U.S. International Trade Commission

Publication 4122 March 2010

Washington, DC 20436

In the Matter of

Investigation No. 337-TA-589

Certain Switches and Products 

Containing Same
U.S. International Trade Commission

COMMISSIONERS 

Shara L. Aranoff, Chairman 

Daniel R. Pearson, Vice Chairman 

Deanna Tanner Okun 

Charlotte R. Lane 

Irving A. Williamson 

Dean A. Pinkert 

Address all communications to 

Secretary to the Commission 

United States International Trade Commission 

Washington, DC 20436
U.S. International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436 

www.usitc.gov

Publication 4122 March 2010

In the Matter of

Investigation No. 337-TA-589

Certain Switches and Products 

Containing Same


(“JustCom”). The Commission has terminated the investigation with respect to RATOC and 

JustCom based on settlement agreements, including a consent order. 

On November 7,2007, the ALJ issued his final initial determination (“IDyy), and on 

November 21,2007, he issued his recommended determination on remedy and bonding. In his 

ID, the ALJ found that Belkin’s and Emine’s accused products do not infringe asserted claims 1 

and 12-21. In addition, the ALJ found that the claims are not invalid for anticipation or 

obviousness. The ALJ also found that the claims are not invalid for lack of written description 

support and that the patent is not unenforceable for inequitable conduct. Further, the ALJ found 

that there was no domestic industry based on the asserted patent. ATEN, Belkin, Emine, and the 

Commission investigative attorney each filed petitions for review of the ALJ’s ID and responses 

to the petitions. The Commission determined to review a portion of the ALJ’s ID and requested 

briefing from the parties on the issues under review and on remedy, the public interest, and 

bonding. 

Having examined the record of this investigation, including the ALJ’s final ID, the 

written submissions on review, and the responses thereto, the Commission has determined (1) to 

modify the ALJ’s claim construction of the term “body;” (2) to adopt the ALJ’s claim 

construction of the terms “fixedly attached” and “integrated into;” (3) to determine that Belkin’s 

and Emine’s products do not infringe the asserted claims under the adopted claim construction; 

and (4) to determine that, alternatively, if a broad claim construction were adopted for the term 

“body,” the claims would be invalid for anticipation or obviousness in light of the asserted prior 

art. 

The authority for the Commission’s determination is contained in section 337 of the 

Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 5 1337), and in section 210.45 of the Commission’s 

Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 C.F.R. 9 210.45). 

By order of the Commission. 

Maril y nk/Abbott 

Secretary to the Commission 

Issued: February 8,2008 

2 
CERTAIN SWITCHES AND PRODUCTS CONTAINING 337-TA-589 

SAME 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached NOTICE OF COMMISSION 

DETERMINATION OF NO VIOLATION OF SECTION 337; TERMINATION 

OF THE INVESTIGATION has been served by hand upon the Commission 

Investigative Attorney, Anne Goalwin, Esq., and Heidi E. Strain, Esq., the following 

parties as indicated, on February 8, 2008 

J I 

Marilyn R. 

U.S. International 

Abbott, Secretary 

Trade Commission 345 

500 E Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20436 

ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANTS ATEN 

INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD., AND ATEN 

TECHNOLOGY, INC.: 

Arthur Wineberg, Esq. 

Tobias E. Zimmerman, Esq. 

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD 

LLP 

1333 New Hampshire Ave, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

P-202-887-4000 

F-202-887-4288 

Yitai Hu, Esq. 

Ming-Tao Yang, Esq. 

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD 

2 Palo Alto Square 

3000 El Camino Real, Suite 400 

Palo Alto, CA 94306 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

cylfvia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

(@ha First Class Mail 

( )Other: 
Page 2 - Certificate of Service 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS BELKIN 

CORPORATION AND BELKIN LOGISTICS, INC.: 

Steven E. Adkins, Esq. 

Eric S. Namrow, Esq. 

Ted J. Ebersole, Esq. 

JONES DAY 

5 1 Louisiana Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20001 

P-202-879-3939 

F-202-626-1700 

Robert Dickerson, Esq. 

Yasser El-Gamal, Esq. 

JONES DAY 

555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90071 

P-213-489-3939 

F-2 1 3-243 -2539 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT EMINE 

TECHNOLOGY, CO., LTD.: 

Sturgis M. Sobin, Esq. 

HELLER EHRMAN 

17 17 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

P-202-912-2000 

F-202-912-2020 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

(@ia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

(&a First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

(&a First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

PUBLIC VERSION 

products containing the same by reason of infringement of claims 1 and 12-21 of United States 

Patent No. 7,035,112 (the “’1 12 patent”). The complaint named three respondents besides Belkin 

and Emine: R4TOC Systems, Inc., RATOC Systems International, Inc. (collectively, “RATOC”), 

and JustCom Tech, hc. (“JustCom”). On January 18,2008, the Commission terminated the 

investigation with respect to RATOC and JustCom based on settlement agreements, including a 

consent order. 

The ALJ held an evidentiary hearing on July 16-20,2007, and thereafter received briefing 

from the parties. On November 7,2007, the ALJ issued his final ID, and on November 21,2007, 

he issued his recommended determination on remedy and bonding. In his ID, the ALJ construed 

the claims and found that the accused products do not infringe claims 1 and 12-21. ID at 39-51. In 

addition, he found that the claims would be invalid for anticipation or obviousness under certain 

alternate claim constructions. ID at 53-67. The ALJ also found that the claims are not invalid for 

lack of written description and that the patent is not unenforceable for inequitable conduct. ID at 

68-70. Finally, he found that the domestic industry requirement was not met. ID at 71-74. 

On November 19,2007, ATEN, Belkin, Emine, and the Commission investigative attorney 

(“IA”) each filed petitions for review, challenging the ALJ’s determinations. See Complainants 

ATEN International Co., Ltd.’s and ATEN Technology, Inc.’s Petition for Review of the Initial 

Determination; Respondents Belkin International and Belkin Inc.’s Contingent Petition for Review 

of the Initial Determination (“Belkin Pet.”); Corrected Contingent Petition by Respondent Emine 

Technology Co. Ltd. for Review of November 7,2007 Initial Determination (“Emine Pet.”); and 

Petition for Review of the Office of Unfair Import Investigations of the Initial Determination. 

2 
PUBLIC VERSION 

The Commission determined to review the ALJ’s claim construction of the terms “body,” 

“fixedly attached,” and “integrated into,” and his determinations on infringement, anticipation, 

obviousness, and domestic industry. The Commission determined not to review the ALJ’s claim 

construction of the terms “connector plugs,” “connector ports,” “cable,” or “molded attachment 

element,” or his determinations on the level of skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art, written 

description, or inequitable conduct. The Commission received briefing on the issues on review 

and on remedy, the public interest, and bonding. 

B. Patent at Issue 

This investigation pertains to switches. The ’ 1 12 patent is entitled “Automatic Switch” and 

is directed to a switch and a method of making a switch. The patent application resulting in 

the ’1 12 patent was filed on July 8,2002, and the patent issued on April 25,2006 to Kevin Chen. 

It is assigned to ATEN International Co., Ltd. The ’1 12 patent has twenty-three claims, but only 

eleven claims are asserted in this investigation, claims 1 and 12-2 1. 

C. Products at Issue 

All of the accused products are keyboard, video display, and mouse switches (“KVM 

switches”). These types of switches allow a single keyboard, video display, and mouse to share 

two or more computers. ATEN accuses numerous switches of infringement. The parties agreed 

that the accused products can be categorized into six groups, discussed in more detail below. 

11. ANALYSIS 

A. Claim Construction 

Generally, the words of a claim are “given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which 

3 
PUBLIC VERSION 

is the “meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the 

time of the invention . . . .77 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 

banc). Moreover, claims must be read in view of the specification of which they are a part. Id. at 

13 15. In Phillips, the Federal Circuit emphasized the importance of the specification, stating that 

usually the specification is dispositive of claim construction issues and that “it is the single best 

guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. In addition, the Court recently reiterated that a 

patentee may limit a term by implication through the specification. See On Demand Machine Corp. 

v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

The Federal Circuit has also held that special rules apply where there is no accepted 

meaning of a claim term to a person of ordinary skill in the art. For example, in Irdeto Access, Inc. 

v. Echostar Satellite Corp., the Court stated that “if a disputed term has ‘no previous meaning to 

those of ordinary skill in the prior art[,] its meaning, then must be found [elsewhere] in the 

patent.”’ 383 F.3d 1295,1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (brackets original) (qu0tingJ.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. 

Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Thus, in these cases, the patent 

specification takes on particular importance. 

There are two independent claims asserted in this investigation, claims 1 and 2 1 : 

1. A switch comprising: 

a body; 

a switching circuit contained within the body; 

a set of connector ports electrically coupled to the switching circuit; and, 

a plurality of cables fixedly attached to and extending from the body, each cable in the 

4 
PUBLIC VERSION 

plurality of cables having a plurality of connector plugs, 

wherein each connector plug in the plurality of connector plugs for one of the cables in the 

plurality of cables are matched a respective connector plug in another one of the cables 

in the plurality of cables, and wherein the switching circuit switches to connect each of 

the set of connector ports to one of the plurality of cables. 

’1 12 patent, col. 3,ll. 19-32 (emphasis added). 

21. A method comprising the steps of: 

providing a body; 

enclosing a switching circuit within the body; 

integrating a first computer cable and a second computer cable into the body, each of the 

first computer cable and the second computer cable including a first end electrically 

coupled to the switching circuit and a second end having a plurality of connector plugs, 

each connector plug in the plurality of connector plugs in the first computer cable being 

matched to a corresponding one of the plurality of connector plugs in the second 

computer cable; and, 

providing a plurality of connector ports on a surface of the body, the plurality of connector 

ports electrically coupled to the switching circuit; 

wherein the switching circuit electrically switches the plurality of connector ports between 

the plurality of connector plugs of the first computer cable and the second computer 

cable. 

’1 12 patent, col. 4,ll. 24-43 (emphasis added). 

The ALJ construed seven terms from the asserted claims: (1) “body,” (2) “fixedly 

attached,” (3) “connector plugs,” (4) “connector ports,” (5) “cable,” (6) “molded attachment 

element,” and (7) “integrated into.” We determined to review three of those terms: “body,” 

“fixedly attached,” and “integrated into,” which are in bold in the claims above. With respect to 

the claim constructions that we determined not to review, we stated in our notice that we 

5 
PUBLIC VERSION 

understood the ALJ to have adopted the reasoning of the party whose claim construction he 

adopted, and on that basis we determined not to review. 

1. “Body” 

The ALJ construed the term “body” to mean “an enclosure that provides good-weather 

resistence [sic], impact resistence [sic], and absolute protection of the internal circuit board and 

circuits thereon.” ID at 22. Complainant ATEN argues that the term “body” means the “main, 

central, or principal part” of the switch, excluding the switching circuit. See Written Submission 

of Complainants ATEN International Co., Ltd. and ATEN Technology, Inc. in Response to the 

Commission’s Notice of Determination to Review the Initial Determination (“Comp. Submission”) 

at 2-3 & 27-28. Respondent Belkin argues that the term “body” means an “integrally injection 

molded enclosure that provides good-weather resistance, impact resistance, and absolute 

protection of the internal circuit board and circuits thereon.” See Belkin Respondents’ Submission 

Concerning Issues Under Review, Remedy, the Public Interest and Bonding (“Belkin Submission”) 

at 12. Respondent Emine asserts that the term “bodyl’ means “a single integral enclosure that is not 

assembled from separate parts, such as by the means of screws.” See Respondent Emine 

Technology Co. Ltd.’s Submission Regarding Issues on Review and on the Issues of Remedy, the 

Public Interest, and Bonding (“Emine Submission”) at ‘1 1. The IA asserts that the claim term 

“body” means the “main, central, or principal part” of the switch and that it includes the switching 

circuit. See Office of Unfair Import Investigations’ Submission in Response to Commission 

Request for Written Submissions on Issues under Review and on Remedy, the Public Interest, and 

Bonding at 3 & 8. 

6 
PUBLIC VERSION 

We construe the claim term “body” to mean “an enclosure for an internal circuit board.” In 

addition, we conclude that the claimed “body” does not include the prior art box disclosed in the 

Background of the Invention section of the ’1 12 patent specification.’ We find it unnecessary to 

reach the issues of whether the specification limits the term “body” to an enclosure that is 

inj ection-molded, singular, or integral or whether the claimed “body” includes the switching 

circuit. 

Our analysis begins with the claims themselves. Independent claim 1 states that a 

switching circuit is “contained within the body.” ’1 12 patent, col. 3,l. 21. Independent claim 21 

states that the body “enclos[es] a switching circuit.” ’1 12 patent, col. 4,l. 26. Turning to the 

specification, we see that it describes an automatic switch that “includes a main body . . . enclosing 

an internal circuit board.” ’ 1 12 patent, col. 1,ll. 39-41. This is consistent with the claims. Based 

on the language of the claims and the specification, we conclude that the claimed “body” is “an 

enclosure for an internal circuit board.” For the ’1 12 patent claims, the “internal circuit board” 

comprises a switching circuit. ’1 12 patent, col. 3,ll. 21 & 26. 

Respondent Emine raises the question of whether the inventor disavowed the prior art 

described in the Background of the Invention section of the ’1 12 patent. We find that he did. 

The specification criticizes the prior art switch for lacking features that are described as advantages 

of the present invention. In On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., the Court cited 

Astrazeneca AB v. MutuaZ Pharmaceutical Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2004), for the 

* Therefore, insofar as an enclosure contains “outer walls that are made of metal material or rigid 

plastic material and assembled together by means of screws,” it is not a “body” within the meaning 

7 
PUBLIC VERSION 

proposition that “[wlhere the general summary or description of the invention describes a feature 

of the invention (here, micelles formed by the solubilizer) and criticizes other products (here, other 

solubilizers, including co-solvents) that lack the same feature, this operates as a clear disavowal of 

these other products. . . .” On DemandMachine Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333,1340 

(Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, criticizing a prior art device that lacks features described as features of the 

invention operates as a disavowal, even without an express statement to that effect. Further, the 

specification takes on particular importance in this case, because the experts acknowledged that 

there is no accepted meaning of the term “body)’ in the art.* See Tr. at 465 Parker); Tr. at 1135-36 

(Min). 

In the Background of the Invention, the specification explains: 

Inmost [sic] cases, the box 41 includes outer walls that are made of metal material 

or rigid plastic material and assembled together by means of screws (not shown). 

The automatic switch 40 is normally positioned on a host enclosure of a computer 

configuration and tends to unexpectedly fall off the host enclosure to resuZt in a 

damaged circuit board due to vibration. Moreover, when a high humidity exists, 

moisture in the air tends to attach to the circuit board to cause short circuit. Repair 

or maintenance of the circuit board is therefore required. 

’1 12 patent, col. 1,ll. 23-32 (emphasis added). In contrast, when introducing the present invention, 

the Background of the Invention states that “[tlhe present invention relates to an automatic switch 

for a user to automatically switch between two or more computer configurations, and more 

particularly to an automatic switch that has an integrally injection-molded enclosure to provide 

of the claim term. ,112 patent, col. 1,ll. 23-25. 

The specification is also particularly important because the general definition of the term “body” 

is “the main, central, or principal part” - a claim construction proposed by ATEN and the IA, but 

8 
PUBLIC VERSION 

good weather-resistance, impact-resistance, and absolute protection of an internal circuit board 

there~f.”~ ’112 patent, col. 1,ll. 5-10 (emphasis added); see also ’1 12 patent, col. 1,ll. 41-44. The 

inventor’s contrast between the problems and solutions - vibration problems and impact resistance 

as well as moisture problems and weather resistance - and his description of the solution as a 

change to the body (from the box), effects a disavowal of the prior art box. 

Indeed, the parallel structuring of the Background of the Invention and the 

Summary of the Invention directly contrast the problems with the prior art with the solution 

presented by the inventor. They both begin by describing the hction of the prior art; then 

they describe the structure of the prior art; and finally they describe, respectively, the 

problems with the prior art and the solution presented by the inventor. This structure 

highlights the comparison and is illustrated in the table below: 

one that provides little guidance to the meaning of the term here. See CX-228 (MERRIAM 

WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 128 (10th ed. 2001)). 

Although the phrase “more particularly” might normally set off a preferred embodiment, in this 

case the first part of the statement describes the general field, which is well-known in the prior art, 

and the “more particular” description describes the invention. 

9 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Prior Art 

Function 

Prior Art 

Structure 

Probled 

Background of the Invention 

“For people to access two or more computers 

at the same time, there is developed an 

automatic switch to enable a user to 

automatically switch among different signal 

paths.” ’1 12 patent, col. 1,ll. 16-18. 

“FIG. 1 shows a conventional automatic 

switch 40 that is configured into a box 41. The 

box 41 is internally provided with a circuit 

board (not shown). Ports 42,43, and 44 for 

various types of signal cable connectors are 

provided on peripheral walls of the box 41 .” 

’112 patent, col. 1,ll. 18-23. 

“Inmost [sic] cases, the box 41 includes outer -- 

walls that are made of metal material or rigid 

plastic material and assembled together by 

means of screws (not shown). The automatic 

switch 40 is normally positioned on a host 

enclosure of a computer configuration and 

tends to unexpectedly fall off the host 

enclosure to result in a damaged circuit board 

due to vibration. Moreover, when a high 

humidity exists, moisture in the air tends to 

attach to the circuit board to cause short circuit. 

Repair or maintenance of the circuit board is 

therefore required.” ’1 12 patent, col. 1,ll. 

23-32. 

Summarv of the Invention 

“A primary object of the present 

invention is to provide a plug-type 

automatic switch for a user to 

access and control multiple 

computer configurations through 

one single switch.” ’ 1 12 patent, 

CO~. 1.11.36-38. 

“The automatic switch includes a 

main body externally provided with 

connector ports and enclosing an 

internal circuit board.” ’1 12 patent, 

CO~. 1,ll. 39-41. 

“The main body has an integrally 

in. ection-molded plastic enclosure 

to provide good weather-resistance, 

impact-resistance, and absolute 

protection of the internal circuit 

board and circuits thereon.” ’ 112 

patent, col. 1,ll. 41-44. 

Solution 

Accordingly, the specification identifies features of the invention and then criticizes the 

prior art for lacking those features, and as such, the inventor disavowed coverage of the indicated 

prior art.4 See Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333,1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

The fact that the specification only describes one type of prior art, stating that in most cases the 

boxes are made of multiple components held together by screws, simply means that the scope of 

the exclusion is limited to the prior art boxes actually referred to. 

10 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Moreover, the specification states: “In brief, the automatic switch 10 of the present invention uses 

the main body 20 having cable-connected connector sets 30 to replace the conventional box-type 

switch 40, enabling the switch 10 to be used in a more convenient manner.” ‘1 12 patent, col. 3,ll. 

9-13. This further suggests that the inventor did not intend for his claims to cover the conventional 

box-type switch 40. 

Finally, the specification employs a different term than “body” to describe the prior art 

enclosure “box,” stating that “[i]nmost [sic] cases, the box 41 includes outer walls that are made 

of metal material or rigid plastic material and assembled together by means of screws (not 

shown).” ’1 12 patent, col. 1,ll. 23-25. Different terms in a patent claim presumptively have 

different meanings. See CAE Screenplutes Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 

1308,13 17 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Similarly, in our view, the use of a different term to describe the prior 

art in the specification suggests that the prior art “box” differs fkom the claimed “body.” 

Accordingly, we construe the term “body” to mean “an enclosure for an internal circuit board” and 

conclude that the claimed “body” does not include the prior art box described in the Background 

of the Invention section of the ’1 12 patent specificati~n.~~ Thus, the claimed body does not 

include an enclosure containing “outer walls that are made of metal material or rigid plastic 

material and assembled together by means of screws.” ’1 12 patent, col. 1,ll. 23-25. 

The inventor’s silence when the examiner called the prior art box a body cannot be relied upon 

to broaden the scope of the claims. JX-2 at ATENOOO141, ATENOOO162-63, & ATENOOO190. 

See Eustmun Koduk Co. v. Goodyeur Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 

overruled on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,1456 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (en banc); Saluzur v. Procter di Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

The cases on claim construction cited by ATEN and the IA do not persuade us otherwise. 

11 
PUBLIC VERSION 

2. “Fixedly Attached” 

The ALJ construed the term “fixedly attached” to mean “fastened, attached, or placed so as 

to be firm and not readily movable.” ID at 24. Belkin and Emine argue that the term “fixedly 

attached” means “permanently joined together.” Belkin Submission at 37-42; Belkin Pet. at 5-6; 

Emine Submission at 31-34; Emine Pet. at 13-14. 

We adopt the ALJ’s claim construction and here provide reasoning for our construction. In 

our view, nothing suggests that permanence is a requirement of the claim term “fixedly attached.” 

The claims themselves do not recite “permanently attached.” Moreover, Figures 2 and 3 do not 

show that the term “fixedly attached” requires permanent attachment as the respondents suggest. 

Even if they were to show a permanently attached fixture, they depict at best preferred 

embodiments . 

Nor does the prosecution history show a contraction or syrrender of claim scope as the 

respondents argue. Although the patent examiner stated “[ilt would have been obvious to one of 

ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to use [the] fixedly connection design 

of Krakovich for the connection of the AAPA, as modified, in order to permanently secure the 

connector with the device,” the Federal Circuit has held that unilateral statements by an examiner 

do not affect the scope of the claims much less show a surrender by the patentee. JX-2 at 

ATENOOO191. SeeEastman Kodak, 114 F.3d at 1556; Salazar, 414 F.3d at 1347. 

In addition, the term “fixedly attached” does not have an established meaning in the field 

and it does not even appear in the specification of the ’1 12 patent (except in the claims). Tr. at 

481-82 (Barker); Tr. at 11 17 (Min). Thus, it should be given its general ordinary and customary 

12 
PUBLIC VERSION 

meaning. According to the IA, that meaning is “fastened, attached, or placed so as to be firm and 

not readily movable.” IA Resp. at 21 (citing SX-2 (RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 

REVISED ED. at 499 (1980)). ATEN argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term is 

“securely brought into association.” See Complainants ATEN International Co., Ltd. and ATEN 

Technology, Inc.’s Reply to Respondents’ Written Submissions in Response to the Commission’s 

Notice to Review the Initial Determination at 15. There is not much difference between the IA’s 

definition and ATEN’s. ID at 24. Accordingly, we construe the term “fixedly attached” to mean 

“fastened, attached, or placed so as to be firm and not readily movable.” ID at 24. 

