TransformING

AN ARMY AT WAR

Designing the Modular Force 

1991–2005

by

William M. Donnelly

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2007
CMH Pub 70–108–1

First Printing

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Donnelly, William M., 1962–

 Transforming an Army at war : designing the modular force,

1991–2005 / by William M. Donnelly.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references.

1. United States. Army—Reorganization—History—20th century.

2. United States. Army—Reorganization—History—21st century. 

3. United States. Army—Organization. 4. Military planning—United 

States. I. Title. 

 UA25.D66 2007

 355.30973’09049—dc22

 

2007030193
iii

Foreword

By the summer of 2003, the intensive combat operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan were placing a great strain on the U.S. Army. General 

Peter J. Schoomaker, sworn-in as the chief of staff of the Army on 1 

August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of 

an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how 

the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered 

the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of 

converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This massive 

effort would represent the most far-reaching transformation of the Army’s 

operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the 

Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. 

This study, prepared at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking 

it, and the process of develop­ing modular unit designs. The Army had 

been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of 

the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating 

a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and 

headquarters—that could be assembled into, or “plugged into” (and 

unplugged from), larger formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force, in theory, would greatly 

enhance the ability of the Army to construct packages of units tailored 

for specific missions identified by regional combatant commands. For 

General Schoomaker, modularity also offered the opportunity to lessen 

the strain that prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was placing 

on the Army. Converting to a modular force could increase the number 

of brigade combat teams in the Army without increasing the overall size 

of the service, and more brigades would mean longer times between 

overseas deployments. Scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, the 3d 

Infantry Division would be the first formation to change to a modular 

configuration.
iv

With speed essential, the chief of staff directed that normal force 

development methods not be used. Instead, an ad hoc group, Task Force 

Modularity, would be created at the Training and Doctrine Command 

to develop the modular force designs. The work proved grueling. 

Nevertheless, by the time the task force disbanded in February 2005, 

almost all the major decisions for the modular force had been made and 

modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed 

to Iraq.

This preliminary account of that effort highlights a critical part of 

the Army’s plans to prepare for an increasingly turbulent world and 

illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources employed to 

carry out that initiative. However, the basic purpose of the following 

study is to provide, in layman’s terms, an understanding of the Army 

organizational transformation process; the hard choices that had to be 

made in balancing tactical and operational capabilities; and the relationship of those organizational changes to developments in the areas of 

military doctrine, training and education, and the acquisition of advanced 

weapons, communications, and transportation systems.

Washington, D.C. JEFFREY J. CLARKE

1 August 2007 Chief of Military History
v

The Author

William M. Donnelly received his Ph.D. in history from the Ohio 

State University. An Army veteran of the Persian Gulf War, he is a 

historian in the Histories Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History. 

He is the author of Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during 

the Korean War and We Can Do It: The 503d Field Artillery Battalion 

in the Korean War.
vi

Acknowledgments

Many individuals, not all of whom are mentioned in the narrative, 

played an invaluable role in producing this monograph. Members of 

Task Force Modularity; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC); and Headquarters, Department of the Army, provided the 

documents and consented to the interviews that form the primary sources 

for this study. J. Patrick Hughes, Center of Military History, traveled 

widely to conduct the majority of the interviews for the monograph. Col. 

Jeffrey R. Witsken, TRADOC Analysis Center; John Bonin, U.S. Army 

War College; and Edward N. Bedessem, Center of Military History, 

reviewed the initial draft and offered valuable comments. At the Center 

of Military History, William M. Hammond revised the initial draft, Diane 

Sedore Arms edited the final draft, and Gene Snyder designed the cover 

and book layout and gathered the photos. 
vii

Contents

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Concept of Modularity, 1991–2003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Decision to Create a Modular Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Task Force Modularity, 2003–2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Development of the Heavy Unit of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Development of the Infantry Unit of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Development of the Support Units of Action: An Overview. . . . . 50

Development of the Fires Unit of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Development of the Sustainment Unit of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Development of the Aviation Unit of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Development of the Maneuver Enhancement Unit of Action. . . . 56

Development of the Battlefield Surveillance Unit of Action. . . . . 59

Development of the Units of Employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Unit Designations in the Modular Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Appendix

Representative Divisional Brigade Combat Team

Organizations, 2003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Bibliographical Note. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Abbreviations and Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Charts

No.

1. Original Concept of Flattening Levels of Command. . . . . . . . 16

2. Organization of a Modular Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 

September 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Page
viii

3. Organization of a Modular Infantry Brigade Combat

Team, September 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

4. Organization of a Modular Fires Brigade,

September 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

5. Organization of a Modular Sustainment Brigade,

September 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

6. Organization of a Modular Aviation Brigade,

September 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

7. Organization of a Modular Maneuver Enhancement

Brigade, September 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

8. Organization of a Modular Reconnaissance,

Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Brigade,

September 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

9. Organization of a Unit of Employment at the Higher

Tactical Level, October 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

10. Original Task Force Modularity Design for a Unit of 

Employment at the Operational Level, April 2004. . . . . . . 70

11. Overview of the Organization of a Unit of

Employment at the Operational Level, September 2004. . . 72

Illustrations

General Gordon R. Sullivan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

General Dennis J. Reimer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

General Eric K. Shinseki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Soldiers of the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, 3d Brigade,

2d Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), in Iraq. . . 12

General Peter J. Schoomaker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Soldiers of the 3d Brigade Combat Team,

101st Airborne Division, During a Firefight in Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . 22

General Kevin P. Byrnes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Mixon Jr.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Soldiers of the 26th Support Battalion, Part of the 2d Unit of Action, 

3d Infantry Division, at the National Training Center. . . . . . . . . 37

Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division,

at the Joint Readiness Training Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

A Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

A Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

No. Page
TransformING

AN ARMY AT WAR

Designing the Modular Force, 1991–2005

3

Introduction

In September 2003, the U.S. Army began converting itself from an 

organization centered on divisions numbering from 10,000 to 18,000 

soldiers to one based upon brigades totaling at most 3,900. The means 

for doing this became known as modularity, which the Army defined as 

a design methodology aimed at creating standardized, expandable Army 

elements capable of being tailored to accomplish virtually any assignment. The new units would be as capable as their predecessors, but they 

would also be adaptable enough to assume whatever form was necessary 

to meet a broad range of missions. Over the fifteen months that followed, 

the service completed a design, tested it, and then deployed the first of 

the new modular units into combat in Iraq. The changes in organization 

involved were as extensive as any that accom­panied the mobiliza­tion for 

World War II, when the Army replaced the ponderous, four-regiment, 

28,000-man division of World War I with a more mobile triangular 

division composed of three regiments totaling 17,000 men. They were 

also as radical as the ones that followed the Pentomic reorganization of 

the late 1950s, when the service replaced the triangular division with a 

new 13,500-man design composed of five self-contained battle groups 

that could disperse and converge quickly on a nuclear battlefield. 

The reorganization resembled its two predecessors in many ways, 

but it was also very different. As with them, it came in response to a new 

strategic threat. It also relied heavily on recent technological advances 

and had the benefit of decisive leadership from a deeply concerned chief 

of staff. Unlike them, however, the reorganization altered every echelon 

of the force from battalion to army. Occurring in time of war rather than 

peace and confronting huge budgetary and manpower limitations, the 

reorganization also placed greater emphasis than before on the interdependence of Army units with those from the other services. Drawing 

on a bank of expertise and experience that far surpassed what had been 
4

avail­able in the earlier periods, it likewise used emerging technology to 

a greater extent than in the past. As a result, it depended heavily not only 

on traditional means such as firepower and mobility to achieve its ends, 

but also upon the acquisition, analysis, and transmission of computerized 

information.

This study will examine how the reorganization occurred: the 

origins of the modular idea, the reasons for undertaking the changes 

it envisioned, and the process of develop­ing unit designs for the new 

Army in prospect. 
5

The Concept of Modularity, 1991–2003

When General Gordon R. Sullivan became the chief of staff of 

the Army in June 1991, the service was beginning to change from a 

forward-deployed force oriented toward deterring the Soviet Union to 

a smaller, more flexible body based primarily in the United States. This 

more compact force would have to be pre­pared to conduct missions of 

all sizes, not just large-scale, high-intensity combat, and would have to 

develop what service members called an expedi­tionary mind-set, to be 

capable of quick deployment overseas when necessary. Concerned after a 

year in office that existing methods for changing the Army were too slow 

to meet those demands, General Sullivan organized a set of experiments 

and exer­cises known as the Louisiana Maneuvers to investigate how to 

hasten developments. Much of the work that followed covered two main 

areas: how best to design units that had fighting power equal to or greater 

than that of current units but could deploy more quickly and how to use 

new and future digital tech­nology to improve command and control. To 

save time and money, many of the experiments and exercises relied on 

computer simulations.1

Sullivan set the Army to work on his concept for change in March 

1994. Named Force XXI, the campaign initially developed along two 

lines. The first, involving the redesign of the service’s operational 

1

 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525–5, Force 

XXI Operations (Fort Monroe, Va.: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, 1 August 1994), hereafter cited as TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5; James L. 

Yarrison, The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, 1999); Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Annual Command History, 1 

January to 31 December 1994, ch. 5, Historians files, U.S. Army Center of Military 

History (CMH), Washington, D.C.
6

forces, became the respon­sibility 

of the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command. The second, 

an effort to develop and field digital 

information technologies, came 

under a newly estab­lished Army 

Digitization Office. Sullivan soon 

realized that the breadth of the reorganization he envisioned would 

require the participation not only 

of combat units, but also of those 

parts of the Army that generated 

and supported them. He instructed 

the vice chief of staff of the Army 

to oversee that work.2

Much of the experimentation 

and testing for Force XXI used 

computer modeling. One of the 

best known of those exercises involved a series of computer simulations 

conducted by the Louisi­ana Maneuvers in 1994 and 1995. They involved 

a hypo­thetical armored division called the Mobile Strike Force that used 

technologies expected to be available in 2010, particularly sensors and 

digital command and control systems. It featured well-armed and wellsupplied brigade formations that included both artillery and a versa­tile 

aviation component capable of air attack and air landing operations. 

General Sullivan knew, however, that war games had their limits. To 

compen­sate, he assigned the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, 

as an experi­mental force. In addition to their regular responsibilities, the 

division’s troops would test how prospective technologies, doctrines, and 

unit designs worked in the hands of real soldiers. The unit was reflagged 

the 4th Infantry Division shortly thereafter, but it continued to fill this 

role over the years that followed.3

The Training and Doctrine Command published a pamphlet in 

1994 on Force XXI that set out the characteristics operational forces 

2

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5.

3

 Technical Memorandum TRAC–TM–0194, Mobile Strike Force 2010 (Fort 

Leavenworth, Kans.: TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC), September 1994); Stephen L. 

Y. Gammons and William M. Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary 

Fiscal Year 1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 

pp. 37–38; TRADOC Annual Command History, 1994, ch. 5; Yarrison, The Modern 

Louisiana Maneuvers, pp. 57–58, 67–69.

General Sullivan
7

would need if they were to succeed in the early twenty-first century. 

In that world, the publication noted, soldiers would face a “varied and 

multifaceted” strategic setting and would need to be flexible in their 

application of the U.S. Army’s principles for fighting war. Based mainly 

in the United States, the smaller post–Cold War Army would need a 

high degree of strategic mobility to put itself in “the right place at the 

right time with the right capabilities.” This would require lighter combat 

forces, but the service could not afford to achieve that end at the cost 

of dimi­nished combat power, so the new units would have to possess at 

least as much combat power as current heavy forces. (Existing light units, 

whose design emphasized mobility, used relatively austere amounts of 

equipment and did not have tracked armored fighting vehicles. Existing 

heavy units, designed for sustained high-intensity combat, were based 

around large numbers of tracked armored fighting vehicles and thus 

emphasized combat power over mobility.)4

Given the political and military situation in the post–Cold War 

world, moreover, the Army could probably never again expect to conduct 

major operations on its own. Versa­tile enough to deploy for almost any 

mission, from humanitarian assistance to a major conventional war, its 

forces would have to be able to work effectively with the other American 

military services. Army command elements might also have to serve as 

combined headquarters with the militaries of other nations or coordinate 

with nongovernmental agencies.5

The pamphlet continued that modularity, defined as adaptable 

standardi­zation, would be an important characteristic of the future Army 

because the service would probably lack the scale of organization necessary to meet all possible require­ments for ground troops in the post–Cold 

War world. Since, for example, the United States having enough air and 

maritime transport­ation available to move ground forces rapidly would be 

unlikely, commanders might well find that the Army could provide only 

those that were absolutely necessary to meet the demands of a specific 

operation. The pamphlet cautioned that implementing modularity in 

the Force XXI Army would require fielding the sort of computerized 

information tech­nologies that would allow fewer personnel to do as 

much or more than the larger staffs currently in place. The publication 

suggested that the division would remain the Army’s main tactical 

formation but asserted that when necessary modularity would allow a 

4

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5.

5

 Ibid.
8

rapid, task-related configuration of a division and its support elements 

to do a specific job.6

The Training and Doctrine Command provided further guidance in 

a January 1995 pamphlet. The publication specified that modularity was, 

for the time being, a concept that focused on echelons above division 

and on combat support units (such as engineers and signal elements that 

provided operational assistance to forces in a battle zone) and on combat 

service support units (such as ordnance and transportation that sustained 

fighting forces in theater at all levels of war). 

Within that context, it discussed two approaches. Under the first, 

organizations would be composed of “functionally emulative increments,” 

ele­ments that each contained the complete functions of the organization. 

These would be interchangeable and expandable so that commanders 

could tailor them to meet changing conditions. This approach would 

apply mainly to service support organizations at echelons above division 

and to those components that were expected to contribute elements early 

in an operation before the entire force deployed.7

The second approach, labeled “modular designed units,” would craft 

organizations from discrete elements with different capabilities that in 

combi­nation would produce a functional military unit. Applicable to 

combat, service, and service support units, the concept would allow 

subelements detached from a parent unit to be assigned to a contingency 

force for an indefinite period. This would make the Army more responsive than in the past by allowing it to tailor ground forces to fit specific 

requirements.8

There were several implications in adopting a modular force. In 

recon­figuring units, for example, the Army would have to make certain 

that the new designs provided adequate materiel both for deploying elements and for those remaining behind or going into action later. Training 

programs for individuals and for units would have to be modified to 

reflect the modularity concept, particularly where guidance on when to 

employ the new elements or to add increments to them was concerned. 

Soldiers in the units and their families would also have to be prepared for 

6

 Ibid.

7

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525–68, Concept for Modularity (Fort Monroe, Va.: 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 10 January 1995), par. 

2-1 thru 3-5. The definitions are from Joint Doctrine Division, J–7, Joint Staff. Joint 

Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 August 2006, 

Historians files, CMH. 8

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525–68, par. 3-6.
9

the possibility of more deployments and rotations than might otherwise 

have been normal.9

The January 1995 pamphlet highlighted three sets of circumstances 

that seemed parti­cularly important. The first was that the success of 

the idea itself would depend on the presence of effective information 

systems linked to reli­able telecommunications. This would ensure that all 

the units involved in an operation were reliably connected. The second 

was that the new approach would require major changes in how the 

Army trained its people. The troops and their officers would sometimes 

assume greater responsibilities than those normally associated with their 

ranks or positions, particularly in joint operations with units from the 

other American military services or in combined operations with forces 

from allied nations. The third was that a modular force might need 

more leaders of all ranks than a conventionally configured force. Their 

technical expertise and experience would come in handy in the highly 

automated units, and their pre­sence would sometimes be necessary to 

provide command and control for the many inde­pen­dent elements that 

some missions would entail.10

General Dennis J. Reimer succeeded Sullivan as chief of staff on 20 

June 1995. He continued Force XXI but added an additional program 

titled Army After Next in February 1996. The new effort had the task 

of defining the probable nature of warfare thirty years in the future and 

of identifying future issues that might be of critical importance to the 

Army.11

In four war games, the Army After Next experimented with various 

“battle force” organizations in which new digital information technologies, changes in officer training and education, and new personnel policies 

eliminated one or more of the Army’s command echelons. Among the 

elements considered were what became known as echelons of maneuver: 

fixed combined arms components constructed of artillery, tank, infantry, 

reconnaissance, and, at times, helicopter units that could be augmented 

with additional forces if a particular mission required. Personnel in these 

formations would serve together far longer than in existing units in order 

to create the cohesion and teamwork vital to mastering new equipment 

and new unit designs. A second set of elements, known as echelons 

of concentration, would consist of headquarters whose subordinate 

organizations varied depending on mission. These formations would 

9

 Ibid., pars. 4-1, 4-2, 4-4, 4-5, and 4-6.

10 Ibid., pars. 4-3 and 4-4.

11 Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Knowledge & Speed: The Annual Report on 

the Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army, July 1997, p. B-1.
10

also depend on personnel serving 

together for lengthy periods to 

build cohesion and teamwork.12

In the end, the program’s analysts concluded that “the winds of 

change are blowing in the direction 

of a more dangerous battlefield 

that will raise the performance 

bar. Meeting such a challenge will 

deeply touch soldiers and their 

organizations.”13 They sought to 

prepare the Army by high­lighting 

the need for it to “support rapid 

tailoring to respond to unpredictable crises” and to have “a broad 

mix of capabilities.” This would 

call for a middleweight force that 

could “arrive at a crisis early, with 

sufficient combat power to deliver 

a critical blow to an adversary’s operation.”14 To meet this requirement, 

the Training and Doctrine Command developed the concept of a brigadesize “strike force” composed of modular elements that could be tailored 

to the demands of each mission by adding units with the necessary skills. 

The force would employ advanced digital information technologies that 

provid­ed “the information we need, when we need it and in the format 

we need.”15

Reimer’s successor in 1999 as chief of staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, 

stressed the need for the Army to quicken the pace of its transformation 

into a post–Cold War force. “Our heavy forces are too heavy and our light 

forces lack staying power,” he observed on 23 June. “Heavy forces must 

be more strate­gically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical 

12 Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army (Ret.), and Maj. Jacob Biever, 

U.S. Army, “Optimizing Future Battle Command Technologies,” Military Review 78 

(March/April 1998): 15–21. 13 Ibid.

14 Margaret A. Fratzel et al., Army After Next Spring Wargame 1998: Integrated 

Analysis Report (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: TRADOC Analysis Center, 1999), p. 55. 15 Lt Col Mark G. Cianciolo, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army Strike Force—A 

Relevant Concept? (Student paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1999), pp. 4–14. Quote 

from Wass de Czege and Biever, “Optimizing Future Battle Command Technologies,” 

p. 21.

