IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 11, 2012 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARIO OCHOA 

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sumner County

No. 894-2010 Dee David Gay, Judge

No. M2011-02400-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 7, 2012

Following a traffic stop and search of his vehicle that uncovered over five kilograms of

cocaine, the defendant, Mario Ochoa, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury with

possession of over 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony.

He subsequently pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to

sell or deliver, a Class B felony, in exchange for a Range I sentence of twelve years in the

Department of Correction, reserving the following certified questions of law pursuant to

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A): (1) whether the officer had reasonable

suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) whether the officer exceeded the scope of the stop once he

discovered that the defendant’s temporary license tag was valid; (3) whether the evidence

should be suppressed because the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was not

sufficiently attenuated from the prior seizure; and (4) whether the search of the vehicle

exceeded the scope of what a reasonable person would have understood to have been meant

by the defendant’s consent. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR., JJ., joined.

Jeffery S. Frensley, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mario Ochoa.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney

General; Lawrence Ray Whitley, District Attorney General; and Sallie Wade Brown,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
FACTS

On the morning of October 29, 2010, Investigator Edward Williams of the

Hendersonville Police Department, who was assigned to the 18th Judicial District Drug Task

Force Highway Interdiction Team, stopped the defendant’s vehicle near mile marker 107 on

Interstate 65 in Robertson County based on his inability to read the issuing state on the

defendant’s temporary license plate. Once stopped behind the defendant’s vehicle, he was

able to tell that the issuing state was Texas and he wrote the defendant a warning ticket for

the violation. During the course of the stop, he also radioed for backup from his fellow drug

interdiction officers, asked the defendant a series of questions about whether he had any

illegal substances in his vehicle, sought and received the defendant’s consent to search the

vehicle, and, with the assistance of two fellow officers, conducted an extensive search of the

vehicle that lasted over an hour and eventually involved the use of a drug dog, which

“alerted” at the back bumper area of the vehicle. Investigator Williams then sought and

received the defendant’s permission to take the vehicle to the Sumner County Sheriff’s

Department to continue the search. During that second search, the officers uncovered five

plastic wrapped packages containing a total of 5.78 kilograms of cocaine, which were hidden

in two compartments in an after-market panel located behind the vehicle’s rear bumper

cover.

The defendant was subsequently indicted for possession of more than 300 grams of

cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony. Prior to trial, he filed a motion

to suppress the evidence on the basis that Investigator Williams lacked reasonable suspicion

or probable cause for the initial traffic stop, that his consent was not sufficiently attenuated

from the initial illegal stop, and that the searches exceeded the scope of his consent.

At the suppression hearing, Investigator Williams testified that on the morning of

October 29, 2010, he was in the center median at mile marker 98 of Interstate 65 when he

noticed the defendant’s vehicle, a white Chrysler 300, pass him traveling northbound in the

slow lane. The vehicle did not appear to have a license plate, so he pulled onto the interstate

and began following it. As he did so, he observed that the defendant’s vehicle had some sort

of paper tag and that the defendant appeared to be traveling in unison with two other vehicles

with permanent Texas license plates, one of which was traveling in front of the defendant,

with one to two vehicles in between, and the other of which was traveling behind the

defendant, again with one to two vehicles in between.

Investigator Williams testified that he pulled beside the defendant and drove next to

him in the fast lane for approximately one-half to three-quarters of a mile, looking over

toward him as he did so. During that time, the defendant kept his hands in a “very rigid

posture” in the 10 o’clock and 2 o’clock positions on the steering wheel and never looked at

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him. He next pulled alongside each of the two vehicles with permanent Texas plates to look

in turn at their drivers before pulling off the interstate to let traffic pass and then pulling back

onto the interstate and behind the defendant’s vehicle.

