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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 16-CF-157

CEPHUS HOLLIS, APPELLANT,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia

(CF3-6192-15)

(Hon. Lynn Leibovitz, Trial Judge)

(Argued May 2, 2017 Decided May 3, 2018)

Deborah A. Persico for appellant.

Valinda Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Channing D. 

Phillips, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, Elizabeth Trosman,

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Christopher Bruckmann, and Katherine Earnest, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FISHER and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and STEADMAN, Senior 

Judge.

STEADMAN, Senior Judge: A jury found appellant Cephus Hollis guilty of

fifteen criminal offenses relating to his vicious conduct in two separate incidents 

five days apart, the first with Mr. Hampton Gathers as the victim and the second 

with Mr. Zhong Zu as the victim. At issue in this appeal are his two convictions 

05/03/2018
2

for aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and his three convictions for 

unauthorized use of a vehicle during or to facilitate a crime of violence resulting in 

serious bodily injury (UUV/COV/SBI). Appellant challenges whether the

evidence was sufficient to establish that he caused “serious bodily injury” to either 

of his two victims. In addition, appellant challenges whether the evidence was 

sufficient to establish that his unauthorized use of a vehicle occurred “during the 

course of or to facilitate” a crime of violence. We affirm the convictions.

I. Facts of the Assaults

A. The Gathers Incident

On September 7, 2014, appellant and his cousin Khyree Waters set out on 

foot to steal cars. Appellant told Waters to target Dodges and Chryslers because 

these brands were relatively easy to steal, as well as to look out for delivery people, 

who he said typically leave the car keys in the vehicle while making deliveries. 

Appellant spotted a Dodge Stratus near where they lived, punched out the ignition, 

and drove off in the car with his cousin to look for other opportunities.

As time passed, they spotted a Dodge Avenger that was used by Mr. 

Gathers, a Washington Post delivery person. Appellant hopped into the driver‟s 
3

seat of the Avenger but found no keys. As Mr. Gathers was returning to his car, 

appellant got out of the car and accosted Mr. Gathers, demanding the keys. When 

Mr. Gathers refused, appellant began beating and punching Mr. Gathers until Mr. 

Gathers fell to the ground. Appellant‟s cousin came to join the fray and both men 

continued to kick Mr. Gathers mercilessly until he finally let go of the keys.

Leaving Mr. Gathers lying on the ground, appellant drove off in Mr. Gathers‟

Avenger, which contained newspapers as well as a cell phone and other items 

belonging to Mr. Gathers. Appellant‟s cousin also left, driving the previously 

stolen Stratus. The next thing Mr. Gathers recalled was waking up in the hospital.

The nature and extent of his injuries are discussed in part III(A) of this opinion.

B. The Zu Incident

Five days later, Mr. Zu, who delivered food for a Chinese restaurant, 

approached appellant‟s dwelling with a food order. Appellant opened the door 

wielding a knife two or three inches in length and, without a word, began to stab

Mr. Zu in the head. Appellant continued to stab Mr. Zu “many” times and, even 

after Mr. Zu fell and lost his glasses and perhaps dropped the keys to his car. Mr.

Zu managed to briefly escape from appellant and, while yelling for help, ran to his 

delivery car and jumped in the driver‟s seat. Now holding the keys, appellant 
4

pursued Mr. Zu, jumped into the front passenger seat and demanded that Mr. Zu 

exit the car, repeatedly stabbing Mr. Zu in the face. When appellant got out and 

walked around to the driver‟s side of the vehicle, Mr. Zu exited the vehicle and 

tried to block appellant‟s continued knife thrusts with his hands. Mr. Zu struggled 

to hold the driver‟s door to prevent appellant from leaving, but appellant‟s cousin, 

who had now joined the action, pushed Mr. Zu, his face and body covered with 

blood, to the ground as appellant drove away in the vehicle. Among Mr. Zu‟s 

belongings in the car was his wallet containing $3,400 in cash. An ambulance took 

Mr. Zu to a hospital. The nature and extent of his injuries are described in part 

III(B) of this opinion.

