## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 10-1937

___________ Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc.; * Sanctuary in the Ordinary; Jim Roos, *
* Plaintiffs - Appellants, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. City of St. Louis; St. Louis * Board of Adjustment, *
* Defendants - Appellees, *
* Shari Cunningham; George Hitt; * Joe Klitzing; Irene Soll; John Caruso; * Mary Hart Burton; St. Louis City * Department of Public Safety, Division * of Building and Inspection, *
* Defendants. * ____________________ * * International Municipal Lawyers * Association; Scenic America, Inc.; * Scenic Missouri, Inc., *
* Amici on Behalf of * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: February 16, 2011 Filed: July 13, 2011

___________1 Before the district court, the parties s tipulated to the following facts in their "Joint Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts."
-2- Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ SMITH, Circuit Judge. Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc. ("Nei ghborhood"), Sanctuary In The Ordinary (SITO), and Jim Roos (collectively, "Sanctuary") filed suit against, inter alia , the City of St. Louis ("City") and St. Louis Boar d of Adjustment ("Board") challenging the Board's denial of a sign permit. Sanctuary further challenged the constitutionality of provisions of Chapter 26.68 of the Revised Code of the City of St. Louis ("zoning code") upon which the permit de nial was based. Sanctuary asserted federal and state constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Missouri Declaratory Judgments Act, Missouri Revised Statute § 527.010. It also sought a writ of certiorari pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 89.110, which provides for judicial review of "illegal" Board decisions. The district c ourt granted summary judgment to the City and the Board, finding, inter alia , that the zoning code's restrictions on signs withstood constitutional scrutiny with respect to the Board's denial of Sanctuary's sign permit. Because we conclude that the challenged provisions of Chapter 26.68 of the zoning code are impermissibly content based and fail strict scruti ny, we now reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background A. Factual Background1 Neighborhood, a property-management company, manages the properties of SITO, a non-profit organization. Neighborhood describes itself as a "self-supporting housing ministry that manage s rental housing mostly on the near south side of St. Louis." Roos is the founder of SITO and Neighborhood, and heis also the coordinator2 The City's position is that the object at issue is a "sign," while Sanctuary refers to the object as a "mural."
-3- and spokesperson for the Missouri Eminent Domain Abuse Coalition (MEDAC), a civic organization concerned about eminent-domain practices.

Roos describes himself as a critic of the City's use of eminent domain for private development. Roos and MEDAC, with tenant approval, commissioned a sign/mural 2for the south side of 1806-08 South 13th Street, a SITO-owned building in the Near Southside Redevelopment Ar ea. Roos described the sign/mural as a "poignant way . . . to make a statement." The sign/mural consists of the words "End Eminent Domain Abuse" inside a red circleand slash. The design of the sign/mural is similar to the design that MEDAC uses inits literature, buttons, and other materials. The sign/mural is approximately 363 or 369 square feet in area. It is visible from, among other areas, Interstates 44 and 55 and the Soulard neighborhood.

On April 10, 2007, the City's Divisionof Building and Inspection ("B&I") issued a citation to SITO, care of Neighborhood, declaring the sign/mural an "illegal sign." The citation explained that "[p]ermits must be acquired for signs of this type" and instructed SITO how it could obtain a permit. Consistent with the instructions in B&I's April 10, 2007 citation, SITO and Ne ighborhood filed a sign-permit application with B&I on May 14, 2007.

On May 30, 2007, the City's zoning ad ministrator sent SITO a letter denying its sign permit application because it did not meet certain require ments of the zoning code. The "Basis for Denial" accompanying th e letter stated that the building on which the sign/mural was painted was zoned "D," or "Multiple Family Dwelling District," and identified as the "applicableZoning Code pr ovisions" §§ 26.68.010; 26.68.020(17), (20), (21), (22) and (24); and 26.68.080(A), (B), (D) and (E)(2). A-4- subsequent explanation of the zoning admi nistrator's basis for denial, admitted as evidence at the Boar d hearing, stated:

Appellant has painted a wall sign on th e building at this address. The wall face of the building on which the sign has been painted does not have street frontage as defined in the Zoning Code, and is therefore not entitled to signage. In the 'D' zoni ng district any signage can only be erected, altered and maintained for and by a conforming use and must be clearly incidental to the operation of the conforming use; this property is assessed as a two-family dwe lling. The maximum allowable square footage for any sign within this district is 30 sq. ft.; based on the diameter of the circular sign it is approximately 363 sq. ft. in area. Variances will be required in order to permit this sign.

