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PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN IVORY COAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

Serial No. 108–2

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota 

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner III, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 8

Timothy Docking, Ph.D., Program Officer, Research and Studies Program, 

U.S. Institute of Peace ......................................................................................... 20

Jeanne Toungara, Ph.D., Professor, Howard University ...................................... 25

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 4

His Excellency Pascal D. Kokora, Ambassador from Cote d’Ivoire: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner III: Prepared statement ........................... 11

Timothy Docking: Prepared statement .................................................................. 22

Jeanne Toungara: Prepared statement .................................................................. 27

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 43

The Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 43

Questions for the record, along with responses, submitted by the Honorable 

Eliot L. Engel to the Honorable H. Kansteiner ................................................. 44

Questions for the record, along with responses, submitted by the Honorable 

Barbara Lee to Timothy Docking ........................................................................ 45

Questions for the record, along with responses, submitted by the Honorable 

Barbara Lee to Jeanne Toungara ....................................................................... 48

(1)

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN IVORY COAST 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:11 p.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce, 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will 

come to order. 

This is our first hearing of the 108th Congress, and I look forward to a productive 2 years working with Ranking Member Donald Payne and with Vice Chairman Amo Houghton and with the 

Subcommittee’s other Members. 

Africa, I believe, continues to draw greater attention in our foreign policy, which this Subcommittee can take great satisfaction in. 

We convene today, unfortunately, to look at another African crisis, 

the unraveling of Ivory Coast. Once a pillar of political stability in 

West Africa, Ivory Coast has now proven vulnerable, falling prey 

to the type of war that devastated Sierra Leone. 

The strife in Ivory Coast, should it continue, has the potential to 

ensnare other countries in the region in a state of perpetual armed 

conflict, of lawlessness, of human misery that neighboring Liberia 

has long suffered. Ivory Coast is, in other words, a disaster in the 

making. 

We all hope the recently signed Marcoussis Agreement is the beginning of this troubling conflict’s end. A few caveats, however, 

need to be raised. It is hard for me to see how this French backed 

peace plan is not a reward to rebels who fought their way to the 

negotiating table, and if the plan is followed, into legitimate positions of political power. This may be a realistic policy given the 

international community’s level of commitment to resolving this 

conflict, but the price paid, legitimatizing the rebels’ tactics, is a 

high price. 

It certainly seems to do little to break the cycle of violence in 

West Africa, and it is not the approach that worked in Sierra 

Leone. The rebels are threatening to march on Abidjan if their demands on implementing the agreement, including taking the defense and interior portfolios, are not met. Marcoussis should be 

supported within reason. 

This Subcommittee has long condemned President Charles Taylor of Liberia. His regime abuses Liberians. He bears great responsibility for the death and destruction in Sierra Leone, for which I 

2

am hoping he is indicted. For those not aware, that was the conflict 

in which Taylor backed rebels, cut off the hands and feet of little 

boys and girls. Taylor’s regime today, I am convinced, is backing 

rebel forces in Ivory Coast. 

That the peace pact makes no provision for checking the role of 

foreign governments stoking this conflict—in fact, it is treated as 

a non-issue—is a serious flaw. We deceive ourselves by ignoring the 

role played by Charles Taylor and Burkina Faso President Blaise 

Compaore. We need a back-up policy should the Marcoussis approach fail. 

Building peace in West Africa, once war has broken out, is not 

easy. The roots of conflict—political, economic, religious and ethnic—in Ivory Coast have been growing for some time, and they run 

deep. The Gbagbo Government, with its short-sighted politics of exclusion, has been a big part of the problem. 

A small band of rebels can do great damage to fragile West African institutions. In fact, it took the world’s largest peacekeeping 

operation, backboned by the British military and with the assistance of the Nigerian military, to give Sierra Leone a shot at peace. 

We are counting on Ivory Coast being fixed with far less work. I 

hope it works. 

Before turning to Ranking Member Payne for an opening statement, I would like to welcome our new Members of the Subcommittee. Representative Mark Green just left us. He actually in 

his youth taught in Kenya and lived in a number of sub-Sarahan 

African countries. 

With that said, I would now like to recognize Mr. Payne for any 

opening statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA) at this afternoon’s hearing on Ivory Coast: 

‘‘We convene today, unfortunately, to look at another African crisis: the unraveling of Ivory Coast. Once a pillar of political stability in West Africa, Ivory Coast 

has now proven vulnerable, falling prey to the type of war that devastated Sierra 

Leone. The strife in Ivory Coast, should it continue, has the potential to ensnare 

other countries of the region in a state of perpetual armed conflict, lawlessness, and 

human misery that neighboring Liberia has long suffered. Ivory Coast is a disaster 

in the making. 

‘‘We all hope the recently signed Marcoussis Agreement is the beginning of this 

troubling conflict’s end. A few caveats, however, need to be raised. 

‘‘It is hard for me to see how this French-backed peace plan is not a reward to 

rebels who fought their way to the negotiating table, and if the plan is followed, 

into legitimate positions of political power. This may be a realistic policy given the 

international community’s level of commitment to resolving this conflict, but the 

price paid, legitimizing the rebels’ tactics, is high. It certainly seems to do little to 

break the cycle of violence in West Africa, and it is not the approach that worked 

in Sierra Leone. The rebels are threatening to march on Abidjan if their demands 

on implementing the Agreement, including taking the defense and interior portfolios, are not met. Marcoussis should be supported, within reason. 

‘‘This Subcommittee has long condemned President Charles Taylor of Liberia. His 

regime abuses Liberians. He bears great responsibility for the death and destruction 

in Sierra Leone, for which I’m hoping he is indicted. For those not aware, that was 

the conflict in which Taylor-backed rebels cut off the hands and feet of little boys 

and girls. Taylor’s regime today, I am convinced, is backing rebel forces in Ivory 

Coast. That the peace pact makes no provision for checking the role of foreign governments stoking this conflict—it’s treated as a non-issue—is a serious flaw. We deVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

ceive ourselves by ignoring the role played by Charles Taylor and Burkina Faso 

President Blaise Campaore. We need a back-up policy, should the Marcoussis approach fail. 

‘‘Building peace in West Africa once war has broken out is not easy. The roots 

of conflict—political, economic, religious, and ethnic—in Ivory Coast have been 

growing for some time, and run deep. The Gbagbo government, with its short-sighted politics of exclusion, has been a big part of the problem. A small band of rebels 

can do great damage to fragile West African institutions. In fact, it took the world’s 

largest peacekeeping operation, backboned by the British military, to give Sierra 

Leone a shot at peace. We are counting on Ivory Coast being fixed with far less 

work. I hope it works.’’

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me congratulate you on your reelection as Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee. I think that the expertise that you have gained 

and the time and the interest that you have shown during your two 

previous terms bode well for the continuation of the Committee 

really examining Africa and the problems, and our goal is to attempt to come up with solutions. Congratulations on that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Don. 

Mr. PAYNE. It is good to see your Vice Chairman, Mr. Houghton, 

here, and our new Members hopefully will get a chance to come. 

We have one new Member, but, as we know, this is organization 

time. There are many, many meetings. I have been in meetings 

today, as you have, with Secretary Powell and been in a meeting 

with Secretary Chow from Education. We have had all kinds of 

other meetings, so that is the reason we see the absence of some 

of our Members by virtue of the starting up. 

Let me just say that it is good to see our Assistant Secretary of 

State, Secretary Kansteiner. We look forward to your testimony. To 

Dr. Toungara and to Tim Docking we thank you for taking time out 

this afternoon to give us an appraisal of your analysis of the current situation in Cote d’Ivoire. 

The country of Cote d’Ivoire, the region of West Africa and the 

entire international community was shocked on September 19, 

2002, by a failed coup attempt led by rebels and with conflict and 

chaos that we saw throughout Cote d’Ivoire. 

Widely seen as a beacon of stability and economics assessed in 

the region since becoming independent in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire now 

finds itself in the grip of a situation that threatens to undermine 

the recent steps toward democracy made in the last 10 years. 

Approximately 40 percent of the residents of Cote d’Ivoire came 

from neighboring states because of the economic opportunity there, 

and Cote d’Ivoire was seen as a beacon of stability, of hope, of what 

was good about Africa, so we are very disheartened and we are 

shocked when we did hear in September 2002 of the rebel incursion. 

First, my heart goes out to the Ivoirian people who have been the 

victims. As is usually the case in civil conflict, the people are the 

victims. They have been caught up between the fighting of the government forces and the rebels. People who were seeking reelections, many now find themselves in rebel territory. Most live under 

precarious conditions where it is unclear whether there will be harmony or continued unrest. 

I commend the involvement of the Economic Community of West 

African States, ECOWAS, now under the leadership of John 

Kufour, with the dispatching of the regional forces, the ECOMOG 

4

forces—as you know, the monitoring military group of ECOWAS—

and through diplomatic support to aid and restoring peace in Cote 

d’Ivoire. This type of regional support and collaboration is so key 

in finding real solutions for peace in the country and to stem any 

flaring up in neighboring nations that have seen so much discord 

as we have seen in Sierra Leone, as we have seen in Guinea, as 

has already been mentioned, as we see in Liberia, a country still 

without peace. Stability is important, and we are disturbed at the 

destabilization that we have seen in West Africa. 

The involvement of the French Government also through its use 

of troops and its role in evacuating French citizens and other foreigners and by hosting the peace talks has also been a key element, 

and we certainly support their involvement. 

The recent agreement reached between the government and the 

rebels groups was called into question by Ivoirian people demonstrated by their protesting in front of the French Embassy and 

military bases and in the streets of Abidjan. As the agreement 

called for a coalition government, yesterday the new Prime Minister, Sedou Diarra, was installed. Hours after his installation, 

fighting ensued once again. Many fear the new coalition government will be controlled by the Prime Minister, stripping President 

Gbagbo of much of his power, especially considering the rebels’ 

claim that the accord promises them the posts of Minister of Interior and Defense. However, the regional community confirmed the 

importance of the installation of the new Prime Minister in a meeting attended by the Presidents of Ghana, Togo and Nigeria, as well 

as South Africa’s Vice President, Jacob Zuma, whose country chairs 

the African Union. They pledged their support of this move because 

it was a central feature of the peace accord. 

We hope that a quick cease fire can be reached and that the conflict can be worked out and that we can once again move toward 

stability and elections in the future. I do feel that some of this was 

brought on when certain candidates were restricted from the elections, particularly Mr. Witari. 

I do not even believe in my opinion that he would have been able 

to win the election. However, by restricting people it then gives 

legs to rebels who may have some other agenda. They seize on that 

opportunity to cause disruption and chaos, and I think it was unfortunate that the question of Mr. Witari’s father’s father’s nationality, whether he was Burkina on the other side of the river or 

whether he was born on this side of the river. As we know, the 

countries were made by Europeans, and regardless of the side of 

the river they live on they really are sometimes one and the same 

people, as we of African descent know. To have these artificial 

handicaps thrown in I think partly kind of created this destabilization. 

I once again thank Chairman Royce for calling this important 

hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this timely and important hearing. I appreciate the presence of Assistant Secretary Kansteiner, Dr. Toungara and Tim 

5

Dockings and thank you for taking the time this afternoon to apprise us of their 

analysis on the current situation in Cote d’Ivoire. 

The country of Cote d’Ivoire, the region of West Africa, and the entire international community were shocked when on September 19, 2002, a failed coup attempt led to conflict and chaos throughout Cote d’Ivoire. 

Widely seen as a beacon of stability and economic success in the region since independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire now finds itself in the grip of a situation that 

threatens to undermine recent steps towards democracy made in the last ten years. 

First, my heart goes out to the Ivoirian people who have been the victims, as is 

usually the case in civil conflict. They have been caught in between the fighting of 

government forces and the rebels, who were seeking early elections. Many now find 

themselves in rebel territory. Most live under precarious conditions where it is unclear whether there will be harmony or continued unrest. 

I commend the involvement of the Economic Community of West African States 

(ECOWAS), now under the leadership of John Kufour, with the dispatching of the 

regional forces, ECOMOG (the ECOWAS monitoring group), and through diplomatic 

support to aid in restoring peace in Cote d’Ivoire. This type of regional support and 

collaboration is so key in finding a real solution for peace in the country and to stem 

any flaring up in neighboring nations that have seen so much discord (Sierra Leone, 

Guinea, and Liberia which still is not at peace) and whose stability is interdependent. 

The involvement of the French government, also through the use of troops, in its 

role in evacuating French citizens and other foreigners, and by hosting the peace 

talks has been key as well. 

The recent agreement reached between the government and the rebel groups was 

called into question by the Ivoirian people, demonstrated by their protesting in front 

of the French embassy and military bases and in the streets of Abidjan. As the 

agreement called for a coalition government, yesterday, the new Prime Minister, 

Seydou Diarra, was installed. Hours after his installation, fighting ensued once 

again. Many fear the new coalition government will be controlled by the Prime Minister, stripping President Gbagbo of much of his power, especially considering the 

rebels’ claim that the accord promises them the posts of Minister of Interior and 

Defense. However, the regional community confirmed the importance of the installation of the new Prime Minister in a meeting attended by the presidents of Ghana, 

Togo and Nigeria as well as South Africa Vice president Jacob Zuma—whose country chairs the African Union. They pledged their support of this move because it 

was a central feature of the peace accord. 

We all hope for a quick ceasefire to be reached once again, and for this conflict 

to be worked out through the regional process. 

I thank you once again, Chairman Royce and I look forward to the testimony of 

the witnesses.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congressman Payne. 

I would like to at this time recognize Ambassador Kokora of 

Ivory Coast and ask him to stand to be recognized. [Applause.] 

Thank you, Ambassador. Ambassador, we all wish the best for your 

country. We have received your statement, which we are going to 

print in the record. We appreciate you being with us today. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kokora follows:]

6


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7


84945b.eps
8

Mr. ROYCE. I would now like to introduce Mr. Walter Kansteiner, 

our Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. He was appointed in 

June 2001. His previous government service included serving as 

Director of African Affairs on the National Security Council staff. 

He also served as the Africa specialist on the Secretary of State’s 

Policy Planning staff and with the Department of Defense as a 

Member of the Strategic Minerals Task Force. 

Mr. Kansteiner has more than 20 years of experience with African businesses. The Assistant Secretary holds graduate degrees 

from American University and Virginia Theological Seminary in 

International Economics and Ethics respectively, and it is a pleasure to have him with us today. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER H. KANSTEINER III, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I am 

glad to be here today, and I am particularly glad to welcome the 

new Members of your Committee. 

Congresswoman McCollum, your interest in HIV AIDS and the 

unique ecosystems of Africa are very important to us, and we look 

forward to working with you on those issues, as well as others. 

Congressman Green, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, has deep 

experience and knowledge about East Africa, particularly Kenya, 

and we look forward to tapping some of that insight that Congressman Green has. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Assistant Secretary. I did want to recognize our new Members’ special interest and involvement with respect to the issue of stoning and particularly stoning of women in 

Nigeria and say that the Congresswoman’s effort in focusing the attention of this Committee on human rights abuses, especially 

human rights abuses to women, is going to be much appreciated. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Lastly, I would like to congratulate you, sir, on 

your reelection as Chair of this Committee. I look forward to your 

leadership. We have a lot of issues to cover in these years ahead, 

and I am glad you are where you are. 

As you know, the political situation in Cote d’Ivoire escalated 

into an international crisis on September 19, 2002, when a coup attempted, but failed, to dislodge the government of President 

Gbagbo. The violent incidents of September left rebel forces in control of slightly more than half of the country. Only the intervening 

presence of the French military prevented the rebels from marching on Abidjan. 

In response to the attempted coup, the United States worked 

closely with the French to protect American lives and to take initial 

diplomatic steps in the regional and international community to encourage a political settlement. ECOWAS acted immediately to form 

a contact group. That contact group was to bring an early end to 

the fighting and in fact obtained a cease fire in mid October, large 

part due to the excellent work of the foreign minister of Senegal. 

To monitor the cease fire, the Economic Community of West African States promised to provide a military observer mission. It 

asked the French to take on the task on an interim basis until such 

a force might be deployed. In order to provide momentum to the 

9

peace process, which appeared to have become stalemated, French 

Foreign Minister de Villepin invited the Ivoirian political parties 

and rebel forces to meet in Paris last month. Out of these intensive 

negotiations emerged the Marcoussis Agreement signed on January 

20. 

The Marcoussis Accord provides a format for addressing some of 

the key contentious issues. I might add these are the very issues 

that the rebels claim to be at the heart of their complaints. Those 

issues include citizenship, land ownership and eligibility for the 

presidency, which Ivoirians have long debated. 

To implement the agreement, the parties agreed that a government of national reconciliation would be formed around a consensus Prime Minister. This Prime Minister would be brought in 

from the outside. He would be viewed as neutral, and he would be 

considered a technocrat and capable of pulling together the various 

strains of Cote d’Ivoire society. A transitional power sharing arrangement called for the transfer of some of the presidential powers to this new Prime Minister. Marcoussis did not, however, specify how ministerial portfolios would be distributed. 

The Marcoussis Agreement offers a workable framework for moving toward peace and reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire. The United 

States has repeatedly affirmed its support for the agreement. We 

actively supported U.N. Security Council Resolution 1464, which 

endorsed the accord. 

Implementing Marcoussis will not be easy. Important elements 

among President Gbagbo’s supporters have reacted negatively to 

the proposed participation of rebels in the new government. President Gbagbo has made clear his opposition to awarding certain 

portfolios in the new government to the rebels. 

