Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

April 2003 OVERSEAS 

PRESENCE 

Rightsizing 

Framework Can Be 

Applied at U.S. 

Diplomatic Posts in 

Developing Countries 

GAO-03-396 
GAO’s rightsizing framework can be applied at U.S. embassies in developing 

countries. Officials from the Bureau of African Affairs, and U.S. embassy 

officials in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania, 

said that the framework’s questions highlighted specific issues at each post 

that should be considered in determining staffing levels. Officials in other 

State bureaus also believed that the security, mission, cost, and option 

components of the framework provided a logical basis for planning and 

making rightsizing decisions. 

At each of the posts GAO visited, application of the framework and 

corresponding questions generally highlighted 

• physical and technical security deficiencies that needed to be 

weighed against proposed staff increases; 

• mission priorities and requirements that are not fully documented or 

justified in the posts’ Mission Performance Plans; 

• cost of operations data that were unavailable, incomplete, or 

fragmented across funding sources; and 

• rightsizing actions and other options that post managers should 

consider for adjusting the number of personnel. 

Specific Rightsizing Issues Identified at Each West African Post 

Since the mid-1990s, GAO has 

highlighted the need for the 

Department of State and other 

agencies to establish a systematic 

process for determining their 

overseas staffing levels. To 

support this long-standing need and 

in support of the President’s 

Management Agenda, GAO 

developed a framework for 

assessing overseas workforce size 

and identified options for 

rightsizing. Because the 

framework was largely based on 

work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, 

GAO was asked to determine 

whether the rightsizing framework 

is applicable at U.S. embassies in 

developing countries. To 

accomplish this objective, we 

visited three U.S. embassies in 

West Africa—a medium-sized post 

in Dakar, Senegal; and two small 

embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; 

and Nouakchott, Mauritania—and 

applied the framework and its 

corresponding questions there. 

GAO recommends that 

 the Director of OMB, in 

coordination with the Secretary 

of State, ensure that application 

of our framework be expanded 

as a basis for assessing staffing 

levels at embassies and 

consulates worldwide; and 

 the Secretary of State adopt the 

framework as part of the 

Mission Performance Planning 

process. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-396.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-396, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, House Committee 

on Government Reform 

April 2003

OVERSEAS PRESENCE

Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at 

U.S. Diplomatic Posts in Developing 

Countries 
Page i GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied and Used to Highlight 

Specific Issues at Each Embassy 5

Conclusions 12

Recommendations for Executive Action 12

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 12

Scope and Methodology 13

Appendix I Rightsizing Issues at West African Posts 15 

Dakar: Physical and Technical Security 15

Dakar: Mission Priorities and Requirements 15

Dakar: Cost of Operations 16

Dakar: Consideration of Rightsizing Actions and Options 17

Banjul: Physical and Technical Security 19

Banjul: Mission Priorities and Requirements 19

Banjul: Cost of Operations 20

Nouakchott: Physical and Technical Security 21

Nouakchott: Mission Priorities and Requirements 21

Nouakchott: Cost of Operations 21

Appendix II Rightsizing Framework and Corresponding 

Questions 23 

Appendix III Comments from the Office of Management and 

Budget 25 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 26 

GAO’s Comments 31

Figures 

Figure 1: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Dakar, Senegal 18

Figure 2: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Banjul, The 

Gambia 20

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Figure 3: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Nouakchott, 

Mauritania 22

Abbreviations 

ICASS International Cooperative Administrative Support Services 

MPP Mission Performance Plan 

NSDD-38 National Security Decision Directive-38 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPAP Overseas Presence Advisory Panel 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

April 7, 2003 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Since the mid-1990s, GAO has highlighted the need for the Department of 

State and other agencies to establish a systematic process for determining 

their overseas staffing levels.1

 Shortly after the 1998 bombings of two U.S. 

embassies in East Africa, two high level independent groups called for the 

reassessment of staffing levels at U.S. embassies and consulates. In August 

2001, the President’s Management Agenda directed all agencies to 

“rightsize” their overseas presence to the minimum necessary to meet U.S. 

foreign policy goals. To support the long-standing need for a successful 

rightsizing initiative, in 2002 we developed a framework that identifies 

critical elements of embassy operations—physical security, mission 

priorities and requirements, and cost—and also includes rightsizing 

options for consideration.2

 Each element contains a set of corresponding 

questions for rightsizing the overseas workforce.3

 The questions provide a 

basis for decision makers to systematically link the elements of security, 

mission, and cost to embassy staffing levels and requirements. The 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Staffing: U.S. Government Diplomatic Presence 

Abroad, GAO/T-NSIAD-95-136 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 1995). U.S. General Accounting 

Office, State Department: Overseas Staffing Process Not Linked to Policy Priorities, 

GAO/NSIAD-94-228 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 1994), and U.S. General Accounting Office, 

Overseas Presence: Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic Posts, GAO/NSIAD-95-50S (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 28, 1994). 

2

We presented our framework in testimony in May 2002 and in a report issued in July 2002. 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Observations on a Rightsizing 

Framework, GAO-02-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2002), and Overseas Presence: 

Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives, 

GAO-02-780 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002). 

3

We defined rightsizing as aligning the number and location of staff assigned overseas with 

foreign policy priorities and security and other constraints. Rightsizing may result in the 

addition or reduction of staff, or a change in the mix of staff. The Department of State 

agreed with this definition. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

framework also includes questions on rightsizing options, including 

relocating staff to the United States or to regional centers, and 

competitively sourcing4

 certain functions.5 (See app. II for the rightsizing 

framework and corresponding questions.) After responding to the 

questions, decision makers should then be in a position to determine 

whether rightsizing actions are needed to add, reduce, or change the staff 

mix at an embassy, and to consider rightsizing options. 

