alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 41
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 41 appear at 71 FR 34521 and 34522, June 15, 2006.

§ 41.71 Transit aliens. ( a ) *Transit aliens—general.* An alien is classifiable as a nonimmigrant transit alien under INA 101(a) (15) (C) if the consular officer is satisfied that the alien: ( 1 ) Intends to pass in immediate and continuous transit through the United States;
( 2 ) Is in possession of a common carrier ticket or other evidence of transportation arrangements to the alien's destination;
( 3 ) Is in possession of sufficient funds to carry out the purpose of the transit journey, or has sufficient funds otherwise available for that purpose; and
( 4 ) Has permission to enter some country other than the United States following the transit through the United States, unless the alien submits satisfactory evidence that such advance permission is not required.
( b ) *Certain aliens in transit to United Nations.* An alien within the provisions of paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations, to whom a visa is to be issued for the purpose of applying for admission solely in transit to the United Nations Headquarters District, may upon request or at the direction of the Secretary of State be issued a nonimmigrant visa bearing the symbol C-2. If such a visa is issued, the recipient shall be subject to such restrictions on travel within the United States as may be provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4365 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4365

 To amend title 5, United States Code, to make clear that accounts in 
   the Thrift Savings Fund are subject to certain Federal tax levies.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 17, 2012

   Ms. Buerkle (for herself and Mr. Ross of Florida) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 
                           Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 5, United States Code, to make clear that accounts in 
   the Thrift Savings Fund are subject to certain Federal tax levies.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS.

    Section 8437(e)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended in 
the first sentence--
            (1) by striking ``659)'' and inserting ``659),''; and
            (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting the 
        following: ``, and shall be subject to a Federal tax levy under 
        section 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''.
                                 <all>
```
### §300e–4a. Repealed. Pub. L. 99–660, title VIII, §805(a), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3800

Section, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title XIII, §1305A, as added Nov. 1, 1978, Pub. L. 95–559, §5(a), 92 Stat. 2133; amended July 10, 1979, Pub. L. 96–32, §2(e), 93 Stat. 82; Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. 97–35, title IX, §944, 95 Stat. 576, related to loans and loan guarantees for acquisition and construction of ambulatory health care facilities.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal not applicable to any loan or loan guarantee made under this section before Oct. 1, 1985, see section 805(c) of Pub. L. 99–660, set out as an Effective Date of 1986 Amendment note under section 300e–5 of this title.

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1985, see section 815(a) of Pub. L. 99–660, set out as an Effective and Termination Dates of 1986 Amendment note under section 300e–1 of this title.
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 2004)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 76417]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-27897]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[CGD13-04-043]
RIN 1625-AA00


Security and Safety Zone; Protection of Large Passenger Vessels, 
Portland, OR

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Final rule; notice of suspension of enforcement.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Captain of the Port, Portland, OR, will suspend 
enforcement of the Large Passenger Vessel Security and Safety Zones 
that were created by a final rule published in the Federal Register on 
September 12, 2003. The zones provide for the security and safety of 
large passenger vessels in the navigable waters of Portland, OR, and 
adjacent waters. Enforcement of these security and safety zones will be 
suspended until further notice.

DATES: Enforcement of 33 CFR 165.1318 will be suspended commencing 
December 8, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: LTjg B. Audirsch, c/o Captain of the 
Port Portland, OR 6767 North Basin Avenue, Portland, OR 97217 at (503) 
247-4015 to obtain information concerning enforcement of this rule.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On September 12, 2003, the Coast Guard 
published a final rule (68 FR 53677) establishing regulations in 33 CFR 
165.1318 for the security and safety of large passenger vessels in the 
navigable waters of Portland, OR, and adjacent waters, of Oregon and 
Washington. These security and safety zones provide for the regulation 
of vessel traffic in the vicinity of certain large passenger vessels 
(as defined in 33 CFR 165.1318(b)) and exclude persons and vessels from 
the immediate vicinity of these large passenger vessels. Entry into 
these zones is prohibited unless otherwise exempted or excluded under 
33 CFR 165.1318 or unless authorized by the Captain of the Port or his 
designee. The Captain of the Port, Portland, OR, will suspend 
enforcement of the Large Passenger Vessel Safety and Security Zones 
established in 33 CFR 165.1318 on December 8, 2004.

    Dated: December 8, 2004.
Paul D. Jewell,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port, Portland, OR.
[FR Doc. 04-27897 Filed 12-20-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-15-P
```

