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i 

65–465 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–17] 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO READINESS 

AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 

BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 10, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

CHRISTINE WAGNER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 10, 2011, Global Challenges to Readiness and the Fiscal 

Year 2012 Budget Request .................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 10, 2011 ...................................................................................... 43 

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2011 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO READINESS AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 

BUDGET REQUEST 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Representative from Guam, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Readiness ................................................................................ 1 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bolger, LTG Daniel P., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff (G3/5/7), U.S. Army ........... 5 

Carlisle, Lt. Gen. Herbert J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Plans and Requirements (A3/5), U.S. Air Force ................................................ 7 

Clingan, VADM Bruce W., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans 

and Strategy (N3/N5), U.S. Navy ....................................................................... 9 

Tryon, Lt. Gen. Richard T., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, 

and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps ................................................................... 10 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bolger, LTG Daniel P. ...................................................................................... 51 

Carlisle, Lt. Gen. Herbert J. ............................................................................ 61 

Clingan, VADM Bruce W. ................................................................................ 74 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 47 

Tryon, Lt. Gen. Richard T. .............................................................................. 78 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

GEN Martin E. Dempsey’s Letter to the Hon. Adam Smith Regarding 

the U.S. Army’s Fiscal Year 2012 Unfunded Requirements ..................... 89 

Lt. Gen. Richard T. Tryon’s Responses to Questions Asked by the Hon. 

J. Randy Forbes During the Hearing .......................................................... 87 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 93 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 93 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 111 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 97 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 114 
(1) 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO READINESS AND THE FISCAL 

YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 10, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:31 a.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. Now called to order. We want to welcome all of our 

witnesses and tell you how excited we are to hear your testimony 

today. I want to thank you for your service to our country and particularly for taking time to share your experiences and insight with 

us as we look at the readiness needs for our men and women in 

uniform. 

We did something a little bit out of order today. This is one of 

the most bipartisan subcommittees, I think, that we have in Congress. And I am proud to serve with my ranking member from 

Guam, Madeleine Bordallo and she is not only our partner in this, 

but she is a great resource for us in the entire Pacific area having 

traveled there so much, lived there, studied there. 

And we all believe that the Pacific is a huge area of concern for 

us and readiness concern, so I am going to turn now to Madeleine 

and ask her to offer her opening remarks and any comments that 

she might have. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your kind remarks. And I do look forward to seeing how 

this new dialogue format works out during this morning’s hearings. 

To our witnesses, I look forward to your testimony. 

General Carlisle, it is good to see you again. We miss you out at 

the 13th Air Force in Hawaii, but we are glad to have your background and expertise in the Pentagon. 

To the other witnesses, it was nice to meet you all this past week 

and discuss issues of mutual concern. 
2 

Today’s hearing is the second part in a series that is investigating the readiness of our military to respond, in the context of 

the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, to the full spectrum of 

threats that are known and threats that are unknown. 

During the last hearing with the panel of outside witnesses, I 

stressed that assuming risk is expected in any budget, especially 

in our operation and maintenance budgets. And I think the key is 

to understand better where we assume risk and why this committee should accept that risk. 

The QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] Global Posture Review 

and other strategic documents outline a broad and ambitious goal 

of addressing the full spectrum of threats. And I hope that our witnesses today can contextualize their remarks with these strategic 

documents as guides. In other words, explain the risk this budget 

request presents in the context of our Nation’s strategic global defense posture. 

And further, I remain concerned that, given the size and the 

scope of the operation and maintenance budget, these accounts are 

prime targets for budget cuts. Given the current era of fiscal austerity, I feel that these accounts will become even easier targets for 

cuts as the Department pursues a broad range of cost-cutting initiatives. 

It may be easy to cut O&M [Operations and Maintenance] funding now to make up shortfalls elsewhere, but the second- and the 

third-order effects of these cuts can end up costing the Department 

and our taxpayers more in the long run. 

I also hope that our witnesses will address what impact a potential year-long continuing resolution will have not just on fiscal year 

2011 but on the budget for 2012. I feel that if we do not pass a 

defense appropriations bill with the requested fiscal year 2011 

funding levels, that we will end up with even further significant 

shortfalls in 2012 that will negatively affect readiness without 

truly addressing our country’s core fiscal issues. 

In particular, I am concerned about the operational impact of the 

canceled Navy ship maintenance availabilities. The key to a 313- 

ship Navy is ensuring that our ships are continually and well 

maintained to achieve their expected and even extended service 

life. How will the Navy address this matter? 

Further and in a broader context, I am deeply concerned about 

training capabilities and overall readiness in the Pacific AOR [Area 

of Responsibility]. I remain concerned that even while our Services 

move to expanded ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] platforms, we still—we still—do not have sufficient coverage 

in the Pacific. 

While I greatly appreciate the Administration’s tremendous focus 

on the Asia-Pacific region, I believe that more can be done to better 

posture us against current and emerging threats in this region. We 

focus on China’s growing military power and North Korea’s nuclear 

capability, but we cannot lose sight of asymmetric threats in Indonesia, southern Philippines and southern Thailand. 

So I hope our witnesses can also discuss the importance of the 

military buildup on Guam and the strategic importance of this realignment of military forces to meet both traditional and asymmetric threats in the Asia-Pacific region. 
3 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

And once again, I want to welcome all our members today to 

what I think is going to prove to be one of the most important 

hearings of the year. We have the opportunity to discuss not only 

the state of military readiness today, but to also look to the future 

readiness needs of the force. 

Joining us today are four exceptional witnesses representing 

each of our military services. They are Lieutenant General Daniel 

P. Bolger, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General ‘‘Hawk’’ Carlisle, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force; Vice Admiral 

Bruce W. Clingan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy for the United States Navy; and Lieutenant General Richard T. Tryon, Deputy Commandant for Plans, 

Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps. 

These four distinguished gentlemen are often referred to as the 

Ops [operations] deputies or Ops Deps inside the Pentagon. They 

are charged with not only formulating policy to advance their Services’ core missions, but they are also responsible for determining 

the operational requirements, capabilities and training necessary to 

support the national security objectives and military strategy. 

Gentlemen, we are truly honored to have you join us today, and 

we are extremely grateful for all you do to keep this Nation safe. 

Thank you for your service. 

This hearing is the second in a series of hearings we are holding 

to ask the question, ‘‘Are we ready?’’ Last week’s testimony by a 

panel of independent witnesses was extremely thought-provoking, 

and I believe it serves as a great framework for our discussion 

today. 

The witnesses all emphasized that our force levels are inappropriately sized and apportioned to respond to challenges of current 

global environment. Ms. Eaglen also illuminated the fact that our 

Nation’s armed forces are approaching a geriatric state. 

To give our members a few specific examples of what that really 

means, our surface fleet has an average age of 19 years. The average age of our strategic bombers is 34 years. The average age of 

the C–130H fleet, which I know many members are familiar with 

because we often fly on them when we go on CODELs [Congressional Delegations], is 23 years. Our Air Force tanker fleet is over 

46 years, and the Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicle fleet 

has an average age of 38 years. 

Not only have we allowed our ships and aircraft to reach this 

geriatric state, but we have also downsized our inventory. In 1990, 

we had the equivalent of 76 Army brigades. Today, that number is 

45. In 1990, we had 546 Navy ships. Today we have 286. In 1990, 

we had 82 Air Force fighter squadrons. Today we have the equivalent of 39. In 1990, we had 360 strategic bombers. Today we have 

162, and the Air Force wants to retire six of these before the next 

one is even funded. 

We find ourselves postured in this manner at a time when China 

has rapidly grown and modernized its military. I ask unanimous 

consent that this chart depicting the growth in China’s surface 

fleet, submarine force, air force and air defense between 2000 and 
4 

2009 be entered into the record. The chart is up on the screen, and 

each of our members will be given a copy of it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 50.] 

Mr. FORBES. We cannot afford to allow a budget target to be the 

sole governing basis in our decisions today, or we will bear an enormous cost in the future. I like to refer to this as the instant pudding mindset. We have grown accustomed to quick solutions and 

fast results. However, the outcomes, in many cases, have been devastating. 

There will be no instant pudding solutions to these challenges we 

face. We must break our dependence on deficit spending, right our 

entitlement programs, unleash our labor force, and reorder our 

Federal Government, if we are going to successfully respond to China’s economic momentum and military buildup. 

Once again, I am very thankful to our distinguished witnesses, 

and I look forward to our discussion. 

And as a logistical matter, as the ranking member and I discussed prior to the hearing, I would like to dispense with the 5- 

minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular order so that 

members may ask questions during the course of the discussion. 

I think this will provide a roundtable-type forum that will enhance the dialogue on these very important issues. We would like 

to proceed with standard order for members to address the witnesses. However, if any member has a question pertinent to the 

matter being discussed at that time, please seek acknowledgment 

and wait to be recognized by the chair. 

We plan to keep questioning to the standard 5 minutes. However, I don’t want to curtail productive dialogue. I believe we can 

do this and still ensure each member has the opportunity to get his 

or her questions answered. If we get bogged down, the chair will 

ask members to hold further discussion until the first round of 

questioning is complete. 

I ask unanimous consent that for the purposes of this hearing we 

dispense with the 5-minute rule and proceed as described. Since 

there is no objection, we will do that. 

Let me do now two things logistically to our members. One of the 

things we are trying to do is just get answers. As I mentioned at 

the outset, we are blessed. This is one of the most bipartisan committees probably in Congress. And we had some suggestions at the 

last hearing that rather than wait until your 5-minute time comes 

along, if a member has a question or follow-up, we want you to ask 

that question when it comes along. 

So what we are going to do is go in the order that the members 

are in terms of seniority. But if you have a question at any time 

based on that question or anything else, please just let me know. 

We are going try to be as flexible as we can in trying to get those 

answers. And if it runs too long, I will just try and stop that, and 

we will go into a second round. 

Gentlemen, as I mentioned at the beginning, we thank you so 

much for your service. And I want to just kind of frame the opening 

of this something different than what we normally do. We have 

your written testimony, and I have read it. Many of our members 

have read it; if not, they will read it. 
5 

This morning what I am going to ask you to do is something different. Normally, we will have witnesses that come in, they give us 

written testimony, and then they give us 5 minutes of prepared remarks. The hope sometimes for our witnesses, I think, is to get out 

without having had to say anything. And we are caught in this dilemma. 

Some of us are frustrated because Congress has been spending 

way too much money for years in the past, and we know that exists. There are some frustrations with some of our members because we don’t feel—with some of the folks in the Pentagon, I am 

not talking about you but just some of them—we don’t always get 

the answers we need on the analysis that we need. 

Sometimes people walk over here, and they tell us, ‘‘the DOD 

[Department of Defense] has decided to make cuts, but you don’t 

need to have any analysis on that at all. You just need to trust us.’’ 

But then when we make cuts, they come over and say, ‘‘That is 

going to be the sky falling, and you just need to trust us.’’ 

Oftentimes, you have all heard this. In the field, you have heard 

the men and women that serve under you say, ‘‘Those guys in 

Washington just don’t get it.’’ This is your one opportunity to help 

us get it. And so for each of you, I would like for you to take about 

5 minutes each before we go in to the question and tell us your perception of what those men and women under your commands need 

to be ready. 

Are these budgets going to do it? What are your concerns about 

our readiness? This is your opportunity to make sure when a fight 

comes, we have done everything in our power to make sure we 

have prepared them. And we thank you for doing that. 

And in alphabetical order, we are going to start, General Bolger, 

with you if you would. And thank you again for being here. 

STATEMENT OF LTG DANIEL P. BOLGER, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF (G3/5/7), U.S. ARMY 

General BOLGER. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes and 

Ranking Member Bordallo and all the distinguished members of 

the House Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee. 

On behalf of Secretary McHugh, and General Casey, and more 

than 1 million soldiers who are serving today in the active Army, 

National Guard, and Army Reserve, thanks for giving me this opportunity to talk about just what you just ask about, and that is 

the state of our Army readiness. 

And thanks also for all of the members and your continued support and commitment to our soldiers and our operations worldwide. 

You know, we live in a dangerous world, and I know that is not 

news to anybody here, but it bears repeating under these circumstances. We are a people that has global, political, economic, 

and security interests, and we do face threats that include terrorists, aggressive states and movements, and even nuclear-armed 

countries that have powerful conventional armed forces. 

And one thing we have learned—I think it has been underscored 

for us in the last few weeks—we can rarely predict the next crisis. 

When things go wrong, we do have to be ready to fight. We do like 

to get ahead of the threats when we can, to deter and shape them 

in a constructive way. 
6 

We are always ready to engage positively to help our friends and 

partners. You know, right now, today soldiers are working in more 

than a 100 countries to train local forces and keep the peace and 

assist in humanitarian challenges. And soldiers bring a big range 

of skills. Some of those skills are unique even among the many 

skills provided by U.S. Government agencies. 

And because soldiers can secure themselves when they go in to 

a foreign country, we can often go in to the toughest areas and still 

make a difference. Whether in combat campaigns, or in these shaping operations, successful efforts take time. And America’s enemies 

always question our staying power. So to achieve lasting results 

our Army must sustain its operations over the long haul. 

We have built on the experience of the Navy, the Marine Corps, 

and the Air Force, as well as our allies and have reshaped our force 

on a cycle of readiness for Army forces that runs year after year. 

We go out and we come back as trained, formed, and well-equipped 

units, and our combat effectiveness, I think, has been impressive. 

We do have a strong Army today, Active, National Guard and 

Reserve. And we are fighting two major land campaigns as we 

gather this morning. We are also carrying our other key shaping 

tasks all around the world. We put about 200,000 soldiers out, 

about 170,000 rotational forces, and about 30,000 forward-deployed 

in friendly countries. 

About 50,000 to 70,000 of these soldiers on a daily basis come 

from the National Guard and Reserve. Today, most of that combat 

power, as we know, is in Afghanistan and Iraq, and as we draw 

down in Iraq, we will let our forces come back from a surge level 

pace to one we can follow for a long time and keep going. 

We would like to get to about 1 year out and 2 years back for 

Active forces, and about 1 year out and 4 years back for the Guard 

and Reserve, heading to a sustained rate of 1-to-3 and 1-to-5. And 

that tempo will let us reset and modernize our combat vehicles and 

our aircraft and our radios and our weapons and all our equipment. 

And it will also allow to educate our leaders and our soldiers and 

to train our units across the full spectrum of operations from peacekeeping and wide area security up to and including combined arms 

maneuver. 

And most important, a sustainable tempo will reinvigorate the 

strength of our force, our great volunteer soldiers. We spin too fast. 

We have some hard results, and we know those. We have got about 

30,000 soldiers in long-term medical care, about 40,000 with posttraumatic stress. We have had challenges with our suicide rate, 

misdemeanor crimes, spouse and child abuse, all that. 

There also has been a significant monetary cost of billions of dollars, not just in the Army and the Armed Forces, but across society. These are tragic long-term effects. And I think we have to 

think that just as we need to reset our jet bombers and our nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with timeout for maintenance, we 

also have to take time to reset and recalibrate our most important 

strength of our Army, our soldiers. 

So that is what our Army is doing today. It is an Army America 

can be proud of. And we will succeed today and in the future with 

your continued help. Thank you very much. 
7 

[The prepared statement of General Bolger can be found in the 

Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. FORBES. General Carlisle. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HERBERT J. CARLISLE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS (A3/5), U.S. AIR FORCE 

General CARLISLE. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee, again, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the readiness of your United 

States Air Force. 

Before we start, though, I would like to wish Congressman Giffords a speedy recovery. And I look forward to her coming back to 

this committee as soon as possible and for her to know that all the 

members in the United States Military value her and respect her 

for everything she does for us, and certainly the men and women 

serving at Davis-Monthan in the Tucson area look for her speedy 

recovery. 

My intent today is to describe the current status, activities and 

readiness of the United States Air Force. And I am proud to be 

here with my joint partners as well, because together we spend a 

lot of time just like this in different forums. 

Let me begin by saying that the 690,000 men and women in the 

United States Air Force, Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and Department of Defense civilians who are ready to execute our mission. We 

are committed to the readiness and the ongoing operations abroad 

and at home. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know—excuse me—since the events of 9/ 

11, the tempo of our operations has continued to increase, with 

2010 serving as a benchmark in just everything we have done. 

Close air support has increased. Our air refueling and airlift within 

the AOR has increased. Our ISR shortage has continued to double. 

And we are asking more and more of these young men and 

women every day. I think to your point, Mr. Chairman, as all the 

members of Congress’ job is to take care of their constituents, the 

gentlemen sitting at this table, our job is to take care of those men 

and women in harm’s way outside the Beltway. And that is what 

we are going to do. 

As a matter of fact, you can—one example would be our rescue 

forces. The heroic actions of our rescue forces have been hailed by 

the British, our partners over there as well as our U.S. partners, 

and as a matter of fact, the British combat soldiers can call our 

‘‘Pedro’’ guys. That is the call sign of our rescue forces, the helicopters, and the airmen. It is the only thing more popular than 

mail in the AOR. 

It says a lot about what they do. And when you say, ‘‘Pedro,’’ we 

will come anywhere, anytime, during any weather. And the helicopters have the holes in them to prove it. At the same time we 

are trying to recapitalize that fleet and the CSR [Combat Search 

and Rescue] fleet and how we get back on step in giving them the 

equipment they need. 

After 20 years of continuous deployments and 10 years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, these operations continue to stress 

both people and platforms, and they challenge our ability to main-
8 

tain readiness to the full spectrum of operations. And, Mr. Chairman, that is the key. It is the full spectrum of operations, as Ms. 

Bordallo mentioned, these other things going on in the world and 

we are incredibly engaged to win the day’s fight in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. But there are things throughout this world we have to 

be ready for, and that full spectrum of operations for all the Services is ones that we have to be cognizant of all the time. 

And again, I know, Mr. Chairman, that everyone in this committee clearly knows that, given the increase in our operations and 

the decision to extend the continuing resolution, we all know that 

that will cause major perturbations and problems for our readiness. 

It will suspend some systems sustainment. Depot maintenance 

activities will be deferred. Aircraft and airplanes going to depot 

will be deferred, all of which will adversely affect our people that 

are moving into harm’s way every day, so we truly hope that Congress can come to a resolution of the DOD budget for fiscal year 

2011 for the benefit of our military members. 

They remain dedicated, and they are the foundation of our Air 

Force. And as you said, Mr. Chairman, it is all about the people 

and what they do for us day in and day out, out there. Across the 

spectrum of what we do, we are meeting and exceeding the combatant commanders’ requirements today. 

All of our capabilities are adequate to meet today’s demands. 

And my concern for the future is how do we prepare for the next 

conflict in the next generation and what we are going to face next. 

Our aircraft readiness is adequate. It is not great. And it is not 

going up. It is level to going down, but—— 

I assume that is not me. 

Mr. FORBES. It is our buzzer, General. 

General CARLISLE. It is maintaining the level. It is adequate, but 

it is troubling for the future and again, our ability to conduct full 

spectrum operations. 

Our mobility forces have doubled their activity almost every 

year. We are airdropping more in the AOR more than we ever have 

before. I will tell you that with respect to modernization and the 

slides you brought up, we have challenges, and we have to face 

those soon with respect to both modernization and recapitalization 

of all our fleets. 

We are on a path with the F–35 and its way forward. The KC– 

46X, the C130–J, and CV–22 are all good starts, but we got a lot 

of work to do. And our combat forces continue to provide the needs 

of our United States, and of course, of our combatant commanders. 

A strong Air Force will continue to deliver global vigilance, reach 

and power. The resolution, as I said before, the defense appropriations bill will certainly help continue our readiness in the Air Force 

and the ability to serve this Nation’s daunting challenges in the future. 

I have provided a written statement for the record. But I would 

like to thank you again for your interest in taking care of your airmen and on behalf of all the airmen and their families, thank for 

what you do for us. 

[The prepared statement of General Carlisle can be found in the 

Appendix on page 61.] 

Mr. FORBES. And thank you, General. I apologize for the buzzing. 
9 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. But the Air Force always comes through. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM BRUCE W. CLINGAN, USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY (N3/ 

N5), U.S. NAVY 

Admiral CLINGAN. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo 

and members of the committee, I am in fact delighted and privileged to be here today. 

