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67–888 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–66 

AFGHANISTAN: WHAT IS AN ACCEPTABLE END 

STATE, AND HOW DO WE GET THERE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 3, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Haass, Hon. Richard N., president, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 

NY ......................................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4 

Neumann, Hon. Ronald E., president, American Academy of Diplomacy, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor of Politics 

and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ ...................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma, prepared statement ...... 52 

(III)

(1) 

AFGHANISTAN: WHAT IS AN ACCEPTABLE 

END STATE, AND HOW DO WE GET THERE? 

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, 

Coons, Durbin, Udall, Lugar, Corker, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing will come to order. Thank you all for 

coming to join us today. 

By events that we obviously had no way of predicting, the issues 

that are in front of this committee at this point in time are even 

more compelling and more relevant than they would have been 

anyway. And they were relevant and compelling under any circumstance. We have been planning these hearings for some period of 

time, mostly because July represents that critical moment when 

the President will be making important decisions about our policy 

in Afghanistan. But, for all the obvious reasons, this is a seminal 

moment as we deliberate about our foreign policy and our national 

security interests. 

The death of Osama bin Laden is obviously an event of enormous 

consequence. His wealth, his iconic stature, gained by multiple 

murders and terrorist acts, going back to 1993 or so, his ability to 

plot, organize, direct, motivate, and recruit terrorists, all of those 

things made him a unique threat to our country and our allies. Bin 

Laden’s death deals an enormous blow to al-Qaeda’s ability to operate. It doesn’t end the threat, however. But, still it is a major victory in the long campaign against terrorism waged by our intelligence agencies and our military. 

This event enhances America’s security and it brings us closer to 

our objective of dismantling and destroying al-Qaeda; though, tragically, nothing can erase the bitter memories of September 11, 

2001. The haunting images will be forever seared in our minds: the 

Twin Towers burning, people jumping hand in hand to escape the 

inferno, the buildings collapsing, floor upon floor successively, on 

themselves in a cloud of dust and destruction. But, we remember, 

too, the heroism of America’s finest: the police, the firefighters, the 

emergency workers who gave their lives. These images and the 

2 

realities that they meant, and mean still today, for nearly 3,000 

families and for millions of people around the world, will never be 

forgotten. 

For anyone who has challenged America’s right to go after 

Osama bin Laden, and there have been some, let them remember 

and consider the shameless, cowardly attack out of nowhere that 

bin Laden unleashed on the innocence of all those who suffered, 

and that he then laughed and bragged about. In the wake of World 

War II, it’s hard to believe that one man’s evil aspirations could 

again so convulse the world, so occupy our resources and transform 

our lives. But, he did. And now, thank God, he is dead. 

That death needs to be a lesson to all who embrace violence and 

anarchy in the guise of religious rectitude; the United States of 

America means what it says when we pledge to do whatever it 

takes to protect ourselves and mete out justice to those who wantonly murder and maim. 

So, bin Laden is dead. But, the fight against the violence and the 

hatred that he fomented is not over. In fact, there are many questions—many more than we might have thought—raised as a consequence of the events of the last 48 hours. And it is important for 

us, and for this committee, to think through and find answers to 

these questions. 

One of the reasons we’re here this morning is to examine how 

Osama bin Laden’s death affects the conflict in Afghanistan and its 

implications for our upcoming troop withdrawal, our transition 

strategy, and our partnerships in the region. 

This hearing is the first in a series of six hearings over the next 

3 weeks. It builds on the 14 hearings that we held in the last Congress on Afghanistan and Pakistan. And we are fortunate to start 

with a well-qualified panel of witnesses. 

Dr. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations 

and a friend of this committee. He held many senior government 

positions, including working director of policy planning, and U.S. 

coordinator of policy toward the future of Afghanistan. 

He’s joined by one of his successors, Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, 

who recently went to Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson 

School after serving as Secretary Clinton’s Director of Policy 

Planning. 

Rounding out this group is three-time Ambassador Ronald Neumann who currently serves as the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy. And, like his father in the late 1960s, Ambassador Neumann served as our envoy to Afghanistan from 2005 to 

2007, and recently returned from a trip there. 

So, we thank you all for coming and look forward to a vigorous 

discussion. 

I would just say quickly—before we begin and I turn to my colleague Senator Lugar—as we know, in 2 months, President Obama 

will unveil his strategy for drawing down our forces so that 

Afghans can assume a greater responsibility for their country and 

their future. Our military is making significant inroads, clearing 

the south, particularly, of insurgents. But, we do expect a significant Taliban counterattack this spring, in order to try to regain 

some of those areas. We also know insurgents are spreading into 

3 

other areas of Afghanistan, even as we drive them from their bases 

in the south. 

Clearly, the challenge is not only on the battlefield. Despite the 

tremendous skill and sacrifice of our troops, again and again our 

military leaders and our civilian leaders have repeated the mantra, 

‘‘There is no military victory to be had in Afghanistan.’’ If that is 

true and we accept that it is, then we need to fashion the political 

resolution. 

Out of these hearings, I hope that we can achieve a discussion 

with our partners about how this war ends, what an acceptable end 

state looks like, and what steps we need to take to get there. 

With the death of bin Laden, some people are sure to ask, ‘‘Why 

don’t we just pack up and leave Afghanistan?’’ So, it’s even more 

compelling that we examine carefully what is at stake, what goals 

are legitimate and realistic, what is our real security challenge, 

and how do we achieve the interests of our country. What type of 

Afghanistan do we plan to leave so that we may actually achieve 

those objectives, and how will that peace be achieved? 

Our reintegration efforts, frankly, have had limited impact so far. 

Reconciliation may be more promising in the long run, but it will 

not be fast and it is not a silver bullet. And there may be no grand 

bargain to be had with Mullah Omar or groups like the Haqqani 

Network. Although obviously one of the questions that looms in 

front of us is: How, if at all, has the death Osama bin Laden and 

the events of recent hours affected even the answer to those questions? Some Taliban appear to be willing to negotiate. There are 

different tiers of Taliban. So, the United States needs to send a 

strong and consistent message that we support a political solution 

led by Afghans. It will be difficult, as it was in Iraq, but Afghans 

themselves have to make the hard choices to bring stability to their 

own country. 

So, as we debate the end state, it is inevitable that we need to 

factor in also what can we afford to do, in light of our budget constraints and realities in this country? We will spend $120 billion 

in Afghanistan this fiscal year. And our decisions on resource allocations there affect our global posture elsewhere, as we see today 

in the Middle East, with the crying challenge of Egypt, Tunisia, 

and other countries. We have to ask at every turn if our strategy 

in Afghanistan is sustainable. Our military and civilian strategies 

need to support an Afghanistan that is viable as we transition and 

draw down our forces. 

And finally, we have to consider the regional context, particularly 

Pakistan’s role and what bin Laden’s presence there says about 

that alliance and about the prospects for peace in Afghanistan. 

Sanctuaries in Pakistan continue to threaten the prospects for 

peace in Afghanistan. And, while we have been working closely 

with our Pakistani allies to address our common threats, ultimately we must address Pakistani concerns about what the end 

state in Afghanistan will look like. 

All of this will take patience, it will take careful thinking, it will 

take strategic decisionmaking, and it will take a lot of patience and 

determination. I am confident that we have the ability to achieve 

our goals and to get where we need to go. 

I thank each of you for joining us at this important moment. 

4 

Senator Lugar, it is my pleasure to turn the floor over to you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. I join the Chairman in welcoming our distinguished witnesses, and I thank him for holding this series of hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

These hearings are especially timely, as you pointed out, given 

the killing of Osama bin Laden. Americans are rightly gratified by 

the skill and courage demonstrated by our intelligence professionals and troops. This is an important achievement that yields 

both symbolic and practical value as we continue to fight terrorism 

globally. 

As a prelude to our series, I would offer four observations about 

the ongoing United States effort in Afghanistan. 

First, we are spending enormous resources in a single country. 

The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2012 included more 

than $100 billion for Afghanistan. We have approximately 100,000 

American troops in Afghanistan and another 31,000 in the region 

that are supporting Afghanistan operations. We spent $9.2 billion 

in 2010, and we are spending more than $10 billion this year just 

to train Afghan security forces. President Obama has requested 

nearly $13 billion for training in 2012. Simultaneously, we are 

spending roughly $5 billion per year on civilian assistance mechanisms in Afghanistan at a time when most foreign assistance 

projects worldwide are being cut. 

Second, although threats to United States national security do 

emanate from within Afghanistan’s borders, these may not be the 

most serious threats in the region and Afghanistan may not be the 

most likely source of a major terrorist attack. Last February, 

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Director of the 

National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, said in congressional testimony that Yemen is the most likely source of a terrorist 

attack against American interests in the short term. American resources devoted to Yemen are a tiny fraction of those being spent 

in Afghanistan. Further, we know that al-Qaeda has a far more 

significant presence in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. 

Third, the broad scope of our activities in Afghanistan appears 

to be devoted to remaking the economic, political, and security culture of that country. But we should know by now that such grand 

nation-building ambitions in Afghanistan are beyond our powers. 

This is not to say that we cannot make Afghanistan more secure 

than it is now. But the ideal of a self-sufficient, democratic nation 

that has no terrorists within its borders and whose government is 

secure from tribal competition and extremist threats is highly unlikely. The most recent ‘‘Section 1230 Report on Progress Toward 

Stability and Security in Afghanistan’’ indicates that improvements 

in Afghan governance and development have been inconclusive. All 

of the investments to date and the shift to a comprehensive 

counterinsurgency strategy led by General Petraeus have yielded 

some gains in select areas. The prominent caveat within the 

Defense Department report, however, and sprinkled across nearly 

all recent official statements by the Obama administration is that 

these gains are ‘‘fragile and reversible.’’ 

5 

Fourth, although alliance help in Afghanistan is significant and 

appreciated, the heaviest burden will continue to fall on the United 

States. We have contributed $26.2 billion to the Afghanistan national security forces from 2002 to 2011, while the rest of the 

world, donating through the Afghanistan National Security Force 

Fund, has provided $2.6 billion. Similarly the United States has 

provided $22.8 billion in nonmilitary assistance since 2002, while 

donor partners have provided $4.2 billion. We are carrying the 

lion’s share of the the economic and military burden in Afghanistan 

and this is unlikely to change. Alliance military activities in connection with the civil war in Libya further reduce the prospects for 

significantly greater allied contributions in Afghanistan. 

If one accepts these four observations, it is exceedingly difficult 

to conclude that our vast expenditures in Afghanistan represent a 

rational allocation of our military and financial assets. Our 

geostrategic interests are threatened in numerous locations, not 

just by terrorism, but by debt, economic competition, energy and 

food prices, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 

numerous other forces. 

Some may argue that almost any expenditure or military sacrifice in Afghanistan is justified by the symbolism of that country’s 

connection to the September 11 attacks. But nearly a decade later, 

with al-Qaeda largely displaced from the country, but franchised in 

other locations, Afghanistan does not carry a strategic value that 

justifies 100,000 American troops and a $100 billion per-year cost, 

especially given current fiscal restraints here at home. 

President Obama must be forthcoming on a definition of success 

in Afghanistan based on United States vital interests and a sober 

analysis of what is possible to achieve. Clearly it would not be in 

our national security interest to have the Taliban take over the 

government or have Afghanistan reestablished as a terrorist safe 

haven. But the President has not offered a vision of what success 

in Afghanistan would entail or how progress toward success would 

be measured. The outcome in Afghanistan when United States 

forces leave will be imperfect, but the President has not defined 

which imperfections would be tolerable. There has been much discussion of our counterinsurgency strategy and methods, but very 

little explanation of what metrics must be achieved before the 

country is considered secure. 

I noted in our last hearing on Afghanistan in July 2010, that we 

must avoid defining success there according to relative progress. 

Such definitions facilitate mission creep. Arguably, we could make 

progress for decades on security, employment, good governance, 

women’s rights, and other goals—expending tens of billions of dollars each year—without ever reaching a satisfying conclusion. 

A definition of success must be accompanied by a plan for focusing resources on specific goals. We need to eliminate activities that 

are not intrinsic to our core objectives. We also need to know what 

missions are absolutely indispensable to success, however it is 

defined. 

I am hopeful that these hearings will bring greater focus to the 

mission and strategy in Afghanistan in the context of broader 

United States vital interests. 

I look forward to our discussions. 

6 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

We’re going to go in the order of Dr. Haass, then Dr. Slaughter, 

and then Ambassador Neumann. 

And, as is customary here, we’re happy to put your entire testimony in the record as if read in full. We’d appreciate summaries, 

so that we have a chance to really have a good dialogue here this 

morning. 

I failed to mention, I will be going to Afghanistan next weekend—not this one coming, but the one after—and hope to be able 

to get a good sense, from the Afghans, from President Karzai and 

others, what their take is on where we are, as well as the events 

that have taken place in Pakistan and how that might affect some 

of their calculations. So, we could add that to the record as we go 

forward. 

Dr. Haass, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY 

Ambassador HAASS. Thank you, Senator. Thank you. And thanks 

for having me back here to discuss Afghanistan. 

And, as has been the case whenever I testify here over the years, 

my statement and testimony reflect my personal views and not 

those of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

As you all know, much of the debate about Afghanistan has 

focused on whether United States policy is likely to succeed. With 

success loosely defined as bringing about an Afghan Government 

that, in several years time, can hold off the Taliban with only a 

modest amount of ongoing American help. In theory at least, 

several more years of intense U.S. military effort will provide the 

time and space required to train the Afghan Army and police, and 

weaken the Taliban so that the Taliban will no longer constitute 

an overwhelming threat, or, better yet, decide to negotiate to end 

the conflict. 

Let me say as directly as I can, I am deeply and profoundly skeptical that this policy will work, given the nature of Afghanistan; in 

particular, the weakness of its central institutions, and the reality 

that Pakistan will continue to provide a sanctuary for the Taliban. 

So, yes, U.S. forces will succeed at clearing and holding. But, successful building by the end of 2014 is at best a long shot. Some 

Taliban may give up, but many, and probably most, will not. 

Afghan military and police forces will increase in number and 

improve in performance, but not as much as is needed. 

The bigger question I’d like to talk about, though, is whether it 

is worth—what we are doing is worth it, even if we were to succeed. And I would argue not. Afghanistan, over the years, has 

evolved from a war of necessity into a war of choice. Our interests 

there have become less than vital with the near elimination of 

al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Afghanistan no longer represents a significant global terrorist threat, and certainly no more of one than 

several other countries, most notably Pakistan, in the region. 

Second, there were, and are, other viable policy options available 

to us there. In particular, a more narrow and limited counterVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:22 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\050311-N.TXT
7 

terrorism strategy coupled with a limited degree of nation- or capacity-building. 

The situation in Afghanistan did not, and does not, warrant our 

becoming a protagonist in its civil war, the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy, or the tripling of United States force levels to 

100,000. Afghanistan is not a major terrorist haven, as I said. And 

it should not be assumed it will become one even if the Taliban 

make inroads. It was, and is, an error to equate Taliban return 

with al-Qaeda’s return. And if, however, there is some renewed terrorist presence and activity in Afghanistan, we can, and should, 

respond to it, much as we do in other countries, such as Yemen and 

Somalia. 

The Afghan/Pakistan tie is at the heart of our policy, but also its 

limits. There is no way, I would argue, the United States will be 

able to persuade Pakistan to become a full partner in Afghanistan 

and to stop providing a sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban. Given 

Islamabad’s obsession with India and its view of Afghanistan as a 

critical source of strategic depth in its struggle with India, even a 

solution to the Kashmir conflict would not change this. And there 

is no solution to Kashmir in the offing, certainly not in a timeframe 

that would prove relevant. 

Afghanistan is simply absorbing more economic, military, 

human, diplomatic, and political resources of every sort that it 

wants. The $120 billion annual pricetag, about $1 out of every $6 

or $7 this country now spends on defense, is unjustifiable, given 

the budget crisis we face and the need for air and naval modernization. 

The history of the 21st century is far more likely to be determined in the land areas and waters of Asia and the Pacific than 

it is on the plains and mountains of Afghanistan. We need to be 

better prepared for a number of future counterterrorist interventions elsewhere in the greater Middle East and Africa. And we 

should also make sure that we have adequate forces for dealing 

with possible contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and possibly 

Iran. Afghanistan is a strategic distraction, pure and simple. 

All this is not an argument for complete withdrawal, but it is an 

argument for doing considerably less than we are doing, by transitioning rapidly, over the next year or year and a half, to a relatively small, sustainable, strategically warranted deployment, one 

I would estimate to be on a scale of 10,000 to 25,000 troops. And 

this future troop presence should allow for continued counterterrorist operations along the lines of the sort of operation just carried 

out by United States Special Forces in Pakistan, and for some 

training of Afghan forces at both the national and local level. 

Reductions of the scale I am advocating and the phasing out of 

combat operations against the Taliban have a number of advantages, beginning with the fact that it would save upward of $75 

billion a year and hundreds of American lives and casualties. Continuing what we are doing, on the scale we are doing, will not necessarily achieve more than what is being suggested by what I am 

advocating, given Afghanistan’s history, leadership, demography, 

culture, geography, and neighborhood. And, even if substantial 

progress could be achieved in the near term, there’s nothing to suggest the gains would endure. 

8 

Strategy, as you all know, is about balancing means and ends, 

resources and interests. And the time has come to restore a strategic perspective to what the United States does in Afghanistan. 

Let me, if I can, turn for a few minutes briefly to discussing 

Pakistan. Pakistan is more important than Afghanistan, given its 

population, its arsenal of nuclear weapons, the presence of large 

numbers of terrorists on its territory, and the reality that what 

happens in Pakistan will directly affect India. 

There is the view, in the administration and beyond, that the 

United States has to do a lot to stabilize Afghanistan, lest it become a staging ground for groups that would undermine Pakistan. 

But it is Pakistan that is providing the sanctuary and support to 

the Afghan Taliban, who are the greatest threat to Afghanistan’s 

stability. So, why the United States should be more concerned than 

Pakistanis that Afghanistan could one day endanger Pakistan is 

not clear. It also exaggerates Afghanistan’s actual and potential influence over developments in Pakistan. To be sure, Pakistan is a 

weak state. But, this weakness results far more from internal divisions and poor governance than anything else. If Pakistan ever 

fails, it will less be because of insurgents coming across their border than from decay within. 

It is hard to imagine a more complicated bilateral relationship 

than the one between Washington and Islamabad. And it’s about 

to become more complicated yet. Pakistan is, at most, a limited 

partner. It is not an ally. And, at times, it is not even a partner. 

The United States should be generous in providing aid to Pakistan 

only so long as that aid is made conditional on how it is used. But, 

we must accept that, no matter what the level of aid, there will always be clear differences between how Americans and Pakistanis 

see the world, and sharp differences over what is to be done. 