Last Friday, President Gbagbo addressed his nation, stating that 

he accepted the spirit of Marcoussis, albeit not all the specifics. He 

urged his countrymen to give the accord and the new Prime Minister a chance to restore peace. He said he would not, however, 

transfer his executive powers to the Prime Minister, nor override 

the constitution. 

The Ivoirian rebels insist that, having dropped their demands for 

Gbagbo’s ouster and early elections, they would in fact be awarded 

certain ministries. As Congressman Payne indicated, those ministries included defense and interior. They claim they were promised these posts in Paris. 

To try to break the present impasse, President Kufour of Ghana, 

the new Chair of ECOWAS, convoked President Gbagbo, the new 

Prime Minister Diarra and the rebels to meet with him and the 

ECOWAS contact group in Yamoussoukro Monday of this week. Although the rebels did not participate in the meeting, Prime Minister Diarra was officially installed. 

Achieving and preserving peace and stability will require external forces. French forces in Cote d’Ivoire are now approximately 

3,000. The French have maintained buffer positions along an eastwest axis dividing the government held territory from that held by 

the rebels. 

Regional ECOWAS forces (ECOFORCE) from Benin, Ghana, 

Niger, Senegal and Togo began arriving in Cote d’Ivoire last 

month. There are now approximately 800 ECOFORCE troops in 

10

Cote d’Ivoire, and we expect that to rise to 1,300 fairly soon. We 

have applauded the ECOWAS leaders for their readiness to assume 

direct responsibility for regional security. 

The United States has so far supported the ECOFORCE deploy- ment, both with $1.5 million contractual and logistical support, primarily in the areas of transportation and communication, as well 

as with equipment from our regional depot in Freetown, Sierra 

Leone. That equipment includes trucks and jeeps, other vehicles, 

generators and some communication gear. 

As far as the neighborhood goes, we have made it clear to all of 

Cote d’Ivoire’s neighbors that we cannot tolerate interference and 

further destabilization of this country. We and others have made 

this point with particular emphasis to President Compaore of 

Burkina Faso and President Taylor of Liberia. While both Presidents deny any connection with or support for the rebels, circumstantial evidence suggests there is ample reason to remain concerned and vigilant. 

Several of the coup plotters enjoyed sanctuary for some time in 

Burkina Faso immediately before the coup. The level of coordination and planning, the infrastructure and the weaponry available 

to the rebels all suggest a pattern of outside assistance. 

Liberians are certainly fighting with both rebel groups in the 

west. President Taylor insists he opposes the conflict in Cote 

d’Ivoire, but there is no doubt that there is extensive movement 

across the Liberian/Ivoirian border. Liberians are bringing looted 

items back home, and mercenaries easily cross into Cote d’Ivoire. 

Several ethnic groups straddle the border, and it is easy to recruit fighters ready to settle old grudges. We are looking very carefully at that border; in fact, at all of Cote d’Ivoire’s borders, and 

are maintaining a high level of diplomatic activity to ensure that 

others are also paying close attention to President Taylor and 

President Compaore’s behavior. 

Since the failed coup attempt in September, the United States 

recognized that civil war in Cote d’Ivoire posed a significant threat 

to stability and security in West Africa. It threatened important 

economic interests and might trigger deep-seated ethnic tensions 

and risk endangering the lives and safety of American citizens. 

Our principal political objective in Cote d’Ivoire is the restoration 

of peace and stability in the country and the region. We believe the 

best way to achieve the necessary peace and reconciliation is 

through a more open, transparent and inclusive democratic process. 

The Marcoussis Accord provides for this type of process, but it is 

up to Ivoirians to make it work. 

We do not want to see civil war destroy the Ivoirian economy. To 

date, there has not been a great deal of damage to the economic 

infrastructure, and we are all grateful for that. However, there has 

been considerable social disruption, and normal transportation and 

communication routes have been made unusable or unreliable. Cote 

d’Ivoire has long played a vital and vibrant economic engine for the 

region. If not dealt with, this conflict has the seeds not only to become a center of political instability, but one which spreads economic stagnation and collapse. 

Finally, we are speaking out about the deterioration of the 

human rights situation. We have witnessed the killing and woundVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
11

ing of the innocent since the first day of the coup attempt in September and subsequent fighting. Moreover, as the conflict has continued to fester, we have noted the emergence of what appears to 

be cases of extra-judicial killings and disappearances. These must 

stop, and those responsible must be brought to justice. 

In summation, the situation in Cote d’Ivoire is complex and difficult. The country has significant issues with which its leaders 

must begin to grapple. Some of those issues include ethnic divisions, people that come originally from other countries of the neighborhood, and long histories and rivalries. The leadership has to 

look to the future and not to the past. 

Mr. Chairman, we are anxious to work with all of those that are 

seeking peace in Cote d’Ivoire, and we look forward to working 

with this Committee on achieving some of those. 

Thank you very much, and I would be pleased to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER H. KANSTEINER III, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The political situation in Cote d’Ivoire escalated into an international crisis on 

September 19, 2002, when a coup d’etat attempted but failed to dislodge the government of President Laurent Gbagbo. The violent incidents of September left rebel 

forces in control of slightly more than half the country. Only the intervening presence of French military forces prevented the rebels from marching from Bouake, in 

central Cote d’Ivoire, on Abidjan. In immediate response to the attempted coup, the 

United States worked closely with the French to protect American lives, to draw 

down our embassy presence and to take initial diplomatic steps in the regional and 

international community to encourage a political settlement. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) acted immediately to form a ‘‘contact group’’ 

to bring an early end to the fighting. An ECOWAS team obtained a ceasefire on October 17, and negotiations on a permanent settlement opened shortly afterwards in 

Lome, Togo, under mediation of Togo’s President Eyadema. To monitor the ceasefire, 

ECOWAS promised to provide a military observer mission. It asked the French to 

take on the task on an interim basis until such a force might be deployed. 

In order to provide momentum to the peace process, which appeared to have become stalemated, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin invited the 

Ivoirian ‘‘political forces,’’ i.e., the parties represented in the parliament plus representatives of the three Ivoirian rebel groups to meet in Paris in January 2003. 

Out of these intensive negotiations emerged the Marcoussis agreement, signed on 

January 24, 2003. 

The Marcoussis accord provides a format for addressing some of the key contentious issues—citizenship, land ownership, and eligibility for the presidency—which 

Ivoirians have debated for some time. The participants in the negotiations made 

clear their understanding that many of the measures agreed upon would require 

legislation, and in some instances, changes to the constitution to implement. All parties present pledged to support these measures. To implement the agreement, the 

parties agreed that a ‘‘Government of National Reconciliation’’ would be formed 

around a consensus prime minister. A transitional power-sharing arrangement 

called for the transfer of some presidential powers to the new prime minister. 

Marcoussis did not, however, specify how ministerial portfolios would be distributed 

The Marcoussis agreement offers a workable framework for moving towards peace 

and reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire. The U.S. has repeatedly affirmed its support for 

the agreement. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 

William Bellamy represented the U.S. at the Paris heads of state meeting and expressed support for the agreement. The U.S. actively supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 1464, which endorsed the Marcoussis accord and called on 

the UN Secretary General to examine ways in which the United Nations could assist in its implementation. 

Implementing Marcoussis will not be easy. Important elements among President 

Gbagbo’s supporters have reacted negatively to the proposed participation of rebels 

in the new government. They have demonstrated vociferously and sometimes violently. In particular, they singled out the French as responsible for perceived flaws 

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in the agreement. French military forces remain on high alert and the French are 

acting to protect the lives and property of more than 16,000 French citizens still in 

Cote d’Ivoire. 

President Gbagbo, I believe, walks a narrow line. He has made clear his opposition to awarding portfolios in the new government to the rebels, and his determination to defend the Ivoirian constitution. On Friday, February 7, President Gbagbo 

addressed the nation, stating that he accepted the ‘‘spirit’’ of Marcoussis, albeit not 

all of the specifics. He urged his countrymen to give the accord and Prime MinisterDesignate Diarra a chance to restore peace. He said he would not, however, transfer 

his executive powers to the Prime Minister nor override the constitution. He also 

stated that he was not prepared to accept the rebels as members of the government. 

The Ivoirian rebels insist that, having dropped their demands for Gbagbo’s ouster 

and early elections at Marcoussis, they should be awarded the ministries of Defense 

and Interior in the new government. They claim they were promised these posts in 

Paris. They have given President Gbagbo until the end of this week to implement 

Marcoussis fully or face a resumption of hostilities. 

To try to break the present impasse, President Kufour, the new President of 

ECOWAS, convoked Gbagbo, Diarra, and the rebels to meet with him and the 

ECOWAS contact group in Cote d’Ivoire’s administrative capital, Yamoussoukro on 

February 10. The rebels indicated that they would not appear. Nevertheless, P.M. 

Diarra was officially installed. 

PRESERVING PEACE WITH INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Achieving and preserving peace and stability in Cote d’Ivoire will require external 

forces. French forces in Cote d’Ivoire have risen from 600 present on September 19 

to approximately 3,000. The French have maintained buffer positions along an eastwest axis dividing government-held territory from that held by the Popular Movement for Cote d’Ivoire (MPCI). In the far west, French forces interposed between 

government forces and the Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ) and the Ivoirian 

Patriotic Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) have been confronted on several occasions by rebel forces and have suffered casualties. 

Regional peacekeepers from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, under 

ECOWAS aegis, began arriving in Cote d’Ivoire in January. Approximately 800 are 

now in country; we expect this number to increase initially to 1,300. We have applauded the ECOWAS leaders for their readiness to assume direct responsibility for 

regional security. For more than half a decade, we have worked with ECOWAS to 

develop a regional peacekeeping capability. We are gratified to see large numbers 

of personnel who have received training under our (old) ACRI (Africa Crisis Response Initiative), (new) ACOTA (African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance), and Operation Focus Relief (OFR) among the units deployed. The readiness of ECOWAS members to participate in Cote d’Ivoire peacekeeping was recognized in the Security Council in UNSCR 1464. 

The United States has so far supported the ECOFORCE deployment, both with 

$1.5 million in contractor and logistics support, primarily in the areas of transportation and communication, and equipment from our regional storage depot in Freetown, Sierra Leone. That equipment includes trucks, jeeps, and other vehicles, generators, and communications equipment. We envision that this equipment will be 

returned to the U.S. upon completion of this mission. 

A resumption of fighting is, of course, a possibility. That said, we continue to caution all the parties that this would be a tragic mistake that can bring nothing but 

further suffering to the region. We do not believe that any party is capable of 

achieving a military victory. Certainly, no party should attempt to pursue one. 

LAYING DOWN MARKERS TO NEIGHBORING STATES

We have made clear to all of Cote d’Ivoire’s neighbors that we cannot tolerate interference to further destabilize the country. We, and others, have made this point 

with particular emphasis to President Compaore of Burkina-Faso and President 

Taylor of Liberia. While both presidents deny any connection with or support for the 

rebels, circumstantial evidence suggests there is ample reason to remain concerned 

and vigilant. 

Several of the key coup plotters enjoyed sanctuary for some time in Burkina-Faso 

immediately before the coup. The level of coordination and planning, the infrastructure, and the weaponry available to the rebels all suggest a pattern of outside assistance. 

Liberians are certainly fighting with both rebel groups in the west, along the Liberian border. While President Taylor insists he opposes the conflict in Cote 

d’Ivoire, there is no doubt that there is an extensive movement across the Liberian/

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Ivoirian border. Liberians are bringing looted items back home and mercenaries easily cross into Cote d’Ivoire. I would point out, in addition, that several ethnic groups 

straddle the border, and it is easy to recruit fighters ready to settle old grudges. 

We are looking very carefully at Cote d’Ivoire’s borders, and are maintaining a 

high level of diplomatic activity to ensure that others are also paying close attention 

to President Taylor’s and President Compaore’s behavior. 

UNITED STATES POLICY

Since September 19, the U.S. recognized that civil war in Cote d’Ivoire posed a 

significant threat to stability and security in West Africa, threatened important economic interests, might trigger deep-seated ethnic tensions and risked endangering 

the lives and safety of American citizens. 

Our immediate and continuing concern is the safety of American citizens. Immediately after the failed coup, a European Command (EUCOM) Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT) arrived to assist Ambassador Arlene Render and her staff at the 

American Embassy in Abidjan to organize and carry out the evacuation of American 

citizens from dangerous locations and to find safe havens in Abidjan and in other 

states in the region. To the best of my knowledge, all American citizens are accounted for and are safe. At present, approximately 1,400 of the 3,500 American citizens resident in Cote d’Ivoire on September 19 remain in country. The Embassy remains in very close touch with the American community through its warden system. 

In late October, the official American mission in Cote d’Ivoire was placed in a status of ‘‘ordered departure.’’ The Embassy was reduced to an essential core of approximately 40 key American officials, including security. 

Our principle political objective in Cote d’Ivoire is the restoration of peace and 

stability in the country and in the region. We believe the best way to achieve the 

necessary peace and reconciliation is through a more open, transparent, and inclusive democratic process. The Marcoussis accords provide for this type of process, but 

it is up to Ivorians to make it work. We are prepared to work with Ivoirian leaders 

to help strengthen democratic principles and governance in Cote d’Ivoire. 

We do not want to see civil war destroy the Ivoirian economy. To date, there has 

not been a great deal of damage to the economic infrastructure. However, there has 

been considerable social disruption, and normal transportation and communication 

routes have been made unusable or unreliable. In the past, Cote d’Ivoire’s ability 

to transcend ethnic and political divisions was due in part to its productive economy. National wealth gave the country an infrastructure and economic promise that 

have been the envy of the region. Preserving and restoring the economy will be no 

easy task. 

It is essential to also make clear the role that Cote d’Ivoire has played as a vital 

and vibrant economic engine for the region. Cote d’Ivoire has absorbed excess population from its neighbors, providing cash incomes from which they remit substantial 

sums to their families in the region. The country is the region’s major market and 

transportation hub. Although the conflict has redirected some economic activities to 

its neighbors, without the dynamism of the Ivoirian economy to bolster the region, 

over time a diminished Cote d’Ivoire will begin to send workers home, possibly as 

refugees. If not dealt with, this conflict has the seeds not only to become a center 

of political instability, but one which spreads economic stagnation and collapse. 

Finally, we are speaking out about the deterioration of the human rights situation 

in the country. We have witnessed the killing and wounding of the innocent since 

the first day of fighting. Moreover, as the conflict has continued to fester, we have 

noted the emergence of what appear to be clear cases of extra-judicial killings and 

disappearances. These must stop, and those responsible must be brought to justice. 

We are alarmed by rhetoric that incites mob violence, that enhances ethnic distrust, 

and that preaches hate. This will not restore democracy. 

The situation in Cote d’Ivoire is difficult and complex. The country has significant 

issues of inclusion and participation that it must solve. Its leaders must come to 

grips with the realities of its current ethnic composition, and again assert leadership 

that looks to the future, not the past. We are prepared to work with them, as we 

are with other African peoples, nations, and leaders, towards a better common future for all. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. I would be pleased to answer your 

questions.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Kansteiner. One of 

the questions I was going to ask is that you say circumstantial evidence suggests there is ample reason to remain concerned and vigiVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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lant regarding support the Governments of Liberia and Burkina 

Faso may be providing to rebels in Cote d’Ivoire. 

One of the observations that I have seen in press accounts in the 

past is that Foday Sanko of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor of Liberia actually met in a Libyan 

training camp, a terrorist training camp, and further that that 

same camp hosted Compaore of Burkina Faso at one point, so you 

have three individuals who went through the same experience of 

being trained, and you have a similar modus operandi in terms of 

the way that they have conducted in the past terrorist activities arguably against their own citizens. 

I wanted to ask you in light of that, is there any indication at 

all of a potential Libyan role in this conflict? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. We have not seen any evidence of that, but 

there has been a long history, as you indicate, between some of the 

actors in West Africa that do have links to Tripoli. We have seen 

it with those in leadership positions in Burkina Faso and currently 

in Liberia, but in this particular case we have not seen anything 

per se. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to go into a closed session and 

discuss any details of any of this that you would like. 

Mr. ROYCE. Okay. I appreciate that. 

I was going to ask with the French being neutral, what pressure 

points exist on the rebels to resolve this conflict diplomatically, and 

what do we know about their capabilities, about their motives, and 

how do the Ivoirian rebels differ perhaps from other rebel groups 

that we have seen operate in this theater like the Revolutionary 

United Front rebels, for example, in Sierra Leone? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. There are essentially four rebel forces. We believe there is a certain degree of coordination among them, probably greater coordination in the north from the northern groups, 

perhaps less coordination between the northern and western 

groups, but clearly there is some communication going on there. 

Their motivations are varied, and they stem from everything 

from personal grudges and feeling as if they were relieved of duties 

or positions when they should not have been to more ideological 

motivations, so they truly are varied. An overlay to all of that is 

some ethnic tensions, too, and regional, coastal versus inland, so it 

is very complex. 

It is not as rough as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was 

in Sierra Leone. As crude as that all was, there were probably 

more clear motivating forces, primarily economic, with the RUF. 

This situation is a little more complicated. 

Mr. ROYCE. But again to go back to what pressure points exist? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. The rebels do not have the military capability 

to move any further than they are right now with the French military there, so it is militarily stalemated. The French thus are able 

to pressure the rebels to move into a political dialogue. 

