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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 20, 2016 

v No. 328729 

Kalkaska Circuit Court 

ANTHONY EDWARD LAMAR, LC No. 14-003676-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SAWYER and MARKEY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of resisting and obstructing a police 

officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). He appeals by 

right solely challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. For the 

reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 This case arises from a stop effectuated by Michigan State Police Trooper Karen Roy of 

defendant’s vehicle for a “defective loud exhaust.” Trooper Roy was assigned “to the 7th 

District Hometown Security Team (HST).” She explained that law enforcement personnel 

assigned to HST are “out looking for drug activity, guns, any criminal activity.” According to 

Trooper Roy, “[w]e look for vehicles that have equipment problems, make patrol stops based on 

that.” 

 On the day defendant was stopped, Trooper Roy was stationed in her patrol car “right on 

the edge of the highway, sitting in a private drive,” when she heard the muffler of defendant’s 

vehicle as he drove past. Upon approaching defendant’s vehicle, Trooper Roy “detected a strong 

odor of marijuana inside the car” and asked defendant to exit the vehicle. Eventually, defendant 

consented to a search of his vehicle. Trooper Roy testified at trial that the search produced “a 

grinder,” which was later determined to contain marijuana. 

 After a suppression hearing, the trial court found that “it is likely the exhaust on the 

Defendant’s truck was functioning properly on the day of the traffic stop,” considering the 
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testimony of the witnesses defendant produced at the hearing.1

 However, the trial court denied 

defendant’s motion to suppress, reasoning that “[w]hether or not the Defendant’s truck actually 

had a malfunctioning exhaust at the time is not relevant to the question of whether Tpr. Roy had 

reasonable cause to initiate a traffic stop.” The trial court summarized Trooper Roy’s testimony 

and surmised that “the Defendant is asking this Court to essentially find that Tpr. Roy 

deliberately lied under oath at the preliminary examination and her police report.” The court 

found no basis to make such a finding. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 On appeal, defendant challenges whether the trooper had objective, articulable reasons 

for effectuating the stop of defendant’s motor vehicle. 

We review a trial court’s factual findings in a suppression hearing for clear error, which 

occurs when the Court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” 

People v Lewis, 251 Mich App 58, 67; 649 NW2d 792 (2002). But “the lower court’s ultimate 

ruling with regard to the motion to suppress is reviewed de novo because the application of 

constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to undisputed facts is entitled to less 

deference.” Id. at 67-68 (citations omitted). 

 “[B]oth the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right 

of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Hyde, 285 Mich 

App 428, 438; 775 NW2d 833 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That 

right flows from the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, § 11 of 

the Michigan Constitution. People v Levine, 461 Mich 172, 178; 600 NW2d 622 (1999). 

“[A]bsent compelling reasons, art 1, § 11 provides the same protection as the Fourth 

Amendment.” Id. 

 “A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the 

vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v 

North Carolina, ___ US ___, ___; 135 S Ct 530, 536; 190 L Ed 2d 475 (2014). “An automobile 

stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the 

circumstances.” Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 810; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 

(1996). “In order to effectuate a valid traffic stop, a police officer must have an articulable and 

reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for a violation of 

law.” People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610, 612; 601 NW2d 138 (1999). “[O]n reasonable

 

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 At the suppression hearing, the vehicle’s former owner testified that she had the vehicle’s 

exhaust repaired in January 2013 and that she sold the vehicle to defendant in March 2014. The 

mechanic who performed that repair testified that the vehicle’s exhaust was in “good working 

order” and not emitting “excessive or unusual noise” after the repair. A mechanic who inspected 

defendant’s vehicle less than two weeks after the traffic stop testified that the vehicle’s exhaust 

system was not emitting defective noise and that there was “no evidence of any recent exhaust 

repairs.” 
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grounds shown, a police officer may stop and inspect a motor vehicle for an equipment 

violation.” Id. 

 “Reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized 

suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” People v 

Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996) (citation omitted). A reasonable suspicion 

is established “when a law enforcement officer has a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Navarette v California, ___ US 

___; 134 S Ct 1683, 1687; 188 L Ed 2d 680 (2014). “[W]hether there was reasonable suspicion 

to justify a stop must be made on a case-by-case basis, evaluated under the totality of the 

circumstances, and based on common sense.” People v Dillon, 296 Mich App 506, 508; 822 

NW2d 611 (2012). 

