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i 

58–296 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–116] 

THE THREAT POSED BY AL QA’IDA 

IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 

AND OTHER REGIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JANUARY 20, 2010 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TIM MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, January 20, 2010, The Threat Posed by al Qa’ida in the Arabian 

Peninsula and Other Regions ............................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, January 20, 2010 ................................................................................ 35 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 2010 

THE THREAT POSED BY AL QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 

AND OTHER REGIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities ............... 2 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities ............... 1 

WITNESSES 

Benjamin, Ambassador Daniel, Counterterrorism Coordinator, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 7 

Olson, Adm. Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command .... 5 

Reid, Garry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Combating Terrorism, U.S. Department of Defense .................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Benjamin, Ambassador Daniel ........................................................................ 57 

Miller, Hon. Jeff ................................................................................................ 40 

Olson, Adm. Eric T. .......................................................................................... 49 

Reid, Garry ........................................................................................................ 42 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE THREAT POSED BY AL QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN 

PENINSULA AND OTHER REGIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

AND CAPABILITIES

Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 20, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. SMITH. Good morning. I call the meeting of the subcommittee 

to order. Appreciate our witnesses being here. 

I should point out that we will have votes imminently. It is my 

hope that we will be able to get through the opening statements 

at least from our three witnesses before we go to votes. And we will 

try to keep that as long as possible and then get back as quickly 

as we can. 

We are joined by three witnesses this morning, Garry Reid, who 

is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations 

and combating terrorism at the Department of Defense; Admiral 

Eric Olson, United States Navy, who is the commander of our U.S. 

Special Operations Command; and Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, 

the counterterrorism coordinator for the Department of State. 

And the purpose of this hearing is to offer the committee members a brief background on our ongoing fight against al Qa’ida [AQ] 

and our knowledge of their terrorist networks. Sorry about the 

feedback here. I will move back a little bit. 

And, in particular, al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, in response to the recent attempted bombing of the airline flight on 

Christmas Day that apparently appears to have at least in part 

come out of Yemen. 

To give us a broader understanding of the broad global fight that 

is going on against al Qa’ida—I have, you know, been on the 

Armed Services Committee for 13 years now and chaired this committee for 3 years, and I can assure the American public that the 

three gentlemen in front of us—and many, many others—have 

been working for a long time against the threat that al Qa’ida presents and working in a comprehensive fashion. 

It is not a battle that is limited to Afghanistan or Pakistan or 

Iraq. We understand that this is a threat that metastasizes in a 
2 

variety of different directions, and we are responding to that 

threat. 

I and other members of this committee have been around the 

world to a variety of different places where this is going on. Certainly, again, we have been to Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

but we have also been to the Philippines, to Indonesia, to Yemen, 

other parts of the Middle East, and in Africa. It is a comprehensive 

struggle that we are in engaged in, and we are engaged aggressively in protecting the United States of America from that threat. 

I in particular want to point out that the Special Operations 

Command is the command that has primary responsibility for coordinating this response. They work very closely with the various 

regional combatant commanders, but they are the ones that take 

the lead in coordinating the fight against al Qa’ida and against 

other terrorist groups. And they are doing an outstanding job. 

The men and women who serve in our special forces are some of 

the best that we have to offer in this country. They are doing a 

great job all across the world on our behalf to prepare for us, get 

us into a position to fight back against al Qa’ida. 

So with that, I will yield to Mr. Miller for any opening statement 

that he might have, the ranking member on the committee, Mr. 

Miller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM FLORIDA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are reminded over the holidays that terrorist threat remains and that al 

Qa’ida and like-minded groups do not rest in their efforts to bring 

violence and destruction to the citizens of this country. 

Since 9/11, we have sought to disrupt al Qa’ida and deny it safe 

haven from which they operate. We cannot constrain our efforts, 

however, to specific countries or regions, as our enemy is 

unbounded in its approach. 

As al Qa’ida continues to morph and adapt, we must also be agile 

in our approach to countering the threat of terrorism around the 

globe. 

And with that, I yield back. I would like to add my statement 

for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I, too, have a statement for the record 

that I will submit. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. SMITH. The bells have gone off. We are going to press on for 

a little while anyway, get as much testimony as we can. So we will 

start with Assistant Secretary Reid. 

Mr. Reid, please. 
3 

STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING 

TERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. Reid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, have submitted 

testimony and ask that it be entered into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. And I apologize. Actually, I forgot one important 

thing. Obviously, a lot of what we are interested in with regards 

to the fight against al Qa’ida involves top-secret information that 

we don’t want our enemies to know. All three of these folks here 

have information that is of a secret nature that they will not be 

revealing during this public hearing. 

I think it is important, nonetheless, to have this hearing, to talk 

about what we can talk about, let the public know that we are responding to the threat. But I would encourage all members of this 

committee, if they have questions that require secret information, 

seek out these gentlemen, seek out their departments. They are always very open and willing to meet with members and do that. 

For the purposes of this hearing, obviously, they will not be able 

to reveal that information, but we can get it in a different form. 

I apologize. Mr. Reid, please, go ahead. 

Mr. REID. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with your permission and Congressman Miller, distinguished members, I just 

have brief opening remarks. 

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the threat of al 

Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and other regions of the world. 

The Department of Defense [DOD] appreciates the enduring efforts 

of this committee to provide our special operations forces with the 

tools they need to defeat al Qa’ida, to protect themselves from improvised explosive devices, and to operate at the leading edge of 

technology in today’s extremely complex global security environment. 

Although the attempted terrorist attack of December 25th on 

U.S. soil appropriately brought increased attention to the threat 

emanating from the Arabian Peninsula, it is vitally important—as 

you said, Mr. Chairman—that we view al Qa’ida in a global context. 

The enemy certainly has a global agenda. Osama bin Laden, in 

his 1996 declaration of war on us, said it is the duty of all Muslims 

to fight in every part of the world. Bin Laden’s exploitation of 

ungoverned and poorly governed regions, such as Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Trans-Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the remote islands of the South Pacific as sanctuary for his 

movement reflects his aspirations to establish a new caliphate that 

would extend from Mauritania to Indonesia. 

Although Department of Defense efforts to counter al Qa’ida 

around the world must be tailored to each specific region, they all 

rely on the concurrent execution of training and equipping our 

partner nations’ security forces, increasing intelligence collection on 

the enemy threat, and conducting with our partners counterterrorism operations. 

And if I could just provide a brief overview of how this manifested itself in several regions, in Pakistan, the al Qa’ida core, although still a dangerous threat, has been significantly weakened by 
4 

the operations and activities of many nations against them since 

2001. 

Through the resources and authorities provided by the Pakistan 

counterinsurgency fund, the Department of Defense will continue 

to provide equipment, training and assistance to Pakistan’s security forces to help improve their capabilities to defeat al Qa’ida and 

its extremist allies in their country. 

In north-central Africa, al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, or 

AQIM, is currently engaged in a region-wide kidnapping campaign 

to terrorize U.S. and European travelers and members of the diplomatic community. In May 2009, they executed a British citizen in 

northern Mali. In June, a U.S. citizen was shot and killed in 

Nouakchott, Mauritania, in an attempted apparent kidnapping by 

individuals associated with AQIM. In November of last year, heavily armed AQIM terrorists attempted to kidnap a U.S. embassy employee in Niger. 

The centerpiece of our efforts to counter AQIM is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. The Department of Defense 

conducts bilateral training events underneath this program with 

partners in the region designed to improve counterterrorism capabilities, and we provide CT [counter terrorism]-related equipment 

through Section 1206 authorities. 

In East Africa, al Qa’ida continues to use the Somali safe haven 

as a training and recruitment base. AQ has provided training to alShabaab, which although predominantly an internal Somali movement, has shown signs of expanding its operations across Africa 

into Yemen and further into Europe. 

Department of Defense counterterrorism engagements in the region are designed to deal with both near-term threats and longterm development challenges. We work closely with our international and interagency partners to address al Qa’ida and other 

terrorist threats emanating from the Horn of Africa. 

Our long-term regional strategy is led by Combined Joint Task 

Force Horn of Africa, which employs an indirect approach to countering violent extremism, conducting operations to strengthen partner nations’ security capacity, to enable long-term stability, prevent 

conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests. 

In the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, is the AQ affiliate that poses the greatest threat currently to 

the United States. Al Qa’ida in Yemen was responsible for the 2008 

attack on the U.S. embassy in Sana’a. And in 2009, the Saudi and 

Yemeni branches of al Qa’ida merged to form AQAP [al Qa’ida in 

the Arabian Peninsula]. 

They are responsible for killing South Korean tourists in Yemen 

in March 2009, for the attempted assassination of Saudi Prince 

Muhammad bin Nayef in August 2009, and, of course, the attempted December 25th attack on a U.S. commercial airliner. 

To defeat AQAP, the Department of Defense cooperates closely 

with Yemeni security forces. Since 2006, we have provided over $98 

million in counterterrorism assistance to increase their capabilities 

to prevent cross-border arms trafficking and regional foreign fighter flows, develop competent counterterrorism forces, and mitigate 

the threat of improvised explosive devices. 
5 

We anticipate continuing a high level of commitment to developing Yemen’s military and counterterrorism capacity in the future. Through a broad array of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, the department supports U.S. government efforts to address 

Yemen’s political, economic and humanitarian concerns. 

In Iraq, although still capable of dramatic suicide bombings, al 

Qa’ida has been declining since the June 2006 operation that led 

to the death of former leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The U.S. 

military continues to provide training and assistance to Iraqi 

counterterrorism forces, and we will continue to provide this assistance until U.S. forces are withdrawn at the end of 2011. 