It looks as if the rebels have at least bought into that enough 

that they are showing up in Paris and agreeing to Marcoussis. So, 

I suppose the leverage is that ultimately those French troops will 

not let them gain any more ground. 

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Mr. ROYCE. Does the Marcoussis Agreement perhaps send to you 

the message that political power and legitimacy can be won 

through the barrel of a gun? Is that a concern? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. That is very much a concern. As you mentioned 

in your opening statement, that is not a signal we want to send to 

the rest of Africa or to the rest of the world. So it is going to require some real diplomatic and constitutional writing skills to 

make sure that those benefits that might occur within the society 

do not occur simply because someone took up a gun. 

Mr. ROYCE. My last question would be whether you would perceive that France is committed to staying the course here. As the 

French Government pulls out the French nationals, that arguably 

diminishes or reduces the incentive for France to remain engaged 

in Cote d’Ivoire. What is your perception on that? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. My conversations with Paris would suggest 

that the French government is in this for the long haul. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

I will turn to Ranking Member Don Payne of New Jersey. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

You know, as this conflict started to evolve I was sort of pressing 

our State Department to maybe become a little more engaged; not 

physically, but to try to work diplomatically with some of the factions there, but we seemed to have not engaged ourselves very 

much in that. 

Now, we know that it is certainly a former French colony and 

that France certainly had many more contacts and influence. However, many of the African countries after decolonization have kind 

of sought more involvement from the U.S. in spite of their former 

ties. It would appear to me that we kind of did not feel it was in 

our interest to try and engage the rebels in a diplomatic way. 

Secondly, as you may recall, there were requests from the government for some assistance. They did not want weapons, but they 

did want to get some assistance in logistics. As a matter of fact, 

I was in conversation with the government, and they were saying 

that the rebels outmanned them with weaponry, that they had better weapons. They had better equipment than the government had 

and were simply requesting some assistance to try to be on par 

with the rebels. Once again, we did not respond very positively. 

Is there any interest that we have there, or are we simply sort 

of allowing the French to just be the only player from the west in 

Cote d’Ivoire? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, sir. We are very engaged. It might 

not be high profile, but there is constant diplomatic engagement. 

My senior deputy assistant was in fact at Marcoussis sitting there 

involved with the negotiations. All sides heard our input, and I 

would like to think that we helped and we were constructive in 

that agreement. 

As you know, historically Cote d’Ivoire has had a defense pact 

with France. Hence one reason why Cote d’Ivoire’s army and armed 

forces are so weak is because they historically always relied on the 

French. In fact, if there was ever a national security threat, by 

treaty the French were obligated to come to Cote d’Ivoire’s assistance. That, of course, is one reason why the French did respond. 

16

They were responding to their defense treaty and their defense 

pact with Ivory Coast. 

We have been responsive to some of the government’s requests, 

particularly on humanitarian assistance. We are actively helping 

the ECOFORCE now both with financial support and also equipment. We have a number of boats that left Freeport, Sierra Leone, 

ladened with U.S. Army equipment. They have now landed in 

Abidjan and will be used and moved up country from Abidjan to 

that front line. All that equipment will go to the ECOFORCE. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, I am glad that we are starting to become involved. I believe that if we had become involved earlier on when 

the plea came out—you know, if we are going to sit back and allow 

the rebel forces to take over then we are going to go through a 

whole phase of that. 

Once again, I was not certainly inferring that we should send 

any manpower or anything like that. We know that is a no-no. 

However, I think if we had gotten more involved in negotiations—

as a matter of fact, at one point I thought that some people in the 

State Department almost had a preference to the rebels, to be 

truthful. Someone over there when I talked to them said well, they 

were courteous or something. I do not know. 

I think we really need to be serious about making a clear message that countries cannot be taken over by the barrel of a gun. 

I was disturbed in Venezuela when we sort of looked the other way 

when a coup took over and almost recognized the coup plotters 

until we found they really were not in charge. 

You know, we cannot have it where we have a despot like we say 

Saddam Hussein is, and we want the people to have rule of law 

and we all support that in one place. However, in the other place 

we say well, you know, they take over, and by the rule of force it 

is all right. 

I guess I am playing for more consistent policy, and I guess with 

that I would yield back. Hopefully with giving defense and the interior to the rebels, it just seems to me it would be a pretty hard pill 

to swallow, and then to have the Prime Minister actually having 

more control than the elected President. I just hope that we can 

work with it. 

Finally, we cut peacekeeping 50 percent in our 2004 budget, 

down to $24 million, from 2 years ago. I do not know how we are 

going to be able to assist with the gains we have made in Sierra 

Leone and the Congo and other places with us cutting the budget 

in half for peacekeeping in Africa. It is sad to me. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. First on the cabinet positions, Marcoussis fortunately did not get into cabinet assignments. That would have 

been inappropriate, I believe, and they did not. 

Those specific assignments for various political parties and rebel 

factions need to be worked out by the Ivoirians. They are the only 

ones that can decide how that can be distributed and worked out, 

and we leave it to them. If they are looking for outside guidance, 

we stand ready to provide it. 

On the 2004 budget situation vis-a-vis, the voluntary peacekeeping operation account in Africa, I could not agree with you 

more, sir, and I will look for all the allies I can. Fortunately, we 

do have some fungibility in moving some money around, and I 

17

might very well be coming back to this very Committee to ask for 

that flexibility. 

Mr. ROYCE. Congressman Houghton. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having the meeting. It is very worthwhile, and it is good to be with 

Mr. Payne again. 

Mr. Assistant Secretary, thanks very much for all you do. You 

are a great credit to all of us here. 

I would like to try to understand what the forces are here. The 

French are sort of a buffer group. Is that right? Then you have the 

other nations that you mentioned—Ghana, Niger, Senegal—coming 

in and trying to help them. Then we are protecting our own citizens. We are working on the Marcoussis Agreement. We are giving 

money, $1.5 million, arms and equipment and things like that. 

Is this going to fix the problem? At the end of your statement you 

said, you know, that there are some underlying issues that are 

really pretty important. You said the leaders must come to grips 

with the realities of its current ethnic composition. I do not know 

whether we are on the road to resolution here or not. Maybe you 

could help. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. I think that the Marcoussis framework has a 

good chance of working. It calls on a government of national reconciliation. It forces Ivoirian political parties to address the tough 

questions. 

The tough questions for Cote d’Ivoire right now are foreign visitors. Are they citizens? What are they? As Mr. Payne made reference, there are millions from other West African countries now 

residing in Cote d’Ivoire. What is their status? Are they welcome 

visitors? Are they citizens of that country? Do they have voting 

rights? Do descendants from people that were born in other states 

have leadership rights, i.e., can they run for President? These are 

the contentious issues. 

Marcoussis has a chance of working because it raises up and 

identifies those tough, sensitive, hard issues. Now, that makes it 

hard to get a deal because they are tough and sensitive, but if they 

can reach agreement on these issues they have reached agreement 

on the toughest issues that this country has to face. 

The framework is right. If the people on the ground can use it 

and make it happen, that remains to be seen. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. And driving the diplomatic talks are what nations? The United States? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. The French were driving the Marcoussis Agreement. Once that agreement was reached, supported by a Security 

Council resolution last week, the Secretary General was tasked 

with assigning a special representative, which he has now done. So 

some of the responsibility now shifts to the U.N. 

They have a specific responsibility. They have taken on a role 

that they will be observers, mediators, facilitators to make sure 

this Marcoussis Agreement is fulfilled. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Congresswoman Betty McCollum of Minnesota. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been fascinating to listen to, and I appreciate you being here. I am looking 

forward to learning much more today. 

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As I said, I am learning a lot. I have two questions. I will do 

them both, and I will keep them short, although your answer to the 

first one might become long. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Okay. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. There are three rebel groups. Can you break 

them out for me and kind of explain kind of their different 

polarities so I can figure out what everybody is trying to deal with 

around the table? 

Then my second question is we have had a lot of discussion about 

our French allies and how they have taken a real leadership role 

in trying to maintain some stability here. I have been told that the 

French have been told that there are links with al-Qaeda, and I am 

wondering if our government has any comments on that. 

I will sit back and listen. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Okay. Great. I will try to answer. The rebel 

groups are diverse. The northern based rebel groups were the ones 

that, in September, originally launched the coup or the attempted 

coup. 

It seems that those rebel groups are made up of disaffected 

former army people, people from the northern region, some nonChristians, remembering that Cote d’Ivoire is roughly divided regionally Christians in the south, Muslims in the north. That is, by 

the way, a gross generalization. There are plenty of exceptions and 

pockets of diversity throughout the country. 

The northern groups were dissatisfied with the Gbagbo regime, 

felt that the Gbagbo regime had reneged on certain commitments 

and felt they had no recourse except through rebellion and through 

a military ouster. That is basically how they would describe, I believe, their motivation. 

The western rebel groups have a much greater ethnic overtone 

I would describe. The Guere on the Ivoirian side are cousins to the 

Krahn on the Liberian side. Interestingly enough, the Krahn are 

historically very anti Taylor. The Guere are generally pro government, pro President Gbagbo. 

The other cousins across the border would be the Yacouba on the 

Ivoirian side, and they are often identified with former leader General Guei, who his followers very much are part of this rebel group. 

Their cousins on the Liberian side are the Gio-mano, and so that 

is how you get these cross border assistances. The Yacouba and the 

Gio-mano assist each other, both sides of the border, as do the 

cousins that live further south, the Krahn and the Guere, so there 

is a lot more ethnic play in terms of the western rebels. 

We have not seen any direct links to al-Qaeda to my knowledge. 

But again we could ask for additional information and go into a 

closed session and explore that more fully. 

Mr. ROYCE. Congresswoman Barbara Lee of California. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me also 

thank you for being here and thank our Ranking Member for these 

hearings. 

I have had the privilege really to visit Cote d’Ivoire on many occasions, so, like I think everyone, this has been quite a shock to 

all of us, but understanding a little bit of the history and what has 

transpired is—you know, I guess I would say I could see how this 

is occurring now. 

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I want to find out just in terms of the humanitarian crisis now, 

given the health care needs of the country and the educational 

needs and the infrastructure needs. How is this conflict bearing 

upon the humanitarian situation, and what are we doing? Is 

USAID there? Is it safe for our folks to be there? What actually are 

we doing in terms of our aid and diplomacy to help resolve the crisis and deliver services? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Yes. Good question. The situation is such that 

in parts of the country it is not safe for development agencies and 

non-government organizations to work. In fact, when this erupted 

in September we had to extract most of those people. 

There is a humanitarian need. When you have such massive dislocation there always is. There are refugees in fact that were Liberian citizens who fled the conflict in Liberia and came across into 

Cote d’Ivoire and were welcomed and in fact lived in camps, secure 

camps on the Cote d’Ivoire side of the border. They have now in 

fact been forced to return to Liberia because it is ‘‘safer’’ in Liberia 

than it is in Cote d’Ivoire. 

There is a humanitarian crisis, and we are working with various 

U.N. agencies and NGOs in facilitating and making sure that 

equipment and food and assistance is given to those refugees. 

There are also internal refugees inside Cote d’Ivoire, and we are 

working with U.N. agencies and NGOs to get appropriate material 

to those people. 

Interestingly enough, the infrastructure, the roads and the ports, 

have not been heavily damaged. There has been some damage, but 

it is not heavy. For instance, most of the cocoa crop, although it 

was not as good a quality as usual, has been harvested. Cote 

d’Ivoire produces the finest cocoa in the world probably. I should 

not say that with the Brazilians listening in, but the Ivoirian cocoa 

is fantastic. Most of that crop actually got out. Again, it is somewhat degraded because it was not fermented and did not have the 

time that it needed to get to the ports, but it got out. 

Life is going on. You know, this is not a normal situation, and 

we have to stay focused on the political and diplomatic efforts to 

resolve the situation. 

Ms. LEE. And how is the security situation at the United States 

Embassy? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you for asking. It is good. Our people 

are safe. We have drawn down. We probably have about 50 people 

in our Embassy today, and that is down probably 20 or 30 percent. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Shifting gears, Assistant Secretary 

Kansteiner, I would like to mention a commercial dispute involving 

a U.S. telecom business in Cote d’Ivoire. It is called Corra de 

Comstar. 

This company has had its facility invaded and its operations disrupted, and it has been reported to me that that occurred at the 

behest of a Mr. Alexander Galley with the backing of Ivoirian security forces. Mr. Galley I believe has been named on the June 2001 

U.N. Security Council resolution which bans international travel 

for Liberian Government officials and others presumed to be working with that government whose activities have been discussed 

here today. 

20

I know that this business has communicated with the Ivoirian 

Ambassador here in Washington, and I raise this issue with you to 

make you aware of it if you are not already with the hope that action can be taken. 

Again, I thank you on behalf of the Members of the Committee 

for appearing today, and I believe our Ranking Member, Congressman Don Payne, has additional questions he wants to raise. 

Mr. PAYNE. A very short question or statement that the African 

Development Bank recently left Abidjan. My question is whether 

you know is it just temporary? We would hope that we are not 

going to lose agencies like those that have been there for so long. 

We need to come up with a solution and then get back to normalcy, so I would hope you could check into that. I would hope that 

it is just temporary. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Yes, sir. I share that, and in fact the move to 

Tunis is strictly known as and we understand it to be temporary 

only. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you again for appearing today. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are now going to go to our second panel. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Timothy Docking is a Program Officer specializing in African affairs in the Research and Studies program of the 

U.S. Institute of Peace. He has focused on the study of political development, civil society formation and conflict resolution in Africa. 

His recent research has examined U.S. foreign policy toward the 

continent and the regional war in West Africa. 

Dr. Docking has held research fellowships at the Boston University African Studies Center and the Centre for the Study of Black 

Africa at the University of Bordeaux. Dr. Docking was a Fulbright 

Fellow at the University of Mali. Dr. Docking holds a doctorate in 

political science from Boston University. 

We also have with us Dr. Jeanne Maddox Toungara. She is an 

Associator Professor of History at Howard University. She teaches 

courses on West Africa, the African Diaspora and women in Africa 

at Howard University. Her research interests include West African 

intellectual history, indigenous thought, pre-colonial state formation, political culture and democratization within Francophone African nations, with particular emphasis on Ivory Coast. She holds 

a doctorate from the University of California at Los Angeles. 

We have your complete testimony for the record, so I am going 

to ask you just to summarize your testimony at this time, and then 

we will go to questions from the Members of this panel. 

If you want to begin, Dr. Docking? 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY DOCKING, PH.D., PROGRAM OFFICER, RESEARCH AND STUDIES PROGRAM, U.S. INSTITUTE OF 

PEACE 

Mr. DOCKING. Good afternoon. I would like to thank the Chairman for holding this timely hearing on the Ivory Coast and for inviting me to testify today. I would also like to thank the Ranking 

Member for his leadership in Congress on African affairs. 

21

Please let me make a brief disclaimer. The views I will express 

today are my own and do not represent those of my employer, the 

U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not advocate particular policy 

positions. 

I would like to begin by stating that I believe it is difficult to exaggerate the seriousness of the threat that the present crisis in 

Ivory Coast poses for Ivoirians and the entire West Africa subregion. As this Committee is aware, the Ivory Coast is just the 

most recent state to fall victim to the cancer of violent instability 

that has spread across West Africa for 14 years. If left unchecked, 

this disease will surely spread again with grievous consequences 

for Africans and U.S. strategic interests. 

One characteristic of these conflicts that leads me to this conclusion is the repeated meddling of regional actors in the internal affairs of neighboring states. From the earliest news from the Ivory 

Coast following the September 19 army mutiny, there have been 

reports of English speaking Liberian rebels among northern elements that today are known as the Patriotic Movement for the 

Ivory Coast or the MPCI. These reports quickly gained credibility 

when new fronts in the fighting opened up in the west of the country along the Liberian border. 

There is strong reason to believe that the MPCI has received 

support from Burkina Faso. While less conspicuous than Liberia’s 

involvement in Ivory Coast, according to various sources, including 

the French media, Burkina is implicated in the northern rebellion. 

Let me turn briefly now to American foreign policy toward West 

Africa. Since the late 1990s, our policies have been dominated by 

efforts to contain and isolate the Taylor regime in Liberia, but the 

sanctions we back are leaky and difficult to enforce, and Liberian 

forces are currently fighting in the Ivory Coast. 

With regards to U.S. foreign policy toward Ivory Coast, it is instructive to review our past policies toward neighboring Sierra 

Leone where we backed the British who, along with U.N. peacekeeping forces and the Guinean Army, defeated the RUF last week. 

With the Sierra Leone model in mind, it appears that U.S. policy 

makers intend to approach this crisis in Ivory Coast by backing the 

French in similar fashion. Indeed, this is a wise and prudent starting point for our policy, yet the comparison between the civil wars 

in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast should only be taken so far. There 

are three principal differences between Sierra Leone and the Ivory 

Coast. 

First, the Ivory Coast is sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth largest economy and is a linchpin for the region. Second, the Ivory Coast is 

strategically located, bordering three stable states including two of 

Africa’s brightest democratic stars, Ghana and Mali. Third, the 

character of the crisis in Ivory Coast is also different, and the potential for religiously based violence is real and, if left unchecked, 

could fan the flames of religious tensions throughout the region, especially in Nigeria. 

In brief, the collapse of Ivory Coast would send shockwaves 

across the region, dwarfing the effects of state failure in Liberia 

and Sierra Leone. And at a time when the U.S. is trying to increase oil exports from West Africa and in this age of terrorism 

22

when the threats posed by failed states are clear, a collapse of 

Ivory Coast would strike at our strategic interests. 

