U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

58–398 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 111–1052 

THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF PROCURING 

WEAPON SYSTEMS IN EXCESS OF 

REQUIREMENTS: CAN WE AFFORD MORE C–17S? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 13, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN KILVINGTON, Staff Director 

BRYAN PARKER, Staff Director and General Counsel to the Minority 

DEIRDRE G. ARMSTRONG, Chief Clerk 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 1 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 5 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 35 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 44 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, JULY 13, 2010 

Hon. Mike McCord, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Department of Defense and Alan Estevez, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, U.S. Department of Defense ....................... 8 

Major General Susan Y. Desjardins, Director, Strategic Plans, Requirements, 

and Programs, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, U.S. Air Force ............ 9 

Jeremiah Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation, Congressional Research 

Service, Library of Congress ............................................................................... 22 

William L. Greer, Ph.D., Assistant Director, System Evaluation Division, 

Institute for Defense Analyses ............................................................................ 24 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Desjardins, Major General Susan Y.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Estevez, Alan: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. McCord .................................................. 45 

Gertler, Jeremiah: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Greer, William L. Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 61 

McCord, Hon. Mike: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Estevez ................................................... 45 

APPENDIX 

Charts referenced by Senator Carper .................................................................... 37 

Letter from the Secretary of Defense to Senator McCain .................................... 44 

Questions and responses for the Record from: 

Mr. McCord ....................................................................................................... 68 

Mr. Estevez ....................................................................................................... 76 

General Desjardins ........................................................................................... 88 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(1) 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF PROCURING 

WEAPON SYSTEMS IN EXCESS OF REQUIREMENTS: CAN WE AFFORD MORE C–17S? 

TUESDAY, JULY 13, 2010 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES,

AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. The hearing will come to order. 

Good afternoon, one and all. We are delighted that you are here. 

Thank you for joining us for our first panel and in about 3 or 4 

hours from now the second panel. No, it will not be that long. 

Three years ago, this Subcommittee held a hearing on strategic 

airlift that analyzed the cost effectiveness of the C–5 Modernization 

Program. Two years ago, we investigated the growing cost overruns 

of the Department of Defense’s major weapon systems. Last year, 

Secretary Gates recommended eliminating a handful of expensive 

weapon systems in order to save taxpayer dollars, and Congress 

largely agreed and cut nearly every one of them recommended by 

the Secretary. 

Last month, Secretary Gates announced that the Pentagon will 

attempt to cut its budget by more than $100 billion over the next 

5 years. This will not be an easy task, but this Subcommittee will 

continue to identify ways to help Secretary Gates and his team to 

achieve this level of savings. We do so because we face a troubling 

budget outlook. As this chart shows,1 our yearly budget deficits are 

currently a little bit over $1 trillion, and they are projected to be 

hundreds of billions of dollars over the next few years. Even out 

to 2014, the deficit, which last year was about $1.4 trillion, will 

have been reduced by two-thirds, down to about $462 billion. But 

that is still a lot of money. 

Can we look at the next chart? 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

2 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 38. 

We do not just print money. Some people think we just print 

money. When we run out of money and we want to spend money 

in excess of the monies raised through the Treasury, what we do 

is we borrow it. And if you look at some of our biggest creditors, 

China, almost $1 trillion; Japan, about three-quarters of a trillion 

dollars; United Kingdom, over quarter of a trillion; and if you add 

all those countries that export oil to us, close to a quarter of a trillion dollars as well.1 That is where the money comes from when 

we spend money that we do not have. And we have been spending 

a lot of it. 

To go back, it is hard to believe, but in the year 2000 and I think 

the fiscal year 2001, we actually balanced our Nation’s budget, only 

9 years ago. And there was actually—I remember hearing—I do not 

know if it was Chairman Alan Greenspan or someone else from the 

Federal Reserve, but someone came in and testified before us in 

2001. There was concern that we were paying down the deficit too 

quickly and could destabilize the economy. Hard to believe. That 

was 9 years ago. And when you look at all of this chart, it did not 

turn out that way, did it? 

One of the reasons why we are having this hearing today is to 

figure out how we can have a little bit less red there in that China 

column and a little less green in that Japan column and so forth. 

But our spending levels are at record highs to try as we come out 

of the worst recession since the Great Depression; two wars, terrible recession, and it has almost been like having two feet on the 

accelerator to try to get us moving, get the economy moving. Now 

in the months and years to come, it is sort of like seeing one foot 

coming off the accelerator and starting to tap on the brakes. But 

it is a delicate balance as we figure out—too much braking could 

stall the economic recovery; not enough braking, I think, represents 

a concern to a lot of us who have a sense of fiscal responsibility. 

If we do not control spending, if we do not do something to increase revenues, and if we do not begin to close our deficits, who 

are we going to pass the legacy onto? It is my kids, it is your kids, 

it is our grandchildren, and yours. 

This hearing will analyze potentially unnecessary spending by 

once again looking at strategic airlift. This hearing will ask what 

happens when we buy more weapon systems than the Pentagon 

says we need. It is one thing to buy weapon systems the Pentagon 

says we need, we really need them; it is another thing to continue 

to spend money for weapon systems that the Secretary of Defense 

says, ‘‘We do not need that. We have got enough of that already.’’ 

We had an interesting battle on the Senate floor about a year 

ago. Senator McCain, who will be here in a little bit, and Senator 

Levin, the leaders of the Armed Services Committee, basically at 

the urging of the Administration and also because they thought it 

was the right thing, looked at whether or not we need to continue 

to buy F–22 fighter aircraft. And some of the information that was 

presented to us, as you may recall, was here is an aircraft that I 

think, if memory serves me well, costs about $191 million a copy. 

I think we had bought about 187, and the proposal was to continue 

buying them. Cost per flight hour, about $45,000. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

3 

On any given day, roughly 55 out of 100 of the aircraft are mission-capable. And if you add up all the sorties they have flown in 

Iraq, in the Iraq War, and all the sorties they have flown in Afghanistan, they added up to zero. So did it make sense for us to 

continue buying that aircraft? It did not make sense. Senator 

McCain did not think it made sense. I certainly did not. Neither 

did Senator Levin, neither did the President, neither did Secretary 

Gates, and we said, ‘‘That’s enough. That’s enough.’’ 

Today’s hearing is going to focus a little bit differently. It is not 

going to focus on an aircraft that has not been delivered. To the 

contrary. The C–17 is a superb aircraft. We have a whole squadron 

of them in Dover, Delaware at our Dover Air Force Base. We 

bought over 200 of them and about that many have been deployed. 

They perform admirably with high mission-capable rates. And so 

the question is not: Is the C–17 a dog? It is not. It is a very good 

airplane. When do we have enough of them? 

And so we are going to ask our panelists today what happens if 

we buy more C–17s, even though recent airlift studies have stated 

that our strategic airlift capability exceeds our demand. I want to 

set the scene, if I can, for this topic. Our strategic airlift fleet consists of about 111 C–5s, big airplanes—we have some of those at 

Dover as well—and about 223 C–17s. As good as the C–17 has 

been, though, it cannot do everything. As good as the C–5 is, it cannot do everything as well. That is why we have a blend of C–5s 

and C–17s, and C–130s as well. 

As you know, the C–5 carries more cargo, sometimes almost 

twice as much as the C–17. It can fly further without refueling, almost twice as far as a C–17. It cannot land on austere runways, 

but a study of the record shows that in, I guess, the last decade 

or so, about 95 percent of flights that the C–17 landed and delivered goods, provided airlift for, the C–5 could have done that as 

well. 

But the problem with the C–5 has been reliability. The missioncapable rate hovers around the mid-60s, for the most part in recent 

years as compared to 85 percent for the C–17. 

To correct those deficiencies in terms of mission-capable rate for 

the C–5, the last Administration, the last President, the last Secretary of Defense, said to us: Why don’t we take those C–5s, those 

C–5s that were built in some cases in the 1970s and in some cases 

in the early 1980s, that have another 30, maybe 40 years of useful 

life on their fuselage, on their wings, why don’t we do something 

about the engines? And at least one of our witnesses here has 

flown C–5s. We have them at Dover. I have heard for years how 

the engines just do not work. About every thousand hours, they 

have to change them out. The new C–5Ms will get about 10,000 

hours. They will get about 10,000 hours between engine changes, 

and about 50 or 60 of the weapon systems or components, avionics 

systems, have been changed out as well. The idea is to get us from 

about a mid-50 to 60 percent mission-capable rate up to 75 percent 

or higher, north of there, and so far the three C–5s that have been 

produced, that are being flown literally out of Dover, are doing 

that. 

I think Harlan Geer, sitting right here over my left shoulder, was 

telling me not long ago, that a couple of months ago, one of those 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

4 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

C–5Ms broke 41 records for airlifts in one flight from Dover to Turkey. That is the kind of thing we want to hear. 

I will never forget talking to one of the aircraft commanders 

when they brought—I guess it was the first C–5, into Dover Air 

Force Base for its annual inspection, and I asked the aircraft commander, ‘‘How does this C–5M fly?’’ And he said—I thought I would 

never hear anybody say this about a C–5—‘‘It flies like a rocket.’’ 

I said, ‘‘You are kidding.’’ He said, ‘‘No. It really does. It flies like 

a rocket.’’ 

We have had some blips along the way in terms of the work that 

is being done in the C–5, but for the most part, we are encouraged 

to this point. 

I anticipate that the C–17 will continue to play a leading role in 

airlift for years to come, and I also expect that fully modernized C– 

5s will be a worthy complement to our C–17 fleet. I do not know 

if we have anybody here from Lockheed, but here is the deal, as 

I understand it. We expect the C–5Ms to deliver at least a 75-percent mission-capable rate and the work that Lockheed is doing in 

the modernization to come in under budget, at or under budget. So 

that is the deal. If Lockheed will deliver along those lines, I think 

this is a pretty good deal for the taxpayers. If they cannot, it is not 

a good deal for the taxpayers. 

However, while an even more robust fleet of C–5Ms and C–17s 

would ensure that we would never have to worry about strategic 

airlift, our current budget problems force us to confront some tough 

decisions about how many more aircraft we ought to buy, and this 

starts by looking at how many more C–17s we can afford and 

whether it is cost-effective to keep buying them. The last time the 

Air Force requested C–17s was in fiscal year 2007.1 That was 4 fiscal years ago. However, since then, the Congress has purchased, I 

think, 43 additional unrequested C–17s. Keep in mind the second 

chart we had up here, which shows where the money comes from 

when we are spending money we do not have. It comes from China, 

it comes from Japan, it comes from the United Kingdom, it comes 

from all those countries that have the oil and that have our money. 

In 2007, the Air Force asked for 12. They got 22. In 2008, they 

asked for zero. They got 15. In 2009, they asked for zero. They got 

eight. In 2010, they asked for zero. They got 10. And the question 

is, they have asked for zero again in 2011, what are they going to 

get? And my hope is that the second column under congressional 

purchase, instead of having three question marks, will have a zero. 