At approximately 8:30 a.m., he initiated a stop of the defendant’s vehicle based on his

inability to read the tag clearly while traveling at a distance of five to six car lengths behind

the vehicle. Specifically, he stated that, although he was able to see the main numbers at the

center of the tag, he was unable to read the expiration date or the state of issuance, both of

which appeared to be partially obscured by “some type of plastic cover over the tag” and the

screws of the bracket that held the plastic cover in place. He explained the problem with the

plastic cover as follows: “When it’s a real thin plastic the wind from traveling causes it to

move which picks up glare from the sun, headlights, or just the regular lighting . . . and

causes it to be difficult to read a tag.” He said he was able to see that the tag had been issued

by the State of Texas after he had stopped behind the defendant’s vehicle. He then

approached the passenger side of the defendant’s vehicle, told the defendant the reason for

the stop, inquired where he was going and the purpose of his trip, and asked him to step to

the rear of his vehicle so that he could show him the violation.

Investigator Williams testified that his suspicions about the defendant were further

aroused after he had initiated the stop. The defendant told him that he was relocating from

Austin, Texas to Cincinnati, Ohio, but the vehicle was clean with very little “road trash”

inside it; the defendant had only a small overnight bag in the trunk; and there were no other

keys attached to the key ring with the vehicle’s ignition key, which appeared to be on “a card

or a tab . . . that you would more likely see at a car lot.” The defendant was also unable to

give him the address in Ohio to which he was moving; was vague about the kind of work he

did and the job waiting for him in Ohio; gave varying answers to how long he had owned the

vehicle and from whom he had bought it; appeared to look toward the interstate as if to see

if anyone had stopped with him before answering whether he was traveling alone; appeared

nervous, wiping sweat from his palms and swaying from side to side; and attempted to divert

his attention from the stop by engaging him in conversation about hunting and sports. In

addition, the defendant did not have registration papers for the vehicle and provided him with

a title from the State of Virginia on which the name of the owner did not appear.

Investigator Williams testified that he called for backup approximately eight minutes

into the stop due to the above circumstances and behaviors, which he believed based on his

extensive training and experience were “indicators of criminal activity.” He said that when

he gave the defendant a warning ticket approximately thirteen to fourteen minutes into the

stop, the defendant extended his hand as if to shake hands with him but then took a step

backward and answered “no” when he asked him if he was traveling with anything illegal.

He asked the defendant if there were any weapons, explosives, or drugs in the vehicle, and

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the defendant answered no to each question, changing from a joking to a serious demeanor

at the mention of drugs. He then asked the defendant if he had large sums of U.S. currency

in the vehicle, but instead of answering, the defendant “revisited the drug issue,” telling him

that he had some allergy medication in the vehicle.

Investigator Williams testified that he next questioned the defendant about specific

drugs, asking if he had any marijuana, ecstacy, heroin, or cocaine. He said that the defendant

answered no to each of his questions but exhibited a “major body movement,” dropping his

hand to his side and shifting to the left, when he asked him about cocaine. Earlier in his

testimony, Investigator Williams explained that he had been trained as a narcotics officer to

notice “four major body movements” that are indicative of deception.

Investigator Williams testified that he asked the defendant for permission to search

his vehicle, and the defendant replied, “Sure, go ahead.” He then asked the defendant if he

could pat him down for weapons, and the defendant consented. Afterwards, the defendant

remained standing at the front of his patrol vehicle as he began his search by first examining

the passenger compartment before moving to the trunk of the vehicle.

Investigator Williams testified that he was in the process of opening up the

defendant’s overnight bag in the trunk when Investigators Irwin and Cothron arrived on the

scene and continued with the search while he went back to his patrol car to run a check on

the defendant and the vehicle through the “Blue Light Operation Center,” which covered the

Gulf Coast region. During that process, he observed that the defendant’s “stress and anxiety

level went through the roof,” as Investigator Irwin was searching the trunk area of his

vehicle. Approximately six minutes later, Investigator Williams learned from the Blue Light

dispatcher that the defendant, who had earlier told him that he had been arrested for

“domestic,” had three marijuana convictions, a pending marijuana charge, and some

unspecified involvement with organized crime. When he returned to the defendant and asked

him again if he had been arrested for anything other than the domestic charge, the defendant

told him that he had been arrested for marijuana possession but that it was a simple “cite and

release” offense in the State of Texas. The defendant did not tell him about his other arrests

or that he had a pending marijuana charge.

