106th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the

2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

A Report Prepared by the Staff of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

WASHINGTON:2000

REPORT ON THE RUSSIAN

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

MARCH 26, 2000
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

234 Ford House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515-6460

(202) 225-1901

csce@mail.house.gov

http://www.house.gov/csce/

HOUSE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia

MATT SALMON, Arizona

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York

MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York

SENATE

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado, Co-Chairman

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HAROLD HONGJU KOH, Department of State

EDWARD L. WARNER III, Department of Defense

PATRICK A. MULLOY, Department of Commerce

COMMISSION STAFF

DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Chief of Staff

RONALD J. MCNAMARA, Deputy Chief of Staff

BEN ANDERSON, Communications Director

OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor

JOHN F. FINERTY, Staff Advisor

CHADWICK R. GORE, Staff Advisor

ROBERT HAND, Staff Advisor

JANICE HELWIG, Staff Advisor

MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel

KAREN S. LORD, Counsel for Freedom of Religion

MICHELE MADASZ, Office Administrator

MICHAEL OCHS, Staff Advisor

ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law

MAUREEN WALSH, General Counsel

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION (OSCE)

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki process, traces

its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33

European countries, the United States and Canada. Since then, its membership has expanded to 55,

reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. (The Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, has been suspended since 1992, leaving the number of countries

fully participating at 54.) As of January 1, 1995, the formal name of the Helsinki process was changed to

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE is engaged in standard setting in fields including military security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. In addition, it undertakes a variety

of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within and among

the participating States.

The OSCE has its main office in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various locations and

periodic consultations among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government are held.

ABOUT THE COMMISSION (CSCE)

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance with

the agreements of the OSCE.

The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. House of Representatives, nine members

from the U.S. Senate, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

The positions of Chair and Co-Chair are shared by the House and Senate and rotate every two years,

when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the Commissioners in their work.

To fulfill its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates information on Helsinki-related

topics both to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports reflecting the

views of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing information about the activities of the Helsinki

process and events in OSCE participating States.

At the same time, the Commission contributes its views to the general formulation of U.S. policy

on the OSCE and takes part in its execution, including through Member and staff participation on U.S.

Delegations to OSCE meetings as well as on certain OSCE bodies. Members of the Commission have

regular contact with parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from OSCE participating States.
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CONTENTS

SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND LAW ............................................................................. 3

ELECTION CAMPAIGN .............................................................................................................. 3

MEDIA COVERAGE .................................................................................................................... 4

ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS............................................................................................ 5

ELECTION RESULTS .................................................................................................................. 5

CHARGES OF IRREGULARITIES .............................................................................................. 6

POST ELECTION TRENDS ......................................................................................................... 6

VISIT TO USAID MOSCOW ....................................................................................................... 8
1

THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

MARCH 26, 2000

SUMMARY

 On March 26, 2000, Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin, running with

the backing of the Unity party, was elected by a sizable margin to a full 4-year term. As reported

by the Central Election Commission, Putin received almost 53 percent, with 39,740,434 votes out

of a field of 11 candidates and the option of voting against all candidates. His nearest competitor,

Communist Party chairman Gennady Zyuganov, tallied a little under 30 percent with almost 22

million votes. The rest of the field showed single-digit percentages. More than 75 million people

took part in the election, for a 68.74 percent turnout. A comparatively small number of voters,

about 1.5 million, chose the none of the above option. Details of the election results are listed

below.

 The presidential election was occasioned by the abrupt resignation of President Boris Yeltsin on

New Years Day, 2000, and his appointment of Prime Minister Putin as Acting President. Yeltsin

had been elected to a second term in 1996.

 Throughout the election campaign, Putin had been leading by significant margins in the public

opinion surveys. Some commentators had suggested that the March 26 event might better be

called a coronation rather than an election.

 As Acting President, Putin had promoted a no-compromise policy in pressing the war against

Chechnya, and created an image of returning Russia to stability after the economic and social

uncertainties of the Yeltsin presidency. Putin ran an almost above it all campaign, refusing to issue

a platform or make significant election-oriented policy statements. Watching Putin on television

and listening to his speeches, and especially reading the ones that are published, is a waste of

time, wrote Tatyana Tolstaya (New York Times Review of Books, May 25, 2000), the texts are

written by speechwriters; the video clips are meticulously put together by image-makers; and

everything is vetted by the presidential administration.

 Putin relied on the government-controlled media to promote his candidacy, and at the same time

cast aspersions on his competition.

