alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 3, 2014

No. 04-14-00445-CV

ESTATE OF DELFINA E. ALEXANDER, Deceased

From the County Court at Law No. 2, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013-PBA-000133-L2

Honorable Jesus Garza, Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK 

OF JURISDICTION. Costs are assessed against the party that incurred them.

It is so ORDERED on September 3, 2014.

_____________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 3rd day of September, 2014.

_____________________________

Keith E. Hottle, Clerk
### §3796b. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796b was editorially reclassified as section 10284 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 3796b, Pub. L. 90–351, title I, §1203, as added Pub. L. 96–157, §2, Dec. 27, 1979, 93 Stat. 1220; amended Pub. L. 98–411, title II, §204(a)(3), Aug. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 1561; Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §609Z, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2107, contained provisions similar to those in section 10284 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement, prior to the general amendment of part L of title I of Pub. L. 90–351 by section 609F of Pub. L. 98–473.

Another prior section 3796b, Pub. L. 90–351, title I, §703, as added Pub. L. 94–430, §2, Sept. 29, 1976, 90 Stat. 1347, contained provisions similar to those in section 10284 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement, prior to the general amendment of title I of Pub. L. 90–351 by Pub. L. 96–157.
#### Everybody’s Publishing Company, Inc., Appellant, v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., Respondent.

Order unanimously affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. Memorandum: The claim of *res judicata*is not applicable. Therefore the defenses were not barred. Under the circumstances of this ease, the question of whether the contract is ambiguous so that evidence should be taken as to its meaning on the trial should not be decided on a motion to strike. Bastow, J., concurs in result. (Appeal from order of Erie Special Term denying motion to strike out certain paragraphs of the amended answer.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, Halpern and McClusky, JJ.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-51106

consolidated with

No. 21-51132

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Victor Manuel Almejo-Gradilla, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 4:21-CR-741-1

USDC No. 4:21-CR-538-1

Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Victor Manuel Almejo-Gradilla pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the district court sentenced him to twentyfour months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Almejo-

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 8, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-51106 Document: 00516423513 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/08/2022
No. 21-51106

c/w No. 21-51132

2

Gradilla’s sole challenge on appeal argues the district court plainly erred by 

imposing a condition of supervised release that impermissibly delegates 

judicial authority.1 Critically, however, the United States has filed an 

unopposed motion for summary affirmance that suggests this argument is 

foreclosed by United States v. Mejia-Banegas, 32 F.4th 450 (5th Cir. 2022).

The United States is correct. Mejia-Banegas rejected the exact 

argument urged by Almejo-Gradilla. Id. at 451–52. In no uncertain terms, we 

stated that “[t]he risk-notification condition does not impermissibly delegate 

the court’sjudicial authority to the probation officer.” Id. at 452. Our holding 

in Mejia-Banegas thus carries equal force here: “the district court did not err, 

much less plainly so, by imposing the risk-notification condition.” Id.

Because summary disposition is appropriate, see Groendyke Transp., 

Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), the United States’ motion 

for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the United States’ alternative 

motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the district 

court’s judgments2 are AFFIRMED.

1 Specifically, the challenged condition (also known as “Standard Condition 12”) 

allows the probation officer to determine whether Almejo-Gradilla poses a risk to another 

person and, if so, require notification to that person. See generally U.S. Sent’g 

Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c)(12).

2 The consolidated appeal is from an order revoking another term of supervised 

release and imposing concurrent terms of imprisonment. But Almejo-Gradilla has not 

briefed (and therefore abandoned) any challenge to this judgment. See, e.g., Yohey v. Collins, 

985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., Clarkson v. Vannoy, No. 16-31098, 2017 

WL 6947729, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2017). No discussion of this issue is therefore merited.

Case: 21-51106 Document: 00516423513 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/08/2022
#### § 1508.600 How do suspension and debarment actions start?