Investigator Williams testified that as the spare tire was removed from the vehicle

during the search, “the rear grommet for the back of the bumper fell forward” and a couple

of the plastic push pins holding it in place fell down into the tire well, which indicated to him

that “the vehicle ha[d] been apart” and was “not put back together very well.” In addition,

he noticed that the corners of the screws that held the bumper cover to the vehicle’s wheel

wells “were worn off to indicate that they were frequently removed,” that some metal “pop

rivets” holding the bumper cover in place had been cut off and black magic marker used to

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color the center of the rivets “to match the rest of it,” and that the bumper appeared, from

underneath the vehicle, to have been freshly painted. Investigator Williams said that he was

able to see the defendant’s reaction as he was lying on the ground inspecting the bumper and

that the defendant’s stress level, once again, appeared “to go through the roof.” He stated

that after popping off more pins with a pry tool, he pulled back the bumper cover and

immediately smelled fresh paint and “bondo.” As he looked closer, he saw “what appeared

to be a welded aftermarket compartment” with two access panels secured by Phillips head

screws.

Investigator Williams testified that Investigator Irwin conducted a narcotics sweep of

the vehicle with his drug dog a little over an hour into the stop, after their discovery of the

after-market welded compartment, and that the dog alerted for the presence of narcotics in

the vehicle. At that point, he had a conversation with the defendant about the “peculiarities”

he had found in the vehicle and asked his permission to take it to the drug task force office

to be examined further. The defendant replied that it was “fine,” but if they “removed any

panels or anything to be sure and put the car back together.”

Investigator Williamstestified that Investigator Cothron drove the defendant’s vehicle

to the Sumner County Sheriff’s Department, approximately 22 to 25 minutes away, while he

followed behind with the defendant as a passenger in his vehicle. At the office, the

defendant’s vehicle was pulled into their garage, where he and his fellow officers removed

the access panelsfrom the bumper and discovered five bags containing a substance that fieldtested positive for cocaine and weighed a total of 5.78 kilograms. During the search, the

defendant was either outside smoking a cigarette or inside the lobby with a window view into

the garage area. He did not explain to the defendant the procedures they would employ in

the search at the Sheriff’s Department or tell him the distance they would have to travel to

reach their garage. The defendant, however, never expressed any reservations about having

given them his consent to search, and he had a view at all times of the garage area where the

search was conducted.

On cross-examination, Investigator Williams conceded that he never said anything to

the defendant about his inability to read the expiration date on his temporary tag but instead

told him that he could hardly read the word “Texas,” although he knew it was “beyond [the

defendant’s] control.” He acknowledged that all the information on the tag was printed

rather than handwritten, that the font was larger than the font used on a typical Tennessee

temporary tag, and that the tag was securely mounted in the proper position and height on the

vehicle. He further acknowledged that he was able to determine the issuing state and the

expiration date of the tag by the time he had exited his patrol car and was approaching the

defendant’s vehicle. He also conceded that the brackets did not cover any of the writing and

that he never instructed the defendant to remove the plastic cover from the tag.

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Investigator Williams denied that he purposely delayed writing the warning ticket in

order to allow his fellow officers and the drug dog time to arrive at the scene. He admitted,

however, that he did not tell the defendant he was free to go as he handed him the ticket. He

also acknowledged that he did not tell the defendant he could refuse his request to search his

vehicle, that other officers would be assisting in the search, that he anticipated it would last

over an hour, or that they would use tools during the search. On redirect examination, he

testified that the defendant never asked him to stop the search.

