J-S17004-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

AMERICAN LAWSUIT FUNDING, LLC 

D/B/A VIKING FUNDS, LP 

 v. 

THE DELTA ORGANIZATION, INC., 

THE DELTA ALLIANCE, LLC, DELTA 

PROPERTIES GROUP, LP, THE DELTA 

PARTNERSHIPS, LLC, PHOENIX 

CAPITAL CORPORATION, PHOENIX 

PROPERTIES GROUP GP AND 

LANDMARK INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOLDING COMPANY, LLC 

APPEAL OF: THE DELTA 

ORGANIZATION, INC., THE DELTA 

ALLIANCE, LLC, DELTA PROPERTIES 

GROUP, LP, THE DELTA 

PARTNERSHIPS, LLC, PHOENIX 

CAPITAL CORPORATION, PHOENIX 

PROPERTIES GROUP GP 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2888 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 6, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

2019-09263-CT 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 13, 2024

The Delta Organization, Inc., The Delta Alliance, LLC, Delta Properties 

Group, LP, The Delta Partnerships, LLC, Phoenix Properties Group, GP, and 

Phoenix Capital Corporation (collectively “Logan Defendants”) appeal from the 

judgment entered against them and in favor of American Lawsuit Funding, LLC 
J-S17004-24 

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d/b/a Viking Funds, LP (“Viking”) on the trial court’s non-jury verdict. 1 We 

affirm. 

 We glean the following facts primarily from the parties’ stipulations. See 

generally Joint Exhibits and Stipulations for Trial, 6/20/23.2 Walter Logan 

(“Logan”) controls each of the Logan Defendants. He is the sole member of 

Delta Partnerships, and he and his wife, Darleen Logan, own the Delta 

Organization. The Delta Organization, in turn, is the sole partner of the Delta 

Properties Group. Delta Partnerships and Delta Properties are the partners of 

Phoenix Properties Group (“PPG”), which is managed by the Delta Alliance. 

PPG is the owner of real property in Chester County (“the Premises”) on which 

an advertising billboard is located. In June 2012, PPG entered into an 

agreement with Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. (“Clear Channel”) for the latter 

to use the billboard for a term of five years commencing in July 2012 with an 

annual rent of $31,900 (“the Lease”). 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The Logan Defendants purported to appeal from the trial court’s July 23, 

2023 verdict. However, the appeal properly lies from the November 6, 2023 

judgment entered on that verdict, and is treated as if timely filed on that date. 

See Barrett v. M&B Med. Billing, Inc., 291 A.3d 371, 375 n.3 (Pa.Super. 

2022) (noting that an appeal lies from the entry of judgment on a verdict, not 

from the verdict itself); Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the 

announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order 

shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”). We have 

amended the caption accordingly. 

2

 The stipulations were filed as an attachment to Viking’s June 21, 2023 

pretrial statement and affirmed by the Logan Defendants in their June 23, 

2023 pretrial statement before being admitted at trial on June 28, 2023, as 

Viking’s Exhibit 17. 
J-S17004-24 

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 In May 2016, “the Logan Defendants and Viking negotiated and entered 

into a Purchase and Assignment Agreement (the ‘VPAA’).”3 Id. at ¶ 13. In 

particular, through emails on May 13, 2016, Viking proposed the terms of the 

VPAA and Logan accepted them. The same day, before the Logan Defendants 

executed the comprehensive VPAA, Viking paid $100,000 to the Delta Alliance. 

With no executed copy of the VPAA in hand at the end of July 2016, Viking 

inquired as to its status, and the Logan Defendants responded by attempting 

to renegotiate its terms. After Viking rejected the proposed revisions, “[o]n 

August 23, 2016, the Logan Defendants signed the original VPAA, that was 

initially presented in May 2016.” Id. at ¶ 19. The executed VPAA provided 

as follows: 

WHEREAS, Logan is the owner of [the Premises], such 

Premises having a Billboard erected thereon; 

WHEREAS, Logan is a party to [the Lease] for the lease of 

the Premises to Clear Channel to use the outdoor advertising 

structure or Billboard located on the Premises; 