 In its March 27, 2000 press release, the elections were characterized by the International Election

Observation Mission (a joint effort of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) Office of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Council of Europe) as [marking] further progress for the consolidation of democratic

elections in the Russian Federation. However, a media observer writing for The Moscow Times

called this verdict a most outrageous piece of propaganda, in view of the lack of media diversity

in several regions of Russia.

 Both the Communist Party and Yabloko leadership claimed to have evidence of blatant violations

in several regions. The final report of the OSCE/ODIHR observer mission also found that Notwithstanding the CEC effort to enforce the law vigorously, candidates, campaign organizations and

supporters circumvented the law in some cases.
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 The election was observed by approximately 1000 international observers (Moscow Times, March

27, 2000), with about 400 from the OSCE, including staff of the Commission on Security and

Cooperation in Europe under the aegis of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE. Under the

direction of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE carried

out an extensive observation program, with both long-term and short-term observers. Commission staff observed the election in the cities of Yaroslavl and Veliky Rostov, and towns along the

Moscow-Yaroslavl Highway.

 Commission observers did not note significant violations of generally accepted international norms

on election day, except for the absence of private voting booths at one polling place. There were

some examples of family voting.

BACKGROUND

Russias first freely-elected President, Boris Yeltsin, was elected in 1991 to a 5-year term and again

in 1996. As described in the U.S. State Departments Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:

Politically, economically, and socially, Russia continues to be a state in transition. While

constitutional structures are well-defined and democratic in conception, democratization continues to be slow. The 1993 Constitution establishes a tripartite government with checks and

balances. The executive branch consists of an elected president and a government headed by a

prime minister. There is a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly), consisting of the State

Duma and the Federation Council, and a judicial branch. Both the President and the legislature

were selected in competitive elections judged to be largely free and fair, with a broad range of

political parties and movements contesting offices. The judiciary, still the weakest of the three

branches, showed signs of limited independence.

For all the real and apparent progress since the fall of communism, Russia continues to be plagued by

corruption, a poor economy, a bloated and sclerotic bureaucracy, a ruling class with more than its share of

rapacity and irresponsibility (many of whom rose through the ranks of the Communist Party and Komsomol),

technological backwardness, and lack of a solid middle class. Statistics indicate that the Russia Federation

is losing about 700,000 people per year in terms of annual births and deaths (for more details on Russias

social and demographic challenges, see Z. Brzezinski, Living With Russia, The National Interest, No.

61, Fall 2000).

In 1991, Boris Yeltsin had been a dynamic leader of a renascent Russian state emerging from the shadow of the Soviet Union. Eight years later, tired and apparently in ill health, increasingly out of touch with

the country he ruled, he stepped down from the presidency at the end of December 1999. Yeltsin turned

over the reins of power to the last of his many Prime Ministers, Vladimir Putin, who had served in that capacity only since August 1999. With corruption investigations reaching the Kremlin itself, Yeltsin was

granted broad immunity from possible criminal charges under an agreement brokered with the Duma by

Putin.

Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister, Putin had been head of President Yeltsins national security council. However, probably the most salient feature of his biography was his 16-year career as an

agent of the KGB and his tenure (19981999) as head of the KGBs successor, the Federal Security

Service.
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Under the Russian Constitution, elections for President are required within 6 months after a President

leaves office. As stipulated by the Russian Federation Constitution, the Federation Council (upper house

of parliament) scheduled the election for March 26, 2000.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND LAW

A revision of the election law was signed by President Yeltsin prior to his leaving office. In order to be

nominated for the Office of President, a candidate had to submit petitions containing at least 500,000

signatures. Reflecting increased publicity about public officials and their sources of income, a new provision required that all candidatesas well as their spouses and childrenreveal the amount and sources of

all income for the previous 2 years.

As was the practice in the past, the administration of the elections was carried out by a series of

election commissions, headed by a Central Election Commission in Moscow. The role of the Central

Election Committee is essentially to supervise elections at the national level, i.e., to insure (or try to insure)

that elections laws and regulations are upheld, and that candidates for office are placed on the ballot, or

denied same, in accordance with the law. Subordinate to the CEC are Subject Election Commissions in

each of the 89 Subjects of the Russian Federation, and Territorial Commissions within the Subjects. The

lowest level commissions in the hierarchy are the Precinct Election Commissions at the approximately

94,000-plus polling stations throughout the Federation.

According to the report of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights:

Members of Subject Commissions are appointed by legislative and executive bodies [of

State power] of the Subject based on suggestions from public organizations and elected bodies

of government. One third of the members are chosen from proposals of political parties having

factions in the State Duma. Indeed, there appeared to be a cross-section of parties and blocs

represented on many of the commissions. Likewise, Territorial Commissions are appointed by

the elective bodies of local self government, on the basis of proposals from civic associations.

