U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

67–801 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–58 

PERSPECTIVES ON THE CRISIS IN LIBYA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 6, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Haass, Hon. Richard N., President, Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 

NY ......................................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ...... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

Malinowski, Tom, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Vandewalle, Dirk J., Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College, 

Hanover, NH ........................................................................................................ 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

(III)

(1) 

PERSPECTIVES ON THE CRISIS IN LIBYA 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Webb, Shaheen, Lugar, 

Corker, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. We convene today to further examine the evolving situation in Libya. 

It has now been nearly 3 weeks, since the international coalition 

began airstrikes against Libyan military targets in support of U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 1973. And I think it’s—certainly, the 

more compelling components—maybe ‘‘compelling’’ is the wrong 

word; each situation is compelling—but, I think that the broader 

dangers of the humanitarian catastrophe have been averted, even 

as some circumstances still continue. And, as we know, civilians 

are still dying. And the road forward really needs further definition. 

So, it’s my pleasure to welcome, today, three very excellent witnesses to help us understand what’s happening today and to think 

through how the conflict might be resolved. 

Richard Haass is a friend of the committee and longtime friend 

of mine, personally. His government service was marked by, I 

think, clear-eyed appraisals of difficult situations. And, as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, he’s been out front, telling it like it is, which is what he ought to do. And we expect nothing less today. 

Tom Malinowski has served in a number of senior positions in 

the Clinton administration. I think he’s best known as the Washington director for Human Rights Watch. And from that post, he 

has been a tireless advocate for human rights, and we look forward 

to his assessment here today. 

And our third witness, Dirk Vandewalle, is a professor at Dartmouth College who has spent much of his distinguished career 

focused on Libya. He brings a wealth of expertise. And we appreciate his presence and look forward to his insights. 

I said last week, and I reiterate, that I do believe we have strategic interests in the outcome in Libya. I’ve always suggested that 

2 

we can layer or tier different stages of interest of the United 

States, from vital national security interests, to a legitimate 

national security interest, to a national security interest, to an interest. I mean, these interests are of varying degrees of urgency 

and strategic importance and value. 

But, there are clearly strategic interests, certainly in keeping the 

hopes of reformers across the Arab world alive, and in making sure 

that the Arab Awakening, which may well offer one of the most important strategic shifts since the fall of the Berlin Wall—depending 

on how it comes out, obviously—but, keeping that moving and 

countering the violent extremism of al-Qaeda. Certainly, a peaceful 

turnover in a place like Egypt, as the result of an acquiescence by 

the military in the face of civilian protests, is far more preferable 

than IEDs, military engagement, and suicide bombers, and other 

violence that has been attached to many of the movements and 

transitions and confrontations of the rest of that part of the world. 

And also, I think there is an interest in demonstrating to the region’s leaders that, when the global community makes up its mind 

regarding a particular shared value, as was expressed in the 

United Nations resolution, that there is a value for people understanding that peaceful endeavors are not going to be met by repression and large-scale violence, where, in fact, it is both reasonable 

as well as possible for the United States to make a difference. I 

think the President articulated those kinds of differences that 

exist, and we need to be sensitive to them. 

Obviously, these uprisings have spread with enormous velocity. 

And that is a testimony to the new interconnectivity of the world 

and the pent-up frustrations of people throughout the region, particularly these huge populations of young people, who have little 

opportunity for jobs or education or outlet, but who are all connected to what the rest of the world is doing and living. 

It’s going to take time for us to fully appreciate this transformation. But, we can agree that this is setting a new direction for 

the Middle East, even as we have some uncertainties about some 

aspects of that direction. Moreover, the United States has important bedrock values that we must uphold. And we also have a role 

to play. It’s a role that differs from country to country, depending 

on those interests, as they are defined, and also depending on our 

capabilities and on the possibilities. 

When it comes to Libya, the President faced a difficult balancing 

act. On the one hand, he had a responsibility to help prevent a 

humanitarian catastrophe; on the other hand, he certainly wanted 

to make sure that the United States did not suddenly start out on 

an adventure that brings us to a place of being bogged down in another ground war. I believe he struck the right balance. And America’s military role, which was limited from the beginning, is diminishing even further now, as we speak. 

There is still a need for robust military protections for the civilian population in Libya, and NATO will take the lead on that. 

Even as we continue to assist the NATO mission, we will also 

apply other means to influence the outcome. We need to use stringent economic sanctions and aggressive diplomatic pressure to help 

convince Qadhafi to transition. 

3 

There have been some encouraging signs. One of his most influential and longest serving advisors, Moussa Koussa, defected last 

week, opening the possibility of new insights into how to persuade 

Qadhafi, himself, to go. Defections are, needless to say, a critical 

indicator of people’s beliefs about where things are moving and who 

might actually ultimately win. And I think that Moussa Koussa’s 

defection was important. 

Yet, despite the best intentions, the opposition is, in fact, poorly 

trained, poorly armed, and poorly organized. They have not proven 

capable of holding on to gains deep in pro-Qadhafi territory. Obviously, they need assistance of one kind or another, and it is appropriate that the international community is working through exactly 

what that will be. 

Libya’s Transition National Council has put forward a commendable political program that imagines a more stable, more tolerant, 

and more democratic Libya. They will need outside support for 

that. And I hope we will have a couple of members of that council 

visit us here in Washington, perhaps as early as next week. I met 

with them in Cairo and have extended an invitation. And I’m confident that they would like to take us up on that at a convenient 

moment. 

So, however the situation in Libya ends, whether it’s with regime 

collapse, total and complete, or a rebel military victory, or an extended stalemate, the process of putting Libya back together will 

be a complicated one. But, it is a task where the United States, the 

United Nations, and the Arab League all have roles to play. 

I might add that, while it is a country of vast size geographically—I think something like three times the size of Texas—it is 

a country of only 6 million people, about the population of my State 

of Massachusetts. So, I believe that, in the end, this will be both 

manageable and not exceedingly costly to the global community. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank 

you for holding this important hearing. And I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses. 

The Libyan civil war continues with little prospect that the opposition will be able to defeat the Qadhafi regime’s forces in the near 

term, even with the backing of coalition airstrikes. 

The President and members of his team have stated that the removal of Qadhafi is a diplomatic goal of the United States, but not 

a military goal. The administration has not addressed specifically 

what its plans are for supporting the rebels or how the conflict 

might be concluded. The President has been silent on what our responsibilities may be for rebuilding a post-Qadhafi Libya. We are 

left with a major commitment of U.S. military and diplomatic resources to an open-ended conflict backing rebels whose identity is 

not fully illuminated. This lack of definition increases the likelihood of mission creep and alliance fracture. 

The President has not made the case that the Libya intervention 

is in the vital interests of the United States. Calculations of our 

vital interests must include the impact of any elective military 

4 

operation on our $14 trillion national debt and on armed forces 

strained by long deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Beyond these resource considerations, the application of American power in Libya is misplaced given what is happening or may 

happen elsewhere in the Islamic world. When measured against 

other regional contingencies, Libya appears as a military conflict in 

which we have let events determine our involvement, instead of our 

vital interests. The sustained security problems presented by Iran, 

which is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and 

Pakistan, which already has one, are magnitudes greater than the 

problems posed by Libya. Clearly, with a combined 145,000 American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and years of American effort 

invested in both, those countries have to be considered a far higher 

priority than Libya. Although Qadhafi could conceivably lash out 

with a terrorist attack, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and 

Yemen, which is the epicenter of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, pose the most intense threats of a significant terrorist attack 

in the near term. 

Politically, the outcome of changes in Egypt, which has a population 13 times greater than Libya’s and is a cultural and military 

power within the Arab world, will have far more impact on the 

strategic calculations of other nations than Libya, with its tribal 

conflicts and idiosyncratic politics driven by Qadhafi and his sons. 

Meanwhile the Arab-Israeli peace process is going nowhere, with 

additional uncertainties in the region being created by the popular 

upheavals in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other nations. In this context, a rational strategic assessment would never devote sizable 

military, diplomatic, economic, and alliance resources to a civil war 

in Libya. 

The President has attempted to link United States humanitarian 

intervention in Libya to strategic interests in the broader Middle 

East, but this link is extremely tenuous. In his March 28 speech, 

the President stated that if Qadhafi succeeds in violently repressing his people, ‘‘democratic impulses that are dawning across the 

region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling 

to power.’’ 

But leaders in the region, as well as ordinary citizens, are making calculated decisions based on local circumstances, not what 

happens in Libya. It is not apparent that any government has 

taken a softer line on protesters because we have bombed Libya. 

In fact, governments and populations in the region recognize that 

a coalition intervention on behalf of citizen’s movements is less 

likely because forces are committed to Libya and because the 

strategic rationale for intervention depended on coalition and Arab 

League support. There will be no Arab League request to support 

the protesters in southern Syria or the Shia in Bahrain, for 

example. 

The White House has emphasized the role being played by allies. 

I applaud any burden-sharing that is achieved. But in a revealing 

development earlier this week, the coalition called on the United 

States to continue airstrikes during a period of bad weather, 

because our capabilities exceeded that of other nations. 

5 

Even if allies do assume most of the burden for air operations, 

the longer these operations extend, the more help from the United 

States is likely to be required. Nor should we assume that missions 

performed over Libya by Britain, France, and other NATO allies 

are necessarily cost-free to the United States. The commitments of 

our allies in Libya leave NATO with less capacity for responding 

to other contingencies. We need to know, for example, whether the 

Libyan intervention will make it even harder to sustain allied 

contributions to operations in Afghanistan. Will allies say, ‘‘We are 

dealing with the Libyan problem, as you asked, but we can’t 

continue to do this without reducing our military commitments 

elsewhere’’? 

Most troubling, we don’t know what will be required of the 

United States if there is an unanticipated escalation in the war or 

an outcome that leads to United States participation in the reconstruction of Libya. 

At our hearing last week with Deputy Secretary Steinberg, many 

Senators raised concerns about these scenarios. The last 10 years 

have illuminated clearly that initiating wars and killing the enemy 

is far easier than achieving political stability and rebuilding a 

country when the fighting is over. The American people are 

concerned about potential commitments that would leave the 

United States with a large bill for nation-building in a post-civilwar Libya. 

The President must establish U.S. goals and strategies with 

much greater clarity. He has not stated whether the United States 

would accept a long-term stalemate in the civil war. If we do not 

accept a stalemate, what is our strategy for either ending Qadhafi’s 

rule or exiting the coalition? Without a defined endgame, Congress 

and the American people must assume U.S. participation in the coalition may continue indefinitely, with all the costs and risks that 

come with such a commitment. 

With all these considerations in mind, I look forward to the insights of our witnesses. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Dr. Haass, if you’d begin, and then Mr. Malinowski and Dr. 

Vandewalle. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY 

Ambassador HAASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you 

again, and Senator Lugar and Senator Corker. And thank you for 

asking me to appear again before this committee to discuss United 

States policy toward Libya. 

Let me just make clear at the outset that my statement and testimony reflect my personal views and not those of the Council on 

Foreign Relations, which takes no institutional positions. 

What I thought I’d do is spend a few minutes on lessons to be 

learned, up to now, and then a few minutes on where we might go, 

going forward. 

And I’ll summarize my remarks, in the interest of time. 

6 

Armed intervention on humanitarian grounds can sometimes be 

justified. But, before the United States uses military force to save 

lives, let me set forth a number of criteria: We need to be sure of 

the threat; the potential victims should request our help; the intervention should be supported by significant elements of the international community; the intervention should have high likelihood 

of success at a limited cost, including the cost to our other interests; and other policies should be judged to be inadequate. And I 

would say that not all of these conditions were satisfied in the 

Libyan case. 

Second, it was, and is, not obvious, to me at least, that what happened, or will happen, in Libya will have significant repercussions 

for what happens elsewhere in the region. Here, I’d associate myself with Senator Lugar’s comments. The dynamics in Syria or 

Bahrain or Egypt, not to mention Iran, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia, will 

be determined mostly by local factors and forces, and not by what 

happens in Libya. 

I also believe that policymakers in this country and other countries made a mistake early on in calling explicitly for Muammar 

Qadhafi’s removal. Doing so made it far more difficult to employ 

diplomacy early on to help achieve U.S. humanitarian goals without having to resort to military force. By calling for his ouster, we 

removed the incentive that Qadhafi might have to stop attacking 

his opponents. It also put the United States at odds with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. Last, it increases the odds that 

many would see the intervention as failing, so long as Qadhafi remained in power. 

A lot of emphasis has been placed on multilateral support for 

this operation. But, let me say that multilateralism, in and of itself, 

is not a reason for doing something. Multilateralism is a mechanism, no more and no less, for distributing burdens. It can add to 

the legitimacy of an action, but it can also complicate policy implementation. Such pros and cons always need to be assessed, but 

multilateral support does not make a policy that is questionable on 

its merits any less so. 

Now, many people have commented on the reality that our policy 

toward Libya is inconsistent with our policies toward other countries. On that, I’d simply say that inconsistency is unavoidable in 

foreign policy. And, in and of itself, inconsistency is not a reason 

for rejecting doing something that makes sense, or for undertaking 

something that does not. Some humanitarian interventions may, in 

fact, be warranted. But, that said, we also have to recognize that 

inconsistency is not cost-free. It can confuse the American public, 

and it can disappoint people in other countries, opening us up to 

charges of hypocrisy. 

