alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
exv10w2



 





EXHIBIT
10.2




AMENDMENT TO S-76 NEW HELICOPTER SALES AGREEMENT



THIS AMENDMENT, dated as of the Acceptance Date stated below, by and between the Sikorsky
Contracting Entity (“Sikorsky”) named below and the Buyer named below, hereby amends the S-76 New
Helicopter Sales Agreement between the parties as follows:




     1. Definitions/Information for this Amendment



	 	 	 
	Buyer:

	 	Offshore Logistics, Inc.
	Sikorsky Contracting Entity:

	 	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
	Sikorsky Contract No.:

	 	S76TD02065
	Amendment No.:

	 	1






     2. Amendment — Amend the S-76 Sales Agreements as follows:



     Revise Exhibit A. FOR THE 2002 DELIVERED AIRCRAFT ONLY, as follows:



     1. Add 6086 Collective guards.



     2. Add 8660 Rotor Pedals Lube Kit



     3. Add 9009 Vertical Pylon Access Panels, CSN-76-207



     4. Add 9011 Three (3) Corrosion Inspection Holes



     5. Add 8876 Cyclic Stick Position Guard



     6. Add 8301 Annuciator “Fuel Transfer Feed On”.



     7. Delete 9014 Meggitt Avionics CVR: SC500-120



     8. Add 9021 L3 CVR (replaces Meggitt SCR500-120)



     9. Add 9016: Life Vest Pouches (remove from fuel deck).



     10. Add 9017: Boarding Card Stowage on ERDA Seats.



     11. Add 9018: Covers and Drains on Flight Manual Holders.



     12. Add 9019: Delete Floor Cover and Add Non-Skid.



     13. Add 9020 Mobile 291 Engine Oil



     14. Change 9002 to read HUMS provisions (wire harness shelving)



     15. Add 3451 Standby Attitude Indicator ADI-335D to aircraft 527



     16. Add 3452 NAVLNAV2 switch for AD-335D to aircraft 527



*




     Payment and Price changes in Items 17 and 18 above reflect a credit to Buyer in
the amount of $46,000 as a result of the specified configuration changes.



     19. Delete Exhibit D and substitute the attached Aircraft Envelope and Weight Breakdown
charts.




	3.	 	Reaffirmation — Except as modified above, all of the provisions of
the Agreement remain the same, and the Agreement as modified hereby,
is reaffirmed.





     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been executed by each party’s authorized
representative.



	 	 	 
	Offshore Logistics, Inc.:

	 	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation:
	By: /s/ Drury A. Milke

	 	By: /s/ Tommy H. Thomason
	Name: Drury A. Milke

	 	Name: Tommy H. Thomason
	Title: Executive Vice President

	 	Title: Vice President — Civil Programs
	Date: February 12, 2003

	 	Date: February 14, 2003
### §3796gg–3. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796gg–3 was editorially reclassified as section 10448 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed March 7, 2023 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-00996-CV FRANK MORDENTE, INDIVIDUALL Y AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE MORDENTE 2017 TRUS T, Appellants V. YEVGENY MARCHENKO, VA LERI LIUKIN, AND HIDDEN VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., Appellees On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 471-01896-2022 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III After reviewing the clerk’s record, th e Court questioned its jurisdiction over this appeal because there di d not appear to be a fina l judgment or appealable interlocutory order. At the Court’s dir ection, appellant file d a letter brief. Generally, this Court has jurisdicti on over final judgments and certain interlocutory orders as permitted by statute. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN . §–2– 51.014(a) (listing appealable interlocutory orders). A final judgment is one that disposes of all parties and claims. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Appellees filed suit against appellants, Frank Mordente, Individually and as Trustee of the 2017 Mordente Trus t, and Kade Pr operties, LLC 1 . Frank Mordente filed a pro se answer on both his behalf and that of the Trust. Appellees moved to strike the Trust’s answer because non-attorney Mordente lacked authority to file an answer on behalf of the Trust. See Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp, USA , 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (corporation can appear in court only through licensed attorneys). Appellant appeals from the trial court’s August 31, 2022 order granting appellees’ moti on and striking the Trust’s answer. The appealed order is not a final judgment because it does not dispose of appellees’ claims against Frank Mo rdente and Kade Propberties. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Although appellant f iled a letter brief, nothing therein demonstrates this Court’s jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3(a).