So what steps should the United States Government take to mitigate this crisis? The U.S. must do more than just stand behind the 

French as we did the British in Sierra Leone. We need to put our 

current geopolitical differences aside with the French and stand 

shoulder to shoulder with them in Ivory Coast. 

Finally, events in Ivory Coast should also cause the U.S. Government to revisit its policy toward Liberia from whence many of the 

region’s problems emanate. Principally, we should return to the 

missing link of our Liberian policy: The French. And I think this 

point is very important: For years, the French have viewed Taylor 

as ‘‘part of the solution’’ in West Africa and, thus, failed to back 

hard line sanctions against his regime. In return, Liberia was to 

stay out of the Ivory Coast. Clearly, this deal has now been broken. 

We should, therefore, intensify our dialogue with the French over 

Liberia and encourage them to toughen their policy toward the 

Taylor regime. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I thank you and 

welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Docking follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY DOCKING, PH.D., PROGRAM OFFICER, RESEARCH

AND STUDIES PROGRAM, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE

The views expressed in this testimony are my own and do not represent positions 

of my employer, the US Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies. 

INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT IN WEST AFRICA

I have been asked to speak to you today about the current crisis in the Ivory 

Coast, in particular, to examine the role that regional actors are playing to both assuage and complicate the situation, and to assess American foreign policy toward 

the Ivory Coast. 

To begin with, I believe it is difficult to exaggerate the seriousness of the threat 

that present instability in Ivory Coast poses for Ivorians and the entire West African sub-region. As this committee is aware, the Ivory Coast is just the most recent 

state to fall victim to the cancer of violent instability that has plagued West Africa 

for fourteen years. 

Today, the fifteen-state West African region, with its nearly 240 million inhabitants, houses all the ingredients of the ‘‘coming anarchy’’ that Robert Kaplan described nearly a decade ago. West Africa is the poorest region on earth, where we 

find 12 of the 22 least developed nations in the world: weak governance, collapsed 

states, the growing presence of mafias, gun and drug runners, international meddlers (like Libyan President Mohamar Kaddafi) and a surfeit of young, well-armed 

men, who lie in wait to prey on weak and exposed people and their decaying governments. 

The political instability and violent conflict we currently find in the Ivory Coast 

has numerous socio-economic causes that are important to understand: the politicizing of religious and ethnic differences by opportunistic Ivorian politicians; the absence of a democratic history and the lack of economic diversification of the nation’s 

agricultural-based economy which makes the economy particularly vulnerable to 

price fluctuations for commodities (especially cacao, coffee and palm oil). 

Yet to understand and begin to address the troubling situation in Ivory Coast we 

must also appreciate the regional context of the current troubles. 

For the spread of war in the Ivory Coast is in part a symptom of a larger system 

of conflict affecting the entire region. This warfare started in 1989 in Liberia when 

Libyan-trained, and Burkina Faso-backed, militants started a civil war to overthrow 

Liberian dictator, Samuel Doe. The fighting spread to Sierra Leone in 1991, to Guinea in 2000 and now threatens to engulf Ivory Coast. At the epicenter of this conflict 

system is the president of Liberia, Charles Taylor. 

23

REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE IVORY COAST CRISIS: 

From the earliest reports from the Ivory Coast following the September 19th army 

mutiny—which subsequently led to the annexation of roughly the northern half of 

Ivory Coast to mutinous Ivorian soldiers—there have been reports of English speaking (Liberian) rebels among northern elements that today are known as the Patriotic Movement for Ivory Coast (or the MPCI). 

These reports quickly gained credibility when new fronts opened up in the west 

of the country along the Liberian border. Two groups emerged in this region: 1) the 

Far West Ivory Coast People’s Movement (MPIGO) are the rump supporters of General Robert Gueı ̈, the former military ruler of Ivory Coast (1999–2000) who seized 

power in a coup; 2) The Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ) comprised largely 

of Liberian rebels and reportedly housing members of Taylor’s elite ‘‘Anti-Terrorist 

Unit’’ (ATU) and National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) regulars. These forces 

quickly set off to terrorize villagers and loot everything from automobiles to unprocessed cacao. 

There is also strong reason to believe that the MPCI has received support from 

Burkina Faso. While less conspicuous than Liberia’s involvement in Ivory Coast—

according to French media sources (including Le Monde)—Burkina is complicit in 

the northern rebellion. The open distain between Presidents Campaore ́ and Gbagbo, 

along with Burkina’s past adventurism in the region (in Liberia and Sierra Leone), 

further adds to these suspicions. 

Following the September 19th mutiny, the Gbagbo regime immediately suggested 

that Ouagadougou was behind the northern unrest. Indeed, President Campaore ́

has expressed sympathy for the northern rebels, many of whom are have ethnic 

roots in Burkina Faso and Mali, and he has heaped condemnation on the government in Abidjan, stating recently that Gbagbo should step down or be forced out 

‘‘like Milosevic.’’

But just as some regional states have meddled in the Ivory Coast’s internal affairs, others have actively tried to foster peace. These efforts have been led by the 

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its capable Executive 

Secretary, Mohamed Ibn Chambas. President Eyadema led a series of talks in Lome ́

between Ivorian combatants but after reaching an initial cease fire agreement, was 

unable to achieve a breakthrough in mediation. It was at this point that the French 

stepped up their involvement in the negotiations and brought all sides together in 

January for peace talks 30 kms south of Paris in Linas-Marcoussis. 

The leadership role played by President Wade in addressing the crisis has also 

been commendable. Indeed, Senegal has agreed to contribute the largest contingent 

of peacekeeping troops to the planned 1,200-person ECOWAS force currently deploying in Ivory Coast. Benin, Ghana, Niger and Togo have also agreed to provide 

troops. Nevertheless, the fifteen-member regional organ has not displayed unity 

over its handling of the Ivory Coast crisis and has at times been beset by bickering. 

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA: 

Since the late 1990s, American foreign policy toward West Africa has been dominated by efforts to contain and isolate the Taylor regime in Liberia. This goal has 

contributed to the imposition of UN sanctions including an arms embargo and travel 

restrictions aimed at Taylor and his cabal. In addition to supporting sanctions, the 

US has attempted to channel support to Liberia’s legitimate democratic opposition 

and to build an independent media. The defined goal of these actions is to strengthen the potential chances for a free and fair presidential election scheduled for later 

this year. 

But by the administration’s own admission, sanctions have proven leaky and difficult to enforce; Taylor continues to repress his political opposition and the free 

press; and, as I’ve described above, Liberian forces are currently fighting in the 

Ivory Coast. 

The failure to isolate and contain the Taylor regime presents the United States 

and the international community with a serious problem that must be addressed. 

We have seen from past activities that the Taylor regime seeks to spread instability 

beyond its boarders and then to loot in the wake of violent conflict. Along West Africa’s porous and often vulnerable borders this insidious strategy has at times worked 

and is being repeated again in western Ivory Coast. 

In examining US foreign policy to Ivory Coast it is instructive to review past policies toward neighboring Sierra Leone, where in 2001 the combined forces of 

UNAMSIL, the Guinean Army and the British military beat the Taylor-supported 

rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) into submission. During that 

period the US steadfastly backed all three forces that faced off against the RUF. 

24

Most notable however, and perhaps analogous to the current crisis in the Ivory 

Coast, was our policy vis-a-vis the British. 

From the moment the United Kingdom intensified its support for the failing 

UNAMSIL mission in the summer of 2000, Washington acted in lockstep with London, supporting the British effort financially, politically and by training and equipping African peacekeepers. The end result, as we all know, was the defeat of the 

RUF and the end to a decade of warfare which culminated last year in the free and 

fair election of Sierra Leone’s current government. 

With the Sierra Leone model (of backing a former European colonial power) in 

mind, it appears that US policymakers intend to approach the crisis in Ivory Coast 

by supporting the French in similar fashion. Indeed, this is a wise and prudent 

starting point for our evolving policy toward Ivory Coast. 

Yet the comparison between the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast should 

only be taken so far. To begine with, in comparison to the Ivory Coast, instability 

in Sierra Leone with its 5.6 million people, anemic economy and clearly delineated 

enemy (the RUF) posed a smaller immediate threat to the wider West African region. 

Along with Nigeria, the Ivory Coast is a linchpin for the region. With nearly seventeen million inhabitants, and sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth largest economy, the 

Ivory Coast has long been a stable and relatively prosperous state. Millions of 

Burkinabe and Malians and hundreds of thousands of other African migrants constitute the agricultural backbone of the nation and an important source of remittances to surrounding countries. The Ivory Coast is the world’s leading producer of 

cacao. Abidjan has also become a financial center in West Africa with key banking institutions, and a developed port and road system that serves as a door to the Atlantic 

for its landlocked northern neighbors. 

The character of the crisis in Ivory Coast is also different than it was in Sierra 

Leone, where the principal engine of violence was access to diamond mines. In the 

Ivory Coast there are multiple engines driving the conflict including: the cynical 

quest for political power, ethnic schisms, economic recession, as well as international opportunism and banditry. Yet the most dangerous division—which poses 

profound consequences for the region—is the divide that has developed along religious lines. 

Once latent Muslim/Christian animosities have been stoked and politicized by 

Ivorian politicians since the mid-1990s. Today, the potential for religiously-based violence in Ivory Coast is real and if left unchecked could fan the flames of religious 

tensions throughout the region, especially in Nigeria. Massacres have already taken 

place and a recent UN report has drawn links between death squads based in 

Abidjan and the Gbagbo regime. 

Finally, unlike Sierra Leone which sits between a well-defended and autocratic 

Guinea, and the collapsed state of Liberia, Ivory Coast touches three stable states 

including two of Africa’s brightest democratic stars, Ghana and Mali. Each of these 

states and the nearly 45 million people that inhabit them are feeling the pinch of 

instability in Ivory Coast; the collapse of which threatens to send shock waves 

across these countries and throughout the entire region. 

So US policymakers must do more than just stand behind the French: we must 

stand shoulder-to-shoulder with them. Rhetorically, financially and diplomatically 

we need to assertively back the French-brokered Marcoussis Accords and assure 

President Gbagbo and his supporters that there is no ‘‘American alternative.’’ At the 

same time we need to send a clear message to the northern rebels that the US does 

not accept a divided Ivory Coast. And that both sides must work towards reconciliation and national unity, a program that was well defined by all sides in the 

Marcoussis talks. The US government could underscore this point by drawing on 

various financial tools to penalize any group that tries to renege on the Marcoussis 

deal. 

The clear signs of regional foreign involvement in the Ivory Coast’s internal affairs also warrant a US policy response: American intelligence organizations must 

determine the level of Burkina Faso’s involvement in the conflict and penalize it as 

well. 

Events in Ivory Coast should also cause the US government to revisit its policy 

toward Liberia, from whence many of the region’s problems emanate. Principally, 

we should return to the missing link in our Liberia policy: the French. For years 

the French have viewed Taylor as ‘‘part of the solution’’ in West Africa and thus 

failed to back a hard line sanctions regime in the UN against Monrovia. In return, 

Liberia was to stay out of Ivory Coast. Clearly that deal has now been broken. We 

should therefore intensify our dialog with the French over Liberia and encourage 

them to toughen their policy toward the Taylor regime. 

25

Other regional policies that should be considered by the United States include:

• Developing a short-term contingency plan to exploit the possible indictment 

of Charles Taylor as a war criminal by Sierra Leone’s Special Court;

• Developing a mid and long-term regional plan for West Africa that accounts 

for big-picture economic and human development trends;

• Continuing military assistance to the key regional armies to build capacity 

and strengthen linkages with the United States;

• Increasing aid to the region as an investment in stability, socio-economic development, and the creation of new markets for the US and to help prevent 

state collapse;

• Marrying the administration’s West Africa program with the ambitious conflict prevention/development programs being articulated at the U.S. Agency 

for International Development.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Docking. 

Dr. Toungara? 

STATEMENT OF JEANNE TOUNGARA, PH.D., PROFESSOR, 

HOWARD UNIVERSITY 

Ms. TOUNGARA. I, too, would wish to thank the Committee Chair 

and Members of the Committee. I am very happy to be with you 

today and to share my views on this current situation. Having lived 

in the country for 15 years, I hope I will bring a perspective from 

those who are closer to the ground and actually living this experience. 

A comprehensive and effective peace building initiative in Cote 

d’Ivoire can be developed through a profound understanding of its 

ethnography and history. That includes nearly 70 years of French 

colonialism, 3 decades of one party rule under a benevolent dictator 

and, alas, its fledgling steps toward multiparty democracy during 

this last 10 years. 

The current disturbances emerge from the failures of leadership 

to engage fully the difficult task of nation building in the aftermath 

of colonial rule that merged some 60 odd ethnic groups together 

into a single country. 

Geographical and cultural divisions remain despite the continuing migration of Ivoirians and foreigners from the subregion 

within this country, moving from east to west and north to south 

in search of fertile cash crop zones, largely for growing coffee and 

cocoa, commercial activities, urbanization and education. Such population movement has been a source of productivity and growth, 

cultural diversity and international tourist attraction, as well as 

socio-political advances and setbacks. 

I have attached at the end of this statement excerpts of an article published in the Journal of Democracy in 2001 that explains 

the persistence of the ethnic factor in national politics. 

The question is where do we go from here in the aftermath of the 

most recent coup attempt resulting in civil war, severe human 

rights violations, displacement of persons and heightened xenophobia? How can the United States participate in the search for a 

sustainable and lasting peace in Cote d’Ivoire? 

My recommendations are the following. First, the U.S. should 

support the spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement signed by 

nine participating political parties in rebel groups on January 24, 

2003. Representatives of several African states, international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF and global 

26

and regional organizations such as the UN the EU and AU and 

ECOWAS were present and witnessed these discussions leading to 

this agreement. The roundtable was held after the failure of the 

current regime, led by President Gbagbo, to respond to interventions by African heads of state and ECOWAS mediation. President 

Jacques Chirac and his government should be praised for accepting 

to intervene, both militarily to save lives and diplomatically to facilitate discussions that will hopefully lead to a peaceful settlement 

of hostilities and the appointment of a functional government of 

reconciliation. 

Second, the U.S. should make clear to President Gbagbo and the 

citizens of Cote d’Ivoire its support for international efforts to 

achieve peace and should avoid any bilateral discussions that may 

divide or obfuscate the solidarity of the international community at 

this time. The U.S. should collaborate with and fully support the 

multinational steering committee put in place to monitor the implementation of the agreement. 

The entire region is plagued by conflicts whose roots lie in the 

failure of leaders to provide their citizens equitable and fair access 

to opportunities to thrive within their nations. The international 

community has an opportunity to show its commitment to democracy, development and the peoples of the subregion if Cote d’Ivoire 

can serve as an example of exemplary collaboration in this direction. 

Third, the U.S. itself must show leadership by refusing any effort 

to release economic assistance to the Gbagbo regime until he demonstrates concretely his compliance with the demands of the 

Marcoussis Agreement and supports the efforts to be made by the 

reconciliation government. All economic support should be delivered through non-governmental organizations, either local or international, or through departmental and municipal representatives, 

duly elected, to relieve the pain and suffering or assist with relocation and housing, provide food or meet other needs brought about 

by civil war and human rights violations. 

Fourth, the U.S. should participate in building civil society, and 

it should play a major role through its existing international agencies, USAID and Peace Corps, for example, in educating Ivoirians 

about civic responsibility. It should support the elimination of all 

notions of ‘‘Ivoirite.’’ This is a form of cultural nationalism initiated 

by the ousted President Bedie and manipulated for the political 

purposes that eventually led to discrimination against both foreign 

Africans and Ivoirian northerners by the peoples of the forest zone. 

Fifth, the U.S. should participate in the military plan of the 

Marcoussis Agreement. Specifically, the U.S. should participate in 

the remaking of the Ivoirian defense and security forces by developing a sustainable plan to: 1) meet their physical needs for clothing, boots and a living wage—the initial cause of several military 

coups throughout the region; and 2) to provide for their reeducation 

as a national force. A military reform effort needs to include ethnic 

integration of all units. 

Sixth, many of the problems leading to the violation of the right 

to citizenship of Alassane Ouattara were caused by the lack of an 

independent judiciary. Therefore, the U.S. should provide support 

27

for judiciary reform and the replacement of judges who are incapable of carrying out the will of the Constitution. 

Seventh, the U.S. should provide support through its various 

agencies, judiciary branches and institutions of higher education to 

assist with rethinking notions of citizenship and the status of immigrants. Foreign Africans born in Cote d’Ivoire must now apply 

to be naturalized. Africans who have made life-long contributions 

to the development of the country were disfranchised under the 

ousted President Bedie. Peoples of northern descent have not been 

able to acquire identity cards, simple identity cards, due to discrimination. This problem needs review within the entire region, 

not only Cote d’Ivoire. ECOWAS is seeking to support the freedom 

of movement of all West Africans and wishes to promote regional 

poles of development that might relieve the onslaught of immigrants to just a few nations. The U.S. should lean on those countries that have not yet signed to encourage them to accept the 

ECOWAS proposal. 

Last, the United States should support the cost of new elections, 

wherever and whenever they are judged necessary to advance the 

cause of democratic reform. Elections and referendums as a means 

of conflict prevention are a lot cheaper than conflict resolution after 

war. 

