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THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

ENERGY AGENCY IN SAFEGUARDING AGAINST

ACTS OF TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 3, 2001

Serial No. 107–53

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

RON PAUL, Texas

NICK SMITH, Michigan

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

DIANE E. WATSON, California

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairwoman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

RON PAUL, Texas

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

MAURICIO TAMARGO, Subcommittee Staff Director

JEFFREY PILCH, Democratic Professional Staff Member

YLEEM POBLETE, Professional Staff Member

SANDY ACOSTA, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

Richard J. Stratford, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Nonproliferation .. 12

Steven K. Black, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of Arms Control

and Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy .............................................................................................. 19

William Travers, Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission .................................................................................................................. 25

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Florida, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights: Prepared statement ................................................ 4

The Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from the

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 9

The Honorable Cynthia A. McKinney, a Representative in Congress from

the State of Georgia: Prepared statement ......................................................... 10

Richard J. Stratford: Prepared statement ............................................................. 15

Steven K. Black: Prepared statement .................................................................... 21

William Travers: Prepared statement .................................................................... 28

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 41

(1)

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

ENERGY AGENCY IN SAFEGUARDING

AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:47 p.m. in Room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

[Chairperson of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee will come to order.

I will be making my opening statement, and then we will be recognizing Members as they come in, and then I will be glad to introduce our distinguished set of panelists. And I apologize for being

so late; as you know, the Full Committee ran a little bit late as

well.

It has been repeatedly said that the United States lost its innocence on Tuesday, September 11, 2001. The sense of security and

invincibility that stemmed from being the Cold War victor and the

global superpower was destroyed in less than an hour, the span of

time between the attack on the first tower of the World Trade Center and those on the second tower and, later, the Pentagon.

In this brief moment in history, the United States and the American people realized that anything and everything is possible.

We now fully understand that terrorists have no boundaries, no

sense of remorse, that terrorists place no value on human life. As

the September 11 attacks taught us, no country and no target is

immune from this cancer. To terrorists, any means is justifiable.

Suddenly, the warnings and the analyses by experts on the potential use of chemical and biological weapons and the potential for

nuclear terrorism were no longer viewed as abstract arguments for

action film plots. Suddenly, nuclear-related terrorism became a

vivid and very real threat. This sense of urgency was palpable as

the U.S. put on standby alert its nuclear emergency search team,

which is trained to respond to terrorists armed with nuclear weapons. We therefore needed to evaluate what the U.S. has done and

will do unilaterally and globally to prepare and protect against the

daunting possibility of nuclear terrorism.

The pivotal role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in

ensuring the physical protection of nuclear materials and countering the illicit trafficking of these radioactive elements was best

2

described by Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham at the opening

session of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s general conference held in Vienna from September 17 through the 21st. Secretary Abraham underscored that

‘‘We know our security and that of nations around the world

largely depends upon what this agency does to prevent the proliferation and the misuse of nuclear materials. We cannot assume that tomorrow’s terrorist attacks will mirror those we

have just experienced. That is why the work of the IAEA is so

pivotal.’’

How real or imminent is the threat of nuclear-related terrorism?

President Bush warned at a congressional prayer meeting on

Wednesday, September 19, that there was credible evidence of a

second wave of terrorist attacks that could strike the U.S., which

could include nuclear terrorism. It has also been reported that in

1992 a series of national intelligence estimates from the CIA concluded that such nuclear terrorism was indeed highly likely.

Earlier this year it was reported that the CIA had identified 12

terrorist groups which had attempted to buy enriched uranium and

plutonium in order to make a nuclear bomb, including Islamic militants linked to Osama bin Laden. Such attempts to obtain nuclear

materials was revealed during the trial in the U.S. District Court,

Southern Division of New York, of bin Laden and others for the

August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Testimony revealed that bin Laden had been working on acquiring uranium, presumably for the development of nuclear weapons.

Last week, Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on

Nuclear Arms Control here in Washington, DC, was quoted as saying that,

‘‘Over the next 10 years there is a definite risk of a terrorist

attack with nuclear weapons.’’

The differences in these assessments concerning the immediacy

of the threat appears to hinge on the definition of nuclear terrorism. There are those who argue that terrorist organizations lack

the technology, the manpower, the access to materials to launch a

terrorist attack using nuclear warheads, thus delaying the threat

of nuclear terrorism. Nevertheless, what worries the experts, according to recent reports, is the lethal combination of radioactive

material and conventional explosives.

As Graham Allison, Director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center, has described,

‘‘If you had a softball-size lump of enriched uranium, some materials mostly available at Radio Shack and an engineering

grad from an American university, you would have a reasonable chance of making a crude nuclear weapon.’’

Others would argue that the jackpot for terrorists are ‘‘backpack’’

weapons. Information coming out of the bin Laden trial in New

York reveals that bin Laden has a scientific team working on such

a backpack nuke. However, terrorists such as bin Laden would not

need to go very far to find such minimized weapons. According to

public sources, 80 or more of these backpack nukes were built for

3

Russian special forces during the Cold War. These weapons were

designed to be transported and activated by one man and can deliver a 1-kiloton explosion big enough to destroy a small city.

Prevention of such nuclear-related terrorism hinges on strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials, on preventing

the diversion of such materials for offensive purposes, and on detecting and intercepting the illegal transfers of such dangerous materials. This is where the International Atomic Energy Agency

steps in.

One of the Agency’s two primary goals is to ensure, as far as it

is able, that the assistance it provides is not used to further military purposes. Under this framework, the Agency developed a program to address illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive sources in 1994. The program focuses on helping countries strengthen their nuclear laws and infrastructures to ensure

greater accounting, control, and security over these materials, on

helping countries detect and respond to illegal movements of radioactive materials and to analyze confiscated materials, on developing and providing training for regulatory and facility personnel

as well as law enforcement authorities, on enhancing the exchange

of information via international interagency meetings and through

such efforts as the illicit trafficking database program that it has

developed.

The Agency has also established the Office of Physical Protection

and Material Security which involves the four departments—Safeguards, Nuclear Safety, Technical Cooperation, and Management.

The Agency has developed, in consultation and cooperation with

the world’s customs organizations and INTERPOL, a safety guide

on preventing, detecting, and responding to illicit trafficking in radioactive materials. This guide, along with supplementary technical

manuals, are for the use of customs offices and law enforcement,

as well as other relevant authorities and agencies, in their efforts

to address the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

The Agency regularly reviews the threat, along with the methods

to protect against it. In fact, in May of this year the Agency, in concert with INTERPOL, EUROPOL and the world customs organizations, held an international conference on security of material,

which included multiple sessions on the threats and responses to

nuclear terrorism, assessing vulnerability and strengthening global

protection.

Nevertheless, as the Agency’s Director General stated at the

General Conference in Vienna,

‘‘[that the IAEA] cannot be complacent. We have to and we will

increase our efforts on all fronts, from combating illicit trafficking to ensuring protection of nuclear materials, from nuclear insulation designed to withstand attacks, to improving

how we respond to nuclear emergencies.’’

This, he added, would require extra resources, but he was confident

that the Agency and the member states would rise to the challenge.

Ultimately, we hope that this hearing will provide Members with

a better understanding of the nature, source, and scope of the

threat of nuclear terrorism. We hope to evaluate the Agency’s efforts thus far regarding nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism, the

4

Agency’s role in addressing these grave issues globally and its role

within U.S. priorities and objectives in this realm, the inter-relationship between the Departments of States and Energy represented here today and the Agency and what this relationship and

the U.S. course of action will develop into in the aftermath of the

deplorable attacks of September 11th.

But what does all of this mean for homeland security? How has

the U.S. worked with the Agency to safeguard its own nuclear

plants against sabotage and acts of terrorism such as the one we

witnessed on September 11 of this year? Can they withstand such

an attack without disastrous consequences? Are they vulnerable to

sabotage? Can they be used as a source for illicit trafficking in nuclear materials?

The safety and well-being of our constituents and indeed the

American people depends on all of us, the Congress and the Administration working together to ensure that all possible steps and

even seemingly impossible ones have been taken to protect our

country from nuclear terrorism.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

It has been repeatedly said that the United States lost its innocence on Tuesday,

September 11, 2001.

The sense of security and invincibility that stemmed from being the Cold War victor and global superpower was destroyed in less than an hour—the span of time between the attack on the first tower of the World Trade Center and those on the second tower and later the Pentagon.

In this brief moment in history, the United States and the American people realized that anything and everything is possible. We now fully understand that terrorists have no boundaries, no sense of remorse; that terrorists place no value on

human life.

As the September 11th attacks taught us, no country and no target is immune

from this cancer. To terrorists, any means is justifiable.

Suddenly, the warnings and analyses by experts on the potential use of chemical

and biological weapons and potential for nuclear terrorism, were no longer viewed

as abstract arguments or action film plots. Suddenly, nuclear-related terrorism became a vivid and very real threat.

This sense of urgency was palpable as the U.S. put on standby alert its Nuclear

Emergency Search Team, which is trained to respond to terrorists armed with nuclear weapons.

We therefore needed to evaluate what the U.S. has done and will do, unilaterally

and globally, to prepare and protect against the daunting possibility of nuclear terrorism.

The pivotal role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in ensuring the physical protection of nuclear materials and in countering the illicit trafficking in these

radioactive elements, was best described by Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham,

at the opening session of the IAEA’s General Conference held in Vienna from September 17th through 21st.

Secretary Abraham underscored that: ‘‘We know our security and that of nations

around the world, largely depends upon what this Agency does to prevent the proliferation and the misuse of nuclear materials . . . We cannot assume that tomorrow’s terrorist acts will mirror those we have just experienced. This is why the work

of the IAEA is so pivotal.’’

How real or imminent is the threat of nuclear-related terrorism?

President Bush warned a congressional prayer meeting on Wednesday, September

19th, that there was credible evidence a second wave of terrorist attacks would

strike the U.S. which could include nuclear terrorism.

It has also been reported that, in 1992, a series of National Intelligence Estimates

from the CIA concluded that such nuclear terrorism was highly likely.

5

Earlier this year, it was reported that the CIA had identified 12 terrorist groups

which had attempted to buy enriched uranium and plutonium in order to make a

nuclear bomb, including Islamic militants linked to Osama bin Laden.

Such attempts to obtain nuclear materials was revealed during the trial in U.S.

District Court, Southern District of New York, of bin Laden and others for the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Testimony revealed that bin Laden has been working on acquiring uranium presumably for the

development of nuclear weapons.

Last week, Gary Nilhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, D.C. was quoted as saying that: ‘‘Over the next 10 years, there

is a definite risk of a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons.’’

The differences in these assessments concerning the immediacy of the threat appear to hinge on the definition of nuclear terrorism.

There are those who argue that terrorist organizations lack the technology, manpower, and access to materials to launch a terrorist attack using nuclear warheads,

thus, delaying the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Nevertheless, what worries the experts, according to recent reports, is the lethal

combination of radioactive material and conventional explosives.

As Graham Allison, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center, has described:

‘‘If you had a softball-size lump of enriched uranium, some materials [mostly] available at Radio Shack, and an engineering grad of an American university, you would

have a reasonable chance’’ of making a crude nuclear weapon.

Others would argue that the jackpot for terrorists are ‘‘backpack’’ weapons. Information coming out of the bin Laden trial in New York reveals that bin Laden has

a scientific team working on such ‘‘backpack nukes.’’

However, terrorists such as bin Laden would not need to go very far to find such

minimized weapons.

According to public sources, 80 or more of these ‘‘backpack nukes’’ were built for

the Russian special forces during the Cold War. These weapons were designed to

be transported and activated by one man and can deliver a one kiloton explosion

big enough to destroy a small city.

Prevention of such nuclear-related terrorism hinges on strengthening the physical

protection of nuclear materials; on preventing the diversion of such materials for offensive purposes; and on detecting and intercepting the illegal transfers of such dangerous materials.

This is where the International Atomic Energy Agency steps in.

One of the Agency’s two primary goals is to ensure, as far as it is able, that the

assistance it provides is not used to further any military purpose.

Under this rubric, the IAEA developed a program to address illicit trafficking of

nuclear material and other radioactive sources in 1994.

The program focuses on helping countries strengthen their nuclear laws and infrastructures to ensure greater accounting, control, and security over these materials;

on helping countries detect and respond to illegal movements of radioactive materials and to analyze confiscated materials; on developing and providing training for

regulatory and facility personnel, as well as law enforcement authorities; on enhancing the exchange of information via international and inter-agency meetings and

though such efforts as the Illicit Trafficking Database Program it developed.

The IAEA has also established the Office of Physical Protection and Material Security which involves the four Departments—Safeguards, Nuclear Safety, Technical

Cooperation, and Management.

The Agency has developed, in consultation and cooperation with the World Customs Organization and INTERPOL, a Safety Guide on Preventing, Detecting and

Responding to Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials.

This guide, along with supplementary technical manuals, are for the use of customs officers, other law enforcement, as well as other relevant authorities and agencies in their efforts to address the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

The IAEA regularly reviews the threat, along with the methods to protect against

it.

In fact, in May of this year, the IAEA, in concert with INTERPOL, EUROPOL,

and the World Customs Organization, held an International Conference on Security

of Material, which included multiple sessions on the threats and responses to nuclear terrorism—assessing vulnerability and strengthening global protection.

Nevertheless, as the IAEA Director General stated at the General Conference in

Vienna, ‘‘[The IAEA] cannot be complacent. We have to and will increase our efforts

on all fronts—from combating illicit trafficking, to ensuring the protection of nuclear

materials—from nuclear installation design to withstand attacks, to improving how

we respond to nuclear emergencies.’’