[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 242 (Friday, December 17, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 75571]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-27766]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[File No. 500-1]

Absolute Health and Fitness, Inc.; Order of Suspension of Trading

December 15, 2004.
    It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is 
a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of 
Absolute Health and Fitness, Inc. (``Absolute Health'') because of 
questions regarding the accuracy of assertions by Absolute Health, and 
by others, in public statements to investors concerning, among other 
things, its corporate status and its ownership of certain health and 
fitness facilities.
    The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the 
protection of investors require a suspension of trading in the 
securities of the above listed company.
    Therefore, it is ordered, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that trading in the above listed 
company is suspended for the period from 9:30 a.m. EST December 15, 
2004 through 11:59 p.m. EST, on December 29, 2004.

    By the Commission.
Margaret H. McFarland,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 04-27766 Filed 12-15-04; 1:39 pm]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-P
```
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Uni

ted 

Stat

es D

istr

ict C

ourt

For t

he N

orth

ern 

Dis

trict

 of C

alifo

rnia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TSEGAI HAILE,

Plaintiff,

    v.

SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, etal.,

Defendants.                                                                     /

No. C-08-4149 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’SREQUEST FILED APRIL 23, 2010

The Court is in receipt of plaintiff Tsegai Haile’s “Request for Reasoning,” filed April

23, 2010, by which filing plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s April 20, 2010 Order

Denying Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.

Having read and considered the request, the Court hereby DENIES the request for

the reason that plaintiff has failed to identify any cognizable basis exists for reconsideration. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2010                                                             MAXINE M. CHESNEYUnited States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-04149-MMC   Document 210   Filed 05/04/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2018-03-12T01:50:50-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
### §3032d. Repealed. Pub. L. 114–144, §5(d), Apr. 19, 2016, 130 Stat. 342

Section, Pub. L. 89–73, title IV, §415, as added Pub. L. 106–501, title IV, §401, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2260, related to grants or contracts for computer training and enhanced Internet access for older individuals.
**§ 99.32(a)(4)**

**–**

Final regulations also added § 99.32(a)(4) to require that, upon the request of a parent or eligible student, an educational agency or institution must obtain a copy of the record of further redisclosures described under § 99.32(b)(2) and make it available for review to the parent or eligible student. State educational authorities and Federal officials and agencies that maintain records of redisclosures will have to make that information available to the educational agency or institution w hose records were redisclosed, upon request, so that the agency or institution can make that record available to a parent or eligible student who has asked to inspect and review the student’s record of disclosures. We estimate that two educational authori ties or agencies in each State and the District of Columbia (one for K

- 12 and one for postsecondary ) and the Department itself, for a total of 103 authorities, will maintain the required records of redisclosures. We assume that it will take .25 hours (15 minutes) per disclosure to locate and print a record of disclosures for this requirement. Based on our administrative experience over the ye ars, we assume that few parents and students request this information and, therefore, use an estimate that one tent h of one percent of a total of 68.1 million students will make such a request each ye ar, or 68,076 requests. This translates to an average of 3 disclosures per school. (Divided total number of schools b y total number of requests.) The total number of dis closures by State and Federal educational authorities will be the same as that calculated for schools.

No. of Schools & Postsec. Inst.: 20,629 Average No. of Discloures: x 3 # of Responses 61,887 Hours/Response: x .25

B urden Hours 15,472 Average No. of Disclosures b y State & Fed. Ed. Authorities: 61,887 Hours/Response: x .25

Burden Hours 15,472

School Burden Hours: 15,472 State & Fed. Burden Hours: + 15,472 **Total B urden Hours**  **30,944**
EXHBIT 4





 

 

 

 

 

 

EXHBIT 4.1



Specimen Certificate for Zion Common Stock, 

par value $.01 per share



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Click here for JPEg of Stock Certificate
#### DeRidder’s Unknown Heirs, etc. et al. v. Belknap.

February 7, 1950.

Lawrence S. Grauman, Special Judge.

George F. Williamson for appellants.