Today, as we have done for more than 235 years, the Navy is forward-deployed around the world, protecting our national interests. 

Global trends and an uncertain world underpin an increasing demand for seapower. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked what might be the preeminent concerns of the sailors, both here and abroad, and I would say that 

Congress writ large like this committee clearly does appreciate 

that. 

As a maritime Nation, the United States is dependent upon the 

sea for both economic prosperity and national security. This places 

global demands on our naval forces. Their expeditionary capabilities enable and support joint force efforts to combat both conventional and irregular challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, throughout Africa, and elsewhere throughout the world. 

As has been mentioned, while ground forces remain engaged in 

our OCO [overseas contingency operations] and eventually reconstitute and reset, naval forces will remain the Nation’s strategic reserve and immediate response force. 

The sustained presence and engagement of forward-stationed 

and rotational naval forces will take on even greater importance as 

the future security environment promises to be characterized by 

multiple, concurrent, diverse challenges that demand an immediate 

response that often can’t wait for diplomatic access to be negotiated. 

The President’s budget in 2012 continues to maintain a Navy 

that is forward-postured and present to prevent conflict, deter aggression, enhance cooperative relationships, build the maritime security capacity of partners, provide humanitarian assistance, and 

prevail in combat at and from the sea, if required. 

Thank you for your unwavering commitment to our sailors, our 

Navy civilians, and their families and for all you do to make the 

United States Navy an effective and enduring global force for 

peace. 

I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Clingan can be found in the 

Appendix on page 74.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

General. 
10 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RICHARD T. TRYON, USMC, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS, 

U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General TRYON. Good morning, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and the distinguished members of the committee here 

today. 

Today, after nearly a decade of combat operations, the United 

States Marine Crops remains the country’s expeditionary force in 

readiness. The ability of the Marine Corps to serve as the Nation’s 

crisis response force can be attributed to the steadfast support of 

this committee and Congress, and for that, sir, we thank you. 

The Commandant has established four service-level priorities as 

he has entered office—first, to provide the best-trained and 

equipped Marine units to Afghanistan; second, rebalance our corps 

and posture it for the future; third, to better educate and train our 

marines to succeed in what is an increasingly complex operational 

environment; and fourth, to keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and their families. 

At this moment there are roughly 32,000 marines deployed 

around the world. Twenty thousand are serving in Afghanistan’s 

Helmand province. Partnering with the United States Navy, we are 

forward-deployed and forward-engaged across the globe. Deployed 

and deploying units report the highest levels of readiness for their 

assigned missions. 

The distributed nature of the battlefield in Afghanistan, however, 

requires that we augment our forward-deployed forces with additional equipment and personnel from non-deployed forces and strategic programs. We can sustain this commitment under current 

conditions for as long as the Nation requires, acknowledging that 

it comes at a cost. 

Our equipment abroad and at home station has been heavily 

taxed after nearly 10 years of combat operations. Sixty-seven percent of non-deployed units report degraded readiness in the areas 

of capabilities and/or resources. Resource shortfalls often manifest 

themselves as capability gaps in individual units or collective core 

competencies. 

The primary factor underlying this is equipment, and approximately 63 percent of non-deployed forces report that mission-essential equipment shortfalls exist within their units. Home station 

equipment does not qualify for OCO funding in general. Units in 

dwell are also heavily leveraged in terms of leadership and occupational expertise. 

Now, this is necessary in order to sustain our ongoing operational commitments of the deployed force. And for this reason, approximately 35 percent of non-deployed units report key personnel 

shortfalls. Operations have placed an unprecedented demand on 

ground weapon systems, vehicles, aviation assets, and support 

equipment. 

Congress’ continuing support is needed to posture the Marine 

Corps for the future, and this will require a multiyear effort well 

beyond the end of operations in Afghanistan and the drawdown 

thereafter. Our Commandant has directed that post OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom], we will reconstitute as a middleweight 

force capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict. 
11 

And what this means is that we will be capable of operating in 

the realm of theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, 

disaster relief crisis response, as well as conventional high-intensity combat, and amphibious forcible entry. We are currently in the 

midst of a comprehensive planning effort to fulfill the Commandant’s vision. 

Building upon our strong traditional foundation and incorporating lessons learned from this conflict, we are confident the future Marine Corps will remain a capabilities-based organization, 

agile, flexible, and versatile. As marines continue to serve in combat, the Marine Corps remain the Nation’s crisis response force, 

ready to respond to today’s crisis with today’s forces, today. 

The Marine Corps needs the sustained support of the American 

people and Congress to maintain that readiness. 

In order to meet the challenges of the future in the future security environment, we will require significant consideration with respect to reset and reconstitution. The Marine Corps is grateful for 

the support that Congress has provided to date. We are also mindful of the fiscal realities confronting our Nation. 

We are committed to being responsible stewards of the scarce 

public funds that are available, and we are dedicated to serve the 

Nation with honor, courage, and commitment as America’s expeditionary force in readiness. 

So thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I look forward to the discussion and to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Tryon can be found in the 

Appendix on page 78.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

And thank all of our witnesses. 

At this point in time we are going into our questioning. And one 

of the things that I am going to do is to defer my questions to the 

end, because I want to hear our members’ questions, and I may 

intersperse some of mine throughout, but I would like to, at this 

particular point in time recognize the ranking member, the 

gentlelady from Guam, for any questions she might have. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will 

be very quick. 

I have an immediate concern relative to the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, and I would like to hear from all of the witnesses in just a very brief answer what impact a continuing resolution would have on operational matters in fiscal year 2011, as well 

as in fiscal year 2012. 

We have already seen cancellations of ship availabilities in the 

Navy, so this situation is deeply concerning to me. So if you could 

just briefly answer that, beginning with General Bolger. 

General BOLGER. Thank you, ma’am. 

For us in the Army the continuing resolution challenge really 

comes down to operations and maintenance writ large. And that is 

we are going to do those things necessary to maintain our forces 

that are going into the fight. The challenges will begin to defer 

maintenance and training to give us capability for the full spectrum. 

So based on a year-long continuing resolution, our effect, we would lose about $3 billion in operations and maintenance budget, 
12 

and we have to focus our remaining resources clearly on the next 

to deploy. That would mean some of the full-spectrum training we 

have scheduled this year to regain our capability—for example, to 

do airborne assaults with elements of the 82nd Airborne, to do 

tank-on-tank combat with our armored forces, to do middleweight 

combat, as Rick Tryon referred to, that the Marines are doing 

that—some of that will be deferred, because we are going to put 

our money towards the next-to-deploy units. 

There will be some significant impacts, I believe, on housing and 

installations, because military construction, obviously, is awaiting 

this, and so the new starts will not occur. 

In addition, as I think you are aware, the Department of the 

Army has just recently extended their 30-day hiring freeze on civil 

servants another 30 days, so as that continues, that means that 

some soldiers will probably have to be diverted to do tasks that 

civil servants might be doing now, take us back to maybe 15 years 

ago where soldiers were doing things like checking vehicle registrations at gates and mowing the lawn and all that kind of stuff, 

which again diverts from the training and readiness that our force 

would need. 

And finally, ma’am, I think the other thing that I would mention 

is the challenge it will cause in terms of modernization, because obviously with the continuing resolution we are going to maintain 

what we have, but we are not going to procure new weapons, some 

of which were in the middle of procurement phase, and some like 

our ground combat vehicles are just to start some major phases in 

their development. So all of that would be on hold as we go through 

the continuing resolution. 

I guess I would summarize by saying that it will create a deferred maintenance in this year, and that bill will have to be paid 

at the same time we are trying to fight a war in Afghanistan and 

close out combat major operations in Iraq, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. 

General Carlisle. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am, thank you. 

Very similar, I think probably all four of us will have much the 

same comments. The O&M budget will be significantly affected. 

The flying-out programs and depot maintenance and depot level 

repairables will all be deferred. Today we are cash flowing to maintaining the capability to serve the fight, but that is going to run 

out. And at that point we are going to have to start doing other 

pretty draconian things to just support the fight with no training 

back home. 

So on the O&M budget, as we move money within the O&M 

budget to cash flow what we are doing now, if it is not fixed in the 

fairly near term, then it is going to cause some pretty significant 

problems as we move forward. 

Also MILCON [military construction] is another one—new mission MILCON as well as existing mission MILCON. We have 

projects out there and capabilities that we are going to bring to the 

fight fairly soon that we can’t with no MILCON budget. 

And also on the procurement side, we were going to ramp up, for 

example, our MQ–9 purchase to provide more ISR to the fight. And 

we can’t increase that buy until we get a budget, so we are stuck 
13 

at a lower capability. And although it is procurement, it is nearterm procurement that we can’t do. 

Also new starts, some of the capabilities that we are putting on 

those platforms, whether it is an ISR platform and kinetic or nonkinetic manner or some system or weapon that is a fairly short procurement timeline that we can get out in the field but we have to 

defer, and all this time it is causing us. 

And then the third one again, as Dan said, is the milpers [military personnel] and civpers [civilian personnel] shortfalls are ones 

that are going—the hiring is an issue, as well as the fact that we 

know we have a milpers and civpers shortfall that we are going to 

have to figure out where that money is going to come from to pay 

for that. And again, we are going to have probably folks in uniform 

doing things that were done by civilians that we can’t do, so. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

Admiral. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Ma’am, the continuing resolution is having an 

effect both on current readiness and future readiness. Like all the 

Services, we will guarantee that the forces going forward into conflict and to do the forward-deployed missions are ready. 

So as we find ourselves in a situation where we need to reduce 

both flying hours and steaming days, those shortfalls will be allocated against the forces that we are maintaining in their 

sustainment phase, which are our surge forces to respond to crises 

that may emerge and in those forces that are preparing to deploy. 

So we will see a decline in readiness to complete the mission set. 

Quite specifically, if the continuing resolution were to continue 

through the balance of the year, we would find ourselves canceling 

29 of 89—85, excuse me—maintenance availabilities for ships. Seventy aircraft requiring depot maintenance wouldn’t get it; 290 engines wouldn’t get their overhauls; 140 maintenance and construction projects across about 74 bases wouldn’t be completed. 

And then you look to the procurement side, the future readiness 

side, we would find ourselves not being able to procure two DDG– 

51s, which are BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] and multipurpose 

combatants. Virginia-class submarine wouldn’t be procured. Two 

reactor cores, one for an SSBN and one for a carrier wouldn’t be 

procured. 

Well, thousands of orders for individual sailors wouldn’t be processed, so they would miss some of their important career milestones. And lastly, our travel is curtailed as we endeavor to go 

build relationships with partners and enhance their abilities to 

carry their own security burdens. That is being reduced as well. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. 

General. 

General TRYON. Yes, ma’am. Many of the same issues raised by 

my colleagues here apply. Equipment reset and future reconstitution is, of course, the greatest concern that we all have. We also 

will experience some concerns with civpers funding levels. 

The continuing resolution affects us in the current year, and it 

will have a ripple effect in the out-years. Immediately, MILCON comes to mind. $567 million in contracts have not been awarded to date. $2.4 billion is at risk for the remainder of the year. Contained in that is 13 BEQs, bachelor en-
14 

listed quarters that are necessary to get our marines and serving 

sailors out of Cold War Era barracks that are 40 to 50 years old 

and put them into facilities that are appropriate for them. $71 million has not been awarded for our high-mobility artillery rocket system. There is $168 million in the budget, but that significantly hampers our ability to procure and build toward the future, 

and it also violates some of the economy of scales that we would 

typically enjoy as we make these purchases. 

Equipment reset as discussed is delayed, and there also we lose 

our economy of scales in making purchases that we can with the 

United States Army and the other Services. Flight hours projected to shortfall is about $225 million in our 

flight hour program at the rate that we are currently progressing, 

and we are flying at normal rates right now. Our sortie-based 

training plan will be suspended sometime during the fourth quarter of this fiscal year. 

Marine air ground and control system contracts have not been 

awarded. Tactical communication, modernization contracts to the 

tune of $61 million have not been awarded, and the list goes on. 

It is significant today in the here and the now, and it won’t get any 

better, because the cost of recovery we would anticipate will only 

increase. 

Thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for allowing me to 

ask that question, and as you can see all branches of the military 

agree on this. I know that Congress is looking for ways to address 

our financial situation, but a continuing resolution for the Department of Defense will only cost us more money and will certainly 

be very serious to our security in the future. 

So I thank all of the witnesses and if any of the others would 

like to—— 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo, and I think all of us concur. We just wish that the last Congress could have gotten their 

budget out so you guys weren’t having this hanging over your head. 

But, unfortunately, that didn’t happen, so we have to try to look 

and see how we can put Humpty Dumpty back together again. And 

that is going mean as the CR [continuing resolution] goes through 

also looking at your fiscal year 2012 figures, because we know they 

are all based on the fact that you had the fiscal year 2011 figures 

as well. 

Our next question will be done by Dr. Heck. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thanks to all of the members here today for your dedication 

to our men and women in uniform and for your careers of selfless 

sacrifice to our Nation. 

My question is for General Bolger. I appreciated the line in your 

written testimony regarding the Reserve Force as being a wellequipped, highly-trained and battle-wise operational force. The Reserve Force is the area that is near and dear to my heart. 

And my question is regarding the ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] model and trying to get to the, you know, one-to-two Active 

Duty and one-to-five Reserve dwell time. And I am speaking as a 

commander who has got units either deployed, getting ready to deploy, or just coming back from deployment. It seems that in the 
15 

ARFORGEN model there is a disconnect between TDA [Table of 

Distribution and Allowance] forces and TO&E [Table of Organization and Equipment] forces. 

I live on the TO&E side—I am sorry, on the TDA side. And so, 

as we are cannibalized to back-fill units that are otherwise deploying, we wind up falling out of our ARFORGEN cycle. For instance, 

I have got a unit that is in year TR–2 that is currently deployed. 

What, if any, efforts are under way to try to come up with a force 

sustainment model that takes in the unique needs of the TDA side 

of the Reserve house? 

General BOLGER. Sir, a great question. And the situation you described my colleague Rick Tryon talked about the same challenge 

that is occurring in the Marine Corps in particular, but in other 

Services. 

What we are doing in the Army now, sir, is we have looked at 

not just our operations force, where we put our first emphasis, naturally, to get forces in the field to fight. Now we are also looking 

at the institutional side of the Army, what we call the generating 

force, the part of the Army that gets the other part ready. And we 

are trying to apply some of the same methods to them to get them 

on to our cyclical readiness just as you described, so we don’t have 

to borrow from those units to fill up the next deployers. 

And I will tell you, sir, the two things that are going to help with 

that, I believe, are, one, sort of systematizing our access to the Reserve Components, because the Guard and the Reserve are integral 

to what we do. As we gather this morning, there are almost 70,000 

guardsmen and reservists on duty today with the U.S. Army. 

We could not carry out our task around the world without this 

unprecedented amount of support from our citizen soldiers, so we 

got to think of ways to make sure that that great veteran force is 

looked after and fully integrated in everything we do. 

And along those lines, sir, as you may be aware, Secretary 

McHugh asked General Reimer, the retired Army Chief of Staff, 

General Dennis Reimer. He and Lieutenant General Helmly and 

Lieutenant General Schultz, senior leaders of our Guard and Reserve, came together, ran a panel, and looked at how do we 

operationalize the Guard and Reserve. And not surprisingly, they 

brought back the exact kind of cases as you just described and said 

we have to do the institutional and the policy work that will solve 

that. 

And some of that may require—after we get done looking at it, 

we may want to come back to the Congress for potential legislative 

assistance, if it is some authorities or something that we need to 

look at to better integrate our Guard and Reserve and the force, 

sir. 

So a long answer, but a really critical subject for our force today, 

sir. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Heck, and that was an excellent 

question. 

General, could I just follow up with one of the things that Dr. 

Heck raised? In your testimony you also mentioned the Army is in-
16 

stitutionalizing or trying a rotational scheme, and you go on to 

mention the need to deliver a predictable supply of military power. 

One of the questions we always ask ourselves are, is the Army 

ready, based on the current readiness state that we have and how 

stretched out you are, to deal with unpredictable events around the 

world, because one thing we know is that we are not good at predicting where they are going to be. 

General BOLGER. Sir, exactly right. As we gather this morning, 

the Army does have the capability in the global response force that 

if I would have met you a few years back, I wouldn’t have been 

able to say that. 

We have an airborne brigade command team in readiness at Fort 

Bragg, if they are needed for anything around the world. Our intent is to expand that surge force or that emergency force so that 

eventually it will grow to a size of one division headquarters or— 

I am sorry—one corps headquarters, three division headquarters, 

10 brigade combat teams and about 41,000 enabling forces of 

troops. 

We are not there yet, and that is really contingent on our drawdown in Iraq proceeding on schedule and no increase in our commitments worldwide. But if those things go into effect, we believe 

in our planning that soldiers who deploy after the first of October 

in the Active Component can expect a year out and then 2 years 

back, and then the Reserve Component can expect a year out mobilized and then 4 years back. And that will allow us to reconstitute 

that surge force or that emergency force for just the kind of contingencies you are describing, sir. 

We are not there yet but we can see it, and the only warning I 

would say is that it is always dependent on world conditions, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Gibson from New York had a quick follow-up question on 

that. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank the distinguished panelists, both for being 

here, your testimony and for your leadership of our service men 

and women and their families. 

I did want to follow up on General Bolger’s comments there. 

Based on my experience, recent experience, I led that global response force Army element to Haiti, and as a quick prefacing remark, let me just say that I have full faith that all the Services 

are dealing with the significant challenges of reset. 

And I know that there are hard choices, prioritization, and that 

we are trying to recapitalize our fleet. We are trying to restore the 

balance to the force and all the emotional and mental challenges 

that go with resetting the soldier, sailor, airman, marine as well. 

But my concern about readiness has more to do with how you all 

interrelate. You know, when I led that unit to Haiti, the challenges 

we had had to do with lift, having the capability to get our forces 

there to meet that mission, and then to have the enablers to come 

in a synchronized manner. 

All Services came to the fore to respond to the President’s request, but there were issues with how we synchronize the assets 

and certainly how we got the assets to get there. So my question 
17 

really is how often—you alluded to you get together often—how 

often do you speak about this, about—— 

When you talk about readiness—I am not talking about all that 

hard work you do to get your own Services ready—how much discussion is there about con ops [concept of operations], about how 

you put together the suite of forces so that we can respond in a 

joint manner, which we know is the way we are going to respond. 

And how much did we learn from the Haitian experience? 

General BOLGER. Well, sir, I will start off and then defer to my 

colleagues, but I would mention that jointness is very critical to everything we do. We couldn’t function without it. Soldiers, in particular, I mean, we need a ride everywhere we are going, and 

thank God we got the Air Force, the Navy to give us that ride. 

You mentioned the Haiti experience, a short notice deployment 

with a force. You know, your force was ready to go, but a great hazard and great challenge to get them ready. And the other Services 

are just as stressed by worldwide operations, as you heard my colleagues say. 

I think this is why it is really, really important that we continue 

our pace of modernization and continue to get all the Services on 

a sustainable rate of operations in dwell, because that is what 

gives you the time to do the joint training and education you need 

to gain those capabilities. 

For us as the operations deputies, this is one of the things we 

have looked at. And, of course, as you know, one of the things we 

are looking at right now is how to keep the hard-won gains of 

jointness since the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986, how to keep 

them going with the lessons learned from the current conflict and 

what we foresee as our challenges in the future. 

And that is something we do discuss quite a bit. It is often a subject of operations deputies meetings. And we definitely do bring in 

folks on things like Haiti and say, ‘‘What did we learn from that? 

You know, what went right? What went wrong? What can we do 

to mitigate these gaps,’’ sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And now we are going to go to Mr. Kissell, from 

North Carolina. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And kind of follow-up to the questions and comments just made, 

maybe a little bit of a plug to my colleagues. The Army is working 

on a CODEL for a 1-day trip to Fort Bragg, I think, in June, I believe, Chris, in June, that will feature a lot of this global response 

capability. We refer to Fort Bragg as being the center of the universe. 

And Special Ops is there, Special Forces are there. Ten percent 

of all the Army will soon be based there with several commands 

and 34 flag officers there, so the most flag officers outside of the 

Pentagon, which I think a lot of our members might be able to 

learn a lot about this readiness component that we have in the 

global context. And as we get more information, we will pass that 

around. 

