Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 1 of 12

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew G. Jones 

Law Office of Andrew G. Jones 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Judy L. Woods 

Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff 

LLP 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Steven Matthies, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

The First Presbyterian Church 

of Greensburg Indiana, INC., 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

April 8, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

16A01-1409-PL-380 

Appeal from the Decatur Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable Timothy B. Day, 

Judge 

Cause No. 16C01-1302-PL-58 

Friedlander, Judge. 

[1] Steven Matthies appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of The 

First Presbyterian Church of Greensburg Indiana, Inc. (First Presbyterian). On 

appeal, Matthies argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 

in favor of First Presbyterian. 

We affirm. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 2 of 12

[2] The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) is a national religious denomination 

governed by its Constitution, which provides for a hierarchical or connectional 

system of governance wherein each lower governing body is answerable to a 

successive higher governing body. The Presbytery of Whitewater Valley, Inc. 

(the Presbytery) is the regional governing body responsible for the mission and 

governance of the Presbyterian Church in central and northeastern Indiana, 

including all of Decatur County, where First Presbyterian is located.1

 First 

Presbyterian is the local church that is ruled by its pastor(s) and ruling elders, 

who make up the Session, the lowest level of governance for the Presbyterian 

Church. The Session observes and carries out the instructions of the higher 

governing bodies, including the Presbytery. 

[3] On October 17, 2010, Reverend Steven Matthies was “called” to the office of 

Designated Pastor for the congregation of First Presbyterian. Appellant’s 

Appendix at 72. On that date, Reverend Matthies entered into a Designated 

Pastor Contract (Contract) that covered a three-year period beginning on 

October 18, 2010. The “Terms of Call” set forth in the Contract provided that 

Reverend Matthies would receive a stated salary, housing, and other benefits, 

including, as pertinent to this case, five weeks of vacation.2

 Id. at 13. 

 

1

 There are four levels of governance within the Presbyterian Church’s hierarchical structure. The Synod is 

the second level of governance, above the Presbytery, and covers a multi-state area. 

2

 The Contract does not expressly indicate that the agreed-upon compensation and benefits were for the 

entire three-year contract term or to be provided on an annual basis. The parties treat the Terms of Call as 

setting forth compensation on an annual basis. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 3 of 12

[4] In the summer of 2012, the relationship between Reverend Matthies and the 

First Presbyterian congregation began to deteriorate. First Presbyterian 

maintained that Reverend Matthies alienated himself from the congregation 

when he “neglected his pastoral responsibilities” by failing to make himself 

available for pastoral counseling services, missing scheduled appointments with 

parishioners, and refusing to keep the Session informed of his whereabouts and 

activities even after being asked to do so. Id. at 65. First Presbyterian 

maintains that from June 2012 into July 2012, Reverend Matthies “abandoned” 

his pastoral duties and was absent from church, without informing the Session 

or obtaining consent to take vacation time. Id. at 66. First Presbyterian asserts 

that by August 2012, Reverend Matthies “failed repeatedly to provide pastoral 

services to [First Presbyterian] without explanation.” Id. Reverend Matthies 

asserts that during the timeframe in question, he utilized two of the five weeks 

of vacation he was entitled to and that he informed the Session prior thereto. 

Matthies also asserts that he did not abandon his congregation and lists what 

his pastoral activities consisted of during his final weeks as the Designated 

Pastor for First Presbyterian.3

[5] The discord between Reverend Matthies and the First Presbyterian 

congregation escalated to a point where the Presbytery intervened to meet with 

Reverend Matthies, the Session, and the congregation to attempt to resolve 

their differences. On July 25, 2012, the Presbytery and its Committee on 

 

3

 Reverend Matthies maintains that he met with members of the congregation, attended a funeral, conducted 

a funeral, led a worship service for a local retirement community, and volunteered at a soup kitchen, among 

other activities. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 4 of 12

Ministry (COM) held a meeting to discuss the ongoing discord. Reverend 

Matthies left before the meeting concluded and failed to meet further with the 

Presbytery or the COM. 

[6] On August 15, 2012, the Presbytery and its COM held a special meeting to 

discuss Reverend Matthies’s continued pastoral relationship with First 

Presbyterian. A letter sent to Reverend Matthies that same day informed 

Reverend Matthies that the COM had unanimously voted to immediately 

dissolve his pastoral relationship with First Presbyterian, finding that “the 

pastoral relationship between [Reverend Matthies and First Presbyterian] is no 

longer viable and needs to be ended in order to prevent further deterioration of 

the spiritual health of the church.” Id. at 86. The letter further provided that 

the COM and First Presbyterian would work with Reverend Matthies to 

negotiate a fair and equitable severance package, but Reverend Matthies 

declined such offer. On or about that same day, the COM notified First 

Presbyterian and its Session of its decision to dissolve Reverend Matthies’s 

pastoral relationship with First Presbyterian. 