WHEREAS, as under the Lease, Logan is presently entitled 

to an annual payment of $31,900.00 payable each year on July 1, 

such payment being subject to a five (5) year renegotiable term; 

WHEREAS, Logan seeks $100,000 for which Logan desires 

to sell to Viking an interest in the Premises and billboard Lease. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 As context for the agreement, the trial court indicated that Logan was 

seeking to borrow money from a third party to purchase real estate in 

Philadelphia for a development project, but that Logan had $100,000 in 

personal tax liens that impeded his efforts. Logan turned to Viking, a company 

in “the litigation finance business” whose principal had prior dealings with him, 

to supply the funds necessary to remove the liens. See Trial Court Opinion, 

10/18/23, at 2. See also N.T. Trial, 6/26/23, at 8. 
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Viking desires to purchase the interest on the all [sic] those terms 

and conditions set forth in this Agreement; 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 

hereinafter set forth, the parties hereby agree as follows: 

1. In consideration of Viking paying to Logan one-hundred 

thousand dollars ($100,000,00), the receipt and sufficiency 

of which is acknowledged, Logan hereby sells, transfers, 

conveys and assigns to Viking a one-half, or fifty per cent 

(50%), interest in and ownership of the Premises and Lease, 

and as further consideration agrees to repay to Viking 

$100,000 plus a forty-two per cent (42%) annual rate of 

return on any portion of the unpaid balance until it is repaid 

in full. Logan agrees that until all obligations are satisfied 

under this Agreement, Logan shall pay to Viking all monies 

owed, received and paid to Logan under the aforementioned 

Lease[.4] 

2. The parties intend and hereby agree that Logan can 

terminate Viking’s interest in the Premises and Lease, and 

terminate Logan’s obligation to repay the $100,000 or 

remaining portion thereof, including the 42% rate of return, 

by paying to Viking two-hundred and fifty thousand dollars 

($250,000.00) on or before July 1, 2017. 

3. The parties intend and further agree that if Logan does not 

terminate Viking’s interest in the Premises and Lease before 

July 1, 2017 by satisfying all obligations under paragraphs 

1. and 2. above, Logan can only terminate Viking’s interest 

in the Premises and Lease at any time after July 1, 2017 by 

paying to Viking two-hundred and fifty thousand dollars 

($250,000.00) plus any remaining amounts due and owing 

under paragraph 1. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this 

Purchase & Assignment Agreement to be executed as of the date 

first written above. 

____________________________________________ 

4

 An unexecuted version of the VPAA dated June 11, 2016, indicated that 

Logan was required to pay Viking only one-half of the payments he received 

from Clear Channel pursuant to the Lease. 
J-S17004-24 

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By: /s/ Walter Logan 

Walter Logan on behalf of The Delta 

Organization, Inc., The Delta Alliance LLC, Delta 

Properties Group, L.P., the Delta Partnerships 

LLC and the Phoenix Property Group[5]

VIKING FUNDS 

By: /s/ Paul A. Graeff 

Paul A. Graeff, Jr., on behalf of 

Viking Funds 

VPAA, 6/11/16, at 1-2 (identified as Joint Exhibit 1 in the parties’ Joint Exhibits 

and Stipulations for Trial and admitted at trial as Exhibit P-1). 

 One week after executing the VPAA, the Logan Defendants paid Viking 

$15,950, or one-half of the money Logan received from Clear Channel 

pursuant to the Lease. “At some point before September 2, 2016, the Logan 

Defendants attempted to make additional payments to Viking, but the Logan 

Defendants informed Viking that the check would be returned due to 

insufficient funds.” Joint Exhibits and Stipulations for Trial, 6/20/23, at ¶ 22. 

