alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AFS-12-109-E March 22, 2012

Exemption No. 10485 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2012-0209

Ms. Danielle Tweed Parent of Ashelee Ryan

749 Whitaker Street Sudbury, ON P3E 4B3

Dear Ms. Tweed:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for exemption. It transmits our decision, explains its basis, and the conditions and limitations of the exemption, including the

date it ends.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter received February 21, 2012, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Ashelee Ryan for an exemption from § 121.311(b) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). That exempti on, if granted, would allow Ashelee to exceed the specified weight limit for an FAA-approved child restraint system (CAReS, manufactured by AmSafe Corporation) during use of that child restraint system (CRS) aboard a United States (U.S). aircraft.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition

in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Ashelee.

The FAA has issued grants of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to those presented in your petition. In Grant of Exemption No. 9834 (copy enclosed), the FAA found that numerous people with physical challenges had previously completed flights using restraint systems that addressed unique physical needs regarding safety, support, and security2

in the same manner of operations as described in this petition. The FAA further found that the petition, if granted, would not set any new precedents regarding the use of restraint systems by persons with disabilities.

Having reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption, I find that—

 they do not differ materially from those presented by the petitioner in the enclosed grant of exemption;

 the reasons stated by the FAA for granting the enclosed exemption also apply to the situation you present; and

 a grant of exemption is in the public interest.

Our Decision

Under the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has delegated to me, I hereby grant Ashelee Ryan an exemption from 14 CFR § 121.311(b). In addition, any air carrier or commercial operator operating under part 121 while Ashelee is aboard its aircraft is granted an exemption from 14 CFR § 121.311(b) to the extent necessary to allow Ashelee to exceed the specified weight limit for an FAA-approved CRS during use

of that CRS aboard a U.S. aircraft.

All operations under this exemption must be conducted with at least one of Ashelee's parents or a caregiver accompanying her. Ashelee Ryan may only occupy a passenger seat with no passenger seated behind her. In addition, Ashelee’s parent or caregiver must carry a copy of this exemption and advise the air carrier about the contents of the exemption at least 48 hours before the date of each flight.

This exemption terminates on March 31, 2014, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/s/

John W. McGraw Acting Director, Flight Standards

Service

Enclosure
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dolores Ann Goodwin, Appellant.

Judgment of conviction and orders unanimously affirmed. (Appeal from judgment of Erie County Court, convicting defendant of the crime of assault, first degree. The orders denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and denied motion in arrest of judgment.) Present—Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
Order entered April 2 2 , 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 13
- 01111
- CR DAMIAN ELDER, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cau se No. F12
- 53551
- K



### O RDER
The Court ORDERS the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why appellant’s brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings and recommendations and determine whether appellant des ires to prosecute the appeal, whether appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.8( b ). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the
trial court shall c onduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State , 742 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.

– Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective represe ntation, which may include appointment of new counsel.We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include

written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. This appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The appeal shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
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THIS FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998, HAS
BEEN RESTATED TO REFLECT THE MERGER WITH M-R GROUP PLC UNDER THE PURCHASE METHOD
OF ACCOUNTING.  SUCH MERGER WAS ORIGINALLY ACCOUNTED FOR AS A POOLING OF
INTERESTS IN THE FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE FILED WITH FORM 10-Q ON NOVEMBER 15,
1999.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           1,963
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   81,466
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,917
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</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Bertha K., Appellant.

In a proceeding pursuant to article 7 of the Family Court Act, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County, dated April 29, 1976, which, upon a fact-finding adjudication that appellant is a juvenile delinquent, placed her on probation for a period of one year. Order reversed, on the law and in the interest of justice, without costs or disbursements, and proceeding remanded to the Family Court for a new fact-finding hearing. The Law Guardian appointed to protect the infant had no knowledge, until the cross-examination of the complaining witness at the fact-finding hearing, that said witness had testified at a preliminary hearing in the criminal court regarding the incident herein. The juvenile in this proceeding was not the defendant in that case. The Family Court abused its discretion when it refused to grant an adjournment in order to enable the Corporation Counsel to produce the minutes of the complaining witness’ preliminary hearing testimony in the criminal court. Hopkins, J. P., Shapiro, Hawkins and Suozzi, JJ., concur.
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSVALDO ELIAS,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT AYERS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 08-2798 TEH (PR)

ORDER REQUESTING SUPPLEMENTAL

BRIEFING

A recent en banc decision from the Ninth Circuit, Hayward

v. Marshall, No. 06-55392, 2010 WL 1664977 (9th Cir. April 22, 2010)

(en banc), addressed important issues relating to federal habeas

review of BPH decisions denying parole to California state

prisoners. As such, the Court will provide each party an

opportunity to submit a supplemental brief (not to exceed ten (10)

pages in length) explaining his views of how the Hayward en banc

decision applies to the facts presented in Petitioner’s challenge to

BPH’s decision denying him parole. 