Our July 2002 report recommended that the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) use our framework to support the administration’s 

rightsizing initiatives, starting with its assessments of staffing levels and 

rightsizing options at posts in Europe and Eurasia.6

 OMB said the 

framework would serve as a valuable starting point for rightsizing 

embassies. However, because the questions were developed primarily 

based on our work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, OMB was not confident 

that the questions could be uniformly applied at all posts worldwide. In 

response to OMB’s concerns, you requested that we determine whether 

the questions could be applied at U.S. embassies in developing countries. 

This report presents the results of our work at three U.S. embassies we 

visited in West Africa—the medium-sized post in Dakar, Senegal; and two 

small embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania. The 

objective of our work at these embassies was to determine whether our 

rightsizing framework is applicable at U.S. embassies in developing 

countries. To accomplish this objective, we applied the questions to each 

post in West Africa by reviewing embassy planning and requirements 

documents and by interviewing embassy managers and officials in the 

Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs regarding each embassy’s 

security, mission, cost, and rightsizing options. We also discussed security 

issues at those posts with officials in State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security. In addition, we met with officials in State’s Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to discuss the 

potential applicability of the framework at posts in other developing 

countries. 

 4

Competitive sourcing involves using competition to determine whether a commercial 

activity should be performed by government personnel or contractors. 

5

GAO encourages decision makers to also formulate additional questions to the framework 

as needed. 

6

GAO-02-780. 
Page 3 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Our analysis of the three embassies we visited indicates that the 

rightsizing framework can be applied at U.S. embassies in developing 

countries. Officials at each embassy agreed that answering these questions 

could systematically help identify the trade-offs and options that should be 

considered in determining staffing levels. For example, responses to the 

questions highlighted deficiencies in physical security that need to be 

weighed against proposed staff increases; identified deficiencies in cost 

data needed to make sound staffing decisions; and identified potential 

rightsizing options, such as better defining regional responsibilities and 

related staffing requirements, streamlining support functions, and 

assessing the feasibility of competitively sourcing goods and services. 

Officials in State’s Bureau of African Affairs and other regional bureaus 

agreed that a broad application of the framework and its corresponding 

questions would provide a logical and commonsense approach to 

systematically considering rightsizing issues in developed and developing 

countries and that it can be adjusted as necessary to address emerging 

rightsizing conditions. Currently, most agencies operating overseas do not 

systematically address rightsizing as a policy or management issue. The 

rightsizing issues related to security, mission, and cost, and options such 

as competitively sourcing or relocating staff, are addressed only in a 

fragmented manner, not specifically as part of the embassies’ planning 

process. 

As a result of our work, we are recommending that the Director of OMB, in 

coordination with the Secretary of State, expand the use of our framework 

in assessing staffing levels at all U.S. embassies and consulates. We are 

also recommending that the Secretary of State include the framework as 

part of the Department of State’s mission performance planning process. 

OMB agreed with our findings and recommendations and stated that our 

framework may serve as a valuable base for the development of a broader 

methodology that can be applied worldwide. The Department of State 

generally agreed with our recommendations and said that they welcome 

our work on developing a rightsizing framework. The Department of State 

also said that the framework’s questions provide a good foundation for it 

to proceed in working with OMB and other agencies to improve the 

process for determining overseas staffing levels. In addition, the 

Department of State said that it plans to incorporate elements of our 

rightsizing framework into future mission performance planning. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

In our reviews of embassy staffing issues during the 1990s, we found that 

the Department of State and some other agencies operating overseas 

lacked clear criteria for staffing overseas embassies.7

 Other reviews 

reached similar conclusions. In early 1999, the Accountability Review 

Boards that investigated the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East 

Africa concluded that the United States should consider adjusting the size 

of its embassies and consulates to reduce security vulnerabilities.8

 Later 

that year, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) recommended 

that rightsizing be a key strategy to improve security and reduce operating 

costs.9 In August 2001, President Bush announced that achieving a 

rightsized overseas presence was one of his 14 management priorities. The 

September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States added impetus for 

this initiative. In May 2002, we testified before the Subcommittee on 

National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House 

Committee on Government Reform, on a proposed framework for 

determining the appropriate number of staff to be assigned to a U.S. 

embassy. 

To further assess the applicability of GAO’s rightsizing framework, we 

selected the embassies in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and 

Nouakchott, Mauritania. We selected these embassies based on OMB’s 

questions about whether our framework can be uniformly applied at all 

posts, and because experts suggest that rightsizing in Africa is a significant 

challenge. The embassy in Dakar is a medium-sized post that provides 

regional support to several embassies including Cape Verde, Guinea, The 

Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone. Embassy Dakar has about 90 

direct-hire Americans and 350 local hires working in seven U.S. agencies. 

 7

GAO/T-NSIAD-95-136, GAO/NSIAD-95-50FS, and GAO/NSIAD-94-228. 

8

Former Secretary of State Albright appointed the Accountability Review Boards to 

investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1998 embassy bombings in East 

Africa. Department of State, Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy 

Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam (Washington, D.C.: January 1999). 

9

Former Secretary of State Albright established the panel following the 1998 embassy 

bombings in Africa to consider the organization of U.S. embassies and consulates. 

Department of State, America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, The Report of the 

Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Embassy Banjul is a special embassy program10 post with 7 American 

direct hires and about 65 local hires. Embassy Nouakchott is also a special 

embassy program post with 14 American direct hires and about 42 local 

hires. 

Our work at the three posts in West Africa further demonstrated that our 

framework and corresponding questions can provide a systematic 

approach for assessing overseas workforce size and identifying options for 

rightsizing in developing countries. We identified examples of the specific 

security, mission, and cost issues at each post, which, when considered 

collectively, highlighted staffing issues and rightsizing options to consider. 

(See app. I for more details on our findings at each of the embassies.) 