II. Aggravated Assault

The evolution of the offense of assault in the District of Columbia into the 

current three-tier classification has been set forth in a number of our prior opinions. 

Briefly put, prior to 2007, only two levels of assault existed in the District of 

Columbia. The basic statute of simple assault, now D.C. Code § 22-404 (a)(1)

(June 2017 Cum. Supp.), required no injury and was punishable by a fine of no 

more than $1,000 and imprisonment of no more than 180 days. The more serious 

aggravated assault, now D.C. Code § 22-404.01 (a) (June 2017 Cum. Supp.), 
5

required serious bodily injury and was punishable by a fine of not more than 

$10,000 and imprisonment of not more than ten years.1 “Serious bodily injury”

was not defined in the statute, leaving the courts to define the term.

These two classifications of assault proved problematic in circumstances 

where the injury was more than “mere „bodily injury‟ [such as slapping] but less 

serious than „serious bodily injury.‟” Belt v. United States, 149 A.3d 1048, 1054 

(D.C. 2016) (brackets in original). To fill the gap, the Council of the District of 

Columbia added a new category of felony assault, D.C. Code § 22-404 (a)(2), 

effective on April 24, 2007, that required significant bodily injury and was

punishable by a fine of no more than $3,000 and imprisonment of no more than 

three years. The Council defined “significant bodily injury” as an injury that 

“requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention.” D.C. Code § 22-404

(a)(2) (2012 Repl.). However, the legislation adding felony assault did not amend

the two existing forms of assault, but simply provided an intermediate degree of 

assault for circumstances that were deemed more serious than simple assault but

less serious than aggravated assault.

 

1

 Aggravated assault itself was added as a separate offense in 1994.
6

Over the years, this court has addressed an extended spate of sufficiency 

challenges resulting in an extensive exposition of the term “serious bodily injury,” 

undefined in the statute, and of “significant bodily injury” and its definition as an 

injury that “requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention.” 

 

With respect to the immediate issue before us, we early on defined “serious 

bodily injury” as one that “involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness,

extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or 

impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty.” Nixon v. 

United States, 730 A.2d 145, 149 (D.C. 1999).

2

In subsequent cases, we have 

emphasized the “high threshold of injury” that “the legislature intended in 

fashioning a crime that increases twenty-fold the maximum prison term for simple 

assault.” Bolanos v. United States, 938 A.2d 672, 677 (D.C. 2007) (citing Swinton 

v. United States, 902 A.2d 772, 775 (D.C. 2006)). The evidentiary standard for 

aggravated assault is high and any testimony must be supported by probative 

evidence. See Swinton, 902 A.2d at 775-77; Scott v. United States, 954 A.2d 1037, 

1046 (D.C. 2008); In re P.F., 954 A.2d 949, 952 (D.C. 2008). “Serious bodily 

injury usually involves a life-threatening or disabling injury, but the court must 

 

2

 We adopted this definition from that contained in another statute 

pertaining to sentencing for a sex offense, D.C. Code § 22-3001 (7) (2013 Repl.).
7

also consider all the consequences of the injury to determine whether the 

appropriate „high threshold of injury‟ has been met.” Bolanos, 938 A.2d at 678.

We now turn our attention to the details of the injuries inflicted by appellant 

on each victim. We do so pursuant to the oft-stated and well-established standard 

for such review, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the government 

and giving deference to the jury to weigh the evidence and draw all justifiable 

inferences of fact. See, e.g., Belt, 149 A.3d at 1052. 

III. The Victims’ Injuries

A. Gathers

The evidence presented to the jury as to Mr. Gathers‟ injuries and their 

treatment at the hospital included testimony from the attending trauma surgeon 

who treated Mr. Gathers, the first officer on the scene, and Mr. Gathers.

