### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 11, 200 8 S es sio n
BOBBYE. WHITE AND 

### AN N H . WH ITE v. PU LAS KI ELEC TRIC SY STEM

Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for G iles County No. 3617 Stella L Hargrove, Judge

No. M2007- 01835-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 18, 2008

Bobby E

. W h i t e an d Ann H. White sought judg ment g rantingthem title to a small portion of proper ty that they claim to own by

deed, adver se poss ession and by pay ment of t axes. The trial c ourt g rante d Pulaski Electric Sy stem, a public ele ctric c ompany , su m m ar y j udg ment. Findingno re ve rs ibl e e rr or , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

R I C HAR D H. D I NK I NS , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the cour t, in which F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J r., and ANDY D. B E NN E TT , J J ., joined.

Ke ithF arr in B lue and

Jame s Ru sse ll F arr ar, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e , Pula sk i E le c tr ic Sy ste m.

Sc ott Came ro n Williams an d Eile e n Eliza be th B ur kh a lte r, Na sh vil le , Te nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nts , Bobby E. Whit e and A nn H. White.

OP IN ION
The dispute in this case pe rtains to the owner ship of a small, nine teen- foot square portion of
re a l pr op e rt

y in P uls aki, Te nn e sse e , s itu ate d be tw e e n So uth F ir st St re e t and South S e c on d Stre e t. B ob by E. Whit e and

Ann H. Whi te (“ the Whit e s” ) p ur c ha se d a pa rc e l of c omm e rc ia l pr op e rt

y located at 124 South First St re et o n September 15, 1998. This pa rce l is identified on tax maps as parc el 24.03. Pulaski Electric Ser vice ( “PES”) is the owne r of a n adjoining t ra ct of land. Su b s e qu e n t to a c qu ir in g th e p r o p e rty , th e Wh it e s w e r e g r an te d a b u il d in g p e r mi t f r o m the City

of Pul a sk i f or the c on str

uc tio n o f a

c on c re te -b loc k a dd iti on

to a re sta ur ant th ey

op e ra te on the ir proper ty

. When completed, this addition ex tended their exis ting r estaura

nt building ninetee n fee t east to we st, thereby

running 100 fee t west from South F irst Stre et. I n Fe bruar y 2006, PES i nformed the Whites that their addition was enc roac hing on PES p ro p er ty and would have to be re moved. Shortly there afte r, PES demolished the po rt i o n o f t he White’s building located on the disputed par c e l. T he Whit e s th e re a ft e r f ile d c omp la int

se e kin g a de c lara tio n o f t itl e to t

he dis pute d p arc e l, to quie t title to sa

me and to r ecove r damag es for the de moliti on of their building . They claimed thatIt is P E S ’s c o n te n tio n tha t tra c t o n e a n d tra c t t w o m a k e the 8 1 fee t o f p a rc e l 2 4 .0 3 tha t ru n s w e st fro m S o u th 1
F irst S tre e t.

T h e d istan c e fro m F irst S tre e t to S e c o n d S tre e t is a p p ro x im a te ly 1 7 6 fee t. A d d ing the 6 0 fee t d e sc rib e d in 2

t he 19 29 deed, t he 21 f eet des cr i bed i n t he 19 47 deed, an 8 f oo t al l ey bel ongi ng t o t he C i t y of P ul as ki , an d t he 85 f

eet

o f l a n d c o n v e ye d to the C ity o f P u la sk i o n M a y 8 , 1 9 5 6 , o n e a rr ive s a t 1 7 4 fee t, the a p p ro x im a te d istan c e fro m F irst to S e c o n d S tre e t.