The Logan Defendants made no further payments to Viking. Id. at ¶ 21. 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Pertinent to our later discussion, although the VPAA does not indicate that 

Logan signed on behalf of Phoenix Capital Corporation, the parties’ trial 

stipulation indicated that references to the “Logan Defendants” in the 

stipulations included each of the Delta entities as well as PPG and Phoenix 

Capital Corporation, and that these “Logan Defendants . . . negotiated and 

entered into” as well as “signed” the VPAA. See Joint Exhibits and Stipulations 

for Trial, 6/20/23, at 1, ¶¶ 13, 19. The Logan Defendants were all represented 

by the same counsel. 
J-S17004-24 

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 In June 2017, Viking inquired about the next annual payment due under 

the VPAA. The Logan Defendants informed Viking that they were in 

negotiations with Clear Channel about a lease term extension. In July 2018, 

PPG and Clear Channel agreed to extend the Lease for a five-year term at 

$44,660 per year, with 3% rent increases commencing after 2018. 

In May 2019, PPG assigned its rights in the Lease to Landmark 

Infrastructure Holding Company, LLC (“Landmark”). Pursuant to that 

agreement, the Logan Defendants received $300,000 and directed Clear 

Channel to make all future lease payments to Landmark. “The Logan 

Defendants never sought Viking’s consent to enter into the Landmark 

Assignment Agreement, the Logan Defendants never notified Viking of the 

Landmark Assignment Agreement after the fact, and the Logan Defendants 

never made any payments received ($300,000) under the Landmark 

Assignment Agreement to Viking.” Id. at ¶ 28. 

 Viking initiated this action against the Logan Defendants and Landmark 

by complaint filed September 11, 2019, stating counts of breach of contract, 

partition and accounting, and declaratory judgment. Following discovery, the 

claims against Landmark were dismissed in April 2022 upon the grant of its 

motion for summary judgment. The case was initially listed for trial in the 

autumn of 2022 before the Honorable Edward Griffith, but it was reassigned 

to the Honorable Anthony T. Verway (“trial court”). 
J-S17004-24 

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On February 8, 2023, the Chester County Court Administrator mailed to 

all counsel and filed of record a trial listing letter, referencing the instant 

action, that stated as follows: 

You are hereby notified that you are attached for a Special Listing 

for a non-jury trial in the above-captioned case. The attachment 

is for Wednesday, June 28, 2023[,] at 9:00 am in Courtroom 

No. 19, The Honorable Anthony T. Verway presiding . . . . The 

attachment is for the length of the trial[.] 

Trial Listing Letter, 2/8/23 (emphasis in original). A separate “event 

scheduled” docket entry was also made on that date reflecting the same, i.e., 

attachment for a non-jury trial on June 28, 2023, before Judge Verway. On 

April 28, 2023, the trial court’s law clerk reiterated the June 28 trial date in 

an email to counsel. 

 The Court Administrator sent a follow-up letter on June 14, 2023. This 

letter stated the following information about the trial listing: 

The above case is listed for trial from Monday, June 26, 2023, to 

Friday, July 21, 2023 before the Honorable Anthony T. Verwey in 

Courtroom 19. This case is listed as number 2. 

. . . . 

If you have any questions about any of these matters, please call 

this officer. 

Motion to Reopen Record, 7/5/23, at Exhibit A (some capitalization omitted 

and punctuation supplied). The court’s website likewise indicated that the 

case was second on the list of the cases scheduled before Judge Verway for 

the term running from June 26 to July 21, 2023. Id. at Exhibit B. 
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 In the week before the trial listing, the parties filed pre-trial statements, 

reflecting their stipulated facts and joint exhibits, which included the VPAA and 

email correspondence between its signatories. Both sides filed their proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law by June 23, 2023. Viking presented a 

simple theory of the case, namely that the Logan Defendants failed to 

terminate Viking’s interest in the Premises or otherwise pay in accordance 

with the VPAA, so Viking was entitled to be declared the one-half owner of the 

premises and to collect damages in the amount of missed payments with 

interest. See Viking’s Pre-Trial Statement, at 1-2. 

 For their part, the Logan Defendants presented a convoluted tale of 

sabotage for economic gain by Viking’s CEO, Richard Chakejian (“Chakejian”). 