In Southeast Asia, al Qa’ida has always been attracted to the 

large population of Muslims in the region. Long before the attacks 

of 9/11, they sought to exploit Jemaah Islamiyah, an organization 

led by Indonesian extremists with cells scattered across Malaysia, 

Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Their hotel bombings in 

Bali and Jakarta have killed hundreds. Despite these attacks, Indonesian forces have had significant success. 

The U.S. military counterterrorism commitment to the region is 

anchored by Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines and 

supported by other training and assistance engagements in Southeast Asia. 

Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for inviting me, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I appreciate that testimony, a very comprehensive look at what we are doing across the globe. 

Admiral Olson. I believe I will try to get Admiral Olson’s testimony in, and then we will leave when he is done. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Congressman Miller, and distinguished members of 

the committee. 

I do thank you for this opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the threat posed by al Qa’ida and its associated 

movements and groups. And I am very pleased to join my colleagues, Ambassador Benjamin and Mr. Reid, today. We do, in fact, 

meet regularly in other venues on this and similar topics. 

With your permission, sir, I will submit a written statement for 

the record and open with a briefer oral statement. 

Al Qa’ida is unlike any other terrorist group that has threatened 

America or our interests. It combines exploitation of religion, nationalism, and perceived exploitation with violent action and extremist rhetoric in a way that has attracted thousands of recruits 

and made cult heroes of its top leaders. 

Al Qa’ida’s goals are ambitious, employing a broad network to 

conduct local, regional and trans-regional operations intended to 

recruit, inspire and incite some, while intimidating and terrorizing 

others in order to dominate territory and control the population. 

This provides safe havens that then serve as training areas and 

bases of operations to launch attacks and expand influence. 
6 

Originally operating almost exclusively from within Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, al Qa’ida has expanded and become geographically dispersed over the past eight years since it was substantially 

pushed out of Afghanistan into western Pakistan in the opening 

weeks of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Al Qa’ida is now difficult to define. More than two dozen associated and adherent groups have established themselves in Iraq, the 

Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa, the Trans-Saharan region, 

the Maghreb of North Africa, West Africa, and Southeast Asia. And 

there are several different groups now operating within and from 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Al Qa’ida’s top leaders have proven elusive, and they have 

learned to use a variety of technical and non-technical means to 

communicate. And as you noted, Mr. Chairman, within the U.S. 

government’s efforts to challenge and ultimately defeat al Qa’ida, 

the United States Special Operations Command has been designated as the combatant command responsible for synchronizing 

the Department of Defense’s planning against terrorists and terrorist networks. 

We do this through a continuous series of virtual meetings across 

many government agencies. And serving in this role as an extension of the Joint Staff, we receive and review supporting plans submitted by each of the geographic combatant commanders, we 

prioritize the global requirements, and then we make recommendations regarding force and resource allocation. 

The United States Special Operations Command has also been 

designated as the Department of Defense lead for foreign terrorist 

financing and the DOD proponent for security force assistance. 

That means helping enable less capable countries to be more effective in addressing threats posed to them by al Qa’ida. 

The United States Special Operations Command’s main contribution, though, is in the people-based capabilities we provide to operational commanders. The special operations force, with the support 

and oversight provided by this committee, is well positioned to 

meet the nation’s highest expectations. When and where elements 

of special operations forces are properly employed, mostly in small 

teams and remote places, they are making a real difference against 

the al Qa’ida network. 

Certainly many rising al Qa’ida leaders have been killed or captured, and in many villages our people have provided non-violent 

alternatives to al Qa’ida’s presence, but there is much more to do. 

We must learn to better address recidivism, successful messaging, financing, training, smuggling and the acts of brutality that 

characterized al Qa’ida. And we must do these in partnership with 

or in support of other nations. All of this will require a comprehensive and enduring approach. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee, and I stand ready for your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I think we are down to about two or three minutes on the vote. 

We are going to run and do that and then we will take Ambassador 

Benjamin’s testimony. It is my hope that we will be able to be back 
7 

in half an hour to 40 minutes. And we will try to get back as quickly as we can. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. I think out of respect for our witnesses’ time, we will 

go ahead and get started. I know we had about 45 minutes away 

there. So we will get started in the Q&A. Other members who show 

up can follow up on issues that they are interested in. 

So with that, we will turn it over to Ambassador Benjamin for 

his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN, COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of 

the committee, thanks very much for the opportunity to appear 

here today. Thank you for casting light on this important set of 

issues. I have also already submitted a written statement and I 

will try to summarize that here. 

The attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253, which nearly 

cost several hundred people their lives, was a close call. The president has rightly demanded reviews of and corrections to the key 

failures that lead to the incident. 

The event was a stark reminder that as the president stated recently, not withstanding our many successes against al Qa’ida, we 

face a nimble adversary. Moreover, the events of December 25th 

have shown that at least one al Qa’ida affiliate, not just the group’s 

core leadership in Pakistan, has the potential and the interest to 

carry out strikes against the American homeland, yet we need to 

also make a sober judgment about the capabilities and status of al 

Qa’ida and its affiliates. 

The group has been under unprecedented pressure in the— 

FATA, the federally administered tribal areas and continues to suffer significant setbacks and losses. Al Qa’ida and its affiliates have 

failed to mobilize large numbers of supporters, yet their continued 

ability to attract recruits and the technological savvy means that 

they continue to constitute a formidable foe. 

Let me look at a few key theaters. Al Qa’ida and Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, the beating heart of the global network remains located in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. 

The president has made clear that the mission of the United 

States in Afghanistan/Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al Qa’ida and prevent its return to both countries. Despite the setbacks al Qa’ida has suffered, the Taliban and other extremist 

groups continue to provide it with support and it thus remains a 

capable and dangerous enemy, hence the critical importance of our 

military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan. 

A key element of these efforts against al Qa’ida will be the significant expansion of our support for Pakistan and its people. Our 

assistance will demonstrate the United States’ commitment to addressing problems that affect both everyday lives of Pakistanis and 

bolster Pakistan against the threat of extremism. 

Pakistan is a frontline partner in our counterterrorism efforts 

and we are committed to working with it to defeat and dismantle 

al Qa’ida and counter the violent extremism that threatens both of 

our countries. Both nations are heavily invested in this relation-
8 

ship. And as General McChrystal noted earlier this month, the 

trust deficit between Pakistan and the U.S. Forces has been 

shrinking. 

Al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, claim credits for the 

Christmas day bombing attempt. AQAP officially announced itself 

in January 2009, but the Arabian Peninsula is not a new front in 

our war against al Qa’ida. 

Indeed, al Qa’ida has had a presence in Yemen since well before 

the United States had even identified the group. In 1992, militants 

who claimed allegiance to Bin Laden attacked a hotel in Aden— 

which was then housing American military personnel who were on 

their way to Somalia to support the U.N. mission. In the 1990s, a 

series of major conspiracies were based in Yemen, most of them 

aimed at Saudi Arabia. 

Following the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, the Yemeni government, with support from the United States, dealt significant 

blows to al Qa’ida’s presence in Yemen through military operations 

and arrests of key leaders. During much of the subsequent period, 

the government of Yemen became distracted by other domestic security concerns, and our bilateral cooperation experienced setbacks. 

Next door, however, in Saudi Arabia, al Qa’ida attacks galvanized the government in the kingdom to dramatically improve its 

counterterrorism efforts. The downside of this good news story is 

that many of the radicals driven out of Saudi Arabia fled to Yemen, 

joining other fighters there. This is one of the greatest challenges 

of the contemporary threat: the ability al Qa’ida and its affiliates 

have to continually exploit poorly or ungoverned territories. 

Upon entering office, the Obama administration quickly came to 

understand that this al Qa’ida-related activity, as well as poor and 

deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, demanded a reappraisal of 

our Yemen policy. The U.S. government review, completed in November of 2009, has led to a new, whole-of-government approach 

to Yemen that seeks to mobilize and coordinate with other international actors. 

Our strategy aims to address the root causes of instability, encourage political reconciliation, improve governance and build the 

capacity of Yemen’s government to exercise its authority, protect 

and deliver services to its people. 

U.S. strategy towards Yemen is two-pronged: first, strengthen 

the government of Yemen’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent extremists within its borders; and two, 

mitigate Yemen’s economic crisis and deficiencies in governing capacity, provision of services and transparency. 

As Yemen’s security challenges and its social, political and economic challenges are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, so U.S. 

policy must be comprehensive and flexible in order to be effective 

in the short and in the long term. 

In the past year, the administration has maintained a vigorous 

tempo of senior-level visits to Yemen, most recently by General 

Petraeus, Deputy National Security Advisor Brennan, and Assistant Secretary Feltman, to press our concern about al Qa’ida’s ability to operate from and within Yemen. 

This intensified engagement has paid off. In the last month, 

Yemen has conducted multiple air and ground operations designed 
9 

to disrupt AQAP’s operational planning and deprive its leadership 

of safe haven within Yemen’s national territory. 

Yemen has significantly increased the pressure on al Qa’ida, and 

the United States commends the Yemeni government on these successful operations. We are committed to continuing support for an 

effective counterterrorism effort that will include both security and 

economic development initiatives. 

On the security front, we provide training and assistance to Yemen’s key counterterrorism units. Through diplomatic security and 

antiterrorism assistance programs, we provide training to security 

forces in the Ministry of Interior, including the Yemeni coast guard 

and the central security forces’ counterterrorism unit. In addition, 

we are working with the Defense Department, with whom we coordinate closely, to use 1206 funds for counterterrorism assistance. 

