Sudan

P O L I C Y F O C U S

Introduction

Sudan is in the midst of a historic transition. The six-year Interim Period – which 

began in 2005 – is scheduled to end with a 

referendum on whether the South will remain 

within a united Sudan or become an independent country. Whatever the South’s choice, 

this phase in Sudan’s political development 

will determine the future of the largest country – in terms of land mass – in Africa and in 

the Arab world, with potential ramifications 

beyond Sudan’s borders, since Sudan is only 

one of several African countries with large 

Muslim and Christian populations. Peace, 

largely brokered by the United States, has created an opportunity for significant change. 

The North-South peace brought by the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)1

signed January 9, 2005 brought to an end 

one of Africa’s longest running conflicts, 

with more than two million killed and four 

million driven from their homes. The civilian victims of that conflict were overwhelmingly Christian Africans and the followers of 

traditional African religions in contrast to 

the Arab Muslims dominant in Khartoum. 

That peace is fragile, however, and does not 

extend throughout the country. 

Traveling to Sudan in January 2006, 

the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom found that the CPA’s arrangements for the protection of human 

rights are vulnerable to erosion and manipulation. There have been significant delays 

and shortcomings in the CPA’s implementation, raising questions regarding the sincerity of the commitment of the National 

Congress Party in the Government of National Unity. Moreover, the Commission 

found that new religious freedom and other 

human rights protections agreed to in the 

CPA and enshrined in Sudan’s Interim National Constitution have not yet resulted in 

significant changes in practice in government-controlled areas of the North. The institutions intended to protect human rights 

are not yet functioning, while an authoritarian security system remains in place, and 

the attitude of impunity for human rights 

abuses shows little sign of change. 

The United States has an opportunity to 

influence this process for the better. Sudan 

The U.S. 

Commission on 

International 

Religious Freedom 

was created by 

the International 

Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 to 

monitor the status of 

freedom of thought, 

conscience, and 

religion or belief 

abroad, as defined 

in the Universal 

Declaration of 

Human Rights and 

related international 

instruments, 

and to give 

independent policy 

recommendations 

to the President, 

Secretary of State, 

and Congress.

U n i t e d S t a t e s C o m m i ss i o n o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l i g i o us F r e e d o m

visit our web site at 

www.uscirf.gov

First Vice President Salva Kiir and President Omar Bashir

National Congress Party (NCP)

The NCP began as the National Islamist Front (NIF) which 

was led by Hassan al-Turabi. The NIF led a successful military coup 

in Sudan in 1989. In 1998, the NIF changed its name to the National 

Congress Party. After a falling-out with Turabi, the NCP is now led 

by the current President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir and Second Vice 

President Ali Osman Taha. The NCP is the main Northern based 

partner in the GONU. 

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 

(SPLM/A) 

Founded in 1983 by Dr. John Garang and others, the SPLM/A 

was a largely Southern based rebel movement that fought against 

various Sudanese governments, including the NIF and the NCP. The 

SPLM/A advocated separation of religion and state, and fought 

against policies of ethnic and religious marginalization pursued by 

successive governments in Khartoum. Dr. Garang died in a helicopter crash in July 2005, just weeks after he was sworn in as Sudan’s 

First Vice President in the GONU. In August 2005, Salva Kiir, Dr. 

Garang’s deputy in the SPLM/A, replaced Dr. Garang as the head of 

the SPLM/A and as Sudan’s First Vice President.

Government of National Unity (GONU) 

The GONU is the government that has been formed in 

accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 

signed in January 2005. The NCP and the SPLM/A were signatories to the CPA, and representatives from both now have key 

leadership roles in the GONU with Omar al-Bashir (NCP) as the 

President, and Salva Kiir (SPLM/A) as First Vice President. National ministries are now headed by both SPLM/A officials and 

NCP officials, but the NCP is the majority partner, occupying 

the office of the President, a majority in parliament, and most 

of the other key posts in the government.

winter 2006
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is a strategic nation where U.S. influence has 

already made a difference and should continue to do so. Unlike in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, Sudan’s equivalent of the Taliban and 

of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athists have not been 

removed from power, but remain the major 

political force in the country, requiring close 

monitoring to ensure their compliance with 

commitments made to abide by international human rights standards. Moreover, 

the United States has a formal role on the 

Assessment and Evaluation Commission, a 

body established by the CPA to monitor its 

implementation. 

The Commission concludes that continued U.S. leadership, resolve, and resources are needed to ensure that a stable and just 

peace is sustained in Sudan, that institutional development in the South brings stability 

and progress to that devastated region, and 

that Sudan’s millions of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) can be assisted to return home in safety or to resettle 

elsewhere. The United States, through its 

expenditure of massive humanitarian relief 

and the investment of considerable political 

capital, has a huge stake in peace in Sudan, 

a country that has been a source of regional 

instability and a haven for Islamic extremists and international terrorists.

Conditions in Sudan, particularly in 

the North, warrant the Commission’s recommendation that Sudan continue to be 

designated by the Secretary of State as a 

“country of particular concern” for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Sanctions should remain an essential 

element of U.S. human rights policy toward 

Sudan, but should not preclude U.S. support 

for economic and political development in 

the South, as well as educational exchanges and specific programming throughout 

Sudan to promote religious freedom by assisting those, including in the Government 

of National Unity, favoring greater protection of human rights, the establishment of 

rule of law, and the development of truly 

accountable and democratic governmental institutions. The lifting of current U.S. 

sanctions should be conditioned on proven 

performance, in terms of CPA implementation, an end to the genocide in Darfur, and 

improvement in religious freedom conditions in the North. 