//

//

Case 3:08-cv-02798-TEH Document 6 Filed 05/03/10 Page 1 of 2
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The Court sets the following schedule:

1. No later than May 10, 2010, Respondent must send to

Petitioner a copy of the Hayward en banc decision. 

2. No later than May 28, 2010, Respondent must file and

serve any supplemental brief applying Hayward to the facts presented

in Petitioner’s case. 

3. No later than July 2, 2010, Petitioner must file and

serve any supplemental brief applying Hayward to the facts presented

in his case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 05/03/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\HC.08\Elias-08-2798-hayward briefing.wpd

Case 3:08-cv-02798-TEH Document 6 Filed 05/03/10 Page 2 of 2
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JOSEPH P. RUSSONIELLO, CSBN 44332

United States Attorney

LUCILLE GONZALES MEIS, SBN CO 15153

Regional Chief Counsel, Region IX

Social Security Administration

SHEA LITA BOND, SBN D.C. 469103

Special Assistant United States Attorney

333 Market Street, Suite 1500

San Francisco, California 94105

Telephone: (415) 977-8943

Facsimile: (415) 744-0134

E-Mail: Shea.Bond@ssa.gov

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

PETER TALLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

_________________________________)

CIVIL NO. 3:08-cv-04529 SI

STIPULATION AND ORDER AWARDING

ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE 

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), AND COSTS UNDER

28 U.S.C. § 1920

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties through their undersigned counsel,

subject to the approval of the Court, that Plaintiff be awarded attorney fees under the Equal Access to

Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in the amount of TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED

FORTY-THREE dollars and 74 cents ($2,443.74), and costs in the amount of SEVENTY dollars and 81

cents ($70.81) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920. This amount represents compensation for all legal services

rendered on behalf of Plaintiff by counsel in connection with this civil action, in accordance with 28

U.S.C. §§ 2412(d) and 1920..

This stipulation constitutes a compromise settlement of Plaintiff's request for EAJA attorney

fees, and does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of Defendant under the EAJA. 

Payment of TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-THREE dollars and 74 cents ($2,443.74)

in EAJA attorney fees, and costs in the amount of SEVENTY dollars and 81 cents ($70.81), shall

Case 3:08-cv-04529-SI Document 39 Filed 06/29/10 Page 1 of 2
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constitute a complete release from and bar to any and all claims Plaintiff may have relating to EAJA fees

in connection with this action. Any payment shall be made payable to Plaintiff and delivered to

Plaintiff’s counsel.

This award is without prejudice to the rights of Plaintiff’s counsel to seek Social Security Act

attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406, subject to the provisions of the EAJA.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 22, 2010 /s/ Ian M. Sammis

(As authorized via email)

IAN M. SAMMIS

Attorney for Plaintiff

Dated: June 21, 2010 JOSEPH P. RUSSONIELLO

United States Attorney

LUCILLE GONZALES MEIS

Regional Chief Counsel, Region IX

Social Security Administration

/s/ Shea Lita Bond

SHEA LITA BOND

Attorneys for Defendant

IT IS SO ORDERED:

Dated:

United States District Judge

2

Case 3:08-cv-04529-SI Document 39 Filed 06/29/10 Page 2 of 2
#### Edward G. Pauling, appellee, v. East End Garage, appellant.

Gen. No. 27,205.

Action to recover the value of an automobile kept in defendant’s garage and delivered by defendant to some unauthorized person upon a fraudulent telephone order purporting to be from plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry Olson, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1921.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed November 29, 1922.

Clyde L. Day and John J. Beilman, for appellant. William G. Wise, for appellee.

Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.
### §4744. Grants to other organizations

#### (a) Amount of grants; conditions

The Office is authorized to make grants to other organizations to pay up to 75 per centum (or, with respect to fiscal years commencing after the expiration of three years following the effective date of the grant provisions of this chapter, up to 50 per centum) of the costs of providing training to professional, administrative, or technical employees and officials of State or local governments if the Office—

(1) finds that State or local governments have requested the proposed program;

(2) determines that the capability to provide such training does not exist, or is not readily available, within the Federal or the State or local governments requesting such program or within associations of State or local governments, or if such capability does exist that such government or association is not disposed to provide such training; and

(3) approves the program as meeting such requirements as may be prescribed by the Office in its regulations pursuant to this chapter.

#### (b) "Other organization" defined

For the purpose of this section "other organization" means—

(1) a national, regional, statewide, areawide, or metropolitan organization, representing member State or local governments;

(2) an association of State or local public officials; or

(3) a nonprofit organization one of whose principal functions is to offer professional advisory, research, development, educational or related services to governments.