6

This, he added, would require extra resources but he was confident that IAEA

Member States would rise to the challenge.

Ultimately, we hope this hearing will provide the Members with a better understanding of the nature, source, and scope of the threat of nuclear terrorism.

We hope to evaluate IAEA’s efforts thus far regarding non-proliferation and nuclear terrorism; the Agency’s role in addressing these grave issues, globally, and its

role within U.S. priorities and objectives in this realm; the inter-relationship between the Departments of State and Energy, represented here today, and the IAEA;

and what this relationship and U.S. course of action will develop into in the aftermath of the deplorable attacks of September 11, 2001.

But what does this all mean for homeland security? How has the U.S. worked

with the IAEA to safeguard its own nuclear plants against sabotage and acts of terrorism such as the ones we witnessed on September 11th of this year? Can they

withstand such an attack without disastrous consequences? Are they vulnerable to

sabotage? Can they be used as a source for illicit trafficking in nuclear materials?

The safety and well-being of our constituents and the American people depends

on all of us—the Congress and the Administration—working together to ensure that

all possible steps, and even seemingly impossible ones, have been taken to protect

this country from nuclear terrorism.

I look forward to it.

I thank the witnesses in advance for their testimony and the work that they do.

I would also like to thank Barry Gidley who is handling public information matters

for the IAEA, for his assistance and cooperation and for being so responsive to this

Subcommittee.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I look forward to hearing the testimony

today, and I thank the witnesses in advance for their testimony

and for the work they do day in and day out. I will introduce the

panelists, but I am sorry that we will be unable to hear from you

until we have another Member of our Subcommittee.

We have the farm bill on the floor; there is a lot of interest and

a lot of amendments. We expect a series of votes, and I think that

that is where most of the folks are. We will have three votes total

in about 15 minutes. But I will introduce you so that when we get

another member of the panel, we can get right to the testimony.

Today we are joined by an exceptional panel of witnesses to thoroughly explore the topic at hand. We will be hearing first from the

State Department witness, currently the acting Assistant Secretary

of State for the Bureau of Nonproliferation, Mr. Richard Stratford,

who is also the Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs. At

his post he is responsible for guidance on international nuclear energy affairs, nuclear expert control policies, nuclear cooperation

agreements and international initiatives in nuclear energy technology. Most notably, with regards to today’s hearing, Mr. Stratford

is a frequent U.S. delegate to meetings of the Board of Governors

of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the Agency’s

General Conference, where he represents the U.S. in the Committee of the Whole.

Previously, from 1987 to 1993, he served as Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs. During the Reagan Administration, he was the Executive Assistant to the Ambassador at Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs, without a doubt an expert at today’s hearing, and we welcome you

today.

Mr. Stratford is accompanied by Ambassador E. Michael Southwick, whom we welcome back to our Subcommittee. He became

Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau on International Organization Affairs in January 1998 from which he develops and imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
7

plements U.S. policy in the United Nations and its specialized

agencies and other international organizations. He also has responsibility for the development of U.S. policy in the specialized and

technical U.N. agencies as well as voluntary funds and programs

such as UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Food Program. He served

as Ambassador to Uganda from 1994 to 1997. As a foreign service

officer, he has held a variety of positions concentrating on African

affairs and management. For instance, at his current post, Ambassador Southwick headed a State-Pentagon team that successfully

negotiated a new international treaty banning the use of child soldiers.

Welcome back to our Subcommittee, Ambassador. Thank you for

being an accompanying witness today.

Testifying second will be Colonel Steven K. Black. He currently

serves as the acting Director of the Office of Arms Control and

Nonproliferation in the National Nuclear Security Administration,

a subagency of the Department of Energy. His office is responsible

for a broad range of nonproliferation policy, arms control and international security issues, particularly those involving nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction. It also coordinates and

manages programs involving former Soviet weapons scientists, develops initiatives involving the nuclear fuel cycle, executes the Department of Energy’s statutory responsibilities for export control,

and provides the U.S. mission in Vienna with personnel, policy,

and technical expertise especially in the area of international nuclear safeguards.

A retired colonel prior to joining the NNSA, he served for over

20 years as an Air Force intelligence officer. During his Air Force

career, Colonel Black commanded the Intelligence Watch Center in

the Cheyenne Mountains, conducted on-site arms control inspections throughout Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and served as a

military attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in the waning

days of the Soviet Union, and served on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

He finishes his Air Force career this year upon completion of a

tour of duty in the Office of the Vice President, where he is responsible for international security issues.

Welcome, and we look forward to your testimony. Thank you,

Colonel.

And lastly we will be hearing the testimony of Dr. William D.

Travers. Dr. Travers has been the Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since October, 1998,

where he is the Chief Staff Official of the NRC, managing the dayto-day operations of the agency.

Dr. Travers first joined the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in

1976. Soon after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, he was assigned to the on-site response team and directed all the licensing

and inspection activities related to the cleanup. He later served as

the Chief of the Emergency Preparedness Branch where he developed policy and carried out licensing reviews. Subsequently, he

served as Deputy Associate Director for Advanced Reactors and Licensed Renewals, where he led an agency effort to revise the agency’s requirements for renewing nuclear power plant operating licenses.

8

As Director of the Spent Fuel Project Office, he established a new

organization which focused on issues related to systems for the safe

storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel.

Beginning in late 1996, Dr. Travers served as the Director of the

Special Projects Office, which was responsible for all inspection and

licensing activities associated with the shutdown of the Millstone

nuclear power plant.

We look forward to hearing Dr. Travers’ testimony, and we welcome all of you here today; and I would like to recognize Mr.

Menendez for opening statements.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. I appreciate your

calling the hearing in the oversight capacity of the Committee.

Let me just say, I think the IAEA is a great institution, very important. However, I have in the past raised some serious questions

I have had about the mission of the IAEA in the context not of its

role in ensuring the safety of those nuclear entities that exist in

the world but in terms of what its role should be in the context of

being concerned about the proliferation issues and the facilitation

of those individuals in operational capacity and others.

And one of my concerns has been the been the Bushir nuclear

facility in Iran. And the real question, I think, is in the wake of

September 11, I think we have to ask ourselves as a country and

the rest of the nations of the world, can we afford to do business

as usual, so to speak, in the days ahead?

Certainly in the United States we are going through a major

process. I was looking at all of our Federal, State, and local government entities and looking at whether or not their organizational

structures and goals are meeting the ultimate security needs of the

United States. We are looking at the military, law enforcement, intelligence, emergency preparedness response, public health agencies and how others are going to adapt to protect the American people.

Now, the International Atomic Energy Agency is a consensusdriven organization that is in the business of serving member

states in regard to the safe and efficient use of nuclear power, and

that is a vitally important task, but in the wake of September 11,

I think we have to ask whether a further fundamental change for

the Agency is in order.

I am not wondering whether the IAEA can do more. Most organizations, whether national or international, given the opportunity,

will seek to do more, and given the money will seek to do more.

Rather, I am wondering qualitatively whether member states together should in part determine that an additional focus of the

Agency in the post-September 11 world is to see what it can do to

successfully protect the world from nuclear proliferation, from the

illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, the protection of facilities

against terrorism and sabotage, among other issues. And I hope

that in the course of today’s hearing we may hear some answers

to those questions.

I certainly continue to be concerned about the IAEA’s funding of

entities like the Bushir plant in Iran. It seems to me that part of

what we need to do in this global effort that is presently under way

is to determine whether or not we want the ability of people to

9

have ultimately the operational capacity to have access to nuclear

plants that can also be diverted for nuclear weaponry.

Do we want to assist those entities to ultimately achieve their

goals; or is it in our national interest in a place like Iran, that has

huge oil and natural gas reserves and obviously doesn’t need nuclear energy for the purposes of its domestic consumption, should

we not be looking to create a standard in which we don’t get engaged in assisting those to have the operational capacity that we

would not want to see both as a country or, for that matter, as a

world community?

Having said that, Madam Chairlady, I ask that my full statement be entered into the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Menendez follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

In the wake of the events of September 11th, we have asked ourselves whether

the nations of the world can afford to do business as they did prior to the horrific

attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

As a result of this catastrophe, United States federal, state and local government

agencies will by necessity change or even transform their organizational structure

and goals. The military, law enforcement and intelligence, emergency preparedness

and response and public health agencies and others will have to adapt if we are to

protect the American people from terrorism.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is a consensus-driven organization that

is in the business of serving Member States with regard to the safe and efficient

use of nuclear power. That is a vitally important task. In the wake of September

11th, however, we must ask whether a fundamental change for the agency is in

order.

I am not wondering whether the IAEA can do more. Most organizations, national

or international, will accept more money to do more things. Rather, I am wondering

qualitatively whether Member States together should refocus the mission of the

Agency to adjust it to the post-September 11th world—not so that it can do more

but so that it can successfully protect the world from a nuclear disaster. Now we

have to ask whether the IAEA should do something in the realm of

counterterrorism.

The agency is involved in the critically important work of ensuring the security

of nuclear material, of nuclear plant facilities, and certifying that nuclear materials

are not diverted from safe uses. But it has no explicit role in counterterrorism. We

must ask whether these roles are adequate to the changed reality.

For years, I have been concerned about IAEA activities with respect to providing

support for two projects in particular: the proposed Juragua ́ nuclear power plant in

Cienfuegos, Cuba, and the plant under development in Bushehr, Iran. I have sponsored amendments that the House saw fit to pass restricting IAEA funding or sanctioning the ability of other nations to assist with the development of those plants.

I continue to believe that we must consider both of these regimes a threat to the

United States both in terms of nuclear technology proliferation and in conducting

nuclear terrorism. Thus, I take issue with the IAEA’s institutional neutrality with

regard to the proliferation threat of these two regimes. Now we add terrorism to

the mix.

If the IAEA is considered the international authority of record on the safe use of

nuclear power, and if it knows, for example, that both these nations pose a threat

in terms of nuclear safety or nuclear weapons proliferation, why does it not take

issue with the direction that those programs are taking?

The IAEA monitors nuclear power use and ensures through peaceful cooperation

that nuclear powers can operate safely. But it does not seek to prevent nuclear proliferation for weapons development. Why doesn’t the agency opine when it witnesses

nonproliferation violations?

After September 11th one has to wonder whether the IAEA should express concerns about proliferation of particular facilities or nations. After September 11th we

add terrorism to the set of concerns. Like our agencies, it is my hope that the leadership of the IAEA is starting to think seriously of ways to adapt to this threat.

10

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. And we will have all the

panelists’ statements be made a part of the record, so feel free to

summarize.

I would like to recognize for a few brief moments Ms. McKinney

and she will deliver the full text of her opening statement when we

come back.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am not going to

speak long at this particular point. I would just welcome the panelists and my colleague from Durban, Ambassador Southwick, welcome. I have some fond memories of some of those encounters in

Durban and look forward to hearing the testimony of everyone, but

when I get back I will have a full statement pertaining to this particular topic today.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. So we will just be in recess; and

we will have a series of three votes, and we will be back. Thank

you so much.

[Recess.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Committee is once again in session, and

now I am very proud to recognize our Ranking Member of the Subcommittee and my good friend, Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, who

will make her opening statement. We will be glad to submit it in

its entirety to the record.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

For decades, millions of citizens in the United States and across

the world have strongly opposed the use of nuclear power. Now—

in the shadow of the tragic and sobering attacks in New York and

here in Washington, no time is better than now to seriously question the logic and sustainability of nuclear energy use.

Why? Not even considering the fact that we will never find a safe

way to dispose of nuclear waste, we simply can’t guarantee the containment dome strength of any reactor in the world that would

withstand a modern day jet crash or that key auxiliary buildings

that house spent fuel pools could survive such attacks.

Clearly, the pre-September 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission

precautions were based on erroneous assumptions that attackers

would try to avoid risking their own lives, would lack skills and resources to cause serious harm and would probably be thwarted by

intelligence agents.

Last week one of the agencies, present here at today’s hearing,

the International Atomic Energy Agency, stated that though nuclear plants are by far the most robust civilian buildings in the

world, they are unlikely to survive a direct hit from an airliner

fully laden with fuel. A deliberate hit of that sort is something that

was never in any scenario at the design stage. These are vulnerable targets and the consequences of a direct hit could be catastrophic.

Madam Chair, I would submit the remainder of my statement for

the record. I think that is sufficient and just about says it all.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Thank you Madame Chair for calling this timely hearing.

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For decades, millions of citizens in the United States and across the world have

strongly opposed the use of nuclear power.

Now, in the shadow of the tragic and sobering attacks in New York and here in

Washington, no time is better than now to seriously question the logic and sustainability of nuclear energy use.

Why? Not even considering the fact that we will never find a safe way to dispose

of nuclear waste, we simply cannot guarantee the containment dome strength of any

reactor in the world that will withstand a modern day jet crash or that key auxiliary buildings that house spent fuel pools could survive such attacks.

Clearly, the pre-September 11th Nuclear Regulatory Commission precautions

were based on erroneous assumptions that attackers would try to avoid risking their

own lives, would lack skills and resources to cause serious harm, and would probably be thwarted by intelligence agents.

According to Rigor Khripunov, the associate director of the University of Georgia’s

center for International Trade and Security who studies nuclear issues, ‘‘Sept. 11th

was a watershed in the perception of threats as we still had illusions that terrorists

may have some inhibitions in using those weapons of mass destruction. But, they

used such a weapon’’ by slamming hijacked jets into selected targets. There are no

inhibitions, and that includes nuclear weapons.’’

