AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 2, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01083-CV IN THE INTEREST OF D.N. P. AND A.E.P., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 417-50742-2012 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Osborne In this appeal, Mother and Father dispute whether their mediate d settlement agreement (“MSA”) requires Fath er to pay, as additional child s upport, a portion of the annual amounts he receives as a participant in his employer ’s profit-sharing plan. In the trial court, Mother moved to enforce the divorce decree’ s child support provision that incorporates the MSA’s terms. After hearing Moth er’s motion, the trial court rendered a judgment for child support arrearage. Fa ther appeals, contending the trial court’s orde r makes impermissible substant ive changes to the MSA and the decree. Concluding tha t the trial court clarified t he decree in accordance with family code section 157.421, we affirm the tria l court’s judgment.–2– T EX
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. C ODE § 157.421. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.4.
B ACKGROUND Father and Mother entered into an MSA on October 24, 2012. The MSA included provisions for support of their three children: 2. Father shall pay $1357.64 per month to Mother for child supp ort. The first payment shall be due and payable on the [sic] November 1, 2012 and a like payment on the same day of each month thereafter until June 1, 2014, at which time Father shall pay $1131.37 per month to Mother for child support under the contingencies set forth in the Texas Family Code for reduction or cessation. A wage withhol ding order shall issue. 3. As additional child support, Fa ther shall pay to Mother a su m equal to 30% of his net annual bonus within seven days of recei pt for years 2013 and 2014. Thereafte r Father shall pay to Mother a sum equal to 25% of his net annual bonus within seven days of receipt during the period Father owes a duty of support for the two younger children. Father agrees to provide to Mother documentation of his bonus award, by present [sic] to her a cop y of his paystub showing such bonus in the month of payment and a yearend paystub. This agreement was incorporated into the parties’ January 10, 2 013 final decree of divorce: Additional Child Support IT IS ORDERED that [Father] is obligated to pay and shall pay t o [Mother] additional child support equal to thirty (30) percent of his net annual bonus, with the payment being due and payable within sev en days of [Father’s] receipt of his annual bonus each year for 20 13 and 2014. Thereafter, [Father] is ORDERED to pay to [Mother] additional c hild support equal to twenty-five (25) percent of his net annual bon us, with–3– the payment being due and payable within seven days of [Father’ s] receipt of his annual bonus each year thereafter for so long as [Father], has a court ordered obligation to pay child support for the you nger two children. IT IS ORDERED that [Father] sha ll provide to [Mother] documenta tion of his yearly bonus award, by providing [Mother] with a true an d correct copy of his pay stub showing such bonus in the month of payment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED t hat [Father] shall provide to [Mother] a true and correct copy of his year end paystub by no later than January 15 of the following year. In 2019, Mother filed a “Motion for Enforcement of Child Suppor t Order,” alleging that Father had not pai d any amounts in “additional ch ild support” since the date of the decree. She also alleged that Father refused to pro vide the required payroll information. She requested “confirmation of all arrearages and rendition of judgment plus interest on arrearages, atto rney’s fees, and costs.” She a lso requested that Father be held in criminal contem pt, or in the alternative: Movant requests that, if the Court finds that any part of the o rder sought to be enforced is not specific enough to be enforced by contemp t, the Court enter a clarifying order more clearly specifying the duti es imposed on [Father] and giving [Father] a reasonable time withi n which to comply. The clerk’s record does not include a response by Father to Mot her’s enforcement motion. The reporter’s record reflects hearings rel ated to Mother’s motion on April 11, June 20, and August 29, 2019. In those hear ings, Mother testified that Father had not paid any “additional child suppor t” in accordance with the MSA or the decree. Father agreed, but contended he was not required to do so because he has never, in the thirty years he has worked for his employer, received–4– any “bonus.” Rather, he testified 1 that he has received only an annual distribution from his employer’s profit-sharing plan in addition to his sala ry. The parties also offered conflicting testimony whet her Father had provided the a nnual documentation required by th e MSA and the decree. At the conclusion of the hearing on Mother’s motion, the trial court ruled that the decree would be clarified t o carry out the parties’ intent in the MSA and decree. The court explained that the dec ree’s reference to “additional child support” was “considered by one side to be one name and by another side to b e another name,” but the parties intended the same source—the net payment Father received annually from his employer in addition to his regular salary—for the “ad ditional child support” included in t he MSA and the decree. At a third and final hearing, the trial court heard the parties ’ arguments on Mother’s motion to enter judgment for child support arrearage i ncorporating the trial court’s rulings from the previous hearings. The court’s “Judgme nt for Child Support Arrearage” signed on August 31, 2019, provides in part: Petitioner [Mother] made a request that the [January 10, 2013 d ecree] be clarified in relation to wha t the term, “net annual bonus” i ncludes. The Court finds and clarifies that “net annual bonus” includes profit sharing, received by [Father] from the date of divorce through the time Respondent [Father] had an obligation to pay child support for [D.N.P. and A.E.P.].