3. 

The ALJ construed the terms “integrated into” and “integrating . . . into” to mean “formed 

“Integrated Into” and “Integrating. . . Into” 

into a unified whole that is inseparable without disassembling the whole.” ID at 35. Belkin and 

Emine argue that the phrase “integrated into” means “blended or blending into without clear 

boundary and cannot be disassembled,” relying on the fact that the specification describes an 

integrally injection-molded enclosure, which would result in a blending of the parts. Belkin 

Submission at 42-43; Emine Submission at 34. 

We adopt the ALJ’s claim construction and here provide our reasoning. The terms 

“integrated into” and “integrating . . . into” do not have accepted meanings in the art. Tr. at 496-97 

(Barker). Respondents point to the specification’s description of the body as “integrally 

injection-molded” and assert that this suggests that the term “integrated into” requires blending of 

the parts. Belkin Submission at 42-43; Emine Submission at 34. This assertion ignores the context 

of the term as it is used in the claims. The claim language at issue is found in claims 13 and 21. 

13 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Claim 13 recites that the first end of each cable of the plurality of cables be “integrated into” the 

body. ’ 112 patent, col. 4,ll. 1-2. Claim 21 recites “integrating a first computer cable and a second 

computer cable into the body.” ’1 12 patent, col. 4,ll. 27-28. The claims, therefore, deal with the 

integrated nature of the connection between the cables and the body, whereas the specification’s 

description of “integrally inj ection-molded” referred to by respondents deals with the integral 

nature of the body, not the connection. Thus, the description in the specification does not impart 

meaning to the claim term, because they are used in different contexts. Accordingly, nothing in the 

claims, specification, or prosecution history suggests that the term “integrated into” requires 

blending of the parts. 

The plain meaning of the term “integrate” is “to form, coordinate, or blend into a 

functioning or unified whole.” CX-228 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 606 

(10th ed. 2001)). While this allows blending, it does not require it. Moreover, because claim 13 

depends from claim 1, the term “integrated into” recited in claim 13 must have a narrower meaning 

than the term “fixedly attached” in claim 1. In our view, the unified nature of the term “integrated 

into” suggests that the cables are inseparable from the body without disassembling the body. 

Accordingly, we construe the phrases “integrated into” and “integrating . . . into” to mean “formed 

into a unified whole that is inseparable without disassembling the whole.” ID at 35. 

B. Infringement 

A determination of infringement is a two-step analysis. “First, the court determines the 

scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 

1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citations omitted). “[Second,] the properly construed claims are 

14 
PUBLIC VERSION 

compared to the allegedly infringing device.” Id. 

The ALJ found that ATEN did not establish that any of the accused products infkinge the 

asserted claims of the ’1 12 patent, because they do not have a “body” as he defined the term. ID 

at 39-5 1. The ALJ nevertheless found that all of the other claim limitations in claims 1, 12, and 

14-20 are met by all of the accused products. ID at 42-43. He found that certain products do not 

meet the limitations of claims 13 and 2 1, because the cables are not integrated into the body as he 

construed the term. ID at 44-46. 

As noted earlier, the parties stipulated that the accused products form six representative 

groups. Four of the groups consist of products manufactured by Belkin. The remaining two 

groups consist of products manufactured by Emine. We determine that none of the accused 

products infringe the asserted claims of the ’1 12 patent because they all use the prior art “box” 

criticized by the specification rather than the claimed “body.”7 

The Belkin CA Group 1, Version 1 and Version 2 products, the Belkin Group 2, Version 

1 and Version 2 products, and the Belkin Group 3 products, represented by CPX-37, CPX-7, 

CPX-10, CPX-5, and CPX-6, respectively, all have clamshell casings made of two rigid plastic 

pieces that are held together by screws. CPX-37; CPX-7; CPX-10; CPX-5; CPX-6; Tr. at 514-22, 

552-61, & 569-601 (Barker). Belkin’s Group 4 products have a box-type casing that is made of 

Because we adopt a claim construction that is similar to the one put forth by Emine, there is no 

need for remand. ATEN had notice of the claim construction and an opportunity to present 

evidence that the “body” limitation is met under this claim construction. See Exxon Chem. Patents, 

inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Moreover, the record is fully 

developed and contains undisputed evidence that permits us to conclusively decide whether the 

15 
PUBLIC VERSION 

rigid plastic pieces that are held together by screws. CPX-40; Tr. at 601-07 (Barker). These 

casings all match the description in the specification of the prior art “box,” so they are not “bodies” 

as required by claims 1 and 21. Because Belkin’s products do not meet the limitations of the 

independent claims, they also do not infringe the asserted dependent claims. 

The Belkin CA Group 1, Version 2 products, the Belkin Group 2, Version 2 products, and 

the Belkin Group 3 products also do not meet the “molded attachment element” limitation of claim 

12 or the “integrated” limitations of claims 13 and 21. The cables are fixedly attached to the body 

by means of thumbscrews and although the cables are attached to the connector plug by means of 

a molded attachment element, they are not attached to the body that way. CPX-7; CPX-5; CPX-6. 

Moreover, the cables can be removed fkom the body without disassembling the whole, so they are 

not integrated. Thus, these products do not infiinge claims 12, 13, and 21 for these additional 

reasons. Finally, the Belkin Group 4 products do not meet the “providing a plurality of connector 

ports on a surface of the body” limitation of claim 2 1. Although the products have connector ports, 

they are not on the surface of the structure as required by claim 21. CPX-40. Thus, these products 

do not infiinge claim 21 for this additional reason. 

The Emine Group 1 and Group 2 products, represented by CPX-9 and CPX-50, 

respectively, have casings made of two rigid plastic pieces that are held together by screws. CPX-9; 

CPX-50; Tr. at 608-27 (Barker). These casings also match the description in the specification of 

the prior art “box,” so they are not “bodies” as required by claims 1 and 2 1. Because Emine’s 

accused products infkinge the asserted claims under our claim construction. See Bowers v. 

Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

16 
PUBLIC VERSION 

products do not meet the limitations of the independent claims, they also do not infringe the 

asserted dependent claims. Moreover, the Emine Group 2 products do not meet the “providing a 

plurality of connector ports on a surface of the body” limitation of claim 21. Although these 

products have connector ports, they are not on the surface of the structure as required by claim 2 1. 

CPX-50. Thus, they do not infringe claim 21 for this additional reason. Accordingly, we conclude 

that Belkin’s and Emine’s products do not infringe the asserted claims.8 

Finally, under our claim construction, there can be no finding of infringement as to the 

accused products under the doctrine of equivalents, because the inventor excluded the prior art box 

from the claims and cannot recapture through the doctrine of equivalents what was given up by the 

specification. Astrazeneca, 384 F.3d at 1342. 

C. Validity 

We need not reach the issue of validity, but as the ALJ ruled in the alternative in this 

investigation, we follow suit, assessing validity under a broader construction of the term “body.” 

We conclude that if the term “body” were simply construed to mean “an enclosure for an internal 

We note that if the prior art disclosed in the Background of the Invention section of the ’1 12 

patent were not excluded from the scope of the claims and the term “body” were simply construed 

as the “main, central, or principal part” (or as “an enclosure for an internal circuit board”), we agree 

with the ALJ that all of the accused products would infringe at least claim 1 of the ’1 12 patent. ID 

at 39-51; see also CPX-37; CPX-7; CPX-10; CPX-5; CPX-6; CPX-40; CPX-9; CPX-50; Tr. at 

514-22,552-61, & 569-627 (Barker). In addition, we agree with the ALJ that the additional 

limitations of claims 12-21 are met by the accused products (except those products expressly 

referred to above as not meeting certain limitations (i.e., “molded attachment element,” 

“integrated,” and “providing a plurality of connector ports on a surface of the body”)), and we 

adopt his findings to that effect. Id. We add that, with regard to claim 12, the Belkin Group 2, 

Version 1 products meet the “molded attachment element” limitation, because the cables are 

17 
PUBLIC VERSION 

circuit board” or the “main, central, or principal part,” the claims would be invalid as either 

anticipated or obvious. 

An issued patent is presumed valid and the burden is on the party challenging the validity 

of the patent to show that it is invalid by clear and convincing evidence. Helzjii Ltd. v. Blok-Lok 

Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

1. Anticipation 

A determination that a patent is invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. 9 102 requires a 

finding that each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art 

reference. See Celeritas Techs. Inc. v. Rockwell Int ’1 Corp., 150 F.3d 1354,1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

Anticipation is a factual question. See State Contracting and Eng g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 

346 F.3d 1057,1068 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

The ALJ found that respondents failed to prove that the claims, as he construed them, were 

invalid. ID at 53-56. Nevertheless, he concluded that if the term “body” were construed broadly 

as proposed by ATEN and the IA, claims 1, 12, and 14-20 of the ’1 12 patent would be invalid as 

anticipated. ID at 56. The ALJ found that the following items are prior art: Startech.com 

(“Startech”) SV211K Switch Kit (CPX-4); Avocent Outhok ES Series User Guide (RX-535); 

ATEN Master View Pro KVM Switch model CS-1016 (FWX-8) and ATEN Master View KVM 

Switch model CS-228 (CPX-1) used with corresponding cable model 2L-1701P (RPX-9); and 

associated user manuals (Rx-60; RX-42; RX-59). ID at 56-58. 

fixedly attached to the body through a molded attachment component that brings the cables into 

association with the body. See CPX-10. 

18 
PUBLIC VERSION 

ATEN argues that the Startech product and certain Avocent products are not prior art. 

Specifically, ATEN asserts that there is no evidence that these products are the same as the 

products that were offered for sale more than six years ago. Comp. Submission at 37-38. We note 

that the Avocent Outlook ES Series User Guide is dated 2001, which is earlier than the July 8,2002 

application date of the ’1 12 patent, so it is prior art. Moreover, we do not have to decide whether 

the Startech switch is prior art, because ATEN’s own switches noted above disclose all of the same 

elements as the Startech switch and ATEN does not dispute that they are prior art. Accordingly, 

we rely on the following items of prior art: Avocent Outhok ES Series User Guide (RX-535); 

ATEN Master View Pro KVM Switch model CS-1016 (RPX-8) and ATEN Master View KVM 

Switch model CS-228 (CPX-1) used with corresponding cable model 2L-1701P (RPX-9); and 

associated user manuals (RX-60; RX-42; RX-59). 

If the prior art disclosed in the Background of the Invention section of the ’ 1 12 patent were 

not excluded fiom the scope of the claims and the term “body” were simply construed as “an 

enclosure for an internal circuit board” (or as the “main, central, or principal part”) and if the 

switching circuit were considered to be part of the body, claims 1 and 14-20 would be anticipated 

by the identified prior art. Claims 12, 13, and 21 would not be anticipated under any claim 

construction for the term “body.” In addition, if the switching circuit were not considered part of 

the body, none of the claims would be anticipated.’ 

We adopt the ALJ’s findings that the prior art switches disclose: a KVM switch with a 

’ The parties dispute whether the claimed switching circuit is part of the body or not. We do not 

decide this issue, but rather consider invalidity under both constructions. 

19 
PUBLIC VERSION 

main part (and we add that the main part is an enclosure for a switching circuit (body)); a switching 

circuit contained therein; a set of receptacles (connector ports) on a wall of the body to receive the 

peripheral plugs that are electrically connected to the circuit board; and at least two cables 

(plurality of cables) that attach to the connector ports attached to the switching circuit that are on 

the wall of the body by thumbscrew attachments so as not to be readily movable (fixedly attached) 

and they extend from the switching circuit (which under this alternate claim construction is a body). 

ID at 59-60; see also RX-535; RPX-8; CPX-1; RPX-9; RX-60; RX-42; RX-59. We also agree 

that the evidence shows that each cable has attached at its computer end a plurality of 

cable-connected connectors (connector plugs) for insertion into mating receptacles for the 

peripherals on the computer; the provided or compatible cables sold for use with the switches have 

matching sets of cable-connected connectors (connector plugs) on each cable for insertion into 

standard peripheral ports on the computers; and the switching circuit functions so as to switch the 

electrical connection with the set of peripheral receptacles on the switch wall (connector ports) 

among each of the plurality of cables. Id. 

We determine that the thumbscrew attachments do not satisfy the “molded attachment 

element” limitation of claim 12, because the part of the thumbscrew that attaches to the circuit is 

the metal screw, not the molded element that connects the cable to the thumbscrew. 

With regard to dependent claims 14-20, we agree with the ALJ and his findings that the 

evidence shows that the set of connector ports on the wall of each prior art switch contains ports to 

connect computer peripherals (claim 14), including a keyboard port (claim 19, a mouse port 

(claim 16), and a video port (claim 17) to connect a keyboard, mouse, and display, respectively. ID 

20 
PUBLIC VERSION 

at 60; see also RX-535; FWX-8; CPX-1; FWX-9; RX-60; Rx-42; RX-59. Each cable or set of 

cables couples the switching circuit to a computer (claim 18). Id. Each of the plurality of cables 

or sets of cables has a keyboard, video, and mouse cable with respective plugs (claim 19). Id. 

Further, there is a second cable or set of cables that couple the switching circuit to a second 

computer (claim 20). Id. Accordingly, claims 1 and 14-20 would be anticipated if the term “body” 

were construed to mean “an enclosure for an internal circuit board” (or to mean the “main, central, 

or principal part”) and if the switching circuit were considered part of the body, because each and 

every limitation is met. 

2. Obviousness 

Obviousness is a legal determination based on underlying findings of fact. In re Kotzab, 

217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The underlying factual inquiries include (1) the scope and 

content of the prior art, (2) the level of ordinary skill in the art, (3) the differences between the 

claimed invention and the prior art, and (4) secondary considerations of nonobviousness. Graham 

v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of 

these inquiries in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 

Before the ALJ, respondents argued that the asserted claims are invalid for obviousness and 

the IA argued that claims 13 and 21 are invalid for obviousness in light of the prior art. ID at 61. 

The ALJ determined that claims 13 and 21 are not invalid for obviousness under his claim 

construction, but that they would be under the claim constructions proposed by ATEN and the IA. 

ID at 63. Specifically, he found that a person of ordinary skill in the art could have reasonably 

combined the disclosures of the allegedly anticipating prior art with the Yamada reference to arrive 

21 
PUBLIC VERSION 

at the claimed invention. ID at 63. 

The Yamada reference (RX-522 (certified translation)) is a Japanese patent application 

with a publication date of February 25, 1997. It discloses an automatic switch for personal 

computer peripherals. Although the Yamada reference does not expressly disclose a KVM switch, 

it discloses a design that allows a user to switch a printer connection between two computers. 

Moreover, the Yamada reference discloses that the printer can be replaced with a display signal or 

various other types of computer or peripheral devices. Rx-522 at 3(0011). 

More specifically, the Yamada reference discloses a device shown in Figure 1 and 

described in paragraph (0009) that has a housing (a body) that encloses a switching circuit. Figure 

1 is shown below: 

/4’ 

The device described in Yamada also has a set of connector ports (A & B) that are electrically 

coupled to the switching circuit. In addition, it has three cables (3,4, and 5) that are “fitted into the 

main housing unit 1 directly with one end of the cable via a protective ring 6.” Rx-522 at 2(0009). 

Figure 2 more clearly shows the protective ring 6 and shows that it has a lip on the inside and 

outside of the housing so that the attachment element connects the cable fixedly to the housing and 

22 
PUBLIC VERSION 

the cables extend fiom the housing. RX-522, Figure 2; Tr. at 1222,1226 (Min). Figure 2 is shown 

below: 

Thus, the Yamada reference discloses a body, where the cables are fixedly attached to the body, not 

the switching circuit. Moreover, Yamada discloses a plurality of cables that are integrated into the 

body as required by claims 13 and 21 and it discloses a molded attachment element, ie., the 

protective ring 6, as required by claim 12. As such, it discloses cables that are fixedly attached and 

extending fkom the body, even if the term “body” were construed to exclude the switching circuit. 

The Yamada reference does not, however, disclose cables that have a plurality of connector 

plugs, where the plugs are matched with the plugs of the other cables. The prior art references 

discussed with regard to anticipation, however, disclose these other elements. Accordingly, each 

and every limitation of claims 1 and 12-21 is disclosed by the prior art. See Tr. at 1460 (Barker). 

The Supreme Court recently stated that “[tlhe combination of familiar elements according to 

known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 

127 S.Ct. at 1739. In this case, substituting the known protective ring fiom Yamada for the 

thumbscrew connections in ATEN’s prior art switches would predictably result in the cables being 

fixedly attached to, directly extending fiom, and integrated into the body as claimed. The 

23 
PUBLIC VERSION 

protective ring would perform the same hction in both applications. 

ATEN asserts that the Yamada reference is directed to printer switches, not KVM switches. 

Comp. Submission at 3 1. Yamada, however, indicates that it could connect two computers to one 

printer or one computer to two printers and that other computer peripherals could be used, 

including a monitor. RX-522 at 2-3(0011). Mice and keyboards are also computer peripherals. 

Moreover, printer switches are not so different from KVM switches that a person of ordinary skill 

in the art would have no knowledge of printer switches. Tr. at 1457-61 (Barker); Tr. at 1369-70 

(Min). And finally, the claims themselves are not limited to KVM switches, but are directed 

generally to a “switch.” ’1 12 patent, col. 3,11. 19-32. Thus, we believe that the printer switch of 

Yamada is relevant prior art. 

Finally, secondary considerations do not suggest that the claims are not invalid for 

obviousness. The ALJ found that while ATEN offered evidence regarding commercial success 

and copying of their cable KVM switch in general, its evidence did not focus on the integrated 

cables. See ID at 67. Additionally, he found that this evidence was rebutted by a showing that the 

cable KVM products were not necessarily successfbl, that Emine did not copy ATEN’s design, and 

that their appearance and any success in the market may have been driven by market changes, 

rather than by any alleged copying of an ATEN product or design. See id. We agree and adopt his 

analysis of the secondary considerations evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that claims 1 and 

12-21 would be invalid for obviousness in light of the prior art if the term “body” were construed 

to mean “an enclosure for an internal circuit board” (or to mean the “main, central, or principal 

24 
PUBLIC VERSION 

part”) and if the switching circuit were not considered part of the body.” 

D. Domestic Industry 

In order to prove a violation of section 337 in a patent-based action, a complainant must 

demonstrate that a domestic industry exists or is in the process of being established. 19 U.S.C. 

0 1337(a)(2). See Certain Microsphere Adhesives, Process For Making Same, and Prods. 

Containing Same, Including Self-stick Repositionable Notes, Inv. No. 337-TA-366, USITC Pub. 

2949, Comm’n. Op. at 8 (Jan. 1996). Because there are other dispositive issues in this case, we do 

not address the issue of whether ATEN has met the domestic industry requirement.” See Beloit 

Corp. v. Valmet OY, 742 F.2d 1421, 1422-23 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 

111. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, respondents Belkin and Emine did not violate section 337. 

By order of the Commission. 

MarilylkJAbbott 

Secretary to the Commission 

Issued: February 29,2008 

. 

lo Likewise, claims 12, 13, and 21 would be obvious if the term “body” is construed to mean “an 

enclosure for a switching circuit” or to mean the “main, central, or principal part” and the 

switching circuit is considered part of the body. 

to meet the limitations of claim 1 as we have construed them. See, e.g., CPX- 19; CPX-5 1 ; 

CPX-45. 

We do note, however, that at least three of ATEN’s alleged domestic industry products appear 

25 
CERTAIN SWITCHES AND PRODUCTS CONTAINING 337-TA-589 

SAME 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached COMMISSION OPINION has 

been served by hand upon the Commission Investigative Attorney, Anne Goalwin, Esq., 

and the following parties as indicated, on 

February 29, 2008 

U.S. International Trade Commission 

500 E Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20436 

ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANTS ATEN 

INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD., AND ATEN 

TECHNOLOGY, INC.: 

Arthur Wineberg, Esq. 

Tobias E. Zimrnerman, Esq. 

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD 

LLP 

1333 New Hampshire Ave, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

P-202-887-4000 

F-202-887-4288 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS RATOC SYSTEMS, 

INC., RATOC SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

AND JUSTCOM TECH, INC.: 

Richard F. Cauley, Esq. 

Erick P. Wolf, Esq. 

Larry E. Severin, Esq. 

WANG, HARTMANN & GIBBS, PC 

1301 Dove Street, Suite 1050 

Newport Beach, CA 92660 

P-949-833-8483 

F-949-833-228 1 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

(x) Via Overnight Mail 

( ) Via First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

(x) Via Overnight Mail 

( ) Via First Class Mail 

( )Other: 
Page 2 - Certificate of Service 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT EMINE 

TECHNOLOGY, CO., LTD.: 

Sturgis M. Sobin, Esq. 

HELLER EHRMAN 

17 17 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

P-202-912-2000 

F-202-912-2020 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

&) Via Overnight Mail 

( ) Via First Class Mail 

( )Other: 


The complainants are ATEN International Co., Ltd. of Taipei, Taiwan, and ATEN 

Technology, Inc. of Irvine, California (collectively “complainants” or “ATEN”). The 

Commission named the following companies as respondents: Belkin Corporation and Belkin 

Logistics, Inc. (collectively “Belkin”), both of Compton, California; Emine Technology Co., 

Ltd. (“Emine”) of Taipei, Taiwan; JustCom Tech, Inc. (“JustCom”) of San Jose, California; and 

RATOC Systems, Inc. of Osaka, Japan, and RATOC Systems International, Inc. of Santa Clara, 

California (collectively “RATOC”).’ The Commission Investigative Staff of the Office of Unfair 

Import Investigations (“Staff’) is also a party. 71 Fed. Reg. 70983-984 (2006); Rx-4. 

11. Remedy 

A. Limited Exclusion Order 

The Commission has broad discretion in selecting the form, scope, and extent of the 

remedy in a section 337 proceeding. Viscofan, S.A. v. United States Int ’I Trade Comm ’n, 787 

F.2d 544, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A limited exclusion order directed to respondents’ infringing 

products is among the remedies that the Commission may impose, as is a general exclusion order 

that would apply to all infringing products, regardless of their manufacturer. See 19 U.S.C. § 

1337(d). 