But honestly, my question—and I will preface real quickly, the 

most important assignment that we have is where our men and 

women are in harm’s way. And that is where our attention should 
18 

be in making sure that we do everything we can to minimize the 

threats there and support those men and women. 

But also, as the chairman said, we are looking to the future, and 

this series of hearings is upon readiness. The chairman read over 

a series of numbers that actually made me feel a little bit young 

to hear how old some of our equipment is. 

I am going to ask each one of you, and feel free to be brief in 

your answer. As the chairman said, one of the most important 

things we can have is information, to know what you are thinking, 

what your thoughts are. And so I am going to ask each of you to 

respond. What is the biggest deficiency that we face right now as 

we get ready for future challenges? And once again, feel free to be 

brief. 

General BOLGER. Sir, I will start off. The biggest deficiency is 

time. As much as we enjoy good modernization, we have programs, 

it is time to train and integrate, put the great people we have together and have time to prepare for full-spectrum operations. And 

I think you would hear that same thing from any of our sergeants 

or any of our officers as they prepare that training. 

They really need the time not to focus on the Afghan fight or the 

Iraq stability operations, but to focus on that full-spectrum integration. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. 

General CARLISLE. Sir, I would echo that. I think we have spent 

10 years doing what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. We 

have got to get that right, and we have got to win, but as I said 

in my opening statement, the full spectrum and the points that the 

chairman brought up referenced the growth of, for example, the 

PRC [People’s Republic of China] and their forces. And that is just 

one, and there are many more that have spent a lot of time expanding. 

So, our modernization and our ability to operate in an anti-access 

air denial environment, in a degraded environment for electromagnetic spectrum, all those are things that we in Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty comfortable with the fact anything more than 

about 6 feet up the ground we own. 

And we don’t have to worry about our space capability because 

it is pretty well—there is not a lot of threat. But that won’t be the 

case wherever we go next. And those are the things that I think 

that—and it is time, it is practice, it is concentration, it is modernization of the systems, it is—and I know Bruce will probably 

mention this, but the air-sea battle, the construct that the Department of Navy and Department of the Air Force put together—those 

are the things that we have really got to move. We got to take— 

our belief is we really have to go to the next level in joint. We don’t 

need to be joint, we need to be integrated. And we need to go across 

domains to make things happen. 

Mr. KISSELL. Admiral. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Sir, I have to echo my shipmates here—time. 

The Navy has been operating for the last 3 years at a pace that 

is equivalent to our surge capacity. That has come at a cost where 

we have been deployed forward so much that time available for 

maintenance has resulted in a degrade in material readiness. 
19 

And the time available for training has caused us to constrain 

our training to mission-tailored as opposed to the full range of military operations. So as we look forward, we would need time. 

And I might say as well that the rate of the stress on the force 

would be a little bit less, if we were at our aspiration of 313 ships 

or so as afloat for the force structure. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. 

General. 

General TRYON. Sir, I would probably report that in my judgment, jointness across the board is very good. Me and my colleagues here, I think we work together to achieve joint solutions in 

every instance. One of the ways we do that is through the Global 

Force Management Board that routinely meets to discuss how 

forces are going to be used, where they are going to be used and 

what the economies of scale can be to address the given situation. 

And the Marine Corps is postured uniquely perhaps with the 

United States Navy in a—more than a joint partnership, it is family. And that is evidenced in a recent experience where with the 

repositioning of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a requirement to reinforce that unit with a battalion became manifest to address the scenario that is developing off the coast of Libya. 

1st Battalion 2nd Marines within 20 hours of receiving the execute order deployed into Souda Bay and across that to the amphibious ships and are now positioned off the coast of Libya. 

They did that because they are inherently a team that is taskorganized and can very quickly and in an agile fashion adapt to the 

situation. However, I mentioned in my earlier comments about 

home station equipment sets. That is becoming an increasingly 

more important issue with us. 

As you probably know, a little bit different from the Army, when 

marines deploy, we take our gear forward with us. For example, as 

the marines came out of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 40 percent of 

the equipment that was in Iraq was transferred to Afghanistan 

without the benefit of a full refurbishment or reset. 

So, that gear is still forward and it is undergoing the wear and 

the tear that is typically associated with combat operations. So, a 

lengthy answer to your question, but the equipment reset is indeed 

a priority. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Kissell. 

And now the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Scott, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to go back to kind of your original comments and, 

Generals, for all of you. I think every member of this committee 

wants you to have everything that you need to support the 

warfighter. And yet as we look at February’s numbers, we had an 

$8 billion-a-day deficit. That is approximately an aircraft carrier a 

day, if I understand the pricing correctly. 

When we asked DOD for proposals and information, on one hand, 

we understand that we need additional dwell time for our soldiers, 

yet we know that they propose to reduce the number of soldiers in 

the Army by approximately 27,000 and the soldiers in the Marines 
20 

by 15,000. We don’t have the ships that we need. We don’t have 

the planes that we need. We don’t have the vehicles or the equipment that we need. 

And I guess as someone who has been here in Congress for less 

than 3 months, my question is what is wrong with the procurement 

process at DOD? How do we fix it? Because we cannot—we cannot—sustain an $8 billion a day deficit in this country. And as you 

answer those questions, I would like for you to tell me if you think 

that the national debt and deficit spending is a threat to our security as a country as well. 

General BOLGER. Sir, thanks for that question. I will go first, and 

I would say that I think the national debt and deficit is a concern 

to all American citizens whether in uniform right now or not, and 

I know it is for me. 

And, sir, your question about procurement and the need for procurement reform, I think what we would say is procurement as 

written now is designed about making it perfect in every regard as 

we can, and we probably made it too complicated. And I think we 

need to settle for just good enough. 

I know for the Army, in particular in this war, we have brought 

a lot of things on to our operational need statement, which doesn’t 

go through the normal procurement process, from small business 

and from others, good ideas. Maybe of 10 good ideas that are 

brought to a unit, maybe 8 of them don’t work, but 2 of them do. 

And among those good ideas that we are currently using today 

in Afghanistan and Iraq that came to us courtesy of a Marine 

Corps program like that is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

vehicle series that are keeping our soldiers alive on operations, our 

marines, our sailors, our airmen who are on the ground. 

So, I think there is great merit in looking at those so-called operational need or joint operational needs programs as a way ahead 

for procurement reform. And I hope we will do that. 

And then, sir, another thing I would mention, you mentioned the 

proposed reduction of soldiers. There were two really important caveats on that that I think the Secretary of Defense wisely put on 

that. And the first was timing. 

It is set for the year 2015, which is 4 years from now. That is 

close in budget and programming terms, but it is a bit distant in 

terms of strategic and what may happen in the world. So I think 

we have left ourselves the opportunity to revisit that, if the world 

conditions alter. 

And then the second point is that not only is it close in that regard, the number is not great by itself. Our Active Duty strength 

is set at 547,400, and this would represent about 5 percent of that. 

So, with 4 years to prepare, I think we can give the best range of 

options to you all and to our chain of command as to what type of 

reduction may make sense, based on the world situation, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, General. 

General CARLISLE. Sir, I would agree and echo much of what 

Dan said. Clearly, in my opinion, our economy and our national 

debt is a national security issue. And I don’t think there is any 

doubt in anybody’s mind, certainly in uniform and all Americans, 

that our economy is one of our strengths itself, so it is something 

that we have to protect. And I would agree with you 1,000 percent. 
21 

On the procurement side and acquisition side, sir, I think all the 

things that bureaucracy does can sometime inflate costs. I think 

there is a—and I am not a procurement or an acquisition expert; 

that is why they let us be the Ops Deps [Operations Deputies], because we are probably not as good at acquisition—but I think that 

we have a tendency sometimes to go to the exquisite, and we can’t 

afford to go to the exquisite. So, I think good enough is exactly— 

as Dan said—is right. 

I think there are economies of scale. I think there is stability in 

a program that allows it to go through a process. I think sometimes 

impatience on the part of a variety of audiences—be it a consumer, 

the warfighter or job creation, whatever—there are a lot of people 

that will create impatience, and sometimes that causes problems in 

your programs as you move forward. 

And I couldn’t agree more that we have got to get it right, and 

we have got to fix the procurement and acquisition process in the 

Department of Defense, if we are going to be able to maintain the 

level of fielding of our combat forces that we need for the future. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, General. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Sir, in regard to the deficit spending, we as a 

Nation are equally concerned about that challenge going forward to 

develop solutions. From at least my personal perspective, the Department of Defense, and certainly the Navy budget, is carrying a 

level of risk this year, fiscal year 2012, and in the out-years as we 

look at that. 

That would cause me to suggest that one of the solutions to the 

deficit spending that I would not advise is to diminish DOD, and 

certainly the Navy’s budget. I think the Secretary of Defense has 

said that 2012 is a reduction from what we thought would be an 

increase, but still an increase. And then as we begin to plan in the 

out-years, it is pretty flat. 

But to cause a decline, I think, at a time when we are trying to 

reset and reconstitute the force and meet an evolving security environment, that is going to invite multiple concurrent diverse crises, 

would in fact increase risk. 

Regarding procurement, we understand and have been working 

for a number of years to address that. I believe part of 2012’s budget across all Services was to increase the cadre of procurement professionals. And certainly we are looking to do that in the Navy as 

well as continue and enhance very rigorous oversight. 

Just one example, the type of oversight that is in my lane is the 

requirement. What is the capability requirement to make sure that 

we can generate the effects necessary on the battlefield that the 

Nation expects of us? 

And so, we don’t gold watch them as we might have in the beginning of my career. We are looking for parity or over match sufficient to match the capacity equation. And so, we are taking a holistic approach to resolving the procurement challenges that we face. 

General TRYON. Sir, your second question first. I think all of us 

share concern with respect to the budget deficit and the implications that it has long-term. 

To your question or your comment with respect to end strength, 

I would like to just comment on the fact as this war progressed, 

both the Army and the Marine Corps were authorized to grow the 
22 

force in order to meet the threat that was seen as confronting our 

Nation. 

And the Marine Corps began in 2007 and, in fact, although we 

achieved the numbers, the end strength, we are still in the process 

of forming units and will round out in fiscal year 2012 to complete 

the ‘‘Grow the Force’’ initiative. 

Having said that, in August our Commandant directed that we 

meet and we look deep, we look down range to consider how we 

might posture ourselves for the future. And based on his direction, 

we gathered and conducted an internally driven force structure review leveraging lessons learned over the course of the 10 years of 

combat in order to figure out how we might posture ourselves better in the future, how we do more with less and how we can leverage the capabilities of technology in the operating battlefield environment today to accomplish our mission. 

With respect to procurement I am not a programmatic guy. But 

I would say I think we are informed to a certain extent with the 

urgent unfilled requirements, the UUNS [Urgent Universal Needs 

Statement] process that manifested over the course of the Iraq and 

now the Afghan conflict that facilitated the acquisition of gear that 

was needed on the battlefield quickly. 

And I know that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, is examining exactly the kind of question that you just 

posed to us to determine how we might better streamline process 

and accelerate acquisition to achieve the kind of products that we 

need, the reliable kind of products that we need to succeed in the 

battlefield. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman for his question. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I would like to begin with General Bolger, primarily because 

your statement is the only one that referenced it. And I would like 

the other generals and admirals to respond to it as well—on page 

three of your statement made an interesting comment about the 

concept of versatile force mix characteristic. We sort of touched 

upon it earlier, and that is of course using the Guard as well as 

the Reserves to sort of, I guess, define readiness. And that is what 

you are looking into the future, I understand your statement is 

saying, as to how we would then meet readiness requirements. 

What I am curious about is, for example, the Guard, Adjutant 

Generals are basically State appointments. It is a jurisdictional 

issue, first of all. Secondly, there are funding considerations, that 

which the State governments may pay for that which the Federal 

Government pays for. 

So, in your perception on how you feel we are moving to this new 

joint mix force, how do you anticipate actually coming to address 

jurisdictional concerns? And how are they going to work side-byside? Guard units are permanent, for one thing. Yours rotate for 

another. So, how do we do this? I understand wartime, I am just 

curious about how you anticipate seeing this actually fulfilled for 

the future in terms of readiness. 

General BOLGER. Ma’am, I think that is a great question, a great 

point. And exactly one of the challenges we are looking at as we— 
23 

we refer to it as convert the Guard and Reserve from a strategic 

Reserve—in other words a force that is primarily gaining readiness, but you use it only in the event of a very major conflict, you 

know, the Cold War, World War III-type scenario. 

We are talking about it now being an operational reserve. And 

we actually learned a lot from our brothers and sisters in the Air 

Force on this. The Air Guard and the Air Reserve have been integrated in the Air Force for quite a while. And they also have to 

deal with the challenges of State duty versus Federal duty. 

And so, mirroring a little of what they learned and then modifying it naturally for the needs of ground forces, we think what we 

do is we are going to prioritize it so that we can serve the Governors and the Adjutants General. 

So, if for example, we give a predicted schedule that says, ‘‘Five 

years from now, your brigade that is normally available in your 

State is going to be rotated in and do combat duty in Afghanistan,’’ 

the Governor then has time for he or she and their team to look 

at that, know that is coming up, and then, I think, make the prudent arrangements for who is going to pick that duty up. 

And I think some of the things that have been recommended, 

and these are cases we have seen, there is an Army Reserve as 

well that it does not have a State duty, but sometimes they are 

available. 

Could there an arrangement, a task organization that would tell 

the Governor, ‘‘Look, these Active Component forces or these Army 

Reserve forces will be available to fill the gap while your combat 

brigade is deployed,’’ because I think, ma’am, that is the real concern at the State level, and I think rightly so, for homeland missions. 

The other thing that helps us, ma’am, is the reorganization that 

the Department of Defense did when they established U.S. Northern Command and their strong relation to a strengthened National 

Guard Bureau, because our number one priority is always homeland defense. 

We don’t always put most of our forces against it. But should a 

homeland defense issue occur, everything goes to that first. And I 

think that was one of the big lessons after 9/11, although most that 

was handled by local and State elements. 

So, we are looking very closely at that, ma’am. But I think this 

is a fundamental responsibility that goes back to the founding of 

America with the militia versus the Active Force and the regular 

forces. And I think it is one that we really got a great opportunity 

to make some good changes right now, because we got a very veteran Guard and Reserve. 

They don’t require that great amount of training and mobilization time they might have needed when they were less wellequipped or less well-trained. They are as veteran as they have 

ever been in the Army. And I think it really gives us opportunity 

to solve these challenges that in many cases have existed for quite 

awhile, ma’am. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

And I do know that the Air Force has done it very successfully. 

So, if you would, General, if you would respond to that. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. 
24 

I think we at the United States Air Force, in some ways our mission is uniquely suited to have a mutual capability. And to be honest, we could not—we, the United States Air Force, could not conduct our mission without our Guard and Reserve partners, and it’s 

every part of the mission. 

It depends on mission set. Air superiority alert or air defense 

alert that we that we set in Hawaii with 154th, for example, or the 

ASA [Air Sovereignty Alert] folks that are scattered and doing an 

incredible job throughout the Nation for homeland defense, those 

are, you know, the Title 10, Title 32 question you asked about. But 

we have worked it out very well. 

They are on Title 32 orders till the klaxon goes off. The minute 

the klaxon goes off, they are on Title 10, and they are doing the 

mission for NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] or PACOM 

[U.S. Pacific Command] in Hawaii. 

So we have worked our way through some of that, and we are 

sharing everything we have with our brethren here. But it is a 

unique capability in a lot of ways because of our mission set. 

The other thing that I think is that we have gone into the total 

force enterprise in the case of KC–135s and F–22s, where part of 

the squadron is Guard, part of it’s Active. You have an amazing 

amount of flexibility when you build total force enterprise like that. 

And we still have a lot to learn. There are things we need to do. 

And with other missions where it is predominantly State. If we 

have C–130s in the southern part of the country, they can do firefighting in the fire seasons. The ability to back those guys up and 

send more planes out with that capability is, again, those are 

things that we can continue to work on. 

But whether it is the attributes that the Guard and Reserve 

bring with respect to continuity, which is incredibly valuable, experience, because they generally are very experienced, very good in 

what they do, I will tell you in my previous job in the 13th Air 

Force command, that organization could not operate without the 

Guard and the 109th in the background and supporting us all the 

time. And so, I think we are fortunate in our ability to do that. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Ma’am, thank you for your question. 

We have it a little bit easier, not having a Guard force. And so 

we have embarked in the last decade on a total force concept where 

we size and shape the Active and Reserve Components in concert 

with each other. 

And we look at what our current demands are, and we assess 

what the demand will be in the future security environment. And 

we size and shape the Reserve Component on a real-time basis to 

make sure that the total force can respond to the requirements 

that we anticipate. 

We also employ our Reserve forces, whether we are involved in 

a conflict or not, day-to-day as they augment various activities that 

we have ongoing. So that keeps them refreshed and able to add 

value when they are called upon. 

General TRYON. And Ma’am, like the Navy, we have no National 

Guard, as you all know. We have a total force concept with our Reserve community and have had a total force concept for a number 

of years. 
25 

Our Reserve, selected Marine Corps Reserve is 39,600 strong. I 

alluded to a force structure review earlier, and just for point of 

clarification, our Reserve establishment will remain at 39,600. 

There will be no change and no impact on our Reserve Force. 

We also will tailor our reserve component so that it complements 

the Active Duty structure that we have. We bring complete units 

on to Active Duty. They train in our installations. They train sideby-side with the Active Duty forces. And we also utilize some of the 

unique capabilities in terms of manpower to bring Reserves forward for individual augments to fill joint manning documents and 

the like. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schilling, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Thank you very much. I appreciate your gentlemen’s service to this great Nation. 

This past weekend I was actually in Afghanistan and got to see 

some of the great work that is happening there. Myself and four 

other members of Congress had the opportunity to walk through a 

city called Marja, which a little over a year ago, our men and 

women couldn’t land there without taking fire. And we didn’t have 

to wear a vest. So, you know, I just want to thank you for that and 

the work that is going on over there. 

You know, I understand the folks are getting kind of burnt out, 

lots of tours going across. And, you know, I think a lot of it comes 

down to, you know, giving them the break and make sure the families are taken care of. And, you know, constitutionally, that is our 

job as the Congress is to make sure we are well-protected, that our 

money is spent properly. 

And, you know, I think that the one thing that I look at it is the 

defense of this Nation is huge, because a lot of the other issues 

that we are dealing with today don’t really matter, if we don’t have 

a good defense system. 

So I look at it as a top priority to make sure things are spent 

properly. And then—— 

Looks like I get the buzzer now—but, you know, when I visited 

with several of the troops there, they were all very positive, upbeat. 

And some of them, you know, had been over there for quite some 

time. And, you know, I guess, we look, you know, to you folks to 

just kind of help direct us and just help us make good solid decisions on supporting the troops, their families. 

You know, I know, I had a personal experience with one of the 

guys that came back. He had been back home for a couple of years. 

And about 2 months ago, he ended up taking his life. And it wasn’t 

because of going in and serving the military. It was, you know, it 

was a broken home and things like that. 

But, you know, I think that there are a lot of things that we are 

taking note of, and we are focusing our efforts into fixing that. But, 

you know, I just want to thank you for what you are doing. 

And, you know, I think with the financial condition of the country, you know, every penny that we spend—you know, the one 

thing that I was talking to one of my colleagues about yesterday 

is the fact that when China spends a dollar, they know that dollar, 

every penny of it, is being spent properly. And, you know, that is 
26 

the one thing that we have an obligation to the citizens to do is 

make sure we spend it properly. 

And look forward to just working with you all. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman. 

And the gentlelady from Missouri, Ms. Hartzler, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for all that you are doing. 

With all we have been hearing about readiness and our desire, 

our joint effort to make sure that we are ready and that we are 

fully equipped and our country is going to be safe in the years to 

come, I know we have got lots of challenges of equipment and dwell 

time and other issues. 

But at the same time, we are also approaching changing a major, 

major policy within the military, the repeal of the ‘‘Don’t Ask/Don’t 

Tell’’ policy. And I want to get your thoughts about some of those 

things. 