Senator Kerry, you mentioned the idea that the United States 

has a whole range of interests, up to ‘‘vital.’’ And I would say that, 

in principle, it is acceptable to intervene militarily in situations 

where we have interests that are less than vital. But, in those 

cases—and I would call them wars of choice—it must be shown 

that the likely costs are commensurate with the interests involved, 

and again, that other policies would not have done equally well or 

better. Otherwise, I don’t believe a war of choice can be justified. 

7 

As I expect you’ve gathered, I did not support the decision to intervene with military force in Libya, but, as the saying goes, ‘‘We 

are where we are.’’ So, where do we go from here? 

First, we have to begin with intellectual honesty here. We must 

recognize that we face an all-too-familiar foreign policy conundrum: 

There is a large gap between the professed goals of the United 

States and the means we are prepared to devote to realizing them. 

Now, anytime there is such a gap between ends and means, 

there are two choices: You can either reduce the ends or you can 

elevate the means. It’s about that simple. And the Obama administration, up to now, has largely emphasized increasing the means; 

hence the no-fly zone to the no-fly zone plus, and now there’s apparent interest in arming opposition forces. 

I would advise against taking this path. We cannot be confident 

of the agenda of the opposition toward either the Libyan people or 

various United States interests, including counterterrorism. Nor 

can we be certain, at this stage, as to which opposition elements 

with which sets of goals might, in the end, prove dominant. Arms, 

once transferred, as we learned in Afghanistan, can be used for any 

purpose. And, as we’ve learned in many countries in the greater 

Middle East, situations, however bad, can always get worse. 

The only way I know to ensure the replacement of the current 

Libyan regime with something demonstrably better would be 

through the introduction of ground forces that were prepared to remain in place to maintain order and build local capacities in the 

aftermath of ousting the government; essentially, nation-building. 

But, I would also add that United States interests in Libya simply 

do not warrant such an investment on our part. 

I also think that it’s important to recognize that there’s little reason to conclude that the Libyan opposition will, anytime soon, be 

able to defeat the Libyan Government. The Libyan Government 

may implode, but we cannot base our policy on this hope. 

So, where does this leave us? It argues for reducing the immediate aims of American foreign policy and giving priority to humanitarian, as opposed to political, goals. This would entail undertaking or supporting a diplomatic initiative to bring about the 

implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, and 

most importantly, to bring about a cease-fire. 

What would probably be required—in order to gain the support 

of the opposition—would be a set of political conditions, possibly including specified political reforms and a degree of autonomy in the 

east. Sanctions could be introduced or removed to effect the acceptance and compliance by the government, or the opposition, for that 

matter. Muammar Qadhafi might have to remain in office for a 

time. The country might effectively be divided for some time. And 

an international force could well be required on the ground to keep 

the peace. 

Such an outcome, I expect, would be criticized by some, but it 

would stop the civil war and it would keep many people alive who 

would otherwise perish. It would create a window for political reform and possibly, over time, lead to a new government, one without Muammar Qadhafi. And the United States could use this time 

to work with the Libyans in the opposition and beyond—in the government, for that matter—to begin the process of building national 

8 

institutions, which will be necessary, and to do so in a context 

without the added burden of an ongoing civil war. 

Let me also add that a compromise negotiated outcome would 

also be good for the United States, as it would allow us to focus 

our resources—economic, diplomatic, military, and political—elsewhere. Far more important than Libya for United States interests 

in the region are Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Iran. But, it is important not to lose sight that the Middle 

East is not the entire chess board. The United States needs to reserve resources for other parts of the world—the Korean Peninsula 

comes to mind—for possible wars of necessity, for military modernization central to our position in the Pacific, and for deficit 

reduction. 

So, let me close with a general thought. Foreign policy must be 

about priorities. As you all know, the United States cannot do 

everything, everywhere. This consideration would have argued for 

avoiding military intervention in Libya. Now it argues for limiting 

this intervention, what we seek to accomplish, and what is required of the United States. 

Thank you again for asking me back. And obviously, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Haass follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking me to appear before this committee to discuss recent U.S. policy toward Libya. Let me make two points at the outset. First, 

my statement and testimony reflect my personal views and not those of the Council 

on Foreign Relations, which as a matter of policy takes no institutional positions. 

Second, I will address today’s topic from two perspectives: first, the lessons to be 

learned from recent U.S. policy toward Libya, and second, my recommendations for 

U.S. policy going forward. 

Analysis must be rigorous. In two critical areas, however, I would suggest that 

what has been asserted as fact was in reality closer to assumption. First, it is not 

clear that a humanitarian catastrophe was imminent in the eastern Libyan city of 

Benghazi. There had been no reports of large-scale massacres in Libya up to that 

point, and Libyan society (unlike Rwanda, to cite the obvious influential precedent) 

is not divided along a single or defining faultline. Gaddafi saw the rebels as enemies 

for political reasons, not for their ethnic or tribal associations. To be sure, civilians 

would have been killed in an assault on the city—civil wars are by their nature violent and destructive—but there is no evidence of which I am aware that civilians 

per se would have been targeted on a large scale. Muammar Gaddafi’s threat to 

show no mercy to the rebels might well have been just that: a threat within the 

context of a civil war to those who opposed him with arms or were considering doing 

so. Armed intervention on humanitarian grounds can sometimes be justified. But before using military force to save lives, we need to be sure of the threat; the potential 

victims should request our help; the intervention should be supported by significant 

elements of the international community; the intervention should have high likelihood of success at a limited cost, including the cost to our other interests; and other 

policies should be judged to be inadequate. Not all of these conditions were satisfied 

in the Libyan case. Such an assessment is essential if we are asking our troops to 

put their lives at risk, if we are placing other important interests at risk, and if 

we are using economic and military resources that puts our future more at risk. 

Second, it was (and is) not obvious that what happened or happens in Libya 

would, or will have, significant repercussions for what happens elsewhere in the region. Libya is not a particularly influential country; indeed, Gaddafi’s isolation in 

no small part explains why it was possible to get Arab League and U.N. support 

for a resolution supporting armed intervention. The dynamics in Syria or Bahrain 

or Egypt, not to mention Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, will be determined mostly 

by local factors and forces and not by what happens in Libya. 

American policymakers erred in calling explicitly early on in the crisis for 

Gaddafi’s removal. Doing so made it far more difficult to employ diplomacy to help 

9 

achieve U.S. humanitarian goals without resorting to military force. It removed the 

incentive Gaddafi might have had to stop attacking his opponents. The call for 

Gaddafi’s ouster also put the United States at odds with much of the international 

community, which had only signed on to a humanitarian and not a political mission 

when voting for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. It increased the odds the 

intervention would be seen as a failure so long as Gaddafi remained in power. And, 

as I shall discuss, requiring Gaddafi’s removal actually makes it more difficult to 

effect the implemention of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 and stop the 

fighting. 

Multilateralism is not a reason for doing something. Multilateralism is a mechanism, no more and no less, for distributing burdens. It can add to the legitimacy 

of an action; it can also complicate policy implementation. Such pros and cons need 

to be assessed. But multilateral support does not make a policy that is questionable 

on its merits any less so. To think otherwise is to confuse ends and means. 

Inconsistency is unavoidable in foreign policy, and in and of itself is not a reason 

for rejecting doing something that makes sense or for undertaking something that 

does not. Some humanitarian interventions may be warranted. But inconsistency 

is not cost-free, as it can confuse the American public and disappoint people in other 

countries, in the process opening us up to charges of hypocrisy and double 

standards. 

It is acceptable in principle to intervene militarily on behalf of interests deemed 

less than vital, but in such cases—what I would deem ‘‘wars of choice’’—it must be 

shown that the likely costs are commensurate with the interests involved and that 

other policies would not have done equally well or better in the way of costs and 

outcomes. Otherwise, a war of choice cannot be justified. 

As I expect you have gathered from what I have said here today and both said 

and written previously, I did not support the decision to intervene with military 

force in Libya. But we are where we are. So what would I suggest the United States 

do in Libya going forward? 

We must recognize that we face a familiar foreign policy conundrum, namely, that 

there is a large gap between our professed goals and the means we are prepared 

to devote to realizing them. The goals are ambitious: protecting the Libyan people 

and bringing about a successor regime judged to be preferable to what now exists. 

But the means are limited, as the President is clearly looking to our partners in 

NATO to assume the major military role and has ruled out the introduction of 

American ground forces. 

Whenever there is such a gap between ends and means, a government has two 

choices: it can either reduce the ends or elevate the means. The Obama administration has up until now mostly emphasized the latter course. The no-fly zone was 

quickly augmented by additional air operations designed to degrade Libyan Government forces. This proved insufficient to tilt the battlefield decisively in favor of regime opponents. 

Now there is apparent interest in arming opposition forces. I would advise against 

taking this path. We cannot be confident of the agenda of the opposition toward 

either the Libyan people or various U.S. interests, including counterterrorism. Nor 

can we be certain as to which opposition elements with which set of goals might 

in the end prove dominant. Arms once transferred can be used for any purpose. Bad 

situations can always get worse. 

The only way to ensure the replacement of the current Libyan regime with something demonstrably better would be through the introduction of ground forces that 

were prepared to remain in place to maintain order and build capacities in the aftermath of ousting the government. As we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, the only 

thing certain about such a policy trajectory is its human, economic, and military 

cost. U.S. interests in Libya simply do not warrant such an investment on our part. 

And it is obviously far from certain whether any other outside party has both the 

will and the capacity to introduce ground forces on a scale likely to make a decisive 

military difference. 

There is little reason to conclude that the Libyan opposition will any time soon 

be able to defeat the Libyan Government. It appears to lack the requisite cohesiveness and skill. The combination of a no-fly zone, bombing, and arming might, however, have the effect of leveling the playing field and prolonging the civil war, leading to more civilian casualties in the process. This would be an ironic result of an 

intervention designed to promote humanitarian ends. The Libyan Government may 

implode, but we cannot base our policy on this hope. 

This all argues for reducing the immediate aims of American foreign policy and 

giving priority to humanitarian as opposed to political goals. This would entail undertaking or supporting a diplomatic initiative to bring about the implementation 

of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 and, most importantly, a cease-fire. A narVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:42 Aug 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\040611-J.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
10 

row cease-fire is probably unrealistic, though. What would also be required to gain 

the support of the opposition would be a set of political conditions, possibly including specified political reforms and a degree of autonomy for certain areas. Sanctions 

could be added or removed to affect acceptance and compliance. Gaddafi might remain in office, at least for the time being. The country might effectively be divided 

for some time. An international force could well be required on the ground to keep 

the peace. 

Such an outcome would be derided by some. But it would stop the civil war and 

keep many people alive who would otherwise perish. It would create a window for 

political reform and possibly over time lead to a new government without Muammar 

Gaddafi. The United States could use this time to work with Libyans in the opposition and beyond to help build national institutions without the added weight of ongoing fighting. 

A compromise, negotiated outcome would also be good for this country, as it would 

allow the United States to focus its resources—economic, diplomatic, military, and 

political—elsewhere. Far more important than Libya for U.S. interests in the region 

are Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Iran. The United States 

also needs to reserve resources for other parts of the world (the Korean Peninsula 

comes to mind), for possible wars of necessity, for military modernization central to 

our position in the Pacific, and for deficit reduction. 

Foreign policy must be about priorities. The United States cannot do everything 

everywhere. This consideration would have argued for avoiding military intervention in Libya; now it argues for limiting this intervention in what it seeks to accomplish and what it requires of the United States. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward 

to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Haass. 

Mr. Malinowski. 

STATEMENT OF TOM MALINOWSKI, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, 

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, 

members of the committee. Thanks for asking me to come and 

speak to you about this subject today. 

I want to start by saying that my organization, Human Rights 

Watch, has been following events in Libya for a number of years. 

We’ve conducted numerous missions in the country. I’ve met, on 

trips to Libya, members of Qadhafi’s government, including some 

of the officials who’ve gone over, now, to the opposition. And we 

have been in close contact, for a number of years, with some of 

these incredibly brave human rights activists, in Benghazi and 

other parts of the country, who have now formed the core of the 

opposition movement. We’ve also had staff on the ground in eastern 

Libya, since the uprising began, observing these events as they’ve 

unfolded. 

There’s been a lot of discussion about how we don’t know who the 

opposition is. And I don’t think that’s quite fair. I think we do 

know a great deal about them. Certainly, my organization has 

known them for some time. And one thing I can attest to you today 

is that this is not just a localized uprising, centered on Benghazi 

or eastern Libya. It’s not, in my view, a classic civil war between 

east and west fighting over control of the center. What we saw in 

Libya, starting in February, was really a nationwide popular uprising against the Qadhafi government. The difference is that in the 

west, except for Misrata, which is still holding out, the opposition 

movement was brutally put down. In the east, they overcame the 

security forces and found themselves, to their enormous surprise, 

in charge of a large amount of territory. 

11 

Now, about 3 weeks ago, we found Qadhafi’s forces marching on 

that territory in the east, where the opposition was still in control. 