The United States is determined to halt and reverse troubling socioeconomic dynamics in Yemen. Priorities for U.S. assistance include political and fiscal reforms and meaningful attention to legitimate internal grievances, better governance through decentralization, reduced corruption and civil service reform, and economic diversification to generate employment and enhance livelihood. These 

initiatives will contribute to the long-term health of our bilateral 

relationship and help allay suspicion and misunderstanding. 

Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM continues to menace 

parts of the Maghreb and the Sahel. The group conducts low-level 

attacks in northeastern Algeria and in the Sahel, and has killed a 

number of local military personnel, an American NGO [non-governmental organization] worker and a British hostage. AQIM elements 

have repeatedly targeted Westerners for kidnapping for ransom. 

We are encouraging greater coordination among regional states 

and France to frustrate AQIM’s desire to establish itself in Europe. 

And we view the near-term likelihood of such an expansion of operations as diminished in just the last few years. 

Algeria’s successful counterterrorism efforts have led the group 

to focus on the ungoverned areas of northern Mali and Mauritania. 

In fact, the group faces difficulties in recruiting, and in some parts 

of Algeria has largely worn out its welcome. 

Our regional partners value U.S. and other international assistance to build their capacity to disrupt terrorist attacks, better control their sovereign territory and counter those who advocate violence. 

For the foreseeable future, we view AQIM as posing a persistent 

threat in the Sahel, but it is less of a danger to stability than that 

posed by AQAP or al Qa’ida in the FATA. The group is financially 

strapped, and the increase in hostage taking is clearly an attempt 

to raise much-needed revenue. 

AQIM has failed to establish a viable presence in Morocco, Tunisia or Libya, and the Muslim populations of the Sahel and the 

Maghreb generally reject its extremism. 

East Africa. East African al Qa’ida, EAAQ, is composed of a 

handful of experienced operatives, who have maintained a safe 

haven in Somalia for years, and now have the increasingly vocal 

support of the foreign terrorist organization, al-Shabaab. Despite 

some key setbacks, most notably the death of EAAQ leader Saleh 

Nabhan in late 2009, the presence of these al Qa’ida operatives in 
10 

Somalia continues to pose a threat to Somali, regional and Western 

interests. 

EAAQ maintains links to al-Shabaab, which has, in turn, publicly pledged its support for al Qa’ida, and is actively trying to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government and other moderates 

in Somalia. 

Al-Shabaab leaders have publicly threatened to target U.S. and 

Western interests throughout East Africa. Its forces have killed 

scores of civilians, including TFG [transitional federal government] 

ministers and foreign and Somali aid workers. They have stolen aid 

and greatly exacerbated Somalia’s already dire humanitarian situation, even driving the United Nations World Food Program to cease 

operations in parts of Somalia earlier this month. 

Al-Shabaab has also managed to recruit an unknown number of 

foreign fighters, including some Americans. 

Our governance and counterterrorism goals in Somalia are clear, 

and they are mutually reinforcing: achieve a stable national government to help ensure that Somalia will no longer be exploited as 

a base of operations by foreign terrorists. And Somalia will not be 

stable as long as terrorist groups are active there. 

In addition to humanitarian assistance, the United States has 

been providing support—primarily through equipment, logistical 

support and training—to the African Union Mission in Somalia, 

AMISOM, and the TFG. 

The president has underscored that we must continue to take the 

fight to al Qa’ida and its allies wherever they plot and train. Doing 

that will require the military, diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement resources of the U.S. and our allies. 

We must also look to what Deputy National Security Advisor 

John Brennan has called the ‘‘upstream factors.’’ We need to confront the political, social and economic conditions that our enemies 

exploit to win over new recruits, funders and those whose tacit support enables the militants to carry forward their plans. 

We know that violent extremism flourishes where there is 

marginalization and perceived or real relative deprivation. In recognition of this, my office has set up a unit focusing on countering 

violent extremism, which will target local communities most prone 

to radicalization. 

We must do more to address the underlying conditions for at-risk 

populations and improve the ability of moderates to voice their 

views and strengthen opposition to violence. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the contemporary 

terrorist threat was decades in the making, and it will take many 

more years to unmake it. There is still much we need to learn, especially about how to prevent individuals from choosing the path 

of violence. But I believe we now have the right framework for policies that will strengthen security for our nation and the global community. 

Thank you very much for the invitation to speak here today, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin can be found 

in the Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 
11 

We will do the questions under the five-minute rule, just to keep 

it structured. And I guess the machine is here, so there we go. 

I guess my first question is following up on what you talked 

about at the end there, Ambassador Benjamin, because I believe 

that we have done a fairly effective job of targeting al Qa’ida’s networks—the leadership of SOCOM [Special Operations Command], 

and cooperation of a lot of different agencies, you know, coming out 

of what JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] did, starting in 

Iraq and more broadly. 

I think there is an excellent interagency process going on right 

now that has cooperation, that has targeted all of those different 

groups that you all mentioned, and I think really disrupted their 

leadership in an aggressive way, and also changed the way that 

they have to try to plan and coordinate their attacks. They are not 

too anxious to be talking on cell phones or working on the Internet 

now, or to even move around. And I think that is a very effective, 

disruptive tactic. 

The thing that sort of gives me the most concern is what you 

talked about at the end there, which is the radicalization issue. 

And this is something that, you know, we know that al Qa’ida is 

trying to—they try to find recruits that we don’t know about, because that makes it easier to move forward. And they have had 

some success in that. 

And I think it is fair to say that, right now, throughout the Muslim world, they are having greater success with their message than 

we would like. Now, I think it is true that some of this has sort 

of backlashed on them. Some of the more violent acts have undermined support for al Qa’ida, you know, in Pakistan, Jordan, a variety of different places. 

But it is still true that, by and large, a disquieting number of 

Muslims, particularly the youth, you know, do have hostile attitudes towards the West and do agree with some of the, you know, 

central messages of al Qa’ida, that the West is at war with Islam. 

And they very aggressively propagate that message. We had an excellent hearing in this committee about how they use the Internet 

to spread that message. 

So, how we do the counter-radicalization, stop the radicalization, 

is very important. Two questions about that—one, the interagency 

cooperation piece. 

As I mentioned, I think it works fairly well on targeting the top 

folks. I don’t think we have gotten there on the counterradicalization. You got a piece. I know SOCOM is doing some stuff. 

DOD is doing some stuff. A bunch of different sort of layers to this. 

The NSC [National Security Council] is looking at it in terms of 

their strategic communications message. 

Can you talk to us a little bit about how all those different pieces 

are going to come together better and have better interagency coordination? 

And then, what is the core message? What do you think the message is that is working right now, that is enabling al Qa’ida to recruit people like Abdulmutallab? And what is our best counter to 

that? 

So, it is sort of a three-part question there. 
12 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I will try not to go as long as my statement. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, you have asked, really, the core 

question about the future in the long term. And when I appeared 

before you some years ago, I probably, when I was out of government, probably said, we are terrific at the tactical part, at identifying terrorists and their facilitators, and taking them off the 

street. And we are having a harder time with really getting the 

strategic view and articulating a plan that will deal with the long 

term, because, as virtually everyone who has looked at this knows 

well, we are not going to shoot our way out of this problem. 

I think that one of the hallmarks of the Obama administration 

approach has been that we put radicalization at the core of our concerns. And we are thinking very hard about how we proceed in a 

way that, if we take one terrorist off the street, does not result in 

10 more appearing in his place. 

And I do think it is true that al Qa’ida as a movement has failed 

to mobilize on a grand scale. And that is certainly a good news 

story. At the same time, are having not—they are not having problems in finding the recruits they need. And that, from a counterterrorism perspective, is a bad news story. 

You asked about the interagency. I think that, first of all, whenever we have looked at this as a government, what we do well and 

what we don’t, I think that actually, the official version tracks very 

well with what some of us who were outside the government previously thought, which is that we didn’t have the right approach 

on what is known as countering violent extremism, or perhaps on 

the even softer global engagement side. 

I think that there is a clear understanding across the interagency now that this is a very high priority, and that we need to 

coordinate better, and we need to make this a higher priority, and 

we need to put the resources against it to carry through. 

As I said at the end, there is still a lot we don’t know about why 

people turn to violence. And we need more research on this. And 

there is a thriving, you know, research—there is thriving research 

going on within the academic community that we are studying. 

And there is also a great deal of research going on within the government. 

Public diplomacy and strategic communications clearly play a 

vital part in this in terms of reaching out to the large mainstream 

of the Muslim world that does not want to see violence at the heart 

of their faith. And I think that we are making a lot of progress 

there. 

Certainly, having President Obama’s deep engagement on this 

issue has made a difference in terms of global engagement. And his 

trip to Turkey, his Nowruz message, his speech in Cairo—all of 

these have made an important difference. And I think that they 

can make a lasting difference, if we follow them up expeditiously. 

What I would point out is that, countering radicalization specifically, it is in some ways a taller order, because we are not a trusted interlocutor for people who are on the verge of taking the path 

of violence. And that is why we have set up this CVE [countering 

violent extremism] shop within my office, to figure out what the 
13 

interventions are that might be needed to deal with those at-risk 

communities. 