Investigator Kyle Irwin testified that during his search of the vehicle on the roadside

he, among other things, popped open the side panels of the dashboard to look inside the dash,

popped up the backseat to look underneath, removed the spare tire and carpet from the trunk,

removed the defendant’s overnight bag and hygiene kit, and popped the air filter open and

looked inside it. He said that after Investigator Williams showed him the “heavy tooling”

on the rear bumper cover, both he and Investigator Williams crawled underneath the car,

where he could both see and smell the fresh paint that had been applied. Investigator

Williams then removed the license plate and popped off the bumper cover, which revealed

that “it was not a real bumper” but instead a “manufactured bumper” with “two access

plates.” At that point, Investigator Irwin ran his drug dog around the vehicle, and the dog

“alerted” at the trunk area. Investigator Irwin testified that they used an upholstery pry tool,

a screwdriver, a scope, and possibly a socket set during their search, but nothing on the

vehicle was damaged. He acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not ask the

defendant’s permission to “pry parts of his car apart” during the search.

On May 16, 2011, the trial court entered a lengthy written order overruling the motion

to suppress. In its order, the court provided a detailed review of the time frames and

conversations between the officers and the defendant as recorded by Investigator Williams’

dashboard camera. Among other things, the court found that the initial stop was valid based

on the fact that the defendant’s temporary tag was not legible as required by Tennessee law,

that the officer’s thirteen-minute-and-twenty-seven-second detention of the defendant

following the initialstop was justified by the circumstances, and that neither the initialsearch

at the roadside nor the subsequent search at the drug task force headquarters exceeded the

scope of the consent given by the defendant for those searches. Thereafter, the defendant

pled guilty to the Class B felony of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent

to sell or deliver, reserving the following certified questions of law, which he states as

follows:

I. Whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant Mario Ochoa.

II. Whether the officer exceeded the scope of the stop once he discovered the

posted license tag was valid.

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III. Whether the evidence discovered during Mr. Ochoa’s stop must be

suppressed because his consent was an exploitation of and not sufficiently

attenuated from the prior seizure.

IV. Whether the search of Mr. Ochoa’s vehicle exceeded the scope of the

consent that a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange

between the officer and Mr. Ochoa.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

When this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,

“[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and

resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of

fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The party prevailing at the

suppression hearing is afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all

reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Keith,

978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998). The findings of a trial court in a suppression hearing are

upheld unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See id. However, the

application of the law to the facts found by the trial court is a question of law and is reviewed

de novo. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d

295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

II. Suppression Issues

A. Initial Stop

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in finding that Investigator

Williams had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop of the vehicle based on the alleged

license plate violation. Among other things, he points out that the Tennessee Code does not

specify the distance from which the issuing state must be visible but states only that the

pertinent information must be “legible” and that the tag number must be visible from a

distance of 100 feet during the daylight hours. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-4-102(b); -

103(c). The defendant asserts that because the tag was clearly printed and was not

obstructed, obliterated, or adulterated in any fashion, the trial court erred in finding that the

officer’s inability to read the issuing state while traveling behind the vehicle rendered the tag

“illegible” and provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. The State disagrees, arguing that

the officer was justified in stopping the vehicle based on the fact that the tag was not fully

legible to him prior to the stop. We agree with the State.

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Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section

7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and

seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. “These constitutional

provisions are designed to ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary

invasions of government officials.’” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 (quoting Camara v. Municipal

Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is

presumed unreasonable, and evidence obtained as a result will be suppressed “unless the

prosecution demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was

conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. (citations omitted).

An exception to the warrant requirement exists when an officer has either probable

cause, or reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal

offense has been or is about to be committed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v.

Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tenn. 2000). Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard

and must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449

U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). “An

officer’s subjective intention for stopping a vehicle is irrelevant, as long as independent

grounds exist for the detention.” State v. Orson Wendell Hudson, No.

M2004-00077-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 639129, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2005)

(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). An officer’s observation of a violation

of a traffic law provides an objective basis for stopping a vehicle. See, e.g., State v.

Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Levitt, 73 S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2001).

At the suppression hearing, defense counsel essentially conceded that the initial traffic

stop based on the officer’s inability to read the tag was lawful and instead concentrated his

argument on the officer’s prolonged detention of the defendant after the stop. The trial court,

thus, made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in addressing the validity

of the initial stop:

Although the parties have agreed that the initial stop of the Defendant

was valid, based upon reasonable suspicion and supported by specific and

articulable facts, the Court finds that it is absolutely necessary to set out all the

relevant facts in a fact-specific and fact-intensive analysis demanded by the

issues raised in this case.

The facts developed at the evidentiary hearings are not in dispute and

were fully developed through the testimony of Off. Williams, Off. Irwin, and

from the videotapes of the stop, detention, consent, and search of the

Defendant’s vehicle. . . . Because [Officer Williams] could not read the

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Defendant’s license plate clearly, he stopped the Defendant’s vehicle . . . .

Once Off. Williams left his vehicle and looked at the license after the

Defendant’s car was stopped, he could see that the Defendant was driving a

vehicle with a temporary Texas license, and that the plastic cover made it more

difficult to read. Off. Williams testified that at no time was this tag visible

until he was able to approach and see the tag after the Defendant’s vehicle was

stopped. It is clear from the testimony and the videotape that the Defendant’s

temporary tag was not “legible” as required by Tennessee law.

The evidence does not preponderate against these findings. Tennessee Code

Annotated section 55-4-110(b) provides in pertinent part that:

Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a

horizontal position to the vehicle for which it is issued so to prevent the plate

from swinging and at a height of not less than twelve inches from the ground,

measuring from the bottom of the plate, in a place and position to be clearly

visible and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition

to be clearly legible[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-4-110(b). A violation of the section is a Class C misdemeanor. Id.

§ 55-4-110(c).

Investigator Williams testified that he initiated the stop because he was unable to read

the issuing state or expiration date on the defendant’s temporary tag while traveling at a

distance of five or six car lengths behind the defendant’s vehicle. He then explained that

when the vehicle was in motion the wind caused the clear plastic covering over the temporary

tag to move, which obscured the writing on the tag. Thus, we agree with the State that this

case is distinguishable from United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2002), cited

by the defendant, in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant’s

rear plate frame did not violate the Texas statute on the proper display of a license plate

because the frame did not obscure any of the numbers or letters of the plate and the plate was

not covered by any “blurring matter” or “coating, covering, or protective material disturbing

angular visibility.” Id. at 423-24.

We also agree with the State that United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir.

2006), does not provide support for the defendant’s argument that Investigator Williams

lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because it was clear to him before he initiated

the stop that the vehicle had a temporary license plate in place. In Edgerton, the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the district court that an officer had reasonable

suspicion to stop a defendant’s vehicle “not only because he could not read its temporary

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registration tag while following at a safe distance, but also because he could not determine

whether the document posted in the rear window was, in fact, a temporary tag[.]” Id. at

1047. The court focused in its ruling on the reasonable suspicion aroused in an officer by the

failure of a vehicle “to display some form of visible license plate/registration tag, temporary

or permanent,” id. at 1048, without addressing whether the officer’s inability to read the state

of origin on the tag would have been sufficient, alone, to justify the stop. Notably, however,

the court cited favorably a Kansas Court of Appeals case which upheld a Kansas state

trooper’s stop of a vehicle on the basis that its state of origin was not visible on its out-ofstate license plate. Id. n.4 (citing State v. Hayes, 660 P.2d 1387, 1388-89 (Kan. Ct. App.

1983)).

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly found that Investigator Williams

had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle.

