NUMBER 13-11-00197-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

IN RE WASTE MANAGEMENT OF TEXAS, INC.

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF TEXAS, INC. D/B/A

WASTE MANAGEMENT, PHARR, TEXAS, AND JOHN MARTINEZ

 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Garza, Vela, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela

Relators, Waste Management of Texas, Inc., Waste Management of Texas, Inc. 

d/b/a Waste Management, Pharr, Texas, and John Martinez (collectively ―Waste 
2

Management‖), filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a request for temporary stay in 

the above cause on April 7, 2011, seeking to compel the trial court to vacate an order 

compelling discovery on grounds of relevance, overbreadth, and burdensomeness. On 

April 8, 2011, this Court granted the request for temporary stay, stayed the trial court‘s 

order compelling discovery, and requested that the real party in interest, Romeo Garza

Jr., file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus, and such response has now been 

filed. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying litigation concerns a vehicular collision between Garza and 

Martinez, who was driving a garbage truck in the course and scope of his employment as 

a driver for Waste Management. According to Garza‘s first amended original petition, 

Martinez pulled away from a stop sign directly into Garza‘s lane of travel. Garza brought 

suit against relators for personal injuries. Garza served various forms of discovery 

requests on Waste Management, but the only one at issue in this proceeding is the 

following request for production:

Produce pleadings, discovery (including corporate representative 

depositions, answers to: interrogatories, requests for disclosure, requests 

to produce documents, and requests to admit), on all other lawsuits 

involving incidents in which Waste Management of Texas, Inc. has been 

sued in Texas and in which unsafe driving on the part of a Waste 

Management of Texas, Inc. driver has been alleged and/or in which it is 

alleged Waste Management of Texas, Inc. did not employ proper safety 

and/or was negligent with regard to its policies for the operation of its 

vehicles, the training of its drivers, or in setting safety policies. 

Waste Management objected to the request as follows:
3

Defendant objects that the request is overly broad, not relevant, not 

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and 

not reasonably limited in subject matter, geography or time. . . . Further, 

this request is unduly burdensome and harassing because the burden or 

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefits, taking into 

account the needs of the case the amount in controversy, and the 

importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues . . . . Finally, 

Defendant objects that this request is compound and confusing. 

Waste Management did not otherwise respond to this request for production.1 Garza 

filed a motion to compel regarding this response, stating that the ―[p]arties are currently 

working on resolving the discovery dispute; however, court intervention is necessary if the 

parties do not reach an agreement.‖ Attached to the motion to compel was 

correspondence from Waste Management‘s counsel stating that ―[a]s we discussed, we 

will continue to search for information related to Waste Management litigation in the 

South Texas region and beyond.‖ 

Waste Management filed a response to the second motion to compel discovery, 

supported by the January 26, 2011 affidavit of Carrie Schadle, an attorney for Waste 

Management. Ms. Schadle testified as follows:

My firm has represented Waste Management since 2001. During 

that time, there have been approximately 100 cases which have gone into 

litigation. In order to determine whether such cases are responsive to 

Plaintiff‘s request, counsel for Defendant will have to identify the existing 

computer files relating to those cases, order whatever files may exist for 

those cases from archives, identify documents which may exist in this 

office, and request a search at Waste Management for documents relating 

to litigated matters.

After those documents and files have been collected, it will take a 

minimum of 2-2.5 hours per file to determine whether the case falls within 

 

1 We note that the rules of discovery required Waste Management to ―comply with as much of the 

request to which the party has made no objection unless it is unreasonable under the circumstances to do 

so before obtaining a ruling on the objection.‖ TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2; see also id. R. 193 cmt.2. 
4

the scope of the request and what, if any documents might be responsive. 

At $300 per hour, the cost of identifying, collecting, searching, evaluating 

and producing responsive documents for the approximately 100 files since 

2001 could easily exceed $70,000.00.

This cost will not include copying costs, or the costs to Waste 

Management of pulling its employees away from their regular work to 

search for documents.

