NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANPRIT SINGH,

 Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-74109

Agency No. A099 538 850

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued April 16, 2013 Submitted October 30, 2013

San Francisco, California

Before: GOODWIN, O’SCANNLAIN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Manprit Singh petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(BIA) dismissal of his petition seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant Singh’s petition for review. 

FILED

OCT 30 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
In concluding that Singh did not demonstrate past persecution, the BIA

found that Singh failed to corroborate his belief that Congress Party members were

responsible for the vehicular assault against Singh. This was error because, before

requiring such corroboration, Singh was not afforded notice and an opportunity to

respond with evidence or to explain why such corroborating evidence was

unavailable. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).1

On remand, upon providing the requisite notice and an opportunity to

corroborate the asylum claim, past persecution should be determined based on the

totality of the circumstances (e.g., the murder of Singh’s father, Singh’s arrests and

corresponding threats by police, corroboration regarding the vehicular assault,

1 The dissent asserts that Ren is not applicable here, because affording notice

and opportunity to present corroborating evidence would be “manifestly futile.” 

We disagree. Singh was found credible. Despite this finding, the IJ required

corroboration in order to meet his burden of proof. See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1093. 

The BIA held that Singh’s testimony that the Congress Party was involved in his

accident was speculative and that Singh failed to provide corroboration to support

this claim. However, Singh testified credibly that he could obtain the necessarily

corroboration evidence (affidavits from his friends). Singh also testified credibly

that members of the Congress party had admitted to causing the accident, again

suggesting that he could corroborate his testimony. Such affidavits would provide

the objective evidence the IJ and BIA were seeking to grant relief. Under Ren,

Singh should have been afforded an opportunity to obtain evidence to corroborate

his credible testimony. Id. Our review of this issue is limited to whether Singh

was afforded that opportunity. See id. Instead, the dissent wrongly speculates

about the contents of the corroborating evidence in order to determine whether the

opportunity should be afforded in the first instance.

2
corroboration regarding Singh’s friends’ attempted reporting of the incident to

police, Congress Party members’ implied death threat against Singh communicated

to his mother). See Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004);

Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding error by the BIA

where BIA found no past persecution after “viewing each incident in isolation,

instead of examining the totality of the circumstances” and instructing BIA to

consider the incidents “in the context of a larger pattern of conduct”). 

3
Because we remand on the issue of past persecution, we do not reach

Singh’s claims of future persecution, withholding of removal, or relief under CAT. 

See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam).2

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED.

2 The dissent suggests that the IJ made an alterative finding that, assuming

persecution, Singh could relocate in India. Again, we disagree. The IJ’s holding

was not an alterative finding, assuming persecution, but rather a determination of

whether Singh was eligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future

persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b); see also Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971,

976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In the absence of past persecution, an applicant may still be

eligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). The IJ

stated that Singh had the burden of proof, an appropriate statement in making a

determination of a well-founded fear of persecution. If the IJ were making a

relocation finding, after assuming persecution, the burden would instead belong to

the government. Because neither the IJ nor the BIA held that the relocation

analysis was an alternative basis for denying relief, we cannot affirm on a ground

on which the agency did not base its decision. See Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d

1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e must decide whether to grant or deny the

petition for review based on the Board’s reasoning rather than our own

independent analysis of the record.”).

Lastly, even if the IJ’s decision on relocation was an attempt to make an

alternative finding (an argument that only the dissent makes), the IJ’s decision

lacks clarity; therefore remand is necessary “to ensure that [the agency] evaluates

the relocation issue in accord with the proper burden of proof.” Afriyie v. Holder,