They asserted that Logan created another Delta company, Delta Development, 

LLC, to acquire and develop twenty-five lots in Philadelphia, and gave 

Chakejian one-third ownership of that company in exchange for a guarantee 

of the repayment of the loans to finance the development. Chakejian then 

arranged for financing by the company Lava Funding (“Lava”). Before the 

closing, Lava discovered Logan’s $100,000 tax lien and demanded he satisfy 

it. The Logan Defendants then borrowed the money from Viking at Chakejian’s 

suggestion. After four of the lots had been developed, Lava demanded 

payment of the loan. Rather than negotiating an extension in good faith on 

Delta Development’s behalf, Chakejian caused the project to fail, thereby 

ensuring that Logan would not be able to satisfy the terms of the VPAA. 
J-S17004-24 

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Accordingly, Viking was not entitled to the requested judgment because the 

VPAA was but a part of a larger agreement between the Logan Defendants 

and Viking that was never intended to convey ownership of the Premises to 

Viking. See Logan Defendants’ Pretrial Statement, 6/23/23, at 2-4. 

 On June 28, 2023, Viking appeared for trial with counsel, but neither 

the Logan Defendants nor their attorney had arrived. The court took a recess 

to determine their whereabouts and learned from the Logan Defendants’ 

counsel that they were not aware that the trial was proceeding that day. The 

court elected to move forward with the trial. Viking called Chakejian as a 

witness to establish that Logan was in need of $100,000 to enable a loan 

closing to move forward and offered Viking an interest in the Premises so long 

as he had an option to buy it back. See N.T. Trial, 6/28/23, at 10-11. 

Chakejian further testified that the parties executed the VPAA after back-andforth negotiations, but Logan only made one payment in accordance with the 

agreement, and never offered to return the $100,000 or otherwise make 

Viking whole. Id. at 11-12. Viking then offered the stipulations and joint 

exhibits into evidence and rested. The court directed Viking to submit 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after it had an opportunity to 

obtain the transcript. 

 On July 5, 2023, the Logan Defendants filed a motion to reopen the 

record. Therein, their counsel indicated that he interpreted the Court 

Administrator’s June 14 letter, which advised him that the case sub judice was 
J-S17004-24 

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number two on the June 26-July 21 list, to have effectively “moved” this case 

from a June 28 start date to “stand-by” mode for commencement sometime 

during the week of June 26. See Motion to Reopen Record, 7/5/23, at ¶ 3-4. 

Counsel therefore informed his clients that he would be in touch after he 

received a call from the Court Administrator’s office advising them when they 

would start trial. Id. at ¶ 4. Counsel asserted that he had been prepared to 

begin trial on June 26, “and was simply waiting to be given notice that the 

trial of the case that was listed as No. 1 on the [c]ourt’s trial list had either 

settled or been concluded.” Id. at ¶ 7. The Logan Defendants argued that 

“sending out letters with conflicting information concerning the date for 

starting the trial, coupled with the publication of inaccurate information on the 

[c]ourt’s own website, clearly constitute[d] a break down in the court system.” 

Id. at ¶ 13. Maintaining that the reliance on the second letter and the website 

was reasonable and that they had a meritorious defense to Viking’s claims, 

the Logan Defendants requested that the court reopen the record for them to 

mount a defense. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. 

The trial court denied the motion by order of July 11, 2023. Therein the 

court indicated that all the letters received by counsel were accurate and none 

suggested that the parties should “expect a phone call when their case is up.” 

Order, 7/11/23, at unnumbered 2 n.1. The court noted that, in addition to 

the letter and docket entries indicating that the case was specially listed for 

June 28, the parties had further received an email from the court’s law clerk 
J-S17004-24 

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on April 28, 2023, reiterating the June 28 trial date. Id. The court found that 

counsel’s choice to make assumptions about how the trial list worked and how 

long the first case would take to be tried, and to eschew the June 28 date 

instead of contacting the Court Administrator or the trial court’s chambers to 

confirm his beliefs, did not amount to a satisfactory excuse for failing to appear 

contemplated by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at unnumbered 1-2, n.1. 

 Viking filed its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 

12, 2023, therein citing the trial transcript which had been filed of record. 

Viking requested that the court declare it to own one-half of the Premises and 

to enter judgment against all the Logan Defendants, jointly and severally, in 

the amount of $681,097.15, which was composed of Clear Channel’s annual 

rent payments from 2016 through 2022, one-half of the proceeds of the 

Landmark assignment, and simple interest at 6% per year. See

Supplemented Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 7/12/23, at 

7, 9. The Logan Defendants did not propose any countervailing findings or 

conclusions. 