Last week, one of the agencies present here at today’s hearing, the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated that ‘‘though nuclear plants are by far the

most robust civilian buildings in the world, they would unlikely survive a direct hit

from an airliner fully laden with fuel, a deliberate hit of that sort is something that

was never in any scenario at the design stage. These are vulnerable targets and the

consequences of a direct hit could be catastrophic’’.

The reality is—had the terrorists chosen a reactor to hit on September 11th, we

would be talking about hundreds of thousands of dead and radioactive contamination over a wide area.

This new degree of vulnerability comes at a time when Nuclear Power plants

across the United States, in the months preceding the attack, had failed numerous

security tests based on mock attacks from land. There is no testing from the water

and none from the air.

In an article published last week by Scripps Howard News Service, entitled ‘‘U.S

nuclear plants fail security tests’’ reporter Ryan Alessi documents security tests over

the last decade where teams of ex-Navy SEALS have ‘‘penetrated nearly half of the

nation’s 103 nuclear power plants—even with as much as six month’s warning for

a test’’. These tests resulted in severe damage to ‘‘target sets’’ such as key valves

and pumps, which would result in a meltdown of the reactors.

Worldwide, the amount of weapons-usable plutonium in the civilian fuel cycle is

also of growing concern. The civil stockpiles now rival the amount of plutonium held

by the military nuclear weapons states. Both France and Britai n each hold a stockpile of about 60 tons of civilian plutonium, Russia has about 30 tons and Japan domestically holds about 5 tons of plutonium. Given that only a few kilograms of plutonium are sufficient for a nuclear weapon, avenues for theft, diversion and attack

are of increased concern in light of the events of September 11.

Yet, neither US agencies nor the IAEA have come forward with efforts to halt the

accumulation of and commerce in plutonium for nuclear power purposes. Efforts

simply center around controls placed on the material and not around efforts to ban

the production of plutonium, which has no commercial value when used as a nuclear

fuel. Given the proliferation and environmental risks associated with plutonium, efforts must now begin to halt the growth of plutonium stockpiles and to dispose of

this dangerous material as nuclear waste. The time for sweeping this problem under

the rug has ceased. The US must actively work for closure of all plutonium reprocessing facilities and for a halt in commerce in plutonium—key components of a true

‘‘fissile material ban.’’

With this in mind, we must consider the following chilling facts—Security measures are usually now left to each individual power plant. Increasingly, there is less

and less government oversight on security.

There are no consistent security measures between each plant and—would you believe it, a self-policing program urged by the nuclear industry is scheduled to start

this fall and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Clearly we must reverse the trend towards deregulation. We must have external

oversight over these plants.

Many nuclear safety experts believe that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has

refused to upgrade security requirements at nuclear power plants over the last

years and is essentially doing nothing under industry pressure—in order to reduce

cost to industry and reduce ‘‘regulatory burden.’’ At least the IAEA admitted right

12

after Sept. 11 that nuclear power plants weren’t designed against a crash of an airliner. It took the US NRC and US nuclear industry some time to admit that.

As retired rear admiral and former director of U.S military operations in Europe

and the Middle East, Eugene Carroll recently wrote in an editorial entitled ‘‘ Nuclear Plants Could Be Next Targets of Terrorists, ‘‘since when have private companies voluntarily disclosed security shortcomings and made costly improvements to

their security systems and personnel training? ‘‘. These failed security tests came

at a time when many in the power industry and elected officials along with members of the Bush administration were pushing for expanded Nuclear Power use.

Vice-President Cheney stated earlier in the year that the greater use of nuclear

energy must be a part of the country’s long-term energy strategy.

Many outside the beltway will now demand that they have a voice in halting the

increase in Nuclear Power production.

Though nuclear power constitutes 20% of the U.S power supply—I think we might

all make the sacrifice in increasing our conservation efforts if it meant avoiding a

Nuclear holocaust.

Perhaps Rear Admiral Carroll says it best, ‘‘no matter how much security we put

into place only by alleviating abject poverty and hopelessness in the poorest nations

in the world can we eliminate the spirit that breeds terrorists & the sense that even

death is preferable to life under unbearable conditions. This will not be an easy or

inexpensive challenge. But, it is far less costly than the perpetual cycle of attack

and reprisal and with targets like nuclear reactors to aim at’’.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And now we are pleased to hear from our

witnesses, and we will begin with Mr. Stratford. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. STRATFORD, ACTING ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION

Mr. STRATFORD. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. With your permission, I would like to just submit my written statement for the

record and make a few points orally.

The written statement goes into some detail about the role of the

IAEA in preventing terrorism, and it sums up the Agency’s activities with respect to promoting physical security and protection of

nuclear facilities and materials, helping to prevent illicit trafficking, and safeguarding nuclear material against diversions to

nuclear weapons. However, I think today I would like to make

some slightly different points that go beyond the technical.

First, after September 11, nothing is business as usual anymore.

If the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington taught us

anything, it was that the unthinkable must be thought about and

the unanticipated must be planned for.

Second, the IAEA has always had a role in preventing acts of terrorism, at least acts of nuclear terrorism. The safeguards system

has worked over the years to assure that weapons-usable and other

nuclear materials remain in peaceful hands.

The IAEA has played a role for many years in promoting physical security through the publication of what is called Information

Circular 225 and other documents which provide recommendations

on physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which the

U.S. is now trying to strengthen, was negotiated under the auspices of the Agency.

More recently, the IAEA’s forays into the areas of preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and improving physical security at nuclear facilities are a significant expansion of its efforts to

prevent terrorism.

13

My third point: But is what was done in the past enough? Answer: I don’t think anyone here today, least of all me, would say

that enough has been done.

The events of September 11 speak for themselves about the need

to upgrade security on aircraft. We shouldn’t wait for a nuclear-related terrorist incident to prove to us that there is more to be done

with respect to the protection of nuclear material and facilities.

By the way, that phrase I used, ‘‘there is more to be done,’’ is

a quote from at least two different people; and I will tell you where

that came from in a second.

The Administration does recognize the need for action. The IAEA

General Conference, which just met 2 weeks ago in Vienna, heard

DOE Secretary Abraham as the first speaker in what is called the

general debate. He pointed out that terrorists will attack any target and they will use any method. He stressed the IAEA’s role in

preventing the spread of dangerous nuclear materials, providing

physical security over these materials and verifying the peaceful

uses of nuclear energy. The Secretary recognized that we cannot

assume that tomorrow’s terrorist acts will mirror those of September 11.

Now, one of the sources of that quote—the Secretary then said,

‘‘But there is more to be done; and we will seek approaches

that are responsive to today’s, not yesterday’s, environment.’’

He made clear that the U.S. stands behind the efforts of the IAEA

and that addressing new threats will require increased international cooperation and vigilance.

My fourth point: At the General Conference, the IAEA member

states recognized the need to put aside business as usual. Specifically, the General Conference passed a resolution on physical protection which requested the Director General to review thoroughly

the activities and programs of the Agency with a view to strengthening the Agency work relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear materials. And they further asked the Director

General to report to the Board of Governors as soon as possible.

My fifth point: Precisely what does strengthening the work of the

IAEA mean? What do we want the Agency to do? Obviously, our

thoughts on the subject are still jelling, and the Agency is just beginning the review that it was tasked to do.

But brainstorming sessions have already been held at the top

levels of the IAEA in Vienna and, jelling or not, I may be able to

preview some of the possibilities. For example:

Revising Information Circular 225 again with a view to beefing

up security at nuclear installations;

Funding additional physical security review missions with emphasis on the New Independent States, and if possible, Russia, to

include both an IAEA assessment of the adequacy of physical security and the provision of technical assistance to improve physical

security where needed;

Broadening the Agency’s efforts to provide better accounting for

radioactive sources and helping countries locate radioactive sources

that may have been lost or abandoned; and I think that is a fairly

important point because whereas it is very difficult for a terrorist

to get his hands on high-enriched uranium or plutonium to make

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a bomb, it is not that difficult to get your hands on a cobalt source

that is used to irradiate food and attach it to a stick of dynamite.

If you do that and you set it off, there are not a lot of people

going to be killed, except the ones standing next to the stick of dynamite, but you are going wind up contaminating a very large

area. You can decontaminate that area with a great deal of difficulty, but I guarantee, no one is going to want to set foot in that

part of the city again. That is a real weapon of nuclear terrorism,

and it is all too easy to do; and the source issue, I think, is important.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Did you say ‘‘cobalt’’?

Mr. STRATFORD. Yes. There are cobalt sources. There are also

other radioactive materials that are used, for example, in gauges

that are used in oil wells, various types of instrumentation,

irradiators that are used to irradiate both food and other kinds of

materials.

Those things have a tendency to get lost, not in this country

where they are labeled, tracked, and regulated, but in other countries they are not; and, for example, when the Russian military

pulled out of the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union,

there were things left behind—toxic chemicals, various other items

that needed to be cleaned up, and radioactive sources. The IAEA,

in one of their estimates says—they estimate there are over a thousand radioactive sources lost/missing. That is a problem that needs

to be looked into.

Another thing that needs to be done is to proceed apace with the

efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material. That is an effort we launched with a letter from

Secretary Albright 2 years ago, and after some work, the Director

General has called for a meeting in early December to actually

start writing amendments to the Convention. I think we need to

push for universal adherence to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol to

ensure that nuclear material remains in peaceful uses and is not

available for use in a terrorist act.

Now, when will we see something from the IAEA? I expect that

the Director General will make at least an interim report to the

Board of Governors at its next meeting, which will take place in

late November.

What does ‘‘cooperate fully with the work of the Agency’’ mean

for us? I think it means we need to be open to efforts by the Agency

to strengthen its activities and, specifically, to energetically pursue

the tightening of physical security on nuclear materials wherever

such tightening is needed. I also think we need to look at how we

are using our own resources.

Here, I have a word of thanks to the Congress. Over the years,

the Congress has been exceedingly generous in funding our voluntary contributions to the IAEA. The U.S. voluntary contribution

for 2001 is $47 million. And I have been in this business a long

time, and that $47 million is a 100 percent increase over the contribution in 1991, just 10 years ago. So thank you.

Much of that money goes to support the IAEA safeguards program, as it should. But of that $47 million, which I just looked at,

$500,000 is allotted to the Agency’s physical security efforts—

$500,000. And I think most of us would agree that we in the AdVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
15

ministration need to take a hard look at the voluntary contribution

in light of today’s reality, namely, where do we put that 47 million;

and if the Congress is kind enough to grant us the 49 million we

are seeking for next year, where does that go and does physical security have to take a higher priority?

Further, I want to offer one more sign that the Administration

is serious about its support for the Agency and about the Agency’s

role in preventing nuclear terrorism.

It is traditional for the President to include a brief message to

the General Conference in the statement that is read by the U.S.

Head of Delegation. President Bush, after deploring what he referred to as, ‘‘vicious and despicable acts of violence,’’ urged the

member states to advance the role of the IAEA in securing international peace and well-being. The President praised the Agency’s

efforts to safeguard special nuclear materials and the facilities that

produce them. He said, too—and here comes that quote again—

‘‘Much more remains to be done.’’ And he closed by telling the assembled delegates, in his remarks read by the Secretary, ‘‘The

United States has a strong tradition of strong support for the IAEA

that my Administration will continue.’’

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, I don’t

think I can put better than that our policy toward the Agency and

the importance of its role in preventing proliferation and protecting

nuclear materials and facilities. The task now is turning that generic phrase ‘‘strong support’’ into a stronger and more effective

IAEA effort to secure nuclear materials and facilities.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I will stop there.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stratford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. STRATFORD, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in protecting against acts of terrorism. In

the wake of the tragic events of September 11, the international community is looking to strengthen all activities that enhance our protection against terrorist attacks.

Many nations recognize that the IAEA has an important role to play in this area.

The IAEA’s special expertise lies in dealing with nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as nuclear facilities.

During the IAEA’s annual meeting of Member States, which concluded on September 21, the Director General of the IAEA said that the international community

cannot be complacent. It must increase its efforts in countering terrorism and in

combating illicit trafficking or smuggling of nuclear materials. IAEA Member States

agreed there is an urgent need to examine the IAEA’s work in these and related

areas. This effort has already begun, with particular attention to nuclear material

and facility security, nuclear facility safety, and improved management of radioactive sources. Careful consideration is also being given to expanding and improving

current activities or possibly initiating new activities to respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Concern regarding terrorism is factored into several IAEA programs. These include four broad categories: (1) promoting physical security and protection of nuclear

facilities and nuclear and other radioactive materials; (2) inhibiting the smuggling

of nuclear material; (3) safeguarding nuclear material against diversion to nuclear

weapons; and (4) promoting nuclear safety.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACILITIES

The security and physical protection of nuclear material refers to the need to ensure that nuclear material within a State’s jurisdiction is consistently and reliably

16

used and stored safely and securely, and that nuclear material and nuclear facilities

within a State’s jurisdiction are protected from sabotage. This is primarily a national responsibility. However, the IAEA provides important assistance to States in

several ways. To improve the effectiveness of physical protection worldwide, the

IAEA provides assistance to national regimes at both the nuclear facility and state

levels.

The IAEA has published internationally accepted recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, and provides assistance

to its members in improving their legal and regulatory frameworks governing the

physical security of nuclear and other radioactive materials and nuclear facilities.

A cornerstone of the IAEA’s work in this area is its publication of international recommendations in ‘‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,’’ also known as INFCIRC/225. First issued in 1972 and updated periodically to

reflect the best in contemporary practice, INFCIRC/225 is now in its 4th revision.