T he W hit es’ d ee d co nv eys t o t he m “a ce rtai n s t o reh o use an d l o t f ro nti ng ap p ro xim ately 1 9 f ee t o n S o uth F i rst 3
Str eet and runni ng ba ck b et ween paral l el l i nes app roximatel y 10 0 f eet bo und ed on t he east by So ut h Fir st Str eet on t he

s out h a nd wes t by p r op er t y o f t he C i t y o f

P ul as ki and on t he N ort h by ot her p r op er t y o f t he gr ant or pres ent l y occu pi ed b y Wa t k i n s F l o w e r s

. ” T h e D e e d a l s o s t a t e s i n b o l d t y p e : “ N O B O U N D A R Y S U R V E Y WA S MA D E A T T H E T I ME OF THI S C ONVE YA NC E W I TH THE L EG A L DE S C R I PTI ON BE I NG THE S A M E A S THE P R EV I OUS DE ED OF R E C O R D .” T h e d e e d a lso re fer e n c e s the p ro p e rty c o n v e ye d a s P a rc e l 2 4 .0 3

. -2- they held title to the disputed parce l of proper t y b y adver se possession and, fur ther, they wer e e nti tle d to ow ne rs hip of

the dis pute d pro pe rt

y du e to the fa c t tha t th e y and the ir pr e de c e sso rs pa id ta xes o n it fo r mor e tha

n 20 y e ars

. PES co nte nd e d th a t th e Whit e s’ pr op e rt y ru ns on ly 81 fe e t w e st of S outh First S tree t acc ording to title history , deed descriptions, and conve y ance s since 1929 and that the prope rty

descr iption found in the 1985 deed a nd all subsequent dee ds is incorrec t.

Th e tit le his tor

y of the pr operty

is a s f oll ow s: In a

de e d r e g ist e re d Apr il 6 , 1 92 9, pr op e rt y (one tra ct of which was later to be known as parcel 24.03) was c onvey ed by Pulaski Oil C ompany to C. B. Patterson and w ife. The deed de scribes the proper ty as “f ronting in the ag g reg ate a bout 77 fe e t and 2 in ches on

the Wes t si de of

F ir st M a in S tr e e t, [l a te r c ha ng e d to South F ir st St

re e t]
e xten din g ba c k w e stw ard ly 60 fe e t and

bo un de d o n th e No rt

h by an a lle y ; Ea st by

F ir st M a in S tr e e t; South by lot owned by

the cor poration of Pulaski and West by Ms. Sallie Hampton . . .”. In a dee d reg istered F ebrua

ry 12, 1947, the Cumberland Amuse ment Company proper ty “fr onting on an alley immediately

behind the Hampton property , s ai d l o t fr onting 76 f eet 6 inche s on said alley and
run ni ng backbet ween para ll el l in es 2 1 fee t.

.. ” to Ms . No ra F. P a t t e rso n, th en w id ow o f C . B. Patterson. Ms. Patterson conve y ed both the property descr ibed in the 1929 dee d and the 1947 de ed to J ohn W. Berr

y and wife , Christine Ber

ry , on J anuar

y 8, 1949. This deed de scr i b es t ra ct one as “extending back Westwardly 60 fee t” and tra ct two as “ running back be tween pa rallel lines 21 fe et.” 1 I n a de e d re g ist e re d May 8, 19 56 , the Cr e sc e nt Amu se me nt Comp any c on ve y e d a tra c t of pr op e rt y it had obtained fr om Cumberland Amusement Company to the City

of Pulaski. The deed de scribes this tract of prope rty

as “F ronting west on Second Street 165 fee t r unning back e ast betwe en par allel lines approximately

85 fee t to an 8-foot alley , and beingNo. 35 on the orig inal plan of the Town of Pul a sk i.” Th e dis tanc e e a st t o wes t fro m F ir st St re e t to Se c on d Stre e t is a

pp ro xima te ly

17 6 f e e t; there fore , PES contends that ever y deed prior to 1985 demonstrates a history of transf ers supporting the conc lusion that P arc el 24.03 runs 81 fe et. Howeve r, the de ed in e ach conveyance since 1985, 2 descr ibes the prope rt y

as “f ronting approximately

19 fee t on South First St ree t and runningback betwee n para llel lines approximately 100 fee t.” This de scription is in the deed convey i n g t he 3 proper ty from Christine B

