1 Administrative Reterence SerVice 


Report No.3 


U. 	 S. NAVAL PORT OFFICERS IN THE BORDEAUX REGION, 

1917-1919 

. Prepared by 

Dr. HenrY P. Beer. 

Under the Supervision of 

Dr. R. O. Albion, Recorder of Naval Administration 

Secretary's Office, Navy :Department 

Lt. Cmdr. E. J. Leahy, Director, Office of Records 

Administration, Administrative Orfice, 

Navy Department. 

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Navy Department library 

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Washington 25, D.C. 
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'0.. S. Naval Port Officers in the Bordeaux Region 

1917-1919 

For the use ot the American Expeditionary Force at 

the United states ArJ;y and American naval forces, it was 

necessarY' to acquire and dewlop extensive port facilities in France in 1917. Ports suitable for troop transports, cargo vessels, and naval patrol. and escort Te~sels 

bad to be found,so t.ba~ the United Sta~.s oould ge~ Us 

men and material to the front and make its might felt in 

the struggle against Germany. During the preceding years 

\ 	 of the war, the British had preempted the French Channel 

ports and the railroads leading troll them. to the front.­

linea also utilized tor military operations-so that it 

was necessary tor the United States to use the Bay of 

Biscay porta on the west coast ot France. Besides being 

more remote t ro:4 the front, a fact which increased -transportation difficulties, most of these porta were not of s~!ic:1.ent depth to admit the -largest ships and were 

poorly supplied wit.h berths and facilities. ­

Since Bordeaux was the largest coIlJ1lercial port on 

the Bay of Biscay and third largest 1n the country, 

ranking after I.e Havre and IlarseilleB, it was natural ror 

it to become an American base. It lias also natural for 

local interests to seek to attain this desirable end, 

and they did by instigating a repor~ by a French JUilitary 

commission which recommended the establlslllent ot a sta.­

tion for patrol vessels at 10 Verdon, the use of Pau111ac 

.., Eor discharging cargoes, troops, and ani.mals, and the 

oonstruction ot nn fac1lities at Bassena. An inspection 

of the ports on the west coast of France was made upon 

orders issued shortly after the declaration ot war by a 

Joint Franco-A..oeriean commission. It reported that the 

early debarkation ot American troops should take place 

at St. Naza1r&, but 1t indicated that La Rochelle and 

Bordeaux would have to be used. Extene1Ye improv8p18nt8; 

in the way of docks and railroad-facilities were nicom­

_~d ror the last harbor, whi eh should be kept Wloncusbered. pending their oompletlon. There appears to have 

been an examination of these ports by a joi."t board ot 

U. s. A.rm¥ and U. S. ~avy ot!icers during this period. 

In, June 1917 a Military Railroad Gomntis8ion composed of 

American A~ officers made a tour of the French front; 

they inspected the railroad lines connecting it with the 

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Ba;y ot BI._, and t.he port.s of t.he bay, including t.hose 

:In t.he Bordeaux region; and t.hey oolleot.ed dst.a which was 

used in planning the Army's transportation system in 

Frmce. 

'!'be ancient city or Bordeaux, famou:;, in the United 

States: .tor the wines named after it that are produced in 

the neighboring country, is located on a semi-circl.e of 

the Oaronne Riwr sixty mil.es from the sea. Although not 

capable of accOlllJlOdating the largest ocean liners or that 

~, the port of Bordeaux possessed considerable shipbujJding, repair, and supply organizations, in addition 

to being wel.l. protected from the weather, secure from 

naval. attack, and remote .from the usual zones of sutmar:i.ne 

activ1:ti.es. 'l'wunty'lli.les below Bordeaux at Bee dtAmbes 

the Garorme unites nth the Dordogne River to form the 

Gironde Ri:nr, a wide estuary ....hich one naval officer who 

served on it likened to the upper half of Delaware Bay. 

Ct.herport.s on t.he Garonne-Gironde system employed by 

United States forces included Bassens, four miles below 

Bordeaux on the east bank of the Garonne, and Pauillac on 

the west bank of the Gironde twenty-five miles from its 

.:ruth. with wharfage tor vessels too large to ascend to 

Bordeaux. At. La VerdoI;l on the southern side near the 

aouth of the Gironde a great arm of the land provides a 

sheltered roadstead where vessels could be anchored Pel.1dlug the receipt of movement orders. From I.e Verdon a 

rail.road pro'Yided a further means 01" travelling to 

Bordeanx• Across the em.bochure from I.e Verdon, lay Royan, 

one or the chief' sea bathing resorts of France, which was 

uset'ul cbietly bscau•• of it. locat.1on as it. lAcked 

_age wit.h discharge facilit.i.s. 