[7] On February 8, 2013, Reverend Matthies filed his complaint against First 

Presbyterian, alleging violations of the Indiana Wage Claims Statute and 

Indiana common law. Reverend Matthies sought compensation for unpaid 

salary and benefits, including unpaid vacation wages, to which he claims he 

was entitled pursuant to the Terms of Call set out in the Contract. First 

Presbyterian filed its answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim, seeking a 

determination that Reverend Matthies breached his obligations and promises to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 5 of 12

the congregation by abandoning his pastoral duties. As such, First Presbyterian 

argues that it was no longer obligated under the Contract to compensate 

Reverend Matthies for unused vacation time. 

[8] On June 12, 2013, First Presbyterian filed a motion for summary judgment, 

presenting several alternative grounds in support thereof,4

 and Reverend 

Matthies filed a response in opposition thereto. The trial court held a summary 

judgment hearing on July 31, 2014. On August 13, 2014, the trial court entered 

its order granting summary judgment in favor of First Presbyterian. 

Specifically, the trial court found that to resolve the dispute between the parties 

would require the court “to interpret and apply religious doctrine or 

ecclesiastical law,” which, the court noted, it is precluded from doing pursuant 

to the dictates of the First Amendment. Id. at 6. Pursuant to Reverend 

Matthies’s request, the trial court modified its order granting summary 

judgment to include a finding that there is no just reason for delay and directing 

entry of final judgment on behalf of First Presbyterian with regard to Reverend 

Matthies’s claims for breach of contract and failure to pay earned 

wages/benefits. Reverend Matthies now appeals. 

[9] Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party shows there are no 

genuine issues of material fact with respect to a particular issue or claim. Ind. 

 

4

 First Presbyterian argued that the trial court was barred from considering Reverend Matthies’s claim on 

constitutional grounds, that Reverend Matthies named the wrong defendant, that the Contract is not an 

enforceable secular contract, and that the Indiana Wage Claims Statute is inapplicable because First 

Presbyterian is not an “employer” within the meaning of that statute. First Presbyterian also argued that 

Reverend Matthies’s conduct demonstrated that he abandoned his pastoral responsibilities, thereby relieving 

First Presbyterian of any obligations under the Contract. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 6 of 12

Trial Rule 56(C); Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907 (Ind. 2014). We review 

a summary judgment order de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 

2014). Considering only the facts supported by evidence designated to the trial 

court by the parties, we must determine whether there is a “genuine issue as to 

any material fact” and whether “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” T.R. 56(C); see also TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling, 15 N.E.3d 

985 (Ind. 2014). Where the moving party designates material demonstrating 

there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to a particular issue or 

claim, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with 

designated evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907. 

[10] Upon review, we will accept as true those facts alleged by the nonmoving 

party. Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. 2005). “All designated 

evidence and reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and doubts resolved against the moving party.” Bleeke v. 

Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d at 917. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating 

that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 

1000. Finally, we will affirm a grant of summary judgment on any theory 

supported by the record. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. 

Co., 983 N.E.2d 574 (Ind. 2013). 

[11] The fundamental right to religious freedom, including the freedom to believe 

and the freedom to act, is protected by the United States and Indiana 

Constitutions. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The freedom to 
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believe is absolute, while the freedom to act is subject to regulation for the 

protection of society. Id. In such cases, however, excessive entanglement 

between church and state occurs where courts are asked to review and interpret 

a church’s constitution, laws, and regulations. Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 

450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). To be sure, 

[t]he United States Supreme Court has long held that the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires civil courts to refrain 

from interfering in matters of church discipline, faith, practice, and 

religious law. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (13 Wall.), 20 L.Ed. 

666 (1871). Thus, civil courts are precluded from resolving disputes 

involving churches if “resolution of the disputes cannot be made 

without extensive inquiry ... into religious law and polity....” Serbian 

Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 

2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). Accordingly, this court has held that 

“personnel decisions are protected from civil court interference where 

review by the civil courts would require the courts to interpret and 

apply religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law.” McEnroy v. St. Meinrad 

School of Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. 

denied, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1068, 120 S.Ct. 1675, 146 L.Ed.2d 484 

(2000). 

[12] Stewart v. Kingsley Terrace Church of Christ, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). Nevertheless, the First Amendment “does not entirely prohibit 

courts from opening their doors to religious organizations.” Konkle v. Henson, 

672 N.E.2d at 455. A court can apply neutral principles of law to churches 

without violating the First Amendment. Id. Application of neutral principles 

of law to a church defendant, however, has occurred only in cases involving 

church property or in cases where a church defendant’s actions could not have 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 8 of 12

been religiously motivated. See Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocesse, 

Inc., 714 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

[13] The trial court’s basis for granting summary judgment was that it was 

foreclosed by the First Amendment from considering the issues at hand because 

to address such issues would have required the trial court to interpret and apply 

religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law. Reverend Matthies contends that the 

trial court could avoid violating the First Amendment prohibition against 

excessive entanglement by applying neutral principles of contract law to his 

claims for breach of contract and failure to pay earned wages/benefits. Thus, 

Reverend Matthies maintains that his claim can be resolved without reference 

to either church law or doctrine. 

