1 NOTICE Decision fi led 06/ 10/10. The text of this decision may be changed or correct ed prior

to t he fi ling of a Peti tio n for

Rehearing o r th e disposit ion of

the same. NO. 5-07-0346 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT

________________________________________________________________________ CYN THIA SI MPK INS, I ndivi dually and as Speci al ) Appeal f rom the Administrat or for the Estate of Annett e Simpkins, ) Circui t Court of Deceased, ) Madison County. ) Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 07-L- 62 ) CSX CO RP OR ATIO N a nd C SX ) TR ANSP OR TAT ION, INC ., ) Ho nora ble ) D anie l J. Sta ck, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

________________________________________________________________________ JUST ICE C HA PM AN delivered the op inion o f the co urt: According

to the pl ainti ff' s complai nt, Annet te Simpkins was exposed t o asb esto s fibers brought home on the w ork clothes of her h usband , Ron ald Simpkins. Ronald Si mpkins
was exposed to asbestos while working for v arious employers, includi ng the defendants' predeces sor, th e B& O Railro ad. A nnette Simpkins d ied of m esoth elioma canc er in Ap ril 2007 wh ile the ins tant ac tion w as pe ndin g in the trialcourt. Her daughter, Cynthia Simpkins,
was appo inted a s the sp ecial ad ministr ator of A nnette 's estat e and was substituted a s the plaintiff. She now appeals an order di smiss ing t hree cou nt s of the complai nt ag ainst the defendants, CSX Corp. and CSX Transportation, Inc. (col lect ive ly ref erred t o as CSX). The
coun ts we re dism issed p ursua nt t o a mo tion un der se ction 2 -615 of the C ode o f Civil Proced ure (735 IL CS 5/2-615 ( West 2006)), on t he groun ds tha t an em ploy er has no d uty to protect the fami ly of i ts empl oyee from t he danger s of asbes tos brought home o n the w ork clothe s of the e mplo yee. W e find th at such a duty does exist. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings

.2

The fact t

hat thi s case comes to us ona motion to dismi ss pursuant to s ecti on 2-615 of the Code of Civ il Pr ocedure l imit s our consi derati on to the matt ers as sert ed in the pleadings. The supreme court has explained as foll ows:

"A secti on 2-615 moti on to dis miss ( 735 IL CS 5/2-615 ( We st 2002)) chall enges the le gal suffi ciency of a complai nt based on def ects apparent on i ts fa ce. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S. A. Corp. , 213 Ill. 2d 351 , 3 64[, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1110] (2 004 ). The re fo re , we re vi ew de novo an order granti ng or denyinga secti on 2-615 motion. Wakulich v. Mraz , 203 Ill. 2d 223, 2 28[, 785 N.E .2d 843 , 846] (20 03). In r evi ewing the suffi ciencyof a complaint, we accept as tr ue all well-pl eaded facts and all r easonable infer ences that may be drawn from those fac ts. Ferguson v. C ity of Chicago , 213 I ll. 2d 94, 96-97[, 820 N.E.2d 455, 457] ( 20 04 )

. We also cons true the alle gat ions i n the compl aint in the li ght mos t fav orable to t he plaintiff. King v. First Capital F

inancial Services Corp. , 215 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12[, 828 N.E.2d 1155, 1161] (2005). Thus, a cause of action should not be dismissed pursu ant to secti on 2-615 unless it i s clearly appare nt that no set of fa cts can be pr oved th at wo uld entitle the plaintiff to recovery. Canel v. Topinka , 212 Il l. 2d 311, 318[, 818 N.E.2d 311, 317] (2004)." Marshall v. Burge r King Corp. , 222 I ll. 2d 422, 429, 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (2006). For purposes of a moti on to dis miss pur suant t o secti on 2-615, the court may not consider affidavits or other supp orting materials. Kirchner v. Greene , 294 I ll. App. 3d 672, 677, 691 N.E.2d 107 , 112 (199 8); Barber-Colman Co. v. A&K M idw est I nsulat ion Co. , 236 I ll. App. 3d 10 65, 106 8, 603 N .E.2d 1 215, 12 18-19 (1 992). U nlike a section 2-619 motion or a secti on 2-1005 summary j udgment motion (735 I LCS 5/2- 619 , 2-1005 (W est 2006)), a secti on 2-61 5 mo tion relie s solely on the ple adings ra ther tha n on the un derlyin g facts. It is forthat reason that the p laintiff m ust pre vail if suf fici ent fac ts ar e pled which, i f prov ed,3

wou ld entitle her to relief. The scope of our

inquir y is conf inedto th e i ss ue of

w he th er th e p la in ti ff

's complai nt shou ld have b een d ismissed on th e bas is that R onald Simpkins' em ploy er did n ot ow e a du ty of care t o prevent