 On July 21, 2023, the court filed its decision, which culminated in a 

verdict in favor of Viking, but for far less than what was requested. 

Specifically, the court: (1) found all Logan Defendants liable for damages to 

Viking which, including prejudgment interest, totaled $328,214.51; (2) 

declared that Viking is a one-half owner with PPG of the Premises; and (3) 
J-S17004-24 

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dismissed the count seeking partition and accounting based upon Viking’s 

failure to pursue it. See Decision, 7/21/23, at 10. 

 The Logan Defendants thereafter filed a timely post-trial motion. 

Therein, they asserted that (1) the trial court erred or abused its discretion in 

proceeding with the trial, closing the record, and refusing to re-open the 

record because they had received “conflicting information regarding the date 

on which trial of this case was to begin and because the [c]ourt’s official web 

site contained information regarding the trial date which also conflicted with 

previous notices,” Post-Trial Motion, 7/27/23, at ¶¶ 1-3; (2) the evidence did 

not support a finding that Phoenix Capital was a party to, or breached, the 

VPAA, id. at ¶¶ 4-5; and (3) the evidence did not support the ruling that Viking 

owned a one-half interest in the Property, id. at ¶¶ 6-7. 

 Viking filed a response, arguing: (1) the Logan Defendants still had not 

offered a valid reason to reopen the record; (2) their theory of the case did 

not present a meritorious defense; (3) they waived any objections to the 

verdict against Phoenix Capital and the determination that the VPAA conveyed 

an interest in the Premises by not objecting to Viking’s post-trial proposed 

findings and conclusions through the filing of their own proposed findings and 

conclusions; and (4) the Logan Defendants’ claim that the VPAA did not 

convey an interest in the Premises was legally incorrect. See Brief in 

Response to Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 9/11/23, at 4-9. 
J-S17004-24 

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 By memorandum and order of October 18, 2023, the trial court denied 

the Logan Defendants’ post-trial motion. This timely appeal followed, and 

both the Logan Defendants and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.6 

The Logan Defendants present the following questions for our determination: 

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an 

error of law in refusing to reopen the record once counsel had 

provided it with a copy of the Court Administrator’s letter of June 

14, 2023 and a copy of a print out of the [c]ourt’s web site, both 

of which expressly stated that the case was #2 in the court’s trial 

pool rather than being specially listed to begin on June 28, 2023? 

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in: (a) determining that Phoenix Capital Group had 

breached the terms of the [VPAA]; and (b) entering a judgment 

against the Phoenix Capital Corporation where it is undisputed 

that the Phoenix Capital Corporation was not a party to the 

underlying [VPAA]? 

3. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in determining that [Viking] owns a one-half interest in 

the [Premises]? 

Logan Defendants’ brief at 9. 

 We begin with the Logan Defendants’ challenge to the trial court’s 

refusal to reopen the record. Rule 218 of our Rules of Civil Procedure governs 

this issue and provides as follows: 

Rule 218. Party Not Ready When Case is Called for Trial 

(a) Where a case is called for trial, if without satisfactory excuse 

a plaintiff is not ready, the court may enter a nonsuit on motion 

of the defendant or a non pros on the court’s own motion. 

____________________________________________ 

6

 In fulfilling its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) obligations, the trial court indicated its 

reliance on the October 18, 2023 memorandum opinion addressing the Logan 

Defendants’ post-trial motion. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/23. 
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(b) If without satisfactory excuse a defendant is not ready, the 

plaintiff may 

(1) proceed to trial, or, 

(2) if the case called for trial is an appeal from compulsory 

arbitration, either proceed to trial or request the court to 

dismiss the appeal and reinstate the arbitration award. 

 . . . . 

(c) A party who fails to appear for trial shall be deemed to be not 

ready without satisfactory excuse. 

Note: . . . 

A decision of the court following a trial at which the 

defendant failed to appear is subject to the filing of a motion 

for post-trial relief which may include a request for a new 

trial on the ground of a satisfactory excuse for the 

defendant’s failure to appear. 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 218. 

