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80–061PDF 2002

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 6, 2002

Serial No. 107–93

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

HILLEL WEINBERG, Subcommittee Staff Director & Counsel 

DAVID S. ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DEBORAH BODLANDER, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL BERKOWITZ, Professional Staff Member 

MATTHEW ZWEIG, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Michael Krepon, Founding President, The Henry L. Stimson Center ................ 9

Anatol Lieven, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace ..................................................................................................................... 12

Amit A. Pandya, Senior Fellow for South Asia, Institute for Global Democracy ........................................................................................................................ 15

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia: Prepared statement ................................................................. 2

Michael Krepon: Prepared statement .................................................................... 10

Amit A. Pandya: Prepared statement .................................................................... 17

(1)

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA 

THURSDAY, JUNE 6, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:29 a.m. in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. Members, please 

take their seats. 

We want to welcome our witnesses who are with us today. The 

current state of affairs between India and Pakistan is weighing 

heavily on all of our minds. We are concerned about how a possible 

nuclear exchange and how a battle over Kashmir would affect our 

efforts in Afghanistan, would affect the region’s stability. 

The Congressional Research Service informs us that since September 11, nearly 400 of the Indian population were killed as a result of terrorism in Kashmir. While the Administration seeks to 

calm down and cool tensions, we were dismayed to learn that just 

yesterday Prime Minister Vajpayee offered to conduct joint military 

patrols with Pakistan on the line of control and that President 

Musharraf rejected that offer. 

Agreeing to joint monitoring would have been one important step 

to begin to diffuse the tense situation. If President Musharraf is serious about diverting a war, he needs to match his words with 

deeds, and he should agree to some joint monitoring. I hope we can 

explore that issue with our panelists. 

Our nation has delivered over $1 billion worth of assistance to 

Pakistan since our war on terrorism began. While we do appreciate 

all that President Musharraf has done to help us since the September 11 terrorist attacks, we should bear in mind that he and 

the Pakistan military were given an ultimatum soon after September 11 to stop nurturing and supporting the Taliban and other 

Islamic militants or else face those consequences. 

He made the right decision then, and we expect him to follow 

through on that decision now. Those who kill innocent men and 

women and children for any cause are not freedom fighters. They 

are cold-blooded murderers who must be hunted down and brought 

to justice. Any support for them is totally unacceptable. As our 

President has said, any nation that harbors terrorists is a terrorist 

nation. 

2

We look forward to learning from our witnesses today so that we 

may have the benefit of your expertise and be able to appropriately 

respond to the crises. 

I am calling on our Ranking Minority Member, the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. Ackerman, for any opening statement and for 

any of our colleagues who may have opening statements. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

We want to welcome our witnesses here today. The current state of affairs between India and Pakistan is weighing heavily on everybody’s mind. We are concerned about how a possible nuclear exchange and how a battle over Kashmir will 

effect our effects in Afghanistan. 

The Congressional Research Service informs us that since September 11th nearly 

400 Indians were killed as a result of terrorism in Kashmir. While the Administration seeks to cool tensions we were dismayed to learn that yesterday Prime Minister 

Vajpayee offered to conduct joint military patrols with Pakistan on the line of control and that President Musharraf rejected the offer. Agreeing to joint monitoring 

would have been one important step to begin to diffuse the tense situation. If President Musharraf is serious about diverting a war he needs to match his words with 

deeds. He should agree to joint monitoring. 

The United States has delivered over one billion dollars worth of assistance to 

Pakistan since the war on terrorism began. While we appreciate all that President 

Musharraf has done to help us since the September eleventh terrorist attacks we 

must remember that he and the Pakistani military were given an ultimatum soon 

after September 11th... stop nurturing and supporting the Taliban and other Islamic 

militants or else face the consequences. He made the right decision then and we expect him to follow through with it now. People who kill innocent men, women and 

children for any cause are not freedom fighters. They are cold blooded murderers 

who must be hunted down and brought to justice. Any support for them is totally 

and equally unacceptable. 

We look forward to learning from our witnesses today so that we may have the 

benefit of their expertise and be able to appropriately respond to the crises.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today’s 

hearing. Once again, the world finds itself on the brink of war between two nuclear neighbors, and once again we find ourselves 

here because of actions or lack thereof by the government of Pakistan. 

Back in January after the horrendous December 13 attack on the 

Indian Parliament, General Musharraf gave a speech that described his vision of Pakistan as a modern, moderate, secular and 

democratic state, a state that rejected terrorism and would not be 

used as a base for terrorist activity ‘‘anywhere in the world.’’

But no sooner did the international community hail General 

Musharraf for his rejection of Islamic extremism than he reverted 

to form in attempting to describe the terrorist acts committed in 

India as those of freedom fighters. Apparently, his rejection of terror anywhere in the world did not include India. 

General Musharraf seems not to have learned a lesson from September 11 that terrorism, any terrorism, is unacceptable. If Pakistan wants to remain a member of the International Coalition 

Against Terrorism, then support for terrorists in Kashmir must 

end completely and permanently. That means no more infiltration 

across the line of control, no more terrorist training camps on Pakistani territory. 

This is the minimum that the United States should expect from 

our ally in the war on terror, and I hope Secretary Rumsfeld and 

3

Deputy Secretary Armitage are carrying that message to Pakistan 

this week. 

To be fair, we should give credit where credit is due. General 

Musharraf made a courageous decision on September 13 of last 

year and has supported Operation Enduring Freedom. Without 

that support, we would have had a much more difficult time prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. 

In return for that support, the United States has provided significant economic assistance, including $600 million during the 

past fiscal year. The supplemental appropriations bill that just 

passed the House has $40 million in additional aid, and the Administration is requesting another $250 million in economic and development assistance for the coming fiscal year. 

This does not even include the $73 million provided for border security and an additional $75 million for foreign military financing 

in the supplemental and another $50 million in military assistance 

for the coming fiscal year. 

After all this, I think it is time to make clear to General 

Musharraf that no further economic or military support will go to 

Pakistan if he continues to support militant organizations. At the 

very least, no military assistance should go to Pakistan during the 

current crisis. 

What concerns me the most is not that the Administration will 

not deliver the right message, but the man on the receiving end of 

the message does not want to hear it or, worse, intends to ignore 

it. After all, General Musharraf is the architect of the Kargil incursion that brought the subcontinent to the brink of nuclear war in 

1999. What makes anyone believe that a cause for which he was 

ready to go to war 3 years ago is any less dear to him now? 

Our experience so far is that he does not intend to call off Pakistani support for the terrorists in Kashmir. Instead, he continues 

to use violence in Kashmir to internationalize the issue and to 

push the international and world community to intervene on his 

behalf. 

We have seen this strategy before. It is the same one used by 

Yasser Arafat against the Israelis, and, just like the Israelis, India 

has a right to self-defense. It is the same right that we assert as 

we hunt the world over for terrorists with a global reach. 

We have found the next front in the war on terrorism, Mr. Chairman, and it is in Kashmir. The bottom line is that General 

Musharraf has to stop the infiltration across the line of control permanently and verifiably, and he has to dismantle the terrorist 

training camps on Pakistani soil. Only after he has done these 

things can a dialogue with India begin about Kashmir, as well as 

all the other issues that should be discussed between two neighbors. Accepting anything less is simply rewarding terror, and rewarding terror will only bring more terror. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. Burton? I am going to ask our Members if they would try 

to be brief in their opening statements so we can get on with the 

witnesses. Mr. Burton? 

4

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is extremely important 

that the history of this issue be clearly stated, and for that reason 

I hope that we will get at least our 5 minutes. 

Mr. GILMAN. Very well. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. Thank you. First of all, let me just say that 

Mr. Gilman, for whom I have the highest respect, indicated that 

Mr. President Musharraf rejected a proposal for joint patrols along 

the border, but he failed to mention that India rejected a proposal 

for neutral third parties to patrol the border. 

I think that is one of the concerns that they have in Pakistan; 

that there may be some conflicts that occur because of both sides 

being involved in that because they have a long-time, state-of-war 

mind toward each other, and a neutral third party along the border 

seems much more realistic to me. 

Now let us just look at the history of this issue. I have before 

me the resolution of the 21st of April, 1948, and here is what it 

said.

‘‘Having considered the complaint of the Government of India 

concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and 

Kashmir . . .’’,

and I will just take a couple of excerpts out. 

It says,

‘‘Noting with satisfaction . . .’’

This is the U.N. speaking, the Security Council.

‘‘Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire 

that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to 

India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic 

method of a free and impartial plebiscite.’’

Both of them agreed, and the U.N. was very happy about that. 

The U.N. went on to say that they recommended to the governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which 

in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and 

impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and 

Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan. 

Now, they agreed to that in 1948, and ever since then India has 

been recalcitrant in saying they did not want the plebiscite. They 

would not let the plebiscite take place. They will not let the people 

of Kashmir decide for themselves whether they want to be with 

Pakistan, India or independent, and yet this U.N. resolution is still 

in effect, and nobody talks about it. It bothers me a great deal. 

We cast aspersions and point fingers all the time, but the fact 

of the matter is if they just did what they were agreeing to in 1948, 

this issue would be moot today, and we would not be facing the 

possibility of a nuclear war. 

Now let us just go into some of the other facts that are very important. We have heard that several hundred Indian troops have 

been killed by terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, but we have not 

heard these facts. I want you to listen to this. 

Since 1990, 60,000 Kashmiris have died at the hands of Indian 

security forces. Not hundreds. Sixty thousand. One and a half million Kashmiris have had to flee to Pakistan. Six thousand young 

5

Kashmiri women and girls have been raped. Twenty-one thousand 

homes have been burned to the ground. Tens of thousands have 

been tortured and maimed. They find their bodies bound and 

gagged and thrown in the canals up there. 

Billions of dollars worth of property have been looted and destroyed. Indian forces have burned entire villages, sparing neither 

schools, hospitals or places of worship, and they have had up to 

three-quarters of a million troops in Jammu and Kashmir imposing 

martial law, the largest concentration of military forces in a place 

where they are not in a military conflict in the world. This has 

been going on for years, and yet nobody ever talks about that. 

I want to tell you a story. This is a real life story; the story of 

Kunan rampage. There were more than 800 Indian troops sealed 

off and rampaged through the village of Kunan. Indian troops 

herded all the men in the village out into an icy field. While the 

men stood freezing under guard, other troops entered their houses 

and at gunpoint gang raped 23 ladies. Local people say that as 

many as 100 women were molested in some way, and the rampage 

lasted from 11 p.m. until 9 a.m. the next morning. 

You know, that would kind of tick me off if I was in Indiana and 

that happened, but we do not talk about that sort of thing. Now, 

there is concern about so-called terrorists being trained and coming 

across the border in Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan, but the 

fact of the matter is most of the rebellion is coming from people 

who live in Kashmir and Jammu. 

These are not people from the outside that are fighting the Indian occupation. These are people who want a free and fair plebiscite that was promised in 1948, 54 years ago, that has never taken 

place, and they want to have a vote. About 80 percent of the people 

that live there are Muslim, and probably about 15 or 20 percent 

are Hindu, and yet these people, because of their religious beliefs, 

they believe are persecuted on a regular basis. 

The facts bear that out. I could sit here and bring you a stack 

of reports from Amnesty International and other organizations that 

verify what I have just said, and yet what are we doing today? We 

are talking about how important India is and how we ought to put 

more heat on Musharraf. 

Pakistan has been with us in every single conflict I can remember. In Afghanistan when we fought the Soviets, in Somalia. When 

007 was shot down, an American plane, Pakistan was with us. 

They are with us time and time again. India, on the other hand, 

built T–55 tanks for the Soviets, MIG fighter planes, and they were 

opposed to almost everything we did at the U.N. 

Now, the thing that I do not understand is why there is not fairness, and I said this yesterday. I believe sincerely that we ought 

to have an open mind and a nonpartisan approach, if you will, to 

solving this problem because we face the nuclear precipice, but 

what I am hearing from our leadership and others in the Congress 

is Mr. Musharraf ought to take care of this. He ought to do that. 

He is doing everything he can. He is helping us against Osama 

bin Laden. He is helping us every way he can. He has internal 

problems, and yet we keep beating on him. Now we are talking 

about pulling away foreign assistance at a time when he needs our 

help and he needs stability. 

6

What we need to do is get an independent group of military personnel to patrol that border—not Indians, not Pakistanis—who patrol it to make sure that there is no cross border fighting and there 

is no more infiltration. If we do it in a fair and honest way, I think 

we can take us back from this precipice. If we do not and continue 

to point fingers at our friend, Pakistan, I think we are making a 

huge mistake. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

Ms. Berkley? 

Mrs. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have prepared remarks, and I am very anxious to hear our witnesses before 

I say anything. I am hesitant to say anything because I do not 

want to interfere or interrupt the Administration’s peace initiatives 

as they send members of the Administration over to the area in 

order to speak with both parties. 

I want to speak just a moment not only as a Congresswoman, 

but as a citizen of the United States. I mean, we are dealing with 

a part of the world where there is no potable water. There is no 

electricity for most of the countries. There is no infrastructure, no 

decent schools, no quality of life, and we are sitting here worried 

to death that these two nations are going to annihilate each other 

by the use of nuclear weapons. 

Now, it seems to me that they ought to be spending their money 

elevating the quality of life for their citizens and not spending fortunes of money on conventional and nuclear weapons. It is an offense to me to think that I am going to go back to my constituents 

and ask them to continue to make sacrifices, continue to use their 

tax money for foreign aid for the region, continue to have them 

send their young husbands and their sons to stand in the middle 

of warring factions, when I think we need to have people in the region exercising some responsibility on their own. 

It is their lives. It is their countries, and it is time that they 

stand down. While I listen to what Mr. Burton says and I appreciate very much what Musharraf has done in our war against terrorism, I think what the President said is very right. You are either with us, or you are not. 

He is going to have to stop harboring terrorists. He is going to 

have to shut down those terrorist schools and military structures 

and let us start moving forward in an effort to make peace in the 

region. It is just the height of irresponsibility to have gotten to this 

point, and I am beginning to resent the fact that as an American 

we are going to have to clean up this mess that is not being made 

by us. 

I would urge both parties to act responsibly, but I would particularly ask the Pakistanis, who I know have many, many problems, 

to make sure that they start the same way we are asking the Palestinians to end the terrorism, end the terrorist schools, and let us 

start acting responsibly as human beings, as citizens of the world, 

so that we can protect not only that region, but the civilized world 

across the globe. 

We owe it to our fellow citizens throughout the world to ensure 

a safe world for our children and our children’s children. This is 

not the way to do it. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. Berkley. 

7

Mr. Pitts? 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this very important hearing this morning. 

The conflict over Kashmir and the standoff between India and 

Pakistan headlines all of the major news these days, but despite 

the publicity of India and Pakistan being on the brink of war, I 

think few truly grasp the enormous complexity of the issue. 

Surely one mis-step on Kashmir could be catastrophic. Kashmir 

is the meeting point of Communist China, Hindu India and Muslim 

Pakistan. It has been a region filled with humanitarian suffering 

from violence for many years. I have seen firsthand the increased 

toll on human dignity and life in recent years. 

I traveled to Kashmir twice in the last couple of years, both 

times to visit Kashmir refugees who were maimed and wounded in 

the current conflict. Both times, the seriousness of the conflict and 

the suffering etched in the faces of the refugees have haunted me. 

The second time I visited we were able to take wheelchairs. With 

the help of the Mobility Project for these refugees in Kashmir. 

Both of my visits were on the Pakistan side, and I am grateful 

to the government of Pakistan for facilitating those visits and for 

the assistance of humanitarian aid to the refugees. I hope to be 

able to visit the Indian side of Kashmir in the future. 

Needless to say, tension in the region is mounting. The degree 

of humanitarian suffering on both sides—underscored by recent 

media attention—must be addressed. Both governments must reign 

in those who would do harm. Both governments should allow the 

international community to help address the humanitarian needs 

in the area. 