The ability to protect personnel should be a critical factor in determining 

embassy staffing levels. Recurring security threats to embassies and 

consulates further highlight the importance of rightsizing as a tool to 

minimize the number of embassy employees at risk. Our security questions 

address a broad range of issues, including the security of embassy 

buildings, the use of existing secure space, and the vulnerabilities of staff 

to terrorist attack. Officials at the embassies in Dakar, Banjul, and 

Nouakchott agreed that security vulnerability should be a key concern in 

determining the size and composition of staffing levels at the posts and 

should be addressed in conjunction with the other rightsizing elements of 

mission and cost. 

Each post has undergone security upgrades since the 1998 embassy 

bombings to address deficiencies and ensure better security.11 However, 

 10The Department of State implemented the special embassy program to preclude growth at 

posts abroad where U.S. interests are limited, to permit posts with limited resources to 

concentrate on essential objectives by relieving them of lower priority work and to simplify 

and streamline operations so that posts can operate more effectively and efficiently. 

Embassies are designated as special embassy programs if they have 30 or fewer U.S. citizen 

direct-hire positions or 15 or fewer direct-hire Department of State positions. 

11The Department of State assesses security requirements at each overseas post based on 

standards in such categories as perimeter walls and fences, facility setback, building 

material and blast protection, compound accessibility, defense barriers, and other key 

elements of security. 

Rightsizing 

Framework Can Be 

Applied and Used to 

Highlight Specific 

Issues at Each 

Embassy 

Physical and Technical 

Security of Facilities and 

Employees 
Page 6 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

until facilities are replaced as part of the long-term construction plan, most 

will not meet security standards. For example, many buildings at overseas 

posts do not meet the security setback requirement.12 At the Dakar post, 

responses to the framework’s security questions identified significant 

limitations in facility security and office space that likely limit the number 

of additional staff that could be adequately protected in the embassy 

compound. This is a significant issue for the embassy in Dakar given its 

expanding regional role and projected increases in staffing to 

accommodate visa workload and increasing personnel at non-State 

agencies, as well as because planned construction of a new secure 

embassy compound will not be completed until at least 2007. In contrast, 

Embassy Banjul has unused office space that could accommodate 

additional staff within the embassy compound. Although U.S. interests are 

limited in The Gambia, a staff increase could be accommodated if decision 

makers determine that additional staff are needed as a result of answering 

the framework’s questions. In Nouakchott, existing space is limited but 

adequate. However, officials raised concerns about the security risks 

associated with the expected increase in personnel on the compound. 

The placement and composition of staff overseas must reflect the highest 

priority goals of U.S. foreign policy. Questions in this section of our 

framework include assessing the overall justification of agency staffing 

levels in relation to embassy priorities and the extent to which it is 

necessary for each agency to maintain or change its presence in a country, 

given the scope of its responsibilities and its mission. Related questions 

include asking if each agency’s mission reinforces embassy priorities and 

if an agency’s mission could be pursued in other ways. Responses to the 

questions showed that there are key management systems for controlling 

and planning staffing levels currently in use at overseas posts, but they are 

not designed or used to systematically address these staffing, priority, and 

mission issues. 

One such management system is the National Security Decision Directive38 (NSDD-38). NSDD-38 is a long-standing directive that requires non-State 

agencies to seek approval by chiefs of missions on any proposed changes 

 12Department of State’s security requirement (12 FAH-6 H-111.4) states that existing 

chanceries or consulates must have a standoff distance of 100 feet between the protected 

side of the perimeter barrier and the building exterior. 

Mission Priorities and Staff 

Requirements 
Page 7 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

in staff.13 NSDD-38 does not, however, direct the Chief of Mission to 

initiate an assessment of an agency’s overall presence. The Overseas 

Presence Advisory Panel reported that the directive is not designed to 

enable ambassadors to make decisions on each new agency position in a 

coordinated, interagency plan for U.S. operations at a post.14 Post officials 

agreed that the NSDD-38 system has only limited usefulness for controlling 

staffing levels and achieving rightsizing objectives. 

Another management system is the Department of State’s Mission 

Performance Plan (MPP). The MPP is the primary planning document for 

each overseas post.15 State’s MPP process has been strengthened 

significantly to require each embassy to set its top priorities and link 

staffing and workload requirements to those priorities. However, the MPP 

does not address rightsizing as a management issue or provide full 

guidance to posts for assessing overall staffing levels, by agency, in 

relation to a post’s mission. At the three posts we visited, staffing requests 

were addressed in the MPPs in the context of each post’s mission 

performance goals; however, these documents did not address the security 

and cost trade-offs associated with making such staffing changes. In 

addition, Embassy Dakar has an increasing regional role, which is not 

sufficiently addressed in the MPP. 

Finally, the Department of State’s Overseas Staffing Model provides 

guidance for State in assigning its full-time American direct hire staff to 

posts, but it does not include comprehensive guidance on linking staffing 

levels to security, workload requirements, cost, and other elements of 

rightsizing. It also does not provide guidance on staffing levels for foreign 

service nationals or for other agencies at a post. 

Using various methods for addressing staffing and other key resource 

requirements is not effective in planning for or controlling growth. The 

 13The directive requires U.S. government agencies operating under the authority of Chiefs 

of Mission (usually an ambassador) to seek approval by the post’s Chief of Mission on any 

proposed changes in the size, composition, or mandate of their staff. 

14U.S. Department of State, America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century: The Report 

of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

15MPPs are authoritative U.S. government strategy documents prepared annually and 

covering all agencies at a post on the basis of the goals set forth in the Department of State 

Strategic Plan and the International Affairs Strategic Plan. The MPP sets priorities and 

makes requests for staff and other resources, and ensures consistency among agencies in 

country and with Washington headquarters. 
Page 8 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Dakar agreed, as this has resulted in 

growth beyond the post’s capacity. Specifically, The Department of State 

has added at least seven American direct-hire positions to the post, and 

non-State agencies operating in Dakar have added another six positions 

over the last year. In addition, post officials project more increases in 

personnel by fiscal year 2004 to accommodate other agencies interested in 

working out of Dakar. Post officials agreed that a more systematic and 

comprehensive approach might improve the post’s ability to plan for and 

control growth. 