[14] We are not convinced by Reverend Matthies’s argument. There is no doubt 

that the Terms of Call set forth in the Contract provided that Reverend 

Matthies would receive five weeks of vacation. The question remains, 

however, as to whether upon the termination of his pastoral relationship by the 

Presbytery Reverend Matthies was still entitled to compensation for unused 

vacation time. This determination necessarily would have required inquiry into 

the reason for termination. See Stewart v. Kingsley Terrace Church of Christ, Inc., 

767 N.E.2d at 547 (“[a] determination of whether an employer had good cause 

to terminate an employee’s employment contract necessarily involves a 

consideration of the reasons given for the termination”) (citing Rochester Capital 

Leasing v. McCracken, 295 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973)). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 9 of 12

[15] First Presbyterian cites abandonment of his pastoral duties as the impetus for 

termination of Reverend Matthies’s pastoral relationship with First 

Presbyterian. The Presbytery, through the COM, determined that the discord 

between Reverend Matthies and First Presbyterian resulting from the belief that 

Reverend Matthies abandoned his duties had reached the point where Reverend 

Matthies’s pastoral relationship needed to end “in order to prevent further 

deterioration of the spiritual health of the church.” Appellant’s Appendix at 86. 

First Presbyterian therefore asserts that Reverend Matthies, having abandoned 

his position, breached the Agreement, thereby relieving First Presbyterian of 

any further obligations under the Agreement. Reverend Matthies denies 

abandoning his pastoral duties and lists his pastoral activities in the weeks 

leading up to his termination. 

[16] To address these competing positions regarding the facts of this case would 

require a court to inquire into the religious doctrine of the Presbyterian Church 

and its polity. A court would have to determine what the duties of a pastor 

called to serve a local Session and congregation entail and then decide whether 

the pastor’s conduct met such standards. Essentially, the court would have to 

second-guess, in this case, the Presbytery as to its determination that Reverend 

Matthies’s pastoral relationship was detrimental to the spiritual health of the 

church. Indeed, the court’s inquiry would necessarily require it to delve into 

church doctrine to pass judgment on whether Reverend Matthies was fit to 

serve as pastor of First Presbyterian and whether the pastoral services he 

claimed to have provided were sufficient to meet the standards set forth by the 
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Presbyterian Church. It is in this vein that this court has held that the First 

Amendment “proscribes intervention by secular courts into any employment 

decision made by religious organizations based on religious doctrines or 

beliefs.” McEnroy v. St. Meinrad School of Theology, 713 N.E.2d at 337. 

[17] We conclude that the trial court properly determined that review of the issues 

presented would have necessitated the court to interpret and apply religious 

doctrine or ecclesiastical law. The First Amendment requires civil courts to 

refrain from interfering in such matters. See McEnroy v. St. Meinrad Sch. of 

Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly 

entered summary judgment in favor of First Presbyterian. 

[18] Judgment affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., concurs. 

Crone, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A01-1409-PL-380 | April 8, 2015 Page 11 of 12

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Steven Matthies, 

Appellant-Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 

v. 

The First Presbyterian Church of 

Greensburg Indiana, Inc., 

Appellee-Defendant/Counterclaimant 

Case No. 16A01-1409-PL-380 

Crone, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part 

[19] I agree with the majority that reviewing the issues presented by Matthies’s 

breach of contract claim would require us to interpret and apply religious 

doctrine or ecclesiastical law, which is prohibited under the First Amendment. 

Therefore, I concur in the affirmance of summary judgment in favor of First 

Presbyterian on that claim. 

[20] Respectfully, however, I do not believe that the First Amendment would 

preclude us (or the trial court or a jury) from considering Matthies’s claim for 

unpaid vacation wages under the Wage Claim Statute. That claim, in my 

opinion, simply requires a determination of whether or not there was any 

vacation time accrued as of the date of Matthies’s termination. If there was, I 

believe that claim could be viable regardless of the basis for his termination. 

Addressing that claim might involve resolving disputed facts, interpreting the 
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Contract, and applying the Wage Claim Statute, but it would not involve 

interpreting or applying religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law. Consequently, I 

would reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of First Presbyterian on 

that claim.5

 

5

 I am unpersuaded by First Presbyterian’s argument that the ministerial exception of the Indiana Minimum 

Wage Law should be read into the Wage Claims Statute. And as for First Presbyterian’s argument that the 

Wage Claims Statute is inapplicable because it is not his “employer” for purposes of the Statute, I believe that 

there is, at minimum, a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment on that issue.