Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Washington, DC 20528

Office of Inspector General 

The DHS Process for Nominating Individuals 

to the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist 

OIG-08-29 February 2008
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 February 28, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the DHS process for nominating individuals to 

the consolidated terrorist watchlist. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of 

relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary...............................................................................................................................1 

Background............................................................................................................................................2 

Results of Review ..................................................................................................................................4 

Two DHS Components Have Developed Policies and Guidance on Nominations...................4 

DHS’ Management of Component Nomination Activities........................................................8 

Recommendations....................................................................................................................11 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ............................................................................12 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope and Methodology............................................................................14 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ...........................................................15 

Appendix C: Memorandum of Understanding Between Inspectors General of the 

 Intelligence Community ...........................................................................................16 

Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report............................................................................21 

Appendix E: Report Distribution...................................................................................................22 

Abbreviations 

CBP United States Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations 

I&A Intelligence and Analysis 

IC Intelligence Community 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

ODNI Office of the Director for National Intelligence 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

POE Port of Entry 

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System
 

TIDE Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSC Terrorist Screening Center 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
OIG
 Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence requested Inspectors 

General of the Intelligence Community to review their organizations’ 

processes for making nominations to the consolidated terrorist watchlist. The 

Inspectors General undertook to answer six questions related to the 

nominations process in their agency: 

1.	 Are processes and standards for nominating individuals consistent, 

articulated in policy, and understood by nominators; 

2.	 Is there a quality control process in place; 

3.	 Is responsibility for watchlist nominations clear, effective, and 

understood; 

4.	 Have nominators receive adequate training, guidance, and information 

on the nominations process; 

5.	 Do agencies maintain records of their nominations to the National 

Counterterrorism Center and Terrorist Screening Center; and 

6.	 Are organizations with terrorism, counterterrorism, and domestic 

counterterrorism information appropriately participating in the 

nominations process? 

The Department of Homeland Security has made very few nominations to the 

consolidated terrorist watchlist because its components are rarely originators 

of derogatory information linking persons to terrorist activities. U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement combined 

have submitted less than one percent of all nominations made to the 

consolidated terrorist watchlist since 2005. Although the Department of 

Homeland Security does not have an overarching policy on making 

nominations to the consolidated terrorist watchlist, Customs and Border 

Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement have developed and 

implemented processes for making nominations. 

Other Department of Homeland Security components would like to contribute 

to the consolidated terrorist watchlist by providing information that could be 

used to update existing nominations. The Department of Homeland Security 

can better manage its nomination process to ensure information is provided to 

the National Counterterrorism Center. 

We are making two recommendations to enhance the Department of 

Homeland Security’s overall participation in nominating individuals to the 

consolidated terrorist watchlist. 

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Background 

Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities” dated 

December 4, 1981, requires all government agencies and departments 

involved in intelligence activities to provide the President and the National 

Security Council with intelligence information to protect the United States 

from security threats. Government agencies and departments within the 

executive branch that have a national intelligence mission are collectively 

called the Intelligence Community (IC). Members of the IC include: 

• Director of National Intelligence 

• Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

• Air Force Intelligence 

• Army Intelligence 

• Central Intelligence Agency 

• Coast Guard Intelligence 

• Defense Intelligence Agency 

• Department of Energy 

• Department of Homeland Security 

• Department of State 

• Department of the Treasury 

• Drug Enforcement Administration 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation 

• Marine Corps Intelligence 

• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

• National Reconnaissance Office 

• National Security Agency 

• Navy Intelligence 

More recently, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center” 

dated August 27, 2004, requires all government agencies that possess or 

acquire non-domestic terrorism and counterterrorism information to 

immediately notify the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The 

NCTC serves as the primary organization in the United States Government for 

integrating and analyzing intelligence pertaining to terrorism and 

counterterrorism. NCTC is the principal advisor to the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence (ODNI) on intelligence activities, and is responsible 

for developing strategic operational plans for counterterrorism activities. The 

NCTC receives information through nominations made by federal agencies. It 

is not necessary for an agency to be a member of the IC to make nominations. 

Nomination information is placed in the NCTC central repository system, the 

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). 