Qadhafi said that he would show no mercy to the ‘‘rats,’’ as he 

called them, who had risen up against him in that part of Libya. 

And a humanitarian catastrophe, I think, was clearly imminent. 

The Obama administration and its international allies did act 

just in time to stop that from happening. In my view, this was 

probably the most rapid multinational military response to an impending human rights crisis in history, with broader international 

support than any of the humanitarian interventions we’ve conducted in the past, including Bosnia and Kosovo and others in the 

1990s. 

Now, precisely because the international community did act in 

time, before Qadhafi retook Benghazi, we never saw what might 

have happened, had he retaken that city. And so, it’s not as evident 

to us—we don’t feel what was accomplished, because we didn’t see 

those events unfold. This is the classic dilemma of preventive 

action. 

And so, just a few days into the military operation, we’ve moved 

on to a new set of questions—very difficult, very legitimate questions that others have raised and I’m sure we’ll discuss today. But 

before the debate moves on to those questions, we ought to at least 

acknowledge what would likely be happening in eastern Libya 

today, had Qadhafi’s forces continued their march. 

First, there would have been a brutal siege of the city of 

Benghazi. Just look at the dozens of burnt-out tanks and rocket 

launchers and missiles that were stopped on the road to the city. 

It gives us some idea of what might have been unleashed on the 

people of Benghazi. Look at what’s happening in Misrata today, a 

smaller city that’s holding out against a similar assault. 

Second, we would have seen, I think, a merciless campaign of repression against Libyans in that city and all the others in eastern 

Libya who dared to stand up against Qadhafi. Qadhafi’s long track 

record of torturing and arresting and disappearing and killing his 

political opponents, which we’ve documented over the years, attests 

to that. And I think this would have haunted us for quite some 

time. 

Third, the Libyans who rose up against Qadhafi in the east 

would have felt defeated, humiliated, betrayed by the west. We’d 

have seen many thousands of young men from that region living 

in refugee camps, wandering around the Middle East, feeling 

defeated. I would say that would be an al-Qaeda recruiter’s dream 

and something that we had a national interest in avoiding. 

Finally, I do agree with President Obama, that there would have 

been an impact on events in other countries in the Middle East. 

Perhaps not decisive or determinative, but I think one thing we 

have seen in this whole drama over the last few months is that 

events in one country in the Middle East affect events in all of the 

others. That’s been the whole story of the Arab Spring, with something that began in Tunisia inspiring people in Egypt, which then 

inspired people in Libya and other countries. And I think there’s 

no question that authoritarian leaders would have concluded, had 

Qadhafi won, that Hosni Mubarak, in Egypt, made a very big 

12 

mistake by not killing everybody in Tahrir Square, and that Qadhafi’s survival strategy is the one to emulate. 

And I think, if all of these things had happened, Mr. Chairman, 

we probably would still be talking about Libya today. You might 

be holding the same hearing, but it would be a very, very different 

kind of conversation, a much darker conversation than the one that 

we’re going to have. 

Now, all of that said, even if Benghazi may now be safe from 

Qadhafi’s tanks, obviously his thugs still have free rein to shoot 

demonstrators in Tripoli and other cities in the west. In Misrata, 

the civilian population is still besieged. And, unless a secure humanitarian corridor is established to that city, it’s hard to see how 

the half-million residents of Misrata can endure a protracted conflict. And, for the moment, a protracted standoff does look possible. 

Libya is, for the moment, divided in two. 

But, I think we need to remember the choice that President 

Obama and other leaders faced a few weeks ago. They could either 

allow Libya to be reunified, but under Qadhafi, or help at least a 

large part of the country escape that fate. And by trying to reunify 

it under better circumstances, I think President Obama chose the 

better of those two difficult options. 

And I don’t think we should underestimate the strength of the 

nonmilitary measures that are now in place to pressure the regime. 

The men around Qadhafi, the men who are ultimately going to decide his fate, now know something, after all, that they didn’t know 

just a few weeks ago. They know that their leader will never again 

be able to sell a drop of Libyan oil, and they know that he will 

never be able to retake the large parts of Libya that he has lost. 

And now we have time, which we did not have a few weeks ago. 

How should we use that time? Well, in part I think we should 

use it to help the opposition strengthen its capacity to govern in 

the east so that they are better prepared to play their part in governing the country in the future. They face an enormously steep 

learning curve. As I said, they had no idea they would be doing 

this, just 2 months ago. But, they have been very responsive to our 

concerns. We’ve been in their offices every day for the last month, 

raising all kinds of issues, and they have been very responsive. 

They need help in setting up a justice system, courts, police, all of 

the elements of a functioning state. We ought to be working with 

them on planning a future transition to a constitutional rule of law 

state, talking to them about how to manage oil revenues in an 

accountable and transparent way, working with them to secure 

stocks of weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles that some of 

our researchers stumbled upon unsecured in a warehouse recently 

in eastern Libya, as well as land mines and unexploded ordnance. 

I know there’s been a lot of talk about whether to arm the rebels. 

I think there should be much more focus on sending civilian teams 

to start addressing these and other challenges of governance. This 

is the moment, after all, when the character of the future Government of Libya is being determined. It’s also the moment where we 

have the maximum amount of leverage on the people who may 

form that government in the future. 

Now, in time, I think the opposition forces will be stronger and 

better prepared. Meanwhile, as these extremely stringent sanctions 

13 

take their toll, I think the regime, what’s left of it, will grow 

weaker. Defections will obviously contribute to that, as well. I 

think there’s a very strong argument here for patience and for following the kind of approach that the United States followed, for 

example, in the case of Kosovo, after a military action to protect 

the civilian population in one part of Serbia, followed by political 

strategy that ultimately succeeded in changing the character of the 

larger part of Serbia. 

It’s not going to be easy. We don’t know exactly what’s going to 

happen tomorrow. We never do. But, we do know what’s been 

averted, and I think that’s very important. And I think it’s fair to 

say that had we not done what was done, had we stood aside, we 

would not have escaped the problems of Libya. The United States 

would still be embroiled in the country, enforcing sanctions long 

term, evacuating opposition supporters, assisting refugees, dealing 

with an unpredictable and angry Qadhafi. But, we would have been 

embroiled in a tragedy, rather than in a situation that now at least 

has a chance to end well. 

So, I’d prefer the uncertainties that we face now, all of the uncertainties that you mentioned, Mr. Lugar, which I agree are profoundly important—I still prefer those uncertainties to the certainties we would have faced, had this not happened. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TOM MALINOWSKI

Chairman Kerry, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify today. 

Human Rights Watch has been following events in Libya closely since 2005. We 

were able to send several investigative missions there in recent years and were the 

first international organization to release on Libyan soil a report on the human 

rights situation in the country. We met on numerous occasions with senior officials 

in the Libyan Government, including the Justice and Interior Ministers, who have 

now joined the opposition. We were also in regular contact with amazingly brave 

human rights activists throughout the country who tried, despite constant harassment and risk of arrest, to challenge the Qaddafi government’s repression. Among 

them was a group of lawyers in Benghazi who represented families of political prisoners killed or disappeared by the government, and who were waging what seemed 

like a hopeless struggle to get justice for victims of Qaddafi’s misrule. Now, those 

same lawyers and activists are playing a key role in the opposition movement. 

Many of the activists who have since risen to prominence in the opposition came 

from the city of Benghazi, but certainly not all of them. Indeed, it is important to 

note that what we have seen unfold in Libya is not, as some have suggested, a classic civil war in which factions from the eastern and western parts of the country 

vie for control of the center. What began on February 15 of this year became a 

nationwide uprising against the Qaddafi government. It was joined by the people 

of many cities and towns in western Libya, including Tripoli, Zawiyah, Zwara, and 

Sabratha, where protests were brutally suppressed, as well as Misrata, Libya’s 

third-largest city, where opposition forces remain besieged. In eastern Libya, unlike 

in the west, the people overcame security forces, some of whom abandoned the government side; but this difference does not make the conflict in Libya a war between 

east and west. It remains fundamentally a struggle between a government and its 

people. 

Since the Libyan opposition took control of eastern Libya, we have had staff on 

the ground there, documenting abuses perpetrated by the government before the 

rebels took control, monitoring the fighting and its impact on civilians, and engaging 

with the opposition authorities to ensure that they abide by the human rights principles that they say they embrace, and that they repeatedly say they were denied 

for 41 years. 

We have also tried our best to monitor what is happening in the parts of Libya 

that the Qaddafi government still controls, though we have no direct access to those 

14 

areas. We documented a campaign of arbitrary arrests in Tripoli and other places 

in the west against Libyans who were suspected of supporting the opposition, or of 

communicating with the media or people outside Libya about conditions in the 

country. 

When Qaddafi’s forces launched their counteroffensive against the rebels in the 

east in early March, we feared that much larger scale atrocities might unfold if they 

reached the city of Benghazi and other opposition-held towns further east. But the 

Obama administration and its international allies acted soon enough to prevent this 

from happening. Indeed, though this intervention felt painfully slow to the people 

of Benghazi as Qaddafi’s army bore down upon them, it was, by any objective standard, the most rapid multinational military response to an impending human rights 

crisis in history, with broader international support than any of the humanitarian 

interventions of the 1990s, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. 

Precisely because the international community acted in time—before Qaddafi 

retook Benghazi—we never saw what might have happened had it not acted. Today 

in eastern Libya, there are no columns of refugees marching home to reclaim their 

lives; no mass graves testifying to the gravity of the crisis; no moment that symbolizes a passing from horror to hope. The attack on Benghazi was the proverbial dog 

that didn’t bark. And so, just days into the military operation, everyone has moved 

on to a new set of questions. What is the ultimate objective of the mission—to protect civilians or to remove Qaddafi? How long will the operation last? How much 

will it cost? What happens if Qaddafi holds on, and what follows him if he goes? 

These are all important questions. 

But before the debate moves on, as it must, we should acknowledge what could 

be happening in eastern Libya right now had Qaddafi’s forces continued their 

march. The dozens of burned out tanks, rocket launchers, and missiles bombed at 

the eleventh hour on the road to Benghazi would have devastated the rebel stronghold if Qaddafi’s forces had unleashed them indiscriminately, as they have in other, 

smaller rebel-held towns. The continuing siege of Misrata, where Qaddafi’s troops 

have apparently lobbed mortar and artillery shells into populated areas, opened fire 

on civilians, and cut off the supply of water and electricity to a population of 

500,000, gives us some indication of what might have happened, on a larger scale, 

if they had been able to assault Benghazi. 

Qaddafi’s long track record of arresting, torturing, disappearing, and killing his 

political opponents to maintain control (including the murder of 1,200 people in a 

single day in the Abu Salim prison in 1996) suggests that had he recaptured 

Benghazi and other cities in the east, like Baida and Tobruk, a similar fate would 

have awaited those who supported the opposition there. Qaddafi’s threat that he 

would show ‘‘no mercy’’ to the ‘‘rats’’ who rose up to challenge his rule had to be 

taken seriously. The people of eastern Libya certainly believed him: tens of thousands of them had already fled to Egypt fearing Qaddafi’s assault. Hundreds of 

thousands more could have followed if the east had fallen. 

Of course, we will never know for sure what would have happened had Qaddafi’s 

forces continued their march. But if the international community had waited until 

we knew the answer to that question, any intervention would have come too late 

for the victims of the Libyan Government’s assault on the east. This is the classic 

dilemma of preventive action. It is also why nations and Presidents tend to get more 

credit for riding to the rescue after atrocities begin, when images of suffering and 

death have already been broadcast throughout the world, than before they get out 

of hand. But it is better to act sooner when there is good reason to believe that extremely grave and widespread human rights abuses are likely to unfold. That was 

the case in Libya. 

Another dilemma we face in these situations is that there are always many places 

in the world where people suffer terrible human rights abuses. Libya is far from 

the only country where security forces fire on peaceful demonstrators, or lay siege 

to civilian populations, or imprison or shoot government critics. The United States 

can and should be more consistent in how it responds in such cases, especially when 

the government committing the abuses is an ally. But a military response is rarely 

appropriate or possible. Nor does the international community’s failure to confront 

human rights abuses in some cases mean that, for the sake of consistency, it should 

fail to confront them in all cases. 

In Libya, there were several factors that made a military intervention to protect 

the civilian population more feasible than it might have been elsewhere: there were 

strong calls from the Libyan opposition for such assistance; there was broad international support, including from the Arab League and a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of ‘‘all necessary means’’ to protect Libyan civilians; and 

the military task itself—stopping tanks and artillery on an open road before they 

15 

reached the civilian population of Benghazi—could be accomplished while minimizing risks both to allied forces and to civilians. 

There were also other potential consequences had Qaddafi forces ran rampant in 

the east. Since the self-immolation of a vegetable vendor set off a democratic uprising in Tunisia, which inspired a revolution in Egypt, which in turn sparked challenges to dictatorships from Libya and Bahrain to Yemen and Syria, we have seen 

how events in one country in the Middle East can affect the region as a whole. 

Would a bloody end to the Libyan uprising have doomed democratic movements 

elsewhere in the Middle East? By itself, no. But there is no question that it would 

have demoralized champions of peaceful change, who had such a sense of possibility 

and hope after watching the peaceful protesters in Tunisia and Egypt win. Had 

Qaddafi crushed the Libyan uprising by force, there is also little doubt what lesson 

other authoritarian rulers in the region and beyond would have drawn: That Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was wrong not to have killed the protestors in Tahrir 

Square, and that Qaddafi’s survival strategy was the one to emulate. 