These estimates will not include the time and cost associated with 

documents handled by other attorneys or firms. An inquiry to Waste 

Management revealed that there are approximately 90 other files that may 

represent suits filed against Defendant. The only way to identify 

documents for cases filed before the involvement of the undersigned firm 

would be to query insurance companies that carried policies of insurance 

for the relevant periods of time. Depending on the information available 

from the insurance carriers, the next step would be to seek out those files, 

most likely from attorneys who handled those cases. Those attorneys will 

have to search and will incur attorney‘s fees which will have to be 

reimbursed. While it would be impossible to determine exactly how much 

time such a search would take, the cost will be very high. Tracking down 

these documents will be far more complicated than reviewing those 

handled by this firm and it would be reasonable to assume that the cost of 

tracking down these earlier cases would be double that of the those files 

handled by the undersigned firm.

The text of Waste Management‘s response to the second motion to compel differs in 

some respects from Schadle‘s affidavit. The response says, ―Waste Management has 

190 cases flagged as ―litigation‖ cases in the claims database,‖ and ―[a]pproximately 100 

of these cases have been handled by the undersigned firm since 2001.‖ The response 

speculates that ―it is likely the volume of documents will be in the hundreds of thousands 

of pages,‖ and further speculates that the costs of copies alone could conservatively 

exceed $25,000. The response asserts that these estimates do not take into account the 

90 other suits handled by other firms, and speculates that it might cost ―somewhere in the 

neighborhood of $75,000 or more‖ to recover those files. 
5

Garza filed a reply to Waste Management‘s response to the motion to compel 

contending, among other things, that the discovery sought pertaining to other accidents 

involving Waste Management‘s garbage trucks and vehicles was relevant vis-à-vis his 

claims for faulty safety practices and training and that there was a direct relationship 

between the claims at issue and the discovery sought.2

The trial court heard the motion to compel at a non-evidentiary hearing on January 

27, 2011. At the hearing, the trial court ordered Waste Management to respond to the 

request for production, but directed that the response should be limited to those litigation 

files relating to garbage trucks in Texas in the past five years. The trial court, however, 

agreed to hear a motion to reconsider its ruling the following week. 

After the hearing, Waste Management filed a ―Motion for Reconsideration and 

Supplemental Response to Plaintiff‘s Second Motion to Compel Discovery.‖ This motion 

was supported by a second affidavit from Schadle, dated February 2, 2011:

My firm has represented Waste Management since 2001. Since 

2005, there have been thirty-two cases which have gone into litigation in 

Texas where Waste Management was represented by my firm.

A conservative estimate is that it will take a minimum of 2-2.5 hours 

per file to determine what, if any documents in these files might be 

responsive to Plaintiff‘s request as modified by the Court. At $300 per 

hour, the cost of identifying, collecting, searching, evaluating and producing 

responsive documents could easily be at least $24,000.00. This cost will 

 

2 Garza also included an argument which we will characterize as ―what‘s good for the goose is 

good for the gander.‖ Apparently earlier in the litigation, the trial court had ordered Garza‘s counsel to 

produce medical records from a different lawsuit in which Garza had been represented by the same 

attorneys. The trial court had reasoned that since Garza‘s counsel had represented Garza in the previous 

litigation, counsel must be in a position to turn over medical records on that case. Thus, Garza contended 

that, in this case, where counsel for Waste Management admitted that they are the same lawyers who have 

represented Waste Management since 2001, they should have ―intimate knowledge‖ of the litigation files 

and their contents.
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not include copying costs, or the cost to pull the files from the archives.

These estimates will not include the time and cost associated with 

determining whether any cases that may have been handled by other firms 

would contain documents responsive to the request.

On February 3, 2011, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the motion for 

reconsideration. On March 9, 2011, the trial court issued an order granting Garza‘s 

motion to compel and requiring Waste Management to: 

Produce pleadings, discovery (including representative depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, requests for disclosure, requests to produce 

documents, and requests to admit), on all other lawsuits involving garbage 

truck accidents in which Waste Management of Texas, Inc. has been sued 

in Texas in the five years preceding the date of this order, and in which 

unsafe driving on the part of a Waste Management of Texas, Inc. driver has 

been alleged and/or in which it is alleged Waste Management of Texas, Inc. 

did not employ proper safety and/or was negligent with regard to its policies 

for the operation of its vehicles, the training of its drivers, or in setting safety 

policies. Any material related to any person‘s healthcare information 

subject to HIPAA[3] is excluded from production and may be redacted by 

Defendants.