And, again, it is no reflection on the aircraft. As I said, it is an exceptional aircraft. We have just got enough of them. 

We have another chart.1 The chart is entitled ‘‘DOD Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016.’’ I think this was done a 

couple months ago. Some of you are familiar with it. Every so often 

we ask the Department of Defense to look at what our requirements are going to be for airlift, and they measure this in million 

ton-miles per day. Worst-case scenario, which I think includes a 

couple of wars going on and a bunch of problems back here at home 

that we need airlift for. And in the worst-case scenario, the DepartH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

5 

ment of Defense, 5 months ago, said we needed capability to give 

us 32.7, almost 33 million ton-miles per day. Our current capability 

with our current fleet of C–5s and our current fleet of C–17s is almost 36 million ton-miles per day. Instead of borrowing $800 or $900 billion from the Chinese, if 

they were borrowing money from us, if we had such a robust Treasury, that would be one thing. We do not. And to the extent that 

we have about three million ton-miles more per day capability than 

we have need going forward. And even worst-case scenario, does it 

make sense for us to continue to go further and further into debt? 

I do not think it does. Neither does the Secretary of Defense. Neither does the President. In fact, the Secretary of Defense has recommended that the President veto any spending bill that includes 

funding for more C–17s. 

In this hearing, we are going to explore how to manage a costeffective strategic airlift fleet, and it is not this Subcommittee or 

any Committee trying to dictate to the Department of Defense 

what they ought to be doing or what they actually need for the 

strategic airlift for our country. They have told us. This study up 

here, this most recent one, this tells us in a worst-case scenario, 

and it says we have a lot more capability than we have need. As 

it turns out, we have a lot more appetite than we have money to 

buy things with. 

So we are going to look at whether it is cost effective to increase 

our fleet by buying more C–17s. Finally, we will try to determine 

if there is a business case for increasing airlift capabilities beyond 

our airlift demand. I look forward to this hearing. I look forward 

to a productive hearing. We are grateful for everybody who has 

come over to spend some time with Senator McCain and myself, 

and our colleagues, and I again want to thank Senator McCain for 

the excellent work that he and his colleagues did and certainly 

Carl Levin last year on the F–22, and for always reminding us that 

these weapon systems just do not materialize out of thin air. We 

have to buy them. We have to pay for them. And we do not have 

the money. 

What did they use to say about the theory of holes? The theory 

of holes when you are in a hole on the budget, on a deficit, if you 

are in a hole stop digging. Stop digging. That is what we want to 

do. Senator McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will 

make my remarks brief. I want to thank the witnesses and look 

forward to hearing from them, and I do not think we should have 

this hearing without the backdrop of the Secretary of Defense’s recent announcement that he intends to save $102 billion over the 

next 5 years, which means obviously some very tough decisions are 

going to have to be made. And, obviously, the Secretary of Defense 

and the President have long ago announced their opposition to further acquisition of the C–17. 

Now, whether the Appropriations Committee will—how they will 

act remains to be seen, and, Mr. Chairman, I think that is one reason why it is important that we have this hearing. And I quote 

from the authorization bill. The Secretary of Defense said, ‘‘The adH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

6 

1The letter referenced appears in the Appendix on page 44. 

ministration appreciates that the Committee supports the President’s budget request regarding the C–17 program and that it did 

not authorize procurement of additional C–17s.’’ 

According to the OMB’s report on terminations, reductions, and 

savings for fiscal year 2011, the number of C–17s in operations and 

on order together with the C–5 aircraft exceeds what is necessary 

to meet the Department of Defense future airlift needs even under 

the most stressing scenarios. 

According to OMB, the substantial operational costs associated 

with buying additional unneeded C–17s would have to be offset by 

retiring C–5s early. Those aircraft still have on an average 30 

years of useful service life, and it does not seem to me that is a 

reasonable use of taxpayers’ money. 

Perhaps most persuasively, as Secretary Gates noted in a letter 

to me on this program, ‘‘Continuing to purchase C–17s in numbers 

beyond what is required simply diverts limited resources from 

other pressing needs, including critical warfighting capabilities.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that the letter be included in the record.1

Senator CARPER. Without objection, it will be. 

Senator MCCAIN. And Secretary Gates has also made it clear 

that he will strongly recommend the President veto any legislation 

that sustains the unnecessary continuation of this program. 

In remarks delivered over the past few months, Secretary Gates 

noted that it was time to return to the model in which real choices 

were made, priorities were set, and limits were enforced, and he 

specifically cited the C–17 program as an example where Congress 

was failing to make choices when it comes to defense spending. 

And he concluded that we all must be willing to ask and answer 

questions regarding real-world requirements in order to have a balanced military portfolio and a defense budget that is fiscally and 

politically sustainable over time. 

Let us be clear. The only thing sustaining the C–17 program in 

the face of a military requirement that is and will likely remain 

satisfied is the predominance of the military-industrial complex. 

Such machinations should end. When decisions are made to start 

or continue new major weapons programs, the needs of the 

warfighter must preside, not the profit-maximizing tendencies of 

industry or the strictly parochial interests of Congress. After billions of dollars wasted over the last few years, the C–17 presents 

the clearest case why in this regard we must do better. 

I thank the witnesses, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Senator CARPER. Senator McCain, it is great to be sitting here 

next to you and have a chance to hear from these witnesses today. 

Let me just briefly introduce them, if I may. 

Our first witness today is Deputy Under Secretary Mike McCord 

from the Department of Defense’s Comptroller’s office. Under Secretary McCord serves as one of the Pentagon’s chief budget and finance officers. He joins Under Secretary Robert Hale in the Comptroller’s office in helping Secretary Gates take a scalpel to the Pentagon’s budget and holding the service branches’ feet to the fire 

when it comes to wasteful spending. He joined the Department of 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

7 

Defense with 24 years of experience in dealing with national security issues in the Legislative Branch, including, I am told, 21 years 

as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

Under Secretary McCord, we thank you for your participation in 

the hearing. We hope you will be working closely with us over the 

next couple of years to find additional savings in the defense budget. Just one quick question. Where did you go to college? 

Mr. MCCORD. Ohio State. 

Senator CARPER. The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio. 

Mr. MCCORD. Yes, I attended the university in Columbus. 

Senator CARPER. Good for you. All right. You are an Ohio State 

Buckeye. It is great to have you here. Thanks. Thank you for your 

service. 

Our second witness on the panel is Major General Susan 

Desjardins. Is that French, Desjardins? 

General DESJARDINS. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. What is it, garden, some gardens? 

General DESJARDINS. Gardens. 

Senator CARPER. General Desjardins is here today to testify on 

behalf of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, the major 

command in charge of managing the Air Force’s airlift fleet. In the 

Air Mobility Command, General Desjardins serves as the Director 

of Strategic Plans, Requirements, and Programs, and in this position she is responsible for force structures, planning doctrine, and 

requirements of the Nation’s airlift and refueling force. She has 

some 30 years of service in the Air Force, I think, this year, and 

over 3,800 flying hours as a command pilot in a number of different 

aircraft, including C–5s, C–17s, and C–135s. Anything else? 

General DESJARDINS. KC–10s, sir. 

Senator CARPER. KC–10s, all right. General, we are grateful for 

your testimony today. We look forward to a productive discussion 

on our Nation’s strategic airlift fleet. 

And our third and final witness is Alan Estevez. Mr. Estevez is 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness, representing the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Mr. Estevez 

is one of the top advisers to the Pentagon leadership on logistics 

and readiness. He is here today because one of his office’s many duties is to prescribe policies and procedures for the conduct of strategic mobility, to manage strategic mobility programs within the 

Department of Defense. Prior to assuming his current position, I 

am told Mr. Estevez held key positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Is that true? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. That is correct. 

Senator CARPER. Where he played a critical role in re-engineering defense transportation processes. Mr. Estevez, we thank you for 

being here today. We understand you flew in from theater last 

night. Is that true? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. That is correct. 

Senator CARPER. Not the movie theater, but another theater, and 

we want to invite you to discuss, if you want to, a little bit your 

experiences there, what you saw and heard as it relates particularly to the hearing today. And I understand that you and Under 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

8 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. McCord and Mr. Estevez appears in the Appendix on 

page 45. 

Secretary McCord will be delivering joint testimony today, and 

Under Secretary McCord will be giving the oral statement. We are 

told if we observe you carefully as he speaks, we will see your lips 

move. And we want to see how this works out, and we hope you 

will just chime in as is appropriate. 

Under Secretary McCord, I will ask you to start off the testimony 

that has been prepared for you and Mr. Estevez, and then we will 

go right to our general. Thank you. 

Mr. McCord, please proceed, and your full statement will be 

made part of the record, and I think you are prepared to summarize. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MIKE MCCORD,1 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ALAN ESTEVEZ, PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MCCORD. Yes, thank you, Chairman Carper, and Senator 

McCain. I am Mike McCord, Department of Defense’s (DOD) Deputy Comptroller, and as you said, joining me is Alan Estevez, the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Logistics and Materiel 

Readiness, and Major General Sue Desjardins of the Air Mobility 

Command, and we are here to speak about the Department’s decision to end the C–17 program. Thank you for putting the longer 

prepared statement on behalf of Alan and myself in the record. 

I want to begin my oral remarks by thanking you on behalf of 

all three of us, and the Department, for your support of the men 

and women who wear America’s uniform. Your concern for their 

well-being is greatly appreciated. 

DOD depends on two aircraft, the C–17 and the C–5, to provide 

the airlift needed to deliver and sustain our combat power, including most importantly in support of our operations in Afghanistan. 

Over the past 5 years, the Department has conducted three studies 

concluding that our C–17 and C–5 airlift capability is more than 

sufficient for our needs today and in the foreseeable future. Most 

recently, the study to which you referred was known as the MCRS– 

16, the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study, concluded 

last February. It looked at requirements through 2016 to ensure 

that our plans and investments for mobility capability will support 

future operations. 

The results of that study indicated that the Department’s plans 

for strategic mobility capabilities are sufficient to support our projected requirements. The study concluded that the number of C–5s 

and C–17s in the Department’s program of record is sufficient, 

even in the most demanding environments. These findings were 

consistent with all the studies we have undertaken over the past 

5 years, all of which have shown that the size and mix of our strategic airlift fleet is adequate to meet requirements and that we 

have enough C–17s. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

9 

1The prepared statement of General Desjardins appears in the Appendix on page 49. 

Our analyses have also concluded that keeping the C–17 line 

open is simply not cost effective. It is not cost effective to buy more 

C–17s and then retire more C–5s to meet the requirements we 

foresee, and even if our requirements studies turned out to be 

wrong and we wanted to buy more later, keeping the C–17 line 

open was not judged to be a cost-effective way to hedge against 

that risk compared to upgrading the existing C–5 fleet or even restarting the C–17 production line later. 

In addition to these studies, the Air Force Fleet Viability Board 

concluded in 2004 that the C–5A, which is the oldest variant, will 

remain viable until at least 2025. And according to the Air Force, 

the C–5 fleet as a whole will remain viable until 2040. Moreover, 

ongoing modernization and refurbishment of that fleet will increase 

the fleet’s reliability, available, and maintainability. 