Responses to the framework’s questions by Banjul and Dakar consular 

officers also indicated that they could further explore processing all 

nonimmigrant visas from the Dakar post, particularly since Dakar has 

done so in the past on a temporary basis. Neither post’s MPP discussed the 

possibility of covering these functions on a regional basis from Dakar, yet 

doing so would relieve Banjul’s consular officer from processing 

nonimmigrant visas, thereby allowing more time for political and 

economic reporting. Thus, the post might not need to request a junior 

officer to handle such reporting. However, Banjul post officials said this 

arrangement would not be feasible for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, 

their assessment illustrates the importance of weighing the benefits and 

trade-offs of exercising rightsizing options. Officials at both posts also 

agreed that applying the rightsizing questions, as part of the post’s annual 

MPP process, would result in an improved and more systematic approach 

for addressing rightsizing issues. 

The cost section of our framework includes questions that involve 

developing and consolidating cost information from all agencies at a 

particular embassy to permit cost-based decision-making. Without 

comprehensive cost data, decision makers cannot determine the 

correlation between costs and the work being performed, nor can they 

assess the short- and long-term costs associated with feasible business 

alternatives. 

At all of the posts, we found there was no mechanism to provide the 

ambassador or other decision makers with comprehensive data on State’s 

and other agencies’ cost of operations. For example, complete budget data 

that reflect the cost of employee salaries and benefits and certain 

information management expenses for each agency at post were not 

Cost of Operations 
Page 9 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

available. Further, we found that embassy profile reports maintained by 

State’s Bureau of Administration contained incomplete and inaccurate 

information for each embassy’s funding levels and sources.16 Officials at 

each post agreed that it is difficult to discern overall costs because data 

are incomplete and fragmented across funding sources, thereby making it 

difficult for decision makers to justify staffing levels in relation to overall 

post costs.17

In view of Embassy Dakar’s plans to expand its regional responsibilities, 

embassy officials said it would be beneficial to document and justify the 

cost effectiveness of providing support to posts in the region. The type of 

support can be substantial and can have significant implications for 

planning future staffing and other resource requirements. For example, 

Embassy Nouakchott relies heavily on Embassy Dakar for budget and 

fiscal support, security engineering, public affairs, medical/medevac 

services, and procurement/purchasing, in addition to temporary 

warehousing for certain goods. 

OMB and the Department of State recognize that lack of cost-based 

decision-making is a long-standing problem. As part of the President’s 

Management Agenda, they are working to better identify the full operating 

costs at individual posts and improve cost accounting mechanisms for 

overseas presence. 

Our work demonstrates that responses to our questions could be used to 

identify and exercise rightsizing actions and options, such as adjusting 

staffing requirements, competitively sourcing certain commercial goods 

and services, and streamlining warehousing operations. Examples of 

identifying and exercising rightsizing options include the following: 

 16Each post we visited generated a post profile report from State’s intranet Web site. The 

reports contain staffing and other key data on posts, including Department of State funding 

and allotments. However, in all three cases, cost data were inaccurate or incomplete. The 

reports also lacked comprehensive cost data on State’s operations and other agencies’ 

programs. 

17For the purposes of our work, comprehensive costs include salaries and benefits, travel, 

allowances, housing, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services, office 

furnishings and equipment, information management, transportation, diplomatic security, 

representation, other miscellaneous costs, and total costs of each agency operating at a 

post. 

Consideration of 

Rightsizing Actions and 

Other Options 
Page 10 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

• Embassy space and security limitations in Dakar suggest that planned 

increases in staff levels may not be feasible. If Embassy Dakar used our 

framework to complete a full and comprehensive analysis of its regional 

capabilities, in conjunction with analyses of mission priorities and 

requirements of other embassies in West Africa, then staffing levels could 

be adjusted at some of the posts in the region. One rightsizing option 

includes having Embassy Banjul’s visa services handled from Dakar. 

• The general services officers at the Dakar and Banjul posts agreed that our 

framework could be used to identify competitive sourcing opportunities in 

their locations. One rightsizing option includes assessing the feasibility of 

competitively sourcing the work of currently employed painters, 

upholsterers, electricians, and others to yield cost savings and reduce staff 

requirements. This could have a particularly significant impact at the 

Dakar post, which employs more than 70 staff who are working in these 

types of positions.18

• The Dakar and Banjul embassies operate substantial warehousing and 

maintenance complexes. Post officials said that operations and staffing 

requirements at these government-owned facilities could be potentially 

streamlined in a number of areas. The Department of State and other 

agencies maintain separate nonexpendable properties, such as furniture 

and appliances in Dakar, while the Department of State and Peace Corps 

maintain their own warehouses in the same compound in Banjul. 

Department of State logistics managers and post general services 

personnel agree that pooling such items could potentially reduce overall 

inventories, costs, and staffing requirements.19

Relocating staff, competitively sourcing goods and services, and other 

rightsizing options should be based on a full feasibility and cost analysis, 

and thus we are not recommending them in this report. However, such 

rightsizing options deserve consideration, particularly in view of Embassy 

Dakar’s concerns about how to manage anticipated increasing 

regionalization, the general security threats to embassies around the 

 18During our work at the embassy in Paris, we identified as many as 50 positions at the post 

that are commercial in nature and responsible for providing services or goods that have the 

potential to be competitively sourced to the private sector or performed at another 

location. 

19We found similar conditions at the U.S. embassy in Paris, where household appliances 

and furniture were maintained separately by agency and consolidating inventories could 

potentially reduce staffing and other resource requirements. 
Page 11 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

world, and the President’s Management Agenda’s emphasis on reducing 

costs of overseas operations. 