Further, United States’ interest in the region are enormous as 

continued conflict between these two powers which possess nuclear 

missile technology could bring global instability. Is there hope for 

peace in Kashmir or for stability? What role can the U.S. play in 

fostering dialogue and a peace plan? 

With this in mind, I am pleased to say my colleagues Kevin 

Brady, David Bonior and I are announcing today the formation of 

a Kashmir Forum to serve to educate Members and staff on all 

sides on the conflict, encourage non-threatening dialogue on the 

issue on a regular basis, and it will provide an opportunity for all 

sides, including the Kashmiri people, to present their views and to 

work together to reach a common understanding that can lead to 

stability and peace for the people of the region. 

Mr. Chairman, the volatility of this region, the impact of the conflict could have on the rest of the world is very apparent. In some 

ways, it is even more dangerous than the Middle East because both 

sides have nuclear weapons. It is vital that the Congress and the 

Administration pay very close attention to Kashmir. 

Obviously that is occurring now, but where was the attention a 

year ago at a time when some of the current tension could have 

been prevented? I believe President Musharraf desires to bring an 

end to this conflict, as does Prime Minister Vajpayee, and I hope 

both sides can come together, increase confidence building measures, bring an end to the conflict that has caused such suffering. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning, and 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

8

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I will try to be short. 

Let me just say that I respect Mr. Burton, and I think that people 

should pay attention to what Mr. Burton had to say. I agree with 

many of the points and much of the things he had to say. 

Let us not forget that what our colleague has just stated is therein reality because every time we discuss this issue the central 

points that Dan Burton brought up are just ignored. As long as 

they are ignored, the situation in Kashmir is going to get worse 

and worse. 

Today, let me suggest that the people of the United States, the 

people of the world, are frightened to death about what is going on 

in Kashmir because it could lead to the slaughter of even more people outside the borders of Kashmir and Jammu. But we have to get 

to the heart of the matter, and the heart of the matter which keeps 

the conflict on is not terrorism. 

Yes, we condemn terrorism. We demand an end to it. Terrorism 

is the attack of non-combatants and both sides in that war of attack non-combatants. How do we end the fighting? You end the 

fighting by having a vote. That is what the people of Kashmir 

want, a plebiscite. We should demand, the people, the good people 

of this world, demand that the people of Kashmir and Jammu have 

a vote internationally supervised, and in the end that vote will 

clear the path toward peace. Without it, there will be no peace. Let 

us not forget that. 

Dan, thanks very much for bringing that up. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

We will now introduce today’s witnesses, Mr. Michael Krepon, 

Mr. Anatol Lieven and Mr. Amit Pandya. 

Mr. Krepon is the Founding President of the Stimson Center, a 

Washington-based think tank specializing in national and international security problems. Previously he served as President and 

CEO of the Stimson Center. During the Carter Administration, Mr. 

Krepon worked in the U.S. Arms and Disarmament Agency. He 

also spent many years as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace responsible for verification and 

arms control issues. 

Mr. Lieven is Senior Associate for Foreign and Security Policy in 

the Russia and Eurasia Center at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace in Washington where he works on the issue of 

terrorism. Previously, he edited the strategic comments and served 

as an expert on the Soviet Union at the International Institute for 

Strategic Studies in London. 

Mr. Lieven has published a number of books, his latest entitled 

Chechyna: A Tombstone of Russian Power. Mr. Lieven was a correspondent for the Times in Pakistan, in Russia and in the former 

Soviet Union. 

Mr. Pandya is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Global Democracy, previously serving in the United States Department of State 

on the Policy Planning staff and a Deputy Assistant Administrator 

for Asia and the Near East with the United States Agency for 

International Development. He also was the Director of Humanitarian Assistance at DoD. 

9

After a stint in private practice of law and as a lecturer, Mr. 

Pandya held a number of positions in the House of Representatives, and he worked for many years for this Committee. Mr. 

Pandya is a graduate of Oxford and Yale Law School. 

Gentlemen, you may proceed. We will start with Mr. Krepon. 

You may read your full statement into the record, or you may 

shorten it as you may deem appropriate. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, FOUNDING PRESIDENT, 

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER 

Mr. KREPON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to put my 

statement in the record and just——

Mr. BURTON. Could he pull the mike a little closer, Mr. Chairman? I cannot quite hear him. 

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, please, so we can all hear you a little better. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put my statement in 

the record and talk to you about the core issues here. It is very 

rare when the same solution works for everybody in a very complex 

and longstanding problem, but the solution is out there, and it is 

the right solution for everybody. 

The core issue is, as the government of Pakistan says, Kashmir. 

The key element in resolving the core issue is, as the government 

of India says, infiltration—well armed, well trained people, mostly 

Pakistanis and Afghans, coming from the Pakistani side of this dividing line in Kashmir over to the Indian side where they are creating havoc. 

In order to achieve all of our objectives, we have to start with 

the cessation of infiltration. I will tell you why it is good for everybody. It is good for Kashmiris because right now they are caught 

between a rock and a hard place. They are caught between these 

militants and the Indian security forces. You cannot thin out the 

Indian security forces until you stop the infiltration. 

Most Kashmiris—and I was there 21⁄2 weeks ago—most 

Kashmiris are ready to put down the gun. They are looking for a 

dignified and honorable exit from militancy, and they cannot get 

there as long as these folks keep coming across. They cannot get 

to where they want to be until the infiltration stops. 

It is obviously good for India, which does not want to put all 

these counter-insurgency troops up there. They have a very significant security presence. I do not believe the numbers are as high 

as you have stated, Mr. Burton, but there are a lot of folks up there 

who would rather be somewhere else. 

It is good for nuclear risk reduction because as long as these 

folks are coming across, the threat of escalation is there. Escalation 

control starts at the Line of Control. You do not reduce nuclear 

dangers as long as infiltration continues. 

It is good for the region. You do not get regional stability as long 

as people are shooting each other in Kashmir. The escalatory spiral 

is there. 

It is good for Pakistan. Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is killing Pakistan. It is killing Pakistan. It is creating a Kalishnikov culture in 

Pakistan. It is creating autonomous regions within Pakistan. This 

policy has failed Pakistan, and it is the source of many of the problems within Pakistan that have already been noted. 

10

Now, the cessation of infiltration has to be permanent. Our Secretary of State is right because if it is not permanent then we are 

back in this soup 6 months from now, a year from now, 2 years 

from now. It has to be permanent. It has to be verifiable. 

I agree with Mr. Ackerman, which means that the staging areas 

and the training camps on the Pakistani side of this dividing line 

have to be shut down. It is verifiable. It is listenable. We can tell 

when it happens, and the Indians can tell when it happens. 

Now, a lot of other steps have to proceed alongside the cessation 

of infiltration and the emptying of these training camps. We need 

demobilization along the fighting corridors in this region, and it 

has to be phased. We need a resumption of dialogue between India 

and Pakistan. We need nuclear risk reduction arrangements in the 

region. We need them very much. 

We need India to fulfill its constitutional promise to the people 

of Jammu and Kashmir to allow them a special status. That was 

the promise given to them in the Indian constitution. It has not 

been met. The Indian government has to address the human rights 

abuses on its side. People know which units are associated with 

human rights abuses. Why are they still operating? 

We have to provide Kashmiris with the dignified and honorable 

exit that they seek from militancy, and if we can provide Kashmiris 

that, then it is a dignified and honorable exit for Pakistan, as well. 

This is a tough problem, but the beginning of the solution is simple. It is common sense. It is doable. Now, there is choreography 

involved here, which is hard, and which our State Department is 

addressing. But this is a resolvable problem. We can start right 

now. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, FOUNDING PRESIDENT, THE HENRY L. 

STIMSON CENTER

The current crisis is rooted in the creation of independent India and Pakistan in 

1947, which was accompanied by a war that led to the division of Kashmir. This 

division has essentially been reaffirmed by subsequent wars. While the public 

stances of both governments continue to pay homage to maximalist positions, in private, the Government of India appears willing to accept the transformation of Kashmir’s dividing line, which is called the ‘‘Line of Control,’’ into an international border. Islamabad is opposed to this outcome, preferring instead to move the border 

eastward so as to secure control over the fabled ‘‘Vale of Kashmir’’—a Muslim majority area which has suffered the most from militancy and human rights abuses 

over the past twelve years. 

India is unalterably opposed to this outcome, just as Pakistan is now unreconciled 

to the loss of the Valley. With the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both countries, 

the stakes involved in this dispute have risen greatly. An opportunity for Pakistan 

to change the status quo in Kashmir was presented by poor Indian governance, especially by an egregiously rigged state election in 1987. Initially, the resulting uprising in Kashmir was mostly an indigenous affair, but around 1994–1995, the character of militancy changed appreciably, with non-Kashmiri militants, mostly Pakistanis and Afghans, playing a significant role. They have received funding, training, 

material, intelligence, and logistical support from Pakistan’s Army and Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. The sponsors of militancy have presumed that Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons would facilitate unconventional warfare by providing an insurance policy against Indian escalation. The Government of India and 

its military leaders now seek to change this presumption. 

Pakistan cannot wrest the Kashmir Valley from India by force of arms or by diplomacy. Rather than leading to a reconsideration of tactics on the ground, Pakistan’s 

weak position has reinforced the inclination by some to employ unconventional 

means to make India pay for holding this ground. The disconnect between Pakistan’s official position—that it is merely providing moral, political, and diplomatic 

11

support for the Kashmiri ‘‘freedom struggle’’—and ground realities has been great, 

and has only increased the international community’s disinclination to support 

Islamabad’s favored outcome. 

Pakistan’s reliance on unconventional means to keep Kashmir ‘‘on the boil’’ raises 

many serious concerns. It is extremely dangerous to pursue a strategy in which one 

nuclear-armed state seeks to punish a nuclear neighbor through unconventional 

warfare. This strategy risks a catastrophe, either through accident, miscalculation, 

or a break down of command and control. This strategy has also wreaked havoc on 

the fabric of Pakistani society. While failing to wrest control of Kashmir from India, 

it has ‘‘succeeded’’ in generating domestic violence and the Kalashnikov culture at 

home. The future of 140 million Pakistanis has been mortgaged to the fate of five 

million Kashmiri Muslims who live in the Valley. The requirements for domestic 

harmony, properly functioning educational and public health services in Pakistan 

have been badly constrained by policies that place a premium on bleeding India. 

Pakistanis deserve far better than this. Their quality of life should not be held hostage to failed policies in Kashmir. 

Pakistan’s beleaguered President, Pervez Musharraf, is now caught in the excruciatingly awkward space between recognition and extrication of failed policies. He is 

being called to wage a three front battle against terrorism within his own country. 

One front, which the Army leadership wholeheartedly supports, is directed at militant groups that wage sectarian (especially Sunni vs. Shia) violence and that target 

foreigners—including those who assist Pakistan’s armed forces. The second front, 

which presumably has prompted mixed emotions in the Pakistan Army, is being 

waged against the remnants of the Taliban in the northwest. The opening of a third 

front, which is now being pressed upon Musharraf and about which senior Army 

leaders are likely to have reservations, is called for along Pakistan’s side of the Line 

of Control, where militants have their training camps and staging areas for the fight 

against India. 

The conduct of a three front war against terrorism imposes extraordinarily heavy 

burdens on President Musharraf and the Pakistan Army, but the future of Pakistan 

now depends on its successful execution. Attempts to differentiate between ‘‘bad’’ 

terrorists and ‘‘good’’ freedom fighters will not be persuasive, since their methods 

and results are indistinguishable. Similarly, a delicate balancing act in which some 

militant groups are suppressed while others receive the tacit support of the Army 

will only lead to more grief, since disaffected groups will surely play the role of 

spoilers. Half measures will not provide Pakistani leaders an effective exit strategy 

or provide protection against those who wish to destabilize their country. The only 

safe passage through this terrible mess is a straight line projection away from militancy and toward the vision of Pakistan’s founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, 

of a tolerant, progressive, Islamic state. 

Pervez Musharraf shares that vision. He has made some hard, but wise decisions, 

and he will need to make more of them. He and others in Pakistan who share 

Jinnah’s vision deserve our wholehearted support. But that support has to be predicated on concrete steps. The Pakistan Army cannot expect deal making with either 

the United States or India in which the extent of Pakistan’s support for militancy 

becomes a tradable commodity. 

President Musharraf has made another essential step away from nuclear 

brinksmanship by announcing on May 27th that infiltration across the Line of Control dividing Kashmir has ceased. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Indian government officials have acknowledged that this order has been relayed to troops manning militant training camps and border crossings. US Deputy Secretary of State 

Richard Armitage and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have additional time 

to defuse this crisis, and are expected to counsel restraint in India and to deliver 

tough messages to Pakistan. 

The essential elements of a climb-down from the nuclear precipice are now in 

plain view. They need to be orchestrated quickly, however, as spoilers are hiding 

in Kashmir who would like nothing better than to spark a war that destabilizes 

Pakistan, kills Hindus, and disrupts US military operations against the al Qaeda 

network. 

Musharraf’s pledge is a welcome start, but it is insufficient. Militancy cannot be 

turned on and off like a spigot in order to gain political leverage. As Secretary of 

State Powell has stated, the cessation of Pakistani military support for jihadis must 

be permanent rather than temporary. The permanent cessation of Pakistani support 

for militancy in Kashmir requires the closing of training camps and the emptying 

of staging areas for militants on the Pakistani side of the 450 mile-long Kashmir 

divide. A war triggered by a catalytic act can still be averted if the Pakistan Army 

is acting purposefully to shut down these facilities. The closure of camps, staging 

12

areas and the communication links associated with infiltration can be monitored by 

the United States and India, either in parallel or collaboratively. 

Pakistan’s proposal to add international monitors along the LoC would not make 

it harder to infiltrate, since much of this terrain is quite rugged and since most of 

the crossings happen at night. Prior to the current mobilization, the Indian Army 

maintained more than six divisions—approximately 70,000 troops—along this divide, and was unable to stop infiltration. Nonetheless, a symbolic increase in peacekeepers—there are now a few dozen in place—could usefully signify the international community’s support for a permanent end to the crossing of militants. 

Why would Pakistan’s Army leadership agree to roll up the base camps for militancy in Kashmir? First, because if a war breaks out, it could result in nuclear detonations that would turn centuries of Muslim history and accomplishment into rubble. Second, if the war remains conventional, it could go badly for Pakistan, as have 

previous wars. Another loss on the battlefield would further destabilize the country. 

Third, Pakistan’s Army would have to fight another war essentially alone, since 

those who use terrorism as an instrument of state policy now find little sympathy 

abroad. Fourth, most Kashmiris would prefer to see Pakistan stop supporting infiltration. They now seek an honorable and dignified exit from violence, not the continued influx of Pakistanis and Afghans. Fifth, because Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has 

failed the country. 

What would Pakistan gain in return for renouncing support for militancy in Kashmir? To begin with, a new lease on life as the progressive Islamic state that Jinnah, 

Musharraf, and many other Pakistanis have envisioned. In addition, enduring help 

from Washington, Japan, and the European Community to help Pakistan get back 

on its feet. The stakes involved in assisting Pakistan to take corrective measures 

are very high, and worthy of sustained external economic support by the Bush administration, the Congress, and the American people. 

Pakistan also needs positive steps from India to step back from the brink. Alongside the verifiable cessation of infiltration and closure of the Pakistani camps supporting militancy in Kashmir, the Government of India would be expected to pursue 

a phased demobilization of its current war footing, beginning with the international 

border and ending with the troop concentrations along the Line of Control, which 

are likely to stay in place until after the state elections in Kashmir this fall. After 

the elections, these troops would also be expected to stand down. The Government 

of India needs to take concrete steps to address the violation of Kashmiri human 

rights, and work with the state to provide real autonomy, as promised in the Indian 

constitution. Substantive India-Pakistan dialogue must resume as soon as possible 

on a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute and other topics, including nuclear 

risk reduction. The framework for a structured dialogue has been already been 

agreed to in previous bilateral discussions. 