So as a result of these studies, Secretary Gates concluded that 

it is not in the national interest to keep adding C–17s. Last September, he wrote to Congress that the Department does not need 

additional C–17s to meet strategic needs. Accordingly, our budget 

request for 2011 includes no funds for additional C–17 aircraft. The 

President has directly expressed his support for the Department’s 

position on this. In comments concerning the fiscal year 2011 budget request, he said, ‘‘We save money by eliminating unnecessary defense programs that do nothing to keep us safe. One example is the 

$2.5 billion that we are spending to build C–17 transport aircraft 

the Pentagon does not want or need.’’ 

Secretary Gates, as he usually does, made clear where he stands 

by stating in his testimony this year that he would ‘‘strongly recommend’’ a presidential veto of legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of the C–17. 

The reason the Secretary feels strongly about this is because he 

believes, as he told the House Armed Services Committee a year 

ago, that ‘‘a dollar spent for capabilities in excess to our real needs 

is a dollar taken from a capability we do need.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, this remains our position on the C–17 today, and 

I want to thank the Congress for supporting that position in all the 

defense bills that have been reported or passed by the House or 

Senate this year, and I welcome your questions. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Estevez, how did he do? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. He did exactly what we expected. 

Senator CARPER. That is good. All right. 

General Desjardins, please proceed. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SUSAN Y. DESJARDINS,1 DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS, REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS, HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

General DESJARDINS. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished Subcommittee Members, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify about our Nation’s strategic airlift requirements. 

As the Director of Strategic Plans, Requirements, and Programs 

for Air Mobility Command, I and my staff translate air mobility 

mission requirements of the armed forces and the U.S. TransporH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

10 

tation Command into fielded capabilities. We do this by long-range 

planning, requirements assessment, and funding allocations that 

support our ability to organize, train, and equip our mobility forces. 

We are faced daily with difficult choices as there are many more 

requirements than resources, more combat needs than dollars or 

manpower available. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 

Study-16, or MCRS–16, is an important tool that assists us in making some tough, near-term choices that chart AMC’s path towards 

the future. By clearly quantifying valid operational needs, we can 

more accurately streamline and shift our limited resources to meet 

other pressing mission requirements. MCRS–16 determined that 

our program’s strategic airlift fleet of 223 C–17s and 111 C–5s provides excess capacity that permits the retirement of our oldest, 

least reliable aircraft. These C–5 retirements will free up the manning and dollars needed to assign 16 C–17s to the Air Reserve component. The retirements will save approximately $325 million over 

the future years’ defense program in depot level maintenance, flying hours, and modernization costs. 

Conversely, if aircraft retirement restrictions direct us to maintain a fleet in excess of the wartime lift requirements, then additional manpower, infrastructure, and resources would be needed to 

operate a larger fleet. 

To ensure the long-term viability of our strategic airlift fleet, 

AMC continues to invest in the necessary upgrades of our C–5 and 

our C–17. The C–5 provides a combination of outsize capability, 

high-capacity, and long-range airlift that is unequaled by any other 

airlift platform. 

The almost complete C–5 Avionics Modernization Program will 

provide continued access to worldwide airspace. The Reliability, 

Enhancement, and Re-engining Program (RERP) is a vital modernization program. The 52 C–5s currently programmed for the 

RERP modification will provide more reliable, efficient, and enhanced strategic airlift at a reduced cost. We are confident the 

modernized C–5M, or Super Galaxy, will achieve our operational 

and sustainment goals and will meet the worldwide air traffic performance standards. 

The C–17 continues to be the backbone of our Nation’s strategic 

air mobility fleet. It exceeds expectations every day under very 

challenging operational tempo as we support the drawdown in Iraq, 

the plus-up in Afghanistan, and all other ongoing mobility operations worldwide. It adds great breadth and depth to the mobility 

playbook because of its mission versatility, responsiveness, and enhanced capabilities. 

The program fleet of C–17s and the modernized C–5 fleet provide 

the Nation with sufficient, flexible, and responsive inter-theater 

airlift to meet our wartime and peacetime needs. I am confident 

that our Nation’s strategic airlift fleet will remain the keystone of 

the Department of Defense’s ability to rapidly deliver cargo and 

personnel anywhere in the world. 

Air Mobility Command will continue to support our joint and coalition partners while balancing the requirements to be responsible 

stewards of the taxpayers’ hard-earned dollars. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

11 

We greatly appreciate Congress’ support of America’s air mobility 

fleet. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much, General. 

We will do 7 minutes for our first round, and if we need a second 

one, we will use that as well. 

General Desjardins, I just want to come back to your testimony. 

Thanks very much for your testimony. But I just want to try to be 

clear on one point. Is it the policy of the Air Mobility Command 

that we do not need any additional C–17s? 

General DESJARDINS. Yes, sir. We do not need any more C–17s. 

Senator CARPER. All right. And what does the Air Mobility Command believe to be the appropriate mix, if you will, of C–17s and 

C–5s? 

General DESJARDINS. Sir, the program fleet of 223 C–17s and 111 

C–5s currently, according to MCRS, provides, as you indicated in 

your chart, 35.9 million ton-miles a day. That is excess capacity. 

The 32.7 million ton-miles a day is what the Mobility Capabilities 

Study determined was what we needed to meet the future 2016 

challenges that we have ahead. 

So with that excess capacity, then we would look to retire our 

least capable C–5s, and that is what we had asked for, 22 C–5s; 

17 in 2011, and 5 in 2012. 

Senator CARPER. And by retiring the C–5s, I think you said we 

would realize a savings if we retired with 2 years the 22 C–5As, 

realize a savings of about $300, $320 million. Is that right? 

General DESJARDINS. Yes, sir. 

Senator CARPER. It was not that long ago that I think we had 

some folks in to see us, very senior people in airlift, I think maybe 

even the Joint Chief at this time from the Air Force came in and 

said basically we want to buy another 30 C–17s, and we are going 

to pay for it by retiring 30 C–5s. And I said, I do not think the 

math works on that. I do not think the math works on that. 

Mr. McCord, Mr. Estevez, would you just comment on the math 

of that tradeoff, retiring 30 C–5s and using the monies therefrom 

to buy 30 C–17s? Does that work? 

Mr. MCCORD. No, Senator. We agree that would not work, and 

just to follow up on the General’s point, if we already have excess 

capacity, then making tradeoffs between two types of airplanes 

when we already have enough of both is not really going to be a 

way that is going to be cost effective to have more of one and less 

than the other if we still end up with more than we need. 

Senator CARPER. A couple of months ago, Secretary Gates came 

before our caucus, Democratic caucus at lunch, and our Republican 

colleagues have similar caucus meetings every week, and I am sure 

they invited folks from time to time to share their thoughts. One 

of the questions that I asked Secretary Gates and I am going to 

ask you all here today: If we buy additional C–17s, what does it 

mean we do without? That was the question I asked, and let me 

just ask you all to comment on that as well. If we buy more C– 

17s that apparently we do not need, what does it mean we do without? Please. 

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, I guess at the end of the day you, in Congress, would decide that because you would cut something from our 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

12 

budget to pay for them. About $300 million for every C–17 that is 

added is the going price. Already we have had $10 billion added 

over the last 4 or 5 years beyond what we have asked for, and 

should Congress add any more, then, again, you would be making 

that choice really here of what you would cut out of our budget to 

pay for it. 

Senator CARPER. I will tell you what Secretary Gates said. He 

said, ‘‘There are things that we need to better ensure the safety 

and the effectiveness of our warfighters, and to the extent that you 

take away money for those needs and simply use it to buy aircraft 

that we do not need, you put in danger our warfighters. Rather 

than making them more effective and safer, you make them less 

effective and less safe.’’ 

I thought that was a very compelling argument. I think we will 

find out maybe later this year how compelling our colleagues find 

that argument to be. 

I will ask one more question, and then I will yield to Senator 

McCain, but this is another one for Mr. McCord. General 

Desjardins has said in her testimony that in order to manage our 

excess strategic airlift capability, we will need to retire older C– 

5As, and we talked about maybe 22 of them over the next couple 

of years. If Congress appropriates funding for more C–17s this 

year, then we could have to retire even more C–5As if that argument is credible. This balancing act could keep on going and going 

and going. And if we retire all the C–5As, maybe we can retire— 

actually, if you do the numbers, 22 C–5As, we save what, $320 million? If you retire all the C–5As, that would enable us to buy 

maybe three or four new C–17s. I think that is an intellectually 

honest argument. But in your eyes, would that be a cost-effective 

process? And does a cycle like this make it more difficult for you 

and Secretary Gates to achieve your goal of about $100 billion in 

budget savings over the next 5 years. 

Mr. MCCORD. Yes, it would, Senator, because first of all adding 

force structure is kind of the ultimate cost driver in the Department. So many things flow from having extra force structure: 

Training, manning, operating, having construction projects to base 

those things. And we are under a floor from the Congress right 

now, so we cannot have less than X number of both strategic airlift 

planes and C–5s specifically. So it is not clear that we could retire 

anything even if we wanted to, so any more planes that are added 

are basically increasing in an area where we already have excess, 

and adding force structure always adds costs. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Does anybody else want to make a comment? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. If I could. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Estevez. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. First, as you noted, I did come in from theater last 

night, and I just want to say that I had the opportunity on the 

ground for 6 days in Afghanistan to observe our magnificent strategic—— 

Senator CARPER. What did you see? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. We were in Kabul—— 

Senator CARPER. Give us a flavor, if you will. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

13 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Sure. We were in Kabul, Bastion where the Marines are in Helmand Province, Kandahar, and Bagram. We got to 

see C–17s delivering force. They were in every one of those places. 

Counter-IED enablers such as Aerostats that we were putting up 

above outposts so they could see the enemy at a distance, and 

MRAP capability, which we were delivering direct to the warfighter 

in those locations. Watched the handoff between the aerial porters 

and the Army at Bagram to put force out into the field. Just a magnificent flow going in. A true testament to our logistics capability 

in one of the hardest places in the world to get force into. 

Senator CARPER. How was the morale? How was the morale that 

you witnessed? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. I thought the morale was pretty good, and good assessments, frankly, on the ground. It is a tough fight, but people 

think that we can do this. 

Senator CARPER. Good. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. I am very proud to have been out there to observe 

our force engaged. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Glad you were there. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. With regard to the mix here, when we were looking 

at the C–5 RERP 2 or 3 years ago, it is most cost effective to maintain the C–5 fleet than it is to replace the C–5 with a C–17. As 

you said in your opening statement, and as Senator McCain alluded to as well, it is important to have that balanced mix. Aircraft 

are different things for different purposes, all related to the strategic mobility. We have a good mix right now, so replacing C–5s 

with 15 C–17s is definitely not the most cost effective way to sustain the airlift system and the airlift capacity we have. As we 

noted, we are in an overcapacity situation, so retiring some because 

we do not need it is OK, but buying more so that we retire more 

is certainly not the way the Department needs to balancing its 

business in this airlift system. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. And before I yield to Senator McCain, 

let me just—I like to use this example of—I call it the pens and 

pencil example, and I have two C–5s here, A’s or B’s that need to 

be modernized. They have one C–17. For the cost of fully modernizing two C–5As or C–5Bs, we can buy one new C–17. We were told 

by the Air Force that the useful life on these C–5s is maybe another 30, even 40 years. And as good an airplane as this is, these 

C–5s, fully modernized, can carry roughly twice as much and, as 

we have seen, fly in some cases like twice as far. 