So, let me suggest a simple guide to U.S. foreign policy when it 

comes to Pakistan. We should cooperate where and when we can, 

but we should act independently where and when we must. And 

the recent successful operation that killed Osama bin Laden is a 

case in point. 

Let me just turn to one last subject, which is that of diplomacy, 

affecting this entire set of questions. There’s growing interest and 

there’s three particular ideas that are gaining some currency: One 

is negotiations involving the Government of Afghanistan and the 

Taliban; second, negotiations involving India and Pakistan; and 

third, resurrecting some sort of a regional forum. 

In the interest of time, for now, let me just say, I am quite skeptical about the possibility for diplomacy resolving the internal questions in Afghanistan. I am even more skeptical of the potential of 

diplomacy to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan. 

But, I do think there is reason to proceed with the possibility of 

some sort of a regional forum, along the lines of the old ‘‘Six Plus 

Two’’ forum, that actually did contribute somewhat. 

In this context, I would also endorse talks between the United 

States and those Taliban leaders willing to engage. Direct communication between the United States and the Taliban would be preferable to allowing either Pakistan or the Afghanistan Governments 

to act as our go-between. I therefore support the decision announced by the Secretary of State to drop preconditions for talking 

9 

to the Taliban. What matters in any dialogue is less where it begins than where it ends. But, the Taliban need to understand that 

we will attack them if they associate with terrorists, and we will 

only favor their participation in a political process if they forgo 

violence. 

Let me just end with one last thought. We should not kid ourselves. Whatever it is we do or don’t do, vis-a-vis Pakistan or 

Afghanistan, there is unlikely to be a rosy future for Afghanistan 

anytime soon. The most likely future, for the next few years and 

possibly on, is some form of a messy stalemate, an Afghanistan 

characterized by a mix of a weak central government, strong local 

officials, and a Taliban presence, supported out of Pakistan, that 

will be extensive in much of the Pashtun-dominated south and east 

of Afghanistan. 

Resolution of the ongoing conflict by either military or diplomatic 

means is highly unlikely and cannot constitute a basis for U.S. policy. Walking away from Afghanistan, however, is not the answer. 

Instead, I would argue this country should sharply scale back what 

we are doing and what we seek to accomplish. And we should aim 

for an Afghanistan that is simply ‘‘good enough,’’ in light of local 

realities, limited interests, and the broad range of domestic and 

global challenges now facing the United States. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Haass follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. HAASS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking me to appear before this committee, in this 

instance to discuss U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and, more specifically, what constitutes an acceptable end state in that country and how the United States can best 

work to bring it about. As has been the case over the past 8 years, my statement 

and testimony today reflect my personal views and not those of the Council on Foreign Relations, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. 

The questions that inform this hearing are at one and the same time critical yet 

difficult to answer. Indeed, I have come to think that just about anything associated 

with Afghanistan is difficult. I first visited that country as a researcher in the late 

1970s in the months preceding the Soviet-engineered coup. Just over a decade later, 

Afghanistan was part of my portfolio of responsibility when I served as the senior 

director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council 

staff of President George H.W. Bush. It was in the first weeks of that administration—in February, 1989, to be precise—that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan came to an end. And, more recently, in the aftermath of 9/11, I served as U.S. 

coordinator for the future of Afghanistan under President George W. Bush. 

Much of the debate about Afghanistan has focused on whether U.S. policy is likely 

to succeed, with ‘‘success’’ loosely defined as bringing about an Afghan Government 

that in several years’ time can hold off the Taliban with only a modest amount of 

continuing American help. In theory, several more years of intense U.S. military 

effort will provide the time and space required to train up the Afghan Army and 

police and weaken the Taliban so that they no longer constitute an overwhelming 

threat or, better yet, decide to negotiate an end to the conflict. 

I am deeply skeptical that this policy will work given the nature of Afghanistan 

(above all, the weakness of central institutions) and the reality that Pakistan will 

continue to provide a sanctuary for the Taliban. Yes, U.S. forces will succeed at 

clearing and holding, but successful building by the end of 2014 is a long shot at 

best. Some Taliban may give up but many and probably most will not. Afghan military and police forces will increase in number and improve in performance but not 

nearly as much as is needed. 

Of course, I may well be proven wrong here, and sincerely hope I will be if the 

decision is made to keep U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan relatively high until the 

end of 2014 or even longer, as is possible if the United States bases any withdrawal 

decision on conditions that will be difficult to bring about. But the bigger question 

hovering over current U.S. Afghan policy is whether it is worth it even if it were 

10 

to succeed. I would argue it is not, both on the micro (local) level and the macro 

(global) level. 

Some perspective is required. American troops have been fighting in one form or 

another in Afghanistan for nearly a decade. But it is essential to note that today’s 

Afghan war is fundamentally different than the one waged after the 9/11 attacks. 

That war was a war of necessity: the most important national interest (self-defense) 

was involved, and there were no promising, timely alternatives to the use of military force once it became clear diplomacy would not bring about an end to Afghan 

Government, i.e., Taliban, support for global terrorism. 

Over time, however, Afghanistan evolved into a war of choice. What made it so 

were two developments. First, U.S. interests had become less than vital with the 

near-elimination of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Afghanistan no longer represented a 

significant global terrorist threat, and certainly no more of one than several other 

countries (most notably, Pakistan) in the region and in Africa. Second, there were 

other viable policy options available to the United States in Afghanistan, in particular a more narrow and limited counterterrorism strategy coupled with a degree 

of nation, i.e., capacity-building. The situation did not warrant our becoming a protagonist in Afghanistan’s civil war, the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy, or 

the tripling of U.S. force levels to near 100,000. 

Just to be clear, wars of choice are not wrong per se. But before undertaking one, 

it is essential to demonstrate that the likely benefits of using military force will outweigh the costs and produce better results at less cost than other policies. Afghanistan does not meet these tests. It is not a major terrorist haven, and it should not 

be assumed it will again become one even if the Taliban make inroads. It was and 

is an error to equate Taliban return with al-Qaeda’s return. If there is some renewed terrorist presence and activity in Afghanistan, we can and should respond 

to it much as we have been doing in other countries such as Yemen and Somalia. 

The Afghan-Pakistan tie is at the heart of U.S. policy and its limits. There is no 

way the United States will be able to persuade Pakistan to become a full partner 

in Afghanistan (and stop providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban) given 

Islamabad’s obsession with India and its view of Afghanistan as a critical source 

of strategic depth in its struggle with India. Even a solution to the Kashmir conflict would not change this—and there is no solution to Kashmir in the offing, certainly not in a timeframe that would prove relevant to U.S. decisionmaking for 

Afghanistan. 

At the macro or global level, Afghanistan is simply absorbing more economic, military, human, diplomatic, and political resources of every sort than it warrants. The 

$110–$120 billion annual price tag—one out of every six to seven dollars this country spends on defense—is unjustifiable given the budget crisis we face and the need 

for military (especially air and naval) modernization. The history of the 21st century 

is far more likely to be determined in the land areas and waters of Asia and the 

Pacific than it is on the plains and in the mountains of Afghanistan. We had also 

better be prepared for a number of future counterterrorist interventions (along the 

lines of Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen) in Libya and elsewhere in the Greater Middle East and Africa. We also need to make sure we have adequate forces for possible 

contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and conceivably with Iran. Afghanistan is 

a strategic distraction, pure and simple. Secretary of Defense Gates’s recent West 

Point speech makes a case for avoiding sending a large American land force into 

places like Afghanistan. I agree. But less clear is why we should continue to deploy 

a large number of soldiers there for the present and near future. 

All this is an argument for doing considerably less than what we are doing, by 

transitioning rapidly (by mid- or late 2012) to a relatively small, sustainable, strategically warranted deployment, one I would estimate to be on a scale of 10,000- 

25,000 troops. The precise number of U.S. troops would be determined by the terrorist threat, training goals, the role assigned to civilians and contractors, and what 

the Afghans were willing to accept. The future U.S. troop presence should allow for 

continued counterterrorist operations (along the lines of what was just carried out 

by Special Forces in Pakistan) and for training of Afghan forces at both the national 

and local level. 

Such a strategy would be consistent with existing policy, i.e., the President all 

along has said the United States would begin troop reductions as of mid-2011. At 

issue is the pace or glide slope of U.S. troop reductions. The President did not commit to any particular pace or end point. 

Reductions of the scale being advocated here and the phasing out of combat operations against the Taliban have a number of advantages. It would save upward of 

$75 billion a year and sharply reduce American casualties. Doing so takes into account Afghan nationalism and the understandable popular desire to limit foreign 

forces in number and role. Doing less with less avoids a large footprint that would 

11 

be costly and risks wearing out our welcome. A more modest strategy is a more sustainable strategy in every way. 

Continuing to do what we are doing on the scale we are doing it will not necessarily achieve more than what is being suggested here given Afghanistan’s history, leadership, demography, culture, geography, and neighborhood, in particular 

Pakistan. And even if substantial progress is achieved in the near term, there is 

nothing to suggest those gains will endure. Strategy is about balancing means and 

ends, resources and interests, and the time has come to restore strategic perspective 

to what the United States is doing in Afghanistan. 

At the same time, to say that current policy in Afghanistan is not warranted by 

either the stakes or the prospects is not to say the United States has no interests 

or can achieve nothing. There is a need for continued counterterror and counterdrug 

operations. There is also a case for continued training of government and local 

forces. The United States has an interest in seeing human rights respected in 

Afghanistan. A continued U.S. military presence would provide a backdrop for efforts to persuade individual Taliban troops and commanders to give up the fight and 

negotiate a modus vivendi with the Afghan Government. The intention of keeping 

some troops after 2012 takes away the argument that we are leaving Afghanistan, 

something that should reassure many Afghans in and out of government, those 

Pakistanis who want to know the U.S. commitment is continuing beyond 2014, and 

those in this country who do not want to do anything that could be interpreted as 

losing and thereby handing a victory to extremists. 

An additional argument against withdrawing is that great powers need to be careful about making dramatic policy changes. Revising a policy is one thing; reversing 

it quite another. A reputation for reliability is important. This line of thinking, however, should not be employed to justify a continued commitment of large numbers 

of lives, dollars, and time on behalf of questionable goals. 

Consistent with the desirability of maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan, I support talks taking place between the U.S. and Afghan Governments on a 

long-term security relationship, one that would include U.S. forces remaining in the 

country for some time to come. There is obviously a significant degree of internal 

Afghan and regional resistance to this notion. To help allay some of these concerns, 

there should be no U.S. permanent bases and no permanent U.S. troop presence. 

The arrangement could be for an initial period of 5 to 10 years and could be cancelled by either side with 1 year’s notice. 

I understand that this hearing is about Afghanistan, but for any number of reasons it is impossible to discuss it without also discussing Pakistan. Pakistan is 

widely acknowledged to be more important than Afghanistan given its population, 

its arsenal of nuclear weapons, the presence of large numbers of terrorists on its 

territory, and the reality that developments in Pakistan can have a profound impact 

on the trajectory of India, sure to be one of the most important countries in the 

world. 

More specifically, there is the widespread view that the United States has to do 

a great deal to stabilize Afghanistan lest it become a staging ground for groups that 

would undermine Pakistan. But it is Pakistan that is providing the sanctuary and 

support to the Afghan Taliban who are the greatest threat to Afghanistan’s stability. The Pakistanis are doing so because they want to retain influence in their 

neighbor and to limit Indian inroads. 

Why the United States should be more concerned than Pakistanis that Afghanistan could one day endanger Pakistan is not clear. More important, this view exaggerates Afghanistan’s actual and potential influence over developments in Pakistan. 

To be sure, Pakistan is a weak state. But this weakness results more than anything 

from internal divisions and poor governance. If Pakistan ever fails, it will be less 

because of insurgents coming across its borders than from decay within them. 

It is hard to imagine a more complicated bilateral relationship than the one between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan is at most a limited partner; it is not 

an ally, and at times it is not even a partner. There are many reasons for the mutual mistrust; what matters for our purposes here is that it is pervasive and deep. 

The United States should be generous in providing military and economic assistance 

only so long as it is made conditional on how it is used; U.S. markets should be 

more open to Pakistani exports. But we must accept that there will always be clear 

differences to how we see the world and sharp differences over what is to be done. 

Under these circumstances, U.S. foreign policy should follow a simple guide: we 

should cooperate with Pakistan where and when we can, but we should act independently where and when we must. The recent successful operation that killed 

Osama Bin Laden is a case in point. 

Interest is growing in the possibility of diplomacy to contribute to U.S. policy. 

Three potential paths are receiving considerable attention. One involves the GovernVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:22 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\050311-N.TXT
12 

ment of Afghanistan and the Taliban. There is talk of moving toward some sort of 

a new ‘‘shura’’ that would attempt to integrate the Taliban into the formal ruling 

structure of Afghanistan. The second involves India and Pakistan. The third involves neighboring and regional states, including Pakistan as well as Iran, India, 

China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others. This would resemble the ‘‘6 plus 2’’ forum 

that facilitated Afghan-related diplomacy in the past. 

I judge prospects for a major breakthrough on either the Afghan/Taliban or India/ 

Pakistan fronts to be poor. There is a weak and divided Afghan Government that 

enjoys at best uneven support around the country. The Taliban are themselves divided. Pakistan has its own agenda. It is far from clear that the situation is ripe 

for a power-sharing accord that would meaningfully reduce much less end the fighting. India and Pakistan are far apart and again it is not clear the leadership in 

either government is in a position to undertake significant negotiations involving 

meaningful compromise. None of this is reason not to explore these possibilities, but 

expectations should be kept firmly in check. Prospects might be somewhat better for 

reviving a regional forum, though, and this possibility should be pursued. 

I should add that I endorse talks between the United States and those Taliban 

leaders willing to engage. Direct communication is much preferable to either the 

Pakistan or Afghan Governments acting as an intermediary. Consistent with this 

perspective, the decision announced by Secretary of State Clinton in February to 

drop preconditions for talking to the Taliban was a step in the right direction. The 

same logic holds for our rejecting any Taliban preconditions. What matters in a dialogue is less where it begins than where it ends. The Taliban should understand 

we will attack them if they associate with terrorists and we will only favor their 

participation in the political process if they forgo violence. The Taliban should also 

know that we will continue to provide military training and support to the Afghan 

central government and to local groups of our choosing. 

We should not kid ourselves, though: there is unlikely to be a rosy future for 

Afghanistan any time soon. The most likely future for the next few years and possibly beyond is some form of a messy stalemate, an Afghanistan characterized by 

a mix of a weak central government, strong local officials, and a Taliban presence 

(supported out of Pakistan) that is extensive in much of the Pashtun-dominated 

south and east of the country. Resolution of the ongoing conflict by either military 

or diplomatic means is highly unlikely and not a realistic basis for U.S. policy. 

Walking away from Afghanistan, however, is not the answer. Instead, this country 

should sharply scale back what it is doing and what it seeks to accomplish, and aim 

for an Afghanistan that is ‘‘good enough’’ in light of local realities, limited interests, 

and the broad range of both domestic and global challenges facing the United 

States. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward 

to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Haass. Very comprehensive and, I think, very appropriately provocative and 

thoughtful, as well. And we look forward to following up on it. 

Dr. Slaughter. 

By the way, Dr. Slaughter, welcome back. I don’t know if many 

of you know it, but Dr. Slaughter was an intern here in this 

committee in 1979, through persistence, mostly, if I remember. 

[Laughter.] 

But, we welcome you back. You’ve come a long way. 

STATEMENT OF ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, BERT G. KERSTETTER ’66 UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, 

NJ 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Thank you. I hope some of the interns around 

can imagine a similar return. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify, Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar. 

I want to start with three very different and quite dramatic images that frame the story of Afghanistan today. 

First, think about our troops posted on remote and often barren 

outposts in the valleys and on the mountains of Afghanistan, workVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:22 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\050311-N.TXT
13 

ing under fiercely difficult conditions to defeat and drive out the 

Taliban. In the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death yesterday, 

a former paratrooper with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command wrote of his deployment, ‘‘Our job was to build a sustainable 

nation in a Mad Max wasteland, and we did our duty.’’ 

The second image is of the extraordinary operation carried out by 

the highly skilled and trained team of Navy Seals against Osama 

bin Laden’s compound. They succeeded in accomplishing a key part 

of the mission that our troops are in Afghanistan to do: to destroy 

and degrade al-Qaeda. But, that success did not follow from statebuilding operations in Afghanistan. Indeed, it didn’t even take 

place in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan. 

The third image is of young Arabs in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and now Syria mustering the courage to face bullets, 

beatings, and brutality to claim their basic rights as human beings: 

to speak freely, to assembly freely, to participate in deciding how 

they’ll be governed, and to hold their governments accountable for 

the provision of basic services and the possibility of a better life. 

The determination of those protestors, in their millions, to demand far more of their rulers even in desperately poor and conflictridden countries, is exactly the attitude of responsibility and selfreliance that we hope to see among the people of Afghanistan, but 

too often do not. Indeed, many reports from the field describe a culture of dependence, corruption, and inflated expectations that the 

United States and its allies have helped to create. 

As we reexamine our goals in Afghanistan and the next phase of 

how to secure those goals, it’s worth bearing those three images in 

minds, the things that connect them and the disjunctures between 

them. We seek a secure, stable, and self-reliant Afghanistan that 

does not provide sanctuary for al-Qaeda and that is a crossroads 

for an increasingly prosperous and secure region. 

I disagree that Afghanistan is a strategic distraction. It’s a strategic distraction only until the next attack. Moreover, we can’t 

think about Afghanistan separately from Pakistan and India and, 

as I will argue, the broader Central-Asian region, which is an extremely important region, going forward. 

A secure Afghanistan means a country with low levels of violence 

that is defended and policed by its own local, regional, and national 

forces. That means not only an end to open conflict between government and insurgents, but also the basic kind of everyday safety 

that allows citizens to go to work and to send their children to 

school. Establishing that kind of security in Afghanistan requires 

not only building up Afghan police and military forces, but also, 

and crucially, creating the kinds of incentives for them to risk their 

lives for the sake of protecting their own people. 

It also means removing U.S. troops as focal points and targets 

for Taliban attacks; attacks that end up alienating the very 

villagers that our soldiers seek to protect and win over. Our 

counterinsurgency strategy assumes that if we protect and serve 

the population of a village, they will have incentives to give us the 

information we need to protect ourselves and drive out the enemy. 

In some cases, for some periods of time, that has proved true. But, 

it’s a strategy that assumes the troops providing protection are 

there to stay for as long as it takes to erase the possibility of retalVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:22 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\050311-N.TXT
14 

iation by the enemy that’s been informed against. As long as villagers know that we are going to leave someday, as we will, and 

as long as they lack faith in their own government to protect them, 

their instincts for self-preservation will tell them to keep quiet. 