. Be rry , the widow of J ohn W. B err y , to H enry Tatum, dated January 31, 1985. The same descr iption is found in H enry Tatum’s conve y ance to J err y W. W allace on Fe bruar

y-3-

1 , 1 9 8 5 ; J e r

r y W a l l a c e ’ s c o n v e yan c e t o R o b e rtT o d d S a i n to nD e c e mb e r

2 0 , 1 9 9 6 ; an d

f i n a l l y, Saint’s conveyance to the Whit es on September 15, 1998.

The Whites contend that eve ry title owner since 1985 has believed the property to ext end 100 fee t and that ever

y owner since 1985 has bee n assessed a nd paid prope rty

tax based on the 100 foot descri p t i o n i n accorda

nce w ith the tax assessor’ s office proper ty maps. PES moved for summary jud g me nt a sse rt ingthat a ll d e e ds fr om 1 98 5 to the pr e se nt, fr om whic h th e Whit e s d e ri ve the ir c la im to the proper

ty in question, incorre ctly

descr ibe the true dime n s i o n s o f t h e property owned by

the Whit e s; t hat th e a c tua l di me ns io ns of tr a c t 24 .0 3 w e re e sta bli sh e d in

the 19 49 de e d f

ro m Ms

. Patterson to the B err

y s; and that the Whites could not claim title to the property by pay ment of taxes
or adver se possession. I ts moti on was supporte d, inte r a lia , b y c op ie s o f t

he de e ds to t

he pr op e rt

y at issue and the A ffidavit of Ron Holcomb, Chief E x ecutive O ffice r of PES. The trial c ourt g rante d
summa ry jud g me nt t o PE S. O n a

pp e a l, t he Whit e s r a ise the fo llo wi ngiss ue s: 1) whe ther t h e trial c ourt’s Orde r complies with the Jul y 1, 2007 revision of Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04 which re quires the c ourt to state the leg al g rounds in the Orde r g ra nti ngor de nyingsumma

ry jud g me nt; 2) whether the court im proper ly relied upon two aff idavits used i n support of PES’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt; 3) whether , as a matter of law , the Whites are e ntitled to ownership under pa y ment of taxes, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109; PES’s failure to pay taxes, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110; or a dverse possession, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 2-101 or 105.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW

The issues we re r esolved in the trial c ourt upon summary judgme nt. The standard for review of a g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt b y

the tr ia l c ourt

is de novo

. S

e e B l a i r v

. W

. T o w n Ma ll, 130 S.W .3d 761, 763 (Tenn. 2004)

. Th is co ur t must make a

fr e shde te rm inatio n th a t th e re qu ir e me nts of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S.W .2d 49, 50-51 (Te nn. 1977). Whe n r e vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e , w e fi rs t de te rm ine wh e the r fa c tua l di sp ute s e xist. I f a fa c tua l di sp ute exis ts, w e th e nd e te r

mi n e w h e th e r

th e f a c t i s ma te r ia l t o th e c la im

o r d e f e n s e u p o nw h ic h the summary judgme nt is predicate d and whe ther the disputed f act cre ates a g enuine issue for trial. By rd

v . H all , 84 7 S.W. 2d 20 8, 21 4 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc ., 978 S.W .2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). We c onsider the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the non-moving party and re solve all infere nces in that party ’s favor. Stovall v. Clarke , 113 S.W .3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 20 03 ); Go dfr e

yv . R uis , 90 S.W .3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002). We r eview the dec ision to gra nt summary judgme nt as a matter

of law. Finister v. Humboldt Gen. Hosp., I nc., 970 S.W .2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 19 98 ); Robinson v . Omer, 952 S.W .2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997). Be cause the questi on is one of law,
no pr e sumpt ion of

c or re c tne ss atta c he s to the g ra nt o f a summa ry jud g me nt. Hembre e v. State, 925 S.W. 2d 51 3, 51 5 ( Te nn .1 99 6) ; BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson , 100 S.W .3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003)