The May 30, 2007 letter denying SITO's sign- permit application stated that SITO could appeal the denial to the Board, which SITO did on June 5, 2007.

On July 11, 2007, the Board heard SITO's appeal of the permit denial. At the hearing, SITO's attorney argued, inter alia , that SITO's sign/mural does not require a permit because, as a "work of art" or a "c ivic symbol[ ] or crest[ ]," it is exempted from the zoning code's definition of "sign." Inthe alternative, counsel argued that the zoning code's sign regulations violate the free-speech protections of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.

The Board upheld the denial of the si gn permit on July 25, 2007. The Board's "Findings of Fact" stated that the "[p] roposed sign is in conflict with Sections 26.68.010, 26.68.020 and 26. 68.080 of the Zoning Code of th e City of St. Louis." The Board's "Conclusion of Law and Order" stated:

The sign is located in Zone D, the mu ltiple family dwelling district, and the sign is located on a residential building. The sign is substantially larger than the footage allowed by the Zoning Code and it is located on-5- the side of the building in contravention to the requirements of the Zoning Code. Board Member Hitt ma de a motion to uphold the decision to deny the sign permit as the size and location of the sign were in violation of the Zoning Code. The above motion, made by GeorgeHitt and seconded by Joe Klitzing was passed by a 4-0 vote of the Board, with Board member Caruso voting against.

The City justified its outdoor sign restric tions principally on concerns for traffic safety and aesthetics. Neither the City nor the Board is aware of any reports, studies, or memoranda (1) concerning or supporting th e regulation of outdoor signs in Chapter 26.68 of the zoning code, (2) regarding whether the City's restrictions on outdoor signs affect traffic safety, (3) regardi ng whether the City's restrictions on outdoor signs affect the aesthetics of the City or surrounding neighborhood, (4) regarding whether the City's restrictions on outdoor si gns affect property values in the City, or (5) discussing the impact of SITO's sign/mural on the flow of traffic on any street or highway. The City and the Board are unawareof any traffic inci dents in which any driver involved mentioned SITO's sign/mural, or any "painted wall sign," as contributing to such incident. Further, th e City and the Board have no (1) internal memoranda or communications, and no communications to or from them, discussing the adoption or enforcement of the regulations of outdoor signs in Chapter 26.68 of the zoning code or (2) minutes or transcript s of any City Board of Aldermen meeting, including any committee or subcommittee of su ch Board, concerning or relating to the regulation of outdoor signs in Chapter 26.68 of the zoning code.

Section 26.68.020(17) of the zoning code provides that "[i]f for any reason it cannot be readily determined whether or not an object is a sign, the Community Development Commission shall make such de termination." St. Louis City Ordinance 64687 provides that "all functions and duties performed, or powers exercised prior to the effective date of this ordinance by personnel of the Community Development-6- Commission pursuant to any City ordinance shall be performed by personnel of the Planning Commission as assigned by the Planning Commission." The City has no written policy, other than Chapter 26.68 of the zoning code, for use in determining if (1) a sign contains the "symbol[ ] or crest [ ]" of a civic organization, as those terms are used in § 26.68.020(17)(d), or (2) if some thing is "art," as that term is used in § 26.68.020(17)(e).

The City's policies for implementing the sign regulations are contained in Chapter 26.68 of the zoning code.

B. Procedural Background Following the Board's decision, Sanctuary filed suit in state court, challenging the Board's denial of the sign permit and the zoning code provisions upon which the denial was based. Sanctuary asserted federal and state constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Missouri Declar atory Judgments Act, Missouri Revised Statute § 527.010. Specifically, Sanctuary's co mplaint stated that it is brought pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; Article I, § 8 of the Missouri Constitution; The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Missouri Revised Statute § 527.010. Sanctuary further stated that it seeks relief against the enforcement of the zoning code's sign regulations and the practices and policies of the City that allegedly—faci ally and as applie d—deny Sanctuary the opportunity to engage in constitutionally protected communications.