Meanwhile, the Libyans who rose up against Qaddafi in the east would have felt 

defeated and humiliated, and also betrayed by the West. Some of them might have 

continued their resistance inside Libya; others might have fled, ending up in refugee 

camps or wandering about the Middle East. I would note that some legitimate 

concerns have been expressed about recruitment by militant groups, including 

al-Qaeda, in eastern Libya in the past. In our experience, the vast majority of people 

in this part of Libya want nothing to do with terrorism. But it’s easy to imagine 

how groups like al-Qaeda might have exploited the anger and despair that would 

have followed massive atrocities by Qaddafi’s forces while the West stood aside. 

Now, instead, the people of eastern Libya appear to be cobbling together a new 

political identity based on their participation in a movement that professes support 

for democratic principles, and grateful to the international community for the assistance they have received. 

Of course, even if the tragic events I’ve described have been avoided, even if 

Benghazi is safe for now from Qaddafi’s tanks, his thugs still have free rein to shoot 

demonstrators in Tripoli and other cities he controls. Civilians in towns close to the 

front line, like Ajdabiya, have either fled or remain insecure. In Misrata, the civilian 

population is still besieged. Qaddafi’s tanks and snipers are in the city, where it is 

hard for coalition aircraft to stop them. Some aid is just now beginning to come in 

by sea, but Qaddafi forces continue to shell the port, and the people of the city are 

in desperate straits. Unless a secure humanitarian corridor is established, it is hard 

to see how they can endure a protracted conflict. And for the moment, a protracted 

standoff does look likely; Libya is indeed divided in two. 

But not long ago, it looked as if Libya would be reunified under a vengeful despot 

with a long record of violent abuse. Now at least a large part of the country has 

escaped that fate. As for the rest, we should not underestimate the non-military 

measures that the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations have 

implemented. After all, the men around Qaddafi, who may well decide his fate, now 

know something that they didn’t just a few weeks ago: that their leader will never 

again be able to sell a drop of Libya’s oil, or to retake the large parts of Libya he 

has lost. The defection of Qaddafi’s long-time Intelligence Chief and Foreign Minister, Musa Kusa, suggests that these facts are beginning to be understood within 

the Libyan leader’s inner circle. 

When Qaddafi’s forces were massing outside of Benghazi, there was no time left 

to protect the Libyan people or to help them build a future in which their human 

rights would be respected. Now, at the very least, there is time. 

There is time, for example, for the international community to help the Libyan 

opposition strengthen its capacity to govern the parts of Libya it controls, and to 

prepare to play its part in governing the country in the future. As I mentioned, we 

have weighed in with many members of the opposition council in Benghazi. They 

have made their share of mistakes, and not just on the battlefield (including mistreatment of detainees). They face a steep learning curve—none of them, after all, 

had any idea 2 months ago that they would be running much of the country today. 

But when we have raised concerns about their conduct or offered ideas, we have 

found them to be responsive. They are eager for assistance, advice, and training, 

which the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations can and 

should provide. 

They could use assistance in establishing a police force that respects human 

rights, a functioning, independent judiciary, and a system for dealing humanely 

with captured fighters and other prisoners. They would benefit from advice in planning for a transition from Qaddafi’s totalitarian state to a democratic state under 

the rule of law. And they need to hear, clearly and consistently, that the international community will hold them to their professed principles (they should be reVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:42 Aug 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\040611-J.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
16 

minded, for example, that the International Criminal Court will be examining their 

conduct as well as that of Qaddafi’s government). 

The United States and other countries should also be talking to them now about 

how to manage Libya’s oil wealth in an accountable and transparent manner, to 

avoid the resource curse that has undermined democracy in so many other oil rich 

states. Those countries that have frozen the Qaddafi government’s assets should 

consider finding ways of making funds available to the opposition, but on the condition that all transactions are properly audited and that opposition discloses what 

it earns and spends. The opposition should also be encouraged to make commitments now about the future governance of Libya’s sovereign wealth fund. When a 

new government is established, frozen assets should be released to it once a framework is put into place for managing the fund consistent with the U.N. Security 

Council’s affirmation (in resolution 1973) that such assets should be made available 

‘‘to and for the benefit of the people’’ of Libya. 

The opposition authorities also urgently need help in dealing with landmines laid 

by Qaddafi’s forces and other unexploded ordinance, as well as in securing dangerous weapons that could leak to terrorist groups (including shoulder-fired missiles 

capable of bringing down civilian aircraft). 

There has been a lot of talk about whether to arm the rebels and about CIA teams 

running around Libya. There should be much more focus on sending civilian teams 

to start addressing these and other challenges of governance. The State Department’s decision to send an envoy to Benghazi to engage with the opposition is a good 

start. The most important question Libya faces, after all, is not whether Qaddafi 

leaves but what will follow. This is the moment when the character of the future 

Government of Libya is being determined. This is also the moment when the international community has the greatest leverage. 

In time, with appropriate assistance, the opposition forces will be better prepared 

to move Libya toward a more democratic future. Meanwhile, as sanctions take their 

toll, and defections continue, what’s left of the Qaddafi government will likely grow 

weaker. There may be opportunities for mediation as this process unfolds. There is 

certainly a strong argument here for patience. 

None of this will be easy. And of course we do not know with any certainty what 

will happen tomorrow much less a few months or years down the road. We never 

do. But we do have some sense of what has been averted in Libya. 

I think it’s fair to say that had the international community stood aside and 

Qaddafi retaken Benghazi, the United States would still have been embroiled in 

Libya—enforcing sanctions, evacuating opposition supporters, assisting refugees, 

dealing with an unpredictable and angry Qaddafi. But it would have been embroiled 

in a tragedy rather than a situation that now has a chance to end well. I prefer 

the uncertainties we face today to the certainties we would have faced had that 

tragedy happened. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski, very good testimony. 

Mr. Vandewalle. 

STATEMENT OF DIRK J. VANDEWALLE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, HANOVER, 

NH 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you, first of all, for inviting me to testify before this committee. 

In the struggle over Libya, as the fighting moves back and forth, 

the easy part is over. Whether or not Libya descends into a true 

civil war that would pit the west against the east is no longer 

really a Libyan matter; rather, it is in the hands of the International Coalition Forces that entered the fray in the wake of U.N. 

Resolution 1973. 

My talk to you today, Mr. Chairman, is predicated upon the 

assumption that Mr. Malinowski just talked about, that Qadhafi 

will eventually leave the political scene in Libya. And assuming 

that that is the outcome, Libyans will face, in its aftermath, enormous difficulties. 

17 

With virtually all modern state institutions having been eviscerated or neglected by the Qadhafi government, Libya will confront the simultaneous need to restructure its economy away from 

excessive reliance on the state and on oil income; to come up with 

a new political formula that is acceptable to a number of different 

players that have traditionally been antagonistic, but that were 

held together artificially by the authoritarian policies of the 

Qadhafi government; and to create a system of law that serves its 

citizens equitably. 

The United States and the international community, therefore, 

should do all in their power to help create facts on the ground that 

alleviate traditional tensions and fault lines in Libya. 

For all the sympathy the United States may currently feel for 

the opposition movement, headed by the Interim National Council, 

it should be cautious, at this point, about unconditionally supporting it. The declaration the Council issued on the 29th of March, 

A Vision of a Democratic Libya, contains all the buzzwords about 

democratic government and rule of law that appeal to the international community eager to see Qadhafi disappear. 

But, democracy usually only comes at the end of a long process 

of institutionalization that is predicated precisely upon the kind of 

institutional checks and balances Libya has never possessed. If the 

INC became the de facto government, it would be hard-pressed to 

create them ex nihilo, in the aftermath of the conflict. Perhaps inevitably, the Interim National Council’s declaration is a document 

that is, more than anything, aspirational. It contains, as yet, no 

clear vision of how the opposition intends to bring the different 

sides together in a post-conflict situation; how it intends to deal 

with those who have supported the Qadhafi regime; how it envisions the creation of truly national and representative institutions 

that will serve Libya as a whole. 

Genuine support for Qadhafi has traditionally been stronger in 

the western province. The country’s longstanding, checkered history between the two northern provinces harks back to the creation 

of the Kingdom of Libya, in 1951, when the western province, anxious for independence, resentfully agreed to be pushed together by 

the great powers into a single political entity, ruled by the monarchy, with its roots in the eastern part of the country. Ironically, 

history could very well be repeating itself under the auspices of the 

international coalition. And the resentment within the western 

province would be enormous if, once more, a government were created or foisted upon it by an eastern-led rebel movement or 

through the support of the international community. 

This does not mean, of course, that the Interim Council could not 

eventually emerge as a unified political body that represents—truly 

represents Libyan national interests. But, the extraordinary support of, particularly, the United States for the rebel cause should 

certainly allow us to press Council members much harder on some 

of these unresolved questions that will determine how likely and 

how feasibly their vision truly is. 

As the United States continues to find its way eventually toward 

a long-term coherent Libya policy, there are some guidelines about 

a possible involvement in the country’s immediate future that we 

may want to keep in mind. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, our 

18 

military role is somewhat diminishing. But, there are several other 

areas where the United States possesses unique resources Libya 

will very badly need once the fighting is halted. 

The reconstruction of Libya will need to be both integrated and 

systemic, interweaving various social, political, legal, and economic 

initiatives that can help prevent the kind of backsliding that separate efforts at economic and legal or political liberalization, if made 

in isolation, often provoke. 

Because of the evisceration of all political, legal, and social institutions under Qadhafi, Libya will be severely lacking in even the 

basic understandings of how modern representative governments 

and the rule of law work. Our natural impulse will be to insist on 

elections as soon as possible, because that is our tradition. But, 

elections without the prerequisites for a modern democracy in 

place—and here, I think Libya will be found profoundly deficient— 

are hollow and counterproductive. 

With its vast experience of political capacity-building through a 

large number of government agencies, however, the United States 

is in a unique position to help create a sustainable network of civil, 

social, and political institutions that can build the foundations of 

a future democratic Libya. 

Furthermore, the economic reconstruction of Libya’s economy 

after four decades of inefficient state management, cronyism, and 

widespread patronage, could provide a sustained focus for United 

States expertise. Almost 95 percent of Libya’s current income is derived from oil and natural gas. How the proceeds from this hydrocarbon fuel economy are distributed will be seen as crucial by all 

sides in Libya. This will require a number of very creative solutions 

to keep the country unified. The United States could be very helpful in mediating and suggesting a number of ways out of the 

conundrums Libya will encounter in this regard, perhaps by suggesting, as we did in 1951, the creation of a federal formula that 

provides incentives for the different provinces and tribes to work 

together, rather than go their own way. 

In addition, the United States should be proactive in helping 

establish or support those institutions, such as the International 

Criminal Court, that will hold the Qadhafi government responsible 

and accountable for the crimes it has committed. 

But, we could go even further. Since the settling of scores seems 

inevitable in Libya after decades of Qadhafi’s deliberate divide-andrule policies, the United States could establish a Libyan version— 

or help establish a Libyan version of the Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission that brought political opponents in South Africa to 

some kind of understanding. 

Libya is a tribal society. Such societies have very long memories, 

and 40 years of Qadhafi’s rule made some collaboration with the 

regime virtually unaccountable for almost everyone. In thinking 

about rebuilding Libya, any actor who can help prevent the settling 

of scores will be seen as a very valuable interlocutor. 

In conclusion, the challenges for the reconstruction of Libya will 

be enormous. For the first time since independence in 1951, Libyans, at the end of their war of attrition, will be asked to create a 

modern state that provides checks and balances between its citizens and those who rule over them. Four decades of fragmentation 

19 

of the country’s society and the competition for the country’s massive oil revenues will make a consensus around such a creation 

exceedingly difficult. 

Once the euphoria over the future removal of Qadhafi eventually 

would wear off, the hard choices of state-building within Libya lie 

ahead. In a political landscape where citizen loyalties very deliberately never aggregated at the national level, this road ahead will 

prove unsettling and uncertain. And it will undoubtedly provide 

ample opportunities for those who want to obstruct that process. 

To avoid this, the country will need substantial expertise that 

will help a post-Qadhafi Libya to build a new democratic state, to 

reform and develop its badly functioning economy, and to improve 

local democratic governance through a number of educational, economic, and political initiatives. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that Libya’s survival as 

a unified country will depend not only on its own citizens, and not 

only on how its own citizens deal with its longstanding fissures, 

but also on the careful planning of outside powers. The United 

States is uniquely situated to help Libyans address those multiple 

overlapping tasks and, for the first time, to create a political 

entity—to help create a political entity in Libya that all its citizens 

can truly ascribe to. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Vandewalle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DIRK J. VANDEWALLE

In the struggle over Libya, as the fighting moves westward, the easy part is over. 

Whether or not Libya descends into a true civil war that would pit the western and 

eastern provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica against each other is no longer a 

Libyan matter. Rather, it is in the hands of the international coalition forces that 

entered the fray in the wake of United National Security Resolution 1973. 