The trial court ordered production by March 25, 2011. By letter agreement, the parties 

agreed to extend the deadline for production until April 7, 2011. On April 7, 2011, Waste 

Management did not produce the documents at issue to Garza, but instead filed this 

original proceeding.4

 

3

The trial court‘s order refers to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 

(―HIPAA‖). See 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164 (2010). Pursuant to HIPAA, an individual‘s protected health 

information cannot be disclosed without the individual‘s consent unless disclosure is expressly permitted by 

HIPAA. See 45 C.F.R. 164.502. 

4 We note that the issuance of mandamus relief is largely controlled by equitable principles. See 

In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding).
7

In this original proceeding, Waste Management contends by three issues that the 

trial court abused its discretion in overruling Waste Management‘s objections to the 

request for production because the request is: (1) not likely to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence; (2) overly broad; and (3) unduly burdensome. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Mandamus will issue if the relator establishes a clear abuse of discretion for which 

there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 

124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 

1992) (orig. proceeding). With regard to discovery rulings, a party will not have an 

adequate remedy by appeal when: (1) the appellate court would not be able to cure the 

trial court‘s discovery error; (2) the party‘s ability to present a viable claim or defense at 

trial is vitiated or severely compromised by the trial court‘s discovery error; or (3) the trial 

court disallows discovery and the missing discovery cannot be made a part of the 

appellate record or the trial court, after proper request, refuses to make it part of the 

record. In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); 

Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843. 

As stated more recently by the supreme court, mandamus may be appropriate to 

correct alleged discovery errors when, for instance, the order complained of requires 

disclosure of privileged information or trade secrets that materially affect the rights of the 

relator; when discovery imposes a burden that is disproportionate to any benefit received 

by the requesting party; and when the trial court‘s discovery order compromises the 

relator‘s ability to present a viable claim or defense. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 
8

S.W.3d 458, 468 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). An order that compels overly broad 

discovery is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy. In re 

Deere & Co., 299 S.W.3d 819, 820–21 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). 

Stated otherwise, mandamus relief is proper when a trial court signs an order compelling 

discovery that is outside the proper bounds of discovery. In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 

S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).

III. RELEVANCE

In its first issue, Waste Management contends that the request at issue is a ―fishing 

expedition‖ that is not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ―Fishing‖ for 

evidence is impermissible. K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 

1996). In examining Waste Management‘s contention, we note that ―the ultimate 

purpose of discovery is to seek the truth, so that disputes may be decided by what the 

facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed.‖ In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 

938, 941 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 

573 (Tex. 1984) (orig. proceeding)); see In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 

(Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).

Our procedural rules define the scope of discovery to include any unprivileged 

information that is relevant to the subject of the action, even if it would be inadmissible at 

trial, as long as the information sought is ―reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence.‖ TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 

(Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 

(Tex. 1993). Information is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a fact that is of 
9

consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be 

without the information. TEX. R. EVID. 401. The phrase ―relevant to the subject matter‖ 

is to be ―liberally construed to allow the litigants to obtain the fullest knowledge of the facts 

and issues prior to trial.‖ Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. 2009) 

(quoting Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990)). 

Although the scope of discovery is broad, discovery requests must nevertheless 

show a ―reasonable expectation of obtaining information that will aid the dispute‘s 

resolution.‖ In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; see In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 

S.W.2d at 713. Thus, discovery requests must be ―reasonably tailored‖ to include only 

relevant matters. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 

S.W.2d at 713. Therefore, the preemptive denial of discovery is proper if there exists no 

possible relevant, discoverable testimony, facts, or material which would support or lead 

to evidence that would support a claim or defense. Ford Motor Co., 279 S.W.3d at 664.