The need for a systematic approach to rightsizing the U.S. overseas 

presence has been a recurring theme in developing our framework. We 

have noted that the criteria for assigning staff to individual overseas posts 

vary significantly by agency and that agencies do not fully and collectively 

consider embassy security, mission priorities, and workload requirements. 

At the three embassies we visited in West Africa, we found that rightsizing 

issues have not been systematically assessed as part of the embassy 

management and planning process. However, The Department of State has 

taken several steps that help lay the groundwork for such a process by 

refining its overseas post MPP guidance. That guidance, applicable to 

posts in all countries, was recently strengthened and now directs each 

embassy to set five top priorities and link staffing and workload 

requirements to fulfilling those priorities. Chiefs of Mission also certify 

that the performance goals in their MPPs accurately reflect the highest 

priorities of their embassies. This is consistent with questions in our 

framework addressing program priorities. The guidance does not, 

however, identify rightsizing as a management goal or explicitly discuss 

how rightsizing issues of security, mission, cost, and options should be 

addressed. For example, it does not ask embassies to formally consider 

the extent to which it is necessary for each agency to maintain its current 

presence in country, or to consider relocation to the United States or 

regional centers, given the scope of each embassies’ responsibilities and 

missions. 

Officials at the posts in West Africa generally agreed that applying the 

framework and corresponding questions could result in an improved and 

more systematic approach to rightsizing. They agreed that the framework 

can be adjusted to consider emerging rightsizing issues and staffing 

conditions. For example, at Embassy Dakar, the regional security officer 

suggested including a question addressing the capacity of the host country 

police, military, and intelligence services as part of the physical and 

technical security section. Other officials suggested including a question 

regarding the extent to which health conditions in the host country might 

limit the number of employees that should be assigned to a post. 

Officials in the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs generally 

agreed that applying our questions provides a logical basis for 

systematically addressing rightsizing issues. They agreed it is important 

that the Department of State and other agencies consider staffing issues 

Framework’s Questions 

Provide a Systematic 

Approach to Rightsizing 
Page 12 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

based on a common set of criteria, for both existing embassies and future 

facilities. Officials in the Department of State’s Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs also agreed that the 

security, mission, cost, and option elements of the framework provide a 

logical basis for planning and making rightsizing decisions. They also 

believed that rightsizing analyses would be most effective if the framework 

were adopted as a part of the Department of State’s MPP process. 

Our rightsizing framework and its corresponding questions can be applied 

to embassies in developing countries and help decision makers 

collectively focus on security, mission, and cost trade-offs associated with 

staffing levels and rightsizing options. The rightsizing questions 

systematically provide embassy and agency decision makers a common 

set of criteria and a logical approach for coordinating and determining 

staffing levels at U.S. diplomatic posts. We recognize that the framework 

and its questions are a starting point and that modification of the questions 

may be considered in future planning, as appropriate. The Department of 

State’s MPP process has been strengthened and addresses some of the 

rightsizing questions in our framework. In particular, it better addresses 

embassy priorities, a key factor in our rightsizing framework. However, 

the mission planning process neither specifically addresses embassy 

rightsizing as a policy or critical management issue nor calls for 

assessments of related security and cost issues affecting all agencies 

operating at overseas posts. 

In keeping with the administration’s rightsizing initiative, we are 

recommending that 

• the Director of OMB, in coordination with the Secretary of State, ensure 

that application of our framework be expanded as a basis for assessing 

staffing levels at embassies and consulates worldwide; and 

• the Secretary of State adopt the framework as part of the embassy Mission 

Performance Planning process to ensure participation of all agencies at 

posts and the use of comparable criteria to address security, mission, cost 

issues, and rightsizing options. 

OMB and The Department of State provided written comments on a draft 

of this report (see apps. III and IV). OMB said that it agrees with our 

findings and recommendations and stated that our framework may serve 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 13 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

as a valuable base for the development of a broader methodology that can 

be applied worldwide. OMB agreed that security, mission, and cost are key 

elements to consider in making rightsizing decisions. In addition, OMB 

noted that workload requirements, options for information technology, 

regionalization possibilities, and competitive sourcing opportunities 

should be considered in order to adapt the methodology to fit each post. 

The Department of State generally agreed with our recommendations and 

said that it welcomed GAO’s work on developing a rightsizing framework. 

The Department of State said that the rightsizing questions provide a good 

foundation for it to proceed in working with OMB and other agencies to 

improve the process for determining overseas staffing levels. The 

Department of State noted that some elements of the framework are 

already being undertaken and that it plans to incorporate additional 

elements of our rightsizing questions into its future planning processes, 

including the MPP. Department of State comments are reprinted in 

appendix IV. The Department of State also provided technical comments, 

which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate. 

To determine the extent to which our framework’s questions are 

applicable in developing regions, we visited three West African 

embassies—Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, 

Mauritania. At all posts, we spoke with regional security officers, in 

addition to ambassadors and other post officials, regarding the security 

status of their embassies and related security concerns. At all locations, 

we reviewed the applicability of the mission priorities and requirements 

section of the framework by asking the ambassadors, deputy chiefs of 

mission, administrative officers, consular officers, and general services 

officers to answer key questions in that section. To assess the usefulness 

of the cost section, we spoke with the same officers, in addition to 

Embassy Dakar’s financial management officer who provides regional 

support to both Banjul and Nouakchott. We also discussed with key 

officials whether opportunities exist to exercise certain rightsizing options 

such as competitively sourcing post goods and services or streamlining 

embassy functions that are commercial in nature. In addition, we 

interviewed Bureau of African Affairs executive officers, officials in the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Washington, D.C., and the heads of key 

agencies operating in each country. Specifically, in Dakar we interviewed 

the Director and Deputy Director of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and the U.S. Treasury representative. In Banjul and 

Nouakchott, we interviewed the Directors of Peace Corps. We also met 

with officials in the executive offices of the Department of State’s Bureau 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 14 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to 

determine the applicability of the framework in those regions. 

