The c ouple’s child wa s over e ighte en y ear s of ag e at the time of the divorce hear ing. 1 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 185 -CV

M ar ia E liz abe th Br owne , A ppe lla nt

v. Richard Gor don B rowne , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 201S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 07- 0019 00 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
This is a n ap p ea l from a f inal divorce decr ee dissolving the marr iag e of A ppellant Maria E liz abeth B rowne and Appellee Richard Gor don Br owne. In this pro se appe al, Maria raises
se ve ra l is su e s in wh ic h sh e a tta c ks the div or c e de c re e and se e ks a c tio ns fr om t his Court re la tin g to the divorce proce eding s. Be cause we c onclude that Maria’s issues are without merit, we aff irm the trial court’ s judgme nt.
BACK GR OUND

Maria a nd Richard wer e marrie d in 1982. They had one child during their marr iag e. 1 Th e c ou ple se pa rate d in Marc h 20 07 , and

Mari a pe tit ion e d f

or a div or c e the fo llo wi ngmon th. Mari a later a mended he r petition to seek a dispropor ti o n at e share of the c ommunity estate f or seve ral2

rea sons, including a

n alleg ation that Richard wa s at fault in the breakup of the m arr iag e. The trial court he ld a hea

ring in November

2007. At the hea

ring , Richard testified that he had wo rk ed for Xe rox C orporation for approximately

twenty -five y ear s. During his y ear s of employ m en t , h e acc umulated re tirement saving s in a 401(k) a ccount in the a mount of approximately $200,000. For at least two y ear s prior to the divorce hear ing, Ma ria wor ked for Eane s I ndepende nt School District as a teac hing a ssistant for a presc hool class. She quit her job in May 2007, a month afte r filing for divorc e. Testimony

at the hearing established that the c ouple had investe d in rea l estate a nd
acc umulated seve ral prope rties during their marr iag e. At the time of t h e divorce , they had four proper ties, one on Cerro Alto Cove (“the Cerro Alto pr operty”), one on Bob Wire Road ( “the B ob Wir e pr op e rt

y ” ), and tw o on L ipa

n Tr a il (“ the fi rs t L ipa

n Tr a il pr op e rt

y ” and “ the se c on d L ipa

n T ra il proper ty ”). The couple ha d a mortg ag e on t h e C er ro Al to property , and the ba lance due on the
mo rt gage wa s approximately $229,000 at the time of the divorc e. The y also had take n out a loan
a g a i n s t R i c h ar d ’ s r e t i r e m e n ta c c o u n tf o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 t o p u r c h a s e t h e B o b W i r e p r o p e rt y. At the time of the divorc e hea ring , they owed a pproxi mately

$41,000 on the loan. A money -marke t
acc ount in the amount of approximately $9,000 at t he ti me of the hearing was being used to pay back
s o m e o f t h e l o ano nt h e B o b W i r e p r o p e rt y. After the hea ring , the trial court g rante d the di vorce and awarde d Maria the two L ipan Trail prope rties, one- half of Richa rd ’ s r e ti r e me nt a c c o u

nt, a n d s o me per sonal proper

ty , including two vehicles
. T h e trial c ourt awa rded Richa

rd the Cer

ro Alto proper

ty , the B ob Wire proper

ty , the money -marke t acc ount, one-ha lf of his retire ment acc ount, and som e per sonal proper ty , includingAl l of the inf or ma tio n ne c e ssa

ry fo r the dis po sit ion of

the iss ue s in

thi s a pp e a l is a va ila

ble 2 in t he c le rk ’s re c or d a

nd the tr ans c ri pt o f t

he div or c e he ari ng , a

nd a ll re fe re nc e s to t

he re c or d in

thi s opinion are r efe renc es to those two items. 3 two vehicles. The trial c ourt order ed Richar d to sell the Bob Wire prope rty and pay the loan on the proper ty , and aw arde d him the proce eds of the sa le of the pr operty afte r pay ing the loan. Richard
was a lso responsible for the mortg ag e on the Cer ro Alt o proper

