s national security operating environment is the extraordinary pace of technological change—a rate that continues to 

grow, increasing the level of difficulty for U.S. companies to compete in the global 

marketplace. At the same time, decreased competitiveness in the U.S. industrial 

base can portend fewer advancements and greater difficulty maintaining a competitive edge in space technology. This in turn, could have significant, negative national 

security implications, if neither the industrial base nor cutting-edge technology is 

available. In short, diminishing U.S. commercial space industry leadership is a step 

toward diminishing overall U.S. leadership in space—steps we can ill afford to take, 

especially at today’s pace of global change. Effective export policies, as outlined in 

the National Space Policy, require analyses and reforms that should begin as soon 

as possible. Our commercial and security interests will be far better served by a 

more agile, transparent, predictable, and efficient export control regime. 

This is best addressed by the private sector or departments of the government responsible for export promotion. However, U.S. leadership is by far the most important means of ensuring the strength of our U.S. commercial space industrial base. 

Export control reform should ease the transfer of less-sensitive products and technologies to key allies and partners with whom we seek interoperable solutions. 

Mr. HEINRICH. You highlighted the importance of funding our nuclear weapons 

complex in your testimony and expressed specific concerns with the proposed yearlong House CR that would cut in half the additional funding for Weapons Activities. 

This cut deeply concerns me, as well as the significant cut to nonproliferation— $647M. How will these cuts impact our nuclear weapons complex overall modernization plans and how will these cuts affect the New START Treaty? 

General KEHLER. Proposed cuts will jeopardize and delay necessary recapitalization of the nuclear weapons complex as well as negatively impact our ability to sustain the stockpile. Although I cannot speak for the National Nuclear Security Administration, we anticipate they will prioritize available resources to support the reconfiguration of our strategic forces in accordance with the New START Treaty. 

Mr. HEINRICH. General Kehler, in your submitted testimony you address industrial base concerns in respect to space requirements and explain that, ‘‘Many suppliers struggle to remain competitive as demand for highly specialized components 

and existing export controls reduce their customers to a niche government market.’’ 

I couldn’t agree more. Our decades-old system for export controls is largely a Cold 

War legacy that is preventing high tech industries from selling less sensitive items 

that are readily available in other industrialized countries. 

Dr. Miller indicated there are more than 60 nations and government consortia 

currently operating satellites, and the United States share of worldwide satellite 

manufacturing has dropped from approximately 65 percent in 1997 to approximately 

30 percent in 2008. 

I also think it’s important to note that many companies in Europe and elsewhere 

tout their satellites and components as ‘‘ITAR-free.’’ 

Eliminating unnecessary controls will make us more competitive, create jobs, and 

boost exports. 

This committee actually worked to include a Section in the FY10 NDAA conference report that required an assessment of which technologies may be candidates 

for removal from the U.S. Munitions list as well as the implications of doing so, but 

this report has been delayed by over a year. 

What is the status of the 1248 report? 

Dr. MILLER. The report required by Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 is currently in coordination. It was originally delayed to ensure that it could take account of the new National Space Policy, which 

was completed in June 2010, and the National Security Space Strategy, released in 

January 2011. In preparing the Section 1248 report, DoD has worked with the Department of State and a broad cross section of organizations, including the intelligence community, NASA, and the Department of Commerce. Many DoD organizations, including those in the acquisition, policy, and operations communities, participated in the preparation of the report. We are working to complete coordination so 

that we can provide the report to Congress as soon as possible. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Can you speak a little about the urgency for reforming our outdated system in a way that both makes sense from both a security and economic 

standpoint? 

Dr. MILLER. There are compelling security arguments for fundamentally changing 

the regulations and procedures we have had in place since the Cold War for exporting weapons and dual-use equipment and technology. Over the years, we have made 

incremental changes—but this is not enough. We need to establish new rules, orga-
137 

nizations, and processes that deal effectively and efficiently with 21st Century challenges. This is the basis for the ‘‘four singles’’ of our export control reform effort: 

a single control list, a single licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination center, and a single information technology (IT) system for export licensing. The export 

control reform initiative is focused on protecting items and technologies that are the 

U.S. ‘‘crown jewels.’’ By doing so, we will be better able to monitor and enforce controls on technology transfers with real security implications while helping to speed 

the provision of equipment to Allies and partners who fight alongside us in coalition 

operations. A more efficient export control system, based on revised controls and 

new licensing policies and procedures, would allow U.S. companies to compete more 

effectively in the world marketplace. 

Mr. HEINRICH. How can we actively promote the sale of capabilities developed by 

U.S. companies to partner nations? 