In this instance, ATEN requests a general exclusion order. ATEN requests a limited 

exclusion order only in the alternative. It is not disputed that if the accused products are found to 

infringe, ATEN would be entitled at least to the relief afforded by a limited exclusion order, i.e., 

an order directed specifically to respondents’ accused products. However, as discussed below, it 

On November 7,2007, RATOC and JustCom were terminated as respondents. See Order 

No. 38 (Initial Determination). 

2 
has not been established that the record would support the entry of a general exclusion. 

The 337 statute provides that the Commission may order a general exclusion of infringing 

goods from entry into the United States if such a general exclusion is necessary to prevent 

circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products or named persons or there is a pattern of 

violation and it is difficult to identifj the source of the infringing products. 19 U.S.C. 

3 1337(d)(2)(A)(B). Under the so-called Spray Pumps test, to obtain a general exclusion order, a 

complainant must satisfl two prongs: (1) a widespread pattern of unauthorized use of the 

patented invention (including unauthorized importation into the U.S. of infringing articles by 

numerous foreign manufacturers and other evidence of a history of unauthorized foreign use of 

the patented invention), and (2) certain business conditions from which one might reasonably 

infer that foreign manufacturers other than respondents to the investigation may attempt to enter 

the U.S. market with infringing articles. Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components 

Thereox Inv. No. 337-TA-90, Comm’n Op. (1 98 1) (“Spray Pumps”). 

The Commission has identified a number of factors that should be considered with 

respect to the “certain business conditions” element, or second prong, of the Spray Pumps test, 

including: 

1. An established market for the patented product in the U.S. market 

and conditions of the world market; 

2. The availability of marketing and distribution networks in the 

United States for potential foreign manufacturers; 

3. The cost to foreign entrepreneurs of building a facility capable of 

producing the patented article; 

4. The number of foreign manufacturers whose facilities could be 

retooled to produce the patented article; or 

3 
5. The cost to foreign manufacturers of retooling their facility to 

produce the patented article. 

See, e.g., Certain Condensers, Parts Thereof And Products Containing Same, Including Air 

Conditioners For Automobiles, Inv. No. 337-TA-334, Comm’n Determination (Sept. 10, 1997) 

(“Condensers”). 

With respect to the first prong of the Spray Pumps test, ATEN did not offer evidence at 

the hearing to substantiate an unauthorized and widespread use of the patented invention.* 

Nor is there the evidence to support a conclusion that certain business conditions exist 

from which one might reasonably infer that foreign manufacturers other than respondents may 

attempt to enter the domestic market with infringing articles (Spray Pumps second prong). 

In particular, the evidence offered by the parties concerning the relative ease with which 

manufacturers other than respondents could enter the market is mixed at best, and not well 

developed. In any event, ATEN’s argument that any KVM manufacturer can manufacture 

infringing switches with no additional investment (ATEN Br. at 54) is not confirmed by the 

record. 

For example, there is evidence that the complexity of the technology required to 

manufacture KVM switches would not be a strong barrier to entry for new manufacturers, and 

that the cost of production is low. See, e.g., A. Chen Tr. 227-234; Schulemson Tr. 408; Joint 

Although settlements have been reached with respondents JustCom and RATOC, 

admissions of infringement bargained from a settlement are not sufficient evidence, in and of 

themselves, of infringement for purposes of showing a widespread pattern of infringement. See, 

e.g., Certain Plastic Molding Machines, Inv. No. 337-TA-462, Comm’n Op. at 20-21 (Apr. 2, 

2003); Certain Bearings and Packaging ThereoJ; Inv. No. 337-TA-469,2003 ITC LEXIS 90, 

Order No. 106 (Feb. 24,2003). 

4 
Stip. No. 17 (Emine’s equipment costs). However, although the claims of the ‘1 12 patent read 

on a portion of the manufacturing process that does not relate directly to computer technology, 

KVM switches in general play an integral role in computer operations and thus a manufacturer of 

KVM switches must have proficiency in computers, computer hardware, computer memory and 

software. There is also evidence that in order to manufacture KVM switches, even a 

manufacture of other computer peripherals (including various types of KVM switches) would 

have to retool its manufacturing equipment in order to make switches that practice the patent. 

See Zhang Tr. 383,389; A. Chen Tr. 229-23 1. 

In sum, if the Commission determines in this investigation that there has been a violation 

of section 337, it is recommended that a limited exclusion order should issue. However, it is not 

recommended that the Commission issue a general exclusion order. 

B. Cease and Desist Order 

Section 337 provides that in addition to, or in lieu of the issuance of an exclusion order, 

the Commission may issue a cease and desist order as a remedy for violation of section 337. See 

19 U.S.C. 9 1337(f)(l). The Commission generally issues a cease and desist order directed to a 

domestic respondent when there is a “commercially significant” amount of infringing, imported 

product in the United States that could be sold so as to undercut the remedy provided by an 

exclusion order. See Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Monohydrate, Inv. No. 337-TA-293, 

Comm’n Op. on Remedy, the Public Interest and Bonding at 37-42, USITC Pub. 2391 .(June 

1 99 1); Certain Condensers, Parts Thereof and Products Containing Same, Including Air 

Conditioners for Automobiles, Inv. No. 337-TA-334, Comm’n Op. at 26-28 (Aug. 27, 1997). 

ATEN seeks a cease and desist order against the Belkin respondents. It does not appear 

5 
that ATEN seeks such an order against Emine (a foreign entity). 

It appears that no party has contested the entry of cease and desist orders against the 

Belkin respondents in the event that a violation of section is found with respect to Belkin’s 

accused products. The record substantiates ATEN’s claim that Belkin maintains a commercially 

significant inventory of accused products in the United States. See CX-48A. 

Consequently, it is recommended that if a violation of section 337 is found with respect to 

Belkin products, the Commission should issue cease and desist orders directed toward the Belkin 

respondents. 

C. Bond 

The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission must determine the amount of bond 

to be required of a respondent, pursuant to section 337(j)(3), during the 60-day Presidential 

review period following the issuance of permanent relief, in the event that the Commission 

determines to issue a remedy. The purpose of the bond is to protect the complainant from any 

injury. 19 C.F.R. §210.42(a)(l)(ii), 9 210.50(a)(3). 

When reliable price information is available, the Commission has often set the bond by 

eliminating the differential between the domestic product and the imported, infringing product. 

See Certain Microsphere Adhesives, Processes for Making Same, and Products Containing 

Same, Including Self-Stick Repositionable Notes, Inv. No. 337-TA-366, Comm’n Op. a 24 

(1 995). In other cases, the Commission has turned to alternative approaches, especially when the 

level of a reasonable royalty rate could be ascertained. See, e.g. Certain Integrated Circuit 

Telecommunication Chips and Products Containing Same, Including Dialing Apparatus, Inv. 

No. 337-TA-337, Commission Op. at 41 (1995). A 100 percent bond has been required when no 

6 
effective alternative existed. See Certain Flash Memory Circuits and Products Containing 

Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-382, USITC Pub. No. 3046, Comm’n Op. at 26-27 (July 1997)(a 100% 

bond imposed when price comparison was not practical because the parties sold products at 

different levels of commerce, and the proposed royalty rate appeared to be de minimis and 

without adequate support in the record). 

In this case, there is no reliable evidence of a reasonable royalty rate, or evidence to 

support an effective alternate for calculating the bond.3 Consequently, if the Commission issues 

a remedy, it is recommended that the bond be set at 100 percent. 

111. Conclusions 

In accordance with the discussion of the issues contained herein, it is the 

RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION (“RD”) of the Administrative Law Judge that in the 

event that the Commission determines that respondents have committed a violation of section 

337, the Commission should issue a limited exclusion order. It recommended that if a violation 

is found with respect to Belkin’s products, the Commission should issue cease and desist orders 

directed toward the Belkin respondents. Furthermore, if the Commission imposes a remedy 

following a finding of violation, respondents should be required to post a bond of 100% of the 

value of infringing devices imported during the Presidential review period. 

The Secretary shall serve a confidential version of this RD upon counsel who are 

signatories to the Protective Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this investigation 

Respondents argue that there would be no need for a bond during the Presidential review 

period because they sell products at a higher price than ATEN. However, that argument is not 

substantiated in law, and it is unclear that ATEN could not be harmed by continued sales of 

accused products. 

7 
(Order No. l), and the Commission investigative attorney. To expedite service of the public 

version, counsel for each party are hereby ORDERED to file by no later than November 28, 

2007, a copy of this RD with those sections considered by the party to be confidential bracketed 

in red, or if confidential treatment is not requested for any portion of this RD, a statement to that 

effect. 

CLaCQLJ 

Carl C. Charneski 

Administrative Law Judge 

Issued: November 2 1,2007 

8 
CERTAIN SWITCHES AND PRODUCTS 

CONTAINING SAME 

Inv. No. 337-TA-589 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached ORDER was served by hand upon 

Commission Investigative Attorney Heidi E. Strain, Esq., and upon the following parties via 

first class mail and air mail where necessary on February 26, 2008. 

M&yn R./Abbott, Secretary 

U.S. International Trade Commission 

500 E Street, SW, Room 112 

Washington, D.C. 20436 

FOR COMPLAINANTS ATEN INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD., 

AND ATEN TECHNOLOGY, INC.: 

Arthur Wineberg, Esq. 

Tobias E. Zimmerman, Esq. 

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP 

1333 New Hampshire Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

Yitai Hu, Esq. 

Ming-Tao Yang, Esq. 

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP 

2 Palo Alto Square 

3000 El Camino Real, Suite 400 

Palo Alto, CA 94306 

FOR RESPONDENTS BELKIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND BELKIN, INC.: 

Steven E. Adkins, Esq. 

Ric Maccahiaroli, Esq. 

John E. Mauk, Esq. 

JONES DAY 

5 1 Louisiana Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20001 
CERTAIN SWITCHES AND PRODUCTS 

CONTAINING SAME 

Inv. No. 337-TA-589 

Robert Dickerson, Esq. 

JONES DAY 

555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90071 

FOR RESPONDENTS JUSTCOM TECH, INC., RATOC SYSTEMS, INC., AND RATOC 

SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC.: 

Richard F. Cauley, Esq. 

Erick P. Wolf, Esq. 

WANG, HARTMANN & GIBBS, PC 

1301 Dove Street, Suite 1050 

Newport Beach, CA 92660 

FOR RESPONDENT EMINE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.: 

Sturgis M. Sobin, Esq. 

HELLER EHRMAN 

1717 Rhode Island Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

PUBLIC MAILING LIST 

Sherry Robinson 

8891 Gander Creek Drive 

Miamisbug, OH 45342 

LEXIS - =XIS 

Ronnita Green 

Thomson West 

1100 - 13th Street NW 

Suite 200 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Opinion 

Page 

I. Background 

A. 

B. 

. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 

Institution and Procedural History of This Investigation . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 

The Products at Issue ............................................................................. 

11. Importation or Sale ......................................................................................... 

111. Claim Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . ... . . .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. 

A. Applicable Law .............................................................................. 

B. The ‘1 12 Patent ............................................................................. 

C. One of Ordinary Skill in the Relevant Art ......................................... 

D The Disputed Claim Terms and Their Proper Construction ................. 

IV. Infringement Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Applicable Law ............................................................................. 

B. The Accused Products ................................................................. 

V. Validity ..................................................................................................... 

A. Anticipation ......................................................................................... 

B. Obviousness ......................................................................................... 

C. Written Description ............................................................................. 

VI. Unenforceability ......................................................................................... 

VII. Domestic Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Technical Analysis . . .... .. ...... ..... ... ............. .. . . . ..... .......... .............. ....... . 

2 

2 

4 

5 

5 

5 

8 

10 

12 

36 

36 

39 

51 

53 

61 

68 

69 

71 

72 

.. 

-11- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

B. Economic Analysis ............................................................................. 73 

VIII. Conclusions of Law ......................................................................................... 74 

IX. Initial Determination and Order ................................................................. 75 

... 

-111- 
The following abbreviations may be used in this Initial Determination: 

ALJ - 

ALJX - 

CDX - 

CPX - 

cx - 

Dep. - 

EDIS - 

FF - 

JPX - 

JX - 

PCL - 

PFF - 

PRF - 

RDX - 

RPX - 

Rxsx - 

Tr. - 

Administrative Law Judge 

Administrative Law Judge Exhibit 

Complainants’ Demonstrative Exhibit 

Complainants’ Physical Exhibit 

Complainants’ Exhibit 

Deposition 

Electronic Document Imaging System 

Finding(s) of Fact 

Joint Physical Exhibit 

Joint Exhibit 

Proposed Conclusion of Law (CPCL, RPCL or SPCL) 

Proposed FF (CPFF, RPFF or SPFF) 

Proposed Reply or Rebuttal Finding (CPRF, RPRF or SPRF) 

Respondents’ Demonstrative Exhibit 

Respondents’ Physical Exhibit 

Respondents’ Exhibit 

Commission Investigative Staff Exhibit 

Transcript. 
I. BACKGROUND 

A. Institution and Procedural History of This Investipation 

By publication of a notice in the Federal Register on December 7,2006, pursuant to 

subsection (b) of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the Commission instituted 

this investigation to determine: 

[Wlhether there is a violation of subsection (a)(l)(B) of section 

337 in the importation into the United States, the sale for 

importation, or the sale within the United States after importation 

of certain switches or products containing same by reason of 

infringement of one or more of claims 1 and 12-21 of U.S. Patent 

No. 7,035,112, and whether an industry in the United States exists 

or is in the process of being established as required by subsection 

(a)(2) of section 337. 

71 Fed. Reg. 70983-984 (2006). 

The complainants are ATEN International Co., Ltd. of Taipei, Taiwan, and ATEN 

Technology, Inc. of Irvine, California (collectively “complainants” or “ATEN”). Id.; RX-4. 

The Commission named the following companies as respondents: Belkin Corporation 

and Belkin Logistics, Inc. (collectively “Belkin”), both of Compton, California; Emine 

Technology Co., Ltd. (“Emine”) of Taipei, Taiwan; JustCom Tech, Inc. ((‘JustCom~’) of San Jose, 

California; and RATOC Systems, Inc. of Osaka, Japan, and RATOC Systems International, Inc. 

of Santa Clara, California (collectively “RATOC”). Id.; RX-4. 

The Commission Investigative Staff (“Staff ’) of the Office of Unfair Import 

Investigations (“OUII”) is also a party in this investigation. Id. 

The evidentiary hearing on the question of violation of section 337 commenced on 

2 
July 16, and concluded on July 20,2007. Tr. 63-1485.’ ATEN, Belkin, Emine and the Staff 

were represented at the hearing. RATOC and JustCom did not file prehearing statements and 

were not represented at the hearing.2 

Stipulations, however, were not reached until after the hearing. On July 23,2007, ATEN, 

Belkin and Emine filed their “Joint Stipulations” with the Commission Secretary, which 

addressed a wide range of issues. On August 6,2007, ATEN, Belkin and Emine filed a “Second 

Joint Stipulation,” which addressed the design and manufacture of Emine products. The Second 

Joint Stipulation superseded and replaced Stipulation No. 1 1 contained in the earlier filed Joint 

Stipulations. 

The Staff has not objected to these Stipulation documents or to any of the individually 

numbered Stipulations contained therein. Indeed, Staff has relied on several of the individually 

’ The prehearing conference in this investigation immediately preceded the hearing and is 

recorded at transcript pages 6-56. 

* On July 7,2007, shortly before the evidentiary hearing scheduled in this investigation, 

ATEN and RATOC filed ajoint motion to terminate this investigation as to RATOC on the basis 

of a settlement agreement and proposed consent order (Motion Dkt. No. 589-33). That motion 

was denied due to a legal defect in the text of the proposed consent order. See Order No. 35. 

Subsequently, on August 3,2007, ATEN and JustCom filed a joint motion to terminate this 

investigation as to JustCom on the basis of a settlement agreement and proposed consent order 

(Motion Dkt. No. 589-40). That motion also was denied due to a legal defect in the text of the 

proposed order. See Order No. 36. 

On September 19,2007, ATEN, RATOC and JustCom filed a “Renewed Joint Motion for 

Partial Termination Based on Settlement and License Agreements Between Complainants and 

Respondents RATOC Systems, Inc., RATOC Systems International, Inc. and JustCom Tech, Inc. 

And Memorandum in Support Thereof.” (Motion Dkt. No. 589-44.) The Staff supported this 

motion. On November 7,2007, the joint motion for partial termination was granted and an 

Initial Determination issued dismissing RATOC Systems, Inc., RATOC Systems International, 

Inc., and JustCom Tech, Inc. as respondents in this investigation. See Order No. 38 (Initial 

Determination). 

3 
numbered Stipulations in its briefs. The Joint Stipulations and Second Joint Stipulation are, 

therefore, accepted into the re~ord.~ 

B. The Products at Issue 

This investigation is based on ATEN’s allegation that certain products manufactured and, 

or, sold by the respondents infringe claims of its United States Patent No. 7,035,112 (“the ‘1 12 

patent”). See JX-1; CX-7;RX-1. All of the accused products are called “KVM switches” (with 

KVM standing for Keyboard, Video display and Mouse). KVM switches such as those at issue 

in this investigation allow more than one computer to share peripheral devices. Thus, a KVM 

switch will allow two (or more) computers to be controlled from the same keyboard, using the 

same video display, and the same mouse. See Joint Stips. at 1-4; see also, CDX-500 & RDX-2. 

KVM switches are not new. They first came into use in the early 1980s, primarily used by IT 

professionals. Min. Tr. 1038-1039.4 

Indeed, as explained by ATEN’s expert witness, Dr. Donald Barker, a single operator 

with one keyboard, one video screen, and one mouse can, via the KVM switch, “switch this 

keyboard, video, and mouse to anyone of a set of computers.” Barker Tr. 437-438. By the 

operator’s pressing a button or through a sequence of key strokes, the KVM switch allows the 

computer operator to seamlessly move from one computer to another while using a single 

keyboard, video, and mouse. Id. 

A page was missing from the Joint Stipulations as originally filed with the Commission 

Secretary. On September 27,2007, Belkin’s counsel filed a document entitled “Erratum to 

Stipulations,” which contains a corrected copy of the Joint Stipulation with a copy of the Second 

Joint Stipulation. 

Dr. Paul Min is respondents’ expert witness. 

4 
ATEN accuses many KVM switches of infringement, which have different features and 

which bear more than two dozen product names. Some switches bearing the same product name 

have been manufactured in more than one version. In some cases, substantially similar products 

originating from the same manufacturer have been given different names when sold by different 

companies. 

The parties have agreed that the accused products can be categorized into six groups, 

based upon the specific features of the switches that are relevant for the purposes of the 

infiingement analysis to be performed in this investigation. The parties have identified which 

accused products fit within each of these six groups. See Joint Stips.; Second Joint Stip. The 

specific groups are discussed in this Initial Determination as part of the infringement analysis, 

injPa (Section IV). 

11. IMPORTATION OR SALE 

The record shows, and it is uncontested, that Belkin and Emine have imported and, or, 

sold after importation the accused products. See Joint Stips. at 1-7; Second Joint Stip.; Staff Br. 

at 54-55.* 

111. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 

A. Applicable Law 

Pursuant to the Commission’s notice of investigation, this is a patent-based investigation. 

See 71 Fed. Reg. 70983-984 (2006). Indeed, all of the unfair acts claimed alleged by ATEN to 

have occurred are instances of alleged infringement of the ‘ 1 12 patent. Any finding of 

In addition, no party has contested the Commission’s personal jurisdiction over the parties. 

Nor has any party contested subject-matter jurisdiction over the products subject to this 

investigation. See, e.g., Belkin Proposed Conclusions of Law, Section I, 11 1-2. 

5 
infringement or non-infringement requires a two-step analytical approach. First, the asserted 

patent claims must be construed as a matter of law to determine their proper scope.6 Second, a 

factual determination must be made as to whether the properly construed claims read on the 

accused devices. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,976 (Fed. Cir. 

1995)(en banc), afd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 

Claim construction begins with the language of the claims themselves. Claims should be 

given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, 

viewing the claim terms in the context of the entire patent. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 

1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).7 

In some instances, claim terms do not have particular meaning in a field of art, and claim 

construction involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of 

commonly understood words. Id. at 13 14. In such circumstances, general purpose dictionaries 

may be helpful. In many cases, claim terms have a specialized meaning, and it is necessary to 

Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent 

necessary to resolve the controversy. Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int ’1 Trade Comm., 

366 F.3d 131 1, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Vivid Tech., Inc. v. American Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 

795,803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

With respect to claim preambles, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained 

that: 

[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it. In 

other words, when the claim drafter chooses to use both the preamble and the 

body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the invention so 

defined, and not some other, is the one the patent protects. 

Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Bell 

Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 61 5,620 (Fed. Cir. 

1995)). 

6 
determine what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to 

mean, by analyzing the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the 

prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, [as well as] 

the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art. Id. (quoting InnovdPure Water, Inc. v. 

Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 38 1 F.3d 1 1 1 1, 1 1 16 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 

In cases in which the meaning of a claim term is uncertain, the specification usually is the 

best guide to the meaning of the term. Id. at 13 15. As a general rule, the particular examples or 

embodiments discussed in the specification are not to be read into the claims as limitations. 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. However, the specification is always highly relevant to the claim 

construction analysis. The specification is usually dispositive. It is the single best guide to the 

meaning of a disputed term. Phillips, 41 5 F.3d at 13 15. Moreover, “[tlhe construction that stays 

true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention 

will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Id. at 13 16. 

If the intrinsic evidence does not establish the meaning of a claim, then extrinsic evidence 

may be considered. Extrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent and the 

prosecution history, including inventor testimony, expert testimony and learned treatises. Id. at 

13 17. Inventor testimony can be useful to shed light on the relevant art. In evaluating expert 

testimony, a court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim 

construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution 

history, in other words, with the written record of the patent. Id. at 13 18. Extrinsic evidence 

may be considered if a court deems it helpful in determining the true meaning of language used 

in the patent claims. Id. 

7 
B. The ‘112 Patent 

In this investigation, ATEN asserts the ‘ 1 12 patent, which is entitled “Automatic Switch.” 

The ‘ 112 patent issued on April 25,2006, to Kevin Chen. The patent was assigned to ATEN. 