.-4-

Summary judgme nt is a

p p r o p r iate wher e the movant e stablishes that there is no g enuine issue

a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and that a jud g me nt m ay

be re nde re d a s a

matte r o f l aw. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4; S t o v all , 113 S.W .3d at 721. Summary judgme nt should be g rante d at the trial c ourt level when the undisputed f

acts, a nd the infer ence s rea sonably drawn from the undisput ed fa cts, support
on e c on c lus ion , w hic h is the pa rt y se e kin g the summa

ry jud g me nt i s e nti tle d to a jud g me nt a s a matter of la

w. Pero’s Steak

& Spaghetti House v. Lee , 9 0 S. W.3 d 6 14 , 6 20 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; W ebber v. State Farm M

ut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 49 S.W . 3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001)

.
AD EQU AC Y O F THE O RD ER G RA NT IN GSUM M AR Y J UD G M EN T

Ora l argument on the m otions for summ ary judgme nt in the case at ha nd was he ld on J une 29, 2007, and the court issued its Or der g ranting summary judgme nt to PES on J uly 13, 2007. The Or de r s tate s:

This case is before the Court on the 29 day of June, 2 0 0 7 , u p o n Motion for th Summary J ud gm ent of Defenda

nt, Pulaski Electric Sy stem, and Motion for Partial Sum mary Judg me nt o f P la int if

fs , Bo bb y E. Whit e and

Ann H . Wh ite , M e mor and ums of L aw in support ther eof, Response s, toge ther with M em o ra ndums of L aw, statements and a

rguments of counse l, and t h e re cord; from all of which the Court finds that there are no g enuine issues of mater ial fac t, and that Def endant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. Pla int if fs ’ M oti on

fo r P art ial S ummary

Judg me nt i s d e nie d. Cos ts a re a sse sse d to Plaintiffs, for which e x ecution may issue. SO ORDERED.

Pr ior to July 1, 20 07 , the le g a l g ro un ds fo r gra nti ngor de nyingsumma

ry jud g me nt n e e d o nly be stated in the order “upon reque st” of either party

. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 was amende d eff ective J uly 1, 2007, to state: “The trial court sha ll state the leg al g rounds upon which the c ourt denies or g ra nts the mot ion , w hic h s ha ll b e inc lud e d in the or de r re fl e c tin g the c ourt ’s ru lin g .” Th e ru lin g in the ca se at ba

r is not in technical c ompliance with the amende d rule; howe ver, the basis of the ruling can be rea dily

found in the re cord of

the hea ring transcr ipt, th e p l ea d ings, the response s, and the aff idavits. This court does not fi n d t h e W h i t es were pr ejudiced by the def ective written order

as evince d by

the fac t that no party reque sted the trial court state its leg al g rounds afte r the Orde r wa s issued; the hear ing be ing he ld prior to the effec tive date of the revision to Tenn. R. Civ. P 56.04; and the Orde r wa s issued only twelve day s afte r the revision went into e ffe ct. This court is not presente d with an insurmountable obstac le, g iven the cla rity found in the re cord for leg al g rounds. This court finds no reve rsible er

ror a s to this i ssue.