This outcome requires that the United States play a sustained, pro-active role in 

South Asia, a role that previous administrations have been reluctant to adopt. For 

a start, Washington needs to offer India assistance in monitoring whether Pakistan 

is fulfilling its pledges to turn away from terrorism. We also need to help Pakistan 

recover its balance. At this crucial juncture, the avoidance of a nuclear exchange on 

the Subcontinent, the successful prosecution of the war against the al Qaeda network, and the achievement of regional stability all demand demonstrable changes 

in Pakistan’s failed Kashmir policy.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Krepon. 

We will now turn to Mr. Lieven. 

STATEMENT OF ANATOL LIEVEN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. LIEVEN. As we have heard, the armed dispute over Kashmir 

between India and Pakistan is literally as old as the existence of 

these two states, but the present form of the conflict dates back to 

the late 1980s when an indigenous movement of mass protest 

erupted in Indian controlled Kashmir among the Muslim majority 

population there, which is about 64 percent of the total, against 

what was seen, I think rightly, as some very heavy-handed and dictatorial meddling by the Indian central government in the local affairs of Kashmir and the diminution of Kashmiri autonomy. 

13

In a pattern which I think we know very well from other parts 

of the world, ruthless repression by the Indian armed forces, of 

which we have also just heard, then fueled the growth of Kashmiri 

extremism and militancy and led to a cycle of violence both by the 

Indian security forces and by the Kashmirian militants. 

By the way, one should say that these militants then directed 

their campaign of violence not just against the Indian armed forces 

and against the local Hindu and Sikh population in Kashmir, but 

also against moderate democratic elements in the Kashmiri Muslim population, one of whom was murdered almost certainly by 

Muslim extremists only a few weeks ago. 

This home grown situation was then exploited by two other 

forces who became linked. One was the government or successive 

governments of Pakistan in an effort to undermine and, if possible, 

destroy Indian control over the Indian part of Kashmir, and the 

other was elements from the international network of Muslim extremists from Pakistan, also as we have heard from Afghanistan 

and in some cases from the Arab world and in many cases funded 

by the Arab world. 

Their agenda, of course, goes far beyond the Indian subcontinent 

and is indeed directed at the United States. Pakistani support for 

these militants, the creation of camps for them in Pakistani controlled Kashmir of which we have heard, has indeed gravely worsened the crisis in that part of the world, and it is indeed extremely 

necessary, in my view, that the United States should continue to 

exert very heavy pressure on Pakistan to verifiably close these 

camps and to end infiltration across the border into India. 

As we have also heard, this is very much in Pakistan’s own interest because these groups are linked, closely linked, to groups within Pakistan which are aiming at an overthrow of the present Pakistani state and, above all, at the destruction of the Musharraf administration. 

From that point of view, however, I think we also need to keep 

in mind that it would be a dreadful mistake to blame every terrorist act that happens in India or in Indian controlled Kashmir directly on Pakistan because, on the contrary, some of these terrorist 

groups which are now active there have a very, very strong interest 

in provoking war between India and Pakistan in part precisely so 

as to hopefully in their view bring about an overthrow of the 

Musharraf administration to strengthen their own chances of ultimately seizing power in Pakistan. 

We must I think be very careful not to fall into the trap which 

they are trying to set for us and set for India, and we must do our 

best to prevent India also from falling into that trap because, of 

course, the terrorists also hope through conflict between India and 

Pakistan to enflame opinion across the Muslim world and to 

strengthen support for Islamic revolution and anti-American and 

anti-western terrorism. 

A second point, of course, to keep in mind is that the behavior 

of the Musharraf administration and any Pakistani government is 

inevitably going to be strongly affected by the very deep and indeed 

universal sympathy of Pakistani public opinion for the Kashmiri 

Muslim population, for their aspirations for statehood and for their 

suffering at the hands of the Indian security forces. 

14

It is very important, therefore, I think both as a matter of justice, but also as part of the U.S. struggle against Islamic terrorism 

more widely and the struggle to positively influence in the Muslim 

world that the U.S. should be seen to be taking a balanced position 

over Kashmir. On the one hand, the U.S. should strongly condemn 

terrorism there and put pressure on Pakistan to end infiltration, 

but, on the other hand, it should express sympathy for the legitimate grievances and aspirations of the majority population in 

Kashmir. 

In this way, we must also remember that the Pakistani administration is indeed a vital ally in the war against terrorism. Terrorism and extremism in Pakistan can only be controlled by the 

government of Pakistan. Going into Pakistan, invading and occupying the place is simply not an option. Therefore, clearly we have 

to display concern for the domestic position of any Pakistani government, and we have to be careful as far as possible not to undermine it. 

I should say that in the past I have suggested with regard to 

Chechyna that the United States’ approach should perhaps be closer to our approach over Kashmir, which is to stress concern for 

Russian territorial integrity, to recognize the very real threats that 

Russia is facing in Chechyna, but I must also say that I think that 

U.S. policy toward Kashmir in a sense should also be closer to our 

policy toward Chechyna, which is to say that we have to balance 

this with a recognition of the sufferings and grievances of the civilian population. 

I would say that both for the sake of balance, but also for the 

sake of peace, which is, of course, now a vital U.S. national interest. Given the nuclear threat in this part of the world, it is vital 

that the United States should press very strongly for a political solution to the Kashmir problem. 

A possible model in this regard might be in some ways the peace 

process in Northern Ireland, which on the one hand involved a recognition of existing sovereignties and existing borders, but on the 

other hand strongly embodied the softening of those borders, the 

creation of transnational institutions and very serious elements of 

internal reform in Northern Ireland, including, by the way, reform 

of the British police force. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time is expiring. If you would be 

kind enough to wind up your remarks? 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, in conclusion, on the subject of balance I 

should also say that this extends beyond the Kashmir because if 

the Pakistani state has been linked to extremist groups working in 

Kashmir, unfortunately the BJP party which dominates the Indian 

coalition is strongly linked to Hindu extremist groups in India. In 

February and March these were deeply involved in extremely serious massacres of Muslims in the State of Gujarat, which claimed 

some 2,000 Muslim lives and in which, according to credible national reports, the regional BJP led government of Gujarat was also 

deeply implicated. 

I find that not only Muslim acquaintances of mine, but also secular Indian liberal acquaintances, have been gravely disappointed 

by the failure of the United States also to speak out more strongly 

on this issue and in support of Indian secular democracy. 

15

Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lieven. 

We will now proceed with Mr. Pandya. 

STATEMENT OF AMIT A. PANDYA, SENIOR FELLOW FOR 

SOUTH ASIA, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DEMOCRACY 

Mr. PANDYA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my 

written statement be made a part of the record. 

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. PANDYA. The trouble with being third is that all the good 

things have been said, and I address many of the security issues 

that have been raised in my written statement and would simply 

point to two observations. 

One is that U.S. policy is exactly right at this juncture in being 

more forceful with the Pakistani government and in emphasizing 

not only immediate infiltration, but also doing something about the 

more systemic roots of terrorism and violence in Kashmir in the 

form of training camps on the Pakistani side. 

The other observation I would make is that whatever may have 

been the roots of the Kashmiri insurgency in the late 1980s and 

early 1990s that in my opinion at this juncture it is largely, if not 

exclusively, an instrument of Pakistani policy and the nexus of terrorist organizations spanning Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir 

and that Pakistani policy has essentially hijacked and marginalized 

the very legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people that we have 

already heard about. 

What I would like to do in my oral summary is to focus a little 

bit on what solutions, sustainable solutions, might look like because all parties have to believe in the future in order to have an 

inducement to avoid desperate acts in the present. In that respect, 

I am heartened to hear about the Kashmir forum that Congressman Pitts referred to. 

John Hume, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning lawyer from Ulster, 

was in the region in February. He described the challenges that 

they faced in Ireland, the bad blood, the shared history, but widely 

divergent valuations of it, religious division, division of sovereignty 

over a naturally integral territory, and he described the keys to 

success as follows. Respect the difference, create institutions that 

respect the difference, work together in the common interest, spill 

sweat rather than blood, have talks involving all sections and interests of the people and end violence. 

This can occur in South Asia within a framework of what I call 

two sovereigns, India and Pakistan, three nations, India, Pakistan 

and Kashmir, and one Kashmir. What do I mean by this? What I 

am trying to get at here is a series of incremental steps whose 

guiding principles should be recognition of the transnational character of the concerns of ordinary Kashmiris, a recognition of the demographic complexity of the state and the need to bring Kashmiri 

interests to the fore while safeguarding essential Indian and Pakistani interests. 

The problem cannot be solved without the active and constructive 

participation of the people of Kashmir. Between Indian and Pakistani occupation zones, there are at least six different, distinct regions, cultures and ethnicities comprising more than one Muslim 

16

group, more than one Hindu group, Buddhists and Sikhs. Each ultimately cares more about improvement of their quality of every 

day life. 

Kashmir as a whole is not a Hindu-Muslim problem, and any attempt to portray it thus is a disservice to Kashmiris, to peace and 

to the fight against religiously based terrorism. Even in the majority Muslim vale of Kashmir, there is a distinct national history and 

culture substantially nurtured by the influential indigenous Hindu 

Pandit community. 

A Kashmir peace package can be assembled which grants each 

of the parties their essential requirements without prejudice to the 

others. India must be guaranteed security from armed incursions 

and attacks from Pakistani held territory. In the face of armed violence, authentic political processes are simply unviable. The recent 

assassination of Abdul Ghani Lone bears this out rather tragically. 

The current status quo relating to sovereignty has to be a given. 

Kashmiri self-determination will have to focus for now on the practical dimensions of self-government and come about incrementally 

regardless of who represents what portion of the Kashmiri population in international bodies. 

For Pakistan, a settlement must vindicate its role as a champion 

of the rights of Kashmir’s Muslims and legitimate its political presence in Kashmiri affairs as a whole. Kashmir is the source of deep 

feeling in the Pakistani national psyche, and India must demonstrate to Pakistani public opinion that political and diplomatic 

tools will yield more than violence. 

Both India and Pakistan should foster genuine local self-government, and they are both to be faulted in this, in the area of Kashmir that they control, and create the conditions for free movement 

between them. Processes to integrate the lives and economies of the 

two parts of the state could begin soon after a cessation of violence, 

could be done through incremental mechanisms such as trade and 

border agreements, joint commissions on economic, environmental 

and security issues. 

Multilateral development banks and bilateral development agencies would have to provide the material resources necessary to 

carry out these initiatives and others to make peace profitable, 

such as demobilization and the integration of combatants, collaborative projects on environment, energy, infectious diseases, law enforcement, and this is just an illustrative list. 

What would induce the parties to change direction? Ultimately it 

has to be self-interest, rightly understood, assuming an end to Pakistani supported terrorism, which must happen. Once that violence 

ends we must forcefully tell the Indians that the conditions then 

exist for a serious and sustained peace process for Kashmir, and 

we should tell our Pakistani friends now that this is our intention 

and our commitment to them. 

I would simply add, since my time is up, that Michael Krepon 

observed how in the long run a cessation of violence is in the national self-interest of Pakistan. 

I would also expand just a little bit on what Mr. Lieven said, 

which is that a less observed phenomenon has been the very corrosive effect of militarism in the subcontinent on Indian democracy 

as a result of corruption and abuses in security operations not only 

17

in Kashmir, but in other parts of India and in the erosion of the 

cultural tolerance in India. This is really a case where both sides 

are really getting very, very sick on this addiction to bringing the 

other one down. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pandya follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMIT A. PANDYA, SENIOR FELLOW FOR SOUTH ASIA, 

INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Possibly no conflict on earth presents as lethal a combination of military capacity, 

bad blood, irreconcilable national myths, and likelihood of conflict as that between 

India and Pakistan. Events of the past six months have seen them teeter on the 

brink of potentially their worst conflict ever. In part this is because both nations 

openly acquired nuclear weapons just four years ago. In equal part it is because the 

conflict in Indian-occupied Kashmir has become an integral part of a region-wide 

and global extreme Islamicist military campaign, often covert. The close involvement of Pakistani government institutions in that campaign has completed the destabilization of bilateral India-Pakistan relations. 

The conventional view is that the two have gone to war three times in their short 

existence as nation states. Two of those wars (1948 and 1965) were triggered by 

Kashmir, and the third (1971) included fighting in Kashmir. In fact a fourth Kashmir war was fought in 1999, over the mountainous heights of Kargil. This was a 

war by any pragmatic definition. It lasted several months, took more than a thousand lives on the Indian side alone, and only came to an end through the personal 

intervention of the President of the United States. 

As the news attests, and the stream of the most senior officials of the most powerful nations in the world to both capitals confirms, the current situation is highly 

dangerous. Armed conflict and casualties, civilian and military, are already daily reality. Unless something changes, in the short run we may realistically fear at least 

heavy conventional warfare. In the long run chronic heavily armed confrontation 

and suspicion will divert scarce resources from basic human needs of all Indians and 

Pakistanis, and subject the people of Kashmir to escalating misery and horror. 

RECENT BACKGROUND

The fundamental difference in the formal positions of the two sides is simply stated. The Indians accuse the Pakistanis of waging a proxy war by means of insurgency across the Line of Control (LOC) that divides their respective portions of 

Kashmir. The Pakistanis for their part claim that the insurgency in Indian Kashmir 

is wholly a reflection of indigenous disaffection with Indian rule and that they offer 

only moral, political and diplomatic support to the insurgents. The Pakistanis further insist that the only solution lies in India’s agreeing to deal with Pakistan as 

an equal interlocutor on the status of Kashmir. 

The facts are as follows. The people of Indian occupied Kashmir did indeed become disaffected in the late 1980s with repeated misrule by the Indian central government, and many considered insurrection the preferable option. These looked to 

Pakistan for support. However, it has been quite clear from the very outset of this 

dispute in 1948, when Pakistan invaded the territory with no warrant in international law, that Pakistan has had its own interests in Kashmir, and that its support for the indigenous Kashmiri insurgency was an instrument of broader military 

strategy with respect to India. 

It was thus to be expected that Pakistan would gradually seek to control the 

movement against Indian rule, and it did. Closely paralleling the Pakistani government’s marginalization of authentic Kashmiri voices and its cultivation of an irregular military force which consisted of Pakistanis, Afghans and Arabs was the spillover from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The nexus of extremist Islamist 

groups which spanned Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir came to exert an increasing role in the insurgency in Indian Kashmir, and dealt a deathblow to what 

had until then been a national Kashmiri movement rather than a transnational religious cause. 

The Indians stood impotent before this development until the Pakistan Army, 

under the then Chief of Army Staff General Musharraf, seized the Kargil heights 

and with them the capacity to bombard the principal supply road from India into 

Indian Kashmir. Since this came on the heels of a highly publicized and politically 

risky visit by the Indian Prime Minister to meet his Pakistani counterpart in Lahore, Pakistan, the Indians would henceforth assume Pakistani bad faith, particuVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
18

larly after the same General Musharraf seized power in a military coup several 

months later. The Pakistani attack in Kargil was ended only by the personal intervention of President Clinton. 

CURRENT CRISIS

At the very end of 2001, hundreds of thousands of troops massed on both sides 

of the India-Pakistan border. Missiles, artillery and aircraft were deployed. Chronic 

cross-border shelling escalated so much that civilians were evacuated from both 

sides of the border. India recalled its Ambassador. Diplomatic missions were halved. 

Each closed its airspace to the other. Rail and road transport was closed. Rhetoric 

on both sides was belligerent. 

The immediate trigger for that confrontation was a suicide attack in December 

2001 on India’s Parliament. Nine people died in addition to the five attackers. More 

massive damage was barely averted. Had the attack succeeded it could have significantly depleted India’s political leadership. Given the powerful symbolism of parliament in the world’s largest democracy, and its significance as a symbol of national unity in a large and varied nation, the national demoralization and anger 

would almost certainly have been a trigger for war. 