With coalition support the rebels can resist Qadhafi’s forces and—albeit more 

problematic—perhaps advance into Tripolitania and into Tripoli, displacing Qadhafi. 

This is what most Western leaders want but are constrained to openly ask for in 

light of Resolution 1973. Without the coalition the rebels have very little chance of 

succeeding in the near future, the resulting stalemate effectively creating the conditions for civil war. If the struggle moves westward, the coalition’s mandate to protect civilians becomes increasingly unclear if those civilians are Qadhafi supporters 

in Tripolitiania who ask for no protection—or seek protection against the onslaught 

of rebel forces. 

Assuming the outcome of the ongoing conflict in Libya means the removal of 

Qadhafi, the economic, social, and political challenges Libyans will face in its aftermath will be enormous. With virtually all modern state institutions having been 

eviscerated or neglected by the Qadhafi government, Libya will confront a simultaneous need to restructure its economy away from excessive reliance on the state and 

on hydrocarbon revenues; to come up with a political formula that is acceptable to 

a number of different players that have traditionally been antagonistic but that 

were held together artificially by the authoritarian policies of the Qadhafi government; and to create a system of law that serves its citizens equitably. All of this 

will need to be established in an oil economy that creates all kind of opportunities 

for different Libyans players—individuals, families, tribes, and provinces—to pursue 

their own interests at the expense of whatever kind of new Libya may emerge. 

Strictly speaking, what will be needed is not simply the reconstruction of the 

political, social, legal and economic institutions of a Libya past, but in more significant ways the creation for the first time of the kinds of rules, mutual obligations, 

and checks and balances that mark modern states and how they interact with their 

societies. In light of the traditional antagonisms between different tribal groups and 

between the different provinces and the lack of institutional frameworks to resolve 

differences, governance challenges in the postQadhafi period will be enormous. 

The United States and the international community, therefore, should do all in 

their power to help create facts on the ground that alleviate those traditional tenVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:42 Aug 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\040611-J.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
20 

sions and faultlines. For all the sympathy the United States may currently feel for 

the opposition movement headed by the Interim National Council (INC), it should 

be cautious about unconditionally supporting it. The declaration the Council issued 

on 29 March 2011—‘‘A Vision of a Democratic Libya’’—contains all the buzzwords 

about democratic government and rule of law that appeal to an international community eager to see Qadhafi disappear, and to have any alternative take hold. But 

democracy usually only comes at the end of a process of institutionalization that creates precisely the institutional checks and balances Libya has never possessed. If 

the INC became the de facto government, it would be hard pressed to create them 

ex nihilo in the aftermath of the conflict. 

Perhaps inevitable, the Interim National Council’s declaration is a document that 

is more than anything aspirational. It contains, as yet, no clear true vision of how 

the opposition intends to bring the different sides together in a post-conflict situation; how it intends to deal with those who have supported the Qadhafi regime; how 

it envisions the creation of truly national and representative institutions that will 

serve Libya as a whole. 

Despite the claims that it represents the entire country, the INC so far is national 

once more only in its aspirations. Only roughly 12 of its members are known. The 

remainder, claimed to geographically represent the rest of the country, are kept secret for alleged fear of retaliation by the Qadhafi government. Not surprising in 

light of Qadhafi’s policies, none is a truly national figure who can command allegiance in all provinces and across all tribes. 

Genuine support for Qadhafi has traditionally been stronger in Tripolitania. The 

country’s longstanding checkered history between the two northern provinces harks 

back to the creation of the Kingdom of Libya in 1951 when Tripolitiania, anxious 

for independence, resentfully agreed to be pushed together by the Great Powers into 

a single political entity ruled by the Sanusi monarchy with its roots in Cyrenaica. 

History could well repeat itself under the auspices of the international coalition— 

and the resentment within Tripolitania would be enormous if once more a government were foisted upon it either by a Cyrenaican-led rebel movement or through 

the support of the international community. 

This does not mean of course that the Interim National Council could not eventually emerge as a unified political body that represents Libyan national interests. 

But the extraordinary support of the United States for the rebel cause should certainly allow us to press Council members much harder on some of these unresolved 

questions that will determine how likely and feasible their vision truly is. 

As the United States continues to find its way toward a long-term, coherent Libya 

policy, there are some guidelines about a possible involvement in the country’s immediate future we may want to keep in mind. We should first of all realize that 

in a post-conflict Libya we will encounter a country that is not only torn and traumatized by multiple, deep-seated social and economic divisions—but also a country 

that will, as part of its historical legacies, be extremely reluctant to see any outside 

power establish a powerful presence. 

How then should we deal with a post-Qadhafi Libya? How can the United States 

play a productive role in Libya’s future without jeopardizing its standing among the 

different family, tribal, and provincial factions that will inevitably reemerge in a 

country where Qadhafi violently suppressed all rivalries and divisions for over four 

decades? 

There are in fact several areas where the United States possesses unique resources Libya will badly need once the fighting is halted. The reconstruction of 

Libya will need to be both integrated and systemic, interweaving various social, 

political, legal, and economic initiatives that can help prevent the kind of backsliding that disparate efforts at economic and legal reform or political liberalization 

if made in isolation often provoke. 

Because of the evisceration of all political, legal, and social institutions under 

Qadhafi, Libya will be severely lacking in even the basic understandings of how 

modern, representative governments and the rule of law work. Our natural impulse 

will be to insist on elections, as soon as possible. But elections without the prerequisites for a modern democracy in place—and here Libya will be found profoundly deficient—are hollow and counterproductive. Libyans are unlikely to be impressed with calls for early elections in a country where justice and the most basic 

checks and balances to make a democratic system work are not yet in place. With 

its vast experience of political capacity-building through a large number of government agencies, however, the United States is in a unique position to help create a 

sustainable network of civil, social, and political institutions that can build the foundations of a future, democratic Libya. 

Furthermore, the economic reconstruction of Libya’s economy after four decades 

of inefficient state management, cronyism, and widespread patronage could provide 

21 

a sustained focus for United States expertise. Almost 95 percent of Libya’s current 

income is derived from oil and natural gas. How the proceeds from this hydrocarbon-fueled economy are distributed will be seen as crucial by all sides. 

This will require a number of creative solutions to keep the country unified. The 

United States could be helpful in mediating and suggesting a number of ways out 

of the conundrums Libya will encounter in this regard—perhaps by suggesting a 

federal formula that provides incentives for the different provinces and tribes to 

work together rather than go their own way. A more diversified and decentralized 

economy will make the reappearance of a dictator less likely: it is precisely the unchecked centralization and spending of revenues in oil economies that often sustain 

authoritarian governments through intricate patronage systems managed from the 

center. A carefully balanced federal formula once more would prove immensely helpful in this regard. 

In addition, the United States should be proactive in helping establish or support 

those institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, that will hold the 

Qadhafi regime responsible and accountable for the crimes it has committed against 

its own citizens. But we could go even further. Since the settling of scores seems 

inevitable in Libya after decades of Qaddafi’s deliberate divide-and-rule policies, the 

United States could help establish a Libyan version of the Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission that brought political opponents in South Africa to some kind of understanding. Libya is a tribal society; such societies have long memories, and 40 years 

of Qadhafi’s rule made some collaboration with the regime virtually unavoidable for 

almost everyone. In thinking about rebuilding Libya, any actor who can help prevent the settling of scores will be seen as a valuable interlocutor. 

In conclusion, the challenges for the reconstruction of Libya will be enormous. For 

the first time since its independence in 1951, Libyans at the end of their war of attrition will be asked to create a modern state—that provides checks and balances 

between its citizens and those who rule over them. Four decades of fragmentation 

of the country’s society and the competition for the country’s massive oil reserves 

will make a consensus around such a creation exceedingly difficult. 

Once the euphoria over the future removal of Qadhafi wears off, the hard tasks 

of state-building within Libya lie ahead. In a political landscape where citizen loyalties were deliberately never aggregated at the national level, this road ahead will 

prove unsettling and uncertain. It will undoubtedly provide ample opportunities for 

those who want to obstruct that process. 

To avoid this, the country will need substantial expertise that will help a postQaddafi Libya start to build a new, democratic state, to reform and develop its badly 

functioning economy, and to improve local democratic governance through a number 

of educational, economic, and political initiatives. Libya’s survival as a unified country will not only depend on how its own citizens deal with its longstanding fissures 

but also on the careful planning of outside powers. The United States is uniquely 

situated to help Libyans address exactly those multiple, overlapping tasks, and, for 

the first time, create a political entity in Libya that all its citizens can truly subscribe to. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Very thoughtful and helpful. And I’m going to pick up in a moment on some of the questions. 

Let me begin my comments before I ask any questions. I just 

want to—I was just telling Senator Lugar, I tried to call him the 

other night; he was obviously out celebrating. But, I wanted to 

wish him, and I think everybody on the committee wants to join 

in wishing him, many happy returns on his birthday that he celebrated just a couple of days ago. So, we join in doing that. Ageless. 

We won’t mention numbers. [Laughter.] 

Let me just say a word about a political reality. You know, I’ve 

listened to these debates, now, on this committee for 27 years; and 

my friend, here, for longer than me. And there’s kind of a pattern 

to them, in a way, exacerbated since, frankly, Clinton and Bosnia, 

where there seems to be sort of an automatic—that one President 

of one party does this, everybody’s against, there; and if somebody 

else does that, everybody’s against, over here. And I’m not sure our 

foreign policy is as well served by that. 

I can guarantee everybody—I guarantee you, that, sure as I am 

sitting here today, that if President Obama had simply turned his 

22 

back on the Arab League and Gulf States’ request and on the opposition’s request, and we sat here, and CNN and everybody was consumed with the slaughter in Benghazi, we would be hearing how 

weak the President is, how feckless our policy was, and how completely without regard to American values this moment was, and 

the administration was, with respect to Libya. I just guarantee you. 

We already heard some of that about the timeframe that it took. 

And people were warming up, ready to go even further, had the 

Arab League not changed the equation. 

Now, a bunch of us, in talking about this at the outset, said, ‘‘We 

don’t do it unilaterally. We can’t do it unilaterally. It would be inappropriate, for any number of reasons,’’ and suggested that the 

predicate had to be the United Nations first; Arab League, African 

Union, GCC, some combination thereof. Then, lo and behold, we 

actually got all of them. They all stepped up and said, ‘‘You’ve got 

to do this.’’ 

Now, imagine—I just want people to imagine the hue and cry, 

had we done nothing, in the face of all of those pleas. Moreover, 

there are a million and a half guestworker Egyptians in Libya who 

were at significant risk. People seem to be forgetting that. And the 

Egyptians, who we have supported openly and are invested in, 

were significantly concerned about what might happen to them, in 

terms of hostage-taking and/or other things that might have followed. Moreover, we would be engaged in a massive refugee exculpatory, sort of, who-lost-Libya debate, combined with, ‘‘How are we 

going to deal with all these refugees, and what’s our response going 

to be?’’ 

I think it’s hard to suggest that, even with a stalemate, if that’s 

where we are—and I want to come back to that in a minute—that, 

with a Qadhafi who can’t sell his oil, with a Qadhafi who has a 

divided country, with an opposition that is now in a position where 

they know this army cannot move on them in their part of the 

country, you have a very different equation, with a battle—a legitimate battle for the hearts and minds and future of the country, 

which we’ve encouraged in many parts of the world, and we would 

love to see, openly. We’d give our eyetooth to have that in Iran 

tomorrow. So, it seems to me that we’ve got to sort of put this into 

honest discussion. 

Now, Mr. Vandewalle, you’ve sort of begun with an assumption 

about Qadhafi’s departure. And I want to ask you, is that because 

you believe it is an inevitability or you think that’s the only working place from which you can start? 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Mr. Chairman, I think, in the end, it is an inevitability; in part, because—for some of the reasons that Mr. 

Malinowski also spelled out, but I think, increasingly, the options 

for the regime are becoming smaller and smaller as its financial resource base diminishes, as eventually we will likely see more defections. I do think the defection of Moussa Koussa was a very important one, and it certainly will be watched among some of the top 

Libyan policymakers. 

But—so, the bottom line for me is that, overall, I think the options for the regime are narrowing very gradually over time. And 

I simply think, even though there is still a good amount of support 

within the western part of the country, I simply don’t think there 

23 

is enough momentum to that left to really overcome what I see as 

a kind of—a very steady, but slowly growing, support for the rebels 

out east. 

So, in the end, I think it will be a matter of one power block 

against another power block. And I see the western power block, 

meaning Qadhafi, steadily losing its momentum. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Malinowski, do you want to comment on 

that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, I agree with that. The one thing that we 

didn’t have a few weeks ago was time. We were literally hours from 

seeing Qadhafi, essentially, win, retake Benghazi. And then, I 

think, it would have been game over, in terms of building the kind 

of future in Libya that we would have wanted to see. 

Now there is time. And I don’t think time is Qadhafi’s friend. 

Because with time, again, as you said, his resource base will dry 

up. He has what he has. But, everybody around him knows that 

once that’s gone, there will be nothing left. They know that he’s not 

going to be able to retake eastern Libya. So if you believe in Libya 

being a unified country again, you know that the only way that can 

happen is if there is a different kind of government in Tripoli. 

