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AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity 

in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania

BY CÉDRIC JOURDE 

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Security threats in the Sahel are characterized by layers of intertwined and crosscutting interests at the 

local, national, and regional levels.

◆ International partners’ misunderstanding of these complex dynamics leaves them susceptible to manipulation by illegitimate national actors.

◆ Regional cooperation against transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism is hamstrung by governments 

that have calculated that their international standing is enhanced by the perpetuation of instability.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 15 / SEPTEMBER 2011

As the spotlight on the Sahel widens, analytic 

shortcuts are perpetuating a superficial understanding of 

the region’s security dynamics. Suboptimal policies are 

the result. Beyond the common perceptions of states, 

terrorists, and smugglers engaging one another across a 

sparsely populated territory, a more complicated reality 

exists. Rivalries among tribal groups, the state, private 

interests of government officials, castes, and others lead 

to constantly shifting local and regional political and 

economic arrangements. Understanding these layers of 

influence is vital to addressing the security challenges 

facing Mauritania and the broader Sahel.

MUSLIM, SPARSELY POPULATED, AND WEAK?

The lens most often used by analysts to decipher Mauritanian politics highlights the expansive 

Until recently, the Sahel (as-Sahil), literally the 

“shore” of the Saharan “sea,” rarely made headlines. 

Nevertheless, the expanding nexus of illicit trafficking and transnational Islamist terrorism—and the 

increasingly serious risk this poses to stability in the 

region and to international security—is attracting 

growing attention. These concerns will likely mount 

as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attempts to use the window of opportunity presented by 

the Arab Spring to reestablish itself in North Africa 

while transitional governments there devote much of 

their energy to rebuilding state institutions. In turn, 

an unstable North Africa, especially Libya, could further exacerbate insecurity in the Sahel as unsecured 

weapons and trained mercenaries filter their way into 

the region.
2

territory, largely comprised of uninhabited desert, in 

which its 3.2 million citizens live. It is also one of 

the poorest countries in the world. Its government 

agencies are underfinanced, lack adequate capacity, 

and, as a consequence, are incapable of monitoring 

its vast territory. Combined with cultural factors (for 

example, the prevalence of Islam), Mauritania, like 

most of its regional neighbors, is an easy target and 

haven for traffickers and armed groups, including 

transnational Islamist terrorist movements. 

A number of recent events substantiate this assessment. Deadly attacks on remote Mauritanian 

military garrisons by terrorist groups have occurred 

multiple times since 2005. Foreign embassies have 

been targeted by gunmen and suicide bombers. Western tourists and humanitarian assistance workers have 

been regularly assassinated or kidnapped for ransom by 

Islamist extremists since December 2007. In 2010, a 

group of alleged suicide bombers was intercepted and 

neutralized in Nouakchott before it could attack its 

targets. During the past 2 years, Mauritanian security 

forces have periodically clashed with armed groups 

across the border in Mali (once, in 2010, with support 

from French troops). In other Sahelian countries such 

as Niger, the situation is also problematic. Five employees of the French nuclear company AREVA were 

kidnapped and are still held hostage to this day, while 

two young Frenchmen were kidnapped in the center 

of Niger’s capital and killed when their abductors and 

French Special Forces clashed a few hours later.

These acts of violence have been perpetrated by 

battalions (katiba) and small brigades (saraya) affiliated with the region’s most active Islamist terrorist 

organization, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. However, as the October 2010 trial and death sentences of 

three Mauritanians for terrorist ties indicate, local extremist groups such as Ansar al-Islam (the Partisans of 

Islam) and Ansar Allah al-Murabitun fi Bilad al-Shinqit

(the Murabitun Partisans of God in the Country of 

Shinqit)1 have played a role too.

Insecurity in the region is also fed by extensive 

transborder smuggling—directly via weapons trafficked and combatants hired, and because terrorist 

groups or their partners reap huge profits from it, 

which they reinvest in violent activities.