Annett e from bei ng exposed t o asbest os broug ht home on he r h us ba nd 's work clothes and body. We make no determi nation on t he questi ons of whether a breach of that duty occurr ed orwhether such a br each was a proxi mate cause of Annett e' s death. For purposes of this op inion, we must a ssum e that th e facts contai ned in the plaintiff 's complai nt are true. The plaintiff

's complai nt st ates that Annette and Ronald Si mpkins were marri ed from 1951 until1965, after

which time they div orced. For muc h of that time, Ronald was exposed to asbest os in hi s work as a steelworker, welder, r ailroad fir eman, and labore r. He worked in these capa cities fo r several employers, including t he B&O Railroad (the defendants' predecess or), where he worked fr om 1958 to 1964. On January 19, 2007, Annette Simpkins fi led the orig inal complaint i n this m atte r , alle gingthat s he had contr actedmesothel ioma cancer due to exposur e to asbes tos brought home on R onald 's body a nd w ork cloth es du ring their marriage. This is wh at is com mon ly refer red to as "tak e-home" asbe stos expos ure. (We note that Annett e Simpkins al so all eged tak e-home e xpos ur e t o a sb es to s t hr ough he r f

athe r and d ir ec t e xpo su re thro ug h he r o wn emp loymen t. Those all egat ions, howev er, ar e not at issue in this appeal.) The complaint named numerous defe ndants, including asbest os manufact

urers and former e mployers . The three coun ts of the com plaint h ere at issu e nam ed on ly CSX (as a su ccess or to th e B&O Railroa d) an d the Dow Chemical Company, where Ronald Si mpkins worked fr om 1964 thro ugh the end of t

he parti es' marri age i n 19 65 . C ou nt V II of the compl aint a lleg ed that both former e mployers negl ige ntly f aile d to tak e p recautions to protect Ronald Simpkins' fa m ily from take-home asbestos ex posure, co unt VIII alleg ed that both d efendan ts were4

strictl y liabl e for eng agi ng in an ultr ahazardous a ctiv ity, and count IX alleg ed willf ul an d
wan ton cond uct on the p art of both em ployers. On February 28, 2007, CSX filed a sect ion 2-615 motion to dismiss the thre e cou nts of the c omp laint again st it. CSX argued that under I llinois l aw an em pl oye r d oe s n otowe any duty to the fa milies of its emp loyee s. Th is wa s the so le basis for dism issal that it assert ed. We note that the Dow Chemical Compa ny d id not jo inCS X' s m ot io n or

fi le it s o wn motion to dism iss and is not a p arty to th is app eal. On April2, 2007, Annette Simpkins died. On May 2, her daught er, Cynthi a, wa s appointe d the speci al admi nistrator of Annett e' s estate. Cynthi a was late r subst itut ed as the plaintiff in this liti gation. On May 1 8, 2007, the court heard arguments on CSX's motion to dis miss. CS X argued that be caus e no Illino is cou rt has p reviously held that em ploy ers ow e a du ty to the famil ies of employees who are exp osed to asb estos, a llo win g the p laint iff's cas e to go forward agai nst CSX would be creating a new cause of action. Thus, acco rding to C SX, it is an issue that mus t be det ermined by an appel late court or the le gis latur e, not by a t rial
cour t. W e note that C SX im plicitly acknow ledged that no Illinois court has p reviously held that employers do not owe a duty t o protect famil ies f

rom tak e-home asbes tos expo sure either. CSX's at

torneypointed out

that t he plai ntif

f could appe al fr om an order di smiss ing hercase and that

"if [ s]he can cr eate a new cause of acti on, [s] he can creat e a new cause of action." In respo nse, th e plain tiff argued that askin g the co urt to recognize a du ty whe re there
are no prev ious cases on poi nt i s not the s ame as ask ing t

he court to creat e a new cause of acti on. She further argued tha t the Illinois Suprem e Cou rt has expresse d a bro ad vi ew o f duty, and she emphasi zed that findi ng that a duty e xist s is not the same t