This Court has indicated that “a satisfactory excuse must be an excuse 

that would constitute a valid ground for a continuance.” Manack v. Sandlin, 

812 A.2d 676, 681 (Pa.Super. 2002) (cleaned up). Ascertaining the validity 

of the grounds is within the broad discretion of the trial court, “and an 

appellate court should not disturb such a decision unless an abuse of that 

discretion is apparent.” Corrado v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 790 

A.2d 1022, 1035 (Pa.Super. 2001). “An abuse of discretion is more than just 

an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have 

abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised 

was manifestly unreasonable, or the results of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-
J-S17004-24 

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will.” Id. Examples of satisfactory excuses “include agreement of counsel; 

illness of counsel, a party, or a material witness; inability to maintain the 

testimony of an absent witness by means of discovery; or such other grounds 

as may be allowed by the court.” Breza v. Don Farr Moving & Storage 

Co., 828 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2003) (cleaned up). 

 Here, the Logan Defendants insist that the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to grant a new trial upon the proffering of the reasons 

for their failure to appear. Rather than addressing the definition of 

“satisfactory excuse,” the Logan Defendants maintain that they provided “a 

reasonable explanation” for their failure to appear for the scheduled trial. See 

Logan Defendants’ brief at 16. Likewise, instead of explaining how the 

circumstances would have demanded the grant of a continuance for the 

defense, they rely largely upon inapt case law governing entry of a non pros

judgment when a plaintiff fails to appear or dismissal of an arbitration appeal 

when the defendant fails to appear. Id. at 11-14. 

 The trial court rejected the Logan Defendants’ claim of error as follows: 

All parties were given notice of the June 28th trial date through 

their counsel. On February 8, 2023, Court Administration issued 

a letter advising counsel of their trial attachment. Defendants’ 

counsel admits receiving the letter. The letter was twice placed on 

the docket, on February 8, 2023, and March 2, 2023, with the 

notation, “TRIAL LISTING LETTER — SPECIAL LISTING.” My law 

clerk sent an email on April 28, 2023, setting forth my 

requirements for trial, which reiterated the trial date of June 28, 

2023. Defendants’ counsel admits receiving this email. 

Defendants’ counsel claims to have been misled by the trial list 

issued by Court Administration on June 14, 2023, stating that the 

case was No. 2 on the list; the trial list is also published on the 
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Court’s website. . . . The trial list and the letter are accurate. 

This case was to be the second tried during the trial term starting 

June 26, 2023, and trial in the first case was commenced on June 

26th. Defendants’ counsel states that he made certain 

assumptions about how the list operated and how long the first 

case would take to be tried. Court Administration’s letter does not 

advise counsel to expect [a] phone call when their case is up. Had 

counsel needed to know how the first case was progressing, Court 

Administration or my chambers could have answered his 

questions. [The Logan] Defendants have not offered a 

satisfactory excuse for failing to appear for trial. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/23, at 5-6 (quoting Order, 7/11/23, at 1-2 n.1). 

 We discern no abuse of discretion. There is nothing inherently 

conflicting or contradictory about being told the case is both (a) second on a 

trial list that begins on June 26 and (b) specially listed to begin trial on June 

28. It was not an inadvertent or reasonable choice for counsel to assume that 

listing another, first case two days before the instant case’s longstanding 

specific date within the trial term somehow negated that special listing or 

moved the case down the list. Hence, the trial court did not err in concluding 

that the Logan Defendants did not provide a satisfactory excuse for neither 

appearing as scheduled nor being prepared to attend trial when the court 

called to see why he and his client were not there. No relief is due. 

 The Logan Defendants’ remaining issues challenge the factual and legal 

sufficiency of the court’s verdict. In this vein we observe: 

Our review in a non-jury case is limited to whether the findings of 

the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether 

the trial court committed error in the application of law. We must 

grant the court’s findings of fact the same weight and effect as 

the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb the non-jury 

verdict only if the court’s findings are unsupported by competent 
J-S17004-24 

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evidence or the court committed legal error that affected the 

outcome of the trial. It is not the role of an appellate court to pass 

on the credibility of witnesses; hence, we will not substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Thus, the test we apply is 

not whether we would have reached the same result on the 

evidence presented, but rather, after due consideration of the 

evidence which the trial court found credible, whether the trial 

court could have reasonably reached its conclusion. 