And first of all, with this proposal as it is coming forth, what 

changes to facilities are you contemplating in order to address privacy concerns of servicemembers? And what is the cost going to be 

for that? 

General BOLGER. Ma’am, I will start out with that. As you know 

right now, at the direction of the President and the Secretary of 

Defense, pursuant to the act of Congress that was signed last December, we are carrying out the training—to train our force right 

now and then provide an assessment. Our Services will provide the 

best military advice back on what we think those implications will 

be as we complete this policy change. 

I will tell you right now, ma’am, that we are anticipating no 

change at the facilities. The Army recognizes two sexes—male and 

female—sexual-orientation neutral, that is whatever. And our goal 

will be the same, and the standards of conduct will not change. 

And what we have found in our training so far, for folks at my 

age, it is quite concerning in many cases. For folks the age of my 

son or daughter, they don’t know what we are talking about and 

why it is a big deal. And the ones in the military are more concerned about their next deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So but you say right now—is the policy now that 

men and women servicemembers who have opposite sex attraction 

shower together and room together, sleep together? Is that the policy now in the facilities? 

General BOLGER. Ma’am, right now the policy that we have is 

that males live with males and females live with the females. We 

can make an exception for that in combat, and we do. You know, 

a crew in a vehicle or something like that has mixed sex. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Why do have that separation? 

General BOLGER. I am sorry, ma’am? 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Why do have separation between facilities between men and women? 

General BOLGER. Right now, really, just for privacy reasons 

and—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. So we are going make a change your policy so people with the same-sex attraction are being able to shower 
27 

together and to sleep in the same area, so why wouldn’t we have 

separate facilities in those cases? 

General BOLGER. Well, ma’am, part of it is because, basically, 

you are not allowed to act out on your inclinations or interest without the permission of the other person. I mean, the military—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. And why don’t we have men and women, service 

men and women sleeping in the same areas and showering? 

General BOLGER. Well, ma’am, they do not shower together, but 

they do sleep in the same areas routinely. I mean, that is very common. And we make normal privacy arrangements, because when 

you are living very close to somebody, you are still—one of the biggest challenges, of course—and I say this as an infantry guy with 

almost 33 years of service—is to have any kind of personal space 

in that kind of an environment. 

And so people try to allow a little time for somebody to read a 

letter or for somebody to clean up or something like that without 

hassling when they can avoid it. So we are used to that. That is 

one of the things you learn from when you first come into the Service. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you. I would like to hear from the 

other Services, what changes to the facilities you anticipate and 

what the cost would be. 

General CARLISLE. Ma’am, much like the Army, as we work our 

way through it—and I will take for the record and come back with 

more specifics, but because it is not primarily in my area of responsibility within the Department of the Air Force—but in talking 

with the—as we implement this, our intent is very similar in that 

we will provide privacy. 

But additional facilities is not—additional facilities or splitting 

things up to where you have four different groups of people that 

have to maintain separation, that is not our intent, as far as I 

know right now. Again, I will come with more information as you 

need it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 93.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

General CARLISLE. And I would agree with Dan that, you know, 

the common refrain, and we all think about the turbulence and 

what it is going to cause, but to a large extent, the younger folks 

there was—‘‘don’t ask/don’t tell/don’t care’’ in a lot of cases was the 

refrain, because they don’t necessarily understand it. They have 

grown up in a different world than we grew up in, so. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Thank you for your question, ma’am. The 

Navy policy is no change at the facilities and, therefore, no related 

costs. The facilities are based on gender, not sexual orientation. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you. 

General TRYON. Ma’am, consistent with the Department of Defense policy, the Marine Corps policy is the same. The focus for 

successful implementation in our judgment is to concentrate on 

leadership, professionalism, discipline and respect. 
28 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. I would like all of you to address how you 

think that this change will improve the all-volunteer force and not 

undermine morale, discipline, readiness, recruiting and retention. 

General BOLGER. Ma’am, I would offer that the all-volunteer 

force represents the America that it is drawn from, and it is important that all Americans feel like the military that we are putting 

on the battlefield is their military. 

General CARLISLE. Ma’am, I would echo what has been said by 

others. It is about professionalism. It is about professional courtesy 

and respect for one another, regardless. And I can give you my 

opinion with respect to what I think it will do to the force. I don’t 

think any of us know right now. I think—time will tell. 

Having said that, I think if you recruit and retain professional, 

respectful people, it won’t degrade our force at all. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. 

Admiral CLINGAN. The fact is that the current force has a number of individuals with varying sexual orientations. And as we go 

to recruit, we recruit based on other things—performance and their 

capabilities and willingness to go do the missions. And so I don’t 

expect that it is going to change the recruiting demographics particularly. 

And, certainly, within the Service, once you have been inducted, 

or whatever the case may be, it is all governed by standards of behavior, which have not changed. So we don’t consider in the Navy, 

based on the planning that we have done and the surveys we have 

done, that it will have a significant impact at all. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

General TRYON. Ma’am, I think today’s all-volunteer force is a 

tremendous success, and I wouldn’t anticipate any changes to that 

in the future. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I would concur we have a wonderful force right 

now, but I am very concerned that we in this time of war are getting ready to change this radical policy where, just like you said, 

General, we do not know the implication of it, and so I have a lot 

of concerns. But thank you for your answers. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the lady for her questions. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to make a comment as far as long-term readiness and 

then I would like to reengage the near-term readiness issue that 

we were dialoguing about earlier. 

And talking about readiness, of course, it begs the question, 

‘‘Ready for what?’’ One of the things that General Bolger mentioned 

in his early set of remarks is quite remarkable that we have got 

soldiers right now in a hundred countries. He made the point on 

time to get missions done and the need for staying power. 

When I’m back home in the district, my constituents really don’t 

understand Iraq and Afghanistan. And that is my challenge. I take 

that on. I explain why it is that we need to stay. We can’t afford 

to start a war that we don’t finish. So it is my leadership responsibility to follow through on that. 
29 

But I think going forward we need to have—we, the country need 

to have a national dialogue. I think everyone on this committee, regardless of party, we are fully committed. We are going to protect 

our cherished way of life, but there are a variety of views and opinions as to what that means. 

And I am of the mind that we have too many requirements. We 

are asking too much of our military right now. And, you know, 

while I think we could all pass a civics test that we are a republic, 

not an empire, to me, when I look at the facts, we evidence an empire in terms of where we are laid down. 

So, you know, going forward, this is a conversation I am having 

with my colleagues right now as we look towards completing, successfully completing our objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think 

that the time is right to take a serious look at what does it mean 

to protect our cherished way of life as we go forward. 

I would like to reengage the topic of near-term readiness. I appreciate all of the responses that I received on that and certainly 

acknowledge the readiness that was displayed as it relates to moving forces towards any kind of potential response in Libya. 

But with regard to the Global Force Management Board, it is my 

view that we have got risk. We have got significant risk as it relates to the Global Response Force, the GRF. And, of course, that 

is in large measure because we are resourcing the current fight in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

But please tell me a little bit more about how you go through 

that on a joint level and how do you track the status of readiness 

among the forces and what commitment do we have in the outyears as far as exercises to ensure that we have the capability— 

because I think the general was getting ready to make a remark 

about the C–17 availability. 

And so the question, really, did you know—you probably did—did 

you know we had this shortfall, that if we got called, we weren’t 

going to have the capability to move the Global Response Force? 

And going forward, how much situational awareness do we have 

about this challenge to readiness, to joint readiness deployability? 

Thanks. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. Thanks. I appreciate that question. 

I think it is. It is a question—and you are exactly right—it is a 

question of managing risk and ready to do what. And that is your 

point, so I would reiterate that. 

I think in the case of when we look at what is demanded of the 

United States military today, realizing what we have done for the 

last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is risk out there. There 

is risk to every part of our force. I don’t think there is a part of 

force that is not at risk. 

We spend an exhaustive amount of time, this crowd in particular 

in the ops deps tanks, and we go through Global Force Management and hard-to-source solutions, and it is a joint solution. And 

we do turn to one another. And if it is direct support C–130s trying 

to backfill CH–47s as much as we can, we can’t do it across the 

board, because they don’t go to the same place all the time. But we 

do that. 

So we spend a lot of time working joint solutions to issues of how 

we manage the force in the near-term. And to be honest, and I 
30 

think it has been brought up before, with our Army and Marine 

brethren in their engagements that they have had over the last 

decade in a lot of cases, some of that has been Air Force and Navy 

backfill, whether it is joint expeditionary taskings or individual 

augmentees. And that is exactly what we need to do. 

And I think that part of the risk, that we have to realize is that 

we have incredible men and women in our military, and they are 

pretty adaptable and flexible. And we can take a computer technician from Lackland Air Force Base or Syracuse, and you can send 

him to do a joint expeditionary tasking in support of a convoy and 

they do great work for you. 

So we did look at joint solutions. We did look across Services and 

the synergy. We can do that. And we look to take advantage of our 

greatest asset, which is our people and their flexibility and adaptability. 

General BOLGER. I think, sir, building on what Hawk said, the 

jointness and the people aspect to me are the two great multipliers 

we have that allows us to get more out of the numbers of people 

and planes and ships and tanks and all the other things we have. 

And we have to look for opportunities to build on that. Anything 

we can do should always look to empower our folks. 

And I think one of the aspects that a little additional dwell time 

is going give surely for the Army is the ability to get some of our 

folks back into professional schooling and some of these broadening 

experiences where they may have a chance to come over, be an intern for you or something like that, just give them a bigger picture 

than the world of kicking down the next door in a village in Afghanistan. And then that part is important, but got to get that 

broader view. 

And I think as that generation, with all the skills they are showing and the multiple talents that Hawk referred to, as they take 

charge of our military, I think we are going to see them come up 

with some of these solutions. So, you know, it doesn’t have to be 

top down, sir. 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, and I appreciate those responses, too. 

And, Chairman, I am just going to make about 10 to 15 seconds 

to close it up. 

The thing that is concerning to me is that as we look at the potential threats that we face and we look at the Global Response 

Force and we think about in terms of joint command and control, 

joint fires, sustainment capability, mobility and strategic mobility, 

I think you would agree we have got some risk in terms of identifying the joint forces required to address emerging circumstances. 

Now, in situations where we can move a fleet and we have a 

ground force with a highly trained, motivated, disciplined Marine 

Corps, that is great. But when we have to go deeper, when we have 

to reach across and maybe go to the airborne forces, we need a way 

to convey that force. We need a way to sustain that force and to 

complement that force. And it is that joint packaging that has got 

me concerned in the near-term. 

I know that that is on your radar screen. And I think it is important we communicate risk as we go forward in the near-term and 

as we bridge towards what I hope is a more judicious view of the 

long-term. And we are going to protect this cherished way of life. 
31 

I yield back. Thanks very much. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman. 

And the next individual for questions is the gentleman from Arkansas. 

And before he comes back in, General Tryon, I have a question 

for you, if I could, on pre-positioning of our stocks. How important 

is that to the Marines, because one of the things that we are hearing today is that that is not that important, that we have just 

sustainment vessels, we can pull them back, and we can be back 

to the fight in a week or two. You have seen that firsthand. How 

important are those prepositioned stocks? 

General TRYON. Sir, thank you. Thank you for that question. The 

Maritime Preposition Force is comprised of three squadrons that 

are forward-deployed around the world—one in the Med [Mediterranean], one in the Pacific, and one in the Indian Ocean. 

For the Marine Corps and for the program that we have, these 

are capability sets and not simply floating warehouses that you 

would draw supplies from. They are intentionally designed to support fly-in echelons and marry up so that formations can quickly 

assemble in a reception staging area and then complete their onward movement and take on whatever mission that might be there. 

This is a strategic program, in my judgment. Having these forces, 

these assets, these resources forward-deployed I think is fundamentally important, not just to the organizational constructs that the 

Marine Corps has and how we operate with them, but I think to 

the combatant commanders as well. 

It provides the combatant commanders with what is singularly 

their most important—it addresses singularly what their most important concern is, and that is responsiveness. And by having maritime preposition assets forward-deployed, we have a far greater 

ability to respond in time to a crisis or a contingency. 

Mr. FORBES. And two questions on that. First one is how important is time to you in that response capability? 

General TRYON. Sir, I think time is always of the essence, you 

know, from the Marine Corps’ ethos, First to Fight, we can’t get 

there fast enough. And so we want to make sure that we are where 

we need to be with what we need to have in order to carry the day. 

And the way we are organized and equipped and the way the resources that are located aboard the Maritime Prepositioning 

Squadrons, or the way they are arranged, they complement our capability to forward deploy quickly. 

Mr. FORBES. If we did not have those stocks prepositioned and 

we had the ships back in homeport, is there a difference in timing 

between just the sail time to be able to get to wherever the destination is? In other words, how much time does it take to assemble 

the stocks that you would need on those vessels before they could 

move forward? 

General TRYON. Sir, if the squadron is, for instance, back in the 

continental United States, East or West Coast, obviously, you 

would have to deal with whatever the tyranny of distance is between departing the United States and moving to wherever the crisis or the contingency area might be. 
32 

Providing that the ships would remain loaded with the stockages 

that we’re required to support, that would minimize delay in moving them forward. But when we sacrifice time, we assume risk. 

Mr. FORBES. What if they did not keep those ships loaded? 

General TRYON. Sir, that would then require additional time in 

order to be able to load the vessels and—— 

Mr. FORBES. Could that be several weeks’ time? 

General TRYON. Sir, it would depend on the squadron, but it 

would take a matter of time. And I can get back to you and tell 

you exactly what the load time for those—for a squadron might be. 

It depends on port facilities. It depends on the type of ship. There 

are a number of factors associated with that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Arkansas is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having 

this very informative hearing. 

Thank you all for your service. I appreciate it very much. I appreciate you, General Carlisle, mentioning in C–130s. You know we 

have a lot of great ones in Little Rock in my district. 

General Bolger, I wanted to ask you, when you are dealing with 

the transition from a strategic Reserve to operational Reserve, can 

you talk a little bit about how you are going to balance the Guard’s 

role in the States? That is particularly important in a State like 

Arkansas, where we have a lot of tornadoes and storms and things 

like that. And I know that they will continue to respond to several 

incidents like that. 

But if you could provide a little guidance, I am particularly interested in the training balance and how they accommodate that in 

light of a shift to an operational Reserve? 

General BOLGER. Sir, that is a great question, and I think it 

comes down to the fundamental nature of the Guard having arisen 

out of the militia tradition of the United States, always ready for 

home service and then, you know, like the old minutemen, and 

then deploying overseas when necessary. 

Now, Guard in particular and our Reserve, too, have done a 

great job in that for the last decade for the Army. You mentioned 

the term ‘‘operational.’’ In the old days, the Guard really and the 

Reserve were a strategic Reserve. They were the force to be called 

on when things really got big and maybe in the Cold War where 

we were looking at a major World War III-type scale of conflict. 

So now we use about 70,000 guardsmen and reservists on Active 

Duty today every day, really keeping them on Active Duty, a good 

number deployed overseas. And so, how do we balance that with 

the Governor’s needs and expectations that their Guard would be 

available in the event of a state of emergency or a natural disaster? 

Two things we have done that I think are helping us in that 

area, sir. The first is trying to get the Guard and Reserve, and the 

Guard in particular, for State duty on a predictable schedule of deployment, which is to say about 4 years at home for every year deployed. 

If a Governor knew that he or she would have that Guard available for 4 years out of 5, then they know at least that 80 percent 
33 

of the time is covered with a trained, ready unit that knows the 

State and that lives there and is ready to go. And I think our 

Guard has done really, really well on these homeland tasks. 

And then, what about the year where they are going to get mobilized, deployed, and deployed overseas? I think this brings us to the 

second point. Secretary McHugh and General Casey actually commissioned a study led by General Dennis Reimer, one of our former 

Army chiefs of staff. Lieutenant General Roger Schultz, Lieutenant 

General Helmly helped them out with this. They were key leaders 

in the Guard and Reserve. 

And they came back and they said, you know, we need to look 

at a way to create more of a total force for homeland missions as 

well. Maybe we can see a future with some changes to how we task 

organize where the Governor, he or she might have able if the 

Guard brigade was deployed, they could have Army Reserve forces 

resident in that State, which are Federal forces and Reserve. They 

could have active Army units registered in that State. And all that 

would come together. 

And, sir, of course we have had some great and hard-won lessons 

learned from Hurricane Katrina, from Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, 

from the flooding as recently as this month in the United States, 

where we have seen some opportunities there to really get a better 

homeland force. 

And, sir, I would underscore that in the direction we received 

from the President and the Secretary of Defense, homeland defense 

is the number one responsibility of the Department of Defense. And 

normally, our forces are not doing that every day, but they are all 

available and should an event occur in the homeland, just as we 

saw after 9/11, everything will have that direction until that event 

is dealt with, sir. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Sure. I got in the Reserve in 1996, am still in the 

Reserve now, and I can tell you the clear difference between the 

1996 strategic Reserve and the operational now, and particularly in 

terms of readiness. We call this the Readiness Subcommittee. I 

don’t think I have ever heard the word ‘‘readiness’’ until post 9/11 

in the Reserve, and everything changed. So I know exactly what 

you are talking about there. 

I want to ask you about an issue that is more about personnel, 

not equipment, and that is OERs, Officer Evaluations—to some extent, NCOERs [Non-Commissioned Officer Evaluation Reports] as 

well for noncommissioned officers, but I am particularly interested 

in our leaders and how they are rated. I am waiting on an OER 

now as I am leaving my Reserve unit, and I have written and rated 

folks, so I am intimately familiar with OERs. 

And there was a great article in The Atlantic magazine about a 

month ago, and it talked about John Nagl and a bunch of the really 

sharp military leaders who have gotten out of the Army. And I 

know that we have taken steps, particularly in the last decade or 

5 years, to be more innovative to encourage the cliche ‘‘outside the 

box’’ thinking. I saw that firsthand when I went to Fort Dix to 

phase one of ILE [Intermediate Level Education]. 

Instead of a lecture format where you just sit, take notes and listen to an officer, you sit in a sort of a horseshoe, you are given all 
34 

these hypotheticals, you are encouraged to think and to dialogue 

and to—— 

It was actually surprising to me to see that kind of freedom in 

thinking and in structure in the military. And I was encouraged by 

it because I thought that it was teaching folks how to think instead 

of how to memorize some things that they would probably soon forget. 

So, I know that you all have—that there has been an evolution. 

I know we are making progress. But I think the way that people 

are rated—and I am sort of laying it as a predicate so you can comment on it—I think the way people are rated and then the way 

they are assigned is of concern to me. 

The Atlantic article mentioned that, first of all, as I have seen 

on the OER side, you see just all sorts of inflation where no one 

gets any negative comments, because a negative comment, God forbid, completely ruins their career. 

So you get at least good things said about you. And then if you 

did a really good job, you get extraordinary things said about you, 

but nothing bad, because then your career is dead, particularly as 

an officer, particularly as a field-grade officer. So the artificiality 

of the OER process is a concern to me. 

On the assignment side, what concerns me is—and the Atlantic 

article, I commend it to you, if you haven’t read it—but it talks 

about the fact that commanders don’t have the ability to develop 

relationships with individual soldiers and seek those individual soldiers out on a routine basis for assignment. 

You get to know a soldier, you see that they are well-suited for 

this position or that position, you seek them out, and say, ‘‘This is 

the one I want.’’ Now there may be some of that at your level. You 

probably have the ability to get whoever you want working for you. 

But down at, particularly, at the company-grade level and moving into the field-grade level, those assignments do sometimes seem 

random. They don’t seem connected with the history of the individuals involved. And so I would just ask, if you could, to comment 

on that. 

And I would welcome anybody’s comments on this, because I 

think that a lot of these leaders in the Army go on to lead in the 

civilian world. Sometimes, though, we lose them too soon from the 

military, and they get out not because they are ready to get out 

and they have had a fulfilling career, but many times, they are 

ready to get out because they are frustrated with the system. 

And if you would address that—sorry for the long question—but 

if you would address that, I would appreciate it. 

General BOLGER. Well, sir, I think it is actually a very fundamental question because the military is all about people. And our 

goal, as you know, is when anybody joins the Army, we see every 

soldier, every private as a potential leader. 