CX-7; RX- 1. The ‘ 1 12 patent specification describes the environment in which the claimed 

switch can be used, and problems associated with the use of conventional automatic switches 

manufactured according to the prior art. In that regard, the specification’s “Background of the 

Invention” section states: 

The present invention relates to an automatic switch for a user to 

automatically switch between two or more computer 

configurations, and more particularly to an automatic switch that 

has an integrally injection-molded enclosure to provide good 

weather-resistance, impact-resistance, and absolute protection of an 

internal circuit board thereof. 

The highly developed electronic and information technologies 

enable people to collect required information or to trade directly 

over networks via computers, making computers a requisite tool in 

people’s work, learning, entertainments, leisure activities, and daily 

life. 

For people to access two or more computers at the same time, 

there is developed an automatic switch to enable a user to 

automatically switch among different signal paths. FIG. 1 shows a 

conventional automatic switch 40 that is configured into a box 

41.[8] The box 41 is internally provided with a circuit board (not 

shown). Ports 42,43, and 44 for various types of signal cable 

connectors are provided on peripheral walls of the box 41. Inmost 

cases, the box 41 includes outer walls that are made of metal 

material or rigid plastic material and assembled together by means 

of screws (not shown). The automatic switch 40 is normally 

positioned on a host enclosure of a computer configuration and 

tends to unexpectedly fall off the host enclosure to result in a 

“FIG. 1 a perspective view of a conventional automatic switch for switching between two or 

more computer configurations.” CX-7 & RX-1, col. 2,ll. 8-10 (“Brief Description of the 

Drawings”). FIG 1 is reproduced below. 

8 
damaged circuit board due to vibration. Moreover, when a high 

humidity exists, moisture in the air tends to attach to the circuit 

board to cause short circuit. Repair or maintenance of the circuit 

board is therefore required. 

Id., CO~. 1, 11. 5-32. 

In its “Summary of the Invention,” the specification discusses how the patentee addressed 

the problems associated with conventional switches, and provides a general description of the 

claim invention, as follows: 

A primary object of the present invention is to provide a plugtype automatic switch for a user to access and control multiple 

computer configurations through one single switch. The automatic 

switch includes a main body externally provided with connector 

ports and enclosing an internal circuit board. The main body has an 

integrally injection-molded plastic enclosure to provide good 

weather-resistance, impact-resistance, and absolute protection of 

the internal circuit board and circuits thereon. 

The automatic switch of the present invention also includes more 

than one or two sets of cable-connected connectors directly 

extended from the main body and electrically connected to the 

internal circuit board via signal cables. 

9 
The integrally injection-molded enclosure of the main body 

includes a circuit-protecting layer for enclosing the circuit board, 

an outer case enclosing the circuit-protecting layer, and an antislipping layer coating an outer surface of the outer case. 

The circuit-protecting layer of the main body is made of a plastic 

material having a low melting point to avoid damages to circuits 

provided on the circuit board during the injection molding. 

The outer case of the main body has good strength and high 

rigidity and therefore provides excellent protection to the internal 

circuit board and the entire main body of the automatic switch. 

The anti-sl[i]pping layer of the main body has soft surface to 

enable firm holding of the main body and convenient plugging and 

unplugging of signal cables in and from the main body. 

Id., CO~. 1,ll. 37-67. 

C. One of Ordinary Skill in the Relevant Art 

ATEN advances its position as to one of ordinary skill in the art of KVM switches 

through the testimony of its expert witness, Dr. Barker. See ATEN Br. at 3. In Dr. Barker’s 

view, such a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ‘1 12 patent would have at least a 

Bachelor of Science degree in either mechanical or electrical engineering and at least two years 

of experience designing electrical connections and packaging for electronic consumer devices 

including computer peripherals. Barker Tr. 46 1-462. 

Dr. Barker added that one of ordinary skill in the art could also have only an associate 

degree if that person had one or two years of work experience (ie., the equivalent to a year of 

college education), and an additional four to six years work experience in the field. Id. Finally, 

in Dr. Barker’s view, in the context of the ‘1 12 patent one of ordinary skill would have to 

understand the functionality of the circuit and what it does, but need not know how to design the 

10 
details of the circuit. Barker Tr. 463. 

Respondents Belkin and Emine take a different view as to one of ordinary skill in the art 

in 2002, when the ‘ 112 patent issued. In that regard, both Belkin and Emine cite to the testimony 

of its expert witness, Dr. Min, that one of ordinary skill “would have at a minimum a Bachelor of 

Science Degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science or Computer Engineering with 

course work in communication systems and electronics [and] would have at least three years of 

post-graduate industrial experience in the communication equipment industry.” Min Tr. 1048 & 

RDX-32; see Belkin Br. at 43 & Emine Br. at 4. 

For purposes of this investigation, Staff sees no difference between complainants’ and 

respondents’ version of one of ordinary skill in the art such that adoption of one definition over 

the other would materially affect the opinion of either side’s expert. Staff Br. at 5, n.4. 

Nonetheless, Staff concurs with respondents’ definition “because the evidence shows that the 

mechanical engineering and packaging background suggested by Complainants does not take into 

account certain complexities of electrical systems as they affect relevant packaging concerns.” 

Id. For example, Staff cites to the testimony of ATEN witness Joseph Zhang that an electrical 

engineering background is important at ATEN Technology in order to understand issues related 

to KVM product design. Id.; Zhang Tr. 386-387. 

The question presented is both one of the level of education and, or, the experience 

required for one of ordinary skill, as well as a determination of the relevant art to which the ‘ 1 12 

patent applies. As noted, ATEN would require one of ordinary skill to have an electrical or 

mechanical engineering degree and experience designing electrical connections and packaging 

for computer peripherals and respondents would require one of ordinary skill to have an electrical 

11 
or computer engineering degree and course work relating to communications systems and 

electronics. Respondents are correct. 

The patent specification, both in its “Background” and “Summary of Invention,” states 

that the claimed invention relates both to the protection of the switch’s internal circuitry and to 

“[tlhe highly developed electronic and information technologies” and to the ability “to access and 

control multiple computer configurations through one single switch.” CX-7 & RX-1, col. 1, 

11. 5-44. Consequently, one of ordinary skill in the relevant art must be able to understand both 

the packaging elements of the claimed invention and the technical applications for which the 

claimed switch would be used. See Min Tr. 105 1-1054. 

Accordingly, respondents’ proposal is adopted. One of ordinary skill in the art relevant to 

the ‘1 12 patent would have at a minimum a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, 

Computer Science, or Computer Engineering, with course work in communications systems and 

electronics, and at least three years of post-graduate industrial experience in the communication 

equipment industry. 

D. The Disputed Claim Terms and Their Proper Construction 

The patent contains 23 claims (CX-7 & RX-1, col. 3, line 19 through col. 4, line 56), 

1 1 claims of which are alleged by ATEN to be infringed by the respondents’ products, i. e., 

claims 1, 12-21 (see, e.g., ATEN Br. at 22-33). The patent contains two independent claims, 

both of which are asserted by ATEN, i. e., claims 1 and 2 1. Claims 1 and 2 1 are similar, with 

claim 1 pertaining to a switch, whereas claim 2 1 pertains to a method. Compare CX-7 & RX- 1, 

col. 3,linelS with col. 4,ll. 24-25. 

12 
Claims 1 and 21 provide, as follows: 

1. A switch comprising: 

a body; 

a switching circuit contained within the body; 

a set of connector ports electrically coupled to the switching 

circuit; and, 

a plurality of cables fixedly attached to and extending from the 

body, each cable in the plurality of cables having a plurality of 

connector plugs, wherein each connector plug in the plurality of 

connector plugs for one of the cables in the plurality of cables are 

matched a respective connector plug in another one of the cables in 

the plurality of cables, and wherein the switching circuit switches 

to connect each of the set of connector ports to one of the plurality 

of cables. 

21. A method comprising the steps of: 

providing a body; 

enclosing a switching circuit within the body; 

integrating a first computer cable and a second computer cable into 

the body, each of the first computer cable and the second computer 

cable including a first end electrically coupled to the switching 

circuit and a second end having a plurality of connector plugs, each 

connector plug in the plurality of connector plugs in the first 

computer cable being matched to a corresponding one of the 

plurality of connector plugs in the second computer cable; and, 

providing a plurality of connector ports on a surface of the body, 

the plurality of connector ports electrically coupled to the 

switching circuit; 

wherein the switching circuit electrically switches the plurality of 

connector ports between the plurality of connector plugs of the first 

computer cable and the second computer cable. 

CX-7 & RX-1, col. 3,ll. 18-32 (claim 1) and col. 4,11.23-42 (claim 21). 

13 
The following claim terms are disputed by the parties, and relied upon in their arguments 

concerning the infringement and, or, validity issues: (1) “body,” (2) “fixedly attached,” 

(3) “connector plugs,” (4) “connector ports,” (5) “cable,” (6) “molded attachment element,” 

(7) “integrated into.” All but two of the disputed terms (i.e., molded attachment element, and 

integrated into a body and integrating into a body) are found in independent claim 1, while all but 

one of the disputed terms (i.e., molded attachment body) are found in independent claim 21 .9 

Each of these disputed claim term is construed below. 

(1) “body” 

This investigation turns in large measure upon the construction of the claim term “body.” 

ATEN construes “body” to mean “the main, central, or principle part.” ATEN Br. at 9, quoting 

Merrium- Webster ’s Collegiate Dictionary at 138 (1 1 th ed. 2003); Barker Tr. 465; CDX-5 15. 

ATEN maintains that the claim term “body” does not include the circuit board, the switch 

circuitry, and the other electronic elements on the circuit board such as the connector ports. 

ATEN Br. at 13. 

Respondents Belkin and Emine advance a more limiting construction of this claim term. 

Relying on the opinion of their expert, Dr. Min, respondents submit that the term “body,” means 

“a single integral enclosure that is not assembled from separate parts, such as by means of 

screws.’’ Belkin Br. at 11 & Emine Br. at 7; Min Tr. 1066-1067; RDX-42. 

Asserted claim 12 of the ‘1 12 patent is: “The switch of claim 1, wherein the plurality of 

cables are fixedly attached to the body through a molded attachment element.” CX-7 & RX-1, 

CO~. 3,ll. 56-58. 

14 
Staff concurs with ATEN’s definition of “body” as being the “main, central or principal 

part.” In its view, this is the “plain and ordinary meaning of the term.” Staff Br. at 5-8.’’ 

It is undisputed that the claim term “body” as used in the asserted claims of the ‘1 12 

patent is not a “term of art.” In other words, it has no particular meaning to one of ordinary skill 

in the relevant art. See ATEN Br. at 9; Belkin Br. at 10; see also, Barker Tr. 465; Min Tr. 1135- 

1136. Thus, where to begin to construe this crucial term? 

ATEN and Staff look to the dictionary in order to determine the “plain and ordinary 

meaning” of the claim term “body.” Belkin and Emine look to the ‘1 12 patent, in particular to 

the specification, to find out what the inventor meant when he used this claim term. As 

explained below, the construction approach adopted by Belkin and Emine is the correct approach 

and the construction approach adopted by ATEN and Staff is incorrect. 

The Court in Phillips v. AWHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(en banc) 

offers construction guidance that is particularly apt to the present circumstances. There, the 

Federal Circuit stated that “the specification is ‘the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 

term,’ and that the specification ‘acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the 

claims or when it defines terms by implication.’ Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582; Irdeto Access, Inc. v. 

Echosta Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (‘Even when guidance is not 

provided in explicit definitional format, the specification may define claim terms by implication 

such that the meaning may be found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’) 

lo Staff does, however, takes issue with certain limitations on ATEN’s dictionary definition of 

“body” that were advanced by complainants’ expert, Dr. Barker, at hearing. See Staff Br. at 6, 

n.5. In Staffs view, the testimony of Dr. Barker regarding these limitations constitutes an 

improper “after-the-fact attempt to limit his original con~truction.’~ Specifically, an after-the-fact 

attempt that Staff believes is “unsubstantiated.” Id. 

15 
(citations omitted); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 

2004)( same) .” 

Despite the Federal Circuit’s guidance in Phillips, ATEN and Staff begin (and end) with a 

dictionary definition in an attempt to construe the claim term “body.”” They submit that 

according to Merriam- Webster s Collegiate Dictionary, id. , the term “body” means the “main, 

central, or principal part.” This proposed construction (which essentially tells us nothing) must 

fail. 

First, as discussed in Phillips, supra, reliance upon a dictionary definition for claim 

construction is a practice clearly disfavored by the Federal Circuit in most circumstances. 

Indeed, in that case, the Court additionally offered the following pertinent observation: 

The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such 

prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of 

words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context 

of the patent. Properly viewed, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a claim 

term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire 

patent. Yet heavy reliance on the dictionary divorced from the 

intrinsic evidence risks transforming the meaning of the claim term 

to the artisan into the meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its 

particular context, which is the specification. The patent system is 

based on the proposition that claims cover only the invented 

subject matter. As the Supreme Court has stated, ‘[ilt seems to us 

that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and the 

Staff takes this approach despite noting a long line of Federal Circuit cases standing, in 

Staffs view, for the proposition that “[iln construing a claim, the specification and prosecution 

history should be used to interpret what the patentee meant by words or phrases in the claim and 

to give necessary context.” Staff Br. at 2-3, citing, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319; Markman v. 

Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 969,979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc), afd 517 U.S. 370 

(1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Alloc, Inc. v. 

Int’l Trade Comm ’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). While Staff did consider the ‘1 12 

patent specification (see Staff Br. at 7-9), like ATEN, it did so only after first arriving at a 

dictionary definition of the claim term “body,” a definition that Staff cloak’s in the protective 

cover of what it the terms the “plain and ordinary meaning” of “body.” 

16 
public, than that the former should understand, and correctly 

describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a 

patent.’ Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. at 573-74. The use of a 

dictionary definition can conflict with that directive because the 

patent applicant did not create the dictionary to describe the 

invention. Thus, there may be a disconnect between the patentee’s 

responsibility to describe and claim his invention, and the 

dictionary editors’ objective of aggregating all possible definitions 

for particular words. 

415 F.3d at 1320-1321. 

The wisdom of the preceding Phillips analysis is readily apparent from the circumstances 

of the present investigation. Here, the “abstract” dictionary definition of “main, central, or 

principal part” offers a claim construction that simply does not advance an understanding of the 

claim term “body.” Indeed, one wonders what KVM automatic switch, or even any other 

invention, does not have a “main, central or principal part.” This definition is proof of the 

inherent analytical weakness in turning to a dictionary for claim construction at the expense of 

examining the patent itself. In that regard, as discussed below, the specification of the ‘ 1 12 

patent casts considerable light on the patentee’s intended meaning of “body,” thus providing 

valuable knowledge as to what the patentee intended by his invention. 

As stated by the Court in PhiZZips, supra, the specification of the patent must be consulted 

in all cases to decide the meaning of claim terms. Thus, even if a “dictionary definition” of a 

disputed claim term were appropriate, that can only be determined by first consulting the 

specification to find out whether the patentee has sought to impart a special meaning to the term. 

Here, complainant’s expert, Dr. Baker, testified that he did just the opposite. Dr. Barker 

started with Merriam Webster ’s Collegiate Dictionary and only after adopting the dictionary 

definition did he consult the ‘ 1 12 patent, specifically the claim language, “to see if there is more 

17 
insight to what a body means.” Barker Tr. 465-466. Dr. Barker simply started off “on the wrong 

foot” and by having begun his claim construction by accepting outright the dictionary definition, 

without allowing for any consideration of the patent language, his claim construction was 

destined to fail.’* 

Thus, it is quite clear that ATEN’s and Staffs claim construction of the term “body” 

suffers from their failure to consider the patent’s specification. While Staff correctly notes that 

there is no indication in the specification that the patentee sought to be his own lexicographer (a 

canon of construction often used by the Federal Circuit), a substantial portion of the of the ‘ 1 12 

patent specification discusses the protective purpose and the weather-resistance feature of the 

“body” used in the claimed invention. See Background and Summary portions of the 

specification discussed, supra. This discussion occupies a prominent position in the 

specification, even in those portions of the ‘ 1 12 patent that do not pertain to the preferred 

embodiment. Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the specification’s treatment of “body” in 

construing this claim term. 

While ATEN and Staff fall short of the mark in offering a proper construction of “body,” 

so too do Belkin and Emine. The construction offered by respondents (ie., “a single integral 

enclosure that is not assembled from separate parts, such as by means of screws”) is more 

limiting than the ‘1 12 patent claim language and the specification allow. See Belkin Br. at 10; 

Emine Br. at 7. 

l2 Respondents’ expert, Dr. Min, testified that outside the context of the ‘ 1 12 patent, he 

would not have used the term “body” to refer to any of the prior art boxes used in consumer 

electronics or communications equipment. Thus, consistent with Federal Circuit case law, 

Dr. Min consulted the specification to determine what the patentee meant by use of the term 

“body.” Min Tr. 1066-1 067. 

18 
In that regard, even though the specification admittedly touts the benefits of unitary 

plastic injection molding over prior art boxes constructed with multiple pieces, held together by 

screws, there is no clear prohibition against the use of a screw, or the use of multiple pieces, to 

construct the “body” of the KVM automatic switch. There is no explanation as to why the use of 

a screw, or multiple pieces of material, would be unsuitable for the claimed invention, nor is 

there evidence to that effe~t.’~ Indeed, even respondents admit that the specification does not 

necessarily limit the body to one made by injection molding. 

As respondents’ expert testified, even though the only examples of a body provided in the 

‘ 1 12 specification are made through a plastic injection molding process, and even though the 

Background and Summary portions of the specification discuss the benefits of a claimed body 

made through injection molding, one of ordinary skill would know how to construct a body that 

would meet the purposes of the specification without plastic injection molding. See Min 

Tr. 1067.14 

l3 Similarly, during the prosecution of the ‘ 1 12 patent, the examiner cited prior art whose 

purported body was not manufactured through plastic injection molding, or even constructed of a 

single piece of material. See JX-2 (‘ 1 12 Patent Prosecution History). 

l4 Dr. Min testified more than once that injection molding is not required, including the 

following: 

Q. 

A. 

And, again, Dr. Min, does your definition of body in the ‘ 1 12 patent limit the 

body to one that is made integrally injection molded? 

No, in fact, as I just described to you, Mr. Adkins, and when I read the ‘1 12 

specification and patent itself, I read it, and I said this could work. This three 

time injection molding technique could work to provide that protection that 

the inventor was keen on, and a cable can be attached directly and 

permanently and provide all the protection. 

(continued ...) 

19 
As evidenced in the portions of the patent specification quoted, supra, the patentee 

explains the importance of the “body” to the claimed invention, and the superiority of the 

claimed body over the metal box switch prior art. An example of the metal box switch prior art 

is provided, supra, for comparison to the claimed invention. 

The metal box switch prior art was susceptible to humidity and damage, thus needing 

repair or maintenance. The specification states that in the claimed invention, in contrast to the 

prior art, “the main body has an integrally injection-molded plastic enclosure to provide good 

weather-resistence, impact resistence, and absolute protection of the internal circuit board and 

circuits thereon.” See CX-7 & RX-1, col. 1,ll. 41-45; see also, id., col. 1,ll. 8-10,26-32,46-63 

(describing the advantages of the body used in the claimed KVM switch in contrast to the more 

easily damaged and permeable boxes used in prior art s~itches).’~ 

While there is no indication that the use of an embodiment other than this preferred 

embodiment can provide for “good weather-resistence, impact resistence, and absolute 

l4 (...continued) 

But as one of ordinary skill in the art, I saw, yeah, there are other ways, 5 

but that would be a good idea what is described in the ‘ 1 12 patent. 

Min. Tr. 1100-1101. 

l5 The Background and Summary portions of a specification are often a clear and reliable 

guide to understanding the meaning of claim terms and the scope of the claimed invention. See, 

e.g., SafeTCare Mfg. Co. v. Tele-Made, Inc., 497 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(“Background” and “Summary of the Invention” used to distinguish the prior art, and to require a 

“a pushing force, not a pulling force.” “[Wle are not in danger of importing any limitations from 

the specification into [the] Claim .... Rather, we rely on the specification merely to understand 

what the patentee has claimed and disclaimed.”); see also, In re Gabapentin Litig., 2006-1 572, 

slip op. at 21-22,2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22530 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 21,2007) (claims must be read 

in view of the specification; “Summary of the Invention” portion of the specification supported 

the district court’s construction of disputed claim limitations). 

20 
protection” to the internal circuit board, no claim asserted by ATEN even refers to plastic 

injection molding. See Min testimony at n.14, above. As argued by complainants, “dependent 

claim 3 requires the circuit protecting layer of the body to be of injection-molded plastic, thus 

implying that other embodiments of the circuit protecting layer are not made of injection-molded 

plastic.” ATEN Br. at 12-13. Other non-asserted claims depending from claim 1 also refer to 

plastic injection molding. See CX-7 & RX-1, col. 3,ll. 35-58.16 

Moreover, there is no statement in this general discussion concerning the requirements of 

the body that either highlights or otherwise discusses a preferred embodiment of the claimed 

in~ention.’~ The discussion of the body occurs in the Background and Summary portions of the 

specification, all with explicit reference to “the present invention.” The portions of the 

specification illustrating and focusing on the “preferred embodiments” follow. The patentee’s 

statements are necessarily read to apply to any embodiment of the claimed or “present” 

invention. 

l6 Claim differentiation is “not a hard and fast rule of construction.” Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int ’I 

Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000). However, an independent claim is normally 

expected to be broader than its dependent claims. The independent claim is not expected to 

require the limitations added in the dependent claims. Dow Chem. v. United States, 226 F.3d 

1334, 134 1-1 342 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying the doctrine of claim differentiation and concluding 

that an independent claim should be given broader scope than a dependent claim to avoid 

rendering the dependent claim redundant). 

l7 Respondents’ reliance upon Alloc, Inc. v. United States Int ’I Trade Comm s, 342 F.3d 

1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003), is misplaced. In that case, the term “play” (as in the expression “play in 

the joints”) was essentially read into asserted patent claims having to do with locking, grooved 

laminate flooring - even though the term was never explicitly used in any claim, and all the 

illustrations requiring play occurred in connection with particular embodiments of the 

specification. In this instance, however, the required features of the “body” are stated in the ‘ 112 

patent specification, and do not occur in connection with any particular embodiment. 