. . .

1 Initially Father answered all questions by responding that “[o ]n the advice of counsel, I invoke my Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination,” but later i n the hearing gave substantive responses.–5– The Court further finds that Respondent has failed to make addi tional child support payments on his a nnual profit sharing, as clarifi ed in this order. The Court finds and conf irms that Respondent is in arrea rs in the amount of $15,953.56 plus $2,637.78 in accrued interest on that amount, for the period January 10, 2013 through June 20, 2019. Judgment is awarded against Respondent in the total amount of eighteen thousand five hundred ninety-one dollars and thirty-fi ve cents ($18,591.31) for the arrearages and interest. This appeal followed. In a single issue, Father contends the tr ial court erred by making a substantive change to the “additional child support ” provision in the agreed divorce decree “by expanding the definition of bonus to include profit-share.”
A PPLICABLE L AW AND S TANDARD OF R EVIEW Family code section 157.421(a) p rovides that a court may clarif y an order “if the court finds, on the motion of a party or on the court’s own motion, that the order is not specific enough to be enforced by contempt.” T EX
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. C ODE § 157.421(a). A court may not, however, “change the substantive provisions of an order to be clarified.” Id. § 157.423(a). A court may render a clarification order before or in conjunction with a motion for contempt, or after denying a moti on for contempt. Id. § 157.424. As explained in In re V.M.P. , 185 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.): A clarification order is analogous to a judgment nunc pro tunc in that it cannot substantively change a final order. To be clerical in na ture, the error must be one that is not the result of judicial reasoning, evidence, or determination. Correction of a clerical error does not effec t a substantive change in the court’ s order. On the other hand, jud icial error results from judicial reasoning o r determination. Substantive c hange results from correction of a judicial error.–6– Id. at 534 (internal quotatio ns and citations omitted). A substantive change made through a clarification order is unen forceable.
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. C ODE § 157.423(b); see also In re R.F.G. , 282 S.W.3d 722, 725 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). The only basis for clarifying a pri or decree is when a provision is ambiguous. In re R.F.G. , 282 S.W.3d at 725. Wheth er a divorce decree is ambiguous is a question of l aw subject to de novo review. Id. An agreed divorce decree is a contract subject to the usual rul es of contract construction. Id. We construe divorce decrees, like judgments, as a whole to harmonize and give effect to the entire decree. Id. (citing Coker v. Coker , 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)). Our p rimary concern in interpreti ng a contract is to ascertain the true intent of the parties. Id. (citing Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank , 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996)). If, when read as a whole, the decree’s terms are unambiguous, we must give effect to the order in light of the a ctual language used.
Id. But if the decree’s terms are ambiguous, that is, subject to m ore than one reasonable interpretation, we mu st review the record along with the decree to aid in interpreting the judgment. Id.
D ISCUSSION In his sole issue, Father argues that the decree’s additional c hild support provision was clear as to his obligation and did not need to be clarified. Citing Weido
v. Weido , No. 01-15-00755-CV, 2016 WL 135576 4, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 5, 2016, no pet.) (m em. op.), he argues that Mother failed to meet the–7– “heavy burden” to establish the need for a clarification under family code section 157.421. Father also argues that the terms “bonus” and “profit- sharing” are not interchangeable and do not have the same meaning when the decre e is read in its entirety, relying on In re W.M.R. , No. 02-11-00283-CV, 2012 WL 5356275, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 1 , 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). We disagree. Father testified that he has worked for the same e mployer for thirty-one years—apparently for the entire duration of the marr iage 2 —including at the time the parties entered into the MSA and the seven years f ollowing. He testified that he has never been paid a “bonus” by his employer in the th irty-one years he has worked there. Since that is the case, if Father’s interpretatio n of the “additional child support” provision is correct, Fa ther would never owe any addit ional child support despite his promise to pay it annually. Father concedes that ea ch year he has been paid an additional sum in late January or early February from h is employer’s profitsharing plan.