The attackers were based in Pakistan and India blamed Pakistani intelligence. 

Pakistan’s government denied responsibility, condemned the attack and began to 

take modest steps against some of the extremist groups operating from Pakistan. 

Pakistani leader General Musharraf promised more. Indians, noting that Pakistan’s 

government has long armed, trained, and sheltered terrorist groups attacking India, 

dismissed the initial measures as insufficient, and suspended judgment on 

Musharraf’s ambiguous further commitments. Less than two months before the attack on Parliament, similar groups attacked the State Legislative Assembly in the 

portion of Kashmir occupied by India. Thirty-four died in that attack. 

The current heating up of the confrontation arises out of an attack on the family 

quarters of Indian soldiers serving in Kashmir, an attack in which wives and children were the predominant casualties. The Indians insisted that their patience was 

not limitless, demanded verifiable steps from the Pakistan government to curb the 

effects of cross-border terrorism, and went to state of heightened readiness and 

sharpened rhetoric. 

Several features deserve note in this story, and provide a clue as to the dimensions of the current crisis and the way to proceed hence. The Indians built up their 

deployment and readiness to a credible level and then held still. This is the first 

and most important clue. It suggests that the Indians are willing to show restraint 

for long periods of time, although it would be a serious mistake to count on this 

patience indefinitely. 

General Musharraf’s speech of a week and a half ago in response to this buildup was instructive. He claimed that there was nothing going on across the LOC—

a laughable claim; that the problem in Indian Kashmir is all a reflection of internal 

problems—a disingenuous claim; that India was to blame for the heightened tensions—a very partial truth; and that India moreover treats its own citizens very 

poorly—true but irrelevant. 

Had the international community not piled onto General Musharraf then and 

made the point that Pakistan must take steps to stop the cross-border terrorism as 

a first step to deescalation, the Indians would justifiably have assumed that they 

had no alternative but to take matters into their own hands. 

Moreover, other than the bellicose rhetoric with which the Indian Prime Minister 

responded in the wake of the attack on the military family quarters, most Indian 

statements, even immediately in the wake of General Musharraf’s bellicose speech, 

have suggested that India still has some patience left. The Defense Minister suggested earlier that he thought an Indian attack to destroy terrorist base-camps was 

unlikely until after state elections in Kashmir in the Fall, a double symbol of a slow 

fuse and commitment to a political process in the state. The Foreign Minister, the 

Prime Minister and other senior officials have recently suggested that they are yet 

willing to allow General Musharraf some time to demonstrate a meaningful commitment of the Pakistani state to the elimination of terrorism in Kashmir. They have 

also reiterated India’s commitment not to use its nuclear weapons except in retaliation against a first strike by Pakistan. 

The Pakistani response has has been somewhat more ambiguous. While promising 

to do what they can to reduce cross-border military operations, the Pakistanis have 

sought to distract attention or confuse the issues. They have suggested that the true 

issue is the legitimacy of Indian rule in Kashmir and the Indian refusal to talk 

about this with Pakistan. They have suggested simultaneously that General 

Musharraf has curbed cross-border infiltration and that his capacity to do so is limVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
19

ited. Most dangerously, while recently noting that the use of nuclear weapons would 

be insane, authoritative Pakistani officials have also reiterated their nuclear doctrine of possible first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to the nation. 

This threat has in some instances been defined quite broadly to include economic 

sanctions. 

It is of course true that the Indians must eventually talk to the Pakistanis about 

all issues between them, including Kashmir. However, that can hardly be a precondition for Pakistan ceasing a practice that not only violates international law but 

also cuts against the security interests of the parties and the international community. Once there is a cessation of conflict, a range of political and diplomatic processes will become possible and indeed will have to take place. In the immediate 

term however, any attempt by Pakistan to preserve proxy terrorism as leverage for 

this diplomatic goal would be highly dangerous. 

Above all, India cannot, without serious damage to its security interests, reward 

terrorist blackmail with diplomatic concessions. Nor can the international community afford such a precedent. 

Finally, the equally essential movement toward real democracy for the people of 

Kashmir cannot take place in a climate of armed conflict. Such conflict is a practical 

obstacle to meaningful political activity, as is suggested by the reluctance of independent Kashmiri voices to talk to the Indian government for fear of reprisal from 

Islamic extremists, and most tragically by the recent assassination of the moderate 

Kashmiri leader Abdul Ghani Lone. Continuing conflict also makes it impossible to 

diplomatically push the Indian government to do the right thing. 

Under current conditions, zealous and violent extremism in Afghanistan, Pakistan 

and Kashmir constitutes a seamless web. The international community simply cannot accomplish the goals articulated by President Bush, and nor can General 

Musharraf accomplish his vision of freeing Pakistan from the grip of extremism and 

violence, unless all fora are closed to this terrorist network. In this respect, Pakistan’s long-term interest in stability and membership in the community of nations 

demands the same security outcome in Kashmir as do India’s security and the international community’s. Pakistan’s own interests require breaking the addicition to 

myopic pursuit of short-term advantage by ‘‘bleeding’’ India. 

It is worth noting here the suggestion by Mohamed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, that the fledgling nations adopt a common defense and foreign policy. 

It may again be opportune to take such a strategic framework seriously. 

It is of course true that General Musharraf’s ability to control the extremists is 

not limitless, and indeed that he must tread carefully in order to avoid destabilization by them. The Indians understand this, as reflected in much recent Indian commentary. That is partly why they have been as patient as they have in the face of 

symbolically incendiary terrorist attacks on democratic institutions and military 

families. What will convince the Indians to begin standing down is simply a reliable 

indication of a serious and sustained change of direction that demonstrates that the 

same Pakistani state that engaged in the Kargil provocation is now ready to move 

away from proxy war toward compliance with the international rule of law. 

Once this occurs, and we must firmly insist and assist in its service, we must then 

equally vigorously insist that the conditions exist for a serious and sustained peace 

process for Kashmir. We should tell our Pakistani friends now that this is our intention and our commitment. If we fail to follow up thus, we will risk a repeat of the 

current crisis in the future. 

What would a viable peace process look like? 

COMMON INTERESTS

The division of Kashmir stands as a symbol of wars and bitter enmity between 

nations that otherwise share bonds of history, language, culture and religion. Their 

dispute dates to their separation out of a single British entity, and embodies essential national myths that required British India to be partitioned in the first place. 

Pakistanis believe that Kashmir’s Muslim majority cannot prosper in India, because 

the majority of Indians are Hindu. Indians find such an assumption an affront to 

their explicitly secular state, and note that Pakistan’s atrocious treatment of religious minorities would bode ill for the state’s substantial Hindu and Buddhist minorities. 

There is however an alternative vision of international relations in the subcontinent. That larger vision can be an important framework for the specific business 

of peacemaking in Kashmir. 

In the wake of partition, Indian children were taught that Mahatma Gandhi, the 

larger-than-life hero of Indian nationhood, expressed a desire to go to Pakistan, 

whose formation he had opposed, to promote peace between Muslims and Hindus. 

20

Indians, the vast majority of whom are Hindus, knew that he was assassinated by 

a Hindu fanatic who thought him an agent of Muslim interests. Indians knew that 

Gandhi had begun his political career in India as one of the leaders of the Khilafat 

movement to defend the Turkish Caliphate against the victorious allies of World 

War I. 

Pakistanis once knew that Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim 

League and the indispensable strategist, champion and negotiator for the creation 

of Pakistan as a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims, proposed the creation of 

a common defense and foreign policy for the two nations. They knew that Jinnah 

not only formally articulated Pakistan’s identity as a plural and religiously tolerant, 

albeit Muslim, nation, but worked practically to persuade Hindus to remain. They 

knew that he had begun his political career as an Indian nationalist, and had been 

described by none other than the legendary nationalist Gopal Krishna Gokhale as 

‘‘the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.’’

Rich in culture and resources, and the birthplace of several great civilizations and 

world religions, the region is marked by poverty and conflict. Despite its recent advances in cyberscience and its mature spiritual traditions, India evokes images of 

disease and social dysfunction. Pakistan suggests religious intolerance, and a culture of irrational violence. 

Until modern times, the region was a model of financial and administrative accomplishment. Its traders were wealthy, its manufacturers highly productive, its 

craftsmen exquisitely talented. Muslims ruled a predominantly Hindu population 

and elaborated an Indian civilization that partook of both cultures. Its accomplishments in equitable taxation, local administration and sheer revenues were emulated 

by the British. 

Today, all must also acknowledge the contemporary accomplishments of Pakistanis and Indians: abroad and at home, in education, business, leadership of international financial institutions and UN agencies, academic life, and literature. And 

though justifiably known for women’s oppression, both countries have had women 

political leaders, activists, journalists, diplomats, novelists, and filmmakers. 

As British India moved toward independence in 1947, greatness was expected by 

all—Britons, secular Indian nationalists, Muslim partisans of a separate Pakistan, 

and Hindu revivalists. India would inherit British power and wealth, and revive its 

own ancient cultural greatness. 

Greatness was also expected of the relatively small and impoverished new nation 

of Pakistan, so gifted was its leadership. The first generation of Pakistanis sought 

to revive the greatness of Indian Muslim civilization. They sought to represent the 

interests of all Muslims of the subcontinent. 

Greatness will continue to elude both societies in the absence of prosperity and 

security. Neither is possible without peace. 

There are as many Muslims in India as there are in Pakistan. A Pakistani who 

cares about the welfare of Muslims everywhere must surely see that a weak and 

impoverished India is not in the interests of Indian Muslims. And if the hostility 

persists, Pakistan’s greatness will remain hostage to it. Indian nationalists concerned with India’s strength, prosperity, and security (or chauvinists aspiring to revive Hindu greatness) must see that a weak and hostile neighbor is a liability. 

The armed tension between them aggravates their poverty. Vast portions of their 

budgets have been devoured by their relentless search for military security or advantage with respect to the other. Their rush toward nuclear weapons compounds 

this vicious cycle. 

The stakes are enormous. India and Pakistan account for almost one-fifth of the 

human race. But their common problems also offer the occasion for cooperation. The 

populations of both are still predominantly rural, and their national economies rely 

substantially on the prosperity of farmers. River-based irrigation offers one of the 

few means for scientific agriculture. In a water-scarce and population-intensive environment, rivers are also key to the welfare of urban dwellers. 

One positive example of longstanding cooperation so far has been their agreement 

and consultative mechanism for dealing with the complex Indus River system that 

crosses their border. This could be expanded and updated to allow more integrated 

and cooperative planning for mutual benefit. 

The two face common, even interrelated, problems of international crime and terrorism and public-health issues such as tuberculosis and polio. Cooperation on those 

would be of mutual benefit. Both also face similar challenges of ending illiteracy, 

child labor, and oppression of women. They could share experiences and learn from 

each other. 

The process of dialogue and collaboration on these practical problems would also 

build understanding between Indians and Pakistanis. We can imagine the peaceVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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making effects of Indian and Pakistani women discovering in dialogue that what 

they have in common is greater than what divides them. 

The initiation of such a visionary enterprise must come from both the political 

leaders and the business and cultural leaders of both countries, as well as grassroots organizations already addressing these problems. Civil society can push politicians to do what is right. Cooperation offers the almost certain prospect of more 

prosperity for business, a richer culture, poverty reduction, and popular empowerment. 

In the process of collaboration, each could become what it aspires to, and what 

the other would respect rather than fear. 

A NEW PARADIGM IN KASHMIR

As things stood in a state of high tension in February this year, John Hulme the 

Nobel Peace Laureate from Ulster visited South Asia. He articulated with eloquent 

simplicity the elements of success in Ireland, which had once seemed as intractable 

as Kashmir. The similarity was not found only in the bad blood. There were the 

shared history but wildly divergent views of that history. There was a mixed population, a division of sovereignty over a territory that nevertheless had at least potentially common economic and ecological, administrative and infrastructural interests. 

Hume described the key to success in Ireland as follows:

Respect for difference 

Creation of institutions that respect that difference 

In our common interest, work together in the healing process 

Spill sweat rather than blood 

Talks involving all sections and interests of the people 

An end to violence.

Almost all everyday problems that concern ordinary people are transnational in 

character. Societies cannot effectively address economic, environmental, public 

health, law enforcement, or terrorism issues within the narrow compass of national 

boundaries. Of course, the tools for addressing such issues draw on the authority 

of governments. At best this authority reflects the will of their populations. The 

international community should not lightly set that authority aside for it remains 

a source of legitimacy. However, because problems do not stop at borders or shorelines, cooperative ‘‘win-win’’ models between nations are essential; all the more so 

as antidotes to virulent conflict. 

This interdependence is clearly present in Jammu and Kashmir, yet is almost entirely overlooked. Our paradigm of distinct national identities distracts us from the 

key issues. Whether we think in terms of Indian or Pakistani national aspirations 

in Kashmir, or of Kashmiri national aspirations, the temptation is to assume internal unity and external division. This ‘‘win-lose’’ model fails to reflect Kashmiri reality, constituting a dialogue of the deaf between the parties. 

How can peace develop in Kashmir? Within a framework of ‘‘two sovereigns, three 

nations, one Kashmir’’, a series of incremental steps must take place. The guiding 

principles of these should be sidestepping of the 20th century obsession with national sovereignty, recognition of the transnational character of the principal concerns of ordinary Kashmiris, responsiveness to the demographic complexity of the 

state, placing of Kashmiri interests at the center of concern, and safeguarding of essential Indian and Pakistani interests. 

KASHMIR

The conventional wisdom about Kashmir, like most conventional wisdom in history and politics, hides as much as it reveals. It sees events in Kashmir as extensions of events in the rest of the Subcontinent, and not as reflections of Kashmir’s 

distinctive cultural and national history. 

The conventional view goes something like this. At the time of partition, a Hindu 

Maharajah ruled a majority Muslim population. Since Pakistan was formed as a 

Muslim homeland and India as a secular polity, these national Ideas immediately 

clashed over where Kashmir belonged. A Pakistani attempt to force the issue by 

supporting an invading force pushed the Maharajah reluctantly into the Indian 

camp. Kashmiris, the majority of them Muslim, have ever since lived in uneasy allegiance to the Indian government. The subtext of this account is a combination of 

the following elements. Whatever the merits of the Pakistani claim, Indian control 

sits athwart of Kashmir’s predominantly Muslim identity; and whatever the merits 

of the Indian claim, Pakistani support for terrorism and armed violence 

unjustifiably threaten India’s security. 

22

The consensus of western policy is that the dispute between India and Pakistan 

over Kashmir is a matter to be solved by bilateral agreement of the parties. Indeed, 

India and Pakistan themselves agreed almost three decades ago, in the Simla agreement, to such a bilateral approach. Yet Kashmir has remained the principal trigger 

of tension and conflict between them. 

Framing the Kashmir issue bilaterally is supported by precedent. The British offered the territory the option of accession to one or the other of its successor dominions in the subcontinent. The intervention of the United Nations, while acknowledging the claims of self-determination, took place in the context of a problem raised 

to the Security Council by virtue of a conflict between two member states. 

It is of course true that no settlement of Kashmir is possible without the equal 

concurrence of India and Pakistan. But equally true is it that the problem cannot 

be solved without the active and constructive participation of the people of Kashmir—all of them. 

For too long has the question of Kashmir been discussed as ancillary to the search 

for peace between India and Pakistan. This is simplistic and two-dimensional. The 

aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be restored to the center of 

the picture. And with that must come recognition of the complex cultural, religious, 

historical and geographical demography of the state. Without a resolution that does 

them justice, the region will remain a source of instability in a strategically complex 

and vulnerable region. Even were India and Pakistan to officially resolve their bilateral problem over Kashmir, ongoing political instability in Kashmir, along with the 

demographic complexity, would offer temptations to non-official and covertly official 

interference and manipulation on both sides, as well as to the many other neighboring aspirants to regional power and influence. 