21 
Accordingly, the claim term “body” is construed to mean “an enclosure that provides 

good-weather resistence, impact resistence, and absolute protection of the internal circuit board 

and circuits thereon.” The claimed invention, as limited by the “body” limitation of the 

independent claims, cannot be read on the prior art boxes identified in the ‘ 1 12 patent 

specification as unsuitable for the claimed KVM switch. 

(2) “fixedly attached’ 

The claim term “fixedly attached” appears explicitly or by reference in all the asserted 

claims except claim 2 1. JX- 1. As was the case with the claim term “body,” the claim term 

“fixedly attached” is not a term of art. See ATEN Br. at 14; Belkin Br. at 21. See also, Barker 

Tr. 481-482; Min Tr. 11 17.18 

ATEN submits that the term “fixedly” means “securely” and that the term “attach” means 

“brings into association.’’ Combining these terms, ATEN further submits that the claim term 

“fixedly attached” means “securely brought into association.” ATEN Br. at 14 (quoting, inter 

alia, Merriam- Webster s Collegiate Dictionary at 79,440 (1 0th ed. 2001)(CX-227)).’9 

Belkin submits that the term “fixedly attached” means “permanently secured.” Belkin Br. 

at 24. As support for this proposition, respondent contrasts Figures 2 and 3 of the ‘ 1 12 patent, 

which depict cables permanently joined to an injection molded body, with Figure 1, which shows 

a prior art switch representative of earlier known KVM switches that use connector ports to 

attach and detach cables from a box. Belkin Br. at 22. In addition, Belkin relies upon excerpts 

Neither Emine, nor Staff, suggest that “fixedly attached” is indeed a term of art. 

l9 ATEN states that respondents have described the meaning of this phrase as the “jugular” 

issue. See Tr. 896. ATEN “agrees that this issue is of premier importance to this case both for 

infringement and validity.” ATEN Br. at 14. 

22 
from the specification that, in respondent’s view, “demonstrate that cables as used in the ‘1 12 

patent are attached to the body without connector pieces between the cables and body.” Belkin 

Br. at 23 (emphasis in original); JX-1, Abstract, 1:46-48, & 2:23-27. Finally, Belkin notes that 

the examiner “implicitly equated” the terms “fixedly attached” and “to permanently secure” by 

using both to describe the prior art Krakovich reference. Belkin Br. at 23-24. 

Emine agrees that “fixedly attached” means “permanently joined together.” Emine Br. at 

9; Min Tr. 11 17-1 1 18; RDX-48. Like Belkin, Emine relies upon a contrast of Figures 2 and 3 

with Figure 1 (JX-l), the Krakovich prior art, and the fact that the specification that the cables 

are “directly extended from the main body.” See JX-1 , Abstract & JX-1 , Summary; see also, 

Min. Tr. 1 1 18- 1 1 19. According to respondent, this reference in the specification indicates an 

absence of any connector piece between the cables and the body. Emine Br. at 10. 

Staff finds no support to limit the definition of “fixedly attached,” so as to require 

“permanence” as argued by respondents. Staff Br. at 13. Staff notes that while the examiner in 

one instance did characterize a single specific fixed attachment as permanent (JX-2), the word 

“permanent” is not used in the patent or prosecution history. Staff Br. at 13. Nor, in Staffs 

view, is permanence “implied or required” by the use of the term “fixedly attached” in the patent. 

Id. 2o 

Accordingly, Staff finds ATEN’s construction of “securely brought into association” to 

be “more accurate and consistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning.” Staff Br. at 13. 

Still, Staff did not find ATEN’s construction to be “very instructive.” Id. Because a “secure” 

*’ Staff also notes that the inventor, Kevin Chen, testified that he did not intend “fixedly 

attach” to require permanence. Chen Tr. 152. 

23 
electrical connection is required in any event for the switch to operate, Staff suggests that 

ATEN’s use of “secure” in place of “fixed” is overly broad. Staff Br. at 13-14. (It “would, in 

fact, render the term “fixedly” superfluous, to the extent that a secure connection is inherent in 

the attachment of components that continue the electrical signal.” Id.) 

Thus, Staff submits that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “fixedly attached” 

should apply and that such plain and ordinary meaning is “fastened, attached, or placed so as to 

be firm and not readily movable.” Staff Br. at 14, citing Random House CoZZege Dictionary, 

Revised ed. (1980) (SX-2). Indeed, Staff notes that complainants’ expert, Dr. Barker, concurs 

with this construction. Id.; Barker Tr. 483-484. 

Despite the similarities between ATEN’s and Staffs construction of “fixedly attach,” 

Staff notes that ATEN’s application of that term “strays far off point.” Staff Br. at 14, n.8. In 

that regard, it takes issue with Dr. Barker’s testimony that the fixed attachment of the cables is to 

the “body,” rather than to the “circuit board.” Barker Tr. 1384-1386. Staff argues that 

Dr. Barker’s position is strained and inconsistent,” given the fact that he has admitted “( 1) that 

the patent does not require the attachment between the cables and the body to be a direct one 

(Tr. at 83 1-32) and (2) that the circuit board, which he identifies as the point of cable attachment 

in the prior art, is inside the device and itself attached to the body in all examples of prior art 

(Tr. at 1425).” Id. 

It is the finding of this Tribunal that the claim term “fixedly attached” is construed to 

mean “fastened, attached, or placed so as to be firm and not readily movable.” There is no 

requirement that the attachment be permanent. 

24 
(3) “connector plugs” 

The term “connector plugs” is recited in claims 1, 19, and 2 1. JX- 1. ATEN argues that 

the term “connector plugs” means “conductors such as pins used to make an electrical 

connection.” ATEN Br. at 17; Barker Tr. 490. ATEN submits that this construction is consistent 

with the dictionary meaning of the term as it appears in The Authoritative Dictionary ofIEEE 

Standard Terms at 834 (7th ed. 2000) (definition of “plug”). Id. Complainants argue that this 

construction is proper because the ‘ 1 12 patent discloses that cable-connected connectors 3 1,32, 

and 33 are adapted to plug into corresponding connectors on the computer. Id. ; JX-1 . 

Respondents’ expert testified that the term “connector plug” is a widely used term of art. 

Min Tr. 1126-1 127. In that regard, Dr. Min described a connector plug as the “male insertion 

part that connects to the connector port.” Min. Tr. 1127; CDX-524 & RDX-61. Thus, 

respondents argue that a “connector plug ” is a male insertion part that connects to the “connector 

port,” a claim term discussed below. See Emine Br. at 10-1 1. 

Staff is of the view that “[olnce again, Respondents’ definition overly limits the plain and 

ordinary meaning of the claim term.” Staff Br. at 17. Citing the testimony of Dr. Barker 

(Tr. 491), Staff states that neither the intrinsic record, nor a sampling of technical dictionary 

definitions, suggest that the gender of the plugs is male. Id. Nonetheless, Staff also is critical of 

the definition advanced by ATEN, noting that it likewise is too broad and that it “does not offer 

much instruction in the context of the ‘ 1 12 patent or the field of KVM switches.” Id. 

Accordingly, Staff submits that in the context of the ‘ 1 12 patent the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the term “connector plug” is “a device, usually associated with a cord, that by 

insertion in a jack or receptacle establishes connection between a conductor or conductors 

25 
associated with the plug and a conductor or conductors connected to the jack or receptacle.” 

Staff Br. at 18, citing IEEE 100 Dictionary ofIEEE Standards Terms, 7th ed. (2000) (CX-229). 

Furthermore, Staff notes that this construction of :connector plugs” is supported by both 

complainants’ and respondents’ experts. Id.; Barker Tr. 490-491 & Min Tr. 1 128-1 129. 

Finally, Staff asserts that the specification, while not using the term “connector plug,” 

uses the terms “plug” or “plugging” in referring “to the connections made by the user in 

connecting the end of the cables extended from the peripherals into the externally-provided ports 

of the switch, as well [as] the connection made between the ‘cable-connected connectors’ and the 

computers.” StaffBr. at 18, citing JX-1, Col. 1,ll. 64-67, Col. 2,ll. 64-65, & Col. 3,ll. 2-6. 

Thus, Staff concludes that as discussed in the specification, the connector plugs do not require 

gender. Staff Br. at 18. 

It is the opinion of this Tribunal that the construction offered by Staff is correct. 

Accordingly, it is found the term “connector plug” is construed to mean “a device, usually 

associated with a cord, that by insertion in a jack or receptacle establishes connection between a 

conductor or conductors associated with the plug and a conductor or conductors connected to the 

jack or receptacle.” 

(4) “connector ports” 

The term “connector ports” is recited in asserted claim 1 (“a set of connector ports 

electrically coupled to the switching circuit”), claim 14 (“”the set of connector ports contains a 

peripheral port to a computer peripheral,” claim 15 (“wherein the set of connector ports contains 

a keyboard port to connect a keyboard,” claim 16 (“wherein the set of connector ports contain a 

mouse port to connect a mouse,” claim 17 (“wherein set of connector ports contains a video port 

26 
to connect a display,” and claim 21 (“”providing a plurality of connector ports on a surface of the 

body, the plurality of connector ports electrically coupled to the switching circuit”). JX-1. 

ATEN argues that, consistent with the claims and the patent specification, the term 

“connector ports” must be construed to mean “connector for input or output connections between 

peripheral devices and computers.” ATEN Br. at 16, quoting The Authoritative Dictionary of 

IEEE Standard Terms, at 844 (7th ed. 2000). 

Respondents argue that “connector port” is a widely used term of art described by 

Dr. Min as female openings on the surface of the body that signal conductivity and act as a 

tension barrier for the circuit. Emine Br. at 10; Min Tr. 1123 & RDX-57. Respondents further 

argue that the specification “strongly supports” their construction of the term “connector port” 

inasmuch as it repeatedly describes “‘connector ports’ that are ‘provided on the peripheral [or 

external] walls’ of the switch. Emine Br. at 10; JX-1 (emphasis and bracketed material in 

original). In addition, respondents note that Figures 1 through 3 of JX-1 “show connector ports 

only on the external walls of the box.” Id. (Emphasis in original). 21 

Staff construes “connector ports” to mean “a coupling device that provides a point of 

access into a computer (such as the serial and parallel ports on the back of most PCs), network, 

or other electronic system.” Staff Br. at 16. As support for this construction, Staff cites the 

Modern Dictionary of Electronics, 7th ed. (1 999) (SX-3). Id. 

Staff finds respondents’ construction to impermissibly limit the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the claim term. It states that “[nleither the specification, the prosecution history, nor 

21 Belkin and Emine also rely upon the testimony of Dr. Min that before 2002, he had never 

seen any connector ports that were not on the surface of the body of a communications 

equipment or network device. Emine Br. at 10; Min Tr. 1 124- 1 125. 

27 
the other asserted claims specifl that computer ports must be on the surface of the body.” Staff 

Br. at 15. In addition, Staff states that although it may be the case that a connector port on a 

KVM switch may provide a “tension barrier,” as respondents assert, by preventing tension 

applied on the cable from being transmitted into the body, “there is no evidence that that should 

be part of the definition or a necessary limitation of the claims.” Staff Br. at 15-1 6, citing Barker 

Tr. 489. 

Staff likewise finds a problem with the construction advanced by ATEN. While it 

concedes that complainants’ construction (i. e., “connector for input or output connections 

between peripheral devices and computers”), is a “plausible construction” of the claim term, 

Staff states that this definition is not so easily applied to the invention. In Staffs view, this is a 

problem “because the KVM switch of the invention connects peripheral devices and computers 

to each other, and the definition does not say anything about how ‘connector ports’ would apply 

to this intermediate switching device.” Staff Br. at 16. 

Finally, Staff asserts that its construction is consistent with the specification (“externally 

provided with connector ports,” at Col. 1,ll. 39-41 and “connector ports provided on external 

walls thereof,” at Col. 2,ll. 23-27). Staff Br. at 16-17. In Staffs view, these uses of the term 

“connector port” confirm that the port is intended to be, consistent with its plain and ordinary 

meaning, the point of access into the electronic system of the switch for cables extending from 

the peripherals. Staff Br. at 17. 

Once again, Staffs criticisms of the construction offered by ATEN, Belkin, and Emine 

are well taken. Accordingly, it is the finding of this Tribunal that the claim term “connector 

ports” is construed to mean “a coupling device that provides a point of access into a computer 

28 
(such as the serial and parallel ports on the back of most PCs), network, or other electronic 

(5) “cable” 

ATEN submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that in the context of 

the ‘ 1 12 patent a “cable” is used “to transmit signals between the switching circuit and the 

computer.” ATEN Br. at 19; Barker Tr. 473. Thus, complainants further submit that one of 

ordinary skill understands such a “cable” to be: 

A usually flexible (but sometimes rigid) medium via which 

electrical power or signals are transferred. Although the term is 

occasionally applied to a single conductor, especially when it is a 

braid or weave of a number of wires, cable usually means a bundle 

of separate, insulated wires or strands of fiber optic material. 

ATEN Br. at 19, quoting The IZZustrated Dictionary of Electronics at 93,8th ed., McGraw-Hill 

(2001) (CX-433). 

ATEN notes that while this construction is consistent with the usage of the term in the 

patent, neither the dictionary, nor the patent, expressly states how, or where, a “cable” ends. Id. 

at 19.23 ATEN answers that inquiry (i.e., how and where a cable ends) by stating that “[iln 

common parlance in the art, when one refers to a cable, it includes connectors.” Id. ; Barker 

Tr. 477-478. 

22 Indeed, even Dr. Barker (Tr. 488-489,830) and Dr. Min (Tr. 1125-1 126) agree with Staffs 

construction. 

23 By way of example, ATEN states that independent claims “1, 18,20 and 21” specify 

connector plugs on one end of each computer cable with the other end being electrically coupled 

to the switching circuit. (ATEN’s identification of the independent claims is wrong. There are 

only two independent claims, claim 1 and claim 21 .) However, the claims do not identify the 

means by which the cable is coupled to the circuit. ATEN Br. at 19; Barker Tr. 475. 

29 
As further support for this proposition, complainants state that the cables that Emine 

orders for the accused products come with connectors attached (JX-27; J. Chen Dep. 60). ATEN 

Br. at 19. ATEN also states that “Mr. Chacon, whom Belkin identified as on[e] of the three most 

knowledgeable people at Belkin regarding the design and development of the accused products 

(CX-0048C at 8-1 0) but whom Belkin did not call to testifL at trial, testified in deposition that 

the connector end of the cable is part of the cable.” ATEN Br. at 19-20; JX-l5C, M. Chacon 

Dep. Tr. 42. 

Finally, complainants cite to prior art to further support its position. In that regard, 

complainants note that the Cybex Commander User Guide (RX-525C) refers to a 25-pin “D” 

connector at one end of the cable. Also, the Thomas patent, considered by the examiner, 

references “alternative ends for other types of mice and keyboards” such that Dr. Barker testified 

that the cable is understood to have connectors on the ends allowing it to connect to connector 

ports. ATEN Br. at 20; Barker Tr. 477. 

Belkin notes that while Figures 2 and 3 in the ‘ 1 12 patent disclose “signal cables,” 

“mouse cable,” “keyboard cable,” and “video cable,” the term “cable” is not defined in the 

specification of the patent. Belkin Br. at 20; see JX-1 . Emine agrees. Emine Br. at 1 1. For a 

definition of this claim term, respondents turn to their expert, Dr. Min. Dr. Min testified that one 

of skill in the art in 2002, would construe “cable,” a term of art, to mean “one or more wires 

bundled together by a single continuous protective cover.” Id. ; Min Tr. 1 109- 1 1 10; RDX-53. 

Belkin argues that this construction is consistent with the specification and claims of the 

‘ 112 patent. For example, it notes that the Abstract discusses “cable-connected connectors” 

(JX-1 at Abstract; RDX-54) as does the Summary of Invention section of the patent specification 

30 
(JX-1 at 1:46-47; RDX-55) suggesting that there are cables separate from connectors in the 

patent. Belkin Br. at 20. For its part, Emine argues that Dr. Min’s definition of “cable” is also 

supported by The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms (7th ed. 2000) (RX-542C). 

Emine Br. at 11. 

Staff notes that the term “cable” appears, or is incorporated by reference, in every asserted 

claim of the ‘ 1 12 patent. Staff construes this claim term to mean “strands of insulated electrical 

conductors laid together, usually around a central core, and surrounded by a heavy insulation.” 

Staff Br. at 9- 10; SX- 1 .24 

As support for this alternative construction, Staff cites to the testimony of complainants’ 

expert, Dr. Baker (“I am very comfortable using this dictionary definition of the term.” Barker 

Tr. 479-481), as well as to the testimony of respondents’ expert, Dr. Min. (“[Ilt’s a reasonable 

definition ... it’s not a bad definition.” Min. Tr. 1360-1361). 

24 Initially, Staff took the position that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “cable” to a 

person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to mean “[a] stranded, ropelike 

assembly of wire or fiber.’’ It based this construction upon the definition of the claim term as it 

appears in the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, 5th ed. (1994) (SX-1). 

While Staff maintains that the evidence in this investigation supports its original construction 

(citing Barker Tr. 864-865; Min Tr. 11 16), it states that “even more so, the record supports analternative claim construction for the term suggested for the first time at trial, with which all 

parties agreed.” StafCBr. at 10. That alternative construction is the one set forth above. 

31 
In Staffs view, this construction is consistent with the term as it appears in the 

~pecification?~ as well as with Figures 2 and 3 of the ‘ 1 12 patent “which illustrate external cables 

‘11.’” Staff Br. at 1 1. Thus, Staff concludes: 

According to these uses of the term and consistent with the Staffs 

proposed construction of the term, the “cables” are the flexible 

strands of electrical conductors laid together around a core and 

surrounded by insulation (though not necessarily a single or 

continuous protective covering) that connect to the body or ports 

on the switch end, and terminate in “cable-connected connectors” 

on the computer side and a keyboard, video display, and mouse on 

the peripheral side. 

Id. 

Nonetheless, Staff notes that while the parties can agree on the construction of the term 

“cable,” “the application thereof is disputed.” Id. In that regard, it notes that Dr. Min testified 

that “cable” does not include the connectors. Min Tr. 11 1-1 114. Staff further notes, however, 

that Dr. Barker’s application of the term is “inconsistent and hard to follow.” Staff Br. at 1 1-12. 

As an example, Staff states that to find infringement of certain of the accused products, 

*’ In that regard, Staff cites the following passages: 

The automatic switch of the present invention also includes more than one or two 

sets of cable-connected connectors directly extended from the main body and 

electrically connected to the internal circuit board via signal cables. Col. 1,ll. 45- 

49. 

* * * * * 

Cables can therefore be more easily plugged or unplugged in or from the main 

body 20. Col. 2,11. 64-65. 

Staff Br. at 1 1. 

32 
Dr. Barker found it necessary to refer to an entire “cable assembly,” rather than to the claim term 

“cable.” Staff Br. at 12.26 

While differences as to application of the claim term may exist, for present purposes of 

claim construction, this Tribunal finds that the term “cable” means “strands of insulated electrical 

conductors laid together, usually around a central core, and surrounded by a heavy insulation.” 

(6) “molded attachment element” 

The claim term “molded attachment element” appears only in asserted dependent claim 

12, in the context of fixedly attaching cables to the body of the switch. In that regard, claim 12 

provides: “The switch of claim 1, wherein the plurality of cables are fixedly attached to the body 

through a molded attachment element.” See CX-7 & RX-1, col. 3,ll. 56-58 (claim 12). In 

essence, “the molded attachment element” is one manner in which the patent claims that a fixed 

attachment can be made between the cables and the body of the KVM switch. 

ATEN states that because the term “molded attachment element” is not a term of art 

(Barker Tr. 492-493; Min Tr. 1129), the “customary meaning of ‘molded’ and ‘attachment’ 

apply.” ATEN Br. at 18. Accordingly, ATEN construes the claim term “molded attachment 

26 In Staffs view, “The tenuousness and incredibility of Dr. Barker’s application of his claim 

construction for ‘cable’ was illustrated particularly poignantly at trial when Respondent’s 

counsel, Mr. Dickerson, unscrewed the thumbscrew connector in the Belkin CA version 2 

product (CPX-7), the cabling fell to the floor, and Dr. Barker remarked, ‘[tlhe cable that is on the 

floor is not the same cable that I’m talking about’ (Tr. at 760) - a position he takes because he is 

trying to argue that a portion of the cable remains fixedly attached to the body despite the 

removal of the external cables at the thumbscrew attachment. See, e.g., Barker, Tr. 767-68 

(opining that the point where the cables are attached is not at the thumbscrew interface). This 

position is unsupported, inconsistent, and not credible, especially given that, with regard to the 

Belkin version 3 (discussed inza) Dr. Barker admits that he considers the thumbscrew 

attachment to be the point of fixed attachment of the cables to the body. See Barker Tr. at 597.” 

Staff Br. at 12. 

33 
element” to mean “a molded component that brings one part into association with another part.” 

Id. ,citing Miriam- Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed. 2001 , (CX-227); Barker Tr. 493. 

Respondents construe this claim term as meaning “a liquified solid that is permanently 

joined to an object upon cooling.” Belkin Br. at 26 & Emine Br. at1 1 ; Min Tr. 1129-1 130; 

RDX-63. 

Staff adopts complainants’ construction. Staff Br. at 19. First, Staff rejects respondents’ 

construction because they once again have impermissibly read into the claim term a limitation of 

permanence. Id. In that regard, Staff notes that this proposed limitation, i. e., permanence, does 

not appear in the patent or the prosecution history except for the examiner’s single mention to a 

permanent fixed attachment in the Krakovich reference. JX-2. In Staffs view, this mention by 

the examiner “only shows one example of a fixed attachment, not a limitation in the claim.” Id.; 

see Barker Tr. 495 (“I’m fully in agreement with Staff.”). 

For the reasons articulated above, Staffs criticism of respondents’ construction of the 

claim term “molded attachment element” is well-taken. Accordingly, it is the finding of this 

Tribunal that “molded attachment element” means “a molded attachment component that brings 

one part into association with another part.” 

(7) “integrated into” and “integrating. . . into” 

Claims 13 and 2 1 of the ‘ 1 12 patent, respectively, claim a switch with cables “integrated 

into the body” and “integrating [cables] into the body.” JX-1 . Specifically, claim 13, which 

depends from claim 1, recites “a first end of each of the plurality of cables is integrated into the 

body.” Independent claim 21 recites a step of “integrating a first computer cable and a second 

computer cable into the body.” 