hing a s finding that the duty has been brea ched or that the de fendant i s li able. In rebutt al, t he defendant s argued5

that holding there is a du ty to protect family me mbers from take-home asb estos expo sure
wo uld expa nd em ploy ers' liability un der the Fed eral E mplo yers' Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S .C. §51 et seq. (2 00 0) ) a nd th at th e p la in ti ff 's remedy in t

his cas e is ag ainst

the asbes tos manufacturers, not against the emp loyer. The co urt told t he plai ntif

f' s counsel : "Ihave t o be cand id with you. It

sounds li ke a great argument for the [s]upr eme [c]our t." The cour

t then grant ed the motion to dismiss and told t he parti es it

would sever

the clai ms against CSX from the remainder

of the pl ainti ff' s clai ms and enter a findin g, pursu ant to Su prem e Co urt R ule 304 (210 Ill. 2d R. 304), mak ing i ts di smiss al a final and appeal able orde r. The court entere d
a writt en orderto that

effect the same day. The plaintiff th en time ly filed th e instan t appe al. We are perpl exed by CSX's argument that s omehow the tri al court was unab l e to decide t he issue before i t, j ust as we ar e perple xed by the judg e' s apparent acquiesc ence to that argument . Our leg al system i s one of common l aw, which by its very def inition dev elops thro ugh the case law decisi ons of the courts . See Bla ck' s Law Dicti onary 276-77 ( 6th ed. 1990). The tri al judg e has both t he authority and the duty to decide di sputes be fore i t. S ee Marbu ry v. Madison , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60, 7 3 (18 03) (e xplain ing, "It is emp hatica lly the pro vince an d du ty of the judicial depa rtment to say w hat the law is"). There is no prerequi sit e that

an a ppella te co urt deci de cases of fir st i mpressi on. Nor does the absence of statu tory o r regulato ry law cons train the court 's power to deci de disput es before it. See Ill . Co nst. 19 70, a rt. VI, §9 (trial cou rts have ju risdiction over "all ju sticiable matters"). Before turning to the me rits of the parties' con tention s, w e note that the motion to dismiss was directed at three dif ferent counts of the plaintiff' s complaint. Allthree counts, how ever, involved al leg ations that t he ris k of har

m to Annett e Simpkins was for eseeabl e. On appeal, t

he parti es do not distinguish the three co unts. Thus, we, too, wil l dis cuss the m together.6

As both parties not e, no Illinois c ase is d irectly o n po int. Both parti es cit e decisi ons of other ju risdiction s, w hich re ach o ppo site resul ts. The pl ainti ff ar gues t hat g eneral principles of

duty under I llinois l aw support finding a duty to protect family members i n tak ehome asbestos cases. CSX urges u s to follo w th ose ju risdiction s that ha ve not fo und a duty to protect family mem bers fr o m take -home asbestos exposure, arguing that fi nding s uch a duty would lead t o unlimi ted li ability. We agree wit h the pla inti ff. Becaus e we find tha t ordinary principles of

Il linoi s negl ige nce law sup port this conclusi on, we need not consi der the plaintiff

's alte rnati ve arg

ument based on a t

ransfe rred- negl ige nce theor y (see Renslow

v. Menno nite Hospital

, Inc. , 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977)) , nor need we consi der C SX 's relat ed ar gume nt that the common law cannot expand FELA li ability to a nonemployee spouse. We also take note that in l ight of the supr eme court' s recent decisi on in Tedrick v. Comm unity Res ource Center, Inc. , 235 I ll. 2d 155, 920 N.E.2d 220 (2 009 ), we do not belie ve that a tr an sf er re d- ne gl ig en ce th eo ry pr ov id es vi ab le su pp or t f or th e p la in ti ff

's argument

regarding dut

y. Und er Ill inois law, the exist ence of a duty depends on w hether the parti es st and i n such a relations hip to ea ch other t hat the law imposes upon the defendant an oblig ation to act in a reasonab le manne r for the benefit of the p laintiff. M arsh all , 222 I ll. 2d at 436, 856 N.E.2d at 1057. The term "relat ionship" does not n ecess arily me an a c ontrac tual, fam ilial,
or other parti cular s pecialrelationship. See M arsh all , 222 Il l. 2d at