Dr. Kakra Hughes was the attending trauma surgeon on call the night Mr. 

Gathers was brought in and immediately noticed Mr. Gathers‟ heart rate was over 

100 beats per minute, which can “suggest severe pain or bleeding.” Dr. Hughes 

also noticed “a lot” of bruising on Mr. Gathers‟ face, that his shoulder was “painful 
8

and swollen,” and that his left eye and pupil were “sluggish.” CT scans and X-rays 

that Dr. Hughes ordered revealed that the bony structure surrounding Mr. Gathers‟

left eye was broken in multiple places, his nose, jaw, and wrist were also broken, 

and his shoulder was dislocated. Almost two hours after Mr. Gathers was brought 

to the hospital, his pain was still the maximum level on the hospital‟s pain scale.3

Mr. Gathers‟ broken wrist required a plate and screw to set it in place, and seven to 

eight months to heal, which caused him to miss eight months of work. He also 

needed corrective surgery for his tear ducts because his tears would spill into his 

eyes, making it hard to see. Six months after the attack, there were still visible 

marks under both eyes and his left eye was still bloodshot. 

In testifying, Mr. Gathers described his injuries as a dislocated shoulder, 

“badly bruised” eyes, a broken wrist, and damaged tear ducts, and, at the time of 

trial, he still struggled with remembering names and directions to places he has 

been before. Officer Aris Karcic, the first officer on the scene, noted that Mr. 

Gathers was “profusely bleeding from the face” and was “semiconscious.” Officer

Karcic called an ambulance to take Mr. Gathers to the hospital, where Officer 

Karcic observed “severe lacerations, wounds across his face, swelling.” 

 

3

The hospital asks patients to rate their pain on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 

being the minimum and 10 being the maximum. 
9

With respect to Mr. Gathers, the jury instruction defined “serious bodily 

injury” in terms of the last four Nixon factors, omitting only “serious risk of 

death.” Here the jury heard evidence from the responding officer, who described 

Mr. Gathers as “in and out” of consciousness at the scene and from Mr. Gathers 

himself, who could remember nothing following his beating until he “woke up” in 

the hospital.4The jury heard evidence from the treating physician about Mr. 

Gathers‟ “maximum” pain level as well as the full range of his injuries, including 

the broken jaw and eye bones.5 The jury saw photos of Mr. Gathers taken some six

months after the attack, which showed his face was still bruised and swollen and 

his left eye bloodshot.

6

The jury heard that Mr. Gathers was unable to work for 

seven to eight months due to his wrist injury, his tear duct required surgery to fix 

after he was discharged from the hospital, and he had trouble with his memory 

 

4

 See, e.g., Beaner v. United States, 845 A.2d 525, 538 (D.C. 2004)

(unconsciousness).

5

 See, e.g., Jenkins v. United States, 877 A.2d 1062, 1071-72 (D.C. 2005) 

(extreme physical pain).

6

 See, e.g., Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 918-19 (D.C. 2000) 

(protracted and obvious disfigurement).
10

even up to the date of trial.7 Considering these and all the other circumstances of 

the assault and its consequences, we are quite satisfied that the jury could 

reasonably find that the evidence justified a finding of guilt of aggravated assault 

on Mr. Gathers. 

Appellant does not contest this description of Mr. Gathers‟ injuries. Rather, 

his insufficiency argument is based on the proposition that the definition of “severe 

bodily injury” is insufficiently demanding in light of the establishment of the 

intermediate level of felony assault. He asserts that the injuries must now be “lifethreatening” to justify a finding of aggravated assault. He cites our cases such as 

Quintanilla v. United States, 62 A.3d 1261 (D.C. 2013) discussing the nature of 

evidence sufficient to support a finding of felony assault and argues that the 

injuries in our present case are closer to those standards.8 He correctly states that 

 

7

 See, e.g., In re D.E., 991 A.2d 1205, 1211 (D.C. 2010) (protracted loss or 

impairment of function).