Now, that does not take anything from the C–17, which can do 

some things especially with small fields and austere field that the 

C–5s can do. That is a pretty compelling argument. You buy one 

of these, you get two of these modernized, fly them for another 30 

years or so. They carry roughly twice as much, and you can fly 

them twice as far. 

That is a pretty compelling argument. I think it is one of the 

things that has led Secretary Gates, this Administration, and the 

last Administration to recommend to us that we go forward with 

the C–5 modernization, holding Lockheed Martin’s feet to the fire 

to make sure they deliver. But to the extent that they can, it seems 

like to me a pretty decent bargain for taxpayers. 

Senator McCain. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

14 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Estevez, I was also there over the Fourth of July, and I bring 

back the same impressions that you do. I also have a very strong 

impression that the C–130 is doing an incredible job since that was 

our primary means of transportation around the area. It is not the 

most pleasant way to ride, but it certainly does the job, as I am 

sure you are very aware. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. I agree with you on all fronts there, Senator. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. I do not know why they place those aluminum 

poles always in the center of your back, but someday—there are 

some things that I will never understand. 

I think we need to put a little more perspective on the costs here 

we are talking about. Isn’t it true, Mr. McCord, it has been about 

$8.25 billion we have spent just on the additional C–17s that Congress has appropriated? Isn’t that true, roughly? 

Mr. MCCORD. Roughly. I think it might be a little higher, but 

roughly correct, yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. So let us call it $8 or $9 billion that we have 

spent on aircraft that the military says they neither want nor need. 

But I am not sure that the average taxpayer understands the costs 

involved with training, maintaining the crews, all of the aspects of 

these aircraft that add additional billions of dollars to the cost. 

Could you elaborate a little bit on that? And also you, Mr. Estevez, 

if you want to. 

Mr. MCCORD. Yes, Senator. As I said earlier, every force structure increase necessarily carries with it cost increase because you 

have to man that force structure, train people on that equipment. 

You have bases. You might need a new hangar for a plane. It 

would sort of depend. If you only added one, that would be one 

thing. If you add 43, as it indicates here, then you are definitely 

going to need new bases, new equipment, new tooling at these 

bases, all these sort of things that add costs to operate and maintain and train people for that equipment. 

Senator MCCAIN. So we are talking about billions more. I do not 

know if we have any real estimate of those additional costs. I 

would be interested. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Well, I always say that giving us something that 

we do not need is a gift that keeps on giving, because we are going 

to sustain it if it is in the force structure. So a C–17 costs around 

$23,000, a little more than that, per flying hour that it is used. If 

we have it, it is going to be used because it cannot sit there; otherwise, it is going to rot. That includes some training involving that 

crew structure. But that is a gift that keeps on giving, so we have 

10 and that is $23 million per year to sustain that, and over time, 

a 30-, 40-year life cycle, we are talking a substantial amount of 

money. 

Senator MCCAIN. And we are not including in that estimate the 

costs of, say, additional hangars or additional equipment and necessary items to keep those aircraft flying. I do not know if anybody 

has a handle on it. I have never seen an estimate of those additional costs. I am sure they are very hard to get at because at one 

base they may just be able to use existing facilities; at others they 

may have to build additional ones. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

15 

Mr. MCCORD. That is correct, sir. Our staff this morning got me a figure of approximately $1 billion a year for the 43 that have 

been added, for the operating and support costs for the 43 that 

have been added, not all of which are in the fleet yet, but steady 

State, about a billion a year. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I would argue that is another 

point that we need to make to our colleagues. It is not just a onetime expenditure of some billions of dollars, but it is also additional 

billion dollars at least per year of additional costs. 

But that also, as I understand it, will then require the retirement of C–5s. Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. That would be what we would like to do. Frankly, 

we need some legislative relief in order to get down to the numbers 

that we want to for—— 

Senator MCCAIN. And why do you want to do that? Because we 

have overcapacity? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Because we have overcapacity, exactly, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. And yet the reason why you are saying that 

you have to do this because of overcapacity, these are perfectly— 

C–5s are perfectly good aircraft that have 10, 15, 20, 25 years additional life on them that they could have. Is that correct? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. That is correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. So we are talking about the $8 to $9 billion, a 

billion dollars a year, and then the costs of retiring and not keeping 

perfectly good assets. So the ripple effect of this action by Congress 

is rather significant. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. General, do you have sufficient—suppose that 

we just went ahead and bought these additional C–17s and even 

more to come if the appropriators have their way. What does that 

do to your requirements? 

General DESJARDINS. Well, Senator, it is as we spoke about. We 

are already at excess capacity. We have a shortfall then someplace 

else. And so we would have to look at, consider retiring the excess 

capacity that we have got in the strategic airlift fleet. 

I think that as retiring—your point earlier about retiring and 

how much does that cost, certainly we owe two reports on strategic 

airlift requirements, and then C–5 re-engining, we owe a couple of 

reports, as well as getting relief from 316 strategic aircraft. 

But even storage costs to the tune of—if it was 2000 storage, if 

you will, where we would have access to spare parts for the retired 

C–5s, that costs money, too, about $50,000 per aircraft. So there 

are costs associated, but we would look at it and consider our least 

capable aircraft in the fleet and have to stop flying them. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, if we could have from Secretary McCord 

and Mr. Estevez, if we could have a possible—just a paper, a couple 

of pages, as to not only the costs of each of the additional C–17s, 

but the ripple effects of it I think are rather important in case the 

Chairman and I have to engage in debate and discussion on the 

floor of the Senate. This could lead to that kind of a situation if 

the appropriators continue to add C–17s in the defense appropriations bill. 

Again, this is an important hearing because I think we all know 

that with the present economic situation in the country, there is 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

16 

going to be every part of the Federal budget squeezed, and the defense budget will not be immune from that. The Secretary of Defense has already announced that he intends to reduce costs by 

over $100 billion in the next 5 years, and he may be required to 

do much more than that, depending on what happens in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. 

So this is a fight worth having. We have been having it now for 

several years, and I think maybe the environment is now at a point 

where we will be able to prevail over the appropriators, and it is 

very helpful that we have a Secretary of Defense who is a man of 

enormous credibility on both sides of the aisle. 

I thank the witnesses. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Senator. 

I want to come back to—I just want to clarify a point. I raised 

this earlier. I just want to come back to it again as a follow-on to 

one of the questions that Senator McCain was asking. If we retire 

22 C–5As over the next 2 years, did I understand that the savings 

would be about $320 million. Is that the number that I heard? 

General DESJARDINS. Over the fiscal year DP, that is correct, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. And that works out to, I think, about $15 million a copy. And in doing that, that may be the right decision. Far 

be it from me to prejudge, but if later on the modernization program for the C–5Bs goes well and we have retired these C–5As, do 

we have the ability to go back and say, no, Lockheed Martin did 

a great job, they are getting 80-percent mission-capable rate on 

those C–5s that they have modernized, maybe we should do something with those 22 and bring them out of mothballs. Can we do 

that sort of thing? Is that realistic? Or is it too late at that point 

in time? 

General DESJARDINS. Mr. Chairman, it would depend on the kind 

of storage or retirement status we would put them in. But I would 

add that the Air Force is very committed to the modernization programs for C–5, and I did also want to add that we are using—we 

have three C–5s that have been re-engined and—— 

Senator CARPER. I have seen them all. 

General DESJARDINS. Yes, sir, and we are using two of them 

right now in the surge, and they are performing very well. 

Senator CARPER. Good. 

General DESJARDINS. So I just wanted to add that. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. 

Now, General Desjardins, let me just ask a follow-up question. 

The 22 C–5As that are maybe focused on for early retirement or 

for retirement, do they have significant service life left? Or are they 

on, if you will, their deathbed? What do you think? 

General DESJARDINS. Mr. Chairman, we have looked at these 22. 

Not all of them have we identified by specific tail numbers, but we 

have looked at the bad performers, if you will. Do they have service 

life yet left? Yes, they do. But compared with the rest of the fleet, 

these are the least—we would retire the least capable ones. 

Senator CARPER. When you were flying C–5s, any idea how many 

flight hours you have in C–5s? 

General DESJARDINS. I do not have very many, sir. Just over 100 

in the C–5. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

17 

Senator CARPER. What I have heard over the years is the big 

problem with C–5s is the engines, and when you have had a broken C–5 somewhere around the world, in many cases it was the engines. And in the modernization, they have traded out the old engines for, I think, the same GE engines that they use on Air Force 

One, as I recall, and we have sort of increased tenfold the reliability of those engines. 

General DESJARDINS. Yes, sir. And as you know, the enhancement program also includes 70-plus subsystems that were also not 

performing where they needed to be. Each added up to achieving 

a certain mission-capable rate in addition to the engines to get us 

where we need to be at initial operating capability plus 2 years. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thanks. 

If I could turn to you, Mr. Estevez, I think part of the responsibility of the ATL office—and what does ATL stand for? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Senator CARPER. Yes, it does. The office in DOD is to be wary 

of industrial-based concerns as well. We have been told that we 

ought to buy more C–17s in order to keep the C–17 production line 

alive in case our airlift demand drastically increases, even beyond 

the most demanding scenario that we looked at on one of our 

charts over here in the recent study. We have talked with aircraft 

producers in the past. They have told us that when you shut down 

a production line, you do it in a way that is not permanent. Or to 

put it another way, they store the production equipment away so 

that the line could be re-established in the future. Is that a possibility with the C–17 line? And if Congress, for example, did not buy 

any more C–17s in the fiscal year 2011 year, would the production 

line be permanently shut down? And part of this, I know the folks 

that make the C–17, as I said earlier, an exceptionally good plane. 

It is not just the United States that uses them, wants to use them 

in providing airlift. My understanding is other countries have purchased or are endeavoring to purchase the C–17s. Where does that 

fit into all this in terms of production line, keeping the line going? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. There are a couple of facets to your question, so I 

will take them—— 

Senator CARPER. Take your pick. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. With regard to shutting down a line, what we 

would do is we would take the special tooling related to that line. 

We would put that in storage should we for some reason need to 

restart that capability. So it would be there. There would be expense related to doing that. That would not be the best way to go 

about it. Frankly, there is an industrial base that we are fortunate 

to have in this country that can build wide-bodied cargo aircraft, 

and we would more likely draw on that base for our next generation of airlift rather than restart that line. But it is a possibility 

to restart that line. 