Waste Management asserts that the request for production at issue seeks 

irrelevant information and is a mere fishing expedition. 5 We first address Waste 

Management‘s contention that Garza should not be permitted to ―distract attention from 

 

5 We note that Waste Management‘s petition for writ of mandamus places the burden of proof on 

Garza to ―explain how the production of pleadings and discovery from  ̳similar‘ lawsuits is reasonably 

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and how the request relates to the elements of 

his causes of action, which he should be required to do,  ̳as relevancy is the cornerstone of admissibility.‘‖ 

We note that this Court and others have placed the burden of proof regarding relevance, or lack thereof, on 

the party seeking to avoid discovery. See e.g., In re Frank A. Smith Sales, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 871, 874 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding) (―Generally, the party resisting discovery has the burden to 

plead and prove the basis of its objection.‖); Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Jones, 733 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 1987, orig. proceeding) (holding that, as a general rule, the burden of pleading and 

proving the requested evidence is not relevant falls upon the party seeking to prevent discovery). We need 

not further address Waste Management‘s allegation herein because it is not necessary to the disposition of 

this proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4. 
10

the incident at hand‖ by including a gross negligence and exemplary damages claim. 

Waste Management asserts that Garza‘s gross negligence claim is based on his 

allegation that Waste Management acted with conscious indifference to the rights, 

welfare and safety of others by hiring a safety director for its Houston office, but by failing 

to hire a safety director for its Rio Grande Valley office or other areas, thus ignoring safety 

training and policies in the Rio Grande Valley and other areas. Waste Management thus 

contends that Garza should ―at most‖ be entitled to discovery of lawsuits involving 

accidents with garbage trucks and drivers who worked out of the Pharr, Texas office.

6

 

Waste Management essentially argues that Garza amended his pleadings to include a 

claim for gross negligence in order to justify the breadth of his discovery request. We 

note in this regard that, based on the record before us, Waste Management neither 

attacked Garza‘s pleadings through motions for sanctions, by special exceptions, or by 

motion for summary judgment.

Garza‘s original petition, unlike his amended petition, did not include claims 

against Waste Management pertaining to the lack of a safety director in Pharr, the proper 

training of its drivers, the scheduling of its drivers, or gross negligence. Garza amended 

his petition to include these claims after deposing Martinez and a corporate 

representative for Waste Management, and after receiving some of Waste 

Management‘s responses to discovery. In Waste Management‘s First Amended and 

Supplemented Responses, Answers, and Objections, Waste Management revealed that 

it does not have a safety manager whose specific area of responsibility is the Rio Grande 

 

6 Waste Management did not produce information within this unilaterally proposed scope of 

discovery under rule 193.2(b). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2(b). 
11

Valley District of Waste Management; Chuck Haraf is the area safety manager whose 

responsibility includes Pharr, Texas, and his office is located in Houston, Texas; Haraf 

visited the Pharr region of Waste Management in January, August, and September 2010; 

and two other safety professionals for the company visited the Pharr region of Waste 

Management in 2010. 

Based on the foregoing, the trial court may have reasonably concluded that 

Garza‘s request for production is not a fishing expedition because it is not based on 

speculation, but is instead based on Waste Management‘s own responses to discovery. 

See In re Sears Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2003, orig. proceeding) (stating that a fishing expedition is one aimed not at supporting 

existing claims but at finding new ones). This is not a case where Garza is attempting to 

justify an overbroad discovery request by proving a general corporate strategy regarding 

unspecified safety laws, but a discovery request specifically targeted to the safety policies 

and practices as they relate to the circumstances involved in this lawsuit, and as 

evidenced in previous discovery responses. See Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 

S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).

Waste Management argues that the discovery request does not lead to the 

discovery of admissible evidence of ―reasonably similar‖ accidents:

In this case, Garza alleges that Defendant Martinez pulled away from a stop 

sign into his line of travel. . . Even if this were true . . . this is not a case 

involving training, safety policies, or some esoteric application of 

complicated rules to a complex set of facts. This is a simple negligence 

case—the alleged failure to comply with a basic traffic law about which no 

licensed Texas driver or holder of a Texas Commercial Driver‘s License is 

unfamiliar. To suggest that an alleged failure to stop at a stop sign is the 
12

result of negligent training or failure to follow a safety policy by Waste 

Management is ludicrous. 

Waste Management thus asserts that a ―more reasonable‖ discovery limitation ―would be 

a limitation to those cases in which plaintiffs allege a Waste Management driver ran a stop 

sign.‖7

In the instant case, the request for production seeks pleadings and discovery from 

lawsuits:

involving incidents in which Waste Management of Texas, Inc. has been 

sued in Texas and in which unsafe driving on the part of a Waste 

Management of Texas, Inc. driver has been alleged and/or in which it is 

alleged Waste Management of Texas, Inc. did not employ proper safety 

and/or was negligent with regard to its policies for the operation of its 

vehicles, the training of its drivers, or in setting safety policies. 