Their incentives are to go with the winner, not to make us the 

winner. 

Moreover, the only real long-term security flows from competent 

and honest government, whether in a village in Afghanistan or in 

city neighborhoods in the United States. Real security in Afghanistan can come only if the central government has the incentives to 

choose and keep capable and honest local and regional officials, or 

a new constitution allows for more decentralized election of those 

officials, and mechanisms for citizens to hold them directly accountable. 

So, the key question, going forward, is how to align the Afghan 

Government’s incentives with serving the interests of its people at 

every level. Many different strategies have been tried, but if we are 

embarking on a public transition from this period forward, we can 

make clear that, from now on, we will be investing in winners. Our 

development dollars, our civilian assistance, and our military advising and support will flow to those villages, towns, cities, and 

provinces that demonstrate the ability to help themselves. When a 

competent official is replaced with an incompetent one, we will 

shift resources elsewhere. The message at every turn must be that 

we have a strong interest in seeing Afghans succeed in securing 

and rebuilding their country, but not so strong that it means we 

will do it in their stead. 

Security is a necessary but not sufficient condition. We also need 

stability; stability meaning predictability. Real stability, as Chairman Kerry started, cannot be won by military force. It requires a 

political settlement that is sufficiently accepted by all sides to create a long-term political equilibrium. And the sooner we begin constructing that equilibrium the better. 

In a speech at MIT last week, former British Foreign Secretary, 

David Miliband, argued that a political settlement is not part of a 

multipronged strategy in a counterinsurgency. It is the overarching 

framework within which everything else fits and in the service of 

which everything else operates. He recommends that western countries in Afghanistan set out a unified and strong vision addressing 

the security situation, possible amendments to, or interpretations 

of, the Afghan Constitution, basic human rights guarantees for all 

Afghan citizens, and the best model of governance for Afghanistan. 

Such a vision would provide a diplomatic benchmark against which 

all negotiating parties can begin to adjust their positions. I can see 

value in such a course, but my purpose today is not to outline a 

specific diplomatic strategy. 

However we get negotiations on a political settlement underway, 

however, there’s a great advantage to actually beginning the political endgame, rather than continually complementing it, in that it 

will force multiple players to reveal their true preferences about 

what they will and will not accept. Only with a sense of real redlines on all sides can a lasting deal be constructed. 

The death of Osama bin Laden creates a new opportunity to 

begin those negotiations. The United States has already made clear 

15 

that his death is not the end of the war in Afghanistan. But, we 

should now mark this moment as the beginning of the end, as a 

moment that allows us to pivot toward a comprehensive political 

settlement that will bring security and stability to Afghanistan and 

greater security to Pakistan while still allowing the United States 

to take whatever measures are necessary to protect ourselves 

against al-Qaeda. 

That settlement has to be durable and consistent enough with 

the basic rights and interests of all Afghan citizens, sufficient to 

allow all countries, regional and international institutions, corporations, citizens to invest in Afghanistan’s economic and social capital. The architects of a political settlement must pay equal attention to provisions that will provide a foundation for Afghanistan’s 

economic future from trade and investment rather than foreign 

assistance. 

Let me turn to that economic vision. The last thing we seek is 

a self-reliant Afghanistan. U.N. officials, NGO officials, people with 

long experience in Afghanistan often point out that it is impossible 

to build the capacity of a foreign government when the inflated salaries offered by our government, other governments, NGOs, international institutions drain local talent from local institutions. 

When Afghan engineers make more as advisors, or even drivers 

and translators, to Westerners, it is small wonder that local and 

national government bureaucracies fall short. Moreover, large sums 

of aid without sufficient accountability mechanisms, and being distributed too fast, inevitably contribute to growing corruption. 

Moving forward in Afghanistan, we must be aware of our own inflationary footprint on the Afghan economy and the expectations of 

the Afghan people. It is worth exploring how governments and 

other organizations could conform much more to local conditions 

and to pay scales, as many of our soldiers often do. At the same 

time, we need to focus on finding export markets for Afghan farmers and entrepreneurs, and socially, as well as economically, profitable ways to exploit Afghanistan’s mineral sector. 

The recent agreement by Pakistan and India’s commerce secretaries to improve trade ties across a wide range of sectors, and a 

newfound confidence among Pakistani businessmen that they can 

compete in India’s markets, are promising signs of a willingness to 

make long-held aspirations of regional markets a reality. 

Afghanistan’s rich mineral resources are already attracting largescale investment, with China the winning bidder for a $3 billion 

project to exploit Afghanistan’s largest copper mine. The agreement 

commits China to build a powerplant that could provide electricity 

to most of Kabul, and to build Afghanistan’s first railroad which 

will run to the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Afghanistan also has 

a new outlet to the sea, thanks to a 135-mile road, constructed by 

India, connecting the Iranian port of Chabahar with Nimroz province in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan is actually increasingly poised to resume its historic 

and very lucrative position as the trading crossroads of central and 

south Asia. And again, whereas Afghanistan itself may seem strategically less significant, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the rest 

of central Asia are absolutely essential for the United States and, 

I would argue, for the world, going forward. The question for the 

16 

1D.B. Grady, ‘‘Veteran’s Day,’’ The Atlantic, May 2, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/veterans-day/238138/. 

United States is how a regional diplomatic agreement that would 

help address Pakistan’s chronic security concerns at the same time 

as it would engage key regional players in underwriting long-term 

peace and stability in Afghanistan can also help build the foundations of regional economic engagement and integration. 

Before I conclude, it’s worth pausing for a moment to think about 

what this debate is not about. It’s not about finger-pointing for past 

mistakes. It is not about the performance of our troops, which has 

often been superb. It’s not about whether their fight has been 

worth it. We have an overwhelming reason to ensure that Afghanistan cannot again offer sanctuary to al-Qaeda. And the fighting to 

date has brought us to the point where al-Qaeda is severely degraded. It is not about whether COIN is right or wrong as a theory 

of how to fight insurgency. And it’s not about whether Afghanistan 

can ever be governed. 

It’s about getting from where we are now to where we want to 

be, a realistic vision of a secure, stable, and self-reliant Afghanistan. Achieving that goal requires seizing the opportunity and the 

political space, afforded us by Osama bin Laden’s death, to orchestrate and schedule negotiations on a final political settlement within Afghanistan and a broader regional, economic, and security 

agreement. In the meantime, as the endgame begins, we must 

move as rapidly as possible to supporting only those Afghan forces 

and officials who demonstrably take responsibility for their own security and development. That was, after all, the central premise of 

how we distributed funds to European countries under the Marshall Plan. 

In the end, success is a matter of aligning incentives. Our military strategy must work side by side with a development strategy 

and a diplomatic strategy that focuses on building incentives for all 

the relevant players—Afghan villagers in growing urban populations, Afghan troops, the Afghan Government, the Pakistani Government, the Afghan and possibly the Pakistani Taliban, India, 

China, Russia, Turkey, Europe, and others—to act in ways that 

will advance their own interests and our ultimate goals. That is a 

job for our diplomats more than it is for our military and development experts. It may seem like an impossible job, but the sooner 

we begin it, the higher the chances of success. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Slaughter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER

Let me begin with three very different and dramatic images. 

First, consider the image of our troops posted in remote and often barren outposts 

in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan, working under fiercely difficult conditions to protect villagers and fight the Taliban. In the aftermath of Osama Bin 

Laden’s death a former paratrooper with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command wrote of his deployment: ‘‘Our job was to build a sustainable nation in a Mad 

Max wasteland, and we did our duty.’’ 1 The crazy lawlessness of Mad Max similarly 

permeates the Oscar-nominated documentary ‘‘Restrepo,’’ as well as the descriptions 

of other outposts in the Korengal Valley in Bing West’s 2011 book ‘‘The Wrong 

War.’’ 

The second image is of the extraordinary operation carried out by the highly 

skilled and trained team of Navy SEALs who carried out the successful attack 

17 

against Osama Bin Laden’s compound. Amid the deep satisfaction of having finally 

caught the man who symbolized al-Qaeda and the attacks on 9/11 more than any 

other has been a deep pride in the capabilities, organization, and preparation of 

these young men and the intelligence, analysis, and institutions behind their operation. They succeeded in accomplishing a key piece of the mission our troops are 

in Afghanistan to do: degrading and destroying al-Qaeda. But this success did not 

follow from state-building operations on the ground in Afghanistan itself. Indeed, 

the operation did not even take place in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan. 

The third image is of young Arabs from Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and now 

Syria mustering the courage to face bullets, beatings, and brutality to claim their 

basic rights as human beings: to speak and assemble freely, to participate in deciding how they will be governed, and to hold their governments accountable for the 

provision of basic services and the possibility of a better life. The determination of 

these protesters, in the millions, to demand far more of their rulers, even in desperately poor and conflict ridden countries, is exactly the attitude of responsibility 

and self-reliance that we hope to see among the people of Afghanistan, but do not. 

Instead, reports from the field all too often describe a culture of dependence, corruption, and inflated expectations that we have helped to create. 

As we reexamine our goals in Afghanistan and the next phase of how to secure 

those goals, it is worth bearing these three images in mind and reflecting on both 

the connections and the disjunctions between them. 

THE AFGHANISTAN WE SEEK

We seek a secure, stable, and self-reliant Afghanistan that does not provide sanctuary for al-Qaeda and that is a cross-roads for an increasingly prosperous and secure region. 

A Secure Afghanistan 

A secure Afghanistan would be a country with low levels of violence that is defended and policed by its own local, regional, and national forces. Security means 

not only an end to open conflict between the government and insurgents and/or warlords, but also the kind of everyday safety that allows citizens to go to work and 

to send their children to school. It means a country free from the continual fear of 

violence or death, whether targeted or random. 

Establishing that kind of security across Afghanistan requires not only building 

up Afghan police and military forces but also creating the incentives for them to risk 

their lives for the sake of protecting their people. It also means removing U.S. 

troops as focal points and targets for Taliban attacks, attacks that end up alienating 

the very villagers that our soldiers seek to protect and win over. COIN assumes that 

if we protect and serve the population of a village they will have incentives to give 

us the information we need to protect ourselves and drive out the enemy. In some 

cases, for some periods of time, that has proved true. But it is a strategy that 

assumes the troops providing protection are there to stay for as long as it takes to 

erase the possibility of retaliation by the enemy that was informed upon. As long 

as villagers know that we are going to leave some day, as we will, and as long as 

they lack faith in their own government to protect them, their instincts for selfpreservation will tell them to keep quiet. Their incentives are to go with the winner, 

not make us the winner. 

The only real long-term security flows from competent and honest government, 

whether in a village in Afghanistan or city neighborhoods in the United States. Real 

security in Afghanistan can come only if the central government either has the incentives to choose and keep capable and honest local and regional officials or a new 

constitution allows for more decentralized election of such officials and mechanisms 

for citizens to hold them directly accountable. Honest and capable Afghan officials 

exist. The most frustrating and often heart-wrenching stories over the past decade 

are those of mayors or police chiefs or governors who temporarily succeeded in serving their people, only to be murdered without retribution or deliberately fired by the 

central government and replaced with cronies. 

The key question going forward is how to align the Afghan Government’s incentives with serving the interests of its people at every level. Many different strategies 

have been tried, but if we are in fact embarking on a public transition, we make 

clear that we will be investing in winners. Our development dollars, our civilian 

assistance, and our military advising and support will flow to those villages, towns, 

cities, and provinces that demonstrate the ability to help themselves. When a competent official is replaced with an incompetent one, we will shift resources elsewhere. 

In the short term, adopting this strategy could well mean accepting less success 

for U.S. dollars, in the sense of fewer program outcomes or even less territory seVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:22 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\050311-N.TXT
18 

2David Miliband, ‘‘The War in Afghanistan: Mending It Not Just Ending It,’’ speech delivered 

at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 13, 2011, http://davidmiliband.net/speech/ 

the-war-in-afghanistan-mending-it-not-just-ending-it/. 3 Ben Birnbaum, ‘‘Afghan Opposition Leader: International Presence Still Needed After Bin 

Laden’s Death,’’ The Washington Times, May 2, 20100, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 

2011/may/2/abdullah-international-presence-bin-laden-death/. 

cured. Military commanders and civilian program administrators have to be able to 

pull the plug on partially secured territory as soon as Afghan forces demonstrate 

that they are unwilling to take sufficient responsibility for local security and on partially completed programs when local civilian officials fail to meet a basic standard 

of competence. The message at every turn must be that we have a strong interest 

in seeing Afghans succeed in securing and rebuilding their country, but such an interest that it means we will do the job in their stead. 

A Stable Afghanistan 

Stability means predictability. Real stability cannot be imposed or even won by 

military force. It requires a political settlement that is sufficiently accepted by all 

sides to create a long-term political equilibrium. And the sooner we begin constructing that equilibrium the better. 

In a speech at MIT last week former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband 

argued that ‘‘a political settlement is not one part of a multipronged strategy in a 

counterinsurgency; it is the overarching framework within which everything else fits 

and in the service of which everything else operates.’’ 2 He recommends that Western countries fighting in Afghanistan set out a unified and strong vision addressing 

the security situation, possible amendments to or interpretations of the Afghan Constitution, basic human rights guarantees for all Afghan citizens, and the best model 

of governance for Afghanistan. Such a vision, he contends, will provide a diplomatic 

benchmark against which all the negotiating parties can begin to adjust their positions. 

I can see value in such a course. But I would not presume to outline a specific 

diplomatic strategy here. The business of diplomacy is figuring out the fastest and 

best way to get the parties to the table with positions that are sufficiently real and 

flexible to allow for a lasting bargain to be forged. Regardless how we get negotiations on a political settlement underway, however, the great advantage to actually 

beginning the political endgame, rather than continually contemplating it, is that 

it will force multiple players to begin to reveal their true preferences about what 

they will and will not accept. Only with a sense of real redlines on all sides can 

a lasting deal be constructed. 

The death of Osama bin Laden creates a new opportunity to begin real negotiations. The Afghan Government has greeted the death of Bin Laden by arguing simultaneously that U.S. forces should be focusing on Pakistan rather than Afghanistan, since that is where the real terrorists are. At the same time, the leader of the 

Afghan opposition, former Foreign Minister and Presidential candidate, Abdullah 

Abdullah, noted immediately that U.S. forces will still be needed in Afghanistan for 

a long time to come.3 The United States has already made clear that the death of 

Osama Bin Laden is not the end of the war in Afghanistan. But we should now 

mark this moment as the beginning of the end, a moment that allows us to pivot 

toward a comprehensive political statement that will bring security and stability to 

Afghanistan and greater security to Pakistan while still allowing the United States 

to take whatever measures are necessary to protect ourselves against al-Qaeda. This 

pivot will help creates a new set of strong incentives for the Afghan Government 

to engage in the kind of behavior on both the development and defense side that 

warrants our continuing assistance. 

A final political settlement must be durable enough and consistent enough with 

the basic rights and interests of all Afghan citizens to allow all countries, corporations, and individual citizens to invest in Afghanistan’s economic and social capital. 

Predictability is the prerequisite for any kind of long-term investment, and Afghanistan needs the kind of investment that will employ its growing youth population, 

its newly educated women and girls, and its different tribes and ethnic groups. The 

architects of a political settlement must thus pay equal attention to provisions that 

will provide a foundation for Afghanistan’s economic future from trade and investment rather than foreign assistance. 

A Self-Reliant Afghanistan 

U.N. officials and experienced veterans from Non-Governmental Organizations 

often point out that it is impossible actually to build the capacity of a foreign government when the inflated salaries offered by foreign governments, NGOs, and 

international institutions drain all local talent from local institutions. When Afghan 

19 

engineers make more as advisers (or even as translators and drivers) to Westerners, 

it is small wonder that local and national government bureaucracies fall short. 

Moreover, the large sums of aid pouring in to a very poor country inevitably contribute to growing corruption. 

Moving forward in Afghanistan, it is vital to be much more aware of our own inflationary footprint on the Afghan economy and the expectations of the Afghan people. It is worth investigating how governments and other organizations can possibly 

conform much more to local conditions and pay scales, as many of our soldiers certainly do. At the same time, we need a far greater focus on finding export markets 

for Afghan farmers and entrepreneurs and on socially as well as economically profitable ways to exploit Afghanistan’s mineral sector. 

The recent agreement by Pakistan and India’s commerce secretaries to improve 

trade ties across a wide range of sectors and a new-found confidence among Pakistani businessmen that they can compete in India’s markets are promising signs of 

a willingness to make long-held aspirations of broader regional markets a reality. 

Both Pakistan and India’s leaders understand the vital importance of economic 

growth and the value in weaving their two economies closer together. At the same 

time, Pakistan has been proposing closer economic ties with Afghanistan in ways 

that could have a direct impact on China and India. Add to this mix a proposed 

natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to 

India, as well as a $500 million project financed by the Asian Development Bank 

to build a 1,300 megawatt, high-transmission power line carrying electricity produced by hydropower of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through Afghanistan to Peshawar in Pakistan, and possible energy deposits in Afghanistan itself, and the outlines 

of a regional energy market begin to emerge. The path to greater Afghan selfreliance is likely to run through greater regional economic integration. 

Afghanistan’s rich mineral resources are already attracting massive investment, with China the winning bidder for a $3 billion project to exploit Afghanistan’s largest copper mine. The agreement commits China to build a powerplant that can provide electricity to much of Kabul and to finance and build Afghanistan’s first railroad, which will run to the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Afghanistan also has a 

new outlet to the sea, due to a 135-mile road constructed by India connecting the 

Iranian port of Chahbahar with Nimroz province in Afghanistan. It is thus increasingly poised to resume its historic (and lucrative) position as the trading cross-roads 

of Central and South Asia. 

The question for the United States is how a regional diplomatic agreement that 

would help address Pakistan’s chronic security concerns at the same time as it 

would engage key regional players in underwriting long-term peace and stability in 

Afghanistan can also help build the foundations for regional economic engagement 

and integration. Reduced trade barriers and a growing common economic space in 

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan can radiate outward through a much broader Central and South Asian region. From Turkey to China, India to Russia, the EU to 

Singapore, many countries have a strong interest in the economic development of 

this region. And again, when it becomes clear that a serious diplomatic process is 

finally in train, many countries will have an incentive to be sure that they have a 

place at the table. 

Before concluding this discussion of a desirable end state in Afghanistan and how 

to get there, it is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on what this debate is not 

about. It is not about finger-pointing for past mistakes. It is not about the performance of our troops, which has often been superb. It is also not about whether their 

fight has been worth it. We have an overwhelming reason to ensure that Afghanistan cannot again offer sanctuary to al-Qaeda and the fighting to date has brought 

us to the point where al-Qaeda is severely degraded. It is not about whether COIN 

is right or wrong as a theory of how to fight insurgency. And it is not about whether 

Afghanistan can ever be governed. 