In addition, candidates could request the appointment of a non-voting member of the Territorial or

Precinct Commissions.

Domestic observers were accredited by candidates or local NGOs and international observers by

the Central Election Commission.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The Unity Partys strong second place showing in the December 1999 parliamentary elections, the

image of strength and stability projected by Vladimir Putin in comparison with his predecessor, and the

assumption that the ruling apparatus did not want any unpleasant legal consequences in connection with

their tenure in the Yeltsin administration, made Putin the heavy favorite. Public opinion polls put Putin

comfortably aheadat one point by 40 percentage pointsof his nearest competitor, Communist Party

leader, Gennady Zyuganov. The only question was whether the election would go to a second round.

Putins backers were obviously worried about the publicity accorded a small group of activists who had

been campaigning for against all candidates, a legitimate option similar to none of the above in some
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U.S. states. A few days before the election, Putin himself made a personal televised plea to voters to turn

out to the polls. According to Michael McFaul in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations on April 12, 2000, Putins advisors claimed that in mid-January 55 million voters were prepared

to vote for Putin. However, this dropped off to 40 million by election day. If the vote had occurred in

June, testified McFaul, Putin most certainly would have faced a runoff.

Putin himself refused to engage in the typical down-and-dirty of campaigning. He did not debate with

opponents or promote himself through campaign advertising, to say nothing of rousing the crowd at campaign rallies in the manner of his predecessor. Instead, he relied on national TV networks that were either

government-controlled (RTR) or government-sympathetic (ORT) to give him favorable coverage in his

day-to-day conduct of state affairs. Putin created the image of national leader busy at work, traveling

about the country and conferring with regional leadership, seeing that pensions were paid, and pursuing a

war in Chechnya that, despite occasional setbacks, enjoyed the support of a significant majority of the

population.

Putins above it all/steady hand at the switch approach to the campaign appeared to work. Final opinion surveys by two major Russian polling organizations showed him leading his nearest rival, Communist

Party chief Gennady Zyuganov, by around 55 percent to 25 percent (Moscow Tribune, March 24, 2000).

The attacks of Putins opponents, either from the right or left, did not seem to resonate with the

voters. Zyuganov criticized the poor state of Russias economy and charged that without a change in

power, there would be in Russia a military-political dictatorship this summer. However, his campaign

lacked the vigor of his previous bouts against President Yeltsin. Grigory Yavlinsky continued to criticize the

conduct of the war in Chechnya and his concern for the diminution of human rights in Russia. One of his TV

ads on the latter subject was banned from state TV channel for alleged disrespect for state authorities.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, whom the Central Election Commission had tried to keep off the ballot for violations

of the financial reporting rules, vowed to exterminate all separatists (rivers of blood will flow). Film

director and State Duma member Stanislav Govorukhin concentratedas he has in the paston lawlessness in Russia, and at one point ran a campaign video featuring ironic jokes about the countrys current state.

Another candidate who had gained prominence outside the political arena was businessman Umar

Dzhabrailov. According to a Time magazine Special Report of September 8, 1997, Umars name has

been publicly linked to the contract-style killing of his American former partner at the Radisson, Paul Tatum.

After the November 1996 murder, Umar was denied a U.S. visa. The prohibition is still in force and Tatums

slaying is unsolved. Umar has no criminal record, and blames his visa problems on misinformation.

A few days before the election, political consultant and former government official Yevgeny Sevastyanov

dropped out of the race and announced his support for Yavlinsky. Meanwhile, Putin himself had garnered

the support of the former party of power, the Fatherland coalition, as well as that of Anatoly Chubais

and Sergei Kirienko, prominent leaders of the reform-oriented Union of Right Forces (SPS). However,

some SPS activists endorsed Samara governor Konstantin Titov.

MEDIA COVERAGE

 Commission staff observers did not have an opportunity to do an extensive analysis of the media

coverage of the campaign. However, the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR observer mission stated that:
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While the media in the Russian Federation remain pluralistic and diverse, independent

media have come under increasing pressure. Moreover, as during the State Duma election,

important segments of the media, both State-controlled and private, failed to provide impartial

information about the election campaign and candidates.