Those seeking a solution based on the aspirations of the Kashmiri people will 

have to recognize that there are at least six distinct regions, cultures and 

ethnicities—comprising more than one Muslim group and more than one Hindu 

group, as well as Buddhists—between Indian and Pakistani occupation zones. What 

each of these ultimately cares about is improvement of their quality of everyday life. 

Those aspirations can only be addressed locally. A local approach cannot be intelligently implemented without consideration of the particular characteristics embodied in the complex geographical and cultural composition of Kashmir’s population. 

The failure to adequately understand this complexity as the basis of any viable 

settlement of the Kashmir problem is reflected in the terms of discourse. The use 

of the shorthand ‘‘Kashmir’’ to describe the state of Jammu and Kashmir, while undoubtedly innocent in intent, has the effect of focusing attention on the one part of 

the state which is most predominantly Muslim in population and the least like other 

areas of India. Coupled with the reflexive reference to the state’s Muslim majority, 

this has the effect of suggesting that the aspirations of the state’s people are encapsulated in religious terms. It further overstates the normative and empirical significance of the grievances articulated by those purporting to speak for the Muslims of 

the Vale of Kashmir. The tacit assumption that Pakistan represents the ‘‘Muslim’’ 

party to the dispute further falsifies political reality. 

The fact is that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a 19th century multi-cultural state comprising a portion of the Tibetan plateau (Ladakh), a northern outpost 

of mainstream north Indian culture consisting of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs 

(Jammu), a hilly outpost of Punjabi culture (Pakistan-occupied Azad Kashmir), 

mountainous tribal areas on the Afghan border (also now occupied by Pakistan), and 

the Vale of Kashmir. The Vale was the only area with a distinct and integral national history and culture. While it had a Muslim majority it had a national culture 

and political life that depended substantially on the presence of an influential and 

integral indigenous Kashmiri Hindu (‘‘Pandit’’) population. Not surprisingly, the 

seminal modern work on Kashmir’s freedom struggle was written by a Pandit by 

the name of Prem Nath Bazaz. 

The facile equation of Kashmiri national aspirations with the aspirations of Muslim denizens of the Vale of Kashmir, important as those are, simply overlooks sociologically complex political problems which will arise in the future but have not yet 

demanded attention through armed violence. In this respect the Indian experience 

in Northeast India is instructive. Granting autonomy to one group—Assamese—to 

accommodate their aspirations, has spawned separatist movements by other groups 

who feel disadvantaged by the resulting realignments of power. 

As such, complex regions must address conflict in order to accommodate the divergent aspirations of local sub-groups within a framework of development and consultation, inside the constraints posed by cultural geography. Muslims of the Vale 

are more closely related to Pakistan than are their Pandit neighbors. They partake 

of a pan-Islamic identity. That said, they do so as distinctly Kashmiri, and thus 

23

marked by a historical and cultural commonality with non-Muslims that Pakistanis 

have lost. Pandits, Jammu Hindus, Ladakhi Buddhists and Sikhs throughout the 

state all represent types of cultural experience found in polyglot India, but are closer to the geographical margins of resurgent Islamic political identity, and must find 

a future with their Muslim neighbors. 

These are the ineluctable parameters of a solution. 

SOLUTION—ROLE OF INDIA, PAKISTAN AND KASHMIRIS

Between India and Pakistan, as between Israel and Palestine, or in the conflict 

in Ireland, the irreconcilable defining political myths of the disputants infect and 

render impotent all conventional political and diplomatic peacemaking mechanisms. 

Between India and Pakistan there is a cycle of expectation and disappointment. An 

embrace at the border between their two Prime Ministers followed by a bloody three 

month long border conflict 1999. A visit to India in 2001 by the Pakistani military 

ruler followed in short order by daring attacks on state and national legislatures 

in India. It is almost as if the brief optimism fuels the retreat of disappointed 

publics and intellectuals further into the ideology of perpetual antagonism. 

Peacemaking must sidestep these atrophied channels, and appeal to people in 

terms more relevant to their daily welfare. The model of the Irish peace process—

not seeking to solve an insoluble conundrum of sovereignty, but rather looking to 

an emerging practical interdependence and convergence between nominally distinct 

sovereign entities—may offer a useful model for Kashmir. The best package is a 

minimal one that lessens violence, promotes self-government of all Kashmiris, and 

interdependence between the Indian and Pakistani portions of Kashmir. 

The aftermath of the events of September 11 have changed the political calculations of the key parties. For all the immediate tension, this may be the historical 

moment for an unconventional solution. India may better heed the international 

community’s recommendations because they fear that the current crisis in Afghanistan will incline the west to their arch-enemy Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan has 

now thrown in its lot with the west, and for economic and strategic reasons will be 

more responsive to the international community. General Musharraf’s stated resolve 

to end armed militancy in Pakistan is revealing. Pakistani governments may have 

benefited in the past from using terrorist groups as military surrogates against 

India. Now these groups threaten the peace and stability of Pakistan itself. That 

they enjoy widespread, thinly-veiled support among senior and influential officers 

of Pakistan’s armed forces, intelligence and bureaucracy only makes this task more 

urgent. 

A Kashmir peace package can be assembled which grants each of the parties their 

essential requirements without prejudice to the others. India must be guaranteed 

security from armed incursions and attacks from Pakistani held territory. In the 

face of armed violence, authentic political processes cannot work. India will not risk 

any. 

Immediately, there can be no questioning of the current status quo relating to sovereignty over territory controlled by it. The Indian position, probably correct under 

international law, is that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian 

Union. Any attempt to place the legal issue of sovereignty on the agenda at the outset would backfire. Kashmiri self-determination will have to focus for now on the 

practical dimensions of self-government, and come about incrementally, regardless 

of who represents what portion of the Kashmiri population in international bodies. 

On the other hand, no settlement will be acceptable to Pakistan unless it vindicates its role as a champion of the rights of Kashmir’s Muslims, and legitimates its 

political presence in Kashmiri affairs. A way must be found to secure Indian assent 

to unconditional talks. For any Pakistani government to simply renounce a role in 

Kashmir would be political suicide. Kashmir is the source of deep feeling in the Pakistani national psyche. India must demonstrate to Pakistani public opinion that political and diplomatic tools will yield more than violence. It cannot insist on renunciation of terrorism as a precondition for talks. Rather, meaningful unconditional 

talks are what will make that renunciation possible. The Pakistani interest in Kashmiri Muslims as a whole would also be served by political concessions to self-government, on both sides within separate units under separate sovereigns, and by the 

process of cross-border cooperation. 

Any settlement must also serve the people of Jammu and Kashmir. They have 

all suffered a dearth of human and democratic rights. To the extent that they also 

aspire to unity and recognition of special identity on the basis of their shared 

though varied history, that will require the end of regional chauvinism. The people 

of the Vale, whether Pakistan-supported insurgents, pro-independence forces or proIndian political parties, must stop acting and speaking as if they and they alone 

24

speak for the interests of the state’s people. Their majority Muslim State includes 

extensive and strategically significant areas where Hindus and Buddhists are in the 

majority. 

The briefest description will convey the state’s rich cultural variety. On the Pakistani side are the mountain peoples of the Northern Areas already assimilated by 

Pakistan (despite its formal position in favor of Kashmiri self-determination) and 

the distinct Mirpuri group of Azad Kashmir. On the Indian side are both Muslims 

and Hindu Pandits of the Vale, the Buddhists of Ladhak, and the predominantly 

Dogra Hindus of Jammu. Certainly the optimal solution would be one which allowed 

them all to share their geographically defined common destiny within a unitary 

Kashmiri entity. However such a unitary solution is almost inconceivable in the 

short term. Because Buddhists and Hindus would—justifiably on the historical evidence of Pakistan’s poor record with religious minorities—feel insecure in any arrangement that rendered them vulnerable to Pakistani authority or influence, a 

more creative transitional program must be found. 

With due recognition of the issue of Muslim interests in Kashmir, excessive or exclusive focus on their interests would only reward armed insurgency at the expense 

of peaceful political organization and expression, as still practiced by most 

Kashmiris, including many Muslims. Such myopia would also be a recipe for future 

political instability. 

Both India and Pakistan should open the door to genuine local self-government 

in the areas they control, and adopt measures to foster cooperation between these 

areas. Free movement between them will be important. Because it can only come 

about if the security threat is manageable, that will have to be the first order of 

business. 

If an improvement in security comes about, India should reduce its security presence to make room for a political settlement. Political repression and the excesses 

of the Indian security forces have spawned the instability and lawlessness in which 

terrorist groups have thrived. Kashmiri political leaders are afraid to discuss peace 

in this climate of mutual terror. If India fails in this, it will remain difficult to separate authentic Kashmiri insurgents from transnational terrorists, 

SOLUTION: ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

When India and Pakistan openly tested nuclear weapons in 1998, followed by an 

incursion by Pakistani-supported fighters into Indian-held Kashmir in 1999, the 

stakes rose sharply, as did US willingness to get involved. President Clinton met 

the Pakistani Prime Minister at the White House to press him to pull back the incursion, which Pakistan did. Still, while the US assumed a more active role in encouraging the parties to take steps to reduce tension and increase confidence, it continued to eschew the role of a mediator. The international community as a whole 

has shared this reluctance. 

Until quite recently this reluctance to mediate was indisputably correct. The prospects of a negotiated settlement were extremely remote, in the face of a conversation 

of the deaf between India and Pakistan. Indeed, the prospect of a powerful third 

party pressuring the other acted as a disincentive to contemplate difficult choices. 

Neither side would even partially concede what was essential for the other. 

This much was clear from the longstanding difficulties the United Nations encountered in promoting a settlement. A Security Council resolution dating back half 

a century called for a settlement with reference to the wishes of the people of Kashmir. India claims it has taken the wishes of Kashmiris into account in its portion 

of the state, given the legal accession of the state to India and the failure of Pakistan to withdraw. The border between the two remains unresolved under international law, despite the presence there of the oldest extant UN military observer 

group. 

Now, the international community must devote substantial diplomatic, political 

and material resources to a resolution in Kashmir. While some groups attacking 

India from Pakistan are disaffected Kashmiris concerned only about their local interests, an increasing number are outsiders whose operations span Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. They share expertise, personnel, resources and ideology with groups that 

have been identified by the international community as threats to international 

peace and the rule of law. The international community now has a direct interest 

in persuading Pakistan to change course. 

However, as long as Pakistan feels that supporting insurgency in Kashmir is its 

only means of retaining a role there, its commitment to neutralizing these extremist 

forces will remain ambiguous. If the international community seriously wants Pakistan’s wholehearted cooperation with the global struggle against international terVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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rorism, we must encourage the Indians to give Pakistan a better option for a political role in Kashmir. 

Whereas the preferred approach in such a situation would ordinarily be United 

Nations initiative, for historical reasons that is unacceptable to the Indians. It is 

important that a pragmatic approach be adopted, which sidesteps ‘‘theological’’ disputes about the meaning of UN resolutions and instead relies on collective international efforts under any viable institutions. Given the incremental character of 

the approach proposed, a collection of private, semi-official, and specialized multilateral, institutions should work together. 

There can be no progress on interim measures without a cessation of violence. 

Continued violence both detracts from the confidence and good faith necessary for 

bilateral negotiations, and keeps the Indians focussed on the security threat and 

thus unable to reduce their forces or allow an inclusive an uncensored political process. 

Only the United States has the standing to convince Pakistan to turn from a 

Kashmir strategy of covert support for terrorism. The US-Pakistan relationship, including the generous aid already committed, should be made dependent on Pakistani policies that respect Indian security. Only that would confer standing to counsel Indian restraint. 

The west has already demonstrated its willingness to stand behind Pakistan in 

the form of debt rescheduling. Further financial rescue plans and well-crafted bilateral development assistance, through the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development 

Bank, will encourage the Pakistanis to participate in a serious peace process. 

The community of nations should insist that India and Pakistan immediately 

begin parallel, unilateral confidence building gestures, starting with Pakistani respect for the line of control (‘‘LOC’’) and reduced support for violence, and Indian 

movement toward self-government on its side of the LOC. To be equitable, the latter 

should be accompanied by increased self-government in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir. 

Later steps might include cross-border initiatives to help both parts address common issues in an integrated manner across the LOC. 

Processes should be initiated to integrate the lives and economies of the two parts 

of the state. This can be done through incremental mechanisms such as trade and 

border agreements and joint commissions on economic, environmental and security 

issues. There might also be consultative mechanisms for issue-specific talks between 

political and civic institutions on both sides of the boundary (three way nationallocal, two way local), and mutual commitment to allow free access, consistent with 

security requirements, to independent and credible human rights monitoring organizations and the press. The multilateral development banks, other international financial institutions, and bilateral development agencies would have to provide the 

material resources necessary to carry out these initiatives, and to render peace profitable for the parties. 

The international community should take a very clear position with the Indian 

government that its capacity to forcefully push for the cessation of cross border violence depends objectively on the improvement of the Indian government’s record on 

human and political rights in its part of the state. 

The international community could retain a constructive profile by supporting 

non-governmental initiatives in both Pakistani and Indian Kashmir, material assistance for demobilization and reintegration of combatants, and other development and 

transition assistance, including partnership with multilateral development banks or 

UN specialized agencies. 

Serious consideration should also be given to supporting and assisting with regional confidence building measures. These could include technical assistance (including monitoring technology and training) for military transparency at the Line 

of Control or the India Pakistan border, frameworks for dialogue, and collaborative 

projects on environment, energy, infectious diseases, and law enforcement. 

ROADMAP AND CHRONOLOGY

A viable process of confidence building and incremental peacemaking might look 

something like this:

1. India-Pakistan commission to discuss boundary issues in Jammu and Kashmir, and to engage in joint monitoring of the LOC. 

2. Phased demilitarization at the LOC, contingent first on substantial cessation of cross border terrorism. 

3. Three-way (Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri) commission on internal law and 

order. Kashmiris to be chosen from Pakistan-occupied Azad Kashmir and 

all Indian-occupied segments—Vale, Jammu and Ladakh. 

26

4. Indian and Pakistani commitment to proceed with a scheme of local government reform and strengthening of local institutions and local autonomy in 

respective areas of Kashmir. 

5. Issue-specific consultative bodies (water, power, tourism, finance) comprising such local units, and Indian Jammu & Kashmir State and Azad 

Kashmir governments. 

6. Regularly scheduled and publicity-free consultative mechanism for Indian 

government talks with all parties, and with non-party civil society institutions, within Indian Kashmir on political issues. 

7. Corresponding mechanism for Azad Kashmir. 

8. Consultative mechanism for talks among all parties on ethnic and religious 

minority protections. 

9. Consultative mechanism for dialogue between these processes on the Indian 

and Pakistani side of the LOC. 

10. Indian commitment to allow free access, consistent with security requirements, to independent and credible Indian human rights monitoring organizations, and to Indian, and Pakistani press. Corresponding commitment by 

Pakistan for Azad Kashmir.

It is to be expected that many of these initiatives will face obstacles, and yield 

few immediate results. However, the process itself will build confidence. It is 

through repetition that the habit of dialogue will be established, and underlying objective common interests identified. Even if it fails, we must begin to try.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pandya. 

We will now proceed with our queries, and I will be turning to 

my colleagues in just a moment. 

What kind of links exist between al-Qaeda and the terrorist insurgence of militants that are now operating in Kashmir? I would 

turn to all of our panelists. Mr. Krepon? 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, we are asking Musharraf to wage 

a three-front war against terrorism. That is asking a lot. The alQaeda links are mostly still in the northwestern part of Pakistan. 

There is a fear that as U.S. military operations proceed, these elements will filter toward Kashmir. 

I do not believe this is now the case. It could be the case. These 

groups have some linkages. The problem for the government of 

Pakistan is it has sought to differentiate between them. It has 

sought to differentiate between al-Qaeda on the one hand and the 

groups that it supports in terms of anti-Indian militancy. 