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Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, the Department of 

Justice Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is responsible for maintaining a 

consolidated terrorist watchlist. The TSC uses international information from 

the NCTC TIDE system and domestic intelligence from the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) to develop the watchlist. The TSC also provides updates 

on terrorists to operational systems used by other government agencies for 

screening purposes. 

At the request of ODNI, 11 Inspectors General agreed to coordinate a review 

on the processes for nominating individuals to the consolidated terrorist 

watchlist.1 Formalized in a March 19, 2007, Memorandum of Understanding, 

six objectives related to the nominations process were identified: 

1.	 Are processes and standards for nominating individuals 

consistent, articulated in policy, and understood by nominators; 

2.	 Is there a quality control process in place; 

3.	 Is responsibility for watchlist nominations clear, effective, and 

understood; 

4.	 Have nominators receive adequate training, guidance, and 

information on the nominations process; 

5.	 Do agencies maintain records of their nominations to the NCTC 

and TSC; and 

6.	 Are organizations with terrorism, counterterrorism, and domestic 

counterterrorism information appropriately participating in the 

nominations process? 

Nominations made by the FBI, Department of State, Defense Intelligence 

Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency encompass more than 95% of the 

nominations made to the watchlist. DHS has made less than one percent of all 

nominations to the watchlist since 2005. However, DHS is a major consumer 

of nomination information. There are many DHS components that use 

watchlist information daily. For example: 

•	 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes approximately 

1.1 million passengers and pedestrians every day at ports of entry 

(POE). Watchlist information is used to determine their admissibility; 

•	 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) coordinates 

investigations of watchlisted individuals with the FBI to ensure a 

unified approach that might lead to the apprehension of individuals of 

interest and their associates; 

•	 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) receives 

approximately 6 million applications and petitions a year. All 

information is considered, especially for individuals on the watchlist, 

1

 Appendix C. 

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when adjudicating applications to grant immigration benefits or 

citizenship; and 

•	 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checks the watchlist 

against passenger manifests for more than 50,000 commercial flights a 

day to ensure only permissible persons are allowed to fly. 

Results of Review 

Two DHS Components Have Developed Policies and Guidance on 

Nominations 

DHS does not have a management directive, quality control process, or 

training program for the nominations process. Officials at DHS said there is 

no plan to develop a management directive on the nominations process 

because the department rarely owns originating information. However, some 

DHS components, such as CBP and ICE, have developed guidance for their 

respective offices. 

DHS collects a small amount of information that links an individual to 

terrorism or terrorist activities. CBP and ICE are the main contributors of this 

information. The CBP National Targeting Center serves as a clearinghouse 

for CBP and ICE nominations, and as a resource for DHS law enforcement 

efforts. In December 2003, ICE assigned special agents to the CBP National 

Targeting Center to assist in coordinating border activities. In January 2005, 

the ICE Office of Investigations established a permanent ICE Liaison Section 

to the targeting center and provided continuous support and investigative 

coordination regarding terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests 

abroad. 

The targeting center is staffed by personnel from several DHS offices and has 

liaison relationships with many law enforcement and intelligence agencies, 

such as the FBI. While the various workgroups within the targeting center 

perform many different support roles, CBP and ICE personnel at the center 

manage nominations from their agencies to the NCTC, where if approved, 

they are entered into the TIDE system. The TIDE system is maintained by the 

NCTC and serves as a central repository for all information on known or 

suspected international terrorists with the exception of purely domestic 

terrorism information. A subset of the identifying information contained in 

TIDE is transmitted to the TSC for inclusion in the consolidated watchlist. 

The names and identifiers are then transmitted from the TSC to the Treasury 

Enforcement Communications System (TECS) for use at the POEs. 

CBP officers inspect all individuals arriving at a POE seeking admission into 

the United States. The officer queries TECS from his or her post at the POE 

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to determine whether the individual appears to match a watchlist record. 

When an individual being inspected appears to have a matching record, the 

event is referred to as a TIDE encounter, and the officer is required to contact 

the targeting center. The targeting center coordinates with the TSC to 

determine if the arriving traveler is indeed the watchlisted person. When 

additional or corrected information is collected from a TIDE encounter at a 

POE, the new information is sent to the NCTC. The proper procedures for 

encounters with known or potential terrorists are detailed in CBP and ICE 

agency memoranda. 