Sanctuary's complaint alleged that (1) the zoning code's sign regulations are facially invalid under the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution, respectively; (2) the zoning code's sign regulations are unconstitutional as applied under the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution; (3) the City and Board exercised prior restraints in violation of Sanctuary's free speech rights under the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution, respectively; and (4) the-7- City and the Board deprived Sanctuary of equal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In its complaint, Sanctuary sought (1) re versal of the Boar d's denial of the permit; (2) a declaration that the zoning code 's sign regulations violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8, of the Missouri Constitution on their face and as applied to Sanctuary; (3) a judgment declaring that the Board's act denying the si gn permit application illegally violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and ArticleI, § 8, of the Missouri Constitution; (4) a judgment declaring that the zoning code's sign regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the United States Constitution; (5) a judgment permanently enjoining the City and the Board from enforcing the zoning code's sign regulations generally and as ag ainst Sanctuary in association with the mural at 1806-08 South 13th Street, St. Louis, Missouri; (6) nominal damages in the amount of $1.00; and (7) attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Sanctuary also sought a writ of certiorari pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 89.110, which provides for judicial review of "illegal" Board decisions. Sanctuary's petition for writ of certiorari requested th at the district court conduct a de novo administrative review of the Board's deci sion. The petition alleged that the Board's decision was illegal because (1) it utilized a facially unconstitutional zoning code to limit Sanctuary's freedom of speech, (2) th e zoning code is unconstitutional as applied, (3) it was an illegal exercise of prior restraints, and (4) it deprived Sanctuary of equal protection under the law.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Board, concluding that (1) the Board's decisi on denying Sanctuary's sign permit "was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlaw ful, or in excess of the Board['s] . . . jurisdiction," and (2) "[t] he restrictions placed on signs in the Sign Code withstand scrutiny under [Sanctuary's] constitutional challe nges with respect to the denial of [its]3 Missouri courts have not decided "'wh ether the circumference of Mo. Const. art. I, § 8 is identical to that of the First Amendment in all instances.'" BBC Fireworks, Inc. v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n , 828 S.W.2d 879, 881 (M o. 1992) (en banc) (quoting State v. Roberts , 779 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo. 1989) (en banc)). For purposes of this appeal, we will treat the federal and state claims in the present case as coextensive.
-8- sign permit." Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, Mo. , 718 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1040 (E.D. Mo. 2010).

II. Discussion On appeal, Sanctuary argues that th e zoning code's sign regulations (1) impermissibly burden free speech, in violati on of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8, of the Missouri Constitution 3 ; (2) effect a prior restraint on its speech; and (3) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Sanctuary also contends that the district court erroneously declined to issue a writ of certiorari and enter judgment for Sanctuary on its claims under Missouri Revised Statute § 89.110.

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie , 456 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2006). A district court should not grant summary judgment "unle ss there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id . "An issue of fact cannot result from mere denials or concluso ry allegations in the pleadings but must be based on specific factual allegations." Id

.

A. Standing As a threshold matter, the City and Boar d argue that the district court correctly determined that Sanctuary may only challenge those provisions of the zoning code that the Board actually applied to Sanctuary in denying the sign permit. See Neighborhood Enters., Inc. , 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 n.7 ("Petitioners may only4 As a result, the district court concluded that "[n]either the definition of 'sign' in the Code, (on 26.68.020(17) ), nor the restrictions placed on signs, (Section 26.68.010 ) infringe or impinge, facially or as applied to Petitioners, their Constitutionally protect ed political speech." Id . at 1036 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

-9- challenge those provisions of the Code which were actually applied to them."). 4 According to the City and the Board, Sanctuary cannot show a causal connection between its purported injury and the provisi ons of the zoning code not applied to it. See Advantage , 456 F.3d at 801 ("Since most of the content based restrictions and procedural mechanisms which Advantages claims violate the First Amendment rights of other parties were not f actors in the denial of its own permit applications, it cannot show causation with respect to them.").