This is not going to work. It is not going to work. The way 

through this mess is in a straight line, where the government of 

Pakistan follows a consistent policy that terrorism is bad. It is bad 

for the country. It is not working. It is not achieving national objectives in Kashmir. 

Mr. GILMAN. Do any of our other panelists want to comment? 

Mr. PANDYA. Yes, I would, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Pandya? 

Mr. PANDYA. Opinions differ obviously on the extent of al-Qaeda 

or other international terrorist influence in Kashmir, but clearly 

there have been working relationships between these various manifestations of extremism and insurgency, and clearly if you look at 

the map the northwest part of Pakistan, the part that borders Afghanistan, is really only a hop and a skip away from Azad Kashmir 

where many of the outfits that are operating in Indian Kashmir 

are in fact operating from. 

Clearly they do have a common interest in opening up a second 

front for General Musharraf and, more significantly, in taking 

some of the heat off their cohorts on the Pakistan/Afghanistan borVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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der, so it would stand to reason that we can expect an increase in 

collaboration between the various parts of this picture. 

You know, opinions do differ. I have here an Associated Press 

story where the Defense Minister of India suggested very clearly 

that members of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network and Taliban 

fighters from Afghanistan were now in fact working in concert in 

Kashmir as well. 

Mr. GILMAN. Let me address the panelists. For many years, India’s Defense Minister, George Fernandes, said that the major 

threat to India is not Pakistan, but China, and that Pakistan is 

just a proxy of China. Mr. Fernandes often expressed concern about 

China surrounding India by arming nations on India’s borders. 

Can our panelists express your thoughts with regard to that 

proposition? Mr. Krepon? 

Mr. KREPON. China-India relations have improved since India 

carried out nuclear tests. They have a joint working group where 

they discuss ways to deal with their lines of actual control. They 

also have sections of the border that are not settled. 

Mr. GILMAN. Is that a joint working group with another nation? 

Mr. KREPON. India and China——

Mr. GILMAN. And China. 

Mr. KREPON [continuing]. Have these discussions. They are making progress. They are exchanging maps. They are trying to delineate the border areas, and they have begun joint conversations 

about terrorism. 

I have talked to the Defense Minister about how he feels about 

China. He has very strongly held views on this subject, but it 

seems to me that the situation between India and Pakistan has deteriorated greatly while the bilateral relationship with China has 

improved. 

Mr. LIEVEN. Perhaps I could answer that. China, of course, has 

very serious worries of its own about internal Muslim extremism 

and terrorism, and I think that, too, is encouraging a closer relationship between China and India and indeed between China and 

us. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Pandya? 

Mr. PANDYA. I think that a fair dimension that is worth noting 

here is the extent to which introducing discussion of China really 

points to the complexity of the Kashmir problem because, of course, 

portions of the former unified states of Jammu and Kashmir as its 

boundaries were delineated when the British Empire ruled are now 

controlled by China partly as a result of conquest from India and 

partly as a result of cession by Pakistan. 

I think that while this territory may seem unimportant to the 

current discussion because there are very few people there, it is extremely important strategically and deserves recognition as a complicating factor in the strategic——

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. For my colleagues, we are going to continue with our session. Mr. Burton went over to vote, and he will 

come back and continue as quickly as we can. 

Mr. Ackerman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. In regard to something 

that Mr. Krepon said before with regard to terrorism and Pakistan 

enunciating why the reasons against it, you stated that terrorism 

28

is bad for the country. I think that nobody would dispute that, but 

it might be very, very good for domestic politics. I think that domestic politics are playing a higher order of priorities than what 

is good for the country. 

That being said, I would like to know if any of the panelists 

think that General President Musharraf’s zeal for Kashmir is diminished any, number one, because all of the public pledges that 

he has made here and elsewhere against terrorism do not seem to 

be applicable with regard to Kashmir. 

Where do you think he goes with this? Is this just brinkmanship, 

I mean, because like one slip and you are over the edge of the cliff 

here? 

Mr. KREPON. He has five good reasons, five very persuasive reasons, to make his pledges applicable to Kashmir, as well as to Afghanistan. 

Number one, the policy he is pursuing could lead to escalation 

that could cross the nuclear threshold, in which case centuries of 

Muslim accomplishments are reduced to rubble. That is one. 

Number two, if his policies lead to a conventional war there is 

a decent chance that the Pakistan army will not do well. It has not 

done well in previous wars with India, which means the country 

would be destabilized, further destabilized, much worse, and that 

is not in his interest. 

Number three, Pakistan would have to fight this war essentially 

alone. China would not support Pakistan. The United States would 

not support Pakistan. Folks do not support countries that use militancy as an instrument of state policy. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I can stop you mid-count, one would think that 

he is aware of all that. There is nothing I think that we can say 

logically why this is a bad thing that he has not considered already, and yet he is risking it all for the sake of, in my view, domestic politics. 

Mr. KREPON. I do not think the United States Government until 

recently has spoken with one voice to General Musharraf about 

how we view the situation. 

Until fairly recently when we sent Defense Department officials 

to Pakistan, they were talking about the prosecution of the war 

against al-Qaeda. They were not talking about Kashmir. When we 

sent State Department officials to the region, they talked about 

Kashmir. He may have thought that he could balance one against 

the other. 

Now our government is speaking with one voice. There is no differentiation. I think this will change the calculus in Pakistan. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me rephrase the question. Should Musharraf 

do what we would expect and many in the international community 

would expect? Should he reject terrorism in Kashmir, not refer to 

them as freedom fighters, dismantle the terrorist camps and arrest 

the terrorists? Does he politically survive? 

There is one answer that says he does, and one answer says he 

does not. 

Mr. PANDYA. I suppose, you know, he takes a risk either way. 

The truth of the matter is that his position in Pakistan is very 

weak regardless of what he does in Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto has 

called on the officer corps to overthrow him. 

29

The Jamaat-e-Islami at the other end of the political spectrum 

have pulled together an all parties conference that has asked for 

a transitional government to be installed right now and for 

Musharraf to step down. It is very curious that when he made his 

very belligerent speech about a week and a half ago that the way 

that he started out was by complaining about the fact that all 

shades of Pakistani political opinion had not united behind him, 

had not united behind the leader of the nation in this time of peril. 

I am not sure that that is a direct answer to your question, but 

I think, you know, at the end of the day Musharraf’s problems with 

his hold on power can be affected either way by the position that 

he takes on Kashmir. In the end, you know, as a factor to calculate 

it is probably a wash. 

Mr. LIEVEN. I would say that Kashmir is only one element in the 

domestic Pakistani political equation and the threats to Musharraf, 

but it is certainly an important element given the very strong feelings of the Pakistani people and particularly the Pakistani Army 

on this subject. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Ackerman, just two cents worth more. There 

was a national election in Pakistan before General Musharraf took 

power, and in the course of that election the victorious candidate 

did not mention Kashmir. He did not mention Kashmir. Kashmir 

was not an issue in that national election. 

You have asked a really hard question, and I am sure that General Musharraf is struggling with it, but Pakistan does not have a 

future unless it changes course with respect to militancy. It does 

not have a future. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. My question was really is General Musharraf interested in Pakistan’s future or General President Musharraf’s future? 

Mr. KREPON. I think he is interested in Pakistan’s future. I think 

he is interested in Pakistan’s future. He is a patriotic person, and 

I think he can see wisdom here, but he needs our help. 

Mr. PANDYA. May I? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I just might suggest to the Chairman if we 

could suspend because they might need our help on the Floor? 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. The Committee will stand in recess. Mr. 

Burton is on his way back, and we will continue as soon as he gets 

back. 

The Committee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. The panel is back at the table. If we 

could get everyone back to their seats. Can you take your seats, 

please? The Members have a lot of different meetings and hearings 

they have to go to today. We have more votes coming. 

Chairman Gilman will return, but he asked me to go ahead and 

get back to the questioning. I guess it now falls to me to ask a few 

questions. I will take my time, and then I will yield to the other 

Members. 

One of the things that I noticed from the panelists was that 

there was not any mention of the U.N. Resolution. Granted, that 

Resolution took place in 1948 and 1949, but the fact is both India 

and Pakistan agreed that a plebiscite should be held. Fifty-four 

years later that has not been done. 

30

I do not really agree with Mr. Krepon that the solution to the 

problem is to stop the cross-border terrorism. I am sure that that 

is a part of the equation. We need to have some method to make 

sure that the borders are as secure as possible, but it is very mountainous, as you know. It is a long border, and it really needs to be 

policed in a way that is the best way possible. 

India does not trust Pakistan. Pakistan does not trust India. If 

India wanted to preserve that border, they have many more troops 

in that area than Pakistan does, and they could have been making 

steps and strides to do that. 

I believe personally that the best way to do it is to try to have 

the U.N., working with both of those countries, create some kind 

of independent patrolling operation that will do the best they can 

to seal that border off. If they did that, I think that would be a 

giant step in the right direction. 

The other thing that I think should be considered down the road 

is that India, whether you say 750,000 troops, 500,000 troops, 

400,000 troops, whatever the figure is, there should be some strict 

requirements by the Indian government that any human rights violations, gang rapes, atrocities, murders and so forth, be dealt with 

very severely, court martials, whatever it takes to stop that sort of 

thing, which would be in compliance I think probably with the conventions that have been passed throughout the world. 

The third thing is the plebiscite, and Mr. Rohrabacher and I both 

alluded to this. The plebiscite that was alluded to and promised 

back in 1948 should be held. Now, granted it could not be held immediately because the situation being as difficult as it is and the 

possibility of war, but if we can get the border sealed off, if we can 

stop the cross border problems, if we can stop the gang rapes and 

the terrorist activities, and I call them terrorist activities by the Indian Army. 

When you go into somebody’s house and take 50 or 60 men out 

in the field and have them stand there and freeze while you gang 

rape their wives all night long, that to me is an act of terrorism 

just as barbaric as coming across and blowing up military personnel. 

When we are talking about terrorism, there is terrorism on both 

sides. One is under the auspices of the military of India, and the 

other is from the people who are fighting because they believe that 

Kashmir ought to have a modicum of freedom and independence 

which was promised in 1948. 

There are people coming in from outside sources who are trying 

to take advantage of the situation. I think we are all aware of that. 

The bottom line is the people of Kashmir do want to have a vote 

on independence, and they have wanted that for 54 years. That is 

the root cause of the problem. 

If there could be some kind of a commitment to a peaceful negotiation right now to stop the war from happening, number one, and 

a commitment for an orderly withdrawal of Indian troops accompanied by military trials for those who perpetrate atrocities at the 

same time going after the terrorists who are trying to take advantage of the situation and give the commitment to the Kashmiri people that there will be a plebiscite, I think you defuse the whole 

thing. 

31

The terrorists who want to take advantage of it coming from outside, and I do not know how many there are. I do not think anybody knows that. I still think the majority of the problem is inside 

Kashmir. The terrorists who are coming in from the outside would 

not have the fertile ground that they have today if a plebiscite was 

in the offing 6 months, a year, 2 years down the road. If they know 

that there was a hope of getting that plebiscite, I think it would 

really help defuse the situation. 

The bottom line is after listening to you learned gentlemen, and 

I know you have varying points of view, number one, some kind of 

an international operation to patrol the border maybe in conjunction with both India and Pakistan, but having that kind of international organization or under the auspices of something like the 

U.N. 

Number two, trials of those who are perpetrating atrocities upon 

the people of Kashmir from the Indian military. Three, trying to 

make sure that we stop terrorist infiltration wherever it takes 

place, and, four, the promise of a plebiscite. 

It seems to me all of those are logical steps, but to point fingers 

at Mr. Musharraf and Pakistan, who have been friends of ours forever and they have almost never turned us down, and to point the 

finger at them and not point the finger at the atrocities perpetrated 

by the Indian government and their recalcitrance toward a plebiscite which they promised and their leaders have promised over the 

years I think begs the issue. 

With that, I do not think I am asking you any questions. I just 

think or I hope you will take that with you as food for thought. You 

are very learned gentlemen, and you have a lot of knowledge about 

the issue, but I will not belabor this any more. 

Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask a 

question. I apologize if this has been posed to you already. We had 

a couple votes on the Floor, and none of us were quite sure how 

quickly they would come in succession so I think we spent longer 

on the Floor than we needed to. 

My primary question to you is I would like to get a sense of the 

debate over the cross border terrorism and would like your feedback on, number one, whether you think General Musharraf is actively trying to prevent militants from crossing the line of control. 

Number two, whether there has been some wavering in that determination with a more vigorous post September 11, a perhaps 

more relaxed effort or an affirmative allowing of these guerilla 

camps to reopen in March. 

And then third, whether you think as a political matter 

Musharraf has the political base of support or the ability even if 

he desired it to crack down on those who would use violence in the 

cause of Kashmiri separation or independence. 

Bear in mind that there was some skepticism about whether he 

had the base of support to crack down on militancy in the wake of 

September 11 and a lot of concern about mass rebellions in the 

streets never materialized, but I understand that the sensitivity of 

Kashmir is at a wholly higher level even than the September 11 

issue, so if you could comment, each of you, on that? 

32

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Schiff, General Musharraf has proven to be 

successful in shutting down infiltration after he delivered his 

speech on January 12 promising to do so. Over time, a couple of 

months, things were back to normal. 

He is now proving again after his most recent speech on May 27 

that he is shutting it down. I have no doubt that infiltration is now 

way down. There are some folks that he cannot control, but he can 

control most of it. 

It is going to cause him problems in the senior officer corps, but 

he has the capability to do it if he has come to the conclusion that 

it is in his country’s best interest to do it. This is a bitter pill to 

swallow, but the other medicine is even worse. 

The other medicine is he loses his country because he cannot differentiate between bad terrorists over here and good freedom fighters that are fighting India with his army’s support. It does not 

work because we cannot be with him if he tries to maintain that 

differentiation. We cannot. 

We are asking a lot of him, and he deserves our support, but he 

has to be consistent about this. He has to follow through because 

the future of his country depends on it. It is just that simple. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you both share that view that he has the capability to significantly crack down on the terrorism in Kashmir? 

Mr. PANDYA. Yes. 

Mr. LIEVEN. I think he can significantly crack down on it, but, 

as I said in my talk, we must be very clear he cannot eliminate 

it. Among the terrorists in Kashmir and in India proper there will 

be people who will continue attacks in part precisely so as to weaken Musharraf and so as to provoke war between India and Pakistan. 

As I said, we must not fall into the trap of allowing them, the 

terrorists, to create our agenda and to drag India toward war. I 

think it is also worth emphasizing that although Musharraf can 

greatly reduce the infiltration and close down the camps, it will 

cost him very badly at home and in terms of prestige within the 

Pakistani army. 

Of course, that does not mean he should not do it. We must push 

him to do it, but everything we can do in other areas to help, to 

help him, to help compensate for that, we should do. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. I am sorry. Perhaps you can address both 

things in the remaining few seconds I have. 

Is there evidence that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are deliberately 

raising the decibel level of violence in Kashmir precisely because 

they believe it will pull Pakistani troops off the border of Afghanistan and make our life more difficult? 

Mr. PANDYA. It is certainly the move I would make if I were in 

their shoes, and the Indian Defense Minister is on record as suggesting that that is in fact what has happened; that they in fact 

have intelligence to that effect. 

On the question of General Musharraf’s capability, I would simply add that quite apart from whether he objectively has the capacity and the will, the Indians appear to believe, and I think this is 

equally important, the Indians appear to believe that he has the 

capacity and the will. Did they not believe it, they would not be 

giving him a little bit more time as they are right now. 

33

Quite frankly, they have been giving him time since the attack 

on Parliament in December. The Indians have built up certainly 

their military forces quite substantially, but that said it has been 

a few months, and they have not actually launched any kind of attack, so clearly they believe that he has the capacity and the will. 

At the end of the day, I think that the Indians are smart enough 

to understand that he will not be able to control all attacks. I highly doubt that even if there were an attack by rogue elements right 

now within India that the Indians would immediately react to that 

with military action. 

