alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: APPLICATION PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1782 TO TAKE

DISCOVERY OF ASML U.S., INC.

------------------------------

NIKON CORPORATION, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

 v.

ASML U.S., INC., 

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 17-16961

D.C. No. 2:17-mc-00035-JJT

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2017

San Francisco, California

Before: GRABER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,** District Judge.

FILED

DEC 12 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
ASML U.S., Inc., timely appeals the district court’s order, in response to a

request by Nikon Corporation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), requiring ASML

U.S. to produce documents and other information. Reviewing for abuse of

discretion, Four Pillars Enters. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075, 1078

(9th Cir. 2002), we affirm.

The statutory requirements for discovery indisputably are met. The district

court carefully considered the factors described by the Supreme Court in Intel

Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004). On this record,

we cannot conclude that the court abused its "broad discretion" in ordering

discovery limited to documents physically located within the United States. 

Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. FibroGen, Inc., 793 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015).

For example, even for the documents located both in the United States and

abroad, the second Intel factor is met because Nikon’s experts stated, in unrebutted

declarations, that the foreign tribunals would welcome the discoverable evidence. 

Similarly, we are unpersuaded that the discovery order imposes an undue burden

on ASML U.S., the fourth Intel factor. Even if an alternative weighing of the

factors were reasonable, the district court’s decision was not "(1) illogical, (2)

implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts

in the record." Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 589 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal

2
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, no bright-line rule exists in the statute,

Supreme Court law, or our precedents—and we decline to create one—to the effect

that discovery must be denied for the sole reason that the same items are found in

another country.

AFFIRMED.

3
3049.9001 Policy (USCG).       (a) *Applicability.* This section implements 14 U.S.C. 1155 and provides the policy for the USCG to use for contract terminations. This contract termination policy applies to USCG contract terminations, including contracts for commercial items, with a total value of more than $1,000,000.          (b) *Notification.* Before terminating a contract with a total value of more than $1,000,000, the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall notify the contractor and the contractor shall be required to maintain all work product related to the contract until the earlier of—          (1) not less than 1 year after the date of the notification; or          (2) the date the Commandant notifies the vendor that maintenance of such work product is no longer required.          (c) *Work Product Defined.* The term “work product”—          (1) Means tangible and intangible items and information produced or possessed as a result of a contract referred to in subsection (b); and          (2) Includes—          (i) Any completed end items;          (ii) Any uncompleted end items; and          (iii) Any property in the Contractor's possession in which the United States Government has an interest.          (d) *Penalty.* A Contractor that fails to maintain work product as required under subsection (b) is liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day on which such work product is unavailable.          (e) *Requirement.* The Contractor shall insert the substance of this clause in contracts and subcontracts, including contracts and for commercial items, with a total value of more than $1,000,000.    **Parent topic:** PART 3049—TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS
exv10w16



 






Exhibit 10.16




November 18, 2005




Calavo Growers, Inc.

Attn: Arthur J. Bruno

Vice President, Finance

1141A Cummings Rd.

Santa Paula, California 93060





Re:     Renewal Notice for Business Loan Agreement, dated as of January 30, 2004, between
Bank
of America and Calavo Growers, Inc.



Ladies and Gentlemen:




     Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the above referenced Business Loan Agreement, the “Expiration Date”
thereunder is hereby extended to April 1, 2008 or such earlier date as the availability may
terminate as provided in such Business Loan Agreement.


In addition, this is to confirm that the term “current liabilities” as used in Section 7.18 of such
Business Loan Agreement includes amounts outstanding on revolving lines of credit without regard to
the ultimate maturity of such line of credit.




     Please acknowledge the foregoing by signing the enclosed copy of this letter at the place
indicated and returning it to us.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	Sincerely, 

 	 
	 	/s/ Robert L. Munn, Jr.
 	 
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 


Receipt of the foregoing letter on November 22, 2005

is hereby acknowledged:




Calavo Growers, Inc.




	 	 	 	 	 
	By

	 	/s/ Arthur J. Bruno
	 	/s/ Scott H. Runge
	 

	 	 
	 	 
	Its:

	 	Chief Financial Officer
	 	Treasurer
#### In the Matter of the City of Schenectady, Respondent, v Clifford J. Kearney, Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the County Court of Schenectady County at Special Term, entered January 15, 1975, which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and directed entry of a judgment of foreclosure for unpaid tax liens filed against defendant’s prop*712erty. The plaintiff City of Schenectady commenced this in rem action to foreclose certain tax liens (Real Property Tax Law, art 11, tit 3). Its list of parcels affected by unpaid liens included one described as *"Lot*House No. 134 *Street*Broadway” (see Real Property Tax Law, § 1122). Claiming ownership of property commonly known as 130-134 Broadway, Schenectady, defendant served a verified answer challenging the adequacy of the foregoing description and alleging, on information and belief, that relevant taxes were "not unpaid.” The city thereafter moved for summary judgment and this appeal is from the order granting that relief. We agree with the County Court that the quoted description was sufficient to identify the parcel in question (Real Property Tax Law, § 1122, subd 3, par [a]). Defendant’s assertion that he never received notice of any delinquency is without merit for it appears the statute was strictly complied with in this regard (Real Property Tax Law, § 1122, subd 3, par [b]) and, as a subsequent owner, defendant failed to avail himself of the protection afforded by section 1126 of the Real Property Tax Law. Lastly, the burden of establishing a defense to the action rested upon defendant (Real Property Tax Law, § 1134) so that even if his answer were liberally construed to raise the defense of payment, the affidavit of his attorney contained no evidentiary material in relation thereto which would support that defense or present a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, County Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city, but since the foreclosure applies only to those liens which have been due and unpaid for at least four years (Real Property Tax Law, § 1120, subd 1) and the instant order appears to refer to some more recent tax liens, the matter should be remitted to that court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. Order modified, on the law and the facts, by reversing so much thereof as granted judgment foreclosing tax liens not unpaid for more than four years, and matter remitted to County Court for further proceedings in accordance herewith, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs. Koreman, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Kane and Main, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GUANERFE ORDONEZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-71133 

Agency No. A070-080-715 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

 Submitted February 4, 2020**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Guanerfe Ordonez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen 

removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review 

for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 

F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 6 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-71133 

review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ordonez’s untimely and 

number-barred motion to reopen where Ordonez failed to demonstrate a material 

change in country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for an exception to the time 

and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (BIA did not abuse its discretion 

where evidence of general country conditions was not material to petitioner’s 

claim).

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings 

sua sponte. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his court 

has jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the 

limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or 

constitutional error.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
### §3785. Repealed. Pub. L. 109–162, title XI, §1155(3), Jan. 5, 2006, 119 Stat. 3114

Section, Pub. L. 90–351, title I, §804, formerly §805, as added Pub. L. 96–157, §2, Dec. 27, 1979, 93 Stat. 1203; renumbered §804 and amended Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §609B(d), (f), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2093; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, §330001(h)(9), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2139, related to appellate court review.

Another section 804 of Pub. L. 90–351, title III, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 223, is set out as a note under section 2510 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.

A prior section 804 of Pub. L. 90–351 was renumbered section 803 and is classified to section 10223 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
-81 -80 -79 -78 -77 -76 -75

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### ★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲



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### NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL 

## Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 09 Jul 07

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 38.92 N 77.01 WMeters AGL
### MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04

- 11

- 00 194

- CV

IN RE SANTIKOS LEGACY, LTD.

Original Proceeding 1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 23, 2011

PETITION FOR WRIT OF INJUNCTION DENIED

On March 11, 2011, relator filed a petition for writ of injunction. The court has

considered relator’s petition and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief sought.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of injunction is DENIED. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(a)

.

PER CURIAM

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2008

- CI

- 17452 , styled Dragon Fish, LLC d/b/a Motif Modern Living, et

al. v. Santikos Legacy, Ltd. et al. v. C. Hodges & Assocs., PLLC d/b/a Hodges & Associates, et al.

, pending in the

73rd Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Ren é e F. McElhaney presiding. However, the

order complained of was signed by the Honorable David Peeples, presiding judge of the Fourth Administrative

Jud icial Region.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

 OF FLORIDA 

 SECOND DISTRICT 

In the interest of E.H., a child. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

A.C., ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No: 2D14-3566 

 ) 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND ) 

FAMILY SERVICES, and GUARDIAN ) 

AD LITEM PROGRAM, ) 

 ) 

 Respondents. ) 

 ) 

Opinion filed November 14, 2014. 

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit 

Court for Hillsborough County; Elizabeth G. 

Rice, Judge. 

Melissa A. Cordon, Tampa, for Petitioner. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Meredith Hall, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent 

Department of Children and Family Services. 

Jennifer S. Paullin, Guardian ad Litem 

Program, Sanford, for Respondent Guardian 

ad Litem Program. 

PER CURIAM. 
- 2 - 

 A.C., the mother in a termination of parental rights case, petitions this 

court for a writ of certiorari to quash a nonfinal order denying A.C.'s motion to set aside 

a previous order of consent by nonappearance. Because A.C. has failed to 

demonstrate that the order will result in material injury that cannot be corrected on 

postjudgment appeal, we dismiss the petition without prejudice to A.C. raising the same 

issue on direct appeal if and when a final termination order is rendered. See Harris v. 