Specifically, what should we be doing in these microclimates, in 

a sense, to address the socioeconomic drivers? Because even though 

poverty doesn’t cause terrorism, it certainly can be the case 

that—— 

Mr. SMITH. It provides recruits. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, it is certainly useful. It provides recruits, and it is useful as an instrument to others, who want to 

point to the deprivation as an indication of the truth of the al 

Qa’ida narrative. So we are looking at that. 

We are looking at other ways of enhancing the ability of moderate voices to be heard. There is a lot of collaborative work going 

on. We are working collaboratively with the NCTC [National 

Counterterrorism Center] and we will be innovating a number of 

new programs in the very near future that I would be happy to tell 

you about more once they have lifted off. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Admiral, you said in your opening comments that 

increasing recidivism rates are contributing to al Qa’ida’s regeneration. Former detainees are rejoining the ranks of violent extremists. 

Do we know how many of these former detainees are from Gitmo, 

and if any? And are they currently regenerating into the terrorist 

networks? And if they are, are we tracking them? Do we have a 

way to track them? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes sir, so we know there are some. I don’t 

think we know precisely how many and different elements of the 

intelligence community would come up with slightly different numbers. I think the general sense is that probably on the order of a 

fifth are somehow re-engaging in some sort of activity that works 

against our interests. Our ability to track it is of course limited, 

but there are some efforts to do that with an element of the recidivists. 

Mr. MILLER. Ambassador, you talked about the United States 

and I think you said we were not a trusted interlocutor. Who are 

the trusted interlocutors? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, if you are talking about those segments of communities that are closest to radicalization it may be 

people who espouse some ideas that we don’t exactly embrace, but 

who are nonetheless trusted because of some overlap in values. 

And what I am suggesting here is that the critical issue for us is 

ensuring that these people—— 

Mr. MILLER. If I can interrupt, you specifically said the United 

States was not a trusted interlocutor. Can you name somebody who 

is? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, there are many clerics, for example, who will not be considered the United States to be a great 

friend of the Muslim world, but who will also be anti-violent. And 

those people are, as far as we are concerned, very much working 

in our interest if they are turning people away from al Qa’ida. 

Mr. MILLER. Would you name them? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. There are quite a number of them—— 
14 

Mr. MILLER. Well, you were very quick to say the United States 

was not a trusted interlocutor. I would hope that you would be just 

as quick to tell me somebody that was. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I am not sure I want to undermine 

them by associating us with them. I would be happy to supply you 

with a list of such—— 

Mr. MILLER. I will be glad to hear it. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN [continuing]. Clerics. 

Mr. MILLER. Sorry. 

Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I believe Ambassador Benjamin made that statement within the context of trying to reach these kids mostly who 

are becoming radicalized. And I think your suggestion is that if it 

is—— 

Mr. MILLER. Well, if I can reclaim—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER [continuing]. My time because you mentioned the 

United States as a whole. Now you are talking about individual 

interlocutors. And that is why I am trying to figure out why—is 

there anybody in the United States that is trusted to talk to these 

people? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Oh, I am sure that there are. For example, American Muslim spokesmen who would be—who would be 

trusted in this regard. 

Mr. MILLER. Well, you do know the State Department pays for 

Muslim Imams to fly around the world and talk about what it is 

like to be a Muslim in the United States. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I am fully aware of that. But I am not 

sure that those programs are targeted at the communities that we 

are discussing. 

Mr. MILLER. Oh, I am sure they are not. Not especially when 

they go to countries like Sweden, which I think is ridiculous. But 

I just—I find it kind of odd that you would single out the United 

States and then not be willing to say a country or a person. I just— 

maybe I just misunderstood you—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I—— 

Mr. SMITH. If I could—I think you know making relatively minor 

and I think obvious point, and that is that the United States of 

America collectively is not particularly trusted in the broader nonU.S. Muslim world. So when we are thinking about ways to deliver 

a message—— 

Mr. MILLER. And my question is, name me a country that is. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I don’t think we can name a country—— 

Mr. MILLER. But you said the United States was not. So there 

must be a country that is. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I am not sure that that logically follows, 

sir. 

Mr. MILLER. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an interesting exchange. Obviously the United States acts through individuals. The corporate United States can’t do anything independently. 

It is just a concept. 
15 

And so I guess your point is that if an individual is seen as advancing the interest of the United States it is kind of difficult for 

that individual to be persuasive with somebody who is tending to 

get radicalized in this movement, which is wholly anti-United 

States. I guess that is your point. 

It is pretty obvious what our strategic interest is where the 

Hindu Kush is concerned, the tribal areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan. It is al Qa’ida central, has been identified as al Qa’ida central 

for quite some time. And Pakistan has nuclear weapons, nuclear 

technology and a history of exploiting nuclear technology. So we 

have got a real strategic interest here. That is quite clear. 

It becomes a little less clear what our strategic interest is as we 

sort of look around North Africa and elsewhere. You know, take 

AQIM, al Qa’ida in the Maghreb. That was a nationalist movement 

that was largely failing that couldn’t get recruits, that couldn’t get 

money. 

And so they said, ‘‘Hey, we are al Qa’ida,’’ and all of a sudden 

they can get recruits and they can get some money. And yet their 

behavior is largely the same. They are doing exactly the same 

thing that they were in essence doing beforehand, just sort of robbing people and making a living off being—of kidnapping people, 

things like that. 

And to the extent that we think we are going to somehow void 

weak countries, difficult economic circumstances across the board— 

across the world and that is going to solve our problem, that is 

pretty unrealistic, particularly given trends. We are going to have 

more weak states and more economic problems facing global populations. 

To the extent that every time somebody hops up and says, ‘‘I am 

al Qa’ida’’ and we are going to run over there at a great expense 

to us, you know relatively, a very asymmetric relationship there, 

and attempt to shoot our way out of it when we all can see we can’t 

shoot our way out of this. 

I find myself—I think it would be very helpful—oh, and also as 

we—as we jump to respond to each one of these little groups that 

says ‘‘we are al Qa’ida,’’ we sort of play into this notion that this 

is us against Islam because they just scatter themselves across all 

of Islam. And then all of a sudden we are present in all of Islam 

with gripes about the behavior of the local populous permitting 

these individuals to act the way they are. 

So I think it would be real helpful to hear from all three of you 

what you view are strategic interests with regard to you know all 

of these smaller areas that—that we are struggling with right now. 

And I would like to start with Mr. Reid. 

Mr. REID. Thank you for the question. And it certainly is one 

that we also consider and think of the context of these various 

groups that we talked about here, and as you mentioned, Congressman, the AQIM and others. 

I think what I would first say is the al Qa’ida network that we 

described is comprised of these key allies. There is a number of elements we—I did not bring up today, mostly in interest of time, that 

are affiliates or lesser allies. But there are some core allies, and 

Ambassador Benjamin and I both talked about most of those in our 

statements. 
16 

And I think the—if you look at Yemen as an illustration of what 

we don’t know about where the next attack could be coming from. 

So I agree that the—everything you said about the AQ core and the 

relevance—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. What worries me a little bit is that—— 

Mr. REID [continuing]. Of Pakistan. 

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. There are lots of places in the world, 

including within the United States where somebody could decide 

that they are going to do something awful—— 

Mr. REID. Oh, absolutely, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. That we would object to. Back to 

what is the strategic interest? 

Mr. REID. Well, and I would say, sir, what I was leading to there 

is these other areas, particularly trans-Sahara, the Horn of Africa 

and the remote areas of Yemen provide an opportunity and a potential pathway of shifting the locust of attack planning against us, 

which does cut into our strategic interest and allows the core to 

continue to operate. 

So a comprehensive approach to network defeat has to consider 

these alternate locations because they do have potential. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Admiral Olson—— 

Mr. REID. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I am running out of time. 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think the fundamental strategic need is 

defense of the homeland. And that requires prevention of the development of safe havens from which attacks against our homeland 

where our vital interests can be launched. 

I would say that a group cannot self-declare effectively an allegiance to al Qa’ida and through simple self-declaration become a 

group of high interest to us. There is a careful and deliberate, quite 

precise process through which a group is designated by our government as an al Qa’ida affiliate, which then leads to a prioritization 

and some investment against that group. But our preference is always to work through the host nation, through supporting the development of capabilities within that nation to deal with its own 

problems. 

Mr. MARSHALL. My time is—— 

Mr. SMITH. I think we will come back to you in the next round. 

We should have time to get to that. I want to make sure we get 

to the other members and give them their fair allotment of time. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman—I want to apologize for missing your opening statements here—— 

Ambassador, the real issue in my view is radicalization. And it 

seems spectacularly presumptuous of us as non-Muslims, non-Islamic that we have the solution for that. If you look at the guys 

who attacked the airport Heathrow, doctors, educated Brits raised 

in the system, Hasan and Fort Hood, grew up as an American, all 

the advantages. 

Then you look at the ones who come out of these impoverished 

areas and ungoverned spaces. What causes that and how are we 

addressing it? 

Because it seems to me this is an Islam problem. It is their deal. 

We are caught up in it. We are collateral damage, so to speak. And 
17 

your answer to a similar question it was not until late in your answer that you used the word cleric or Muslim. 

And it is troubling that given it is their problem really—now I 

don’t think that Christians or Americans remotely have the best 

ideas as how to counter radicalization—that it would be that late 

in your quote—in your answers that we wouldn’t be engaging, for 

the lack of a better phrase, moderate Muslims. 

Because to me that is who has got to solve this radicalization 

problem are the moderate Muslims. They have got to stand up. 

Many of them are, and some that you have mentioned. But there 

is a comment on that. 