ty and the loans on the two vehicles
awa rded to him. Eac h party

was orde red to pa

y his or her attorney ’s fe es. Mar ia appe aled the tr ial court’s f inal divorce decr ee. A fter Ma ria filed a n appea l, Richard filed a

motion for damag es in the amount of his attorney ’s fe es, alleg ing that Maria’ s appea l was fr ivolous.
DI SCU SSIO N Maria se eks the following actions fr om this Court: (1) e nforc ement of the divorce decr ee; ( 2) consider ation of additional docume nts not considered in the tria l court; (3) issuance of an orde r re quiring Richard to disclose a dditional documents; (4) reve rsal of the divorce decr ee ba sed on the trial cour

t’s failure to awar d Maria spousa l maintenance and a por tion of the proce eds of the sale of the Bob Wire pr operty ; (5) issuance of a n o rd er r equiring Richard to pay for Ma ria’s tria l counsel’s f

ees be cause her tria l counsel alleg edly provided inef fec tive assistance ; and (6) issuanc e of a pe a c e bo nd . We a dd

re ss e a c h is su e be low . We the n a dd re ss s e ve ra l mi sc e lla

ne ou s r e qu e sts
su bmi tte d b y

Mari a . A s a

fi na l matte r, we a dd

re ss R ic ha

rd ’s mot ion

fo r d a ma g e s. 2 Enforcem ent of Divorce

Dec ree Maria r aises several issues that appear to be re quests for this Court to enforc e the terms o f t he divorc e dec ree . Specifica lly , Maria c omplains that: (1) the one- half portion ofThere is nothing in the re cord to sug g est that Maria soug ht enforc ement of the divorce 3 decr ee f rom the trial cour

t. Maria a lso seems to reque st that we enf orce a Tra vis County standing order that require s 4 the parties in a divorce suit or a suit a ffe cting the pare nt-child relationship to behave in a c erta in way throug hout the pende ncy

of their law suit. See Travis County Standing Or der Reg ardingChildren, Property and Conduct of the Par

ties. She alleg es that Richard has violated the standing order in a 4 Ric ha rd ’s re tir e me nt a c c ount a

wa rd e d to he r i n th e div or c e de c re e wa s n ot p ro mpt ly tr ans fe rr e d to her acc ount, a

nd once it wa s transfe rre d, it was inexpl icably transfe rre d back out of

the ac count and then re place d with a lesser amount; (2) Richar d has not provided her wit h the deposits on the re ntal prope rti e s aw ar d e d to h e r in th e d iv o r c e d e c r e e ; ( 3 ) Ri c h ar d h a s n o t p r o v id e d h e r w ith se vera l
a pp lia nc e s and oth e r i te ms awa

rd e d to he r i n th e div or c e de c re e ; ( 4) Ric ha rd dama g e d o the r i te ms
awa rd e d to he r i n th e div or c e de c re e su c h th a t he re nd e re d th e m un us a ble ; and (5 ) h e r c re dit

is
a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d b y the loa n o n th e Ce rr o A lto pr op e rt y e ve n thou g h the pr op e rt y wa s awa rd e d to Ric ha rd . Re g ard ing the ite ms awa rd e d to he r t

hat w e re e ith e r n ot p ro vid e d to he r o r d a ma g e d, Mari a
s eeks c ompensation. Reg ardingthe loan on the Cer ro Alto proper

ty awa rded to Richar d, Maria se eks an orde r re leasing her of

financ ial responsibility

for the loa

n. For the re maining issues, she appea rs to seek a n enfor ceme nt order. Al tho ug h M ari a

may have va lid e nf

or c e me nt iss ue s, sh e mus t r a ise tho se iss ue s w ith the tr ia l c ourt , wh ic h is the pr op e r c ourt to e nf or c e its own d e c re e s. See Tex. R. Civ. P . 308 (“The 3
co u rt s h al l cause its judgments and de cre es to be c arr ied into execution.”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9 .0 06 (a ) ( Wes t 20 06 ) ( “ [T]he c ourt may re nd e r f ur the r or de rs to e nf

or c e the div isi on

of pr op e rt y made in the de cre e of divorc e or a nnulment to assist i n the implementation of or to clar ify the prior order .”) We the ref

ore overr ule all of Maria’ s issues that relate to enfor ceme nt of the divorce decr ee. 4varie ty

of wa y s. Howeve r, Mar ia did not raise this issue in the trial cour t a nd does not c ite to any evidenc e in the rec ord supporting her a rg ument. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1, 38.1(i). The ref ore, the issue is waived. Se e De v inev . D all as Cou nty , 130 S.W .3d 512, 513-14 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.) ; W

ilcox v. Hempstead , 992 S.W .2d 652, 656-57 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 1999, no pet.). 5 Cons ide ra tio n of