An "inescapable threshold question" is whether Sanctuary "has established the traditional elements of Article III standing." Id . at 799. Federal ju risdiction is limited "to cases and controversies, and the 'core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-o r-controversy requirement.'" Id . (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

"[C]onstitutional standing consists of three elements: 1) an injury in fact which is 'actual, concrete, and particularized'; 2) a causal connec tion between that injury and defendant's conduct; and 3) a likelihood that the injury canbe redressed by a favorable decision." Id . at 798–99 (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560–61). "To establish causation a plaintiff must show that its injury is 'fairly traceable' to a challenged statutory provision." Id . at 801 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Klobuchar , 381 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2004)).

Here, Sanctuary requested a sign permit because the City instructed it to do so. Thereafter, the City's zoning administrato r denied Sanctuary's application based upon5 The relevant statutory sections are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this opinion.

6 The relevant statutory sections are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this opinion.
-10- §§ 26.68.010; 26.68.020 (17), (20), (21), (22) , and (24); and 26. 68.080(A), (B), (D), and (E)(2)of the zoning code. 5 Additionally, the zoning administrator stated that the building on which the sign/mural was painted was zoned "D"—"Multiple Family Dwelling District." The zoning administrator testified that "he reviewed the application for the sign and determin ed that the object in question fit the City's meaning of a sign , as defined by the Zoning Code." (Emphasis added. ) He was "able to determine, based on the Z oning Code, that the object wa s a sign, which then did not trigger the provision contained in Sec tion 26.68.020 17 [sic], requiring the City's Planning Commission to make such determin ation." The Board then upheld the denial of the sign permit because the "[p]roposed sign is in conflict with Sections 26.68.010, 26.68.020 and 26.68.080 of the Zoning Code of the City of St. Louis." (Emphasis added.) Because these provisions were "fac tors in the denial of its own permit application[ ]," Sanctuary can "show causation with respect to them." Advantage , 456 F.3d at 801.

Moreover, Sanctuary "has standing to challenge those portions of the Sign Code which 'provide the basic definitional structure for the terms used in [the violated sections] and which more generally define the scope of si gns allowed by [the violated sections].'" Bonita Media Enters., LLC v. Co llier Cnty. Code Enforcement Bd. , No. 2:07-cv-411-FtM-29DNF, 2008 WL 423449, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting KH Outdoor, LLC v. Trussville , 458 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2006)). Sanctuary's challenge may "include[ ] provisions discussing the purpose and intent of the Sign C ode and definitional sections." Id . (citing KH Outdoor , 458 F.3d at 1267). We may "tak[e] into account other provisions," such as § 26.68.030 and § 26.68.050, 6"that may affect the constitutionality of those-11- provisions" applied to Sanctuary. Café Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns Cnty. , 360 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2004). The City's designation of Sanctuary's purported mural as a "sign" essentially acknowledge s that the alleged sign fits no content exemption under §§ 26.68.020(17)(a)– (e), 26.68.030, or 26.68.050. Bowden v. Town of Cary , 754 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (E.D.N.C. 2010).

B. Free Speech Sanctuary asserts that th e zoning code's sign regulations impermissibly burden free speech. According to Sanctuary, the regul ations "are riddled with content-based exemptions and restrictions"; therefore, th e district court erroneously concluded that the zoning code's sign regulations are content neutral. Sanctuary avers that the content-based sign regulations fail strict scrutiny because, under this court's precedent, the City's interests in traffic safety a nd aesthetics are not "compelling" interests.

In response, the City and the Board assertthat the definition of "sign" in the zoning code is content- and viewpoint-neutral. According to the City and the Board, Sanctuary's argument that the exceptions to the definition of "sign" make the sign regulations content-based fails under a constitutional analys is. The City and the Board assert that because the sign regulations ar e content neutral, in termediate scrutiny applies. They contend that the sign regulations satisfy intermediate scrutiny because they serve the significant and established gove rnmental interests of traffic safety and aesthetics and leave open ample altern ative channels for communication of Sanctuary's message.

The Free Speech Clause of the First Am endment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of sp eech . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. This clause "is applicable to the political subdivisi ons of the states." Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Mo. , 54 F.3d 1400, 1402 (8th Cir. 1995). The Free Speech Clause protects signs, as they are "a form of expression.'" Id . (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo , 512 U.S. 43, 48 (1994)). But "signs 'pose distinctive problems that are subject to-12- municipalities' police powers. Unlike or al speech, signs take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displ ace alternative uses fo r land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation.'" Id . at 1402–03 (quoting City of Ladue , 512 U.S. at 48).