While not legally binding on States, the recommendations in INFCIRC/225 provide

expert guidance concerning the objectives and elements of a national system of

physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. They address how to

assign nuclear activities to physical protection categories as well as the requirements for physical protection of nuclear material in use and storage. They also address protecting nuclear facilities against acts of sabotage and the requirements for

physical protection of nuclear material in transit.

A second key document is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear

Material. This Convention was negotiated under IAEA auspices in the late 1970s

and entered into force in 1987. It establishes specific obligations on States Parties

for the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in international transport and storage incidental to such transport. The Convention obligates its parties to make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material and promotes international cooperation in the exchange of physical protection information. The Convention also obligates States Parties to cooperate in the recovery and protection of

stolen nuclear material. It requires States to establish as criminal offenses the misuse and threats of misuse of nuclear materials to harm the public and to prosecute

or extradite for prosecution those accused of committing such offenses.

At the time the Convention was negotiated, some countries were unwilling to

agree to requirements concerning domestic physical protection, in spite of strong arguments by the United States and other governments. Since 1998, we have urged

consideration of expanding the scope of the Convention. In particular, we seek to

extend the Convention to cover the physical protection of nuclear material used for

peaceful purposes in domestic use, storage and transport and for physical protection

to prevent sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.

Thanks to the efforts of Director General ElBaradei, experts from IAEA Members

States have been considering how the Convention might be amended. In May 2001,

they provided their recommendations to the Director General, who will convene an

open-ended drafting group of legal and technical experts in December 2001 to prepare a Convention revision proposal based on those recommendations. International

concern over the increase in illicit trafficking in nuclear material in the early 1990s

has created a more receptive climate for amending the Convention. The horrific

events of September 11 have imparted an even greater sense of urgency. If the revision effort succeeds, it would significantly strengthen international norms in this

area.

In addition to facilitating the establishment of standards of physical protection

and acting as a depositary for the Physical Protection Convention, the IAEA supports training to assist its members in establishing and maintaining effective national systems of physical protection. My colleague from the Department of Energy

will give you more details about the work of the IAEA in this area and U.S. support

to those programs.

We have worked with the IAEA for several years on a small program to deal with

the problem of ‘‘orphan sources.’’ Orphan sources are radioactive sources used in

many different ways, including medical, industrial, research, or non-weapons military applications. They have either never been subject to regulatory control or have

fallen out of this control because they have been misplaced, lost, or stolen. Since

the demise of the Soviet Union, substantial numbers of radioactive sources and

other radioactive materials have been misplaced and/or improperly stored in NIS

countries. These sources and materials are not usable in making a nuclear explosive, but their radioactivity can raise serious human health and safety concerns.

The Administration is reviewing the IAEA efforts to encourage Member States to

17

find and secure orphan sources, with the possibility of building on the existing IAEA

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

PREVENTION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material became a major international concern during the early 1990s, following sharp rises in the number of confirmed cases. Since 1993, States have reported to the IAEA 11 trafficking cases involving highly enriched uranium, four of which were in quantities of a kilogram or

more. States have reported 12 cases involving plutonium, one with almost 300

grams. The other cases involved much smaller quantities. While the total quantities

involved to date are insufficient to construct a nuclear explosive device, the fact that

there are any such materials in illicit commerce requires prompt and effective action.

Illicit trafficking is complex in nature, involving many different types of materials,

facilities, individuals, groups and States. Combating illicit trafficking effectively involves numerous State authorities, including those with responsibility for law enforcement, security, and responding to radiological emergencies. It also requires coordination with such international organizations as the World Customs Organization and Interpol.

In 1994, IAEA Members States called on the Agency to ‘‘take all necessary measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear material.’’ This call emphasized that national governments and authorities must take the main responsibility for preventing

illicit trafficking, but it also asked the IAEA to intensify its support to States in

combating illicit trafficking. In response, the IAEA increased its activities in this

area in coordination with other cognizant authorities. One primary area in which

IAEA assistance has been of great benefit is in tracking trafficking information and

coordinating access to this information for Member States and other international

organizations.

Since 1992, the IAEA has tracked cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material

and analyzed them for patterns and trends. In 1995, the IAEA created an Illicit

Trafficking Database Program, inviting all its members to participate. Today there

are sixty-nine participants. These States account for a very large part of the global

nuclear industry, covering uranium yellowcake production, conversion, fuel fabrication, power and research reactors, enrichment, reprocessing, waste and various nuclear research installations. Participating States submit details regarding each illicit

trafficking case, using an Incident Notification Form to ensure reporting in sufficient detail and with sufficient uniformity for trend and pattern analyses.

The United States has been a strong supporter of the Illicit Trafficking Database

Program, particularly with respect to the design of the database and analysis of the

cases. Currently, a U.S. expert at IAEA headquarters is providing full-time support

to the program.

In addition to information provided by participant States, the IAEA also cooperates with other international organizations on illicit trafficking matters, including

on relevant databases and information exchange. The IAEA works closely with other

international organizations with responsibilities or interest in combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. A Memorandum of Understanding serves as the basis for the IAEA’s coordination with the World Customs

Organization. An Inter-Agency Coordination Committee on the Illicit Cross-Border

Movements of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources meets on an annual

basis to exchange information and plan joint activities. An agreement is being prepared with Interpol that would permit information sharing with the IAEA.

To provide assistance to its members, the IAEA has initiated a program, together

with the World Customs Organization and Interpol, to train law enforcement officers in detection and response to illicit trafficking. In response to States’ requests,

the IAEA is also implementing a research program to promote the development of

improved detection and response methodologies and technologies.

In May 2001, the IAEA, the World Customs Organization, Interpol, and the European Police Office organized an international conference entitled: ‘‘Measures to Detect, Intercept, and Respond to the Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive

Sources.’’ The Conference was hosted by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate

in Stockholm. It was attended by governmental officials and facility operators from

around the world. During the Conference, there was a broad exchange of information on technical systems and programs focused on reducing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and the associated proliferation threat and radiation risk.

18

SAFEGUARDS

One of the IAEA’s primary responsibilities—safeguards—is verifying that States

do not divert nuclear materials in peaceful programs for use in nuclear weapons or

any other unauthorized purpose. While IAEA safeguards activities are not the focus

of this hearing, they do play an important supporting role in reducing the risk that

terrorists could acquire nuclear material without detection.

Non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA for the purpose of verifying the fulfillment of their obligations not to divert any nuclear material under their control to nuclear explosive purposes. The IAEA also performs inspections in the five recognized nuclear weapons States and in non-NPT-signatory

countries such as India and Pakistan, but they are not comprehensive in nature.

The application of IAEA safeguards in NPT non-nuclear weapon States requires

that the State establish a national system for accounting and inspection of all nuclear material under the control of the State. The State is required to provide a domestic system to account accurately for all nuclear material within its borders and

to conduct periodic inventories that are verified by IAEA inspectors. The system is

not designed to prevent theft or diversion—that is the role of physical protection—

but to deter such an action by facilitating early detection. This system can help a

State account for all its nuclear material and to serve as a ‘‘burglar alarm’’ against

a terrorist. A well-designed system will also help to pinpoint the origin of missing

material, identify individuals that had access to it, and facilitate recovery of the material. IAEA safeguards can also help to deter a State from colluding with terrorists

by diverting nuclear material from the State’s national program to terrorist use.

Until the Persian Gulf War, States insisted that IAEA safeguards be applied solely to nuclear material ‘‘declared’’ by a State to the IAEA. IAEA inspectors were limited to conducting safeguards inspections in locations previously agreed to by a

State and the Agency. Following the Gulf War, revelations of Iraq’s covert nuclear

activities led to concerted efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

Over the past decade, the United States has led these efforts to expand the scope

of safeguards to allow the IAEA to detect ‘‘undeclared’’ or secret nuclear activities.

A variety of new safeguards measures and techniques have been developed. To provide the necessary legal basis for a State to accept new safeguards measures, a new

legal document known as the ‘‘Model Additional Protocol’’ has been negotiated.

States party to NPT safeguards agreements are now beginning to accept this new

approach by negotiating their own Protocols based on the Model agreement. Once

widely implemented, these protocols will substantially increase the information

available to the IAEA regarding States’ nuclear activities and provide expanded access for the IAEA to States’ nuclear programs. The Administration, with the support

of Congress, will exert its efforts to encourage widespread acceptance of this Additional Protocol and to ensure that other steps are taken as necessary to strengthen

the safeguards system.

NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY

The IAEA plays an essential role in addressing nuclear safety at nuclear facilities

worldwide. This is accomplished by the development of safety standards, the facilitation of technical meetings, and the provision of education, training and safety

services. In addition, the Agency acts as a depositary for several international conventions related to the safety of nuclear installations including the Convention on

Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management

and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

These Agency programs help to ensure that nuclear facilities are less vulnerable

to terrorist activities. One of the most valuable services offered by the Agency includes safety reviews provided under IAEA direction at the request of Member

States. These reviews are performed by teams of experts who assess national programs according to a variety of Agency safety standards.

CLOSING REMARKS

There are an impressive number of IAEA programs that are particularly important in protecting nuclear material and facilities against acts of terrorism. These include developing and promulgating international standards and guidelines related

to nuclear safety and physical protection, providing training and assembling teams

of experts at the request of Member States to assess their national programs, and

developing the standards that, if followed, will make nuclear facilities less vulnerable to sabotage. The IAEA’s work with other organizations to combat illicit trafVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
19

ficking is of key importance in forestalling nuclear terrorism, as is the role of international safeguards in fostering nuclear security.

In the wake of the tragedy on September 11, we are all seeking to strengthen

ways to counter and eradicate terrorism. As part of this effort, the Administration

will be reviewing U.S. support of IAEA activities to determine whether our priorities

should be revised to enhance the IAEA’s efforts related to the security of nuclear

materials and facilities. The IAEA is an organization known internationally for its

competence and effectiveness. With our support and the support of its other Member

States, there is much the IAEA can do within its mandate to help in the fight

against the scourge of terrorism.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ambassador Southwick.

Mr. SOUTHWICK. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Stratford has given the statement for the State Department,

and I, from my Bureau, certainly support what he has just said.

I would just add that we in the IO Bureau, which oversees our relationship with the U.N. system, believe that the IAEA is certainly

one of the most valuable organizations in the system. As you said

in your statement, it does play a pivotal role in nuclear safety; and

the United States has a consistent record of giving strong support

to that organization, and we believe that we will be continuing to

play that role. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Colonel Black.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN K. BLACK, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. BLACK. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman and Members

of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the

IAEA’s role in preventing nuclear terrorism.

The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security

Administration have long been concerned by the threat of nuclear

terrorism, whether by state sponsors or by substate actors. I understand that this hearing will focus on three topics, each of which I

have addressed in my written testimony. My oral statement will be

a brief summary of some of the main points.

The first point I would like to make is that protection of nuclear

material at its source is the best defense against nuclear terrorism.

The responsibility for establishing and operating physical protection systems for nuclear materials is a sovereign matter and rests

entirely with the government of the state involved. Nonetheless,

the IAEA plays a significant role in the development of international guidelines and standards for physical protection. Those

guidelines are contained in a 1972 document called INFCIRC/225

as referred to by Mr. Stratford.

U.S. physical protection experts from the NNSA and the U.S. national labs have worked closely with the IAEA over the areas to develop this document and its multiple revisions. We have also

worked with the IAEA to jointly conduct international training

courses to help other countries meet the standards contained in

INFCIRC/225. In fact, roughly 500 students from over 60 countries

have attended such courses.

In 1995, the IAEA initiated the International Physical Protection

Advisory Services, or IPPAS, which brings specialists together to

review physical protection systems and compare them with the

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international guidelines contained in INFCIRC/225. When necessary, the IPPAS team then makes recommendations for improvements.

The IAEA is also currently working to strengthen the Convention

on the physical protection of nuclear material. In fact, as Mr. Stratford said, the Director General has already convened a group of experts to meet this December to draft needed revisions.

The IAEA has also played an active role in strengthening the nuclear material safeguards and physical protection in the non-Russian countries that succeeded the Soviet Union as the nonnuclear

weapons states. Each of these countries acceded to the nonproliferation treaty and signed comprehensive safeguard agreements to the IAEA.

The contribution of those IAEA safeguards, that system of controls that requires nuclear material be accurately accounted for,

cannot be overestimated. These safeguards provide assurances that

the physical protection systems are working.

The NNSA is a major partner of several successor states and currently manages projects to sustain or improve levels of protection

at 12 facilities with more than 3 metric tons of plutonium and 800

kilograms of highly enriched uranium.

The second major point is that through 1993 there had been few

reported and verified accounts of illicit trafficking in significant

amounts of nuclear materials, that is, enriched U–235 and plutonium. At that time, almost all the cases known by the IAEA and

the world at large were confined to instances where the individuals

involved recognized neither the value of the radioactive sources

they were transporting nor the dangers of those radioactive materials.

The focus in those early years was centered on health and safety,

and the Agency focused on assisting members in strengthening

their radiation safety infrastructures. At that time, we provided

early technical assistance to the IAEA’s establishment of a database which today serves as an important clearinghouse for official

reports of illicit trafficking.

Another area where the IAEA has played a role is in establishing

guidelines for radiation monitoring at borders.

The final area I would like to address is the problem of sabotage.

Through much of the 1990s, IAEA physical protection guidance focused on preventing theft. As a result of events in the 1990s, the

IAEA began to give greater emphasis to preventing sabotage as

well. That increased emphasis is now reflected in the fourth revision of INFCIRC/225.