And then broader question is, what is the Saudis’ attitudes towards Yemen AQAP because it seems to me they are equally disposed at going after Saudi as they are us. And what is the Saudi’s 

attitude in their help with us in this arena? 

So any of the three want to pitch in on that. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Sir, I don’t disagree with you about the 

need for—the aspect of this that is religious to be hashed out between fellow believers. And that is why it is vitally important that 

we create more political space for moderates, that we find ways to 

constrain the environment in which radicals operate so that people 

believe that it is not in their interest to having—to have terrorists, 

to have radical extremists operating in their neighborhoods, in 

their cities, in their—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. That would be Alexandria, Virginia, where Major 

Hasan grew up? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, for example, quite clearly from the 

reviews we have seen there were failures in not noticing the kind 

of radical influences that he was espousing. 

And one of the things that we are looking forward to over the 

long term is creating environments in which people take seriously 

radical statements and consider that to be their problem as well, 

and begin to confront that and find interventions, whether it is 

clerical, therapeutic or of some other kind. That is one of the ways 

that we are going to tamp down radicalization. And there are many 

different ways that we are going to have to get at that. 

But I think the key thing is to help other countries and communities that have a radicalization problem to create the structures 

in which they contain it, identify it and defeat it really. You asked 

about Saudi Arabia. 

Saudi Arabia is every bit as concerned if not more concerned 

about AQAP. Remember their deputy interior minister is the head 

of counterterrorism was nearly killed several months ago by an 

AQAP attack that used a similar device to the one that was employed on the Northwest flight. 

Saudi Arabia is the country that has the most influence with 

Yemen, and they are working very hard to get the Yemenis to 

maintain their tough stance against AQAP. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Are they spending money in Yemen to support 

that government? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. According to press reports on the order 

of a billion dollars or more annually. And again, those are—— 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Having been to Sana’a recently I 

wondered where the money went. 
18 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, you know, this is a country that 

has enormous economic needs, including simply budget support and 

they—and also training of their security forces. So it is not news 

that the economic requirements of the government of Yemen are 

rather large. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Quickly, anybody, where is the next stop on this 

train for AQ, et al, around the world? If we drive them out of 

Yemen, where do they go next? 

Mr. REID. Just to go back to the earlier point, I think we do have 

to identify and address in advance these potential safe havens. And 

some of these operations and engagements we have talked about 

today get to that. They have telegraphed us already with their interest in areas like Somalia and out in the Trans-Sahara Desert. 

So I believe those are some very likely places and that supports our 

interests in those areas, as we already discussed. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Any of those particular places in the Western 

hemisphere, South America or somewhere? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think there was a period of time in the 

1990s when we were quite worried about radicalization, particularly in the tri-border region in South America. But the countries 

in that region have done quite a good job, I think, at containing 

and diminishing the threat there. 

And that points to a larger issue, which was in response to the 

earlier question, which is that however we define our strategic 

goal, the key part of the answer is going to be capacity building because al Qa’ida and its affiliates are going to show up in many, 

many different places. And we need to have a strategy for enabling 

those who are in those regions to confront their threats and deal 

with them because we cannot be everywhere all the time. And we 

cannot fall into the trap of expending enormous amounts of treasure running to wherever, as Admiral Olson suggested. They just 

declare that they are there. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. Bright. 

Mr. BRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this hearing—very worthwhile. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today and 

your testimony. And my colleague pretty much asked my question. 

But I am going to probably phrase it a little differently and see if 

I can get a little more information. But quite frankly, I am not sure 

the al Qa’ida—if this is a tactic or a strategy that they have implemented. And that is striking at different locations. 

South Asia initially was the primary place that we were engaging. Now the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen is the other place that 

we are addressing now. If either one of you had a prediction based 

on your expertise and your knowledge, where do you think the next 

area might develop to be and for us to be watching out? 

And I guess my question is two-part. What specifically are we 

doing to find out, number one? And then once they appear, what 

are we doing to contain or eliminate them? Anyone. 

Mr. REID. Sir, I would say it is a strategic effort, in my view, and 

declared by al Qa’ida as their strategic objective to establish some 

degree of control in the area between Mauritania and Southeast 

Asia, Indonesia, as you describe, sir. And so, when they lay that 
19 

out several years ago and say this is our strategic intent and then 

they start setting up these enterprises—and they are dots along 

the map all in that area, I think you have to take it for what it 

represents. So I do think it is a strategic effort. 

And it doesn’t have the same level of success in every area. What 

we can do to learn more about it goes back to what Ambassador 

Benjamin just mentioned. And that is to strengthen the security 

capacity and institutions of our partners in those areas. And that 

is where our Department of Defense efforts are focused, in the security force assistance realm across many of these countries and regions we have discussed today. 

We have been engaged for many years in training, equipping, advising and helping these countries build up a force that is capable 

of dealing with terrorism. Very many of them have never organized 

their defense or security forces around that type of threat. And as 

we ourselves have learned over many hard years of war, it does 

take an adaptation of your armed forces to optimize against that 

threat. 

Mr. BRIGHT. Sure. 

Anyone else, either? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I would just reinforce the stated strategic 

goal of al Qa’ida is the reestablishment of the Caliphate in the 

areas that you mentioned. And the decentralization of al Qa’ida is 

an element of the execution of that strategy. So I think we are talking less about where next and either trying to move ahead of them 

or chase them to that place. But it is really the notion of applying 

pressure wherever they are with persistence, preferably through 

the government of the nation that is currently serving as the location. 

We have not been successful in predicting absolutely where the 

next attack on the United States would be launched from. We know 

where al Qa’ida is, but we don’t know—in many cases, but we don’t 

know for certain which element of al Qa’ida is the one most ready 

to launch an attack against us. 

Mr. BRIGHT. Okay. 

Ambassador Benjamin, anything? Any additional—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think Admiral Olson and Secretary 

Reid have captured it quite aptly. I would say simply two things. 

One is that we should never be complacent about the possibility of 

radicalization within our midst. And the trickle that we have seen 

of people who have gone to East Africa to fight and who have become radicalized there ought to be cause for concern. 

We are certainly not immune. The same holds true for Western 

Europe, which has also seen occasional cases of radicalization. And 

there are a number of people who are training in the FATA who 

come from those countries. 

I would also say that among the things that keeps me up at 

night is not so much a new geographic theater as a different form 

in the theaters that we are acquainted with. And so, for example, 

the emergence of a group like Lashkar-e-Taiba as a global threat 

based in South Asia is something that concerns me greatly. 

Mr. BRIGHT. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 
20 

Now, a couple questions on the recidivism front. First of all, 

Saudi Arabia has a program they talk a great deal about where 

they take people who have been part of al Qa’ida and then try to 

reform them. You know, this program is used in a variety of different places. 

Now, it has some obvious limits. I mean, the thought was the 

Jordanian who was the suicide bomber who killed our CIA [Central 

Intelligence Agency] agents had been one of those that had been reformed early on. I know Saudi Arabia was pretty much saying, you 

know, it has got a 100 percent success ratio. I question their statistical analysis. 

Have you worked—I guess I will start with Mr. Reid—more 

closely at that to see about whether or not whether it is Saudi Arabia or Yemen, or any of these countries that some of these people 

have shown up in, have they had any success in actually reversing 

it once people have been radicalized? And if so, how has that 

worked? 

Mr. REID. Sir, I would just note that it is quite possible as people 

are being released this far into the war that those that have been 

held the longest probably are the most hard-core. And it sort of elevates the potential of the recidivist phenomenon. 

Logically those released earlier—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Mr. REID [continuing]. Were presumably guilty of less or less 

along the spectrum. So I think that is a factor as we look at the 

timelines and the increases. I think we have to consider that there 

is some logic to that. And I think it speaks to the careful consideration that is given for further releases. 

As to the Saudi program, from all that I have seen, sir, it is generally a successful program. Clearly, one is too many when it comes 

to someone like al-Rimi or one of these characters that is currently 

fighting us. 

But among those that we work with, it has shown great success. 

And they do invest quite a bit in it. And they have offered to help 

us form these programs elsewhere. But I do just think that one 

point about this group of people we are dealing with is going to 

spike those numbers. 

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned we are sort of rethinking our policy 

on when to release detainees in light of some of what we had 

learned. Can you spell that out a little bit more clearly? How have 

we changed that in recent months? 

Mr. REID. Well, as you are likely aware, sir, the president did 

after the release in mid-December of—of detainees into Yemen call 

a halt to that, to review in particular the Yemeni problem. And it 

is a problem that we have been dealing with for several years in 

trying to find a way to release them. 

Overall and broadly the system is well-developed. And it is an 

interagency system with a great amount of discussion and a great 

amount of review from all angles about the risks of release. And 

the factors go into what we know about the individual, what population or what country we intend to release them in, what the likelihood and the risk factors are there. And they are all very carefully considered in every decision to release. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 
21 

Do either of you want to comment on that at all? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I would just add that one of the key considerations is now and will continue to be the ability of law enforcement and intelligence services in those countries to monitor those 

who are being released and that that is something that I know that 

the interagency process looks at very carefully now. And that will 

continue to be the case because, quite frankly, a 100 percent nonrecidivism rate is likely unattainable. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. So it is going to be important that we 

have capable partners who are going to be able to deal with the 

threats within their borders. 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. 

Follow up a little bit on—I think Mr. Marshall had raised the 

issue of our, you know, footprint as we go around. Every time 

someone pledges allegiance to al Qa’ida, we don’t want to show up 

in force. 