M AT ER IA L C ON SID ER ED BY THE C OU RT IN ITS C ON SID ER AT ION OF P ES’ SUM M AR

Y J UD G M EN T M OTI ON

I n g rantingsummary

judgme nt to PES , the trial cour t stated that it relied upon, “Motion for Summary J udg ment of De fendan t , Pulaski Electric Sy stem, and Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment of Plaintiffs, Bobby E. Whit e and A nn H. White, Memorandums of L aw in support there of, Responses, tog ether with Memorandums of L aw, state ments and ar g uments of counse l, andT h e re is n o do ub t t hat , i f cal l ed , M r. H o l co m b co ul d t est i f y t o t he p rop ert y de scr i p t i o ns co nt ai ned i n t he 4
d ee d s.
-5- the re cord.” The Whites contend that the two a ffidavits of Ron Holcomb filed in support of PES’s
summa ry jud g me nt mot ion we re imp ro pe r, a sse rt ing that Mr

. Ho lc omb ma de i nap pr op ri a te conclusions of law and offe red te stimony that was not base d on persona l knowledg e. The Whit es further complain t h at t h e trial court e rrone ously considere d statements of fa ct submitted by PES which had be en objec ted to or denie d by them.

Af f i d a v i ts o f Ro n H o l co mb
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06 gover ning a ffidavits submitted in support o f m o tions for summary jud g me nt s tate s: Supporting a

nd opposing a ffidavits shall be made on persona l knowledg e, shall set forth such f

acts a s would be admissi ble i n evidenc e, and sha ll show affirmatively that the af fiant is competent to testi fy t o t h e m att ers state d there in. Sworn or ce rtified
c op ie s o f a ll p a

pe rs or pa rt s th e re of re fe rr e d to in an a ff ida vit sh a ll b e a tta c he d th e re to
or ser ved ther ewith. The c ourt may permit aff

idavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answe rs to interrog atories, or further aff idavits. W hen a motion for
summa ry jud g me nt i s ma de and

su pp or te d a s pro vid e d in this ru le , an a dv e rs e pa rt y may not rest upon the mer e alleg ations or denials of the adver se par ty ' s pleading , but his or he r r e sp on se , b y

a ff ida vit s o r a s o the rw ise pr ov ide d in thi s ru le , mus t se t f

or th specific fac ts showing that there is a g enuine issue for trial. I f the a dverse party does not so respond, summary judgme nt, if appropr iate, shall be e ntere d ag ainst the adver se par

ty . Ex pert opinion af

fi d av i t s shall be g overne d by Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 703.

Mr. Ron Holcomb is Chief Ex ecutive Office r of PES. His first aff idavit rec ites his review of the historica l r ecor ds of PES re lative to its use of PES prope rty , as well as the tax maps and de eds to the various par ce l s of prope rty at issue, and r elates the information containe d, primarily the footag e conta ined in the prope rty descr iptions, t o the i d enti fication of the lots as contained on the tax m ap. Much of the information in the aff idavit r elatingto the evolution of title to the property as we ll a s th e dim e ns ion s of pr op e rt y c on ve y e d in

the va ri ou s d e e ds , is a dmi tte d b y the Whit e s in

the ir
re sp on se to D e fe nd ant’ s State me nt o f U nd isp ute d F a c ts. Th e fi rs t af fi davit , in pe rt ine nt p art , me re ly summarizes what can already be found in the de eds and state s from whe re the disputed 19 foot trac t of land evolved. The Court ag ree s that some of the stateme nts of Mr. Holcomb ar e ar g umentative and conc lusory , e.g., h i s s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e W h i t e ’ s b u i l d i n g
- a d d i t i o n w a s n o t“ o p e n l y, c o n t i nu o u s l y, exclusively , adver sely , and notoriously used by the Plaintiffs.” Howe ve r , th e a rgumentative portions
are easily sever able from the factual assertions and the Court disreg ards matter s which ar e not fa ctual in acc ordanc e with Rule 56.06. 4