Let me just address—there is another industrial base that we 

need to consider in this process, and that is our carriers, aircraft 

liner companies that we use under our Civil Reserve Air Fleet program to haul cargo for us that provides us additional capacity in 

our go-to-war capability, and they are doing also a magnificent job 

in sustaining both our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan today. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

18 

Should we have more capacity than we need, at some point we 

dry up the dollars that are available to sustain that industrial 

base. So, again, it is important to balance the whole mix of capacity 

that we have out there, and sustaining those craft carriers is one 

of our key capabilities that we need to retain. 

Senator CARPER. Good. One of the questions that I wove into that 

mix of questions was whether or not there is an appetite from 

other countries, including some of our NATO allies, to acquire C– 

17s. I think some have, and my understanding is that others are 

interested in the aircraft. Can anybody comment on that? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. There are other countries, and I would turn to the 

General to fill that out. The British have some. The Australians 

have some. It is not a cheap plane, so some of our allies do not 

have the resources that we are blessed to have. 

Senator CARPER. But it turns out we do not. We borrow. If we 

do not have the resources, we just go out and borrow the money 

to buy them. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. So there are some allies that do have that capability, and there are some that are buying, continuing to buy from 

the Boeing line. 

Senator CARPER. Good. One of the things that the President has 

been pushing in recent months is to, I think, double over the next 

5 years our exports from this country, and this could be one of the 

very good things that we make well that we might want to export 

more of. 

I have maybe one last question, and this would be for Mr. 

Estevez and for General Desjardins. Three years ago, we faced a 

situation where strategic airlift was in short supply, and we were 

supposedly leasing, I think, a Russian aircraft—I think it is called 

An–124. Were they called Condors? Did they call them Condors? I 

think they did—from the Russians in order to deliver cargo to the 

battlefield. And I assume that we have since stopped this practice 

given the Air Force wants to retire 22 C–5As. Could you all confirm 

that we have stopped leasing the Russian aircraft? 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. We still use the Russian aircraft in situations, and 

I am going to turn to the General to fill this out. But we select the 

right aircraft for the right mission for the right time. An–124 can 

carry eight MRAPs; a C–5 can carry five MRAPs. An–124, because 

it is a commercial plane, being sustained for commercial business, 

has a reliability that it lands at Bagram and takes off without repair and, frankly, it is more cost-effective than flying a C–5 in for 

that mission. 

So when the opportunity arises to use the right aircraft, then we 

are able to lease it and re-lease it through a U.S.-flagged carrier. 

We use that aircraft. I think it is less than 1 percent of the total 

craft costs that we have expended. 

Senator CARPER. All right. General Desjardins. 

General DESJARDINS. Sir, this does not mean that we are not 

using the C–5 and the C–17 for these outsize—when we need to 

use the C–17 and C–5, depending on what kind of field they need 

to go into, potentially a threat environment, then we definitely 

want that organic capacity and that capability to be able to do that. 

But this is contracted through TRANSCOM. It is not a lease. It is 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

19 

a contracted service that we do take advantage of, but in small 

amounts, less than 1 percent, as Mr. Estevez indicated. 

Senator CARPER. Is it 1 percent of missions? Is it 1 percent of 

cargo delivery? 

General DESJARDINS. Flying hours. Of the flying hours, total flying hours for the craft. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

All right. I do not always do this, but I want to do this today. 

We have had a chance to hear from each of you. You have had a 

chance to hear from Senator McCain and myself on these issues. 

I just want to give you maybe a minute apiece, if you would like, 

just to give us some closing thoughts, giving us interchange and 

ideas that have been exchanged. Feel free to re-emphasize some of 

the points that you have already made or to refocus on others. 

I think in our business repetition is good. We call it staying on 

message. But feel free, if you want to repeat some of the points you 

have made or just to re-emphasize, to underline those, or if you 

want to maybe make another point in closing. 

Secretary McCord, why don’t you go first? 

Mr. MCCORD. Thank you, Senator. I guess the only other point 

I would want to make is that while the possibility is always out 

there that the requirements will turn out to be greater than we 

have said, we have studied this many times now, and we do not 

believe that is the case. But even if we were wrong by a little bit, 

we already have, as the General has alluded to, and you have on 

your chart, a pretty healthy buffer in the excess capacity we already have today, and that even if we were wrong, the first place 

we would go is to what we already have on board today to deal 

with any such mis-estimate. You would have to go all the way past 

that to even think about needing to buy more C–17s. But as Mr. 

Estevez has said, RERP’ing or modifying the C–5s we have now 

would still be more cost effective even if we got to that point of 

going past all the excess capacity we already have on board today. 

So we just do not see a case for needing any more. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you, sir. General Desjardins. 

General DESJARDINS. Sir, I would just say a couple things. This 

MCRS–16 study was probably the most extensive study that has 

been 2 years in the making—— 

Senator CARPER. Really? 

General DESJARDINS [continuing]. And some very stressing cases, 

looking forward to 2016, and so I think that it is something that 

has been studied—mobility coverage airlift has been studied a fair 

amount, but I would say that this is, like I said, 2 years in the 

making, and very relevant to where we are and came up with a 

million ton-miles per day that shows that we do have excess capacity. 

I would ask that we—again, we owe the Congress a couple of reports that we are working to get to you so that we can get retirement relief of the C–5As so that we can continue to operate the 

fleet the way that we need to so that we, again, are not corporately, 

the Department, we are shortfelled somewhere else. So we would 

like to do that. 

We do not need any more C–17s, and the fleet that we have right 

now, the programmed fleet, is a strong fleet and it is right-sized. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

20 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Before I turn to Mr. Estevez, I think a couple of years ago we 

actually asked the Air Force when they were talking about the 30– 

30 deal, retire 30 C–5As, the dogs, the worst of the C–5As in order 

to pay for buying 30 new C–17s, which does not work, as we talked 

earlier. Just the math does not work. Maybe with the savings of 

retiring 22 or in that case 30, you could maybe—I do not know— 

buy five or six, maybe five C–17s. But we asked the Air Force, I 

think—Mr. Geer, correct me if I am wrong. Didn’t we ask the Air 

Force to identify by tail number the worst-performing C–5As? Did 

we ever get that list? We never got answers. We never got any tail 

numbers from them. You might just anticipated we would be wanting to see that list. 

General DESJARDINS. Yes, sir. 

INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY GENERAL DESJARDINS 

The following are the 22 C–5A’s at the top of the retirement list. Please note that 

tail numbers may change if schedule inspections reveal costly repair actions: 

70000453 70000459 

70000457 68000217 

70000447 69000017 

69000003 70000446 

70000466 68000225 

69000027 69000001 

69000008 68000211 

70000464 69000015 

70000454 70000465 

70000455 69000019 

70000462 70000467 

Senator CARPER. OK. Mr. Estevez, the last word, please. 

Mr. ESTEVEZ. First I will say that we will have those 22 identified if we get the congressional relief that we are asking for in 

order to retire unneeded capacity. 

I am going to take you up, Senator, on repeating the message. 

We do not need more C–17s. We have studied this repeatedly. No 

studies have come back and said we need more capacity. In fact, 

we are over capacity to the point that we had in dialogue with Senator McCain. It is not just the procurement cost of a new airplane. 

It is a gift that keeps on giving. You have to sustain that plane, 

once you have it, over time, and that is a cost that also could be 

doing other things inside the defense budget that are more important than having more capacity than we need. 

So we appreciate you having this hearing to let us make the case 

that we have the airlift capability that we need and to hear us out 

in that regard. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Well, thank you very much for taking the time to appear before 

our Subcommittee today. I thank each of you for your service to our 

country, and some of the folks on our Subcommittee will probably 

have some additional follow-up questions. How long do we have to 

submit those, do you know? Two weeks. Two weeks. And I would 

just ask, if you get any additional questions from Senator McCain 

or myself or our other colleagues, that you respond to those soon. 

Again, thank you. We look forward to working with you, not just 

with respect to providing cost-effective airlift but other ways to 

save money and to do so in a way that does not undermine our seH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

21 

curity of this country and our ability to defend itself. Thank you 

so much. 

Mr. MCCORD. Thank you. 

General DESJARDINS. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CARPER. We would invite our second panel of witnesses 

forward, both witnesses. Mr. Gertler, welcome. Mr. Greer, welcome. 

Whenever I meet somebody whose name is Jeremiah, I am always reminded of a song, and the one you have probably heard 

more times than you care to recount. 

Mr. GERTLER. Sir, sixth and seventh grade were a particularly 

unfortunate time. 

Senator CARPER. I suspect they were. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Great song. Having to be Jeremiah, it could 

probably have been a little trying at times. I understand you go by 

J.J. What is the second J? 

Mr. GERTLER. Joseph, sir. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Well, we are honored that you are 

with us. We understand you joined us today from the Congressional Research Service, and I am told by Mr. Geer back here that 

you are their top military aviation specialist. That is quite a billing. 

Mr. GERTLER. Yes, sir. I would temper that observation by noting 

I am the only military aviation specialist of CRS, so I am also the 

bottom one. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Well, I understand you came to CRS 

with extensive experience in providing defense analysis to the Congress in your 10-year career on the Hill, served in positions on the 

House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, where you conducted oversight on the entire defense 

procurement budget and issues related to missile defense. 

The House Armed Services Committee, when you were working 

over there, who chaired? 

Mr. GERTLER. Actually, three chairmen during my tenure, sir: 

Floyd Spence, Bob Stump, and Duncan Hunter. 

Senator CARPER. All right. And on the Senate Armed Services 

Committee? 

Mr. GERTLER. I was not on the committee staff. I was on the staff 

of a member of the committee handling committee issues for Senator Charles Robb from Virginia. 

Senator CARPER. OK. And in addition to your time on the Hill, 

I am told, Mr. Gertler, that you have also served as analyst at the 

Department of Defense during part of the Clinton Administration 

and as a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. We thank you for your testimony today and look forward 

to hearing from you as we delve into this issue. 

Mr. GERTLER. It is an honor to be here. 

Senator CARPER. Our second and final witness is Dr. William 

Greer from the Institute for Defense Analyses. The Institute for 

Defense Analyses is a federally funded research center that conducts research and analysis on issues of national security for policymakers. Dr. Greer is the Assistant Director of the System Evaluation Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Dr. Greer’s 

service at the Institute of Defense Analyses has included conducting studies on air mobility and a range of other aviation issues. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

22 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Gertler appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

Dr. Greer was a task leader of the congressionally mandated study 

on the Size and Mix of Airlift Force, which was published in February 2009. 

Dr. Greer, I understand that your testimony will focus today on 

the conclusions you came to in the course of that study. We are 

eager to discuss whether these conclusions can be applied to our 

current airlift discussions. We thank you for your testimony. I 

think it is going to be quite insightful and I think useful as we 

move forward on these issues and these deliberations. Thank you. 

Your entire testimony will be made part of the record. I would 

ask each of you to use maybe roughly 5 minutes. If you go a little 

bit beyond that, that is all right. If you go 25 minutes, that is not 

all right. I will have to rein you in before we get that far along. 