220996F.P05

1 Kade Properties, LLC is not a party to this appeal. /Bill Pedersen, III / BILL PEDERSEN, III JUSTICE–3– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
FRANK MORDENTE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE MORDENTE 2017 TRUST, Appellants
No. 05-22-00996-CV V. YEVGENY MARCHENKO, VALERI LIUKIN, AND HIDDEN VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., Appellees On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 471-01896- 2022. Opinion delivered by Justice Pedersen, III. Justices Molberg and Miskel participating.

In accordance with this Court’s op inion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellees YEVGENY MARCHENKO, VALERI LIUKIN, AND HIDDEN VISTA PROPERTIES, INC. recover their costs of this appeal from appellants FRANK MO RDENTE AND THE 2017 MORDENTE TRUST.
Judgment entered March 7, 2023
§ 505.9 Review of adverse agency determination. ( a ) When we determine to deny a request to amend a record, or portion of the record, you may request further review by the Agency's Access Appeal Committee. The written request for review should be mailed to the Chairperson, Access Appeal Committee, FOIA/Privacy Act Office, Office of the General Counsel, Broadcasting Board of Governors, Suite 3349, 330 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20237. The letter should include any documentation, information or statement, which substantiates your request for review.
( b ) The Agency's Access Appeal Committee will review the Agency's initial denial to amend the record and your documentation supporting amendment, within 30 working days. If additional time is required, you will be notified in writing of the reasons for the delay and the approximate date when the review is expected to be completed. Upon completion of the review, the Chairperson will notify you of the results.
( c ) If the Committee upholds the Agency's denial to amend the record, the Chairperson will advise you of: ( 1 ) The reasons for our refusal to amend the record;
( 2 ) Your right and the procedure to add to the file a concise statement supporting your disagreement with the decision of the Agency; and
( 3 ) Your right to seek judicial review of the Agency's refusal to amend the file.
( d ) When you file a statement disagreeing with our refusal to amend a record, we will clearly annotate the record so that the fact that the record is disputed is apparent to anyone who may subsequently have access to, use of, or reason to disclose the file. If information is disclosed regarding the area of dispute, we will provide a copy of your statement in the disclosure. Any statement, which may be included by the Agency regarding the dispute, will be limited to the reasons given to you for not amending the record. Copies of our statement shall be treated as part of your record, but will not be subject to amendment by you under these regulations.
#### Vito Marrione, Respondent, v Stephen Ficano Enterprises, Inc., Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 747]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.), dated February 1, 2000, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, *292on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

After consuming alcoholic beverages in a public park, the plaintiff was allegedly injured when, while leaning against the defendant’s wrought iron gate adjacent to a sidewalk, the gate opened causing the plaintiff’s arm to become impaled upon a picket. The plaintiff commenced this action alleging, *inter alia,*that the defendant was negligent by permitting the latch on the gate to become and remain inoperable.

In moving for summary judgment, the defendant met its initial burden of demonstrating that it had not created the alleged defective condition of the gate or its latch, and that it did not possess actual or constructive notice thereof for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been corrected *(see, De La Rosa v New York City Hous. Auth.,*260 AD2d 424; *Roth v Spletzer,*236 AD2d 599).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. The photographs upon which the plaintiff relied were taken approximately two years after the accident, and there was no proof that the allegedly defective condition of the gate as shown in the photographs existed at the time of the accident *(see, Saks v Yeshiva of Spring Val.,*257 AD2d 615; *Anis v Associated Rest. Mgt. Corp.,*202 AD2d 459; *Davis v County of Nassau,*166 AD2d 498).

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Mangano, P. J., S. Miller, McGinity, Luciano and Smith, JJ., concur.
### §2000e–17. Procedure for denial, withholding, termination, or suspension of Government contract subsequent to acceptance by Government of affirmative action plan of employer; time of acceptance of plan

No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer, shall be denied, withheld, terminated, or suspended, by any agency or officer of the United States under any equal employment opportunity law or order, where such employer has an affirmative action plan which has previously been accepted by the Government for the same facility within the past twelve months without first according such employer full hearing and adjudication under the provisions of section 554 of title 5, and the following pertinent sections: Provided, That if such employer has deviated substantially from such previously agreed to affirmative action plan, this section shall not apply: Provided further, That for the purposes of this section an affirmative action plan shall be deemed to have been accepted by the Government at the time the appropriate compliance agency has accepted such plan unless within forty-five days thereafter the Office of Federal Contract Compliance has disapproved such plan.