Dr. MILLER. This is an area more appropriately addressed by the private sector 

or U.S. Government departments and agencies with export promotion responsibilities. However, we expect that export control reform would result in the ease of 

transfers of many less-sensitive items and technologies to U.S. Allies and partners. 

Mr. HEINRICH. You highlighted the importance of funding our nuclear weapons 

complex in your testimony and expressed specific concerns with the proposed yearlong House CR that would cut in half the additional funding for Weapons Activities. 

This cut deeply concerns me, as well as the significant cut to nonproliferation— 

$647M. How will these cuts impact our nuclear weapons complex overall modernization plans and how will these cuts affect the New START Treaty? 

Dr. MILLER. Last November, the President announced his commitment to modernize the nuclear infrastructure, which supports our nuclear deterrent, and our 

nonproliferation efforts. The President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget request represents the first step towards that commitment. The proposed cuts, $624M for 

Weapons Activities and $647M for Nonproliferation Activities, would not have any 

direct effect on the New START Treaty, but they would delay much needed investments in our nuclear infrastructure, and reduce our ability to secure nuclear materials and prevent proliferation globally. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I took particular interest in one of the recommendations the Commission presented which was that the President should designate the nuclear weapons laboratories as ‘‘National Security Laboratories.’’ Can you speak a little as to 

why this is important? 

Dr. PERRY. The National Laboratories already perform a substantial amount of 

work for not just the Department of Energy, but also the Department of Defense 

and Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community as well. This is beneficial 

for everyone concerned, but it in some sense shortchanges the Labs, because these 

other agencies can contract for services ‘‘a la carte,’’ without having a larger stake 

in the overall health of the Laboratory complex. The Posture Commission was quite 

explicit in its concerns over the health of the intellectual infrastructure of the Labs 

and believed that, as your question points out, 

The President should designate the nuclear weapons laboratories as National 

Security Laboratories. This would recognize the fact that they already contribute to the missions of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security 

and the intelligence community in addition to those of DOE. The president 

should assign formal responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, State, 

and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for the programmatic and budgetary health of the laboratories. 

America’s Strategic Posture, Report of the Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States, United States Institute of Peace 

Press, 2009, p. 64. 

In a related recommendation, the Posture Commission also pointed out: 

To reinforce this designation, the Commission recommends that the President 

issue an Executive Order formally assigning the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, 

State, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence joint responsibility for the health of these laboratories. The White House should establish an interagency process to accomplish this and ensure that work in defense, 

homeland security, and intelligence is assigned to the national laboratories, 

building on work already in progress. 

Such a step is needed because that work already in progress has brought 

home an essential lesson: elements of the federal government outside DOE are 

keen to utilize the capabilities of these laboratories but they are not keen to 

invest in the underlying science and engineering that generates those capabilities. As one expert has put it, the rest of the government is anxious to buy wine 

by the glass, but no one wishes to invest in the vineyard (Frances Fragos Town-
138 

send in remarks at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit, December 3, 2008). The 

Commission believes that this diversification of support is the most—and perhaps the only—effective way to maintain the excellence of the laboratories. But 

much more buy-in is needed from outside DOE. What is required is not a series 

of small projects but a few, large, sustained efforts that will support capability 

building. To accomplish this objective would require strong, high level support 

and, so far, this has been lacking. The directors of the weapons laboratories 

have established the following criteria for support from a broader range of agencies: projects should be synergistic with the Laboratory mission, of national importance, and done with excellence using unique Laboratory capabilities. The 

Commission endorses these criteria. 

America’s Strategic Posture, Report of the Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States, United States Institute of Peace 

Press, 2009, p. 54. 

The revised designation for the Labs thus would reflect this broader national security reality and strengthen the programmatic and budgetary health of the Labs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Dr. FLEMING. General, since the closure of the Barksdale Weapons Storage Area 

in 2007, we have a single point of failure in the ALCM mission, a critical vulnerability that I have serious concerns about. As part of its Nuclear Roadmap, the Air 

Force reached the decision in 2009 to re-certify the Barksdale WSA, going as far 

to request funding for the project in its Fiscal Year 2010 budget request. However, 

in testimony before the full committee on February 17th of this year, General 

Schwartz indicated that the Air Force does not intend to move forward with this 

project, citing concerns over its cost. At that time General Schwartz stated he was 

confident that Air Force Global Strike Command has a ‘‘workable’’ solution in place 

to mitigate training and readiness issues that result from having our nuclear bombers at Barksdale separated from nuclear munitions. While day-to-day readiness and 

proficiency are critically important, I remain more concerned about operational impacts—specifically impacts to STRATCOM’s ability to execute Presidentiallydirected OPLAN cruise missile missions. 