441, 856 N.E.2d at 1060 (explaining that whether or not the law imposes a duty on a defendant for the bene fi t of a plaintiff depends on " '"the sum t otal of those cons iderations of pol icy which l ead the l aw to say that

the pla inti ff i s enti tled

to p rote ction " ' " (qu otin g Kirk v. Michael ReeseHospital & MedicalCenter , 117 Ill. 2d 507, 527, 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (1987) (quoti ng W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §53, at 358 (5t h ed. 1984))). As the s upreme court has noted, " ' the concept

of duty in negl ige nce cases i s ver y involved, compl ex[,] and indeed7

nebulou s.' " Marsh all , 222 I ll. 2d at 435, 856 N.E.2dat 10 56- 57 ( quo ting M ieh er v . B rown , 54 Ill. 2d 539, 545, 3 01 N .E.2d 3 07, 310 (1973)). M oreover, every person owes every ot her person the duty to us e ordinar y care t o prevent

any injury tha t might na turally occur as t he
reaso nably forese eable cons equence of hi s or her own act ions. S ee Forsyt he v. Clar

k USA, Inc. , 224 Ill. 2d 274, 2 91, 864 N.E .2d 227 , 238 (20 07). Whether a relations hip exis ts bet ween the part ies t

hat willjust ify t

he imposi tion of

a duty depe nds u pon four fa ctors: (1 ) the fo reseea bility of the har m, (2) t he likelihood

of the injur y, (3) the mag nitude of

the burden involv ed in g uardingagai nst the harm, and ( 4) the consequences of placing on the defendant the duty to protect

agai nst the harm. M

arsh all , 222 Ill. 2d at 43 6-37 , 856 N.E .2d a t 105 7; Wa rd v. Kmart Corp. , 136 I ll. 2d 132, 140-41, 554 N.E.2d 22 3, 22 6-27 (199 0). O ur de termina tion of d uty is in forme d by pub lic poli c y considerations. Marsh all , 222 Ill. 2d at 436, 8 56 N .E.2 d at 1 057 . As a m atter of p ublic policy, it is best to place the du ty to pro tect again st a har m on the pa rty bes t able to prev ent it. See Court v. Grzelinski , 72 Ill. 2d 141, 15 0-51, 37 9 N.E .2d 281 , 285 (19 78). Applyingthese principl es, we find t he out-of

-state case s that

have found a

d uty in simi lar circum stance s to be more persu asive tha n tho se that have not. W e find t wo cases particu larly helpful . The Tennessee S upreme Court' s decis ion in Satterfield v. B reeding Insulation Co. , 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn . 2008), o ffers a thoug htfuland persuas ive discuss ion of the role the part ies' relationship should pl ay in dete rminin g the ex istence of a d uty, w hile the Ne w Jersey case of Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. , 186 N.J. 394, 89 5 A.2d 1 143 (20 06), cite d by the pla inti ff (and reli ed upon in many of t he other c ases she cit es), r equired t he New JerseySupreme Court

to apply g eneral principles of duty si milar

to I llinois' s to ci rcumst ances nearly identical to thos e present in the instan t case. Satterfie ld

involved a 25-ye ar-ol d woman who d ied a s a re sul t of mesot heli oma cancer, which she cont racte d after beingexposed to as bestos f ibers brought

home on her8

fa th er 's work clothes during her childh ood. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at351-52. In rejec ting the father's em ploy er's argume nt that it ow ed no duty to the daughter because it did not have
a spec ial relation ship w it h her , th e Tennessee S upreme Court f irst examined g eneral principles of negl ige nce law. The court explai ned tha t all p eople have a duty to othe rs to refrain from a ctions " 'which involve[] an unre ason able ri sk of ha rm ' " to others. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W .3d a t 355 (quo ting Re sta tement (Sec ond) of Tort s §302 (1965)) . Generally, how ever, people hav e no duty "t o protect others from dang ers or risk s except f or those that they them selve s ha ve created." Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 357. This is what is k nown as the "no duty to ac t" rul e. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W .3d a t 357 (citing R estatem ent (Sec ond ) of T orts §314 (196 5)). T hese prop osition s, emb odied in the Se co nd Restate ment of Tort s, are not unique to Tennes see law, and as previ ously expl ained, t hey are the law in I llinois al so. The Satterfie ld

court t hen went on to expla i n the rol e that an analysi s of the relation ship between the par ties should pl ay in a duty analysi s under these gene ral principles. It explai ned that

