alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 217
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 217 appear at 68 FR 51362, Aug. 26, 2003.

§ 217.12 Reasonable accommodation. ( a ) A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program or activity.
( b ) Reasonable accommodation may include: ( 1 ) Making facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and
( 2 ) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions.
( c ) In determining pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of a recipient's program or activity, factors to be considered include: ( 1 ) The overall size of the recipient's program or activity with respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities and size of budget;
( 2 ) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and structure of the recipients workforce; and
( 3 ) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
( d ) A recipient may not deny any employment opportunity to a qualified handicapped employee or applicant if the basis for the denial is the need to made reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental limitations of the employee or applicant.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-7119
BRUCE E. ANDERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus WARDEN, Bland Correctional Center, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge. (CA-93-759) Submitted: November 30, 1995 Decided: April 19, 1996 Before HALL, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Bruce E. Anderson, Appellant Pro Se. Katherine P. Baldwin, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* The parties consented to disposition by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988). 2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the magistrate judge's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) petition. * We have reviewedthe record and the magistrate judge's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge. Anderson v. Warden , No. CA-93-759 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2433 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2433

              To suspend temporarily the duty on Aspirin.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 18, 2005

  Mr. Murphy introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
              To suspend temporarily the duty on Aspirin.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ASPIRIN.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.05.70      O-Acetylsalicylic   Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         acid (Apirin)(CAS                                                  31/2009
                         No.50-78-2)
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         2918.22.10)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
§ 1506.5 Does the application of remedies prescribed in this part preclude USADF from imposing other sanctions or remedies? ( a ) The remedies and sanctions available to USADF under this part for collecting debts are not intended to be exhaustive. USADF may impose, where authorized, other appropriate formal and informal sanctions upon a debtor for inexcusable, prolonged or repeated failure to pay a debt.
( b ) Nothing in this part is intended to deter USADF from demanding the return of specific property or the payment of its value.
( c ) This part does not supersede or require omission or duplication of administrative proceedings required by contract, statute, regulation or other USADF procedures, *e.g.,* resolution of audit findings under grants or contracts, informal grant appeals, formal grant appeals, or review under a procurement contract.
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Exhibit 10.8.2  


 
 

AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT    
    


        THIS AMENDMENT TO THE EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT is made effective as of January 26, 2006 by and between Liquidity Services, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), and the undersigned ("Executive"). 


 
 

Recitals:  



        A.
Executive and the Company entered into an executive employment agreement dated as of November 11, 2005 (the "Executive Employment Agreement"); and 


        B.
Executive and the Company wish to amend the terms of the Executive Employment Agreement in this Agreement. 


 
 

Agreement:  



        NOW,
THEREFORE, to induce Executive to continue such Executive's employment with the Company, and in consideration of the agreements contained herein and of such other good and valuable
consideration, the sufficiency of which Executive acknowledges, the Company and Executive, intending to be legally bound, hereby agree that the Executive Employment Agreement is hereby amended in the
following respect: 


        The
following section, entitled "8.6 Code Section 409A Matters," is hereby added to the Executive Employment Agreement: 


        "Anything
in this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, if (A) on the date of Executive's "separation from service" (within the meaning of
Section 409A(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code")) with the Company, Executive is a "specified employee" (within the meaning of
Section 409A(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Code) and (B) as a result of such separation from service, Executive would receive any payment under this Agreement that, absent the application of
this Section 8.6, would be subject to the additional tax imposed pursuant to Section 409A(a) of the Code as a result of the application of Section 409A(2)(B)(i) of the
Code, then no such payment shall be payable prior to the date that is the earliest of (1) six months after the Executive's separation from service, (2) the Executive's death or
(3) such other date as will cause such payment not to be subject to such additional tax. Any payments which are required to be delayed as a result of this Section 8.6 shall be
accumulated and paid as a lump-sum on the earliest possible date determined in accordance the preceding sentence." 


 
 

[THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]


1







 



        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment on the date first written above. 



	

 	
 	
LIQUIDITY SERVICES, INC.
	

 	
 	

By:	
 	

/s/  WILLIAM P. ANGRICK, III      
 William P. Angrick, III

Title: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer





	
Agreed and Accepted:	
 	

 
	

By:  /s/  JAMES WILLIAMS      
	
 	

 
	

NAME:  James Williams
	
 	

 





	
 	
 	

 
	Address:	 	2232 North Kentucky St.