Can you describe in-detail STRATCOM’s involvement, if any, in the initial assessment to re-certify the Barksdale WSA? If such an assessment were performed, were 

any conclusions made or courses of action recommended? 

General KEHLER. Our involvement with the initial assessment to re-certify the 

Barksdale WSA was in response to the Air Force’s Nuclear Road Map and the reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise effort. My staff conducted an internal look to 

determine the feasibility of reopening the Barksdale WSA. After reviewing the costs 

associated with sustainment of all WSAs, and evaluating the analysis conducted 

under the original 2006 PDM III study, which determined a single WSA at Minot 

AFB was feasible to meet our operational requirements, we decided the operational 

risk to meeting our OPLAN mission requirements was acceptable and decided not 

to pursue recertification of the Barksdale WSA. 

Dr. FLEMING. Did the Air Force consult with STRATCOM prior to the Air Force 

making the decision not to move forward with the Barksdale WSA recertification? 

If so, did STRATCOM raise any concerns or objections regarding potential operational impacts of not recertifying the Barksdale WSA? 

General KEHLER. Yes. The Air Force collaborated closely with us and the nuclear 

enterprise to ensure our operational requirements were a factor in the decision. As 

we worked through this decision process, we evaluated the potential operational and 

support risks to execution of our OPLAN, concluded the risk was acceptable, and 

did not submit any objections to this decision. 

Dr. FLEMING. At any point in time did STRATCOM planners perform a vulnerability assessment related to consolidating the ALCM mission at Minot AFB? 

General KEHLER. Yes. My staff was closely involved with supporting the 2006 Program Decision Memorandum–III (PDM–III) directed studies and assessments. We 

participated on the team responsible for assessing nuclear cruise missile force structure changes and developing missile consolidation options and ensured STRATCOM 

operational requirements were addressed throughout the process. The results of this 

study verified we could meet all operational requirements and execute all directed 

missions operating from a single WSA location. 

Dr. FLEMING. Did the Commander of JFCC–GS raise any objections or concerns 

over consolidating the ALCM mission at Minot AFB? 

General KEHLER. The ALCM fleet was consolidated at Minot AFB prior to the 

standup of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). Establishing a WSA at 
139 

Barksdale would be operationally beneficial; however, we have achieved a workable 

solution to the USSTRATCOM mission by consolidating the ALCM at Minot AFB. 

This consolidation is due to the fact that the number of ALCMs have decreased; 

therefore, the initial workload since 2007 has decreased. Accordingly, given the fixed 

variables of facilities, support equipment, and personnel, the current solution is 

meeting mission requirements. 

The ALCM mission is operationally viable today with the single WSA at Minot 

AFB. Discussion with the Commander of JFCC–GS at the time of consolidation revealed that concerns were captured as part of the risk analysis of this OSD budget 

driven decision. These concerns were over the pace and magnitude of Program 

Budget Directives (PBD) in terms of how fast the personnel and supply resources 

were drawn down in light of the responsibility to maintain safe and secure stewardship of the nuclear assets. 

Dr. FLEMING. Did the Commander of AFGSC raise any objections or concerns over 

consolidating the ALCM mission at Minot AFB? 

General KEHLER. The ALCM fleet was consolidated at Minot AFB prior to the 

standup of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). Establishing a WSA at 

Barksdale would be operationally beneficial; however, we have achieved a workable 

solution to the USSTRATCOM mission by consolidating the ALCM at Minot AFB. 

This consolidation is due to the fact that the number of ALCMs have decreased; 

therefore, the initial workload since 2007 has decreased. Accordingly, given the fixed 

variables of facilities, support equipment, and personnel, the current solution is 

meeting mission requirements. 

Dr. FLEMING. Does STRATCOM concur with the Air Force’s decision not to move 

forward with recertifying the Barksdale WSA? 

General KEHLER. Yes, I concur with the Air Force’s decision. While two nuclearcertified WSAs would provide us greater operational flexibility, several other issues 

throughout the nuclear enterprise have higher priority funding shortfalls. I am confident we are able to execute all OPLAN ALCM mission requirements using one 

ALCM WSA. We have assessed the inherent vulnerabilities and risks associated 

with operating a single ALCM storage at Minot and I have determined they are 

manageable through force posturing, force management and planning considerations. 

Dr. FLEMING. What mission impact assessments or risk assessments has 

STRATCOM conducted or participated in to examine the single ALCM location at 

Minot and whether any planned activities in the next few years will impact the ability of ALCM assets at Minot to support STRATCOM mission requirements? Please 

provide a summary of those assessments at the appropriate classification level and, 

if mission impacts or risks are identified, discuss how STRATCOM is mitigating 

these. 

General KEHLER. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

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