(Pub. L. 91–648, title III, §304, Jan. 5, 1971, 84 Stat. 1919; 1978 Reorg. Plan No. 2, §102, eff. Jan. 1, 1979, 43 F.R. 36037, 92 Stat. 3783.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 91–648, Jan. 5, 1971, 84 Stat. 1909, known as the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 4701 of this title and Tables.

For effective date of the grant provisions of this chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), as being 180 days after Jan. 5, 1971, see section 4772 of this title.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Transfer of Functions

"Office", meaning Office of Personnel Management, substituted for "Commission", meaning Civil Service Commission, in subsec. (a) pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1978, §102, 43 F.R. 36037, 92 Stat. 3783, set out under section 1101 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, which transferred functions vested by statute in Civil Service Commission and Chairman thereof to Director of Office of Personnel Management (except as otherwise specified), effective Jan. 1, 1979, as provided by section 1–102 of Ex. Ord. No. 12107, Dec. 28, 1978, 44 F.R. 1055, set out under section 1101 of Title 5.
#### Ephantus Wahome KIMANI, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-74982.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2007.

Filed March 16, 2007.

Ephantus Wahome Kimani, Eloy, AZ, pro se.

Beau Sterling, Esq., Sterling Law, LLC, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, District Counsel, Office of the District Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Phoenix, AZ, Andrew C. Maclachlan, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

*570Before: HAWKINS, THOMAS, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Ephantus Wahome Kimani (“Kimani”) seeks review of the BIA’s final order dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration Judge’s decision that he is eligible for removal under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a) (2)(A) (iii) and 1227(a)(2)(B)®. Kimani contends he is *not*eligible for removal under these statutes because he was not an “alien” when convicted of two California drug crimes but, rather, was a United States citizen, such citizenship having been automatically conferred by the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (“CCA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1431, even though Kimani was over the age of eighteen on the CCA’s effective date.

This court has previously considered and rejected Kimani’s argument. *Hughes v. Ashcroft,*255 F.3d 752 (9th Cir.2001). Because we are bound by the decisions of previous panels, *Koemer v. Grigas,*328 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir.2003), Kimani’s argument fails and his petition must be denied.

DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### § 236.9 No acceleration of Eligible Notes.

Eligible Notes shall not be subject to acceleration, in whole or in part, by USAID, the Noteholder or any other party. USAID shall not have the right to pay any amounts in respect of the Eligible Notes other than in accordance with the original payment terms of such Eligible Notes.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael A. Liotta, Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 923]

—Rose, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Smith, J.), rendered April 6, 1999, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of burglary in the second degree, aggravated criminal contempt and endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree.

In our prior decision (274 AD2d 751), we remitted this matter to County Court because the record on appeal did not permit us to ascertain whether, as defendant contended, there *506was an error in defendant’s sentence and commitment order reciting a conviction of burglary in the second degree as a class D felony under Penal Law § 140.25 (1) and (2). In a decision and order dated August 16, 2000, County Court has now determined that there was an error and corrected defendant’s sentence and commitment order to reflect a conviction of one count of burglary in the second degree as a class C felony under Penal Law § 140.25 (2) as a violent felony offense *(see,*Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [b]). There being no further submissions by the parties in this matter, we affirm on the grounds stated in our prior decision.

Mercure, J. P., Crew III, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment, as amended, as to indictment No. 98-520 is affirmed.
### §3797u–1. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3797u–1 was editorially reclassified as section 10612 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
§ 270.45a-1 Confidential treatment of names and addresses of dealers of registered investment company securities. ( a ) Exhibits calling for the names and addresses of dealers to or through whom principal underwriters of registered investment companies are currently offering securities and which are required to be furnished with registration statements filed pursuant to section 8(b) of the Act (54 Stat. 804; 15 U.S.C. 80a-8), or periodic reports filed pursuant to section 30(a) or section 30(b)(1) of the Act (54 Stat. 836; 15 U.S.C. 80a-30), shall be the subject of confidential treatment and shall not be made available to the public, except that the Commission may by order make such exhibits available to the public if, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, it finds that public disclosure of such material is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
( b ) The exhibits referred to in paragraph (a) of this section shall be filed in quadruplicate with the Commission at the time the registration statement or periodic report is filed. Such exhibits shall be enclosed in a separate envelope marked “Confidential Treatment” and addressed to the Chairman, Securities and Executive Commission, Washington, DC. Confidential treatment requests shall be submitted in paper only, whether or not the registrant is required to file in electronic format.
[Rule N-45A-1, 7 FR 197, Jan. 10, 1942, as amended at 20 FR 7036, Sept. 20, 1955; 58 FR 14860, Mar. 18, 1993]