Add itiona l D oc uments Maria c o n te n d s th a t t

h e tr ia l c o u rt w a s n o t p r e s e n te d w it h a ll r e le v an t e v id ence relating to the c ommunity estate be cause Richard f ailed to disclose a c on s i d er able amount of
e v i d e n c e an d p r o v i d e d i n a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e e s t a t e , an d M ar i a ’ s t r i a l c o u n s e l f a ile d to p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t a l l r e l e v an t e v i d e n c e o r o b j e c t t o R i c h ar d ’ s i n a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, Maria r equests that this Court consider the fo l l o wi ng evidenc e that wa s not presente d to the trial court: (1) the amount of money Richard took “w hen closing chec king a nd saving s acc ounts that [were] not considere d in the division of assets”; (2) the corr ect monthly income information for the Cerro A lto property ; (3) the “ Edwar d J ones ac counts”; (4) the profits fr om the sale of the B ob Wire proper ty ; and (5) a ccur ate infor

mation reg ardingRichard’ s rental income
. I n making her arg uments, Maria nece ssarily ref ere nces documents that are not in the
rec ord
. Al t houg h she attac hed many documents to her br ief, such attachments ar e not par t of the
rec ord and c annot be c onsidered. S e e G o n z a le

z v . V il la r r e al , 2 5 1 S.W .3d 763, 777 n.17 (T ex . Ap p . —Corpus Christi 2008, pet. dis m’d w.o.j.) (holding that attachme nt of documents as
e xhibi ts o r a

pp e nd ic e s to a

pp e llate br ie fs is no t fo rm a l inc lus ion in r e c or d o n a pp e a l and do c ume nts the re fo re c ann ot b e c on sid e re d) ; Nguyen v . Intertex , Inc. , 93 S.W .3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—HoustonMaria a lso seeks a revision of the divorce decr ee ba sed on the a dditional documents she 5 would like us to consider. B eca use we will not c o n s i d er addit ional documents that ar e not in the re c or d, we a lso wi ll n ot r e vis e the div or c e de c re e ba se d o n th os e do c ume nts . We the re fo re ov e rr ule this iss ue. 6 [14t h Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (sa me). Ac cordingl y , we overr ule all of Mar ia’s issues re lating to the
c on sid e ratio n o f d oc ume nts no t c on sid e re d in the tr ia l c ourt
. 5
Di sc los ure of Add itiona l D oc uments Maria a l s o argues that Richar d failed to disclose a considera

ble amount of inf or ma tio n p e rt ine nt t o th e div isi on of th e estate , a nd sh e re qu e sts that th is C ourt or de r h im t o disclose the information. She seeks disclosure of: (1) all information per taining to f

our individual
a c c o u n t s R i c h a r d h a d w i t h E dw ar d J o n e s ; an d

( 2 ) t h e s a l e a m o u n to f

t h e B o b W i r e p r o p e rt y. Ho w e v e r , M ar ia

h a s n o t c it e d , an d

w e h a v e n o t f

o u n d , an y le g a l a u th o r it y e mp o w e r in g th is Court to order disc losure of doc uments alleg edly not provided to the trial co u rt
. Fur ther, a s we have alre ady stated, we will not consider docume n t s t h at ar e not included in the r ecor d. See G onzalez , 25 1 S. W.3 d at 77 7 n .1 7; Nguyen , 93 S.W .3d at 29 3
. Thus, we ove rrule Ma ria’s issues pe rtaining to the disclosure of doc uments.
Reve rsal of Divorce