And whether they stay in and become noncommissioned officers, 

warrant officers or commissioned officers or whether they do their 

time and get out with an honorable discharge and go to civil life, 

in any case, we think we have some leader development responsibilities to everyone. And we really do. 

So, even in our basic training, even in our very low level training, there are some of those folks who get leadership responsibil-
35 

ities. And we encourage that, because as we have seen over and 

over in the current fight, it really is a couple of privates first class 

or a young sergeant who are often having to make some very, very 

critical decisions that can have strategic implications. 

You mentioned evaluation, our officer evaluation. The current 

one has been around for about over 20 years, and we are about due 

to relook it. In fact, General Casey has directed that we come back 

with some options on some changes we may need to make, and 

maybe expand the way we do evaluations. 

At least for the Army, we are still pretty traditional in the sense 

that you are evaluated by your chain of command, your immediate 

commander and then commander one level up. There is some 

thought that maybe you need to get some peer feedback involved 

in that. There is some thought that maybe we need to hear from 

subordinates, you know, get what would be called in industry a 

360-degree view. 

Now how do you do that in a hierarchical organization with a 

uniformed court of military justice—we have to work our way 

through that. But I think we have got an innovative enough force, 

so we can come up with some options there, sir. And since you have 

got some views on that, I will take back to our task force to come 

see you, because you have got some unique perspectives where we 

are at now. 

Sir, the final comment had to do sort of with, for want of a better 

term, what makes a young person stay in the military? And the answer is unique to every man and woman, but I think for the people 

who reach that crossroad when they decide to stay in or get out, 

it really has to do with one thing. ‘‘Am I making a difference? Does 

the Army think that what I am doing is doing something?’’ 

I think some people think it is because of money or because of 

rank or because of getting an award. I don’t think that is it. I think 

folks, they come in and they swear in front of the American flag, 

and they know it is an important task they do when they put on 

a uniform. And they want to make that contribution. And I think 

it is incumbent on us in our leader development to give them that 

opportunity to use their talents, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you for that. 

And we thank the gentleman from Arkansas for his service. And 

if you have any other thoughts, if you could get back with the gentleman, I know he would love to work with you on doing that. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I would like to work with you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. General, we just have a couple of questions left. And 

I would just like to—since you got the microphone warmed up, 

General Bolger, I will just ask you. You have a unique perspective 

on jointness—that was the question that was asked a little bit earlier—because you were Chief Strategy Division J–8, and later you 

were Director of Strategy & Analysis J–5 in Joint Forces Command. 

How important is jointness to the Army? And when the flag goes 

down on the Joint Forces Command, who will have the legal authority to put together the teams within the Services that the Joint 

Forces Command currently have? 
36 

General BOLGER. Sir, I think that is a great question. Jointness 

for us really—and this has been long-standing in the American 

military, I mean, you can go all the way back to our origins when 

we were first working with the Army and the Navy and the Marines and then got the Air Force as an independent Service after 

World War II—it is absolutely critical. 

No single Service in the United States can carry out a task by 

itself. We need the team, and we are representative of a much larger team, obviously. You are right, sir, I had the privilege to serve 

at Joint Forces Command and to see that in action, because that 

command is charged with really enhancing and strengthening 

jointness across the force. 

And I think the proof is in the operations. I mean, there are 

things that we have been able to carry out since the GoldwaterNichols Reform with Joint Forces Command, in many cases providing leadership, and the Services themselves working well together under the Joint Staff and the OSD [Office of the Secretary 

of Defense]. I think we have been able to achieve a lot. 

And I think, sir, your question that you asked that is really important is, as Joint Forces Command is disestablished and their responsibilities are put elsewhere, who really brings the team together? And, sir, my understanding of the law is that the statutory 

authority rests with the Secretary of Defense, always has, I mean, 

and obviously, with the President as well. 

Mr. FORBES. The Secretary obviously can’t do that on a day-today basis like the Joint Forces Command did. 

General BOLGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Does it rest anywhere else? 

General BOLGER. Sir, it does. Combatant commanders have that 

authority right now. 

Mr. FORBES. Do they shift between Services? 

General BOLGER. They do. For example, in Central Command, 

General Mattis can make task organization changes as necessary. 

General Ham, who just took over Africa Command, is making some 

significant ones right now, as he postures for potential contingencies in North Africa. So that is a combatant commander. That 

responsibility is delegated to them from the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

And that is one of the reasons Joint Forces Command in particular was a command that had a great deal of utility in the time 

that it was there. 

We are currently in the middle of preparing plans to make sure 

that the core capabilities of Joint Forces Command are preserved 

and I think, sir, we may have to come back to you all through the, 

obviously, through our Service departments and through the Secretary of Defense on potential authorities or something that may 

need to shift, as that organization transitions from being a combatant command to whatever it is when we are complete with this execution. 

Mr. FORBES. One last question on that, you talked about the 

teams. One of the teams that has been put together very uniquely 

has been the team of Joint Forces Command in terms of their ability to do jointness. Do you know of any other place in the world 
37 

that has that unique set of individuals that have that kind of experience and expertise in doing that? 

General BOLGER. Sir, I think you make a really good point. It is 

unique in the United States Armed Forces. It is unique worldwide 

among our allies. As you know many of our allies come through Supreme Allied Command transformation, which is headquartered in 

Norfolk, to work with us in that joint environment and to understand our hard-won lessons that go all the way back to the World 

Wars and such, what we have learned about operating in that joint 

environment. 

That workforce that lives in that area is very, very unique, and 

I can tell you at least in the planning that we are doing so far, sir, 

that is a strong consideration. How do we keep the core of that 

team together? How do we maintain that hard-won expertise? How 

do we continue to build it for the future? Because jointness will be 

just as important a year from now or 5 years from now or 10 years 

from now as it is today, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General Carlisle, just a quick question for you. You saw the 

charts we had on China and one of the things we are worried about 

is the modernization of our air force. You have to watch those airmen get into those planes and defend freedom around the world. 

How concerned are you with readiness capabilities when we look 

at the growing modernization of China’s military and what should 

we be expecting for that in the next 5, 10, 15 years? 

General CARLISLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Great question. And I think my brother here, my shipmate Bruce, said to add 

this. You know certainly in the air component or the cross-domain 

space component, cyberspace component, air, maritime, we look at 

where they are putting so many of their resources, and it is a big 

concern because for the last 10 years our focus has been in Iraq 

and Afghanistan and theirs has been on modernizing. 

I mean, it is a statement of fact. And they are doing it in their 

subsurface. They are doing it in their surface fleet. They are doing 

it in their air. They are doing it in their space and counter-space 

capability as well as in the known cyberspace. 

So it is very big concern, and I think Admiral Willard probably 

thinks about it every day when he gets up and every night when 

he goes to bed. 

I think that with respect to readiness, I think there is qualitative 

advantage that we still possess, despite their rolling out of their 

newest airplane. And in our legacy and new systems is our current 

hedge against what they are doing. I believe our future—a successful F–35 program for all the Services, a successful long-range strike 

capability, a successful SSBN and DDG fleet—all those things are 

critical as we move forward. 

And this is a time I believe with respect to future readiness that 

as we make this transition and as we back out the forces out of 

Iraq and we look to investments in the future and given the economy and the deficit that we have to deal with, we have got to do 

those right in how we modernize into the future so that we can still 

maintain our influence throughout the world that we have today. 

So, again, I mentioned the other day to you, Mr. Chairman, you 

can’t make them 10 feet tall, because they are not. But you also 
38 

can’t disregard them. There is an area there where you have to pay 

very, very close attention to what they are doing and why they are 

doing it and what we will do to maintain our capability to influence 

and maintain our capability, in particular in that part of the world. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

One last question from me then I think Ms. Bordallo has one 

final question. 

Admiral, one of the concerns we all have—and you and I have 

talked about this—is with ship maintenance. And we are looking 

at fiscal year 2010. We had a $200 million shortfall. We don’t have 

a fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2012, we are looking about $367 million shortfall. 

At what point, with the all of the surge time that you were talking about earlier with the deferred maintenance that we have, do 

we start becoming concerned that we need to have a reevaluation 

of the service life of the vessels that we have? 

Admiral CLINGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. We 

obviously look to share risk across the Navy’s entire portfolio. And 

one of the areas that we are reluctant to share risk in is the maintenance, because we are absolutely dedicated to get our fleet to its 

expected service life. 

Since 2009 through the 2012 budget, we have added $800 million 

to the maintenance program. We have shifted manpower from 

staffs and units back to the ships themselves and to the shorebased maintenance so that we can address this. We have increased 

our planning capacity, and we have developed class maintenance 

plans, and within that, individual ship plans. 

So, we have put ourselves on a path which didn’t begin this year, 

but, frankly, a year or 2 ago, to make sure that we can plan and 

execute maintenance with more precision and finely tuned to get 

those ships into the condition they need to be. 

That doesn’t mean that the shortfall doesn’t concern us. And as 

we look at a couple of drivers, the continuing resolution will put 

us behind the expected maintenance and, therefore, the material 

condition of some number of ships I mentioned. Twenty-nine of 85 

availabilities, if the continuing resolution goes through the balance 

of this year, will not be accomplished. That will back wave or backlog into what we had in terms of shortfalls for fiscal year 2012. 

And as we look out to the coming years, that was why I mentioned earlier the Secretary’s funding profile in regard to lessening 

the increase this year and then flattening in the out-years was 

what we thought was a righteous contribution to the Nation’s deficit challenges. 

If we were to find a decline in the DOD or Navy budget in this 

particular case, we would be concerned again about our ability to 

maintain the ships and get them to service life, considering the balance of the portfolio that has equal requirements as well. 

Mr. FORBES. Just want to just elaborate on that answer just a 

little bit if I could. 

And then Ms. Bordallo, you have the final question. 

Explain to me, if you would, the impact in terms of lost maintenance capabilities in dollars that we would have, if the continuing 

resolution continues. 
39 

And then, help me explain to other members of Congress, who 

tell me the Navy is coming in and telling us that they are going 

to have this enormous problem on the CR, if they don’t get that— 

if that continues with maintenance—and that is going to horrible— 

but they are not so worried about the $567 million shortfall that 

was budgeted and the impact that that is going to have. 

And maybe I am not articulate on my questioning, but help me 

bridge those gaps. 

Admiral CLINGAN. Yes, sir. Every budget, of course, is built on 

the preceding year. And so while we might, as we manage material 

readiness risk across our fleet, making sure that the ships that we 

deploy and the aircrafts that we push forward are prepared to do 

the mission in terms of their material condition, we have a backlog 

of some maintenance that has accumulated for a variety of reasons 

over the last 3 years. 

One of them has been, as I mentioned earlier, time. As we have 

operated at surge tempo, both training time and maintenance time 

has been constrained. That has caused us to reduce the scope of 

maintenance done on ships, sometimes to forego doing the maintenance all together, and there has been a shortfall in the funding 

of the maintenance as well. 

But that is a manageable risk, as we work just in time to get the 

capacity we need for deployments and for our surge obligations, in 

case of unforeseen circumstances or crises. When you then walk 

into the continuing resolution, it takes that risk that we are managing temporarily year to year, and it adjusts the calculus. 

As I mentioned, we did not anticipate 29 of 85 availabilities not 

being completed. And so that is an exacerbation of the problem of 

29 ships that didn’t get maintenance that we expected that would. 

And then, that, of course, for the budget under consideration today, 

fiscal year 2012, the $367 million shortfall in availabilities, again, 

is managing risk across a whole number of considerations. 

But that additional 29 plus the availabilities in terms of scope 

and number that we were planning on carrying in 2012 is now disproportionately risky. It doesn’t mean it has become intolerable, 

but it is carrying more risk than we anticipated. And, of course, we 

would like to mitigate that by some budget solution for 2011 and 

then get on with 2012. 

Mr. FORBES. If you have the opportunity to do it, I don’t expect 

you to do it today, but at some point in time, could you supply our 

committee with a list of what maintenance that $560 million would 

incorporate? In other words, what are we doing? Because 

everybody’s tolerable risk maybe somebody else’s intolerable risk. 

And we would just like to take a look at that, to get a snapshot 

of what risk we are taking by not doing that maintenance. Is that 

is something that you could do at some particular point in time for 

us for the record? 

Admiral CLINGAN. I would be pleased to. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 93.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

Now, I would like to recognize the distinguished ranking member 

for her final question. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
40 

And, of course, you know coming from Guam and with the military buildup you know my questions will be centered to General 

Tryon. 

General, can you address concerns about training capabilities in 

the Asia-Pacific region. The QDR stated, ‘‘Finally, the United 

States seeks to develop additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific that respond to the need for 

constant readiness of U.S. forces to carry out joint operations.’’ 

So, that is the written statement there. Now, one of my concerns, 

General, I have long expressed, and, of course, Guam is looking forward to the 8,600 marines from Okinawa. We are welcoming the 

3rd Marine Expeditionary Forces. And as you probably know, these 

are the same forces that liberated Guam 65 years ago, so our people look at it as a homecoming. 

But I have long expressed my concern about the preferred alternative location for the firing ranges on Guam. Although the problematic agreement has been signed by our governor a couple of 

days ago, there are still concerns about this property. 

And I, along with Senator Webb, have urged that DOD to look 

more closely at Tinian for the firing ranges. And that is our neighboring island in the Northern Marianas. The Marine requirement 

seemed to have shifted since the beginning of the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] process in 2006, so I remain skeptical 

that the land on Guam needed for the range can be leased by the 

Department of Defense. 

Now, what I wanted to get from you today in a statement for the 

record is—what is it? We have never really received any specific information about why is it more advantageous for training on Guam 

versus Tinian. And I would think that more virtual urban-style 

training could be done in Guam and live fire in Tinian. Could you 

comment on that? 

General TRYON. Yes, ma’am. Thanks for your question. Obviously, we are still early in the implementation of the AIP [Agreed 

Implementation Plan] process. 

The Commandant’s intent in the Pacific is really threefold—first, 

to ensure that the marines are properly positioned in the Pacific 

writ large to respond to whatever threat and to support our national security objectives and that wherever marines are, that they 

have the ability to properly train in order to be prepared for those 

contingencies and, last but certainly not least, that wherever marines are, that their quality of life meets standards and promotes 

a high state of morale and readiness. 

Guam is clearly strategically located in the Pacific region and offers unique advantages to forward-deployed forces that provide us 

with a flexible response. We are indeed working with the government of Guam right now with respect to ranges and our ability to 

train. 

We have recently entertained, I think as you know, the governor 

of Guam and had the opportunity of taking him down to Quantico 

to show him some of our operational ranges and provide him with 

a perspective as to how we operate our ranges, the safety measures 

and margins that are associated with range operation, and how we 

cohabit side-by-side with the civilian communities that adjoin our 

various bases. 
41 

The Department of the Navy is our lead in conducting the dialogue with Guam. The guiding principles that the Under Secretary 

is using in his dialogue is that first and foremost, OneGuam, as 

you know, that we will coordinate projects that meet both the Marine Corps’ needs as well as the needs of the government of Guam 

in terms of infrastructure and the like; Green Guam that will protect the natural resources and promote energy efficiency; 24/7 access to Pagat, into Pagat Cave, the cultural sites that are on the 

eastern side of the island; and that we will also minimize the footprint that the Marine Corps has on the island with the goal of a 

net negative land acquisition strategy. 

At this point in time, we are still stepping through the pros and 

cons of what kind of a range can be constructed adjacent to Route 

15 on Guam. 

The downside of having a range off the island is a couple of 

things. First, marines would not have immediate access to a range 

or training area, which again goes back to the question of time and 

risk in the event that we have to deploy quickly. Field-firing weapons and preparing for a rapid move would require close and ready 

access to ranges. 

Transportation to off-island training creates a time requirement. 

It generates additional operational and maintenance expense. And 

at this point in time, we haven’t conducted enough of an assessment on any of the off-island—the potential off-island training sites 

to understand whether they can even meet our training requirements or not. 

So, it is very much a work in progress, ma’am. And I don’t want 

to not answer your question, but I also don’t want to make a statement that would be conjecture. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So, in other words, no definite decisions have 

been made, and as you said it is a work in progress. 

General TRYON. It is, indeed, a work in progress, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, Generals, we want to thank you for your 

service to our country. Thank you so much for what you do to train 

and protect our men and women in uniform. We really appreciate 

you taking time to be with us today. 

I think I speak for the Ranking Member, our door is open to you 

at any time that there is something you see that we need to be 

doing to help the readiness of our country. We just have an open 

invitation, and we just appreciate your help in helping us do that 

job we need to do. 

Thank you, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 10, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 10, 2011 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral CLINGAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

[See page 39.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

General CARLISLE. No facility changes are anticipated in order to implement the 

repeal of ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’’ Therefore, there are no expected costs. [See page 

27.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 10, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. General Casey said at last week’s posture hearing that the Army’s 

rotational force model allowed them to hedge against unexpected contingencies. Is 

this a reasonable assessment of the state of the force? Can the Army rapidly respond to an unplanned event—or several should they occur simultaneously? How 

much strategic risk are we accepting with these rotational force models that provide 

‘‘just-in-time’’ readiness? 

General BOLGER. The Army’s rotational force generation model is designed to provide strategic flexibility and depth to meet unexpected contingencies. The high demand for forces over the past nine years consumed the readiness of forces as quickly 

as it was generated and caused the Army to accumulate additional risk due to limited strategic depth. Restoring balance to the Army is the critical first step to reduce 

strategic risk. The Army’s plan includes a decrease in the global demands for forces, 

full implementation of our force generation model (including favorable deployment 

to dwell ratios), and assured access to the Reserve Component. The Army rapidly 

responds to unplanned events through the use of its Surge Force. If there are several events, the Army will utilize the Surge Force that is trained/ready for contingency missions. The Army has low level strategic risk with our supply based force 

generation model because it generates progressive readiness across the Total Force. 

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of 

threats described by the witnesses at last week’s hearing? If not, what should we 

be doing? 

General BOLGER. The Army remains a resilient, professional, and combat-seasoned force. However, operational demands continue to strain our Soldiers, Civilians, Families, equipment, and infrastructure. Deployment-to-dwell ratios remain 

high, putting stress on the All-Volunteer Force and hampering the Army’s ability 

to train for full spectrum operations. The Army’s plan to reduce this risk to the force 

is contingent upon achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios over the long-term, 

maintaining assured access to the Reserve Component, adequately providing for Soldiers, Civilians, and Families, and receiving reliable, timely, and consistent funding. 

To ensure we are ready and to restore strategic depth to the Army, our leadership 

is working to establish manageable deploy-to-dwell ratios. This will not only provide 

adequate time for Soldiers to recover and equipment to be repaired, but also provide 

the time to conduct full spectrum training so we are prepared for the range of missions mentioned last week. Maintaining access to the Reserve Component will assist 

us in achieving favorable deploy-to-dwell ratios and bring skill sets and experience 

essential to be successful in these complex environments. 

With the demands placed on Soldiers and Families, we must also take care to ensure we provide them a quality of life commensurate with the quality of their sacrifice. Providing adequate reintegration time and assistance, ensuring they have a 

high quality of life on Army installations, and meeting other health and family 

needs will be essential in sustaining an All-Volunteer Force by having Soldiers and 

Families continue to choose to stay Army. 

Effective repair and replacement of equipment after a deployment is also vital to 

maintaining readiness. Currently, the Army spends approximately $11 billion each 

fiscal year on procurement and maintenance actions for reset of a redeploying force 

of approximately 150,000 Soldiers and their equipment. Because of the large reset 

requirement driven by wartime demands, the pace with which equipment can be 

retrograded and repaired, and the critical need to reconstitute our prepositioned 

stocks of equipment, the Army will continue to require supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for reset for 2 to 3 years upon completion of 

military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

These measures will help ensure we are ready by completing the rebalancing of 

our Army and restoring strategic depth and capacity necessary to provide a sustainable flow of trained and ready forces for these missions at a tempo that is sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force. 

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the 

Army’s Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it 

comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications 
98 

to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the 

witnesses described in the hearing last week? 