613 F.3d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2010).

4
Singh v. Holder, No. 08-74109

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The court’s decision in Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011), does

not control this case. Ren states clearly that, “[i]f a credible applicant has not yet

met his burden of proof, then the IJ may require corroborative evidence,” and, if he

so requires, “must give the applicant notice of the corroboration that is required

and an opportunity either to produce the requisite corroborative evidence or to

explain why that evidence is not reasonably available.” Id. at 1093 (emphasis

added). This rule does not mandate that every credible applicant who has yet

failed to carry his burden of proof be afforded with notice and opportunity to

present corroborating evidence.1 Such a conclusion, furthermore, would be

manifestly futile in this case. The IJ found that Singh credibly testified to the

following facts: (1) he was hit intentionally by the jeep; (2) other people in the

village told him they believed the Congress Party was behind the attack; and (3)

there were no witnesses to the attack. Singh never in his testimony claimed that

FILED

OCT 30 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

1There will certainly be cases where the applicant can present credible

testimony that does not satisfy the burden of proof, and corroboration is

unnecessary or futile. This is consistent with the statute, which states: “Where the

trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates

otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant

does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). This language, specifically the phrase “where a trier of fact

determines,” implies that the trier of fact may determine that no corroborative

evidence is required.
anyone had direct knowledge of the perpetrators’ identity or political affiliation. 

As the IJ noted, “[Singh] even acknowledged that all the people who told him were

merely relying on rumors and none of them had witnessed that these individuals

[who attacked him] were members of the Congress Party.” Thus, the IJ did not

find that corroboration was necessary—indeed, the IJ seemed to believe

corroboration would be impossible. Even if Singh obtained declarations from his

friends as to the perpetrators of the attack, these declarations would still be

speculative and would fail to satisfy Singh’s burden of proof. The IJ did note that

Singh provided “no objective evidence” to support his claims. But this is a far cry

from a determination that the applicant “should provide evidence.” 

Furthermore, the IJ clearly stated, as an alternative ground for the

disposition, that Singh had failed to demonstrate that he could have safely

relocated within his native country.2 Singh argues that this finding should be

2The relevant regulation states:

[A]n immigration judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, shall

deny the asylum application of an alien found to be a refugee on the

basis of past persecution if . . . [t]he applicant could avoid future

persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of

nationality . . . and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable

to expect the applicant to do so.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (emphasis added).

2
displaced because the IJ improperly placed the burden of proof on him and not on

the government where it belongs.3 Such a claim misreads the IJ’s opinion and

misconceives the administrative record. Before concluding that Singh “has not

established that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate,” the IJ had analyzed

and cited the extensive evidence submitted by the United States that tended to

show relocation could be both safe and practicable. During direct as well as crossexamination, Singh had the opportunity to dispute this evidence and to provide his

own. He did not do so. Indeed, the only evidence that Singh presented on this

issue was his own asseverations that he would have difficulty finding a job and that

the individuals who allegedly persecuted him in the Punjab state would have the

means and the motivation to pursue him hither and yon. Against the weight of the

3

See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii).

3
government’s evidence, the IJ did not find Singh’s testimony availing. This

conclusion is not unreasonable.4

Because I do not believe that Ren compels remand in this circumstance, and

furthermore because the IJ’s alternative holding concerning relocation provides an

independent basis for his decision, I would deny the petition for review.5

I respectfully dissent.

4Singh disputed the IJ’s determination concerning the reasonableness of

relocation on appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals. The BIA’s

decision did not address the issue but, by explicitly invoking Matter of Burbano,

20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), incorporated the conclusions and reasoning

of the IJ as articulated in her decision. In such circumstances, we may examine the

IJ’s determination concerning relocation as if it had been that of the BIA, see

Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010); and we review for

substantial evidence, see INS v. Eliaz-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992). 

This court, therefore, must uphold the agency’s findings unless “we . . . find that

the evidence not only supports [the opposite] conclusion, but compels it.” Id.

5The same logic that disposes of Singh’s application for asylum similarly

decides his prayers for withholding of removal and protection under the

Convention against Torture (CAT). The procedure for denying withholding of

removal on the grounds that relocation within the native country is reasonable is

substantially the same as for asylum. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B),

with 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). Because Singh cannot overcome the

government’s evidence concerning the reasonableness of relocation in the asylum

context, he similarly cannot prevail in withholding of removal. 

On the other hand, Singh’s burden for securing relief under CAT is even

greater. See Hasan v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing

that “the legal standard for considering the possibility of relocation is different in

the context of a CAT claim than in an asylum claim” and that, in the former, “the

burden is on the applicant”). 

Singh could not prevail on the relocation question for his asylum

application; he likewise cannot in these other claims.

4