When we receive information from any source concerning a cause for suspension or debarment, we will promptly report and investigate it. We refer the question of whether to suspend or debar you to our suspending or debarring official for consideration, if appropriate.
#### § 228.31 Authority to approve waivers.

The authority to approve waivers of established policies under this regulation is delegated within USAID. Recipients or contractors shall request any necessary waivers through the USAID agreement or contracting officer.
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AUGUSTINE FALLAY,

Plaintiff.

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 08-cv-02261-CRB (JCS)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

A continued judgment debtor examination of Augustine Fallay was set for September 30, 

2016, at 9:00 AM. Mr. Fallay was ordered to by the Court on August 26, 2016, to produce and 

bring the requested documents to the September 30 judgment debtor examination. Mr. Fallay 

failed to produce the requested documents. See Order ECF Dkt 230. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Augustine Fallay shall appear on November 4, 2016, at 

9:30 AM, in Courtroom G, 15th Floor, San Francisco, California, and then and there show cause 

why he should not be sanctioned by paying attorneys' fees and costs for failure to comply with the 

judgment debtor examination. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 5, 2016

______________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-02261-CRB Document 239 Filed 10/05/16 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AUGUSTINE FALLAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 08-cv-02261-CRB (JCS)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 5, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Augustine Fallay

8605 Thermal Street

Oakland, CA 94605 

Dated: October 5, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Karen Hom, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JOSEPH C. SPERO

Case 3:08-cv-02261-CRB Document 239 Filed 10/05/16 Page 2 of 2
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tony Vega, Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 246]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Joseph Cerbone, J.), rendered December 3, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted murder in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 20 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court’s *Sandoval*ruling, which permitted inquiry into defendant’s felony drug conviction but precluded inquiry into a violation and use of aliases, balanced the appropriate factors and was a proper exercise of discretion *(People v Walker,*83 NY2d 455, 459). The record fails to support defendant’s claim that the court based its ruling on irrelevant considerations.

Since defendant’s cross-examination of the police officer created the misleading impression that the police prompted the complainant’s identification of defendant by supplying the complainant with defendant’s name, defendant thereby opened the door to the challenged testimony concerning a photographic identification *(see, People v Givens,*271 AD2d 372; *People v Cruz,*249 AD2d 136, *lv denied*92 NY2d 924).

The record before us demonstrates that defendant received meaningful representation *(see, People v Benevento,*91 NY2d *19708, 713-714). Defense counsel’s withdrawal of his motion to suppress identification testimony was proper since the complainant was sufficiently familiar with defendant so as to render the photographic identification confirmatory, and there was no other pretrial identification *(see, People v Rodriguez,*79 NY2d 445). Counsel’s cross-examination of the complainant at trial, viewed as a whole, was effective.

Defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would reject them. Concur — Williams, J. P., Mazzarelli, Ellerin, Wallach and Saxe, JJ.
### §3057g. Findings

The Congress finds the older Native Hawaiians—

(1) have a life expectancy 10 years less than any other ethnic group in the State of Hawaii;

(2) rank lowest on 9 of 11 standard health indicies 1 for all ethnic groups in Hawaii;

(3) are often unaware of social services and do not know how to go about seeking such assistance; and

(4) live in poverty at a rate of 34 percent.

(Pub. L. 89–73, title VI, §621, as added Pub. L. 100–175, title I, §171, Nov. 29, 1987, 101 Stat. 961.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 3057g, Pub. L. 89–73, title VI, §608, as added Pub. L. 95–478, title I, §106, Oct. 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 1551; amended Pub. L. 97–115, §13(d), Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1608; Pub. L. 98–459, title VI, §603, Oct. 9, 1984, 98 Stat. 1788, authorized appropriations for grants for Indian tribes, prior to the general amendment of this subchapter by Pub. L. 100–175. See section 3057n of this title.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1987, except not applicable with respect to any area plan submitted under section 3026(a) of this title or any State plan submitted under section 3027(a) of this title and approved for any fiscal year beginning before Nov. 29, 1987, see section 701(a), (b) of Pub. L. 100–175, set out as an Effective Date of 1987 Amendment note under section 3001 of this title.