(Pub. L. 88–352, title VII, §718, as added Pub. L. 92–261, §13, Mar. 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 113.)
### §300ff–85. Privacy protections

#### (a) In general

The Secretary shall ensure that any information submitted to, or collected by, the Secretary under this subchapter excludes any personally identifiable information.

#### (b) Definition

In this section, the term "personally identifiable information" has the meaning given such term under the regulations promulgated under section 264(c) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title XXVI, §2685, as added and amended Pub. L. 109–415, title V, §501, title VII, §703, Dec. 19, 2006, 120 Stat. 2814, 2820; Pub. L. 111–87, §2(a)(1), (3)(A), Oct. 30, 2009, 123 Stat. 2885.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 264(c) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, referred to in subsec. (b), is section 264(c) of Pub. L. 104–191, which is set out as a note under section 1320d–2 of this title.

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 300ff–85, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title XXVI, §2685, as added Pub. L. 101–381, title IV, §411(a), Aug. 18, 1990, 104 Stat. 626, related to notification of emergency response employees, prior to the general amendment of this part by Pub. L. 109–415.

#### Amendments

2009—Pub. L. 111–87 repealed Pub. L. 109–415, §703, and revived the provisions of this section as in effect on Sept. 30, 2009. See 2006 Amendment note and Effective Date of 2009 Amendment; Revival of Section note below.

2006—Pub. L. 109–415, §703, which directed repeal of this section effective Oct. 1, 2009, was itself repealed by Pub. L. 111–87, §2(a)(1), effective Sept. 30, 2009.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2009 Amendment; Revival of Section

For provisions that repeal by section 2(a)(1) of Pub. L. 111–87 of section 703 of Pub. L. 109–415 be effective Sept. 30, 2009, and that the provisions of this section as in effect on Sept. 30, 2009, be revived, see section 2(a)(2), (3)(A) of Pub. L. 111–87, set out as a note under section 300ff–11 of this title.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2442 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2442

    To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Thionyl Chloride.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 18, 2005

  Mr. Murphy introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To extend the temporary suspension of duty on Thionyl Chloride.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. THIONYL CHLORIDE.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.28.01 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to Thionyl Chloride) is amended 
by striking ``12/31/2006'' and inserting ``12/31/2009''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
FORTISSIMO
      ACQUISITION CORP.

    


    


    __________ 
      ___, 2006

    


    Fortissimo
      Capital Management Ltd.

    14
      Hamelacha Street

    Park
      Afek,
      Rosh Ha’ayin 48091

    Israel

    


    Gentlemen:

    


    This
      letter will confirm our agreement that, commencing on the effective date
      (“Effective Date”) of the registration statement for the initial public offering
      (“IPO”) of the securities of Fortissimo Acquisition Corp. (“FAC”) and continuing
      until the earlier of the consummation by FAC of a “Business Combination” or
      FAC’s liquidation (as described in FAC’s IPO prospectus) (the “Termination
      Date”), Fortissimo Capital Management Ltd. shall make available to FAC certain
      office space, utilities and secretarial support as may be required by FAC from
      time to time, situated at 14 Hamelacha Street, Park Afek, Rosh Ha’ayin 48091
      Israel. In exchange therefor, FAC shall pay Fortissimo Capital Management Ltd.
      the sum of $7,500 per month on the Effective Date and continuing monthly
      thereafter until the Termination Date.

    


    
      	 	 	Very truly yours, 
	 	 	 
	 	 	FORTISSIMO ACQUISITION
              CORP. 
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	 	By: ________________________________ 
	 	 	
              Name:

            
	 	 	
              Title: 

            


    

    


    AGREED
      TO
      AND ACCEPTED BY:

    


    FORTISSIMO
      CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LTD.

    


    


    By: _________________

    Name:
      

    Title:
EXIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of New York Regional Rail Corporation
(the Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Joel Marcus, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
     Company.

/s/ Joel Marcus
----------------
Joel Marcus,
Chief Executive Officer
November 14, 2002
#### Anna Budrow, Appellant, v. Grand Union Company, Respondent.