34 
ATEN submits that the terms “integrating” and “integrating into”are not terms of art, and 

that neither the claim language nor the specification purport to give the terms any specialized 

meaning. ATEN Br. at 21; Barker Tr. 497. Thus, ATEN turns to the plain and ordinary meaning 

of “integrated” to construe the claim term as “formed into a unified whole.” Id. at 2 1-22 , citing 

Merriam- Webster ’s Collegiate Dictionary, at 650 (1 1 th ed. 2003); Barker Tr. 497; CDX-527. 

“Thus, cables that are integrated into the body form a single structure.” ATEN Br. at 22; Barker 

Tr. 497. 

Respondents provide a narrower construction, stating that “integrated” means “blended 

into without clear boundary and cannot be disassembled.” Belkin Br. at 27 & Emine Br. at 12; 

RDX 65 & 67. In pursuing this construction, Belkin argues that the specification mentions 

“injection-molding” five times and that this could only mean “blended into without clear 

boundary and cannot be disassembled.” Belkin Br. at 28. 

Staff takes the position that the construction offered by Dr. Barker (“formed into a unified 

whole”) is not specific enough inasmuch as it would render the term identical to “fixedly 

attached.” Staff Br. at 20; Min Tr. 1363-1364. Accordingly, Staff construes the term 

“integrated” as “formed into a unified whole that is inseparable without disassembling the 

whole.” Id. 27 

It is the finding of this Tribunal that the claim terms “integrated into” and “integrating ... 

into” mean “formed into a unified whole that is inseparable without disassembling the whole.” 

27 Staff notes that while this is the claim construction that complainants advanced in their 

Pre-Hearing Statement (at 22), it is not the construction offered by their expert, Dr. Barker, at 

hearing. Staff Br. at 20-2 1. 

35 
This construction takes into account the specification's multiple references to inj ection-molding, 

but stops short of the unnecessary limitation that the unified whole could not be disassembled. 

IV. INFRINGEMENT DETERMINATION 

A. Applicable Law 

In a section 337 investigation, the complainant bears the burden of proving infringement 

of the asserted patent claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Certain Flooring Products, 

Inv. No. 337-TA-443, Commission Notice of Final Determination of No Violation of Section 

337,2002 WL 448690 at 59, (March 22,2002); Enercon GmbH v. Int 'I Trade Comm 'n, 15 1 F.3d 

1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

Each patent claim element or limitation is considered material and essential. London v. 

Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Literal infringement of a claim 

occurs when every limitation recited in the claim appears in the accused device, i. e., when the 

properly construed claim reads on the accused device exactly. Amhil Enters., Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 

81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Southwall Tech. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 

(Fed Cir. 1995). 

If the accused product does not literally infringe the patent claim, infi-ingement might be 

found under the doctrine of equivalents. The Supreme Court has described the essential inquiry 

of the doctrine of equivalents analysis in terms of whether the accused product or process contain 

elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention. 

Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17,40 (1 997). 

Under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement may be found if the accused product or 

process performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain 

36 
substantially the same result. Valmont, 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The doctrine of 

equivalents does not allow claim limitations to be ignored. Evidence must be presented on a 

limitation-by-limitation basis, and not for the invention as a whole. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 

at 29; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. US., 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, if an element is missing 

or not satisfied, infringement cannot be found under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of 

law. See, e.g., Wright Medical, 122 F.3d 144, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & 

Evenflo Cos., Inc., 16 F.3d 394,398 (Fed. Cir. 1994); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 

F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Becton Dickinson and Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 

798 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 

The concept of equivalency cannot embrace a structure that is specifically excluded from 

the scope of the claims. Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 

1996). In applying the doctrine of equivalents, the Commission must be informed by the 

fundamental principle that a patent’s claims define the limits of its protection. See Charles 

Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med. Mfg., Inc., 92 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992). As the Supreme 

Court has affirmed: 

Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to 

defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine 

of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, 

not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the 

application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not 

allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in 

its entirety. 

Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. 

Prosecution history estoppel may bar the patentee from asserting equivalents if the scope 

of the claims has been narrowed by amendment during prosecution. A narrowing amendment 

37 
may occur when either a preexisting claim limitation is narrowed by amendment, or a new claim 

limitation is added by amendment. These decisions make no distinction between the narrowing 

of a preexisting limitation and the addition of a new limitation. Either amendment will give rise 

to a presumptive estoppel if made for a reason related to patentability. Honeywell Int 'I Inc. v. 

Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139-41 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 

2829, 162 L.Ed.2d 865 (2005)(citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 22,33-34; and Festo Corp. 

v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,733-34,741 (2002)). The presumption 

of estoppel may be rebutted if the patentee can demonstrate that: (1) the alleged equivalent would 

have been unforeseeable at the time the narrowing amendment was made; (2) the rationale 

underlying the narrowing amendment bore no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent at 

issue; or (3) there was some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably have 

been expected to have described the alleged equivalent. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1140, citing, 

inter alia, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 

2003)(en banc). 

In other circumstances, a patentee may obtain coverage of equivalents unforeseeable at 

the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was surrendered, or for 

aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral relation to the reason the amendment was 

submitted. Festo, 535 U.S. at 738. The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment, 

one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have 

literally encompassed the alleged equivalent. 535 U.S. at 741. 

38 
B. The Accused Products 

’ As earlier noted, the parties have stipulated that the accused products form six 

representative groups. Four of the groups consists of products manufactured by Belkin. The 

remaining two groups consist of products manufactured by Emine. See Joint Stips. at 1-2; 

Second Joint Stip. at 2. 

In addition, for each group the parties have designated an accused device that is 

representative of all of the accused devices within that particular group. Thus, if the 

representative accused product is found to have infringed the ‘ 1 12 patent, then all accused 

devices within the group are also found to have infringed the patent. The same reasoning applies 

in the event that the accused device is found not to have idringed the patent. 

1. Belkin Accused Products 

Belkin Group 1 

Belkin Group 1 includes the following products in KVM WL Models: FlDKl02P 

(versions 1 and 2); FlDKl02Pv (versions 1 and 2); FlDKl02U (versions 1 and 2); FlDLl02P 

(versions 1 and 2); and FlDLl02U (versions 1 and 2). Joint Stips. at 1,T 1. These products are 

referred to as the Belkin “Compact” or “CA” Version 1 KVM products and the Belkin 

“Compact” or “CA” Version 2 KVM products. 

The Belkin CA Version 1 products are represented by CPX-37. This KVM switch has a 

clamshell casing with ports for KVM peripherals on the outer wall of the switch. Two cables 

extend from a molded strain relief element attached to the casing around the switch. These 

cables have cable-connected connector plugs to electrically connect the switch to various 

computers. See CPX-37; see also, Staff Br. at 24. 

39 
The Belkin CA Version 2 products are represented by CPX-7. The Belkin CA 

Version 2 products are KVM switches with a clamshell casing. They have ports for KVM 

peripherals on the outer wall of the switch, as well as a thumbscrew connector piece on the outer 

wall of the switch that connects to the mating half of that thumbscrew connector. The 

thumbscrew connector has two cables extending fiom a molded strain relief element, which 

cables have cable-connected connector plugs to electrically connect the switch to various 

computers. See CPX-7; see also, Staff Br. at 28. 

The infiingement analysis of the CA Version 1 and the CA Version 2 accused products is 

set forth below. 

Claim 1 

It is found that both the Belkin CA Version 1 products and the CA Version 2 products do 

not literally infringe claim 1. Specifically, these accused devices do not meet the limitation of 

the claim term “body.” In that regard, this claim limitation is as follows: “A switch comprising: 

a body.” JX-1, col. 3,ll. 19-20. 

As discussed in the claim construction portion of this Initial Determination, supra, the 

claim term “body,” as it appears in the ‘ 1 12 patent, is construed to mean “an enclosure that 

provides good weather-resistence, impact resistence, and absolute protection of the internal 

circuit board and circuits thereon.” This construction of the term “body” is critical to this 

investigation. Yet, whether the result of an erroneous claim construction, an oversight, or simply 

a tactical decision, complainants (and Staff) have failed to build an evidentiary record that, given 

this Construction of “body,” would support a finding of infringement of the Belkin Group 1 

Compact KVM products as to claim 1. 

40 
This evidentiary dilemma that ATEN (as well as Staff) finds itself in is not surprising 

though inasmuch as complainants (and Staff) expansively construe “body” to mean “the main, 

central, or principal part.”** Moreover, at the hearing, the two parties directed their efforts 

exclusively toward building an evidentiary record that fit within their definition of “body.” No 

attempt was made by either to introduce evidence that would support an alternative, and less 

expansive, construction of “body.” Indeed, that is exactly what happened here as the term 

“body,” as it appears in the ‘1 12 patent, is construed to mean “an enclosure that provides goodweather resistence, impact resistence, and absolute protection of the internal circuit board and 

circuits thereon.” 

Indeed, in their post-hearing briefs, other than with respect to claim construction, 

complainants barely even mention the term “body.”’’ For example, ATEN states that “[elvery 

one of Respondents’ accused KVM switches has a body, a switching circuit, a set of connector 

ports on the surface of the body, the plurality of cables, and each of the plurality of cables has a 

plurality of connector plugs required by independent claims 1 and 21 .” ATEN Br. at 23 

28 Again, given ATEN’s proposed construction that “body” means “the main, central, or 

principal part,” of course respondents’ accused products are going to have a body that meets this 

definition. Indeed, the breadth of this proposed construction begs the question as to whether 

there can be any automatic KVM switch that does not fall within its reach. But this broadside of 

a definition tells us nothing about what the patentee claims to have invented. It is only by 

looking at the ‘ 1 12 patent, in particular the specification, that we can properly construe the term 

“body” in a way to understand the claimed invention. 

29 This shortcoming may be explained by ATEN’s issue misidentification. It argues that “the 

issue of infringement of claim 1 ... is the question of where the cables are securely attached - as 

every one of these claims require the cables be fixedly attached to the body.” ATEN Br. at 24 

(emphasis in original & fn. omitted). To be sure, the claim construction of the term “fixedly 

attached” is important to this investigation, but it is not the “jugular issue” as anticipated by the 

parties. See, e.g., ATEN Br. at 14. 

41 
(emphasis added).30 

Thus, the net result of ATEN’s failure to properly construe “body” is that it has 

introduced no evidence into the record to show that the accused devices of Belkin Group 1 

(CA Version 1 and CA Version 2) have a body that meets the first claim limitation of claim 1. 

Specifically, there is no evidence to show that these accused devices have a body that provides 

“weather-resistence, impact resistence, and absolute protection of the internal circuit board and 

circuits thereon.” Thus, the Belkin CA Version 1 and CA Version 2 products do not literally 

infringe claim 1. 

These accused products, however, do meet the remaining claim limitations of claim 1. 

The remaining claim limitations (while set forth earlier, bear repeating) are as follows: 

1. A switch comprising: 

* * * * * 

a switching circuit contained within the body; 

a set of connector ports electrically coupled to the switching 

circuit; and, 

a plurality of cables fixedly attached to and extending from the 

body, each cable in the plurality of cables having a plurality of 

connector plugs, wherein each connector plug in the plurality of 

connector plugs for one of the cables in the plurality of cables are 

matched a respective connector plug in another one of the cables in 

the plurality of cables, and wherein the switching circuit switches 

to connect each of the set of connector ports to one of the plurality 

of cables. 

30 Staff also tersely addresses the term “body” in its post-hearing brief (i. e., other than with 

respect to claim construction). For example, Staff simply submits, “CPX-37 shows that the 

Belkin CA Version 1 products have an outer casing enclosing the inner circuitry. See Barker, 

Tr. at 512, 514. This is the main or principal part of the switch (body). See Min, Tr. at 1359.” 

Staff Br. at 24. 

42 
JX-1, CO~. 3,ll. 19-32. 

In that regard, both the CA Version 1 accused devices (CPX-37) and the CA Version 2 

accused devices (CPX-7) have a body (albeit one that does not infringe claim 1) consisting of an 

outer casing that encloses a circuit board. Barker Tr. 5 12,5 14. Thus, the switching circuit is 

contained within this body. Id. The connector ports on a surface of the body receive the 

peripheral plugs that are electrically coupled to the switching circuit. Barker Tr. 5 13,5 15-5 17. 

In addition, a plurality of cables (two) are attached to, and extend from, the body of the 

switch so as to be fixedly attached. Barker Tr. 520-522.31 Through this set of electrical 

connections, the peripheral ports are electrically connected to each of the plurality of cables by 

the switching circuit. Also, each of the two cables has attached at its computer end a plurality of 

cable-connected connectors (i.e., connector plugs) to be inserted into their respective ports on the 

various computers, and the connector plugs on each of the two cables match those on the other 

cable. See CPX-7 & CPX-37; see also, Barker Tr. 5 12-522,871. 

Thus, the evidence establishes that the Belkin CA Version 1 products and the CA 

Version 2 products do not literally infringe claim 1 of the ‘ 1 12 patent. 

Claim 12 

Both the Belkin CA Version 1 and CA Version 2 products are found to practice the 

limitation of claim 12. In that regard, the cables of the CA Version 1 products are “fixedly 

attached” to the body of the switch through a molded component, i. e., the strain relief molded 

attachment element, which is held in place by the walls of the body. See Barker Tr. 523. 

3’ In the CA Version 2 KVM products (CPX-7), the attachment takes place by means of 

thumbscrews. This thumbscrew attachment satisfies the “fixedly attached” limitation. 

43 
As for the CA Version 2 products, the cables are “fixedly attached” by means of 

thumbscrews. The cables terminate at the thumbscrew connector and thus, the cable connects to 

the body of the switch. The representative exhibit for the CA Version 2 products (CPX-7) shows 

that the thumbscrew connector brings the cables into association with the body via a connector 

port in such a way that the cables cannot be readily moved. The cables, therefore, are “fixedly 

attached.” See Min. Tr. 1 1 1 1, 1 1 15, & 1 149; Barker Tr. 72 1 (agreeing that thumbscrew 

connectors could accomplish “a fixed attachment”); see also, n.3 1, supra. 

Claim 13 

The Belkin CA Version 1 products are found to literally practice the added limitation of 

claim 13 because the ends of these accused products are formed into a unified whole, ie., they 

are integrated into the body and they cannot be separated without disassembling the whole body. 

See Barker Tr. 524,837 & 851. 

The CA Version 2 products, however, do not literally infringe claim 13. As is evidenced 

by CPX-7, the thumbscrew connector does not integrate the cables into the body as is required by 

claim 13. Thus, the cables are separable from the body of the switch without disassembling the 

whole body, or in any way disrupting the integrity of the switch. Also, there is also no finding of 

infringement as to the CA 2 Version products under the doctrine of equivalents. 

Claims 14 throwh 20 

Claims 14 through 20 depend from claim 1. The evidence establishes that all of the 

limitations of these claims are practiced by the Belkin CA Version 1 and CA Version 2 products. 

In that regard, CPX-37 (CA Version 1) shows that the set of connectors on the wall of the switch 

includes ports to connect computer peripherals (claim 14), specifically, a keyboard port (claim 

44 
15), a mouse port (claim 16), and a video port (claim 17). Also, each cable, or set of cables, 

couples the switching circuit to a computer (claim 18) and each of the plurality of cables has a 

keyboard, video, and mouse cable with respective plugs (claim 19). A second cable in the 

plurality of cables couples the switching circuit to a second computer (claim 20). A similar result 

obtains for the CA Version 2 products upon examination of CPX-7, the representative accused 

device. See Barker Tr. 550-551,837. 

Claim 21 

Claim 2 1 involves a “method comprising the steps” of claim 1 and claim 13. Given the 

preceding analysis that both the CA Version 1 and CA Version 2 products do not meet the 

claim 1 limitation of “body,” so too do they fail to meet the claim 21 limitation of “providing a 

body.” Thus, the Belkin Group 1 products do not literally infkinge claim 21. 

In addition, given the infringement analysis as to claim 13, while the CA Version 1 

products meet the limitation in claim 2 1 as it relates to “integrating” the cables, the CA Version 2 

products do not, given their use of thumbscrews. 

Finally, both the CA Version 1 and the CA Version 2 products otherwise meet all the 

limitations of Claim 21. For example, these accused products are made with a casing enclosing 

the inner circuitry, i.e., the switching circuit. Furthermore, each of the two cables or sets of 

cables is electrically coupled to the switching circuit at one end, and has a plurality of cableconnected plugs at the other end matching those of the other cable. Also, the plurality of 

connector ports on a wall of the body that receive the peripheral plugs are electrically coupled to 

the switching circuit. Through this set of electrical connections, the peripheral ports are 

electrically connected to each of the plurality of cables and their cable-connected connector plugs 

45 
by the electrical switching of the switching circuit. See Barker Tr. 524-526; CPX-37. 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is found that the neither the Belkin CA 

Version 1 products, nor the CA Version 2 products, infringe claim 21 of the ‘ 112 patent. 

Belkin Group 2 

Belkin Group 2 includes the following products in KVM F/G Models: FlDFl02P 

(versions 1 and 2), FlDF102U (versions 1 and 2), FlDGl02P (versions 1 and 2), FlDGl02V 

(versions 1 and 2) and FlDGl02W (versions 1 and 2). Joint Stips. at 1,12. 

The Group 2, Version 1 products are represented by CPX-10. These Version 1 KVM 

devices are switches with a clamshell casing having ports for KVM peripherals on an outer wall 

of the switches. Two cables extending from a molded strain relief element are attached to the 

casing around the switches, which cables, in turn, have cable-connected connector plugs to 

electrically connect the switches to various computers. See CPX-10; see also, Staff Br. at 30. 

The Group 2, Version 2 KVM products are represented by CPX-5. These accused 

devices are KVM switches with a clamshell casing having ports for KVM peripherals on the 

outer wall of the switches, and a thumbscrew connector piece extending from the switches that 

connect to the mating half of that thumbscrew connector. The mating half of the thumbscrew 

connector has two cables extending from a molded relief element, which cables have cableconnected connector plugs to electrically connect the switches to various computers. 

ATEN submits that “Belkin Group lNersions 1 and 2 Compact and Belkin Group 

2Nersion 1 and 2 Flip are the same, except for a few minor modifications.” ATEN Br. at 24-25. 

Thus, it argues that the infringement analysis should be the same. Id. Staff agrees with position, 

except as to the “fixedly attached” limitation. Staff Br. at 28. On balance, ATEN is correct and 

46 
the infringement analysis applied to Belkin Group 1 will also apply to Belkin Group 2.32 

Applying the infringement analysis of Belkin Group 1 to Belkin Group 2 yields the same 

results. Accordingly, both the Version 1 products and the Version 2 products are found not to 

literally infringe claim 1. In that regard, these accused devices meet every limitation of claim 1, 

except the claim limitation that pertains to the term “body.” Similarly, neither Group 2 product 

line infringes claim 2 1 (“method” of “providing a body”) inasmuch as both fail to meet the claim 

1 limitation as it relates to the term “body.” 

Finally, the added limitations of claims 13 through 20 read on the Group 2, Version 1 

devices, as well as the Group 2, Version 2 devices, except the latter do not infringe claim 13 

(cables “integrated” into the body) and correspondingly do not infringe claim 2 1 as to the method 

for integrating the cables. 

Belkin Group 3 

Belkin Group 3 consists of the Version 3 KVM Switch device, which consists of model 

number FlDK102U (version 3). Joint Stips at 2,T 3. This accused device was identified at 

hearing as CPX-8 (a disassembled version of the device).33 It is a KVM switch with a clamshell 

casing with ports for KVM peripherals on an outer wall of the switch, and a thumbscrew 

connector receptacle within the outer casing of the switch body. This thumbscrew connector 

receptacle connects to the mating half of that thumbscrew connector which, in turn, has two 

cables extending from a molded strain relief element. These cables have cable-connected 

32 Thus, the Version 1 analysis of Group 2 tracks the CA Version 1 analysis of Group 1, while 

the Version 2 analysis of Group 2 tracks the CA Version 2 analysis of Group 1. 

33 Staff cites this exhibit as CPX-6 (the assembled of the device). In either case, the same 

infringement analysis applies. 

47 
connector plugs to electrically connect the switch to 

various computers. See CPX-6; see also, Staff Br. at 32.34 

The infringement analysis of the Version 3 products (ie., Group 3) parallels the 

infkingement analysis of the CA Version 2 products (Group 1). Thus, it is found that Version 3 

does not literally infringe claim 1 because it does not meet the limitation with respect to the 

claim term “body.” Version 3 does, however, meet all of the remaining claim 1 limitations. It is 

also found that Version 3 practices the additional limitations of claim 12 and claims 14 through 

20, but it that does not practice the limitations of claim 13 and claim 21 for the reasons 

mentioned in the Group 1 CA Version 2 analysis. 

Belkin Grow 4 

Belkin Group 4 consists of Version 1 of a KVM switch for Mac Mini sold with the name 

(or model number) FlDMl02U. Joint Stips. at 2,n 4. This accused product is identified as 

CPX-40. It is a KVM switch with a casing assembled with screws. It has ports for KVM 

peripherals on an outer wall of the switch and two cables extending from a molded strain relief 

element attached to the casing around the switch. The cables have cable-connected connector 

plugs to electrically connect the switch to the various computers. See CPX-40; see also, Staff Br. 

at 31-32. 

The infringement analysis for this group of products is the same as that for CA Version 1 

34 The primary difference between the Belkin Version 2 and Belkin Version 3 products is the 

fact that the thumbscrew connector on the cable mates with threaded metal inserts and an edge 

card embedded in the body of the switch, rather than with a mating connector piece attached to 

the body. 

48 
(Group 1) and Version 1 (Group 2).35 Therefore, the evidence shows that the Belkin KVM for 

Mac Mini does not literally infringe claim 1 because it does not meet the limitation relating to the 

claim term “body.” As in the parallel infringement analyses, this accused device meets all 

remaining limitations of claim 1. In addition, the evidence shows that the Belkin KVM for 

Mac Mini literally infringes claims 12 through 20, but not claim 21, inasmuch as it does not meet 

the limitation of a method comprising the steps of providing a body. 

2. Emine Accused Products 

Emine has manufactured KVM switches for itself and for other companies. For purposes 

of this investigation, the accused Emine products are separated into two groups. 

Emine Group 1 

Emine Group 1 consists of KVM switches known by several products names, depending 

upon the company making the designation and the country in which the products have been sold. 