1 So in original. Probably should be "indices".
#### § 238.9 No acceleration of Eligible Notes.

Eligible Notes shall not be subject to acceleration, in whole or in part, by USAID, the Noteholder or any other party. USAID shall not have the right to pay any amounts in respect of the Eligible Notes other than in accordance with the original payment terms of such Eligible Notes.
§ 224.35 The record. ( a ) The hearing will be recorded and transcribed. Transcripts may be obtained following the hearing from ALJ at a cost not to exceed the actual cost of duplication.
( b ) The transcript of testimony, exhibits and other evidence admitted at the hearing, all papers and requests filed in the proceeding constitute the record for the decision by the ALJ and the A.I.D. Administrator.
( c ) The record of the hearing may be inspected and copied (upon payment of a reasonable fee) by anyone, unless otherwise ordered by the ALJ pursuant to § 224.24.
#### § 237.12 Prosecution of claims.

After payment by USAID to an Applicant hereunder, USAID shall have exclusive power to prosecute all claims related to rights to receive payments under the Eligible Notes to which it is thereby subrogated. If a Noteholder continues to have an interest in the outstanding Eligible Notes, such a Noteholder and USAID shall consult with each other with respect to their respective interests in such Eligible Notes and the manner of and responsibility for prosecuting claims.
Exhibit 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


         In  connection  with the  accompanying  Quarterly  Report  of  Internet
Infinity, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended December 31,
2005 (the  "Report"),  I,  George P.  Morris,  Chief  Financial  Officer  of the
Company, hereby certify that to my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ss.78o(d)); and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  February 14, 2006
                                                      /s/ George P. Morris
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     George P. Morris
                                                     Chief Financial Officer


         The above  certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.  ss.1350)  and is not being filed as
part of the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John J. Walsh, Sr., Appellant.

The judgment is modified accordingly by striking therefrom the provision for sentence, the fine remitted, and the matter remitted to the Court of Special Session for resentenee upon a conviction of the charge set forth in the second count. In view of the stipulation on the trial and the concession in the Attorney-General’s brief that the physicians’ prescriptions in evidence were genuine orders for the Parapack treatment, and in view of the other conceded facts guilt of the charge set forth in the first count was not established" beyond a reasonable doubt. Sentence may be imposed solely on the conviction of the charge set forth in the second count. Nolan, P. J., Johnston, Adel, Sneed and MaeCrate, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN ALLEN RAINWATER,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

JOHN McGINNESS, Sheriff,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 12-16992

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00030-GGH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Gregory G. Hollows, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted February 18, 2014*** 

Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

John Allen Rainwater appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations during

FILED

MAR 03 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

 *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
his detention in the Sacramento County Jail pursuant to California’s Sexually

Violent Predator Act (“SVP Act”). We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d

918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment because, even

assuming that a constitutional deprivation occurred, Rainwater failed to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any such constitutional deprivation

resulted from an official county custom or policy, whether McGinness was

personally involved in any constitutional violation, or whether there was a causal

connection between McGinness’s conduct and any such violation. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (requirements for municipal

liability); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for

supervisory liability); see also Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)

(party opposing summary judgment must present “significant probative evidence

tending to support its claim that material, triable issues of fact remain” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject Rainwater’s contention that his detention in a jail pursuant to the

SVP Act is unconstitutional. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (declining to hold that

involuntary civil commitment detainees cannot be housed in jail).

2 12-16992
We also reject Rainwater’s contention that he raised a genuine dispute of

material fact based on the “totality of conditions” of his confinement. Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (courts generally may not find constitutional

violations based on the totality of conditions of confinement). 

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 

AFFIRMED.

3 12-16992
#### Melanie Miller et al., Respondents, v City of New York, Defendant, and New York City Transit Authority, Appellant.