Dec ree Maria contends that the trial court err ed in de ny ing her reque st f or spous al
m a i n t e n an c e an d

i nf a i l i n g t o aw ar d

h e r a p o rt i o no f

t h e p r o c e e d s o f

t h e B o b W i r e p r o p e rt y.
A. Spou sal Maintenance Mari a c on te nd s th a t sh e wa s e nti tle d to sp ou sa l ma int e na nc e be c a us e (1 ) s he ha d to quit her job with the Ean es S ch o o l Di strict and move to Ne w B raunf els bec ause of

Richard’ s7

hara ssment, a

nd it wa s difficult to find a newjob without a teachinglicense; a nd (2) she did not want to u se the mon e y sh e re c e ive d fr om a pr e -h e ari ng sa le of a joi ntl y ow ne d pro pe rt y be c a us e us ingit would require her to pa

y at least twe nty -eig ht perc ent in taxes. A trial cour

t’s decision to awa

rd or not awa

rd spousal maintenanc e is revie wed unde r
an abuse- of-discr etion standard. See Deltuva v . Deltuva , 113 S.W .3d 882, 888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). An a

war d of spousal maintena

nce is intended to provide temporary and re habilitative
su pp or t f or a sp ou se wh os e a

bil ity to s up po rt he rs e lf

ha s e ro de d o ve r t ime wh ile e ng a g e d in homemaking activities and who s e ca p ital assets are insufficient to provide suppor t. Se e id .; O’Carolan v. Hoppe r , 7 1 S .W.3d 529, 533 (Tex. App.—Austi n 2002, no pet.). A tria l court may order maintenanc e if the dur ation o f t h e m ar ri age w as ten y ear s or long er, the spouse see king maintenanc e lac ks sufficient pr operty to provide for

his or her minimum r easona ble needs, and the spouse see king ma intenance : (1) ca nnot suppor

t him or her self due to a

n incapa citating phy sical or mental disability ; ( 2 ) i s t h e custodian of a child with a disability

requiringsubstantial car e and supervision, or (3) lacks a dequate ear ning a bility . Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051 ( West 2006). There is, however , a gene ral presumption that spousal maintenanc e is not warr anted

“ un le ss t he sp ou se se e kin g ma int e na n c e h a s e xe r c i se d d ili g e nc e in: (1 ) s e e kin g su ita ble e mpl oy

me nt;
or (2) developing the nece ssary skills to become self-suppor ting during a period of sepa ration and during the t ime the suit for dissolution of the marriag e is pending .” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 8.053(a) (West 2006). At the divorce hear ing, Ma ria testifi ed t h at she planne d to work af ter the divorc e. Spe c if ic a lly , th e fo llo wi nge xch ang e oc c ur re d b e tw e e n M ari a

and he r t ri a l c ouns e l:8

C o u n s el : Ar e y o ugo i n g t o b e w o rk i n g? Mari a : Ye s, sir , I

a m. Counsel: And how much a re you likely

to make? Mari a : Pr ob a

bly 12 .5 0 to $1 3 a

n h our, a lth ou g h I

g ot a job of fe r f or 15 in Houston, Texas.
I n a dd iti on , a

fr ie nd of Mari a ’s wh o wa s a g ue st- se rv ic e mana g e r a t a ho te l te sti fi e d th a t he wo uld hire he r as a

manag er at the hotel if she neede d a job. H e testified that mana g ers at the hotel started
a t a bo ut $ 25 ,0 00 to $ 35 ,0 00 a y e ar a nd re c e ive d b e ne fi ts. I n addition to any income she planned to e arn by working , Maria w as also aw arde d the two L ipan Tra il properties, whic h are both income-produc ing pr operties. Ma ria testified that she
c ou ld r e nt t

he fi rs t L ipa

n T ra il p ro pe rt

y fo r $80 0 pe r mon th. She te sti fi e d th a t a ft e r s ub tr a c tin g ta xes, i n s u r an c e p ay

m e n t s , an d

m a i n t e n an c e c o s t s , s h e w o u l d e ar n$ 5 6 4
. 5 3 a

m o n t hf r o m t h e p r o p e r t y. Re g ard ingthe se c on d L ipa n T ra il pr op e rt