If the U.S. had followed through with its condemnation of the 

fraudulent electoral practices that resulted in the self-proclaimed 

presidency of Gbagbo and if the U.S. had collaborated seriously 

with the international community to pay for new elections at that 

time, perhaps there would have been fewer victims of human rights 

violations carried out by Gbagbo supporters in the gendamerie and 

death squads. At the time, Gbagbo was still leader of a very weak 

minority party, the FPI, and did not have the support of a widespread youth coalition now mesmerized by the prospect of resistance to France, the former colonizers. 

To conclude, President Gbagbo has proven time and again that 

he is unreliable and incapable of promoting national unity. He 

should not be given any opportunity to further distract this process 

or ignore the demands of leadership. 

The U.S. must be clear and persistent and refuse to compromise 

on the basic principles of democracy and human rights. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Toungara follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEANNE TOUNGARA, PH.D., PROFESSOR, HOWARD

UNIVERSITY

A comprehensive and effective peace-building initiative in Coˆte d’Ivoire can be developed through a profound understanding of its ethnography and history; including 

nearly seventy years of French colonialism, three decades of one-party rule under 

a benevolent dictator, and, alas, its fledgling steps toward multiparty democracy 

during the last ten years. The current disturbances emerge from the failures of leadership to engage fully the difficult task of nation building in the aftermath of colonial rule that merged over sixty-odd ethnic groups into a single country. Geographical and cultural divisions remain despite the continuing migration of 

Ivoirians and foreigners from the subregion within the country, moving from east 

to west and north to south in search of fertile cash crop zones (largely for coffee 

and cocoa), commercial activities, urbanization, and education. Such population 

movement has been a source of productivity and growth, cultural diversity and 

international tourist attraction, as well as socio-political advances and setbacks. I 

have attached at the end of this statement excerpts of an article published in the 

28

Journal of Democracy (2001) that explains the persistence of the ethnic factor in national politics. 

The question is ‘‘Where do we go from here?’’ in the aftermath of the most recent 

coup attempt resulting in civil war, severe human rights violations, displacement of 

persons and heightened xenophobia. How can the United States participate in the 

search for sustainable and lasting peace in Coˆte d’Ivoire? 

First, the U.S. should support the spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 

signed by nine participating political parties and rebel groups on January 24, 2003. 

Representatives of several African states, international financial institutions (World 

Bank, IMF), and global and regional organizations (UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS) witnessed the discussions leading to the Agreement. The roundtable was held after the 

failure of the current regime led by President Gbagbo to respond to interventions 

by African heads of state and ECOWAS mediation. President Jacques Chirac and 

his government should be praised for accepting to intervene, both militarily, to save 

lives, and diplomatically, to facilitate discussions that will, hopefully, lead to a 

peaceful settlement of hostilities and the appointment of a functional government 

of reconciliation. 

Second, the U.S. should make clear to President Gbagbo and the citizens of Coˆte 

d’Ivoire its support for international efforts to achieve peace and should avoid any 

bilateral discussions that may divide or obfuscate the solidarity of the international 

community at this time. The U.S. should collaborate with and fully support the multinational steering committee put in place to monitor the implementation of the 

Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The entire region is plagued by conflicts whose roots 

lie in the failure of leaders to provide their citizens equitable and fair access to opportunities to thrive within their nations. The international community has an opportunity to show its commitment to democracy, development and the peoples of the 

subregion if Coˆte d’Ivoire can serve as an example of exemplary collaboration in this 

direction. 

Third, the U.S. must show leadership by refusing any effort to release economic 

assistance to the Gbagbo regime until he demonstrates concretely his compliance 

with the demands of the Marcoussis Agreement and supports efforts by the reconciliation government. All economic support should be delivered through nongovernmental organizations (local and international) or through departmental and 

municipal representatives to relieve pain and suffering, assist with relocation and 

housing, provide food, or meet other needs brought about by civil war and human 

rights violations. 

Fourth, the U.S. should participate in building civil society and play a major role 

through its existing international aid agencies (e.g., USAID, Peace Corps) in educating Ivoirians about civic responsibility. It should support the elimination of all 

notions of ‘‘Ivoirite ́,’’ a form of cultural nationalism initiated by ousted President 

Bedie, manipulated for the political purposes and that resulted in discrimination 

against foreign Africans and Ivoirian northerners by peoples of the forest zone. 

Fifth, the U.S. should participate in the military plan of the Marcoussis Agreement. Specifically, the U.S. should participate in the remaking of the Ivoirian defense and security forces by developing a sustainable plan to: 1) meet their physical 

needs for clothing, boots, and a living wage (the initial cause of several military 

coups), and 2) provide for their (re)education as a national force. A military reform 

effort needs to include ethnic integration of all units. 

Sixth, many of the problems leading to the violation of the right to citizenship of 

Alassane Ouattara were caused by the lack of an independent judiciary. Therefore, 

the U.S. should provide support for judiciary reform and the replacement of judges 

who are incapable of carrying out the will of the Constitution. 

Seventh, the U.S. should provide support through its various agencies, judiciary 

branches, and institutions of higher education to assist with rethinking notions of 

citizenship and the status of immigrants. Foreign Africans born in Coˆte d’Ivoire 

must now apply to be naturalized. Africans who have made life-long contributions 

to the development of the country were disfranchised under Bedie. Peoples of northern descent have not been able to acquire identity cards due to discrimination. This 

problem needs review within the entire region. ECOWAS is seeking to support the 

freedom of movement of all West Africans and wishes to promote regional poles of 

development that might relieve the onslaught of immigrants to a few nations. The 

U.S. should lean on those countries that have not yet signed to accept the ECOWAS 

proposal. 

Last, the U.S. should support the cost of new elections, wherever and whenever 

they are judged necessary to advance the cause of democratic reform. Elections and 

referendums as means of conflict prevention are a lot cheaper than conflict resolution after civil war. If the U.S. had followed through with its condemnation of the 

fraudulent electoral practices that resulted in the self-proclaimed presidency of 

29

Gbagbo and collaborated seriously with the international community to pay for new 

elections, perhaps there would have been fewer victims of human rights violations 

carried out by Gbagbo supporters in the gendamerie and death squads. At the time, 

Gbagbo was still the leader of a weak, minority party (FPI) and did not have the 

support of a widespread youth coalition now mesmerized by the prospect of resistance to (France), the former colonizers. 

President Gbagbo has proven time and again that he is unreliable and incapable 

of promoting national unity. He should not be given any opportunity to obfuscate, 

distract, or ignore the demands of leadership. The U.S. must be clear and persistent 

and refuse to compromise on the basic principles of democracy and human rights. 

Excerpt: 

‘‘Ethnicity and Political Crisis in Coˆte d’Ivoire,’’ by Jeanne Maddox Toungara, 

Journal of Democracy, 2001(July), Vol. 12, no. 3, pp.63–72. 

The ethnic factor remains a divisive and disturbing theme in the internal politics 

of Coˆte d’Ivoire. Thirty years of one-party rule under Fe ́lix Houphoue ̈t Boigny (decd. 

1993) and the Parti De ́mocratique de Coˆte d’Ivoire have resulted in little change in 

the way the peoples of this small West African nation perceive themselves. Foremost 

in their psyches is their identity as members of regional extended family and corporate kin groups competing with others for their share of scarce economic resources 

and political clout. The latest round of elections (2000–2001) have revealed profound 

weaknesses in the capacity of the leadership to prevent violence and guarantee the 

rights of citizens while these disparate groups defend their turf. Houphoue ̈t’s carefully crafted ethnic balancing act has been dismantled, leaving primordial ethnic 

linkages up for grabs and disturbing fragile alliances among the urban middle class 

as each group battles to protect the positions and advantages gained—individually 

and collectively—during the First Republic. Only the determination of the international financial community to restrict donor funds when conditions allowing wanton violations of human rights, killings, and insecurity went unchecked seems to 

have forced the leadership to reconsider its role and responsibilities to the state. 

The primary question here is whether and how might processes of democratization pave the way toward collaborative and equitable relationships with the state, 

given the diversity of the population and the persistence of ethnic and regional rivalry? Are there any lessons or messages that the 2000–2001 elections have revealed to assist in charting the way toward peace and prosperity in Coˆte d’Ivoire 

and that might be applied elsewhere? Has the international financial community 

settled finally into a shared discourse supportive of democratization? 

As an artificially constructed enclave, this territory of 15.5 million inhabitants is 

composed largely of the descendants of immigrants who still identify with ethnic 

homelands situated beyond the national boundaries that define its autonomy. Several large, extended-family kin groups trace their ancestry to adventurers who, fleeing warfare, seeking freedom from age-old traditions, or navigating toward new economic opportunities, led their followers into the territory that, in 1893, the French 

carved into a colony. Until 1945, the neighboring country of Burkina Faso was administered from Coˆte d’Ivoire and was called Haute Coˆte d’Ivoire (Upper Ivory 

Coast). More than sixty different groups have been identified within the current borders and most belong to one of four distinguishable linguistic families that share 

common ethnographic characteristics. 

The 1998 census data shows that 44.1% are Akan speakers, mostly inhabiting the 

southeastern quadrant, whose principal groups migrated in successive waves from 

Ghana. Baule groups began arriving from the mid-18th century and settled toward 

the center in savanna woodlands (an area referred to as the Baule ‘‘V’’ for the 

plunge the savanna takes into the southern forest zone). The 18th-century migrations of the Agni brought them into the eastern forests. The Abron settled into the 

eastern savannas about half the distance between the northern border and the Atlantic Ocean in the 15th century and were influenced by savanna the cultures with 

whom they shared lands on the northern side of their enclave. The ‘‘Lagunaires,’’ 

peoples of the lagoons (composed of some fifteen different groups), stretched from 

the Ghana border through the lagoon areas, covering about two-thirds of the coast. 

Catholicism made an early appearance in the southeastern quadrant, bringing 

Christian mission education, literacy and, consequently, opening access to colonial 

service positions. About 12% of Ivoirians are Catholic, the majority of whom reside 

in the southeast (Abidjan, Yopougon, Grand Bassam, Abengourou, Bouake), though 

a large contingent exists in towns of the southwest (Gagnoa, Daloa, Man). 

Kru-speaking peoples inhabit the southwestern quadrant, having migrated from 

the west (Liberia) around the 14th and 15th centuries, and make up about 11% of 

the population. They are composed of Bete, We (Guere), Krou, Dida, and Godie 

groups. Those closest to the border share cultural and family ties with neighboring 

communities in Liberia. The Mande began migrating into Coˆte d’Ivoire as early as 

30

the 10th century in response to political transformations due to the rise of ancient 

empires such as Wagadu (Ghana), Mali and Songhay. The earliest to arrive penetrated the forest fringe and settled in the upper portion of southwestern quadrant. 

Due to their linguistic specificity they were labeled Southern Mande and include the 

Dan (Yacouba), the Gouro and the Toura groups. They account for about 12% of the 

population. Most peoples in the southwestern quadrant practice indigenous religions, though Protestant movements from Liberia have been influential. Some coastal areas underwent massive conversion to the independent church of Prophet Harris 

during the early years of French colonialism. Catholics claim over 60,000 members. 

The tropical zones of the southern quadrants were conducive to cash crop production,—i.e., cocoa, coffee, oil palm, coconut palm, pineapples, and timber exploitation—commodities which continue to generate wealth and attract migrant laborers. Foreigners make up 26% of the population with a vast majority coming from 

Burkina Faso to produce cash crops. 

The northern half of the country with portions plunging into the southwestern 

quadrant is composed of distinct language families from the north—the Northern 

Mande and the Voltaic—which in nearly equal proportions make up over 30% of the 

population. The notion of the ‘‘Great North’’ is a political invention that masks the 

actual composition of the region. The northeastern quadrant is home to Voltaic 

speaking peoples. The Senufo moved into the area from Burkina Faso and cover a 

broad swath of territory through the middle of the northern half of the country. 

Their arrival dates back several centuries, well before the arrival of the Mande and 

Baule groups. Likewise, Kulango habitation in the northeastern section dates back 

to the arrival of their ancestors from northern Ghana several centuries ago. They 

made way for the arrival in the 18th century of a smaller group composed of the 

Lobi who today inhabit the borderlands separating Coˆte d’Ivoire from Ghana and 

Burkina Faso. For the most part, Voltaic groups practice their own religions though 

many have been influenced by the presence of Muslim traders and clerics. 

The Northern Mande include the Malinke in the northwest and the Dioula (from 

jula, meaning trader) who settled to the east of the Senufo. Whereas indigenous religions and Christianity are practiced among the Southern Mande in the southwestern quadrant, the Northern Mande are nearly 100% Muslim. Muslim merchants have carried Islam into the commercial centers of the southern regions, gaining some conversions among local inhabitants. Internal migration of long-distance 

traders (jula) into southern forest zones was encouraged under French colonialism 

to establish markets and promote the growth of the colonial economy. A symbiotic 

relationship between emerged between local ethnics who owned the surrounding 

lands and town dwellers; Muslim merchants managed the redistribution of imported 

goods and the transportation sector, assisting in the movement of crops from the 

farms to collection centers. The establishment of French colonial headquarters near 

the markets created in an anomaly such that several wealthy towns in the southern 

regions are controlled by northerners; making it possible for them to dominate in 

municipal elections today. 

The implementation of a democratic electoral process and multiparty politics in 

1990 opened the way for competitive elections in which the stakes have assumed 

new importance after Houphoue ̈t’s death. New players had an opportunity to establish themselves and their kin as legitimate successors to the nation’s founder. Henri 

Konan Bedie, as President of the National Assembly, succeeded Houphoue ̈t as head 

of state in 1993, following procedures set out in the oft-amended Article 11 of the 

Constitution. The steps leading to Bedie’s removal in 1999 reveal errors of judgement that may have been committed out of fear, but were clearly avoidable if principals of democracy, transparency in governance, and respect for the rule of law had 

been maintained. Shortsightedness and weak leadership have thrown Coˆte d’Ivoire 

into turmoil. 

The notion of Ivoirite ́ emerged to justify limiting access to public services and 

rights of citizenship based on vague perceptions by individuals interested in reducing the influence of northerners and emigrants in Ivoirian politics. Bedie supported 

a movement within the PDCI-dominated National Assembly to impose a grandfather 

clause in the new electoral code (8 December 1994) requiring that both parents of 

candidates for the presidency and the legislature must be Ivoirian by birth. 

Ouattara, who had left the country to become the Managing Director for Africa at 

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) fell prey to Bedie’s manipulation of the 

Ivoirian judicial system which resulted in Ouattara’s disqualification as a candidate 

on the grounds that he was not truly an Ivoirian citizen. Ouattara, who was born 

in Dimbokro (Coˆte d’Ivoire) moved to Burkina Faso from Coˆte d’Ivoire with his parents in 1952 at age 10 and acquired his first Ivorian identity card in 1962. The AfriVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
31

can American Institute granted scholarships to African students based on their 

country of residence, thereby allowing Ouattara to depart with a passport from 

Upper Volta along with students from Coˆte d’Ivoire, Niger and other from Upper 

Volta. He continued to carry a passport issued by Burkina Faso and, according to 

him, his position as Vice Governor at the Banque Centrale des Etats Africains 

Occidentaux (BCEAO), reserved for a national of Burkina Faso, was an arrangement between Burkinabe administrators and Houphoue ̈t-Boigny. (See interview, 

Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent, no. 2062, 18–24 July 2000.) 

Bedie removed many devoted and highly respected technocrats of northern origins 

and replaced them with less competent persons belonging to his own Baule group. 

His security forces terrorized northerners and collaborated in the forced removal of 

numerous Burkinabe laborers from the southwestern region. Conflicts with Kru 

landowners over Burkinabe exploitation of fertile lands resulted in about 20 deaths 

and by November 1999, an estimated 12,000 Burkinabe had returned home. Nearly 

two million Burkinabe who had made Coˆte d’Ivoire their home and were allowed 

to vote under the Houphoue ̈t regime were disfranchised. 

By linking Ouattara to Burkinabe identity, Bedie created a tidal wave of 

xenophobic reaction throughout the forest zone against foreigners in general and 

Ouattara in particular. The U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on Human 

Rights 2000 gives details of numerous human rights violations that began under 

Bedie and continued during several months under the present regime. In light of 

the massive human rights violations against northerners, the conditions leading to 

the emergence of a united opposition from the north coalesced as never before. 

Northerners fearing for their safety sought refuge behind a leader with whom they 

identified based on ethnicity, national origins, religion, and a proven record of service to the nation.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much for your testimony. Let me go 

back to a point that I made in my opening comment, Professor, and 

that was whether the Marcoussis Agreement sends the message 

that political power and legitimacy can be won through the barrel 

of a gun. 

I want to say that I concur with some of your analysis in terms 

of Gbagbo’s regime and the prevention of candidates from the two 

major political parties running. I do think the United States went 

on record at the time criticizing that election. 

Coming back to the question of rebel activity and whether or not 

that excuses what has gone on in the countryside, I would like your 

view of that, so maybe we could discuss that for a minute. 

Ms. TOUNGARA. I think that Congressman Payne, who is a sincere believer in the continent generally and Cote d’Ivoire in particular, put his finger on a very important issue when he asked 

about the consistency of U.S. policy. 

The consistency of U.S. policies must be found in defense of 

democratic principles and practices and a belief in representatives, 

the interlocutors of democracy. I do not think that consistency can 

be found in U.S. collaboration with regimes that oppress those 

democratic principles and practices. 