[717 NYS2d 198]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant New York City Transit Authority appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bruno, J.), dated November 12, 1999, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the defendant New York City Transit Authority, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

The injured plaintiff, Melanie Miller, alleged that she was stabbed in the right hand by a rival high school student while riding a subway train in Brooklyn. As a result of this incident, she and her mother commenced an action against, among others, the New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the TA).

Generally, municipalities and their agencies are not subject to tort liability for their failure to furnish police protection to individual citizens *(see, Cuffy v City of New York,*69 NY2d 255, 260). Indeed, it is well settled that the TA “owes no duty to protect a person on its premises from assault by a third person, absent facts establishing a special relationship between the *364authority and the person assaulted” *(Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,*55 NY2d 175, 178; *accord, Rios v New York City Tr. Auth.,*251 AD2d 484).

In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, the TA submitted evidence that the motorman, upon learning of the altercation, promptly notified the police, who responded to the scene. Thus, the TA made a prima facie showing that it was not negligent in the happening of the incident, and it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of fact *(see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320). While a municipality may be held liable where its employees have failed to observe the municipality’s own regulations or common standards of behavior *(see, Crosland v New York City Tr. Auth.,*68 NY2d 165), the plaintiffs failed to submit any proof in evidentiary form that the TA violated its own regulations or common standards of behavior. The affirmation of the plaintiffs’ attorney submitted in opposition to the motion was devoid of any evidentiary value *(see, Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557). Moreover, the hearing testimony of the injured plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the standards of behavior of the TA.

Finally, we reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the TA was not entitled to summary judgment until after the plaintiffs have had an opportunity to conduct discovery. Indeed, “[t]he mere hope that evidence to support their claim would be uncovered is insufficient to deny the [defendant’s motion] for summary judgment” *(Flanagan v City of New York,*243 AD2d 677, 678). Ritter, J. P., Thompson, Friedmann, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
### §16990. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 16990 was editorially reclassified as section 20990 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
### §284e. Research on osteoporosis, Paget's disease, and related bone disorders

#### (a) Establishment

The Directors of the National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases, the National Institute on Aging, the National Institute of Dental Research, and the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, shall expand and intensify the programs of such Institutes with respect to research and related activities concerning osteoporosis, Paget's disease, and related bone disorders.

#### (b) Coordination

The Directors referred to in subsection (a) shall jointly coordinate the programs referred to in such subsection and consult with the Arthritis and Musculoskeletal Diseases Interagency Coordinating Committee and the Interagency Task Force on Aging Research.

#### (c) Information clearinghouse

#### (1) In general

In order to assist in carrying out the purpose described in subsection (a), the Director of NIH shall provide for the establishment of an information clearinghouse on osteoporosis and related bone disorders to facilitate and enhance knowledge and understanding on the part of health professionals, patients, and the public through the effective dissemination of information.

#### (2) Establishment through grant or contract

For the purpose of carrying out paragraph (1), the Director of NIH shall enter into a grant, cooperative agreement, or contract with a nonprofit private entity involved in activities regarding the prevention and control of osteoporosis and related bone disorders.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title IV, §409A, as added Pub. L. 103–43, title III, §302, June 10, 1993, 107 Stat. 151; amended Pub. L. 105–340, title I, §102, Oct. 31, 1998, 112 Stat. 3192; Pub. L. 109–482, title I, §103(b)(7), Jan. 15, 2007, 120 Stat. 3687.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2007—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–482 struck out heading and text of subsec. (d). Text read as follows: "For the purpose of carrying out this section, there are authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for fiscal year 1994, and such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 1995 through 2003."

1998—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 105–340 substituted "through 2003" for "and 1996".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2007 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 109–482 applicable only with respect to amounts appropriated for fiscal year 2007 or subsequent fiscal years, see section 109 of Pub. L. 109–482, set out as a note under section 281 of this title.