I think what the Indians are looking for is evidence of a serious 

sustained change of direction by the Pakistani state. I think if they 

see that, if they see it in the level of infiltration going down and 

in some kind of policy change that systemically attacks the bases 

of terrorism in Pakistan, I believe that they will give General 

Musharraf a little bit more time. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Mr. GILMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Pitts? 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question for the entire panel. How does the issue of extremist 

Hindu groups with their pan-Hindu designs affect the Kashmir 

issue? Would it be helpful to the issue if the Indian government 

took action against these groups for their criminal activity, groups 

that have committed atrocities against people in Kashmir or in Gujarat, and would this help alleviate pressure on Musharraf from 

the Pakistani groups as well? I would appreciate any comments. 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, as I said in my address, I believe that it would 

be extremely helpful if the Indian government did this and if the 

west and the United States in particular were to push them much 

more strongly on this and to be seen to do so both because I think 

this would be right in itself, but also because I think this would 

create a very good impression in Pakistan and in the Muslim 

world, it would diminish the impression, which, of course, our enemies are continually trying to cultivate that the United States is 

one sided in its attitude to Muslims and does not care about atrocities committed against Muslims. 

I also think that the existence of both states in South Asia is now 

a vital interest of America and the world because of their possession of nuclear weapons. In that context we have to do everything 

we can to strengthen the Pakistani state internally so that it can 

deal with its extremists, but we also need to do everything possible 

to help preserve Indian pluralist democracy because I believe that 

in the end the survival of India as a country depends on its democracy. 

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Pandya? 

Mr. PANDYA. In the same way that you have heard how General 

Musharraf has to crack down on extremism in order to save the 

Pakistani state, a very senior Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar, who 

is now a member of the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, recently published a piece where he suggested that not only the attacks in Gujarat, but that the government’s response to those atVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
34

tacks, had done more to destabilize India than the activities of the 

Pakistani intelligence over the 50 years since partition. 

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Krepon? 

Mr. KREPON. The terrible violence in Gujarat has further alienated Kashmiri Muslims from the center, but the issues for them 

are Kashmir-centric. They care far less about what is going on in 

Karnataka or Gujarat or other states. They are very focused on 

their daily lives. 

I have to tell you that in this last trip I interviewed a wide range 

of disaffected Kashmiri Muslims, folks who were associated with 

Hizbula Mujahedeen, which is primarily an indigenous group, folks 

who are separatist leaders, political leaders. 

It strikes me that they are ready for reconciliation. They are 

ready to put down the gun. They are looking for honorable ways 

of public service. They are not ready to stand for elections. There 

is a state election coming up in September and October. I do not 

think they are going to stand for elections in part because one of 

their leaders—who spoke out quite vocally that the foreigners, the 

Pakistanis, the Afghans, were not welcome in Kashmir, and that 

the guns that they were bringing in and the violence they were 

bringing in were not welcome—was assassinated. He was contemplating having surrogates run in the state elections. It is very hard 

to have an honest public conversation in Kashmir because if you 

seek to move away from violence, you will become a target of violence. 

The human rights problems of which you speak exist in Gujarat, 

and they are serious. They are painful to watch. They exist in 

Kashmir too. The government of Pakistan cannot wrest the Kashmir Valley away from India by diplomacy. It cannot wrest the valley away by conventional arms. It certainly cannot wrest the valley 

away by escalating to the nuclear level, and so it has relied heavily 

as an instrument of state craft on unconventional warfare to bleed 

India, to make India pay. 

This has failed. It has failed in every respect. It is doing severe 

damage to Kashmiris, it is doing severe damage to Pakistan, and 

it is doing severe damage to the Indian security forces. It has to 

stop. It is time. This is the core of the matter at this point. If it 

can stop, every door is open to help people out. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. The President of Ethan Allen formed a 

Kashmiri study group a few years ago, and I believe one of our 

Members was part of that. One of the recommendations, and there 

were several, for progress toward the restoration of normal life in 

Kashmir was by demilitarizing civilian inhabited areas since it is 

the people who are suffering. 

What is your view on this recommendation? What steps do you 

think could be taken toward that? 

Mr. KREPON. The fellow you are talking about, Farooq Kathwari, 

is just an extraordinary fellow. He has taken a very personal interest in the well-being of Kashmiris. 

The Indian security presence in Jammu and Kashmir is extremely heavy even when they are not ready to fight a war with 

Pakistan. This causes real problems. That presence has to be 

thinned out. It has to be moved to the border and out of the cities, 

but it is awfully hard to do that when you are facing well armed, 

35

well trained militants who keep coming across with the active assistance of the Pakistan army and the intelligence services. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. LIEVEN. I would like to second that, but I must say that 

when it comes to helpful suggestions from outside from the international community about what to do on Kashmir, a very major 

problem has been that India over the years has categorically and 

consistently rejected not just the U.N. resolutions of which we have 

heard, but any international role in resolving this conflict whether 

by international bodies or by individual states like America. 

I must say that I think in view of the dangers which this conflict 

now poses for humanity as a whole, I do not think that this Indian 

approach can any longer be regarded as legitimate, and I think 

that our support for Indian aspirations to play a much stronger 

role on the world stage, one aspect of which is, of course, India’s 

desire for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, should be 

very closely linked by us to India’s willingness to allow us a role 

in trying to seek a solution to this conflict. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Before I get into my questions, let me 

just note that I am not a fan of General Musharraf. I do not call 

him President Musharraf. No one has elected him to anything. 

There is not a democracy in Pakistan. The democratic government 

was overthrown by the current government. The referendum that 

they had in Pakistan makes a mockery of the democratic process, 

and they deserve a real election. 

By the way, I think that it is possible had they had a real referendum Musharraf would have been confirmed by the Pakistani 

people, but he chose instead, along with his clique, to make sure 

that they had a fake election, and that is very sad. 

Any suggestion that elections are then the answer in Kashmir 

has to be taken with that consciousness, with that, you know, reality. The fact is that if Mr. Burton and I are calling for a plebiscite, it would have to be internationally inspected. It would have 

to be something that would be guaranteed by the international 

community to be a just and fair plebiscite in Pakistan. 

With that said, let me suggest that people who are trying to tell 

us that the root cause of the problem in Kashmir is the infiltration 

of terrorists from Pakistan are on some other planet than I am on. 

I mean, I do not know. I do not think this was going on for the 

last 50 years. It has been 50 years since the United Nations demanded some kind of an election, a plebiscite, so the Pakistani people could control their own destiny through the ballot box. 

If you do not give people the option of controlling their destiny 

with ballots, they will turn to bullets, and their sympathizers from 

elsewhere will help them. The root cause of this problem is the intransigence of India that makes sure that experts like yourself suggest well, it is just off the table. The sovereignty question is off the 

table. 

It is not off the table. It is not off the table at all. If we want 

peace, pleading for peace and then suggesting that it is just the 

terrorists infiltrating that are causing the problem, we will not 

36

bring a more peaceful world. We have to be tough with our friends 

and tough with our adversaries and come up with a solution that 

will give the Kashmiri people a choice. 

That is the only time this is going to end because that is the only 

time the people on the other side who are supporting them will refrain from supporting the Kashmiris with weapons the way they 

see it. 

Let me be bold and make this suggestion. There should be a 

plebiscite for the Kashmiri people internationally supervised to 

make sure that it is absolutely an honest election. We can do that. 

I believe that is within our capabilities if India will agree and Pakistan will agree, and I believe they will if we step forward with this. 

The plebiscite should ask these questions. Do the people of Kashmir want to be part of India? Yes or no? If the answer is no, do 

the people of Kashmir want to be part of Pakistan? Yes or no? 

Number three, should they be or do they want to be independent? 

They should be given those choices. 

Again, I do not believe, and one of the panelists suggested that 

India is looking to Pakistan for a major change of direction, and 

that is what is going to bring about peace, a major change in direction from Pakistan. No way. This has nothing to do with the policy 

of Pakistan. It has everything to do with the fact that you have 

hundreds of thousands of people in the Kashmir who are not being 

given the right to determine their destiny with a ballot and have 

been denied that for 50 years. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, let me note we have a panel. Mr. Burton 

and I very clearly talked about the plebiscite, but no one managed 

the mention that even as an alternative for peace. This has been 

going on in the United States Government and then Congress and 

the Executive Branch for 50 years. The United States is going to 

be a peacemaker if we face that reality. 

I would throw that up to the panel and let them go right ahead. 

Mr. KREPON. Let me talk about the plebiscite because it is something you care so deeply about. You are right. It deserves to be discussed in this forum. 

The original U.N. resolution said Pakistan has to vacate the territory that it gained in the war that divided Kashmir. Pakistan has 

to vacate that ground. Then India needs to vacate its ground, and 

then there would be a plebiscite. 

The plebiscite as originally conceived by the U.N. resolution only 

gave Kashmiris two choices. One choice you are with Pakistan, all 

of you. The other choice was you are with India, all of you. 

If we fast forward the situation 50 plus years later, if you gave 

that choice to Kashmiris the overwhelming vote would be none of 

the above. We do not want to be with Pakistan. We do not like the 

way Pakistan——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us give them that choice, too, which is 

independence. Let them choose if they want to be independent. 

Mr. KREPON. Okay. If you change the terms of the plebiscite and 

you give people a third vote, a third choice of independence, Pakistan would be unreconciled to the outcome. India would be 

unreconciled to the outcome. You are consigning Kashmiris to endless violence for as far into the future as I can see. 

37

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us put that to Pakistan and India and let 

them go on the record and say no. We are not going to let the 

Kashmiri people have a choice to vote on a plebiscite that includes 

independence or includes going to one side or the other. I do not 

think we have put that officially to the Pakistanis. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mrs. Davis? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I heard I think it was you, Mr. Lieven, that said something to 

the effect about the Pakistanis being a vital ally of our war on terrorism, so I guess my question to you is I know that Pakistan has 

pulled their troops out of Afghanistan. What other effects will this 

have on our war on terrorism? What do you see this conflict within 

Pakistan and India doing to us in our war? 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, it very much depends what happens, of course, 

but certainly inside Pakistan we need the help against the terrorists that are based there, including very many al-Qaeda people who 

fled from Afghanistan and are now inside Pakistan. Some of these 

have already been arrested with the help of the Pakistani security 

forces. The single most senior al-Qaeda figure——

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Mr. LIEVEN [continuing]. Who we have got so far was got not in 

Afghanistan, but in Pakistan and only through the help of the Pakistani government. 

Mrs. DAVIS. But are they going to be able to help us now because 

they are concentrating on their own war? 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, this is a real problem. Yes, their attention has 

been massively distracted, but another problem is, of course, that 

Pakistani help in this matter does not just depend on Musharraf, 

on the top of the administration. Frankly, it also depends on a lot 

of junior officers, junior policemen. Are they going to report a presence of suspicious Arabs in their neighborhood, or are they going 

to keep it quiet? Are they going to look the other way? 

That is why I stressed the critical importance of trying to keep 

enough of Pakistani public opinion on our side and retain real support from the Pakistani government, but also more widely in Pakistani society because what we have to recognize in this regard is 

that Pakistan is not Afghanistan, and it is not Iraq. The option of 

going in there and destroying the regime, taking over, bringing in 

a new and better regime simply does not exist both because Pakistan is so big, it has nuclear weapons, but also because Pakistani 

dictatorship is nothing like the dictatorship of the Taliban or Saddam. 

In the end, we have no option but to work through the Pakistani 

government. That is a very unsatisfactory option, but is the only 

one we have. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And if we work through the Pakistani government 

and India is also an ally, how does that affect our relationship with 

India? 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, it is very difficult, but I would say that we 

have to preserve and to be seen to preserve a certain balance there, 

which includes denouncing violent extremists in Pakistan, but also 

in India as strongly as we possibly can. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you not get in trouble when you ride the line? 

38

Mr. LIEVEN. It is going to be very difficult. I would not pretend 

that it is anything but that, but I do not think we have any choice 

in the matter. 

Mr. PANDYA. May I add that in rooting out terrorism, India, 

Pakistan and the United States do have a common interest. The 

parties may not recognize that we have an equal common interest, 

but we do indeed have a common interest. 

To return to your question, ma’am, about what happens if there 

is a second front that Pakistan has to deal with, indeed it is a distraction, but that is a second front that Pakistan has chosen to 

open up and to leave open, and it is in the hands of the Pakistani 

government not to completely close that front, but at least to close 

it sufficiently that they can give their primary attention, if not 

their full attention, to our war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda 

and their allies. 

This is a policy choice that the Pakistani government makes, and 

it is one I think that we can prevail on them to make in the right 

way. 

Mrs. DAVIS. When you talk about another front, how do you 

think India would respond if India went into Pakistani territory so 

to defend themselves, and the Pakistanis used a low yield nuclear 

weapon warhead? Then what would happen? 

Mr. KREPON. Congresswoman Davis, the Indian and Pakistani 

leadership are responsible people. They are sane people. They understand fully what a nuclear detonation would mean, and they are 

going to go to great lengths to avoid going there. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I hope so. 

Mr. KREPON. To answer your first question, if there is a war, a 

conventional war, it is way more than a distraction to U.S. efforts 

against al-Qaeda. 

Number one, U.S. forces on the ground in Pakistan——

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Mr. KREPON [continuing]. Are at greater risk and have to figure 

out do we stay here, or do we move? Number two, the prosecution 

of the war against al-Qaeda in Pakistan itself becomes very problematic for us. 

Number three, the loser of the war blames the United States. 

Many Pakistanis have thought because U.S. forces are in Pakistan 

they are an insurance policy against a war with India. 

Mrs. DAVIS. That is why I see this as a real problem for the 

United States. 

Mr. KREPON. It is a real problem. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Cantor? 

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to ask 

a general question. 

Back in January, President Musharraf made a speech in which 

he promised to crack down on the Islamic terrorist extremists, and 

I think just recently our National Security Advisor, Dr. Rice, said 

that India had to give President Musharraf time to dismantle the 

terrorist network. 

You know, it is in the back of my mind as we continue our war 

against the terrorists, you know, the idea of the Bush doctrine that 

39

we are going to be very uncompromising insofar as our tolerance 

for any involvement with terrorists. 

I want to ask anyone on the panel the specific acts and specific 

action taken by Musharraf to really crack down on Islamic terrorists, extremists into Kashmir, as well as India itself. 

Mr. KREPON. No leader has a harder problem in cracking down 

than General Musharraf does. There are some terrorists, folks who 

forment violence, sectarian violence, within the country between 

Sunni and Shiite Muslims. He is totally against them. He is cracking down hard on them. The army is with him. 

These folks also are targeting foreigners in Pakistan, including 

foreigners who help the armed forces, so everybody is in agreement 

we have to go after these guys and really sit on them. They are 

mostly in the southwest of Pakistan. 

There are al-Qaeda elements in the northwest of Pakistan where 

the Pakistani military is giving us some help. That is hard for 

them to do. There are probably some misgivings. 

Now, the folks who are carrying out acts of violence against India 

in the eastern part of Pakistan, they have had the blessings of the 

army leadership, and they are now the problem because they are 

the trigger of a war that could wreck havoc on our war against alQaeda. 

Musharraf has dealt with this group, this set of groups, like 

turning a spigot. Sometimes he turns it off. Sometimes he turns it 

back on. He says give me time, this is a tough problem. It is a 

tough problem, and he deserves time as long as he continues to 

turn the spigot in the right direction and does not reverse it. 

That is what we just have to focus on like a laser beam right 

now. We have to stay on top of this problem. We cannot walk away 

from it a month from now or 2 months from now because then we 

will be back into the current hair trigger situation. 

Mr. LIEVEN. Would you forgive a perhaps slightly undiplomatic 

comment from a British citizen? 

Just to bring out that these issues are complicated, one has to 

remember that for many years a terrorist movement in Northern 

Ireland directed against British rule, the rule of a very close American ally, was supported and indeed funded by many Americans 

who sympathized very strongly on Irish nationalist grounds with 

the IRA struggle in Northern Ireland. 