We conducted our work from October 2002 through January 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested members of 

Congress. We are also sending copies of this report to the Director of OMB 

and the Secretary of State. We also will make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will also be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-4128 or John Brummet on (202) 512-5260. In addition to the 

persons named above, Janey Cohen, Lynn Moore, Ann M. Ulrich, and 

Joseph Zamoyta made key contributions to this report. 

Sincerely yours, 

Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 15 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

This appendix provides detailed information on the responses to the 

rightsizing questions in our framework at the embassies in Dakar, Senegal; 

Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania. Specific rightsizing 

issues, actions, and options for consideration are highlighted. 

Prior to the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, U.S. diplomatic 

facilities in Dakar1

 had serious physical security vulnerabilities, including 

insufficient setbacks at most office buildings, including the chancery. 

Since 1998, many steps have been taken to ensure better security 

throughout the post. Important steps included (1) the relocation of the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to a more secure 

location, (2) host-country cooperation for embassy-only traffic on the four 

streets surrounding the embassy’s main building, (3) the renovation and 

expansion of a more secure “waiting facility” for the consular affairs 

section, and (4) an increase in surveillance and detection units for the 

entire compound and employee residences. 

Although security at the Dakar post is now characterized as “good” for the 

current number of personnel, embassy officials cautioned that actions by 

Senegalese authorities to close off streets adjacent to the embassy are 

temporary measures that could be reversed at any time. In addition, the 

office space in the chancery can only accommodate a slight increase in 

personnel. Officials said that adding personnel to the post would aggravate 

certain security concerns. 

Embassy Dakar increasingly has more regional responsibilities and there 

are significant pressures to assign more personnel to Dakar—a situation 

that has been exacerbated as a result of the recently ordered departure 

status at the U.S. embassy in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire.2

 The Dakar post now 

has about 90 American direct-hire personnel and 350 local hires. Staff 

projections over the next two fiscal years indicate an increase in staffing at 

 1

The Dakar post includes three main embassy office buildings, separate USAID and Peace 

Corps compounds, and a separate warehousing compound that includes a repair and 

maintenance facility. Two U.S. Department of Treasury personnel work in the Central Bank 

of West African States building. 

2

In October 2002, based on the fighting between rebel elements and Ivoirian government 

forces, the Department of State ordered U.S. government personnel in nonemergency 

positions and family members of all U.S. government personnel in Cote d’Ivoire to leave the 

country. 

Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West 

African Posts 

Dakar: Physical and 

Technical Security 

Dakar: Mission 

Priorities and 

Requirements 
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 16 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

the embassy for additional agencies, such as the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention and the Departments of Agriculture and Homeland 

Security, and the possible transfer of Foreign Commercial Service 

employees from the embassy in Abidjan. In addition, the Dakar consular 

section will be increasing its consular officers for visa purposes from two 

to four and may need additional staff in the future. As a result of 

increasing regional responsibilities and more personnel, Embassy Dakar 

may require additional Department of State support personnel as well. 

In spite of Dakar’s increasing regional role and responsibilities, the post 

has difficulty attracting and retaining experienced foreign service officers. 

Embassy officials indicated that senior foreign service officers perceive 

the post as having a relatively high cost of living, a low pay differential, 

and no available consumables. Hence, many key positions are filled with 

inexperienced junior staff, placing constraints on some offices in carrying 

out their mission.3

Comprehensive information was not available to identify the total annual 

operating costs for Embassy Dakar or for each agency at the post. Cost 

data were incomplete and fragmented. For example, embassy budget 

personnel estimated operating costs of at least $7.7 million, not including 

American employee salaries or allowances. Available Bureau of African 

Affairs budget data for the post estimated fiscal year 2003 operating costs 

of at least $6 million, including State’s public diplomacy costs, post 

administered costs, and International Cooperative Administrative Support 

Services4

 expenses, but these costs did not reflect the salaries and benefits 

of Department of State and other U.S. agency American employees and the 

State bureau allotments, such as for diplomatic security. If all costs were 

included in a comprehensive budget, the total annual operating costs at 

the post would be significantly higher than both estimates. Post and 

Bureau officials agreed that fragmented and incomplete cost data make it 

 3

In June 2002, we reported that diplomatic programs and management controls at hardship 

posts could be vulnerable due to staffing shortfalls, and posts’ ability to carry out U.S. 

foreign policy objectives effectively could be weakened. U.S. General Accounting Office, 

Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic 

Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: June 2002). 

4

The International Cooperative Administrative Support Services system is the U.S. 

government’s system for providing and sharing the cost of common administrative support 

at its diplomatic and consular posts. 

Dakar: Cost of 

Operations 
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 17 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

difficult for them to systematically and collectively approach rightsizing 

initiatives and consider the relative cost-effectiveness of rightsizing 

options. 

Responses to the framework’s questions regarding rightsizing actions and 

other options at Embassy Dakar highlighted the impact of security 

conditions on anticipated staffing increases and the need to define and 

document the embassy’s growing regional responsibilities as part of the 

MPP process. They also highlighted potential opportunities for 

competitively sourcing certain embassy services to the private sector, as 

well as opportunities for streamlining warehouse operations. Embassy 

officials are reluctant to purchase commercial goods and services from the 

local economy due to quality and reliability concerns, and thus they 

employ a large number of direct-hire personnel to maintain and provide all 

post goods and services. If goods and services were competitively sourced 

to the local economy, the number of direct hires and costs could possibly 

be reduced. Opportunities also exist for streamlining Embassy Dakar’s 

warehousing operations, which could yield cost savings. 

The left box of figure 1 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that were 

raised at Embassy Dakar in response to the framework’s questions. The 

box on the right side identifies possible corresponding rightsizing actions 

and other options post decision makers could consider when collectively 

assessing their rightsizing issues. 