General BOLGER. The rotational model allows the Army to generate readiness to 

meet both current demands and unforeseen contingencies. The Mission Force consists of available pool units that satisfy current combatant command demands such 

as Operations New Dawn, Enduring Freedom, Global Response Force, and theater 

posture on the Korean peninsula. In steady-state, the generated will be sufficient 

to satisfy Department of Defense’s projected needs. The Surge Force consists of selected units at high readiness levels that are available to respond to unforeseen 

threats. The Surge Forces are sized to meet Army requirements for the early phases 

of the Department of Defense’s operational contingency plans, an additional small 

scale contingency, and homeland security event; additional strategic forces will flow 

for later phases. 

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When 

this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a ‘‘temporary fix’’ to 

the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet 

ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In 

your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure 

that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task 

and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies? 

General BOLGER. The Army has no equities. This is best addressed by the United 

States Navy and the United States Air Force. 

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for 

the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10? 

General BOLGER. This question is perhaps better suited for the Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy or Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology. However, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) considered the 

20-year timeframe directed in legislation, but focused the bulk of its efforts about 

5–10 years in the future where the DoD can begin to make a difference now with 

near-term investment decisions. As recent events have demonstrated, our ability to 

clearly and precisely foresee challenges to our national security is spotty, at best. 

The Secretary of Defense recently commented that our ability to predict the future 

is perfect—perfectly wrong. So it would make sense for us to explore and consider 

what challenges and opportunities could arise over the 20-year timeframe of a QDR, 

but focus the bulk of our rigorous analysis and professional judgment on near-term 

and mid-term issues. A good amount of our Research and Development investments, 

including Science and Technology, should be focused on developing new capabilities 

to preserve our competitive advantage in all domains (air, land, sea, space, and 

cyberspace) throughout the 20-year QDR timeframe. 

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined 

by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force 

are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe 

require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same 

events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion? 

General BOLGER. Over the past several years, operational demands have exceeded 

the Army’s sustainable supply of forces, which has challenged the Army’s ability to 

maintain readiness for multiple additional contingencies. These current operational 

demands have included Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom and other requirements such as deterrence posture on the Korean peninsula and the Global Response Force. As demand approaches a more sustainable level, the Army will build 

increased capacity to respond to additional contingencies. The Army’s rotational 

model accommodates this increased capacity through a Surge Force consisting of 

units in training at elevated readiness levels. Another factor that will increase the 

Army’s ability to respond to additional unforeseen contingencies is longer unit dwell 

times. Longer dwell times enable units to train for the full spectrum of operations 

rather than focusing on specific missions such as counterinsurgency. 

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs 

of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that 

more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with 

the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to 

ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we’ve already 

paid for? 

General BOLGER. The Army has a very structured process to estimate life cycle 

costs to ensure program requirements and resources are identified to operate and 

maintain equipment. These costs are continually revisited during program execution 
99 

and reviews and actions are taken to address operation and maintenance costs and 

requirements. These requirements are then reflected in our annual budget submissions. Our fleet management strategy/modernization plans consider the viability of 

our fleets in terms of capabilities and conditions and result in the proper repair or 

modernization strategies to support readiness requirements, fleet reliability and 

costs. Additionally, some programs like Condition Based Maintenance + provide significant enablers (sensors on equipment and condition reporting) to identify maintenance conditions and requirements that reduce costs while improving fleet availability and readiness. 

Mr. FORBES. What do you feel is DoD’s role in investing in alternative sources of 

energy? If so, which types of alternative energy (fuels, renewable energy, etc.), and 

do you believe the DoD is doing enough? 

General BOLGER. Mr. Chairman, the Army’s role in the development of alternative 

energy must be done with the goal of building a robust energy portfolio that assures 

its ability to perform missions around the globe. Energy plays an important role in 

command and control, mobility, endurance, resilience and protection capabilities for 

Army forces conducting the range of military operations in often remote locations 

worldwide. Likewise, energy is critical to supporting operations such as space, intelligence, information and communications, often in more developed but nevertheless 

vulnerable locations, both at home and abroad. In order to ensure that it is able 

to meet mission requirements now and into the future, the Army must pursue alternative energy sources, particularly those that can be generated locally or regionally 

to deployed forces. In addition, the Army must pursue research, development and 

fielding of associated technologies such as storage and intelligent control/distribution to strengthen its secure energy portfolio. Decisions on development of specific 

technologies, and system designs, by the Army must take into account factors of 

mission and operating environment. 

Historically, the Army’s pursuit of mission-related capabilities has produced technologies that prove useful for broader applications, both Government and civilian. 

Various sensors, communications systems and unmanned vehicles are simple but salient examples. Military demand also may support industry capability growth to 

produce better or more cost-effective materials or technologies—again benefitting 

American society. In fact, given the growing awareness of energy and water as important factors impacting our economy and domestic security, these additional benefits could prove significant. However, the Army must focus on military capabilities 

and readiness to guide its investments in energy capabilities. While the Army has 

made important strides to reduce its energy footprint, more must and will be done. 

Mr. FORBES. The costs of our weapons systems have risen dramatically in the last 

two decades. And in these current economic times, we can’t afford to buy the quantities we need at these high procurement costs. This, in turn, reduces the economies 

of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have 

for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military? 

General BOLGER. The Army is aggressively pursuing initiatives to better and more 

prudently manage its acquisition process and resources. The Secretary of the Army 

and Army Chief of Staff commissioned an unprecedented blue ribbon review last 

May of the Army’s acquisition system—a cradle to grave assessment. The Acquisition Review Panel submitted its report in February 2011. It included 76 recommendations in four broad areas that extend across various Army organizations. 

Those broad areas address requirements generation, risk management, organizational alignment, and resources. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) to 

assess those recommendations. The ASA(ALT) will provide specific recommendations for implementation of those portions of the report which are judged to improve 

the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army’s Acquisition process. 

However, the Army leadership did not stop there. To ensure that we purchased 

the right equipment to meet the needs of our Soldiers, the Army instituted a series 

of capability portfolio reviews to examine all existing Army requirements and terminate programs that we judged to be redundant, did not work or were just too expensive. These broad based reviews have already helped the Army identify key gaps 

and unnecessary redundancies while promoting good stewardship of our nation’s resources. We remain committed to using every effort to obtain the right systems, supplies and services at the right time and at the most cost-effective, streamlined manner. 

Mr. FORBES. Are there other ‘‘out-of-the-box’’ ideas we should be considering in 

order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial 

time? 
100 

General BOLGER. The Army is implementing two innovative initiatives that are 

intended to increase overall force readiness without spending more money. The first 

initiative aims to decrease non-deployables in the four highest categories (legal, 

medical, Theater Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) and separations). 

The second initiative implements policy and procedural changes the Army has developed to increase personnel stability in units as they move through the Army 

Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. These changes help to improve the timing of 

assignments, reassignments, separations, and extensions to limit any negative impact on unit readiness. 

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2010, Secretary Gates began an insourcing initiative 

to bring contracted functions back into the government. While the stated goal was 

to bring inherently governmental work back in house, we also were told that a 40% 

‘‘savings’’ was being budgeted against the insourcing goals. As we look at the fiscal 

year 2012 budget request, we see many cases where the Secretary’s ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’ are driving reductions in civilian personnel authorizations and pay. Are 

there areas where functions that were identified for ‘‘insourcing’’ last year are now 

unfunded due to the ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’? If so, how much risk is associated with 

these functions or positions being unfunded? 

General BOLGER. There are 5,391 un-funded civilian positions which were previously scheduled for in-sourcing. Several Army Commands have notified Headquarter Department of the Army of a potential for mission risk if these positions 

are not filled. Headquarters Department of the Army is evaluating these risks for 

Secretary of the Army decision. The Secretary of the Army has already approved 

30 positions in Army Cyber Command for in-sourcing due to mission risk. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase 

their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned 

that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment 

of other AOR’s like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, to our 

forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified 

last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have 

unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR. 

General BOLGER. The Army has begun to rebalance its Military Intelligence Force 

to institutionalize and enhance core intelligence capabilities, invest these capabilities where ‘‘risk-to-force’’ is greatest and generate sufficient capacity to sustain mission-essential support to committed forces through the Army Force Generation process. This is in response to the Secretary of Defense’s emphasis to rebalance Defense 

programs to institutionalize and enhance current warfighting capabilities as well as 

prepare for future risks and contingencies. The Army’s Military Intelligence Rebalance Strategy will provide greater core intelligence capability at the Brigade Combat 

Teams and Division/Corps to mitigate intelligence capability gaps. This strategy will 

inherently improve the Army Intelligence capability for Army units supporting the 

Pacific theater as well as improve Army Intelligence support to units deploying in 

support of other world-wide contingencies. 

The Army has not decreased Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

support to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) as a result of Army ISR support to U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM). The command and control of Army ISR and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) assets reside within the Combatant 

Commands. As a result, any cross leveling of ISR and PED assets require concurrence from both the Combatant Commands and Joint Forces Command. In addition, 

modifications to the Global Force Management Allocation Plan would require Secretary of Defense approval. These structural measures have allowed the Army to 

maintain its ISR support at a steady state to PACOM. 

The number of Army ISR missions in support of PACOM has remained relatively 

unchanged. The minimal changes that have occurred were mission related in nature 

and not a result of divesting assets in support of other Combatant Commands. In 

addition, the United States Army Pacific Command’s (USARPAC) ISR PED capacity 

remains unchanged. USARPAC has been able to provide PED support to the other 

Combatant Commands on an ad hoc basis, when capacity permits and at the discretion of PACOM. We will continue to support CENTCOM ISR requirements without 

any detriment to PACOM or the other Combatant Commands. With the exception 

of a minimum amount of ISR training assets in CONUS to support force generation 

requirements, all Army ISR assets are dedicated in support of the Combatant Commands. 

Mr. FORBES. The FY12 budget request is short of your requirement for depot 

maintenance by more than 16%. What are the risks to readiness,—both in the near 
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term and in the long term—of this request as the Air Force continues to sustain 

what was described as a ‘‘geriatric’’ fleet by Ms. Eaglen in last week’s testimony? 

General CARLISLE. Although we took risk in weapon systems support by initially 

funding it at 80 percent, we identified efficiencies that improved funding to 85 percent. Additionally, we are managing near term risk and maintaining our 

warfighting readiness through balanced support to our legacy fleet and new aircraft. 

The 16 percent in unfunded requirement risk includes software, sustaining engineering and technical orders; however, this is mitigated through enterprise-wide 

prioritization to fund the highest priority systems in the year of execution while ensuring a stable depot workload and workforce are maintained. The long-term depot 

maintenance risk is mitigated through Full Scale Fatigue Testing and Structural Integrity and Service Life Extension Programs which will improve the sustainability 

of legacy aircraft and ensure total force readiness. 

Mr. FORBES. There is little detail in the FY12 budget to inform Congress as to 

how the Air Force plans to sustain the nuclear enterprise and to correct the deficiencies of the past. Can you please tell us what your plan is in FY12 to ensure 

that the corrective actions that have been taken over the past two years are sufficiently resourced? 

General CARLISLE. A concerted Air Force focused on reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise resulted in significant structure, process and cultural change. This focus 

has revitalized critical aspects of the nuclear enterprise resulting in renewed visibility and stringent adherence to established nuclear standards, additional personnel to recapitalize the nuclear workforce and increased funding to sustain legacy 

systems and infrastructure. In FY12, the Air Force plans to continue critical deterrence initiatives including: the future of Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence 

(GBSD), the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP), the Air Launched 

Cruise Missile (ALCM) Follow-on, and the F–35A Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) capability. Additionally, the Air Force is initiating the new Penetrating Bomber program in FY12. For GBSD, the Air Force is planning to internally source funds to 

develop initial pre-AoA concept characterization and technical descriptions. For 

CVLSP, the Air Force will pursue a full and open competition with projected contract award in late FY12. Also, the Air Force is analyzing an ALCM Follow-on per 

Nuclear Posture Review guidance and OSD direction. The ALCM Follow-on AoA is 

planned to be complete in FY12. In addition, development efforts for a nuclear capable Penetrating Bomber will begin in FY12. F–35A DCA integration efforts with the 

B61–12 are planned to support Extended Deterrence. Lastly, Air Force modernization efforts to sustain legacy systems including the current ALCM, the current 

bomber fleet and the Minuteman III ICBM will continue in FY12. For the current 

ALCM, multiple service life extension programs will continue to ensure viability 

through 2030. The current bomber fleet and Minuteman III ICBM will be sustained 

through ongoing and future modernization programs. These efforts will help ensure 

that the corrective actions taken over the past two years are sufficiently resourced. 

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of 

threats described by the witnesses at last week’s hearing? If not, what should we 

be doing? 

General CARLISLE. The Air Force is ready to counter current threats to our national interests and committed to meeting future readiness challenges. Our longterm readiness concerns focus on aging equipment and weapon systems, and the 

current high operations tempo for our people. 

Overseas Contingency Operations have posed constant personnel and platform 

challenges since late 2001. In response, we have modified our personnel deployment 

construct to better support the Combatant Commanders while better managing our 

people, especially those with high demand/limited supply skill sets. 

We have balanced and rebalanced our resources—personnel, weapons systems, 

training, and equipment—to remain ready to execute today’s operations and foster 

the flexibility required to meet the uncertain requirements of tomorrow. It will take 

constant diligence and the support of our national leaders to maintain this balance 

in a world of increasing technology and lethality. 

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the 

Army’s Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it 

comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications 

to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the 

witnesses described in the hearing last week? 

General CARLISLE. The Air Force funds the entire force to the same readiness 

level, thereby eliminating tiered readiness and minimizing any strategic implications. Similar to the Army’s Force Generation Model, the Air Force’s force generation construct is the Air & Space Expeditionary Force, or AEF. As part of the AEF 

battle rhythm, Air Force capabilities enter a ‘‘normal training and exercises’’ phase 
102 

from the period immediately following deployment up to the next predeployment 

spin-up time. Included in this phase is a brief period of reconstitution to regain mission-ready status following deployments. Additionally, the Air Force typically deploys its forces as task-organized capabilities thereby mitigating lengthy reconstitution times. 

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When 

this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a ‘‘temporary fix’’ to 

the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet 

ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In 

your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure 

that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task 

and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies? 

General CARLISLE. Providing airmen to support the joint fights in Iraq and Afghanistan has had no measurable impact on Air Force operational readiness. The 

AF continues to support ground forces in the CENTCOM AOR with Joint Expeditionary Taskings (JET) and support deployed AF headquarters functions with Individual Augmentees (IA). The AF has followed a policy of providing personnel for 

these JET and IA taskings from within our institutional forces (non-operational 

staffs) to reduce impacts on Air Force operational units. All personnel assigned to 

JET or IA taskings are fully qualified for their assigned mission prior to deployment. 

JET and IA taskings have trended downward over the past four years, in line 

with the levels of combat forces in CENTCOM. The Air Force currently has 7,954 

personnel deployed to the region, down from 9,273 in 2010 and 12,896 in 2009. In 

2008 and 2007 the totals were 13,338 and 13,752, respectively. 

The DoD and AF continue to balance the demands of Iraq, Afghanistan and other 

contingencies such as Japan humanitarian relief and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Libya) with preparations for future conflicts. Recent operations have tested the capacity and resolve of our armed forces, but our soldiers, sailors, airmen and 

Marines continue to adapt and meet the demands placed upon them. 

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for 

the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10? 

General CARLISLE. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review set the course for the 

Department of Defense for the next 20 years through its articulation of a strategy 

and investment to further its rebalancing and reform efforts. The 2010 QDR Report 

addresses readiness requirements in several respects. For example, the report discusses the importance of having continued access to land, air, and sea training 

ranges and operating areas that are needed to maintain DoD’s operational readiness. In his portion of the report, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff articulated the requirements associated with Joint force readiness across the full range 

of military operations. Specifically, he identified the need for investment in critical 

enablers (such as Special Operations Forces) where shortages have persisted, and 

for investment in expanded electronic warfare and other capabilities. He also highlighted resetting the force and replacing prepositioned stocks as two crucial readiness requirements. The Chairman estimated that full restoration (replacement and 

repair of equipment lost in combat and degraded by wear and tear) would take 

years after OIF and OEF are completed. 

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined 

by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force 

are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe 

require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same 

events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion? 

General CARLISLE. Yes, the AF is ready to respond to multiple near-simultaneous 

contingencies—in fact, we are doing it now. We must recognize, however, that the 

compounding effects of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and unplanned contingencies such as Japan humanitarian relief and Libya, will make it 

increasingly difficult. Recapitalization of combat losses, repair and replenishment of 

equipment, and targeted capability upgrades are still required to maintain the levels of readiness our nation demands. 

In the context of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our data shows that 

the USAF has experienced decreasing readiness since 2001 due to aging aircraft and 

high operations tempo. Nonetheless, we have been able to match resources with 

readiness requirements to support Combatant Commander needs and conduct combat operations. 
103 

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs 

of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that 

more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with 

the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to 

ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we’ve already 

paid for? 

General CARLISLE. The Air Force shares your concern about the affordability of 

operating and maintaining our weapon systems. We continue to identify efficiencies 

and cost reduction initiatives to reduce total ownership cost. For example, the Air 

Force conducts Business Case Analyses to determine the most affordable 

sustainment approach for many of our weapon systems. Implementation can require 

upfront investment that will ultimately result in overall cost reduction. Your funding support for these investments as well as funding for tech data and sustaining 

engineering studies (where warranted) will drive more affordable sustainment for 

our Air Force programs. 

Mr. FORBES. What do you feel is DoD’s role in investing in alternative sources of 

energy? If so, which types of alternative energy (fuels, renewable energy, etc.), and 

do you believe the DoD is doing enough? 

General CARLISLE. From the Air Force perspective, it is of vital importance to 

have the energy available necessary to accomplish our global mission to fly fight and 

win in air, space, and cyberspace, and we are working to further advance our energy 

security posture. For the Air Force, energy security means having assured access 

to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy 

to meet operational needs. This includes ensuring critical assets have the power to 

operate in the event of a natural disaster or attack, and improving our energy security posture by providing domestic alternatives to foreign oil. 

Although not without challenges, alternative sources of energy and fuels present 

opportunities for the Air Force to increase its supply of energy and improve its energy security posture. The Air Force must consider all sources of energy, renewable, 

alternative and even traditional fossil fuels to improve our energy security and expand our energy portfolio. This includes evaluating all sources. However, the Air 

Force will generally be a consumer, and not a producer, of energy and fuel. 

We are in the process of certifying our aircraft to fly on synthetic and bio-based 

fuels blended with traditional JP–8. The certification process expands the types of 

fuel our aircraft can use. Once the commercial market is ready, having the ability 

to use non-traditional aviation fuels provides us with an improved energy security 

posture and increased protection from price fluctuations resulting from foreign oil 

sources. The Air Force is continuing to review and evaluate potential alternative 

aviation fuel candidates beyond the synthetic and biofuel-based fuel blends. 

Regarding renewable energy for our facilities, we recognize that there is not a 

‘‘one size fits all’’ solution and that the economics will dictate our approach. However, we are open to consider long-term business arrangements with companies who 

are ready to build, operate, and maintain renewable energy projects to generate 

electricity, heat, or other positive energy benefits for our air bases. In this regard, 

we are not viewing nor are we wed to ‘‘inside the installation boundary’’ as the only 

option. 

Mr. FORBES. The costs of our weapons systems have risen dramatically in the last 

two decades. And in these current economic times, we can’t afford to buy the quantities we need at these high procurement costs. This, in turn, reduces the economies 

of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have 

for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military? 

General CARLISLE. Yes, we agree. The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force recognized the importance of Recapturing Acquisition Excellence (Air Force 

Strategic Plan—Priority 5) and implemented the Acquisition Improvement Plan 

(AIP). A combination of the AIP’s 33 completed improvement actions resulted in a 

stronger workforce, clearly defined requirements, incremental development strategies, predictable schedules and budgetary needs; all directed at improving the ability to provide industry with clear and concise requests for proposal enabling better 

buying power for the Air Force. 

Specifically, two AIP initiative areas ‘‘Improve Requirements Generation Process’’ 

and ‘‘Instill Budget and Financial Discipline’’ made significant improvements to help 

the Air Force ‘‘Recapture Acquisition Excellence’’. On the AIP Initiative 2, ‘‘Improve 

Requirements Generation Process’’ requires the Service Acquisition Executive, and 

when applicable, the Air Force Materiel Command Commander or Air Force Space 

Command Commander, in conjunction with the Air Force Requirements Oversight 

Council, to attest that the acquisition community can fulfill the Capabilities Development Document requirements. On AIP Initiative 3, ‘‘Instill Budget and Financial 
104 

Discipline’’ improves cost estimating process (budgeting programs to a confidence 

level typically 55–65%), program baseline guidance, and funding stability. 