Arlington, VA 22205




2











QuickLinks


AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

Recitals

Agreement

[THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2446 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2446

        To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Mondur P.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 18, 2005

  Mr. Murphy introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
        To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Mondur P.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MONDUR P.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.02.14 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to Mondur P) is amended by 
striking ``12/31/2006'' and inserting ``12/31/2009''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of CALI Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report),the undersigned certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.    
          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.      The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

| |                                                                                                                    
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | CALI Holdings, Inc.
BY: /s/ James E. Jenkins   
James E. Jenkins, President
and Chief Executive Officer
May 5, 2005
#### International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Local Union No. 44, Respondent, v Construction Employers of the Hudson Valley, Inc., et al., Appellants.

an action to recover damages predicated upon defendants’ alleged interference with certain collective bargaining agreements, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, dated June 27, 1977, which denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. Whether the nonmember contracts were illegal, as claimed by defendants, cannot be determined from a mere reading of the complaint. Proof in that regard is required. Accordingly, liberally construed, the complaint is sufficient as a pleading. Titone, J. P., Rabin, Shapiro and Cohalan, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Coutts, Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 350]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that County Court erred in failing to afford him an opportunity to withdraw his plea before imposing a greater sentence than agreed to at the time of the plea. Before sentencing the court learned that defendant was a second felony offender, so the promised sentence of 2 to 4 years’ incarceration was not permitted for assault in the second degree, a class D violent felony. The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of three years on each assault count, the minimum sentence for a second felony offense that is a class D violent felony offense *(see,*Penal Law § 70.06 [6] [c]). Defendant’s contention is not preserved for our review and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see,*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]; *People v Luksch,*265 AD2d 895, *lv denied*94 NY2d 825). (Appeal from Judgment of Cayuga County Court, Contiguglia, J. — Assault, 2nd Degree.) Present — Pine, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Kehoe and Lawton, JJ.
#### Yvonne Coleman, Respondent, v Dennis R. Coleman, Appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered March 3, 1977, denying defendant’s motion to vacate a previous order of said court entered November 13, 1975, which latter order, *inter alia,*awarded plaintiff interim child support in a separation action, unanimously reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law and on the facts, without costs or disbursements, said motion granted to the extent of vacating so much of the order of November 13, 1975, as provided for child support, and all subsequent orders and judgments enforcing said provision; and defendant is directed to pay the sum of $35 per week for support of the youngest child, *pendente lite,*from August 26, 1975, and the parties are directed to proceed to trial expeditiously. Appeal from order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered on or about Novemfipr 26, 1975, unanimously dismissed, as academic in light of the foregoing, without costs or disbursements. Judge Dollinger originally awarded plaintiff custody of the youngest child and exclusive possession of the marital residence, but denied interim financial relief. Thereafter, on ex parte communication by plaintiff he, *sua sponte,*substituted an interim award of child support of $75 weekly. This procedure was improper. (See Judiciary Law, art 15; Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-35; DR 7-110, subd [B].) Accordingly, the motion to vacate that part of said order and *758all subsequent orders and judgments enforcing the child support award should have been granted by Judge Cotton. However recovery of the moneys heretofore paid by the defendant for child support, also requested on the motion, may not be granted. (See *Grossman v Ostrow,*33 AD2d 1006.) Recovery of child support payments has not been sanctioned in this jurisdiction for the essential reason that such support (like alimony) is deemed to have been devoted to that purpose, and no funds exist from which one may recoup moneys so expended. *(Haas v Haas,*271 App Div 107.) On the record before Judge Dollinger, uninfluenced by the ex parte communication, $35 per week is an appropriate award for interim child support of the youngest child. Settle order on notice. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Birns, Lane, Sandler and Sullivan, JJ.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIONEL NAVARRO,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT AYERS, Warden,

Respondent. ______________________________

)

)

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No. C 08-3866 MMC (PR)

ORDER DIRECTING PARTIES TO

FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS

On July18, 2008, petitioner, a California prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin State

Prison and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2007 decision by the California Board of Prison

Hearings (“Board”) to deny petitioner parole. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition

and petitioner has filed a traverse.

A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit addresses important issues relating to federal

review of parole decisions. See Hayward v Marshall, No. 06-55392, 2010 WL 1664977 (9th

Cir. April 22, 2010) (en banc). Consequently, the parties will be directed to file

supplemental briefs setting forth their respective views as to the effect, if any, of the

Hayward en banc decision on the Court’s determination of the instant petition.

Case 3:08-cv-03866-MMC Document 12 Filed 05/20/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Accordingly, the Court hereby sets the following briefing schedule:

1. No later than ten days from the date this order is filed, respondent shall send to

petitioner a copy of the Hayward en banc decision. 

2. No later than twenty days from the date this order is filed, respondent shall file

and serve on petitioner a supplemental brief addressing the impact of Hayward on the instant

action. 

3. No later than twenty days from the date respondent’s supplemental brief is

filed, petitioner shall file and serve on respondent either a supplemental brief addressing the

impact of Hayward on the instant action or a notice that he does not intend to file such a

brief.

4. The parties’ respective supplemental briefs shall not exceed fifteen pages in length.

5. The matter will be deemed submitted on the date petitioner’s supplemental brief is

due. No extensions of time will be granted to file the supplemental briefs absent a showing

of exceptional circumstances. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 20, 2010 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-03866-MMC Document 12 Filed 05/20/10 Page 2 of 2
#### Oakfield Group, L. L. C., Respondent, v Bell Atlantic Corporation, Appellant.