I remember when President Bush, the first President Bush, supported the idea of rebellion in Iraq during his presidency and called 

upon the Iraqi people to stand up for their own rights and to act. 

Today we find ourselves ready to go in to remove a dictator, so the 

issue of determining the will of the people becomes quite difficult 

and challenging for a country like ours when the regime itself is 

a repressive regime. 

Given President Gbagbo’s inability to control the oppression and 

violence brought about by the activities of elements within the 

gendamerie (and the human rights record shows that with the 

32

Yopougon incident and others) the idea that people must continue 

to support or to lie low under that kind of oppression becomes quite 

difficult to defend. 

Even in our own historical experience in the United States, we 

rose up against oppression; and so the United States has to find 

some way to support those who would rise up against oppression. 

So I think the consistency of our policies and our methods must lie 

within our principles, and in this case I think we must try that. 

The Marcoussis Agreement appeals to that effort, and I think that 

we must support it. 

Mr. ROYCE. I wanted to share with you that Congressman Payne 

and myself were election observers in Nigeria for the presidential 

elections there, along with now Secretary of State Powell, who 

joined us for that effort in order to try to ensure that we had some 

modicum of fair and free and transparent elections. 

I want to share with you the observation that it is a very difficult 

issue in terms of West Africa when you have a situation where 

rebel groups, and I will take Sierra Leone for an example, are cutting off the limbs of children as a kind of organizing device, and 

when you light a match in that part of the world, which is already 

seeing conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau. I mean, we 

have seen such atrocities that the call for resolving these issues by 

revolutionary fervor perhaps will not get one to the desired end. 

I wonder if now the resolution in Sierra Leone might provide an 

example of a way in which the international community can engage 

and bring about democratic governance and do it in a way that 

does not ignite and further compound the problem, because once 

there is a recourse to revolution, civil war, it is very difficult to extinguish those flames. 

I need not mention to you the rape and pillaging that is going 

on right now in Cote d’Ivoire. There was not any mention in your 

remarks about rebel activity. I was just wondering, Dr. Toungara, 

about that and about your perception on that front? 

Ms. TOUNGARA. Yes. According to the human rights reports, everyone is guilty. There is no one with clean hands when it comes 

to the issue of human rights violations, neither the rapes nor the 

pillaging, et cetera. 

The issue that you bring up pertaining to elections and perhaps 

even the model of Sierra Leone, but looking at elections first I 

would like to draw upon the example of Liberia when the Carter 

team went in. I knew people who were part of that observation effort who did note and did report widespread fraud. The outcome 

was that the elections were ‘‘fair enough.’’ Okay. The ultimate outcome we have with us today. 

The question then becomes how good is democracy for some, and 

how good is it for others? What is the U.S. willing to tolerate for 

some, but not willing to tolerate for others? Either we defend democracy and its principles or we do not, so ‘‘fair enough’’ is not 

really good enough when the ultimate outcome is the kind of situation that we have in Liberia. 

I think we have to be very careful when we do not take these 

situations seriously. This is our only early warning system, those 

very early grumblings on the ground. This is when our people need 

to be there. This is why I propose the kind of recommendations 

33

that you see that have to do with rebuilding society from the 

ground up in terms of teaching democratic principles, in terms of 

creating an independent judiciary, in terms of training a military 

that is really not well educated about its responsibilities to the nation. 

I really did think that the Ivoirians would make it to the next 

election. This withdrawal of the rebels surprised me a little bit, but 

then not so very much when I looked more deeply and saw that the 

government had announced pay raises for itself at the same time 

that it was eliminating these 700 soldiers. So that issue, in combination with the other series of grievances on the ground, I think, 

ultimately pushed the rebels in that direction. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Ms. TOUNGARA. The example in Sierra Leone shows the presence 

of an occupation force, the former colonizers, about which a number 

of Sierra Leoneans seem to be quite happy. 

I do not know to what extent that might be necessary in Cote 

d’Ivoire, but I do believe that most Ivoirians, and I think we saw 

this in the Forum, are quite capable of evaluating a situation and 

seeing the solutions and implementing those solutions. The problem we had here was the lack of good, strong, and consistent and 

sincere leadership. 

There was a Forum for Reconciliation that took place well before 

this coup attempt. The results of the Forum were never implemented. If they had been implemented, I do not think we would be 

here today. We would probably we waiting for the 2005 elections. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Toungara. 

I am going to go to Dr. Docking for two questions. One, in your 

testimony you mention the growing role of international meddlers, 

including Libya’s Muammer Qadhafi and West Africa. 

I was going to ask how is the Libyan President active in this region, and do you have reason to believe that he is involved in the 

current conflict in Cote d’Ivoire? If so, in what way? 

Mr. DOCKING. Well, as the Assistant Secretary mentioned, there 

is a long history of Qadhafi’s involvement in the region. And as you 

mentioned, we know that Charles Taylor received training up in 

Liberia. Blaise Compaore received training up in Libya. A number 

of actors who have brought this cancer of instability to West Africa 

have their roots in Libya. We also know that Tripoli has pretty 

close ties to Ouagadongou. 

Now, we are all aware that there has been a PR campaign, if you 

will, a campaign to rehabilitate President Qadhafi—his image 

internationally—and I think that is an error. I think that what we 

have seen over the last decade is that he has fixed his gaze on subSaharan Africa. He has turned away from areas where he used to 

meddle. 

I think the evidence suggests that he continues to meddle in 

West Africa, as I have mentioned, although there is no hard evidence in the public domain that I know of linking him to this current conflict. There are discussions when you talk to people of 

weapons transfers coming through Libya, but no one is willing to 

go on the record. 

Mr. ROYCE. No one has really nailed down the source of the 

weaponry yet, or at least that has not been acknowledged. 

34

You describe Liberian President Charles Taylor as being at the 

epicenter of West African chaos, and you note his support of the 

rebels operating in the west of Cote d’Ivoire. Why has the international community generally not recognized this involvement in 

your opinion, and what are the chances of Taylor’s support for the 

rebels ending under the Marcoussis Agreement, in your opinion? 

Mr. DOCKING. The last part of your question was what? 

Mr. ROYCE. What is the chance of any support coming from Liberia, coming from Charles Taylor, ending as a result of the 

Marcoussis Agreement? 

Mr. DOCKING. I think you are correct in pointing out that 

Marcoussis does not address this problem, and so the involvement 

coming out of Monrovia, out of the western Ivory Coast—I am 

sorry; eastern Liberia—is not addressed, and that is unfortunate, 

but I think within the confines of that accord it is probably appropriate. 

I highlighted this argument in my oral presentation today because I think it is fundamental; that is, Taylor’s role in the instability in the region. I think we need to redouble our efforts to stop 

that. As I mentioned, I think the French need to be brought on 

board now that the playing field has changed a little bit, and hopefully they can toughen up their policies with Liberia as well. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go to our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne of 

New Jersey. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I appreciate both of your testimonies, and I think Dr. Toungara really kind of put her finger on 

about what I raised initially about the inconsistency of our policy. 

First of all, the U.S. became involved only late after the Cold 

War period in Africa. Primarily pro west or pro east was the battle. 

Following that, it was difficult to know what you were for. I think 

maybe our government did not know what we were for by virtue 

of knowing what we were against. We were against the Soviet influence in Africa. 

Well, once that left, then the question was well, now what do we 

do? It was almost like the candidate pictured became President. 

Now what? I think that the lack of having a real strong policy at 

that time left us with individual, kind of tailor made, policies. 

Now, one sort of piece does not fit all problems. However, if you 

have an overriding philosophy then you can tailor your policy to 

the countries. For example, there were some of us who, even 

though when the election came in Liberia and Taylor was a candidate, the elections were relatively fair and free because Liberians 

felt they needed to vote for Taylor to end the conflict, so, I mean, 

there was very little coercion. 

I mean, he had the resources. He had the political signs. He had 

the election day kind of operations, plus he had been feeding people 

in Lofa County for years, so the ingredients were there for his victory. 

However, preceding Taylor, you know, Sergeant Doe killed 

Tolbert and assassinated or executed the cabinet level people and 

leaders of Liberia right on the beaches, and our country did not 

have disdain. As a matter of fact, after Sergeant Doe took over in 

the early 1980s we tripled the U.S. aid to Liberia. Now, to me that 

makes no sense. 

35

Then Taylor comes along, and you say gee, the other guy just 

killed the President and all his people. Can the next guy be any 

worse? I think the absence of a policy—we should have had some 

policy against Doe, but Doe was pro west, and we looked the other 

way about the atrocities of what was happening there. As a result, 

we have practically no policy there. 

I think the people of Cote d’Ivoire show that they went out in the 

streets when General Guei took over. They marched in the streets 

and actually repelled the military general, just ousted him by virtue of their saying we are not going to have a military takeover. 

Of course, I think that mistakes were certainly made with the 

question of Outtara being a legitimate candidate by the elections 

people. They should have allowed him to run because I doubt seriously whether he would have won anyway, but for them to exclude 

someone creates an issue that is bigger than the individual. 

I would just say those things to indicate that we have had a very 

checkered policy and past, and the French I think are very noble 

how they went in to save lives in Cote d’Ivoire. I mean, if they had 

not gone in I think perhaps the rebels probably would have taken 

over totally, to be truthful. 

However, while they were good in Cote d’Ivoire, they would allow 

their businessmen to do business with Taylor in logging for the 

French businesses, so in one country what they did was great. The 

other country they are aiding and abetting a person who turned 

into a dictator even though he was elected. 

Maybe my question would be if either one of you or both were 

Mr. Kansteiner and you were Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, what would you do there in Cote d’Ivoire in particular 

and perhaps West Africa in general? Either one. 

Ms. TOUNGARA. Go ahead. 

Mr. DOCKING. Thank you for your question. I think that as I said 

in my oral testimony, we really need to back the French at this 

point for a number of reasons, principally because as we saw a couple of weeks ago, the Ivoirian street is trying to drive wedges between French and American points of view. 

That is very dangerous, and I think the French appreciate that 

more than we do right now because they still have approximately 

15,000 citizens in Ivory Coast, and I think the street there, the 

popular movements based in Abidjan, are trying to drive any sort 

of wedge they can in between our two policies to discredit the 

Marcoussis Accord. I think that that is one very strong reason why 

we need to stand shoulder to shoulder in this endeavor. 

I think Marcoussis is a program that is fairly misunderstood as 

well. I think as Professor Toungara mentioned and Assistant Secretary Kansteiner mentioned, the ministries are not delineated 

within that agreement and so a lot of talk about the interior ministry and the defense ministry is almost a moot point because it is 

not binding. That agreement was not signed, so I think that there 

is room for discussion there. 

I think that one thing that we need to do in West Africa that 

would affect the Ivory Coast is to adopt a regional policy that tries 

to get at the cancer of conflict; that is, the roots of instability in 

that area. It means we need to buttress governments like Mali and 

Ghana. We need to come down on governments like Burkina Faso 

36

that we think are involved in this and take a comprehensive, holistic sort of approach of carrots and sticks to try to turn off this conflict in Ivory Coast before it spreads again. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. Just a little point. You were saying that there was nothing concrete and that this was not so. One 

perception is reality. There is a perception that the rebels were 

given military and interior. 

Now, you are looking at it a little more closely than most of the 

people, but one of the reactions against this were people who were 

supportive of the government just felt how can you give these two 

important ministries to the rebels. 

Materials that I have received say that defense was going to be 

under the Prime Minister or would not be under the jurisdiction of 

the President. Could you clarify that with us or with me anyway? 

I am a little confused. 

Mr. DOCKING. I would just say that within the accord itself ministries are not laid out very clearly, and I think Professor Toungara 

has done some research on this very point and can probably inform 

us better than I. 

I make this point just to go back to the Chairman’s questioning 

about winning power through the barrel of a gun. That is a real 

concern. That is not a precedent that we necessarily want to support. 

I would just say that the Marcoussis Accord does not necessarily 

award power to the extent that the media has portrayed it as extending to all the sectors. I think it creates and sets out a good 

framework for a government of national accord, and it addresses a 

lot more issues as well that need to be addressed. 

Ms. TOUNGARA. I would say, to go directly to the issue of this reconciliation government led by Seydou Diarra. Diarra has a sterling 

history in diplomacy as an Ambassador for Cote d’Ivoire in several 

countries and international organizations. He also served as manager of government under the junta led by General Guei. 

Now he comes back to us as someone who was recommended by 

President Gbagbo to assume the position of Prime Minister. That 

was one of the demands of the Marcoussis Agreement. In the discussions that took place after the Marcoussis Agreement (during 

the discussions with the heads of state and such) exactly who 

should become members of this reconciliation government did not 

make it into any text. 

Cote d’Ivoire has a constitution that allows for an appointed 

Prime Minister. The Prime Minister that Gbagbo had appointed before was also the head of the FPI. He went to Marcoussis as a representative of the FPI. So one of the complaints that Gbagbo has 

taken back to his people now is that his government was not represented, although the person who was his Prime Minister was 

clearly there and clearly present and representing his party. 

The issue with the reconciliation government, and this is what 

Gbagbo said to his people, is that he will not under any conditions 

give up any of the powers granted to him by the current constitution. Okay. There are some aspects of the constitution that were 

put on the table and are included in the Marcoussis Agreement, 

but among the powers that he does not intend to give up are those 

37

that allow for the Prime Minister to appoint a government and to 

propose that government to the President. 

So theoretically, in keeping with the constitution, he has no obligation to accept members of the rebel groups into those key positions, namely the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Security. He has no obligation whatsoever. It is up to Seydou Diarra 

to propose a government. Gbagbo told his people when he finally 

addressed them a week after the Marcoussis Agreement, to wait for 

Diarra to come and then see what he will do. Let’s see what he will 

propose. That was his message to them, and now we are in this difficult period where we actually have to see what Diarra will propose. Apparently there are some names that have come forward, 

and so we are waiting to see. 

Now, with regard to what the U.S. should do, I think the U.S. 

should show a great deal of restraint. What do I mean by that? I 

mean that this is a critical moment where the moral over the commercial must take precedent because the commercial has driven too 

many of our policies and driven us into too much trouble; and 

whatever economic benefits we might derive from this time by rapidly patching something together, in the long run this will play 

against us and will also play against long-term efforts to establish 

democracy in Cote d’Ivoire. 

If I were the Assistant Secretary, I would look very carefully and 

attempt to take the moral high ground. I think it is very important 

for the U.S. to represent what people think it represents. Now, 

whether we do it or not is another thing, but we at least have to 

say those things. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I look at the events unfolding in Africa and the Middle East 

and a variety of other places around the world, I think about the 

fact that in many cases, many times in our nation’s history and in 

fact almost every nation’s history, it has found itself aligned with 

unsavory characters in order to accomplish a bigger purpose. 

Certainly the case could be made in retrospect that our alliance 

with the Soviet Union in the Second World War was morally reprehensible because, of course, Stalin was such a horrible person 

and a bloody dictator, but, of course, a bigger picture and a bigger 

issue, our own survival and that of the west in general, determined 

our allegiance. 

Many times that happens in countries around the world, and 

when we were in the midst of a Cold War that really did, I think, 

have the possibility of challenging our survival, we also made alliances with people who were sometimes less acceptable than others, 

so I see no purpose in trying to analyze our current foreign policy 

or analyze the root of the mistakes that we think were made in 

various areas in Africa by what happened in the 1980s or before. 

I am, however, quite interested in determining the extent to 

which we believe any kind of stable democracy can develop out of 

the situation in Cote d’Ivoire and am wondering that in light of the 

fact that we recognize that by their very nature especially newly 

emerging democracies can be very, very fragile, and if they try to 

develop in an area in which there is great conflict and where there 

38

is not the long history of this kind of government it is sometimes 

difficult to get that flower to grow. 

What I wonder is whether the French especially, or any of the 

organizations that have an interest in West Africa, are in it for the 

long haul; that is to say to what extent do you think, Dr. Docking, 

in particular, that the French can be encouraged to think about 

this regional picture that we were talking about earlier, and can 

they be a major player in it? 

I do not understand for the life of me right now. You know, they 

are looking at Liberia in particular as a source of maybe some stabilizing influence. That is a weird concept in my mind. I cannot understand it, but, you know, is there purpose, do you think, just very 

localized, or do you think that their interests can be, since they apparently have the ability to work in the area, especially in Cote 

d’Ivoire, can we expand that at all? Can we hope to? What should 

we do to try? 

Mr. DOCKING. Thank you for your question. It is a very good one, 

and I probably will not be able to do it full justice, but I will attempt to place the Ivory Coast and the West Africa region in a bit 

of context. 

I think that today if we look across that 15 country region we 

find more democracies in that area of the continent than in any 

other area, a higher concentration if we begin with countries like 

Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Cape Verde, Nigeria, if you will. 

Democracy has its successes in that region, and not just in the 

Anglophone world. There are a number of Francophone countries 

there as well, and the French have contributed to that in places 

like Benin very concretely to the development of that democracy, 

so I do not think we should give short shrift to their concern about 

democracy. 

But, I think you are correct in pointing out that motives have 

been mixed sometimes as Professor Toungara has pointed out. 

There often are commercial motives mixed in with international relations motives and political motives, and we often find that they 

do not square. That leads to hypocrisy and, unfortunately, governments like we find in the largest chunk of the continent—dictatorships. 

I think that you are wise to bring this point up, and I think that 

speaking from Washington, DC, looking at our foreign policy primarily we just need to be continuingly concerned about our cooperation with the French because they continue to be the prime 

player in that region of the world. They give more money than we 

do. They are more plugged in. They have a longer history in that 

area. They have more influence, frankly. 