Today, the Air Force continues to implement Dr Carter’s 23 directed ‘‘Better Buying Power’’ initiatives targeted to reducing expenses allocated to overhead and support functions. The Air Force’s goal is to continue improvements to redirect savings 

to modernization and readiness programs for our warfighters without jeopardizing 

product delivery. 

Mr. FORBES. Are there other ‘‘out-of-the-box’’ ideas we should be considering in 

order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial 

time? 

General CARLISLE. The United States Air Force continues to assess how to best 

meet national defense needs. As one way to develop and study ‘‘out of the box’’ ideas 

we conduct two Title 10 war games to determine what capabilities and force structure USAF should possess in near and far term. Unified Engagement looks at how 

to better work with partner nations through the full spectrum of conflict 12 to 15 

years in the future; while the Future Capabilities Game looks 20 to 25 years into 

the future to what the broad range of technology will be, and how that may influence and affect the future of the Air Force. These war games provide us the ability 

to explore and test alternative force structures that better address future challenges, using affordable, technically feasible and operationally balanced platforms 

across all AF missions. The war game results are used alongside Science and Technology investments to continue to look for ‘‘out-of-the-box’’ ideas to respond to our 

national defense needs. 

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2010, Secretary Gates began an insourcing initiative 

to bring contracted functions back into the government. While the stated goal was 

to bring inherently governmental work back in house, we also were told that a 40% 

‘‘savings’’ was being budgeted against the insourcing goals. As we look at the fiscal 

year 2012 budget request, we see many cases where the Secretary’s ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’ are driving reductions in civilian personnel authorizations and pay. Are 

there areas where functions that were identified for ‘‘insourcing’’ last year are now 

unfunded due to the ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’? If so, how much risk is associated with 

these functions or positions being unfunded? 

General CARLISLE. The AF is presently conducting a highly focused, strategic review of the entire AF civilian workforce. The goal is to ensure the AF executes this 

reduction strategically and in a manner that meets all mission requirements while 

continuing to support our Airmen and their families. The AF will review all Core 

Functions to balance risk, while satisfying our efficiency targets. While the total AF 

reduction amount will remain unchanged, the program specific adjustments will be 

determined by our strategic review and programmed during our FY13 POM submission with our actual execution plan. 

All ideas are on the table and the final distribution will be approved by the CSAF 

and SECAF. Again, the resulting decisions will adjust FY12 and inform the FY13 

POM. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase 

their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned 

that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment 

of other AOR’s like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, to our 

forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified 

last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have 

unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR. 

General CARLISLE. In addition to currently fielded Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance capabilities, the Navy is developing complementary capabilities 

above, on and below the surface of the sea to provide global ISR support to each 

Combatant Commander, including Pacific Command. Across all three realms Navy 

is implementing a family of systems approach to employ more sensors and increase 

time on station. Equipped with plug-and-play sensors utilizing automated processing, these systems will provide focused collection with reduced manpower. 

Current airborne ISR aircraft, such as the EP–3 and P–3, continue to deploy in 

support of PACOM mission requirements. Successful P–3 redstripe recovery efforts 

will increase the P–3 AIP presence in the PACOM AOR to 12 deployed aircraft in 

Dec 2011. Development of a new generation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (Fire 

Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), Medium Range Maritime 

(MRMUAS), and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike 

(UCLASS)) continues and will provide both land and sea-based capability with 

greater persistence and area coverage than current platforms. The Navy will deploy 

Fire Scout on the Littoral Combat Ship as that class comes on line and deploys to 
105 

PACOM in the FY13 timeframe. Also, the Navy will establish the first of two BAMS 

UAS orbits in the PACOM AOR in FY17. 

The Navy is also funding additional surface assets that provide critical ISR to 

fleet assets, including investment in Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System 

(SURTASS) equipped ships that will support the Pacific theater. Additionally, the 

Navy continues to develop Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs). UUVs will expand 

access into areas that are inaccessible or hazardous to manned platforms as well 

as fill capacity gaps. 

Mr. FORBES. Energy has been repeatedly highlighted as an area that could impact 

future military readiness based on availability of supply. RAND recently published 

a report regarding alternative fuels. Some of the conclusions suggested that the alternative fuel industry is immature, could not scale up to make an appreciable difference as a domestic alternative, and recommended that DoD not invest in this 

market. 

A. Could you please comment on that report? 

B. Can you also provide your opinion whether you believe DoD has a role in the 

development and procurement of alternative fuels? 

Admiral CLINGAN. A. The RAND Corporation study accurately states that the Department of the Navy’s switch to biofuels, in and of itself, will not reduce the nation’s total energy consumption by a significant margin. However, the RAND Report 

was not well researched and did not take into account the recent research and development advances in the biofuels technologies. RAND stated in their report that 

the Fischer-Tropsch coal-to-liquid/biomass-to-liquid fuels are the most promising 

near-term options for meeting the Department of Defense’s needs cleanly and 

affordably. Currently, there are no Fischer-Tropsch plants here in the United 

States. Additionally, under the guidelines of the Energy Independence and Security 

Act (EISA) of 2007, Section 526, any replacement fuel has to have a greenhouse gas 

emission profile less than petroleum. In order to meet this guideline, any FischerTropsch coal-to-liquid plant would have to have carbon capture and sequestration 

incorporated into this overall process. While there is important carbon capture and 

sequestration research and development ongoing at DOE, there has not been any 

carbon capture and sequestration process built to commercial scale in the United 

States. In summary, due to the EISA 2007, Section 526 guidelines and the cost prohibitive carbon capture and storage process, we feel that the Fischer-Tropsch coalto-liquid/biomass-to-liquid fuels are not the most promising near-term option for 

meeting the Department of Defense’s needs cleanly and affordably. 

While the use of alternative fuels can contribute toward guaranteeing our energy 

supplies, reducing our operational risks, and during volatile upward price swings in 

petroleum, could represent additional cost savings, the Department of the Navy’s 

energy strategy has not been limited to alternative fuels. We have aggressively 

adopted proven energy efficient applications and practices commonly found in the 

commercial sector. We have funded both science and technology/research and development projects in pursuit of increased energy efficiency since these projects can potentially and directly contribute to the combat capability of our operating forces by 

reducing our energy consumption both afloat and ashore, and by achieving significant cost savings. 

B. The Navy prefers to see itself as an ‘‘early adopter’’ of available biofuels. The 

military has often led in the development of new technologies where there was a 

compelling military use, even if the civilian use was ultimately greater (ex. GPS, 

the Internet). The operational use of alternative fuels by the Department of the 

Navy will be hastened by collaborating with federal agencies and private industry 

at every step of the research, development, and certification process. The alternative 

fuel program establishes the Department of the Navy as an early adopter for investors in a nascent industry that could significantly enhance energy security, and 

thereby national security, in the mid- to long-term. By positioning itself as an early 

adopter by testing available biofuels and certifying them ‘‘fit for use across our 

major platforms and leveraging test and certifications accomplished by the other 

services that meets our specifications’’, the Navy is better poised to reap the following benefits: 

• Cost savings. Increasing our use of alternative energy sources helps us achieve 

a level of protection from energy price volatility. For every $10 increase in the 

cost of a barrel of oil, the Navy spends an additional $300 million dollars a year. 

Operating more efficiently saves money by reducing the amount we spend for 

fuel. Savings can be reinvested to strengthen combat capability. The cheapest 

barrel of fuel afloat or kilowatt-hour ashore is the one we do not have to use. 

• Guaranteed Supply. Our reliance on energy can be exploited by potential adversaries. Efficiency and alternatives may be our best countermeasure. Energy 
106 

efficiency increases our mission effectiveness by expanding our range and endurance, and reducing our need for logistics support. Efficiency improvements 

minimize operational risks of that logistics tether, saving time, money, and 

lives. Alternative fuels provide the Navy an ‘off-ramp from petroleum,’ mitigating the risk to a volatile and ever more expensive petroleum market. 

• Fossil Fuel Dependence. The Navy recognizes that our dependence on fossil 

fuels and foreign sources of oil makes us more susceptible to price shocks, supply shocks, natural and man-made disasters, and political unrest in countries 

far from our shores. 

• Combat Capability. Making our ships and aircraft more efficient improves 

their fuel economy. We can increase the days between refueling for our ships, 

improving their security and combat capability. We can also extend the range 

of our aircraft strike missions, allowing us to launch our aircraft farther away 

from combat areas. Increasing our efficiency and the diversity in our sources of 

fuel improves our combat capability strategically and tactically. 

Mr. FORBES. There has been significant discussion of energy as an issue that may 

impact military readiness particularly regarding assured access to oil. The Arctic is 

said to contain nearly 20% of the world’s untapped oil, natural gas, and mineral resources; estimates include over 400 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and gas and 

mineral deposits worth over $1 trillion. 

• a. While the United States is one of eight Arctic nations with sovereign claims, 

do you feel it is in our national security interest to be more proactive in this 

region due to the prospect of oil in this region? 

• b. What are the consequences if the nation fails to act? 

• c. What is the military’s role in this region, and is the DoD prepared? 

Admiral CLINGAN. a. Navy’s national security responsibilities in the Arctic are 

similar to those in any other maritime domain. Although the current potential for 

conflict in the Arctic appears to be low, Navy’s core responsibility is to defend the 

United States from attack upon its territory at home and to secure its interests 

abroad. In this regard, the nation’s ability to defend its interests and avoid potential 

crises and conflicts in the Arctic would be significantly enhanced if the United 

States joined the other seven Arctic littoral states and acceded to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. While sea ice loss is increasing access to 

energy and mineral deposits in the region, the rate at which these deposits have 

been extracted has not dramatically increased. Additionally, the Arctic will continue 

to be ice-covered during the winter months through the next several decades, further complicating resource extraction. Navy is proactively addressing cooperative 

partnerships in the Arctic to promote safety, stability, and security as detailed in 

the Navy’s Strategic Objectives for the Arctic. 

b. Because the U.S. is an Arctic nation and the Arctic is primarily a maritime 

domain, the U.S. Navy has an obligation to be prepared for the changes that are 

occurring in the region. Failure to prepare for the increasing access to the Arctic 

will limit our overall ability to respond to security incidents and challenges. 

c. Arctic-related security requirements stem from increased human activity in the 

region that can invite crises over resources, territorial boundaries or excessive 

claims. While the Navy has operated in the Arctic on a limited basis for decades, 

we must balance limited resources with ever-expanding global requirements. Navy’s 

Task Force Climate Change is carefully reviewing the right capabilities at the right 

cost at the right time to meet national requirements for the Arctic, as they potentially represent a considerable commitment of funds during a resource-constrained 

period. 

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of 

threats described by the witnesses at last week’s hearing? If not, what should we 

be doing? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The readiness of the Navy to provide the warfighting resources 

needed by our Combatant Commanders is a function of capability, capacity and proficiency across the full range of naval missions. Achieving the required levels of each 

requires a fine balance between acquiring new warfighting capabilities to address 

emerging threats; modernizing existing capabilities to keep them relevant; sustaining systems and platforms so that they function properly until the end of their 

expected service life; and training our personnel to guarantee they can employ the 

systems and platforms effectively in a combat environment. The Navy has succeeded 

in ensuring our forward deployed forces are prepared to accomplish their planned 

missions. Additionally, the Navy continues to develop the future capabilities and capacity necessary to support the National Military Strategy in a security environment increasingly characterized by sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
107 

systems. The Department of Navy in concert with the Department of Air Force, has 

developed an Air Sea Battle Concept and associated initiatives that outline necessary enhancements across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, 

Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to address the A2/AD threat. The President’s 

FY12 Budget request addresses these initiatives appropriately in an implementation 

effort that will span several years. 

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the 

Army’s Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it 

comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications 

to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the 

witnesses described in the hearing last week? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The Navy has been forward deployed since its inception to protect our national interests abroad and to rapidly respond to crises with mission tailored forces. While some forward presence has been provided by units stationed 

overseas, historically most has been generated by a rotational model from the continental United States. The current model, termed the Fleet Response Plan, is comprised of phases: Maintenance; Training (Basic, Integrated); and Sustainment, during which an overseas deployment typically occurs. Properly resourced and managed, the Fleet Response Plan provides maintenance opportunities to ensure the 

systems and platforms are effective against extant threats throughout their expected service life; training across the full range of naval operations to ensure personnel can succeed in missions from humanitarian assistance to high-end warfare 

against a peer rival; 6–7 months of forward deployed time each cycle to support the 

Combatant Commanders; and a period following deployment when a unit’s high 

readiness is sustained to enable surging forward in response to crises. The President’s FY12 Budget request provides sufficient resources to meet the Combatant 

Commander’s most critical requirements and to sustain a relevant Navy into the future. 

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When 

this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a ‘‘temporary fix’’ to 

the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet 

ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In 

your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure 

that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task 

and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The long-term use of Sailors to meet ground force requirements 

in Iraq and Afghanistan has been necessary to address the evolving needs of the 

joint force as these conflicts have progressed through various phases. The Navy provides over half of its IA support in core skill areas, such as cargo handling, airlift 

support, and SeaBees, with approximately 5,500 serving in these ‘‘core’’ missions. 

Navy also provides approximately 4,700 Sailors for provincial reconstruction, detainee operations, civil affairs, customs inspection, and a variety of other ‘‘non-core’’ 

missions. The joint sourcing process to meet both ‘‘core’’ and ‘‘non-core’’ requirements is deliberate and is currently focused on reducing IA requirements without 

unduly increasing the risk to mission success. 

Navy’s FY12 end strength anticipates a phased reduction in IA demand in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Should IA demand remain at current levels, or increase over time, 

we will be challenged to meet manning requirements for the Fleet. The Navy continues to size, shape, and stabilize our force through a series of performance-based 

measures designed to retain the skills, pay grades, and experience mix necessary 

to meet current and future requirements. 

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for 

the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review focused on two 

objectives: to further rebalance the capabilities of the Armed Forces and institutionalize successful wartime innovations to better enable success in today’s wars 

while ensuring our forces are prepared for a complex future; and to reform how the 

department does business. In conjunction with the completion of the QDR, the Deputy Secretary of Defense submitted the long-range plans for the construction of 

Naval vessels and the procurement of aircraft for the Navy and Air Force. These 

plans reflect the best effort of the Department of Defense to address the difficult 

planning challenge of forecasting requirements and procurement for a thirty year 

time frame. These products provide Congress a basic foundation for the assessment 

of the long-term readiness requirements of the force. Additional detail regarding the 

QDR is more appropriately addressed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
108 

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined 

by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force 

are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe 

require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same 

events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion? 

Admiral CLINGAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs 

of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that 

more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with 

the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to 

ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we’ve already 

paid for? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The combined President’s FY12 Budget request baseline and 

OCO budget submissions represent the best balance of risk and available resources 

across the Navy portfolio. The Navy appreciates the subcommittee’s continuing support and believes both ship and aviation maintenance will be best served by supporting the President’s FY12 Budget request. A comprehensive maintenance strategy is essential to minimizing the total ownership cost (TOC) of Navy platforms and 

to ensuring that these assets reach their expected service life. Crucial to executing 

any maintenance strategy is a clear understanding of the current condition of each 

asset and a detailed plan for properly maintaining and logistically supporting the 

equipment. 

Submarines and aircraft carriers have well defined engineering processes that 

closely manage maintenance and repair work. Navy investments in the past several 

budget cycles in the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program 

(SURFMEPP) and enhanced assessments of surface ships are providing Navy maintenance planners with greater insight on the maintenance and repair requirements 

and are facilitating refined ship life cycle management. 

For aircraft, each Type/Model/Series of Naval aircraft have a rigorous sustainment 

construct that relies on a robust Fleet Support Team (FST) of engineers, logisticians, and other key aviation subject matter experts that utilize the concept of RCM 

(Reliability Centered Maintenance) to continuously monitor and improve the maintenance of in-service aircraft. The President’s FY12 Budget request increased emphasis on continuing these key aviation FST functions. 

Mr. FORBES. What do you feel is DoD’s role in investing in alternative sources of 

energy? If so, which types of alternative energy (fuels, renewable energy, etc.), and 

do you believe the DoD is doing enough? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The Department of the Navy (DON) has set two priorities that 

illustrate its role in investing in alternative sources of energy: Energy Security and 

Energy Independence. Energy Security is achieved by utilizing sustainable sources 

that meet tactical, expeditionary, and shore operational requirements and force 

sustainment functions, and, having the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs. Energy Independence is achieved when Naval forces 

rely only on energy resources that are not subject to intentional or accidental supply 

disruptions. As a priority, Energy Independence increases operational effectiveness 

by making Naval forces more energy self-sufficient and less dependent on vulnerable energy production and supply lines. 

To demonstrate the feasibility of utilizing alternative sources of energy for tactical 

purposes, we have flown an F/A–18 Hornet on a 50/50 blend of JP–5/camelina fuel; 

operated a Riverine Command Boat (RCB–X) on a 50/50 blend of F–76/algae fuel; 

and test flown a Seahawk helicopter on a 50/50 blend of JP–5/camelina fuel. DON 

also commissioned the USS Makin Island that utilizes a gas turbine engine and 

electric auxiliary propulsion system, which leads to increased fuel efficiency. Like 

the other Services in DoD, DON leverages many different types of alternative energy solutions based upon various installations’ geographic location, natural resources, and available technology that includes solar, wind, geothermal, and waste 

to energy applications. We have plans to install over 100 MW of solar power 

through the FYDP and are currently conducting 22 anemometer (wind) studies. In 

our Expeditionary Forward Operating Bases, we are using flexible solar panels to 

recharge batteries and light the insides of tents with energy efficient LED lighting. 

These are just a few examples of the different types of alternative energy sources 

that DON is currently using. 

Lastly, the Secretary of the Navy has set forth five energy goals to reduce the 

Department of the Navy’s overall consumption of energy, decrease its reliance on 

petroleum and significantly increase its use of alternative energy. DON is committed to thoughtfully investing in alternative sources of energy for the future. 
109 

The Secretary of the Navy’s Energy Goals: 

1. Increase Alternative Energy Use DON–Wide: By 2020, 50% of total DON 

energy consumption will come from alternative sources. 

2. Increase Alternative Energy Ashore: By 2020, at least 50% of shore-based 

energy requirements will come from alternative sources; 50% of DON installations 

will be net-zero. 

3. Reduce Non-Tactical Petroleum Use: By 2015, DON will reduce petroleum 

use in the commercial fleet by 50%. 

4. Sail the ‘‘Great Green Fleet’’: DON will demonstrate a Green Strike Group 

in local operations by 2012 and sail it by 2016. 

5. Energy Efficient Acquisition: Evaluation of energy factors will be mandatory 

when awarding contracts for systems and buildings. 

Mr. FORBES. The costs of our weapons systems have risen dramatically in the last 

two decades. And in these current economic times, we can’t afford to buy the quantities we need at these high procurement costs. This, in turn, reduces the economies 

of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have 

for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military? 

Admiral CLINGAN. To partially address the historic cost growth in weapons systems, the Navy has strengthened acquisition policy to improve program oversight, 

control requirements, and more effectively monitor contractor performance through 

acquisition program and portfolio reviews of acquisition programs and the supplier 

base. A Department of Navy instruction established acquisition governance comprised of a 2 pass, 6 Gate review that has achieved closer coordination between the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Chief 

of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps. It also provided enterprise constructs to afford the opportunity to better understand and control costs, including operations and sustainment costs. 

Navy has engaged in vigorous control of requirements growth and changes with 

the establishment of annual Configuration Steering Boards within the program review and oversight process. The Configuration Steering Board requires programs to 

provide business case analysis and tradeoff discussions to stringently control adjustments to requirements. 

Process improvement initiatives are also being pursued in accountability, acquisition workforce management, and efficiencies as described in the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics memo titled ‘‘Better Buying 

Power, Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 

Spending’’, dated 14 SEP 2010. 