During the last week of the campaign, Russian Public Television produced some particularly biased

coverage of Grigory Yavlinsky, showing him allegedly receiving the endorsement of homosexuals and being

supported by Jews in yarmulkes. However, according to a Radio Liberty analysis it is far from clear that

television coverage was decisive in Yavlinskys poor showing (RL, Russian Election Report, Laura

Belin, Poor Showing Reveals Yavlinskys Limited Potential).

ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS

Starting in Yaroslavl, Commission staff observed the election in that city and continued south along

Moscow-Yaroslavl Highway, stopping in Veliky Rostov and communities along the way. The precinct level

of vote tabulation was observed in the village of Glebovskoye, Yaroslavl Oblast.

The observer team was stopped briefly by police in Veliky Rostov for a document check. (A day

earlier, on a trip to Kostroma from Yaroslavl, the observer team was stopped for about 45 minutes at the

police post entering the Kostroma Oblast. Supposedly, there was a significant problem with grand theft in

the area.)

As has been increasingly the case in election coverage in the former Soviet Union, election day itself

appeared to proceed normally in the polling stations under observation. In all of the Yaroslavl polling stations, local observers either from political parties, the local legislature, or social organizations were present. Contrary to the stereotype, several of the Communist Party observers were young people. In most of the polling

places, there was a sufficient number of voting booths, although some voters followed the tradition of voting outside the booths, at times discussing their vote with others. Family voting was occasionally observed.

The vote tabulation in Glebovskoye was long and complicated, due to the fact that the polling place

served as the tabulation center for mobile ballots from even smaller communities off the main road. As a

result, instead of mobile ballots contributing the usual 510 percent of the totals, these ballots made up

about 40 percent, which lengthened the time needed to match signatures with requests. In any event, the

count appeared to be conducted conscientiously and according to regulations.

ELECTION RESULTS

As reported by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the final results of the election as released by the

Central Election Commission on April 5, 2000 were:

Vladimir Putin Acting President and Prime Minister 39,740,434

Gennady Zyuganov Chairman of the Communist Party 21,928,471

Grigory Yavlinsky Chairman of the Yabloko Party 4,351,452

Aman Tuleev Governor of Kemerovo Region 2,217,361

Konstantin Titov Governor of Samara Region 1,107,269

Vladimir Zhirinovsky Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 2,026,513
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Ella Pamfilov leader of Civil Dignity bloc, 1991-1994 758,966

Stanislav Govorukhin Duma member and film maker 328,723

Yuri Skuratov former Procuator General 319,263

Aleksei Podberezkin leader of Spiritual Heritage bloc 98,175

Umar Dzhabrailov businessman 78,498

Against all candidates 1,414,640

CHARGES OF IRREGULARITIES

The OSCE observer mission gave the Russian elections fairly good grades. However, Putins two

chief competitors, Gennady Zyuganov and Grigory Yavlinsky alleged that irregularities had occurred.

Zyuganov was especially vocal, claiming in a letter to the Central Election Committee that serious irregularities took place in 25 of Russias 89 subjects (see RFE/RL, Russian Election Report, 7 April 2000,

Laura Belin, Fraud Charges Unlikely to be Examined Impartially). Yavlinsky also expressed serious

doubts about the results, and charged that in some regions Yabloko observers were prevented from

observing the vote tally. Unlike Zyuganov, Yavlinsky did not challenge Putins victory itself.

In its final report, the OSCE/ODIHR mission stated that candidates, organizations and supporters

circumvented to the law in some instances. Examples were 1) distribution of anonymous campaign material, 2) certain groups with ties to electoral campaign organizations posing as non-partisan election observers, and 3) involvement of regional administration personnel in campaign activity.

POST ELECTION TRENDS

There are two aspects of post-election trends in Russia. The first aspect concerns the policies of a

future Putin Administration. Putins young and activist image obviously stands in contrast to the almost

reclusive, detached Yeltsin in the final days of his presidency. His intelligence background and his clear

disdain for Western concern over the conduct of the war in Chechnya, have led many to expect a tougher

Russia vis-a-vis the Westor a more clearly defined toughness that had already begun to take shape

under Yeltsin in the wake of NATOs Kosovo bombing and NATO expansion. Veteran human rights

activists in Russia have predicted that the Kremlin will undertake a more repressive policy toward political

opposition. Putins generally pro-market statements on the domestic economy and some of his early appointments rekindled the interest in Western business circles toward investment in Russia, but given past

experience, many are waiting to see words translate into a commerce-friendly, rule of law environment.