To evaluate the constitutionality of th e zoning code's sign regulations—which constitute a restriction upon speech—"weapply the familiar framework." Id . at 1403. "We first 'determine whether [the] regulation is content-based or content-neutral, and then, based on the answer to that question, . . . apply the proper level of scrutiny.'" Id

. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Ladue , 512 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). We note that "the argument th at a restriction on speech is content-neutral because it is viewpoint-neutral has been repeatedly rej ected by the Supreme Court." Id . at 1405.

The City and the Board "contend[ ] that each challenged provision is a constitutionally permissible time, place, and manner restriction." Id . at 1403. "A purported time, place, and manner restriction is constitutionally permissible so long as it is 'justified without reference to th e content of the regulated speech . . . .'" Id

. (alteration in original) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence , 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). "Therefore, our threshold inquiry for each challenged provision of the sign code necessarily focuses upon whether the provision at issue is a content-based restriction and then, based upon the resolution of that question, we will apply the appropriate level of scrutiny." Id

. Upon review, we conclude that the z oning code's defin ition of "sign" is impermissibly content-based because "the message conveyed determines whether the speech is subject to the restriction." Id . at 1403–04 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc ., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)). Put another way, to determine whether a particular object qualifies as a "sign" under § 26.68.020(17) and is therefore subject to the regulations, or is inst ead a "non-sign" under § 26.68.020(17)(a)–(e) or-13- exempt from the sign regulations under §§ 26.68.030 or 26.68.050, one must look at the content of the object. Thus, an object of the same dimensions as Sanctuary's "End Eminent Domain Abuse" sign/mural would notbe subject to regulation if it were a "[n]ational, state, religious, fraternal, prof essional and civic symbol[ ] or crest[ ], or on site ground based measure display device used to show time and subject matter of religious services." St. Louis City Revis ed Code § 26.68.020(17)(d). "Simply stated [§§ 26.68.020(17), 26.68.030, and 26.68.050] [are] content-based because [they] make[ ] impermissible distinctions based solelyon the content or message conveyed by the sign." Whitton , 54 F.3d at 1404. "The words on a sign define whether it is subject to [the sign regulations]." Id .; see also Soltanic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach , 410 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005) ("In short, because some types of signs are extensively regulated while others are ex empt from regulation based on the nature of the messages they seek to convey, the sign code is undeniably a content-based restriction on speech.").

In reaching this conclusion, we ar e not "required to accept legislative explanations from a governmental entity regarding the purpose(s) for a restriction on speech without further inquiry." Whitton , 54 F.3d at 1406. "[E]ven when a government supplies a content-neutral justification for the regulation, that justification is not given controlling weight without further inquiry." Id . (citing City of Cincinnati , 507 U.S. at 429–30). As a result, "even if we agr ee with the City . . . that its restriction is 'justified' by its interest in maintaining traffic safety and preserving aesthetic beauty, we still must ask whether the regulation accomplishes the stated purpose in a content-neutral manner." Id . "Although [the City's] justifi cation for enacting [the sign regulations] was to curtail the traffic dangers . . . and to promote aesthetic beauty, [the City] has not seen fit to apply such restric tions to" all signs of the same dimensions. Id . at 1407. The City has "differentiat[ed] between speakers for reasons unrelated to the legitimate interests that prompted the regulation." Id . (quotation and citation omitted).7 The City conceded at oral argument that the challenged provisions of the sign code would not pass constituti onal muster under strict scru tiny. Nevertheless, we will independently analyze whether the challe nged provisions satisfy strict scrutiny.
-14- Because the challenged sign provisions of the zoning code are content-based restrictions, strict-scrutiny applies. Id . at 1408. 7