But I think that one of the strengths, certainly, of what SOCOM 

and what some of the other agencies have done is where we see 

threats in a variety of different places, we can deal with them with 

a very light footprint. In fact, I think going forward when you look, 

you know, Iraq, Afghanistan, those would not be the models of how 

we hope to be able to operate in the future, that we can do it working with the host nations in a cooperative fashion. 

And I know, Admiral Olson, to the degree in which you can get 

into this, can you talk a little bit about, you know, how a light footprint can, in fact, make a big difference on stopping, you know, 

radicalization or stopping a terrorist haven from being created in 

a given place? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I could certainly answer 

that to the degree. The light footprint is really for a couple of different reasons. One is to gain an understanding of the place and 

the people there so that we can just learn better about what motivates—what may motivate elements of that society to select an al 

Qa’ida path. And what might motivate them to select an alternative to that. 

But most of our presence in sort of what I call moving ahead of 

the sound of guns is a train, advise, assist kind of a presence. It 

is working mostly with counterparts, mostly at the small unit level, 

mostly for the purpose of enabling them. And the military and then 

the law enforcement realms to provide better for their own sovereignty and their own security. 

It is difficult to measure success by what doesn’t happen. But 

you are—I would second what you said, that there is known value 

to what it is we are doing in relatively small footprints around the 

world. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Ambassador, I was looking through your remarks. 

And I just—if I can, attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 

that may have resulted in the death of several hundred people, efforts to strike us, al Qa’ida militants attacked a hotel, attack on 

the USS Cole, al Qa’ida attacks, repeatedly targeted Westerners for 

kidnapping for ransom, have killed a number of local military per-
22 

sonnel and an American NGO worker and a British hostage, carry 

out attacks and kidnappings. Hostage-taking is clearly an attempt 

to raise revenue. Its forces have killed scores of civilians. 

And then you say the president has confirmed that we must continue to take the fight to al Qa’ida and its allies wherever they plot 

and train. That includes exploiting opportunities to bring al 

Qa’ida’s operatives to justice by presenting them before a court of 

law. 

That scares the hell out of me. Is that supposed to scare people 

that will cut your head off and take you for ransom and blow up 

ships and—I mean, you don’t—the courts of law. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. As it says in my statement, sir, we do 

use the entire range of different capacities to target terrorists. I believe the passage that you are referring to actually talks primarily 

about our partners having the law enforcement capability to try 

terrorists within their countries, which we have found as an empirical matter to have a very powerful effect in terms of discouraging 

radicalization because the experience of terrorists being taken into 

court and treated like ordinary criminals and de-glorified, as it 

were, from the kind of cosmic warrior or holy warrior image that 

they have, is a very humbling one. 

And I submit that the example of a country like Indonesia, which 

under our—with our advice—instituted a number of very important 

counterterrorism laws, and has used a law enforcement approach, 

among others—they have killed quite a number of terrorists—has 

been extremely successful in terms of tamping down radicalization 

within their borders. 

The Saudis also use a law enforcement approach within their 

borders. And I would submit that many people would say that their 

rehabilitation system is even softer than their court system. 

So I think that we need to be flexible in how we approach these 

matters. We have, I think, by in large encouraged our counterterrorism partners around the globe to strengthen their rule of law institutions as part of a broader counterterrorism effort, and they 

have been very successful. 

Mr. MILLER. But your statement says doing that will require the 

military, intelligence, and law enforcement resources of the U.S. 

and the allies. So it is not just the courts of our allies. You are talking about the courts of the United States as well, are you not? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I certainly support the attorney 

general’s decision to try people in American courts. I think that 

this is a vindication of our system and this is an appropriate response to the threat we have at hand. I do not suggest by any 

means that the only response to terrorism is to insist on the capture and arrest and conviction of terrorists. 

There are many terrorists who are far beyond our ability to capture. I work very closely with Admiral Olson and Secretary Reid 

to deal with the others, but I certainly think that a law enforcement approach has to be part of the arsenal that we use. 

Mr. MILLER. Do you think we should kill them? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think that when it is appropriate we 

should target terrorists with lethal force, absolutely. 

Mr. MILLER. What about military tribunals? 
23 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. The administration has decided that in 

some cases tribunals are an appropriate approach. I am not the attorney general, but I will certainly bow to his authority and his 

counsel on this and to the president’s. 

Mr. MILLER. You would bow to the Attorney General? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes, I would—happily. 

Mr. MILLER. Defer? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay, thank you, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I guess I have to observe the questioning of my 

good friend, Mr. Miller, who really is a good friend of mine, that 

as I recall—and I know far more than I am free to say—but certainly all Americans know that we are prepared to hit these people 

and kill them. 

And we are doing that, and we are doing it weekly. We are doing 

it not only in Pakistan, but we are doing it elsewhere. And it is not 

as if we are reluctant to do so. In fact, what we worry principally 

about is what sort of collateral damage are we going to cause once 

we have identified a target that is really on our list. Can we go 

ahead and kill that target? So, the range of things that we are attempting to do. 

Back to the strategic interests. You know, Admiral Olson, obviously the goal is to protect the United States, United States’ interests, United States’ citizens. The question is the strategy that we 

adopt—in furtherance of that goal. We wrestled for a while there 

with how we should approach Afghanistan. 

Should there be a troop buildup? And, concluded that the appropriate—we knew what our strategic interest was. The appropriate 

strategy here was to go ahead and build up the capacity of the Afghan people to deal with this threat themselves. That wasn’t going 

to happen without a buildup of troops for us, so we are building 

up troops. 

And that we had a real strategic interest—a unique strategic interest—because of the fact of Pakistan and al Qa’ida central and 

nuclear technology, et cetera. We are not suggesting that we apply 

the same strategy globally. And it certainly is our hope that it is 

a lighter footprint. 

And it is certainly our hope that we have partnerships of partners out there, all of whom who have a strategic interest to further 

our interests in avoiding having somebody with a bomb in his underwear get on a plane and come to the United States. That is very 

minute police work. 

You get information about folks like that from local people who 

are willing to cooperate. Probably not with us, since we have some 

credibility issues right now, but with local folks. So we are building 

capacity and at the same time, we are trying to give people a strategic interest to help us out. 

Now, why would some of these countries have a strategic interest? How do we get them interested in helping us avoid underwear 

bombers? 

Mr. Ambassador, you—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. It is actually—— 
24 

Mr. MARSHALL. To do that I think we are sort of fighting against 

their own religion, in a sense. They can be accused of that, and 

they can be exposed in many different ways. Those individuals who 

step forward to say yes, we do have a strategic interest in keeping 

people like this from hitting the United States. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think that by and large the level of 

international cooperation in defending our selves and our allies 

against this threat is really quite good. And many countries—and 

we don’t need to name them all—that would—that might criticize 

aspects of our politics, our policies in the world—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. If I could interrupt, I don’t have that much time. 

So let’s take Yemen specifically and I think we would both have to 

concede that we cannot police the population of Yemen. Can’t be 

done. Saudi Arabia could get closer to doing it. But certainly we 

can’t do it. So what we would really like ideally is for somebody 

within Yemen to police Yemen. So how do we get them strategically interested in doing that? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I think that the experience of the 

last few months is indicative, in that repeated engagement, the 

offer of assistance, and I mean high level engagement. The offer of 

assistance to deal with this critical issue, which they have come to 

realize threatens them. This is the combination of incentives. 

And when you bring together different members of the international community, such as Saudi Arabia, such as the UAE 

[United Arab Emirates], in their neighborhood, as well as the 

Brits—and others—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. If I can interrupt? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes? 

Mr. MARSHALL. So we are going to pay them, in a sense, to do 

this for us. And do we create an environment as a result of taking 

that approach, in which for decades if you give us enough money, 

we will keep the militants down? If you give us enough assistance 

we will keep the militants down? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I don’t think that is correct. We are not 

paying them. In fact, we do not give them cash subsidies. Our assistance to Yemen is directed on the humanitarian side, on the AID 

[Agency for International Development] side of things. It all goes 

through non-governmental organizations. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So incentives that you are discussing? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes. Obviously there are incentives on 

the security side. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I was using the shorthand. Somehow we are 

going to help them. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. But it is also a matter of persuasion and 

of showing them the extent to which the threat—that they are targeted as well. And I am sure that part of the government’s move 

toward a more effective stance against al Qa’ida was conditioned by 

the targeting of their own intelligence officials and others within 

that society, and that they have come to see that this endangers 

them. 

They are not in alliance with al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula 

in any way, shape or form. And this is really about dealing with 

a threat to Yemeni stability. 
25 

Mr. MARSHALL. I understand that. But the underwear bomber, 

how does the underwear bomber play into their strategic interest, 

which I think in fact is what you have identified. They are threatened as well. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. I apologize. I am way over. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could move it along. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I have just one real quick one. Monday AQAP released a statement that said jihad against the infidels and their 

agent helpers, not only on the ground, but in the sea and in the 

air, as well as their crusader warships in the Gulf of Aden—Winston Churchill-esque of them—but in this setting, Admiral, can you 

talk to us about the legitimacy of that statement? Is that just puffing, or is that what—could you talk to us about in general about 

that statement? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, my opinion would be that there is certainly 

an element of puffing in there, but we can’t dismiss the threat. 

They have demonstrated the ability to strike from Yemen, including strike at sea from Yemen. So I think that we have got to take 

what they say seriously, although it is in their own interests to inflate their capabilities. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes. And then, our planning and response goes 

without saying, but you need to say it anyway for the record. That 

we are in fact planning those kinds of responses necessary to 

counter that kind of nonsense? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the response clearly depends on what it is 

we are responding to. But the government of Yemen has demonstrated a willingness recently to go after al Qa’ida on its own. 