General Reimer
11

footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, and tactically 

mobile.”16 To improve the Army’s strategic responsiveness, Shinseki 

established a transformation process that would begin with current units, 

designated as the Legacy Force, and move through an Interim Force to 

what planners termed an Objective Force, the Army of the future. Upon 

completion of the process, the service would be able to field a combatready brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, 

and five divisions in 30 days. The key component of the Interim Force 

would be medium brigade combat teams that could deploy more quickly 

than existing heavy brigades but be more lethal and have greater tactical 

mobility than existing light brigades. Converted from several existing 

heavy and light brigades over a relatively short period of time and named 

Stryker Brigade Combat Teams after the wheeled armored vehicles they 

used, these units would be equipped with advanced digital command and 

16 Gen Eric K. Shinseki, “Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army,” 23 June 1999, 

Historians files, CMH.

General Shinseki speaks with troops of the 101st

Airborne Division in Iraq in 2003.
12

communications systems developed by Force XXI programs. In addition 

to giving the Army a capability that war games had identified as crucial 

in the post–Cold War world, the new brigades would serve as prototype 

organizations to test concepts for the final Objective Force.17

When the Training and Doctrine Command began to build Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams in December 1999, it also started working 

on the design of the Objective Force. To stress that this concept 

would not be a mere refinement of the existing Army’s structure, its 

developers created a “Units of Purpose Framework” to provide what 

they called “a means for investigation and discussion outside current 

parameters.” There were two basic groups in this framework: units 

of action (UAs) and units of employment (UEs). Fixed organizations 

designed to accomplish distinct, prescribed, mission-essential tasks, 

units of action would replace the Army’s existing brigades.18 Units of 

employ­ment would supplant Army elements above the brigade at the 

17 Mark J. Reardon and Jeffery A. Charlston, From Transformation to Combat: 

The First Stryker Brigade at War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2007), pp. 3–8. 18 TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3–91, Draft version 2.1, Objective Force Tactical 

Operational and Organizational Concept for Maneuver Units of Action (Fort Monroe, Va.: 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 6 November 2001), p. 4. 

Soldiers of the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry 

Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), in Samarra, Iraq
13

division, corps, and army levels. Lacking any fixed organization beyond 

a base of components that would allow them to serve as cores for highly 

versatile head­quar­ters, they would take any form that was necessary to 

complete a mission. They would do this by taking command of other 

units of employment and various units of action that were drawn from 

pools of forces and designed to meet the requirements of whatever 

assignment they received.19

A further step forward occurred in the fall of 2002, when the U.S. 

Army War College received an assignment directly from Secretary of the 

Army Thomas E. White to answer the question: “Given the improvements 

in communications and situational awareness, can the Army reduce/flatten the layers of command through army without loss of effectiveness?” 

The study’s leader, the director of Army planning at the War College, 

Col. James H. Embrey, rephrased the question and passed it to a select 

group of the college’s students. The group submitted its findings on 

29 January 2003. Besides recommending that the Army combine its 

division, corps, and army levels above brigade into two echelons, it 

suggested the stream­lining of theater command. In place of the operating 

systems at that level—movement and maneuver, fire support, operational 

protection, intelli­gence, and logistics—there would be just three major 

components: sustain­ment, protection, and information superiority. This 

proposed structure would become the basis of the theater-level designs 

the modularity builders would later use.20

By the end of General Shinseki’s term as chief of staff in June 

2003, modularity had become a key characteristic spanning all of the 

elements in the design for the future Army. Units of action would be the 

building blocks of that force. Fixed organizations with discrete sets of 

capabilities that nonetheless em­ployed as many standardized systems 

as possible, they would be able to plug into any organization because 

of the common parts they shared. This would increase the strategic 

responsiveness of the Army many-fold by giving the service a pool of 

readily adaptable forces from which it could draw to provide higher 

com­mands with components tailor-made for whatever job they needed 

to do. If changing circum­stances so required, commanders would find 

19 Ibid.

20 Quote from Final Briefing, Col Jim Embrey, USAWC [U.S. Army War College], 

to Secretary of the Army, Headquarters Redesign, 29 Jan 03. PowerPoint Slide, Objective 

Force ASCC [Army Service Component Command], 4 Sep 03. For the traditional organization of theater command, see Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100–7,

Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, 31 May 1995, pp. 5-1 to 5-22. 
14

making quick adjustments to the mix or size of the forces pursuing a 

mission easy.21

Following that approach, by the time that General Peter J. 

Schoomaker succeeded General Shinseki as chief of staff on 1 August 

2003, the unit of action had developed into two basic types: maneuver and 

support. The maneuver units would be the tactical arm of the new Army. 

Composed of three battalions that contained built-in infantry, artillery, 

tank, reconnaissance, aviation, and logistical ele­ments, the force would 

have a headquarters that could draw from a troop pool to incorporate any 

addi­tional combat or support units it needed. The units would use digital 

command, communications, and intelligence systems both to control their 

subordinate commands and to keep informed of what was happening 

around them. Those improvements would greatly increase their combat 

power in compari­son with that of previous Army brigades. Of course, 

these qualities, and the units’ ability to deploy anywhere in the world in 

ninety-six hours, depended heavily on the development and acquisition 

of new vehicles, weapons, and digital systems.22

The support units of action were much less developed. By June 2003, 

Training and Doctrine Command had identified all the functions such as 

intelligence and force protection that these units should provide, but it had 

yet to prepare detailed plans on how to approach them. Issues involving 

elements that combined the capabilities of more than one branch of the 

Army were of particular concern. Although the existing Army contained 

multifunctional units such as divisional support battalions, the high 

technology force of the future would need many more of them. The 

change from one system to the other would require major revisions in 

doctrine, unit training, and leader development programs.23 

The Training and Doctrine Command released the final coordinating 

draft of its concept for the unit of employment in May 2003. The plan 

21 Final Coordinating Draft, TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3–92, Objective Force: Unit 

of Employment Concept (Fort Monroe, Va.: Joint/Army Concepts Directorate, Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Concepts, and Strategy, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, 20 May 2003), p. 4; Intervs, J. Patrick Hughes and Jeffery A. 

Charlston, CMH, with Michael Burke, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 7 Jun 06, and Clinton Ancker, Combined 

Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 7 Jun 06, CMH; 

TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3–91, Draft version 2.1, pp. 41–43. 22 Change 2 to TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3–90 O&O [Operational and Organizational], 

The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Plan Maneuver 

Unit of Action (FINAL), (Fort Knox, Ky.: Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab, 30 June 

2003), pp. 1-6 to 1-7, 3-1 to 3-2. 23 Final Coordinating Draft, TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3–92, pp. 6, 51–53.
15

outlined a new design for levels above the unit of action in the restructured 

Army. Instead of having divisions, corps, and armies above the brigade 

as had been the case in the past, there would be only two levels—a unit 

of employment at the operational level and a unit of employment at the 

higher tactical level. Combining many of the functions of the army and 

the corps, the unit of employment at the operational level would be the 

primary integrator of U.S. and multinational land-based forces during a 

campaign. Able to plan its operations four to five days in advance and 

to control an area of operations of up to 500 square kilometers, it would 

allocate support units as needed and direct the battles its forces fought 

until it achieved its goals (Chart 1).24

The unit of employment at the higher tactical level would combine 

some of the functions of both a corps and a division. Command­ing flexible sets of subordinate units of action, this headquarters would rotate its 

forces through cycles of engagement and resupply in order to maintain 

continuous pres­sure on an enemy. It could project its operations two to 

three days in advance and would have an operating radius of up to 150 

kilometers.25

The Army later coined the term unit of employment Y (UEy) to 

label the unit of employment at the opera­tional level, and the term unit 

of employment X (UEx) to label the unit of employment at the higher 

tactical level. Neither was of any particular size. The span of control in 

each would vary according to the mission it received and the number 

of units assigned to accomplish the task. In effect, a small but versatile 

headquarters commanding a standard base of communications, sustainment, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces could draw 

on whatever additional assets it needed to achieve its ends. With the 

number and type of units of action it commanded varying from conflict 

to conflict, the headquarters had the ability to perform not only Army 

functions, but also those of joint task forces and joint forces land component commands. Should the need arise, it would also be able to interact 

effectively with nonmilitary U.S. government agencies, multinational 

forces, and nongovernmental organizations.26

The May 2003 draft pamphlet cautioned that the execution of the 

unit-of-employment concept was dependent on “the development and 

incorporation of a large variety of advanced capabilities.” The most 

important were in command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais­sance. These improvements, the 

24 Ibid., pp. 6, 24–25. 25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., pp. 6, 40–41.
Joint Forces

Command

Army Service

Component

Command

Joint Forces

Land Component

Command

Joint–Campaign Level-Integrates the military instrument with other instruments of national power-Integrates all elements of the joint forceOperational–Major Land Operations- Plans and executes major land operations- Orchestrates joint, interagency, and multinational operations- Executes administrative control and Army support to other servicesHigher Tactical–Battles- Puts together complementary and reinforcing capabilities with engagements to achieve military conditions within a specified area of operationsTactical–Engagements- Plans and conducts close combat- Generates specific effects or outcomes within the area of operations

Corps

Div

Bde

Chart 1—ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF FLATTENING LEVELS OF COMMAND

Levels Explained Current Transformed

Unit of employment at

the operational level

Unit of employment at

higher tactical level

Theater-wide support to Joint 

Forces Land Component 

Command for major combat 

operations

War fighting

All types of maneuver and 

nonmaneuver units of action

Maneuver

Recon, Surveillance, and

Target Acquisition

Fires

Aviation

Sustainment

Maneuver Enhancement Source: Based on CSA Decision Brief as of 181730 Mar 04, Historians files, CMH.
17

pamphlet predicted, would form “the backbone of the Objective Force” 

and introduce “potentially the most revolutionary advances in force 

effectiveness.” In addition, the Objective Force would require fielding 

what had become known as Future Combat Systems (FCS). Networking 

existing equipment with state-of-the-art weapons and sensors, some in 

design but others still only concepts, this would add immeasurably to 

the Army’s ability to achieve the rapid tactical decisions the program’s 

planners sought.27

By the early summer of 2003, the Army had developed the concept 

for what it envisioned as the ultimate form of its post–Cold War operational forces. Even so, modularity and the Objective Force were still 

only concepts. By then, however, the Army was at war in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Facing circumstances for which the service was ill prepared, 

a new chief of staff would turn to modularity for part of the solution for 

the immediate and pressing problems he faced. 

27 Ibid., pp. 44–45.

19

Decision to Create a Modular Army

Within a month of taking office, General Schoomaker instructed the 

Army to begin work on converting to a modular, brigade-based force. His 

directive was part of a larger effort he was making to adapt the service 

to the conditions it faced in the summer of 2003. The Army had gone 

to war in Afgha­nistan and Iraq, but those conflicts were hardly the only 

challenges it had to face. It was also continuing a long-time commitment 

in Korea, conducting stability operations in the Balkans and the Sinai, 

and participating in counterterrorism operations in various countries 

around the world. He stressed during his confirmation hearing that the 

United States and its Army were in “a long fight” for the “very survival 

of our way of life.” In a world where the strategic environment had been 

transformed since the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, he said, the 

Army would have to adjust its priorities and be prepared to reexamine 

even its fundamental way of thinking.28

Unspoken at the time but clear was Schoomaker’s estimation that 

much of the Army was still mired in a mentality created by decades 

of preparing to fight the Soviet Army. Under the circumstances, he 

reasoned, the need to transform the service to make it react more quickly 

to the demands of regional unified commands such as the U.S. Central 

Command was particularly important. Changing would have to be a 

long-term effort rather than an objective in itself because an Army at 

war could not wait to perfect all the systems required for the future 

force before fielding them. As systems designed for that force became 

available, it had to move them into its current formations to improve 

their capabilities.29

28 Opening Statement (As Prepared) of General Peter J. Schoomaker Before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, 29 Jul 03, Historians files, CMH. 29 Transcript of Testimony of General Peter J. Schoomaker Before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, 29 Jul 03, Historians files, CMH.
20

During July and August, Schoomaker formed an estimate of what 

he needed to do during his tenure as chief of staff. After consulting with 

senior Army leaders, he had his transition team, the Training and Doctrine 

Command, and the Army Staff develop a set of focus areas highlighting 

aspects of the Army that needed immediate attention for change to begin. 

The list that resulted covered an expanse of topics: the Army’s public 

relations, adapting leader development for the “long fight,” revising the 

way units were manned and deployed, and reversing the post–Vietnam 

War policy of placing most support units in the reserve components. 

Modularity, the effort to build a standardized, brigade-based force, was 

the most prominent among the topics requiring prompt scrutiny. The 

Army Staff and the Training and Doctrine Command then developed a 

set of essential tasks for each focus area. None of those efforts were to 

be seen as stand-alone activities. Rather, each was to be viewed as part of 

an integrated whole, the campaign to transform the Army. Schoomaker 

assigned responsibility for each focus area to an Army major command, with the majority of the areas going to the Training and Doctrine 

Command. The command, in turn, formed a task force for each of its 

focus areas with the mission to achieve the objective the chief had set 

for that area.30

30 Interv, Jeffery A. Charlston, CMH, with Col Robin P. Swan, Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 12 Dec 05, 

Historians files, CMH; Information Paper, Col Robin P. Swan, DAMO-ZT, 14 Oct 03, 

General Schoomaker
21

General Schoomaker decided to convert the Army to a modular, 

brigade-based force for several reasons. At that point, 73 percent of 

the Regular Army’s brigade combat teams and 33 percent of the Army 

National Guard’s were deployed overseas in the Balkans, the Sinai, 

Afghanistan, and Iraq.31 Since the Army relied mainly on unit rotations 

rather than individual replacements to fill personnel requirements and 

since many rotations involved only a brigade combat team, the brigade 

rather than the division had become the main tactical echelon in planning for deployments. Senior commanders in Iraq, moreover, had begun 

responding to the various tactical problems they encountered by tailoring 

units into temporary and permanent groupings. This meant that even 

when a divi­sion deployed to Iraq, it might soon relinquish operational 

control of some of its brigade combat teams while assuming control of 

other nondivisional elements. The process of force tailoring also affected 

smaller units, which were sometimes rendered incapable of performing 

their full missions for lack of manpower or expertise. Schoomaker 

concluded that a modular, brigade-based force was the answer to the 

problems that resulted. This new force organization would not only 

provide better support for current operations, it would also help the Army 

react more quickly to the needs of regional commanders when future 

contingencies arose.32

Another reason to convert to a brigade-based Army was that it 

offered the opportunity to expand the number of brigade combat 

teams. Given the tempo of operations around the world, the existing 

division-based force of thirty-three Regular Army and thirty-six 

Army National Guard maneuver brigades was too small to allow 

a sufficient interval between deployments. One of the modularity 

effort’s objectives thus became to produce new unit designs that 

would allow the fielding of between seventy-seven and eighty-two 

sub: Information Paper–Background on CSA [Chief of Staff, Army] Immediate Focus 

Areas, Historians files, CMH. 31 Spec Bill Putnam, Army News Service, “Keane Announces Overseas Unit 

Rotation Schedule,” 23 Jul 03, Historians files, CMH; Kim Burger, “US Army To Refocus 

Modernization,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 38 (1 October 2003). 32 John J. McGrath, The Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment 

in the US Army (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp. 

110–11; Information Paper, Col Rickey Smith, Task Force Modularity, 11 Oct 03, 

sub: Modularity, Historians files, CMH; Thom Shanker, “Army Is Designing Ways 

To Reorganize Its Forces,” New York Times, 6 Aug 03; Putnam, “Keane Announces 

Overseas Unit Rotation Schedule.”
22

brigade combat teams with a temporary increase of only 30,000 in 

the Regular Army’s strength.33

Recent experience in Iraq provided another justification for 

Schoomaker’s interest in a modular force. According to Lt. Gen. William 

S. Wallace, the commander of V Corps during the 2003 invasion, U.S. 

Army units equipped with digital information technologies had “provided 

a substantial glimpse into the advan­tage of waging network enhanced 

warfare.” Although V Corps had experi­enced problems with these 

technologies, especially in getting information to and from echelons 

below division, the Army’s command had gained a clear view of the 

digital information future.34

33 Task Force Modularity Mission Analysis Backbrief, 30 Sep 03, copy in Historians 

files, CMH; Defense Department Special Briefing on U.S. Army Transformation by 

General Peter Schoo­maker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 26 Jul 04, Historians files, 

CMH.34 Statement by Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, Commanding General, 

Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Before the 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Armed Services 

Committee, United States House of Representatives, on C4I Interoperability: New 

Challenges in 21st Century Warfare, 21 Oct 03. 

Soldiers of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division,

next to a Humvee during a firefight in Iraq
23

Since the creation of the Force XXI program, however, the Army had 

fielded a variety of digital information systems. As a result, there was 

no stan­dardization across the force in that area. To remedy the problem, 

Schoomaker directed the Training and Doctrine Command’s Combined 

Arms Center and the Army’s operations staff, or G–3, to determine which 

parts of the existing Army Battle Command System could be used to 

provide a reasonably effective com­mand and control package to all of 

the Army’s units. The result of that effort be­came known as the Good 

Enough Battle Command system. Developers of modular unit designs 

would rely heavily on it in their work.35

Although General Schoomaker expected the Global War on Terror to 

be long, he nonetheless felt that little time remained to make the shift to 

the new force. For the moment, he reasoned, the war was not a factor in 

the Army’s annual budget. Instead, the administration of President George 

W. Bush had covered its cost through supplemental appropriations from 

Congress. Growing pressures on the federal budget, however, especially 

from Social Security and the nation’s health care requirements, and an 

increasing reluctance in Congress to fund the conflict with supplementary 

appropriations, suggested that change was in the offing. When it occurred, 

the Army might face budget cuts or have to pay the cost of the war out 

of current operating expenses. In either case, the service would find it 

difficult to pay for the war while converting to a modular organization 

and continuing to sup­port the development and fielding of the future 

force.36

Schoomaker’s relationship with Secretary of Defense Donald H. 

Rumsfeld also figured into his determination to move ahead. Rumsfeld, 

who had taken office in early 2001, was determined to transform a 

military that he believed was still mired in Cold War concepts and 

practices. Although he declined to shut down General Shinseki’s Army 

Transformation project, he was dissatisfied with the rate of change that 

the general’s programs had achieved. Rumsfeld thought the proper 

organization of a post–Cold War force should rest on digital technology. 