y , Ma ri a te sti fi e d th a t sh e c ou ld r e nt e a c h o f t he tw o unit s
o n t h e p ro p er t y

for $650 pe r month, amounting to a total of $1,300 per month. Af ter subtra cting taxes, in s u r an c e p ay

me n ts , an d

ma in te n an c e c o s ts , s h e te s ti f ie d th a t s h e w o u ld

e ar n$ 9 9 6
. 0 3 p er month from the prope rty . She also testified that she rec eived $54,000 from the pre- hear ing sa le of
s e v e na c r e s o f

p r o p e rt y t h e c o u p l e h a d o w n e d an d t h a ts h e h a d a

b o u t $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 o f

t h e m o n e y

l e f t
. In
a dd iti on , th e tr ia l c ourt

awa rd e d M ari a

half of Ric ha

rd ’s re tir e me nt a c c ount, wh ic h amou nte d to approximately

$100,000. On ap p ea l , Maria a

rg ues that the trial c ourt should have a war ded her

spousal
ma int e na nc e be c a us e sh e wa s une mpl oy e d at th e tim e of the div or c e he ari ngand

did no t w ant t o u se9

money that would be hea

vily taxed. However , g iven the asse ts awar ded to her ; the money she
rec eived from the pre- hear ing sale of proper ty ; the testimony

at trial re g ardingher pla

ns to work and the amount she wa s likely to ear n; and the pre sumption that spousal maintenanc e is not warr anted;
we c onclude that the tr ial court did not abuse its discre tio n i n d ec lining to awa rd spousal maintenanc e. We there fore overr ule this issue.
B. P roce eds of B ob Wire P ropert y Maria a lso contends that the t rial court err ed in awarding the proc eeds of the sale of the B ob Wir e pr op e rt

y so le ly to R ic ha rd . M ari a a lle g e s th a t sh e sh ou ld h a ve be e n a wa rd e d at le a st
a t h i r d o f t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e s h e : ( 1 ) i n i t i a l l y f

o u n d t h e p r o p e r t y; (2) a ssisted in im proving and maintaining t he property ; and (3) contributed some of her money for expenses related to the prope rty
.

A trial co u rt i s char g ed with dividing the pa rties’ c ommunity

estate in a

“just and ri g ht” mann e r, havin g du e re g ard fo r t he ri g hts of

e a c h p art y . T e x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 7 .0 01 (We st 20 06 ); Moroch v . Colli ns , 174 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pe t. denied). We use a n abuse- of-discr eti o n standard in r eviewingthe trial cour t’s division of the property in a divorce decr ee. Mu rff

v . M ur ff , 6 15 S.W. 2d

69 6, 69 8 ( Te x. 19 81 ). A tri a l c ourt is p re su me d to have pr op e rl y exercised its discre tion in divi ding the assets of a marria g e. Id . at 69 9. A t ri a l c ourt a bu se s it s discretion if it ac ts arbitrar ily , unrea sonably , without reg ard to g uiding lega l principles, or without sup p o rt i n g ev idence
. K- Ma rt C or p. v . H on e y c utt , 2 4 S. W.3 d 3 57 , 3 60 (T e x. 20 00 ); Bocque t v. He rring , 972 S.W .2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). We will rever se on appe al only if the prope rty

division is so disproportionate as to be manif estly unfair. O’Carolan , 71 S.W .3d at 532.10 H e r e , t h e t r i a l c o u rtaw ar d e d R i c h ar d t h e C e r r o A l t o p r o p e r

t y, t h e B o b W i r e p r o p e rt y, half of h is r e ti r e me n t a c c o u n t, an d tw o c ar s . T h e tr ia l c o u r

t o r d e r e d Ri c h ar d to s e ll th e B o b Wire proper ty , and with the proc eeds of the s ale, to repay the loan for

the prope rty . Any

money rema ining from the sa le of the pr operty afte r re paying the loan was awa rded to Richa