Garza‘s first amended original petition asserts that the ―Pharr office of Waste 

Management does not have any safety director, and this is a policy which emanates from 

corporate headquarters of Waste Management.‖ The petition continues that ―Drivers 

such as Defendant Martinez are not properly trained in safety and/or their work schedule 

is such that it promotes unsafe driving.‖ 

All of the cases cited by Waste Management in connection with its arguments 

pertaining to relevance concern the admissibility of evidence, not the discovery of 

evidence. According to Waste Management, there is a ―nexus‖ between the 

admissibility of evidence and the discoverability of information, and ―courts often use both 

 

7 We note that this argument conflicts with an offer made to the trial court that Waste Management 

would ―agree to produce for the last five years all automobile accidents that occurred in Hidalgo County, or 

even the Rio Grande Valley.‖ Moreover, as stated previously, Waste Management did not produce any 

discovery pursuant to this unilaterally selected scope of discovery. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2(b). 
13

types of cases when discussing discoverability.‖ Waste Management‘s arguments are, 

to some extent, correct. The two concepts are related and courts often use both types of 

cases when discussing discovery. For example, in rejecting discovery as overbroad and 

irrelevant, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that:

[T]he plaintiffs‘ requests and the trial court‘s order reflect a 

misunderstanding about relevance. American jurisprudence goes to some 

length to avoid the spurious inference that defendants are either guilty or 

liable if they have been found guilty or liable of anything before. See, e.g., 

TEX. R. EVID. 404 (barring proof of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ―in order to 

show action in conformity therewith‖). While such evidence might be 

discoverable in some cases (e.g., to prove motive or intent, see id.), it is 

hard to see why reneging on some other settlement offer makes it more or 

less probable that the insurer reneged on this one. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3; 

TEX. R. EVID.401.

In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.W.3d 667, 669–70 (Tex. 2007) (orig. 

proceeding).

Nevertheless, Waste‘s contentions herein essentially assume that the standards 

for discovery and standards for admissibility are wholly congruent. That is incorrect. 

Discovery is not limited only to information that will be admissible at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 

192.3(a); Eli Lilly & Co., 850 S.W.2d at 160 (Tex. 1993); Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 573. 

―To increase the likelihood that all relevant evidence will be disclosed and brought before 

the trier of fact, the law circumscribes a significantly larger class of discoverable evidence 

to include anything reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material evidence.‖ 

Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 573; see Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977) 

overruled on other grounds, Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992); In re Nolle, 

265 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). 
14

Based on the foregoing, the trial court may have concluded that the information 

sought in the request for production is relevant and discoverable because it has a 

tendency to make the existence of a fact that is consequential to the determination of the 

action—that is, whether or not the accident was caused because the Pharr region of 

Waste Management did not properly train its drivers in safety matters, or improperly 

scheduled them, or because the Pharr region of Waste Management did not employ a 

safety director when other Waste Management locations did—more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 401. An examination 

of the state-wide distribution of litigation files in comparison to Waste Management‘s 

regional safety offices would be relevant to Garza‘s claim that the Pharr office of Waste 

Management is deficient in its safety training and management. Waste Management‘s 

first issue is overruled.

IV. OVERBREADTH

Waste Management contends in its second issue that the discovery request is 

overly broad because the scope of discovery is not limited to the subject matter of the suit, 

that is, whether Martinez was negligent or Waste Management acted negligently toward 

Martinez in training him or scheduling him, thereby causing the accident. Waste 

Management contends that the request is not limited in scope to documents concerning 

Martinez‘s training and is not limited in time to the years that Martinez was employed by 

Waste Management. 

Discovery orders requiring document production from an unreasonably long time 

period or from distant and unrelated locales are impermissibly overbroad. See In re CSX 
15

Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; see In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713; Dillard Dep’t 

Stores, Inc. v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1995); Texaco, 898 S.W.2d at 815. A 

central consideration in determining overbreadth is whether the request could have been 

more narrowly tailored to avoid including tenuous information and still obtain the 

necessary, pertinent information. See In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 153; In re Am. 

Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713. Overbroad requests for irrelevant information are 

improper whether they are burdensome or not, so evidence is not necessary to support 

an objection if the discovery requests themselves demonstrate overbreadth as a matter of 

law. See In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 153; In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 22 S.W.3d 338, 

341 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., 274 S.W.3d 

195, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). However, a 

reasonably tailored discovery request is not overbroad merely because it may include 

some information of doubtful relevance, and the ―parties must have some latitude in 

fashioning proper discovery requests.‖ In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713; 

Texaco, 898 S.W.2d at 815. 

In analyzing the discovery request at issue, we are guided by numerous cases 

which have addressed overbroad discovery requests. See, e.g., In re Allstate County 

Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.W.3d at 670 (holding that requests for transcripts of all testimony 

ever given by any Allstate agent on the topic of insurance; every court order finding 

Allstate wrongfully adjusted the value of a damaged vehicle; personnel files of every 

Allstate employee a Texas court has determined wrongfully assessed the value of a 

damaged vehicle; and legal instruments documenting Allstate‘s status as a corporation 
16

and its net worth were overbroad); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 153 (stating that 

request to identify all safety employees who worked for defendant over a thirty-year 

period qualifies as a ―fishing expedition‖); In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713 

(stating that request for production of all documents the defendant had ever produced on 

any of its products over the course of its fifty years in business was overbroad and of 

questionable relevance); K Mart Corp., 937 S.W.2d at 431 (stating that request for 

information relating to all criminal activity on all K Mart property over last seven years was 

overbroad); Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 909 S.W.2d at 492 (stating that a request requiring 

a 227-store search in twenty states for documents over a five-year period was overly 

broad); Texaco, Inc., 898 S.W.2d at 814–15 (stating that request for ―all documents 

written by [defendant‘s safety director] that concerned safety, toxicology, and industrial 

hygiene, epidemiology, fire protection and training‖ was overbroad); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 

Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1983) (stating that requests concerning fuel filler 

necks in every vehicle ever made by General Motors were overbroad); see also 

Fethkenher v. Kroger Co., 139 S.W.3d 24, 30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) 

(concluding that discovery request was overbroad where it asked store to describe, in 

detail, any previous incidents pertaining to automatic door malfunctions at all 188 stores 

in southwest region; court noted that appellant ―failed to narrow the request in a manner 

that would heighten its relevancy‖); In re Lowe’s Cos., 134 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, orig. proceeding) (holding that discovery order was 

overbroad where it allowed plaintiffs to access computer data without any limitation as to 

time, place, or subject matter and print data concerning falling merchandise accidents for 
17

an unlimited period of time preceding the accident in this case and for an unlimited 

geographic area). 

In examining the appropriate breadth of discovery, it is fundamental that each 

lawsuit concerns a specific claim arising from a specific set of facts. Those seeking 

discovery, however, are often interested in learning about related accidents, products, or 

claims culminating in litigation. Such requests might be appropriate or might be 

overbroad depending on the relationship between the request for production and the 

claims at issue in the lawsuit. See, e.g., In re Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. LLC, 313 S.W.3d 

910, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding) (holding discovery order requiring 

relator to produce every document from every lawsuit in which it has been involved for the 

past five years, with no limitations as to subject matter, was overly broad as a matter of 

law.); see also In re Valvoline Co., No. 01-10-00208-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3696, at 

**20–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 14, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) 

(granting mandamus relief where ―benzene-related lawsuits‖ was undefined in the 

discovery requests and the request was not limited to suits containing claims similar to 

that suit). 

It is clear that, under certain circumstances, parties are entitled to discover 

information about other lawsuits. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 

844, 850 (Tex. 1992) (referencing Chrysler‘s failure to ―disclose all similar lawsuits,‖ but 

concluding that plaintiff was not harmed by the omission); Humphreys v. Caldwell, 881 

S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, orig. proceeding) (concluding that 

relator failed to meet burden to show that responding to interrogatory ―regarding all 
18

lawsuits in Texas within the last five years involving similar claims in which State Farm 

had been a party‖ was overbroad or unduly burdensome); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 

v. Engelke, 824 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) 