35 Patrick Chisholm, “‘Good Enough’ Battle Command,” Military Information 

Technology 8 (17 August 2003) online edition, Historians files, CMH; Lt Col Nello 

Thomas, “Task Force Network Formed,” Army Communicator 28 (Winter 2003): 18–21; 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Transformation Roadmap 

2003, 1 Nov 03, pp. 8-6 to 8-8.

36 Memorandum for Record (MFR), Col John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 

4 Feb 04, sub: After Action Review of Task Force Modularity Decision Brief to CSA, 

Historians files, CMH; U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, Robert M. 

McCaleb, Long Term Budgetary Implications of Today’s Army Decisions, 18 Mar 05, 

pp. 5–10.
24

He felt that this would greatly increase the effective­ness of long-range 

precision-guided munitions by perfecting the command and intelligence 

systems necessary to use them. In pursuit of those ends, he established 

an Office of Force Transformation in 2001 to push the services into 

examining new ideas. When Shinseki’s term in office ended in 2003, 

the secre­tary also passed over all of the service’s active senior officers 

to pull Schoomaker out of retirement to take the job. At the general’s 

swearing-in, Rumsfeld said that the new chief of staff was “the right man 

to lead the United States Army as it continues its transformation into a 

force that will provide 21st century capability to the challenges we will 

face.” With such an endorsement, Schoomaker believed that he could 

expect nothing less than strong support for the modularity program from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense.37 

Schoomaker had one final advantage. He knew that the Army could 

draw on a large bank of research and experience it had built up over the 

fourteen years since 1991, when General Sullivan had begun the process 

of changing the service into a post–Cold War force. Besides producing 

an extensive body of work on modu­larity, the studies and experiments 

that resulted had given Army planners considerable experience in how to 

analyze and alter force structures. The knowledge could serve to shorten 

timetables and smooth the way to change.38

The chief of staff, however, was concerned about the institutions—the 

Training and Doctrine Command and the Army Staff—that would run 

the effort. During July, while awaiting confirmation, he met with Maj. 

Gen. William G. Webster Jr., who would shortly take command of the 

3d Infantry Division (Mechanized). Aware that the general had just 

served as deputy commander of the Com­­bined Forces Land Component 

Command in Iraq and was thus well versed in how a regional command 

worked, Schoomaker gave him a special job. After setting out his reasons 

for converting the Army to a modular force, he told the general to begin 

think­ing about how that force should be organized. Once Webster took 

37 Department of Defense News Release 599–01, 26 Nov 01, Cebrowski Appointed 

as Director of Force Transformation, Historians files, CMH; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance, Apr 03; Peter J. Boyer, “A Different 

War,” New Yorker 78 (1 July 2002): 54–67; John Hendren, “Army Holds Its Ground in 

Battle With Rumsfeld,” Los Angeles Times, 19 Nov 02; Erin Q. Winograd, “Rumsfeld 

Wants Independent Panel to Review Army Transformation,” Inside the Army, 17 Mar 

03. Quote from Department of Defense News Release 566–03, 1 Aug 03, Schoomaker 

Sworn in as Army Chief, Historians files, CMH. 38 Col Jeffrey R. Witsken et al., Task Force Modularity: The Role of Analysis in the 

Creation of the Modular Force (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: TRADOC Analysis Center, 

July 2005), pp. 2–3.
25

command of the 3d Division, he was to prepare the unit for its second 

deployment to Iraq by deve­lop­ing a plan to convert its three bri­gades 

into five heavy units of action, using only the men and materiel it already 

possessed. Web­ster and his planners were to refrain from consulting with 

the Army Staff and the Training and Doctrine Command until they had 

a full course of action in hand. Normal force develop­ment processes 

would be too slow, Schoomaker said, because the Train­­ing and Doctrine 

Com­mand was too steeped in outmoded, Cold War ways of thinking, and 

the Army Staff was already too busy running a service at war.39

Schoomaker nonetheless broadened the effort to transform the Army in 

a 2 September 2003 memo­ran­dum that directed the Training and Doctrine 

Command to organize not only the 3d Infantry Division but also the 101st 

Airborne Division (Air Assault) into prototype modular organizations. In so 

doing, the command was to avoid augmenting the two units in any way by 

making the best use it could of their existing men and materiel and nothing 

more. To assist, it was to create a coor­dination cell in each organization. 

That group would con­sult with the regional com­mands to ensure that the 

final designs for the two forces met their require­ments.40

The design and decision process for modularity was to be quick. The 

deadline for delivery of the new heavy and infantry brigade combat team 

organiza­tions was set for January 2004; those for support brigades and 

echelons above the brigade came later in the year. The reorganization of 

the 3d Infantry and the 101st Airborne Divi­sions was also to occur during 

2004 so that those units would be fully redesigned when they deployed 

to Iraq in 2005. To expedite the process, the chief of staff stated that 

nothing had to be perfect. In fact, he expected the initial versions to have 

weak points. They could be fixed later as the Army conducted additional 

analysis and gained operational experience with the designs. That said, 

Schoo­maker nonetheless set three goals that the initial modular brigade 

combat teams had to meet. First, they had to be as capable as current 

units. Second, they had to be easier to deploy than existing units. Finally, 

they had to be configured in a way that permitted the Army to duplicate 

them without having to seek an increase in manpower.41

39 Interv, J. Patrick Hughes, CMH, with Maj Gen William G. Webster Jr., former 

commanding general, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 12 Sep 06, Historians files, 

CMH.40 Information Paper, Smith, 11 Oct 03, sub: Modularity. Hereafter, the 101st 

Airborne Division (Air Assault) will be referred to by its more familiar designation as 

the 101st Airborne Division. 41 Witsken et al., The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force, p. 1; 

Col Rickey Smith, Task Force Modularity, Task Force Modularity Talking Points for 

CSA Backbrief, 24 Sep 03, Historians files, CMH.

27

Task Force Modularity, 2003–2005

In early September 2003, responding to the chief of staff’s directive, the head of the Training and Doctrine Command, General Kevin 

P. Byrnes, organized Task Force Modularity at Fort Monroe, Virginia. 

Byrnes selected his deputy chief of staff for developments, Maj. Gen. 

Robert W. Mixon Jr., to lead the effort.

At its peak strength, Task Force Modularity employed about fifty 

people, with another thirty-five providing analytical support. The 

core of the project’s personnel came from the Training and Doctrine 

Command’s subordinate organi­zations and from a Unit of Employment 

Integrated Concept Team that the com­mand had established in January 

2003 to work on Objective Force echelons above the brigade. Because 

the conversion to a modular, brigade-based Army would be a sweeping 

change for the service, the task force requested and received personnel 

from the Headquarters, Department of the Army; the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Acquisition, Logis­tics, and Technology; the National 

Guard Bureau; the Office, Chief of Army Reserve; the Judge Advocate 

General; Forces Command; the Army Materiel Com­mand; and the Army 

War College. The staff was a mix of active-duty and retired officers, 

civil servants, and civilian contractors. In keeping with Schoomaker’s 

emphasis on making units more capable of operating jointly and the Army 

more responsive to the needs of regional combatant commanders, the 

task force also requested and received personnel from the other military 

services and from the Joint Forces Command.42

42 After Action Review (AAR), Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional 

Army, Task Force Modularity, 28 Feb 05, pp. 3–4, Historians files, CMH; Witsken et al., 

The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force, p. 2; Col Jeffrey R. Witsken, 

Maj Patrick L. Walden, and Peggy Fratzel, Task Force Modularity: Integrated Analysis 

Report, Analysis Underpinning Recommendations to the CSA, September 2003–March 
28

Schoomaker’s stress on speed 

and a belief on the part of team 

members that few problems would 

develop led the task force’s leaders 

to expect that the project would 

last only three or four months. 

As a result, many of the subject 

matter experts working with the 

group served on temporary duty 

orders and returned to their parent 

organizations in early 2004. In 

the event, as the task force’s after 

action review commented, the 

expectation proved “incredibly 

optimistic.” Diffi­culties arose in 

settling the designs for theaterlevel organizations and for several 

of the support brigades. Further 

analyses also identified areas in 

the plans that needed modification. Questions cropped up as well when 

the group became involved in the program’s implementation phase. In 

the end, the task force ran for nearly sixteen months and did not disband 

until February 2005.43

In an unusual arrangement for a force development project, Task 

Force Modularity operated under “close hold” while it was formulating 

its initial designs during 2003 and 2004. In effect, members of the group 

could request information from other organizations, but they had to obtain 

permission to discuss what they were doing with outsiders, even members 

of their own parent agencies. General Schoomaker established this policy 

to keep information on the project from reaching the chiefs of the Army’s 

branches and the commandants of their schools. He hoped to prevent 

the sort of friction that had occurred during earlier development efforts, 

when branches such as the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, or Engineers had 

2004 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: TRADOC Analysis Center, 31 March 2004), p. 9; 

Spreadsheets, Task Force Modularity, 28 Oct 03, sub: TFM [Task Force Modularity] 

Roster as 28 Oct 03, and 4 Nov 03, sub: TFM Roster 4 Nov 03; E-mail, Clinton Ancker, 

CGSC [Command and General Staff College], to Col Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC 

DCSDEV [Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments], et al., 10 Oct 03, 3:24 P.M., sub: 

Support UAs [Units of Action]. Last three in Historians files, CMH. 43 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, pp. 21, 23.

General Byrnes
29

sometimes sought to pro­tect their 

interests at the expense of the 

overall force. As General Byrnes 

emphasized in a 30 September 

2003 briefing at the Training and 

Doctrine Command, this was to 

be a time “for free-thinking and 

innovation, not parochialism.”44

General Mixon, as a result, would 

only brief the schools’ commandants in February 2004, after 

the chief of staff had approved 

the design for the heavy brigade 

combat team and concepts for other 

modular organi­zations. After that, 

the branches became more involved 

with the pro­cess, parti­cularly with 

work on the support brigades and 

with the develop­ment of doc­trine 

for modular units. Until it disbanded, however, the task force continued 

to guard against parochialism. General Mixon was convinced that the 

entire project would probably have failed if Schoomaker had followed 

normal procedure and sought branch participation.45

Another unusual aspect of the modular design process was the 3d 

Infantry Division’s independent work on the design for a heavy unit of 

44 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, p. 5. Quote from Information Paper, Lt Col DeVito, TRADOC 

HUB, 30 Sep 03, sub: TF Mission Analysis Back Briefs to CG, TRADOC, 30 Sep 03. 

E-mail, Col Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC DCSDEV, to Col John Twohig, FDD [Force 

Development Directorate], et al., 25 Sep 03, 10:12 A.M., sub: TF Modularity Close Hold 

Information. All in Historians files, CMH. 45 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, pp. 10–11; MFR, Col John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 

5 Feb 04, sub: After Action Review of Task Force Modularity CSA Decision Brief to 

Commandants; E-mail, Maj Gen Robert W. Mixon, TRADOC FC [Futures Center], to 

Gen Kevin P. Byrnes, TRADOC CG [Commanding General], 5 Feb 04, 9:28 P.M., sub: 

Commandant Backbrief; Memo, Lt Gen William S. Wallace, U.S. Army Combined Arms 

Center, 30 Jun 04, sub: Assignment of Doctrine Proponency for Modular Organizations; 

E-mail, Col John Twohig, TRADOC DCG [Deputy Commanding General]/COFS 

[Chief of Staff], to Col Henry M. St. Pierre, Army G8-FD, et al., 20 Feb 04, 9:59 P.M., 

sub: Playing Both Ends Against the Middle; Interv, J. Patrick Hughes, CMH, with Maj 

Gen Robert W. Mixon Jr., former director, Task Force Modularity, 7 Sep 06. All in 

Historians files, CMH. 

General Mixon
30

action. That effort remained largely separate from that of the task force 

until 7 November 2003, when Schoo­­­­maker rejected Webster’s design 

and decided to use a task force proposal as the basis for the unit’s further 

development. During that time, General Webster had authority to bypass 

the chain of command to communicate directly with the chief of staff 

on this matter. 46

Even so, the parallel efforts conducted by Webster and the task force 

were not totally separate. Webster and Mixon were friends, so Mixon 

knew of the Schoo­maker assignment. Although the two groups never 

interacted directly, whenever one team developed a key finding pertinent to the other, its commander would inform his counterpart without 

revealing larger aspects of the team’s work. By the early fall of 2003, the 

Training and Doctrine Command’s Ana­lysis Center had the 3d Infantry 

Division’s designs in hand and was simulating them in its explorations. 

Circumstances changed further following Schoomaker’s decision in 

November. Within the week, a team from Task Force Modularity was 

visiting the division to help reconcile design differences.47

Although the chief of staff ordered a close-hold approach to design 

details given to the Army’s branches and schools, he instructed Task 

Force Modularity to make early contact with the regional commands, 

Army service component com­mands, the Joint Forces Command, and the 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. He wanted to ensure that the task 

force created designs that fulfilled the requirements of those organiza­tions 

while improving the ability of modular units to cooperate with forces 

from the other services. The general also had a second motive. He hoped 

to gain support for the Army’s effort to change itself by keeping those 

organizations informed of the process.48

These contacts began almost immediately. Shortly after its formation the task force analyzed material developed by the Joint Forces 

Command’s Joint Futures Lab to learn the concerns of joint and regional 

commanders most likely to employ Army units in combat. Identifying 

issues that pertained to the new brigade- and division-level echelons 

under construction, the task force passed the resulting analyses back 

to the Joint Forces Command and the joint and regional com­manders 

for comment. Some of the responses were influential. Later, once draft 

46 Interv, Hughes with Webster, 12 Sep 06.

47 Ibid. See also Witsken et al., The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular 

Force, ch. 5; Col Jeffrey R. Witsken, Comments on draft, 19 Mar 07, item 14, Historians 

files, CMH. 48 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, pp. 6, 11–12.
31

designs were ready, a team from the task force presented them to the other 

military services, the Army service component commands, and various 

other commands and joint organizations. The additional comments also 

proved useful. 

The consultations varied, depending on the type of unit under 

consideration and the nature of the organization consulted. The most 

important of the consultations involved the Central Command’s Army 

service component command, the Third Army, and the commanders of 

its theater-level subordinate commands. Their recent combat experi­ence 

and their strong views on the theater-level echelon would have a major 

influence on the final designs of theater-level support commands and the 

unit of employment at the operational level’s headquarters.49

Task Force Modularity also worked closely with Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, whose staff sections required the information 

to plan and coordinate the rapid implementation of modularity. In turn, 

the Army Staff provided the task force with important information on the 

number of soldiers the service could call and the quantity of equipment 

it could provide. The data were crucial to the design of both maneuver 

and support units of action. The task force also briefed the Army Staff 

on its decisions before presenting them to the chief of staff. Army Staff 

personnel who had served on temporary duty with the task force in 2003 

often served as key links in this process.50

49 Ibid., pp. 11–12. E-mails, Col Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC DCSDEV, to Maj 

Gen Robert W. Mixon, TRADOC DCSDEV, 8 Oct 03, 4:50 P.M., sub: Combatant 

Command Review of Needed Capabilities; Maj John Jones, TRADOC DCG/COFS, to Col 

Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC DCSDEV, 17 Oct 03, 9:22 A.M., sub: Regional Combatant 

Commanders’ Required Capabilities Trip 10–21 Nov 03; Col Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC 

DCSDEV, to Maj Gen Robert W. Mixon, TRADOC DCSDEV, 30 Sep 03, 1:30 P.M., 

sub: JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] Assessment of Our Synthesis of Their Work; 

Maj Gen Robert W. Mixon, TRADOC FC, to Gen Kevin P. Byrnes, TRADOC CG, 3 

Nov 03, 6:15 P.M., sub: Briefs with LTG [Lieutenant General] McKiernan and LTG 

McNeill; Col Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC DCSDEV, to John W. McDonald, 20 Oct 03, 

8:11 A.M., sub: FW: Continued Work on TF MODULARITY COA [Courses of Action]; 

and Mike Burke, TRADOC DCG/COFS, to Clinton Ancker, CGSC, 31 Oct 03, 10:30 

A.M., sub: Meeting with AEF [Air Expeditionary Force], 30 Oct 2003. MFRs, John J. 

Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 21 Jun 04, sub: AAR for the Task Force Modularity 

UEx and UEy VTC [Video Teleconference] to the United States Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command (USASMDC) and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution 

Command (MSDDC) 21 June 2004, and 18 Jun 04, sub: Results Task Force Modularity 

UEy Update to ASCCs–17 June 2004. All in Historians files, CMH. 50 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, pp. 16, 20; Col. Henry M. St-Pierre et al., Transforming to the 

Modular Force: A Review on the Design Development and Division Execution to the 

Modular Design (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.­: U.S. Army War College, 20 March 2005), ch. 
32

The task force also established and maintained close coordination 

with a number of the task forces working on the chief of staff’s other 

focus areas. For the most part, this involved providing information the 

groups would need to incor­por­ate modularity into their work, but two 

of the task forces were particularly impor­tant to the modularity effort 

itself. Given the complexity of designing aviation units and of devising 

con­cepts for their use, General Byrnes gave Task Force Aviation the 

lead for deve­loping concepts and designs for aviation in the modular 

force. Similarly, although Task Force Modularity oversaw the design of 

the sustain­ment brigade and settled what­ever theater-level sustainment 

issues arose, Task Force Logistics provided sub­stantial assist­ance in 

those areas. Task Force Modu­larity also worked with the “HUB,” a group 

General Byrnes had established at Fort Monroe to manage the efforts of 

the Training and Doctrine Command’s various focus area teams. Since 

the HUB determined time lines for important issues shared by more than 

one of the com­mand’s task forces, the connection enabled Task Force 

Modularity to plot dates for key deci­sions it and the other teams had to 

make to meet the chief of staff’s objectives.51

Early in the design process, General Schoomaker directed Task 

Force Modularity to enlist the services of respected experts who could 

be counted on to review with rigor the concepts and designs for brigade 

combat teams, units of employment at the higher tactical level, and 

support brigades. The appointees the task force selected fell into three 

groups. The first, com­posed of retired senior officers from the Army and 

the other military services, was known as The Devil’s Advocates. The 

second, consisting of retired senior Army officers, some of whom had 

extensive experience in previous redesigns, was called The Grey Beards. 