Problematic Implementation of the 

Peace Agreement 

Although Sudan’s North-South civil 

war (1983-2005) had many contributing 

causes, religious factors were key: 1) the 

effort of the Islamist government in Khartoum to extend sharia, or Islamic law, as 

well as Arabic language and culture to the 

African Christians and the followers of traditional African religions in the South; and 

2) Khartoum’s efforts to impose an extremist interpretation of Islam on all Sudanese 

Muslims. With neither side securing victory, 

the civil war ended in a set of compromises 

and mutual concessions, contained in the 

CPA. Among the most important of these 

was the agreement that sharia would not 

apply in the southern part of the country, 

but would continue to apply in the North, 

with special provisions for non-Muslims in 

Khartoum, the national capital, from being 

automatically subject to its punishments.

The final resolution of a number of important issues has been left to an array of 

commissions and administrative arrangements. The Commission delegation learned 

that there have been significant delays and 

shortcomings in the implementation of the 

CPA. These developments raise questions 

regarding the sincerity of the commitment 

of the National Congress Party leadership, 

who still holds the major levers of power 

in the new Government of National Unity. 

Northern politicians have a long history of 

broken promises in respect to the rights of 

Southern Sudanese.

The CPA’s arrangements for the protection of rights are vulnerable. Key bodies have either not yet been established, are 

only beginning to function, or have yet to 

prove their worth. At the time of the visit, 

the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, on which the United States is represented, was just beginning its vital work. 

Southerners reported to the delegation that 

revenue-sharing was being implemented in 

a way that lacked transparency, making it 

difficult to determine if the South was actually receiving its agreed share of Sudan’s 

current oil revenues.

The delegation was told that there are 

four competing drafts for the functioning of 

the yet to be formed national Human Rights 

Commission, as provided by the interim 

constitution. Not all of these drafts were in 

accord with international standards relating 

to the independence and mandate of such 

commissions.2 The Commission delegation 

also learned that the National Constitutional Review Commission, charged with 

ensuring the creation on a proper legal basis 

for the various bodies necessary to implement the CPA, had been dormant for most 

of the past year. The establishment of the 

Special Commission for the Protection of 

the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National 

MICHAEL CROMARTIE, CHAIR

Vice President, Ethics and Public Policy Center

FELICE D. GAER, VICE CHAIR

Director, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement 

of Human Rights, The American Jewish Committee 

NINA SHEA, VICE CHAIR

Director of the Center for Religious Freedom, 

Freedom House

PREETA D. BANSAL, COMMISSIONER

Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

ARCHBISHOP CHARLES J. CHAPUT, 

COMMISSIONER

Archbishop of Denver 

KHALED ABOU EL FADL, COMMISSIONER

Professor of Law at UCLA

RICHARD D. LAND, COMMISSIONER

President and CEO of the Ethics and Religious Liberty 

Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention 

ELIZABETH H. PRODROMOU, COMMISSIONER

Associate Director of the Institute on Culture, 

Religion, and World Affairs and Assistant Professor of 

International Relations, Boston University

BISHOP RICARDO RAMIREZ, COMMISSIONER

Bishop of the Diocese of Las Cruces, 

New Mexico

JOHN V. HANFORD III, 

EX-OFFICIO, 

NON-VOTING COMMISSIONER

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom, U.S. Department of State

JOSEPH R. CRAPA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Commissioners
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Capital has only just been announced.3 Special provision for non-Muslims appeared 

to amount to little but promises of judicial 

discretion and training to make the police 

more culturally sensitive, which Christians 

in Khartoum believed were inadequate to 

protect their rights. Ominously, President 

Omar El Bashir has rejected the findings of 

what was supposed to be a binding decision by the Abyei Boundary Commission.4

There are also questions about the 

depth of the commitment of the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Movement/Army 

(SPLM/A) to its former leader Dr. John 

Garang’s vision of a united Sudan. MoreCommissioner Bishop Ricardo Ramirez and Former Prime Minister Sadiq Al Mahdi, Khartoum

Former Prime Minister Sadiq Al Mahdi and USCIRF Chair Cromartie, Khartoum

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USCIRF Work on Sudan

Sudan was one of the first countries to be a focus of attention 

by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 

The Commission found religion to be a major factor in Sudan’s 

long-running North-South civil war because of Khartoum’s 

coercive policies of Arabization and Islamization. That war’s 

millions of victims were overwhelmingly Christians and followers of traditional African religions. Its victims also included Muslims, particularly in the Nuba Mountains, condemned 

for opposing the Islamist regime in Khartoum. 

Since its inception, the Commission has recommended 

that Sudan be listed as a “county of particular concern” (CPC) 

in its extensive reporting on Sudan. The Commission has frequently testified at Congressional hearings on the myriad religious freedom violations there, held a full-day public hearing 

on Sudan, convened numerous press conferences, and issued 

many press releases drawing attention to the plight of the 

suffering in Sudan. In the midst of the war in 2000, former 

Chair of the Commission, Elliot Abrams, conducted a site visit 

to Southern Sudan.

In January 2006, a year after the signing of the peace 

agreement ending Sudan’s North-South civil war, a Commission delegation visited Khartoum, Juba, and Kadugli in Sudan 

and Nairobi and Lokichokio in Kenya to discuss the impact 

of recent developments on religious freedom conditions in 

Sudan. Meetings included cabinet-level members of the Government of National Unity, lead negotiators for both sides, the 

retired Kenyan general who had mediated the North-South 

peace negotiations, opposition politicians, civil society activists, religious leaders, and representatives of international 

humanitarian organizations. A visit to the Jebel Aulia Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp outside Khartoum provided 

an opportunity to hear directly from individuals displaced by 

the civil war.

The visit was agreed to by Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity. The Commission’s travel and program were 

facilitated by the U.S. Embassies in Khartoum and Nairobi 

and by the newly established U.S. Consulate General in Juba. 