These usual suspects of insecurity in the Sahel—

Islam, vast uninhabited land, weak states—do indeed 

play a significant role in regional instability, but they 

fall short of explaining all the dynamics of insecurity.2

 At times, the state is the instigator of armed 

violence, such as the 1989–1990 killing of hundreds 

of Haalpulaaren, Sooninko, and Wolof—ethnic minorities known as “Black Africans”—at the hands of 

Arabic-speaking officers of the Mauritanian security 

forces. This was accompanied by the violent deportation of about 80,000 others. An amnesty law that 

protects security personnel from any form of judicial 

prosecution for past abuses perpetuates these grievances and reinforces suspicions of the state and its 

security forces. 

Not only is insecurity in the Sahel more complex 

than it appears, but so are the political actors involved, 

the reasons they engage one another, and the intersections of local, national, and regional dynamics.

T H E O V E R L AY O F M I C R O P O L I T I C S A N D 

REGIONAL RIVALRIES

Security analysts of the Sahel often first adopt a 

global perspective and then zoom in on the domestic politics of a given country. But they rarely zoom 

in enough. This is necessary, however, to get past

conventional myths that frame analyses of security 

in the region.

Take the case of illicit trafficking across the Sahel, which involves goods ranging from cigarettes 

and stolen cars to drugs, weapons, and persons. 

This has evolved into a broad and interconnected 

“economy of insecurity.” At stake are the business 

interests, alliances, and rivalries of state officials, 

tribes, or factions of tribes. Many tribes have historically occupied vast areas that straddle international boundaries, such as the Rgueybat, who inhabit 

parts of Mauritania, Morocco, and the Western Sahara. Some groups, such as the Ideybussat and the 

Tajakant, have been so successful that they have 

expanded beyond the region to the Persian Gulf, 

Dr. Cédric Jourde is an Associate Professor at the School 

of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada. His research focuses on the politics of identities in Sahelian countries and on dynamics of regime change and regime survival.
3

where they do business in the region’s commercial 

hubs, such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi.3

Competition and influence over this transborder trade are decades old, and to some degree they 

explain how tribes and clans have engaged in various conflicts. In northern Mali, smuggling “remains 

a long-cherished symbol of autonomy and control 

and an important part of both social practices and 

shifting political alliances.”4 Further complicating 

matters, such transborder traffic is shaped not only 

by intergroup politics but also by specific individuals. 

Because of tribal structures and traditions, individual 

personalities sometimes “make” the tribe more than 

the reverse.5 Swings in influence and authority, then, 

are sometimes reduced to the strength of individuals 

with distinct and complex interests.

Local politics can also seriously blur the differences between state and nonstate actors. It is no secret that some state officials from Mauritanian border 

regions (in the military, in the customs administration, and elsewhere) have used their positions and 

resources to further their private or clan’s business 

interests. Similarly, “many agents of the state on the 

Malian and Algerian sides of the border consider 

their position in the state apparatus as a means to 

feed their tribal solidarity with state money.”6 In the 

zones inhabited by Malian Tuaregs, “customs officials 

and the smugglers often belong to the same clan.”7

The argument that the state cannot control 

these illegal economic transactions, therefore, misidentifies the problem. In fact, some high-ranking 

military officers, as well as members of their families 

and tribes, play key roles in this illicit economy and 

are involved in numerous local power struggles. The 

result is a seemingly irreconcilable tension: the state 

as an abstract entity is threatened by this illicit business, yet simultaneously many state agents are deeply 

involved in these activities. The suggestion, then, 

that the Mauritanian state needs more technology, 

surveillance materials, vehicles, and capacity-building is true, but it misses the point. That state officials 

may follow private, social, and political incentives 

not congruent with the interests of the state indicates 

that the problem is less technical than political. Allegiances to one’s ethnic group, tribe, clan, or personal 

network can be stronger than those to the state. 