A complete list of the products is contained in the Second Joint Stipulation. The products 

contained in Emine Group 1 include the following: EM-2 1 OCP, EM-2 1 OCU, EM-2 1 OCPA, and 

EM-2 1 OCUA. Several of these Emine Group 1 products are equivalent to certain identified 

Belkin, JustCom and RATOC products. Second Joint Stip. at 2,y 1 1. 

The Emine Group 1 KVM products are represented by CPX-9. These KVM switches 

consist of a clamshell casing with ports for KVM peripherals on an outer wall of the switches. 

Two cables extend from a molded strain relief element attached to the casing around the 

switches. The cables, in turn, have cable-connected connector plugs to electrically connect the 

35 Dr. Barker testified that the analysis for the Mac Mini product would be the same because 

the Mac Mini device has the same elements that are present in the Flip Version 1 and the CA 

Version 1 products. Barker Tr. 842,851. 

49 
switches to various computers. See CPX-9; see also, Staff Br. at 33. 

The infringement analysis for the Emine Group 1 KVM devices is the same infringement 

analysis that was applied to the Belkin CA Version 1 products (Belkin Group l), the Belkin 

Version 1 products (Belkin Group 2), and the Belkin for Mac Mini (Belkin Group 4). This is so 

given the similarity of products’ elements. See Barker Tr. 842,85 1. 

Accordingly, consistent with the infringement analysis for the Belkin Groups 1,2, and 4, 

it is found that the Emine Group 1 products do not literally infringe claim 1 meet because they do 

not meet the claim limitation as to “body.” In all other respects, the Emine Group 2 devices meet 

the remaining claim 1 limitations. It is Mer found that the Emine Group 1 products practice 

the additional limitations of claims 12 through 20 of the ‘ 1 12 patent, but not claim 2 1 insofar as 

this claim relates to a method for providing a body. 

Emine Group 2 

Emine Group 2 consists of KVM switches with the products names EM-2 1 OCD, 

EM-2 1 OCDA, EM-2 1 OCDP, EM-2 1 OCDPA, EM-2 1 OCV, EM-2 1 OCVA, EM-2 1 OCVP and 

EM-21OCVPA. Second Jt. Stip. at 2; 7 11. 

The Emine Group 2 products are represented by CPX-50. These products are KVM 

switches with a casing assembled from different parts with screws. The switches have cableconnected KVM ports, with two cables extending from a molded relief strain element attached to 

the casing around the switches. These cables have cable-connected connector plugs to 

electrically connect the switches to various computers. See CPX-50; see also, Staff Br. at 34.36 

36 Dr. Barker similarly described the Emine Group 2 devices, noting that they have a “very 

small compact body.” Barker Tr. 616. He also noted that a primary difference with the Emine 

(continued. ..) 

50 
The infringement analysis for the Emine Group 2 products is the same as that for the 

Emine Group 1 analysis. Thus, it is found that the Emine Group 2 accused devices do not 

literally infringe claim 1 because they do not meet the claim limitation of the term “body.” These 

accused devices do, however, meet all of the remaining limitations of claim 1. It is fbrther found 

that the Emine Group 2 products literally practice the added limitations of claims 12 through 20, 

but not claim 2 1. 

As noted above, given the failure of the Emine Group 2 products to meet the claim 1 

limitation as to “body,” the accused devices contained in Emine Group 2 likewise fail to meet the 

limitation in claim 21 as to the “method” of providing a body. In addition, while the 

cable-connected ports of the Emine Group 2 products do in fact meet the port limitations of the 

other claims (see, e.g., Barker Tr. 847), in that they are coupling devices providing a point of 

access into the electronic system of the switch for the plugs extending from the peripheral 

devices, claim 21 additionally requires that the ports be located on the surface of the body. 

Clearly, that is not the case here. Therefore, Emine Group 2 products do not literally infringe 

claim 21. See Barker Tr. 616-617,735-736; Min Tr. 1371.37 

V. VALIDITY 

One cannot be held liable for practicing an invalid patent claim. See Pandrol USA, LP v. 

AirBoss Railway Prods., Inc. 320 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, the claims of a 

36 (...continued) 

Group 2 products is that the set of ports for the plugging in of peripheral devices is at the end of 

the cable, and not “on the body or near the body.” Id. 

37 A doctrine of equivalents analysis is inappropriate as to this element inasmuch as it has 

been waived by ATEN. See Barker Tr. 623-626. 

51 
patent are presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. 0 282; DMI Inc. v. Deere & Co., 802 F.2d 421 

(Fed. Cir. 1986). Although a complainant has the burden of proving a violation of section 337, it 

can rely on this presumption of validity. A respondent must overcome the presumption by “clear 

and convincing” evidence of invalidity. Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. United States Int ’I Trade 

Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756,761 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

Respondents argue that the asserted claims of the ‘1 12 patent are invalid under the claim 

construction proposed by ATEN. The Staff argues that the asserted claims are invalid under its 

own proposed claim construction, and also cites the invalidity testimony of respondents’ expert, 

Dr. Min, as it applies to ATEN’s proposed construction. ATEN opposes any finding of 

invalidity. 

Inasmuch as no infringement has been found on the part of any accused product, the 

question of patent validity is addressed herein only in the alternative. In addition, respondents’ 

and Staffs invalidity arguments are further removed from the ultimate question of violation of 

section 337 because they are based on alternate proposed claim constructions (i.e., claim 

constructions not adopted by this Tribunal), or respondents’ multiple grounds of patent invalidity 

(e.g., obviousness in addition to anticipation for the same claims). 

Despite the contingent nature of the invalidity questions, a detailed summary of the record 

evidence concerning the validity question follows. In particular, the discussion below shows that 

if the Staffs proposed claim construction were adopted (which respondents contest to a lesser 

degree than ATEN’s proposed construction), there is clear and convincing evidence that the 

asserted claims of the ‘ 1 12 patent would be invalid. 

52 
A. Anticipation 

Respondents argue that all asserted claims of the ‘1 12 patent are invalid due to 

anticipation under the claim construction proposed by ATEN and, or, Staff. The Staff argues that 

claims 1, 12 and 14-20 are invalid as anticipated under the claim construction proposed by 

ATEN and, or, the Staff.” ATEN opposes any finding of anticipation. 

The grounds for finding a patent claim to be invalid due to anticipation are set forth in 

35 U.S.C. 8 102. Prior art anticipates if it discloses every limitation of an asserted claim. See 

Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech Gen ’1 Corp., 424 F.3d 1347,1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The 

Federal Circuit has observed, “that which would literally infringe if later anticipates if earlier.” 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

Anticipation is a question of fact. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 

133 1, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(“However, without genuine factual disputes underlying the 

anticipation inquiry, the issue is ripe for judgment as a matter of law.” Id.). 

With one minor exception in Emine’s post-hearing brief (see discussion below 

concerning the “written description” requirement), the evidence and invalidity arguments set 

forth in the parties’ briefs incorporate the construction proposed by ATEN and Staff for the claim 

term “body” (i.e., “a main, central, or principal part”), as in “a body” (independent claim 1) or 

“providing a body” (independent claim 21). The parties provide no argument relevant to any 

38 The Staff does not agree with respondents’ arguments to the effect that claims 13 and 21 

are anticipated because it does not believe that the “integrated” or “integrating” limitations are 

found in a single piece of prior art. The Staff does, however, find claims 13 and 2 1 to be obvious 

in view of a combination of prior art. See Staff Br. at 40,42. As discussed, inpa, in the section 

on obviousness, this Tribunal would reach the same conclusion if the Staffs claim construction 

(including the ATEN/Staff proposal for the term “body”) were adopted. 

53 
more limited construction that might be given to that term. See ATEN Br. at 38-49 & Reply Br. 

at 18-28; Belkin Br. at 33-57 & Reply Br. at 19-29;39 Emine Br. at 27-4840 & Reply Br. at 

13-23;4’ Staff Br. at 35-50 & Reply Br. at 15-17. 

The parties’ briefs reflect the record evidence on the validity question. Respondents’ 

expert witness, Dr. Min, recognized that ATEN and the Staff share the same proposal for “body,” 

and also that the term “body’’ should have the same meaning in every claim. See, e.g., Min 

Tr. 1 108. Dr. Min provided evidence concerning alleged invalidity of the asserted claims of the 

‘ 1 12 patent based on the claim construction proposed by ATEN and the Staff, as he stated at the 

commencement of his testimony on the subject: 

Q. Dr. Min, have you been requested to consider the validity of 

the asserted claims of the ‘ 1 12 patent? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Q. 

that regard? 

Can you explain, briefly, to Judge Charneski what you did in 

A. I read, of course, the patents and specification and what I 

39 As summarized by Belkin, “[tlhis inventor claimed to have invented a body that would 

replace boxes. He removed connectors and fixedly attached cables that used to be detachable. 

Complainants would have the Administrative Law Judge call a box a body and find that 

detachable cables are fixedly attached cables. Carefully chosen dictionaries may support such a 

broad reading. The specification, however, does not. What Complainants now must claim was 

invented here has been practiced long before 2002.” Belkin Reply Br. at 29 (emphasis added). 

40 “Respondent’s [sic] expert, Dr. Min, thus provided a detailed description of how, under 

Complainants’ claim construction, each and every asserted limitation of the ‘ 1 12 Patent is found 

within the four corners of several distinct prior art references, including Complainants’ own 

products . . . .” Emine Br. at 27-28. 

41 “Because Complainants’ claim construction is excessively broad . . . each and every 

asserted claim limitation existed in real-world prior art references before the date of invention.” 

Emine Rely Br. at 15 n. 12. 

54 
think is the patent said, and then I also received interpretation 

given by the Complainant at ATEN and contrasted that with my 

own understanding of what the patent meant, and I’ve done some 

prior art search myself, just to see what the, what was out there 

before this date. 

* * * * 

Q. 

validity analysis? 

Dr. Min, whose claim construction did you use in your 

A. I used ATEN’s. 

Min Tr. 1137-1 138. Indeed, Dr. Min proceeded to testify concerning the prior art solely in terms 

of the claim construction proposed by ATEN and the Staff for the term “body, ” i. e., the 

dictionary definition of “a main, central, or principal part.” See, e.g., Min Tr. 1 148, 1 1 56.42 

As detailed above (Section 111, “Claim Construction”), the term “body” is not properly 

construed according to the proposed construction of ATEN and the Staff. Rather, the claim 

limitations containing the word “body” limit the invention to a greater extent.43 Inasmuch as the 

parties’ briefs and the evidence of record address the prior art only in terms of the broader and 

erroneous interpretation of the invention proposed by ATEN and the Staff, there is not clear and 

convincing evidence that any of the prior art cited against the ‘ 1 12 patent contains the claim 

limitation “a body” (claim 1) or “providing a body” (claim 2 1). In fact, there is no evidence of 

42 “Respondents’ infringement case was presented primarily by an analysis under ATEN’s 

proposed claim construction, but Dr. Min testified that he had also analyzed the prior art under 

the Staffs proposed claim construction and that the difference in claim construction did not . 

change his invalidity opinions or conclusions in any way.” Staff Br. at 38 n. 12 (citing Min 

Tr. 1140). 

43 In contrast to the proposed construction ATEN and the Staff, the proper construction of “a 

body” or “providing a body” requires a “body” to protect the internal circuit board and circuits 

thereon, and further excludes structures identified in the ‘ 1 12 patent specification as belonging to 

the prior art rather than the claimed invention. 

55 
record at all relating to a “body” as properly construed, and the matter was not addressed by the 

parties in their post-hearing briefs. 

Consequently, it cannot be found that any of the cited prior art, either alone or in 

combination, contains or discloses all elements of any asserted claim of the ‘1 12 patent. Thus, 

for example, anticipation (which requires a finding of all claim limitation of a single piece of 

prior art) cannot be found. 

However, if the claim term “a body” or “providing a body” were construed as broadly as 

proposed by ATEN and the Staff, the asserted claims of the ‘ 1 12 patent would be invalid. 

ATEN may have realized during the hearing and in its briefing that its broad proposed 

construction of the term “body” would lead .to a finding of patent invalidity. ATEN has at times 

attempted to modify its position of the meaning of “body” by focusing on the attachment of 

cables to the alleged “body,” rather than its broad dictionary definition of the word. ATEN also 

attempted to distance itself from the Staff in the validity portion of its briefs, even though the 

Staff proposed the same dictionary definition verbatim for the term “body.” See, e.g., ATEN 

Reply Br. at 18 (“Staffs challenge to the patent’s validity arises from its incorrect and over2’ 

inclusive construction of the term ‘body. ’ n’ (Emphasis added)). 

This inconsistency in ATEN’s position was not lost on the other parties. For example, 

Emine states: 

In trying to harmonize his contradictory testimony, Dr. Barker 

instructed the court to ignore all other structural elements 

encompassed within the body as a whole when doing its analysis 

and instead require attachment [of a cable] to only a specific part of 

the body (i.e., the body wall). However, this position cannot be 

reconciled with the Complainants’ expansive, dictionary-based 

construction of “body” which means a “main, central or principal 

56 
part.” Dr. Barker’s attempt to harmonize his contrasting testimony 

runs afoul of the legal principle that claims must be construed 

consistently for both infringement and invalidity. See Kim v. 

ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 13 12, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Emine Reply Br. at 16-1 7 (footnote omitted). 

In contrast, the Staffs briefs consistently apply ATEN’s and the Staffs identical 

proposed construction of the term “body” to both the infringement and invalidity questions. In 

view of that broad interpretation of the term “body” (which this Tribunal has rejected) and the 

Staffs interpretations of the other disputed claim limitations (which have been adopted), the 

Staffs briefs demonstrate that, but for the proper construction of the term “body,” the asserted 

claims of the ‘1 12 patent would be invalid. See Staff Br. at 35-50 & Reply Br. at 15-17. 

With respect to anticipation, the Staff argues that claims 1, 12 and 14-20 are invalid due 

to anticipation in view of several pieces of prior art. The Staff provides detailed analysis with 

respect to the following: Startech.com (“Startech”) SV211K Switch Kit (CPX-4); Avocent 

OutLook ES Series User Guide (RX-535); ATEN Master View Pro KVM Switch model 

CS-1016 (RPX-8) and ATEN Master View KVM Switch model CS-228 (CPX-1) used with 

corresponding cable model 2L- 170 1 P (RPX-9); and associated user manuals (RX-60; RX-42; 

RX-59). See, e.g., StaffBr. at 37-38. 

There is no dispute that the ATEN devices or publications (relied upon by the Staff and 

discussed herein) are prior art properly cited against the asserted claims of the ‘ 112 patent 

because they were on sale in the United States or described in a written publication more than 

one year prior to July 8,2002, filing date (CX-7/RX-1) of the ‘1 12 patent, i.e., before the 

undisputed critical date of July 8,2001. The prior art status of these devices and references is 

57 
also supported by the record. See Staff Br. at 37; ATEN Br. at 43. 

Relying on the deposition testimony of a Startech representative, ATEN belatedly argues 

that it has not been demonstrated that the Startech SV2 1 1 K device purchased and offered into 

evidence in 2007, is identical to any device that might have been on sale in 2001. See ATEN 

Br. at 43. Yet, while the Startech testimony relied upon by ATEN does appear to raise the 

possibility that some modifications were made to Startech devices over the years, it in no way 

forecloses the possibility that the devices were on sale in 2001, and it also indicates that the 

design has remained the same in all respects material to an invalidity analysis of the ‘ 112 patent. 

See ATEN Br. at 43; Belkin Reply Br. at 21 (quoting, inter alia, Teeple Dep. (JX-32) Tr. 72). 

Moreover, ATEN’s expert confirmed during his own presentation on direct examination 

at the hearing that the Startech product identified as CPX-4 (upon which this invalidity analysis 

is based) is “a good representative of the prior art.” See Barker Tr. 1388; see also Min Tr. 1142 

(concerning ATEN demonstrative exhibits). Thus, conclusions reached with respect to the 

products represented by CPX-4 (a Startech product purchased in 2007) do in fact provide a 

reliable prior art analysis. 

ATEN presents a scant argument concerning the Avocent art to the effect that spread 

sheets purporting to record sales of the products do not match. See ATEN Br. at 43-44. ATEN’s 

belated argument is unclear, and does not raise an effective challenge to the clear and convincing 

evidence that the Avocent OutLook ES Series User Guide (Rx-535) constitutes prior art to the 

asserted claims of the ‘ 1 12 patent. In addition, the Avocent documents confirm at least one sale 

of a prior art device before the critical date. See Rx-78C; RX-84C; RX-138C (Belkin 

Abuyounes Dep. Designations). 

58 
While ATEN argues that the prior art discussed herein “is essentially the same as what 

the Examiner considered,” it is undisputed that these precise pieces of prior art were not before 

the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) examiner during prosecution of the ‘ 1 12 patent. 

Compare ATEN Br. at 44, with Staff Brief at 37. 

The evidence of record, as analyzed by respondents’ expert during the hearing, clearly 

and convincingly shows that if the “body” were limited merely to “a main, central, or principal 

part” of the switch, then each of the ATEN, Startech and Avocent prior art devices or references 

enumerated above contained all limitations of independent claim 1 and its dependent claim 12 

(wherein a plurality of cables are fixedly attached to the body through a molded attachment 

element). 

In particular, the prior art disclosed: a KVM switch with a main part (a “body”); a 

switching circuit contained therein; a set of receptacles (connector ports) on a wall of the body to 

receive the peripheral plugs that are electrically connected to the circuit board; and at least two 

cables (plurality of cables) that attach to the connector ports on the wall of the switch body by 

molded thumbscrew attachments (molded attachment elements) so as not to be readily movable 

(fixedly attached) and to extend from the body. 

The evidence also shows that each cable has attached at its computer end a plurality of 

cable-connected connectors (connector plugs) for insertion into mating receptacles (connector 

ports) for the peripherals on the computer; the provided or compatible cables sold for use with 

the switches have matching sets of cable-connected connectors (connectors plugs) on each cable 

for insertion into standard peripheral ports on the computers; and the switching circuit functions 

so as to switch the electrical connection with the set of peripheral receptacles on the switch wall 

59 
(connector ports) among each of the plurality of cables. See Min Tr. 1 147-1 158 (StarTech 

SV21 lK), 1190-1 197 (ATEN CS-228 and ATEN CS-1016), 1206 (Avocent Outlook). 

In addition, the prior art at issue contains all the claim elements of dependent claims 14 

though 20. In particular, the evidence shows that the set of connector ports on the wall of each 

prior art switch contains ports to connect computer peripherals (claim 14), including a keyboard 

port (claim 15), a mouse port (claim 16), and a video port (claim 17). Each cable or set of cables 

couples the switching circuit to a computer (claim 18). Each of the plurality of cables or sets of 

cables has a keyboard, video and mouse cable with respective plugs (claim 19). Further, there is 

a second cable or set of cables in the plurality that couple the switching circuit to a second 

computer (claim 20). See Min Tr. 1140 (Startech), 1153-1 155, 1193-94 (ATEN CS228), 1197 

(ATEN CS-1016), 1206 (Avocent Outlook); see also Min Tr. 1365-1367 (each of the prior art 

products anticipates all the asserted claims of the ‘1 12 patent under the Staffs claim construction 

except for claims 13 and 21). 

ATEN’s attempt to avoid a finding of invalidity centers around an argument that is 

inconsistent with the claim language of the patent. Specifically, ATEN and its expert argued that 

the alleged invention of the ‘ 1 12 patent is found in the secure attachment of cables to the “body” 

of the KVM switch rather than to the circuit board. See, e.g., ATEN Br. at 40. ATEN and its 

expert rely on a “test” to determine whether or not the cables can be securely attached to the 

“body” of the KVM switch when the circuit board has been removed. While such a test may 

show whether the cables might be attached securely to the body of the KVM switch in the 

absence of the circuit board, the “test” does not rely on devices as they were assembled in the 

prior art for actual use. 

60 
Moreover, although ATEN’s “test” may have indicated that the cables were attached to 

the circuit board in the prior art, that should not be unexpected inasmuch as there must be a some 

sort of connection between cables and circuit board in order for KVM switches to work. ATEN, 

however, has not shown any place in the ‘1 12 patent which requires that cables secure only to the 

body of the switch, and that they cannot also be connected to the circuit board in a KVM switch 

covered by the patent. ATEN has failed to link its so-called “test” to the asserted claims of the 

‘ 112 patent. 

In summary, there is clear and convincing evidence of record that if the proposed claim 

construction of ATEN or the Staff were adopted, at least claims 1, 12 and 14-20 would be invalid 

as anticipated pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 3 102. 

B. Obviousness 

Respondents argue that the asserted claims of the ‘ 1 12 patent are invalid as obvious under 

the claim constructions proposed by ATEN and, or, the Staff. The Staff argues that claims 13 

and 21 are invalid as obvious under such claim constructions. ATEN opposes a finding of 

obviousness. 

Obviousness is grounded in 35 U.S.C. 0 103, which provides, inter alia, that: 

A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 

identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this 

title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 

patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 

whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 

made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 

subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the 

manner in which the invention was made. 

35 U.S.C. 9 103(a). 

61 
An allegation of obviousness is evaluated under the so-called Graham factors: (1) the 

scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at 

issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. 

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1966). 

“One of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting 

that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious 

solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.” KSR Int’Z Co. v. TeZeflex Inc., No. 04-1350, 

- U.S. - , 127, S.Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007). “[Alny need or problem known in the field of 

endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combing 

the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. Specific teachings, suggestions or motivations to 

combine prior art may provide helpful insights into the state of the art at the time of alleged 

invention. Id. at 1 74 1. 

Nevertheless, “an obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of 

the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of 

published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits 

and of modem technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this way.” Id. “Under the 

correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and 

addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” 

Id. at 1742. A “person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity . . . .” Id. 

The ultimate determination of whether an invention would have been obvious is a legal 

conclusion based on underlying findings of fact. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994,998 (Fed. Cir. 

1999). As discussed above in connection with alleged anticipation, there is no evidence that the 

62 
claim limitation of a “body,” as properly construed, is found anywhere in the cited prior art. 

Consequently, based on the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, a finding of patent 

claim invalidity due to obviousness cannot be entered. 