In W.M.R. , in contrast, Father changed jobs after entering into an agree d modification order in which he promised to pay “20% ‘of the net after taxes of any bonus he receives from his employment’” as part of his child su pport obligation. See
W.M.R. , 2012 WL 5356275, at *5. In the ne w job, there was a different pay structure. Id. at *5–6. In the new pay structure, Father was paid commissions that were

2 The record reflects that the parties were married in 1998 and divorced in 2013, and Father testified in 2019 that he has worked for the same employer for thirty-one ye ars.–8– included in his regular wage checks. Id. The trial court rendered judgment for arrearages based on Father’s commissions, but the court of appe als reversed, concluding that Father’s testimony about his new job and the or der’s language supported the common usage and dictionary definition of a bonus as “a premium paid in addition to what is due or expected” or as payment for services “in addition to or in excess of the compensation that would ordinarily be gi ven.” Id. at *6 (citing
B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY 206 (9th ed. 2009) and W EBSTER ’ S T HIRD N EW I NT ’ L D ICTIONARY 252 (3rd ed. 2002)). The eviden ce showed that in the new job, Father’s commissions were part of his regular compensation, not in addit ion to it. Id. The court recognized, however, that Father’s job change resulted in a change in the parties’ initial understanding. See id. at *5 (“Mother’s testimony only demonstrates her understanding of bonu ses in Father’s previous payment struc tures . . . .”). Here, in contrast, there is no job change. The parties’ underst anding, memorialized in the MSA, was that Father received an additional payment annually from his employer (called a “n et annual bonus”), and he would p ay Mother, as “additional child support,” a speci fied percentage of that paym ent within seven days. At that time and in all the years following, the only additiona l payment Father received from his employer was from the employer’s profit-shari ng plan. As the trial court noted, the decree’s refere nce to “additional child suppor t” was “considered by one side to be one name and by a nother side to be another name, ” but the only–9– possible basis for the parties’ understanding was, as the trial court clarified, that “‘net annual bonus’ includes profit sharing.” Nor does Weido present similar circumstances. There, the court determined there was no clerical error in the MSA because there was no evi dence presented that there was any error—either clerical or substantive—in the MSA. See Weido , 2016 WL 1355764, at *3 (“No such evidence was presented to support a finding that the MSA contains an error.”). The court went on to hold that the MS A was not ambiguous in any event; the MSA provided two specific options f or the child’s schooling, and the requested modification was to send the child to school elsewhere.
See id. at *1, 5. This was a substantive change that the trial court wa s “absolutely prohibited” from making. Id. at *5 (“The trial court ca nnot modify the MSA for the parents.”). Here, in contrast, Mo ther presented evidence that t he MSA was ambiguous. Father also argues that considering the decree in its entirety, the parties understood the terms “profit sharing” and “bonus” to have diffe rent meanings. He cites to the decree’s awards in paragraphs H-4 and W-5 to each spouse of any interest in “any profit-sharing plan” or “accrued unpaid bonuses” existi ng by reason of that spouse’s past, present, or future employment. We disagree. “An agreed divorce decree is a contract subject to the usual rules of contract con struction.” In re R.F.G. , 282 S.W.3d at 725. Under those rules, a specific provision such as the “additional child support” paragraph controls over general terms such as th ose in paragraphs–10– H-4 and W-5. See, e.g., O’C onnor v. O’Connor , 694 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (specific language in divo rce decree that court had no jurisdiction over husband ’s military retirement benefits controlled over more general awards of retirement bene fits elsewhere in decree, citi ng “well established rule of construction that the specific language of an instrumen t controls over its general terms”). We must also c onstrue the decree so that no pr ovisions will be rendered meaningless. See Coker , 650 S.W.2d at 393 (courts should examine and consider entire writing “in an effort to harmonize and give eff ect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless,” con struing property settlement agreement incorporated in divorce decree). As we hav e discussed, construing the “additional child support” provision to exclude Father’s profitsharing distribution would rende r the provision meaningless. We conclude the trial court did not err by finding the MSA’s “a dditional child support” provision to be ambiguous and rendering judgment to cl arify as permitted under family code section 157.421. See T EX
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. C ODE § 157.421(a), (b). We decide Father’s sole issue against him.–11– C ONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s August 31, 2019 judgment for child support
arrearage.

191083F.P05 /Leslie Osborne/ LESLIE OSBORNE JUSTICE–12– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF D.N.P. AND A.E.P., CHILDREN,
No. 05-19-01083-CV On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 417-50742- 2012. Opinion delivered by Justice Osborne. Justices Myers and Carlyle participating.
In accordance with this Court’ s opinion of this date, the judg ment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee Bernelle L. Reichle y recover her costs of this appeal from appellant Fra ncisco Jose Pena, Jr.
Judgment entered March 2, 2021