Much has been made of Putins unwillingness to seriously clean house of the Yeltsin family in the

Kremlin. Nevertheless, it is clear that Putin wishes to take charge and be seen as the leader who restored

order and direction to a Russia that appeared rudderless during Yeltsins last 2 years (although some

observers have maintained that domestically the security services had been restoring their own form of

domestic order since 1994). As President Putins term unfolds, the following developments may be expected:

 The Chechen War is likely to continue at a lower level of intensity, but with the brutality that

characterizes an unsophisticated and badly-led military trying to suppress an increasingly desperate guerrilla movement. The Russian Army may actually win eventually, but unlike the Tsarist army

in the 19th centuryor the U.S. Army against the ApachesMoscow does not have a 35-year

time frame and such a protracted conflict would cost many lives, scarce resources, and domestic

discontent.
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 Moscow will attempt to rein in the authority of the regional leaders. Putin has announced plans to

establish seven new federal districts to convey Moscows policies over the 89 regions that have

been operating with varying levels of independence from Moscow (with corresponding varying

levels of observance of Russian federal laws). This shake-up will be welcomed by many Russians

who see regional governments as arbitrary and corrupt. The danger is that the federal government

may create simply another level of bureaucracy with its accompanying corruption.

 The crackdown on independent media has been visible, repeated and at times violent. Since the

election, Moscow authorities have briefly jailed media-magnate Vladimir Gusinsky on embezzlement charges that were later dropped. Gusinskys NTV network has been critical of the war in

Chechnya and alleged corruption in Kremlin. Government officials claim that Gusinskys troubles

were connected with shady business dealings, not politics, but Russian democrats see an increase

in curbs on civil liberties in the making. While Putin gives lip service to democracy, rule of law, and

freedom of the press, his actions and his words reveal a bureaucratic security service mentality that

does not always connect with the concepts. (For example, see the testimony of Sarah Mendelson

at the Commission hearing of May 23, 2000, The Putin Path: Are Human Rights in Retreat? on

the Commission web site: http://www.house.gov/csce)

 Moscow has attempted to convince Western investors that its safe to go back into the water.

Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has been wooing the international community with marketbased rhetoric and Putin has stated his intention to move on tax and investment legislation. However, as Vladimir Voinovich writes in the March 30, 2000 New York Times, Putins biggest problems remains the endemic corruption in Russian society, a problem harder to deal with than the

Chechen rebels. No economic reform legislation, and certainly the accompanying rhetoric, will

mean anything if corruption is not reduced to manageable levels.

 Based on trends that were developed during the Yeltsin presidency, the Russian Government will

probably continue to resist U.S. foreign policy initiatives which Russians viewor can present

as threats to Russian security or establishing world-wide U.S. hegemony. Russia is not sufficiently

powerful to openly challenge U.S. military or economic dominance, but her diplomats will try to

create obstacles for U.S. policies (National Missile Defense, U.S. resistance to the International

Criminal Court, North Korea policy, stance on Iraq and Serbia, further NATO expansion).

Another aspect of post-election Russia is the political topography: what have the elections shown

about Russias major political parties/blocs? A few conclusions may be drawn for the near future:

 Combined with the results of the 1999 parliamentary elections, Unity becomes the new, younger

party of power, replacing Our Home is Russia and the party of power wannabe Fatherland-All Russia. Yeltsins departure for all practical purposes is a symbolic turning out the light

on the already declining national political presence of his generation.

 Zyuganovs second place finish, four times the vote of the third place competitor, indicates that the

Communist Party still retains an overall appeal throughout the country, although Zyuganov lost to

Putin in his home region of Orel and did not do as well as he did in 1996.

 While many Russian opinion polls indicate that most respondents favor democracy and political

reform, this does not translate into votes for Grigory Yavlinsky and his Yabloko party.
8

 Reform-oriented political leaders continue their post-Soviet split. Yabloko is on its own, the most

prominent leadership of the Union of Right Forces supported Putin, while other activists supported

Konstantin Titov.

 Vladimir Zhirinovskys appeal with Russian voters, if it ever was that great, is descending rapidly.

His 2.7 percent total was less than half of his 5.7 percent mark in 1996. His LDPR parliamentary

caucus has been reduced by a third since its heady days of 1993 to under 20 seats.

VISIT TO USAID MOSCOW

While in Moscow, Commission staffers also met with Connie Carrino, head of the USAIDs Assistance to Russian Orphans program, and were briefed on the latest USG/AID iniatives direction of programs aimed at assistance to Russian orphans. AID has contracted with two NGOsHolt International

Childrens Services and Mercy Corps International to work with Russian NGOs to support programs

designed to help families keep their children at home, rather than turning them over to state institutions. The

program does not support assistance to Russian government institutions, orphanages, or international adoption.
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