The NNSA has begun working to address the threat of sabotage

through unauthorized access at nuclear power plants in the former

Soviet republics. For example, our national laboratory experts have

implemented improved access control systems, detection and alarm

systems, interior physical barriers, and security procedures and

training programs. Currently, most of our work in the successor

states to the Soviet Union is focused on physical protection upgrades to sites in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

To conclude my comments, I would quote Secretary of Energy

Abraham, who, in his address to the IAEA General Conference last

month, only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11,

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reiterated the Agency’s critical role in the global effort to ensure

that nuclear materials are never used as weapons of terror. In a

world increasingly threatened, as well, by illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the possibility of terrorist attacks on nuclear

facilities, it is certainly in our own national security interest to

help the IAEA to fulfill this role.

That concludes my comments, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN K. BLACK, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank

you for the opportunity to discuss the activities of the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) in preventing acts of terrorism with nuclear or other radioactive material. The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration

have long been concerned about the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, whether by

the hand of state sponsors of terrorism, or by substate actors, such as Osama bin

Ladin’s al-Qaeda organization. Indeed, many of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nonproliferation programs are designed to assist the IAEA in these

very efforts. It is my understanding that this hearing will focus on three closely related topics: the physical protection of nuclear material; recommendations to improve capabilities for interrupting and responding to illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources; and the protection of facilities against terrorism and sabotage. I will address each of these topics in my remarks. Specifically,

I will describe current and planned IAEA activities, many of which have been covered by my State Department colleagues, and what DOE and the NNSA are doing,

or plan to do, to support the IAEA.

The IAEA’s program for nuclear material security includes activities in the following areas: promulgating guidelines for physical protection, supporting the U.S.-

led effort to strengthen the international Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material, assisting states through the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), training, assisting in design basis threat assessments, and

coordinating donor states’ support to countries, especially in the Newly Independent

States and the Baltic republics, to upgrade safeguards and physical protection systems. These physical protection activities are complemented by the IAEA’s safeguards system, and the Agency’s programs in the areas of illicit trafficking and nuclear safety.

I. PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Protection of nuclear material at its source location is the best defense against

nuclear terrorism. The responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive

physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests

entirely with the Government of that State. Nonetheless, the IAEA plays a significant role in assuring nuclear facilities and materials have adequate protection.

Since 1972 when the IAEA published ‘‘Recommendations for the Physical Protection

of Nuclear Material’’ (Information Circular or INFCIRC/225), the Agency has been

the focal point and catalyst for the development of physical protection guidelines

that have become the international norm. US physical protection experts from the

National Nuclear Security Administration and the U.S. National Labs have worked

closely with the IAEA over the years to develop this document and its multiple revisions. In addition, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 requires that foreign

nuclear operators maintain adequate physical security measures to protect their USorigin nuclear material.

Since that time, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the IAEA have

jointly conducted numerous international training courses on physical protection

and on methods for accounting and control. Roughly 500 students from over 60

countries have attended such courses.

For the past six years, we have also worked with the IAEA to offer regional

courses on physical protection: three times in the Czech Republic for students from

countries throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—a fourth such

course in the Czech Republic is being conducted as we meet here today, and two

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regional physical protection courses have also been presented in China. The June

2000 course in China included students from seven East Asian countries, including

China. Finally, we have also sponsored a regional physical protection course in

South America, with participants from Argentina and Brazil.

Revision 4 of INFCIRC/225 underlines the importance of defining a Design Basis

Threat (DBT) as the basis for designing and evaluating a physical protection system

to prevent theft of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear facilities. The National

Nuclear Security Administration has worked with the IAEA to develop a workshop

for assisting States in developing their own DBT. To date, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the IAEA have jointly presented the workshop in two

countries (Romania and Slovenia), and the IAEA has made plans for conducting

similar training in up to an additional 20 countries. It should be pointed out that

while the IAEA does provide for visits and training, it does not provide funding or

equipment for any security-related upgrades to individual nuclear facilities.

Many students of the courses co-sponsored by the U.S. and the IAEA have gone

on to become responsible in their respective countries for the physical protection and

safeguarding of nuclear material.

Since 1995, the IAEA has also taken an increasingly active role in assessing the

physical protection systems of countries and in providing advice on improvements,

both at the state regulator level and at facilities. In 1995, the IAEA initiated the

International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS). The National Nuclear

Security Administration provides strong support to the IPPAS program. Currently,

a US physical protection expert from Sandia National Laboratory coordinates the

IPPAS program for the IAEA. Upon request from a State, the IAEA convenes an

international team of physical protection specialists that reviews the requesting

State’s physical protection system and compares it with the international guidelines

in INFCIRC/225. When necessary, the IPPAS team makes recommendations for

needed improvements. NNSA or Nuclear Regulatory Commission physical protection

experts have either led or participated in all of these missions. To date, 12 IPPAS

missions have been carried out. We also contribute to implementing recommendations from these IPPAS missions and to assisting States in evaluating the progress

of those improvements. In particular, NNSA has worked with five countries (Czech

Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania) to make IPPAS-recommended

physical protection improvements.

The IAEA took a further step to expand its physical protection role in 1999, when

the Agency established its Office of Physical Protection and Material Security. The

office consists of a Director and two assistants—one a physical protection expert

from Sandia National Laboratory and the other from the US Customs Service. This

office oversees all IAEA activities related to the security of nuclear material and

other radioactive materials. This program is currently funded at $2 million per year;

one million dollars from the IAEA’s regular budget and another million dollars in

extra-budgetary contributions, largely from the U.S. Prior to establishment of this

program in 1999, all IAEA physical protection activities were funded entirely from

extra-budgetary contributions.

In addition to the assistance it provides to states in meeting the physical protection guidelines contained in INFCIRC/225, the IAEA plays a significant role in the

current effort to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear

Material. In 1999 the IAEA Director General convened an experts meeting to study

whether there was a need to revise the Convention. The US took the initiative in

seeking a revision that would broaden the Convention, to expand obligations relating to physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful

purposes. After extended multilateral consultations hosted the IAEA, the international experts concluded last May that there is ‘‘a clear need to strengthen the

international physical protection regime’’ and that a spectrum of measures should

be considered, including possible revision of the Convention. The Director General

has convened a group of legal and technical experts who will meet in December to

draft such an amendment.

U.S. Bilateral Efforts

In addition to directly supporting the IAEA, the US also works with countries

that have US-origin nuclear materials to ensure that this material has adequate

physical protection in accordance with the guidelines in INFCIRC/225. US experts

from the National Nuclear Security Administration and the National Laboratories,

the NRC and the Department of Defense, conduct periodic visits to sites and meet

with regulatory authorities of countries that have received nuclear material from

the U.S. Since this program of bilateral visits began in 1974, the US has conducted

more than 130 visits in over 40 countries. Physical protection improvements have

been made to facilities in several countries with U.S.-origin nuclear material as a

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result of these bilateral consultations. In some other cases, the decision was made

to remove the material from the facility.

IAEA Efforts in the Newly Independent States and the Baltic States

Throughout the past decade, the IAEA has also played an active role in strengthening nuclear material safeguards and physical protection in the countries that succeeded the Soviet Union as non-nuclear weapon states. Each of these countries acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. In addition to applying safeguards, the IAEA has coordinated

assistance provided by the U.S. and other donor countries to upgrade the protection,

control and accountability of nuclear materials in the NIS and Baltics. The National

Nuclear Security Administration is a major partner of states in this region and is

currently implementing projects to sustain or improve levels of protection at 12 facilities with more than 3,000 kgs of plutonium and 800 kgs of high enriched uranium. The National Nuclear Security Administration sponsors some 20 regional

training courses, with about 300 participants, each year at the George Kuzmycz

Training Center in Kiev. The bilateral program is currently focused primarily on

helping Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan meet their IAEA safeguards obligations and in bringing physical protection of their facilities up to the standards contained in INFCIRC/225. It costs approximately $2 million a year.

The Role of IAEA Safeguards

While physical protection may be the first line of defense against terrorists, the

contribution of IAEA safeguards—requiring that nuclear material be accurately accounted for—cannot be overestimated. Non-nuclear weapon states that have signed

the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are required to have ‘‘comprehensive safeguards

agreements’’ with the IAEA. These agreements require a state to account for, and

permit the IAEA to verify, all nuclear material on its territory. In a few states that

have not signed the NPT (India, Pakistan, Israel, Cuba), the IAEA applies safeguards at select facilities. The IAEA also can apply safeguards to facilities in the

U.S. and the other four recognized nuclear weapon states (the U.K., Russia, France,

and China) on a voluntary basis.

The primary purpose of IAEA safeguards is to provide independent assurance that

a state does not divert nuclear material in peaceful programs to other non-peaceful

activities. In requiring the state to account for its nuclear material, however, IAEA

safeguards also provide a vital tool against the possible theft of nuclear material by

adversaries below the level of the state (e.g., terrorists). Safeguards provide assurance that the physical protection system has worked, by enabling the operator of

a facility to account for its nuclear material—and enabling the IAEA to verify that

conclusion. On the other hand, if material is stolen by some adversary—a terrorist

group with insider assistance, for instance—the aim of safeguards is to detect the

theft and enable a response.

One potential threat which IAEA safeguards cannot guard against, however, is a

scenario in which the terrorist does not seek to steal material for some act away

from the facility, but in which the act is aimed against the facility itself. This type

of threat, which includes sabotage, is addressed in the latest update of the international physical protection guidelines, Revision 4 of INFCIRC/225.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES FOR INTERCEPTING AND RESPONDING

TO ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

Illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials occurs on an international scale and has reportedly increased dramatically in recent years. Through

1993, there had been few reported—and verified—cases of illicit trafficking in significant amounts of nuclear materials (i.e., enriched 235Uranium and 239Plutonium).

At that time, almost all the cases known by the Agency, and the world at-large,

were confined to instances where the individuals involved recognized neither the

value of the radioactive sources they were transporting, nor the dangers of the radioactive materials themselves. The focus in the early years was centered on health

and safety issues, ever watchful for the emergence of the more nefarious trafficking

in special nuclear materials. Meetings and discussions at the time noted that while

the public did not necessarily make a distinction between nuclear materials and

other radioactive sources, separate and distinct treatment of each was necessary

since official state controls and legal requirements for each were fundamentally different. The Agency focused on intensifying its efforts to assist Member States to

strengthen their radiation safety infrastructures and other measures. In addition,

the Agency decided to consolidate its newly formed illicit trafficking database and

it proposed new protocols for participating members to officially report instances of

trafficking to further populate the database.

24

I should note here that the Department of Energy (DOE) provided early technical

assistance to the IAEA regarding this database. In 1995, experts from our National

Laboratories, drawing upon lessons learned in developing their own trafficking database, provided on-site assistance to the IAEA. This assistance continues today in the

form of routine information sharing. Since those early years, progress in addressing

the trafficking phenomenon has taken on a new urgency and importance, both within the IAEA, and its Member States. Let me note some particular examples:

• The United States, along with 68 Member States, participates in a Member

State Points of Contact system. As a result of this initiative, the Agency’s database serves as a clearinghouse for official reports of trafficking, enabling

it to share the data with Member States. It also allows the IAEA (and the

United States) to better understand particular instances of trafficking, allowing them to reach back to the contributing Member for follow up information,

and to better determine the seriousness of a particular event, as well as the

need for follow-up or assistance.

• The IAEA, with the help of Member States, and segments of the international

law enforcement community, developed a preliminary set of functional requirements for equipment to be used in radiation monitoring at borders. Evaluations of equipment by the IAEA will assist States and international organizations in their selection of border monitoring equipment.

These are two examples of initiatives undertaken by the Agency in which the National Nuclear Security Administration has had a role.

In addition, NNSA sponsors the International Technical Working Group (ITWG),

which is broadly organized under the G–8. The ITWG’s primary and current goal

is to develop a preferred approach to conducting nuclear forensic investigations. The

ITWG is a highly informal group striving to achieve scientific and investigatory consensus to assess the value of various experimental techniques for answering ‘‘attribution’’ (where was the suspect material manufactured) questions.

The ITWG has provided progress reports to the IAEA on the nature and extent

of its work over the last several years, but is not guided by the IAEA in the conduct

of its work. The IAEA has expressed interest in the ITWG and its efforts, and would

ultimately like to set up a regional system of capabilities to analyze seized nuclear

materials. Such a postulated regional system requires careful review and analysis.

Additionally, NNSA sponsors internally based nuclear forensic efforts carried out

by our National Laboratories. These efforts take the form of an established and tested multi-laboratory effort to analyze nuclear material, following strict forensic

guidelines to establish it’s isotopic composition and it’s origin. Let me take a moment, with my remaining time, to outline some areas where NNSA could contribute

to further improving the IAEA’s role in intercepting and responding to illicit trafficking events.

Developing international standards for border monitoring. The National Nuclear

Security Administration plans to enhance its work with the IAEA later this Fall in

better defining what standards should be recommended and followed at border

points world-wide. This will better ensure the effectiveness of Member States in detecting and responding to trafficking events by using proven standards and equipment.

Assistance with Training Materials. As you have already heard, the IAEA makes

a valuable contribution in the area of training in a host of subject areas. This is

particularly helpful for States where such training is otherwise unavailable from national resources. The National Nuclear Security Administration plans to develop,

with the IAEA’s help, a Nuclear and Radioactive Material Container Reference Manual. Such a manual, with contributions from leading manufacturers and appropriate

Member States, will assist customs personnel on-the-ground with a useful guide, so

more informed decisions can be made by enforcement personnel when a suspicious

or puzzling package or container requires characterization.