CBP Policy 

CBP processed all of its nominations for the watchlist through the targeting 

center. The final determination of the identity resolution is performed by the 

TSC in consultation with the targeting center. The FBI has jurisdiction to 

investigate terrorism in the United States. When individuals with suspected 

terrorist connections are identified by CBP at POEs, the information must go 

to the FBI. The normal procedure is for CBP to notify the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force (JTTF). In these instances CBP will not make a nomination 

because the FBI will process the nomination through the NCTC. 

On September 12, 2006, CBP provided a directive to its field offices. The 

directive lists the targeting center as the focal point for CBP operational 

coordination with the TSC, NCTC, and the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task 

Force. Additionally, the directive provided detailed protocols for CBP 

officers to make nominations or to provide updated information to the 

watchlist through the targeting center. The directive also establishes and 

regulates the activities of CBP counter terrorism Response Teams at the 

POEs. These teams are responsible for handling TIDE encounters and 

coordinating their activities with the targeting center and other law 

enforcement agencies. 

To determine CBP awareness of and participation in the nominations process 

we questioned the managers of the eight CBP divisions responsible for 

operations. We did not speak to managers of support divisions such as 

training. As shown in Figure 1, all but one official understood the CBP 

process for nominating individuals to the watchlist. Staff from offices 

responsible for making nominations, such as the Office of Field Operations, 

told us that a quality assurance process was in place through the national 

targeting center review process, ensuring only quality recommendations are 

made to the watchlist. Furthermore, even officials generally uninvolved in 

nomination activities understood CBP has a policy for nominating known or 

suspected terrorists to the watchlist. 

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Figure 1: Questionnaire Results from CBP Operational Offices 

Aware of 

nomination 

process 

Office 

responsible 

for making 

nominations 

is clear 

A quality 

control 

process 

exists for 

nomination 

Has 

guidelines 

regarding 

nomination 

Has 

received 

sufficient 

training 

Air and 

Marine Yes Yes N/A Yes No 

Office of 

Field 

Operations 

Yes Yes Yes Yes No 

Traveler 

Security & 

Facilitation 

Yes Yes Yes Yes No 

Border 

Patrol 

Yes Yes Yes Yes No 

Container 

Security 

Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A 

Operations Yes Yes Yes Yes No 

Cargo and 

Conveyance 

Security 

No No N/A Yes N/A 

Agriculture 

Programs 

and Liaison 

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

CBP recently developed a draft policy to supplement existing directives. With 

the finalization of the policy, CBP will have the most comprehensive process 

throughout DHS for coordinating watchlist nominations. This draft policy 

will explain the criteria for nominating, and for approving the transmission of 

information to the targeting center. It includes a process for POE and 

targeting center supervisors to review nominations before being sent to the 

NCTC (Figure 2). 

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Figure 2: Draft CBP Nomination Review Process 

CBP Officer 

NCTC 

CBP Director of 

Field Operations 

NTC 

CBP 

Supervisory Officer 

ICE Guidance 

ICE agents in the United States did not make any nominations to the watchlist. 

The Department of Justice has the jurisdiction for investigating and 

prosecuting domestic terrorism cases while ICE is responsible for enforcing 

immigration and customs laws.2 Not having domestic jurisdiction over 

terrorist-related cases reduces the occasions ICE would have to make 

watchlist nominations. ICE agents overseas can, and do, make nominations 

directly to the NCTC. However, ICE is represented on the JTTF and any 

derogatory information ICE develops about individuals who could be 

nominated, is submitted through the JTTF. 

ICE has published three memoranda that affect nominations to the watchlist. 

The first, in September 2004, provided a nomination memorandum to all 

Special Agents-in-Charge and Deputy Assistant Directors in the Office of 

Investigations. This memorandum detailed interim operating procedures that 

mandated all “positive and possible” TIDE encounters be reported to the ICE 

2

 Department of Justice – National Security Division “Combat Terrorism,” 

http://www.usdoj.gov/whatwedo/whatwedo_ct.html. 

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targeting center representative. This memorandum also documents the 

coordination between ICE and the FBI through the JTTF. 

A second memorandum, in March 2005 required that all subjects for watchlist 

nominations be submitted through the JTTF. For cases requiring immediate 

action, ICE mandated coordination through the targeting center (Figure 3). 