(compelling answer to interrogatory about lawsuits for five-year period). Thus, discovery 

as to other lawsuits has been allowed when the information sought is relevant, that is, 

when the other lawsuits have a material connection to an issue in the case, or present the 

same or similar issues, or are factually similar. See, e.g., Allen, 559 S.W.2d at 803 

(approving a request for the production of ―all complaints, lawsuits, or inquiries, including 

all correspondence, documents, investigative reports, or any paper by which the 

defendant responded to these complaints, claiming that persons have contracted cancer 

as a result of breathing fumes,‖ because party could establish pattern of disease and 

because that information was ―unavailable from any other source‖); In re Rogers, 200 

S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, orig. proceeding) (noting that requests for 

documents from and information concerning other lawsuits were ―not irrelevant on their 

face to the issues at hand‖ but the trial court abused its discretion in ordering production 

because some of the documents ordered produced were subject to confidentiality 

agreements or protective orders in the other lawsuits); see also In re Ernst & Young, 

L.L.P., No. 05-02-00352-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2986, at **4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

April 30, 2002, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication) (requiring the production 

of pleadings where the defendant was sued for audit or review work, professional 

negligence, or accounting malpractice where ―[t]hese are the same or similar matters at 

issue in this case‖ because it was ―permissible discovery‖). Cf. In re Colonial Pipeline 
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Co., 968 S.W.2d at 942 (―While the plaintiffs may be entitled to production of any relevant 

discovery from the related cases  ̳as they are kept in the usual course of business,‘

relators cannot be forced to prepare an inventory of the documents for plaintiffs.‖). As 

recently stated by the First District Court of Appeals, when discovery of material related to 

other lawsuits and complaints is allowed, the information sought has a ―direct, material 

connection to the instant litigation.‖ In re Nolle, 265 S.W.3d at 495–96.

In the instant case, the trial court‘s order limits the request for production to the 

temporal period of five years, the geographical region of Texas, and the subject matter of 

litigation files concerning garbage truck accidents where the case involved unsafe driving, 

and negligent or improper policies regarding vehicle safety, training, or operation. The 

cases cited by Waste Management do not support the proposition that any of these 

limitations is per se overbroad. The litigation files sought are factually similar to the case 

at hand, are closely related in temporal proximity, and concern similar legal issues. 

Accordingly, the trial court may have concluded that the request for production at issue 

was relevant and not overbroad.

We note that Waste Management asserts that the litigation files may include 

documents which contain private or confidential information, such as medical and 

financial information about third parties, including, for instance, social security numbers, 

and orders pertaining to child support obligations. Waste Management also asserts that 

certain files may be subject to confidentiality agreements. In this regard, we note that the 

trial court expressly ordered that ―[a]ny material related to any person‘s healthcare 

information subject to HIPAA is excluded from production and may be redacted.‖ In this 
20

proceeding, Waste Management has not identified any specific private or confidential 

information in its litigation files that would be subject to production.

Waste Management‘s argument is well-taken insofar as the production of 

documents in one lawsuit does not necessarily mean the documents may be produced 

without restriction in an entirely different lawsuit. Some of the documents ordered 

produced may contain confidential data or may be subject to confidentiality agreements 

or protective orders in the other lawsuits. See In re Rogers, 200 S.W.3d at 324. As 

stated by the Texas Supreme Court:

[W]e are mindful that resolution of this discovery dispute may affect more 

than the immediate parties to this litigation. The possibility exists that the 

rights of CI Host‘s customers and others may be detrimentally affected or 

even abrogated by disclosure of some information on the tapes; these third 

parties may have other legal bases for objecting to disclosure of the 

information on the tapes. Our discovery rules do not require notice to third 

parties so that they might have an opportunity to be heard on their own 

objections. Yet, we are loath to allow CI Host to unilaterally waive its 

customers‘ privacy rights by its failing to adhere to the discovery rules. Cf. 

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1993) (taking into 

account compelling public interests in determining scope of discovery in 

products-liability suit). It therefore falls upon the trial court to give serious 

consideration to these interests. A protective order forbidding disclosure of 

any trade secrets on the tapes is already in place, and we are confident that 

the trial court will give due consideration to any other privacy interests at 

stake as this case progresses.

