* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-10038

Summary Calendar

FRANK JOHN STANGEL

Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

JOHNSON & MADIGAN PLLP, formerly Johnson & Madigan; MICHAEL J.

MINENKO

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:99-CV-1518-D

July 27, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Stangel sued Minenko and Johnson & Madigan, a Minnesota

attorney and law firm, respectively, for legal malpractice, breach

of fiduciary duty, and promissory estoppel. We AFFIRM the

dismissal of the action for want of personal jurisdiction.

Where, as here, a court considers a motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction without conducting an evidentiary hearing,1 Stangel argues that the district court erred in failing to

take judicial notice of his pending bankruptcy case. However, the

court's order denying Stangel's motion to reconsider shows that the

court determined that the bankruptcy case was closed.

2 the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of jurisdiction. See

Bullion v. Gillespie , 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990).

Stangel alleged that his claims again st Minenko and the law

firm were "related to" his bankruptcy proceeding in the Northern

District of Texas. The district courts have subject matter

juris diction over cases that are "related to" bankruptcy

proceeding s. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). The bankruptcy court has

jurisdiction over claims that are "related to" a bankruptcy action

when those claims could have an effect on the bankruptcy estate.

See In re Canion

, 196 F.3d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1999). Stangel

failed to allege any fact to show that his claims against Minenko

could have any conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate. 1

Since Stangel failed to make a prima facie showing that the

court could have jurisdiction over his claims under § 1334(b),

subject matter jurisdiction would accordingly be based on diversity

of citizenship. Stangel argues in the alternative that the court

had personal jurisdiction over Minenko and the law firm if subject

matter jurisdiction arises from diversity of ci tizenship. Due

process requires that the defendant have minimum contacts with the

forum state in order for the court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over him. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington

,3

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Minenko's contacts with Texas are

limited to billing communications with Stengel regarding the case

undertaken in Minne sota. Communications from a nonresident to a

domiciliary regarding the execution of a contract are insufficient

to support personal jurisdiction. S ee Gundle Lining Constr. Corp.

v. Adams County Asphalt, I nc. , 85 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1996).

Minenko's contacts with Stangel in Texas regarding the handling of

a property di spute in Minnesota are not the minimum contacts

necessary to create persona l jurisdiction over the defendants in

Texas.

We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Stangel's claims,

because there is no subject matter jurisdiction under § 1334(b) and

no personal jurisdiction over the defendants where subject matter

jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.

AFFIRMED.