Nat’l Brokers of Am., Inc. v. Jordan, 307 A.3d 1206, 1217 (Pa.Super. 

2023) (cleaned up). We review the court’s denial of a motion for post-trial 

relief for an error of law or abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Spencer v. 

Johnson, 249 A.3d 529, 549 (Pa.Super. 2021). 

 The Logan Defendants claim that the trial court’s ruling that Phoenix 

Capital Corporation breached the VPAA was not supported by the evidence. 

Their entire argument is as follows: 

In the instant case, the court entered a judgment in the 

amount of $328,214.51 against all of the defendants, including 

the Phoenix Capital Corporation resulting from their alleged 

breach of the underlying [VPAA]. A review of the [VPAA], 

however, reveals that the Phoenix Capital Corporation was not a 

party to it. Because it is well established that a person or entity 

that is not a party to a contract cannot be held liable for breaching 

it, Roman Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Vollrath, 313 A.2d. 305 

(Pa.Super. 1973), it is respectfully submitted that the court’s 

determination that the Phoenix Capital Corporation had breached 

the terms of that agreement is not supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Logan Defendants’ brief at 17-18 (cleaned up). 

 The trial court addressed this issue thusly: 

Upon review, the Phoenix Capital Corporation was not listed as 

party to the VPAA. However, the parties’ joint stipulations entered 

into for trial and submitted at trial, recite: 
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13. On May 13, 2016, the Logan Defendants and 

Viking negotiated and entered into a Purchase and 

Assignment Agreement (the “VPAA”). 

 . . . . 

19. On August 30, 2016, the Logan Defendant[s] 

signed the original VPAA, that was initially presented 

in May 2016. 

The “Logan Defendants” are defined on the first page of the joint 

stipulations as, “The Delta Organization, Inc., The Delta Alliance, 

LLC, Delta Properties Group, L.P., Delta Partnerships, LLC, 

Phoenix Property Group, GP, and Phoenix Capital Corporation” 

(emphasis added). . . . While a party who is not a party to 

contract cannot be held liable for its breach, in this instance the 

parties have stipulated that Phoenix Capital Corporation was a 

party to the VPAA. Accordingly, it was not error to enter judgment 

against it. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/23, at 13-14 (citations omitted). 

 We conclude that the trial court committed no error of law or abuse of 

discretion in refusing to grant post-trial relief as to Phoenix Capital. It is wellsettled that “[a] stipulation of facts is binding and conclusive on a trial 

court[.]” Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241 A.3d 600, 615 (Pa. 2020). 

Consequently, a party cannot “validly complain about a stipulation to which 

he agreed.” Phillips v. Schoenberger, 534 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. 1987). 

There are instances when a non-party may be liable for a breach of 

contract, such as corporate successor liability or piercing the corporate veil. 

See Fizzano Bros. Concrete Products, Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 A.3d 951, 

969 (Pa. 2012); In re Dravo LLC, 307 A.3d 146, 154 (Pa.Super. 2023). 

However, since the Logan Defendants stipulated that Phoenix Capital, as one 
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of “the Logan Defendants,” in fact entered into the VPAA with Viking, Viking 

had no incentive to establish a non-signatory basis for Phoenix Capital’s 

liability at trial. Phoenix Capital cannot now fault Viking for failing to prove 

something that was obviated by the stipulation to which Phoenix Capital 

agreed. See Phillips, 534 A.2d at 1079. 