But, again, thank you both. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF JEREMIAH GERTLER,1 SPECIALIST IN MILITARY AVIATION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Mr. GERTLER. Thank you, Chairman Carper, and thank you for 

inviting me to testify and participate in this hearing on behalf of 

the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 

Senator CARPER. Do you two know each other? 

Mr. GERTLER. For about an hour now, sir, yes. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Fair enough. Please proceed. 

Mr. GERTLER. As this is my first testimony since joining the Congressional Research Service, I wish to acknowledge for the record 

the significant contributions made to CRS’ work and to that of the 

entire Congress by my predecessor, the late Christopher Bolkcom. 

As a former staffer and client of CRS, I well know and share the 

regard in which his counsel was held by Members of the Congress, 

and I hope only that my work will do credit to his memory. 

That work today concerns strategic airlift. I will not repeat the 

many facets of the current request or current situation regarding 

C–17s and C–5s that have already been gone over by the previous 

witnesses. 

Senator CARPER. Let me just interrupt for a moment. As I said 

earlier to the first panel, sometimes repetition is helpful. Sometimes it is not. So do not be reluctant to emphasize or re-emphasize—— 

Mr. GERTLER. Well, I was being mindful of your 25-minute dictum, sir. 

Senator CARPER. Fair enough. 

Mr. GERTLER. In that case, as you know, the 2011 budget submission does not include any further procurement of the C–17 

transport and proposes to retire 17 C–5As. 

In previous years, Congress has added C–17s beyond the number 

requested. So far this year, both authorizing committees and the 

full House have acted on the bill. None has added any new C–17s. 

None has added any additional C–5 modernizations. 

As Members of the Subcommittee know, Mr. Chairman, Congress 

traditionally adds programs to defense budgets for quite a number 

of reasons. Each of these is discussed more fully in my written tesH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

23 

timony, but, briefly, they include such factors as policy differences 

with the Executive Branch, as seen in the case of the alternate engine for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter and the V–22 Osprey and 

in the Congress’ annual solicitation of the services’ unfunded request lists. 

Another factor is to maintain options for future policy changes, 

as in the sustainment of the B–1 bomber prior to the 1980 Presidential election, which allowed the voters to choose between the 

two candidates’ competing visions for that program. 

Constituent benefit. As members’ statements and press releases 

make clear, economic and employment benefits for a particular geographical area underlie a number of congressional procurement decisions. 

To maintain a viable industrial base: Separate from the constituent interest aspect of keeping production facilities open, maintaining national capabilities to design, develop, and manufacture 

certain defense items has been seen as a goal worthy of national 

investment. Indeed, this interest is not unique to Congress. The 

Department of Defense itself has on occasion requested systems, 

absent formal requirement or in excess of them, in order to preserve industrial capabilities. 

To reduce risk. Now, ‘‘risk’’ is one of the less consistently defined 

terms used in defense discussions, but it usually attempts to measure the probability that a particular military goal will not be met 

by a certain schedule. If a particular force posture is deemed high 

risk, Congress has added assets in order to bring that risk down. 

And to hedge against changes in requirements from current projections. One common observation regarding the post-Cold War 

world is that uncertainty is the norm in defense planning. 

Budget requests are based on estimates of future challenges and 

threats, projections of U.S. national interests, and the likely capability requirements extending from them. But even highly educated 

projections have at times not foreseen substantial challenges. 

Other times, Congress may have differences over the assumptions 

or analytical process of an important study. Adding unrequested 

systems can be seen as giving commanders flexibility in case future 

events differ from DOD’s projections. 

That brings us to today’s hearing. DOD’s most recent study of 

airlift demand, the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study2016, is classified. But its unclassified executive summary stated, 

‘‘With few exceptions, MCRS found the Department’s planned mobility capabilities sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements.’’ It went on to say that the capacity of the Department’s strategic airlift fleet exceeds the peak demand in each 

of the three MCRS cases that they studied. 

Critics, some of whom are advocates of further C–17 production 

or additional C–5 modernizations, can have legitimate questions 

about that conclusion. It is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, to address 

the contents of a classified study in an open session, but I have included in my written testimony some questions that readers of 

MCRS–16 can ask to gain insight into the relevance of the study’s 

data and the validity of its conclusions. 

Finally, as to cost effectiveness, it can be a very tricky metric. 

Costs from mature systems are comparatively easy to determine, 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

24 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Greer appears in the Appendix on page 61. 

but the effectiveness side of the equation is more difficult to quantify because, as I have noted, the purposes for which DOD requests 

certain systems and Congress’ goals in approving and/or expanding 

on those requests may not be the same. And, of course, another effect of spending on unrequested items is to divert money from 

known needs. 

Instead of chasing any one element of this farther, I will stop 

here, Mr. Chairman, so that we may focus on the points of most 

interest to the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the Congressional Research Service. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Gertler, thank you so much. Dr. Greer, 

please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. GREER, PH.D.,1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, SYSTEM EVALUATION DIVISION, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 

Mr. GREER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased 

to be here to talk about a recent study we have done also. Our 

study is not the MCRS study but one done a year before that, as 

you mentioned, and it is called the Size and Mix of the Airlift 

Force. 

The Department of Defense selected us to do a study, which was 

actually requested by the National Defense Authorization Act in 

2008. And so I am going to confine my testimony today, not to all 

the parts of the study we were asked to do, but I will confine it 

to the C–5/C–17 part of it, which is what is relevant here. 

I will also ask that the lengthier version of my oral remarks be 

entered into the testimony. 

Senator CARPER. Without objection, your entire testimony, including those remarks, will be included. 

Mr. GREER. Now, the National Defense Authorization Act had a 

wide range of operational scenarios they asked us to look at: Peacetime operations, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, homeland security, irregular warfare, all the way up to major combat operations, 

so the whole gamut. 

Within these, the study considered numerous alternatives that 

included upgrading existing C–5s and procuring additional C–17s. 

So we looked at a large number of alternatives, all of which had 

different mixes of these aircraft. 

We also examined fleets that were both larger and smaller than 

planned for acquisition. We looked at operational effectiveness and 

life-cycle costs. So unlike the MCRS, ours was a cost-effectiveness 

study. So I will summarize the approach we took, the alternatives 

we looked at, and the main findings. 

The program of record when we did our study 2 years ago was 

the base case that we used, and then we did excursions from that. 

For strategic airlift, the program of record actually only had 205 

C–17s at that time, not 223. So that is what we used as our base 

case. It did have 111 C–5s for a total of 316 aircraft. The C–5s can 

be further divided into 59 C–5As and 52 C–5Ms. So that is the program of record. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

25 

Senator CARPER. When you say C–5Ms, do you mean C–5Bs 

or—— 

Mr. GREER. Well, I mean B’s and C’s that have been upgraded 

to the C–5M through the RERP process. One name for it is either 

C–5 RERP or C–5M. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. GREER. So the RERP modification, by the way, just so you 

know, involves not just new engines and pylons but a number of 

other auxiliary power units—— 

Senator CARPER. What are some of the most important ones? 

Mr. GREER. Well, the most important one would be the engines, 

no question about that. 

Senator CARPER. But beyond the engines? 

Mr. GREER. I have listed the auxiliary power units, and I do not 

remember the other multiple—I can provide that later. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thanks very much, if you could. 

Mr. GREER. I just do not remember off the top of my head. 

Senator CARPER. Just for the record. Thank you. 

Mr. GREER. The most important one is the engines, though. 

So I will just remind us again that we looked at 205 C–17s rather than 223. So the requirements—we had sort of two questions to 

answer here. What were the requirements? And did this program 

of record meet the requirements? And how did the alternatives 

match up in cost-effectiveness? 

The requirements we used were different from the MCRS. The 

MCRS had not been done, so we did not have the same major combat operations details that they had. So instead we used the only 

other existing Department of Defense requirements, which was the 

MCS, the Mobility Capabilities Study from 2005, for the major operations. 

For the non-major operations, we were able to take advantage of 

the latest—the SSSP or the Steady State Security Posture scenarios, which were the same as used in MCRS. So our requirements were a mixture of the non-combat ones from MCRS plus the 

major combat operations from the MCS. 

When we take those scenarios, we looked at how the program of 

record matched itself against delivery, and we found that the program of record meets the acceptable risk for delivery in those scenarios, in all those scenarios combined. So the alternatives we 

looked at, just to mention them briefly, were not just the base case, 

which had 316 aircraft, but it looked at smaller and larger excursions that held the C–5 RERP fleet constant at 52 C–5Ms, while 

adding C–17s and/or reducing C–5As. We also looked at excursions 

in which all of the C–5s were RERP’s to C–5Ms, all 111 of them, 

and then other ones in which we actually did not RERP all the C– 

5Bs that are currently planned, so something less than 52 would 

be RERP’s and then either adding or subtracting other aircraft. 

What we found, obviously, is that larger fleets do better than 

smaller ones. They cost more so there is a tradeoff in cost and effectiveness, but I will remind you that the program of record met 

the requirements that were postulated. 

We addressed two other issues—several other issues, one of 

which was starting and stopping the C–17 line, which was one of 

the major questions asked of us. Our assessment of the C–17 line 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

26 

shut down and restart is that continued production, even at very 

low rates of, let us say, five aircraft a year is expensive relative to 

the restart costs. So we think that the scenarios in our study do 

not call for any larger numbers, but if there were a requirement 

that emerged some time in the future, our feeling from our calculations is that restarting would be better than paying the cost as a 

hedge for continuing production, because the likelihood of that future requirement we think is fairly low. 

The requirements that we used from the MCS study seemed to 

be very similar to that from the MCRS study after 5 years. So we 

do not see a reason for extrapolating to higher requirements. 

We also looked at lifetimes, and we found the C–5s and C–17s 

all have lifetimes beyond the year 2040. 

So, Mr. Chairman and other Members of the Committee, I will 

conclude there with my prepared remarks and be glad to discuss 

any of the other findings. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks so much for those comments. 

I would like to start off my first question just by asking you to 

look back just a little bit to earlier in the afternoon when we had 

three other people sitting at this witness table, and they gave us 

their testimony and responded to our questions. I just want to take 

a minute or two, each of you, and just reflect on what you heard 

that maybe you agreed with, anything that you did not agree with, 

or maybe just some thoughts that sort of grow out of what you 

heard them say. Please. Dr. Greer, do you want to go first, please? 

Mr. GREER. I would be glad to. I did take a couple of notes. 

Senator CARPER. I thought you might. 

Mr. GREER. Some of the comments, the questions had to do with 

cost, and since the MCRS study really did not deal with cost, that 

was not in that study, but there were opinions expressed anyway. 

We looked fairly extensively at the cost of everything, and one interesting observation was the tradeoff of one for one if you buy a 

C–17 and get rid of a C–5A, what is involved there. And vaguely 

it was said this would not be a good idea. 