So, I think with patience that the objective will likely be 

achieved. And we shouldn’t lose our nerve. We ought to believe in 

ourselves and believe that the influence that the United States and 

this remarkable international coalition can bring to bear will not 

be insignificant in the end. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason—I ask this of any of you— we have frozen $31–$33 billion of Qadhafi’s assets that we have 

access to and capacity to freeze. That’s a lot of money. And that 

money can, in fact, go to pay for a lot of this operation and/or a 

lot of the rebuild, can it not? 

Mr. Vandewalle. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Indeed, it could. It certainly could. Thirty billion dollars would go—an enormous amount. On the other hand, we 

should also not forget that the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Libya and 

the National Reserves of Libya probably total about $170 billion, 

which makes that number almost—not quite marginal, but at least 

diminishes it. And that money is still under control of the Qadhafi 

government. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. So, it—you know, it—as Mr. Malinowski said, 

you know, he could sit this out for a while. And I think we’ll have 

to be patient. 

But, eventually, also, and one of the things I didn’t stress in response to your initial question, the fact that Qadhafi remains in 

power, in a sense, also occurs because he has created around himself this kind of aura, in a sense, of invincibility, the fact that he 

truly is the leader of Libya, that nothing really happens without 

him. And that kind of creation of a myth, if you want to, around 

him has been a very powerful mechanism to keep him in power. 

As his resources, again, diminish, as some of the money that is 

being used from that $30 billion, presumably to aid the east and 

so on, I think the stature of Qadhafi, particularly among those that 

support him, would, again, be dramatically undercut in the 

longrun. 

24 

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage did you say, of the total revenues of Libya, are oil? 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. It’s about—in terms of current income, it’s 

about 95 percent. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ninety-five percent is oil. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. I’d like to raise the general question of when the 

United States should become involved in the civil war of another 

country. Now, in this specific case, the thought has been that we 

are implementing a response on the basis of important humanitarian concerns. But, whatever that justification may have been, it 

came as a result of people fighting each other in Libya. And terrible things happen in civil wars. It may very well be that, in civil 

wars that have occurred elsewhere in the world, people might have 

suggested intervention at some point to save a lot of lives; or simply to terminate the civil war, for example. But, I simply question, 

to begin with, the premise that the United States should become 

involved in a civil war. And I would like comment, by any of you, 

on that general premise. 

Ambassador HAASS. I will respond to that, Senator Lugar. I’m 

sympathetic to what you’re saying. We can’t roll back history, and 

we can’t know how things would have turned out, had we not done 

certain things. But, I’m unpersuaded, which many people assert, 

that it was a known fact that a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe was imminent. I don’t claim to be the world’s living expert 

on Libyan society; Professor Vandewalle knows a lot more. But 

when I look at Libya, I haven’t seen any large-scale massacres 

in that country. I don’t see the soot of ethnic division, say, in a 

Rwanda that we had between Hutus and Tutsis. I don’t see anything like that in Libya. 

Qadhafi’s approach to the rebels was that they were politically 

opposing him. It was not a tribally based or an ethnically based situation; it was a civil war. And people take up arms in civil wars, 

and people who take up the arms kill and get killed. And civil wars 

tend to be, as we know from our own country’s experience, the most 

brutal sort of encounters. 

But, before we intervene, we have to be sure humanitarian catastrophes on a scale beyond what one would normally expect to come 

from fighting in a civil war are imminent. We also have to ask ourselves, Do we have other tools that we think could do some good? 

And I don’t think the United States adequately explored what we 

could accomplish through diplomatic means to prevent this situation from unfolding. And I don’t think we’ve persuaded ourselves 

that our intervention will necessarily make a bad situation better. 

There’s a lot of history that suggests intervention in civil wars prolongs them. And we might be seeing that here. And, as a result, 

an awful lot of people could be killed, and indeed will be killed, if 

this civil war goes on for months or even longer. 

So, you’ve got to look at these situations on a case-by-case basis. 

We do end up with an inconsistent policy. I don’t think we can 

have a one-size-fits-all policy here. But, I’d be wary of taking too 

many lessons from the Libya case—any more, Senator, than from 

25 

the Bosnia case—in setting up a foreign policy construct based on 

it. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Malinowski, do you have an idea? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, maybe this is a semantic question, but 

it’s not a insignificant semantic question. 

I’m not entirely comfortable with the use of the term ‘‘civil war’’ 

in this case. To me, a civil war is a struggle between two political 

factions or ethnic factions, maybe representing different parts of a 

country, for political control of the center. And I think, superficially, it does look that way, because of the phenomenon I described, that the protest movement in the west was beaten through 

brute force, and brute force didn’t work in the east; and so, you 

ended up with the opposition in control of territory. 

And so, it sort of looks like east versus west. But, this was a 

nationwide rising against Qadhafi—in Tripoli; in Zawiyah, as we 

saw, the city that held out for quite some time, where people were 

brutally put down; in Misrata, which is a western city, where people are still holding out. So, to me, it doesn’t really feel like ‘‘civil 

war’’ is the right terminology. 

Bosnia was much more of a civil war. And, as you recall, Senator 

Lugar, those who opposed any humanitarian intervention in Bosnia 

stressed that aspect of it. You know, they argued, ‘‘This is a complicated civil war between people who have been at each other’s 

throats for hundreds and hundreds of years. And we’ll never be 

able to resolve it.’’ And, in the end, I think a lot of us felt—I believe 

you felt—that it was important, in that case, for both humanitarian 

and strategic reasons, despite all of those complexities, to intervene 

on behalf of a besieged civilian population. And it was successful. 

When do you do it? I think Mr. Haass laid out a number of very 

good conditions. And I think I essentially agree with his conditions. 

We disagree on whether those conditions were met in the Libya 

case, or not. I also agree with him that perfect consistency is impossible to achieve. At the end of the day, where I come down is, 

you can’t do this in every case, even in every case where our moral 

values and our strategic interests are implicated. But, just because 

we can’t help everybody, everywhere, doesn’t mean that, for the 

sake of consistency, we should help nobody, nowhere. This was a 

case where it was possible to do something. And I think the situation we’d be talking about right now would be far, far worse, far 

darker, had we not done what we did. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just leap ahead for a moment to the fact 

that we are, apparently, implementing a humanitarian response. 

Now, at the onset, would it not have been appropriate for the President to say, ‘‘This is my plan for Libya,’’ and then provide some detail regarding manner in which our Armed Forces would be used 

and the nature of our long-term involvement in the country? 

Essentially, the Iraq situation comes to mind, where, clearly, the 

dictator was overthrown fairly rapidly, but then our stated reason 

for the use of military force shifted from the regime’s possession of 

weapons of mass destruction to building a model democratic state 

in the Middle East. And 8 years later, we have achieved that, I 

hope. But, a lot of people are suggesting that we should not be so 

fast about withdrawing the troops because it may undercut whatever progress has been made. 

26 

In other words, it just seems to me that we’re still in a situation 

that started with the humanitarian affair, but continues, day by 

day, improvised, without any particular congressional approval, or 

approval of the rest of the Nation, except for polls that ask, ‘‘Do 

you think the President is handling the situation in Libya correctly 

or incorrectly,’’ and so forth. What is the proper course now for the 

President, for the Congress, and for the country in terms of our foreign policy in Libya? 

Ambassador HAASS. Let me just say that we are looking at an 

enormous set of needs emanating from Libya. There’s actually 

some consensus on this panel, if not on how we got to where we 

are, about the future. You are looking at a country that essentially 

lacks national institutions, has tremendous resources, but these 

resources never really have been put to the use of the country. 

You are going to need, whether the country is unified or not, 

whether Qadhafi’s there or not, some sort of an international physical presence, boots on the ground. Whether it’s peacekeeping or 

aggravated peacekeeping, I don’t think we know. It could be a mixture of the two. 

I predict you are looking at an enormous multiyear effort to help 

this country essentially become a functioning country. Otherwise, 

I think we are looking at the potential that Libya begins to take 

on shades of Yemen, a country with significant ungoverned spaces, 

ongoing fighting, a strategic nightmare for ourselves, as well as, 

potentially, a humanitarian and political and economic nightmare 

for the people there. I don’t think the world has begun to wrap 

itself around that. 

But you have a resolution, as you know, in 1973, that specifically 

precludes an international force. People have not begun a serious 

conversation about who’s going to maintain order in the country, 

much less, if and when order is secured, how are we going to 

undertake the process of rebuilding. 

There are enormous Libyan assets, but, in Iraq, we saw that 

the fact that you have national assets doesn’t necessarily automatically translate into a neat funding mechanism for international 

activities. 

So, my hunch is we haven’t really begun, what, in military jargon, would be the ‘‘phase 4’’ part of this. And I think we are looking 

at a multiyear effort that’s going to require a large international 

role. People have not begun to plan for it, as I can tell, and have 

not begun to politically prepare their own publics for it. NATO 

hasn’t in any way transitioned to that; the Arab League hasn’t. So, 

my hunch is, the debate is not even close to being where it’s going 

to need to be, Senator. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just before I recognize Senator Shaheen, I might 

just say quickly that I think that’s a very, very good point—several 

points—with respect to what’s needed, et cetera. I would point out 

that Secretary Rumsfeld promised us that the Iraqi oil was going 

to pay for the war. And there was—very little effort has been made 

to, in fact, translate that into reality. I see no reason why, with respect to Libya, if you had $170 bil- lion in reserves and $30 billion in seized assets and a continuing 

revenue stream of some 95 percent of its country’s revenue—this 

27 

is an oil-rich country, and the notion that they could not take some 

designated component of that, as a prerequisite to any of these 

developmental efforts, is beyond my comprehension. It should be 

insisted on and absolutely guaranteed. 

So, I think there’s a way forward. And we should welcome the 

opportunity, with a readily paid-for capacity, to, in fact, help another country on the African Continent develop the kinds of institutions and capacity that will help us all, I think, in the longrun. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, to all of our panelists, for being here. 

I have to start with Dr. Vandewalle, since he’s a Dartmouth professor and I always like to recognize people from my home State 

of New Hampshire. So, thank you very much. It’s great to have you 

here. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. My pleasure. 

Senator SHAHEEN. One of the things you talked about in your 

testimony is that there is the potential for history to repeat itself. 

And you pointed out that Libya was really created sort of artificially, back in 1951, when the provinces were pushed together. 

Given that, given the obvious continued separateness of the east 

and west, would it be better for us not to try and maintain a unified Libya? 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. There are several people who make exactly 

that—you know, put forward exactly that argument, that, in a 

sense, you know, Libya was pushed together for, essentially, strategic purposes in 1951, and that certainly the two provinces, from 

an economic point of view, could both survive on their own. Both 

have their own oil fields. The eastern province would be relatively 

richer off than the western province would be. But, it certainly 

would be possible, from an economic point of view. 

The big question, of course, is whether or not that is still acceptable—a kind of a separation down the road is still acceptable to 

Libyans, themselves. And despite the kind of weak national idea 

that I’ve depicted in my presentation to this committee this morning, my argument would be that I don’t think Libyans would want 

to see their country divided, that they truly want to keep it together, despite the differences that exist, and would really like to 

move forward again as a unified country that could share the oil, 

that could share the infrastructure for the oilfields, and so on. 

So, in a sense, I think we shouldn’t be supporting any kind of 

solution—and, in a sense, we are, by leaning one way or the other 

in this international coalition, but we shouldn’t be supporting any 

movement forward that would lead to a separation of Libya. 

And hence, also, while I was a little skeptical of the Interim 

Council that we’ve—what they have produced so far, yes, there is 

all kinds of very nice descriptions of a unified Libya, and so on, in 

the document—that two-page document that they have produced, 

but I don’t sense any kind of real thought having been given yet 

to what that really means on the ground. And one of the things 

that it’s going to mean is somehow you’ve got to come up with a 

formula to divide oil proceeds in Libya. And that needs to be more 

or less shared equally. Indeed, one of the reasons that led to this 

upheaval was the fact that it was not shared equally, that the 

28 

western province had profited quite extraordinarily, at the expense 

of the eastern province. 

So, as long as that is not there, I think we should be a little bit 

skeptical of the transitional council. But, in the end, I think, if it 

proves that it truly wants a national union again of Libya, and that 

it can bring in partners from the west of the country, I think it 

would certainly be the preferred solution for Libyans, themselves, 

to keep the country unified. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. You say that there are only certain members of the Interim Council that we really have identified 

and know who they are. Mr. Malinowski testified that we do, in 

fact, know a lot more about the opposition than popular media reports would suggest. One of the concerns that’s been raised about— 

by a number of our military leaders has been potential ties to terrorist groups. 

Can you all talk about who these opposition leaders are and 

what we do really know about them, and whether they do have— 

or we believe they have ties to terrorist organizations? 

And I’ll ask you to go first, and then maybe—— 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Sure. 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. Mr. Malinowski and Dr. Haass. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Senator, we know relatively little about the 

Council. We know there are 31 members on it, according to their 

own self-description. Of those 31, we roughly know 12, including a 

couple of military commanders, at this particular point in time. 