B. Detention Following Initial Stop

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by finding that Investigator

Williams was justified in detaining him for the approximate thirteen and a half minutes that

elapsed following the initial stop of the vehicle until he received the warning ticket. The

defendant argues that the purpose of the stop ended once Investigator Williams pulled up

behind his vehicle and was able immediately to ascertain the state of issuance on his

temporary plate and that the ensuing detention, questioning, and investigation were not

reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, lasted much longer than necessary, and went

far beyond the least intrusive means available to the officer. The State responds by arguing

that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the officer’s actions were reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. We, once again, agree with the

State.

An officer’s actions following the stop of a vehicle based on probable cause or

reasonable suspicion must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which

justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The detention “must be

temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida

v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see also State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 767-68 (Tenn.

2000). The officershould also employ the least intrusive meansreasonably available in order

to dispel the suspicion that gave rise to the stop. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. “The proper

inquiry is whether, during the detention, the officer diligently pursued a means of

investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel suspicion quickly. A reasonable traffic stop

can become unreasonable if the time, manner orscope of the investigation exceeds the proper

parameters.” State v. Brown, 294 S.W.3d 553, 562 (Tenn. 2009) (citations and internal

quotations omitted).

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“‘[R]equests for driver’s licenses and vehicle registration documents, inquiries

concerning travel plans and vehicle ownership, computer checks, and the issuance of

citations are investigative methods or activities consistent with the lawfulscope of any traffic

stop.’” State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 840 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v.

Gonzalo Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 242358, at *22 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Feb. 20, 2002), reversed on other grounds by State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn.

2003)). A driver who is stopped for a traffic violation “should expect ‘to spend a short

period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and

registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be

allowed to continue on his way.’” State v. Donaldson, ___S.W.3d___, 2012 WL 3667376,

at *6 (Tenn. Aug. 24, 2012) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)).

“[W]here a de minimis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific

inquiry.” Id. (citation omitted).

The trial court found that the various suspicious circumstances that developed both

before and after the stop, and which the court reviewed in detail in its order, justified the

detention of the defendant from the time of the initial stop until the time the warning ticket

was issued. The record does not preponderate against these findings and conclusions.

Investigator Williams provided a long list of suspicious circumstances that, based on his

training and experience, were indicators of criminal activity. These ranged from the

defendant’s appearing to travel in unison with two other vehicles and his rigid posture and

demeanor while driving to his inability to provide the registration on the car and the fact that

he produced a title, which was not in his name, from a state other than the one in which the

vehicle was licensed and from which he claimed to be moving. In addition, he gave vague

and inconsistent accounts about his ownership of the vehicle and his travel plans and

appeared nervous when answering the officer’s questions.

We agree with the trial court that the number and variety of suspicious circumstances,

which developed both before and after the stop, distinguish this case from State v. Garcia,

123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003), in which our supreme court concluded that an officer’s initial

stop and continued detention of a defendant were not based on reasonable suspicion and that

the defendant’s subsequent consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the

unlawful stop and seizure. Id. at 342.

The officer in Garcia testified that she stopped the defendant because he was weaving

in his lane, and she believed he might be intoxicated or falling asleep at the wheel. Id. at

338, 341. She said that she was satisfied two minutes into the stop that the defendant was

not intoxicated, but the defendant subsequently gave inconsistent answers to who owned the

vehicle and where he was going. Id. at 338. However, the vehicle was not stolen and the

registration matched the vehicle. Id. After radioing for a drug dog and giving the defendant

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a warning ticket, the officer told the defendant that the stop was complete but then asked him

if he had any illegal weapons or drugs in the car. Id. at 339. According to her testimony, the

defendant’s demeanor changed at the mention of drugs, with his Adam’s apple “bobbing up

and down,” an indicator of deception, as he answered no. Id. The defendant then consented

to a search of his vehicle, which uncovered 40.1 pounds of methamphetamine. Id. at 340.

After reviewing the videotape of the stop, our supreme court found no evidence of any

weaving or sharp or jerking movements by the defendant. Id. at 344-45. The court,

therefore, concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. Id. The court

further concluded, based in part on the officer’s testimony that she knew two minutes into

the stop that the defendant was not intoxicated, that the defendant’s consent to search was

gained in exploitation of his unlawful detention. Id. at 347-48.