Actually in our study we show that quite explicitly. There is 

about a factor of 2 in the difference between the money you pay 

to buy a C–17 and operate it for 25 years and the cost to operate 

a C–5A for the same period. It turns out to be around $400 to $600 

million, depending on whether it is reserve or active. So that is 

about $400 to $600 million to buy—$250 million of which is to buy 

it, the rest of it is to operate it, as Senator McCain was commenting about. And if you then compare that with getting rid of 

a C–5A, how much do you save? Over that same period of time, you 

save about $250 million. So there is a factor of 2 difference. You 

pay more to buy a C–17 than you save in getting rid of a C–5. You 

would save—you would have to get rid of two C–5s to pay for the 

one C–17 that you bought. You would lose an airplane, one total 

airplane. 

Let me just let you make some comments, and if you do not 

mind, I will look at my notes and see if there are any others I want 

to comment on. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thanks. 

Mr. GERTLER. Senator, I think the most striking piece of testimony that I heard this morning had to do with the tail costs, the 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

27 

idea that, yes, you buy the aircraft and that is one price, but it is 

so rare that we look at the costs to operate and support that over 

its lifetime. 

Now, frankly, that goes both ways. If one is resuscitating a C– 

5, particularly one that has been retired and is going back through 

a modernization program, that, too, will have an operational tail 

cost, although the C–5Ms should have a lower operating cost than 

the current C–5A, B, C fleet, in large part due to the improved engines that get much better fuel efficiency. But consideration of a 

life-cycle cost rather than the year-by-year acquisition cost, which 

is what Congress seems so often to focus on, may lead to a different 

conclusion than if one just looks at the annual outlay. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Thank you for those observations. 

Mr. Gertler, I believe in your testimony you said to us that Congress sometimes adds on unrequested items to defense bills because they differ with the policy and not necessarily because of parochial concerns. You gave us a very good example in the F–35 alternate engine program. I know some members without parochial 

interests in the F–35 alternate engine believe that the competition 

of the alternate engine will drive down costs and produce a better 

quality engine. When it comes to adding more C–17s, are there any 

policy disagreements akin to the one that you cited with the F–35 

alternative engine? And do any of these policy arguments have any 

merit in your opinion? 

Mr. GERTLER. There are several policy arguments. I think the 

two main ones that come to mind as being on point with regard to 

the C–17 decision are the industrial base discussion, which we 

have had at some length. There has currently been or rather recently been a very public debate on this subject. Secretary Gates, 

in testimony a few weeks ago, stated that he believed that the commercial wide-body airline or aircraft industrial base would be sufficient to pick up the slack if we needed to go back and do another 

tranche of military cargo aircraft. And some members publicly took 

him to task for that statement and differed with him on that. 

Senator CARPER. Say that again? What did the Secretary testify 

to? Just say that again. 

Mr. GERTLER. That military—and I am paraphrasing here. That 

military cargo aircraft are just wide-bodied cargo aircraft, and we 

already know how to make civilian wide-bodied cargo aircraft, so 

the military—there may not be a military uniqueness to the C–17 

production line or technology base. And, again, that is something 

over which people can reasonably differ, and have. 

But I think the other significant one has to do with hedging, the 

notion of do we have margin if our projections about the future are 

wrong. In terms of the million ton-miles per day figures we saw, 

the Department currently has an excess of about 10 percent. Now, 

when an insurance salesman comes to your home and says, ‘‘I 

would like to sell you some insurance; something bad might happen 

to you,’’ you make a decision about what it is worth to you to have 

that eventuality covered. 

We have right now 10 percent worth of insurance already built 

into the program. Some members may believe that we need to have 

a greater insurance, that we need to have more excess in case our 

projections about future demand for airlift prove to be wrong. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

28 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. 

Dr. Greer, if I could, a question for you. In your testimony, you 

discuss, among other things, the cost of restarting the C–17 production line if it were to be shut down in the next year or two. I believe that if Congress decided not to buy additional C–17s in fiscal 

year 2011, as I said earlier, foreign sales would prevent line closure, at least for the next couple of years. Could you further discuss the cost of restarting a terminated C–17 production line? Did 

your calculations include the possibility that foreign sales could at 

least keep part of the C–17 production line open for the next several years? 

Mr. GREER. I would be glad to answer. First of all—— 

Senator CARPER. One more time. There you go. 

Mr. GREER. Yes, sorry. Thank you very much. We did not take 

into account foreign sales. We were simply looking at U.S. acquisition, and it really would not change anything in our analyses other 

than the start date at which the line would shut down. 

We looked at this from a point of view of an investment, very 

much like an insurance policy that was referred to before, is that 

if we have several hedging options against a future which might 

change dramatically from that which we have today. One would be 

to go ahead and build 15 a year. Another one would be to build five 

a year, keeping the line operating at a sort of sustainment level. 

And then a third one would be keeping a warm line active, which 

I think Mr. Estevez referred to as just keeping the tooling at very 

minimal cost, but not building anything. And then shutting it 

down. Those were the four different things we looked at. 

It would take about a billion dollars, we think, to restart the entire facility from cutting it down, razing it to the ground, and building a new facility. This was a rough guess. There are numbers 

twice that much, actually from the Boeing company that it might 

be as much as twice that, but $1 or $2 billion seems to be the range 

that the Air Force and contractors believe is right. And this seems 

to be in accord with, comparison with other large facilities that 

have been proposed to be built to build large-bodied aircraft. 

The hedging calculation then is to say how likely is it that you 

would expect to see a large requirement increase, and we do not 

see that very likely from any of the patterns we have seen in past 

studies. 

Another angle we took on that was to say how many years would 

it be before—let us say we went 10 years and then discovered, my 

gosh, we really need to build—we have suddenly emerging very 

high requirements. We need more C–17s. We probably would build 

a different airplane at that time, but let us say we would still build 

C–17s. Would it have been smarter to have maintained the C–17 

line or to have stopped it, 10 years from now restarting it? In that 

particular case, it actually would have been better to have stopped 

and restarted. You do not get—in the sense that you would have 

saved money overall because of the discounting value of dollars in 

the future spent versus dollars spent tomorrow. And the one advantage in continuing the production is that you would get the aircraft faster. You have already been building them, so there they 

are. But you have had to maintain them during a period of time 

when you did not need them, and then there is still time to build— 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

29 

and whether you would build a C–17 10 years from now is still arguable. Probably new technology would come in, and a new airplane would be chosen. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. Let me just follow up on that. Do you 

recall—actually, either of you can respond to this one, if you will, 

but do you all recall—and you may have said this but I missed it, 

but has there been an aircraft production line that has been successfully restarted in recent memory upon having been shut down? 

Mr. GERTLER. Actually two come to mind. 

Mr. GREER. OK. I only know one, so you—— 

Mr. GERTLER. OK. That again is referencing, as I mentioned in 

my testimony, the B–1, which the Carter Administration canceled 

in 1997, I believe, production of that stopped. And it was restarted 

several years later under the succeeding Administration. 

That was a fairly unusual case because in that case the contractor, Rockwell International, put an enormous amount of their 

own money, something in the vicinity of a quarter billion dollars, 

to keep the facility there, to store the tooling and to keep most of 

the workers employed so that they would be available. They were 

essentially betting on the outcome of the presidential election and 

that the subsequent Administration would restart the B–1. 

But it should be noted, even with a large investment and their 

maintenance of large amounts of raw materials as well to start the 

B–1, it still took 3 years from when they got the go-ahead until the 

next plane came off the production line. So they were shut down 

for a long period, but the restart still took a good while. 

That differs in a very significant way, I think, from the C–17 

case, and it is this: At that time there was a thriving aerospace industry in Southern California. People who stopped working because 

a program went away at one plant went across the street to the 

plant that had just won a contract. And so there were a lot of workers to draw from when you restarted, when you got your contract. 

That is not the case now. The C–17 line is the last airframe production line in California. And so there is a big question as to 

whether if you close the plant the workers would disperse to other 

industries and not be available when you decided to restart. 

The other one that comes to mind—and I knew fewer details 

about this—is the C–5. The C–5A was built from 1969 to 1973. 

Congress decided to start the C–5B, and that ran from 1985 to 

1989. There was a 12-year break in production of C–5s. But, frankly, I do not know much of the detail of how Lockheed facilitized to 

restart that production. 

Mr. GREER. I do not know much more about that. We actually 

talked to Lockheed about the C–5’s stop and restart, trying to get 

data for analyzing the case for the C–17, trying to find analogs. I 

know that they did stop and put their tools aside, kept them in 

mothballs, so to speak, so that they could use them again 12 years 

later. Most of the records from that period of time seem to have 

gone away, so it is hard to reconstruct the actual cost, which was 

our issue. So I cannot comment any more than that because there 

is no more information than that. 

Mr. GERTLER. It should be said, I believe, though, that that was 

at Marietta, Georgia, which was a plant that was doing other proH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

30 

duction of other aircraft during that period. It was not dedicated 

to a single aircraft in the way that the C–17 facility—— 

Senator CARPER. What else were they building? C–130s? 

Mr. GERTLER. C–130s were made there. They were doing fighter 

work at the time? 

Mr. GREER. They were doing fighter work. Which one would that 

have been? I do not know for sure. I do not remember. 

Mr. GERTLER. Not coming off the top. 

Mr. GREER. But you are right that there were—— 

Mr. GERTLER. And one other factor with regard to the C–17 facility. It is an enormous amount of property in Southern California. 

It is immensely valuable land, which is to say—— 

Senator CARPER. Roughly how many acres? Any idea? 

Mr. GERTLER. I do not know. It is next to an airport, and I do 

not know how much of the entire airport facility Boeing actually 

owns. 

Senator CARPER. Which airport? 

Mr. GERTLER. It is part of the Long Beach airport. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Mr. GERTLER. But presumably, if the production line were shut 

down for a significant period of time, Boeing would want to operate 

on good business principles and monetize their asset. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thank you. 

This might be my next to the last question for either of you, but, 

Dr. Greer, your written testimony indicates that there might be future ways to increase airlift outside of C–5s and C–17s. I think you 

discussed an interesting possibility of employing refueling tankers 

that are not being utilized to conduct airlift missions. To your 

knowledge, has the Department of Defense and the Air Force ever 

put this suggestion into practice? 

Mr. GREER. Well, yes, sir. The tankers carry cargo all the time. 

The KC–10 self-deploys, carrying its own internal cargo that it 

needs wherever it goes. I am told from the Air Force that aircraft, 

KC–10s or C–135s, returning to the United States refueling, let us 

say, in Germany, if there is cargo at the base that needs to come 

back, rather than calling in an airlifter, they simply put it on the 

tanker. The tanker then brings it back. 

The tanker has a fixed space for cargo, so the fact that it is carrying fuel does not displace the cargo. The cargo and the fuel go 

into totally different areas of the airplane. It does add weight, so 

you get more fuel burned, of course, if you are carrying cargo. So 

this is done frequently. 