Figure 3: ICE 2005 Procedures 

More recently, in an April 2007 memorandum, ICE officers are required to 

track the amount of time spent working on national security cases with the 

JTTF. ICE will then be able to quantify the actual time spent on 

counterterrorism activities that support national security investigations related 

to TIDE encounters. ICE is currently working to formalize an agency 

directive that will incorporate previously published memoranda into a 

formalized policy for the field. 

DHS’ Management of Component Nomination Activities 

Only two DHS components–U.S. Coast Guard and Intelligence and Analysis 

(I&A)–are members of the IC. Many DHS components outside of the IC 

would also like to provide additional information on existing nominations. 

DHS components in general have difficulty finding answers to their questions 

about nominations and obtaining information on the nomination process. Of 

the officials we interviewed, only staff from CBP and ICE were able to 

describe how to make a nomination. Without clarification on the type of 

terrorist information the NCTC is seeking and a method to provide it, DHS 

components do not know how to make or enhance watchlist nominations. 

DHS needs a single point of contact for nominations to coordinate overall 

nomination activities, ensure proper distribution of nomination-related 

information to all DHS components, and clarify nomination criteria. 

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Coordination of DHS Nominations 

DHS components have information that could be used to make or update 

nominations to the watchlist. Providing the information to the NCTC is 

challenging and many components are providing updates on nominations 

through informal methods. We interviewed staff from 11 DHS components to 

identify the most appropriate entity for coordinating DHS nominations. All 

but one perceived I&A to be the natural lead for developing nomination 

procedures. 

For example, the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement is responsible for 

coordinating DHS efforts to track and sever connections between drugs and 

terrorism. Staff conduct drug-to-terrorist assessments, collaborate with 

national and local JTTFs, and participate in working groups to facilitate 

information exchange. The office regularly gathers information with a drugto-terrorist connection. If the National Joint Terrorism Task Force needs 

information relating to a potential connection, it calls the Office of 

Counternarcotics Enforcement. Counternarcotics Enforcement staff knew 

about watchlist nominations, but did not know whether any of the information 

they collected was useful to the NCTC. 

TSA collaborates with the Federal Aviation Administration to vet information 

related to terrorism and aviation records. When Federal Aviation 

Administration staff identifies information about known or suspected terrorists 

with pilot licenses, they notify the TSA. TSA staff we interviewed stated the 

information is important to the watchlist but, other than notifying the TIDE 

system record holder, it does not receive feedback on whether the NCTC 

includes it in current nominations. 

USCIS is required to complete a background check on each applicant, 

petitioner, and beneficiary prior to granting an immigration benefit. USCIS 

requests FBI name checks on applications for asylum, lawful permanent 

residence, and naturalization prior to granting immigration benefits. Part of 

USCIS daily operations involves reviewing documents and conducting 

interviews of individuals seeking benefits and their associates. USCIS 

interviewers routinely request updated addresses, biometrical data, and 

information on applicants, their sponsors, and associates. This places the 

agency in a unique position of being able to provide updated information on 

persons already watchlisted, and to learn whether they are in the United 

States. 

I&A is responsible for defining DHS intelligence collection requirements, 

compiling intelligence reports, and providing information to DHS and the IC. 

Staff in I&A receive various intelligence reports from DHS components that 

are written in response to DHS standing collection requirements, and include 

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information ranging from raw data on people and conveyances at POEs to 

final intelligence reports. I&A uses the data from DHS components to write 

intelligence reports for the IC. As previously discussed, CBP and ICE 

coordinate nominations internally through the National Targeting Center. 

I&A could work with the targeting center to identify some best practices and 

methods that would better facilitate operational aspects of nominations for 

DHS. Given I&A’s primacy in DHS for collecting and disseminating 

intelligence, and for managing the DHS interaction with the IC, it would be 

appropriate for I&A to promulgate and manage DHS-wide counterterrorism 

watchlist nomination procedures. 

Clarification and Distribution of Nomination Information 

DHS components have access to additional information that could be provided 

to the NCTC to update and enhance existing nominations. However, there is 

no clear definition of terrorism-related information and no documented DHS 

protocol for ensuring proper distribution of information to all components. 