Bef'ore the entranc;e of the .Americans into Bordeaux, 

it had been developed as a rev~ctualling base bf the 

French. To increase 1 ts capaci~y for this purpose, new 

quays and facilities were constructed at Bordeaux, 

Bassens, PlDrlJ)ac, and at Blaye on the east bank of the 

Gironde not far 1"rom Pauillac. So crowded were the docks 

00. the ri:wer in 1915 that colliers were considerably debeto... get.t.ing bert.b.. The t.ot.al quantity of 

1Irports was greatly expanded while the exports 'Were even 

more grea~ reduced. But the advent of the Americans 

liaS to effect. an even greater change in the economic life 

of t.he region. 

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PRINCIPAL FRENCH PORT.5 AND RAILROAD5 

U.5ED ElY AMERICAN EXPEDITIOllARY FORCE.5 . Gt""...... M~..".,.t") • ..0 '~..~IC~ or ~Y • """""_.. ~ • ~HOI<M"V I'QIIT ~ 1PI>'OI(f" ..T TOwH~ 

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The ilOpOrtance of the port faciUties in Fl"ance in 

the American miUtary .£tort was roalized by Rear Admiral. 

Albert Gleaves, commander of the Cruiser and Transport 

Foree of the U. S. Navy, who said that -the number of 

troops that may be landed in France at present depends 

not uPon the success of the antl-subm&r1n8 cfllllP8,ign, and 

consequent tonnage available and building, but upon the 

port !ac:illties pro"fided in France and England for tbs 

dieembarkation of the troops and supplies that must come 

trom America. 'II 

The U. S. Navy Department at the outbreak of the 

war had no plana for the organization of a port system 

and Uttl.e idea of wbat would be needed in connection 

therewith. Following the ded.e1on of the government to 

&nil mercban_t TeBBe18, Rear Admira1 William S. Sims was 

ordered tollQrd. the ond of l!&rch 1917 to England to 

represent the Navy and keep it informed of developments. 

Cn June 14, 1917, he 11"85 plAced in cOIllD8lld of our naval 

vessels abroad as Force Coamander, U. ' S. Naval Foroe,s 

Operating in European Waters. Secretary of the Navy 

Daniels informed S1.m8 on Kay 8 that the French government 

had requested and the Navy Depa.rtment was · contemplating 

the establishment of temporary bases at Bordeaux and Brest. 

S1u: approved-provided the destroyer bases did not surfer. 

Orders were iS8Ued by the Secretary on June 1 to Capt. 

William B. Fletcher to organize the"vessels being fitted 

out tor distant senice as the U. S. Patrol Squadrons 

Operating in European Waters, to proceed to Brest, establish 8 base there.. and begin operations in the waters 

I adjacent to the F):'ench coast under the general command of 

Vice Admiral. W. S. Sims. SllghUy more than a month later 

Captain Fletcher" reached Brest with his converted yachts.. 

and, after locating bis headquarters on shore at Brest.. 

began operating nth the French Navy ag.31nst Garman submar1.nes. His original complement of eight vessels 1mS 

augmented by two additionaJ. squadrons of converted yachtlll 

in August and September, and by a destroyer squadron in 

October.. 

At the beginning of" June, Comdr. John B. Patton.. an 

officer at considerable experience in naval construction 

who had recently been recalled from retirement.. received 

orders from. the Chief of t.he Bureau of Na'l1gation to proceed to Bordeaux, France and take command of" the naval 

base to be established there. He could get no definite 

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orders in the departaent. as to what his enct duties were " 

to be, but., knowing that be "WOuld. have to establish the 

base, he asked. .for and WaB aas1gned an engineer officer, 

a p83II8.ster, and several. yoemen. He was told by the 

French naval attache 1:1 Waob1ngton that the Navy Department bad agreed to establish two na-val bases in France ~ 

Arriving in Bordeaux in the Espagne on July 1.8, he reported by letter to Admiral Sims and to Captain R1chard H. 

Jackl!!lOn, the Naq Representatlve 1n Paria. A.tter seeing 

the and Captain Fletcher subsequently in PariS, be was 

still without specific inst ructions from the Amel"i.can 

Naval author!ties so he proceeded along the lines already 

worked out by the French, who had planned the development 

of a coaling and supply station at .Pauillac tor the use ,. of t:'le naval patrol and escort vessel" operating along , 

the coast. 