The Commission wishes to express appreciation to the United 

Nations personnel who briefed the delegation and otherwise 

supported the visit.
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To Contact the Commission :

United States Commission on

International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol St., NW, Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

Web site: www.uscirf.gov

E-mail: communications@uscirf.gov

Voice: 202-523-3240 

Fax: 202-523-5020

over, the ability of the SPLM/A to hold its 

former Sudanese government adversaries to 

the letter, much less the spirit of the CPA, 

is limited by the SPLM/A’s own limited institutional capacities. The SPLM/A faces the 

triple challenge of participating in the Government of National Unity, of establishing 

the new regional government of Southern 

Sudan which it leads, and of transforming 

its armed wing from a rebel movement to a 

standing army, all without Garang’s leadership.5

 On a positive note, there was a smooth 

transition by the Government of National 

Unity and the SPLM/A to Dr. John Garang’s 

successor, Salva Kiir, as First Vice President 

of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, and 

leader of the SPLM/A. 

Finally, as the Commission’s delegation learned during its visit to Juba, the 

SPLM/A must accomplish this Herculean 

task in one of the most impoverished and 

least developed areas of the world, a region 

devastated by more than 20 years of warfare 

and suffering from decades of neglect by the 

Northern-dominated national government 

in Khartoum.6 The South’s lack of infrastructure was underlined when the delegation found itself in a meeting with one of 

the Ministers of the new Government of 

Southern Sudan in the tent city in which he 

was living due to the lack of housing in the 

new Southern capital. 

A year after the CPA’s signing, it is necessary to educate the Sudanese in a more 

systematic manner about the terms of the 

agreement, including the protection of freedom of religion or belief. For people to assert 

their rights, they need to know them. It is 

troubling that little effort has been made to 

inform the Sudanese people about the CPA 

or the Interim National Constitution. 

Although efforts are continuing to 

broaden participation in the Government 

of National Unity, significant political opposition exists to the current power-sharing 

arrangement, including parties that represent both of Sudan’s main Islamic sectarian 

movements and the followers of Hassan alTurabi, who provided the ideological foundation for the former regime. To ensure 

that elections called for by the CPA are free 

and fair, the government will need to take 

considerable steps, for which external assistance and international monitoring may 

be necessary. If they are not, the protections 

for individual rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief, enshrined in the CPA and 

in the Interim National Constitution, may 

well remain just words on paper, like those 

in previous Sudanese constitutions.

Religious Freedom Still Limited 

in the North Despite 

Promised Safeguards

The Commission delegation found 

that in government-controlled areas of the 

North, the religious freedom and other 

human rights protections agreed to in the 

CPA and enshrined in Sudan’s Interim National Constitution have not yet resulted in 

significant changes in practice:7

• All Sudanese in the North, and specifically in the national capital area, including 

Christians and followers of traditional 

Protestant Pastors in Khartoum speaking with USCIRF Chair Cromartie

U.S. Embassy Nairobi representative, USCIRF Staff 

Steve Snow and David Dettoni 
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African religions, are subject to sharia. 

Contrary to the understanding even of 

some Sudanese, the CPA and the Interim 

National Constitution’s special provision 

for the rights of non-Muslims in the national capital does not exempt Christians 

and followers of traditional African religions from sharia. Rather, it proposes 

to mitigate the impact of its application 

by providing for alternatives to the punishments prescribed for Muslims, at the 

court’s discretion.

• As has been the case for decades, no permits for new church construction have 

been granted. There were some indications, however, of a loosening of bureaucratic restrictions on church ownership 

of property, e.g., the authorities have in 

three instances permitted land purchased 

by a church to be registered in the name 

of the church as an institution rather than 

in the name of a church official, notwithstanding a previous requirement that had 

made such property more vulnerable to 

legal problems. 

• Churches built without such official 

permission exist at the authorities’ sufferance. Those constructed in squatter 

settlements or IDP camps have often 

been razed. Church-owned properties 

that are legally recognized are nevertheless vulnerable to seizure in a legal atmosphere in which government action is not 

effectively constrained by an independent judiciary. The most glaring example 

was the government seizure of a Roman 

Catholic recreational facility taken not 

for a public purpose, but for the use of 

the National Congress Party. 

• Although not applied in recent years, the 

legal penalty of death for apostasy from 

Islam remains the law of the land. Converts 

to Christianity from Islam face societal 

pressure and harassment from the security services to the point that they typically 

cannot remain in Sudan. The law against 

apostasy is also of concern to Muslims; the 

last instance in which the death penalty was 

applied was to a Muslim reformer.8

• The government supervises and controls 

most Muslim religious institutions in 

order to enhance a militant interpretation 

of Islam that promotes intolerance and 

undermines the rights of Muslims who 

adhere to other interpretations, as well as 

the rights of non-Muslims and women. 

• Government agencies in the North, including education and the governmentcontrolled media, continued to show a 

preference for Islam, reinforcing the message that Christians and non-Muslims 

are not equal members of society. History books reportedly ignore the Christian 

and other non-Muslim societies that existed in what is now Sudan for centuries 

before the Islamic conquest. In addition, 

Koranic verses are found throughout 

school texts, even in mathematics and 

geography. All law students in the North, 

whether Muslim or non-Muslim, must be 

competent in sharia.

• Freedom of the press is limited, although 

there are some courageous independent 

voices testing those limits.

• The activities of both indigenous and international humanitarian and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are 

subject to harassment and interference 

by the security services, even under the 

Government of National Unity.