There are at least three definitions that could be used to define terrorismrelated information. First, U.S. Code Title 18, Chapter 113B, section 2331(1) 

provides a definition of international terrorism: 

[T]he term international terrorism means activities that— (A) involve 

violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 

criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a 

criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States 

or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a 

civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 

intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 

mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily 

outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national 

boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the 

persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which 

their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.... 

Second, U.S. Code Title 18, Chapter 113B, section 2331(5) provides a 

definition of domestic terrorism: 

[T]he term “domestic terrorism” means activities that— (A) involve acts 

dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 

United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate 

or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government 

by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 

mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily 

within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 

Third, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, “Integration and Use of 

Screening Information” dated September 16, 2003, broadly defines terrorist 

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information as “information about individuals known or appropriately 

suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation 

for, in aid of, or related to terrorism....” 

Although neither the NCTC nor DHS has provided guidance on what 

constitutes information related to terrorism, the TSC provided a memorandum 

to I&A and the Office of Policy detailing the nominations process, criteria that 

must be met for a nomination to be accepted, and an expedited process for 

urgent circumstances. The July 2007 TSC memorandum identifies specific 

information the center would like to have on known or suspected terrorists. 

The TSC memorandum was not widely distributed within DHS. Only I&A 

and the Office of Policy received copies. We provided copies to the DHS 

components with whom we met. Most staff said this was the first document 

they had seen outlining a process for making watchlist nominations. 

Knowledge of the correct procedures for making a nomination would enable 

these agencies to provide more complete information to DHS components and 

the IC. 

TIDE Nomination Process 

A gency 

N om ination 

National Counter 

Terrorism C enter 

A pproved 

Terrorist 

Screening C enter 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #1: Develop and issue department-wide guidance 

governing the DHS watchlist nomination process. 

Recommendation #2: Develop protocols for sharing NCTC and TSC 

watchlist guidelines with all DHS IC and non-IC components to ensure proper 

inclusion and updating of NCTC information. 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated the comments prepared by I&A regarding our report and where 

appropriate, made changes to address their concerns. I&A management 

agreed with the report’s findings and our recommendations. A copy of I&A’s 

written comments in its entirety is included as Appendix B. 

In its written response, I&A emphasized the need for DHS to perform 

watchlisting duties effectively and accurately. I&A said that issues related to 

the quality and integrity of watchlisting and the redress process for removing 

names from the watchlist are of “vital importance” and that subsequent 

reviews should be conducted on those subjects. Further, I&A is committed to 

using its analysis of raw data from POEs and daily operations to help ensure 

nominations are correct. 

CBP and ICE provided technical comments for consideration. Where 

appropriate, we made changes to the report to ensure the accuracy of 

information. 

Recommendation #1 

We recommended that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 

develop and issue department-wide guidance governing the DHS watchlist 

nominations process. 

I&A Response 

I&A concurred with our recommendation. 

OIG Analysis 

We agree that the action I&A plans to take will satisfy the intent of this 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open pending 

the development, issuance, and our receipt of the department-wide watchlist 

guidance. 

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Recommendation #2 

We recommended that the Under Secretary develop protocols for sharing 

NCTC and TSC watchlist guidelines with all DHS Intelligence Community 

and non-Intelligence Community components to ensure proper inclusion and 

updating of NCTC information. 

I&A Response 

I&A concurred with our recommendation. 

OIG Analysis 

We agree that the action I&A plans to take will satisfy the intent of this 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open 

pending development, issuance, and our receipt of the protocols for sharing 

NCTC and TSC watchlist guidelines with all DHS Intelligence Community 

and non-Intelligence Community components. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope and Methodology 

We reviewed DHS’ activities for making nominations to the consolidated 

terrorist watchlist. Our objective was to determine whether DHS had 

participated in the nomination process. To make that determination we 

evaluated whether DHS had developed a process for making nominations; 

employed a quality control process for nomination accuracy; ensured the 

responsibility for making nominations was clear; provided nominators 

adequate training; and maintained records of nominations. We conducted the 

review at the request of the Director of National Intelligence. 

We conducted our fieldwork from July to October 2007. We received 

briefings from officials at the National Counterterrorism Center and the 

Terrorist Screening Center. We interviewed DHS officials from 11 

components: Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, Customs and Border 

Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis, National Protection and Programs, Operations Coordination, 

Screening Coordination Office, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret 

Service. 