It was very difficult in many ways for the U.S. Administration 

and U.S. Courts to get a grip on this, given the feeling of so many 

Americans, so while I entirely believe in a very tough struggle 

against Islamic terrorism, I think we do need to recognize the very 

difficult position that this places many Muslim governments in. 

Mr. PANDYA. But I do think that we need to have an accurate 

reading of history. You know, selective use of history I think is 

highly dangerous here. 

Congressman Rohrabacher earlier talked about what are the root 

causes of this problem. Well, I think that what we need to understand is that in 1948 the Pakistan army, along with allies who 

were irregular forces from the tribal areas, invaded the disputed 

territory of Kashmir and thereby rendered this problem an insoluble and an intractable one. 

40

Had they not done that, I do not think we would be facing the 

same situation today, so I think we need to understand all of history. If we do understand that, then it becomes clear that the 

struggle over Kashmir or these wonderful phrases that we hear 

about the human rights of the Kashmiri people, which is very important, of the Kashmiris’ self-determination, which is very important, can also be very cynically manipulated for purposes of state 

policy. 

I think we need to understand this about President Musharraf’s 

relationship to the various forces that are active in Kashmir; that 

these are indeed deliberate instruments of state policy, and I do 

not think we should mince any words about that. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I have another Committee that I have to attend to. I am going 

to ask Mr. Pitts if he would chair the balance of this hearing. 

I want to thank our witnesses for their time and for their expertise. We thank you for being with us today. 

Mr. Pitts? 

Mr. PITTS [presiding]. Thank you. Just a couple of things to wrap 

up. Someone said or mentioned that Benazir Bhutto had called for 

the officer corps and the military in Pakistan to overthrow President Musharraf. Do you have any more details? Can you document 

that? 

Mr. PANDYA. If you will give me a few minutes, I will try to find 

it for you. 

Mr. PITTS. Sure. 

Mr. PANDYA. It is quoted in an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review by Ahmed Rashid. 

Mr. PITTS. If you could supply the Committee with that article? 

Mr. PANDYA. Yes. I would be happy to. 

[The information referred to is not reprinted here but is available 

in Committee files.] 

Mr. PITTS. We would appreciate that. I noticed, Mr. Pandya, that 

you wanted to speak, and time ran out, on the issue of the plebiscite for independence that Mr. Rohrabacher was asking about. If 

you would like to continue on that and give us your thoughts? 

Mr. PANDYA. Yes. Thank you. I think that for the most part Mr. 

Krepon has addressed the complexities of the plebiscite, the extent 

to which this is really a package deal. The U.N. resolution called 

for a reference to the wishes of the Kashmiri people, but also withdrawal of forces. It is a chicken and egg problem. How do you get 

to a withdrawal of forces when each side is afraid that the other 

one will take advantage? 

This is where the observation that I just made about the origin 

of this problem I think is very apt. The Maharajah of Kashmir did 

not accede to India until his kingdom was already half overrun by 

Pakistani and Pakistani supported forces, so I think that it becomes very difficult in the context of military threat to do anything 

intelligent or rational with reference to the wishes of the people. 

I think that the difficulty with the idea of plebiscite is simply 

that too much water has flowed under the bridge. Pakistan has 

now incorporated the northern areas, the remote mountainous 

areas, into Pakistan. Those are no longer administered as part of 

Azad Kashmir, which Pakistan treats as a nominally independent 

41

or autonomous state, so already we have had that. We have had 

Chinese occupation of significant portions of the old state of 

Jammu and Kashmir. Under these circumstances, I think that to 

talk about any meaningful statewide exercise of self-determination 

immediately is simply unrealistic quite apart from the security 

problems. 

Certainly I think that the conditions could be created through an 

incremental process of the kind that I described in my oral remarks 

where we might one day get to the point where in the same way 

that the citizens of Scotland and Wales found themselves with 

home rule and their own Parliament, one day all the people of 

Kashmir as a unified entity might indeed have self-determination, 

but I think that that is going to take an awful lot of goodwill, 

which is not very much in evidence. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Pitts, can I? 

Mr. PITTS. Go ahead, Mr. Krepon. 

Mr. KREPON. Can I add a couple of words? An independent Kashmir can work. An independent Kashmir can work only if its neighbors will allow it to be and not seize the opportunity to get the outcome they wanted, which is not independence. Neither Pakistan 

nor India thinks independence is a real good idea. They think it is 

a terrible idea. 

Number one, an independent Kashmir would become an endless 

battleground as it is today without independence. Number two, 

there are elections in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir. 

They happen every 5 years or so. There is another election coming 

up. Violence and intimidation are part and parcel of these elections. 

If the election is over independence, the level of violence and intimidation that would be imposed on Kashmiris on both sides of 

this divide would be intense, way beyond anything we have seen 

so far. 

Third point. Payback. South Asia is about payback. India-Pakistan relations is about payback. India vivisected Pakistan in 1971, 

created a new state of Bangladesh. Pakistan is paying India back 

for that vivisection. Basically it was due to their own mis-rule, but 

they have blamed it on India and not on themselves. 

What is happening in Kashmir today is payback for 1971. If you 

have an independent Kashmir, there will be more payback. There 

will be more attempts to unravel the fabric of Pakistan and India 

through the creation of new independence movements. You are 

looking at a South Asia of endless violence if you go down this 

path. 

Mr. PITTS. In light of what you have just said, if dialogue begins 

for peace talks is there a place for Kashmiris in those talks? If so, 

what? Mr. Lieven? 

Mr. LIEVEN. I would say that there has to be a place for 

Kashmiris. On the other hand, I would follow my colleagues in saying that I do not think that a plebiscite on independence or early 

moves toward independence are the way to go partly because that 

is simply unacceptable in the first instance to India and probably 

in the second instance to Pakistan as well. But I do think that the 

interests of the Kashmiri people must be very high on any agenda. 

42

As part of that, Mr. Krepon has spoken on elections in Indian 

controlled Kashmir. Unfortunately, on a number of occasions over 

the years the government has essentially failed to respect the results of those elections; not elections about independence, but just 

elections for certain parties which favored stronger autonomy for 

Kashmir. 

The people of Indian-controlled Kashmir will need assurances 

that in the future the democratic process there within India, even 

within India, should be respected by the Indian state, and for them 

to have such assurances I believe once again there has to be a role 

for the international community. 

Now, that does not by any means have to be based strictly on 

United Nations resolutions any more than the peace process in the 

Middle East has to be based strictly on United Nations resolutions, 

but I think a very important first step is that India must move 

away from this insistence that this is simply a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan in which, frankly, India will set the 

rules. It has to accept a role for the international community and 

the United States of America. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. 

Ms. Davis? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Well, I had another question, but with what you just 

said it brought me to something else. Now, India does not want the 

United States of America or the international community involved 

at all. Is that what I am hearing you say? 

Mr. KREPON. Words are really important in India, and the current words are that India does not want mediation by a third 

party, but it welcomes facilitation. It welcomes the facilitation of 

the United States in particular. 

This problem is so deep that India cannot solve it bilaterally with 

Pakistan. They need third parties to help. Our government has to 

get with it. I mean, we have been so episodic in our interest. 

I agree that we need to be very proactive and we need to be focused, and we need to have a policy rather than simply saying we 

are here to help; we are waiting for the two sides to agree that we 

can help. 

Mrs. DAVIS. What do you think is the reason we do not have the 

policy? Is it because of the volatility of our war on terror and our 

depending upon India and Pakistan because of their location? 

Mr. KREPON. I think one of the reasons from my point of view 

is that we have seen this problem as being an intractable one, sort 

of like the Middle East, so we are not going to get involved because 

it is a hopeless situation, and they are not ready yet. As we saw 

in the Middle East, if you lay back until folks are ready all kinds 

of chaos can happen in between. 

Mrs. DAVIS. You are smiling. Do you have something different to 

say, Mr. Pandya? 

Mr. PANDYA. Well, now that I have left the U.S. Government I 

think I can say this. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I would love for you to say it. 

Mr. PANDYA. I think that U.S. foreign policy has difficulty walking and chewing gum at the same time. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I would say I agree with you. 

43

Mr. PANDYA. I do think that a lot of it has to do with, you know, 

the squeaky wheel getting the grease. It is tragic and frightening 

that this is how much South Asia had to squeak before we understood exactly how dire things were there, but I think that that is 

a good part of it. 

I do not believe it is because in a passive kind of way we do not 

understand that Kashmir is important, in a passive kind of way we 

do not understand that two nuclear neighbors can get into trouble 

with each other, particularly if they have gone to war three times 

in 50 years. 

In a passive kind of way we do, but I think that what it is going 

to take here is active and sustained diplomacy, and I do not only 

mean, you know, that we get assurances from General Musharraf 

or even that he does something significant on terrorism for now. I 

think that what it is going to take is active, sustained diplomacy 

where we continue talking to the parties as if this were of common 

interest. 

The one thing I will say about the Indian view of the U.S. role 

that I think is important is that whereas traditionally the Indians 

have been very leery of any kind of outside ‘‘help,’’ I think that in 

this instance there are a couple of new considerations, one of which 

I think is the very significant warming of relations between India 

and the United States, including the very significant enhancement 

of our military to military relations, special forces training, equipment, co-production of defense equipment. 

I think that all of that not only gives us leverage, but I think encourages the Indians to see that what we are up to here is not an 

outside big brother coming in and wagging a finger, but rather a 

friend and partner working together with them on issues of common interest and sometimes seeing things differently. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is it possible to bring all parties together, and would 

it be better to bring them together without preset conditions, or 

would it be better to bring them together with some present conditions so there is no misunderstanding? 

My main question is is it possible to sit down at the table and 

bring them together and come to a solution? Even if you did with 

the government, would the people on both sides stand for it? 

Mr. LIEVEN. I do not know that one needs preset conditions, but 

I think that if the United States is to be involved here it should 

start out with a pretty clear idea of what it is aiming at as a solution in the end. Because if one looks at the history of international 

negotiations and peace processes of this kind you are much more 

likely to get results if instead of simply saying oh, well, you know, 

we will try to bring the sides together and see what happens, 

America itself formulates an idea of what it thinks a just and stable settlement in Kashmir would look like and then works consistently and steadily toward that end. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And do you think it is possible? 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, I think it is possible for the United States to 

formulate its own goals. 

Mrs. DAVIS. But is it possible to bring the two parties together? 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, we have to try, you know. There are so many 

of these desperately intractable problems around the world, but I 

think, as Mr. Krepon has said, there are some issues like the MidVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
44

dle East, or like Kashmir because of the nuclear dimension, which 

are simply so dangerous for humanity, for the region and for the 

interests of the United States that standing aside is simply not an 

option. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And when we try and we have the preset plan or 

what we think should be——

Mr. LIEVEN. I would think so, yes. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. The answer, do we shoot ourselves in 

the foot with our coalition on the war on terrorism? 

Mr. LIEVEN. Well, we would certainly make ourselves quite unpopular with important sections of Indian public opinion and the 

Indian government, but then I have to say I think it is an open 

question just how much of an asset India is in the war against terrorism. On one hand it is clearly some kind of an ally, but, on the 

other hand, some of what India has been doing has actually greatly 

diminished our influence and our prestige in Pakistan and, indeed, 

more widely in the Muslim world. 

I would say that not for reasons of sympathy, but simply for reasons of reality, in terms of controlling and cracking down on terrorism having the Pakistani government on our side is, frankly, 

more important because it is there that the terrorists are based, 

and India is going to work against Islamic terrorists, frankly, whatever we do. Pakistan is not. Not necessarily. 

Mr. PANDYA. The immediate challenges are important—the war 

on terrorism, what impact this has on that, you know, the tension 

between the two countries being bad for regional stability. All that 

is important. My opinion, though, is that the United States, if it 

is to have meaningful influence in the region, cannot simply be 

coming in as a fireman to address specific conflagrations. 

I think that what it is going to take is a sustained process of engagement with the region of a kind that we have not had with either country or with the region as a whole. What it is going to take 

is a real indication that we are there because we consider the region and the welfare of its people important. 

We recognize that they have more than the capacity to make 

trouble, and unless we are willing to be present in that way I think 

it will be a little bit harder for us to get the kind of traction with 

either or both sides that it would really take to address any one 

of these specific problems. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I tend to agree with you. 

Mr. KREPON. Mrs. Davis, it is a bit of an overstatement, but not 

much, to say that the war on terrorism is going to be won or lost 

in Pakistan. 

Mrs. DAVIS. That is why this is such a hot-bed and a tricky——

Mr. KREPON. Yes. What happens from here on out is key. I think 

Secretary Powell totally understands this, and he has a game plan. 

We are sending some heavy hitters into the region. I think there 

is reason for optimism here, but please do not use the template of 

the U.S. role in the Middle East and then pick it up and transpose 

it onto South Asia. 

We are going to have to operate differently in South Asia. There 

are reasons for it. We have a very positive role to play, and my colleagues are exactly right. We have to ride this problem for the duVerDate May 01 2002 10:57 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MESA\060602\80061 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
45

ration. We cannot come and go. I think we can get out of this mess. 

I really do. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PITTS. The Chair thanks the lady. 

I do not think anyone on the panel has spoken to evaluate the 

current diplomacy. It might be crisis diplomacy that is going on 

there, but would you give your opinions as to the impact and what 

is happening with the current U.S. effort to try to de-escalate the 

tension there in South Asia? 

Mr. KREPON. It is really hard for any administration to work two 

severe crises at the same time, in part because the severity of the 

crises demands the attention of the very most senior people. 

The last time something like this happened was back in 1956 

when the Soviets invaded Hungary and the Egyptians were attacked by the Israelis and the British and the French. It happened 

at about the same time, and the Eisenhower Administration had to 

move in two directions at once. 

I think the Bush Administration is now very focused on South 

Asia, as well as on the Middle East. I think it is pretty clear what 

the exit strategy is, and it begins with the cessation of infiltration, 

and it does begin with the closure of these camps and the staging 

areas. It has to be permanent, as the Secretary of State says. 

We have the means to monitor this. India has the means to monitor it, maybe not as good as us, and maybe we can help India to 

monitor it because there is no trust between India and Pakistan. 

It has to be through technical means. Once we are moving in the 

right direction, there is going to be a resumption of dialogue on all 

the important issues. 

The government of India has got to improve its performance in 

Kashmir. Lots of things have to happen. The choreography is not 

easy, but there is a path now in view to move away from the brink. 

There are folks on the ground who are spoilers, and they are 

going to want to destabilize Pakistan. They want to kill Hindus, 

and they want to disrupt U.S. military operations. It is a ‘‘threefer,’’ and they are going to try to do it. 

The only insurance policy the region has against a war when this 

next act of violence occurs is if Musharraf is consistently acting to 

stop infiltration and to close the camps. If he is not, then the tolerance of the Indian government in the face of another huge provocation is going to be slight. 

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Pandya? 

Mr. PANDYA. As I said, I think that U.S. policy is exactly right 

at this juncture, and I would also note that had we not had an interest in the region in December and in the months since then because of our interest in Afghanistan largely, I think that things 

could have been significantly more dire. 

I think that it is possible that after an attack on the Kashmir 

State Assembly and on the Indian Parliament in the space of less 

than 3 months that the Indians would have had a serious, serious 

provocation to actually engage in a military attack on Pakistani 

territory or on Pakistani-held Kashmir, so I think that it is quite 

clear that the sheer interest of the United States is a restraining 

factor and, moreover, the way that we have conducted our diplomacy in the last 2 weeks has been exactly right. 

46

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. 

Mr. LIEVEN. I would second that, but I would have to add that 

I think the relative silence of the United States on the subject of 

the massacres in Gujarat was extremely bad and has made an extremely bad impression on many people around the world. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. Thank you for extending your time here 

to answer the questions. I know we have more and we could go on, 

but this has been very informative, very helpful. The Committee 

thanks the panel very much for this hearing. 

The hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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