Mr. H o l co m b ’s second a ffidavit re counts a 1964 Resolution of the B oard of May or and Al de rm e n o f t

he City of Pul a sk i ( a tta c he d a s a

n e xhibi t to the Affidavit of Te rr y Ha rr iso n, City-6-

Rec o r d e r ) , w h e r e in an 8 f o o t a ll e y w a s d e d ic a te d , a d jo in in g th e e xis ti n g 8 f

o o t a ll e y a t th e r ear

of the prope rty

ultimately conveyed to the Whit es and which exis ting alley was re fer ence d in the 1956 deed to the City of Pulaski fr om Cre scent Amusement Company (the “ Cresce nt Trac t”). He further explains that the PES building was constructe d on the Cresc ent Tra ct in the mid-six ties and that the Whit es 19 foot addition e ncompassed the 16 foot alley as we ll as an additional 3 fe et on the Cresc ent Tr a c t. F or

the same re a so ns a

pp lie d to the fi rs t a ff

ida vit , w e fi nd

the se c on d a ff

ida vit a pp ro pr iate
and a dmi ssi ble . T he re fo re , with the e xce pti on of Mr . H olc omb ’s op ini on

a s to the Whit e ’s po ssi ble adver se possession claim, we find his affidavits to be in compliance with Tenn. R. Ci v

. P. 56.06; further m o re , we s ee no evidenc e off ere d in the rec ord by

the Whites to refute the a ccur acy of the
re c or ds of

fe re d b y PES.

P laintif fs’ Respons e to D efendan t’s State m ent of Und ispu ted F acts

Rul e 56 .0 3 r e qu ir e s a

party mo vi ng fo r s umm ary jud g me nt t o s ub mit

“ a se pa ra te c on c ise statement of the material facts as to which the moving pa rty contends ther e is no g enuine issue f or tr ia l,” t o w h i c h t h e n o n
- m o v i n g p art y i s r e qu i r e d t o r e s p o n d b y e i t h e r a g r e e i n g t h a t t h e fa c t is undisputed, ag re eing for pur poses of c onsideration of the summary judgme nt motion t hat it is not disputed or disputing the a sserted fac t. The Whit es complain that the trial court err ed in considering tw e nty -o ne state me nts of mate ri a l fa c t subm itt e d by PES, to wh ic h the y ha d obje c te d or d e nie d, in its c on side ratio n o f t

he mot ion . T he ba sis of the ir ob je c tio ns to t

he a sse rt e dly

un dis pute d f

a c ts “include the Def

endant’ s lack o f ci t at i o n to the rec ord, other tha n the improper a ffidavits of Ron Ho lc o mb , an d th e d e s ig n a ti o n o f s tate me n ts a s o n e s o f ‘ f a c t’ w h e n th e y w e r e a c tu a lly leg al conclusions.”

M an y o f th e o b

je c ti o n s r e late to th e w o r d in g o f th e f a c tu a l a s s e rti o n s s tate ments as being “vague and c onclusive” an d t o the utiliz ation of lot numbers, but admit the truth of the fa ctual
as s e rti o n s c o n ta in e d , p arti c u la r ly th o s e d e ta il in g th e d im e n s io n s o f th e p r o p e rty d e e d e d to the Whit es. Signific antly , the Whites admit (1) the dispute conce rns owner ship of approximately 19 square fee t of proper

ty ; ( 2) the conveyance of the fir st 60 feet of the prope rty

held by plaintiffs in the 1929 deed; ( 3) the 1947 c onvey ance of 21 feet i mmediately west of the 60 f eet c onvey ed in 1929; (4) the 19 4 9 c o n v e y an c e o f th e 8 1 f e e t t r a c t t o th e B e r

r y s ; ( 5 ) th a t, a t t

h e ti me o f

th e 1 9 49 conveyance , there was a

n 8 foot alley

belong ing to the City

of Pulaski adjoining the pr operty on the west; (6) the proper

ty conveyed to the City

of Pulaski in 1956 fronted 165 fe et o n S o u t h Second Street and r an bac k betwee n para llel lines 85 fee t to an 8 foot alley ; and (7) that the 1985 deed f rom Ms. Be rry to the Tatums contained a descr iption that had the proper ty line extending bac k 100 fee t from F irst S t re et