The third was dubbed the The Critics. The chief of staff’s intent in this was 

4; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, July 

2004, pp. 1-7 to 1-9. An example of these “pre-briefs” to the Army Staff is Memo, John 

J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 14 Jun 04, sub: Army Staff UEy Update Pre-Brief, 

Historians files, CMH. 51 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, p. 13; Information Paper, DeVito, 30 Sep 03, sub: TF Mission 

Analysis Back Briefs to CG, TRADOC, 30 Sep 03; TF Mission Analysis Backbriefs to 

CG, TRADOC, 30 Sep 03; Spreadsheets, Nena Barley, Strategic Plans Directorate, 6 Oct 

03, sub: HUB RFIs [Requests for Information] 6 OCT 03 (1) (1), and n.d. [c. Apr 04], 

sub: Issue Crosswalk (Encl 2); Briefings, TRADOC HUB, 13 Jul 04, sub: HUB TF Update 

Brief (13 Jul), and Brig Gen E. J. Sinclair, CDR, U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center, 

May 04, sub: Modular Force Aviation Structure; PowerPoint Presentation, TRADOC 

HUB, 16 Jul 04, sub: TRADOC Focus Areas: Minutes from TF Lead Update Briefs to 

CG TRADOC. All in Historians files, CMH. 
33

not only to tap into another source of expertise. Some of the individuals 

who would be involved had been very critical of other Army pro­grams 

and policies. By consulting them early in the process, the general sought 

to gain their support for the new modular Army. In the end, the groups 

provided a valuable service. The task force’s after action report concluded 

that the three teams had helped to guard against any tendency on the part 

of team members to develop a group-think mentality.52 

In September 2003, before starting on any designs, General Mixon 

directed the task force to conduct a detailed analysis of its mission. During 

the discussions that followed, the Training and Doctrine Command’s 

deputy chief of staff for intelli­gence provided an assessment of the 

operational environment in which modular forces could expect to operate. Task force members also searched force deve­lopment literature for 

useful studies and defined key terms so that everyone would use the same 

vocabulary. They also developed a list of specified and implied tasks. 

One of the first of those efforts, begun on Schoomaker’s and Byrnes’ 

instruction, was to “map functions to organizations”—that is, to establish 

what the ground forces were required to do before designing forces that 

could achieve those results. Since the chief of staff had stressed that one 

goal of modularity was to produce Army units better able to operate in 

a joint environment than in the past, the task force examined both the 

Army’s list of functions (as defined by Field Manual 3–0, Operations) 

and similar lists developed by various joint organizations. Based on this 

analysis, the group concluded that a modular Army would require the 

following types of units: unit-of-employment headquarters; heavy brigade 

combat teams; infantry brigade combat teams; aviation brigades; strike 

brigades—later termed fires brigades; reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition brigades—later designated as battlefield surveillance 

52 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, pp. 17–18; Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, Integrated Analysis 

Report, p. 9; Draft Paper, Task Force Modu­larity, 6 Feb 04, sub: Army Reorganization: 

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development and Education, 

Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), 6 February Change Recommendation; E-mails, 

John Tilelli to Col Rickey E. Smith, 13 Oct 03, 8:00 A.M., sub: Modularity, and 17 

Oct 03, 11:21 A.M., sub: TF Modularity Notes; UEx Comments from GEN(R) Tilelli 

13 Nov 03; E-mails, John McDonald, TRADOC DCG/COFS, to Col Rickey E. Smith, 

TRADOC DCSDEV, et al., 12 Oct 03, 5:59 P.M., sub: Trefry Comments, and John W. 

McDonald to Maj Gen Robert W. Mixon,TRADOC DCSDEV, et al., 12 Nov 03, 1:19 

P.M., sub: Critics; MFR, Col Rickey E. Smith, Task Force Modularity, 7 Jan 04, sub: 

After Action Review of Task Force Modularity Experts Day I–6 January 2004; Interv, 

J. Patrick Hughes, CMH, with Brig Gen (Ret.) Thomas R. Goedkoop, 14 Aug 06. All in 

Historians files, CMH. Goedkoop was a senior adviser to Task Force Modularity. 
34

brigades; protection brigades—later designated as maneuver enhancement brigades and then changed again to combat support brigades 

(maneuver enhancement); and sustainment brigades.

The task force ended its analysis by identifying five essential tasks 

the Army would have to complete if it was to succeed in transforming 

itself into a modular force. First, it would need to shift from a divisioncentered to a brigade-centered organization based on heavy (armored) 

and infantry units of action. Second, the Army would have to develop 

both single-function and multifunctional modular support units of action. 

Next, it must redesign the headquarters elements for echelons above 

brigade using concepts for the units of employment at the operational 

and higher tactical levels. Fourth, the service had to reorganize the 3d 

Infantry and the 101st Airborne Divisions as modular units using only 

their existing resources without disrupting their scheduled deployment 

to Iraq in 2005. Last, the Army would need to reorganize the remaining 

Regular Army divisions and the echelons above division along with Army 

National Guard–enhanced separate brigades as modular units without 

disrupting scheduled overseas rotations.53 When the process was near 

completion, the task force’s leaders briefed Generals Schoomaker and 

Byrnes on the group’s findings to ensure that its conclusions meshed 

with the chief of staff’s intentions. 

Since a heavy division would be the first unit to be reorganized, the 

task force gave priority to developing a heavy brigade design. Given 

Schoo­maker’s insistence on fielding modular units quickly, however, the 

task force also began work on designs for the other parts of the modular 

force. As one design neared completion, the group wasted no time in 

shifting its priorities to another. As a result, the emphasis moved from 

the heavy brigade to the infantry brigade combat team. From there it 

switched to the headquarters of the unit of employment at the higher 

tactical level, then to the support brigades, and finally to the headquarters 

of the unit of employment at the operational level and its theater-level 

commands.54

53 This discussion of Task Force Modularity’s mission analysis is based on AAR, 

Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force Modularity, 28 

Feb 05, pp. 4–5, 17; Smith, Task Force Modularity Talking Points for CSA Backbrief, 

24 Sep 03; Briefing, Task Force Modularity, 30 Sep 03, sub: Mission Analysis Back 

Brief 30 Sep 03; PowerPoint Presentations, FDD, TRADOC, 17 Sep 03, sub: Modularity 

Construct 171532Sep03, and CADD, TRADOC, 29 Sep 03, sub: Assump­tions (V3) 

291600SEP03. All in Historians files, CMH. 54 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, 28 Feb 05, p. 5; Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, Integrated Analysis Report, 

p. 11.
35

Even so, Task Force Modularity could never have met Schoomaker’s 

deadlines without the assistance of the Training and Doctrine Command’s 

Ana­lysis Center, which supported its efforts in four ways. First, the 

center provided rapid assess­ments of the task force’s first designs and 

the associated work. Second, it compared competing designs to weigh 

their relative strengths and weaknesses. Third, it conducted analyses in 

re­sponse to questions and concerns General Schoomaker raised as he 

reviewed the proposed designs and con­cepts. Finally, after the chief of 

staff had approved a design, the center assis­ted in the refinement of the 

operational and organizational ideas.55

The center ran a number of analyses to obtain maximum results in the 

shortest time. Using existing simulations and sce­narios where possible, 

center analysts made four key assumptions: the scenarios were representative of the full spectrum of operations a modular force would face; the 

operations and equipment of the opposing forces in the scenarios were 

ade­quate representations of the threats which would confront it; the use 

of assets from the other military services and their effects were consistent 

with the level of joint interdependence expected to exist between 2005 

and 2008; and the technologies the modular force would need such 

as the Good Enough Battle Com­mand would be available. Instead of 

placing sole reliance on quanti­tative analysis, both the center and the 

task force employed professional military judgment to ensure that their 

analyses properly addressed all aspects of organizational design. This 

was particularly important because there was too little time to address 

the entire range of possibilities that might occur between low-intensity 

stability and support operations and high-intensity conflict. 

Much of the analytical effort focused on the chief of staff’s criterion 

that unit designs should be at least as good as those then in opera­tion. 

This led to a search for “show stoppers,” designs that somehow crippled 

or degraded critical functions a unit had to perform. When problems of 

the sort appeared, further ana­lysis determined whether design changes 

could either fix the problem or reduce the risk to an acceptable level. If 

not, the design was discarded.

The Analysis Center conducted its assessments by using simulations 

that reproduced the operational and the tactical levels of war. To conduct 

and evaluate them, the center formed a team of retired and active-duty 

brigade commanders, active-duty operations officers, experts from the 

Training and Doctrine Com­mand’s schools and centers, and individuals 

55 This discussion of analytical support for Task Force Modularity is based on 

Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, Integrated Analysis Report, and Witsken et al., The Role 

of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force. 
36

who had gained experience testing designs for General Shinseki’s Objective 

Force. Experts on the threats the modular force could expect to encounter 

on the battlefield played the opposing forces. 

The tactical-level simulations the modelers used focused on brigade 

combat teams. Those at the operational level centered on the unit of 

employment at the higher tactical level. The teams conducting them 

contained retired colonels who had commanded brigades, retired military 

personnel with experience in the Battle Command Training Program, 

former division and corps staff officers, and experts with relevant 

experience from the Training and Doctrine Command’s schools and 

centers. To ensure that operational assessments reflected the results of the 

tactical assessments, personnel who worked on the tactical simulations 

also participated in the operational simulations. Throughout the process, 

a group of retired general officers served as senior mentors, providing 

valuable insights and advice.

In addition to conducting operational and tactical simulations, the 

Analysis Center worked on modular designs for sustainment, training, 

and deployment organizations that would become necessary if the 

Army adopted the modular idea. Using examples from the simulations 

it had completed and coor­dinating with Task Force Logistics, the center 

sought to determine how a modular force would conduct sustainment 

operations and the amount and composition of support a brigade combat 

team would require in the field. It also conducted an analysis to examine 

how the Army’s new organization would affect the service’s ability to 

deploy forces overseas. While making these assessments, the center twice 

surveyed participants in its simulations on the changes a modular reorganization would impose on training and leader development programs. 

Besides simulations and the assistance of senior mentors, Task 

Force Modularity sought other sources of support. A study of military 

history provided material to compare the processes and effects of earlier 

redesigns with those of the one in progress. The task force also used 

lessons from recent com­bat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once 

designs for the brigade combat team and the unit of employment at the 

higher tactical level were approved, the task force sent teams to monitor 

the reorganization of the 101st Airborne and 3d Infantry Divisions. The 

insights those observers gained helped to speed the fine-tuning of the 

designs being adopted by these divisions. 

As part of their reorganization, the 101st Airborne and 3d Infantry 

Divi­sions rotated their newly designed brigade combat teams to the 

National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness 

Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Task force working groups 
37

accompanied the units, but the need to prepare the two divisions for 

deployment to Iraq in 2004 and 2005 resulted in such a rapid conversion 

that the usefulness of what the teams learned was limited. The deadlines 

that resulted kept the Army’s logistics and personnel support orga­n­izations from supplying all of the troops and materiel the new designs 

required. The 3d Infantry Division’s brigades thus adopted only part of 

the modular format, and its officers and troops received little instruction 

on how modular forces oper­ated before they began their training rotations. 

Despite these difficulties, the 3d Infantry Division’s commander, General 

Webster, appreciated the observers’ con­tributions. He later said that 

their appraisals proved invaluable in teaching his troops to use both the 

headquarters at the higher tactical level and the heavy unit of action.56

56 See Maj. Gen. William G. Webster, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Thomas R. Goedkoop, 

and Maj. Eugene A. Yancey III, Task Force Modularity: Initial Insights Memorandum, 

National Training Center Rotation 04–07 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: TRADOC Analysis 

Center, 22 July 2004); Col. Jeffrey R. Witsken and Maj. Eugene A. Yancey III, Task Force 

Modularity: Initial Insights Memorandum, National Training Center Rotation 04–05 

(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: TRADOC Analysis Center, 29 April 2004); Memo, TRADOC 

Analysis Center, 20 Jul 05, sub: Modular Force Collection Effort: Comprehensive Insights 

and Analysis Memorandum, and PowerPoint Presentation, Headquarters, 3d Infantry 

Division (Mechanized), sub: 3ID [3d Infantry Division] Reorganization: GAO [General 

Soldiers of the 26th Support Battalion, part of the 2d Unit of Action, 3d 

Infantry Division, at the National Training Center
38

General Schoomaker’s judgment that the Army had a narrow 

window of opportunity resulted in 

an accelerated design effort unlike 

any other in the recent history of the 

Army. How Task Force Modularity 

did its job, however, is only part of 

the story. The case histories that 

follow describe the final products 

and how they came to be.

Development of the Heavy 

Unit of Action

The initial guidance Task 

Force Modularity received was 

to create a design the Army could 

use to form five heavy units of 

action from three existing heavy 

brigade combat teams. The task 

force established several planning 

teams to produce initial designs. 

Since General Schoomaker had 

instructed the com­man­der of 3d Infantry Division to produce his own 

proposal, the task force also included that design in its analysis. As the 

effort gained momentum, the task force imposed two conditions on its 

developers. The units they designed had to be able to fill any mission 

the force might receive, and they could make use of only equip­ment 

and technology either currently in the Army’s inventory, commercially 

available, or soon to be added. When completed, each proposal was to be 

measured against the existing heavy brigade organization in use by the 3d 

Infantry Division. (See Appendix.) The comparison would demonstrate 

if the new design met Schoomaker’s mandate that it be as capable as

the one it replaced.57

Accounting Office] Brief 16 Nov 04, both in Historians files, CMH; Intervs, Hughes with 

Webster, 12 Sep 06, and Goedkoop, 14 Aug 06. Goedkoop led the collection effort. 57 This discussion of the development of the heavy unit of action is based on Witsken 

et al., The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force, pp. 12–34; E-mail, Col 

Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC DCSDEV, to Expert Panel Team II TRADOC DCSDEV et 

al., 3 Oct 03, 7:35 P.M., sub: RE: CLOSE HOLD TF Modularity Timeline Task Force 

Modularity; PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: COA Comparison for 

Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 

15th Infantry, 3d Infantry 

Division, at the Joint 

Readiness Training Center
39

During October 2003, simulations employing a process known as 

concept design exploration tested five proposals at the unit of action 

Maneuver Battle Lab at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The first plan offered a 

radical alternative to the 3d In­fantry Divi­sion’s organization by combining the heavy brigade’s armor and infantry elements at the platoon level. 

Labeled the “network enabled” design because of its heavy depen­dence 

on digital information technologies, it featured three maneu­ver batta­lions 

composed of four line companies, with each battalion supported by an 

engineer company. The other two combat units were a strike battalion, 

com­posed of two howitzer batteries and a multiple-launch rocket battery, 

and an armed reconnaissance troop that included a tactical unmanned 

aerial vehicle (UAV) platoon. Flying camera-equipped unmanned aerial 

vehicles, the unit could see over and around obsta­cles to provide ground 

commanders with live pictures of what was going on in a combat zone 

beyond their immediate lines of sight.

The second proposal used the Stryker Brigade Combat Team as its 

model. It also contained three maneuver battalions of four line companies each, but its infantry and armor elements were combined at the 

company level, and it had an engineer platoon to support each battalion. 

This proposal featured an armed reconnaissance squadron that had two 

UAV platoons and an aerial reconnais­sance troop of scout and attack 

helicopters.

The third and fourth proposals drew on the years of work the Army 

had spent developing the Objective Force unit of action. As with the 

first two pro­posals, the third featured three maneuver battalions of four 

combined arms com­panies each and a strike battalion. A key difference 

was that, along with its armed reconnaissance squadron, it had an aviation 

battalion with scout and attack heli­copters. The fourth was a version of 

the third that featured only two maneuver battalions.

The fifth proposal came from the 3d Infantry Division. It divided 

the divi­sion’s assets into five units of action. Each unit had one armor 

batta­lion and one mechanized infantry battalion, a howitzer battalion, 

an engineer bat­ta­lion, and an armed reconnaissance troop. No aviation 

CSA Brief 061300 Nov 03; MFRs, Col John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 7 Nov 

03, sub: Results Task Force Modularity Heavy Brigade Combat Team Design Briefing 

to CSA 7 November 2003, and 19 Jan 04, sub: After Action Review of Teleconference 

with Senior Advisors; Task Force Modularity, Overarching Modular Briefing to CSA, 

4 Feb 03; John W. McDonald, John’s Notes to Modular Briefing to CSA Backups, 

version 2.0; Donald Meyers, TF Mod Infantry UA Comparison 2 Feb 04; John Bonin, 

Briefing Notes, 4 Feb. All in Historians files, CMH. MFR, Twohig, 4 Feb 04, sub: After 

Action Review of Task Force Modularity Decision Brief to CSA; Interv, Hughes with 

Goedkoop, 14 Aug 06.
40

or multiple-launch rocket systems were included, but there was an 

unmanned aerial vehicle platoon. The division’s design fell short of the 

benchmark established by General Schoomaker. Since its designers had 

assumed that no external equipment or personnel would be available, its 

“five out of three” format was much smaller than the other designs and 

suffered from very limited combat power when compared with them.

The exploration process generated a string of insights that would 

guide the task force’s subsequent development of the heavy unit of action 

design. A number stood out. Three maneuver elements were necessary 

for effective operations. Every echelon needed its own set of sensors and 

weapons. The force required a “robust” recon­naissance organization with 

both air and ground capabilities. Each maneuver battalion required the 

support of at least one engineer company. The target acquisition element 

of the fires battalion needed both counterbattery radar to pinpoint the 

location of enemy artillery and unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles. 

Helicopters should be retained by the unit of employment at the higher 

tactical level for distribution to units of action as needed.

At the close of the concept design exploration phase, Task Force 

Modu­larity’s leadership decided to discard options three and four and 

to develop the first two proposals. The 3d Infantry Division meanwhile 

revised its proposal into a third alternative. At this time, the Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, informed the task force and the 3d Division’s 

planners that the Army could not meet Schoo­maker’s objective to increase 

the number of brigade combat teams if heavy units of action contained 

three maneuver battalions. 

By late October, the task force could choose from three courses of 

action. The first, from the 3d Infantry Division, closely resembled the 

division’s first proposal. It divided the division’s assets into five units 

of action, each possessing two maneuver battalions of three companies 

each. The task force determined that the design had better command 

and intelligence capabilities than the 3d Infantry Division’s existing 

arrangement but less maneuverability and firepower. 

The second course of action re­flected the limitations on resources 

with which the task force had to work. Rather than carve five units of 

action from three existing brigade combat teams, it called for just four. 