I had a conversation with a contact person in London, where I 

pressed them—and I should say, as backup, first of all, that I’ve 

watched Libya on and off now for 25 years. And, of the people that 

were on the National Council, there were probably two or three 

that I recognized, that were truly recognizable, as a national—as 

national figures. When I pressed the person in London on what the 

committee—the rest of the committee looks like—and a point, of 

course, they have been making is that, ‘‘We can’t tell you the rest 

of the committee, because they may be in danger,’’ understandably, 

if they would live in the western part of the country. But, even 

when I pressed them on it, I simply couldn’t get a very good 

answer. 

So, my hunch is that we know quite a bit less than we would 

want to know. And I think, particularly if this Interim Council 

moves forward and becomes a privileged partner, which already it 

is, because France and some other countries have recognized it, 

that we really should push harder not only on their political program, but also to know who, precisely, is on the Council and 

whether or not any of those personalities have, in the past, had any 

dealings with more radical Islamic groups, for example, that have 

existed in North Africa, and were eviscerated, eradicated in Libya 

in the mid-1990s. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Malinowski. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, when we say ‘‘we know’’ or ‘‘we don’t 

know,’’ I always want to know who the ‘‘we’’ is. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I think you testified that ‘‘we’’—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We—— 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. Know more than—— 

29 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There is this phenomenon in Washington, that 

many of us who’ve worked in government have seen, which I’ve 

always found a bit amusing, that we don’t acknowledge that something is known until it’s come to us in a folder marked ‘‘classified’’ 

from the agency with three letters in it. And, obviously, our intelligence agencies weren’t hanging out with human rights activists 

in Benghazi for the last few years. And that’s no fault of theirs. It’s 

not their job to know who those people are. Our military obviously 

had no contacts with those people. And those people who follow foreign policy for a living weren’t thinking very hard about the local 

politics of cities in eastern Libya for the last few years. So, it’s sort 

of understandable that most of those folks are going to say, ‘‘We 

don’t know who they are.’’ Right? But, that doesn’t mean it’s not 

knowable and that there aren’t people who do know. 

There are 31 members of the Council. We, Human Rights Watch, 

don’t know each and every single one of them. We did know, before 

this all started, virtually all of the leading members of the Council. 

We had worked with some of them when they were, as I mentioned, human rights activists—actually, very good people in 

Benghazi. If we could pick the future leaders of Libya, those are 

the kinds of people we would likely pick. 

We have met, several times, with the Qadhafi government officials who went over to the opposition, and had pretty strong impressions of those individuals, as well. And, since then, we have 

been in Benghazi, on the ground, speaking every day to members 

of the Council about their day-to-day work, about some of the mistakes that they have made—and they have made considerable mistakes—about their vision for the future of the country. And so, we 

have gotten to know a substantial number of the members of the 

Council. 

On the al-Qaeda issue, absolutely, there has been al-Qaeda recruitment in eastern Libya over the years. There is also a domestic 

group, called the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which was set up 

to fight Qadhafi. And there’s controversy about whether it had ties 

to al-Qaeda, whether they were broken or not, which is complicated. 

But, just because some of those people existed in eastern Libya, 

and now there is an opposition in eastern Libya, doesn’t mean that 

the two are one and the same. Certainly, in our experience, the 

members of the Council are generally people committed to a secular democratic vision. They’re mostly lawyers, professionals, 

human rights activists, former government officials. 

The rank-and-file fighters—that’s everyone—everyone in eastern 

Libya. It’s democrats, Islamists, Monarchists, men, women, bakers, 

butchers. It’s everyone. And yes, of the small number of people who 

may have gone to Iraq and fight, those people are in the mix, as 

well. 

But, imagine if the only thing we cared about here was the fight 

against terrorism and al-Qaeda; imagine what would have happened, had there been a bloodbath and a humanitarian catastrophe 

in the east, and all of these people felt, ‘‘We just got betrayed by 

the Americans and the Europeans and the U.N. They didn’t stand 

up for us.’’ They’re living in refugee camps, they’re wandering 

around the Middle East. That’s the nightmare scenario. And now 

30 

we’ve got people who are developing a new political identity, which 

is absolutely not fully formed yet. And, yes, just because they say 

they’re for democracy doesn’t mean they will be in 10 years. But, 

at least that’s the political identify that they are trying to form 

themselves around. And I think that’s a much better outcome. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

My time is up. 

Dr. Haass, I would really like to hear your answer, so I’ll come 

back to you on the next round. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thanks for having this hearing. 

And I do want to say that I heard your comments about people 

taking positions on this conflict based on who’s leading it. And, 

while I enjoy working with you and certainly enjoyed working with 

you on the START Treaty, which most people on my side of the 

aisle did not support, I find those comments offensive. 

And, while they may reflect actions you’ve taken over the last 27 

years, where you’ve supported efforts that a Democrat was involved 

in, and didn’t support actions that a Republican was involved in, 

I think there are legitimate concerns that people on both sides of 

the aisle have. Matter of fact, there are a lot of Republicans that 

are joining with you on a resolution, I think. So, I just want to say 

that, for what it’s worth, I find that very offensive. 

Personally, I’ve not made comments critical of the President. But, 

I do have concerns about mission creep. And I think those are 

legitimate concerns. I associate myself with much of what Mr. 

Haass has said. 

What I find duplicative, recycling, is the ease with which we 

come into these conflicts and think that we can pay for them with 

resources that exist in the country, like Iraq, which is ridiculous. 

I think the same thing may well turn out, here. 

And the bigger issue to me is really moving ahead. I—you know, 

what’s happened over the last several weeks and months has happened. I don’t really care about litigating those. What I do care 

about is making sure that, from here on, that we don’t involve ourselves in mission creep. I agree with the statement, ‘‘We are where 

we are.’’ 

And so, I’d like to ask to each of the panelists—and I thank each 

of you for your testimony; I think you’ve done so with strong feelings about where we are—Do we need to have American military 

boots on the ground fighting Qadhafi forces? I’d just like yes, no, 

or short answers from each of you. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. No. 

Senator CORKER. OK. 

Ambassador HAASS. We don’t need to, and we shouldn’t. But 

there will be a need for international boots on the ground as we 

transition in Libya. 

Senator CORKER. All right. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. I think I agree with Richard Haass. We may 

not need American boots on the ground, but we will certainly probably need some kind of boots on the ground, internationally speaking, to, in the end, make the final push to remove Qadhafi. 

Senator CORKER. So—but, you would all say we don’t need American boots on the ground to fight Qadhafi forces. 

31 

Ambassador HAASS. Let me just say, I—— 

Senator CORKER. Yes. 

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. Just to be clear, I do not think 

the purpose of international forces in Libya should be to join the 

civil war against Qadhafi. 

Senator CORKER. Let me ask you, do you—— 

Ambassador HAASS. Just to be very clear, that I do not think 

there will be any chance of getting an international force to do 

that. And I don’t think it would be wise, if you could. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I agree with that. 

Senator CORKER. Should we have our CIA on the ground, involved in covert operations to try to assassinate Qadhafi and make 

it easier, so there’s no bloodshed? 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. I think, particularly from the viewpoint of 

Libyans, that would probably not be an optimal solution for them. 

Despite the opposition that exists to Qadhafi, and so on, there is 

still, particularly in the western part of the country, a good deal 

of support for him. And so, if we come in and support those kinds 

of initiatives, I think sooner or later that would probably come back 

to haunt us. 

Senator CORKER. And comments from any of the other two? 

Ambassador HAASS. Well, I’m not real enthusiastic about assassination as a tool of American foreign policy. And also—and it gets 

back to Senator Shaheen’s line of questioning—we need to be confident that we have something better to put in its place. However 

flawed this regime is—and God knows it’s flawed—in my experience, 31 people can’t run anything. So, the idea that you have a 

serious alternative to Qadhafi in play somewhere in eastern Libya 

or in London is a nonstarter. It just doesn’t exist. Revolutions go 

through phases. If Qadhafi were to disappear, there would be a 

falling out, there would be a splintering; often the immediate successors are not the ultimate ones. We have to be careful—— 

Senator CORKER. OK. 

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. About putting so much of our 

focus on regime change, as if that were the solution. Because I 

don’t think that is the solution. If it were to happen, it has to be 

a part of something much larger. 

Senator CORKER. And I can’t imagine a human rights person 

would want to see that happen. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I don’t even know what to say. 

Senator CORKER. OK. So, let me just move on. 

I am very concerned about our mission creep. And, militarily, I 

think we perform those functions that are unique if we are going 

to be involved. I have the same exact concerns that Mr. Haass expressed. And I’ve expressed those from the very beginning. I am 

glad that, if something like this is going happen, we have a coalition. I’m glad that others are involved. And I think others can take 

the lead on those types of things we just talked about. 

So, then we move to nation-building. I mean, I—you know, I 

don’t think—my experiences are much shorter—4 years—than the 

chairman’s. So, you know, we’re involved in the most major nationbuilding effort in modern times, in Afghanistan, and it began, by 

the way, in a very narrow way. And I’m very concerned that’s 

where we’re headed. 

32 

Each of you have talked about building democratic institutions, 

courts, justice systems, all of those kinds of things. On what scale 

are you all talking about our involvement being, in that regard? 

Because one thing leads to another. You’ve got to have economic 

growth, so then all of a sudden we’re building all kinds of highways. We’re doing all kinds of things in countries. I’d love to hear 

what your thoughts are, as it relates to U.S. involvement in that 

regard. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I don’t think it would be anything of the scale 

or of the nature of what we’re experiencing in Iraq and Afghanistan; very different kinds of conflicts. 

You know, first of all, this is not a communal conflict in which 

people of one ethnic group are at the throats of people of another 

ethnic group, which, you know, would require, as in the former 

Yugoslavia, large numbers of peacekeeping troops on the ground 

just to keep people from killing each other. In Ivory Coast, you 

have that kind of conflict right now, something we’re all very concerned about, where there is going to need to be a U.N. presence 

on the ground to keep communities apart for some time. That’s not 

the case in Libya. Nor is it an impoverished government, as we’ve 

discussed; there are tens of billions of dollars available for infrastructure development that already belong to the Government of 

Libya. 

I think it’s more along the lines of what we helped to do in some 

of the eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 

which involved training and advice, provision of expertise in how 

to develop a constitutional system, how to deal with some of the 

questions Mr. Vandewalle raised about how to manage oil revenues 

in a way that’s transparent, accountable, that benefits different 

regions of the country in an equitable way. 

That’s not the kind of massive resource-draining commitment 

that we find ourselves in, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would be still 

a commitment, I think, worth making. 

Senator CORKER. So, would it be a commitment—I mean, we— 

we’re involved in many of the former Soviet countries right now, 

in helping them with democracy and transparency and anticorruption efforts. So, you’re talking about something on the scale of 

Libya just being another one of those type countries? I find that 

hard to believe, but is that what you’re talking about? 

Ambassador HAASS. I would answer it this way. I don’t think the 

U.S. role has to be particularly in the lead, here. The Europeans 

have a much larger stake, for reasons of geography and history. As 

Senator Kerry said, the idea of a pay-as-you-go formula ought to 

be the going-in assumption. We don’t have to turn the place into 

Singapore. I don’t think that’s necessary. I wouldn’t say our goal 

is necessarily to produce, any time soon, democratic institutions. I 

think it is functioning institutions that you want. You want to prevent Libya from being a failed state. And I think it’s a fundamentally different challenge if you’re trying to do this amidst continued 

fighting or if you have, essentially, a secure environment. But, I 

would think that the U.S. role in this would be minimal, in terms 

of people involved, and certainly in terms of our resources. That 

should be our going-in position. There are so many other places in 

the world where there’s no substitute for American leadership, 

33 

where we have to carry a disproportionate burden. I see absolutely 

no reason why the United States should be taking a central role 

in the future of Libya. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I think 

that last comment is one that expresses my sentiment. I just don’t 

see where there’s anything about Libya that causes us to uniquely 

need to take the lead. I think there are much greater reasons for 

European allies and others to do that. And we have a lot on our 

plate. It’s evident that the President, even, is not interested in additional activities. And I hope we’ll do everything we can to move 

others into the lead, as it relates to this effort. 

And again, I thank you for having this hearing today, and I hope 

we’ll have others. 

There was a vote, yesterday on the floor, regarding the constitutionality of this effort. And I voted against it, as I think 90 other 

Senators did. Separate and apart from what’s actually happened 

here, because I do think it makes it partisan, I think it would be 

good for us to have some hearings, down the road, just to talk 

about the War Powers Act. Not to try to pin it on this effort and 

make it into something that might be perceived as partisan. But, 

when you have a war of choice, like this, that we’re involved in, it 

does raise—especially when there’s not an imminent threat—there 

are reasonable discussions that should occur. And I think it would 

be helpful to committee to have those hearings. Again, not to focus 

it on this effort, but just to help us be more consistent—which was 

one of the things I think many of the witnesses have talked 

about—be more consistent in our future endeavors. 

And I thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Corker. I think that 

point is an important one. And I would agree with you completely. 

I have no notion in my head, swirling around, that I envisioned 

some huge United States post-effort here. I think that we can be 

part of it and helpful, maybe help shape and frame. But, I would 

clearly envision that to be far more in a zone of interest and activity of others who are engaged in this effort now, and who are much 

more proximate, and frankly, have a longer history of engagement 

with Libya. And I think they’re quite anxious, actually. I just met 

with folks in both Great Britain and France, and I think they’re 

prepared to assume that kind of leadership role. 