In this case, by contrast, we have concluded that the initial stop was lawful based on

Investigator Williams’ inability to read the issuing state on the defendant’s temporary license

plate. Furthermore, more suspicious circumstances arose after the stop than in Garcia. These

included the fact that the defendant’s luggage and the condition of the vehicle did not

substantiate his claim that he was making a cross-country move, his inability to produce the

registration papers on the vehicle, his having only the ignition key to the vehicle on a tab or

card like one commonly used at a car lot, his production of a title for the vehicle that was

from a different state than the one from which he claimed to be moving and on which the

name of the owner did not appear, his lying to the officer about his criminal record, and his

inconsistent answers to the officer’s questions about his travel plans.

C. Defendant’s Consent as Exploitation of the Alleged Illegal Stop

The defendant next contends that the evidence should be suppressed because his

consent to search the vehicle was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegalstop and seizure.

However, our determination that the initial stop and seizure were valid renders this issue

without merit.

D. Scope of Defendant’s Consent to Search Vehicle

Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the searches

of the vehicle did not exceed the scope of what a reasonable person in his situation would

have understood by the exchange between himself and Investigator Williams. In support, he

cites the extended duration of the roadside search, the fact that multiple officers and a police

dog were involved, and the officers’ use of tools “to deconstruct the vehicle in order to

conduct the search.” He also points out that he was never informed of the distance he would

have to travel to reach the police garage, the scope of the search that would occur there, or

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that he had the right to revoke his consent to search.

In its thorough order, the trial court first reviewed the law regarding the scope of a

consent to search before making the following findings of fact and conclusions of law with

respect to this issue:

The Court finds that the search of the Defendant’s vehicle after his first

consent at the side of the interstate was very thorough and detailed throughout

the entire vehicle in areas that would, or could, specifically conceal “anything

illegal,” “weapons,” “explosives,” “large sums of money,” or “drugs”

including “marijuana,” “cocaine,” “ecstasy,” and “heroin.” The scope of the

consent given first by the Defendant was not exceeded by the thorough search

of the vehicle beside the interstate. Further, before the scope was expanded to

cover the after market compartment that was located during the search, the

Defendant gave consent for an expanded search as long as his vehicle was “put

back together.”

. . . .

Therefore, this Court specifically finds that the duration and scope of

the search by the side of the interstate after Defendant’s first consent was

given was not unreasonable, and that after finding a post market compartment

the scope of the consent search was expanded by the second consent given by

the Defendant.

The record supports the findings and conclusions of the trial court. The standard for

measuring the scope of a defendant’s consent is “‘that of objective reasonableness–what

would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer

and the suspect.’” State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866, 872 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Florida v.

Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). An officer’s expression of the object of the search is

relevant to the understanding of the typical reasonable person, as are any expressed or

implied limitations by the person giving consent as to the time, duration, area, or intensity

of the search. Id. at 871-72.

Here, the defendant answered “sure” to Investigator Williams’ request, “Is it okay if

I search your vehicle?” His consent to the search occurred almost immediately after he had

answered “no” to questions of whether he had any drugs, weapons, large sums of currency,

or anything illegal in the vehicle. He never revoked his consent or expressed any

reservations about the extent or duration of the roadside search, and he agreed to allow the

officers to take the vehicle to their headquarters to continue the search so long as they put the

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vehicle back together. At one point during the drive to the garage, he made a joking

comment about Investigator Williams taking him on a tour of the rural countryside and

mentioned that he needed to get back on the road. That was the extent of his protest,

however, and he never said anything to the officer about wanting to revoke his consent to

search. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the

searches did not exceed the scope of the defendant’s consents to search.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we conclude that the trial court

properly overruled the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence uncovered during the stop

and search of his vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

_________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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