However, if a broader definition of body were to be applied, especially that proposed by 

ATEN and the Staff, at least claims 13 and 2 1 of the ‘ 1 12 would be invalid due to obviou~ness.~~ 

If ATEN’s or the Staffs claim construction were adopted, the only asserted claims of the ‘ 112 

patent that may not be anticipated by the prior art are: claim 13 (which depends from 

claim 1, and contains the “integrated” limitation), and claim 21 (an independent claim method 

that contains the corresponding “integrating” limitation). 

Nonetheless, there is clear and convincing evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the 

art could have reasonably combined the disclosures of the anticipating prior art with the Yamada 

reference cited by respondents and Staff (RX-522) to achieve the expected result of the alleged 

invention of the ‘ 1 12 patent, and specifically to satisfy the additional limitations of claims 13 and 

21 as those limitations are construed herein (and as proposed by the StafQ. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. 

at 739 (“[Tlhe combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be 

obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”). 

The Yamada reference (RX-90, RX-522 (certified translation)) is a published Japanese 

44 The claims found to be entirely anticipated under ATEN’s or the Staffs proposed claim 

construction would certainly be automatically obvious under the same construction. See In re 

Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388,391 (Fed. Cir. 1991)(“[S]ince anticipation is the ultimate 

of obviousness . . . the subject matter of these claims is necessarily obvious and we need not 

consider them further.”). 

63 
patent application with a release date of February 25, 1 997.45 It disclosed an automatic switch for 

a personal computer peripheral. Although the Yamada device is not a KVM switch (for a 

keyboard, video or mouse), the Yamada design would allow a user to switch a printer connection 

between two computers. 

A question is raised as to whether one or ordinary skill would turn to art such as the 

Yamada printer switch. Contrary to ATEN’s arguments, the relevant art covers computer 

peripherals such as the Yamada art. A person of ordinary skill is presumed to have knowledge of 

arts reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is concerned. See In 

re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In this case, no party proposed a definition of a 

person of ordinary skill that would restrict that person’s field of knowledge to KVM switches.46 

In fact, during the prosecution of the ‘ 1 12 patent, the examiner also considered prior art outside 

KVM switches. See JX-2 (file history); Barker Tr. 1458-1459. 

Moreover, as discussed above in the section on claim construction (Section 111), one of 

ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ‘ 1 12 patent would have been educated in communications 

systems and electronics, and would have had post-graduate industrial experience in the 

communication equipment industry. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been 

aware of computer peripherals such as printers and printer switches, and would have understood 

the applicability of such art to problems associated with peripherals such as KVM switches. 

45 This reference was not before the examiner during prosecution of the ‘ 1 12 patent. See 

JX-2 (file history); Min Tr. 1222. 

46 Even ATEN’s expert could not deny that his own proposed person of ordinary skill in the 

art approaching the problem addressed in the ‘ 1 12 patent would have had knowledge of, and 

experience with, computer printer switches in addition to KVM switches, and would have had 

the skill and the knowledge to combine their teachings. See Barker Tr. 1458-1460. 

64 
Objections to the Yamada art are merely academic at best. Not only would the computer 

application be used in tandem with one or more printers, but the evidence shows that both Emine 

and ATEN have produced printer switches (the subject of the Yamada reference) as part of their 

business, in addition to KVM switches. See Min Tr. 1220-1221; K. Chen Tr. 99-100 (In its 

beginnings, ATEN produced an automatic printer switch designed by Kevin Chen, the inventor 

of the ‘ 1 12 patent); Hou Tr. 930-93 1,950 (KVM and printer switches made by Emine). 

Respondents’ expert testified that one of ordinary skill would appreciate the fact that certain 

features of printer switches could be used for KVM switches. Min Tr. 1369-1370 (“And looking 

at the one, well, we can easily see that attaching cable in here, yes, I will do it in KVM as well, so 

that’s just a natural blend of expertise.”). 

Turning to the disclosure of the Yamada patent application, it is evident that the Yamada 

switch has cables attached to the main part of the switch (a “body” according to ATEN and the 

Staff> by a molded strain relief element (constituting a “molded attachment element”) so as not to 

be readily movable (fixedly attached), as well as cables integrated into the main part of the switch 

(body) so as to form a unified whole (integrated) that cannot be separated from the body without 

disassembly of the whole. The Yamada switch (as illustrated in its Fig. 1) is depicted below. 

65 
According to the record evidence, the only limitation that may be absent from the 

anticipating prior art references, under the Staffs construction, is the integration limitation of 

claims 13 and 2 1. However, it is clearly and convincingly disclosed by Yamada. See Min 

Tr. 1222, 1226 (Yamada discloses integrating the cables using a molded attachment element to 

eliminate connectors on the surface of the switch); 1368 (con~lusion);4~ see also, Barker Tr. 1460 

(Dr. Barker agreed on cross-examination that a combination of Yamada with any one of the other 

prior art devices discloses all limitations of each asserted claims in the ‘1 12 patent.). Therefore, 

when Yamada is combined with any of the anticipatory prior art references, all claim limitations 

of the remaining claims are disclosed. 

As indicated above, one of the Graham factors which must be considered in an 

obviousness analysis, is “objective evidence of nonobviousness,” also called “secondary 

considerations. See StratoJex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 

(“Thus evidence arising out of the so-called ‘secondary considerations’ must always when 

present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.”). However, secondary 

47 Specifically with respect to the Staffs proposed construction of the claims, respondents’ 

expert testified: 

Q. 

renders those claims obvious under the Staffs construction? 

And what is your opinion as to why the Yamada reference, prior art switches, 

A. 

ATEN’s interpretation is, you cannot detach it without disassembling. The printer 

switch, as shown in Yamada, the way the cables are attached to, through the 

molded attachment, and that would make that limitation integrating into the body 

obvious, combining that with other of the prior art references, you know, cited 

earlier on. 

Yes, that additional, the element in your interpretation, in addition to what 

MinTr. 1368. 

66 
considerations, such as commercial success, will not always dislodge a determination of 

obviousness based an analysis of the prior art. See KSR Int’Z, 127 S.Ct. at 1745 (commercial 

success did not alter conclusion of obviousness in the trial court or the Supreme Court). 

In this case, secondary considerations do not overcome the obviousness determination. 

While ATEN offered evidence regarding commercial success and copying of their cable KVM 

switch in general, this evidence did not focus on the integrated cables. See, e.g., Yang 

Tr. 254-255 (regarding cable KVM allowing ATEN to break into market with large national 

retailers); Barker Tr. 1455 (regarding press releases and product reviews of ATEN products). 

Additionally, this evidence was rebutted by a showing that the cable KVM products were 

not necessarily successful, that Emine did not copy ATEN’s design, and that their appearance 

and any success in the market may have been driven by market changes, rather than by any 

alleged copying of an ATEN product or design. See Hou Tr. 952-953,972-973 (Emine’s cable 

KVM line not successful); Hou Tr. 938 (Emine did not have an ATEN sample nor copy ATEN’s 

design when designing its first cable KVM); Lin Tr. 996-997 (Emine did not copy ATEN design 

for cable KVM “because it was a very simple project. All we have to do is to remove the 

connector port and to connect a cable onto that main board, it was something very simple.”); 

Barker Tr. 1464 (in 2000-2002, the market started to recognize that perhaps there was a 

consumer market for KVM switches). 

Accordingly, the evidence of record shows clearly and convincingly that if a claim 

construction were adopted such as that of the Staff, claims 13 and 21 of the ‘1 12 patent would be 

invalid as obvious. 

67 
C. Written Description 

The first paragraph of Section 1 12 of the Patent Act provides: 

The specification shall contain a written description of the 

invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 

such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 

skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most 

nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the 

best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 

invention. 

35 U.S.C. 9 112,y 1. 

Emine devotes less than two pages of its main post-hearing brief to an argument that the 

asserted claims 1 and 12-20 of the ‘ 1 12 patent may be invalid due to a failure to comply with the 

written description requirement of section 1 12. Specifically, it is argued that this Tribunal should 

declare those claims invalid “to the extent Complainants continue to argue that the ‘ 1 12 Patent 

can be applied to products with connector ports located other than on the body of a KVM 

switch.” Emine Br. at 47-48. ATEN opposes this argument. ATEN Reply Br. at 4 n.4. 

This Tribunal has not adopted ATEN’s proposed construction of “connector ports.” 

Further, it was Emine’s argument that ATEN adopted an overly broad definition of “connector 

ports” to read on Emine’s Group 2 products with cables ending in connector plugs rather than 

having connector ports on the body. However, infringement of those devices has not been found. 

Thus, Emine’s argument concerning the “written description” requirement is moot. In any event, 

Emine’s argument concerning the “written description” requirement is not developed in its briefs, 

and it is unclear whether one of ordinary skill would encounter a deficiency in reading the ‘ 1 12 

patent if ATEN’s proposed claim construction had been adopted for this claim limitation. 

68 
VI. UNENFORCEABILITY 

Emine argues that the ' 1 12 patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct committed 

by the patentee (or his representative) during patent prosecution before the PTO. ATEN and the 

Staff oppose a finding of unenforceability. As explained below, Emine has failed to establish the 

alleged inequitable conduct by the required clear and convincing evidence standard. 

A patent is unenforceable on grounds of inequitable conduct if the patentee made 

affirmative misrepresentations of material fact to the PTO, failed to disclose material 

information, or submitted false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive. GFI, 

Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer 

Ingelheim GmbH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Labounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States 

Int 'I Trade Comm 'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Both materiality and intent must be 

proven by clear and convincing evidence. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 

863 F.2d 867,872 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also, Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 

1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2004). If materiality and intent are shown, then one must determine 

whether the equities warrant a conclusion that the patentee has engaged in inequitable conduct. 

Hoffman-La Roche, Inc v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354,1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

In this case, Emine argues that ATEN failed to disclose its own prior art switches that 

would have been material to the prosecution of the '1 12 patent, and also that ATEN misled the 

examiner by fabricating and submitting to the PTO a stylized Figure 1 with statements about the 

prior art that did not accurately reflect the state of the art at that time. 

In view of the invalidity discussion above (see Section V), there is clear and convincing 

evidence that ATEN's own prior art switches (particularly the ATEN Master View Pro KVM 

69 
Switch model CS-1016 and the ATEN Master View KVM Switch model CS-228) were material 

to the prosecution of the ' 1 12 patent because they contain many elements of the asserted claims. 

Also, as discussed above, if a claim construction were adopted that is broader than that 

adopted in this Initial Determination (for example, if the Staff's claim construction were 

adopted), the ATEN prior art would clearly anticipate many of the ' 1 12 patent claims, and in 

combination with other prior art would clearly render others at least obvious. In such a case, the 

ATEN prior art would be highly material. 

Thus, Emine clearly has established materiality. It has failed, however, to establish the 

requisite intent to deceive. In that regard, Emine attempts to build its case of intent on the basis 

of inference, and little else. An examination of Emine's main and reply briefs shows that it relies 

upon an inference of intent on the part of the inventor, or ATEN, or patent counsel, or all of these 

parties. However, there is absolutely no showing by respondent that such an inference is 

warranted. 

In addition, Emine did not develop a record sufficient to find specific evidence of the 

deceptive intent that it now seeks. While the patent and its prosecution history are in evidence, 

there is little information from which the reasons for specific actions and statements could be 

discerned. The only witness whose testimony directly addressed the question of inequitable 

conduct is that of inventor Chen (see Chen Tr. 166-170). His testimony provides little insight 

into the question of intent other than the fact that he was aware of his duty to provide known 

material information to the PTO. Thus, Emine's charge of inequitable conduct must fail. 

Consequently, it is not found by clear and convincing evidence that the ' 1 12 patent is 

unenforceable. 

70 
VII. DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 

As stated in the notice of investigation, a determination must be made as to whether an 

industry in the United States exists as required by subsection (a)(2) of section 337. Section 337 

declares unlawful the importation, the sale for importation or the sale in the United States after 

importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent only if an industry in the 

United States, relating to articles protected by the patent . . . concerned, exists or is in the process 

of being established. There is no requirement that the domestic industry be based on the same 

claim or claims alleged to be infringed. 19 U.S.C. 9 1337(a)(2). 

The domestic industry requirement consists of both an economic prong (i.e., there must 

be an industry in the United States) and a technical prong (Le., that industry must relate to articles 

protected by the patent at issue). See Certain Ammonium Octamolybdate Isomers, Inv. No. 337- 

TA-477, Comm’n Op. at 55, USITC Pub. 3668 (Jan. 2004). The complainant bears the burden of 

proving the existence of a domestic industry. Certain Methods of Making Carbonated Candy 

Products, Inv. No. 337-TA-292, Comm’n Op. at 34-35, USITC Pub. 2390 (June 1991). 

Thus, in this investigation it must be shown by ATEN that it satisfies both the technical 

and economic prongs of the domestic industry requirement with respect to the ‘ 1 12 patent. 

A. Technical Analvsis 

For the purposes of ATEN’s argument concerning the technical prong of the domestic 

industry required, ATEN placed its products into five groups. ATEN characterizes some of the 

products as 2-port cable KVMs, and others as 4-port cable-KVM. Group 1 is represented by 

CPX-52, CPX-46, CPX-45, CPX-19 and CPX-53. Group 2 is represented by CPX -17, CPX-15, 

CPX-38, CPX -1 8 and CPX-601. Group 3 is represented by CPX -1 1 and CPX-51. Group 4 is 

71 
represented by CPX-34. Group 5 is represented by CPX-22. ATEN argues that all of the 

representative devices practice all the asserted claims of the ‘ 1 12 patent. See ATEN Br. at 3 1. 

All other parties oppose a finding that the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement is 

satisfied. 

The testimony of ATEN’s expert, as reflected in ATEN’s brief, is based only on its 

proposed claim construction, which includes its proposed construction for the term “body.” 

Limitations based on the term “body” are contained in all claims of the ‘ 1 12 patent (both asserted 

and non-asserted) because “body” limitations are contained in the independent claims. As 

detailed in Section I11 (Claim Construction) and discussed throughout this Initial Determination 

(including Section IV in which no infringement was found by accused products), ATEN’s 

proposed construction for the term “body” is based on an overly broad, dictionary definition that 

is inconsistent with the patent claim and the specification, including the Background and 

Summary portions. Thus, it has been rejected.48 ATEN does not provide any evidence 

whatsoever with respect to any alternative to its proposed claim construction. Consequently, 

having fallen on the sword of its own failed claim construction, there is simply no evidence that 

ATEN’s products practice any claim of the ‘ 1 12 patent. 

Accordingly, it has not been established that the technical prong of the domestic industry 

requirement is satisfied. 

48 As discussed in Section V (Validity), ATEN has also attempted to modify its 

interpretation of “body” in various portions of its testimony and briefing, such as through the use 

of a so-called “test” for patent infringement involving the attachment of cables. That “test” has 

been rejected as inconsistent with the claims, and is unpersuasive. 

72 
B. Economic Analvsis 

A domestic industry is defined in subsection 337(a)(3) as follows: 

(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), an industry in the United States 

shall be considered to exist if tliere is in the United States, with 

respect to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, trademark 

or mask work concerned -- 

(A) significant investment in plant and equipment; 

(B) significant employment of labor or capital; or 

(C) substantial investment in its exploitation, 

including engineering, research and development, or 

licensing. 

19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3). 

The economic prong of the domestic industry requirement is satisfied by meeting the 

criteria of any one of the three factors listed above. 

Inasmuch as complainants admit that they do not manufacture KVM switches in the 

United States, it must be shown that pursuant to subsection 337(a)(3)(C), set forth above, there is 

a substantial domestic investment in the exploitation of the ' 1 12 patent.49 

Complainants' own evidence shows that most of activities and expenditures related to the 

patent occur overseas in Taiwan or mainland China. See, e.g., Yang Tr. 258-259. Nevertheless, 

the evidence provided at the hearing demonstrates a substantial investment in the United States, 

especially through complainant ATEN Technology, Inc. of Irvine, California. 

ATEN Technology, Inc. had operating expenses in 2006 of [ 3, including rent, 

payroll, purchasing, advertising, product development and other expenses. Yang Tr. 255; 

49 Neither complainants nor the Staff alleged that complainants license the ' 1 12 patent in the 

United States. 

73 
CX-749C. The record evidence shows that the equivalent of [ 3 full-time employees are based 

in the United States, and devote their time to products that complainants and the Staff allege to 

practice the ‘ 1 12 patent. The total payroll for these employees was [ ] in 2006, and is 

expected to be approximately the same in 2007. The employees engage in customer training and 

support, the drafting of manuals, a limited amount of testing, minor repairs to returned products, 

and a small amount of design work.5o See Yang Tr. 313-314,341-348,356-361,374-386; see 

also, CDX-212C-1 (guide to payroll expenditure data). The employees are also involved to some 

extent in the development of two new products, including market and technology feasibility 

analysis, and industrial design. See Yang Tr. 262-263. The domestic employees also share office 

and technical equipment, and office space with other employees. 

Accordingly, if it had been established that complainants’ products practice the ‘ 1 12 

patent, the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement would be satisfied. 

VIII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. The Commission has personal jurisdiction over the parties, and subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the accused products. 

2. The respondents have imported and, or, sold for importation the accused products. 

3. It has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused 

products infringe any asserted claim of the ‘ 112 patent. 

50 Many of these activities have long been recognized as relevant to the domestic industry 

question. See Certain Cube Puzzles, Inv. No. 337-TA-112, USITC Pub. 1334,219 U.S.P.Q. 322 

(Int’l Trade Comm’n 1983) (domestic industry based on quality control, repair and packaging of 

imported cube puzzles); Certain Plastic Fasteners and Processes for the Manufacture ThereoJ; 

Inv. No. 337-TA-248, Initial Determination (June 1987), aff d, Comm’n Op. at 49-51 (1987). 

74 
4. It has not been established by clear and convincing evidence that any asserted claim of 

the ‘ 1 12 patent is invalid due to anticipation. 

5. It has not been established by clear and convincing evidence that any asserted claim of 

the ‘ 1 12 patent is invalid due to obviousness. 

6. It has not been established by clear and convincing evidence that claims 1 and 12-20 

of the ‘ 1 12 patent are invalid due to a failure to comply with the written description requirement. 

7. It has not been established by clear and convincing evidence that the ‘ 112 patent is 

unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 

8. It has not been established that the domestic industry requirement of section 337 has 

been satisfied. 

IX. INITIAL DETERMINATION AND ORDER 

Based on the foregoing opinion, findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence, and 

the record as a whole, and having considered all pleadings and arguments, including the proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is the Administrative Law Judge’s INITIAL 

DETERMINATION (“ID”) that no violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 

amended, has occurred in the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the 

sale within the United States after importation of certain switches or products containing same by 

reason of infringement of one or more of claims 1 and 12-21 of United States Patent No. 

7,035,112. 

The Administrative Law Judge hereby CERTIFIES to the Commission this Initial 

Determination, together with the record of the hearing in this investigation consisting of the 

following: 

75 
1. The transcript of the hearing, with appropriate corrections as may hereafter be 

ordered by the Administrative Law Judge; and further, 

2. The exhibits accepted into evidence in this investigation as listed in the attached 

exhibit lists. 

In accordance with 19 C.F.R. 8 210.39(c), all material found to be confidential by the 

Administrative Law Judge under 19 C.F.R. 3 210.5 is to be given in camera treatment. 

The Secretary shall serve a public version of this ID upon all parties of record and the 

confidential version upon counsel who are signatories to the Protective Order (Order No. 1) 

issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this investigation, and upon the Commission 

investigative attorney. 

To expedite service of the public version, each party is hereby ORDERED to file with the 

Commission Secretary by no later than November 14,2007, a copy of this ID with brackets that 

show any portion considered by the party (or its suppliers of information) to be confidential, 

accompanied by a list indicating each page on which a bracket is found. At least one copy of 

such a filing shall be served upon the Administrative Law Judge, and the brackets shall be 

marked in red. If a party (and its suppliers of information) considers nothing in the ID to be 

confidential, and thus makes no request that any portion be redacted from the public version of 

this ID, then a statement to that effect shall be filed in lieu of a document with brackets. 

76 
Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 0 21 0.42@), this Initial Determination shall become the 

determination of the Commission unless a party files a petition for review pursuant to 

$210.43(a) or the Commission, pursuant to 0 210.44, orders on its own motion a review of the 

ID or certain issues herein. 

Carl C. Charneski 

Administrative Law Judge 

Issued: November 7,2007 

77 
CERTAIN SWITCHES AND PRODUCTS 

CONTAINING SAME 

Inv. No. 337-TA-589 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached INITIAL DETERMINATION was 

served by hand upon Commission Investigative Attorney Heidi E. Strain, Esq., and upon the 

following parties via first class mail and air mail where necessary OnNovember 23, 2007. 

Trade Commission 

SW, Room 112 

Washington, D.C. 20436 

FOR COMPLAINANTS ATEN INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD., 

AND ATEN TECHNOLOGY, INC.: 

Arthur Wineberg, Esq. 

Tobias E. Zimmerman, Esq. 

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP 

1333 New Hampshire Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

Yitai Hu, Esq. 

Ming-Tao Yang, Esq. 

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP 

2 Palo Alto Square 

3000 El Camino Real, Suite 400 

Palo Alto, CA 94306 

FOR RESPONDENTS BELKIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND BELKIN, INC.: 

Steven E. Adkins, Esq. 

Ric Maccahiaroli, Esq. 

John E. Ma&, Esq. 

JONES DAY 

5 1 Louisiana Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20001 
CERTAIN SWITCHES AND PRODUCTS 

CONTAINING SAME 

Inv. No. 337-TA-589 

Robert Dickerson, Esq. 

JONES DAY 

555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90071 

FOR RESPONDENTS JUSTCOM TECH, INC., RATOC SYSTEMS, INC., AND RATOC 

SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC.: 

Richard F. Cauley, Esq. 

Erick P. Wolf, Esq. 

WANG, HARTMANN & GIBBS, PC 

1301 Dove Street, Suite 1050 

Newport Beach, CA 92660 

FOR RESPONDENT EMINE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.: 

Sturgis M. Sobin, Esq. 

HELLER EHRMAN 

1717 Rhode Island Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

PUBLIC MAILING LIST 

Sherry Robinson 

889 1 Gander Creek Drive 

Miamisburg, OH 45342 

LEXIS - NEXIS 

Ronnita Green 

Thomson West 

1100 - 13* Street NW 

Suite 200 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(PARTIES NEED NOT SERVE COPIES ON LEXIS OR WEST PUBLISHING)