Other more broadly based ideas, such as examining whether more effective and

consistent worldwide controls on commercially-used radioactive sources are needed,

could also be addressed. The problems associated with the abandonment of hazardous radioactive materials-sometimes called ‘‘orphaned sources’’, is a very difficult

one. Different States employ different rules and regulations regarding the licensing

and use of such materials. Different penalties are enforced for their misuse. Environmental characterization and restoration in some regions may prove extremely

costly and resource intensive. As a practical matter, however, the IAEA inspects nuclear material in States that are parties to the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) with

the explicit objective of providing ‘‘timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and

25

deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.’’ The IAEA does not have

a legal charter or statutory responsibility to track ‘‘other radioactive material,’’

which consists of fission products and radioactive isotopes which cannot be used to

manufacture nuclear explosives.

However, the problem ought to be better-defined; the IAEA could serve as a forum

to focus attention on the problem worldwide, and seek consensus on practical responses.

III. PROTECTION OF FACILITIES AGAINST TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE

Until publication of Revision 4 of INFCIRC/225, IAEA physical protection guidance and activity focused largely on protecting uranium and plutonium against theft

and possible use in a nuclear device. While sabotage was mentioned in INFCIRC/

225 prior to Revision 4, its discussion and guidance was limited. As a result of terrorist events in the late 1990’s, the IAEA and international physical protection experts recognized that greater emphasis should be given to preventing sabotage of

nuclear materials and facilities. This increased emphasis is reflected in Revision 4

of INFCIRC/225.

That document makes clear that the level of physical protection of nuclear material and facilities is logically a function of the consequences of the theft or sabotage

of the material or facilities, as well as of the assessment of the threat. The consequences of theft of nuclear material and subsequent fabrication of a nuclear device

have long been acknowledged. Although nuclear power plants typically incorporate

safety procedures and personnel trained to minimize the effect of a large, catastrophic incident, more work on improving physical protection needs to be done. The

consequences of sabotage at a nuclear power plant have been particularly appreciated since the Chornobyl meltdown that resulted from safety failures.

On a bilateral basis, the National Nuclear Security Administration has begun

working to improve the physical security of nuclear power plants in Ukraine and

Armenia. We are focusing these cooperative activities on addressing the threat of

sabotage through unauthorized access to the plant. Our national laboratory experts

have implemented improved access control systems, detection and alarm systems,

interior physical barriers, and security procedures and training programs in both

Ukraine and Armenia. As I stated earlier, most of our work in the successor states

to the Soviet Union is focused on physical protection upgrades to sites in Ukraine,

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The IAEA can play—and has already committed to do

so—an important role in developing additional guidance for protection of nuclear

power plants against sabotage. The National Nuclear Security Administration has

already begun working with the IAEA in this vital endeavor.

CONCLUSION

In his address to the IAEA General Conference last month, only a few days after

the terrorist attacks of September 11, Secretary of Energy Abraham reiterated the

Agency’s critical role in the ‘‘global effort . . . to ensure that nuclear materials are

never used as weapons of terror.’’ In a world increasingly threatened as well by illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the real possibility of terrorist attacks on

nuclear facilities, it behooves us to do what we can, within the constraints of the

resources available to us, to enable the IAEA to fulfill this role.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Travers.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM TRAVERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

FOR OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Mr. TRAVERS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I certainly appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss with the Committee the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s programs related to

safeguards and security for NRC-licensed commercial nuclear facilities and perhaps, more importantly, to discuss the actions that

NRC and its licensees have taken in response to the terrorist acts

that occurred on September 11. I will also briefly note the NRC’s

ongoing activities with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Let me begin by explaining response to the September 11 attacks. Within 30 minutes of the plane strikes, we activated and

staffed our incident response centers in our headquarters and reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
26

gional offices and began close coordination with the FBI and other

intelligence and law enforcement agencies, our licensees, and various military, State and local authorities. Immediately after the attacks, we advised nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle facilities to go to the highest level of physical security—we call that

Level 3—which they promptly did.

As of today our agency and our licensees are still in a heightened

state of security and readiness. We continue to monitor the situation closely and are prepared to make adjustments to the security

measures as appropriate.

Let me point out that, to date, the NRC has not received information from the FBI or any other law enforcement or intelligence

agency that a general or specific credible threat has been made

against any NRC-licensed facility nor against any of NRC’s facilities.

The NRC’s prime focus and responsibility, as you know, is to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained and to promote the common defense and security of the Nation and commercial possession and use of Atomic Energy Act materials. We take this responsibility very seriously and over the

years have established and refined requirements and programs intended to protect NRC-licensed facilities and nuclear materials

against both radiological sabotage and the theft or diversion of special nuclear material.

NRC activities related to domestic safeguards and security and

emergency response can be grouped into four basic categories:

Developing and implementing requirements for safeguarding certain types of nuclear facilities and material and inspecting for compliance with those requirements;

Assessing the threat environment;

Maintaining and coordinating emergency response capabilities;

and

Providing physical security for NRC employees and facilities.

Beginning in the late 1970s, the NRC established requirements

for safeguards for civilian nuclear power plants and fuel facilities

that possess special nuclear material. The regulations apply a graded approach, that is, greater controls and protection are applied to

nuclear materials and facilities that likely have greater appeal to

an adversary. As such, nuclear power plants must implement security programs that include varying degrees of site controls, intruder

detection systems, central alarm stations, physical barriers, armed

guard forces, and detailed response strategies. The result is that

nuclear power plants are among the most hardened structures in

this country.

The NRC inspects these facilities to verify compliance with NRC

requirements and to assess licensee safety performance and to enforce our regulations.

One such NRC requirement, for example, is that commercial

power reactors have the capacity to defend against a Design Basis

Threat, or DBT. This DBT, in general, assumes that adversaries

will consist of several well-trained and dedicated individuals with

knowledge of the facility that are armed with weapons up to and

including automatic weapons and special equipment, such as incaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
27

pacitating agents and explosives. Licensees must establish and implement a security plan to respond to this assumed threat.

NRC oversight of licensee efforts in this area include routine and

event-based on-site inspections and force-on-force exercises. Any deficiencies found in an exercise are promptly corrected and the corrections are verified by NRC inspectors.

In addition to the capacity to defend against a DBT, licensee security programs include provisions for requesting assistance from

off-site authorities for threats that exceed the DBT.

In the area of threat assessment, the NRC continuously monitors

and assesses in coordination with Federal intelligence organizations the overall threat environment in the United States and

abroad in support of domestic regulatory programs. This threat assessment program seeks to ensure the continued adequacy of the

DBT assumption specified in our regulations. We also maintain a

more real-time threat assessment capability, again through ongoing

liaison with national intelligence and law enforcement communities.

Additionally, the NRC’s Emergency Response Program includes

the capability to respond to a radiological sabotage incident. This

would be accomplished within the U.S. interagency crisis and consequence management framework. Most of these activities are conducted under the Federal radiological emergency response plan in

coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy and other

Federal participants.

NRC’s program is designed to assess licensee responses to

planned specific events and to support local, State, and Federal authorities in the case of an emergency declaration.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the

continuing uncertainty about future terrorist intentions, the NRC

is undertaking a thorough review of its safeguards and physical security program. The nature of the attacks requires that the NRC’s

review include a comprehensive examination of the basic assumptions underlying the current safeguards and physical security programs.

Additionally, in light of the sophistication of the September 11

attacks, this review must involve other U.S. national security organizations. We currently are interacting with the FBI and other

Federal law enforcement and intelligence organizations and the

military, so that changes to our programs consider pertinent information from all relevant Federal organizations.

Having provided a brief description of NRC’s current activities

here at home, I would very briefly like to address our international

interests.

NRC cooperates with the regulatory and safety agencies of some

30 countries to exchange safety and safeguards information, carry

out training activities, and conduct studies on subjects of mutual

interest. We also support U.S. Government participation in programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other international organizations as well. Of primary interest today is the role

of the IAEA in strengthening programs to protect nuclear material

and facilities from terrorist threats.

28

I would like to say that NRC stands ready to work with the Department of State and the Department of Energy and representatives of other agencies to develop a U.S. position on enhancing and

using IAEA capabilities in this area.

In closing, I would like to reiterate that the NRC takes very seriously its obligation to ensure adequate protection of the Nation’s civilian nuclear facilities against acts of domestic sabotage, theft or

diversion.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to join you today. Thank you

very much, Madam Chair.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Travers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM TRAVERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Madam Chairman, members of the Committee, I am here before you today to discuss the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) programs related to safeguards

and security for NRC-licensed commercial nuclear facilities and, more importantly,

to discuss the actions that NRC and its licensees have taken in response to the terrorist acts that occurred on September 11th. I will also briefly note the NRC’s ongoing activities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Let me begin by explaining the NRC’s actions in response to the September 11

attacks. Within 30 minutes of the plane strikes, we activated and staffed our incident response centers in our Headquarters and Regional offices and began close coordination with the FBI and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, our

licensees, and various military, state and local authorities. Immediately after the attacks, we advised nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel facilities to go to the highest level of physical security (Level 3), which they promptly did. In addition, nonessential NRC personnel were excused and increased security measures were implemented at NRC facilities. We also advised them to continue to maintain this increased security posture.

As of today our agency and our licensees are still in a heightened state of security

and readiness. We continue to monitor the situation closely, and are prepared to

make adjustments to security measures as appropriate. Let me point out that to

date, the NRC has not received information from the FBI or any other law enforcement or intelligence agency that a general or specific credible threat has been made

against any NRC-licensed facility nor against any of NRC’s facilities.

The NRC’s prime focus and responsibility is to ensure that adequate protection

of public health and safety is maintained and to promote the common defense and

security of the nation in the commercial possession and use of Atomic Energy Act

materials. We take this responsibility very seriously, and over the years have established and refined requirements and programs intended to protect NRC-licensed facilities and nuclear materials against both radiological sabotage and the theft or diversion of special nuclear material. (Special nuclear material includes plutonium,

uranium-233, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235.)

NRC activities related to domestic safeguards and security and emergency response can be grouped into four categories:

• Developing and implementing requirements for safeguarding certain types of

nuclear facilities and material and inspecting for compliance with those requirements;

• Assessing the threat environment and the international environment insofar

as it has implications for domestic threats;

• Maintaining and coordinating emergency response capabilities; and

• Providing physical security for NRC employees and facilities.

Beginning in the late 1970s, the NRC established requirements to safeguard civilian nuclear power plants and fuel facilities that possess special nuclear material.

The regulations apply a graded approach—that is, greater controls and protection

are applied to nuclear materials and facilities that likely have greater appeal to an

adversary. As such, nuclear power plants must implement security programs that

include varying degrees of site access controls, intruder detection systems, central

alarm stations, physical barriers, armed guard forces, and detailed response strategies. The result is that nuclear power plants are among the most hardened strucVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
29

tures in this country. The NRC inspects these facilities to verify compliance with

NRC requirements, to assess licensee safety performance, and to enforce our regulations in a manner that ensures adequate protection of the health and safety of the

public.

One such NRC requirement, for example, is that commercial power reactors have

the capacity to defend against a Design Basis Threat or DBT. This DBT, in general,

assumes that the adversaries will consist of several well-trained and dedicated individuals with knowledge of the facility and are armed with weapons up to and including automatic weapons and specialized equipment, such as incapacitating

agents and explosives. Licensees must establish and implement a security plan to

respond to this assumed threat. NRC oversight of licensee efforts in this area include routine and event-based on-site inspections, performance indicator reviews,

and force-on-force exercises. Any deficiencies found in an exercise are promptly corrected and the corrections are verified by NRC inspectors. In addition to the capacity to defend against a DBT, licensee security programs include provisions for requesting assistance from offsite authorities for threats that exceed the DBT.

In the area of threat assessment, the NRC continuously monitors and assesses— in coordination with other Federal intelligence organizations—the overall threat environment in the United States and abroad in support of the domestic regulatory

program. This threat assessment program seeks to ensure the continued adequacy

of the DBT assumptions specified in NRC regulations. We also maintain a more

‘‘real-time’’ threat assessment capability, again through ongoing liaison with the national intelligence and law enforcement communities, to evaluate any reported or actual threat to a licensee and to provide timely threat advisory and assessment information to our licensees. Further, all reported security-related events of more than

minor significance are promptly analyzed by an internal team of subject matter experts to help guide immediate NRC follow-up actions.

Additionally, the NRC’s emergency response program includes the capability to respond to a radiological sabotage incident. This would be accomplished within the

U.S. government interagency crisis and consequence management framework. Most

of these activities are conducted under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy, and other Federal participants.

NRC’s program is designed to assess licensee responses to plant-specific events and

to support local, State, and Federal authorities in the case of an emergency declaration.

Finally, we protect NRC personnel and contract staff and facilities through a comprehensive physical and personnel security program. This program includes the continual assessment and adjustment of physical security measures in response to Federal government-wide advisories.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing uncertainty about future terrorist intentions, the NRC is undertaking a

thorough review of its safeguards and physical security program, even though we

believe our nuclear power plants and certain fuel cycle facilities are among the

hardest and best protected industrial sites in America. The nature of the attacks

requires that the NRC’s review include a comprehensive examination of the basic

assumptions underlying the current safeguards and physical security program. Additionally, in light of the sophistication of the September 11th attacks, this review

must involve other U.S. national security organizations. We currently are interacting with the FBI, other federal law enforcement and intelligence organizations,

and the military so that changes to our programs consider pertinent information

from all relevant federal agencies.

Having provided a brief description of the NRC’s current activities here at home,

I would now like to address our international interests. NRC cooperates with the

regulatory and safety agencies of some thirty countries to exchange safety and safeguards information, carry out training activities, and conduct studies on subjects of

mutual interest. We also support U.S. Government participation in programs of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international organizations.

