NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-342

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 524724

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior Court 

judgment affirming his classification by the Sex Offender 

Registry Board (SORB) as a level two sex offender. On appeal,

Doe challenges the classification on various grounds, including 

by arguing that the hearing examiner failed to provide an 

adequate explanation for how Doe presents a moderate risk of 

reoffense. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the 

Superior Court judgment and remand for entry of a new judgment 

vacating the final classification and remanding the matter to 

SORB for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and 

order.

Background. On May 6, 2014, a nurse at a skilled nursing 

center walked into a patient room and discovered Doe, a

certified nursing assistant, with a female dementia patient
2

(victim). The nurse saw Doe with the victim behind a curtain

and that the victim was naked from the waist down with her legs 

spread open. The nurse asked Doe what he was doing, to which 

Doe responded, "I know I'm in trouble, this looks bad, I'm 

sorry." Doe claimed that he was changing the victim's diaper,

but the nurse checked and noticed that the diaper was clean. 

The nurse immediately took the diaper and secured it in a paper 

bag. Another nursing center employee responded to the incident 

and testified at trial that she saw blood in the victim's vagina 

immediately after the incident.

When questioned by the police on June 10, 2014, Doe 

admitted to putting his fingers inside the victim's vagina

during the incident in question, as well as on another occasion 

in January 2014 while he was working an overnight shift.1

Doe was indicted in Superior Court on two counts of rape; 

after a bench trial on April 12, 2017, Doe was found guilty of

one count of rape. Doe was sentenced to six to eight years in 

State prison.

In the SORB classification proceedings, Doe raised several 

risk-mitigating factors, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016): 

(1) factor 28 (supervision by probation or parole) for having 

1 Doe was advised of his Miranda rights and agreed to be 

interviewed by the police. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 

(1966).
3

strict parole conditions; (2) factor 32 (sex offender treatment) 

because of Doe's completion of sex offender treatment; (3) 

factor 33 (home situation and support systems) due to Doe's 

robust support network of family and friends; and (4) factor 34 

(materials submitted by the sex offender regarding stability in 

the community) as a result of Doe's course completions,

continued education, and anticipated housing and employment on 

release. The hearing examiner agreed that these factors applied 

and that three of the four were to be given "full weight." He 

ultimately concluded that Doe nevertheless presented a moderate 

risk of reoffense and a moderate degree of danger. On this 

basis, the hearing examiner classified Doe as a level two 

offender. Although the hearing examiner's written decision 

included an extensive explanation of how Doe presented a 

moderate degree of dangerousness, it included little explanation 

of why he presented a moderate risk of reoffending. In fact,

the hearing examiner's discussion of Doe's risk of reoffense 

cited to only one risk-elevating factor that bore on that issue 

(factor 16, public place).2 

2 The examiner's original decision applied factors 7, 18,

and 19 to conclude that Doe had an increased risk of reoffense. 

As SORB's brief acknowledges, the examiner then issued an 

amended decision treating these three factors as bearing only on 

Doe's degree of dangerousness. This appears to reflect that 

factor 7's "position of trust" provision refers only to 

"increased level of dangerousness," factor 18 refers only to 
4

Discussion. Our review is narrow. We may set aside or 

modify SORB's decision only if we determine "that the decision 

is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction,

violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law,

or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender 

Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 

643, 649 (2019) (Doe No. 496501). Moreover, hearing examiners 

have been delegated extensive discretion "to consider which 

statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how much 

weight to ascribe to each factor." Doe, Sex Offender Registry 

Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109-

110 (2014). Our review is principally limited to whether the 

hearing examiner examined the relevant factors and provided an 

adequate explanation for his or her conclusions. See Doe No. 

496501, supra at 657 (hearing examiner is required to "make 

explicit his or her findings" regarding degree of dangerousness 

and risk of reoffense, and "make clear that each determination 

"danger to public safety," and factor 19 refers only to 

"increased degree of dangerousness." 803 Code Mass. Regs. 

§ 1.33(7)(a)(2), (17), (18). We note that in the background 

section of his decision, the hearing examiner did touch on 

factor 35 (psychological or psychiatric profiles regarding risk 

to reoffend), by referencing Doe's scores on the Static-99R and 

Stable-2007 models and attaching "some weight" to those scores,

but "only to the extent they may be seen as general indicators 

of risk of re-offense." The examiner did not, however, cite 

this factor in his overall assessment of Doe's risk of 

reoffense.
5

is supported by clear and convincing evidence"). See also Doe,

Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 136652 v. Sex Offender Registry 

Bd., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 651 (2012) ("SORB's decision must 

show that the classification is based on a sound exercise of 

informed discretion rather than the mechanical application of a 

checklist or some other reflex").

Our review leads us to conclude that while the hearing 

examiner adequately engaged in the required qualitative and 

objective review that balanced all the relevant risk-aggravating 

and risk-mitigating factors as to Doe's degree of dangerousness,

he failed to provide sufficient analysis as to Doe's risk of 

reoffense. As noted, the hearing examiner concluded that the 

four risk-mitigating factors Doe raised applied and that three 

of them should be given "full weight." In the face of this, the 

perfunctory analysis in which the hearing examiner engaged 

failed adequately to explain how he concluded, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that Doe presented a moderate risk of 

reoffense."3

3 To be clear, we do not accept Doe's contention that the 

hearing examiner erred in concluding that factor 16 (public 

place) applied. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 390261

v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 219, 225 (2020),

quoting 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(16)(a) ("public place"

includes "any place that is open to the scrutiny of others or 

where there is no expectation of privacy"). Here, Doe assaulted 

the victim in the presence of another patient in a nursing 

center, despite the likely detection by the patient occupying 
6

The judgment affirming SORB's decision is vacated, and the 

case is remanded for entry of a new judgment vacating the final 

classification and remanding the matter to SORB for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.4

So ordered.

By the Court (Milkey, Sacks & 

Smyth, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: August 12, 2024.

the room and nursing center staff. In addition, Doe did not 

raise this argument before the agency, and therefore waived it. 

See Smith v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 803,

810 (2006). Nor do we discern any error in the hearing 

examiner's concluding that Doe presented a moderate degree of 

dangerousness. That conclusion is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence and adequately explained.

4 In light of this disposition, we need not address Doe's 

argument that a remand is necessary under Doe No. 496501, 482 

Mass. at 655-657, for a particularized finding whether Internet 

dissemination is warranted, making Doe's sex offender registry 

data available to healthcare providers with whom Doe might seek 

employment. The hearing examiner will be able to consider that 

issue on remand. Nothing in this memorandum and order should be 

interpreted as stating any substantive position on how Doe 

should be classified.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.