In re CI Host, 92 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding). When a party asserts 

that only part of a request is protected in such circumstances, the party must produce 

what is discoverable, must assert any applicable privileges, and must segregate and 

produce to the court in camera the materials that it seeks to protect from disclosure. See 

id. Accordingly, Waste Management should produce all documents in the lawsuits listed 
21

in the request for production that do not contain private data and that are not subject to a 

confidentiality agreement or protective order in the other lawsuits, and should request an 

in camera hearing regarding those other documents containing allegedly confidential or 

privileged matter in order for the trial court to give due consideration to the privacy 

interests at issue in the requested documentation. See id.

Waste Management‘s second issue is overruled. 

V. UNDULY BURDENSOME

In its third issue, Waste Management contends that the discovery request is 

unduly burdensome given the likely benefits of the discovery. Waste Management 

supports this contention by reference to Schadle‘s affidavits and the estimated cost of 

almost $25,000, ―without even considering the extra added burden‖ of making sure that 

Waste Management redacts the responsive documents to comply with HIPAA. 

Under the rules of civil procedure, discovery should be limited if it is unreasonably 

cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more 

convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(a); In re 

Stern, 321 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding). Further, 

discovery should be limited if the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs 

its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 

parties‘ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the 

importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 

192.4(b); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex. 2009) (orig. 

proceeding). 
22

The fact that a discovery request is burdensome is not enough to justify protection; 

―it is only undue burden that warrants nonproduction.‖ ISK Biotech Corp. v. Lindsay, 933 

S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.); see In re Alford 

Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d at 181 (requiring demonstration of undue burden or 

harassment); In re Energas Co., 63 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. 

proceeding). A discovery request will not result in an undue burden when the 

burdensomeness of responding to it is the result of the responding party's own 

―conscious, discretionary decisions.‖ ISK Biotech Corp., 933 S.W.2d at 569; see In re 

Whiteley, 79 S.W.3d 729, 734–35 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding). A 

party resisting discovery cannot make conclusory allegations that the requested 

discovery is unduly burdensome but must instead produce some evidence supporting its 

request for a protective order. In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d at 181; In re 

Energas Co., 63 S.W.3d at 55.

Waste Management provided a specific time and cost estimate for the discovery 

via testimony that the request would require the production of thirty-two files at 

approximately two and a half hours per file and its counsel would charge $300 per hour for 

the production. According to the testimony, the production did not include the costs of 

copying or recalling the files from archives. In the instant case, the trial court may well 

have determined that the alleged costs were excessive given that the trial court 

specifically referred to these estimates as ―guestimates.‖ Moreover, the trial court may 

have determined that the charge of $300 hourly was excessive. 
23

Further, given the paucity of information before trial court and this Court, it is 

difficult to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to limit the 

discovery on grounds that it causes an undue burden. Waste Management asserts that 

Garza could more easily and less expensively obtain the same information by deposition; 

however, Waste Management does not assert or provide evidence that any specific 

person could provide the requested information. There is no information in the record 

regarding the amount in controversy or the parties‘ resources. We do not know how 

Garza was injured, although counsel asserted in hearing that his incurred medical 

expenses approximated $60,000, nor do we know what compensation Garza is seeking 

in this lawsuit. Moreover, Waste Management did not provide testimony pertaining to 

how many litigation files that might be responsive had been handled by other firms, 

although, based on arguments at the trial court‘s hearings in this matter and the text of the 

petition itself, the parties may have chosen to focus solely on the thirty-two files handled 

by its current firm. See BASF Fina Petrochemicals L.P. v. H.B. Zachry Co., 168 S.W.3d 

867, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that nonparties do 

not recover their attorneys‘ fees incurred in complying with a subpoena). Without 

objective data, such as information regarding the foregoing matters, it is difficult to 

evaluate the extent of the burden involved for Waste Management and balance that 

burden against Garza‘s legitimate interests in obtaining that information, and even more 

difficult to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, it was at least 

within the discretion of the trial court to determine that Waste Management failed to carry 

its burden of proving burdensomeness as a justification for refusing to produce. 
24

Waste Management‘s third issue is overruled.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the record presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

ordering Waste Management to produce the discovery at issue herein. We lift the stay 

previously imposed in this matter. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b) (―Unless vacated or 

modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective until the case is finally decided.‖). 

We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 

ROSE VELA

Justice

Delivered and filed the 

31st day of August, 2011.