Dakar: Consideration 

of Rightsizing Actions 

and Options 
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 18 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Figure 1: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Dakar, Senegal 

 Limit staff growth on the basis of existing 

security and space issues until a new office 

building is complete and/or accelerate plans 

for a new building.

 Define and document regional 

responsibilities and performance indicators 

as part of the MPP process. 

 Assign more experienced officers to post.

 Assess feasibility of competitively sourcing 

key support operations that are commercial 

in nature, such as warehousing and 

maintenance. 

 Determine total cost of operations by 

agency, and document as part of post's 

MPP, and relate total costs to bilateral and 

regional responsibilities and for justifying 

staffing levels. 

Rightsizing actions and other options to consider

Physical and technical security of facilities 

and employees:

 Security of embassy office buildings 

upgraded, but buildings still do not meet 

standards.

 Security limitations of office buildings could 

limit growth in numbers of staff and expansion 

of post responsibilities.

Mission priorities and requirements:

 MPP defines bilateral responsibilities and 

performance indicators, but not growth and 

regional responsibilities.

 Post has large number of direct hire personnel 

devoted to support operations that are 

commercial in nature.

 Key positions are becoming hard to fill with 

sufficiently experienced staff.

Cost of operations:

 Estimate is at least $7.7 million, but 

incomplete, not fully developed in post MPP, 

and not useful for decision-making.

Rightsizing elements

Source: GAO.
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 19 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Officials at the post in Banjul characterized the compound as having good 

physical security and enough office space to accommodate additional 

staff. The post chancery compound is a “lock-and-leave” facility, as it does 

not have the 24-hour presence of U.S. government personnel. There are 

two leased vacant residential houses located directly behind the chancery 

building but separated from the chancery by a dividing wall. Embassy 

officials in Banjul have proposed buying the houses but explained that it is 

difficult to justify the cost because the purchase would put the embassy 

over its allotted number of homes (i.e., giving it nine homes for seven 

personnel). Some officials have suggested that the houses could be used 

for temporary duty personnel working at the post. During our work, 

visiting officials from the Immigration and Naturalization Service were 

using one of the houses to conduct political asylum visa interviews. 

Usually, however, the houses are vacant. According to the ambassador and 

the regional security officer, if the vacant houses were to be leased by 

nonembassy tenants, the chancery’s physical security would be seriously 

compromised.5

 In addition, the regional security officer expressed 

concerns regarding the training and quality of the security contractor, 

particularly because the post does not have a Marine detachment to back 

up the security guards. 

Much of Embassy Banjul’s resources are devoted to supporting internal 

post operations instead of focusing on external goals, such as political 

reporting and public diplomacy. For example, more than 60 local hires 

carry out facilities maintenance and other post support functions while 

only 3 of the 7 American direct-hire personnel address the post’s 3 main 

program goals in The Gambia—namely, reinforcing democracy, increasing 

economic prosperity, and improving the population’s health. Since the 

consular officer is also responsible for political and economic reporting, 

the post recently requested one junior officer rotational position to help 

balance the duties in all three areas. Over the past 2 years the number of 

nonimmigrant visa applications in Banjul more than doubled—from 1,712 

applications in March 2000 to 4,635 applications in September 2002—while 

the percentage of refused applications decreased from a high of 65 percent 

in September 2000 to a low of 38 percent in September 2002. Post officials 

said that the lack of a full-time consular officer may impede the post’s 

 5

The chancery has a 78-foot setback in front and a more than 100-foot setback on the side 

with the vacant houses. Without the buffer of the vacant houses, the chancery would have a 

less than 20-foot setback. 

Banjul: Physical and 

Technical Security 

Banjul: Mission 

Priorities and 

Requirements 
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 20 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

ability to focus on preventing fraudulent visa applications. The post has 

also requested one dual-purpose local employee to back up its growing 

public diplomacy and security assistance portfolios. 

Banjul’s primary post planning document, the MPP, did not include 

comprehensive data on the total cost of operations. The Bureau of African 

Affairs’ budget for the post estimated total costs of at least $1.7 million for 

fiscal year 2003. However, these estimates did not include American 

salaries and other expenses, such as State Bureau allotments. 

The left box of figure 2 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that were 

raised at Embassy Banjul in response to the framework’s questions. The 

box on the right identifies corresponding rightsizing actions and other 

options post decision makers could consider when collectively assessing 

their rightsizing issues. 

Figure 2: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Banjul, The Gambia 

Banjul: Cost of 

Operations 
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 21 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Embassy Nouakchott officials characterize the post compound as having 

good physical security, which has been upgraded since 1998. However, the 

chancery does not meet security setback requirements, and compound 

facilities have security deficiencies.6 Answering the framework’s questions 

regarding physical security did not indicate a need to change the number 

of staff based on existing security conditions at the embassy office 

buildings. However, embassy officials said that the questions helped 

highlight the need to consider the security risks and trade-offs associated 

with expected increases in the number of personnel at post. 

When asked specific questions regarding mission priorities and 

requirements, Embassy Nouakchott officials told us that the post has an 

adequate number of personnel to meet current mission requirements and 

priorities but that there are generally few bidders for positions at the post. 

The Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission emphasized that an increase 

or decrease of one employee greatly affects how the post accomplishes its 

mission—more so than at a larger post, such as Dakar. For example, the 

Regional Security Officer position is vacant and is being covered on a 

temporary duty basis by Dakar’s Assistant Regional Security Officer. Also, 

the post currently has no positions for political and public diplomacy 

officers. One officer may be assigned to multiple positions owing to 

limited demand for certain services. For example, the Consular Officer at 

Embassy Nouakchott is also responsible for the duties of a 

commercial/economic officer. However, the post hopes to add one fulltime officer for political and human rights reporting, according to the 

post’s MPP. 

Operating costs for the Nouakchott post are not fully documented in the 

MPP or used to justify staffing levels. Embassy Nouakchott officials 

roughly estimated total operating costs of about $4 million for fiscal year 

2003. The Bureau of African Affairs’ budget for the post estimated partial 

operating costs of only $2.1 million annually, but the estimate did not 

include American salaries, diplomatic security, and other costs. 