It is about getting from where we are now to where we want to be. I have argued 

for a realistic vision of a secure, stable, and self-reliant Afghanistan. Achieving that 

goal requires seizing the opportunity and the political space afforded us by Osama 

Bin Laden’s death to orchestrate and schedule negotiations on a final political settlement within Afghanistan and a broader regional economic and security agreement. In the meantime, as the endgame begins, we must move as rapidly as 

possible to a posture of supporting only those Afghan forces and officials who demonstrably take responsibility for their own security and development. That was, 

after all, the central premise of how we distributed funds to European countries 

under the Marshall Plan. 

In conclusion, success in Afganistan is above all a matter of aligning incentives. 

Our military strategy must work side by side with a development strategy and a 

diplomatic strategy that focuses on building incentives for all the relevant players— 

20 

Afghan villagers and growing urban populations, Afghan troops, the Afghan Government, the Pakistani Government, the Afghan and possibly the Pakistani Taliban, 

India, China, Russia, Turkey, the EU, and others—to act in ways that will advance 

their own interests and our ultimate goals. That is a job for our diplomats more 

than for our military and our development experts. It may seem like an impossible 

job, but the sooner we embark on it, the better the chances that we can get it done. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Slaughter. 

Ambassador Neumann. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD E. NEUMANN, PRESIDENT, 

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar, 

thank you very much for inviting me to appear here, about a 

month after my last trip to Afghanistan. I found that security has 

improved in some areas, but, as everyone is noting, heavy fighting 

is ahead of us. 

It took a long time to get in place the military and civilian forces 

decided on in 2009, longer than many had hoped, although many 

of those hopes were not very realistic. I think that lag between 

decision and action is now distorting the discussion of where we 

are. I believe that the thing to watch is what happens next year. 

If United States forces can transfer some of the difficult areas to 

Afghans, and the Afghans can hold them, then transition will begin 

to have real credibility. If not, the strategy will lose all credibility. 

But, I believe these forthcoming operations are much more important than the speculative kind of conclusions that people are dashing to at the moment. 

The killing of Osama bin Laden is significant, but the war is not 

over. We’ve all agreed on that, so I won’t talk about that. 

You asked, in your letter, how policy choices have affected the 

current dynamic. I would say that security is improving and politics are a mess. Afghanistan does suffer from a weak government 

with much corruption. These problems are large; they are not 

unique to the area. However, our actions have made many of these 

problems worse. 

Strident public criticism was taken by many Afghans as evidence 

that the United States was turning against Karzai. Since, through 

ignorance, the United States has employed many corrupt warlords 

as contractors, this has created the suspicious question, ‘‘Why 

should I fire my crooks if you won’t fire yours?’’ 

Our goal of destroying al-Qaeda remains important, but it is not 

clear to Afghans what this means for our longer term policy toward 

Afghanistan. When I was there, I heard the same point from 

Karzai, from his most strident opponents, from Afghans who are 

not even in politics, saying, ‘‘What does the United States want? 

What does it intend?’’ 

The result of this has both immediate and longer term consequences. For President Karzai, I believe that he has developed a 

strong suspicion that we are either against him or we will leave before Afghanistan has the strength to survive. And he has intensified his survival strategy, seeking to build a network of military 

and political supporters who will sustain him if we bail out. And, 

for survival, he will tolerate very poor performance. 

Clearly, many of the problems of poor governance in Afghanistan 

are Afghan problems. However, I am emphasizing our own responVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:22 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\050311-N.TXT
21 

sibility because that is a piece of the issue which we can work on 

and fix. And I think we have not paid enough attention to it. For 

Afghans, generally, the confusion results in the pursuit of hedging 

strategies. 

I might move on here, because you’re going to tell me I’m out of 

time, and my timing device is not ticking. 

Afghans generally are pursuing hedging strategies because of 

this confusion. Many fear the return of the Taliban, either because 

of our withdrawal or through a political deal. Some non-Pashtuns 

would fight rather than submit to such a return. Some are thinking 

about how to position themselves if the Taliban returns, and are 

even considering a civil war. I heard on my visit more talk about 

thinking about a civil war than I’d ever heard before. This hedging, 

as much as corruption, is getting in the way of resisting the 

insurgency. 

You asked what we need to achieve. We need to clarify our longterm intentions. To prevent the return of terrorism, we need to 

build Afghan security forces capable of carrying on the level of 

fighting required as we pull out. The standard I am referring to is 

not impossible, but it does require dynamic leaders, as well as essential support capacities that are only now being developed, because we didn’t choose to begin that until recently. This is a process of several years. 

Difficult areas must be turned over to Afghan lead, and I think 

that process needs to start while United States forces are thinned 

out. The Afghans need to be given some opportunity to lead, even 

to fail, before we simply are out the door. 

There is a big difference between some of us here today, obviously, although some of the difference between, for instance, me 

and my very respected colleague, Dr. Haass, is about the speed at 

which one tries to turn over. But, I think that question is an 

incredibly serious one. 

I think that we are behind what many people hoped would be 

our time schedule, but that we are right on the cusp of beginning 

to turn over areas in the south within the next 6 to 12 months. If 

we cannot do that, then I think the strategy’s a failure. But, rushing away just as we are getting to that point would also, I think, 

be a great mistake. 

The Afghan central government must control its more rapacious 

local leaders; we all agree on that. This is easy to say, very difficult 

to do, after 30 years of divisive warfare. I think we are spending 

too much in some of our economic programs, fueling a culture of 

dependency and corruption that does them no good, since we cannot sustain it. Yet, having said that, I understand that Afghans, 

not we, have to work out acceptable political institutions. 

You asked about broader policy considerations. Two that I support are regional solution and negotiation, but on the understanding that neither provides a fast way out. There exists a long 

instructive history of negotiation to end such conflicts, and every 

one of them took years while fighting continued. To expect less in 

Afghanistan is unrealistic. Nor is it clear the Taliban leadership 

seeks compromise. 

I believe that President Karzai needs to know that he has solid 

U.S. backing to achieve a good agreement, not a fast one. I do not 

22 

believe that separate parallel U.S. negotiations will do more than 

create confusion and counterbidding between different parties. I believe our role in negotiations can reassure other Afghans that their 

essential freedoms will be protected, something that is very destabilizing now. 

Afghanistan had a long period of peace when its neighbors essentially left it alone. We need to focus on recreating this, understanding that such a situation requires that the neighbors realize 

that they cannot achieve their maximum desires. It is not clear to 

me that Pakistan recognizes that. 

Additionally, a regional solution that many speak about a sort of 

neutrality requires an Afghan Government capable of preserving 

internal order. If many Afghan parties contend for power, they will 

draw in foreign support, leading to the rapid destruction of any 

neutrality agreement. 

Let me just very briefly, as I close, note three points that I’ve expanded on in my written testimony. 

I think that the effort in Afghanistan is essential to our goals in 

Pakistan. I do not think they can be treated as alternatives, 

because of the way Pakistan looks upon Afghanistan. If we are 

leaving, Pakistan’s security issues, its strategic analysis of Afghanistan is extraordinarily different from whether we have commitment 

to stay, so that I think it is incredibly important to approach Pakistan with the linkage in mind. 

I think there is a grave danger of excessive dependence on local 

security forces. I have lived with a number of those situations. 

There are some things that can work; most of them are abysmal 

failures. 

I do not think counterterrorism is an alternative to a broader 

strategy, although it is certainly a part of one. It depends on onthe-ground intelligence and resources. If our primary approach to 

Afghanistan is counterterrorism, then what we say to the Afghans 

is, ‘‘All we bring you is endless years of slaughter.’’ There is nothing in that approach which will produce Afghan support for us in 

that policy. If we are not there, at least in part, to help build a 

country, there is nothing in that policy that attracts Afghans. 

I understand the gravity of our deficit. However, I understand 

also, as I believe you do, that the United States does not have the 

luxury of pursuing only one interest at a time. I believe that, in 

the effort to turn over to Afghan forces, we can bring down our 

financial burden to an acceptable level. I also believe that the alternative is to grab at some patchwork strategy that will cost us far 

more in the long run. 

And I am pleased to answer your questions. Thank you very 

much for including me. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Neumann follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD E. NEUMANN

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, thank you for inviting me to appear before you 

today. As you know I was U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007. Additionally, I returned last year and again in March of this year for 2 weeks. I had 

the opportunity to visit many parts of the country and to talk to Afghan friends and 

foreign diplomats as well as the extensive briefings provided by ISAF and our Embassy. I am speaking only for myself, not for the American Academy of Diplomacy, 

the organization of which I am now President. 

23 

I would like to make a few, short comments on the current status and then turn 

to your questions. Much of the current debate turns on analysis of what the strategy 

has accomplished. That desire for instant scoring is very American, the American 

people and the Congress have a right to accountability but at the same time the 

demand for a bottom line can also be problematic because it sometimes invites very 

premature judgments. Getting the balance right is important. 

Take security, for example. Judging not only from the views of my military colleagues but from what I heard from Afghan friends on the ground during my visit, 

there is definitely more security in parts of Helmand, Kandahar, and even in the 

north. But what does that mean for final analysis? Very little. The areas secured 

need to be turned over to Afghan forces and they, in turn, need to hold it with only 

a very light U.S. backing. That has not yet been tried so therefore much so-called 

analysis is speculation with inadequate evidence. 

What can we judge? The current strategy is working slower than many hoped but 

not slower than is logical. Washington focuses on policy and tends to discount the 

time lags from decision to execution. We thus leap to conclusions of failure about 

the time one could begin a serious analysis. The decision to enlarge forces and 

money, something I would have dearly loved in my time, is about 2 years old. Yet 

the actual troops only completed their arrival 8 months ago and became effectively 

employed less than that. Ditto for civilian programs where people have to arrive, 

learn jobs, develop contacts with locals, etc. Simply put, we have had a potentially 

effective strategy for a rather short time. It is certainly too early to claim success 

yet one can say that the trajectory of the policy is working, if not its desired pace. 

Because of the time lag between decision and action we are now in a somewhat 

artificial and highly polarized debate about the numbers to be withdrawn. If significant numbers of troops are not withdrawn many will call the strategy a failure and 

if they are withdrawn too quickly we may guarantee failure. 

The thing to watch is the next year. If U.S. forces can transfer some of the difficult areas such as Helmand to the Afghans, and the Afghans can hold them, then 

transition will begin to have credibility. If nothing important or difficult has been 

transferred a year from now the strategy will have to be questioned; perhaps to the 

point of giving up. These forthcoming operations should have much more focus than 

the debate over immediate withdrawal numbers. 

The killing of Osama bin Laden is a significant victory for the United States but 

it is not the end of the war. Mistaking its significance could be costly. Insurgentsecured territory in in Afghanistan could easily become a new sanctuary area for 

terrorist operations directed against the United States. Al-Qaeda as an organization 

continues to exist and will be under pressure to show its strength through action 

in Afghanistan and against the United States. The Arab, Chechen, and Punjabi 

fighters we see emerging on Afghan battlefields will not disappear. The linkages between the Haqqani movement and al-Qaeda have apparently become tighter in recent years and a more central part of the insurgency. That will not change. We 

turned our back on al-Qaeda before. First, we did little to take it seriously after the 

bombing of our Embassies. The second time, by assuming we needed to put little 

effort into Afghanistan in the period 2002–04, we let al-Qaeda regrow exactly when 

they were weak and Afghanistan was more secure than it is now. To make the same 

mistake a third time, to count victory before it is in hand, would be exceptionally 

costly. 

Turning directly to your questions, your letter of invitation first asked how recent 

policy choices have affected the current dynamic and potential for progress. Honestly, the answer points in two ways. On security, on building Afghan army forces, 

I think the results are positive. Politically, however, we have and continue to cause 

confusion. The poor relations with President Karzai have grown over several years 

because of problems on both sides. 

Afghanistan does suffer from a weak government with a high degree of corruption. President Karzai is poorly positioned to control these problems. He controls 

very little money since virtually the entirety of Afghanistan’s development comes 

from foreign donors and many projects are executed without coordination with or 

consent by the Afghan Government. Nor does President Karzai control force since 

military operations are directed by NATO/ISAF. Years of warfare have left few 

Afghans with any confidence that they can rely on pensions or continuing employment so there is a strong social pressure to grab what one can to protect oneself. 

These problems are large but not unique to Afghanistan. 

However, the way we have gone about addressing them with President Karzai has 

made many problems worse rather than better. Two years of strident public criticism by U.S. officials were taken by many Afghans as evidence that the United 

States was against Karzai, perhaps even intending to overthrow him. This is because in Afghan culture one would never criticize a friend in public in this manner 

24 

unless the friendship was over and the criticism was an excuse for moving against 

him. The idea that the criticism could actually be about what is stated is not credible to Afghans. When we continued this behavior it set off a search for the ‘‘real’’ 

reasons and inspired many wild conspiracy theories. 

Additionally, the United States also has employed equally corrupt warlords as 

contractors. This was done through ignorance, pressure for speed, and lack of knowledge of power and patronage networks in Afghanistan. Yet the result is to create 

further questions along the line of ‘‘why should I fire my crooks if you won’t fire 

yours?’’ NATO and USAID are now seeking to clean up their own contracting problems but are finding this hard and slow. 

The decision to begin withdrawal of troops in July 2011 caused considerable additional confusion. While the decision had various caveats about conditions on the 

ground it was the date that was emphasized in President Obama’s statements. This 

convinced many—not just Afghans but Pakistanis and even the Taliban—that 

America was on the way out of Afghanistan. Since virtually no one believed that 

the Afghan Army would be ready to take over so quickly, this perception created 

a scramble for survival. The NATO decision to move the transition date to 2014 has 

helped the immediate problem but has not responded to the larger need for strategic 

clarity. 

Currently, there is considerable confusion among Afghans about longer term U.S. 

intentions. When I was in Afghanistan in March I heard essentially the same point 

from President Karzai, opponents like Dr. Abdullah, ex-ministers who oppose Karzai 

and even Afghans who are not in politics at all; each asking what our intentions 

are. This may be unfair but the fact is that they do not understand our long-term 

strategic intent. 

The result of all this is that President Karzai has developed strong suspicions that 

we are either against him or will leave before a state and army strong enough to 

survive have been built. Accordingly, he has intensified a survival strategy, that is, 

he is seeking to build a network of supporters who will sustain him politically and 

militarily if America bails out or moves against him. For survival he will tolerate 

poor performance in these supporters. From his point of view he has little choice 

if the United States is about to pull the plug; and we have not told him otherwise. 

This may also account for some of his efforts to strengthen ties with other regional 

powers. 

He also is seeking to define himself as something other than an American puppet 

(Afghan history shows that those marked as foreign puppets generally came to a 

bad end when their foreign patron departed). This produces public criticism. Sometimes it is excessive and unfair to us. Yet we seem not to pay attention to anything 

less than a scream. For example, the issue of control of the private security companies began in 2006 but we offered no plans or alternatives until the issue became 

a crisis in 2010. Clearly, many of the problems of poor governance are Afghan problems, some resulting from years of war and others from the character of individuals. 

However, I emphasize our own responsibility for the worsening of the issue because 

it is a part of the problem that is too little understood. 

The result is a messy lack of trust and mutual bad feeling. The United States is 

by far the bigger and stronger player. Hence, if the situation is to be improved it 

needs to start with greater strategic clarity from our side. Even if that is possible, 

patience and time will be needed. We have a home to which to return. If things end 

badly that will not be the case for Afghans like President Karzai. That imbalance 

is bound to make him cautious. 

For Afghans more generally, the confusion results in the pursuit of hedging strategies. For example, everyone I talked to expects a major insurgent push this summer to regain the initiative. If we start pulling troops out there is the fear of 

Taliban victories in parts of the country. Many non-Pushtun groups fear this could 

lead the present Afghan Government to make a political deal with the Taliban, 

bringing them back to some measure of power in return for survival of the government. 

This may not happen but such an outcome is greatly feared by many, particularly 

the non-Pushtuns. These minorities, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others, were massacred and abused by the Taliban. They would fight rather than submit to a return 

of the Taliban that could threaten them. This could be the cause of a civil war. They 

might not wait to see if all their fears are realized. I do not think such a civil war 

is imminent but it is being talked of more than I have ever heard before. Groups 

and individuals are thinking about how to position themselves should it occur. This 

produces the ‘‘hedging’’ that, as much as corruption, gets in the way of unity in resisting the insurgency. 

You asked what we need to achieve. Clearly we need to answer this question because it is the very lack of definition that is causing so much Afghan confusion and 

25 

the hedging strategies I mentioned. Within Afghanistan we want to prevent the return of externally directed terrorism, to keep out the possibility of terrorism from 

Afghanistan. There is a confusing discussion about whether al-Qaeda post-Osama 

bin Laden remains a threat in Afghanistan or whether this is essentially a Pakistani issue. Here I wish only to note my belief that if a movement that continues 

to consider itself at war with us is able to claim ‘‘defeat’’ of a superpower its potential for increasing recruits, funding and danger is enhanced. Although quantification 

is not possible, my judgment is that, such an al-Qaeda victory would significantly 

increase the potential for attacks on Americans in the world and in the United 

States. 

We recognize that AQ is a movement that regenerates itself. Therefore since a 

single moment of victory is unlikely the first thing we need to achieve after clarity 

of purpose are Afghan security forces, essentially the army, capable of carrying on 

the level of fighting that is likely to remain after our departure. The Taliban are 

not ‘‘ten feet tall’’ so the standard I am referring to is not impossible but it does 

require dynamic leaders willing to fight for their country as well as their having 

essential support and logistics capabilities that are only now being developed. That 

said, this is a process, not a single moment in time. Certain areas, difficult ones, 

must be turned over to an Afghan lead while U.S. forces are thinned out but remain 

available in extremis. Whether this is possible should become clearer over the next 

year. The Afghan Army must be given some opportunity to learn, even to fail, before 

suddenly being left on its own. 

Additionally, the Afghan central government must control the more rapacious 

local leaders and institute a modicum of fair government so that there is a reason 

for Afghans to support the government. This is easy to say and incredibly difficult 

to do. Afghans must overcome 30 years of divisive politics. We are spending a great 

deal on development and governance; quite possibly too much in terms of what 

Afghanistan can actually absorb. We may well be fueling a culture of dependency 

and corruption that does them no good since we cannot sustain the cost. 

Yet, having said this I would be very hesitant to suggest that we can have fully 

shaped policy answers. Afghans, not we, have to work out acceptable political institutions. That took us years after the Articles of Confederation, a secret convention, 

a grueling ratification campaign and an eventual civil war. I doubt a foreign design 

would have made our process easier. 