. The Whites have not shown a ny disputed fac t which would nec essitate a tr ial relative to the various proper ty descr iptions. The re cord shows that the descr iption upon which they rely (conve ying 100 f

eet) was e rrone ous, as the g rantor ha d only 81 fee t to convey

.-7- CLAIMS OF THE WH ITES TO TH E PR OP ERTY AT ISS UE

P ay m e ntof Ta xe s

Th e Whit e s c on te nd

the y sh ou ld b e g ra

nte d r e lief b ased on

the pr e sumpt ion

of ow ne rs hip throug h pay

ment of taxes contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109. I n support of this contention, they asser t that the y and their pr edec essors have been a ssessed and pa id tax es on Parc el 24.03 since 1985 and t h at t h e t ax assessor’ s maps and re cords a s well as eve ry deed sinc e 1985 desc ribes the pr op e rt y a s r unnin g 10 0 f

e e t w e st f ro m South F ir st Str e e t. Th e y a lso c on te nd that PES ha s n ot p a id taxes on the disputed portion of proper ty , and is there fore barr ed fr om its claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110.

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 8- 2- 10 9 s tate s:

Any pe rs on ho ldi ngany

re a l e state or

land of any kin d, or any le g a l or e qu ita ble int e re st the re in, wh o ha s pai d, or wh o an d thos e thr ou g h who m su c h p e rs on c la ims h av e p ai d, the state a

nd county taxes on the same for mor e then twe nty (20) y ear s c on tin uo us ly pr ior to t he date wh e n a

ny qu e sti on ari se s in any of the c ourts o f t

his state conc erningthe sam e, an d wh o has had or who and those through whom such person c laims have ha d, such person' s deed, conveyance , g rant or othe r assura nce of title r e c o r d e d

in th e r e g is te r ' s o f

f ic e o f th e c o u n ty

in w h ic hth e la

n d li e s , f o r s u ch period of mor e than twenty (20) y ear s, shall be pre sumed prima fa cie to be the leg al
owner of such land.

The presumption cre ated in the s tatute i s a rebuttable one. W elch v. A. B. C. Coal Co., 293 S.W. 2d 44 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 95 6) ; se e als o Meals v. Lucas, N o

. 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 4 0 4

- CH

- 0 0 0 8 5 , 1 9 9 5 WL 31 84 67 a t *3 (T e nn . Ct . App . M ay 26 , 1 99 5)

. Th e evi den ce s ho ws tha t th e Whit e s and

the ir prede cessor s paid city

and county

taxes on the disputed proper ty for ove r twenty

(20) y ear s; however , inasmuch as ne ither they nor their pr edec essors had le g al title or equitable inter est in the disputed 19 foot trac t of land, they wer e not entitled to the pr es u m p tion of leg al owner ship gr anted by the statute. Moreove r, the tax map cannot be used to establish the boundary lines of t he prope rty

. See Sta te of T e nn esse e v

, W he tse ll , 2006 Tenn. App. L exis 334 (May 22, 2006).

Even if the Whites did m eet the statutory require ments to rece ive the bene fit of the presumption t h at they

are the leg al owner s of the disputed trac t, PES rebutted the presumption by showing by

clea r and c onvincing proof that a ny purported title to the disputed tract c laimed by the Whit es wa s not valid. The s tatutory presumption is that the claimant is the prima facie leg al owner of the land; a s such, it is controlling only i n t h e ab s en ce of contra

ry fac ts and circ umstances. See De av e rs v . D e av e rs, 457 S.W .2d 618 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970)

. Throug h the re corde d deeds a nd other public rec ords dating as fa r back as 1929, PES has shown, by a pre pondera nce of evidenc e, that the pr op e rt y de sc ri pti on

c on ta ine d in

the Whit e s’ de e d is e rr on e ou s.