Each had an armor battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion of three 

line companies, an engineer company, and a combined arms company 

that would serve as a reserve force. Other combat units included an armed 

reconnais­sance squadron composed of two ground recon­naissance troops 

and an unmanned aerial vehicle platoon and a fires battalion with two 

howitzer batteries. Each line company, the fires battalion, the support 
41

battalion, and the unit’s headquarters and headquarters company had 

small-unit unmanned aerial vehicles—reconnaissance drones weighing 

only a few pounds—that were easily deployed by units below the brigade 

level. The unit of action also had a signal company and a military intelligence company that contained an analysis platoon, a human intelligence 

section, and an integration platoon designed to process and coordinate 

all of the intelligence obtained from the vari­ous sources available to a 

unit in the field. The task force concluded that this design had better 

command and intelligence capacities than those of the 3d Division and 

a much greater ability to conduct reconnaissance. The cuts in maneuver 

and fire­power capabilities, however, meant that the unit’s tactics would 

be more predict­able than those of the benchmark and render it more 

dependent on joint air and artillery fire support.58

The third course of action used proposals for the Future Combat 

Systems unit of action as a starting point but also drew on assets from 

nondivisional units. It had three different maneuver battalions: an armor 

battalion of three com­panies, a combined arms battalion of two mechanized 

58 S. Sgt. Raymond Piper, Army News Service, “Small UAV Provides Eyes in the 

Sky for Battalions,” 17 Feb 05, Historians files, CMH.

A Shadow tactical unmanned aerial vehicle is prepared for launch.
42

infantry com­pa­nies and one armor 

company, and an infantry battalion 

consisting of one mecha­nized and 

two light infantry companies. As 

with the second course of action, 

the armed re­con­naissance squadron 

had two ground reconnaissance 

troops and a tactical unmanned 

aerial vehicle platoon, but the fires 

battalion had three howitzer batteries. As in the second course of 

action, this design also had a support 

battalion, a military intel­ligence 

company, and a signal company. In 

its assessment, the task force noted 

that the design had better command 

and intelligence capabilities than the 

3d Infantry Division’s plan. It also 

surpassed the other two courses of 

action because it had a third maneuver battalion. This gave it an edge 

in close combat by making it more 

flexible and less predictable. 

During a 7 November 2003 briefing for General Schoomaker, General 

Byrnes explained the task force’s selections. The group, he said, had 

found producing five units of action from three brigade combat teams 

impossible. Even so, a four-from-three solution would still draw five or 

six extra brigades from the Army’s five regular heavy divisions. This 

would give the Regular Army thirty-eight or thirty-nine maneuver units 

of action even before it converted its other five regular divisions to the 

new format. Byrnes emphasized that the new brigades would be more 

lethal than current designs.

The chief of staff responded that the 3d Infantry Division would be 

a pro­visional modular formation in 2005. The task force should support 

the division in its transition, he said, but nonetheless concentrate its 

main effort on the wider Army. Turning to the three courses of action, 

Schoomaker stressed that maneuver units of action had to put “more boots 

on the ground” by preparing more soldiers than before to do missions 

previously considered infantry-only. He also directed the task force to 

investigate the feasibility of creating, within units of action, engi­neer, 

military police, and chemical units capable of performing secondary misA soldier prepares to launch 

a Raven unmanned aerial 

vehicle. 
43

sions as infantry. Complimenting the task force on its efforts to increase 

human intelligence capabilities, Schoomaker nonetheless observed that 

existing brigade combat teams were weak in their ability to detect what 

an opposing force was doing or could do to thwart a mission. In that light, 

he directed the task force to join with Task Force Intelligence to improve 

tactical intelligence capabilities. Turning to the Army’s readiness for joint 

operations, the general stated that diluting the service’s unique skills and 

capabilities to achieve that end was unnecessary. Instead, plan­ners had 

to find ways to plug the Army’s strengths into a joint force.

During the discussion, a representative of the Army’s G–3 office 

underscored the difficulties in providing the resources to carry out the 

third, three-battalion course of action. Schoomaker acknowledged the 

problem but stated that the effort would serve to frame the case for 

increasing the Army’s strength by specifying precisely what was needed 

to do so. At the end of the briefing, the general chose the second and third 

courses of action for further analysis and development. 

Between the November 2003 briefing and February 2004, the task 

force sought to create a final design it could recommend. Its main problem was the develop­ment of a two–maneuver battalion unit that could 

reduce the risks such a force incurred. These included limited flexibility 

in responding to tactical developments, a lack of endurance, and a need 

often to fight simultaneously on a line rather than sequentially in the 

safer triangular formation of two up and one back. Compound­ing these 

problems, the unit of employment at the higher tactical level often had 

to commit its reserve early during simulations, when its assigned units 

of action had only two maneuver battalions. General Mixon would later 

call this issue the “most fundamental chal­lenge” the developers faced 

during the entire design process.59

There were other challenges. Simulations had shown that designs 

containing fewer maneuver companies did worse in battle than those 

with more. This was because the smaller number of maneuver companies 

proved more suscep­tible to attrition. Assessments had likewise shown that 

if there were many ways to neutralize an enemy the real issue was finding 

him. Maneu­ver units of action had to be able to conduct reconnaissance 

in complex terrain and in areas where the enemy could mingle with 

noncombatants. This meant that they required highly capable sensors, 

manned reconnaissance, informers and other undercover agents, and 

teams trained to analyze the resulting data to create the kind of information on the enemy and his intentions that tactical units needed. 

59 Interv, Hughes with Mixon, 7 Sep 06.
44

To alleviate those problems, the task force employed a series of 

techno­logical and organizational expedients that its designers termed 

enablers. On the technological level, these included reliance on the Good 

Enough Battle Command system, counterbattery radar, various threat 

detecting sensors, and tactical and small-unit unmanned reconnaissance 

vehicles. 

All of those additions were useful, but the organizational enablers 

made the real difference. To enhance the heavy unit of action’s flex­i­­­bility, 

the two maneuver battalions it contained would become combined arms 

forces employing two armor and two mechanized infantry companies 

and an engineer company. The unit’s armed reconnaissance squadron 

would mean­while gain a third ground reconnaissance troop and a forward 

support company, and the two batteries of its fires battalion would field 

eight rather than six howit­zers. A new brigade troops battalion (later 

designated the special troops battalion) also came into being to provide 

com­mand, security, and support for the headquarters, separate companies, 

and any attachments (Chart 2). 

To enhance logistics, each combat battalion was also to have a forward support company, but that changed later in 2004, when complaints 

began to arise that the military occupa­tional specialties the units mainly 

employed were open to women, who constituted a large percentage of 

the Army’s soldiers in those fields. In that sense, by putting the units 

on the tables of organization of combat batta­lions, the design violated a 

law that prohibited the assignment of female soldiers to positions with 

a high probability of becoming engaged in direct combat. Since finding 

enough men with the proper specialties to replace the women in all of 

the modular Army’s forward support companies would be impossible, 

the designers moved the units to brigade support battalions. These 

organizations could retain mixed-gender companies because they were 

not combat arms units.60

To accommodate all the changes involved, the heavy unit of action’s 

staff had to grow. A deputy com­mander was added along with a plans 

officer, a specialist in psychological operations and military deception, 

a civil-military rela­tions officer, a public affairs component, a human 

intelligence cell, an operational law team, and an air defense–airspace 

management group. When circumstances required, there would also be 

a special operations liaison officer. The task force concluded that this 

60 Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Task Force 

Modularity, Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 

2004, pp. 8-5 and 9-6; Rowan Scarborough, “Women in Combat Ban Again at Issue,” 

Washington Times, 4 Feb 05.
Heavy Bde

Combat Team

Bde Special

Troops Bn

Bde Combat Team

Headquarters &

Headquarters Co

Distribution Co

Chart 2—ORGANIZATION OF A MODULAR HEAVY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, SEPTEMBER 2004

Armed Recon

Squadron Forward

Support Co

Recon Troop

Combined Arms

Maneuver Bn

Armed Recon

Squadron

Fires

Bn

Bde Support

Bn

Medical Co

Headquarters &

Headquarters Co

Maintenance Co

Maneuver Forward

Support Co

Fires Forward

Support Co

Headquarters &

Headquarters Troop

Tank Co

Engr Co

Mechanized Inf Co

Headquarters &

Headquarters Co

Target Acquisition

Platoon

Headquarters &

Field Arty Battery

Headquarters Battery

Signal Co

Military Intell Co

Bde Special

Troops Bn

Headquarters &

Headquarters Co

Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Task Force Modularity, Army

Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. C-2.
46

headquarters, if necessary, could manage the addition of one or two more 

maneuver battalions without any loss of effectiveness.

On 4 February 2004, Task Force Modularity presented the chief 

of staff with an update on its work. After examining the new heavy 

brigade combat team design, Schoomaker approved it for the 3d Infantry 

Division but not for the rest of the Army’s heavy divisions. He wanted 

to see how it worked in practice and to evaluate the refinements that 

would occur when reality collided with design before doing anything 

final. He also agreed with Task Force Modularity that a three-battalion 

unit of action was best. Because of that, he wanted to delay service-wide 

fielding of the two-battalion force until his G–3 office had decided how 

many heavy units of action the Army needed. If a lower number would 

work, he might not have to settle for the smaller design. The problem 

remained, however, that the Army was at war and had few resources to 

spare for the conversion to a modular structure. No one could be sure, 

the vice chief of staff noted at the meet­ing, whether the service would 

have the means in the near future to organize the three-battalion heavy 

units everyone wanted. In that light, the two-battalion design might be 

the best available. 

Development of the Infantry Unit of Action

As with the heavy units, both the task force and the first unit scheduled 

for conversion to the infantry unit of action, the 101st Airborne Division, 

developed designs to compare against a standard reference derived from 

the 101st’s existing organization.61 (See Appendix.) The developers had 

instructions to produce a design that could replace the current light infantry, 

air assault, and airborne bri­gades with one general-purpose formation. 

That force was to be capable of con­ducting the forcible entry mission then 

assigned only to airborne and air assault units. In doing this, designers were 

to follow the same guidance they had received for the heavy unit of action. 

The new designs were to be at least as capable as but more deployable than 

existing brigade combat teams. They were to allow the Army to create more 

infantry brigade combat teams without increas­ing its strength. As with the 

61 This discussion of the infantry UA design is based on Witsken et al., The Role 

of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force, pp. 26–36; Paper, John Bonin, Task 

Force Modularity, sub: Infantry UA Concepts, version 1.2, 261100 Nov 03, Historians 

files, CMH; Overarching Modular Briefing to CSA, 4 Feb 03; John’s Notes to Modular 

Briefing to CSA Backups, version 2.0; TF Mod Infantry UA Comparison 2 Feb 04; 

Bonin, Briefing Notes, 4 Feb; MFR, Twohig, 4 Feb 04, sub: After Action Review of 

Task Force Modularity Decision Brief to CSA.
47

heavy unit of action, they were only to employ systems and technologies 

that could be fielded by 2005.

This guidance, but especially the requirement to produce more units, 

led task force developers to rely on the experience they had gained in 

designing the heavy unit of action. Discerning early, for example, that 

the goal of turning three existing infantry combat teams into five units 

of action would be difficult, they replaced it with the four-from-three 

solution they had used before. Using as a reference a recent light infantry 

improvement study, they relied mainly on organizational concepts from 

the heavy unit of action such as the brigade troops battalion; a fires battalion instead of an artillery battalion; a variant of the armed reconnaissance squadron; and a larger, more capable brigade staff. As before, the 

designers used digital communications and threat detecting technology 

such as radar, thermal imaging, and unmanned aerial vehicles to ensure 

that the new units’ lethality compared favorably with that of the old.

Task Force Modularity considered three courses of action in designing the infantry unit of action. The first came from the 101st Airborne 

Division, which proposed a force with three fully motorized infantry 

battalions; a three-battery, 105-mm. howitzer battalion; a forward support 

battalion; an engineer company; a military intelligence company; a signal 

company; and a headquarters company. The task force had two main 

objections to this proposal. First, the design was not truly modular because 

it received a portion of its assets from a division. Second, the undersized 

brigade headquarters and support battalion diminished the unit’s ability 

to take independent action. Several items in the plan, however, attracted 

the designers’ interest. In the end, they adopted the 101st’s proposal to 

mount scouts, mortar units, and weapons units in wheeled vehicles.

The other two proposals came from the task force. The first underwent 

a num­ber of modifications during its development but ended with a 

maneuver force of two infantry battalions, each with three rifle companies, a weapons company, and a forward support company. The weapons 

company featured a sniper sec­tion, a mortar platoon, a scout platoon, 

and three assault platoons of armored High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicles (popularly known as Humvees) armed with heavy 

machine guns, grenade launchers, and tube-launched, optic­ally tracked, 

and wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles. The forward support company 

included a transportation platoon that could move one rifle company. 

The recon­naissance squadron had two motorized and one dismounted 

reconnais­sance troops, a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle platoon and 

other sensors, and a forward support company. The fires battalion had two 

firing batteries of eight 105-mm. howi­t­zers each, tactical unmanned aerial 
48

vehicles, and new, lightweight countermortar radars that the Army was 

procuring for the special operations forces. The support battalion included 

a transportation platoon that could move two rifle companies. The brigade 

troops battalion had a two-platoon engineer company, a signal com­pany, 

and a military intelligence company. As with the heavy unit of action, 

the proposed unit’s table of organization contained extensive intelligence 

elements and a more robust staff than those of the reference unit. The task 

force con­si­dered increasing the size of the unit’s rifle squads to twelve 

men to meet the chief of staff’s desire for more infantrymen. In the end, 

however, the need to remain within the Army’s existing end strength 

forced the task force to retain the standard design.

The task force’s second proposal was similar to the first with the 

addition of a third infantry battalion. The engineer company in this design 

also gained a third platoon to support the new unit.

The task force’s initial assessment of the three courses of action led 

the infantry UA design team to drop the 101st’s recommendation because 

the design was not achievable by 2005. Later, more detailed assessments 

of the task force’s other two courses of action found several flaws. The 

two-battalion design contained the same risks as the two-battalion heavy 

unit of action: limited flexibility, a lack of endur­ance, and a necessity 

to fight on a line rather than in a safer two-up-and-one-back formation. 

Furthermore, the range of the fires battalion’s 105-mm. howitzers limited 

the battalion’s ability to support its forces in the field, especially the 

wide-ranging reconnaissance squadron. This compelled the battalion to 

depend more on external fire support than was the case with the heavy 

unit of action. The task force could have reduced this risk by replacing 

the 105s with towed 155s, but this would have compromised the new 

unit’s ability to conduct airborne and air assault operations. The heavy 

155s were transport­able only by the Army’s medium-lift helicopters, 

which were already much in demand as troop and materiel transporters. Another area of risk was in antitank capability. Lacking tanks, the 

two designs had to depend on infantry antitank weapons such as the 

portable Javelin and larger, Humvee-mounted TOWs. Compared with 

the benchmark brigade combat team, however, the task force’s designs 

slightly increased the number of Javelins but significantly decreased the 

number of larger missiles. 

At the 4 February briefing for General Schoomaker, Task Force 

Modularity recommended that the chief of staff approve the two-battalion 

course of action (Chart 3). The planners argued that the design would 

allow the Army to field more infantry units of action using the service’s 

existing resources while reducing risks by exploiting new organi­zations 
Inf Bde

Combat Team

Bde Special

Troops Bn

Bde Combat Team

Headquarters &

Headquarters Co

Distribution Co

Chart 3—ORGANIZATION OF A MODULAR INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, SEPTEMBER 2004

Inf Bn Forward

Support Co

Motorized

Recon Troop

Inf Bn Recon Squadron Fires Bn Bde Support Bn

Medical Co

Headquarters &

Headquarters Co

Maintenance Co

Fires Forward

Support Co

Headquarters &

Headquarters Troop

Weapons Co

Rifle Co

Headquarters Co

Firing Battery

Target Acquisition

Platoon

Headquarters &

Headquarters Battery

Signal Co

Military Intell Co

Bde Special

Troops Bn

Headquarters &

Headquarters Co

Source: Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. D-2.

Engr Co

Dismounted

Recon Troop

Recon

Squadron Forward

Support Co
50

and technologies. Units of action designated as airborne would be 

manned with parachute-qualified personnel, but specialists essential to 

their operations such as parachute riggers would be drawn from echelons 

above the brigade. Schoomaker approved this recommendation and 

directed that the Army activate two of the brigade combat teams during 

fiscal year 2004. Even so, he was unwilling to abandon all thought of 

a three-battalion unit of action. He instructed both the task force and 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, to study further whether the 

design might yet be feasible.

Development of the Support Units of Action: An Overview 

The work on the units of employment had shown that the new 

commands would need support units of action if they were to replace 

the division and corps echelons. To provide support units of action, 

designers would have to split the capabilities in existing divisions and 

corps between new maneuver units of action and new support units. 

Receiving an assignment and the forces necessary to complete it, a unitof-employment headquarters could allocate missions directly to one of 

its support units of action or place that command under the control of a 

maneuver unit of action.

Following General Schoomaker’s directive to tie functions to organizations and drawing heavily on the work of the Unit of Employment 

Integrated Concept Team, the task force’s designers decided that the 

modular Army would need five types of support units of action: a 

battlefield surveillance brigade, a fires brigade, a maneu­ver enhancement brigade, an aviation brigade, and a sustainment brigade. The units 

were to share several characteristics. They were to be fully modular, 

easily tailored to meet the different demands of each new mission, and 

in pos­session of the technology and liaison officers necessary to work 

directly for units of employ­ment, joint headquarters, and multinational 

headquarters. Besides being able to reinforce other units of action, all 

but the aviation brigade could fill several roles rather than just one. The 

maneuver enhancement brigade, for example, would support armor and 

infantry units in the field by combining engi­neer, military police, and 

air and chemical defense functions in one unit.

As the effort to design the units continued, a question arose: were 

the bri­gades of “campaign quality?” In other words, could they sustain 

a unit of employment at the higher tactical level and its subordinate 

units well enough to enable the force to fight at a level equal to that of 

a current corps or division? As a result, the designers had to work with 
51

a support unit of action that, as a perma­nent base, consisted only of a 

headquarters, a basic organization, and some core capa­bilities. For each 

mission it received, that unit would acquire a different set of subunits, 

with the mix of those forces changing as its missions changed. In the 

end, the command’s success as a support unit of action would depend on 

how well unit-of-employment commanders learned to manage their units’ 

capabilities and how well they tailored the mix to achieve their goals.

The simulators ran more iterations of the computer war game simulations than normal to learn how to do this. In the process, they identified 

a need for extensive changes in doctrine and training if leaders were to 

use support units of action effectively. In the Army of the 1990s, for 

example, divisional artillery or signal battalion commanders served as 

senior staff officers for the division commander within their specialized 

functions. In the new modular force, the unit of employment at the higher 

tac­tical level would have no permanently assigned battalions or brigades. 