The naval station at Pauill&c was located in the 

neighboring hamlet of Trompeloup, thirty miles trom 

Bordeaux, where a steel .and concrete -.marf was ava:ilable 

for u:!le. Here nth the approval and assiatance of the 

French authorities Commander Patton began the development 

of . "base for the use of the American naval vessels which 

were just then arriving on the coast of France. He acquired land, rented buildings, contracted for coal, and 

began the construction of another wharf from piling and 

planks. "The transformation of vineyards, industrial 

pl ants, and pastures into a naval base comprising storage 

buildings, housing for personnel, and repair facilities 

"Went ahead under the direct supervision of Lieut. louis L. 

Bernier, a nativa of ~anC8 long a resident ot the United. 

States and. an experienced f!bip repair man who had enrolled 

in the Naval Reserve Force and accompanied Patton to 

Bordeaux. Admiral Sims, to whoee headquarters in London 

Ccmnander Patton had been reporting his troubles, sought 

in August to obtain authorization from the Navy Department 

f~ the expenditure "of $150,000 on the proposed base, but 

Admiral William S. Benson,the Chief of Naval Operations, 

responded that it was not the department '5 poliey to commit itself to the establishment of shore base8 except for 

a'fiation purposes to a greater extent than the military 

s1tuat10n absolutely demanded. and that it was the intention to supply two repair ships for the use of the 

small craft operating on the French coast. S1m.' 15 rejoinder was that the 5i tuation demanded a shore establlsh:nent at Pau1llac and that furnishing mother sb1.pa 

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would · 
 be diverting valuable trano-Atlant1c tonnage. 

In reply Admiral Sims was informed that the U. S. s. 

Panther and the u. s. s. Bridgeport would be sent to 

France. This decision forced the discontinuance of the 

work on the repair shop at Pauillac much to the disappointment of the French, but ilie preparations for its 

use 8S a coaling station went ahead. .A. former la\Uldry 

building furnished accoamociat1ons for the men to be 

attached to the station, and ample storerooms. 

At Bordeaux in the meantime Commander Patton had 

been organizing the starr of the Amertcan Naval Base. 

Its organization,. as prescribed in a general order of 

July 31, 1917J comprised several. departments. The 

office of the Commanding Officer or Port Officer, consisting of Commander Patton, a chie!' yeoman and S yeomen, was concerned witil the movements of vessels, log 

books, pereonnel records, the Bureau of NaVi gation, and 

communication. Paymaster F. B. Colby acted ·as disbursing ofticer, supply officer, and accoWlting officer 

and was concerned with general ~nistratlon, contracts, 

requisitions, pay roll, storehouses and supplies, ordnance stores, and commissary department. He was assisted by a chief yeoman and a yeoman. The industrial 

department was under Lieutenant Bernier and comprised 

a ciVil engineer, an electric1an, a chief petty officer, 

and ten men. Surgeon H. Shaw, Assistant Surgeon L. Hays, 

and four hospltal corp~n composed the medical department, which took care of the sick bay, hospital arrangements, and sanitar,r inspection. At the end of September, nineteen enlisted men were included in the 

persormel at Bordeaux; these increased to only twentytour at the end of 1917. 

To look a!'ter the interests ot American ships 

which were beginning to arriva in considerable numbers 

at French ports, Admiral Sims ordered Comdr. Frank P. 

Balchr1n to duty as naval port officer at St. Naaaire 

and Commander Patton to adelitional duty in the SaM 

capacity at Bordeaux. The latter1a orders were issued 

to him on September 24, 1917 and deSignated hill. AS naval port officer at Bordea~ Pau1l1ac, and Basaens. 

Admiral Sims notified Rear Admiral Fletcher, COJIIIIIATlder, 

u. -s. Patrol Squadrons operating on the French Coast, 


that these officere were to be under his orders and 


described their dutiee as follows: 


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5. SHIPl'lHG 

He should control all U.S. Shipping, 

p6nnittlng no Tessel to sail except under his 

orders, and in regul.&r organized convoys. "nle 

term "U.S. Shipping" 18 to be construed a8 embracing troop transports, chartered supply 

Tessels--caITying ILI'miY supplies, Naval supply 

Tessels, all vessels under Charter, to the U.S. 