That is not saying that we need to defer to them every time or 

any time, for that matter, but we do need to work hand in hand 

with them, and we cannot let, I do not think, international affairs 

in other parts of the world, as we all know are taking place right 

now, that put us against the French. I do not think that we need 

to let that interfere with our interests in parts of the world like 

West Africa. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, I understand and I agree. I just do not 

know what exactly—when you say working hand in hand and enVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
39

couraging and that sort of thing, I do not know what that really 

means there. 

I can understand what it means specifically in the area of Cote 

d’Ivoire, but I do not know what it means regionally. What do we 

need to do to get them to become a regional player if in fact we 

agree that it is going to be hard for any democracy to thrive with 

people like Taylor and others around? 

Mr. DOCKING. It may be a bit of wishful thinking on my part to 

use the metaphor hand in hand, but I think we do need to have 

good relations with them. We do need to realize the weight that 

they carry in the region, and we should act cooperatively with 

them, always trying to strengthen our cooperation. 

Concretely, if you want to look at the ECOWAS, the Economic 

Community of West Africa States, I think that together we can do 

a lot along the lines of training ECOWAS forces, for example. I do 

not think that those efforts would be at odds at all. That is just 

one example I am trying to think of off the cuff. 

Mr. Tancredo. Thank you very much. I appreciate your answer. 

Mr. DOCKING. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Congresswoman McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. I am going to change the topic a little bit. Congresswoman Lee asked a few questions about humanitarian aid and what was going on, and I would like to ask you for 

your opinion and your thoughts on a few things. 

The delivery of food has been extraordinarily difficult in the area, 

and in order to stabilize, people are being pulled into factions quite 

often that have food so then you align yourself just to feed your 

family. One of the questions I have is what should we be doing? 

What can we do? What needs to be done as far as making food delivery safe and effective getting to those who need it? 

Then, as I have been watching this unfold and reading it the 

number of people that are becoming displaced within their own 

country, homeless, without health care, are not able to get to jobs, 

continues the cycle of hopelessness, desperation, and then what 

does the international community need to be doing about those two 

issues, as well as refugees in other countries or making plans for 

when the reconciliation and the peace process moves forward to 

have everyone fully integrated back into the society to bring it to 

stability? 

If you would both just give me a brief thought or two? 

Ms. TOUNGARA. Well, I would say that, and I mentioned part of 

this in my testimony that it is going to be very important to work 

with both local and international non-governmental organizations. 

Communication is still going on within the country. The French 

have occupied some strategic points almost from site to site, from 

east to west, almost dividing the country in half. I think that at 

those various zones one could likely get services to the people that 

actually need them. Apparently, there are tens of thousands of displaced persons around the area of Yamoussoukro right now, for instance, and that is an area that the French do control. So I would 

say to do as much as possible, to go directly and as close to those 

locations where displaced persons actually are to deliver services. 

We do know that the MPCI, that is the rebel group in the northern region, has worked very closely with the French and the AmeriVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
40

cans, for instance, in getting the Americans, particularly the young 

people in the church school from Bouake out of Cote d’Ivoire. So 

they will likely continue to work with the international community 

to see that services are delivered appropriately to those area. 

I would make sure that we bypass government services and go 

directly to those that have already shown that they are willing to 

deliver things to those people in need. 

With regard to displaced persons and refugees, I do not think 

there is much that we can do about that until peace has been established, until peace has been restored, and that may involve the 

same kind of action that the British have taken in Sierra Leone. 

U.S. forces would not do it; but, as my colleague says, we have 

to support the French and the international community. We know 

that we have ECOWAS troops on the ground now. We may actually 

be talking about an occupation of several areas of the country until 

we get past elections. 

Once calm has been restored to the country either by occupation 

or post elections, people will go home. People want to be at home. 

Everything that we can do to support peace and the end of warfare 

will be helpful. 

Mr. Kansteiner mentioned the military support for loyalists, for 

the government, because it is very weak. We do know that the government has been reinforcing its military capacity. It remains to be 

seen how warfare will end because neither the rebel groups nor the 

loyalists, the loyalist army, has agreed to disarm. As a matter of 

fact, each has said that it will not disarm. The rebels say that as 

long as the government army has not disarmed it will not disarm 

either, so as we talk about reintegration and as we look toward an 

end to the hostilities, peace may be directly linked to disarmament. 

There is a lot of work yet to do before displaced persons and refugees can go home. 

Mr. DOCKING. If I could just add to that a little bit? I agree with 

much of what you just heard. Primarily, though, the conflict needs 

to remain ceased. We need to maintain a cease fire, and we do not 

even have a cease fire on all fronts right now. That is the number 

one, most important consideration when we are thinking about humanitarian affairs, and only then can we bring in the resources 

that these people need. 

We know now that there are one million internally displaced people within Ivory Coast and tens of thousands of refugees in a number of other countries. What I might just add to what Professor 

Toungara just mentioned is that we need to also, in addition to 

thinking about Ivory Coast directly, we need to think about how 

this conflict is affecting countries like Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso. 

You all know that many of the workers that work in the fields 

of Ivory Coast to make it such a productive agricultural center are 

Burkinabe and Malians, millions in fact, up to a quarter of the population of Ivory Coast. The reason I bring that up is because these 

people send back very important remittances to their families back 

home, so I think the economic impact of this conflict is not fully 

appreciated. 

I think we need to think of the effects of this and perhaps how 

we can help with economic assistance. 

41

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. Before you conclude, I just want to say as I was 

looking at the slides, you know, there was one interesting one that 

says, you know, USA, We Need Your Support, making a plea. 

I am one that have always felt that we should really have been 

more engaged, as I said, not to put physical assets of the military 

there, but that we could have been more supportive of the regional 

organizations to have diplomacy. Although the Assistant Secretary 

said there was some involvement, I just do not think it was 

enough, and not to overshadow France, but to work with them, I 

think, as we did with the British in Sierra Leone. 

The second thing I just want to mention is that Libya certainly 

has been accused of supporting the rebels in different areas—you 

know, Burkina, Liberia, et cetera—and I think that is what happens when we in the West really did not—you know, we talk about 

it passes over. However, if we had continued or started some educational projects or a little more aggressive water projects in Africa 

where before Libya got involved in a lot of the supplying of military. 

They were doing humanitarian issues when South Africa was 

trying to become free when the U.S. was opposed to Mandela being 

released from prison. We did not want to oppose the apartheid government. Libya was supporting the front line states of Rhodesia, 

Zimbabwe, Mozambique and the others who were fighting with the 

ANC against the white apartheid government. 

I say that to say that with a little more concentration in the past 

and even currently, because our development assistance fund is 

down to about $600 or $700 million for 2003, sort of the devil 

moves in where there is a vacuum created. I hope that we can correct it as we move forward. 

Even with Saudi Arabia, in many instances they were coming in 

to parts of Uganda building roads and putting the name of Saudi 

princes on development projects, water projects, where I think we 

could have been a little more supportive of development over the 

years. 

Once again, we talk about we do not want to dwell on the past, 

but we need to know where we have come from so we know where 

we are going in the future. I agree, Mr. Tancredo, that we need to 

see where we are going in the future, but we do have to know 

where we have been in the past. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think Congressman Payne makes a good point. I 

think that over the long haul the goal of the United States should 

be to support democratic governance. As we work with the French 

and as we work with ECOWAS and we work with the international 

community, we cannot lose sight of that goal as we have discussed 

today. In the long term, that is in our national interest. That is in, 

frankly, the interest of Africa. 

There are times in our history, as Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick has pointed out, when given the contrast, given the option 

between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian regime administrations, we have backed the authoritarian regime with the concept that it is easier to change, to convert an authoritarian society, 

than it is a totalitarian regime. 

That has been the position the United States has given in the 

past, but as we move forward our goal is to see to it that all sociVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
42

eties have the democratic option of bringing rule of law because 

under that is going to be the greatest opportunities for those citizens. 

At the same time, I think we have to recognize in this theater, 

in this region, that there are international actors, international 

forces in play here. Besides some of the state sponsors, you also 

have drug runners. You have terrorists. You have arms merchants. 

You have religious extremists. 

Unfortunately, though the Saudis may have brought some major 

roads, they also bring Imans to the local Sufi Muslim mosques that 

teach something different than Islam. They teach a Wahhabism 

that is a very radical and new confrontational approach. 

This is a portion of the world where child soldiers are common 

and where opportunists are only too happy to use them in a conflict 

(people who could care less about West Africa or about Africans are 

only too willing), so however legitimate a conflict may be, if we support a resort to arms we must do so with extreme caution because 

it is a lot easier to destroy in this part of the world than to build. 

Push for more democracy. Push for leverage for greater transparency in elections. Try to work with the international community 

to do that, but my fear is that a call for revolution, an excuse for 

revolution, will bring nothing but more chaos. 

I wanted to say on behalf of myself and Congressman Payne, we 

have made trips to West Africa, and we have met with many African delegations. I think our counsel would be that the United 

States does need to play a greater role, does need to bring more 

leverage, more pressure to bear, but I think we have to be very, 

very cautious in terms of inciting any revolutionary fervor here because we have seen only too clearly the type of tragedy that it has 

brought to the region. 

I want to thank our panelists for the trip here, for their testimony, their contributions to this debate. I want to thank Ranking 

Member Payne again and the other Members of this Committee. 

Thank you so much. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m. the hearing was concluded.] 

(43)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Thank you Mr. Chairman: 

Let me begin by saying how saddened I am with the ongoing violence in the Ivory 

Coast. This country has been a leader in Africa with democratic and economic reforms. 

My interest in the Ivory Coast centers around my work with Senator Harkin to 

end the scourge of child slavery. Less than 2 years ago, I became aware that there 

were child slaves working the cocoa fields of West Africa—especially in the Ivory 

Coast. Through my efforts and Senator Harkin’s, an historic effort was undertaken 

by the cocoa industry to take responsibility for the working conditions of farms that 

the industry does not directly own. In the past year and a half, an enormous 

amount of work has been done to address this problem. I would be terribly saddened 

to see all of this effort wasted. 

Just yesterday, CIA Director Tenet described the frail nature of the Ivory Coast 

and explained that, in fact, the whole region relies on the Ivory Coast for its economic strength. At the base of this is the cocoa production. 

Improving the cocoa farmers’ economic state is the key to ending child slavery. 

In Africa, cocoa farmers get only about 50% of the world cocoa price, which is about 

$2,400 per ton today—twice what it was a year ago. It is important to note that 

Indonesian cocoa farmers get about 80% of the world cocoa farmers. So, even though 

West African cocoa farmers may be earning more due to higher prices, they still 

should earn more of the world price. Too much is being shaved off by middlemen. 

The world cocoa community has embarked on an effort to improve the living conditions of the farmers and the laborers. Right now they are implementing pilot programs in the Ivory Coast as well as Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Guinea. These 

programs are working to improve the cooperatives that farmers can join, which provides higher income to the farmers. As a condition of membership of the coops, the 

farmers must abide by international labor standards and allow inspections. The 

farmers also receive education and training on how to better grow their crop, increasing yield and quality of the product. 

I want to thank the cocoa industry, the governments of the Ivory Coast, Ghana, 

Cameroon, Nigeria, and Guinea, Free the Slaves, the Child Labor Coalition, the 

International Labor Organization and all the other people and organizations that 

have come together to put together a workable solution this tragedy. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you to our Subcommittee Chairman and Ranking member for holding this 

hearing, our first of the 108th Congress. I look forward to working with you and 

all of the members this year. 

Our subcommittee’s jurisdiction includes many of the most pressing and complex 

challenges facing our world today. 

The topic of this hearing is a good example: the prospects for peace in Ivory Coast. 

We have monitored the very fluid situation on the ground in Ivory Coast with much 

interest and with great concern. 

I am very pleased to have the esteemed panelist before us today to share their 

insight into the crisis in Ivory Coast. I am anxious to hear from each of you and 

to explore how the U.S. could do more to alleviate this crisis. 

44

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD, ALONG WITH RESPONSES, SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW

YORK, TO THE HONORABLE H. KANSTEINER

Question 1: 

We have heard rumors that in the western areas of the Ivory Coast, there have been 

a great many roadblocks and that people transporting cocoa to the ports have had 

to pay bribes to get the product through. 

Can the State Department confirm this? 

Answer: 

The United States Embassy in Abidjan has reported that the numerous impromptu roadblocks that have appeared in much of Cote d’Ivoire since the attempted coup of September 19, 2002 have created serious impediments for the cocoa 

industry to bringing production to market. These roadblocks have seriously increased the time and cost required to bring the product from farms to port, which 

can degrade the quality of the perishable product. Generally, bribes must be paid 

to expedite transit through the roadblocks. Cocoa purchasing, shipping, and processing companies (including three American companies) were forced to hire extra 

trucks and crews at added expense to ensure that the cocoa got to their pants and 

the ports. Many local middlemen or wholesalers who would normally purchase the 

product from the farmers and take it to market are refusing to do so, forcing the 

farmers also to rent trucks and transport the product themselves. Nevertheless, industry sources report that the amount of product reaching the port is not significantly less than in 2001. 

Question 2: 

If the bribes are being paid, then this probably means the farmers are still not 

earning a decent living. I fear this will perpetuate the child slavery problem. What 

role is the State Department willing to take to counter this problem? 

Answer: 

Child labor is an important issue in Cote d’Ivoire. The United States Government 

has raised this issue with the Ivoirian government for a number of years. 

While thousands of children and youths work with their parents on cocoa plantations, the vast majority work with their parents on the family farms. Nearly all 

cocoa is produced on modest family farms of a few acres. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of children working on the cocoa plantations has declined 

since last September, as foreigners have fled. With the cease-fire line separating 

northern Cote d’Ivoire from the rebel-held north and with the Mali and Burkina 

Faso border closed, the flow of immigrant labor south to Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa belt 

is largely cut off. 

It is not clear at this point how significant the cost of transiting roadblocks is, 

or who is bearing the cost. The world price of cocoa fluctuated widely following September 19, 2002, but in general has been substantially higher than prior to the attempted coup. It is not readily evident who is bearing the increased costs, and how 

much is being passed on to the international purchasers. 

At the same time, security concerns have risen markedly among the non-Ivoirian 

citizen agricultural labor force since September 19, 2002. Many have fled their 

homes and/or places of employment, while seasonal migrants in neighboring countries have been impeded from traveling into and trhough Cote d’Ivoire. More than 

one hundred non-citizen farm workers were allegedly killed in central Cote d’Ivoire 

by government troops and their bodies placed in a mass grave and two nearby wells. 

We believe that the general security situation and the growing rate of internal displacement is a serious and direct threat to the well-being of children in the labor 

force, and may also contribute to an increased workload for local children who are 

required to replace the foreigner workers who are no longer as readily available. 

It is important to note, however, that coordinated efforts to combat child labor on 

the part of ILO/IPEC (with substantial USDOL funding), the Sustainable Tree Crop 

Program, and the chocolate industry and contractors of the United States International Development Agency, among others, are continuing to the extent possible 

with local personnel, despite the conflict and the evacuation of expatriates. These 

projects are tackling the child labor problem from several directions, from increasing 

farm productivity and encouraging farmer cooperatives to providing vocational education alternatives for rural children and increasing the income of the women who 

most often pay the school fees for their children. At this time, the International 

Labor Organization is recruiting local implementers to replace regional workers who 

have been moved to Ghana. These efforts will increase the capacity of cooperatives 

45

to package and transport their own crops, which in turn should increase their share 

of total revenue. 

The Department of State and the United States Embassy in Cote d’Ivoire have 

been active in supporting all international efforts to achieve peaceful resolution of 

the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire and to minimize its impact on vulnerable populations, 

including children. We are also advocating implementation of the Marcoussis accords, which provide for resolution of some of the long-standing issues surrounding 

citizenship and land tenure in Cote d’Ivoire, which will directly affect the child labor 

issue. We will continue these efforts, and will also consider further contributions as 

appropriate to support humanitarian relief efforts in Cote d’Ivoire. 

Question 3: 

One of the pilot projects is to use the daily ‘‘farm report’’ to include social education 

messages about child labor conditions. This will enable the program to reach thousands of farmers who live in remote areas. The world cocoa community is also purchasing thousands of radios to distribute. 

Will the State Department work with the government of the Ivory Coast to assist 

with the distribution of the radios? 

Answer: 

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is providing 

support for the development of radio-based dissemination of information covering a 

range of social, child labor, and vocational agricultural issues as part of the Sustainable Tree Crop Program. The radio programming is being handled from a regional 

platform, and will reach Cote d’Ivoire from broadcasts in nearby countries, including 

Ghana and Mali. The chocolate industry is pursuing efforts to make radios widely 

available. 

The first efforts are a pilot. Project partners would like to learn from these before 

promoting them as ‘‘best practice.’’

The Department of State has not received a proposal to distribute radios to farmers in remote areas of Cote d’Ivoire. We are prepared to review such a proposal to 

see if there are ways for the Department of State or other appropriate United States 

Government agency to assist in the implementation of the distribution of radios for 

the purpose of better dissemination of information in Cote d’Ivoire regarding child 

labor. 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD, ALONG WITH RESPONSES, SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, TO TIMOTHY DOCKING

Question 1: 

Do the French or other nations have a backup plan if the Marcoussis Agreement 

fails? 