Religious Freedom Conditions 

Have Improved in the South and in 

the Formerly Contested Areas

In the South, the Nuba Mountains, 

and other transitional areas formerly contested by government and Southern rebel 

forces, religious freedom conditions have 

significantly improved since the signing of 

the CPA. North-South peace has dramatically decreased the severe abuses of religious 

freedom and of other universal human rights 

that characterized military operations by Sudanese government forces and pro-government militias in the South and other areas 

of fighting during the civil war. Christian 

leaders in the major southern center of Juba 

reported a general lifting of the climate of 

fear of government security forces that had 

prevailed in the city during the war. A major 

Christian religious event was being advertised publicly during the Commission visit. 

On the down side, Muslims with whom the 

delegation met in Juba expressed concern 

about their prospects, especially in light of 

the anti-Muslim and anti-Northern violence 

that followed the announcement of Dr. John 

Garang’s death.

Representatives of international NGOs 

working in the South reported to the delegation that since the signing of the CPA, there 

has been a decrease, although not a total 

cessation, in reports of the heinous crime 

of abduction into slavery, a tactic employed 

by government-supported militias against 

Southerners during the North-South civil 

war. Khartoum has established a mechanism for assisting victims of abduction, the 

Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWAC). 

Estimates of the number of victims vary 

enormously, but there is a general consensus that a majority of victims, numbering in 

the thousands, remain unidentified and that 

those responsible for their enslavement have 

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USCIRF Delegation meets Roman Catholic Cardinal Zubeir 
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P OLI C Y F O C U S su d a n

not been held to account. CEAWAC lacks 

funds to return home even those whom it 

has documented as victims. The lack of action of Sudan’s legal system toward the perpetrators is inexcusable. Clearly more needs 

to be done to eliminate abduction into slavery, to prosecute the violators, and to ensure 

the rights of victims.9

Considering the poverty and lack of 

infrastructure in the South, as well as the 

general devastation there and in the formerly contested areas, peace may well be 

unsustainable without development and 

security. Community leaders told the Commission delegation that tangible “peace 

dividends” such as schools, clinics, and jobs 

are needed in order to provide alternatives 

to young people who only have known years 

of warfare. Insecurity also presents a major 

concern, whether from banditry or from 

continued attacks by the Lord’s Resistance 

Army – previously and perhaps to date, supported by Northern elements in the government in Khartoum.

The Plight of Sudan’s Internally 

Displaced Persons and Refugees 

Calls for Greater Resources 

In terms of the number of civilians displaced by conflict, no country comes close to 

Sudan. There are more than 600,000 refugees 

and four million IDPs from the North-South 

civil war, and more than 200,000 refugees 

and two million IDPs from Darfur, for a total 

of seven million displaced Sudanese from a 

population of 40 million. In the Khartoum 

area alone, there are 255,000 IDPs residing 

in official camps, and an additional 1.7 million living in unofficial squatter settlements. 

The overwhelming majority of the nearly five 

million displaced as a result of the NorthSouth civil war are Christians or followers of 

traditional African religions; those displaced 

from Darfur are Muslims who are members 

of tribes identified as African as distinct 

from Arab. 

Sudanese of all walks of life who met 

with the Commission delegation made clear 

that they want peace and are weary of the 

many conflicts that they have lived through 

since independence. One of the surest signs 

of the hunger for peace is that approximately 

500,000 IDPs and 50,000 refugees already 

have returned to the South and transitional 

areas. Preparations are being made for still 

others to return home with assistance, an effort to which the United States is the largest 

contributor. Southerners living in Khartoum 

overwhelmingly told delegation members that 

they plan to return to the South, even those 

who had lived for many years in the North 

and had secure jobs. 

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) oversees refugee returns, 

and the UN Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates IDP returns in Sudan. Both agencies 

have emphasized that all returns of refugees and IDPs must be voluntary. This has 

been memorialized in recent tripartite 

agreements between the UNHCR, Sudan, 

and major host countries of Sudanese refugee camps. 

However, the international community 

has acknowledged that the infrastructure of 

Southern Sudan is so frail and overstretched 

that it can support only a relatively small 

number of returns at this time. This obstacle is compounded by serious protection 

concerns, as well as a total lack of safe transportation options from the IDP camps to the 

places from which the IDPs fled. According 

to UNHCR, land mines and unexploded 

ordinances are “omnipresent” along the 

feeder roads that would be used by returning refugees and IDPs. By now, the UN had 

expected to have 23 way stations in place to 

assist spontaneous returnees en route, but 

currently has only two. As a result, while all 

returns must be “voluntary,” many individuals who do wish to return home have no way 

of doing so at this time.

Indeed, according to IDP community leaders with whom the Commission 

delegation met, most of Sudan’s internally 

displaced would like to return home without further delay. In spite of difficult conditions, these displaced persons would 

rather work to rebuild their country than 

continue to be confined to IDP camps 

under deteriorating conditions. The community leaders indicated that the reason 

so few had returned was because they 

could not afford to pay for the dangerous, 

weeks-long journey home to the South or 

the transitional areas. On the other hand, 

as Walter Kalin – the Representative of 

the UN Secretary-General on the Human 

Rights of Internally Displaced Persons 

– recently reported, many IDPs in and 

around Khartoum are “badly or not at all 

informed about conditions in their places 

of origin.”

The journey itself is, indeed, very arduous. The trip begins with a 220 mile ride 

packed into a truck from Khartoum to 

Kosti. Once in Kosti, the IDPs must wait in 

the outdoors for up to a month to catch a 

barge for a journey which can take between 

5 and 25 days, in a boat with no guardrails, 

sanitation, or cooking facilities. This water 

route is necessary because travel by road is 

not feasible as the few passable roads in existence are laden with landmines. From the 

port, returnees must find their way home, 

often on foot. 