8

 Of course, the fact that injuries meet the felony assault standard does not 

mean that they cannot also meet the more demanding standard for aggravated 

assault. In our view, the injuries suffered by Mr. Gathers taken as a whole are 

significantly more serious than those sustained in the cited cases dealing with 

felony assault. In fact, every assault and every set of injuries will have its own 

characteristics, just as is the case with other crimes which result in disparate 

sentences. Determining whether a particular assault is deemed felony or 

aggravated could well be a task left to a fully instructed jury, rather than calling for 

a detailed appellate parsing of numerous cases, and reversal for insufficiency 

(continued...)
11

we have used the phrase “life-threatening” in several opinions. But we have 

generally done so in a qualified manner: e.g. “[T]he victim has usually sustained 

life-threatening or disabling injuries.” Scott, 954 A.2d at 1046, citing Swinton, 902 

A.2d at 775. In fact, the settled Nixon standard already includes the equivalent 

“substantial risk of death” and appellant‟s approach would negate the other four 

types of injuries that we have held sufficient to constitute aggravated assault. The 

legislature in establishing the new offense of felony assault was “fill[ing] the gap” 

and left unchanged the section on aggravated assault. Belt, 149 A.3d at 1054. So 

to speak, the enactment did not move the existing goal posts but instead inserted a 

new scoring opportunity at, say, the fifty-yard line. Indeed, Scott itself went on to 

say, quoting Swinton, that “[a]ggravated assault victims „typically required urgent 

and continuing medical treatment (and, often, surgery), carried visible and longlasting (if not permanent) scars, and suffered other consequential damage, such as 

significant impairment of their faculties.‟” 954 A.2d at 1046. This is not an inapt 

description of the sufferings of Mr. Gathers from this brutal beating by appellant. 

It is fair to say that the jury could reasonably view this case of aggravated assault

on Mr. Gathers as “in short, horrific.” Id.

 

(...continued)

would generally occur only for a clearly outlier verdict. As we pointed out 

recently in Belt, 149 A.3d at 1056, every day juries are entrusted with deciding 

difficult factual issues applying their common sense.
12

B. Zu 

The assault on Mr. Zu somewhat differs from the assault on Mr. Gathers in 

that the jury was instructed on only one theory of aggravated assault, as follows:

“Serious bodily injury for this offense involving [Zhong Zu] is an injury that 

involves extreme physical pain.” The question of the sufficiency of the evidence 

thus rests on whether enough was presented to meet “the demanding standard we 

require for proof of extreme physical pain” to allow a finding of guilt on that 

ground. Jackson v. United States, 940 A.2d 981, 989 (D.C. 2008).

Unlike the other four criteria for severe bodily injury, the term “extreme 

physical pain” is, as we noted in Swinton, “regrettably . . . subjective.”

Nonetheless, we went on in Swinton to set forth an exposition of the term, saying: 

“[T]he adjective „extreme‟ – typically defined as „existing in the highest or the 

greatest possible degree‟ – unambiguously indicates that the level of pain must be 

exceptionally severe if not unbearable.” 902 A.2d at 777. But, importantly, 

Swinton further observed that “even absent graphic descriptions of suffering from 

the victim herself or other witnesses, a reasonable juror may be able to infer that 

pain was extreme from the nature of the injuries and the victim‟s reaction to them.”
13

Id.; see also Medley v. United States, 104 A.3d 115, 127-28 (D.C. 2014).

Dr. James Street was a trauma surgeon on call when Mr. Zu was brought to 

the emergency room by ambulance. He observed numerous stab wounds on Mr. 

Zu‟s forehead, face, left cheek, nose, right shoulder, left flank, and both hands. 