Clark & Manby for appellee.

Judge Cammack

Affirming.

*186This action was instituted by Mr. William B. Belknap to quiet title to two tracts of land in Oldham County. He purchased the lands at a sale held by the United States Marshal for the Western District of Kentucky in 1933. The appeal is from a judgment granting Mr. Belknap the relief sought.

The lands formerly belonged to Stanislaus P. M. C. DeRidder, who failed to pay United States Federal income taxes for the years 1924, 1925 and 1926. The Collector of Internal Revenue levied upon the lands. That officer became the purchaser in 1931 and the sale was confirmed by the United States District Court at Louisville. Subsequently, the lands were sold by the United States of America at public auction and Mr. Belknap became the purchaser. Mr. Belknap was given a quitclaim deed. In 1941, Mr. Belknap filed an answer in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against Ann Manning DeRidder McAndrews, the widow of Stanislaus P. M. C. DeRidder, and Martin McAndrews and the unknown heirs of Stanislaus P. M. C. DeRidder, seeking to have his title quieted. Mrs. McAndrews pleaded that the purchase by the United States of America in 1931 was void, and, therefore Mr. Belknap’s title was also void. The Circuit Court of Appeals held in the case of McAndrews v. Belknap, 6 Cir., 141 F. 2d 111, that Mr. Belknap’s deed was void. But it was held also that the heirs of DeRidder were guilty of laches in asserting their claim to the property, and both the petition of Mr. Belknap and the cross petition of the DeRidder heirs were dismissed.

During the intervening years it was held in an action in the Oldham Circuit Court that Mrs. Ann Manning DeRidder McAndrews was the sole heir of her deceased husband, Stanislaus P. M. C. DeRidder.' .This fact was set out, in the answer of the heirs of Mrs. McAndrews in the action now before us. They also stated that they had'no claim or title to the two tracts of land. The judgment properly recites that all of the defendants were before the court. The warning order attorney appointed to represent the nonresident defendants reported that he could make no affirmative defense for them. The judgment recites also that Mr. Belknap has a fee simple title to the two tracts of land.

Since he obtained his deed in 1933, Mr. Belknap *187•has been in the continuous, open, notorious, hostile and adverse possession of the lands. None of the litigation heretofore mentioned has in any way affected his possession. As pointed out in the case of Martin v. Hall, 152 Ky. 677, 153 S. W. 997, L. R. A. 1918A, 1041, an unsuccessful action leading to no change of possession does not arrest the running of the statute of limitations. See also 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Possession, section 181. Under the circumstances, we think the chancellor properly granted Mr. Belknap the relief sought by him.

Judgment affirmed.
### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-40865 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. CARLOS TENEYUQUE-MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:11-CR-1779-1
Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Th e Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Carlos Teneyuque-Medina has m o v e d for l e ave t o w ithdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v . C alifornia , 386 U.S. 7 38 (1967), a nd United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th C ir. 2011). Ten e yuque-Medina has not filed a response. We h a ve reviewed counsel’s brief and the r elevant portions of the record reflected therein. W e concur w ith counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolo u s i s sue for appellate review. Accordingly, c ounsel’s U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D April 16, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R

. 47. 5, the court has d eterm ined that this op inion should not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-40865 Document: 00512210462 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2013No. 12-40865

motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused f rom further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS D ISMISSED. See 5 T H C I R
. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 12-40865 Document: 00512210462 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/16/2013
§ 213.4 Fraud claims. ( a ) The CFO will refer a claim that appears to be fraudulent, false, or misrepresented by a party that has an interest in the claim to the USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG). The OIG has the responsibility for investigating or referring the matter, where appropriate, to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The OIG has the responsibility to provide the results of the investigation on a timely basis to the CFO for any further action.
( b ) The CFO will not administratively compromise, terminate, or suspend collection action, or otherwise dispose of a claim that appears to be fraudulent, false, or misrepresented by a party that has an interest in the claim, without the approval of DOJ.