In the near term we must recognize, as we are beginning to do that we do bear 

some responsibility as well for the corruption. We have strengthened warlords, paid 

little attention to who got contracts and what we paid, and then blamed all the 

problems on the Afghans while demanding a change to ‘‘good government’’ that was 

far more complete, and therefore unrealistic, than the situation in any of the surrounding countries. More recently, we are starting to focus more narrowly on behavior that really hurts the war effort and on key institutions like the army. I endorse 

this fine tuning of the anticorruption policy. 

What we can do is to add greatly to the growth of modern, educated Afghans capable of adjusting their country to something other than a culture of feuding ‘‘commanders’’ and short-term political bargains. Funding educational exchanges in the 

long run is worth more than cash for work or seed programs not tied to markets, 

although both have their place. 

We can work hard to maintain political space so that new ideas, a free media, 

and different political ideas can put down roots. We must do our best to ensure that 

the Afghan Army remains multiethnic, professional, and nonpolitical. We need to 

come to decisions about how we will approach the Afghan elections of 2014. That 

decision should follow from our decisions on forces and money—the tools of influence—and take into account what is realistically achievable. 

These are all long-term visions and none of them will be possible without expanded security. Hence I return to the absolute need to get the transfer to Afghan 

lead right; fast enough to inspire confidence and not so wedded to a timetable as 

to rush to failure. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, you asked further what broader policy considerations should be part of the dialogue. Two that are frequently discussed are a regional solution and negotiation. I support working on both while realizing that neither is quick or an alternative to fighting. In fact, seen as a quick alternative to 

war, each would become a serious mistake. 

There exists a long history of negotiation to end such conflicts and it is instructive. Choose your model; Cambodia, Namibia, El Salvador, Algeria with the French, 

or our own experience in negotiating the end to the American Revolution. Each took 

years of talking. Most took some years of talking about talking before serious discussion began. To expect less in Afghanistan is absurd, particularly since it is not clear 

whether or not the Taliban leadership is interested. 

26 

Because negotiating any peace that meets our strategic needs is a long process 

it makes sense to begin as soon as possible—but not to be in an excessive haste to 

conclude. We should negotiate in support of President Karzai. He is the leader of 

a sovereign state that must live with the result. He needs to know that he has solid 

U.S. backing to achieve a good agreement. And by our presence in the negotiations 

we can, if we choose, also act to reassure other elements in Afghanistan that their 

most essential freedoms will not be sacrificed. 

It is often remarked that Afghanistan had a long period of peace when its neighbors left it alone. We do need to focus on recreating a regional basis for peace. We 

need also to understand what that means. A regional solution requires that the 

neighbors realize they cannot achieve their maximum desires. It is not clear to me 

if Pakistan realizes that. Perhaps they will not until an Afghan Army is competent 

enough not to lose. Recognizing limits to ambition may require the United States 

to renounce permanent bases and influence projection that potentially threatens 

Iran and Russia. India also needs to be willing to observe limits in its own influence 

with Afghan parties since the struggle for influence between India and Pakistan is 

another source of tension. 

Additionally, a regional solution still requires the existence of an Afghan Government capable of preserving internal order. If many Afghan parties contend for power 

then they will draw in foreign support. Support of one power will draw in another 

to protect its interests. The result would be the rapid destruction of an agreement 

on neutrality. Hence, with regard to a regional peace I believe that we should start 

discussing the idea now because it is necessary but we should avoid any idea that 

this approach can be a short cut to the exit. 

Some comments on strategies offered by others: 

Pakistan vs. Afghanistan: Some commentators have noted that Pakistan is the 

bigger issue and therefore suggested a shifting of U.S. efforts toward Pakistan. I 

agree on the importance of Pakistan but one must be careful to see what is at issue 

and, therefore, the necessary response. Pakistan’s policy over three decades has 

been driven by three factors, although their relative weight has shifted in senior 

Pakistani thinking. One is fear of India, including the ability of India to threaten 

it from Afghanistan. The second is a desire to either control or exercise preeminent 

power over the Government in Afghanistan, both for Pakistan’s own interests and 

to preempt new Pushtun threats to Pakistan’s unity. Third, and more recently, 

Pakistan has had to contend with threats from radical Islam within Pakistan. 

It is entirely possible that the first two themes remain dominant in Pakistani 

strategic calculations. In oversimplified terms this means that if the United States 

appears likely to leave Afghanistan then Pakistan will make a bid for dominance. 

Its tools will be Taliban insurgents with which it has maintained ties. 

I am of the opinion that Pakistan’s strategy would fail; that they would trigger 

a civil war in Afghanistan, that their clients would not be able to control the whole 

country. However, while they were engaged in an effort to control Afghanistan in 

alliance with radical Islamic elements I think it likely that Pakistan would not do 

a good job of confronting its own radicals. 

This is a complicated subject that merits expanded discussion at another time. 

Now I only want to draw out two policy points. First, Pakistani thinking about its 

strategy will be much more heavily influenced by whether it believes the United 

States will persevere in Afghanistan—something it does not now believe--than by 

continuing our decade’s failure to convince Pakistan to alter its basic strategic calculus about its interests in Afghanistan and see things our way. 

Second, if Pakistan proceeds as outlined above and does not deal strongly with 

its own radicals, the influence of the latter is likely to expand and with it their 

threat to the Pakistani state. We should be alert to this very dangerous threat. We 

should respond to it better than we have in terms of our Pakistani and regional policy. Yet in doing so we should understand that our action or inaction in Afghanistan 

will be a large, perhaps the largest element in Pakistan’s understanding of where 

its interests lie. 

Decentralization: Two arguments are particularly frequent on the subject of decentralization. One is that we need to return to traditional Afghan structures. The 

other is that by building up local forces we can sidestep the messy process of reinforcing a central government. Both arguments have some merit but both are massively overstated and misunderstand much about current Afghanistan. 

The old structure might better be characterized as parallel government (a term 

I owe to anthropologist Dr. Thomas Barfield who is much more of an authority on 

this subject than am I) in which the state was responsible for a limited range of 

functions while others belonged to tribes and communities. Recreating this structure 

runs into all sorts of problems. The old state had little to no responsibility for development. This is clearly no longer acceptable to Afghans. Yet communities and tribes 

27 

have no resources for development. At the same time, the tribal leaders were considerably stronger than is now the case. Years of warfare and the growth of militia 

leaders have weakened tribal authority as have the insurgent’s systematic assassination of tribal leaders. Some form of more decentralized government may well be 

necessary in Afghanistan. However, it will have to be a new evolution created by 

Afghans, not an effort by superficially informed foreigners to recreate a partially 

mythical past. 

Local forces may well be an important component of Afghan defense. However, to 

rely on them as a game changer is a mistake. The record of such forces in Afghanistan is one of creating militias responsive to commanders who feud with one another, terrorize their neighbors, and are incapable of unity against the Taliban. It 

is exactly the rapacious behavior of such local forces that created the conditions that 

led many Afghans to welcome the Taliban in the 1990s. The same overbearing behavior and settling of old scores is held by many observers to be a primary cause 

of the resurgent insurgency in Kandahar and Helmand. 

We have a long record of the failures of such forces, including the effort to build 

the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) during my time. The new effort at 

constructing units called Afghan Local Police (ALP) is somewhat more promising 

but only because it is being managed very carefully to avoid the problems of the 

past. That very care keeps it slow. It is not a program that can be expanded quickly 

without leading to failure. Nor does the ALP program have the potential to be more 

than a useful adjunct to regular security forces. Having talked extensively with the 

people who are running the program it is clear that ALP units will be attacked this 

year. Their survival under serious attack will depend on back up from ISAF and 

Afghan forces. This is a mix of forces that may work but it illustrates why reliance 

on such local forces must be limited at best. Additionally, there are a variety of so 

called ‘‘village security forces’’ that are far more problematic in their composition 

and leadership. Many of these should be disbanded or, at least, not supported by 

us since they lack appropriate oversight and may alienate more people than they 

secure. 

Counterterrorism will be a component of any military campaign. However, it is 

sometimes spoken of as a policy alternative in terms of keeping just enough force 

to strike terrorists and get out of nation-building. I will not try to summarize a complicated discussion but I want to make one policy point that seems frequently overlooked and would probably doom too great a reliance on counter terrorism—it offers 

nothing to Afghans except endless killing. Just striking enemies may appear to meet 

U.S. policy goals on terrorism but this is illusionary. Effective strikes must depend 

on intelligence gathered on the ground. If all we have to offer Afghans is a permanent condition of the brutality of the last three decades then many will prefer the 

Taliban, will prefer anything to the continuation of such a strategy. They will ask 

us to leave or push us out. And without assets on the ground we will not have the 

intelligence to carry out counterterrorist strikes successfully. Thus the policy would 

fail. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you again for inviting me to testify. I believe 

deeply that failure in Afghanistan will lead to years of dangerous instability in Central and South Asia and increased threats to the United States. A bloody, long lasting civil war in Afghanistan that draws in Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and possibly the 

United States would further poison relations across the region with dangerous and 

unpredictable consequences for our own interests. 

Even the modest success I have described is not assured. Yet we have a much 

better chance of succeeding than we had 2 years ago. We have no shortcuts that 

hold any promise of working. Poised between what I see as the realistic alternatives 

we need to clarify our modest long-term purpose in Afghanistan, make clear that 

our goals do not threaten Afghanistan’s neighbors, get on with building the Afghan 

security forces and continue to strengthen better governance at a realistic, long-term 

pace. Over the next few years such an approach can lower our financial burden to 

a sustainable level. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, I understand the gravity of our deficit. However, 

I understand also, as I believe you do, that the United States does not have the luxury of pursuing only one interest at a time. The choice is to persevere responsibly 

or to run quickly to some patchwork strategy that will cost us much more in the 

long run. 

I would be pleased to respond to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, all of you. You’ve 

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28 

tant one. And there are just a huge number of questions that leap 

out of this. 

As I listen to you, each of you make assertions that, on their 

face, sound reasonable. You know, ‘‘They need to work out this 

relationship,’’ or, ‘‘They need to have stability or prosperity,’’ or, 

‘‘They need to be able to do this or that.’’ But, in the end, the process for getting to almost any one of those goals, is convoluted, 

expensive, and needs to be measured against the overall mission 

here. So, let me try to bear down a little bit. And I know my colleagues will also try to do this as we try to figure it out. 

Ambassador Neumann, you just said ‘‘counterterrorism is not an 

alternative to a broader strategy.’’ And you say we can afford to do 

this mission over a long period of time. Let me try to measure that 

against Dr. Haass’s proposal here, and see if I can get the two of 

you more engaged in this. 

What is our basic goal? What’s the strategic interest to the 

United States? What are we trying to protect, here? What is in our 

national security interest, with respect to Afghanistan, per se? 

Ambassador Neumann. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Thank you, sir. 

I have very modest goals, myself, having struggled with this 

problem. I think we need an Afghan Army that can carry on the 

level of fighting that is likely to go on for a long time in Afghanistan, something we all agree we’re not going to get peace quickly. 

I believe we need a government that has a modest amount of support so that it can hold this together. 

The CHAIRMAN. How much American support do you envision 

having to be there to sustain that Afghan Army? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I see us with a declining slope. I don’t 

want to put myself in the shoes of General Petraeus or our military 

commander; I think that would be excessive. But, I think, over the 

next year, what one should hope to see in the south would be the 

transfer out—whether to other places or out of Afghanistan; it’s the 

President’s decision—of most of the combat brigades in the south 

and southwest, while those which are partnered with the Afghan 

Army probably have to stay. That’s basically the model we had in 

Iraq—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me a ballpark figure? I’m not asking you to be General Petraeus—who won’t be General Petraeus, 

himself, in a little while—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Over at CIA, but give me a sense of 

the numbers you recommend? What are we talking about? We’re at 

150-or-so-thousand troops now. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I would hate to put figures on it, because 

I don’t really think that I know enough. But, I would say, over a 

3-year slope, that that number probably should come down by more 

than half, perhaps considerably more than half. I do not know how 

many additional training forces one is going to have to retain, because, to sustain itself in the field, the Afghan Army’s also going 

to need medical support and the package—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Don’t you have to have an ability to measure 

what the Taliban are capable of and what the Taliban intentions 

will be over that period of time? 

29 

And is there any way to measure that? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I don’t know if there’s a good way to 

measure that, because I’ve not—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Does that matter to us? If the Taliban are not 

harboring al-Qaeda, if al-Qaeda doesn’t exist, if we have an ability 

to attack al-Qaeda from a sufficient platform that exists in the region, why is it of critical interest to the United States? I’m being 

devil’s advocate, here, a little bit. But, why is it of critical interest 

to us what happens between the Afghans? Haven’t they always 

sought accommodation? And won’t they seek it anyway? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I think my answer begins by disputing 

the premises on which you began the question, sir. I think what 

one sees is a considerable linkage, still, of al-Qaeda. You are seeing 

more foreign fighters, for instance, in the east. The linkages with 

Saraj Haqqani are much more of fundamentalist Chechens, 

Uzbeks, others coming into the battlefield. If—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me stop you there so I can get a response from the others, because I want to get them in on this. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. OK. Basically, all I’m saying to you is, I 

think, first of all, that separation is not correct; second, that if you 

have a civil war going on in Afghanistan, you will see the linkage 

intensify, because the Taliban will need the reinforcement of 

al-Qaeda. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, you think the United States needs to actually 

be there to prevent civil war. 

Let me ask Dr. Haass. Do you want to respond? Is that where 

that takes us? 

Ambassador HAASS. I just disagree profoundly with what I just 

heard. So, let me just make clear what I believe our U.S. policy 

needs to be, and why. 

The goal should be to make sure that Afghanistan is not a major 

platform of terrorist attacks against the United States or the world. 

That is our goal. Our goal is not to build up the Afghan Government or have a certain level of U.S. troops. That’s a potential 

means of realizing that goal. I do not think we should do it with 

what I would call counterterrorism only, but I do think that should 

be a more central part of our policy. There should be a degree of 

local capacity-building. There should be a degree of local diplomacy. 

The CHAIRMAN. How is that distinguished from the idea of building police, and building armies—— 

Ambassador HAASS. Oh, because the question is one—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Sustainability? 

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. The question is one of balance, 

and the question is one of scale and emphasis. I think that we 

should have a CT—a counterterrorism policy; that’s the dominant 

part. We should try to build up some local capacities, but we should 

be realistic about what it is we’re trying to build up. We’re never 

going to, I believe, accomplish some of the goals I’ve heard here. 

And we should save money. If we can save $75 billion a year, which I believe is the scale of 

savings we would get from the kind of policy I’m talking about, 

that is one-fourth—one-fourth of the fiscal savings everybody suggests we need on a slope of $300 billion a year. We would get 25 

percent of what we need through this policy, alone. And that is an 

30 

extraordinary bit of progress that we could get. And I believe we 

could get it without materially affecting the prospects for what our 

goal is in Afghanistan, which is to make sure it is not a major platform of terrorist attacks against the United States. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Let me stop you there for a minute. I want 

to get Dr. Slaughter in on that, too. 

There’s a clear difference here, and we need to explore it very 

carefully. Dr. Haass suggests that the goal is a limited one of preventing—say that again—of preventing—— 

Ambassador HAASS Afghanistan from being a platform—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Afghanistan from being a platform 

for terrorism. 

Dr. Slaughter, you have said that our goal is a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. Now, a stable and prosperous Afghanistan is, 

first of all, somewhat nebulous. But, does it really take that to protect the interests of the United States? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. So, I actually agree with Richard that our ultimate goal, the reason we’re there, is absolutely to prevent Afghanistan from being a platform for terrorists who can attack the United 

States. Our difference is how you can accomplish that goal. I don’t 

think you can accomplish that goal without a political settlement 

that, longer term, produces a measure of security, a measure of stability, and a measure of self-reliance. 

The problem with the strategy that Richard’s articulated is, that 

is the strategy we tried. We did that. For 3 to 4 years after we invaded Afghanistan, we pursued a narrow counterterrorism strategy. And the result was, the Taliban came surging back. We did 

not want to be in Afghanistan, fighting the kind of counterinsurgency strategy we are now, but we perceived there was—that that 

strategy had failed. 

The issue now is precisely how we can prevent the Taliban from 

taking over in such a way that the—we’re not going to be able to 

negotiate with the Taliban and have them not fight al-Qaeda, unless we have a political settlement. 

The CHAIRMAN. We need to dig into this a lot more. I’m confident 

we will with my colleagues. 

My time is expired on this round. So, Senator Lugar. And we’ll 

see where we wind up. 

The committee will be in recess until we can restore order. 

[Recess taken to remove protestors.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Folks, you know, this committee has a good tradition of really exploring these issues in a very open and thorough 

and unbiased way. And I respect, and I think everybody knows 

this, everybody’s right to their point of view and to make that 

known. And you can choose your forum. But, it would really be 

helpful to us if we could ask people to respect this process and to 

allow these proceedings to continue without manifestation, interruption, demonstration, or otherwise. I think every member, and I 

think people trying to explore these issues, would really respect 

and appreciate that. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Haass, I’d like to follow through on Chairman Kerry’s questions. If I remember correctly, you recommended 

that U.S. troop presence gradually diminish to about 10- to 25,000 

31 

personnel in 12 to 18 months. And you’ve indicated that this group 

would support antiterrorism activities in Afghanistan. My understanding of our operations currently is that they are very comprehensive. And while Afghanistan is not a huge country, it is a 

large one. Where would we place the 10- or 25,000? Or how would 

you conceive their operations, day by day? 

Ambassador HAASS. I’d say three things. One is, what I would do 

a lot less of, just to be clear, is combat operations against the 

Taliban. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Yes, I agree. 

Ambassador HAASS. I would dramatically reduce and phase out 

that dimension. 

Second, in terms of the counterterrorism mission, that seems to 

me a tactical decision, quite honestly, Senator. You’d probably want 

to have some sort of a pool of forces. And then, obviously, you’d 

want to have it distributed wherever you thought you were most 

likely to face—where the intelligence suggested you were going to 

meet terrorists, which, again, are quite few in number. 

The training mission, again, is a question of where it could be 

logistically best carried out, with Afghans either at bases or in the 

field. Some of the best training, as you know, doesn’t take place on 

bases, but takes place actually outside, in the field. So, that to me 

is—quite honestly, those are ultimately implementation decisions. 

I think the big question is one of division of labor; again, phasing 

out combat operations and limiting us to training. By the way, not 

just national forces; I would also believe the United States should 

do training of selected local forces. We shouldn’t put all our eggs 

in, if you will, in Kabul, Iran, police and army. 

Senator LUGAR. Therefore, it’s conceivable that, if we had people 

who were skilled in antiterrorism on the ground, we would be able 

to—hopefully, with good intelligence—ferret out those who might 

be contemplating another attack upon us. 