 Defendant’s main arguments on appeal center on his assertions that the trooper’s 

assessment as to why she stopped defendant was a mere pretext. Additionally, defendant argues 

that because the trooper had no formal training relative to the proper decibel level of vehicle 

exhaust systems, her testimony was tantamount to either a fabrication of the truth or mere 

speculation. 

 The issues of pretextual stops have long been decided. In Whren v United States, 517 US 

806, 116 S Ct 1769, 135 L Ed2d 89 (1996) plainclothes police officers patrolling a high drug and 

crime area in an unmarked vehicle observed a truck driven by the defendant waiting at a stop 

sign for an unusually long time. Suddenly, the truck turned without signaling, and one of the 

officers stopped the vehicle to warn the driver about the traffic violation. While approaching the 

vehicle, the officer observed crack cocaine in defendant’s hands. Defendant argued that the 

traffic stop was pretextual and that the evidence should therefore be suppressed. The United 

States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that police officers with probable cause to believe that a 

traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle even though the stop is a prextext to search for 

evidence of other, more serious crimes, stating, in relevant part: “Subjective intentions play no 

role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. 517 US at 813. It is important to 

note, however, that pretext is irrelevant only when sufficient legal cause exists to effectuate the 

stop. Hence defendant’s next argument is that the trooper lacked sufficient legal cause to 

effectuate the stop. 

On this issue, defendant argues that Trooper Roy did not have a reasonable suspicion that 

he was violating the law because she did not demonstrate knowledge of the specific noise 

limitations for motor vehicles contained in § 707c(1) of the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC), 

MCL 257.1 et seq., and she did not have equipment or training to corroborate her suspicion that 

his vehicle was emitting a sound in excess of those limits. Defendant’s argument presumes that 

Trooper Roy suspected he was violating MCL 257.707c(1), but she made no mention of the 

statutory noise limits at the preliminary hearing. Rather, she testified that she heard defendant’s 

muffler as he passed, which was not “normal for a vehicle that . . . has a functioning muffler,” 

and initiated a traffic stop for “a defective loud exhaust.” While a loud exhaust may run afoul of 

the noise limitations found in MCL 257.707c(1), there are other provisions of the MVC that 

govern mufflers and exhaust systems that do not reference those limitations. For example, MCL 

257.707 requires that a motor vehicle “be equipped with a muffler in good working order and in 

constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual noise and annoying smoke” and “be equipped 
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with a properly operating exhaust system . . . .” MCL 257.707(1) and (3). Similarly, MCL 

257.707c(3) prohibits a person from “operat[ing] a vehicle on a highway or street if the vehicle 

has a defect in the exhaust system which affects sound reduction, is not equipped with a muffler 

or other noise dissipative device, or is equipped with a cutout, bypass, amplifier, or a similar 

device.” 

 Trooper Roy testified that even though there were other vehicles on the road, she was 

“certain” that it was defendant’s vehicle making the loud noise “[b]ecause I watched him go by 

me. I could hear the vehicle as it passed my location.” That there were other vehicles in the area 

providing a contrast in sounds when Trooper Roy made an auditory observation of defendant’s 

vehicle demonstrated “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting” the trooper’s suspicion 

that defendant was in violation the MVC. Navarette, 134 S Ct at 1687. As this Court has noted 

in numerous decisions, an ordinary traffic stop is governed by the same standards as any other 

stop. “A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment . . . if the police officer has 

reasonable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United 

States v Botero-Ospina, 71 F3d 783, 787 (10th Cir 1995). Here the testimony of the trooper 

makes clear that she had reasonable suspicion to believe that the exhaust system of the vehicle 

operated by defendant was defective. And, to the extent she may have been wrong in terms of 

pin-pointing the exact decibel level necessary to constitute a violation, such a “mistake” does not 

diminish the legality of the stop. See Heien, 135 S Ct at 536. (“[S]earches and seizures based on 

mistakes of fact can be reasonable.”) Additionally, and as previously stated, “[t]he subjective 

intent of the police officer is irrelevant to the validity of the stop.” Dillon, 296 Mich App at 508-

509. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Jane E. Markey