Of the nearly 4 million IDPs resulting 

from the North-South Civil War, 1,260,000 

Commissioner Ramirez at IDP Camp Jebel Aulia, Khartoum
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were expected to return in 2005 and 2006, and 

UNHCR expected to repatriate 140,000 of the 

refugees by May 2006, out of a population of 

more than 400,000 refugees. UNHCR and 

U.S. officials now concede, however, that the 

actual number of returns will likely be much 

smaller. At this rate, voluntary returns will 

take several years. 

Moreover, once home, the returnees 

will likely remain without shelter, sufficient 

food, potable water, or access to schools or 

medical services. Many – particularly the 

elderly, women, and female-headed households – face serious security risks as well. 

Nor are there any state structures to support speedy resolution of land disputes or 

other conflicts. 

The numbers of potential returnees 

are so great and the infrastructure in the 

South so lacking that the return effort will 

necessarily be massive, requiring a concomitant response by the United States 

and other donors. Particular emphasis will 

need to be placed on developing safe and 

regular transportation options by river and 

by air while the roads are de-mined, as well 

as a general commitment among the U.S. 

Agency for International Development 

(USAID), OCHA, and UNHCR to more 

closely coordinate development efforts to 

support returns of IDPs and refugees. 

The resources of the Southern Sudanese 

churches and other private groups engaged in humanitarian and development 

assistance in the South are already considerably strained. Moreover, increased 

international attention to Darfur and to 

reconstruction in the South has meant 

that fewer resources, such as food and 

medical services, are going to the IDP 

camps around Khartoum and the refugee 

camps in neighboring countries such as 

Kenya. Those remaining camp residents 

are often those with the least. If conditions in these camps continue to deteriorate, the refugees and IDPs within them 

may feel compelled to return to an area 

where they will face serious dangers en 

route and more dangers upon arrival.

The Sudanese authorities, the donors, and the international community 

need to accelerate efforts to enhance the 

capacity of the South and transitional 

areas to absorb large numbers of IDPs and 

refugees. Otherwise, significant dangers 

will be faced, not only by the individuals who choose to return, but also to the 

peace process itself and to the development prospects for the region. Without 

adequate preparation, large scale influxes 

would likely result in additional tensions 

within overstretched local communities 

due to competition over scarce resources 

and services. This could result in further 

conflict and diversions of funding from 

recovery and development to pay for 

emergency humanitarian assistance.10

Darfur Threatens Sudan Peace, 

Must be Resolved within a 

National Context

Since 2003, government forces and 

“Janjaweed” (government-backed militias 

from Arab tribes) have carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against African 

Muslim civilians in the western region of 

Darfur, similar to Khartoum’s previous 

tactics against Christians or followers of 

traditional African religions in the NorthSouth conflict. The government’s culpability in the killings of an estimated 400,000 

persons, the destruction of 90 percent of 

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COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT 

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed January 9, 

2005 followed and subsumed a series of partial and preliminary agreements addressing the relation of state and religion, 

the national capital, power-sharing, wealth-sharing (i.e., of 

oil revenue), and security. The understandings reached in 

the CPA were in turn reflected in Sudan’s new Interim National Constitution and in the Interim Constitution of Southern 

Sudan. According to the CPA: 

• a referendum would to be held at the end of a six-year transition period (the Interim Period) to determine whether the 

South stays within a united Sudan or becomes independent;

• the South would be exempt from sharia, which, however, 

would continue in the North;

• special provision would be made to protect the rights of nonMuslims in the national capital; non-Muslims would still be 

subject to those provisions of the penal code based on sharia 

but, at the discretion of the courts, not to the same penalties 

as those prescribed for Muslims;

• the former government of Sudan in Khartoum, led by the 

National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), would form a Government 

of National Unity, with the SPLM/A having a minority 

share of government offices; the SPLM/A would assume 

responsibility for the government of Southern Sudan; 

• local autonomy would be granted to the formerly contested 

areas of the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile State, 

which would, however, remain part of the North, and a 

special administration would be established in the oil-rich 

area of Abyei, whose boundaries would be determined by 

an independent Commission; a popular referendum would 

determine whether Abyei continues to have a special status 

in the North or becomes part of the South; 

• elections for President of Sudan, President of Southern 

Sudan, state governors, the National Assembly, the legislature of Southern Sudan, and all state legislatures 

would be held “not later than the end of the fourth year 

of the Interim Period”; and

• during the Interim Period, Sudan would be under new constitutional arrangements, i.e. an Interim National Constitution and an Interim Constitution for Southern Sudan, 

to be replaced by permanent constitutions following the 

Southern referendum. 

Internally Displaced People, Sudan 

Photo Credit to UNHCR, S Mann
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Darfur’s villages, and the widespread torture, rape, and abduction of civilians is well 

documented. The State Department has 

termed Darfur an instance of genocide.11

Abundant evidence demonstrates that the 

Sudanese government has directly overseen 

and organized Darfur’s destruction.12 UN reports have cited the government as “largely 

responsible” for the humanitarian disaster 

caused by the Darfur conflict and have cited 

the Sudanese armed forces and governmentbacked militias for “serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian 

law,” including the killings of civilians and 

rape and sexual violence against women.13

Despite international pressure, the perpetrators of these crimes, both members of the Sudanese armed forces and allied militias, have 

not been brought to account, either by the efforts of domestic or international bodies. 

According to UN Secretary-General 

Kofi Annan, there has been a marked deterioration in the situation in Darfur since 

September 2005.14 With villages destroyed 

and lives at risk from further attack by government-supported Arab militiamen, many 

thousands of civilians remain in camps, 

either as IDPs in Sudan or as refugees in 

Chad. Despite the presence of African 

Union forces in Darfur, these traditionally 

self-reliant African villagers are unable to 

return home to raise crops and are now dependent upon international humanitarian 

assistance, with the United States and other 

foreign donors funding the relief effort necessitated by Khartoum’s actions. 