We also interviewed staff from antiterrorism and intelligence subcomponents: 

CBP Office of Anti Terrorism, National Targeting Center, and Office of 

Intelligence; ICE Office of Intelligence; I&A Collection Requirement Office, 

Homeland Environment Threat Analysis, and Intelligence Watch and 

Warning. Additionally, we surveyed organizations that made nominations to 

determine their awareness and participation in the nominations process. 

We also reviewed component records and documents such as guidance for 

making nominations, current and planned processes for making nominations, 

and nominations made to the consolidated terrorist watchlist. 

Our work was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections 

issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

Memorandum of Understanding Between Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community 

Regarding the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum 

Review of the Nominations Process for the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist 

Between the Offices of the Inspectors General 

of 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Department of Justice 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

National Security Agency 

Department of Homeland Security
 

Department of State 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

Department of the Treasury 

Department of Energy 

March 19, 2007 

Amended and Restated as of May 7, 2007 

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Appendix C 

Memorandum of Understanding Between Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community 

I. BACKGROUND 

Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated terrorism watchlist that is 

populated by information from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Agencies that possess or 

acquire terrorism and counterterrorism information, excepting purely domestic 

counterterrorism information, are required by Executive Order 13354 to 

promptly give access to such information to the NCTC. The NCTC then 

provides a subset of that information to the TSC for inclusion on the 

consolidated watchlist. In contrast, the FBI provides purely domestic 

counterterrorism information directly to the consolidated terrorism watchlist. 

The Information Sharing Environment, which is part of the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and was created by the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is responsible for 

reporting to Congress on whether there are consistent standards for placing 

individuals on, and removing individuals from, the terrorism watchlists; 

whether processes are available for correcting errors in the watchlists; and 

whether the federal government takes adequate measures to ensure the 

accuracy of information about individuals on the watchlists. 

On December 14, 2006, the Intelligence Community Inspectors General 

(ICIG) Forum agreed to coordinate a review of the processes for nominating 

individuals to the consolidated terrorism watchlist. The Offices of the 

Inspectors General (OIGs) of the ODNI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 

Department of Justice (DOJ), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Security Agency (NSA), 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Department of Energy 

(Energy), Department of State (State), and Department of Treasury (Treasury) 

will work together to accomplish this review. This Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) provides the terms of agreements for coordination 

among these OIGs. 

II. OBJECTIVES 

The objectives of the review are to ascertain, both within agencies and across 

the Intelligence Community (IC), whether: 

1.	 Processes and standards for nominating individuals to the 

consolidated watchlist are consistent (both within agencies and 

across the IC), articulated in policy or other guidance, and 

understood by nominators; 

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Appendix C 

Memorandum of Understanding Between Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community 

2.	 Quality control processes are in place to help ensure nominations 

are accurate, understandable, updated with new information, and 

include all individuals who should be placed on the watchlist based 

on information available to the agencies; 

3.	 Responsibility for watchlist nominations is clear, effective, and 

understood; 

4.	 Nominators receive adequate training, guidance, or information on 

the nominations process; 

5.	 Agencies maintain records of their nominations to the NCTC (and 

to the TSC, in the case of the FBI), including the source of the 

nomination and what information was provided; and 

6.	 Organizations with terrorism, counterterrorism, and domestic 

counterterrorism information in their possession, custody, or 

control appropriately participate in the nomination process. 

III. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

The ODNI OIG will coordinate the work of the OIGs participating in the joint 

review, review watch list nominations within the ODNI, and examine any 

cross-agency issues. The ODNI OIG, with the assistance of staff from the 

NSA OIG, also will conduct a review of watchlisting nominations in the NSA. 

The DOJ, DHS, DIA, CIA, NGA, Energy, State and Treasury OIGs will lead 

watchlisting reviews within their respective agencies. 

To ensure the success of the review, each participant agrees to the following 

requirements. 

1.	 This review will focus on issues surrounding the process for 

nominating individuals to the terrorism watchlist. Other issues, 

such as the quality and integrity of the existing watchlist or the 

redress process for removing names from the watchlist, do not fall 

within this joint effort. These issues are possible subjects for 

subsequent reviews. 