Now, second, as an auxiliary to this counterterror role, it would 

be helpful, obviously, if the government and the military of Afghanistan were fairly stable. It sounds as though what you describe is 

a far smaller military footprint. This would then be a limited training situation, at that point, of a few people, rather than a comprehensive program providing for the training of up to 400,000 people, which is often mentioned presently. And when that larger 

program is mentioned, in our questions to witnesses, there rarely 

is mention of who pays for all of this and for how many years. 

Those who conceive such a program lasting indefinitely in the future must contemplate huge budgetary commitments on the part of 

the United States given that it appears unlikely the Afghan Government will be able to generate the income to pay for such a program in the foreseeable future. 

But, let me shift to the Taliban. If, in fact, the Taliban continue 

to be around, and, as Dr. Slaughter has said, in a 3- or 4-year 

period of time they came back and they were a problem, this is 

certainly unsatisfying to us, who would like to see people thriving 

in a democratic society. But, at the same time, the history of the 

country has been one of many challenges and tribal fissures that 

has not been very peaceful and democratic. 

32 

Isn’t it conceivable that the Taliban are always going to be 

around? If this is indeed the case and if our strategy is based upon 

eradicating the country of the Taliban, then that strategy really is 

farfetched. Now, if not the Taliban, it appears some other group 

could increase its appeal on the basis of promises to provide more 

stability than is currently being offered by the government. Furthermore, in the absence of a central government that even can get 

out and provide solutions to problems taking place throughout the 

country, isn’t it likely that there’s to be a great deal of local government in Afghanistan for a long time? 

So, one of the interesting things about your strategy is that while 

you assume we are going to have to endure a very unsatisfying 

governmental situation, we at least have boots on the ground to 

ferret out potential terrorists who might attack us or others in the 

world as a rationale for being there at all. Absent that, it is not 

clear altogether why we are in Afghanistan. In other words, we’re 

not in all of the other countries that have terrorists—al-Qaeda, 

al-Shabaab, all the rest. Somehow or other, they’re getting a free 

pass. We’re busy in Afghanistan, expending a huge portion of our 

total defense budget. 

So initially, Dr. Haass and Dr. Slaughter, your ideas are appealing, and I want to explore them to make sure my understanding 

of this is correct, because it’s clearly running counter to where 

we’ve been heading. It is sort of clear in the budget debate that 

we’re having presently as well. And even in your strategy of 12 to 

18 months getting there, this is still going to be an expensive process. It would require moving personnel or getting some other organization going. 

I would just add, finally, that our confidence in President Karzai 

ebbs and flows, but, unless we’re really prepared to present an 

alternative, he will be the President of the country and corruption 

will remain apparent. How, indeed, we hope to eradicate all of that 

is hardly clear at all. All that said, I think we really need to 

sharpen our objectives. This is not an exercise in cynicism, it’s an 

exercise in the realities of Afghanistan and the history of the place 

and what is possible, in terms of our own security. 

Now—and what do you say to all of that, Dr. Slaughter? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Thank you, Senator Lugar. [Laughter.] 

So, I would say the first thing is that Richard and I, and, I think, 

maybe Ambassador Neumann—at least Richard and I agree that 

fighting the Taliban is not why we are there. The reason we are 

there is exactly to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States. 

The only question is, What’s a successful means to that end? When 

we tried the counterterrorism strategy, we couldn’t get the intelligence that we needed to be able to actively, effectively attack alQaeda. We got a—— 

Senator LUGAR. And why is that—— 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. We got Osama bin Laden because 

we got intelligence. We couldn’t get the intelligence, because the 

Taliban were terrifying villagers, they’re still terrifying villagers so 

that, as I said, they have no incentive to give us that kind of intelligence. So, we moved from the kind of strategy that Richard advocates to a full counterinsurgency strategy, where we said, ‘‘We’ll get 

that intelligence by clearing, holding, and building, and getting the 

33 

confidence of those villagers.’’ I do not think that can work over the 

long term. 

So, the difference is, I’m advocating a political settlement that 

actually gets enough stability—this is not going to be some rosy 

vision of Afghanistan—but enough stability so that, in fact, Afghan 

forces have an incentive to fight the Taliban themselves. And we 

have—and this is critical—the ability to stay in the country and get 

the intelligence we need. So, it is a strategy of how you remain in 

the country sufficient to get the intelligence you need to do what 

we both agree, which is, long term, to ensure that al-Qaeda cannot 

come back and use Afghanistan as a platform. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, in terms of intelligence collection, there’s 

no particular evidence that the intelligence that got us to Osama 

bin Laden has any relationship to the Taliban’s continued activity 

in Afghanistan. 

Now, without getting into intelligence methods—my point is, if 

you have some people on the ground, maybe we already knew that 

there was an encampment of al-Qaeda there that was about to 

attack us. But, most people writing about that period of time indicate that we were not particularly vigilant and were not really on 

that track. Books written about the subject indicate that many of 

the administration still believed Iraq was a problem and we could 

hardly spend any time at all thinking about Afghanistan at the 

time. 

I suppose my hope is that, if we’re talking about any troops being 

there, they be of a limited number while retaining the capacity to 

inform the relevant authorities of the existence of an al-Qaeda encampment or other assets the organization may have in the country. And in response, maybe we do something about that camp, 

that threat, as opposed to acting in every village in Afghanistan. 

Ambassador HAASS. Can I just—I was involved in the policy, as 

you know, after 9/11. And where I believe the United States could 

have done more then was to have done a bit more training, and so 

forth. 

Again, I am not sitting here advocating a counterterrorism-only 

strategy. There is a place for a limited degree of training. But, 

there is a fundamental difference, if we expect to build up an 

Afghanistan—be it through training efforts, aid efforts, diplomatic 

efforts—that’s going to be sufficiently robust, that is going to be a 

major partner. It’s not going to happen. And in all intellectual honesty, sir, I think we have to assume, if we adopt something like I 

am suggesting. 

But, even if we don’t, I believe we’re going to face a future in 

Afghanistan where the conservative Pashtuns in the south and 

east are going to dominate. And, whether you technically call them 

‘‘Taliban’’ or ‘‘conservative Pashtuns,’’ that’s what it’s going to be 

like. And, to me, the challenge for American foreign policy is not 

to prevent that from happening. That is impossible to prevent, I 

would suggest, given the nature of Afghanistan. We ought to try 

to break the historic link between the Taliban and groups like 

al-Qaeda. And I believe that that is a link that can be broken. Indeed, there’s enough statements on the record from people in the 

Taliban suggesting that one should not equate the two. Our own 

34 

military leadership has made such comments. And that’s the reason I favor having diplomacy. 

I do not think our long-term goal here, as much as perhaps we 

would like it, would be to create this sort of ‘‘attractive’’ Afghanistan, by all sorts of human rights and economics and other measures that we would like to see. I simply think that is beyond our 

capacity. And what we have to do is accept the fact that there’s 

going to be conservative Pashtun, or call it Taliban, inroads in 

parts of the country, and preventing that cannot be the basis of 

American foreign policy in that country. Even modest goals in 

Afghanistan are ambitious. But, ambitious goals in Afghanistan, I 

would think, are simply out of the question. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. But, that’s a strawman. No one is arguing for 

some kind of perfect Afghanistan that respects human rights. I 

think we’re actually saying the same thing. You said ‘‘diplomacy for 

a political settlement that would, indeed, negotiate with the 

Taliban to peel them away from al-Qaeda, to create a government 

that could actually govern with the Taliban, with others, with 

Pashtuns, with Tajiks, in Afghanistan in such a way that we could 

decrease our footprint, but still stay, at least to the extent we need 

to, to protect our interests.’’ 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Could I join, as well? [Laughter.] 

I just want to note two things. 

First, Dr. Haass’s notion, which, as always, he expresses brilliantly, is attractive. But, there are elements of a mirage here. The 

notion of going down, in 18 months, to the levels of forces he recommends; it’s taken us the better part of 2 years to get in place 

the adequacy of trainers that we have now. This notion that you 

can pivot on a dime, with our large forces, is not true. Second, the 

numbers grossly underplay any kind of serious advisory effort. So, 

this is a recipe for failure. You build Afghan forces, you throw them 

out, after 2 months training, without advisors, without backup, as 

green troops, and watch them fall apart; and then you say, ‘‘See, 

I told you the problem—the policy was a failure.’’ This makes no 

sense to me. 

There is a relationship between negotiations and fighting. If the 

image we convey with the Afghans is that we’re about to bail out, 

the army’s going to fall apart because we’re not backing it, the 

advisors are too few, there’s not a lot of incentive for anybody on 

the other side to negotiate seriously. So, there’s a difference 

between saying you will accept a Pashtun role—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mind if I just interrupt here—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN [continuing]. By the Taliban—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And add a question? 

What is the incentive for them to negotiate now? Are they negotiating now? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. No. 

The CHAIRMAN. And is there any indication they’re about to 

negotiate? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I would have to say, at the top leadership level, I’m skeptical. I mean, you’ve heard that from all of us. 

But, if part of what we’re saying is, ‘‘You want negotiations,’’ then 

to say also that you will essentially move quickly away from the 

military, I think pulls against the notion that you can have a sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:22 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\050311-N.TXT
35 

cessful negotiation. I’m dubious you can have it. But, if that is part 

of your policy, then recognize—as former Israeli Prime Minister 

Rabin said, that they had to fight as though there were no negotiations, and negotiate as though there were no fighting. If you lose 

that, I think you lose the ability to negotiate. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I need recognize Senator Casey. 

But, I’d just put on the table the question we haven’t gotten to 

yet, and there’s a lot more to explore here and sort of focus in on 

the mission. But, what if you had a sufficient force there, in terms 

of counterterrorism, that made it clear they would not allow the 

Taliban to take over the country? Now, if that is a stated capacity, 

with much less involvement, there’s an incentive to negotiate and 

you haven’t pulled the rug out from anybody. So, I think we need 

to come back and think about how other pieces might fit this. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Appreciate you arranging this hearing. This is a very important hearing among 

many that we’ll have, and I’m grateful. 

And, at the risk of some repetition, but around here that’s important—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY [continuing]. To get our points across, all of us— 

I wanted to focus on the nature of this hearing, in the sense that 

we talk about an endgame, but maybe to focus on the description 

of an endgame. 

And I use, as a predicate to my question, a visit that I had to 

Iraq in the summer of 2007. And, at the time, it was about Iraq, 

obviously, and it was in a dinner meeting, a small group of people, 

including General Petraeus and then-Ambassador Crocker. And 

now that they’re both still engaged, maybe the question would be 

relevant again. But, what I was complaining to both of them about, 

as representatives of the Bush administration, was the way thenPresident Bush described the endgame or the goal, and sometimes 

his administration. And I was complaining about it. And I said, 

‘‘Win and lose is a wrong way to talk about it, in my judgment.’’ 

‘‘Victory and defeat,’’ the usual language that we use, I thought 

was inappropriate and, frankly, misleading. That was my 

complaint. 

Ambassador Crocker, at the time, said that his—the way he—the 

language he tended to use—if not all the time, most of the time— 

was—as it relates to Iraq, was ‘‘sustainable stability,’’ two words. 

I think the American people need to hear, from a lot more of us, 

a basic description of what our goal is in Afghanistan, not in a page 

or a volume, but literally in a sentence or two, so we can focus on 

the goal. If we were sitting in that same meeting today, in Kabul 

or anywhere, and you were sitting there and I asked you the same 

question, What’s the best way to describe it? And what is the best 

outcome that you could articulate, in a sentence or even a phrase? 

And I just ask it to all three of our panelists. 

Dr. Haass. 

Ambassador HAASS. The sentence I used in my testimony, sir, 

was that a ‘‘messy stalemate’’—— 

Senator CASEY. Right. 

36 

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. ‘‘An Afghanistan characterized 

by a weak central government, strong local officials, and a Taliban 

presence that’s extensive in much of the south and east.’’ I would 

include in that ‘‘a small U.S. presence.’’ And that, to me—it doesn’t 

sound that different, by the way, than what we have now, with a 

far smaller U.S. footprint. And my own view is, that’s probably 

about as good as things will get. And that’s also good enough. 

Senator CASEY. So, you would say that is both achievable and 

acceptable. 

Ambassador HAASS. Yes, sir. 

Senator CASEY. OK. 

Dr. Slaughter. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Thank you. 

So, I said ‘‘secure, stable, and self-reliant.’’ ‘‘Secure,’’ meaning 

much lower levels of violence. ‘‘Stable,’’ meaning predictable, stable 

enough so that you can actually invest, so some economic activity 

can regenerate. And ‘‘self-reliant,’’ where the Afghans are taking 

the lion’s share of responsibility for their safety. 

I think, in terms of getting there, we’re not that far apart. It does 

mean, over time—and I agree with Ambassador Neumann, in 

terms of moving from training—from actually fighting to advising. 

So, we want to actually give these forces a chance. But, it means 

a smaller U.S. footprint. In my view, it also, though, requires an 

overarching political settlement in Afghanistan and a larger regional agreement at the same time, to actually get us there. 

But, the one sentence is ‘‘secure, stable, and self-reliant.’’ 

Senator CASEY. Ambassador Neumann. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Secure and stable, yes, and I enjoyed 

your comment, because one of the problems I think we have right 

now is, the United States does not have a clear expression. 

Whether or not it’s the expression any of us come up with, we desperately need it. And not only for the American people, clearly 

where you have your responsibility, but we are not projecting, to 

anyone in Afghanistan, a clarity of purpose right now. And that is 

enormously important. And it’s lack is debilitating. 

I don’t have perfect words in my head, but I think Chairman 

Kerry has put his finger on one key part: that the Taliban can’t 

win, that’s not the same as stability but, knowing that we will persevere to that extent, whether its counterterrorism, raids, other 

things, whether its United States forces—there’s a lot of issues in 

there—but, knowing the Taliban cannot win is a central piece of 

Pakistani thinking, of Afghan thinking about what they can or 

can’t count on us. 

I think the second thing we need to get at—again, I don’t think 

I have perfect words—is: enough support that Afghanistan has a 

chance to rebuild. I’m dubious about using ‘‘stability,’’ because it is 

so hard to achieve, for all the issues we disagree on. But, maybe 

it’s a good word, but it’s very hard to get there. But, the sense that 

they have enough support to build stability, in a sense that its in 

their hands is crucial. They can still mess this up, with everything 

we are capable of doing. And I don’t want to suggest a goal that 

depends wholly on us. 

But, I would say the stability sufficient that the Taliban cannot 

win, although they can reenter in some form of negotiations. And 

37 

enough sustainability that Afghans can make their own decisions. 

That’s not yet at the bumper-sticker kind of level that one needs, 

both for the Americans and the Afghans. But, I think those are the 

two key pieces. 

Senator CASEY. Well, one last question with regard to Pakistan. 

I’ve been to Islamabad twice, and I plan to go back this year. And 

obviously the world has changed so dramatically. And, like a lot of 

Members of Congress, but also like a lot of Americans, I’ve got a 

series of questions to ask, as it relates to who knew what, when, 

and the details of that. 

But, if you had the chance to sit down with Pakistani leaders 

right now, in light of what’s happened over the last 48 hours or 

so—and maybe I’ll leave this as a question for the record, because 

of time—but, if you could help us formulate some of those questions, that’d be helpful for those of us traveling. But, I have to say 

that, when I was there in 2008, but even more so in 2009, there 

was a sense then that the relationship, and especially on intelligence-sharing, was getting better. That’s what I heard from our 

people. And that was encouraging. And obviously there’s, at best— 

and maybe this is too optimistic, but, at best, a very mixed record; 

and, in light of what just happened, a very poor record. So, if you 

can help us formulate those questions and help us better articulate 

them, that would be—that’d be great. 

Maybe we can just—I’ll put that in the record for a question. 

But, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for that, Senator Casey. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you 

for your testimony. 

I think that—as it relates to what’s happening today on the 

ground in Afghanistan, I think General Petraeus and others have 

asked that they be allowed to see through this fighting season. And 

I think most people in this body are willing to let them go through 

this fighting season, at present. And so, I think we’re not really 

talking about something imminent today. 

But, let me just ask this question, and we—you know, we’ve had 

Libya and other things on our mind—to all three of you briefly. 

Would you all agree that what we’re doing in Afghanistan is not 

a model for the future? 

[No response.] 

Senator CORKER. I mean, I think it’s a simple yes/no. But—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I—first, yes, I agree it’s not a model. Second, if I had to do a fifth war, and I’ve been in four—— 

Senator CORKER. Yes. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I would devoutly like the dynamic effective leadership on our side. 

Senator CORKER. So, this is not something we can do in country 

after country after country. Everybody agrees that this is not a sustainable model. Is that agreed? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I do agree that we cannot be engaged in country 

after country, with this degree of responsibility for both security 

and building basic institutions. I do not think that is a model that 

works, going forward. 

38 

Ambassador HAASS. Senator Corker, not only would I agree; but, 

since the answer for everyone is yes—and I expect you think it’s 

yes, as well—it begs the question then, Why is it the model for 

Afghanistan? And I would simply suggest, it should not be and it 

cannot be for any longer. 

Senator CORKER. Well, one of the things that—I’m not as much 

of an expert as you all are on foreign relations, but, I’ve learned 

around here, it’s easy to enter, but it’s very difficult to leave, and 

the reasons for being in a place continue to evolve. 

But, let me just ask this. So, we keep talking about ‘‘safe haven.’’ 

And I’m confused even as to what a ‘‘safe haven’’ is. I mean, we 

saw, recently, where a fairly tawny by Pakistan standards, neighborhood can be a safe haven. So, what is it about Afghanistan— 

especially to Dr. Slaughter and Ambassador Neumann—that 

makes it more of a safe haven, if you will, than some of the other 

places that we might consider having 100,000 troops? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. So, I think we have to go back to where we were 

before. If the Taliban either controls an enormous part of Afghanistan unchallenged, or were it actually to take over the government 

again, then effectively you have the ability of al-Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups to move—— 

Senator CORKER. But—— 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. Freely back and forth from Pakistan. If the Pakistanis—the more serious they get, they just move 

over to Afghanistan. 

So, you know, we have to remember where we came from. And, 

indeed, I don’t think we would have been able to actually get 

Osama bin Laden, had we not driven him out of where he was in 

the Taliban, put—in Afghanistan—put him on the run. We finally 

drew intelligence from all over the place to actually get him. But, 

we can’t think that that—leaving that area alone, and leaving 

Afghanistan possibly still open to a government that would be completely willing to host al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks, is not 

a threat to us. That’s where people are getting trained, that’s 

where attacks are still getting mounted. We do have to have a Government in Afghanistan that does not host al-Qaeda. 

Senator CORKER. But, I’m confused, because I know you keep— 

you’ve said, I think, that we shouldn’t fight the Taliban. We are 

fighting the Taliban. And basically, we’re fighting criminality in 

Afghanistan. We’re fighting criminality on a daily basis. The people 

that we’re locking up in prisons, in most cases, are not extremists. 