And our response, to the extent that it is possible, will be in support of the Yemeni government. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But if they came after one of our warships—I 

have to believe the crusader warships are—is code for great ships 

of ours? 

Admiral OLSON. Self-defense is the fundamental rule at sea. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes. One last quick one. The remaining 200 detainees, would you expect the recidivism rate of that group, given 

who they are and what they have done in the past, and their track 

record would be higher than recidivism rates in the first crew we 

let go, just in general? 

Mr. REID. Congressman, I don’t have a deep knowledge of each 

case, but I would not—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, we have saved the worst for last here. 

Mr. REID [continuing]. Expect that all of them would be released. 

There is a population within that that are not intended to be released, and that goes to the long term post-Guantanamo detention 

solution that the administration’s working. There is not an intent, 

that I know of, that every person that is currently held will be released—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is it fair to say that these are the worst of that 

700 that were there? 

Mr. REID. I certainly think it is logical that the worst would be 

the last released, sir, yes, sir. 
26 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. I will hand it back. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Appreciate it. 

Mr. SMITH. One more question, but then I want to make a couple 

of points before I make it. First of all, I want to make sure that 

it is very clear that the decision on where to hold the people who 

are currently in Guantanamo is one of the things we are debating, 

we have no intention of simply releasing them. 

In fact, whether Guantanamo remains opened or closed has no 

impact whatsoever on how many of these people are going to be let 

out. It simply isn’t part of the discussion. And I think that has 

been mixed up a number of times in public debate. 

Mr. CONAWAY. If the gentleman would yield? 

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The point I was making though is we give these 

folks to others who have great intentions on the front end of detaining them for as long as we might, we run the risk that regime 

changes, bribes, whatever the corruption, cause these folks to get 

out. 

Mr. SMITH. Again, I mean, you know, we have transferred hundreds of these people from Guantanamo under the previous administration, and I think the decision not to release them to Yemen 

any more is a reflection of the fact that that didn’t always work 

out. 

And again, even whether or not we released these inmates to 

other countries, that is—the decisions would be the same whether 

Guantanamo was open or closed. If that person is perceived to be 

a risk to be released to that other country, they will not be released, whether they are held in Guantanamo or held someplace 

else. And that is a tricky balance, I will grant you that. 

And certainly in the past both administrations have released 

people that later returned to the battlefield, and we are going to 

take steps to change that policy. And we have released some people 

to countries where we thought they were going to be held, and they 

weren’t held, as well. So we have learned from that experience and 

we will hold them. But again, that is a separate issue. 

And returning a little bit to Mr. Miller’s points about holding 

people in civilian court and trying them and convicting them. That 

is one piece of the broader strategy. And whenever those issues 

come up, you seem to get the impression from the people questioning them as if that is all that we are doing. It clearly is not. 

This is a comprehensive strategy. And a huge element of that 

comprehensive strategy has been to target and eliminate leaders in 

various al Qa’ida groups across the globe. And we have been statistically more aggressive in doing that in the last year than under 

any year since 9/11. 

So we have not backed down in the least bit under the idea that 

there are some people who threaten us who we don’t have the opportunity to bring them to court and we will use whatever means 

necessary to make sure that they do not threaten us. However, 

there is value to bringing these people to justice. 

To trying them, convicting them, and locking them up. And if 

that is available, if that is a piece of it, then that we must do. 

There has been this false dichotomy like well, either we are at war 

or this is a law enforcement issue. And I can’t believe we are still 
27 

having that conversation, because anybody who is paying any attention knows that the answer to that question is it is both. 

It is obviously both. These people threaten us in a variety of different ways, some of which call for a law enforcement mechanism 

and some of which call for a military action. And I can’t believe 

that even the former vice president would disagree with that basic 

assessment. It is both, and then it is a matter of how you choose 

to do both and how smart you are in implementing that policy. 

And we are all learning, and getting better at it. But there is an 

absolute commitment I know from this administration to do what 

is necessary to make us as secure as possible and to weigh all of 

those options appropriately. 

The question that I have has to do with something that is concerning us. There were some earlier questions from Mr. Marshall 

about these various groups, al Qa’ida in the Maghreb, AQAP, alShabaab—and I think a lot of these groups started out with purely 

local concerns. 

Certainly that was the case in Algeria. They didn’t like the Algerian government. It was a revolutionary effort. And I think it 

would be a mistake to treat those people as part of a broader global 

thing and give them greater importance than they have. 

But what has seemed to be happening with these groups is they 

seem to have gone from being local groups to being more invested 

in the broader jihad. And we have even seen that with the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud. 

These were groups that had local grievances, but all of a sudden 

decided that they were at least publicly going to state that they 

were trying to do broader attacks. Certainly, that has happened in 

Yemen. I think we have some evidence that al-Shabaab is talking 

in the same way. AQIM to this point has confined themselves within their region, but has in fact started to attack westerners. Tell 

me a little bit about, you know, what our analysis is of these various, you know, localized groups’ thinking and why we think they 

may suddenly now be willing to do these broader outside of the 

area attacks—if that, you know, portends of a broader trend that 

we need to be concerned about and try to confront. 

Mr. Reid, I’ll let you take the first crack at that? 

Mr. REID. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

I think there are two things that you have to consider in this, 

and one of these is just practicalities. And as the core element has 

lost the—certainly the degree of movement and communications 

and financing that it had pre-2001 up till now, they have called 

upon the affiliates to take more action, and even to the extent that 

the affiliates are being looked at to raise revenue for the core instead of vice versa, as it used to be. 

So I think that is a factor in why we see them doing that. 

Mr. SMITH. Sorry to interrupt, you know, why would they do 

that? Why would a group that is, you know, who want to overthrow 

the Algerian government—what is sort of the different reasonings 

that would make them, because it seems to me it would be sort of 

counter their certain, you know, stated and focused goal of, in 

many cases, years, if not decades, to all of a sudden start, you 

know, doing the broader approach? Why would they view it in their 

interests to make that transition? 
28 

Mr. REID. I would agree with you that it ought to be probably 

viewed as a miscalculation on their part. And I think it speaks to 

back too, I believe, Mr. Marshall’s question about how do you divide this. And they have weakened their brand, weakened their 

ideological strength across the network by expansion. 

And, again, I think there is practical needs, but I also think 

there are certainly plenty of indicators of the stature that bin 

Laden and Zawahiri hold within these movements is powerful. And 

there are these leaders and sub leaders that want to gain in stature by aligning with them and pledging loyalty to them. And it 

only takes one or two in these movements to generate this type of 

activity. 

So I think there is a gaining favor and gaining stature and credibility as a jihadist aligning yourself with the core. And then there 

is the practical side of revenue generation and recruitment. And 

they—when they do an attack, it generates more recruits. And I 

think that is part of it. 

Now, with the great strategy, however, it has to be looked at as 

part of their overall effort to attack at us, to make us look weak, 

to strengthen themselves and to spread out over time. 

Mr. SMITH. I will—I am going to—sorry. I am going to let Mr. 

Marshall get back in here, and I will let you answer that question, 

as I have gone over time. You can turn this off and—go ahead. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, why don’t we just—what do you think 

about just sort of opening it up to, you know, mutual questioning. 

You can interrupt any time you want to. I will understand. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So just taking AQIM as an example, faltering effort, hard to persuade people to join, those who are—you know, 

they attempt to recruit, sort of look at their—you know, the circumstances of AQIM as a nationalist movement, a secessionist 

movement, a rebel movement, and an Algerian now comes and 

says, ‘‘Well, why would I be interested in that?’’ 

And you change it to al Qa’ida, and all of a sudden there is an 

interest, and new life in a sense is breathed into the operation. And 

those folks who have been at it for while don’t know any other life. 

Part of the problem with the folks that we returned to—that we 

let out of Gitmo or wherever, this is what they do. This is how they 

make their living. And in economies like the ones that sort of foster 

this kind of problem, there is not much else they can do to make 

a living, so recidivism is no big surprise. 

What worries me is if we sort of get suckered into it, and we acknowledge that this is a key strategic interest of the United States, 

well, then that is confirming and somehow elevating their status. 

And yet we also can see there is not a whole heck of a lot that we 

can do about them. The locals are going to have to deal with that. 

So all of a sudden this is an almost heroic Robin Hood-like group 

that we have defined now, which makes it more difficult for the 

locals to deal with that Robin Hood-like group. 

And so again, I am back to, you know, sort of what is our strategic vision here and how we are—I just want to make that observation. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Ambassador, did you want to follow up—similar points there? 
29 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes, I view it as one large set of questions. I think Secretary Reid has touched on many of these points. 

I do think that this was for several groups an important step in 

branding. I think that they viewed the al Qa’ida brand as being a 

global attractive brand precisely because al Qa’ida had inflicted the 

damage of 9/11 on a superpower. It had attached itself, rightly or 

wrongly, to the glory of driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan, and 

so I think that they felt that this was a way of getting a shot in 

the arm for a—in that particular case of Algeria, for a group that 

was actually on the ropes. 