Another common but problematic perspective 

is the Sahel as a no-man’s-land. Though the desert 

is vast, the actual areas used by humans are much 

more limited. All human activity—whether it is tourism, nomadism, trafficking, or terrorism—relies on 

the region’s key land routes and converges at water 

points and fuel stops. That local communities, armed 

Islamists, smugglers, and other groups involved in illegal activities sometimes interact at these nodes, 

then, is no surprise. 

Similarly, many AQIM leaders are Algerian 

and would find it difficult to navigate the complex 

terrain of the Sahel without support from some local communities. Accordingly, AQIM leadership’s 

strategy of marrying into these communities is pragmatic. Local community support is itself a combination of grievances with the national government 

(“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”), practical 

business interests, and ideological motivations. At 

the least, communities notice the presence of these 

groups. In addition, some state officials originate 

from these peripheral communities, while others 

are stationed nearby and have relationships within 

them. Yet, again it is the micropolitics that supersede the interests of the state.

ISLAMISM AND LOCAL POWER STRUGGLES

Local groups interpret, interact with, reject, or 

adopt Islamism and the ideology of Islamist movements in unique ways. Accordingly, although the 

entire population in Mauritania and most of the Sahel is Muslim, this religious identity is filtered and 

informed by other identities.

Castes. Most ethnic groups of the Sahel are 

internally organized by hierarchies of castes that 

define social status. These are not rigid but change 

over time and are geographically idiosyncratic. 

However, they still affect how people live their lives, 

and therefore how they interact with Islamism. For 

instance, many Mauritanian leaders in AQIM come 

from Moorish society’s top-tiered “free” Zwaya tribes 

“allegiances to one’s ethnic group, 

tribe, clan, or personal network can 

be stronger than those to the state”
4

of the southwest region. The Zwaya have historically specialized in religious scholarship, providing 

most of the region’s religious scholars (ulama, qadi, 

Imam, and others) who oversee traditional religious 

schools (called mahadra in Mauritania). By contrast, 

the vast majority of Haratin, lower tiered “freed captives” of Moorish society, are extremely poor and 

can hardly move up the socioeconomic ladder. 

Given that context, many Haratin have been attracted by the egalitarian discourse (“all equal before God”) of Islamist movements such as Tabligh 

wa Da’awa. Founded in India in the 1920s, this orthodox but nonviolent group has become the largest 

transnational Islamist order in the world. It seeks 

a re-Islamization of Muslim societies from below 

and therefore rejects the caste hierarchy and any 

other form of ethnic or racial distinctions. While 

attracting far fewer followers, violent groups such 

as AQIM also use an egalitarian antiestablishment 

discourse that rejects ethnic, national, or racial differences. This could explain why Mauritania’s only 

two homegrown suicide bombers were Haratin.

Ethnicity. Islamism in Mauritania cannot be understood without an appreciation of its history of ethnic power struggles. For example, counterintuitively, 

few members of Mauritanian Islamist groups come 

from the Haalpulaar, Sooninko, and Wolof ethnic 

minorities of the Senegal River Valley, though they 

are all Muslim, have often been targeted by state security forces, and comprise roughly 30 percent of the 

population. This is largely because power struggles 

fought in the name of ethnoracial identities have historically marginalized Black Africans. Islamist movements are often unable to bridge such differences, 

preventing them from reaching individuals outside 

the Moorish community. In fact, in the villages of the 

Senegal River Valley and neighborhoods of Nouakchott where Black African ethnic minorities have 

settled, many conceive of Islamism as a reincarnation 

of an older “Arab nationalist” ideology that favors 

the “Arabness” of Mauritania to the detriment of its 

non-Arab communities.

In Mali and Niger, where the governments are 

predominantly controlled by ethnic “Southerners” 

(or Africans), the economic and political marginalization of Tuareg communities during most of the 

postcolonial period also factors into the pull of Islamism. Having been deprived of development resources and access to ruling political coalitions for 

decades, some northern Tuareg communities are similarly suspicious of their governments’ calls to fight the 

“Islamist enemy.”

Meanwhile, in Algeria and Morocco, the unresolved issue of the “Sahrawi problem” in Western Sahara creates broader challenges. Prospects for youth 

stuck for years in Sahrawi refugee camps are gloomy. 