Designers had to work out who the senior staff officers for such functions 

would be at that level.62

By early March 2004, work on concepts and designs for both the support units of action and the unit of employment at the higher tactical-level 

head­­quar­ters seemed far enough advanced for General Mixon to brief 

General Schoo­maker. He did so on 19 March, noting that the three support 

brigades that differed the most from existing designs—fires, maneuver 

enhancement, and battlefield sur­veillance—needed additional analysis. 

During the discussion that followed, General Byrnes noted that he was 

willing to use the five designs as prototypes in creating units. They were 

the “80 percent solution” General Schoomaker wanted and could always 

be modified later in the light of additional analysis and field experi­ence. 

On that basis, General Schoomaker approved the designs.63

Task Force Modularity did not propose to eliminate all functional 

support brigades. For some tasks, pure civil affairs, military police, air 

defense, and engineer bri­gades, among others, would still be required. 

These units would normally be attached to a unit of employment at the 

operational level. They would then either work directly for that command 

or, if a mission so required, become attached to a unit of employment 

at the higher tactical level. Conversely, if that command received units 

62 Witsken et al., The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force, pp. 

38–42; Interv, Hughes and Charlston with Ancker, 7 Jun 06. 63 MFR, Col John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 19 Mar 04, sub: Results Task 

Force Modularity Current Force Unit of Employment Decision Brief to CSA 19 March 

2004; CSA Decision Brief as of 181730 Mar 04. Both in Historians files, CMH.
52

smaller than a brigade, it would in turn attach them to its subordinate 

units.64

Development of the Fires Unit of Action

The fires unit of action was at first named the strike unit of action. 

The task force’s initial work on it drew heavily on the concept of “effectsbased oper­ations.” This is defined as a process for imposing a desired 

result on an enemy by applying a full range of military, diplomatic, 

economic, and psychological means across every possible level of action 

from the tactical to the strategic.65 Following this approach, the new unit 

of action would use both lethal and nonlethal means, applying force when 

necessary but also knowledge drawn from such disciplines as psychological operations, civil-military operations, and electronic warfare.66

By early February 2004, the task force had given the strike unit of 

action three missions: strike (destruction of enemy forces, battle command, and support functions), shaping (destruction of enemy capabilities 

and forces not in contact with maneuver units of action), and close support 

(providing additional fires and effects to maneuver units of action and 

other support units of action). The base for this version of the force was 

a headquarters and a support battalion. The head­quarters would include 

a counterbattery radar platoon and a tactical unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle platoon. To accomplish its missions, the unit would command a variety of forces received through the process of force-tailoring. 

These could include field artillery, Army attack helicopters, air assault 

infantry, special operations forces, information operations contingents, 

and units from the other military services.67

Within a month, however, further analysis led to a major change. 

Task force designers found that since attack helicopters would carry out 

most long-range strike operations and experienced pilots would have to 

be involved in the planning, transferring those missions to the aviation 

unit of action made sense. From then on, the main focus of the strike unit 

of action became the provision of close support against enemy forces in 

64 Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, 

pp. 5–27. 65 Quote from Lt. Col. Robert G. Black Jr. and Col. Eugene B. Smith, “Operational 

Effects in OIF,” Field Artillery (January-February 2005): 29. 66 PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: Design Guidance v.1.3 

241200 Oct 03, Historians files, CMH. 67 Overarching Modular Briefing to CSA, 4 Feb 03; John’s Notes to Modular Briefing 

to CSA Backups, version 2.0.
53

contact with allied units, counterfire against enemy artillery and mortars, 

and precision fire using pinpoint accurate munitions such as wire- and 

laser-guided projectiles. To enhance that function, task force designers 

added a multiple-launch rocket and missile battalion to the unit’s basic 

organization. To signify that the force would concentrate on its combat 

role, they then renamed it the fires unit of action (Chart 4).68

Development of the Sustainment Unit of Action

Early designs for the sustainment unit of action expected it to plan, 

coor­dinate, and control combat service support within the unit of employment at the higher tactical level’s area of responsibility. It would conduct 

con­tract­ing and aid operations with host nations, provide support to joint 

and multinational forces, and attend to the restoration and refitting of U.S. 

units depleted by combat. Replacing existing division and corps logistics 

management struc­tures, it would support up to ten maneuver and support 

units of action and could use logistical assets received from the unit of 

employment at the operational level. The task force’s early work envisioned 

a fixed organization containing both multifunctional and single branch 

units. The unit of action could control addi­tional units assigned to it from 

a force pool or by a unit of employment at the higher tactical level. By 

March 2004, how­ever, the task force had developed a pared-down design 

with only a head­quarters and a brigade troops battalion as its base. The unit 

would obtain the remainder of its complements when it received a mission. 

Organizing to fulfill whatever task it received, it could make effective use 

of both multifunctional support battalions—which could fill quartermaster, 

ord­nance, maintenance, or other roles equally well—and battalions that 

concentrated on only a single function. The mission of the sustainment 

unit of action remained the same as in the early design. The chief of staff 

approved this design for implementation (Chart 5).69

Development of the Aviation Unit of Action

Task Force Modularity worked closely with Task Force Aviation 

in deve­loping designs for aviation units of action. Its early ideas on the 

subject called for a force that could provide reconnaissance, security, 

68 CSA Decision Brief as of 181730 Mar 04.

69 PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: SUA [Support Units 

of Action] Horseblankets (12 Nov 03) v.JWM2, Historians files, CMH; Overarching 

Modular Briefing to CSA, 4 Feb 03; John’s Notes to Modular Briefing to CSA Backups, 

version 2.0. 
Fires Bde

Headquarters

&

Headquarters

Battery

Chart 4—ORGANIZATION OF A MODULAR FIRES BRIGADE, SEPTEMBER 2004

Multiple

Launch

Rocket Bn

Unmanned

Aerial

Vehicle Co

Bde

Support

Bn

Target

Acquisition

Battery

Signal Co

Source: Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. 1-16.

Multiple

Launch

Rocket Bn

Field

Arty

Bn

Information

Opns

Organic Assigned
Sustainment Bde

Headquarters

&

Headquarters

Co

Chart 5—ORGANIZATION OF A MODULAR SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE, SEPTEMBER 2004

Human

Resources Finance Support Co Medical Signal Co

Source: Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity

Ammo

, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. 1-16.

Transportation Maintenance

Organic

Bde

Troops

Bn

Support

Bn

Supply

& Service

Medical

Bde

Attached Assigned (size based on mission)
56

attack, and lift support to maneuver units of action; could conduct reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and screening operations for the unit 

of employment at the higher tactical level; and could func­tion within 

a combat radius of 150 kilometers. The unit would contain up to six 

aviation battalions if a mission so required. Providing expert planning 

to synchro­nize aviation operations, it would coordinate Army aviation 

with the aviation assets of the other military services. When Task Force 

Modularity revised the strike unit of action into what became the fires 

unit of action, it transferred that force’s long-range strike mission to the 

aviation unit of action.70

By March 2004, Task Force Aviation had created two types of aviation units of action. One was heavy and the other light, but both could 

support up to five brigade combat teams. Each had two attack battalions, 

one assault battalion, one general support battalion, one aviation support 

battalion, and a headquarters. The difference between the two designs 

was that the heavy one employed attack helicopters in its attack battalions 

while the light one used armed observation helicopters (Chart 6).71

Later in the year, Task Force Aviation developed a medium unit of 

action. A cross between the heavy and light versions, it contained the 

usual attack batta­lions, but one was armed with attack helicopters and 

the other with armed obser­vation helicopters. Task Force Aviation also 

developed an aviation expeditionary brigade for the Army National 

Guard. This design not only allowed Guard units to fulfill homeland 

defense as well as expeditionary roles, but it also complied with Secretary 

Rumsfeld’s directive to rebalance the active and reserve components. The 

unit had much the same mix of battalions as the other three aviation units 

of action, but it exchanged one attack battalion for a security and support 

battalion that would be equipped with a new light utility helicopter. 

Theater-level aviation brigades that would serve primarily in reserve 

components also received the task force’s attention. They were designed 

without any attack units and with fixed-wing support aircraft.72

Development of the Maneuver Enhancement Unit of Action

In its analysis, the task force concluded that units from many of 

the Army’s branches filled a protective function by executing missions 

70 PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: SUA Horseblankets (12 

Nov 03) v.JWM2. 71 Overarching Modular Briefing to CSA, 4 Feb 03; John’s Notes to Modular Briefing 

to CSA Backups, version 2.0; Briefing, Modular Force Aviation Structure. 72 Briefing, Modular Force Aviation Structure.
Aviation Bde

Headquarters

&

Headquarters

Co

Chart 6—ORGANIZATION OF A MODULAR AVIATION BRIGADE, SEPTEMBER 2004

Aviation

General

Support Bn

Utility

Assault

Helicopter Bn

Aviation

Support

Bn

Attack

Helicopter

Bn

Signal Co

Source: Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. 1-16.

Unmanned

Aerial

Vehicle Co

Organic Assigned
58

that prevented or miti­gated the effects of hostile action. Because these 

forces all served the same purpose, the designers decided that assigning 

them to the same unit of action headquarters was logical. Originally 

named the protection unit of action because of this, the command that 

resulted marked a radical departure from the Army’s tradi­tional practice 

of creating and organizing force structure by branch. The new unit’s 

headquarters would be its only permanent part. When a mission arose, it 

would deploy with and use components of whatever sort were necessary 

to do the job.73

By mid-November 2003, the protection unit of action was responsible 

for preventing or at least reducing the effects of hostile actions against 

U.S. Army and joint force personnel, resources, facilities, and data. As 

part of this mission, it would coordinate and supervise security operations 

in areas designated by higher head­quarters. As a standing, multifunctional 

headquarters, its staff had the exper­­tise to control a mission-oriented 

grouping of chemical, engineer, air defense, and military police units. 

With augmentation from civil affairs, psycho­logical operations, and 

combat service support forces, the protection unit of action could also 

conduct security, stabilization, and reconstruction operations.74

The task force’s designers were very conscious of the way the war 

in Iraq was evolving and the dispersed nature of many operations there. 

This led them to stress the protection unit of action’s ability to coordinate 

and control a range of secu­rity operations. Whether employed by the unit 

of employment at the opera­tional level, by the unit of employment at 

the higher tactical level, or by joint commanders, the force could make 

effective use of all the combat power it had in a single area, control 

battalion-size maneuver units, or serve as a stability or reconstruction 

headquarters.75

The protection unit of action’s structure was radically different from 

that of the chemical, engineer, air defense, and military police units in 

the Army’s branch-specific brigades. As a result, concerns inevitably 

arose about how well the force’s officers and troops would understand 

the way the unit of action was supposed to work. Reason­ing that the 

73 PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: Design Guidance 

v.1.3 241200 Oct 03; PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: SUA 

Horseblankets (12 Nov 03) v.JWM2. 74 The design of the protection unit of action was influenced by a study conducted at 

the National Defense University in 2004. See National Defense University, Transforming 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, May 2004, Washington, D.C., Historians 

files, CMH. 75 PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: SUA Horseblankets (12 

Nov 03) v.JWM2.
59

word protection hardly conveyed the full role the unit was designed to 

serve, General Byrnes ordered a change to a more suitable title: maneuver 

enhance­ment unit of action. Soon afterward, during a 19 March 2004 

task force briefing, General Schoomaker stressed that since the mis­sions 

the force would receive required it to have “a combat arms mentality,” 

meaning soldiers needed to be technical specialists willing and able to 

enter into and survive dangerous situations. Thus the Army had to develop 

the means to inculcate that mentality. The general also expressed concern 

about how the units’ commanders would acquire the know­ledge necessary 

to make effective use of units drawn from so many different branches of 

the service. Reasoning that deferring such ques­tions to when the Army 

actually established the unit seemed best, he approved the design, but 

work on it nonetheless continued until well into 2005 (Chart 7).76

Development of the Battlefield Surveillance Unit of Action

During the design of the five support units of action, the effort to 

develop the battlefield surveillance unit proved to be particularly difficult 

and contentious. Should the unit of action most resemble a military intelligence brigade, an armored cavalry regiment, or some combination of the 

two? Early guidance from the task force clearly favored the intelligence 

option. It described the new organi­zation as an “information superiority” 

unit of action, stressed multidisciplinary intelligence efforts, and said 

little about an armed reconnaissance role. Because of the significant 

reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities maneuver unit of action 

designs already contained, task force planners assumed that those units 

would fill that role if it became necessary. Using their inherent intelligence capa­bilities and combat power, the reasoning went, the units 

would have little diffi­culty doing jobs divisional cavalry squadrons and 

corps armored cavalry regi­ments had always done.77

By November 2003, the task force had renamed the unit the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance unit of action and had included 

76 MFRs, Col John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 9 Mar 04, sub: After 

Action Review of Briefing to CG, TRADOC ref: Support Unit of Action Requirements 

Determination—Continuation from 2 March 2004 Session, and 19 Mar 04, sub: Results 

Task Force Modularity Current Force Unit of Employment Decision Brief to CSA 19 

March 2004; Interv, J. Patrick Hughes with Lt Col Telford E. Crisco Jr., Combined Arms 

Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 8 Jun 06; Col Jeffrey 

R. Witsken, Comments on draft, 19 Mar 2007, item 14. All in Historians files, CMH. 77 Quote from PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: Design 

Guidance v.1.3 241200 Oct 03. Witsken et al., The Role of Analysis in the Creation of 

the Modular Force, p. 46.
Maneuver Enhancement Bde

Headquarters

&

Headquarters

Co

Chart 7—ORGANIZATION OF A MODULAR MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE, SEPTEMBER 2004

Chemical MP

Bde

Support

Bn

Engr Signal Co

Source: Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. 1-16.

Explosive

Ordnance

Organic Assigned

Air

Defense

Arty

Civil

Affairs Maneuver

Attached or Under

Operational Control (size based on mission) (size based on mission)
61

in its design all aspects of military intelligence. The force now had the 

ability both to mount sur­veillance in regions that separated brigade 

combat teams’ areas of operation and to reinforce maneuver unit of 

action intelligence efforts. Its mission was to provide timely, relevant, 

and accurate intelligence to the commanders and subordinate com­mands 

of units of employment at the higher tactical level and joint task forces. 

If necessary, special operations forces and Army aviation units could be 

assigned to the unit for reconnaissance operations.78

Further analysis followed. By February 2004, it had led to more 

revisions and yet another new name: reconnaissance and surveillance 

unit of action. The force’s base structure remained generally the same 

as before, with a headquar­ters, a military intelligence battalion that 

included a tactical reconnais­sance unmanned aerial vehicle element, a 

support element, and a long-range surveillance unit. The command could 

still obtain special operations units from force pools, but it could now 

also command a ground armed reconnaissance element if needed. This 

change came in re­sponse to concerns that occasions might arise when 

the unit would have to fight to obtain information or to conduct security 

operations. At that time, however, little work had been done on how the 

unit would conduct such missions.79

By early March, the force had been renamed once again, this time 

as the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition unit of action. 

Its mission and characteristics, however, remained the same. At a 9 

March briefing, General Byrnes remarked that there remained a role for 

cavalry in the modular force and that manned reconnaissance required the 

“professional judgment of a soldier.” He suggested that the Army create 

a force pool of such units for the modular force instead of an organization 

akin to the current armored cavalry regiments. During the 19 March 

briefing, General Schoomaker, who had served in armored cavalry units 

earlier in his career, also addressed the issue. He thought that the unit of 

action’s overall design needed more analysis and refinement, parti­cularly 

on how to provide the resources for ground reconnaissance and the role 

armored cavalry units should play. Perhaps, he said, the time had come 

to consider eliminating cavalry regiments as separate organizations.80

78 PowerPoint Presentation, Task Force Modularity, sub: SUA Horseblankets (12 

Nov 03) v.JWM2. 79 John’s Notes to Modular Briefing to CSA Backups, version 2.0; Witsken, Walden, 

and Fratzel, Integrated Analysis Report, p. 46. 80 MFRs, Col John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 9 Mar 04, sub: After 

Action Review of Brief­ing to CG, TRADOC ref: Support Unit of Action Requirements 

Determination—Continuation from 2 March 2004 Session, and 19 Mar 04, sub: Results 
62

Further changes occurred on 30 July 2004, during a briefing at the 

Training and Doctrine Command, when General Byrnes questioned 

whether the unit of action needed a ground reconnaissance squadron. 

That a unit of employment at the higher tactical level could simply 

assign the mission to one of its brigade combat teams, he said, made 

more sense. When told that the unit of action needed an all-weather 

armed ground reconnaissance unit to round out its other resources, the 

general responded that this was “old think.” He argued that it reflec­ted 

neither the modularity effort’s concept of brigade-centered operations 

nor the reconnaissance abilities of maneuver units of action. The chief 

of the Army’s Armor Branch, Maj. Gen. Terry L. Tucker, objected. 

Assessments had shown, he said, that if the commander of a unit of 

employment at the higher tactical level lacked such a force, he would 

have to call in elements of a brigade combat team, thereby degrading the 

parent unit’s combat power. One of Task Force Modu­larity’s key senior 

mentors, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Huba Wass de Czege agreed with Tucker, but 

Byrnes remained unconvinced. He ordered the removal of the ground 

reconnaissance element from the design.81

Finally, in August 2004, General Schoomaker asked if the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition unit of action was needed 

at all. Might not an augmented Stryker Brigade Combat Team do the 

same job when it became necessary? One reason for his inquiry was that, 

with a war in progress, the Army was having difficulty finding the troops 

and equipment to man all the projected units of action. The Stryker units 

seemed a likely possibility, and they were already present in the force. 

Task Force Modularity undertook another round of assessments 

and ana­lyses to answer the question. By October, it had developed a 

new concept of close, near, and far reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition opera­tions for the modular force. Under it, brigade 

combat teams had the primary responsibility for close operations; the 

reconnaissance, surveil­lance, and target acquisition unit of action took 

primary responsibility for near operations; the unit of employ­ment at 

the operational level and joint com­mands had responsibility for far 

opera­tions. Analyses indicated that this unit of action needed air and 

ground capabilities that were adjustable based on the mission it received 

Task Force Modularity Current Force Unit of Employment Decision Brief to CSA 19 

March 2004. 81 MFR, John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 30 Jul 04, sub: After Action 

Report from TF MOD [Task Force Modularity] Brief to CG TRADOC on “How the 

UEx Fights” and RSTA [Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition] Brigade 

Mission/Organization, Historians files, CMH.
63

from the unit of employment at the higher tactical level. Its design thus 

retained the long-range surveillance detachment that was part of its 

brigade troops battalion and the unmanned aerial vehicle company that 

belonged to its military intelligence battalion. In addition, the unit of 

action headquarters had the ability to control supplementary ground and 

air reconnaissance and surveillance units attached to it for the duration 

of a mission (Chart 8).82

The designers considered turning the job over to Stryker forces when 

the need arose, but they found that although those units could perform 

the mission, they would need significant augmentation to do so. The use 

of a Stryker force in this way, moreover, removed a powerful maneuver 

element from the unit of employment at the higher tactical level. In light 

of these findings, General Schoomaker decided to retain the unit of action 

in the modular force. Reflecting the new concept of reconnaissance, 

surveillance, and target acquisition for the modular force, it received yet 

another name, becoming the battlefield surveillance brigade.