excepti ons to the no-duty- to-act rule exi st where spe cial recogni zed relationships exist , eit

her between t

he plaintiff

and the defe ndant or bet ween the defendant and a third party w hose action s create the risk to the plaintiff. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at359. How ever, the co urt foun d that neither the no-d uty-to-act rule nor the se excep tions were applicable to the f

acts before it . This is because the case did not involv e a situation wh ere the father 's employer s imply f aile d to act

to prot ectthe daughter from harm cau sed by a third party; rather , it

involved "t

he employer' s own misfea sanc e–its injurious af fir mativ e act of operating its facil ity in such an unsaf e manner that dang erou s a sbestos fibers w ere trans mitt ed outside the facility" on its emp loyees' work clothes. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 364 . Th e cou rt, theref

ore, fo und it unnecessar y to consi der whether the employer had any additi onal duties to the da ughte r flowingfrom a spec ial relationship. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 364.9

At least one other c ourt has fol lowed the Tenness ee court 's approach. See Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, I nc. , No. 58579-7-I , slip op. at 12 ( Wash. App. Augu st 13, 2007) (unpubli shed opinion) (fi nding t hat a duty to prevent harm from take-home asbestos ex posure
can aris e "even in the absence of any specialrelationship" if the injury is foresee able). W e findthis approach per suasiv e. For one thing , as ment ioned, t he Satterfie ld

court des cribed genera l principles of

negl ige nce law embodied in the Second Restatement of Torts. Also as previou sly mentione d, in I llinois, as in Tennessee , allparti es owe to all others the dut y to take
reaso nable pre cau tion s to p reven t thei r acti ons from har min g al l other s. To find t hat an employer

whose workers ar e e xpo sed to asbest os owes no duty to protect others from exposure–as sumingthe exposur e is bot h forese eable and pr event able without undue burd en–m erely because the others do not hav e any part icular speci al rel ations hip with t he employer

(such as an employee or a busines s inv itee ) would defy l ogic and leadto grossly unfa ir results. This is not to s ay the empl oyer has unl im it edli ab il it y t o a llth e wo rl d; as we will discuss later in this opinion , liability will be limited by foreseea bility. W ith this in mind, we turn our atte ntion t o Olivo , where the New Je rseySupr eme Cou rt found the risk

of take-home asbes tos exposure f oreseeabl e in acase of a woman who diedof mes othe li oma cancer af ter being exposed t o asbest os broug ht home on he r h us ba nd 's work clothes. Un der N ew Jersey law, as un der Illinois la w, a duty analysi s inv olve s both a det ermin ationof whether t he injur y was foresee able and a cons ideration of publ ic poli cy. Olivo , 186 N .J. at 403, 89 5 A.2d a t 1148. W e find the cou rt's analysis of both fa ctor s pers uasi ve. We focus now on i ts analy sis of the for eseea bil ity of t

he harm. In Olivo , as he re, on e of th e h us ba nd 's emp loyers argued that it ow ed no duty to protect its forme r emp lo yee' s wife f rom take-hom e asbestos ex posure. Olivo , 186 N.J. at 400, 895 A.2d at 1146- 47. When considering t he fores eeabil ity of

the harm, the Olivo court explai ned as fo llo w s: " It requir es no leap of imagination to presume t hat duri ng the decades10

of the 1940' s, 50' s, 60' s, [70' s,] and early 1980' s when Anthony [Oliv o] workedas a welder and steamf

itt er[,] eithe r he or his sp ouse would be handling his clothe s in the normal and expect ed proc ess of l aundering them so t

hat the garment s could be worn t o work aga in. Anthony 's soiled work clothing had to be laundered [,] and [his e mp loy er] * ** s hou ld h ave forese en th at

wh o ever pe rformed t

hat ta sk would come into conta ct with t he asbest os that infi ltr atedhis cloth ing wh ile he p erform ed his contracted task s." Olivo , 186 N.J. at 404, 895 A.2d at 1149. CSX argues that t

he B&O R ailroad did not k now of the dangers of take-home asbes tos wh ile Ron ald Simpkins wo rked for it. The questi on, however, is not whether the employer actua lly foresaw the risk t o Annette Simpki ns; rather, th e qu estio n is w heth er, th rou gh
reaso nable care, it should have foreseen the risk. " '[W]h at is requ ired to b e fores eeab le is the gene ralchara cter