What I do not know would be done—this is a fair question to 

ask—is that in our analysis we assumed that the tankers that 

went to the theater, while waiting for tanking missions as we built 

up forces in theater, could they be used during their spare time, 

so to speak, carrying cargo around in the theater? They are not 

leaving the theater. They are still operating there. They are on call 

to come back and be a tanker when needed, but they can operate 

during this open time as airlifters. I do not know if we have experience with that sort of thing happening. But there is no question 

that tankers can carry cargo, they do carry cargo, and this kind of 

utility certainly is possible. It may be just a policy change, that is 

all. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

31 

Senator CARPER. OK. The next question I want to ask is one that 

neither of you may be prepared to respond to. I am going to ask 

you, if you cannot respond to it today, if you could for the record. 

We talked about the potential for foreign sales, additional foreign 

sales of the C–17, and my question either for here or for the record 

is: Could you recommend some things that our government, Executive and Legislative Branches working together, might do to 

incentivize and encourage those foreign sales so that the line may 

be extended beyond the next year or two? That would be a question. If you all want to respond to that now, or a bit later, I would 

ask that you do that. What would be your preference? 

Mr. GREER. Later for me. 

Mr. GERTLER. Certainly to find someone who would know an answer to the question would be my preference. 

With regard to foreign sales, though, the C–17 is currently operated by the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Qatar, and NATO 

is buying a small pool to share among NATO nations. 

Senator CARPER. When you say small pool, what? Three or four? 

Mr. GERTLER. I believe it is three aircraft to be a NATO-wide capability. They have an order from the United Kingdom for one additional aircraft. They have orders from the United Arab Emirates 

for six. And they have an agreement for another 10 for India, but 

as of last month, that contract had not been signed. I do not know 

whether it has actually been signed yet. So far that is what they 

have got in train for the production line. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Well, with an Administration, a President—as I said earlier, the President has been quite vocal about 

doubling our exports over the next 5 years, and this might be one 

for the Administration to focus a bit on. 

Did either of you want to add anything in response to my question? 

Mr. GREER. No. I have nothing to add to that. 

Mr. GERTLER. No, sir. 

Senator CARPER. What I would like to do as we come to the end 

here is just say, any closing thoughts? Do you want to take a 

minute or two to add any closing thoughts before I give a wrapup statement and we call it a day? 

Mr. GREER. OK. Shall I start? 

Senator CARPER. Please. 

Mr. GREER. OK. I had just one thought that I would like to add 

to the comments so far. As you know, from the time we did our 

study until the time MCRS did its study, there was about a 10-percent rise in capability. In our study, we see one could also extract 

at least another 10 percent, if not 20 percent, higher capability 

without buying a single additional airlifter. And this would be partially through using tankers—that was part of it—partially through 

having CRAF, aircraft, the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet, carry heavier 

cargo than they traditionally carry. They carry bulk now. If they 

can carry small larger vehicles called ‘‘oversized’’ by the military, 

that would help a lot. We found that was actually the single biggest help. And C–5s carrying a larger load temporarily during wartime, which they are permitted to do, and also relying more on allies who have airlifters to assist would also greatly benefit this. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

32 

1The prepared statement of Senator Carper appears in the Appendix on page 35. 

Now all of these can be counted on, you understand, but if we 

can extract even some of those, you are going to increase the capability even more before we have to buy a single additional airplane 

of any kind. 

Senator CARPER. Good. That is an interesting thought. Thank 

you. Mr. Gertler. 

Mr. GERTLER. Sir, one other factor with regard to maintaining 

the production line has not really been gone into today. Over the 

last few years, there have been a number of looks, both by the Department and by private industry, at a civil variant of the C–17. 

There is some interest from the package delivery industry, from the 

freight haulers, in that. There are also some obstacles, technical 

ones and having to do with export-controlled items. It may also not 

wind up being an economical proposition, but I believe that if you 

are looking for a way to extend that production line, the possibility 

of commercial sales, which are then aircraft that could be in the 

Civil Reserve Fleet and available to the Department as that insurance policy, should we need more than we think, is one way to address both issues. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Well, good. Thank you so much for all 

the thought that you have put into your work that enabled you to 

come here to testify before us today and to respond to our questions. 

I have a closing statement for the record that I want to enter 

into the record.1

I would like to add to that the following: I said early on, a decade 

ago—it is hard to believe a decade ago we had balanced budgets 

in this country. We had two of them in a row, I think, the first 

since 1968. And there were concerns about our paying down the 

debt, the Nation’s debt too quickly, that it would somehow destabilize our economy. And it did not work out quite that way, as we 

know, and we found between 2001 and 2008 we basically ran up 

as much new debt in our country as we did in the first 210 years 

of our Nation’s history. And last year the deficit was even greater, 

and we are looking toward—if we do not do something, we will end 

up doubling our Nation’s debt again over the coming decade. That 

is not sustainable. 

What do we do about it? One of the things that the Administration, the President has called for, and what I would describe as a 

multi-pronged attack on the deficit: One, a freeze on overall nonsecurity discretionary spending; second, convene a Deficit Reduction Commission, with a lot of good people, Democrats and Republicans, some very bright people on that Commission whose job is 

to come back to all of us later this year, all of us in the Congress, 

and say these are some things we think we might want to consider 

with respect to entitlement programs, Medicare, Medicaid, Social 

Security, and some of the other entitlement programs, too, to be 

able to save some money, and to look at revenues—we have a lot 

of—we call them the Bush tax cuts which expire, I think, later this 

year. The question is what do we do about those? So everything 

would be on the table, the entitlements and the expiring tax cuts. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

33 

The third thing that the Administration has started focusing 

on—and this Subcommittee has certainly focused on it for several 

years, both when Senator Coburn was our Chairman and the last 

several years that I have been privileged to Chair this Subcommittee. But one of the things we tried to focus on is some people call it waste, fraud, and abuse. It is more than just that. It is 

just inefficient spending, in fact, an inefficient spending of taxpayers’ dollars, and in some cases not taxpayers’ dollars but monies 

that we borrow from all over the world. 

Among the things that we have begun to focus on are something 

called improper payments. As it turns out, we spent last year, Federal agencies—this is not including the Department of Defense or 

all of Homeland Security, but improper payments in the Federal 

Government, about almost $100 billion in 1 year, a lot of the overpayments. We are focused on trying to recover monies that have 

been overpaid, misappropriated, and going out and recovering 

those monies. I think we recovered in Medicare just in the last 

maybe 2 years, and just part of the Medicare program, Parts A and 

B, not C and D, but we have recovered about $600 million by just 

going after—we call it post-audit recovery for inappropriate spending. So the idea is not just to stop making improper payments but 

to go back, and after we have overpaid the monies, go out and recover it. And we provide to the—it is contractors, private contractors, who do the recovery. They get to keep maybe 10 cents on the 

dollar. That is their incentive for doing the work. We are going to 

extend that to not just Medicare Part A but Medicare Part A, Part 

B, Part C, and D, and also to work the same approach with respect 

to Medicaid, and now to extend that to—with the House voting, I 

think tomorrow, to pass our improper payments legislation which 

some of us have worked on for a long time, with the Administration 

and with the past Administration, we can increase our ability to go 

there and recover money and bring it back to the Treasury, bring 

it back to the Medicare trust fund. 

The major weapon systems, cost overruns a big factor here. If my 

memory serves me correctly, in 2001 the Department of Defense, 

as I said, major weapon system cost overrun in 2001 was about $45 

billion. That is a lot of money. I think in 2008 it was $295 billion, 

which is a whole lot more money. And so part of that is F–22 and 

part of it is, frankly, weapon systems that we may not need any 

more of, and that could go to really good systems, like the C–17s. 

One of the ideas that is being discussed is whether or not to give 

this President enhanced rescission powers. Some describe it as almost statutory line-item veto powers, not to give them forever but 

maybe a 4-year test drive, see if it works, see if it is actually helpful, see if the President abuses that power and unbalances this balance between the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch. 

We have got a bunch of IT projects that actually deliver better 

service for less money to the people of this country. Unfortunately, 

we have a bunch of IT projects that do not, and they are way over 

budget, they are not meeting their advertised benefits for us. 

And another area that we have explored in the Subcommittee is 

the tax gap. The last time we heard, the IRS was saying, I think 

2 years ago, that they felt the tax gap was about $300 billion in 

any given year. That is monies that are owed to the Treasury that 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

34 

are not being collected, a fair amount of which they actually know 

who owes the money. And if we can only collect a third of that, that 

is $100 billion. That is a lot of money. 

And so if you add all that stuff together—the 3-year freeze on 

non-security discretionary spending, the Deficit Reduction Commission that we have got up and running to look at entitlement programs and the revenue side, consider improper payments, including the ability to go out and recover money that has been misappropriated or misspent, major weapon systems, enhancing the 

President’s rescission power, try it out for maybe 4 years, and these 

failed IT projects that the Administration is focusing on, and the 

tax gap, just collecting more of the money that is owed. And one 

other that has always intrigued me is surplus properties. The Federal Government owns huge amounts of property, not just land, not 

just defense installations but all kinds of property that we do not 

use anymore, that are empty, we have to pay utilities, provide security, do some maintenance to maintain them. It does not make 

a whole lot of sense. And the idea that we can maybe encourage 

agencies to sell that stuff and reduce our costs, those are just some 

of the things that we are trying to do. 

When you put it all together, it is actually a pretty good program. Does that mean we are going to wipe out all that red ink 

that we are looking at down the line? No. But we would sure have 

a lot less than we would otherwise, and we need to do that. So your 

testimony is helpful in that effort, and we are grateful to you and 

to our first panel of witnesses for it. 

Again, over the next couple of weeks, you might hear some questions from our colleagues, who either were here or not here, and 

to the extent you can respond to those questions and take a look 

at the one question I asked about when you are promoting foreign 

sales, particularly our friends from CRS, if you could help us with 

that, we would be most grateful. 

I have asked our Republican colleagues here over my right shoulder if they have any questions and they wanted to use me as their 

mouthpiece to ask any other questions. I could not get them to do 

it. But they said they thought Senator McCain did a pretty good 

job, and I think he did as well. 

We look forward to having an ongoing dialogue with you, and 

thank you again for joining us today. With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thanks. 

[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(35) 

A P P E N D I X 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.001
36 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.002
37 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.003
38 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.004
39 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.005
40 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.006
41 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.007
42 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.008
43 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.009
44 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.010
45 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.011
46 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.012
47 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.013
48 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.014
49 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.015
50 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.016
51 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.017
52 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.018
53 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.019
54 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.020
55 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.021
56 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.022
57 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.023
58 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.024
59 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.025
60 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.026
61 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.027
62 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.028
63 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.029
64 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.030
65 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.031
66 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.032
67 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.033
68 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.034
69 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.035
70 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.036
71 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.037
72 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.038
73 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.039
74 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.040
75 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.041
76 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.042
77 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.043
78 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.044
79 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.045
80 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.046
81 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.047
82 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.048
83 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.049
84 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.050
85 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.051
86 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.052
87 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.053
88 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.054
89 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.055
90 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.056
91 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.057
92 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.058
93 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.059
94 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.060
95 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.061
96 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.062
97 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.063
98 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.064
99 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.065
100 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.066
101 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.067
102 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.068
103 

Æ 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


58398.069