We visited one prison where there were 1,300 or 1,400 prisoners. 

There were maybe 80 that would be capital-T Taliban. Most of 

what we are fighting is criminality. 

And I hear you and Dr. Neumann saying two very different 

things. I mean, I’m confused. I think you say we shouldn’t fight the 

Taliban. I—you know, he says we should be fighting the Taliban. 

It’s very confusing to me what the two of you are saying. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I’m happy to—— 

Senator CORKER. OK. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. So, we fought the Taliban, initially, because 

the—— 

Senator CORKER. But—— 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. Taliban ruled Afghanistan—— 

39 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. I’m talking about this—— 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. And they were the—— 

Senator CORKER. Yes. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. They were—— 

Senator CORKER. Today. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. They ousted al-Qaeda. 

Senator CORKER. The Taliban today. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. That’s right. The Taliban today made a major 

resurgence, is once again—was and we’re degrading them now, but 

was once again in a position to either rule a large part of Afghanistan or, conceivably, to take back over the government. So, we have 

pushed them back, to the extent that they should not rule Afghanistan. In that sense, I completely agree with Ambassador Neumann. 

They should not rule Afghanistan. 

How are we going to get there? We can get there by continuing 

to fight them. I don’t think that’s actually a strategy that is successful. Or we can get there by negotiating with them in such a 

way to allow a political settlement where they’re part of the government—they are—as Richard said, there are many different 

types of Taliban—if they will no longer host al-Qaeda. 

And, to Senator Kerry’s question, I think the death of Osama bin 

Laden gives us an opening to try again to see how much they are 

willing to negotiate. There are many different impacts of that 

death. And we should take that as an opportunity. So, I’m suggesting we stop fighting them. We cut a deal that allows for a more 

stable government in Afghanistan that will not openly host 

al-Qaeda. 

Senator CORKER. Probably easier said than done. I would agree 

with that. 

I just want to read a quote from Secretary Gates, on February 

the 17th, ‘‘Being able to turn security over to the Afghan forces, 

against a degraded Taliban, is our ticket out of Afghanistan.’’ 

There’s numbers of other questions I would have liked to have 

asked. But, I think the one thing that would stun the American 

people, on the ground in Afghanistan, is how much we are investing in this country, and what we are investing in. And I think that 

we have distorted greatly, hugely, their expectations, much about 

their culture, with the—just the vast amount of money that is coming in. 

Let me just ask the two of you, if you agree with Secretary 

Gates. And should we very abruptly change the dynamic of civilian 

investment that we have ongoing in Afghanistan and really focus 

more on this degraded Taliban and a quicker exit out of there, once 

we feel we’ve accomplished that, after this fighting season? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. First, I agree with Secretary Gates. And 

I think a lot of what we are disagreeing about, on the panel, is an 

issue of how fast you can do that without blowing it by trying to 

go too fast. 

Second, I do think we are overspending on the economic side. I 

think we are fueling too many bad tendencies, including Afghan dependency. We’re paying people to do things they ought to do themselves. There is a fair amount of tension also between the military 

spending. So, we need to look, I would recommend, at both CERP 

and at AID. 

40 

Senator CORKER. It’s both of it—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN. It’s—— 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Is civilian spending, right? I 

mean—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Yes. There’s a lot of rapid spending for 

very short-term results that are not sustainable. And I don’t think 

that they are as essential. I’d be a little careful about draconian 

cuts. But, I think we’re overspending there. 

I do think security—let me put it this way. The Afghan Army 

does not actually have to win the war, for many of our goals. It has 

to be capable of not losing it. That changes the negotiating 

dynamic. That changes the security situation. I do think it is our 

way out. What I am saying, though, is that I think this process 

needs to be looked at very hard so that we do not destroy whatever 

changes we’ve created for success by suddenly moving out much too 

quickly. 

There’s pretty long record of how we get to this. We’ve had 

some—lot of experience in Afghanistan—in Iraq recently, with 

turning over, as well. And so, I think we should be very careful not 

to jump to totally politically inspired timetables of numbers and 

speed, recognizing that you’ll never have as much time as, you 

know, any general or any ambassador would like. 

And I’m not an ambassador anymore, I have to note. I do testify 

only for myself, not for the American Academy or anybody else. 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you all for your testimony. And I 

do hope we’ll look at the civilian spending. And I agree that it’s 

happening on both through the military and through our State 

Department. And hopefully that’s something, since all three of you 

have very differing—or two of—you have two differing views, but 

all three of you agree with the fact that we’re spending too much 

money there on the civilian side. Is that—— 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I don’t want to be on the record saying that I 

don’t. I mean, I think we are spending it in ways that are problematic. But, overall, I think we want to pull down on the military 

spending. And very carefully monitored spending on the civilian 

side, I think can work. But, we’re putting too much in at one time; 

I’d agree with that. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Corker. 

Senator Menendez and then Senator Durbin. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I look at the situation in Afghanistan. I look at the $10 billion 

per month cost of our counterinsurgency effort. I look at nonmilitary contributions to Afghan reconstruction and development; 

almost $23 billion from 2002 to 2010 which is expected to increase, 

obviously, as we seek a transition to a civilian mission. And I ask 

myself, even if we are willing to make the enormous economic commitment to build a democracy and fund the necessary security elements, at a cost of tens of billions of dollars per year, what’s the 

likelihood of our success? Seems to me the government is corrupt. 

Our working relationship is strained, to say the least. Our focus on 

building security forces is challenged, because its membership 

largely excludes Pashtuns in the south, which is the base for the 

41 

Taliban. Is there an amount of money or a plan that can actually 

work there? 

Ambassador HAASS. I would say no. I would be quite explicit. I 

would say our policy won’t work and it’s not worth it, even if it did 

work. So, I would actually go beyond that. I just think, given the 

scale of the challenges we face around the world, our fiscal situation, I cannot find a strategic rationale for the scale of effort that 

we are undertaking on the military and civilian sides in Afghanistan, even if it were to work. And again, I think there’s a negligible 

chance, Senator, it will work, which only, to me, increases the 

questions that I believe need to be raised about the direction and 

scale of U.S. foreign policy, here. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Senator, I don’t think we’re trying to build a 

democracy in Afghanistan, as the end. Once again, our goal is to 

ensure that there is not a government in Afghanistan that hosts 

al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks in such a way that they can 

freely plan and execute attacks against the United States. That’s 

why we went in. That’s why we’re there. We succeeded very 

quickly, early on. We took our eye off the ball, the Taliban started 

coming back. If the Taliban were to take over tomorrow, they 

would once again host al-Qaeda. We would not be able to actually 

be in country to be able to get the intelligence, to be able to do 

what we need to do. 

So, our focus still has to be a government in Afghanistan that 

does not host al-Qaeda and that is not defeated by the Taliban. 

With that, I think we can, in fact, get to, as I said, a secure, a stable, and an increasingly self-reliant Afghanistan. Rather than 

doing it by trying to build the country from the ground up, we need 

to do it politically, diplomatically, keeping our forces there by 

reaching a political settlement and a larger regional settlement. 

Every other country in that region has an absolute stake—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. At what cost and—— 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. In a stable government. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. For how much time? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I think that, actually, we can do this in a couple 

of years. I mean, I think we can start the political negotiations immediately, and the pace of transition does depend on how well the 

Afghan forces perform. But, increasingly there’s evidence that some 

are performing well, when—and we can play, then, an advisory 

capacity. We should not be fighting their battles for them. 

Ambassador HAASS. There is a fundamental disagreement here. 

This administration, several years ago, decided to—the words of 

the President, ‘‘to take the war, the fight, to the Taliban in the 

south and east of the country.’’ We essentially became a protagonist 

in Afghanistan’s civil war. I thought that was an incorrect decision 

then. I continue to believe it is an incorrect decision now. 

I do not believe we should simply assume that the Taliban can 

take over. I don’t believe they can, militarily. I think there’s way 

too much pushback, particularly in the north and west of Afghanistan. I do think, however, they are likely, no matter what we do, 

to make inroads in the south and east. But, I would not assume 

for a second that Taliban inroads equate into al-Qaeda return, that 

it’s stated here—that’s a testable proposition. There’s lots of evidence to suggest the Taliban would not do it. But, that’s the reason 

42 

we should talk to them. And, if they were ever to do it, that’s the 

reason we should attack them. But, I do not believe we should base 

U.S. policy on that, to me, truly unproven assumption. 

I’d just say one other thing. I do not believe the goal, as Dr. 

Slaughter’s articulating it, ‘‘self-reliant Afghanistan’’ is a reasonable goal. I would say it would not simply take us several years. 

I think that is an open-ended commitment for the United States, 

military and economically. And I do not believe, again, that that 

can be strategically defended, given the costs and given the opportunity costs, given all else we need to worry about in the world and 

given all else we need to worry about here at home. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Originally, Vice President Biden reportedly 

favored a more limited mission in Afghanistan, designed solely to 

interrupt al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And this approach, obviously, envisioned a smaller ISAF presence in Afghanistan. Advocates of this approach assert that the Government of 

Afghanistan is not a fully legitimate partner, primarily because of 

widespread government corruption. They believe a counterterrorism strategy that relies more heavily on Special Operation 

Forces to track and kill select mid-level insurgent commanders, 

which has previously been shown to be effective, and which would 

be used to attack the al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, would be a better approach. 

What are your views on that approach as an alternate? And if 

you don’t believe that it’s a good approach, what’s our argument for 

a broader counterinsurgency strategy instead of a targeted, more 

limited counterterrorism strategy? 

I’ve always thought that we should have a counterterrorism 

strategy, and while I have been supportive of the administration so 

far, I’m having a real hard time as we move forward. So, give me 

why one over the other. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Sir, I think—no one has said you don’t 

want that piece in the strategy—I think the big debility with at 

least the press; I’m not sure it was completely fair to the Vice 

President—what was portrayed as a solely counterterrorism strategy—is that, I believe that is strategy which, first of all, it requires 

a lot of on-the-ground presence to make it work. We’ve all said 

that. Second, it is—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. More than we have now? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. No, not more than we have. But, what 

I believe you get, if you have a strategy reduced to that, that’s not 

focused on doing anything with and for Afghanistan, is a strategy 

that invariably turns Afghans increasingly against us, to the point 

that that strategy fails as a sole strategy. 

If all our purpose has nothing to do with the purpose of Afghans 

who have to live in their country, then Taliban rule, or pretty much 

anything else that gets us out and ends that, becomes an improvement. So, if you really want to create the xenophobic reaction to 

foreigners that so many talk about, then have a strategy that is 

based only on fighting our enemies and doing nothing for Afghanistan. I don’t mean that we have to be in the total ‘‘build a democracy’’ mode, but if you deal only in extremes, if you deal with the 

kind of extreme—the press, at least, portrayed the Vice President 

43 

as having ‘‘very small U.S. forces to just hit terrorists’’—I think 

that becomes a complete failure. 

I do have—it was pretty clear—a serious difference about how 

much strategic interest we have here. My feeling is that what you 

will get, if we have something that can be really defined as a loss 

is—first of all, a huge propaganda victory for people who consider 

that they are at war with us and intend to continue that war. I 

don’t know how you measure the consequences, but I’ve never 

heard of one side quitting successfully in the middle of a war. 

Second, I think, in the context of the likely civil war in Afghanistan, something much larger than the fighting only in the Pashtun 

south, you draw in Pakistan, you draw in Iran, Russia gets drawn 

in, you end up with an instability that roils all of central Asia. I 

suppose we could turn our back on it. I, personally, believe that in 

that kind of situation, fear of India might well lead the Pakistanis 

to a much stronger support for radicals, in that they would be unlikely to deal with their own radicalism at the same time. And that 

also leads to greater instability in Pakistan. 

I find this a really frightening prospect, and one that scares me 

enough that I would stick with things, albeit looking for ways to 

spend less, which I think we can do over a year or two by cutting 

troop numbers. But, I think we have to try to turn it over to 

Afghans at a reasonable pace. That has not yet been tried. We are 

only now arriving at the point where we start trying it. We ought 

to see how it works. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

There are several things which motivate my thinking on this. 

The first is a sense of history. Afghanistan has been a graveyard 

of empires. Nations that have come to this country in an effort to 

suppress or reform it have a long history of failure. 

Second, this is the longest war in American history, and there’s 

no end in sight. When Ambassador Neumann says, ‘‘We would be 

guilty of quitting in the middle of a war,’’ can anyone say with honestly, ‘‘We’re in the middle of this war?’’ I’m not sure they can. 

And the third is the fact that I think the road to Kabul is paved 

with good intentions. When you look at a corrupt regime running 

this country, when you look at a $10–$12 billion monthly payment 

by American taxpayers, much of which is being wasted and, sadly, 

portions of which are being diverted to fund our enemy, you have 

to ask yourselves: How long can we sustain this? 

Mr. Haass, I read your testimony. And I was really kind of cheering you on, until I got to the last paragraph. And I’ve got to ask 

you about it, because here’s what you said, ‘‘Resolution of the ongoing conflict by either military or diplomatic means is highly unlikely and not a realistic basis for U.S. policy. Walking away from 

Afghanistan, however, is not the answer.’’ I want to ask you about 

that. 

If this is about money, then clearly spending it, or wasting it, is 

very hard to justify. But, it’s about a lot more. If you believe that 

resolution of this conflict by military means is highly unlikely and 

44 

not a realistic basis for U.S. policy, how can we send one more 

American soldier to fight and die in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador HAASS. It’s a good question and a fair question. I do 

not believe that United States interests, to the extent they exist in 

Afghanistan, require a resolution of the conflict. That’s good news, 

because we’re not going to get a resolution of the conflict, sir. But, 

we can maintain or protect ourselves or protect our core interests. 

Our core interest, again, is: Afghanistan ought not to launching 

pad for terrorist attacks against us or the world. We can do that, 

I believe, with a degree of counterterrorism presence and activity 

and a degree of limited, focused training on Afghan local and national troops. I believe we can protect our core interests with a 

modest investment. So, that’s why I’m trying to come up with, not 

the proverbial middle course, because it’s actually closer to one end 

than the other; but, I don’t believe the answer is withdrawal. 

Senator DURBIN. So, those of us—many of us who face this vote— 

faced two votes on Iraq in Afghanistan—23 of us voted against the 

invasion of Iraq; I continue to believe that it was the right vote. 

I voted for the invasion of Afghanistan. I voted for it to go after 

al-Qaeda for what they did to us on 9/11, and to find and, if necessary, kill Osama bin Laden. Now, here we are, almost 10 years 

later. And I have to tell you, if you would have asked me whether 

I was signing up for the longest war in American history, which 

has no end in sight even after the killing of Osama bin Laden, I 

would have to seriously say that wasn’t the bargain. That isn’t 

what I thought I was voting for. 

And now the question I have is this: If our goal in Afghanistan, 

as Dr. Slaughter has said and I think you’ve just said, is to prevent 

terrorist attacks on the United States, why are we limiting this to 

Afghanistan? Aren’t there other countries in the Middle East that 

are also harboring terrorists, wishing ill on the United States? 

Aren’t there countries in Africa? So, why have we drawn the line 

here and said we’ll stay as long as necessary to reach a ‘‘goodenough’’ solution in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador HAASS. Well, it’s actually the same approach I would 

actually suggest for these other countries. What I’m trying to do— 

maybe—it must be a drafting problem and I wasn’t clear—I am 

trying to scale down dramatically the United States involvement 

and investment in Afghanistan much more akin to what we have 

been doing in other countries, like Yemen and Somalia. I want to 

emphasis to be on counterterrorism, a degree of training. 

But, I agree with you, I don’t believe—coming back to something 

Senator Corker said before, I think before you arrived—this is not 

a template that’s sustainable, I believe, for any other country. I 

don’t believe it’s a template that ought to be sustained in Afghanistan. The war you signed up for 10 years ago—and I think you 

made the right vote, there, in signing up for this in Afghanistan, 

after 9/11—was a limited war. 

Senator DURBIN. Yes. 

Ambassador HAASS. This war has now morphed into something 

much more. We have basically allowed ourselves to become protagonists in a civil war. This was a mistake. And I believe what we 

need to do is dial it back, again, to a more limited mission, which 

is the one that you, I believe, correctly signed up for. And I believe 

45 

that limited mission is both affordable and in the interests of the 

United States. I do not believe the expanded mission that the 

United States has allowed itself to be drawn into is either affordable or justifiable or defends our core vital national security interests. 

Senator DURBIN. And it is calling on us to send our fighting men 

and women to fight and die. 

Ambassador HAASS. Absolutely. I agree with you on that. 

Senator DURBIN. So, we are now in a very sterile conversation 

about diplomacy and foreign policy. The reality is, they’re fighting 

and dying over there. And the question is, How long will we keep 

sending them? 

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, I think the answer is that there is 

a case—the United States does have a vital national interest in— 

to make sure that Afghanistan does not become, again—and this 

is not unique to Afghanistan, this is similar to other countries—a 

place where terrorists can act with impunity. That is something 

that I believe, because it is of vital national interest, our Armed 

Forces would gladly be involved with. But, again, the problem with 

Afghanistan is, we have allowed our mission to grow. We’ve had 

classic creep in objectives. And that is something that I believe is 

not in the national interests of the United States. 

Senator DURBIN. Dr. Slaughter. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. So, again, we’re not disagreeing about the 

endgame, here. I think we all agree that we need to draw down our 

troops substantially. I think the President agrees with this. 

The way I would differ with Richard is, we tried a limited 

counterterrorism strategy that—when you voted originally—we 

drove the Taliban out very fast, then we moved to a limited 

counterterrorism strategy. After 3 or 4 years, we turned around 

and the Taliban were deeply resurgent. We did not choose to be 

part of a civil war; we realized that we were at risk of losing all 

the gains we made. And we had to go back in with a counterinsurgency strategy. 

Senator DURBIN. Let me ask you this question. Is it not true— 

I mean, they tell us—we could gather all of the known al-Qaeda— 

active al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in this room—in this room—and yet 

we are spending $10–$12 billion a month in a war with the 

Taliban, which—— 

I’ve asked this basic question: Can we achieve what we want to 

achieve in Afghanistan without defeating the Taliban? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. We can achieve that if we have a stable government in Afghanistan, that includes part of the Taliban, that does 

not host al-Qaeda. I think we agree. If we can get to an agreement 

where the Taliban can meet certain basic conditions, they can be 

part of the government and they do not host al-Qaeda, then we—— 

Senator DURBIN. And do you think—— 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. Our interests are served. And I 

think we can get there. 