Heffeman, Santry and Bergan, JJ., concur; Deyo, J., dissents, in the following statement, in which Brewster, J., concurs: I dissent. The record fails to disclose that there was any unusual accumulation or in fact any accumulation of oil whatsoever at the spot where the plaintiff fell. There is also a total lack of evidence that the plaintiff slipped on any oil or that oil was the proximate cause of the accident. On such a record the trial court had no alternative but to grant the motion to dismiss. Since we may assume that the plaintiff adduced all of the evidence available to her, a new trial would serve no useful purpose.
#### Lester M. Livingston, Respondent, v. Aaron Hecht, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements; the date for the examination to proceed to be fixed in the order. No opinion. Settle order on notice. Present — Clarke, P. J., Dowling, Smith, Page and Greenbaum, JJ.
#### Deutsche Lufthansa AG., Also Known as Lufthansa German Airlines, Respondent, v City of New York et al., Appellants.

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County, entered on January 30, 1976, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Gellinoff, J., at Special Term. Respondent shall recover of appellant $60 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Birns, Lane and Lynch, JJ. [85 Misc 2d 719.]
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT MICHAEL FORD, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D19-1024 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed October 16, 2019. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk County; J. Kevin Abdoney, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2012); Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2000); Dowdy v. Singletary, 704 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1998); Dwyer v. State, 981 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
KHOUZAM, C.J., and CASANUEVA and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
### §3789p. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3789p was editorially reclassified as section 10238 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
§ 213.3 Other remedies. ( a ) This part does not supersede or require the omission or duplication of administrative proceedings required by contract, statute, or regulation (e.g., resolution of audit findings under grants or contracts; or appeal provisions under grants or contracts).
( b ) The remedies and sanctions available to the Agency under this part for collecting debts are not intended to be exclusive. The Agency may impose, where authorized, other appropriate sanctions upon a debtor for inexcusable, prolonged or repeated failure to pay a debt. For example, the Agency may stop doing business with a grantee, contractor, borrower or lender; convert the method of payment under a grant or contract from an advance payment to a reimbursement method; or revoke a grantee's or contractor's letter-of-credit.
[67 FR 47258, July 18, 2002. Redesignated and amended at 86 FR 31140, June 11, 2021]
#### Peerless Trading Company, Respondent, v. Cleland A. Ward, Appellant, Impleaded with Another.

— Order modified so as to provide that the requirement of the particulars of the damages sustained by the defendant Cleland A. Ward, as alleged in the paragraph marked 4 in his amended answer, be stricken out; and as so modified the order is affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. All concurred.
#### Diane Ricci, an Infant, by Her Guardian ad Litem, Grace Ricci et al., Respondents, v. Joseph Rolles, Appellant.

On the court’s own motion, its decision of April 16, 1962, is amended to read as follows: In an action by the infant plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her while riding a sled at the invitation of the defendant, who had tied the sled with a rope to the rear of his automobile; and by her father to recover damages for medical expenses and for loss of the infant’s services, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated November 10, 1961, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. Order reversed, without costs, and *789plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment denied. With reference to clinging to vehicles, section 1233 of article 34 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that: “No person riding upon any * * * sled * * * shall attach the same or himself to any vehicle upon a roadway.” Subdivision (a) of section 1230 of the same article provides that the “ parent of any child * * * shall not authorize or knowingly permit any such child * * * to violate any of the provisions ” of such article. If it be assumed that the defendant, by attaching the rope of the sled to his automobile, violated the statute (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1233), nevertheless such violation does not per se subject him to liability. It is true that the defendant’s violation of a statute is negligence; but whether or not such negligence on the part of defendant is sufficient to cast him in liability depends upon all the other proof which may be adduced. It is therefore incumbent upon the jury or other trier of the facts to consider such negligence in the light of all the other relevant facts proved; and then, on the basis of all the proof adduced, to determine: (1) whether the negligence inherent in the statutory violation was the proximate cause of the accident; and (2) whether the negligence of the infant plaintiff contributed to its happening *(Counihan*v. *Werbelovsky’s Sons,*5 A D 2d 80, 83; *Martin*v. *Herzog,*228 N. Y. 164, 168-170; *Amberg*v. *Kinley,*214 N. Y. 531, 538-540; cf. *Daggett*v. *Keshner,*284 App. Div. 733, 738; cf. *Kavanagh*v. *New York, O. & W. Ry. Co.,*196 App. Div. 384, 387-388, affd. 233 N. V. 597). It may be noted that here a preliminary basic question of law is also involved, namely: whether the said section 1233 applies only to the rider of the sled or whether it encompasses the operator of the automobile as well as the rider of the sled. We do not at this time pass upon that question. Under the circumstances, the questions of fact presented should be tried; they should not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Brennan and Rabin, JJ., concur.