Development of the Units of Employment

In November 2003, Task Force Modularity published the initial draft 

of a white paper entitled Unit of Employment (UE). The report’s concepts 

relied heavily on the force design work done by the Army over the years 

prior to the creation of Task Force Modularity. It proposed replacing 

the three echelons above brigade—division, corps, and army—with a 

modular organization of two echelons. (See Chart 1.)

The study warned that while thinking of the new commands as 

improvements on the division and corps was natural, they would not be 

altered versions of their predecessors. Instead, both would be “modular 

entities designed to employ a tailored mix of forces.”83 The two units of 

employment would be designed around the future Battle Command System, 

a joint command and control system that would allow operations between 

Army forces and other joint forces to be integrated to a degree unattainable 

in the current force. The unit of employment at the higher tactical level 

would be the “primary tactical echelon,” combining the functions of the 

current division with the tactical responsibilities of the corps. The unit of 

employment at the operational level would consolidate most of the functions done by corps and armies into a single level. Both units of employment 

82 Witsken et al., The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force, pp. 

46–49; Briefing, Task Force Modularity, 3 Dec 04, sub: TF Modularity RSTA Brigade 

Analysis: Briefing to LTG Wallace 3 Dec 04, Historians files, CMH. 83 Task Force Modularity, Unit of Employment (UE), Initial Draft, 14 Nov 03, p. 6.
Recon, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Bde

Headquarters

&

Headquarters

Co

Chart 8—ORGANIZATION OF A MODULAR RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET

ACQUISITION BRIGADE, SEPTEMBER 2004

Support

Co

Long-Range

Surveillance

Detachment

Signal

Co

Source: Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. 1-16.

Organic

Bde

Troops Bn

Special

Opns Forces

Aviation

Bn

Attached or Under

Operational Control

Intell

Bn

Unmanned

Aerial

Vehicle Co

(size based on mission)
65

would have the ability to “flex”—that is, to form an intermediate third 

echelon in the hierarchy of command structures. For example, one unit of 

employment at the higher tactical level could command another or a division headquarters in the cur­rent field army. In this case, it would serve as 

a land component headquarters having direct charge of a force composed 

primarily of ground combat units. In the same way, a unit of employment 

at the operational level serving as the land component headquarters in a 

major combat operation could command another.84

The unit of employment at the operational level would have the ability 

to function as the senior Army command in a theater and as the Army 

component command in charge of all Army personnel, organizations, 

units, and installations in a unified, multiservice force. Without adding 

components, it could also serve either as the Army forces headquarters 

and joint land forces component command in a major combat operation 

or as the joint task force headquarters in a smaller scale con­tingency. 

The unit of employment at the higher tactical level, for its part, would 

serve as the primary combat-level headquarters of the modular Army 

with control over a mission-tailored mix of combat and support units 

of action. In smaller scale contingencies, it could serve with no supplementary units as the Army forces head­­quarters or the joint forces land 

component command. It might also serve with little or no increase in 

assets as a joint task force headquarters.85

According to the white paper, a unit of employment at the 

higher tactical level would exercise its authority through four 

command posts: a home station operations center, two deployable 

command posts, and a mobile command group. Although the home 

station operations center would not deploy, it would be more than 

just a rear detachment. Using satellite communications and digital 

information technologies, it would provide detailed analytical and 

planning support for deployed forces. Each of the other three command posts would be fully deployable with its own self-contained 

security and support elements. At this level, the normal relationship 

between the unit of employment at the higher tactical level and its 

subordinate units would be operational control. With the theater 

support command tailoring support units to the needs of the forces 

in operation, the unit of employment would assign tasks, designate 

objectives, and issue whatever directions were needed to accomplish 

its mission. 

84 Ibid., pp. 6–7.

85 Ibid., pp. 38–46.
66

In most cases, the force’s primary focus would be on areas of operation, which could be either contiguous or noncontiguous. To accomplish 

its mission, the unit’s comman­der would develop a plan that specified 

objectives, established areas of responsibility, allo­cated resources, and 

outlined relationships between the forces under their control.86 Concerned 

mainly with efforts in the field at the tactical level and the roles of the 

heavy unit of action and unit of employ­ment at the higher tactical level, 

the white paper presented few details on how the unit of employment at 

the operational level would exercise command and control. 

Between November 2003 and February 2004, Task Force Modularity 

con­tinued to develop and analyze the unit of employment at the higher 

tactical level, using the same methods that it employed for developing and 

refining other aspects of the modular concept. War games and simulations 

involving heavy and infantry units of action produced insights into how 

those forces would relate to units of employment at the operational and 

higher tactical levels. Designs for the two units of employment and for 

the various support units of action were also assessed, using a corps- and 

division-level war fighting simulation. During this period, Secretary 

Rumsfeld expressed an interest in the possibility of eliminating an 

echelon above brigade.87 

At a 19 February 2004 Task Force Modularity briefing, General 

Schoo­maker approved the emerging design of the unit of employment at 

the operational level and its supporting elements for continued development. He stressed that the unit of employment at the higher tactical level 

should be focused on “war fighting” while the unit of employment at the 

operational level concentrated on “creating conditions for the success 

of the fight.” At that time, he instructed the task force to remove the 

home station operations center from the design. Headquarters of the 

sort would be more useful if situated at key installations, where they 

could support more than one deployed unit of employment at the higher 

tactical level.88

On 19 March 2004, Task Force Modularity returned to General 

Schoo­maker to obtain his decisions on the unit of employment at the 

86 Ibid., pp. 30–35, 48–51.

87 AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task Force 

Modularity, pp. 5–10, 16–19; Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, Integrated Analysis Report, 

pp. 6–11, 43–47; E-mail, Col John J. Twohig to Brig Gen David C. Ralston, Army 

G–3, et al., 19 Jan 04, 1:25 P.M., sub: Additional Information Reference Headquarters 

Layering, Historians files, CMH. 88 MFR, 19 Feb 04, sub: Results Task Force Modularity Heavy Brigade Combat 

Team Design Briefing to CSA 19 February 2004.
67

higher tactical-level and support unit-of-action prototype designs. At that 

point, the unit of employment’s headquarters had a mobile command 

group, two tactical command posts, and a main command post, along 

with security, support, and signal elements (Chart 9). Its subordinate 

units would vary according to the demands imposed by the missions 

it received. The headquarters design provided the command with the 

means to con­trol combat and support units of action as well as to serve 

as an Army force headquarters without the addition of supplementary 

elements. If augmented, it could be a joint task force or combined or joint 

forces land component command. In his comments approving the design, 

the chief of staff highlighted the fact that the unit of employment at the 

higher tactical level was not just a division headquarters under another 

name, but rather a tactical and operational headquarters that would do 

tasks that only divisions and corps had done. He added that the design for 

the maneuver units of action would permit the modular force to add the 

equivalent of three and one-third divisions to the Regular Army without 

increasing the number of headquarters above brigade. While the approach 

involved some risk, he was willing to take it since the organizations in 

modular force were so “very capable.”89

In April 2004, Task Force Modularity created an integrated concept 

team to design the headquarters for the unit of employment at the operational level and its associated theater-level commands. The task force 

relied heavily on the expertise in theater-level operations of Col. (Ret.) 

John Bonin, professor of concepts and doctrine at the Army War College 

and a member of the task force. It also consulted frequently with regional 

combatant commands such as the European Command and the Central 

Command and Army service component commands such as U.S. Army, 

Europe, and U.S. Army, Pacific. The work generated significant debate 

in two areas: on designs for theater-level commands and on the number 

of echelons that should exist above the unit of action.90

The task force’s initial idea, based on Bonin’s work, provided for 

three different theater-level commands: a theater information superiority command, which combined intelligence and communication 

functions; a theater protection command, which united area security 

with air defense; and a theater sustain­ment command, which had charge 

89 Quote from Ibid. Briefing, Task Force Modularity, sub: Task Force Modularity 

Current Force Unit of Employment Decision Brief to CSA 19 March 2004, Historians 

files, CMH; Interv, Hughes and Charlston with Ancker, 7 Jun 06. 90 Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular 

Force, p. 42; AAR, Modularity Implementation Within the Institutional Army, Task 

Force Modularity, pp. 11–12, 19.
Unit of Employment at 

the Higher Tactical Level

Tactical 1

Chart 9—ORGANIZATION OF A UNIT OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE HIGHER TACTICAL LEVEL

OCTOBER 2004

Tactical 2 Main Mobile Command Gp Special Troops Bn

Four deployable command posts, with security, signal, and life support provided by the special troops battalion

Fixed Elements of the Unit of Employment at the Higher Tactical Level

Assigned or Attached to the Unit of Employment at the Higher Tactical Level as Required

A mix of assigned and attached brigade combat teams

Heavy Bde

Combat Team

Inf Bde

Combat Team

Stryker Bde

Combat Team

Recon, Surveillance,

and Target

Acquisition Bde

Fires Bde Aviation Bde Maneuver Enhancement

Bde

Sustainment

Bde

A mix of assigned and attached supporting brigades

Source: Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, p. 1-11.
69

of logistics. The com­mands would receive a mix of units from force 

pools tailored to the demands of each mission (Chart 10).91 Third Army, 

which the task force was using as the developmental framework for the 

unit of employment’s staff, objected to this concept, arguing instead 

that more conven­tional theater commands would suffice. Threatened 

with the loss of theater-level headquarters under this design, a number 

of the Army’s branches also demurred. The debate that ensued led the 

Training and Doctrine Command to convene a high-level workshop 

on 25 May 2004, with generals attending from the Third Army; the 

U.S. Army, Pacific; the Joint Forces Command; and the Training and 

Doctrine Com­mand. At this conference, General Byrnes decided to 

develop a modi­fied course of action proposed by the Third Army’s 

representa­tives. This design eliminated the theater information superiority command and the theater protec­tion command. It also organized the 

command’s headquarters by joint functions that included, as necessary, 

elements representing such specialties as signals and communications, 

military intelli­gence, sustainment, and civil affairs. Byrnes directed 

the task force to prepare a basic organizational plan for the unit of 

employment and to examine how to tailor this design to each regional 

ground combat command.92 

Task Force Modularity presented these revisions to the chief of 

staff on 15 June. General Schoomaker approved both the modified 

theater-level commands structure and the continued development of 

a basic design for the unit of employment at the operational level. 

Each headquarters and its theater-level commands would share the 

same functional organization but would vary in size depending on the 

needs of the regional combatant command it was assigned to support. 

In that way, the command could be modified to become the Army 

service compo­nent commander for a regional combatant command, 

yet retain its ability to be at some other time a joint task force or a 

joint forces land component command. General Schoomaker stressed 

his earlier guidance that the unit of employment at the higher tactical 

91 Paper, John Bonin, The “UEy” Echelon in the Future Force, 20 Nov 03. See 

also idem, Theater Protection Command Concept Paper, version 1.1, 2 Apr 04, and 

Theater Information Superiority Command Concept Paper, version 1.0, 2 Apr 04. All 

in Historians files, CMH. 92 Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular 

Force, pp. 42–43; E-mail, Col John Twohig, 26 May 04, sub: Results of UEy Senior 

Leader Workshop at Fort Monroe 25 May 2004, with atch FW: Email to Commandants, 

and Interv, J. Patrick Hughes and Jeffery A. Charlston, CMH, with John Bonin, U.S. 

Army War College, 21 Mar 06, both in Historians files, CMH; Intervs, Hughes and 

Charlston with Burke, 7 Jun 06, and Hughes with Crisco, 8 Jun 06.
Unit of Employment at 

the Operational Level

Theater

Sustainment

Command

Chart 10—ORIGINAL TASK FORCE MODULARITY DESIGN FOR A UNIT OF EMPLOYMENT

AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, APRIL 2004

 Source: Task Force Modularity, In Progress Review (IPR) for the Chief of Staff of the Army, Unitof Employment at the Operational Level (UEy), 15 Jun 04, as of 141639 Jun 04, Historians files, CMH.

Theater

Protection

Command

Theater Information

Superiority

Command

Operational

Forces

• Title X support• Theater engineering• Medical• Theater-level and tactical sustainment• Reception, staging, onward movement and integration

• Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense• Air and missile defense• Survivability• Joint rear area coordinator capable• Theater engineering• Rear area base defense• Detainee operations

• Area communications network• Operational-level intelligence• Reconnaissance and surveillance• Information operations• Space control formations• Spectrum management

• Combatant command operational forces
71

level was primarily responsible for the tactical command and control 

of units of action, with the capability to be a joint task force or joint 

forces land component command headquarters for smaller operations. 

He also pro­vided additional guidance to design the staffs of units of 

employment at the operational level with core capabilities but not to 

overstructure them.93 

On 27 September, after further work that included conferences 

with Army service component commanders, war game assessments, 

and presentations to senior leaders of the other military services, Task 

Force Modularity returned to General Schoomaker for a decision. The 

briefing detailed the group’s conclusions on the unit of employment at 

the operational level and its subordinate commands. One important new 

influence on the team’s final product had been the experience of V Corps 

in Iraq after the end of major combat opera­tions in 2003. The Central 

Command directed the corps to serve as the headquarters for Joint Task 

Force 7, but without the additional staff necessary for it to function 

effectively as, in effect, a theater-level echelon. This led the task force’s 

designers to develop a very robust organization for the new command’s 

headquarters. In the end, the chief of staff approved the prototype designs 

for the headquarters and for the theater intelli­gence brigade, the theater 

sustainment command, the theater network command, and the theater 

civil affairs brigade (Chart 11). Although every one of the task force’s 

unit-of-employment, unit-of-action, and theater-command designs 

would undergo further refinement, the Training and Doctrine Command 

published ver­sion 1.0 of the Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, 

volume 1, which presented the Army with information on brigade combat 

teams and the two units of employ­ment in October 2004.94 

The final major decision on the unit of employment had to do with 

how many echelons above brigade the new modular force should have. 

Operational asses­s­ments had shown that occasions would arise when, 

either for political reasons or because of the complexity of an operation, 

having an intermediate tactical echelon between the two regular units of 

93 MFR, John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 15 Jun 04, sub: Results Task 

Force Modularity UEy Update in Progress Review to CSA 15 June 04, Historians files, 

CMH.94 Task Force Modularity, UE Decision Briefing to CSA, 27 Sep 04, Historians 

files, CMH; Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the 

Modular Force, pp. 44–45; MFR, John J. Twohig, Task Force Modularity, 27 Sep 04, 

sub: Results Task Force Modularity Unit of Employment Decision Briefing to CSA 27 

September 2004, Historians files, CMH; Interv, Hughes and Charlston with Bonin, 21 

Mar 06. TRADOC planned for volume 2 of Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity

to discuss the support units of action.
Unit of Employment at 

the Operational Level

Chart 11—OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATION OF A UNIT OF EMPLOYMENT

AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, SEPTEMBER 2004

 Source: Task Force Modularity, CSA Decision Brief, 27 Sep 04, v7 10Sept04 without backups, Historians files, CMH.

Theater

Intell

Capability

Regionally focused command and control headquartersDedicated set of associated and regionally focused units; unit size and capability tailored to specific theaterRepresentative menu of available units assigned or attached based on mission, enemy, terrain, and weather; troops and support available; time available; and civil considerations

Theater

Sustainment

Capability

Theater

Network

Capability

Theater

Civil Affairs/Civil-Military

 Opns Capability

Unit of

Employment

at the

Higher

Tactical

Level

Marine

Air-Ground

Task Force

Aviation Chemical MP

Air and

Missile

Defense

Medical Engr Information Opns
73

employ­ment would be wise. The task force had then to consider whether 

occasions of the sort were common enough to warrant the creation of permanent intermediate headquarters with their own supporting assets.95 

Task Force Modularity had concluded that only the two echelons 

were necessary, a position reflected in the Army Comprehensive Guide 

to Modularity, volume 1. The publication addressed the issue by noting 

that “the Army tailors the UEy with an additional UEx headquarters and 

forces to serve as the intermediate tactical level.” The only change necessary in a unit of employment at the higher tactical-level headquarters that 

received such a mission would be the replacement of its commander, a 

major general, with a lieutenant general for the duration of the operation. 

Then, if the operation transitioned into a protracted effort to stabilize the 

command’s area of responsibility, the additional unit of employment 

would go back to its home station, and the normal two-echelon arrangement would remain.96 Further assessments in January 2005 and discussions between the Combined Arms Center; the Headquarters, Department 

of the Army; and the retired officers mentoring the modularity effort led 

in March 2005 to a Training and Doctrine Command decision to retain 

the original design. The format the task force laid down for a unit of 

employment at the higher tactical level was generic. If the need arose, 

the command could be tailored to perform as an intermediate stage.97

Regional combatant commands and Army service component commands, however, strongly supported the existing system of three echelons 

above brigade at the division, corps, and army levels. They argued that the 

span of control in some operations was so broad and complex that only a 

headquarters trained to handle situations of the sort could master them. 

Although the Training and Doc­trine Command argued that the standard 

unit of employment at the higher tactical-level headquarters could do the 

job, it concluded that the modular force would not be compromised by 

the addition of a second version of the command. General Schoo­­­maker 

had the final say. In April, he directed the organization of two types of 

units of employment at the higher tactical level. The first was referred to 

as the “two-star” unit of employment at the higher tacti­cal level because 

it would be commanded by a major general. The second was referred 

to as the “three-star” unit of employment at the higher tactical level 

95 Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular 

Force, p. 51.