Understandably, some may be tempted by more adventurous business-related or ideological alternatives.

Clans. Interclan rivalries also matter. For instance, the arrival of the Tabligh wa Da’awa movement in Mali’s northern region of Kidal at the end 

of the 1990s added a new layer to longstanding clan 

interactions. As one clan adopted new Tabligh doctrine, others would immediately reject it, mostly because of historical rivalries.8

In short, the transborder illicit economy, Islamism, and other phenomena are all constantly 

shifting and are frequently reappropriated or rejected 

by local actors who interpret and perceive these external influences through local lenses.

I N C U M B E N T S WAV E T H E F L A G O F 

NATIONAL “SECURITY”

Local and national power struggles also often intersect. The Mauritanian regime, like its counterparts 

in Chad, North Africa, and to some extent Niger, 

struggles with a legitimacy deficit. As authoritarian 

systems, they all face domestic discontent and resort 

to a mixture of repression and co-optation to check 

internal opponents. In such contexts, “insecurity” is 

used by incumbents, or at least rival factions within 

these regimes, to command greater authority.

Deciphering the sources of insecurity in regimes 

where the military is a dominant political actor requires paying close attention to the dynamics of factionalism within the security forces.9

 For instance, 

Mauritanians remember the clashes between two of 

“violent groups such as 

AQIM use an egalitarian 

antiestablishment discourse”
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former President Ould Taya’s cousins between 2003 

and 2005 as well as the more recent tensions between 

current President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and 

his cousin and predecessor. More generally, the only 

engine of leadership change since 1978 has been 

the coup d’état. In each instance, military officers 

have ousted military officers. The sole exception was 

President Ould Shaykh Abdellahi’s election in 2007, 

though he was subsequently deposed and replaced 

after 17 months by his military chief of staff, General 

Ould Abdel Aziz, confirming the rule. Indeed, every 

recent coup d’état has been fomented by close collaborators of the ousted leader. Given this unpredictable environment, the recent arrests of high-ranking 

Mauritanian officers for drug trafficking does not necessarily mean that the government is cracking down 

on this trade. Rather, identifying which officials have 

not been arrested and who is responsible for the arrests is often a more revealing piece of information.

Insecurity in the Sahel may also be conceived 

as a political resource for incumbent regimes. During President Taya’s rule in Mauritania from 1984 

to 2005, the regime instrumentalized notions of insecurity to impose a wide range of restrictions, often 

in the name of counterterrorism.10 During the last 5 

years of Taya’s reign, Mauritanian security forces arrested dozens of people labeled as “Islamists,” ranging from youngsters suspected of belonging to Islamist militias to mainstream Imams and opposition 

politicians such as the current head of the Islamist 

Tawassoul party, which has never called for violence 

but advocates for financial disclosures of politicians 

and security officials. In addition to silencing influential local actors, the regime successfully capitalized internationally on the climate of fear to attract 

external support. Western countries, mainly the 

United States and France, and to some extent the 

European Union, provided the Taya regime with 

financial, material, and diplomatic backing. In similar ways, the Nigerien and to some extent Malian 

governments have used the theme of “insecurity” 

to clamp down on Tuareg and other communities. 

This strategy has often backfired, simply intensifying 

animosity towards the government. 

Much can be learned from these experiences. 

The 2008 coup was widely condemned internationally precisely because it abruptly interrupted a 

democratic transition many had applauded. However, “insecurity” and “instability” were soon mobilized to justify support for the new military strongman 

in Nouakchott, General Ould Abdel Aziz. Several 

analysts have raised the possibility that leading up 

to the coup “a number of [violent] acts were ordered 

to destabilize the presidency of Ould Abdellahi and 

undermine his credibility in the eyes of his foreign 

partners, especially France.”11 Shortly after the coup, 

General Ould Abdel Aziz publicly claimed that the 

previous president was too soft on Islamists and that 

only he could provide security. France quickly extended its support. The United States, though the 

leading nation among those that strongly condemned 

the coup, eventually resumed its support after the 

general organized and won presidential elections in 

2009. In short, when governments in the Sahel wave 

the flag of “instability,” it may be concealing more 

complex domestic dynamics.