of the ev ent o r har

m *** [,] not its precis e nature or manner of
occurren ce.' " Marsh all , 22 2 Ill. 2d at 44 2, 8 56 N .E. 2d a t 10 60 ( quo ting Bigb ee v. P acific Telephone & Telegraph Co. , 34 Cal. 3d 49, 57- 58, 665 P.2d 947, 952, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 862 (1983)). Lik e the Olivo cou rt, w e be lieve that it takes little im agination to presume t hat when an em ploy ee w ho is e xpo sed to asbe stos brin gs hom e his work clothes, mem bers o f his family are likel y t o be exposed as well . Thus, the genera l chara cter of the harm t o be prevent ed was reasonably forese eable. As we have prev iousl y stat ed, under a s ecti on 2-615 motion to dism iss, cou rts may not consider affid avits o r oth er su ppo rtive docum entation. Kirchner , 294 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 691 N.E.2d at 11 2; Barber-Colman Co. , 236 I ll. App. 3d at 1068, 603 N.E.2d at 1218-19. How ever, the pla inti ff di d fil e a num ber of docu ments i n support of her all egat ions and argume nts that the hazard s of take-home a sbestos w ere kn own orsh oul d have be en kn own to the defe ndants'predecess or, the B&O R ailroad, duri ng the rel ev ant ye ars of R onald Simpkins'employment f rom 1958 to 1964. The defendant s have al so argued that the ri sk of11

harm from t ake-home exposure was not forese eable unt il 1972, when the Occupational Safety and Health Admi nistrati on, or OSHA, int roduced regulati ons to prev ent t ake -home asbest os exposure. We canno tcons ider tho se fact-s pecific argume nts de rived from affidavits
or oth er su ppo rtive documentat ion. The defe ndants'choice of a section 2-615 mot ion, rather than a sec tion 2- 619 motion or a secti on 2-1005 motion for a summ ary jud gment, c ontro ls the way both the parti es may proceed a nd our sc ope o f review . Again, for pu rpose s of this motionwe m ust take as true the plaintiff' s pl eading s, which al leg e that the B&O Railroad knew or should have k

nown during t

he rele vant

times that t

he asbes tos fib ers c arr ied h ome from work on Ron ald Simpki ns' clothing and bo dy pose d a risk of harm to Annette Si mpkins. We find t

hat the risk o f harm to Ann ette Simp kins w as fore seeab le at the tim e Ro nald Simpkins work ed for t

he B&O R ailroad. Findingthat the risk of ha rm w as fore seeab le does not en d ou r inqu iry. Fo reseea bility is an import ant fac tor ( see Co rcora n v. Villag e of L ibertyv ille , 73 Il l. 2d 316, 326, 383 N.E. 2 d 177 , 180 (197 8) (ex plainin g that fore seeab ility is the co rnersto ne of our d uty analysis)); how ever, it is not the only factor. As pr ev io us lyoutline d, we must al so conside r the likelihood of

the inj ury, the le vel of the bur den i nvolved in prot ecting ag ains t t ake -home asbest os exposure, and the consequences of placing that burden on an employer who se workers are exposed to asbest os. See M arsh all , 222 Ill. 2d at 436-37, 856 N.E.2d at 1057. We w illnext consi der the l ike lihood of the inj ury. A cursory l ook at the case s that both the pa rties cite to in support of their v arious positi ons illust rates both the perv asiveness and the seriousness of asbestos-rel ated di seases. While apparent ly the l ike liho od o f
con tra cting

mesot heli oma or anothe r asb est os-r elat ed lung di seas e thr ough take -home exposu re vari es depending on the duration of expos ure, these cases also demons trat e that the likelihood

of devel oping s uch a disease from a nything more tha n incidental ex posure is not remote. Anne tte Simpkin s' complai nt all eges f acts t hat support the c onclusi on that t he12

magnit ude of the har

m was great , asser

tingthat asb esto s fibe rs ha ve a "toxi c, poisonous , and highly delet erious effect upon the heal th of

per sons inhaling, ingesting [,] or otherwise absorbi ng them." A llegedly , Annette eventual ly died from her asbestos-r elated cancer. Thus, the likelihood of seri ous o r fatal inju ry to an yon e fores eeab ly exp osed to asb estos is substantial eno ugh to warrant t he imposi tion of