And, you know, it has not necessarily worked out very well for 

them, but you can understand how they made that decision. What 

I would also point to is that there are counter trends as well, and 

so—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Could I interrupt and ask you what you mean by 

it is not very—it hasn’t worked out very well for them? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I think that they did not attract 

the recruits or the finances that they expected from taking this 

plunge by associating themselves with al Qa’ida. And in fact, if 

anything, it drew greater attention from regional partners, from 

the United States and from others, who decided that they wanted 

to contribute to capacity building in the area in cooperation so that 

the—this group would be further diminished. And the fact is that 

as a force in Algeria, when it—which was a primary theater—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. If what you just said—what you stated to be your 

belief that they didn’t really get that much out of it, is that widely 

conceded by those who are actually working this in Mali and elsewhere? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. That would be my assessment, but I— 

you have two other experts here, so I will defer to them. 

Mr. REID. I would agree that the GSPC [Groupe Salafiste pour 

la Pre ́dication et le Combat], and with everything Ambassador Benjamin said, they were greatly diminished by the Algerian force effort against them. And we don’t see that it strengthened their 

hand, particularly with their movement by aligning with AQ. 

But what it brings to us is the added dimension of these external 

aspirations directed at us and our European allies. And they do 

have potential, and there are indications of their external planning 

that concern us. And that is what the AQ dimension brought to 

this group. 

We were very well focused on GSPC in trying to assist partners 

in the region before the merger. The TSCTP [Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership] existed long before the AQ merger. 

So we see a situation where we are relatively succeeding against 

a group. Al Qa’ida comes in, tries to prop them up, take advantage 

of them and the situation, just like they took advantage of JI 

[Jemaah Islamiya] and Hambali in 2001, 2002. This is their nature. And so I do agree that it hasn’t strengthened GSPC’s agenda 

by aligning with AQ. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I—— 

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador, you stated earlier you were going to get 

to some counter trends. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. That was just what I was going to get to, 

and that is that there are other groups that have looked at al 
30 

Qa’ida and who have been approached about merging and have declined to. And the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a case in point, 

a group that is actually, you know, in negotiations to put down its 

arms, or perhaps those negotiations have been concluded, a group 

that saw that it didn’t have a future with al Qa’ida, didn’t want 

the external direction of that sort. 

And, you know, that it suggests to me that the picture is more 

complicated out there. And in fact, within the Egyptian group of 

radicals, some chose to go with al Qa’ida, some chose not to. Some 

decided that the al Qa’ida argument about attacking the far enemy, 

attacking the West, was persuasive. Others did not. 

So it is not a monolithic picture, and I think that is important 

to keep in mind. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to—just one more area of questions I want to 

ask. Going back, you mentioned early on, you know, some of the 

efforts of the administration to do outreach to help with some of 

the counter radicalization efforts, the Cairo speech, you know, 

being most prominent. 

I think we need to do a better job sort of making clear why that 

is so important in the broader battle against al Qa’ida. And I think 

that sort of gets into the narrative that al Qa’ida is pushing. I 

think there are a number of different pieces. I mean one of the 

things I do believe that we need to do better is a little bit of negative campaigning. 

I think al Qa’ida has fallen the most, based on their own actions, 

basically. Certainly, we have disrupted them, but, you know, you 

look to the bombing in Jordan when they bombed the wedding 

party at the Hotel Jordan, just totally, you know, the population 

in the country always was against them. The population turns 

against them. 

The violent acts of Zarqawi and others in Iraq totally turned the 

Iraqi population against them, so sort of pointing out, as I like to 

put it, that, you know, for all of the ideology, you know, they love 

to go online and talk about their Islamic outlook and all of this 

stuff, but the bottom—at the end of the day, they are a bunch of 

violent psychopaths. And when that is made obvious, it undermines 

their support across the Muslim world. We certainly want to make 

that point. 

On the other side, their message to Muslims that have some appeal, because, you know, many, many Muslim countries don’t have 

a great deal of economic opportunity, don’t have a great deal of political freedom, and al Qa’ida blames the West for that. The West 

is at war with Islam. In a nutshell, that is their message. 

If you go into jihad, it is a defensive posture because of what the 

West is doing to us. They want to eliminate us. I mean that is the 

message they send. It is, obviously, not true and not what we want 

to do, and I think some of the outreach efforts are designed to 

counter that. And this is a place where, even though we are not 

the most reliable interlocutor, as you correctly pointed out, we still 

have to deliver some kind of message that begins to counter that. 

So walk us through the Cairo speech a little bit, and then the 

overall strategy of how we present an image that makes it clear to 

the Muslim world that al Qa’ida is lying about us—simply isn’t 

true—why that is so important and how we do it. 
31 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, of course, this is a very large and 

multifaceted effort. I think that the president did a superb job of 

reopening the dialogue, in a sense, between the United States and 

large parts of the Muslim world, many different Muslim communities. And his focus on our need to work together based on common interests and shared respect, I think, is vitally important. And 

that is a message that he has gone to great lengths to underscore 

along the way. 

I think that his general message, and the administration’s message, that we understand that we cannot—that we as a nation will 

not prosper and that we will not—that we will not flourish as long 

as others are lagging behind is a very powerful one. At the moment, we have to recognize that there is an awful lot going on out 

there that is that those communities are looking to—for support of 

that message. 

And I think that the president and his team have shown, for example, a great deal of engagement on the Middle East peace process as a further example of that kind of commitment to deal with 

key issues of concern. 

Obviously, there is a lot of work to be done here, because we did 

not get to the position that we saw in the last year or two in that 

kind of low polling numbers which were indicative of that position 

overnight. And so there does need to be that kind of engagement. 

I know that my boss, the secretary of state, is deeply committed 

to this. And, you know, she has appointed the first ever special representative to Muslim communities. She made a point of going to 

the conference in Morocco and to continue to amplify on these messages her commitment to a whole range of different programs of 

engagement in the Middle East, but in other parts of the Muslim 

world, I think, is also exemplary in that regard. 

There is no question we have a lot of work to do. And, you know, 

a great deal of it will be in the realm of the dialogue, and a great 

deal of that will be in the realm of action. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. That is all I have got at this time. If 

there are any other questions? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Ambassador, your countering violent extremism 

office—how are you organized, staffed, is it interagency, how are 

you funded, what are you essentially doing, planning to do, just 

thumbnail summary of all of that? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We have actually convened a number of 

interagency conferences to discuss this work. I have hired a number of staff to do this. We are looking to work closely, particularly 

with embassies, because they have the ground knowledge, and they 

are the ones who will—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Do you have a separate budget? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We have within our budget a line for, a 

line item for CVE. And we are working on making that a more robust number in—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Can you go ahead and tell us what is right now? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I cannot tell you what it is right now. 

I—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. How many personnel? Do you roughly know how 

many personnel—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Are doing it in my office? 
32 

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Half a dozen in—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. And current programs besides convening and 

talking about this? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We are working with NCTC and others 

to come up with an agenda to visit a number of different posts. We 

have put out notices to post of the kind of programming that we 

are interested in doing. We have done quite a lot of smaller 

projects in the past through the Ambassador’s Fund, which is 

roughly a million dollars. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So it sounds like you are sort of getting up and 

running at this point? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We are getting up and running. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I would not present it as more than that. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Is this a new effort or is it modeled after something we have been—are you taking over from others within state 

that we are doing something similar? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. There have been a number of different 

CVE programs within the Office of the Coordinator. One of the 

problems that we have in the government is nomenclative—lots of 

people believe they are doing CVE. It means a lot of different 

things to different organizations. To us, this means addressing concerns in communities that are on the edge of radical issue. 

Mr. MARSHALL. We are the Armed Services Committee. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Right. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So pardon me if I demonstrate my ignorance 

about how state is organizing, what it has been doing in this effort. 

CVE is a term that you all have had around—right. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Counter violent extremists. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, I got that part, but—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I am sorry. 

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. How long has that term been 

around? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I will be very frank. It met me when I 

walked in the door in late May and I guess it has been going on 

within the government for several years, but I was not familiar 

with it until I got sworn in. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I really don’t have anything else. Thank 

you—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Do you want to talk about the CVE—— 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, thank you all. 

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. Of it. We can all agree that we are 

in favor, right, countering violent extremism? 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I want to thank all of you and, also, you know, 

point out, you know, all three of you represent agencies that have 

men and women across the globe in harm’s way doing very difficult 

tasks in very dangerous places as part of this effort. Certainly 

DOD, Special Operations Command, they are fighting the fight in 

a number of different countries. 

You know, the State Department as well has people doing the development, the communications piece in harm’s way. I am really 
33 

confronting the challenge that we face in a very comprehensive way 

and we appreciate that. 

We can always get better at it. The purpose of this hearing is to 

have that conversation so that we in Congress can cooperate with 

you to get to that point, what we can improve and do better at this 

very, very important task. But we really appreciate all the work 

that you are doing. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? Could I say one 

last thing to—— 

Mr. SMITH. So I am finished there anyway. 

Mr. MARSHALL. This may be the chairman’s last formal hearing 

as chair of this committee. I have a sense that he may be moving 

on to another subcommittee. 

And for the record, I would just like to say that all of us who 

have worked on the committee have enjoyed his leadership and 

found him to have been very thoughtful and very, very energetic 

in sort of exploring the—you know, in a very creative fashion 

frankly, I thought, the different issues that this committee ought 

to be, this subcommittee ought to be wrestling with. 

So I want to compliment you on the record before you moved on. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Jim. I appreciate that and I know we will 

see. We are going to be reorganizing in light of a retirement on our 

committee. I will say that no matter what, I will remain on this 

committee even if not as chair. These issues are very important to 

me and will continue working on them. That’s kind of you Jim— 

I appreciate that. 

And with that, we are adjourned. Thank you very much for your 

testimony. 

[Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JANUARY 20, 2010 

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JANUARY 20, 2010 

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