"With rare exceptions, content disc rimination in regulations of the speech of private citizens on privat e property . . . is presumptively impermissible, and this presumption is a very strong one." City of Ladue , [512] U.S. at [59], 114 S. Ct. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[C]ontent-based restrictions on politicalspeech 'must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny.'" Ward [ v. Rock Against Racism ], 491 U.S. [781,] 798 n. 6, 109 S. Ct. [2746, ] 2758 n. 6 [(1989)] (quoting Boos [ v. Barry ], 485 U.S. [312,] 321, 108 S. Ct. [1157, ] 1164 [(1988)]). "For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling stat e interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Ed. Ass'n [ v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n ], 460 U.S. [37,] 45, 103 S. Ct. [948,] 955 [(1983)]. The requirement that a restriction on sp eech be narrowly drawn requires the regulation to be the "least restrictive" alternative available. Ward , 491 U.S. at 798 n. 6, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 n. 6 (quoting Boos , 485 U.S. at 329, 108 S. Ct. at 1168).

Id

. Here, the City's asserted interests ar e traffic safety and aesthetics. But "a municipality's asserted interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while significant, have never been held to be compelling." Id .; see also Soltanic , 410 F.3d 1250 at 1267 (concluding that a city's "asserted interest s in aesthetics and traffic safety" are not "compelling"); cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego , 453 U.S. 490, 507–08 (1981) ("Nor can there be substantial doubt that the twin goals that the ordinance seeks to further—traffic safety and the appearance of the city—are substantial governmental goals." (emphasis added)).8 Because we hold that the challenged provi sions of the zoning code violate the First Amendment, we need not reach Sanctuary's prio r restraint and equal protection claims, nor its argument that the district c ourt erroneously declined to issue a writ of certiorari under Missouri Revised Statute § 89.110. See, e.g. , Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield , 616 F.3d 189, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (" Green Party II ") ("We need not address plaintiffs' equal protection and due process claims, for they challenge provisions of the CFRA that we have struck dow n under the First Amendment—namely, the CFRA's ban on l obbyist contributions and the solicitation of contributions by lobbyists.").
-15- Furthermore, "[e]ven if we were to assume that [the City's] proffered interests in aesthetics or traffic safety were ade quate justification for content-based sign regulations, the sign code cannot withstand strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly drawn to accomplish those ends." Soltanic , 410 F.3d at 1267. The zoning code's sign regulations "recite[ ] those interests only atthe highest order of abstraction, without ever explaining how they are served by th e sign code's regulations generally, much less by its content-based exemp tions from those regulations." Id . The zoning code "offer[s] no reason for applying its [sign re gulations] to some types of signs but not others." Id . In summary:

Although the sign code's regulations may generally promote aesthetics and traffic safety, the City has simp ly failed to demonstrate how these interests are served by the distincti on it has drawn in the treatment of exempt and nonexempt categories of signs. Simply put, the sign code's exemptions are not narrowly tailore d to accomplish either the City's traffic safety or aesthetic goals.

Id . at 1268.

Therefore, the City's "si gn code fails both aspects of [strict scrutiny]: the sign code is not narrowly tailored to accomplish th e City's asserted interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, nor has our case law r ecognized those interests as 'compelling.'" Id

. at 1267. 8-16- C. Remedy Because we have determined that the zoning code's definition of "sign" violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendm ent because of the presence of contentbased exemptions and exceptions, we mustdetermine whether we may sever these provisions from Chapter 26.68 of the zoning c ode or whether we must strike down the entirety of Chapter 26.68 along with those provisions. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield , 616 F.3d 213, 246 (2d Cir. 2010) ( "Green Party I "). "The District Court did not consider the severability issue becau se it held that each of the challenged provisions was constitutional." Green Party II, 616 F.3d at 210. "We therefore remand to the District Court to consider the severability issue in the first instance." Green Party I, 616 F.3d at 248; see also Green Party II, 616 F.3d at 211–12 ("We . . . remand to the District Court to de termine whether the unconstitutional provisions of the CFRA addressed in this opinion are severable from the remainder of the law."); Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach , 574 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009) ("We remand to allow the distri ct court to determine whether the unconstitutional provisions are severabl e from the remainder of § 5.60."); Ackerley Commc'ns of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge , 135 F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that "severability disputes usually turn on fact-intensive inquiries best left to the trial court in the first instance").