a duty. S ee Forsyt

he , 224 I ll. 2d at 291, 864 N.E.2d at 238 (f

indinga duty where the "li kel ihood of i njury *** would not be remote and could be deadly"). We must al so conside r the b urdeninv olv ed inguardingaga ins t t ake -home asbest os expo sure. We again fi nd the deci sions in Satterfie ld and Olivo persu asive. Alt hou gh th e
cour ts in both Tennes see and New Jersey desc ribe di ffer ently f rom I llinois courts the factors they cons ider in d etermin ing the ex istence of a d uty, th e cou rts in bo th st ates in fact addressed this issue. The Satterfie ld

court cons ideredwhether"the degree of f oreseeabi lit

y of the risk

and the grav ity of

the harm out

weigh the burden that wou ld be impo sed if the defen dant w ere requir ed to engage i n an alterati ve course of co ndu ct that w ould have prevented the harm." Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 365. The court di scussedmeasures t hat coul d have pre vent ed the da ug ht er 's exposure: the em ploy er cou ld have prov ided warning s to i ts empl oyees about t he dangers of bri ngingasbest os-la den clothing home, it coul d have prov ide d covera lls for employees to we ar w hile w orkin g aro und asb esto s, an d it co uld have requir ed the empl oyees to chan ge befo re leaving a nd p rovided an on -site laund ry facility to clean t he cover alls . The court foun d thes e mea sures " to be fe asible a nd efficacio us w ithout im posin g proh ibitive costs
or burden s" on the em ployer. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 368 . Simila rly, t he Olivo court consider ed "the nat

ure o f t he ris k and how relativ ely easy it would hav e been to pr ovide
wa rnin gs to work ers such as Ant hony about the handling of his c lothing or t o provi de protectiv e garments." Olivo , 186 N.J. at 405, 895 A.2d at

1149.13

An ne tt e's complai nt all eges a numbe r of w ays th e emp loyer h ere co uld have re duced the ri sk of

exposure– i.e. , by substi tuting othe r product s, prov idingwarnin gs of the danger, provi ding safety instruc tions, te stin g t he pr odu cts, an d req uiring hy gienic pr actices . CSX offers no real argument

regarding t

he burd en tha t implem enting an y of th ese p ractices wo uld have place d on the em ploy er, ch oosin g instead to rely on t he lack of an y spe cial relatio nship with Annette Simpkins as d ispositive of its duty analysis. W e find that t he burden of guarding against

take-home asb estos expo sure is not u ndu ly bu rden some wh en co mpa red to the na ture of

the risk to b e pro tected against. Finally, we consider

the conseque nces of pl acingthat burden on employers such as the defend ants o r their predecesso r. The d efendan ts contend tha t recognizing a duty he re
wo uld expose employe rs to l imitless l iabil ity t o "the entire worl d." The Olivo court addresse d a sim ilar a rgu m ent and fou nd that such fears of limitless liability were "overstat ed." Olivo , 186 N.J . at 40 5, 89 5 A.2 d at 11 50. T he co urt exp lained that the duty it wa s reco gnizing "is focu sed o n the p articular ized fo reseea bility of h arm to plaintiff 's wife, who ordinari ly would perf orm typi cal househol d chores t hat wo uld include laundering the work clothe s worn by herhusband." Olivo , 186 N.J. at 405, 895 A.2d at

1150. Thus, the scope of l iabi li ty wil l be inhere ntl y li mit ed by the for eseea bil ity of t

he harm. We agree w ith the Olivo court t hat our fo cus o n fore seeab ility provid es an acce ptable limi tati on on an employer' s potent ial liability. It is certa inly forese eable t hat the wife of an asbest os-exposed

worker would al so be exposed t o asbest os dust t hrou gh washing his cloth ing. It is also foreseeable that other mem bers of the h ouse hold could be ex pose d. It is notnece ssarily fo reseea ble tha t any p erson wh o sha res a ca b w ith the asb estos w orker w ould inhale asbest os dust and de vel op mesothel ioma. S ee Satter fiel d v. Breeding I

nsulat ion Co. , No. E2006-00903-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 14 (Tenn. App. Apr il 19, 2007) (expl aining that wh ile harm to fam ily mem bers "w ho ro utinely com e into c lose co ntact w ith emp lo ye es'14