Senator DURBIN. And do you think this Karzai government can 

be the host for that kind of concern? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I think we are now in a position where we have 

pushed back enough, and our troops have succeeded in pushing 

back enough, that we are now in a strong enough position to enter 

46 

a negotiation that will not just be the Karzai government, it will 

be a coalition government with a set of conditions that will then 

allow us to dramatically pull down our forces. But, we have had to 

push back, through counterinsurgency, because of what we lost 

through a pure counterterrorism strategy. And now we need to 

move to the political phase. 

Senator DURBIN. If that’s our goal, that negotiation should have 

started yesterday. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I could not agree more. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I recognize Senator Shaheen, let me just 

follow up quickly. 

Dr. Slaughter, you said the goal would be that this government 

would include the Taliban as a coalition, having negotiated that. 

Why is it necessary to have that? Why couldn’t you simply have a 

government that is promoting its own agenda and the Taliban on 

the outside of it, and have an ongoing stalemate? It’s their struggle. And, while we are aligned with that government that’s fighting 

the Taliban, we have an arrangement where we have a platform, 

we’re doing counterterrorism, we’re making sure the Taliban aren’t 

harboring any terrorists, and we also can guarantee that they’re 

not going to be able to take over. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Why isn’t that adequate? Why do you have to go 

to that next tier? 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. With respect, we have a messy stalemate, of the 

kind you’re describing and Richard Haass is describing, when we 

have 130,000 U.S. and allied troops there. Right now, if we were 

to pull out those troops, I do not think we’d have a Karzai government, sort of, defending its interests. I think you would see—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we didn’t say ‘‘pull out.’’ 

Dr. SLAUGHTER [continuing]. Major Taliban advances. So, we 

have to get a political solution. 

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody has said ‘‘pull out.’’ People have said ‘‘reduce.’’ Big distinction. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. And I think we’re agreed that, if you can hand 

over to the Afghan forces, and we maintain and advisory role, then 

that that can continue, although it’s still not as strong as a government that actually has at least some Taliban as part of it, so that 

there is, in fact, some kind of settlement. 

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, could I say something? 

I actually think the model you’re suggesting is much more realistic. The idea that we’re going to be able to negotiate, or the 

Afghans themselves are going to be able to negotiate, a broad-based 

government with discrete power-sharing arrangements seems to 

me highly optimistic. But, I would think it’s perfectly acceptable 

that—given, particularly, the localized tradition of Afghanistan; 

you have a weak central government that’s not necessary nationally representative—that the Taliban or conservative Pashtuns, call 

them what you will, have considerable influence again in the south 

and east of the country, and that so long as they are willing to 

abide by certain redlines that we can live with, I do not believe it 

is essential that we have a national compact or a government that 

is unified or self-reliant or anything else. Indeed, to try to jam 

47 

Taliban participation on the Tajiks and Uzbeks and others, I would 

suggest, would not only fail, but would probably be counterproductive. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me recognize Senator Shaheen. We’ll come 

back to this in a second. 

Yes, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it’s fitting, as I’m sure people have said already, that 

we’re having this discussion the day—2 days after Osama bin 

Laden has been killed. After all, as you all point out, it was his 

masterminding the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 

United States that got us into this war. 

And so, as we think about what the endgame here is, what impact will the death of Osama bin Laden have on that endgame? 

Obviously, it was a huge national security and military and intelligence triumph for the United States. But, what will the real impact be, if any, on the Taliban who are operating in Afghanistan? 

And does it have any impact on our allies as we look at the fight 

ahead? 

Ambassador HAASS. I believe the only way it has significant impact would be if it leads the Pakistanis to seriously reconsider their 

continual provision of a sanctuary to the Taliban. If this leads, 

through some sort of new conversation between the United— 

between Washington and Islamabad—to a material change in Pakistani policy, then I think it will have major repercussions. But, so 

long as Pakistan is willing to play the role it’s played for all these 

years, and provide sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban, not only does 

it mean that Osama bin Laden’s death will not have material impact on the future of Afghanistan, but it will not, essentially, have 

the sort of salutary effects you and I would like to see, you know, 

more broadly. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Slaughter. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

I’m not sure we fully know. And one of the things I’m arguing 

is that we should take this moment to explore. I agree that it could 

change some of our relations with Islamabad. I think though it also 

may change the willingness of some Taliban to negotiate. There are 

arguments that Osama bin Laden was very close to the top leadership, Mullah Omar, of the Taliban. With him gone, that may create 

some political space. It’s at least worth exploring. It also creates 

political space for us with President Karzai. And, in the sense that 

President Karzai often says, ‘‘Well, we’re going to stay,’’ because 

it’s—we’re there for our interests more than we are for his. 

This is now a moment where we can say, as we’re hearing all 

over the place—although obviously it’s a symbolic death, it’s a very 

important symbol. And it gives us a chance to pivot. So, that may 

give us more leverage, also, with President Karzai. Seems to me, 

we should seize that moment and explore. We’re not going to be 

worse off. We may be substantially better off. 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. 

Ambassador Neumann, do you have anything to add to that? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I basically agree. I am more—much more 

dubious that it is a moment for negotiations. I have nothing 

48 

against exploring them. But, I think Senator Kerry’s description of 

a possible kind of end state was more realistic. 

For one thing, there have been a great many negotiations over 

30 years in Afghanistan. Almost all of them have fallen apart. Most 

of them, which are power-sharing agreements, have not worked. I 

think we need to get out of the American mindset that agreement 

ends things. Look at negotiations, historically, at least in Afghanistan, much more like the agreements of the Middle Ages/Renaissance Europe—they’ll last until one person, one side, is strong 

enough to break them and go with them. 

So, while negotiations are relevant, but pinning a lot of hope on 

them, or thinking that, because you’ve inked the page, you’ve got 

something, I’m pretty dubious about. 

I do agree, on your question, that, very specifically, this is a 

place to push Pakistan. But, recognizing we have interests in common, and we probably have interests that oppose. And perhaps the 

thing that we need to clarify most is what the interests are that 

we have that we will sustain. 

The confusion and the doubts of Pakistan, Afghanistan, regional 

players, about us, is enormously debilitating in this struggle, 

because we are such a huge player. Enemies, friends, and those 

that are neither, take position, in part, based on where they think 

we are. And when they don’t know, they invent the answer. And 

then they go from that reasoning. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, we’re going to have a hearing on Thursday to talk about Pakistan, so that will be an opportunity to explore that a little further. 

I want to go back to the discussion that Senator Durbin was having earlier. And I’m having trouble, I guess, Mr. Haass, trying to 

distinguish between the endgame that you’re describing, which 

sounds to me very much like what we’ve been doing in Afghanistan 

from the time we went in and removed the Taliban until we increased our forces. So, I wonder if you could just describe in further 

detail how that’s different so I can understand the distinctions that 

you’re making. 

Ambassador HAASS. What I’m suggesting is different in two 

ways. It’s different in where we’re trying to get to and how we get 

there. My goal is not a democratic Afghanistan, though I’d like to 

see it. It’s not an Afghanistan that’s at total peace, though I’d like 

to see it. It’s not a unified, strong national government. I don’t 

think any of those things is in the cards. 

What I’m looking for is simply an Afghanistan that has a minimal level of functionality, where, above all, it is not a place where 

al-Qaeda, or groups like it, act with impunity. And the way I believe we achieve that—this is a very modest goal—the way I would 

try to achieve it is through a heavy emphasis—not a sole emphasis, 

but an emphasis on U.S. counterterrorism capabilities, with a degree of training up of Afghan police and army forces, both nationally, but also locally, and a degree of diplomacy, particularly one 

on one with the Taliban, to try to draw some redlines with them, 

and also to try to have some sort of a regional forum. I would dramatically decrease U.S. troop levels. Right now, roughly 100,000; I 

would reduce them by three-quarters or more as quite quickly. 

49 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you just talk about why what you’re just 

describing is different than what we were doing? Because—— 

Ambassador HAASS. Sure. 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. It doesn’t sound that different to 

me. 

Ambassador HAASS. It sounds quite different to me, and maybe 

I’m not articulating it well. But, my—what the—the big difference 

is, the current U.S. policy is trying—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m not talking about the current U.S. policy. 

I’m trying to see if I can understand the distinction you’re making 

between what we should be doing now, and what we are doing, and 

how that is different from what we did when we initially went into 

Afghanistan and continued to do, really until the buildup after 

President Obama was elected and began to increase troop size and 

trainers, because—— 

Ambassador HAASS. Sure. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m not understanding the distinction you’re 

making. 

Ambassador HAASS. That’s—OK, I apologize. I didn’t understand 

your question, Senator. 

The original policy, after 9/11, once the government was ousted, 

was a fairly narrow counterterrorism policy. It did not involve significant training up of Afghan police or army forces at either the 

national or local level. Now those—between—if you add up Afghan 

national army and police, it probably is more than 300,000. So, essentially we have done all that, particularly in the last couple of 

years. Plus, there was not a real diplomatic dimension. We allowed 

the ‘‘Six Plus Two’’ forum to essentially go into disuse. The United 

States did not try to test the Taliban as to whether they had 

changed their ways, when it came to association with al-Qaeda. So, 

essentially, you know, those are the differences. 

And what we did also—the big difference—what we started 

doing, and I would end doing, is—I would bring to an end combat 

operations against the Taliban. Starting 21⁄2 years ago, the United 

States made the policy decision that it would henceforth target the 

Taliban militarily. And that was the principal rationale for the 

military increases taken in 2009, as well as the subsequent surge. 

I believe that was ill-advised, and I want to go back to the phase 

before that, where the United States no longer targets the Taliban, 

militarily, on the assumption that Taliban presence is one in the 

same as al-Qaeda return. I think that is an incorrect assumption, 

and I do not believe the United States can—or should, rather— 

conduct policy in Afghanistan based on that. So, I would remove 

that component of our policy. 

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Can I just jump in there? 

Again, the desire of our policy was not to fight the Taliban for 

the Taliban’s sake. The desire of our policy was to push them back 

from the gains that they had made when we were following a narrow counterterrorism strategy, and, as Ambassador Neumann said, 

also to actually convince the Afghans we were there not just to 

fight terrorism, but because we had their interests at heart, as 

well. 

If we had negotiated with the Taliban 2 years ago, or tried to 

negotiate, we would be in a very different position. I think the way 

50 

we understand this is that we push back enough so we are now in 

a position to negotiate with the Taliban, with redlines. Maybe we 

can do that without the Afghan Government. I mean, to Senator 

Kerry’s point, it’s still a sovereign country. It’s a little difficult to 

be negotiating with the enemy of the government independently of 

the government, but I would say we try a comprehensive settlement. If we can’t get that, we negotiate in other ways. But, we had 

to push back on the Taliban so that we would then be in a position 

to negotiate the kind of solution you’re talking about. We’re not 

there to fight the Taliban for the sake of fighting the Taliban. 

Ambassador HAASS. We, then, obviously have a disagreement 

here. I do not believe we had to do it, because I’m not trying to get 

the Taliban to become great citizens participating in the political 

life of Afghanistan. I only have one simple goal with the Taliban. 

It’s that they do not reestablish the sort of relationship they had 

with al-Qaeda. I do not believe we had to militarily go to war 

against the Taliban for the last couple of years to do it. I believe 

we have—always have the option of attacking the Taliban directly. 

Plus, I believe the Taliban—based upon statements they have 

made and that have been reported back, they, themselves, have 

come to question their deep association with foreigners, which is 

what al-Qaeda is to them. 

But, I think we have to accept, no matter what happens in 

Afghanistan, at some point the south and the east of Afghanistan 

is going to be dominated by Pashtun political leadership, which is 

going to be extraordinarily conservative in its behavior. And 

whether you call them, technically, Taliban or not, there’s going to 

be unattractive features of that, in terms of their vision of a society 

and how they go about promoting it. But, I think that is inevitable, 

whether we have 100,000 American troops there for 5 more years. 

And 6 or 7 more years from now, that will happen, in any event. 

That is the future of Afghanistan. 

At some point, we have to be willing to carry out a foreign policy 

that accepts a degree of local realities and limits. And one of the 

problems with our policy in Afghanistan is, when we get too ambitious there, and we don’t respect, I believe, enough local culture 

and traditions and realities, we are committing ourselves to an expensive policy that will not have enduring benefits in any way that 

are commensurate with the military or human or economic investment we are going to be making. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Very—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Could I say—— 

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. My time is up, but—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN [continuing]. One thing? 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’ll yield back to you, Senator Shaheen. I’m 

perfectly happy to have you pursue and closeout the hearing. I 

have a 12:15 I need to go to. 

But, I just want to weigh in, before I go. And then Senator 

Shaheen will close it out. I—— 

This is a very—let me just say, first of all, the complexity of this, 

and the difficulties of reaching adequate definitions and understandings of what your, sort of, underlying premises are, is obvious. 

You know, this is complicated. It’s not easy, No. 1. 

51 

No. 2, we have a bad habit—I want to pick up on what Dr. Haass 

was just saying—we kind of have a habit of saying—you know, 

well, we’ll throw out this idea of negotiating, or we’ll throw out this 

idea of, you know, achieving the sufficient stability, and this and 

that. But, in the end, good diplomacy, and its failure, which is conflict and war, is usually based on people’s perception about their 

interests. And it’s one thing for us to sit here and talk about, ‘‘Hey, 

you know, we’re going to try and do this, or we ought to do that, 

or here’s our perception.’’ But, I find that, very often, it is not adequately based on, and in, the realities of the culture that we’re in 

the midst of, or their interests and the way they see themselves 

playing out, here. 

You know, most Afghans don’t want to see the Taliban return. 

That’s a reality. And I don’t think enough of our discussion has, 

sort of, taken that reality into account, here. You know, poll after 

poll shows that the Taliban do not have widespread support, and 

they are not seen to represent Afghans, or even Pashtun interests, 

on a national basis. Yet, the current approach to negotiations, 

which we’re sort of putting on the table here, appears to be almost 

counterproductive, in terms of some of our interests, because it 

alienates some of the ethnic groups that don’t feel represented. 

So, you have Pashtuns who feel excluded by the negotiations. 

You have minority Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras who are vehemently against any kind of deal with the Taliban, because they still 

remember the atrocities of the 1990s. You have Afghan women who 

fear they’re going to pay a very heavy price for peace as the prospect of any of these negotiations. And civil society members are 

strongly opposed to a Taliban return. 

So, it seems to me we ought to be able to factor those realities 

into where things may flow, with less troops and with the Afghans 

having to resolve these things for themselves, with us there, in a 

continuing capacity. In terms of the question of incentives, what 

kind of incentives are we providing? I don’t see us saying we’re 

abandoning the Afghans. I don’t see us saying we’re not going to, 

you know, be there to represent our interests also, and work with 

them to go through that process, and also prevent the Taliban from 

making any kind of enormous significant gain. 

I might add that, regionally, there’s a lot of anxiety about the 

Taliban coming back to power in any way. You’ve got Russia, central Asian republics, Saudi Arabia, India. All have varying degrees 

of antipathy to the Taliban coming back. And it seems to me that 

we could work more of a regional effort to try to deal with some 

of that reality than we have. A number of people have suggested 

to me there may be options here with the ‘‘Stans’’ and with Russia 

and with other countries, including, I might add, Iran, that we 

have not adequately explored. Iran doesn’t like the Taliban. Iran 

also doesn’t like drug-trafficking. And it seems to me there are 

legitimate interests here that ought to be explored in other ways 

here as we go forward. 

So, the Pakistan piece of this is obviously critical. And there are 

a lot of questions raised in the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death. 

But, I do think that—we’re going to have a hearing on that— 

there’s a lot we can explore. 

52 

But, I’d just summarize by saying, I think that we really have 

to do more work. And that’s the purpose of these hearings, to hone 

in on the realities that we’re dealing with, and what the possibilities are. We could spend a lot of money for a long period of time. 

And I tend to agree with Dr. Haass, I don’t see a lot of indicators 

that that is going to significantly change the dynamic on the 

ground. And I think what’s ultimately going to change it is Afghans 

themselves feeling they have a stake with a sense of what the longterm power-broker structure is going to be. And I think it could be 

significantly less prominently American, and significantly less expensive. And that’s what we have to really examine here very, very 

carefully as we go forward here. 

So, I know this is worth a lot more discussion, which is why 

we’re going to have five more hearings on it, including having the 

Secretary of State come in, toward the end, and share her views 

from the administration’s perspective now. 

We will leave the record open for a week for colleagues to be able 

to submit questions in writing, and even to follow up on some of 

those questions that have been placed today. 

I’m extremely grateful to you. I think the three of you have very 

effectively helped to frame the complexity and the realities of this 

debate. And it’s a good shaping, if you will, for our discussions as 

we go forward. So I thank you very, very much. I think it’s been 

very profitable and very helpful. 

Senator Shaheen, if you would close out the hearing, I’d appreciate it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I am—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I apologize. Well, do you want to ask a couple of questions before you do? 

The CHAIRMAN. No? 

Senator SHAHEEN. I do not. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will, then, have the record available for any 

submission of additional questions. 

And, with that, we stand adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this full committee hearing on the situation in Afghanistan. It certainly is timely in light of the elimination of Osama bin 

Laden this past Sunday. 

For almost 10 years, our men and women in uniform have faced hardships in the 

effort to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and 

I congratulate our Nation’s finest for their tireless pursuit for justice. We rejoice 

that this monster is dead. While we have succeeded in taking out the head of 

al-Qaeda, the effects of his death are yet unseen, and could span a broad range of 

possibilities. We must, therefore, not let our guard down in the Global War on Terrorism, and must remain ever vigilant in protecting our Nation and its people. 

As the ranking member of this committee’s Subcommittee on East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, I also want to recognize at this hearing the contribution by the 

Republic of Korea—our Nation’s close friend and strong ally in Asia—to the commitment to peace in Afghanistan. In fact, last month, South Korea pledged an additional $500 million over 5 years to the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) serving in Afghanistan. I understand that this additional assistance, a large 

increase over the $180 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA) that Korea 

53 

provided to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2010, will enhance the capabilities of the 

Afghanistan National Security Force and support the country’s economic and social 

development. 

Korea has actively taken part in international efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, particularly in alliance with the United States, and has continually increased its assistance and activities there. From 2002 to 2007, Korea deployed military medics and 

engineers in Afghanistan. They provided medical service to 260,000 people and 

helped build the U.S. Bagram Airfield. 

Korea officially joined the ISAF in April 2010, deploying 350 troops to Afghanistan. In July 2010, Korea established its own Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 

in Parwan province in eastern Afghanistan. The Korean PRT’s activities, which include education assistance, health and medical service, rural development aid, improved governance and police training, are greatly appreciated by the Afghanistan 

Government and local residents. 

I commend the Republic of Korea for its past assistance to ISAF forces and people 

of Afghanistan and their new pledge of additional assistance. 

Thank you again, Chairman Kerry, for holding this full committee hearing on the 

situation in Afghanistan. 

Æ