Complementary to these initiatives, Navy recommends stable funding for Programs throughout their development and economic quantity/multi-year procurements. These disciplined actions, which provide industry with steady workforce projections and encourage industry to invest in capital improvements, break the noted 

cycle and have a proven record of success. 

Mr. FORBES. Are there other ‘‘out-of-the-box’’ ideas we should be considering in 

order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial 

time? 

Admiral CLINGAN. From intense analysis of anti-access and area denial challenges 

to emerging energy technologies, new ideas are constantly being generated in order 

to ensure the Navy continues to perform its roles and missions in the evolving security and economic environments. 

The Navy has a robust process for inspiring, developing and implementing new 

concepts and approaches in response to changing defense needs. The Navy’s concept 

generation and concept development (CGCD) program provides a collaborative approach and structure for developing new strategic and operational concepts that address current and future challenges, position the service to seize opportunities, and 

serve to shape the Navy across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 

Leadership, Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. The process 

includes vetting and validating new ideas through analytical studies, workshops, experimentation, Naval War College war games, and, as required, Fleet level live force 

experiments and exercises. 

This process capitalizes on a strategic top-down approach, while enabling full and 

seamless integration with joint and coalition operations and requirements. The 

President’s FY12 budget submission resources a variety of ideas across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 

that have been vetted and are mature enough to merit investment. 
110 

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2010, Secretary Gates began an insourcing initiative 

to bring contracted functions back into the government. While the stated goal was 

to bring inherently governmental work back in house, we also were told that a 40% 

‘‘savings’’ was being budgeted against the insourcing goals. As we look at the fiscal 

year 2012 budget request, we see many cases where the Secretary’s ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’ are driving reductions in civilian personnel authorizations and pay. Are 

there areas where functions that were identified for ‘‘insourcing’’ last year are now 

unfunded due to the ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’? If so, how much risk is associated with 

these functions or positions being unfunded? 

Admiral CLINGAN. In-sourcing is one of the tools the Navy uses to ensure the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor employees is available to accomplish its roles and missions. To meet FY12 budget expectations, in-sourcing priorities were re-evaluated, along with contractors overall, as part of a holistic workforce 

balancing effort. 

Mr. FORBES. In the past year, the USMC successfully demonstrated its Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) which incorporates solar power technologies with a unit currently deployed to Afghanistan. That initiative had resounding success and buy-in from the individuals in the unit. 

• Will the USMC continue the ExFOB? 

• If so, will you incorporate new technologies and redeploy with future units? 

• What is the FY12 PB request to fund these efforts? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of 

threats described by the witnesses at last week’s hearing? If not, what should we 

be doing? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the 

Army’s Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it 

comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications 

to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the 

witnesses described in the hearing last week? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When 

this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a ‘‘temporary fix’’ to 

the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet 

ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In 

your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure 

that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task 

and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for 

the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined 

by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force 

are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe 

require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same 

events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs 

of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that 

more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with 

the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to 

ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we’ve already 

paid for? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. What do you feel is DoD’s role in investing in alternative sources of 

energy? If so, which types of alternative energy (fuels, renewable energy, etc.), and 

do you believe the DoD is doing enough? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The costs of our weapons systems have risen dramatically in the last 

two decades. And in these current economic times, we can’t afford to buy the quantities we need at these high procurement costs. This, in turn, reduces the economies 
111 

of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have 

for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Are there other ‘‘out-of-the-box’’ ideas we should be considering in 

order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial 

time? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2010, Secretary Gates began an insourcing initiative 

to bring contracted functions back into the government. While the stated goal was 

to bring inherently governmental work back in house, we also were told that a 40% 

‘‘savings’’ was being budgeted against the insourcing goals. As we look at the fiscal 

year 2012 budget request, we see many cases where the Secretary’s ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’ are driving reductions in civilian personnel authorizations and pay. Are 

there areas where functions that were identified for ‘‘insourcing’’ last year are now 

unfunded due to the ‘‘efficiencies initiative’’? If so, how much risk is associated with 

these functions or positions being unfunded? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. When Secretary of Defense Gates first accepted his post under the 

Bush Administration, he called for a 12-months boots on the ground policy to sustain dwell time goals. To date, home station mobilization and demobilization continues to be challenge for our men and women in the Guard and Reserves. I believe 

it improves readiness as well as morale and welfare when a soldier can deploy and 

demob from home station. Can you detail what efforts the Army has taken to 

achieve this policy objective of Secretary Gates? What can Congress do to help facilitate and expedite this matter? 

General BOLGER. The Army utilizes a rotational force generation readiness model 

as a core process to achieve the SecDef 12-months boots on the ground policy and 

is actively engaged with making decisions in the Army’s Campaign Plan for First 

Army’s transformation initiative. This initiative will realign the deployment and demobilization stations. The Army recognizes that readiness and morale are key components of determining the locations of deployment and demobilization stations. 

The Army continues its effort to reduce stress on the Active Component (AC) and 

Reserve Component (RC) forces by achieving near term boots on the ground (BOG): 

Dwell goals of 1:2 AC and 1:4 RC. Starting in FY12, Reserve Component Soldiers 

(USAR and ARNG) will have at least four years at home for every year deployed. 

The Army’s effort is contingent upon continued decrease in global demands and 

assured access to the Reserve Component. This effort will provide citizen Soldiers, 

Families and Employers with predictable deployment schedules. With your support 

for this plan, the Army will meet near-term BOG: Dwell goals of 1:2 AC and 1:4 

RC starting in FY 12. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years? 

General BOLGER. The Army’s FY12 President’s Budget request funds the Service’s 

highest priorities to support the current wars, ensure readiness and strategic depth 

in an uncertain and increasingly complex strategic environment, and care for Soldiers, their families and Army civilians. We will ensure that Army priorities are appropriately resourced using whatever means are appropriated by the Congress. 

However, as we look toward FY12 program execution, we ask for Congress’ support 

in helping the Army mitigate any fact of life changes that may develop during the 

course of the year. The Army appreciates the continued commitment and support 

of the U.S. Congress in all that we do. 

Please see attached April 15th, 2011, letter from GEN Dempsey to Representative 

Adam Smith. [See page 89.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the 

use of services contractors. In your role as your service’s operations planner, how 

do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how 

much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon 

services contractors? 

General BOLGER. Logistics contractor requirements increased over time due to the 

extended duration of conflict, the nature of the conflict, and combatant commander 

operational decisions. The Army is reliant, but not over-reliant, on contractors for 

logistics and other base support services, as concluded by a 2010 Joint Staff study 

on contractor dependency in which the Army participated. The Army does not factor 
112 

in the role of contractors when calculating Readiness. However, contractors that provide maintenance operations (i.e., aircraft maintenance for Army aviation) do directly support the serviceability ratings of those organizations. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Describe for me the Air Force’s force sizing construct. Specifically, 

what type of force size metrics will be used in the future to capture accurately the 

inventory of aircraft available to the commanders? My understanding is, historically, the Air Force has counted structure via combat wings but is now moving to 

a tail-metric. I’m concerned that this will lead to an inflated perception about the 

readiness of our Air Force since a total count of wings won’t be able to denote which 

aircraft are in depots or training. What is the rationale behind this change? 

General CARLISLE. As the question has several parts, each will be addressed in 

turn. 

Regarding force sizing inputs/direction: As threats to our national security have 

changed over time, so have our force sizing constructs. Accordingly, the force options 

that the AF provides to the President through the combatant commanders have 

changed from the one-size-fits-all fighter or combat wing to something more adaptable, scalable, and flexible to counter the evolving threat. To size a force that is able 

to respond to the pressing needs of combatant commanders today—yet remain 

adaptable to the ambiguous future threat—the AF participates actively in the Secretary of Defense’s Support to Strategic Analysis (SSA). 

Force sizing process: In the SSA framework there are scenarios in which demand 

for Service capabilities is measured after all the competing demands for forces are 

combined. Within the SSA, Integrated Security Constructs (ISCs) are built to represent a series of demands on forces. This is based on potential contingency operations in various theaters and in combination is sourced using only PMAI (Primary 

Mission Aircraft Inventory) ‘‘combat’’ and ‘‘combat support,’’ coded aircraft inventory 

ensuring aircraft in depot and training units are properly accounted for. Within 

each of the ISCs there are three primary phases (non-surge, surge, and post-surge) 

in the planning construct. Component-specific (Active, ANG, AFR) rotation policies 

apply during the non- and post-surge phases that are included in force sizing to 

meet the demands. 

Force Readiness: AF forces are counted and task-organized as wings, groups and 

squadrons which capture the total force numbers to include the number of aircraft 

platforms. The AF generates and presents its force to desired readiness levels, 

thereby eliminating tiered readiness and minimizing any strategic implications. For 

counting forces, the AF uses tail-metrics that include PMAI counts as well as total 

tails; for determining readiness, PMAI is used along with other factors. This will 

increase visibility into our fleets for sustainment and recapitalization purposes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years? 

General CARLISLE. The Air Force made difficult choices while building the FY12 

President’s Budget, and we balanced our mission in a way that maximizes our efforts to support the joint fight, while embracing SECDEF guidance to achieve efficiencies goals. In accordance with Secretary Gates’ intent, we looked within our own 

programs, strived to be more efficient, and used the savings for higher priorities, 

including readiness. We have identified several items that provide direct support to 

our combatant commanders in today’s joint fight that emerged since the FY12 President’s Budget submission. The A–10 Maintenance Tester and the EC–130H avionics 

upgrade improve our readiness posture and operational capabilities by resolving 

issues that could require grounding Aircraft. We also require a variety of munitions 

replacement in support of ongoing operations that will provide replenishment of 

weapons critical to meeting future wartime needs. If we receive full support of our 

FY12 budget request, we are confident we can fund our most critical requirements 

to ensure a ready force. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the 

use of services contractors. In your role as your service’s operations planner, how 

do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how 

much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon 

services contractors? 

General CARLISLE. Contractors play an important role from an operational perspective, and sometimes provide niche and interim maintenance support. Currently, 

contract maintenance comprises a small percentage of the total maintenance effort 

for 13 airframes. However, contract maintenance provides a high percentage in mission areas that expanded rapidly to meet warfighter needs or in situations where 

there are no trained Air Force personnel to maintain the aircraft. Five aircraft types 

(C–27J, MQ–1/9, MC–12W, and RC–26) fall into this category and rely solely on contract maintenance. The Remotely Piloted Aircraft category is scheduled to increase 
113 

to 800 aircraft by 2020 in order to meet warfighter demands. This rapid growth outpaced the Air Force’s ability to staff and train personnel to maintain this high-demand capability, necessitating the use of contract maintenance. While readiness is 

not an issue with contractor maintained aircraft, the Air Force will transition the 

MQ–1/9 to organic support over time. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment of other AOR’s like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, 

to our forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have 

unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR. 

General CARLISLE. The Air Force provides Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to the combatant commands to support daily, steady-state operations and can redistribute assets when surge operations are required. The Joint 

Staff prioritizes and allocates ISR assets according to the Global Force Management 

Allocation Plan which matches available assets to combatant command requirements. While the majority of airborne ISR assets are currently supporting 

CENTCOM due to the high demand, assets are available to support efforts in the 

Pacific region. In addition to ‘‘national’’ assets that are available to meet COCOM 

requirements, the Air Force has established a Global Hawk squadron at Andersen 

AFB, Guam, and continues U–2 missions in the Republic of Korea. Additionally, 

Global Hawk, U–2 and WC–135 assets have all contributed to recent humanitarian 

operations in Japan. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years? 

Admiral CLINGAN. The Navy has two unfunded priorities for the PB12 budget submission. There is a $367M shortfall in ship depot maintenance that equates to the 

deferral of 44 surface ship availabilities. Additionally, there is a $317M shortfall in 

aviation spares which are used to support over 3,700 individual fleet aircraft. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the 

use of services contractors. In your role as your service’s operations planner, how 

do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how 

much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon 

services contractors? 

Admiral CLINGAN. As mandated by Congress, the Navy is responsible to man, 

train, and equip the force while the Combatant Commanders are responsible for 

operational planning and employment. The Combatant Commanders are in a better 

position to explain how service contractors are factored into operational planning. 

The Navy employs a total force construct that applies the most suitable manpower—active, reserve, civilian, contractor—to accomplish specific tasks. The balance is adjusted annually as we shape the force to meet the needs of the Navy and 

address policy and fiscal guidance. 

The total force remains well postured to prevail in current conflicts and respond 

effectively to the multiple, concurrent, diverse crises anticipated in the future. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment of other AOR’s like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, 

to our forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have 

unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR. 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the 

use of services contractors. In your role as your service’s operations planner, how 

do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how 

much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon 

services contractors? 

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
114 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. RUNYAN. Ensuring that our deploying and deployed forces have the equipment, training, and personnel they need often comes at the expense of non-deployed 

Army units. Under current budget constraints, what are the strategic implications 

for Reserve and National Guard Army units and their ability to provide ‘‘surge’’ capability to meet current and future threats? 

General BOLGER. Manning: The Army Reserve/National Guard (ARNG) has been 

very successful in maintaining its assigned End Strength. However, the ARNG does 

not have the ability to pull from a pool of Soldiers at schools or in the accession 

pipeline as the Active Component does. All ARNG Soldiers are assigned to a Modified Table of Organization & Equipment (MTOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) position. This creates a situation where the ARNG must cross level between units and sometimes states in order to ensure that all ARNG formations are 

deploying at 100%. The ARNG has successfully met all requirements to date in support of overseas contingency operations. If recruiting and individual training resources do not meet requirements, the ARNG will be in a degraded position to continue to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) demands. 

Equipping: The ARNG is at the highest level of equipment modernization and 

readiness that it has ever been. If that level of readiness is not sustained with the 

required resource levels then the ARNG’s future ability to surge in support of overseas contingencies as well as Homeland Defense/Security will be degraded. 

Training: Pre-mobilization training resources set the stage for successful post-mobilization training and validation for deployment. The ARNG in conjunction with 

United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and First Army has worked to 

decrease the amount of post-mobilization training time over the last 10 years. This 

decreased post-mobilization training time enables increased ‘‘Boots on the Ground’’ 

(BOG) time in theater. If pre-mobilization training resources are decreased, there 

will be a direct impact to the amount of BOG that Reserve Component (RC) units 

will perform. 

Overall decreased funding for the ARNG will create a situation whereby supporting surge efforts will be significantly degraded. The timelines involved with 

building readiness for RC units mandate that funding be at or near required levels. 

It is too late to apply increased funding when a surge demand is received. The 

timelines for acquiring and fielding equipment, sending Soldiers to Schools, and conducting individual pre-mobilization training are too long to support immediate reaction to OCO demand. If the RC is funded at required levels, units can respond to 

immediate demands as evidenced most recently by the 60–90 day notification to mobilization experienced by the 77TH Theater Aviation Brigade, the 116TH Infantry 

Brigade Headquarters, and six ARNG Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (TUAS) 

Platoons. 

Mr. RUNYAN. We have not had a very good track record of predicting the next contingency. What is the Army doing to be ready for that next contingency and where 

do you think it will occur? 

General BOLGER. While we cannot predict with certainty when and where crises 

may occur, we do anticipate that in an era of persistent conflict Army forces will 

continue to be required for a variety of missions. In order to best respond to a full 

spectrum of future operations the Army is creating a Surge Force. This Surge Force 

is capable of resourcing all Army requirements for the first two phases of the Department of Defense’s operational contingency plans, one additional small scale contingency, and a homeland security event. The Surge Force will consist of one corps 

headquarters, three division headquarters, ten brigade combat teams, and 41,000 

enablers in support of these formations. The Army’s rotational model resources 

these units to high readiness levels before they enter the Surge Force window. 

Surge Force units will have sufficient dwell time to train to full spectrum standards. 

Mr. RUNYAN. We have been in combat now for almost ten years with many soldiers having repeated deployments. What effect has this had on unit, soldier and 

family readiness? How will your rotational model assist in preserving the all volunteer force and provide for a more ready force? 

General BOLGER. Multiple deployments have rendered our Army out of balance. 

The effects of repeated deployments are increases in behavioral health stress in Soldiers, the number of non-deployable Soldiers in units, and high risk behaviors that 

affect the Soldier and their Families. Additional effects are a deployment to dwell 

ratio below 1:2 Active Component (AC) and 1:4 Reserve Component (RC), backlogs 

in Professional Military Education, and the lack of strategic depth and flexibility to 

support unforeseen contingencies. Restoring balance to the Army is a high priority. 

Full implementation of the Army supply based force generation model establishes 

predictable BOG:Dwell ratios, prepares the Army for full spectrum operations and 
115 

sustains the All-Volunteer Force. The Army fully supports programs that sustain 

and build resilient Soldiers, Families, and Civilians. The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program and Army Risk Reduction and Health Promotion Program will assist 

in improving behavioral health. We will also maintain our pledge to the Army Family Covenant by assisting our Families in meeting the challenges, stresses and 

strains on those left behind. 

Mr. RUNYAN. What are the Army’s three main challenges in readiness today? 

General BOLGER. 1. Demand. The number one challenge to readiness today remains the continued and excessive demand for Army forces. While the overall demand for Army forces has been reduced, the demand for critical enablers continues 

to exceed sustainable levels, further challenging the Army’s ability to meet required 

dwell time ratios for those units. Unique, ad hoc, and individual manning demands 

(joint manning documents, individual augmentations, etc.) place additional burdens 

on the force. 

2. Balance. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model provides a path for 

Army units to build readiness over time in order to maximize mission or contingency related readiness prior to arrival date or availability windows. However, because of the continued and excessive demand, the Army remains out of balance, 

both across the ARFORGEN Force Pools (Reset, Train/Ready and Available) and 

across the Components (Active and Reserve). Additionally, critical resources are 

often shifted from our non-deployed forces to ensure the success of our deployed 

forces. This is especially problematic for those units in the Train/Ready window, 

which under the doctrinal design of ARFORGEN, are to be manned and equipped 

to respond to un-foreseen contingencies. Currently, the Army’s ability to respond to 

those contingencies is challenged and is addressed in the Chairman’s Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA). 

3. Material Availability. The Reset phase of ARFORGEN is critical to ensuring 

that equipment is refitted, re-distributed, and/or fielded as new equipment to units. 

The Army forecasts the need for Reset may continue for multiple years following 

the end of Operation New Dawn (CY 2011) and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Steady, predictable, and continued support for both procurement and modernization 

of equipment coupled with continued support for the Army’s Reset program is imperative to ensuring the adequate availability of equipment. 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Carlisle, in the near term what are your top Unfunded Requirements (UFRs) for Air Force readiness? 

General CARLISLE. The Air Force made difficult choices while building the FY12 

President’s Budget, and we balanced our mission in a way that maximizes our efforts to support the joint fight, while embracing SECDEF guidance to achieve efficiencies goals. In accordance with Secretary Gates’ intent, we looked within our own 

programs, strived to be more efficient, and used the savings for higher priorities, 

to include readiness. We have identified several items that provide direct support 

to our Combatant Commanders in today’s joint fight that emerged since the FY12 

President’s Budget submission. The A–10 Maintenance Tester and the EC–130H 

avionics upgrade improve our readiness posture and operational capabilities by resolving issues that could require grounding Aircraft. We also require a variety of 

munitions replacement in support of ongoing operations that will provide replenishment of weapons critical to meeting future wartime needs. If we receive full support 

of our FY12 budget request, we are confident we can fund our most critical requirements to ensure a ready force. 

Mr. RUNYAN. The fiscal year 2012 budget request reflects shortfalls in depot maintenance requirements. With an aging aircraft fleet how much risk does this pose to 

Air Force Readiness. What is the impact? 

General CARLISLE. Although we took risk in weapon system support by initially 

funding it at 80 percent, we identified efficiencies that improved funding to 85 percent. Additionally, we are managing near term risk and maintaining our 

warfighting readiness through balanced support to our legacy fleet and new aircraft. 

The 16 percent in unfunded requirement risk includes software, sustaining engineering and technical orders; however, this is mitigated through enterprise-wide 

prioritization to fund the highest priority systems in the year of execution while ensuring a stable depot workload and workforce is maintained. The long-term depot 

maintenance risk is mitigated through Full Scale Fatigue Testing and Structural Integrity and Service Life Extension Programs which will improve the sustainability 

of legacy aircraft and ensure total force readiness. 

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