R E G I O N A L R I VA L R I E S O V E RW H E L M 

MUTUAL INTERESTS

The ongoing dispute in the Western Sahara, the 

Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger (and indirectly 

in Mauritania), and the Algerian civil war of the 

1990s–2000s all continue to influence insecurity at 

both the regional and national levels. These conflicts 

have created a “political economy of conflict” featuring trade in arms and illicit goods, which sponsors 

the activities of communities and political actors 

across the Mauritanian borderland and the Sahel 

more generally. Consequently, local politics adapt to 

and intertwine with these regional dynamics. Commercial routes, for instance, are sometimes reconfigured according to the needs of Tuareg and Sahrawi 

groups and how they relate with their enemies of the 

moment, whether they are regional governments or 

rivals within their own communities. As a result, 

rebel groups originally organized around some political grievance eventually involve themselves in trafficking activities unrelated to their primary aims, as 

illustrated by kidnappings of foreigners by AQIM for 

financial gain.

Political rivalries among regional neighbors 

also complicate the drivers of insecurity. In most 
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African conflicts, armed groups are enabled by 

neighboring governments or factions within governments who provide financial and military support or simply tolerate their presence. Since the 

conflict in Western Sahara in the 1970s, the ambiguous status of the Sahrawi communities as well 

as former and active Polisario combatants has been 

a constant source of contention between Algiers 

and Rabat, periodically transforming Mauritania 

into a proxy battlefield. Similarly, every time there 

is a coup d’état in Mauritania, rumors spread about 

Morocco’s or Algeria’s role.

Such regional rivalries permeate analysis of 

seemingly unconnected political developments, 

thereby frustrating cooperation and feeding suspicion. Interpretations of the December 2010 arrests 

in Mauritania of alleged Polisario activists who may 

have had business relations with AQIM are a case 

in point. Some concluded that the Algerians had either turned a blind eye on their Polisario “protégés,” 

or, worse, were using them to help AQIM, a group 

whose very existence buttresses Algeria’s image as 

regional counterterrorist champion. To others, the 

allegation of Polisario-AQIM connections was simply a manipulation by the Moroccan government to 

tarnish the reputations of its opponents, the Polisario 

and Algeria. Again, regional rivalries make it hard to 

interpret and understand what is really happening, let 

alone act on this information.

SOME LESSONS

Three broad lessons emerge from the layered 

complexity of insecurity in Mauritania and the Sahel 

more generally. 

Avoid dichotomous thinking and shortcuts to 

knowledge. The frequently presented choice of either stability provided by the military (sometimes in 

civilian clothes) or the violence of Islamist terrorists 

is artificial. So is the binary notion of the state versus 

insurgents and traffickers (that is, nonstate actors). 

Policymakers and analysts must devote more time 

and resources to considering the complexity of the 

region. Among the issues worth studying at length 

are the spectrum of rivalries among tribes specializing 

in illicit commerce, the tensions between castes, the 

impact of ethnicity on Islamist mobilizations, the 

personal competition between military officers, the 

political economy of Sahelian communities such as 

the Tuareg, and the complex and at times contradictory structures of loyalty, including those to the state 

(an employer), a tribe, and personal interest. Devoting more time to acquiring and maintaining a deep 

knowledge of the region will improve international 

policy engagement, better respond to the real needs 

of the region, and lower the risk of analysts being 

manipulated by local actors who know how to “talk” 

to them. 

Build stronger loyalties through genuine development and political outreach to marginalized 

communities. Some communities in the Sahel 

have been denied access to decisionmaking circles 

and development schemes for decades. Exclusion 

from state institutions and political processes has 

eliminated channels through which their legitimate interests can be assessed and incorporated in 

transparent and nonviolent ways. This exacerbates 

already opaque insecurity dynamics throughout 

the region. Sustainable development programs, as 

well as inclusive political solutions, are particularly relevant. For instance, the official recognition of Mauritania’s moderate Tawassoul Islamist 

party by the government in 2007 was constructive. 