After conducting an initial trauma evaluation, Dr. Street determined that Mr. Zu 

was “relatively” stable. None of the wounds were “bleeding excessively” and the 

wounds could be controlled, followed by a cleaning and stitches to close most of

them. A major concern was the proximity of one of the stab wounds in Mr. Zu‟s 

left side to “a lot of critical structures in that area, lung, heart, diaphragm, stomach, 

spleen.” A chest X-ray showed that ten percent of Mr. Zu‟s lung was collapsed, 

and a chest tube was placed in him to relieve that condition. The next day, Mr. Zu 

underwent a surgical procedure in which a scope was put in his abdomen that blew 

up the abdomen with air and enabled the doctor to determine that the diaphragm 

was fortunately intact. The stab wound to Mr. Zu‟s nose required the expertise of 

an ear, nose, and throat doctor to repair it. Following his discharge after three 

days, Mr. Zu was scheduled to return to the hospital one week later to have the 

stitches removed. He remained at home a month to rest and recover from the 

incident.
14

A direct report of pain in the record was a medical record dated the day of 

the assault. As explained by Dr. Street, the hospital practice was to ask a patient as 

to his or her level of pain on a scale of 1 to 10, in which “[t]en is supposed to

represent the most excruciating pain one could ever imagine.” The record 

contained a nurse‟s notations that early on, Mr. Zu‟s self-reported a maximum pain 

level of 10, which, upon his receiving pain medication, alleviated to somewhat 

lower levels. Although Dr. Street did not testify about any specific behavioral 

manifestation of such pain, he did describe in detail the subsequent medical and 

surgical procedures that the wounds necessitated. Mr. Zu himself, testifying 

through an interpreter, described in vivid terms the whole unprovoked and vicious 

stabbing attack with its multiple and recurring stab wounds and its aftermath in the 

hospital, although he did not volunteer information about his pain nor was he asked 

about it. Other witnesses to the scene described Mr. Zu as screaming for help and 

lying on the ground covered with blood still coming out from him. And the jury 

was shown a series of photographs depicting Mr. Zu‟s wounds in detail.

Appellant in his reply brief explicitly states that he does not dispute that “Zu 

suffered extreme physical pain.” Rather, he rests his case for reversal on the same 

argument he made with respect to Mr. Gathers, namely, that the injuries must be 
15

“life-threatening” to warrant a finding of aggravated assault.9 In the previous 

subsection of this opinion, we have addressed and rejected this argument and the 

same rejection of course applies here. In a number of prior cases, we have 

sustained convictions for aggravated assault involving severe physical pain.10 

Given appellant‟s concession and the full record here, we do so again in sustaining 

the conviction for aggravated assault on Mr. Zu.

IV. The Enhanced Sentence

Under D.C. law, the authorized sentence for committing the basic crime of 

unauthorized use of a vehicle is imprisonment up to five years. D.C. Code § 22-

3215 (d)(1) (June 2017 Cum. Supp.). If the defendant “took, used, or operated” the 

vehicle “during the course of or to facilitate a crime of violence,” the sentence is 

up to ten years, and if serious bodily injury results, the potential sentence increases 

by another five years. D.C. Code § 22-3215 (d)(2)(A) (June 2017 Cum. Supp.). A 

“crime of violence” is defined by cross-reference to D.C. Code § 23-1331 (4) (June 

 

9

 In fact, it is not readily apparent that Mr. Zu‟s wounds would not meet that 

standard. As described, the knife thrust in the left flank came perilously close to 

vital organs. Cf. Cheeks v. United States, 168 A.3d 691, 697-98 (D.C. 2017).

10

 See, e.g., Jenkins v. United States, 877 A.2d 1062, 1070-72 (D.C. 2005) 

(multiple stab wounds). See also Jackson v. United States, 940 A.2d 981, 989-90 

(D.C. 2008) (listing a series of cases) and note 8, supra.
16

2017 Cum. Supp.). D.C. Code § 22-3215 (d)(2)(B) (2012 Repl. & June 2017 Cum. 

Supp.) That subsection lists, among other offenses, aggravated assault, assault 

with significant bodily injury, robbery, and carjacking, all of which crimes 

appellant was convicted of committing against Mr. Gathers and all of which were 

included in the charge to the jury on this offense.