III. Conclusion Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

______________________________-17- Appendix

Section 26.68.010 of the zoning code provides:

These regulations shall govern and control the erec tion, remodeling, enlarging, moving, operation and maintenance of all signs by conforming uses within all zoning di stricts. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed a waiver of the provisions of any other ordinance or regulation applicable to signs. Signs located in areas governed by several ordinances and/or applicable regul ations shall comply with all such ordinances and regulations.

Section 26.68.020 of the z oning code defines the re levant terms from the "Comprehensive Sign Control Regulations ." It provides, in pertinent part:

For the purpose of this chapter the following terms, phrasing, words and their deviations shall have the meaning given herein:

* * * 17. Sign. "Sign" means any object or device or part thereof situated outdoors which is used to advertise, identify, display, direct or attract attention to an object, person, ins titution, organization, business product, service, event, or location by any means including words, letters, figures, designs, symbols, fixtures, colors, motion illumination or projected images. Signs do not include the following : a. Flags of nations, states and c ities, fraternal, religious and civic organization; b. Merchandise, pictures of models of products or services incorporated in a window display; c. Time and temperature devices;-18- d. National, state, religious, fratern al, professional and civic symbols or crests, or on site ground based measur e display device used to show time and subject matter of religious services; e. Works of art which in no way identify a product. If for any reason it cannot be readily determined whether or not an object is a sign, the Community Devel opment Commission shall make such determination.

* * * 20. Sign Frontage. "Sign frontage" means the length along a ground floor building front, facing a street or a private way accessible from a street, which is occupied by a separate and distinct use or by the same use which occupies the front of said building.

21. Street Front. "Street front" mean s any boundary line of a premises or parcel of land that runs parallel to and within twenty (20) feet of the right-of-way of a street or hi ghway designated and assigned an individual name or number by the legi slative action of the municipality. 22. Street Property Line. "Street property line" means a common boundary between private property and a dedicated street or alley.

* * * 24. Wall Sign. "Wall sign" means a sign attached to, painted on, or erected against a wall or parapet wall of a building or structure which extends no more than twenty-four (24) inches from the wall surface upon which it is attached and whose disp lay surface is parallel to the face of the building to which the sign is attached. (Emphasis added.) Section 26.68.080 of the zoning code concerns "Signs in zone districts C, D, and E" and provides, in relevant part:-19- A. General. On premises signs may be erected, altered and maintained only for and by a conforming use in the district in which the signs are located; shall be located on the same premises as the conforming use and shall be clearly incident al, customary as commonl y associated with the operation of the conforming use provided, however, that no sign of any type shall be erected or maintained for or by a single unit dwelling. B. Permitted Contents. Identification by letter, numeral, symbol or design of the conforming use by name , use, hours of operation, services offered and events. C. Permitted Sign Types. Wall, window and ground.
D. Permitted Maximum Number. One (1 ) sign for each front line of the premises on which the conforming use is located. E. Permitted Maximum Sign Area.

* * * 2. All other uses. Total signage shall not exceed thirty ( 30) square feet.

Section 26.68.030 of the zoni ng code is entitled "Signs permitted in all district" and sets forth 14 categories of signs ex empted from the sign permit requirement. It provides:

The following described signs are not covered by the rules and regulations set forth below in Section 26.68.060 and a building permit for any of the following described si gns, if necessary, may be issued by the Building Commissioner without th e said Commissioner determining if said sign complies with such rules or regulations. A. Signs required or specifically authorized for a public purpose by any law, statute, or ordinance; may be of any type, number, area, height, above grade, location, illumination or animation, authorized by law, statute or ordinance under which the signs are required or authorized.-20- B. Signs of danger or a cautionary nature which are limited to: wall and ground signs; not more than two (2) pe r street front for each conforming use, or two (2) for each dwelling unit; not more than four (4) square feet per sign in area; not more than ten ( 10) feet in height above grade; may be illuminated only from a concealed light source which does not flash, blink or fluctuate; and shall not be animated. C. Signs in the nature of corner stones, commemorative tables and historical signs which are limited to: wall and ground signs; not more than two (2) per premises ; not more than six (6) feet in height above grade; may be illuminated only from a concealed light source which does not flash, blink, fluctuate; shall not be animated. D. Signs which identify by name or number individual buildings within institutional or residential build ing group complexes and which are limited to: wall and ground signs; not more than four (4) signs per building; not more than ten (10) s quare feet per sign in area; not more than twelve (12) feet in height above grade; any location on the premises; may be illuminated only fro m a concealed light source which does not flash, blink or fluctuate and shall not be animated. E. Signs in the nature of decorati ons, clearly incidental and customary and commonly associated with any national, local or religious holiday; provided that such signs shall be di splayed for a period of not more than sixty (60) consecutive days nor more than sixty (60) days in any one year; and may be of any type, number, area, height, location, illumination or animation. F. Signs in the display window of a business use which are incorporated into a display of merchandise or a di splay relating to services offered on the same premises and limited to: wi ndow signs; one (1) sign per five (5) feet of window frontage; not more than eight (8) square feet per sign in area; ground level windows only; may be illuminated only from a concealed light source which does not fl ash, blink or fluctuate; shall not be animated.-21- G. Signs commonly associated with and limited to information and directions relating to the conforming use on the premises on which the sign is located, provided that each such sign is limited to: wall, window and ground signs; not more than four (4 ) square feet per sign in area; not more than eight (8) feet in height above grade; may be illuminated only from a concealed light source which doe s not flash, blink or fluctuate; shall not be animated except that gauges and dials may be animated to the extent necessary to di splay correct measurement. H. No more than two (2) ground, wall or window political signs may be erected and maintained on each premis es provided that such signs shall not be more than ten (10) feet square , shall not be more than six (6) feet in height; shall not flash, blink, fluctuate or be animated but may be illuminated; shall not be posted more than ninety (90) days prior to the election to which the sign is related and shall be removed within fifteen (15) days following the election to which the signs relate. I. Signs which are not visible fro m any public right-of-way, from any publicly owned land or from any level whatsoever of any other premises; may be illuminated; may be animated. J. Signs displaying only the name and address of a subdivision or of a planned building group of at least eight (8) buildings each containing a conforming use or uses and limited to: wall and ground signs; one (1) per street front; not more than twenty ( 20) square feet per face in area; not more than six (6) feet in height above grade; may be illuminated only from a concealed light source which does not flash, blink or fluctuate; shall not be animated. K. Signs consisting of illuminated build ings or parts of buildings which do not display letters, numbers, sy mbols or designs and limited to illumination from a concealed light s ource which may not flash or blink, but may fluctuate by a change of colo r or intensity of light, provided that each change of color or dark to light to dark cycle shall have a duration of one and one-half (11/2) minutes or longer; shall not be animated.-22- L. Signs giving parking or traffic directions, provided that such signs are limited to: wall and ground signs; one(1) sign per curb cut on the premises; not more than six (6) squa re feet per face in area; not more than six (6) feet in height abovegrade; may be illuminated from a concealed light source which does not fl ash, blink or fluctuate; shall not be animated. M. Temporary signs that only advertise or identify construction, remodeling, rebuilding, development, sale, lease or rental of either a conforming use or a designated land ar ea shall not be required to comply with the rules and regulations, relati ng to signs in their zoning district, unless said sign is viewable from any public right-of-way for a period in excess of six (6) months. If said sign is so viewable in excess of six (6) months, it must be approved by the Building Commissioner as a permanent sign under the rules and regulations set out in Section 26.68.060. N. Signs on trash or refuse containers.

(Emphasis added.)

Section 26.68.050 of the zoni ng code is entitled "Political signs in F through K districts" and provides:

In addition to the signs exempted by Section 26.68.030 permits are not required for the following political signs in the F through K zoning districts: A. Permitted Sign Types of Political Signs. Wall, ground, window and marquee. B. Permitted Maximum Number of Political Signs. Three (3) signs for each premises or designated land ar ea on which the signs are located. C. Permitted Area of Political Signs. No limitation.-23- D. Permitted Maximum Height Above Grade of Political Signs. Twenty-five (25) feet. E. Permitted Location of Political Signs. No limitation.

F. Permitted Illumination of Politi cal Signs. May be illuminated by a concealed light source but shall not flash, blink or fluctuate. G. Animation of Political Signs. Signs shall not be animated. (Ord. 59979 § 18 (part), 1986.)

(Emphasis added.)

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