Of primary interest today is the role of the IAEA in strengthening programs to

protect nuclear material and facilities from terrorist threats. I understand that

IAEA is currently focusing its attention in four areas: (1) measures to protect

against the diversion of nuclear material suitable for use in nuclear weapons; (2)

protection of nuclear facilities from terrorist attack; (3) protection of radiation

sources from terrorist use; and (4) emergency preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack.

NRC stands ready to work with the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and representatives of other U.S. agencies to develop a U.S. position on enhancing and using IAEA’s capabilities in these areas.

30

In closing, I would like to reiterate that NRC takes very seriously its obligation

to ensure adequate protection of the nation’s civilian nuclear facilities against domestic acts of sabotage, theft, or diversion. I appreciate the opportunity to join you

today to discuss our agency’s programs.

Thank you Madam Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions that

you and members of the Committee may have.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We have a briefing at 4 p.m., so we will probably keep our questions brief. If they don’t show because there is

a special New Jersey-New York delegation meeting with the Mayor

and the Governor’s staff, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Engel, and

Mr. Smith and others would like to submit their questions to the

witnesses in writing and the Subcommittee will compile and forward them to the appropriate agencies.

And with that comes Mr. Gilman. We are going to begin our

round of questions, so I will ask a few. But if you have an opening

statement, it would be great if we could recognize you. I don’t know

if you are out of breath by running over here.

Mr. Gilman, for his statement.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank you

for conducting this hearing. It is an important and timely hearing

on the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and safeguarding against acts of terrorism.

Initially, right after September 11, we had all kinds of calls in

my constituency—incidentally, where we lost some 98 members of

families in our area. The calls suddenly switched this week to security for Indian Point 2, the nuclear plant in our area, and what are

we doing about it. And our newspaper, regrettably, the local newspaper on the front page put a great map of just where it is located

and just where the Coast Guard is situated. They do a lot of that.

They even put the maps of all our reservoirs to make it easier for

anyone who wants to find them.

I want to welcome our panel today, Richard Stratford, Assistant

Secretary; Michael Southwick, Deputy Assistant Secretary; Steven

Black, our Assistant Deputy Administrator in the Office of Arms

Control; and Mr. William Travers, Executive Director for Operations.

As Dean of our New York congressional delegation and with my

congressional district located just north of New York City along the

shores of the Hudson River, I personally witnessed the devastation,

the barbaric September 11 attacks both on Ground Zero and the

Pentagon, and on our families who have lost loved ones.

I had the opportunity to go to Ground Zero with our President

and with our good Chairperson, and it left indelible memories. And

since that tragic day, our Nation, in cooperation with our international allies, has begun a war against terrorists and those states

that harbor and support them. We are reviewing our criminal justice policies. We are increasing transportation safety measures,

freezing financial irradiators, and rethinking the steps our Nation

is going to have to take to defend against any such future acts of

terrorism, including biological, chemical, and possible nuclear—

hopefully not.

Also located on the Hudson River just across from my congressional district in Buchanan, New York, is the Indian Point nuclear

power plant. These two plants are just 35 miles north of New York

City in the heart of our Hudson Valley region, and 20 million peoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
31

ple are at risk from the results of any attack on Indian Point more

than at any other nuclear site in the entire Nation.

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, my office

has been inundated with calls from our citizenry, public organizations, local leaders, concern about the future safety and security of

these plants.

Presently, both the private operator, local law enforcement and

the U.S. Coast Guard have taken steps to increase security at that

plant. However, there are outstanding questions about the Federal

Government’s role in ensuring adequate security at these facilities,

structural integrity of these plants and what steps have to be taken

to protect Indian Point against any terrorism, including a targeted

attack against using a domestic airliner like those of September 11.

Earlier this week, in my letter to NRC Chairman Meserve, I requested a report on NRC’s response at Indian Point to the September 11 attacks and what steps are in place, what measures

would be put in place to protect that plant from any future threat.

While I have not received a response from NRC, I look forward to

Chairman Meserve’s response and Mr. Travers’ remarks on that

issue.

So, again, I want to thank you, Madam Chairman, for arranging

this hearing. I want to welcome our panelists. And we look forward

to your recommendations.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Gilman. We appreciate it.

I would like to recognize my colleague, Cynthia McKinney, for

her questions.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to go back to—Mr. Stratford mentioned cobalt, which

I probably acted a bit surprised about, but in what condition does

the cobalt have to be in order to become an instrument like the

way you described?

Mr. STRATFORD. Well, in terms of the technical aspects of all this,

you are talking to the wrong person, but there have been a number

of accidents around the world with radioactive sources which were

used in x rays, in irradiators, and things like that.

When we talk about cobalt, understand we are talking about

some of the most powerful of irradiators, the kinds of things that

are behind big shields in a room, and you put all the food and other

things like that that you want to irradiate, and then you do that.

There have been accidents around the world where sources were

disposed of in a dump, for example; and there was one incident in

Brazil, as I recall, where somebody brought one of these things

home and cracked it open and the family was just delighted to see

all this glowing powder, which is what it was, and spread it

around; and all of a sudden, you have very, very sick people in an

area that has to be decontaminated. And those kinds of incidents

have occurred at least half a dozen times around the world.

Now, the question is, are there lost sources out there of sufficient

radiation that you could do something bad with it? And the answer

is—according to the IAEA, there are about a thousand unaccounted

for.

So the question is, what do you do about that? Well, you can certainly do what the IAEA is doing and go into countries and help

32

them build a regulatory structure, one like ours where sources,

when they are manufactured, are labeled, tagged, logged out and

logged back in again and there is a system for disposing of them.

You can try to do that with countries, but after you have done that

and everything is perfect, you still have a thousand missing

sources.

Ms. MCKINNEY. What about in the mining process? Is that an

area where leakage could occur, and then you have something like

that as well?

Mr. STRATFORD. Mining, I don’t think mining could be a problem.

You certainly do wind up in mining with what are called radioactive—the tails; is that the right word—radioactive tails. But you

are talking about tons and tons of material with very low radioactivity. Mining is not a problem.

The problem is when you have nuclear material which is either

of a kind that you can use in a weapon or it is nuclear material

that is itself highly radioactive, like some of the radioisotopes, or

it is nuclear material that has been irradiated so it is highly radioactive, like the spent fuel from a nuclear power plant, for example.

Those are three different types of material which are dangerous for

two different reasons, one because of the bomb and the other because of radioactivity. So you have to protect all of it.

The stuff you could use in the bomb you protect with not just

physical security but you protect with safeguards. You want to

know where it is at all times.

The material that is highly radioactive, you can’t necessarily

know where every bit of it is at all times, because you use it in a

lot of different places, like every oil well in the Gulf of Mexico, for

example. We have a system that tracks these things.

Now the question is, where are the lost ones? Well, you wouldn’t

know or they wouldn’t be lost. You have to go looking for them. So

the question is, what more should the Agency do not just to build

regulatory structures around the world, but to go looking for

sources?

Now, what does it mean to go looking for sources? Well, we have

a capability in this country, for example, if you want to go looking

for radioactive material, you have people who are trained to do that

and equipment that they could find lost radioactive material fairly

easily. That capability doesn’t necessarily exist in a small country

in Central Asia or Eastern Europe, where there may have been radioactive sources left behind when the Russian military withdrew

from that particular country.

That is one of the issues because, as I said, when we stop to

think about what we should be looking at, well, you could look for

highly enriched uranium and plutonium, but usually that is very

well guarded and accounted for and very hard to get to.

I won’t say impossible. If September 11 taught us anything, it is

that the impossible is all too possible. But generally speaking, that

stuff is very well protected.

If I were a terrorist, I would go looking for something that isn’t

surrounded by armed guards, but I could use it for a very messy

purpose and that is what it would be, messy. The people who would

get killed are the people standing next to the dynamite stick. Other

people don’t die from that kind of radiation being spread around,

33

but it is difficult to clean up, not impossible, but after it has been

cleaned up would you eat a turnip grown from a garden that had

been contaminated? I don’t think so.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you.

Madam Chair, I have one more question, and I think two would

be for Mr. Travers—or Dr. Travers.

We just recently voted on an airline bailout bill, and shortly before the vote, news reports emerged that the airline industry had

lobbied and spent millions of dollars to encourage the Congress, as

well as other places, not to institute enhanced security. They didn’t

lobby me, and I rarely do get lobbied for stuff like that. But anyway millions of dollars were spent to prevent security—enhancing

security.

Now, is the nuclear power utility industry lobbying right now, or

have they lobbied, or what is their posture with respect to security

and the need for us to increase our security at this point and not

stand down on our security?

Mr. TRAVERS. Well, I can certainly characterize the current situation, especially in light of what has occurred on September 11; and

that, simply put, is that we advised all of our nuclear power plant

licensees to begin to establish the highest level—we currently call

that Level 3—of security posture. And we advised—and I will make

clear what that means. If they don’t, we have a regulatory tool

called an order which we can implement and direct certain actions

be taken if we think they are inherent to maintaining public health

and safety.

All of the nuclear power facilities that we regulate have implemented Level 3 requirements. I can give you a sense of what those

are, and actually some of that is appropriate to Representative Gilman’s question. They include additional guards, additional controls

on access, additional—in some cases, additional weaponry and

things of that sort. As of today, all of our nuclear power plant licensees maintain that level of security.

Now, in the longer term, in the more recent months, we have

maintained in virtually all of our regulatory programs a dialogue

with all of our stakeholders. Those include the people that operate

the plants, and we have been engaged in a number of elements

with the industry related to how we conduct force-on-force exercises. And right now the licensees that we regulate have proposed

a different sort of scheme than we currently have in place for conducting that sort of inspection activity to ensure that they have in

place the appropriate strategies that would deal with an attack by

terrorists.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Would that proposal include something less rigorous than what you have proposed?

Mr. TRAVERS. It could be, and if it is——

Ms. MCKINNEY. So it is?

Mr. TRAVERS. We haven’t yet implemented it, but we are in the

stage of piloting a new technique for assessing that capability.

Ms. MCKINNEY. I think my question is, was their counter proposal something less rigorous than what your proposal is?

Mr. TRAVERS. We don’t know yet, because what we intend to do

is pilot; and if turns out it is not as effective in ensuring the protecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:42 Jan 28, 2002 Jkt 075561 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\IOHR\100301\75561 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
34

tive strategy at the nuclear power facilities, it is not going to be

adopted by the Commission.

Ms. MCKINNEY. So you are going to pilot what they

counterproposed?

Mr. TRAVERS. I wouldn’t call it a ‘‘counterproposal.’’ I don’t want

to mince words.

They have suggested a program that is not very different from

what is in force now in terms of emergency preparedness exercises,

off-site included, and other programs where licensee self-assessment, rather than periodic NRC inspection, takes over at a more

frequent interval, frankly, and provides—at least in some instances—the possibility of a more effective program to demonstrate

their compliance with our requirements.

We are not prejudging that that is the case in this instance. In

fact, while we carry out this pilot, we are going to continue to implement our existing program at nuclear power facilities as well. So

they are going to be carried out in tandem.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. McKinney.

And, Mr. Gilman, I know Dr. Travers had begun to address the

concerns you had about your installation, but I don’t know if you

got a sufficient——

Mr. GILMAN. I would welcome it. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Dr. Travers, would our Indian Point plant on the Hudson, which

is located in the flight path of airlines from Westchester County

Airport, or any nuclear power plant in the United States be able

to withstand a direct, targeted strike from a domestic airliner such

as attacked the World Trade Center?

Mr. TRAVERS. Nuclear power plants clearly were not designed—

and Representative McKinney indicated that in her opening statement—for impact by a large commercial airliner; and I guess a corollary to that is, we have not conducted detailed engineering analyses that would need to be done, and frankly will be done, to establish what the vulnerabilities of that sort of impact would be.

But having said that, I would indicate that these plants are rather hardened. They have a number of inherent capabilities that we

believe would lend a very significant release of radioactivity rather

unlikely. They include a reactive building, or the containment that

surrounds the reactor itself, multiple and redundant systems that

are inherent in the design of all nuclear power plants; training of

operators and staff that are intended to include coping with unexpected instances where skill and innovation may be called into

play; and lastly, the implementation of the emergency preparedness plans that are in place surrounding—in the surrounding community for all nuclear power plants.

So I am not here to say with any precision that we know today

what the effects of a large commercial airliner impacting Indian

Point would be, but we intend to carry out analyses of that sort,

and we will certainly be looking at those issues.

As Mr. Stratford indicated, everything has changed, and the

Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, supported by the

Commissioner, has tasked me and the NRC staff with a total topto-bottom reevaluation of our security requirements and processes;

and I think it is very appropriate in light of what has occurred.

35

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Doctor.

A number of groups in my area have petitioned that the government use the armed forces to defend our nuclear power plants.

What are your thoughts about that proposal?

Mr. TRAVERS. Well, as a matter of practice today, licensees, the

people who operate the plant, are required to protect against a Design Basis Threat which is defined and is classified. Beyond that,

the use of off-site governmental organizations is assumed in the

event of an attack that overcomes the level of the Design Basis

Threat; and as a matter of fact, much of the coordination and interaction that the NRC has had with Federal counterparts has included discussions on that topic, which I obviously won’t get into

in detail, but they include coordination on the threat environment

and the discussion of what steps might be taken if needed.

Mr. GILMAN. Are you satisfied, Dr. Travers, with the security arrangements being made at the Buchanan plant?