Appellant challenges his two convictions of UUV/COV/SBI involving the 

use of the Dodge Stratus (the first stolen car) and the Dodge Avenger (Gathers‟

car). He argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he used either car 

“during the course of or to facilitate” a crime of violence. We have little difficulty

in rejecting this assertion. As the government rightly argues, the stolen Dodge

Stratus provided the means by which appellant could scour the neighborhood and 

brought him to the location where the assault on Mr. Gathers and the robbery of his 

car could occur. And in stealing Mr. Gathers‟ car as the mechanism for fleeing the 

scene of the assault, he also stole the contents of that car, including the 

identification and cellphone.

To counter this analysis, appellant would have us read into the statute an 

intent element; that is, that the statute must be construed as requiring that the 

defendant “took, used, or operated” the vehicle with the intent or purpose of 
17

making it easier to commit a crime of violence.11 We see no basis for doing so. 

He asserts that upon stealing the Dodge Stratus and looking for other cars to steal, 

he had no intention of committing a serious assault in the process. “[I]n examining 

the statutory language, it is axiomatic that the words of the statute should be 

construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly 

attributed to them.” Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 

753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we construe 

the word “facilitate” in its normal everyday meaning to “make easier or less 

difficult.” Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary 812 (2002); see also, 

e.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 653 (3d ed. 1992)

(defining and giving an example of facilitate as “to make easy or easier: political 

agreements that facilitated troop withdrawals”). Whatever appellant intended or 

could foresee as a likely possibility at the time of stealing the Stratus, the fact of 

the matter is that its use could be seen to have facilitated his commission of the 

eventual offense. By means of the car, appellant was able to scout out and arrive at 

Mr. Gathers‟ location. Moreover, UUV is a continuing offense. Even to the extent 

that some intent may be relevant, a reasonable inference can be made that, at the 

point of arrival, appellant was prepared to do whatever necessary to take 

 

11

 Appellant focuses on the word “to” preceding “facilitate,” reading it as 

the equivalent of “in order to.” But the statute employs not only the word “took” 

but also “use or operate,” which reflect no element of intent. 
18

possession of Mr. Gathers‟ car. Furthermore, his co-conspirator cousin used the 

Stratus to return quickly to the scene of the assault to aid appellant in forcing Mr. 

Gathers to give up the car keys and in this way the car was actually used “in the 

course of” the assault.12

Appellant also presents what he might term the tautology of treating his 

carjacking Mr. Gathers‟ Avenger as the requisite “crime of violence.” Such an 

analysis, he implies, would make every carjacking an offense subject to 

enhancement. This might be an objectionable feature if the government were to 

rely solely on carjacking as the crime of violence. But, as indicated, it does not. 

The crime of violence can be both the assault itself, where use of the Avenger 

made possible his fleeing the scene of the crime to avoid detection, and the actual

robbery of at least the contents of the car.

13 In short, in any common-sense view, 

both cars were part and parcel of the full story of the event involving Mr. Gathers.

 

12

 Appellant cites federal cases interpreting a statute involving “in 

furtherance of.” We do not find these cases helpful, as we view that phrase as 

more restrictive than “facilitate” in our statute.

13

 Robbery requires asportation or the carrying away of another‟s property, 

Lattimore v. United States, 684 A.2d 357, 359 (D.C. 1996), and is not a lesserincluded offense of carjacking. See Pixley v. United States, 692 A.2d 438, 440 

(D.C. 1997). 
19

V. Conclusion

In the event of affirmance, appellant and the government are in agreement 

that the two convictions for felony assault merge into the two respective 

convictions for aggravated assault and are therefore vacated. In all other respects, 

the convictions appealed from are affirmed.

So ordered.