So, I think that we can heed your words with respect to your and 

other people’s concerns about the mission creep, here. I think a lot 

of us are very, very determined not to, under any circumstances, 

see that evolution. 

Let me also make a comment, if I can, about your initial comments on what I’d said earlier. I always listen carefully to a Senator, who’s my friend and who indeed worked as diligently and as 

bipartisanly as you could—as nonpartisanly—on the START 

Treaty; and Senator Lugar, likewise. And, on reflection, I absolutely understand how you would—could take my comments. And 

they were probably just not crafted as sharply as they should have 

been. And I, in no way, intended to assert that you or someone else 

in the Senate—I really had in mind, to be honest with you, some 

very notable, highly identifiable, and well-known media outlets and 

personalities who are automatic on these things. And I, by no 

34 

means, intended to suggest that Senators, you know, are engaging 

in that. 

But, I do think—and I stand by those words—I think there are 

those out there who are just instantaneous in these, whether it’s 

both of our national committees. But, the politics of these things 

often just kind of get out of control. And I think we’re all better 

served if we can, you know, keep that away. 

But, to whatever degree that that was interpretable in a way 

that, you know, suggested otherwise, I certainly don’t want you to 

have that belief. And I don’t intend that. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate my friend Senator Corker’s concerns. I wish some of 

those voices—he wasn’t here at the time—had been raised about 

Iraq, where we have lost an enormous amount of United States 

resources and lives, for a mission that I didn’t think was in our 

national interests. 

Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa is reportedly the expert on the 

Qadhafi regime. But, his close affiliation with Qadhafi, at least to 

me, implicates him in the terror perpetuated and supported by that 

regime. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez, can I interrupt you just for 

one second? I apologize. 

In 5 minutes, both Senator Lugar and I have to go meet with 

President Perez. Could we ask you to close out the hearing, if that’s 

possible, if any other colleagues come—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I have to leave after this, but will leave it 

to Senator Shaheen. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think she has another round. 

If I could thank all of the witnesses very, very much for coming. 

And I think it’s been helpful, and it’s helped to actually shed some 

light on a number of different options as we go forward. So, we’re 

very appreciative. 

I apologize for interrupting. 

Senator MENENDEZ [presiding]. As head of Libya’s intelligence 

service, he is reportedly responsible, or at least knowledgeable, 

about the kidnappings, torture, and murders committed by the regime, including the bombing of Pan Am 103. This is a man who, 

in 1980, was expelled from his position as Libya’s envoy in London 

for calling, in a newspaper interview, for the killing of dissidents, 

telling the Times that ‘‘the revolutionary committees have decided 

last night to kill two more people in the United Kingdom, and I 

approve of this.’’ 

So, in my opinion, this is a man that should be charged with 

crimes against humanity. Instead, the U.S. Treasury has lifted the 

freeze on Koussa’s assets, hoping the move will encourage other 

Libyan officials to split from Qadhafi. 

So, is the intelligence that we seek to collect from Koussa so 

great, or is the example of having others defect so great, that we 

should overlook his personal history, his crimes, and the deaths of 

Pan Am 103 that killed 270 people, including 34 New Jerseyans? 

Is what we seek to gain from him worth the price that we’ll have 

to pay? 

35 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I feel strongly that he should not get immunity, and no one should get immunity, for potential prosecution for 

those kinds of crimes. And I don’t think it’s necessary to stimulate 

their defection. In this case, actually, it was clear he was not going 

to get immunity, and he did defect. So, there you have it. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. I mean, Moussa Koussa was certainly, as I’ve 

describe him, the bloodhound of the regime. And his defection 

came, of course, at the time when I think he realized that the tide 

was perhaps turning, in Tripoli, against him. And certainly, he was 

very closely implicated, with all kinds of unsavory activities of the 

regime. 

Much like Mr. Malinowski, I don’t—I thought it was regretful, in 

a sense, that his assets were unfrozen. I don’t think that that in 

any way will sway people in Tripoli. And, frankly, I also don’t think 

that, in a sense, that his defection at this particular point in time 

is that important anymore. I think people are starting to see what 

is happening, the close advisors around Qadhafi. And certainly he 

should not be immune from prosecution, which, as I understand, he 

is not yet. The International Criminal Court is thinking of indicting 

him. So, his assets may be his own again, but certainly he is not 

immune from prosecution yet. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Dr. Haass, does it make sense to unfreeze 

his assets? What do we gain from that? 

Ambassador HAASS. You’re asking me to express an opinion 

about what’s essentially to me, more a matter of tactics than anything and of tradeoffs. I just don’t know how valuable it would be 

to get his cooperation on certain subjects. Or whether the example 

of him would be worth, if you will, whatever you’d get for unfreezing certain assets. That’s a level of tactics. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I think of it a little differently. I don’t 

think of it simply as a tactic. I think it is to some degree, a policy. 

Will your policy be one of unfreezing the assets of those who may 

have had significantly violate human rights, who may have been in 

the midst of killing people and ordering the execution of terrorist 

acts? I don’t understand the standard that we set. To me, it’s more 

than a tactic. It sends a message that even if you have committed 

crimes they may be excused. I’m not sure that that’s the message 

we want to send. 

Ambassador HAASS. I expect there are some parallels here to the 

criminal justice system. I don’t have background in that. But, 

you’ve always got to ask yourself what sort of tradeoffs you want 

to make, and whether it’s worth it. And you’re right to raise questions of principle and morality. But if you knew, however, that getting the cooperation of a certain individual, even though he had 

done certain heinous things in the past, could save all sorts of lives 

in the future, that might be a consideration you would have to 

make. 

And all I’m saying is, sitting here today, I’m not in a position to 

make these sorts of judgments, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. I appreciate that. The point is that he 

already defected. So, if anything, he’s got to be worried about prosecution. Unfreezing his assets doesn’t seem to me a tactic or a policy that we want to pursue. 

36 

Let me ask you this. You know, Qadhafi clearly trained terrorists 

in North Africa. And his reign of terror extended well beyond his 

own national and regional borders. This is a man who referred, in 

1985, to the slaughter of innocent travelers that included an 11- 

year-old American child as a ‘‘noble act.’’ Is there any question, if 

our diplomatic and other efforts were to fail in accomplishing 

Qadhafi’s resignation, that he would, if in power, continue to support terrorism or move in that direction, after everything he’s 

done? 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Senator, I think, in light of both the history of 

what we know of the man and in light of what the alternatives 

would be left to him, I would think that the kind of behavior we’ve 

seen in the past, involvement in terrorism and so on, would be one 

of the only ways left for him at that particular point in time. And 

hence, why I’ve always argued very much that dividing up Libya 

and leaving part of the country under his control would be a major 

disaster for the country and for the international community. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Any other opinions on that? No. Thank you 

very much. 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Thank you. 

I wanted to go back to Dr. Haass and ask you if you would respond to my question of earlier: Who are the opposition leaders? 

And what do we know about them? And how concerned are we 

about potential ties to terrorist organizations? 

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, the only way I know to answer that 

question is that you can’t know who are going to be the potential 

successors. We could know each one of these 31 people well, we 

could have roomed with all of them in college. We don’t know what 

they would do if they were to come to power. We can’t assume that 

all 31 will come to share power equally. Indeed, the one thing we 

can assume is, they will not. And, whether it’s the Russian Revolution, the Iranian Revolution, or virtually any other revolution we 

can think of, people who initially come into power, when the ancien 

regime is ousted, invariably, themselves, are ousted. In civil wars, 

the people who come to the fore are not normally the Jeffersonians, 

they’re often the guys with guns. 

So, I think we can persuade ourselves of almost anything about 

what a successor government would be in Libya. And we can sit 

here and say it would be benign, or we could say it would be terribly malign, or somewhere in between. I don’t think we know. And 

I don’t think we can base our policy on that. 

That’s true not just of Libya. That’s true of virtually all the situations right now in the Middle East. We don’t know what Egypt’s 

complexion is going to be a decade hence. If Assad were to disappear tomorrow in Syria, we don’t know what sort of political 

leadership would take its place in Damascus and what its foreign 

policy would be toward Israel or anybody else. 

So, we have to approach all these situations with a degree of 

humility. And we almost end up in the land of Don Rumsfeld, talking about unknowns. In virtually every one of these cases, the succession issue is, to a large extent, beyond our power to control and, 

in some cases, even to anticipate. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Also, as you all know, there’s quite a debate 

about arming the opposition forces. So, first of all, I guess I would 

37 

ask you, Do you think that it would be legal to arm the rebels? And 

second, should we do that? 

Ambassador HAASS. You can make it legal through a finding. So, 

that, to me, is not the real issue. The bigger issue—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. Is whether you ought to do it. 

I would say, no, for two reasons. One is the one, essentially, I’ve 

just mentioned. I’m nervous about empowering people whose agendas I’m not confident of. But, second, Afghanistan is something of 

a warning here, where we arm people in one geopolitical context, 

only to find that, when the context changed, the balance of power 

among those who we armed changed, and the purposes to which 

they used the arms was suddenly no longer in our interest. 

Once you provide arms, you essentially forfeit control. We have 

to understand that. Now, we may decide that’s necessary. I don’t 

think it is in this case. And I would strongly argue against going 

down that path. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m going to ask each of you to respond. But, 

could you also talk about it in the context of our allies and whether 

we think they share that view? Our other allies in this endeavor. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. On arming the rebels. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I mean, there has been some—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think largely, yes. There may be some exceptions to that rule. Largely, yes. 

On the question of whether it’s the right thing to do or not, I 

want to stay neutral on that. I can share some of our observations 

from—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI [continuing]. From the field. 

One of them is, is that the rebels have plenty of arms. On the 

opening days of the conflict, one of our folks stumbled upon a massive complex of warehouses stuffed to the brim with all kinds of 

weapons, including antiaircraft and antitank weapons that, in principle, would have been quite useful to the rebels. They weren’t 

using them, because they didn’t know how to use them. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. So, were that decision to be made, I would say 

that simply depositing more boxes of guns and ammo wouldn’t add 

very much to the equation, unless the country providing the arms 

and ammo were also willing to engage in training, which is a—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. And I assume—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Which is a more difficult and—— 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. That that’s implicit in that—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. In that question. That—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. So, that would be one caution. And I think the 

more immediate need, and I mean, like, yesterday—is helping the 

rebels secure the weapons stocks that they have. There are whole 

bunch of MANPADS, for example, the shoulder-fired missiles, that 

actually we discovered in this warehouse. Most of them are not 

there anymore. In the back and forth of the fighting around 

38 

Ajdabiyah, somebody took them. The rebels have told us that they 

would welcome assistance in securing these weapons stocks. 

I know the State Department is interested in doing that. There 

have been constraints about being able to send people to Benghazi 

to actually begin to work on that. That’s, I think, the most urgent 

thing. And I think it would be helpful for you all to reinforce that, 

for all kinds of reasons. 

Dr. VANDEWALLE. Senator, I think—much like my two colleagues—I think I would be quite skeptical of arming the rebels beyond what they have already; in part because, as Mr. Haass said, 

I think there is a unknown quality yet to the provisional government, if you want to call it that, the Interim Council, that we simply don’t know yet how all of this will shake out. 

I would also be very, very worried about what Mr. Malinowski 

just mentioned, and that is a kind of leakage that could happen 

with these weapons, they eventually end up—particularly in subSaharan African countries, where there’s lots of links with Libya. 

But, above all, I would be very skeptical of arming the rebels, in 

light of the enormous fissures and divisions that you have inside 

of Libya that could then be used in any kind of post-settlement period to really impose the vision of one group or another over the 

others. I think Libya already will face enough difficulties without 

having to worry about certain groups having access to weapons. 

Ambassador HAASS. Can I just add one thing on that? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Sure. 

Ambassador HAASS. History, again, suggests that if and when 

the rebels succeed in their initial goal, which is to get rid of 

Qadhafi, then that glue disappears. And we have to then assume 

that arms we provide for that purpose will be used for the purpose 

of the power struggle. We will be fueling the subsequent civil war, 

not between the rebels and the government, but between and 

among the rebels. And so, if we are going to go down that path— 

which, again, I don’t think we should do—we should do it with our 

eyes open, knowing that the arms do not disappear the day the 

goal for which they were provided is achieved. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

And I just have a final question for Mr. Malinowski. 

Could you comment on the situation with refugees right now in 

the country, and whether there is a need for more humanitarian 

workers, or what their situation is? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There is still a trickle of refugees coming out, 

both on the Tunisian side—more on the Tunisian side now than on 

the Egyptian side. We averted what would have been, I think, a 

major outflow on the Egyptian side. 

The Tunisian Government, as far as I’ve seen, has really risen 

to the occasion in a very inspiring way. There’s a lot of assistance 

being provided to folks on that side of the border. I know the State 

Department has been very engaged in that; UNHCR is present. So, 

I’m not an expert on this, but my sense is that the numbers are 

not overwhelming right now and there is a pretty good humanitarian response that’s been mobilized. 

39 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. 

Well, thank you all very much. We appreciate your being here. 

And I will close the hearing at this time. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