Mr. TRAVERS. Yes, I am.

Mr. GILMAN. What steps are the NRC or any other Federal agencies taking to defend our nuclear plants from any terrorist attack

across the Nation, as well as in our own area?

Mr. TRAVERS. Well, at all of the nuclear power plants and in several of the fuel facilities, as I mentioned, the posture is one of a

very high level of alert with enhanced capabilities over and above

the normal.

In the normal sense, nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle

facilities, at least Category 1 fuel cycle facilities, are required to include features that involve, for example, armed civilian guard force,

physical barriers, detection systems, access controls, worker background checks before workers are allowed on site, detailed response

strategies in the event that an attack is launched, and

preestablished links to off-site authorities who could be called upon

to assist. So at Buchanan, at Indian Point, and at all of the nuclear

power facilities across the country, these elements in place not only

have been enhanced to an appropriate degree, we think; and we

have, as I mentioned before, kept in a coordination role with other

organizations and—military included, who could be called upon if

needed.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. McKinney, go ahead.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Would you yield for just a minute?

Mr. GILMAN. Please.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you.

I am wondering with respect to your answer, then does that

mean you would live close to one of these places?

Mr. TRAVERS. I have. For about 4 years, I lived not too far away

from Three Mile Island.

Ms. MCKINNEY. That is used to be. Now, does that mean today

you would live near one of these places?

Mr. TRAVERS. I believe, and I think it is my responsibility and

the Agency’s responsibility that we take the appropriate measures

and that our licensees take appropriate measures to protect public

health and safety. That is my job. I take it very seriously. I know

the Commission does, and I am comfortable that we have in

place—perhaps not perfect, but we have in place a strategy that we

believe is effective, and would be.

36

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. One last question, Madam Chairman. Mr. Travers,

and to all of the other panelists, in light of recent events, how do

you assess the level of cooperation between the NRC and other government agencies involved in the emergency process?

Mr. TRAVERS. I think it has been very good. We have had a very

good coordination not just with the FBI, but the Department of Energy, other intelligence organizations. We have preestablished,

really, in the event of something of this sort—we never quite expected this, but we certainly have preestablished links which include NRC representation at the Strategic Information Operations

Center that the FBI is coordinating in Washington here.

So, it continues. It began within minutes, really, on September

11th, and it has continued. At NRC it has continued 24/7 since that

time.

Mr. GILMAN. Colonel Black, any comment?

Mr. BLACK. I would echo what my colleague has said. I think the

coordination that has gone on between law enforcement agencies,

State Department, NRC, Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, and, of course, the National Nuclear Security Administration has been very good. And I might add, I did not think it was

particularly bad prior to September 11th, but certainly the events

of September 11th have ramified the importance of the situation.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Southwick?

Mr. SOUTHWICK. We have engaged in a number of task forces active around the clock since September 11th in all kinds of ways to

strengthen our links domestically and internationally.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Stratford?

Mr. STRATFORD. I think I would echo that. The point I would

make is that we have had a long and a very amicable relationship

with the NRC for a long time. I might add, I was at the NRC back

in the 1970s, for 3 years, in the seventies era.

Our role is a bit more limited. Where we come into play is if

something happens in the U.S., we have an operations center that

is responsible for telling people overseas what is going on, getting

it from NRC. And if it is something that happens in this country

that might affect Canada or Mexico, we have a role in dealing directly with officials in those countries. Other than that, our role is

somewhat limited with respect to this type of emergency situation.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And following up on Ms. McKinney’s and Mr. Gilman’s questions, what about the level of international cooperation within and outside of the Agency? You had

talked more on the domestic side, and right now you had referred

to the international corporation. How has that improved in light of

the September 11th attack?

Mr. STRATFORD. I would have to say there has been a great deal

of interaction between officials in the U.S. Government and their

counterparts overseas. I would have to say 99 percent of it I am

not privy to, but if you read the newspapers you will see what extraordinary cooperation is going on between law enforcement officials, between intelligence officials, and between officials in the

various countries that are responsible for emergency situations.

37

I have to say the level looks to be extremely high, although I am

not an expert in that area. Now, the thing that I am close to is

what is happening in the context of the IAEA, and I just came from

2 weeks over there in mid-September for the Board of Governors

and the General Conference, and it was exceptionally clear to me

that people there were looking for enhanced activity on the part of

the Agency to deal with what might turn out to be nuclear terrorism.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And following up on Mr. Gilman’s question about his problem of his facility close by in his district, we have Turkey Point in south Florida, as you know. Can

Turkey Point in south Florida sustain such an impact and contain

the possible radioactive fallout?

And what security measures were in place at facilities like Turkey Point prior to September 11th and how have any of those

changed, whether it is the physical construction of the containment

buildings, the physical barriers, the security?

And did any of the crisis scenarios that you had undergone, the

mock drills conducted to assess the safety of nuclear plants, ever

take into consideration the type of terrorist attack that we experienced? And I know that we have been alluding to that in all of your

statements.

Mr. TRAVERS. I would say, once again in answer to your question,

that nuclear power plants clearly are not designed to sustain a direct hit from a large commercial airliner.

The mock drills that are conducted to demonstrate the adequacy

of protective strategies that would be used in the event of a terrorist attack, and perhaps also the emergency preparedness exercises that are conducted in coordination with offsite authorities, we

believe would help, or could help. Perhaps not directly—the first

part—perhaps not directly from a commercial airliner hit, but any

other terrorist incident we believe would be—or the strategies that

are employed would be greatly assisted by the work that has been

done previously to test the strategies.

And the ultimate emergency preparedness work and preparations that are done in the surrounding communities we would believe would also be effective in helping to mitigate any release

should it occur.

Once again, I would have to say that while we haven’t done the

detailed analyses that would be needed to make a precise or relatively precise assessment of what impacts could be at Turkey

Point or at Indian Point, these facilities are remarkably—for commercial facilities in this country—hardened in terms of their construct, because of the nature of the reactor and the materials that

are contained within it.

So, they have inherent to them features such as the ability to

withstand earthquakes and hurricanes and tornadoes. All of these

hardening elements of the design, we believe, would help. I don’t

know how much, but we believe they would help in any impact of

an airplane.

Additionally, the sorts of redundancies that are built in in terms

of the emergency water cooling systems, the training of operators

and so forth, we believe would act to help in any mitigation strategy that would have to be brought to bear.

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Alexander Lebed, who served

briefly under Russian President Yeltsin, remains convinced that

the Cold War era will bring backpack nukes, and that they have

not been properly secured and could easily find their way to the

black market and into terrorists’ hands.

Has the Agency been involved in an effort to secure an accurate

inventory of these, and what steps has the Agency and the U.S. bilaterally with the Russian Federation undertaken in this regard?

And are Russia and the former Soviet states the only sources of

these backpack nukes?

One thing that has been discussed about radioactive material is

cost. What are the methods of accounting and inventory of radioactive materials to prevent against trafficking as well?

Mr. BLACK. Madam Chairwoman, there has been quite a bit of

reporting in the 1990s about these backpack nukes or ‘‘suitcase’’

nukes. And while I wasn’t at the NNSA at the time, I can only

imagine that there was quite a bit of attention devoted to it in then

the Department of Energy. I would like to actually take the question back with me and give you a more complete answer in a written form later, if I could. Particularly on the backpack nuke issue.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, that would be great, thank you.

Mr. BLACK. And I will include as well in that description how we

go about trying to inventory special nuclear materials in Russia,

because it is a very large effort on the part of NNSA and it is quite

active.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We look forward to getting that

response.

I wanted to know what the involvement of the International

Atomic Energy Agency is in the Juragua plant in Cuba. Even if

Cuba were able to secure funding—which is very doubtful—for the

completion of the first reactor, would the Agency allow such a completion, given the dangerous structural flaws and the related problems with the plant? Does it contain nuclear material which could

be smuggled and used by terrorists for offensive purposes?

Mr. STRATFORD. Actually, I think I will take that one, particularly since I was the person—well, I don’t know, 5 or 6 years ago— who testified before HIRC at a hearing that was specifically aimed

at reactors at Cienfuegos. The good news is that for I think since

1992, construction had essentially stopped and the reactors were

not even mothballed. Translated, that means they were not even

being looked after as they should if you planned on finishing them.

The other good news is that at the end of last year, both the

Cuban Government and the Russian Government threw in the

towel publicly and said, all right, that is it. We are not going to

finish the reactors. There is no plan to do so. The money is not

there, et cetera.

And if they did want to finish them, I have to say that would be

a serious mistake, because the pictures I have seen of Cienfuegos

are not pretty. We are talking about vines growing on reactors and

metal that is rusted, et cetera.

The bottom line is I don’t believe we are ever going to see those

reactors completed at Cienfuegos. That is number one. Number

two, there is no nuclear material there that I know of, so that is

not an issue.

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There is IAEA cooperation with Cuba in the technical assistance

area, and in fact I have a list of all the IAEA projects in front of

me, and basically what we are talking about is we are talking

about alarm systems for toxic chemical spills, industrial components, cancer therapy, radio synthesis for hematology—I can’t pronounce this—medical issues, strengthening nuclear instrumental

services, et cetera.

We are looking at an Agency interaction with the Cubans, which

is basically zero in terms of proliferation significance and goes to

the medical and agricultural and radiological uses of nuclear energy, which does not bother us one bit. Juragua would have bothered us a lot more than ‘‘one bit,’’ and that is what I said in my

testimony 6 years ago.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Upon discovery of Iraq’s illegal nuclear and

chemical weapons program, the International Atomic Energy Agency expanded its role to cover all nuclear-related activity in the

countries being inspected. Iraq has been mentioned as a possible

state sponsor of the terrorists’ attacks of September 11th.

What is the Agency’s current role in Iraq? What steps are being

taken to secure nuclear material in Iraq and illicit trafficking stemming through and from Iraq? How do safeguards and inspections

apply with regards to Iran and other terrorist or rogue states, and

does the Agency need to be invited into a country to gain access?

How does this limit its capacity to safeguard against diversion and

trafficking, given that rogue states tend to be less than forthcoming

and cooperative in this area? And what can we do in Congress to

help you improve this situation?

Mr. STRATFORD. I wish I had a Dictaphone so that I could have

gotten all of those at one time. Let me start with Iraq.

The IAEA is not doing the job inside Iraq now in terms of inspections that the U.N. wanted it to do. That is an across-the-board

problem with respect to activities that involve weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. When the agency will get back in is an open

question.

Now, that having been said, the Agency is not otherwise cooperating with Iraq, so we are not looking at a situation where the

agency is providing technical assistance to the Iraq nuclear program.

The Iranian situation is a bit different. We have for quite some

time had what I will euphemistically refer to as serious concerns

about the direction of Iran’s nuclear program. And we, frankly,

think that because we have those concerns that nobody should cooperate with Iran with respect to peaceful nuclear cooperation.

But the Russians do not buy that argument and the Russians are

building the Bushehr nuclear reactor, which we do not like and

have told them so. Not because we think Bushehr is a diversion

problem, but because, number one, when you think somebody is

cheating and lying and has weapons ambitions, you shouldn’t be

doing business with them in the peaceful nuclear area. That is one;

shouldn’t get Bushehr under those circumstances.

And number two, building Bushehr, in our judgment, provides a

cover for Iran to go out and procure other things ostensibly for

Bushehr, but for what we think are a weapons-related effort.

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Now, the Agency does have technical cooperation with Iran. That

technical cooperation is in almost all respects like Cuba; namely,

medical, agricultural, industrial, et cetera. There are two technical

assistance projects that the Agency has with Iran that are Bushehr

related, but they are not related to Bushehr construction. What

they are related to is helping Iran put together the kinds of regulatory infrastructure that would allow them to oversee the safe operation of Bushehr.

Now, under those circumstances, if Bushehr is going to go forward, I would like to see it go forward safely, and so that kind of

IAEA assistance does not bother me.

But that having been said, we still continue to tell the Russians

that we think Bushehr is fundamentally the wrong plant in the

wrong place.

Madam Chairman, I did not answer all of your questions. Would

you like to throw one or two more at me? I would be happy to try.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. That is no problem. Mr.

Gilman?

Mr. GILMAN. We are being called to a House floor briefing at 4

o’clock. Mr. Travers, when can we expect the results of your assessment of the terrorist threats, including a domestic airliner or any

other type of threat against a nuclear plant?

Mr. TRAVERS. There are quite a lot of elements to that. We are

in the midst of developing a response to the tasking that Chairman

Meserve and the Commission have given me. At first blush, I think

there are elements that will take some time that we are going to

include in our first go-around in getting back to the Commission.

Mr. GILMAN. How much time?

Mr. TRAVERS. I am afraid I do not have that answer for you.

Mr. GILMAN. Can you give an estimate?

Mr. TRAVERS. I think there are elements that could take months,

if not years, in some instances.

Mr. GILMAN. I hope not years. And I hope not too many months.

We are now confronted with this kind of a situation and we would

like to be able to address them. Please don’t allow it to linger too

long. I think it is timely now to get some information to us quickly.

Mr. TRAVERS. And I think, apropos to your question, is a mention

that in the near term, we have already begun an assessment of

what should be done now. And we are working on that, but there

are elements that will take some time.

Mr. GILMAN. Madam Chairman, thank you for conducting this

hearing.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. McKinney any follow-up statements or

remarks?

Ms. MCKINNEY. I will leave them for another time. Maybe you

will have this hearing again.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, we will. Any remaining questions left

unanswered will be submitted in writing, including my long list to

you Mr. Stratford.

Thank you, and this meeting is now adjourned. Thank you so

much for your patience, and all of the audience.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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