contami natedclothin g" is forese eable, the risk of har m to pe ople "who might pos sib ly co me into contact

with the employees' clothing, but w hose co ntacts are sporad ic or unpred ictable," is "only a remo te possibility"), aff'd , 266 S.W .3d 347 (Tenn . 2008). We note thatthe pla inti ff ar gues t hat the duty to protect

agai nst t ake-home asbest os exposu re can be li mited t o t he immediate famil y of workers who are exposed to asbestos, while the defendant s contend t hat the re is no rati onal rea son to draw the line there. As an example, t

hey contend, a hous ekeeper or ba by si tt er w ho re gu la rl y l au nd er s t he em pl oy ee 's clothing might be just as likely to be expo sed as me mbers of the immedi ate family, if not
more so. The court in Satterfie ld addressed similar arguments. The co urt agreed that there
was no principledreaso n to limit liability to th e imm ediate families o f wo rkers w ho h andle asbestos. Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 374 . The court explained as follows:

"There is no mag ic ta lis man that pro tects persons f rom the har

mful ef fects of expo sure to asbest os simply because they do not live under t he same roof or

are not
a member of t

he em pl oy ee 's family by blood or mar riag e. I t is forese eable t hat the adverse effects of repeat ed, regular, and extended exposure to asbest os on an
em pl oy ee 's work clothes could injure the se persons ." Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 374. The court t

herefor e held tha t the duty t o protect agai nst exposur e to asbes tos transport ed outsi de the workpl ace on an employee 's clothing extends t o any person who is forese eably exposed thr o ugh "cl ose contac t with an e mployee' s contami nated work c lothes over an extended period of time." Satterfie ld , 266 S.W.3d at 374. We do not beli eve t

hat the issue of

whether anyone ot

her than a mem ber of an
em pl oy ee 's immediat e family is owed a duty i s before us. Whetherharm to any such per son is forese eable depends on an assess ment of circums tances not

present ed in thi s case. W hile
we do n ot exp ressly lim it the du ty to immedi ate family member s, we decide t oday only that employe rs owe the immedi ate famili es of their employees a duty t o prot ect a gai nsttak e-home15

asbest os exposure. S hould a proper cas e aris e, we can conside r wh ether th e duty exten ds to others who regularl y come into contact with employees who are expo sed to asbestoscontaining prod ucts. After a con sidera tion of th e polic y facto rs used to deter mine duty, we believ e that Ann ette Simpkins was e ntitled to the exercise of ca re from her h usband 's employer. W e reit erate , however, t

hatwe are not re liev ing t he plai ntif

f of the burden of pr ovingher case. Du ty is not th e equiv alent of li ability; s he must stillprove a breach and proxi mate cause
. These are f

actualmatters for a jury to dec ide. W e have merely foun d that, u nder the fac ts alleged, the B& O R ailroad ow ed a du ty of care to the sp ouse of o ne of its employ ees. We hold that

the pla inti ff' s complai nt suff icie ntly s tate s a cause of acti on to establi sh
a duty of car e owed by the defe ndants'predecess or to the d eced ent. W e reverse the circ uit court' s dismissalof the plainti ff' s complaint and remand the cause for further proceeding s.
Reversed; cause remande d.

DO NO VAN and W EX STTE N, JJ., co ncur.NO. 5-07-0346 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT

___________________________________________________________________________________ CYN THIA SI MPK INS, I ndivi dually and as Speci al ) Appeal f rom the Administrat or for the Estate of Annett e Simpkins, ) Circui t Court of Deceased, ) Madison County. ) Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) ) v. ) No. 07-L- 62 ) CSX CO RP OR ATIO N a nd C SX ) TR ANSP OR TAT ION, INC ., ) Ho nora ble ) D anie l J. Sta ck, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opini on Fi led : June 10, 2010

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justi ces : Honorable M elissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable James K. Donovan, J., and Hon orable Jame s M . W exstten, J., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn eys John A. Barner d, Amy Garrett, S immonsCooper LL C, 707 Berkshi re Boulev ard, for East Alton, IL 6202 4; Charles W . Chap man, 30 0 Evans A venue, W ood R iver, IL Appe llant 62095

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn eys Ku rt E. R eitz, H eath H . Ho oks, T hom pson Co burn LLP, 5 25 W est M ain Stree t, for P.O. Box 750, Bellev ill e, I L 62222-0750 Appell ees

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