Answer: 

It is likely that the French have contingency plans in the case that one or more 

sides scrap the Marcoussis Accord. These plans could include a new round of talks 

in Paris or more covert discussions with the governments in Ouagadougou and Monrovia—the two governments suspected of supporting the rebels in Ivory Coast. However, the French, Americans and the governments of others African nations have 

correctly adopted the diplomatic course of fully backing the Marcoussis Accords. In 

my view, this is the best and most prudent approach to the current situation in 

Ivory Coast for two reasons: first, the Marcoussis plan is a good, comprehensive program of political and social reform; second, in order for this plan to succeed, international partners must not give any of the warring sides in the conflict an excuse 

to walk away from the peace agreement, i.e. to adopt an alternative program. For 

this reason all sides involved in attempts to bring peace to Ivory Coast French will 

closely guard any ‘‘back up’’ plans. 

Question 2: 

How bad is the humanitarian situation in the Ivory Coast? 

Answer: 

There are more than 1 million internally displaced people currently living in the 

Ivory Coast. Tens of thousands more have fled the country to Ghana, Guinea, Mali 

and even Liberia where, according to the UN’s Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), some 36,000 Ivorians prefer to stay in the dangerous border areas of 

war-torn Liberia instead of returning to western Ivory Coast. It is also important 

46

to note that tens of thousands of refugees from Liberia living in Ivory Coast face 

growing hostility from Ivorians sympathetic to the Gbagbo regime. Moreover, the 

UN has documented the presence of death squads in Abidjan and surrounding areas 

(with close ties to the Ivorian government) that are targeting perceived rebel supporters. These two dynamics—the proliferation of refugees and the growth of vigilante groups—make for a volatile mixture. 

Question 3: 

Dr. Docking, one of your research interests focuses on the connection between HIV/

AIDS and conflict in Africa. What are the implications of the conflict in Ivory Coast 

for the spread of AIDS in that country and the West Africa region? More broadly, 

how have the armed conflicts that have gripped the sub-region since 1989 affected 

the spread of AIDS? 

Answer: 

Empirical evidence from zones of conflict elsewhere on the continent (especially 

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) confirms that HIV/AIDS spreads at an increased rate in destabilized/violent settings. Given the explosion of refugees in the 

Ivory Coast, along with the collapse of central authority (police forces, and traditional protections for women and girls found at the village level of Ivorian society) 

one can surmise that sexual violence—one of the leading causes of the spread of 

AIDS in Africa—is on the rise. Indeed, there are numerous reports of widespread 

rape of Ivorian peasants by rebel forces in western Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast has 

by far the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in the West African sub-region with an estimated 11% of its adult population infected (estimated 1999). While data confirming 

the instability-induced spread of this plague will lag, they will most surely show in 

the coming years that the current warfare is having a dramatic impact on the 

spread of HIV/AIDS in Ivory Coast. 

The impact of armed conflict on the spread of HIV/AIDS in the region (especially 

in Liberia and Sierra Leone) is difficult to determine because there is no statistically 

valid epidemiological survey of the area due to the prolonged conflict and instability. 

Nevertheless, we know that West Africa’s wars have led to an explosion of sexual 

violence against women. One study estimates that nearly 10% of female internally 

displaced people (IDPs) in Sierra Leone were victims of sexual violence during the 

civil war (‘‘War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone,’’ Physicians for Human 

Rights, 2002.) 

Question 4: 

What is the worse case scenario for this conflict? Is there any chance it could reach 

a Rwanda-like state? 

Answer: 

Unfortunately, a worse case scenario is quite easy to imagine in Ivory Coast. One 

need just look to the west where the collapsed states of Liberia and Sierra Leone 

stand as a testament of the evils that can befall African states if violence and rebellion are left unchecked. Indeed, the Ivory Coast, with its deep ethnic and religious 

divisions could present an even more volatile situation. We have already witnessed 

the use of hate media, the growth of death squads and youth militias, the construction of the racist notion of Ivorite ́, the disenfranchisement of a large segment of the 

Ivorian population and the meddling of neighboring states. We also find a government that is not above exploiting religious and ethnic differences for political gain. 

All of these factors combine to poison inter-regional and inter-religious relations in 

Ivory Coast, and to create a social context where future mass killings and even 

genocide is possible. 

Question 5: 

In your testimony, you mention the growing role of international meddlers, including Libya’s Mohamar Kaddafi, in West Africa. How is the Libyan President active 

in this region? Do you have reason to believe that he is involved in the current Ivory 

Cost conflict? If so, in what way? 

Answer: 

The comments I have direct at Kaddafi’s role in this crisis are based on his known 

past involvement in the region. It has been documented that many of the rebels/

warlords from West Africa received their start in Libyan training camps. Two of the 

principal culprits in West Africa’s conflicts, Charles Taylor and former leader of the 

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, Fodah Sankoh, received training 

and support from Kaddafi. The President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Campaore, is also 

known to have a close relationship with Libya’s strongman. Indeed, Taylor, 

47

Campaore and Kaddafi were for years the troika of leaders most responsible for destabilizing West Africa’s Mano River Union states. During this period they trained, 

armed, financed and at times acted as a conduit for the flow of illegal weapons and 

conflict diamonds taken out of RUF-controlled mines of Sierra Leone. While some 

have suggested that Kaddafi and Campaore have recently distanced themselves 

from Taylor (especially following revelations that Taylor hosted al Qaeda 

operatives), there is no concrete evidence of a break in these relations. And until 

there is, it is prudent to assume that Kaddafi is complicit in the policies adopted 

in Burkina Faso and Liberia toward the Ivory Coast. 

Question 6: 

You describe Liberian President Charles Taylor as being the ‘‘epicenter’’ of West African chaos. You note his support of the rebels operating in the west of Ivory Coast. 

Why has the international community generally not recognized this involvement? 

What are the chances of Taylor’s support for the rebels ending under the Marcoussis 

Agreement? 

Answer: 

I believe the West now fully appreciates the extent of Taylor’s involvement in the 

Ivory Coast. Indeed, the Liberian Defense Minister recently publicly acknowledged 

that Liberian forces are fighting in western Ivory Coast. The problem faced by the 

West however is how to further punish Liberia for this meddling. The West has already established a series of sanctions against Taylor designed to contain, isolate 

and weaken his regime. These have only been partially successful and some Liberians (even those within opposition parties) are suggesting that sanctions are not 

working and therefore should be dropped. So the question of which ‘‘stick’’ to use 

next to punish Taylor is a real one, and an issue not addressed in the Marcoussis 

Accord. 

Question 7: 

In your testimony, you call on the U.S. to reassess its policy toward Liberia. What 

changes do you recommend? 

Answer: 

Following on the last answer (question #6), I believe it is clear to the US government that to effectively contain and weaken Taylor, it must have the cooperation 

of its Western partners—principally the French. Therefore, I suggest that the US 

press the French to get tough with Taylor. For years the French have worked to 

weaken sanctions against Taylor in the UN Security Council. The French have consistently objected to sanctions on timber, an important source of funding for the 

Taylor regime, especially so since the flow of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone 

dried up. As part of that deal, Liberia understood that it was to stay out of Ivory 

Coast. That deal has now been broken and apparently France, keenly interested in 

US support for its long-term efforts to rebuild Ivory Coast, is reviewing its regional 

policy, hinting now that it will take a tougher stance on Liberia. So I recommend 

that our government, while supporting French efforts in Ivory Coast, keep up the 

pressure on Paris to toughen its line on Monrovia. I also think the US needs to have 

a sound contingency plan in place to respond to a (apparently forthcoming) war 

crimes indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court in Freetown. The US must 

also maintain pressure on: Burkina Faso to withdraw any support it has given to 

the MPCI; the Gbagbo regime to crack down on death squad activity; on all Ivorian 

actors to abide by the Marcoussis Accord. 

Question 8: 

In your testimony, you express the hope that the French will face up to the destabilizing role that Liberian President Charles Taylor is playing in Ivory Coast, and 

no longer treat him as ‘‘part of the solution.’’ Why have the French taken this view 

of Taylor? What are the chances of the French making this reassessment? 

Answer: 

Building on my previous answer (question #7), it has not always been clear why 

the French have taken a soft line approach to Taylor. Some have suggested that this 

approach was designed to frustrate American goals in the region and to preserve 

French diplomatic dominance in West Africa; others hold that French policy has 

been dictated purely by economics and that French timber companies profit from the 

sale of Liberian logs; others have said that French policy toward Liberia is weak 

simply because France has had very little historical contact with Liberia and limited 

economic interests; and still others have argued, as I do above, that the French had 

a deal with Liberia based on Taylor’s agreement not to meddle in the affairs of 

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France’s prized former colony, the Ivory Coast. I am confident that there is truth 

in elements of each of these explanations. I am also confident that the crisis in Ivory 

Coast will spur France to change its policies toward Liberia, especially if pushed by 

the US to do so. 

Question 9: 

What are the regional economic and political consequences of the fighting in Ivory 

Coast? 

Answer: 

The current fighting in the Ivory Coast is having profound consequences on the 

region. Ivory Coast is a regional financial center, home to the African Development 

Bank (ADB) and other important monetary organizations. Many of these institutions, including the ADB have had to move or suspend operations in Ivory Coast 

due to security concerns. The Ivory Coast has one of the top four economies is subSaharan Africa and home to more than 4 million immigrants whose remittances 

(principally to Burkina Faso and Mali) form an important component of those economies. The Ivory Coast is also an important transit point for West African commerce, 

e.g. Malian cotton, and gasoline, which flows over the nation’s relatively good roads 

to/from ports in Abidjan and San Pedro. With the closure of northern borders, the 

economies of the land-locked countries to the north of Ivory Coast are being severely 

pinched. The Ivory Coast is also the world’s biggest producer of cocoa beans and a 

large producer of coffee and palm oil. The cultivation and commercial flow of each 

of these products has been severely constrained by the instability, driving this economy of more than sixteen million people into the gutter. Politically, this conflict is 

also set to further divide and destabilize the region-complicating relations within 

the ECOWAS regional body, and stressing relations between neighbors. In short, 

the conflict in Ivory Coast is having a profound impact on the political and economic 

stability of the region. 

Question 10: 

Is the U.S. making a sufficient effort to resolve this crisis? 

Answer: 

I am confident that the US government appreciates the seriousness of the current 

crisis in Ivory Coast and, despite the current competing foreign policy priorities, will 

implement a constructive course of action—involving at least some of the ideas I 

suggest above—to support peace in the region. 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD, ALONG WITH THE RESPONSES, SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, TO JEANNE TOUNGARA

Question 1: 

Your testimony, while damning of the Gbagbo government, omits any reference to 

the rebels, critical or otherwise. Do you believe their resort to arms is justified? What 

foreign support might the rebels be receiving? 

Answer: 

As a historian, I have attempted to track the steps leading to the rebels’ resort 

to armed protest in Ivory Coast. First, the rebels’ grievances against the Gbagbo regime are legitimate. Following the December 1999 coup d’e ́tat, several participating 

members of the armed forces that removed Bedie and brought General Guei to 

power as leader of the junta were imprisoned, persecuted, and killed. Others fled 

into exile and are now actively involved in the civil war on the side of the rebels. 

The opportunity for a peaceful transition from the junta to civilian rule failed when 

Gbagbo revealed himself as a willing collaborator with Guei to prevent candidates 

from participating in the 2000 presidential elections. On the day of the vote, several 

parties boycotted the elections, but Gbagbo, having received the most ballots cast 

in his favor, appealed to the people to take to the streets to run Guei out of town. 

Everyone, not only Gbagbo supporters, took to the streets. Gbagbo then declared 

himself the victor. Massive human rights violations followed as the gendamerie assaulted and sometimes killed persons of northern origins (by ancestry or patronymIvoirians and foreigners). Such violations have continued under Gbagbo’s presidency. He is incapable or unwilling to control this unit. Now the ‘‘death squads’’ 

have added to the daily terror under which Ivoirians must live. It is assumed that 

since these violations take place during the curfew, they are associated with and 

protected by the Gbagbo regime. In subsequent elections (legislative, municipal, deVerDate Mar 21 2002 17:15 Mar 27, 2003 Jkt 084945 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\021203\84945 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
49

partmental), the democratic process was thwarted by the Gbagbo administration’s 

refusal to issue the new required voting identification cards to all eligible Ivoirians 

of northern descent. Ivoirians who speak out against Gbagbo are tortured and sometimes killed. 

Question 2: 

In your testimony, you call on the U.S. to financially support new elections in Ivory 

Coast. When should these elections take place? 

Answer: 

Ideally, the international community should have insisted on new elections immediately following Guei’s departure. The West waits too long before responding to crisis. The next opportunity for presidential elections will be based on the decision of 

the reconciliation government and steering committee for the Linas-Marcoussis 

Agreement. Gbagbo is not cooperating with the spirit of the Agreement. Presidential 

and legislative elections should be held as soon as order is restored, transparent 

electoral procedures established, and new candidates given an opportunity to 

present their platforms. 

Question 3: 

Professor Toungara, you have worked training African women as peace facilitators. 

What role can women in Cote d’Ivoire play in bringing a durable peace to that country and reducing the religious and ethnic tensions stirred up by politicians? Are African women involved in peace promotion in West Africa? 

Answer: 

Yes, there was an active ngo based in the Abidjan area that had benefited from 

numerous international awards to promote democracy in Ivory Coast and in West 

Africa. Since the current unrest, I am not aware of any activity. 

Question 4: 

What is ‘‘Ivorite ́,’’ and why is it so divisive in Ivory Coast? In your testimony, you 

call for purging it. How might this be done? 

Answer: 

This concept seeks to determine who among Ivory Coast’s sixty-odd ethnic groups 

and 16.8 million inhabitants is really ‘‘Ivoirian’’ to the exclusion of those who are 

not. The tendency is for peoples whose origins are in the northern half of the country to be viewed as ‘‘foreigners’’ in their own country by those whose 19th-century 

ancestors migrated into the southern regions. In reality, Ivory Coast is artificial enclave with only two small groups in the center of the country whose origins cannot 

be traced to surrounding nations. Now that xenophobia has been unleashed and is 

manipulated for political ends, it will take reeducation in schools, churches and 

throughout communities to dissipate the suspicion that has been created. 

Question 5: 

Does the Marcoussis Agreement send the message that political power and legitimacy can be won through the barrel of the gun? 

Answer: 

No. It shows that the African heads of States, European governments and international agencies 1) realize the gravity of the situation; 2) understand, respect, and 

find legitimate the grievances of the rebels and opposition groups; 3) recognize that 

this opposition speaks for millions of Ivoirians who do not have the means to resist 

human rights violations; 4) expect the Ivoirians to assume their responsibilities for 

restoring peace and democracy; and 5) will commit time and resources to assist in 

this effort. The question is where will the U.S. stand? Will is support the fraudulent 

reign of the Gbagbo regime or will it stand with the international community on 

the side of decency, democracy and respect for human rights? 

Question 6: 

Why did you describe the October 2000 presidential election that put President 

Laurent Gbagbo in power as a ‘‘sham’’ (December 2001 issue of Journal of Democracy)? How is this election relevant to the current search for peace in Ivory Coast? 

Answer: 

Yes, see #1 above. Gbagbo is perceived as an illegitimate ruler by two-thirds of 

the population, including the rebels. 

50

Question 7: 

In your testimony, you commend the role of the French government in brokering 

the Marcoussis Agreement. How do you account for the anger at the French expressed 

by some Ivorians? 

Answer: 

I taught at the University in Abidjan for 12 years. Students were easily persuaded 

to protest against any icon of power. The French, as former colonizers, are a natural 

target during this period in which local authority is challenged. It is common knowledge that the massive street demonstrations are funded by Gbagbo. A former student protest leader, Ble ́ Goudou is organizing the protests on Gbagbo’s behalf. 

Question 8: 

Why has ethnicity emerged as an increasingly divisive issue in Ivorian politics 

since President Felix Houphouet Boigny’s death in 1993? 

Answer: 

The multi party system makes it possible for weak leaders and politicians to manipulate preexisting affinities, especially during a period of economic downturn. 

Question 9: 

How critical are workers from neighboring countries to the economy of Ivory Coast? 

Answer: 

Workers from neighboring countries are essential for Ivory Coast’s export production of cocoa and coffee. About 26% of the population consists of ‘‘immigrants,’’ some 

of whom were born in Ivory Coast, and others who have lived there for several generations. These ‘‘immigrants’’ make important contributions to the economies of 

their ancestral homelands in surrounding countries, in addition to supporting secondary and tertiary sectors of the Ivoirian economy. 

Question 10: 

How would you describe the human rights situation in Ivory Coast in recent years? 

Answer: 

Ivoirians are in dire need of relief from the government and the rebel movements. 

They are suffering from massacres, rapes, hunger, displacement, and death squads 

The situation is critical and getting worse. Fear has displaced driven hundreds of 

thousands of farmers out of the countryside and into areas near French or ECOWAS 

occupation for protection. 

Question 11: 

How best can a durable peace and national reconciliation be fostered given the 

deep political divisions in Ivory Coast? 

Answer: 

International intervention is necessary. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement provides 

a framework for the return to order. The U.S. must support the members of the 

international community and African governments that are involved in the peace 

process and encourage the daily monitoring of the Gbagbo regime. I think he should 

resign in light of the severity of human rights violations and disrespect for the rule 

of law. No financial assistance should be released to the Gbagbo regime. He is now 

spending on weapons from Eastern Europe and China to escalate the war. My testimony of February 12 has a number of recommendations for U.S. policy toward Ivory 

Coast at this time.

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