rd. The trial court a

war ded Maria ha lf of Richar d’s re tirement ac count, the two L ipan Tra il properties, a nd two car s. Maria doe s not point t o, and the recor d does not show, any evidenc e esta

blishing that the trial cour

t’s division of the community estate was not equitable. Althoug h Richard wa s awa rded the proc eeds of

the sale of

the B ob Wire proper

ty , he wa s al s o o rd er ed t o repa y the loan on the proper ty
. I n addition, Richa

rd wa s responsible for

the loans on the Cer

ro Alto proper

ty and the two
c ars awa rd e d to him . M ari a

wa s awa rd e d tw o in c ome -p ro du c ingpr op e rt ie s and wa s n ot r e sp on sib le for a ny loans. Considering all of the evidenc e in the rec ord, we conclude that the trial cour t did not abuse its discre tion in awardingRich ar d t h e proc eeds of the B ob Wire proper

ty
. Se e Mu rff

, 615 S.W .2d at 698-99. Ineffe ctive Assistance

Maria r equests that this Court order Richa rd to pay for he r trial attorne y ’s fe es beca use h er tria l counsel provided ine ffe ctive assistanc e. In support of her claim of inef

fec tive assistance , Maria a lleg es that her trial counsel: (1) did not que stion or object to inacc urate financ ial inf or ma tio n p ro vid e d b y

Ric ha rd ; ( 2) did no t dra w at te nti on to co ntr a dic tor y or un tr uth fu l st a te me nts made by Richard; (3) ignor ed her reque sts tha t he objec t to inaccur ate infor mation or provide
acc urate information; and (4) soug ht a no-fa ult divorce rather than a divorce on the g rounds of
me nta l c ru e lty , a s w a s des ir e d by Mari a . Ho we ve r, the do c tr ine of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e g e ne ra lly11

does not extend to civil cases. See M cCoy v . Texas Instruments, Inc

. , 1 8 3 S
. W
. 3 d 5 4 8, 553 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 6, no pe t.) ; Cherqui v. W estheime r St. Festival Corp. , 116 S.W .3d 337, 343 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Althoug h an exception to the g ener al rule ha s been
cre ated with re g ard to trial c ounsel in pare ntal termination ca ses, see I n re M.S. , 115 S.W .3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003), the case befor e us does not fa ll within t he exception. Thus, the doctr ine of ineffe ctive assistanc e does not a pply to this case. Ac cording ly , we ove rrule this issue.
Issuan ce of

Peac e Bond Maria a lso complains that the trial court did not issue a peac e bond to pr otect her f rom Richard’ s alleg ed har assment, and she reque sts that this Court issue a pea ce bond. She a lleg es that Richard ha s subjected he r to hara ssment in person and by telephone and email, including thr eate ning to approa ch her

and say , “He llo W ife” when he s ee s h er in public. She contends that her trial counsel should have soug ht a pea ce bond but did not.

A p e a c e bo nd

is u se d in a c ri min a l con te xt an d ma y be iss ue d w he n a

ma g istrate is inf or me d und e r oa

th that an o ff

e ns e is e ith e r a

bo ut t o b e c omm itt e d o r h a s b e e n thre a te ne d a g a ins t
someone. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 7.01-.18 ( We s t 2 0 0 5 ) (describing proce dure f or issuing pea ce bond) . Her e, Mar ia did not file an a pplication for a

peac e bond or othe rwise make a
c la im to th e t r i a l c o u rtt h a tR i c h ar d w a s a b o u tt o c o m m i t , o r

h a d t h r e a t e n e d

t o c o m m i t , a

c ri me ag ainst her. She testified at the hearing that she had to quit her job and move from Austin to New Br aunfe ls beca

use Richar d hara ssed her

by calling her, se nding he r emails, and approa ching her a nd her f riends. Howe ver, the evidenc e shows that Richar d was ha ndling the r ental prope rties during the separ ation, and Mar ia testified that whe n Richard contac ted her, he asked que stions about the rental proper ties and aske d her to sig n contra cts. Thus, not only did Ma ri a n o t fi l e an application for a12

peac e bond or infor

m the trial court of

her de sire for

a pea ce bond, she also does n ot point to any
e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to su g g e st that Ric ha rd wa s a bo ut t o c omm it a