The exclusion of this moderate player for some 17 

years nurtured antigovernment discourses. From 

a socioeconomic point of view, Malian initiatives 

such as the Investment and Development Fund for 

the Socioeconomic Rehabilitation of the Regions 

of Northern Mali are a good start. So is Mauritania’s Program for the Prevention of Conflicts and 

the Consolidation of Social Cohesion, which is 

directed at both Haratin and returning Black African refugees. The resources channeled into these 

programs, however, are unquestionably insufficient. 

Given that Sahelian countries are among the poorest in the world, their international partners can 

“the choice of either stability

provided by the military 

(sometimes in civilian clothes) or

the violence of Islamist terrorists 

is artificial”
7

play a significant role in providing support to assist these countries’ development programs among 

marginalized communities.

Meanwhile, outreach should not be equated 

with the militarization of these areas. If these local 

communities begin to witness the rising presence 

of their national governments’ security forces—or 

those of their international partners—this outreach 

would backfire.

Support legitimate political regimes. International partners should provide strong support to 

democratic regimes and those that are implementing democratic changes, while pressuring those that 

opt for authoritarian policies. The unfolding Arab 

Spring is demonstrating what some Sahelian and 

sub-Saharan countries already knew: legitimate governments are less subject (though not immune) to 

the opposition of armed groups and better equipped 

to respond to societal demands. Mali, for example, 

is much less subject to antigovernment violence 

than regimes that employ an authoritarian style. 

The greater legitimacy of democracy mutes the 

resonance of calls for jihad and armed rebellion, 

except in specific regions, not coincidentally where 

these regimes underperform, as in northern Mali. 

Autocratic Mauritania and Algeria, on the other 

hand, have been directly targeted, both in words 

and deeds. International partners of Sahelian countries, as well as regional organizations such as the 

African Union and the Economic Community of 

West African States, should strongly and consistently condemn authoritarian actors such as military coup–makers or unconstitutional heads of states 

(for example, Niger’s former President Tandja) that 

threaten the development of democratic institutions 

and practices.

NOTES

1 Shinqit is the ancient name used in the Arab world to refer 

to most of what is today Mauritania. Murabitun is the name of a 

local group that eventually invaded Morocco and Spain at the 

turn of the 11th century.

2

 On Western “representations” of Mauritanian politics, see 

Cédric Jourde, “Constructing Representations of the ‘Global War 

on Terror’ in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), 77–100.

3

 Armelle Choplin, “From the Chinguetti Mosque to Dubai 

Towers,” The Maghreb Review 35, nos. 1–2 (2010), 146–163.

4

 David Gutelius, “Islam in Northern Mali and the War on 

Terror,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), 

70.

5

 Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, “Prêcher dans le désert: 

l’univers du Cheikh Sidi Yahya et l’évolution de l’islamisme mauritanien,” Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara 14–15, (2001), 6.

6

 Judith Scheele, “Tribus, États et fraudes: la région frontalière algéro-malienne,” Études rurales, no. 184 (July–December 

2009), 91. Emphasis added.

7

 Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror in a 

Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front,” Journal 

of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), 159.

8

 Ibid., 149–150.

9

 Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, “Une armée de tribus? Les 

militaires et le pouvoir en Mauritanie,” The Maghreb Review 35, 

no. 3 (2010), 339–362.

10 Cédric Jourde, “The International Relations of Small 

Neoauthoritarian States: Islamism, Warlordism, and the Framing 

of Stability,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (June 2007), 

481–503.

11 A. Antil and C. Lessourd, “Non, mon Président! Oui, mon 

général! Retour sur l’expérience et la chute du président Sidi Ould 

Cheikh Abdallahi,” L’Année du Maghreb 2009, V (2009), 382.
8

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