Recognizing the extraordinarily pressing need for U.S. and international action 

on Darfur, the Commission nonetheless 

concludes that more can be done to assist 

the rest of the country. Urgent efforts to end 

the killing and atrocities in Darfur and to 

resolve the problems facing IDPs and refugees are needed, along with international 

attention and resources devoted to severe 

problems in other parts of Sudan affected 

by the delays and shortcomings in the implementation of the CPA.

Moreover, the conflict in Darfur is 

yet another illustration of Sudan’s broader 

political pattern of deliberate marginalization and resource-deprivation of all of 

Sudan’s regions with non-Arab or nonMuslim populations. Full implementation 

of the CPA, with its provisions for democratic elections, human rights guarantees, 

revenue-sharing, and state governments 

with significant powers, both North and 

South, hold promise for overcoming the 

internal tensions that have torn Sudan 

since independence. Although resources 

are admittedly limited, the Commission 

concludes that ways must be found to continue U.S. leadership. Engagement on both 

Darfur and the implementation of the CPA 

is critical to help the Sudanese secure the 

peace they overwhelmingly desire.

USCIRF Chair Cromartie, Foreign Minister of Sudan Liam Akol, and Commissioner Ramirez
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Recommendations 

for U.S. Policy

I. U.S. Diplomacy

The U.S. Government should:

• assign a ranking official to the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum with a mandate to advance the human rights aspects of CPA implementation, including coordination 

of U.S. engagement with the various mechanisms established by the CPA, the Interim National Constitution, and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 

as well as U.S. foreign assistance to support these 

mechanisms and to promote human rights, including 

religious freedom, as recommended below;

• in support of the ranking official, provide more adequate U.S. Embassy and Consulate staff with appropriate rank, training, and language skills to strengthen 

reporting on human rights conditions and advocating 

for human rights protections, and require political and 

public affairs officers to travel regularly throughout 

Sudan to monitor and examine human rights concerns; 

II. Implementation of the Comprehensive 

Peace Accords

The U.S. Government should:

• report publicly every six months, through the State 

Department or the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, on the 

status of implementation of the CPA and the return of 

IDPs and refugees; this reporting should include information on CPA mechanisms to protect human rights 

as well as significant obstacles to CPA implementation 

and the return of IDPs and refugees; 

• take a leadership role within the Assessment and Evaluation Commission to ensure the timely, transparent, and 

complete implementation of the CPA’s power-sharing, 

revenue-sharing, and security arrangements in order to 

prepare the way for the agreed-upon referenda and for 

free and fair elections at all levels;

III. Existing Sanctions

The U.S. Government should:

• maintain existing U.S. sanctions on Sudan until particularly severe violations of freedom of religion or belief 

throughout Sudan and the genocidal atrocities in Darfur 

are ended;

• ensure that sanctions do not preclude U.S. support for (a) 

development projects in Southern Sudan, including with 

the participation of the government of Southern Sudan; 

(b) programming in Sudan, whether in the North, the 

South or elsewhere, to advance implementation of the 

human rights aspects of the CPA, other protections for 

human rights, the rule of law, and the development of 

truly accountable and democratic governmental institutions; and (c) educational exchanges between Sudan 

and the United States; 

IV. U.S. Foreign Assistance

The U.S. Government should:

• ensure that USAID, the State Department’s Human 

Rights and Democracy Fund, and other providers of 

U.S. government assistance develop a strategy and 

fund specific programs to 1) promote implementation of the human rights and religious freedom provisions of the CPA, and 2) advance legal protections 

and respect for freedom of religion or belief throughout Sudan, in recognition of (a) the central role of 

religion as a factor in the civil war, and (b) the emphasis within the CPA to religious freedom concerns; 

the programs funded by USAID’s Office of Transition 

Initiatives, should be expanded;

• specific objectives for these U.S. programs should 

include:

- greater efforts to ensure citizen awareness of and 

enforcement of the legal protections for human 

rights included in the CPA, the Interim National 

Constitution, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, and the international human rights 

treaties, including the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Sudan 

is a party;

- grassroots reconciliation and “peace through dialogue” among Sudanese, including building on 

steps USAID has already taken to promote reconciliation among Southern Sudanese, recognizing that 

participants in such programs must be transported, 

housed, and fed; participants should specifically include religious and other civil society leaders from 

Sudan’s diverse religious and ethnic communities; 

- greater capacity of those elements of civil society 

throughout Sudan (i.e. the North, the South, and 

the transitional areas) that promote religious tolerance, respect for human rights, and the peaceful 

resolution of conflicts, to advance those goals on 

both the national and the local levels; 

- development of an independent and impartial judiciary in Southern Sudan, including through training of judges, prosecutors, and court administrators 

and support personnel, with the aim to ensure international standards of due process, fair trial, and 

non-discrimination;

• expand the use of educational and cultural exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, the International 

Visitors Program, and lectures by visiting American 
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• work with UN agencies and NGO partners to ensure that 

the populations which remain in refugee and IDP camps 

continue to receive at least the same level of humanitarian 

assistance as before, so they are not unduly pressured into 

making “voluntary” returns;

• work with other resettlement countries, UNHCR, and its 

NGO partners to ensure that UNHCR expeditiously identifies those refugees for whom repatriation is not an appropriate or imminent solution to their displacement, including 

those who have suffered from past persecution; secure – as 

appropriate – timely local integration in countries of first 

asylum or resettlement to third countries for such refugees; 

and promptly devise a strategy to achieve this concurrent 

with efforts to repatriate refugees to Sudan;

VI. Freedom of Religion and Belief and Related 

Human Rights Concerns

The U.S. Government should:

• use U.S. bilateral discussions with Sudan, as well as UN 

mechanisms and bilateral discussions with third countries 

with influence in Sudan, to urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to:

- allow all religious groups to conduct their activities without harassment, discrimination or undue interference, 

including activities such as publishing or importing religious literature as well as building, repairing, and operating houses of worship and social service programs;

- repeal laws that punish changing one’s religion or encouraging another to do so; end official accusations 

of blasphemy, apostasy, “offending Islam,” or similar 

charges used to stifle public debate or restrict the right 

to freedom of expression;

- dismantle the burdensome bureaucratic obstacles the 

government places on international humanitarian assistance; remove the state security services from their 

current role in regulating humanitarian assistance; 

- establish an independent and impartial national 

Human Rights Commission as called for in the Interim National Constitution and in accordance with 

the international standards for such bodies in terms 

of independence, adequate funding, a representative 

character, and a broad mandate that includes freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief;

- abandon efforts to force religious organizations to register as nongovernmental organizations under regulations that give government officials effective control 

over their activities;

- permit relations between national religious communities and their co-religionists abroad in accordance with 

universal human rights norms;

- reform the state security services to be representative 

of all Sudanese and ensure that all national institutions 

such as the military, law enforcement agencies, and the 

highest levels of the judiciary are representative of and 

equally protective of all Sudanese regardless of religious affiliation or belief;

scholars and experts, in order to introduce more Sudanese 

to the experience of societies in which religious freedom 

and other human rights are protected by law; preference 

should be given to programs that bring together leaders 

from various religious and ethnic backgrounds from the 

North, South, and the transitional areas;

• expand international radio broadcasting to Sudan to provide objective sources of news and information and to 

improve awareness of the CPA and its implementation, 

including specific programming promoting grass-roots 

reconciliation and respect for freedom of religion; support 

independent television and radio broadcasting, including 

in the South, to the same end;

• promptly dispense financial assistance for humanitarian 

purposes, to build civil society, and to promote economic 

development in Southern Sudan, including in the area of 

an independent network of telecommunications;

V. Refugees and IDPs

The U.S. Government should:

• appoint a high-level “Special Representative” or “Coordinator” to Refugees and IDPs of Sudan to ensure that U.S. 

resources and influence are effectively applied to facilitate 

voluntary returns as soon as they can be done in safety and 

in dignity; to coordinate IDP and refugee returns with reconstruction efforts in Southern Sudan; and to ensure that 

those refugees who need a durable solution other than repatriation are not left to languish in camps;

• provide additional assistance – and urge other countries to 

follow suit – to expedite development efforts in the South. 

Although the United States has been the leading donor to 

these efforts, Congress funded Southern Sudan humanitarian and development assistance at $63 million less than 

the $100 million requested by the Administration. Without 

a significant increase in the commitment by the U.S. and 

other donors to develop the South, safe IDP and refugee 

returns – and the peace brought by the CPA – may not be 

sustained;

• urge UN agencies and their NGO partners to focus urgently on practical, community-based solutions to providing returnees with basic infrastructure and health and 

education services;

• urge OCHA and UNHCR to strengthen their efforts to disseminate information to IDPs and refugees about return 

and reception conditions, including expanding “look and 

see” trips by refugees and IDPs to review conditions and 

report back to their camps so that individuals can make 

informed choices about returns; and urge that OCHA and 

UNHCR also track returns more closely;

• lend and operate safer modes of transportation, including 

planes and river vessels, to facilitate spontaneous – as well 

as organized – voluntary refugee and IDP returns; de-mining efforts of roadways should continue and be intensified; 

• encourage OCHA to move quickly to establish the 21 remaining “way stations” on the return route to Southern 

Sudan which, according to its own plans, should have been 

in place by now;
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USCIRF Recommendations on Darfur (May 2005)

In order to build on the peace accords and to protect civilian 

populations, the U.S. government should:

• closely monitor compliance by the government of Sudan 

with UN Security Council Resolutions addressing the conflict in Darfur;

• support a stronger United Nations and African Union presence in Sudan sufficient to protect civilian populations 

and to monitor compliance with the peace accords and 

Security Council resolutions, including by 

- urging the expansion of the African Union’s mandate in 

Darfur to explicitly include active protection of civilians 

and preventative protection; 

- providing resources such as improved communications equipment, reliable vehicles and helicopters, and 

logistics assistance to enable African Union troops to 

move quickly to places where abuses are occurring; 

- bringing in advisors on civilian protection issues in armed 

conflict to train and work with African Union commanders; 

- ensuring that there is a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of refugees and 

the internally displaced; providing an early warning system with GPS capability to warn camps and villages of 

approaching forces; 

- supporting the assignment of designated protection 

teams to camps for internally displaced persons; 

- supporting the active enforcement of the aerial “no fly” 

zone already specified in Security Council Resolution 

1591 of March 29, 2005, which calls for the immediate 

cessation of “offensive military flights in and over the 

Darfur region;” 

- taking measures to prevent – and providing aid to 

those victimized by –widespread sexual violence and 

rape in Darfur, including by training advisors for the African Union mission and encouraging the African Union 

to include female troops and female police officers in 

their deployment to handle rape cases effectively; and 

- supporting a substantial increase in the number of 

human rights monitors from the Office of the UN High 

Commissioner for Human Rights and in the number of 

African Union troops deployed in Darfur; 

• prevail upon the government of Sudan to provide needed 

humanitarian access to international relief organizations;

• continue efforts to aid the suffering civilian population 

of Darfur, including by seeking an end to killing, to ethnic cleansing and forced displacement, and to Sudanese 

government impediments to the distribution of international humanitarian assistance; assisting refugees and 

internally displaced persons to return home in safety; and 

promoting a ceasefire as well as a peaceful and just resolution of the grievances that underlie the crisis; and

• urge the Sudanese authorities to cooperate with the international prosecution of those accused of violations of 

international humanitarian law and human rights law in 

connection with the events in Darfur since July 1, 2002, 

in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1593 of 

March 31, 2005.