c ri me or ha d threatened t o commit a crime a g ainst her. Ac cording ly , we ove rrule this issue.
Ot he r Mi sc e lla ne ous Re que

sts
A. Sup ervision of T axation of P ropert ies Maria r eq u es ts that this C ourt “ove rsee the way the prope rties [were] taxed.” Howeve r, she does n o t ex plain her r equest other than to state that her

rea son for it is that Richard told her that she would be spending “an obse rvant [sic] amount” on taxes. Fur ther, she does not cite,
an d we have not f

ound, any

leg al authority

for suc h a re quest. See T e x. R. A p p . P. 38.1(i). Acc ording ly , we ove rrule this issue.
B. Disclosure of All S igned Docum ents I n an oth e r

i s s u e , M ar i a

r e qu e s t s t h a t

w e o r d e r R i c h ar d ’ s t r i a l a t t o r

n e y t o d i s c l os e copies of a ll documents signe d by Maria dur ing the pendenc y of the law suit. S he alleg es t hat she signe d some of the documents “under extreme stress” and that she “wa s talked into sig ning se vera l do c ume nts wi th n o le g a l r e pr e se ntatio n ava ila ble .” Ho we ve r, sh e do e s n ot c ite to any e vid e nc e in the reco rd t o s u pport her r equest, nor doe s she cite a ny leg al authority

for suc h a re quest. Se e id
. We theref ore ove rrule this issue.
C. Refinan cing of

P ropert ies Awarded to Richard Mari a a lso a sk s th is C ourt

to r e qu e st that Rich ard re fi na nc e the Ce rr o Alto pr op e rt y and one of the vehicles awa rded to him in the divorce decr ee. She alleg es that she ca nnot refina

nceAfter Richard f iled a motion for dama g es, Mar ia filed a motion ti tled “Appe llant’s Counter 6 ‘Appe llee’s Motion for Damag es.’ ” Be cause her motion is, in substance, a r esponse to Richar d’s motion for damag es, we treat it as a response rathe r than a counter -motion. 13 the home in which she lives beca use t he C err o Alto proper ty and the vehicle are still in her na me. To the extent that Maria’s r eques t relates to an enf orce ment of the divorc e dec ree , she must seek enfor ceme nt in the trial court. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 308; Tex . Fam. Code A n n . § 9
. 0 0 6 (a ). To the extent that the request re lates to something othe r than enfor ceme nt of the divorce decr ee, she has not cited, and w e h ave not f

ound, any leg al authority

for suc h a re quest. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(i). Thus, we ove rrule the issue.
Dam ages for Filing F

rivolous A

ppeal I n a motion filed with this C ourt, Richard r equests that we deter mine that Maria’ s
a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s and

awa rd dama g e s in

the a mou nt of $6 ,5 70 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s. See Tex. R. App. 6 P. 45 (permitting a

ppellate court to a

war d preva iling party “just damag es” upon de termination that appea l is frivolous). I n deter mining whe ther a

n appea l is frivolous, we re view the r ecor d from the appellant’ s vie wpoi nt and dec ide whethe r the a ppellant had r easona

ble g rounds to believe the judgme nt could be re verse d. Sm ith v . B ro wn , 51 S.W .3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)
. Whether t o g rant sanctions for a frivolous appe al is a matter of discretion that
an a pp e llate c ou rt ex erci se s w ithpr ud e nc e and

c a uti on and on ly a ft e r c are fu l de lib e ra

tio n in tr uly
e g re g iou s c ir c ums tanc e s. Go ss v . H ou sto n Cm ty . Ne wsp ap e rs , 2 5 2 S. W. 3 d 6 5 2 , 6 5 7 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2008, no p et
. ). Al though the re a re va rious defic iencies in Mar ia’s14

appea l, and although we ha ve re jected he r ar g uments, we e x erc ise our discre tion to deny Richard’ s motion. CO NC LU SION

Be cause we have over

ruled e ach of

the issues raise d b y Maria, w e af firm the trial court’s judg ment.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Apr il 29, 2010