State, 99 So. 3d 952, 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (table decision) (dismissing petition 

without prejudice to raise the issue again on direct appeal); see also Arnone v. State, 

701 So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ("[T]his court's certiorari jurisdiction cannot be 

invoked unless the petitioner establishes that no adequate remedy is available on 

plenary appeal to correct the judicial error." (citing Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers 

Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995))).

 Petition dismissed. 

CASANUEVA, VILLANTI, and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
#### Abraham Gelch, as Administrator of the Estate of Howard Gelch, Deceased, Respondent, v. Homer C. Wilkins, Appellant.

Order denying motion to change the place of trial from Kings County to Allegany County for the convenience of witnesses affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. No opinion. Nolan, P. J., Adel, MaeCrate, Schmidt and Beldoek, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**Section
      1350 Certification of Principal Financial Officer**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of INX Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q
      for the period ended March 31, 2007 (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Brian Fontana, Vice President
      and
      Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
      adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





By: /s/
      BRIAN FONTANA


Brian Fontana, Vice President


and
      Chief
      Financial Officer





May
      4,
      2007
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZATREA EVANS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES,

LLP, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-08-4993 MMC

THIRD ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF

TO SUBMIT CHAMBERS COPY IN

COMPLIANCE WITH GENERAL

ORDER 45 AND THE COURT’S

STANDING ORDERS

On February 26, 2010, plaintiff electronically filed a reply in support of her motion to

alter or amend the judgment, as well as an affidavit in support thereof. Additionally, on

February 26, 2010, plaintiff electronically filed a reply in support of her motion to disqualify

or recuse, as well as an affidavit in support thereof. Plaintiff has violated General Order 45

and the Court’s Standing Orders, however, by failing to deliver to the Clerk’s Office “no later

than noon on the business day following the day that the papers are filed electronically, one

paper copy of each document that is filed electronically . . . marked ‘Chambers Copy’ and .

. . clearly marked with the judge’s name, case number, and ‘Chambers Copy-Do Not File.’” 

See General Order 45 § VI.G; see also Standing Orders for Civil Cases Assigned to the

Honorable Maxine M. Chesney ¶ 2.

Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to comply with General Order 45 and the Court’s

Standing Orders by submitting, no later than Friday, March 5, 2010, a chambers copy of

Case 3:08-cv-04993-MMC Document 124 Filed 03/04/10 Page 1 of 2
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the above-referenced documents.

The Court has previously advised plaintiff of her failure to comply with General Order

45 and the Court’s Standing Order in connection with earlier-filed documents. (See Order,

filed May 13, 2009; Order, filed October 22, 2009.) Such reminders appear to have had

little to no effect on compelling compliance therewith.

Parties are expected to comply with court rules without repeated reminders. 

Accordingly, plaintiff is hereby advised that the Court will impose sanctions, including, but

not limited to, striking from the record any electronically-filed document of which a

chambers copy has not been timely provided to the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 4, 2010 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-04993-MMC Document 124 Filed 03/04/10 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Janus Hotels and Resorts, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Louis S. Beck, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:


          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Louis S. Beck
------------------------------

Louis S. Beck
Chief Executive Officer
October 30, 2002
#### ALICE M. TAMBURRINO *v.*CESARE A. TAMBURRINO

(AC 25510)

DiPentima, McLachlan and Hennessy, Js.

Argued February 22

officially released March 29, 2005

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2437 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2437

        To suspend temporarily the duty on Desmodur BL XP 2468.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 18, 2005

  Mr. Murphy introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
        To suspend temporarily the duty on Desmodur BL XP 2468.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESMODUR BL XP 2468.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.05.70      Copolymer of        Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         methyl ethyl                                                       31/2009
                         ketoxime and
                         toluenediisocyana
                         te (CAS No.
                         352462-03-4)
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         3911.90.45)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Luis Aguirre, Appellant, v Roman Catholic Church of St. Helena, Respondent.

[716 NYS2d 302]

—Orders, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), both entered August 20, 1999, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint and denied as moot plaintiffs *127motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law §§ 202 and 240 (1) claims, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court correctly concluded that plaintiff’s action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law. The fact that plaintiff worked at Monsignor Scanlan High School, which had a separate bookkeeper, budget and bank account from the Church of St. Helena, does not create a triable issue of fact concerning the school’s status as an unincorporated division of the church without separate legal status, in light of the undisputed evidence that the church owned the school property, that the pastor appointed the school’s administrator (who was also the assistant pastor) and the school’s principal, and that the church was obligated to make up any deficits *(see, Pappas v Greek Archdiocese,*178 AD2d 104; *Smith v Roman Catholic Diocese,*252 AD2d 805).

Since plaintiff applied for, and received, Workers’ Compensation benefits as an employee, he cannot now claim independent contractor status based on his allegations that he worked for cash on his day off. Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Wallach, Saxe, Buckley and Friedman, JJ.