2.	 The OIGs participating in this ICIG joint effort will assist ODNI in 

determining the scope of the joint review. 

3.	 The OIGs that are conducting watchlisting reviews within their 

respective agencies will examine all of the issues within the scope 

of the ICIG joint effort. The OIGs’ reviews, however, are not 

limited to the scope of the ICIG joint effort. 

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Appendix C 

Memorandum of Understanding Between Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community 

4.	 The OIGs conducting interviews and collecting information will 

document those interviews and information in accordance with 

their agency’s respective procedures. 

5.	 The OIGs that are conducting watchlisting reviews within their 

respective agencies will keep the ODNI OIG apprised of 

developments and progress in their reviews, and they will provide 

the ODNI OIG an opportunity to review their draft reports before 

they are finalized and released. They also will have final authority 

over the content of their reports. 

6.	 To the extent possible, monthly meetings will be held by 

representatives from each OIG review team to address issues and 

share findings. The ODNI OIG will reserve space at the CIA for 

these meetings. Each participating organization will bear its own 

travel expenses throughout the duration of the review. 

7.	 With respect to the OIGs whose agencies will be inspected by the 

ODNI, the agency OIG will assist the ODNI OIG with identifying 

whom to interview and accessing the agency’s workspace. The 

ODNI OIG will schedule, conduct, and document interviews of 

agency employees. 

8.	 The ODNI OIG will analyze its findings, as well as the findings of 

the OIGs that are conducting watchlisting reviews within their 

respective agencies, in a separate report that examines the watchlist 

nomination process across agencies. The OIGs that performed 

watchlisting reviews within their agencies, the OIGs whose 

agencies were inspected by the ODNI as part of this review, and 

the heads of agencies to whom the ODNI OIG makes 

recommendations will have an opportunity to review the ODNI 

OIG’s draft report. The ODNI will not append the reports of the 

OIGs that performed watchlisting reviews within their agencies to 

its report. 

9.	 The ODNI OIG will issue its final report analyzing the watchlist 

nomination process across the IC to the heads of the departments 

and agencies reviewed; IC IG Forum members; officials to whom 

recommendations are addressed; the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI); the Director of the National Counterterrorism 

Center; the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (upon approval of the 

DNI); the DDNI for Collection; and other officials as appropriate. 

If possible and appropriate, the ODNI will issue the report, or a 

summary thereof, to the public. 

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Appendix C 

Memorandum of Understanding Between Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community 

10. The ODNI OIG will be responsible for monitoring compliance 

with its report recommendations and will provide a status report to 

the ICIG Forum at each meeting of the Forum until all 

recommendations are closed. 

11. The OIGs that are conducting watchlisting reviews within their 

respective agencies will be responsible for monitoring compliance 

with their report recommendations. 

12. The ODNI OIG will copy the agency OIG on any correspondence 

sent from the ODNI OIG to the agency. 

13. Each OIG that is conducting a watchlisting review will perform its 

own investigations of waste, fraud, abuse, or illegal actions that 

may be uncovered during the review. Allegations involving other 

agencies will be referred to the appropriate OIG for action. 

14. The ODNI OIG will issue an announcement letter to the IC 

agencies affected by this review. 

15. This review will be performed in accordance with the President’s 

Council on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for 

Inspections, January 2005. All participating OIGs must follow 

these or higher (e.g., Yellow Book) standards. 

IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND TERMINATION 

This MOU shall become binding and enter into force upon signature of all 

parties. It shall terminate upon implementation of all recommendations from 

the respective OIG reports. Early termination of this MOU may occur upon 

the approval of the ICIG Forum. Any OIG may withdraw from the MOU at 

any time by providing written notice to the ICIG Forum. This MOU shall be 

dated as of March 19, 2007. 

V. SIGNATURES 

The undersigned, whose signatures appear on separate signature pages 

attached hereto, have reviewed this document and are in agreement with the 

conditions contained herein. 

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Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector 

Megan McNeely, Lead Inspector 

Levar Cole, Inspector 

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Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Executive Secretary 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 

Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection 

 General Counsel 

 DHS OIG Liaison 

 I&A Audit Liaison 

 CBP Audit Liaison 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Intelligence Community 

Director for National Intelligence 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

•	 Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: 

Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528, 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.