Finally, the Logan Defendants assert that the trial court committed an 

error of law in finding that the VPAA conveyed an ownership interest in the 

Premises to Viking. They argue that the “facts and circumstances surrounding 

the execution of the [VPAA,] as well as the post-execution activities of the 

parties, compels the conclusion that neither [Viking] nor . . . Logan intended 

the [a]greement to serve as a deed conveying one-half interest in the 

[Premises] to [Viking].” Logan Defendants’ brief at 18-19. In particular, the 

Logan Defendants point to: (1) “the simple fact that the document in question 

was captioned “Purchase and Assignment Agreement,” as opposed to “Deed;” 

(2) the VPAA “contains none of the provisions that are commonly found in . . . 

deeds,” such as referring to the parties as grantor and grantee, including a 

metes and bounds description of the property, and being signed by witnesses; 

(3) the fact that both parties signed the VPAA although a deed only requires 

the signature of the grantor; (4) the inability of the VPAA to be recorded, given 

the absence of the above-referenced deed language; (5) the parties’ failure 

to treat the VPAA as a deed by attempting to record it and pay real estate 

transfer tax; and (6) Viking’s failure to inform Clear Channel of its part 
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ownership of the Premises and to demand that Clear Channel directly pay 

Viking its share of the annual rent. Id. at 19-21. 

The trial court proffered the following defense of its declaration that 

Viking owned one-half of the interest in the Premises: 

On its face, the VPAA is clear and unambiguous, and the 

intent of the parties can be ascertained from the document itself. 

The VPAA acknowledges payment of consideration of $100,000.00 

to [the Logan] Defendants by Viking for which [the Logan] 

Defendants “hereby sells, transfers, conveys and assigns to Viking 

a one-half, or fifty percent (50%), interest in and ownership of the 

Premises and Lease.” The adverb “hereby” demonstrates the 

intent to accomplish something by the words that follow. Black’s 

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The word “convey” is sufficient 

to pass fee simple title to the premises conveyed. [See] 21 P.S. 

§ 2.6 A deed is not necessary to transfer property; an “instrument 

in writing” will do. Id. To be enforceable against the assignor, 

an assignment of an interest in land need only include an adequate 

description of the property, a recital of the consideration, and the 

signature of the assignor. Zuk v. Zuk, 55 A.3d 102, 107 

(Pa.Super. 2012). A description of the property is adequate where 

it describes a particular piece or tract of land that can be identified, 

located, or found. Id. The first whereas clause of the VPAA 

defines the “Premises” as “real property located at N/O Nutt Road, 

E/O Township Line Road at the intersection of Route 23 and Route 

113 in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, tax parcel number 15-7-15.” 

. . . Logan signed and initialed each page of the VPAA on behalf 

of [the Logan] Defendants. The [Logan] Defendants made a valid 

transfer of a one-half interest in and ownership of the [Premises] 

to Viking. . . . There was no need for the court to consider 

extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent since no ambiguity exists. 

______ 

6

 “[I]n any deed or instrument in writing for conveying or 

releasing land hereafter executed, unless expressly limited 

to a lesser estate, the words ‘grant and convey,’ or either 

one of said words, shall be effective to pass to the grantee 

or grantees named therein a fee simple title to the premises 

conveyed, if the grantor or grantors possessed such a 

title[.]” 21 P.S. § 2. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/23, at 11-12. 
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 The trial court did not err in holding that the language of the VPAA 

unambiguously conveyed a one-half interest in the Premises to Viking. As 

such, extrinsic evidence was not admissible to prove the intent of the parties. 

See, e.g., Ramalingam v. Keller Williams Realty Grp., Inc., 121 A.3d 

1034, 1046 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“When a writing is clear and unequivocal, its 

meaning must be determined by its contents alone. Only where a contract’s 

language is ambiguous may extrinsic or parol evidence be considered to 

determine the intent of the parties.” (cleaned up)). The fact that the 

agreement provided the Logan Defendants opportunities to buy that interest 

back from Viking did not negate the conveyance. Since the parties stipulated 

that the Logan Defendants did not make the requisite payments to Viking to 

avail itself of those opportunities, the trial court’s declaration of Viking’s 

ownership was proper. 

 Therefore, since none of the Logan Defendants’ arguments reveals that 

the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law in proceeding 

to trial without their presence, entering its verdict in favor of Viking, and 

denying their post-trial motion, we have no cause to disturb the court’s verdict 

and judgment. 

 Judgment affirmed. 
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Date: 8/13/2024