- end the impunity with which members of the security 

forces and others acting as agents of the government 

have engaged in human rights abuses; urge the establishment of effective mechanisms for accountability for 

past abuses; and in the absence of such bodies, provide 

full cooperation with international institutions, including those mandated by the UN Security Council;

- cease messages of intolerance and discrimination against 

non-Muslims in the government-controlled media;

- exclude negative stereotyping in school textbooks; include in school curricula, in textbooks, and in teacher 

training the concepts of tolerance and respect for 

human rights, including freedom of religion or belief; 

history texts should reflect the religious and cultural 

diversity of Sudan’s past;

- undertake a comprehensive review, in collaboration with 

Sudanese civil society and independent international experts, to bring Sudanese law into compliance with Sudan’s 

international human rights obligations; and

- cooperate fully with international mechanisms on 

human rights issues, including inviting further visits 

by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 

of Human Rights in Sudan, and by the UN Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention;

VII. Victims of Slavery and Human Trafficking

The U.S. Government should:

• use U.S. bilateral discussions with Sudan, as well as UN 

mechanisms, and bilateral discussions with third countries 

with influence in Sudan, to urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to prosecute strictly the crime of abduction 

into slavery, most of whose victims were women and children taken during the North-South civil war or in Darfur 

by government-sponsored militias; ensure that the existing 

mechanisms accomplish speedy identification, voluntary 

return, and family reunification of victims as well as measures for their rehabilitation and reparation.
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ENDNOTES

1

 See box for a summary of major provisions of the CPA. For full 

text of the CPA and the preliminary agreements it subsumed, see 

United States Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Sudan, “Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” March 16, 2005 

(http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/cpa_toc.html, 

accessed February 22, 2006).

2 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 

found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for 

the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/

menu6/2/fs19.htm, accessed February 14, 2006). These are commonly referred to as “the Paris Principles.”

3 ReliefWeb, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Country Team in Sudan, “United 

Nations Sudan Situation Report 3 January 2006,” (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6KW3AF?OpenDocument, 

accessed February 17, 2006).

4 In the CPA, “the government and southern representatives agreed 

to the establishment of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) and 

tasked it with evaluating historical and conflicting claims to the land 

and demarcating a border between the groups. The final report of the 

ABC was completed in July 2005, but the Government of Sudan has yet 

to publicly release the document or accept its findings, as stipulated in 

the CPA. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), in contrast, supports the release of the ABC’s findings.” U.S. Institute of Peace, 

“Resolving the Boundary Dispute in Sudan’s Abyei Region,” October 

2005 (http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/1026_sudan.

html, accessed February 17, 2006).

5 Dr. John Garang died in a helicopter crash shortly after the Government of National Unity was formed. The timing of his death, 

just weeks after he was sworn in as First Vice President of Sudan, 

aroused suspicions among many Southern Sudanese resulting in 

rioting both in Khartoum and in the South.

6 Sudan ranks 141st on the United Nations Human Development 

Index of 177 countries surveyed. The index is available on-line at 

http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=1&y=1&z=1.

7 See UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 

Sudan, Statement by Ms. Sima Samar to the UN General Assembly, 

60th Session, October 27, 2005. “Since the formation of the Government of National Unity the people of Sudan have seen little change 

in their everyday life – the emergency laws are still in place in Darfur and the East and are also applied in Khartoum, people are arbitrarily arrested or held incommunicado by security forces; torture, 

ill-treatment and killings of civilians continue. Discrimination and 

marginalization of groups continue and basic rights such as access 

to food, shelter, health and education are not guaranteed.”

8 Mahmud Muhammad Taha, a Sudanese Muslim who called for 

debate about the role and content of sharia, was convicted of apostasy and executed on January 18, 1985. Taha was the only individual 

executed on this charge following Sudanese President Ja’far Mohammed al-Nimeiri’s implementation of sharia.

9 For the most comprehensive and authoritative background information on the abduction and slavery issue see U.S Department 

of State, Report of the International Eminent Persons Group: Slavery, 

Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan, May 22, 2002 (http://www.

state.gov/p/af/rls/rpt/10445.htm, accessed February 22, 2006).

10 See comments of Walter Kalin in United Nations Press Release, Much More Needs to Be Done to Ensure Protection of Internally 

Displaced of Southern Sudan, Rights Expert Says, October 14, 2005, 

(http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/20051017sudan.htm), accessed 

February 27, 2006).

11 Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, WashingtonPost.com, “U.S. 

Calls Killings In Sudan Genocide: Khartoum and Arab Militias 

Are Responsible, Powell Says,” September 10, 2004 (http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html, accessed 

February 17, 2006); Sue Pleming, Reuters, “US’s Rice says genocide 

continues in Darfur,” February 17, 2006.

12 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts, UN Doc. 

S/2006/65, January 30, 2006.

13 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mission to Sudan, 

E/CN.4/2005/7/Add.2, August 6, 2005; UN Special Rapporteur 

on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, E/

CN.4/2006/11, January 11, 2006; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General, January 25, 2005; UN News Centre, “Security Council Refers Situation 

in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court,” 

March 31, 2005 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.

doc.htm, accessed February 17, 2006).

14 UN News Centre, “Despite forceful Security Council moves, 

atrocities continue in Sudan’s Darfur region – UN report,” December 29, 2005 (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=1706

4&Cr=Sudan&Cr1=Darfur#, accessed February 17, 2006); Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, UN Doc. S/2005/825, 

December 23, 2005.

For additional information 

on this issue contact: 

Steve Snow, Senior Policy Analyst

202-523-3240 ext. 21

ssnow@uscirf.gov