96 Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, vol. 1, version 1.0, 8 October 2004, 

pp. 5-5, 5-11. 97 Witsken, Walden, and Fratzel, The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular 

Force, p. 51.
74

because it would be commanded by a lieutenant general. The former 

would be somewhat smaller than the latter because the three-star version 

would serve mainly as a joint task force or joint forces land component 

command while retaining the role of an intermediate headquarters as a 

secondary mission.98

98 Intervs, William Donnelly, Stephen Lofgren, and Mark Sherry, all of CMH, with 

Col Rickey E. Smith, TRADOC Futures Center, 6 Feb 06, Historians files, CMH; Hughes 

and Charlston with Burke, 7 Jun 06, and with Ancker, 7 Jun 06. Smith served as the first 

Task Force Modularity chief of staff.
75

Unit Designations in the Modular Force

Previous Army force redesigns had rarely prompted unit redesignations. The main exception had been the Pentomic design, which replaced 

the three regiments in infantry and airborne divisions with five battle 

groups. The term battle group had been selected because the new units 

were smaller than the regiments they replaced but larger than the battalions those forces had originally contained. This new designation also 

empha­sized that Pentomic infantry and airborne divisions were radically 

different from their predecessors.99

In the same way, the designers of the Objective Force and later Task 

Force Modularity had used the expressions unit of employment and unit 

of action to empha­size that their designs were radical departures from 

those of the past. The terms were intended to create a conceptual break 

between traditional unit designations and the functions performed at a 

given echelon of command. The idea was to encourage fresh thinking 

and to avoid preconceived notions based on traditional terms such as 

corps and division. The terms, moreover, were never meant to be the 

final names for the units they created. Instead, in early 2004, the agency 

responsible for determining official Army designations, as well as unit 

lineages and honors, the U.S. Army Center of Military History, embarked 

on a long series of briefings and consultations in search of alternatives. 

After seeking the opinions of concerned parties within the Army and of 

General Sullivan, who at the time headed the Association of the United 

States Army, it proposed three courses of action. 

The first offered few changes. Corps designations and lineages 

would be assigned to units of employment at the oper­ational level and 

division lineages to units of employment at the higher tactical level. 

99 John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army, Army 

Lineage Series (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), pp. 

96–100.
76

Lineages for brigades that were listed on the tables of organization of 

divisions would go to maneuver units of action. The plan sought, in 

particular, to maintain as far as possible historic connections between 

the maneuver units of action and their subordinate components. For the 

support units of action, the planners sought to retain current divisional 

designations and lineages for the sustainment, fires, and aviation unit of 

action headquarters. New designations with no previous line­ages would 

be used for the battlefield surveillance unit of action and maneuver 

enhancement unit of action headquarters. Subordi­nate units for all 

the units of action would keep their current designations and lineages 

to the extent possible under the modular structure. This plan, which 

was already being used in the first divisions switching to the modular 

organization, had the advantage of maintaining the lineages of existing divisions and their con­sti­tu­ent brigades and of limiting changes 

primarily to the unit of employment at the opera­­tional level. It had the 

disadvantage, however, of obscuring the point that modular units were 

different from the old designs.

The second course of action, a “hybrid regiment” plan, suggested 

assigning lineages and numbered army designations such as Eighth 

Army to the units of employment at the operational level. Each unit 

of employment at the higher tac­tical level would inherit the name and 

lineage of an existing division. Maneu­ver unit-of-action headquarters 

would receive regimental headquarters designations and lineages. 

Maneuver units subordinate to them would use the battalion line­ages 

traditional to those regiments. Other units within the unit of action 

would retain their current designations and lineages to the extent 

possible. Among support units of action, however, only the aviation 

units could follow this plan because only they had fixed subordinate 

battalions. The other support units of action would have to use brigade, 

rather than regimental, lineages.

Overall, the approach had three advantages. It main­tained current 

division lineages, returned historical regimental headquarters lineages 

to active use, and retained numbered army designations. As for disadvantages, it cut about 25 percent of the Army’s existing armor and 

infantry regimental lineages from the active force. In addition, extensive 

unit reflagging would be necessary at the battalion level, resulting in a 

confusing and disruptive exchange of flags and lineages among many 

units. This, in turn, would cause emotional turmoil when officers and 

troops learned they would have to exchange historic battle flags, guidons, 

unit awards, and heirlooms for those of other units. Complicating matters, each unit would receive new shoulder patches, but some of the new 
77

lineages that would have to be employed did not include them. Finally, 

of all the support units of action, this alternative was appli­cable only to 

the aviation unit of action. The other support units of action would have 

to use brigade, rather than regimental, lineages.

The third course of action gave each unit of employment at the 

operational level a numbered army designation and lineage. Each unit of 

employment at the higher tactical level received a corps designation and 

lineage. Bri­gade designations, using lineages from separate brigades and 

divisions, would go to the maneuver units of action. Units subordinate 

to these would, when possible, retain their current regimental designations and lineages. Among support units of action, sustainment, fires, 

and aviation headquarters would receive separate brigade designations 

with line­ages from appropriate previous units. Separate brigade designations with no pre­vious line­age would go to the battlefield surveillance 

unit-of-action and maneuver enhancement unit-of-action headquarters. 

Subordi­nate elements in all support units of action would retain their 

existing designations and lineages in every case where the modular design 

allowed it. In addition to emphasizing that the unit of employment at 

the higher tactical level was not merely a redesigned division, this plan 

preserved most current lineages, reactivated many historically significant 

but inactive lineages, and provided each maneuver unit of action with 

a historic shoulder patch. Disad­vantages included the absence of any 

Army National Guard corps lineages for Guard unit-of-employment 

headquarters at the higher tactical level, and some Regular Army units 

would receive Army Reserve division or brigade lineages. The plan also 

required the redesignation of many units, which could damage morale 

and siphon off funds.100

In September 2004, the Center of Military History’s director, Brig. 

Gen. John S. Brown, briefed General Schoomaker on the three options. 

The chief of staff delayed making a decision, saying that he wanted a blue 

ribbon panel headed by General Sullivan and com­posed of other retired 

generals to examine the issue and to make a recommendation. On 25 

January 2005, the panel advised the adoption of the first course of action, 

that of minimal change. While its members noted that the option might 

lead some people to think that the modular force was less than a major 

change in organization, they concluded that soldiers “are dealing with a lot 

100 The discussion of the three courses of action is based on PowerPoint Presentation, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, May 04, sub: Unit Designations in the Modular 

Army, Historians files, CMH.
78

of uncertainty in today’s world” and that giving them “a sense of stability” 

was important by reducing the number of unit redesignations.101

By April 2005, the chief of staff had decided to retain the three 

echelons above the brigade. In that light, he directed the Center of 

Military History to adopt a modified version of the first course of action 

by assigning the lineages of numbered armies to units of employment 

at the operational level, those of corps to three-star units of employment 

at the higher tactical level, and those of divisions to two-star units of 

employment at the higher tactical level. Finally, units of employment at 

the operational level were to use geographical rather than numerical designations, employing, for example, such terms as U.S. Army, Europe, to 

designate the Army component of the European Command. Schoomaker 

also directed that, except for the aviation unit of action, which remained 

designated as a divisional brigade, support units of action were to be 

designated as separate brigades. The Army formally announced this final 

designation plan in October 2005.102

101 Edward N. Bedessem, CMH, Chronology for Work on Designation in the Modular 

Force, December 2004; Ltr, Gen (Ret.) Gordon R. Sullivan to Gen Peter J. Schoomaker, 

25 Jan 05. Both in Historians files, CMH. 102 TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5; Bedessem, Chronology for Work on Designation in 

the Modular Force; PowerPoint Presentation, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Oct 

05, sub: Unit Designations in the Army Modular Force, Historians files, CMH.
79

Conclusion

Although the Training and Doctrine Command would continue 

to revise unit designs as they were tested in the field, the chief of 

staff’s decisions on unit desig­­nations marked the end of the design 

stage for the modular force. While it was running, three major influences were in play. The first was General Schoo­maker, whose ideas 

shaped the process.­ Coming out of retirement, the general entered 

office during an open-ended war that was placing excessive strain on 

the all-volunteer Army and its division-based force. Unlike General 

Shinseki, he wanted a rolling set of changes leading from a current 

to a future force instead of a sharply defined set of Legacy, Interim, 

and Objective Forces. The new chief of staff also concluded that the 

service faced a narrow window of opportunity, both financially and 

politically, in which to make radical changes not only to deal with 

problems existing opera­tions posed but also to set standards for the 

future force. These considerations led Schoomaker to begin the most 

radical transformation in force structure the Army had experienced 

since the Pentomic era of the 1950s. 

The second influence was the requirement that Task Force 

Modularity should work within the existing end strength of the Army 

and use only those technologies and systems that would be available 

by 2005. These limitations forced designers into compromises based on 

resource constraints. The most notable was the decision to field brigade 

combat teams with only two maneuver battalions and a reconnaissance, 

surveillance, and target acquisition squadron and to rely on technological and organizational enablers to ensure that those forces could per­form 

as well as three-battalion brigades. Although Schoomaker preferred the 

three-battalion design himself, he approved the two-battalion version 

because he understood that the Army could not field the larger force 

with the resources it had on hand.
80

The third influence was the emphasis on quickly fielding modular 

designs in the operational force. The judgment that there was a narrow 

window of oppor­tu­nity for an expensive redesign and a pressing need for 

more units to support operations led Schoomaker to insist on an accelerated force development program. He judged that the 80 percent solution 

was sufficient for initial imple­mentation and that the Army would have 

the opportunity to improve its modular designs after it gained operational 

experience. Task Force Modu­larity met the chief of staff’s objective 

by drawing on the huge bank of insight and expertise the Army had 

accumulated since General Sullivan had begun the effort to trans­form the 

Army to fit a post–Cold War world. Compressing the process, however, 

had certain costs, in particular, a lack of sufficient doctrine and proper 

training pack­ages for the first modular units. The gap between design 

and doctrine was especially troubling because the modular Army with its 

two-battalion maneuver brigades and multifunctional support brigades 

was radically different from the force it was to replace.

In many ways, the design process was far different from those of 

earlier efforts to change the Army. Most notable was General Schoomaker’s decision that the need for speed required a close hold on the task 

force’s early work to avoid what he saw as the delaying effects of branch 

paro­chialism. Furthermore, his requirement that the modular force be 

capable of conducting joint operations affected not only the designs, but 

also led to frequent consultations with Army service component commands and the joint regional com­batant commands. In order to meet the 

chief of staff’s deadlines, the effort employed a robust series of analyses 

that relied in part on computer simulations. It also relied, however, on 

experienced retired officers and senior mentors who enriched the entire 

process with their insights. 

Task Force Modularity achieved the objectives General Schoomaker 

had set for it, quickly producing farsighted designs for a modular, brigadebased Army. That, however, was only a beginning. Just as important 

was how those designs would work in the real world. If earlier Army 

transformations are any indication, the ser­vice will adopt one of three 

approaches. It may keep the redesign and build on it because it fits the 

Army’s needs into the foreseeable future. Then again, it could abandon 

everything because of changes in national security strategy or the emergence of a new or evolving threat. Finally, the service could choose a 

middle course, keep­ing some innovations but discarding others. A case 

in point occurred following World War II, when the Army dropped such 

promising prewar designs as the tank destroyer unit because they had 

not performed well in combat. It kept many others, how­ever, such as 
81

the triangular division, a separate armor force, and specialized airborne 

units, all of which remained in use for years. At this point, as far as the 

modular Army is concerned, all options are open.

83

Appendix

Representative Divisional Brigade Combat

Team Organizations, 2003

In 2003, the U.S. Army organized the maneuver brigades in its divisions using a variation of the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions 

(ROAD) concept it had adopted in 1961 to replace the failed Pentomic 

organization. At the time of the invasion of Iraq, most divisions had 

a common base organization of a headquarters, a division artillery, a 

division support command, three maneuver brigade headquarters, an 

aviation element, a reconnaissance element, an air defense element, an 

engineer element, a signal element, a military police element, a military 

intelligence element, and a band. The exact size and composition of these 

base components varied, depending on the type of division. 

The ROAD concept allowed the division commander to tailor 

his forces. The only organic element in the maneuver brigade was its 

headquarters. While three maneuver battalions were normally assigned 

to each brigade (along with a reconnaissance troop in the armored and 

mechanized infantry divisions), the division commander could add or 

subtract battalions as needed. In combat, however, each brigade required 

a “division slice”—a portion of the division’s base elements. Division 

commanders thus normally provided each brigade with the same set of 

units from the base components in order to develop a habitual association among the brigades and these units that would promote maximum 

combat effectiveness.

By 2003, this practice of habitual association generally meant that 

divisions had formed de facto brigade combat teams; indeed, divisions 

often identified their maneuver brigades as brigade combat teams. 

Generally, these brigade combat teams would consist of a brigade head-
84

quarters (and its reconnaissance troop in armor and mechanized infantry 

divisions); three maneuver battalions; a field artillery battalion; a forward 

support battalion; an air defense element; an engineer element; a signal 

element; and a military intelligence element. Depending on the mission 

and the situation, division commanders would provide brigade combat 

teams additional resources either from the division base or from units 

the corps had placed under the division’s operational control.

The following charts are examples of typical brigade combat team 

organizations prior to modular force designs.
Mechanized Inf Bde

Headquarters

&

Headquarters

Co

TYPICAL HEAVY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 2003

MP

Platoon

Armor

Bn

Recon

Troop

Mechanized

Inf Bn

Source: TRADOC Analysis Center, Task Force Modularity Integrated Analysis Report: Analysis Underpinning

Recommendations to the CSA, September 2003–March 2004, p. B-6.

Field Arty

Bn

(Self-propelled)

Assigned

Air

Defense

Arty

Battery

Engr

Bn

Signal

Co

Attached/Direct Support

Military

Intell Co

Support

Bn
Inf Bde

Headquarters

&

Headquarters

Co

TYPICAL LIGHT INFANTRY/AIR ASSAULT/AIRBORNE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM ORGANIZATION, 2003

Inf Bn

Source: TRADOC Analysis Center, Task Force Modularity Integrated Analysis Report: Analysis Underpinning

Recommendations to the CSA, September 2003–March 2004, p. B-126.

Field Arty

Bn

Assigned

Air

Defense

Arty

Battery

Engr

Co

Signal

Co

Attached/Direct Support

Military

Intell Co

Support

Bn
87

Bibliographical Note

Unpublished Sources

The most important source for this work was Task Force Modularity’s 

records. Members of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) 

collected copies of the task force’s electronic records from the TRADOC 

Futures Center Forward (now the Army Capabilities Integration Center 

Forward) in Arlington, Virginia; the TRADOC Combined Arms Center, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the TRADOC History Office at Fort 

Monroe, Virginia. These records include e-mails, memorandums, information papers, after action reviews, and briefings, as well as reference 

works collected by the task force. Especially useful were the detailed 

memorandums prepared after every briefing of General Schoomaker by 

the task force and the after action review written by the task force shortly 

before it disbanded. 

Several other sets of records were consulted. At Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, CMH historians collected documents from the 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, and the Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G–8. Two members of the task force, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) 

Huba Wass de Czege and Professor John Bonin of the U.S. Army War 

College, provided documents from their personal files. For information 

on the designations of modular force units, records at CMH’s Force 

Structure and Unit History Branch were used.

In 2005 and 2006, CMH historians conducted interviews on the 

subject of the design of the modular force and the first steps taken toward 

its implementation. Among those interviewed were Clinton Anker, 

Marsha D. Arrington, Peter B. Bechtel, John Bonin, Michael Burke, 

Wayne F. Chalupa, Lt. Col. Randy Copeland, Lt. Col. Telford E. Crisco 

Jr., Lt. Col. Charles Davis, Col. Rodney Dixon, Col. James Doty, Mark 
88

H. Gerner, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Thomas R. Goedkoop, Judith A. Guenther, 

Col. David R. Hampton Jr., Douglas V. Johnson II, Lt. Col. M. Wade 

Markel, Maj. Gen. Robert W. Mixon Jr., Lt. Col. Karl D. Reed, Col. 

John D. Renaud, Lt. Col. Laura Richardson, Col. Mark Rocke, Col. Earl 

M. Silver, Maj. Stephen B. Sledge, Col. Rickey E. Smith, Col. Ralph 

Sparks, Lewis S. Steenrod, Col. Robert L. Steinrauf, Lt. Col. Fred L. 

Svedarsky, Col. Robin Swan, Col. Paul D. Thornton, Col. (Ret.) John 

J. Twohig, Lt. Col. Thomas E. Wallen, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Huba Wass de 

Czege, Maj. Gen. William G. Webster, Lt. Col. Clifford Wheeler, and 

Col. Jeffrey R. Witsken.

Published Sources

The leading published primary sources were from the U.S. Army. A 

key document is Task Force Modularity’s Army Comprehensive Guide 

to Modularity, volume I, version 1.0. Designed to explain modularity to 

the Army, this reference provides an excellent overview of the subject 

as of October 2004 and gives ample information on brigade combat 

teams and units of employment. The guide, however, does not discuss 

support units of action at any length, and later decisions, especially on 

the echelons of command, modified the modularity concept presented 

in the publication.

Much of the detail on the origins of the modularity concept came 

from Training and Doctrine Command publications such as pamphlets, 

operational and organizational concept documents, and reports on various 

experiments. Especially useful for the key design issues faced by Task 

Force Modularity are two publications from the TRADOC Analysis 

Center, Task Force Modularity Integrated Analysis Report: Analysis 

Underpinning Recommendations to the CSA, September 2003–March 

2004, and Task Force Modularity: The Role of Analysis in the Creation 

of the Modular Force. Interviews and congressional testimony given by 

General Schoomaker provided his reasons for directing the conversion 

to a modular force structure. 

Because the events discussed in this monograph are so recent, 

relatively few secondary sources were used. A number of such documents were useful in tracing the beginnings of the modularity concept, 

outlining the state of the Army in mid-2003, and explaining some of 

the technologies the modular designs would depend on to meet General 

Schoomaker’s “as-capable-as” criteria.
89

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AAR After Action Review

AEF Air Expeditionary Force

Arty Artillery

ASCC Army Service Component Command

Bde Brigade

Bn Battalion

CADD Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate 

CDR Commander

CG Commanding General

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CMH Center of Military History

Co Company

COA Course of Action

COFS Chief of Staff, Army

CSA Chief of Staff of the Army

DCG Deputy Commanding General

DCSDEV Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments 

Div Division

Engr Engineer

FC Futures Center

FCS Future Combat Systems

FDD Force Development Directorate

FM Field Manual
90

GAO General Accounting Office

Gp Group

ID Infantry Division

Inf Infantry

Intell Intelligence

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

LTG Lieutenant General

MFR Memorandum for Record

MP Military Police

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

Opns Operations

Recon Reconnaissance

Ret. Retired

RFI Request for Information

ROAD Reorganization Objective Army Division

RSTA Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

SUA Support Unit of Action

TF Task Force

TFM Task Force Modularity

TF MOD Task Force Modularity

TOW Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided 

TRAC TRADOC Analysis Center

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

UA Unit of action 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UE Unit of employment 

UEx Unit of employment X 

UEy Unit of employment Y 

USAWC U.S. Army War College

VTC Video Teleconference