 6

The Nouakchott post compound includes administrative buildings, residences, and the 

American school. The main security concerns for the Nouakchott post include older 

buildings and inadequate defense barriers. There are plans to assign a Marine detachment 

to the post for additional security. 

Nouakchott: Physical 

and Technical 

Security 

Nouakchott: Mission 

Priorities and 

Requirements 

Nouakchott: Cost of 

Operations 
Appendix I: Rightsizing Issues at West African 

Posts 

Page 22 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

The left box of figure 3 summarizes the main rightsizing issues that were 

raised at Embassy Nouakchott in response to the framework’s questions. 

The box on the right side identifies corresponding rightsizing actions and 

other options post decision makers could consider when collectively 

assessing their rightsizing issues. 

Figure 3: Applying the Rightsizing Framework in Nouakchott, Mauritania 
Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and 

Corresponding Questions 

Page 23 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Physical/technical security of facilities and employees 

• What is the threat and security profile of the embassy? 

• Has the ability to protect personnel been a factor in determining staffing levels at the embassy? 

• To what extent are existing office buildings secure? 

• Is existing space being optimally utilized? 

• Have all practical options for improving the security of facilities been considered? 

• Do issues involving facility security put the staff at an unacceptable level of risk or limit mission accomplishment? 

• What is the capacity level of the host country police, military, and intelligence services? a

• Do security vulnerabilities suggest the need to reduce or relocate staff? 

• Do health conditions in the host country pose personal security concerns that limit the number of employees that should be 

assigned to the post? b

Mission priorities and requirements 

• What are the staffing levels and mission of each agency? 

• How do agencies determine embassy staffing levels? 

• Is there an adequate justification for the number of employees at each agency compared with the agency’s mission? 

• Is there adequate justification for the number of direct hire personnel devoted to support and administrative operations? 

• What are the priorities of the embassy? c 

• Does each agency’s mission reinforce embassy priorities? 

• To what extent are mission priorities not being sufficiently addressed due to staffing limitations or other impediments? 

• To what extent are workload requirements validated and prioritized and is the embassy able to balance them with core functions?

• Do the activities of any agencies overlap? 

• Given embassy priorities and the staffing profile, are increases in the number of existing staff or additional agency representation 

needed? 

• To what extent is it necessary for each agency to maintain its current presence in country, given the scope of its responsibilities 

and its mission? 

Could an agency’s mission be pursued in other ways? 

Does an agency have regional responsibilities or is its mission entirely focused on the host country? 

Cost of operations 

• What is the embassy’s total annual operating cost? 

• What are the operating costs for each agency at the embassy? 

• To what extent are agencies considering the full cost of operations in making staffing decisions? 

• To what extent are costs commensurate with overall embassy strategic importance, with agency programs, and with specific 

products and services? 

Consideration of rightsizing options 

• What are the security, mission, and cost implications of relocating certain functions to the United States, regional centers, or to 

other locations, such as commercial space or host country counterpart agencies? 

• To what extent could agency program and/or routine administrative functions (procurement, logistics, and financial management 

functions) be handled from a regional center or other locations? 

• Do new technologies and transportation links offer greater opportunities for operational support from other locations? 

• Do the host country and regional environments suggest there are options for doing business differently, that is, are there adequate 

transportation and communications links and a vibrant private sector? 

• To what extent is it practical to purchase embassy services from the private sector? 

• Does the ratio of support staff to program staff at the embassy suggest opportunities for streamlining? 

• Can functions be reengineered to provide greater efficiencies and reduce requirements for personnel? 

Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and 

Corresponding Questions 
Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and 

Corresponding Questions 

Page 24 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

• Are there best practices of other bilateral embassies or private corporations that could be adapted by the U.S. embassy? 

• To what extent are there U.S. or host country legal, policy, or procedural obstacles that may impact the feasibility of rightsizing options? 

Source: GAO. 

a

We added this question based on the suggestion of Embassy Dakar’s regional security officer. 

b

We added this question based on the suggestion of officials at the Office of Management and 

Budget. 

c

Embassy priorities are the U.S. government priorities in that country. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Office of 

Management and Budget 

Page 25 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Appendix III: Comments from the Office of 

Management and Budget 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 26 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of State 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 27 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 28 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

See comment 1. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 29 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 30 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

See comment 4. 

See comment 5. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 31 GAO-03-396 Overseas Presence 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated February 25, 2003. 

1. We did not set priorities for the elements in the framework that appear 

in this report. Moreover, we believe that decision makers need to 

consider security, mission, and cost collectively in order to weigh the 

trade-offs associated with staffing levels and rightsizing options. 

2. We did not imply that there is a problem of exploding growth in 

overseas staffing levels that needs to be reined in. Our statement that 

there is a need for a systematic process to determine overseas staffing 

levels (i.e., rightsizing) was made on the basis that the elements of 

security, mission, cost, and other rightsizing options are not 

collectively addressed in a formal process to determine staffing levels 

at overseas posts. On page 1 of the report, we state that rightsizing may 

result in the addition, reduction, or change in the mix of staff. 

3. We modified our report on page 7 to discuss the Overseas Staffing 

Model. 

4. We modified our report on pages 6-7 to more accurately describe the 

National Security Decision Directive-38. 

5. International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) is 

only one component of a post’s total overseas costs and include the 

costs of common administrative support, such as motor pool 

operations, vehicle maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger 

services, building operations, information management, and other 

administrative services. However, this component does not cover all 

employee salaries and benefits, all housing, office furnishings and 

equipment, diplomatic security, representation, miscellaneous 

expenses, and other costs for all agencies operating at a post. Total 

costs associated with each post need to be considered when overseas 

staffing decisions are made. 

GAO’s Comments 

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