[716 NYS2d 336]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for trespass, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pincus, J.), dated February 2, 2000, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the fourth cause of action and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err in denying those branches of the motion which were to dismiss the first, second, and third causes of action asserted in the complaint *(see, Annabi v Cassino,*269 AD2d 551; *Marple v Sorg,*230 AD2d 831; *Wallice v Waterpointe at Oakdale Shores,*222 AD2d 578). However, the court should have granted that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the fourth cause of action asserted in the complaint. A claim for punitive damages is not a separate cause of action *(see, Rocanova v Equitable Life Assur. Socy.,*83 NY2d 603, 616; *Glatter v Chase Manhattan Bank,*239 AD2d 68, 73; *Watts v Clark Assocs. Funeral Home,*234 AD2d 538; *Goldman v Garofalo,*59 AD2d 933). O’Brien, J. P., Thompson, H. Miller and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
### §3796d–2. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796d–2 was editorially reclassified as section 10303 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
#### The People of the State of New York v. Vincent D. Fiore, Also Known as “Cricky” Fiore, Dennis P. O’Dowd, et al., Defendants.

Motion to disqualify Paul R. Shanahan, Esq., from appearing for or representing defendant Dennis P, O’Dowd or any other defendant in the above-entitled action, *975denied. Memorandum: We do not believe that it would be appropriate or proper for us to attempt to determine upon the present papers and at this stage of the litigation the propriety of attorney Shanahan’s representation of defendant O’Dowd. All of the defendants have been apprised of the making of this motion, all of their respective attorneys having been served with the motion papers. Although counsel for most of the defendants were present upon the argument of this motion, none other than the attorney for defendant O’Dowd participated in the argument and none made any objection to the representation of defendant O’Dowd by Mr. Shanahan. The affidavits of Mr. Shanahan and defendant O’Dowd clearly show that said defendant has been fully advised of all of the circumstances set forth in the moving papers and further that defendant O’Dowd strongly urges that he be permitted to continue to have Mr. Shanahan represent him. It is to be expected that Mr. Shanahan will scrupulously obey the Canons of Ethics. Of course, we cannot undertake at this time to pass upon the propriety of any particular line of evidence or argument. Under these circumstances and in the present posture of the litigation, the motion to disqualify Mr. Shanahan should be denied.
### §3515b. Prohibition on funding certain experiments involving human participants

None of the funds appropriated by this Act or subsequent Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Acts shall be used to pay for any research program or project or any program, project, or course which is of an experimental nature, or any other activity involving human participants, which is determined by the Secretary or a court of competent jurisdiction to present a danger to the physical, mental, or emotional well-being of a participant or subject of such program, project, or course, without the written, informed consent of each participant or subject, or a participant's parents or legal guardian, if such participant or subject is under eighteen years of age. The Secretary shall adopt appropriate regulations respecting this section.

(Pub. L. 102–394, title II, §211, Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat. 1812.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to this section were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:

Pub. L. 102–170, title II, §211, Nov. 26, 1991, 105 Stat. 1127.

Pub. L. 101–517, title II, §212, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 2209.

Pub. L. 101–166, title II, §215, Nov. 21, 1989, 103 Stat. 1178.
### The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District 1 

### Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 95-4120

___________ Anthony Kronus Swift, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Story County Jail; Paul H. * Appeal from the United States Fitzgerald, Sheriff; Lt. Gary * District Court for the Foster, Chief Jailer; Sgt. Brent * Southern District of Iowa. Upchurch, 2nd Chief Jailer; * Matthew Cutts, Classification * [UNPUBLISHED] Officer; Kevin McKinley, Jailer; * Rodney Bingham, Jailer; Tim * Shoppe, Jailer; Sean Slezak, * Jailer; Craig McKinney, Jailer; * Scott Kickbush, Jailer, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: September 4, 1996 Filed: September 19, 1996

___________ Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Anthony K. Swift appeals an order of the district court dismissing 1 without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Swift's complaint asserted that hi s constitutional rights were violated by the conditions of hi s confinement in a "suicidal cell" over the weekend at the Story County Jail

. After reviewing the file, we conclude that the district court did not abus e its discretion in

### -2-

dismissing Swift's co mplaint without prejudice. See Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (standard of review); Far mer v. Brennan , 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994) (test for Eighth Amendment violations in prison) ; Williams v. Delo , 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Farmer t o conditions-of-confinement claim).
Accordingly, we affirm.


### A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Sloan *v.*Sloan.

May 15, 1912.

Complaint for land. Before Judge Bawlings. Jenkins superior court. June 21, 1911.

*B. L. Brinson*and *W. Woodrum,*for plaintiff in error.

*William H. Fleming,*contra.

Hill, J.

1. There was no error in overruling the demurrer to the petition and amended petition in this ease.

2. No error of law appears on the trial of the ease; and the evidence is amply sufficient to support the verdict.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*AU the Justices concur.*