[86 FR 31141, June 11, 2021]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Francisco Rivera, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered March 21, 1977, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law, indictment dismissed, and case remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the purpose of entering an order in its discretion pursuant to CPL 160.50. Defendant was driving his car one February evening after spending some time with a friend at a local bar. Suddenly the friend, a passenger in the car, spotted a pedestrian who he (mistakenly) thought had previously burglarized his store. The passenger told defendant to stop the car. He then pulled out a gun and stopped the pedestrian. The pedestrian, on the passenger’s order, handed over his briefcase, wallet and sweater. All of the items, except the sweater, were returned after the "search” failed to turn up any of the goods stolen from the store. The sweater was not returned because it was forgotten in the excitement. When the police came upon the defendant soon after the incident, the sweater was still in the rear seat, where it had originally been tossed. There was no evidence presented at the trial that defendant knew his passenger had a gun or was about to accost the pedestrian, who was mistakenly thought to be a burglar. In fact, the passenger, a friend of defendant, testified that defendant had no knowledge of the gun. The only act performed by defendant was to drive with his friend that evening and stop at the friend’s request. It was defendant who first said that the items should be returned to the pedestrian. Under the circumstances, the evidence was legally insufficient to prove defendant’s guilt of robbery in the first degree. It should also be noted that the record demonstrates that defendant was not accorded a fair and impartial trial. Hopkins, J. P., Damiani, Rabin and Shapiro, JJ., concur.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 44270/44271

STATE OF IDAHO ,

Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v.

MELISSA JO ROGERS BURKY ,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2017 Unpublished Opinion No. 319

Filed: January 17, 2017

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz , District Judge.

Judgments of conviction and concurrent unified sentences of seven years, with three years determinate, for possession of methamphetamine; ten years, with three years determinate, for aggravated driving under the influence; and five years, with three years determinate, for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death

, affirmed

. Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds

, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Atto rney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; MELANSON, Judge;

and HUSKEY, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

In this consolidated appeal

, Melissa Jo Rogers Burky pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine , Idaho Code § 37

- 2732(c)(1) ; o ne count of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death, I.C. § 18

- 8007; and one count of aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substance, I.C. § 18

- 8006(1). The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of seven years, with three years determinate , for possession of methamphetamine; ten years, with three years determinate, for aggravated DUI;2

and five years, with three years determinate, for leaving the scene of an accident. Burk y filed Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions for reduction of her sentences, which the district court granted, retaining jurisdiction. Burky appeals, contending that her sentences are excessive. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 1 14, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

- 15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.
1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
Therefore, Burky ’s judgm ents of conviction and sentences are affirmed.
###### Editorial Note on Part 40

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 40 appear at 71 FR 34520 and 34521, June 15, 2006.

#### §§ 40.36-40.39 [Reserved]
#### BOECK, Respondent, v. SMITH et al., Appellants.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

March 24, 1905.)

Action by Mary G. Boeck against Alfred H. Smith and others. F. Bien, for appellants. J. Marx, for respondent. No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
§ 309.8 Application. ( a ) Peace Corps shall aggressively collect claims and debts in accordance with these regulations and applicable law.
( b ) Peace Corps will transfer to the Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service (FMS) any past due, legally enforceable non-tax debt that has been delinquent for 180 days or more so that FMS may take appropriate action to collect the debt or take other appropriate action in accordance with applicable law and regulation.
( c ) Peace Corps may transfer any past due, legally enforceable debt that has been delinquent for fewer than 180 days to FMS for collection in accordance with applicable law and regulation. (See 31 CFR part 285.)
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 17

- 1061

______ _______________________/

Opinion filed June 6, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Angela Cox , Judge

.

Christopher Scott, pro se , Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel R. Krumbholz, Assistant Attorney

General, Tal lahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.