Th e Whit e s a lso c on te nd that PES is b arr e d f ro m c la imi ngtit le to t

he pr op e rt

y purs ua nt t o Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110( a) since PES has never paid prope rty tax on t he disputed portion. TheyT en n. C o d e A nn

. § 6 7

- 5

- 2 0 3 (a)(1 ) st ates: 5

A ll p ro p e rty o f t h e U n ited S ta te s, the s ta te o f T e n n e sse e , a n y c o u n ty, o r a n y in c o rp o ra te d to w n , city

or t ax i n g di s t r i ct i n t h e s t at e t h at i s u s ed ex cl u s i v el y f or pu bl i c, c ou n t y or mu n i ci pal pu r pos es s h al l be

e x e m p t f ro m tax a tio n [.]
-8- acknow ledg e that PES is not making a claim of title to or interest in the proper ty , but state that PES has asse rted its owner ship of the prope rty in response to the summar y judgme nt motion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 8- 2- 11 0( a ) s tate s: (a) Any person having a

ny claim to rea l estate or land of any kind, or to a ny leg al or equitable inter est there in, the s ame having be en subjec t to assessment for state and county taxes, who and those throug h whom such person c laims have fa iled to have the same assessed and to pa y any state and county taxes thereon for a per iod of more tha n tw e nty (2 0) y e ars , s ha ll b e fo re ve r barr e d fr om br ing ing any a c tio n in lawor in equity to rec over the same, or to r ecove r any rents or pr ofits there from in any of the courts of this state. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-203(a )(1) , the prope rty at issue, being

proper ty of the City

of 5 Pulaski, is ex empt from taxation. Thus, the fac t that PES did not pay taxes on the property does not prec lude it from def

ending the title to same.

Adverse P ossession

The Whites also claim defe nsive title to the property by adver se possession pursuant to Tenn. Cod e Ann. §§ 28 -2 -1 01 and 28 -2 -1 05

. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 8- 2- 10 1, by its te rm s, a

pp lie s o nly

to g rants of pr operty

by the state; conse quently , it is not a pplicable to this case inasmuch as the Whites claim title from a pr ivate par ty

. See M oore v. Brannan , 304 S.W .2d 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 8- 2- 10 5 p ro vid e s: Any pe rs on ho ldi ngany

re a l e state or l and of any kin d o r a

ny le g a l or e qu ita ble interest ther ein, and suc h person a nd those throug h whom such per son claims having be e n in a dv e rs e po sse ssi on of

same fo r s e ve n ( 7) y e ars , w he re the re a l e state is h e ld

an d c l a i m e d b y s u c h p e r s o no r

t h o s e t h r o u g hw h o ms u c hp e r s o nc l a i m s b y a c on ve y anc e , d e vis e , g ra

nt, a de c re e of a c ourt of re c or d, or

oth e r a ss uran ce of ti tle purporting to convey

an estate in fee , and such c o n v ey ance , devise, g rant, or othe r assura nce of title, has been rec orded in the reg ister' s office of the c ounty in which the land lies for a

period of thirty

(30) y ear s or more or

such dec ree enter ed on the minutes of such cour

t for a pe riod of thirty

(30) y ear s o r m ore, is veste d with an absolute and inde fea sible titl e to such re al estate or intere st therein.

Under this statute, a claim for a dverse possession can lie ag ainst the state. See W hitaker v. House, 372 S.W .2d 194 (Tenn. 1963) . To make out such c laim, the claimant is requir ed to show possession of the prope rty for seven y ear s and assura nce of title recor ded for

thirty y ear s or more. State of Tennessee v . W

hetsell, supra. The W hites trac e their claim of title to the 1985 convey ance-9-

from Christine B. B err

y to Henry Tatum. Consequently , they have not sati sfied the r ecor dation require ment of the statute upon whic h they rely

.
CO NC LU SION

Finding no reve rsible er

ror, the r uling of the trial court is AF FI RMED. Costs are asse ssed

a g a i n s tB o b b y E , W h i t e an d A n nH

. W h i t e , e qu a l l y.

___________________________________

RI CHARD H. DI

NKI NS, J UDGE