Government, and such othe;,: U.S. Ilerchant vessels 

as may visit the port in question. Some difficulty may be experienced in controlling U.S. 

vessels which are not under charter by the 

Government, but by working with the French authorities, 1t may be possible to withold the 

clearance of such vessels until they express 

willingness to cary out orders. All Allied 

abipping in Brltim waters 1s now required to 

travel in convoy, regardle8:1 of nationality, 

and the U.S. Government is shortly to require 

all vessels to leave hOJDe ports in convoy. In 

order to reduce shipping 108s8s on this side it 

1s neceslJ8.ry to take a firm hand and dispatch 

our vessels in such a as to provide the 

greatest sequrity. 

6. TROOP TRANSPORTS AND STORE SHIPS 

The Naval Port Officer should be informed by you of the prospectiT8 arrival of 

Troop Transports and Store Ships, and all arrangements made for their escort into port. In 

the ease of Tessels of the same classes outward 

bound they are to be detained in port, or at a 

safe anchorage in the vi cinity ot the port, 

until a convoy can be tOl'T!ied and a suitable 

escort provided. The Naval Port Officer must 

keep you infonned as to the dates of readiness 

tor .sailing of such vessels, and pen11i. t none of 

them to sail except in convoys. This will, 

probably, result in the· delay of some Ships, but 

i t nll ensure safety, and it seems probable 

that a regul.ar outward bound convoy from a suitable port may be arranged to sail about once 

every eight days. In such ..I.!Dnvoy can be placed 

any A.llied westbound merchant vessels. Your 

duty with respect to these convoys will be to 

see that they are provided with suitable escort 

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and to g1w instructions as to tiJle of sailing.. 

Ordinarily they should loave tho French coa.t 

just before dark, eo &8 to pasa through the 

moat dangerous areas by night, and be escorted 

tor about torty-e1ght hours. You would al~o 

prescrtbe the route to be pursued thrOQgh the 

danger sone upon information fundshed tram 

London or Paris or dartTed tram the local 

French authorities.. 

7. The internal organi zation ot the convoy 

will be the responsibility ot the Senior Officer 

of the convoy, ~o should provide the necessary 

instructions for ' zigzagging, behavior under at.­

tack, dispersal, rendezvous, etc. As it is 

probable that tho NaTal Port Officer will frequently be consul.ted on these matters, he should 

be kept supplied with all tha lato.t information 

as to- tested and approved IIlethexls, so that he 

may g1va proper adVice on request.. 

8. llRCRAFT 

The Navel Port O!!1eer should, lIb.never poSSible, arrane~ for the co-operation of 

the French Coastal Air Stat10ns to assist our 

inward and. outward boWld convoys. This may be 

accomplished by your office, ~~t the Port Officer should have !ull authority to oomrnunlcat8 

direct with the local French authorities as well. 

9. lIINESWEEPING 

The Naval Port Officer should, by constant COIIIiun1cation wi~ you and with the 100&1. 

French authori ties keep himself f'ully informed. 

as to the state ot .the approach .channels, the 

progress 01 mine-sweeping operations and the 

results of such operations, and should keep you 

.iJuil.arly infomed. 

10. OOAL AND OTHEa SUPPLIES 

The Naval Port Officer should keep you 

informed as to the &mount of coal. and other supplies on hand and the amounts desired f'rom time 

to time.. 

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11. I~FORMATION 

,The Naval Port Officer should interview the Captain or 1iaster or every u. s. Yanof-War, Transport, Supply Ship, and other vessel! 

entering his port, for the purpose of' bringing 

out any criticisnus they may have to make as to 

difficulties of entering the ports, lack of 

pilots, patrols, etc., and any suggestions they 

may have for improvements. These matters are of 

urgent importance, part.icularly 1n connection 

willi our Troop Transports and Supply Ships. 

Conditions that may be -handled by the local 

French authorities should be taken up direct 

with them. 

12. CO~RDINATION 

It will be the duty of the Naval Port 

I Ofticer to keep 1n constant and close touch with ,' the U.S. !rmy representatives and the French authorities at the ports to work in clooe harmony 

with them and to use every endeavor to avoid friction and ¢lashes of authority. 

13. 

The will have complete charge of the communication of.f'1co at his 

port. He will be g:I.ven the services of a Communication Officer, whenever such detail is 

fQund pos81ble, and rill, also, be furnished 

with a Communication Staff of the necessary size. 

14. At St-Nazaire Assf.tant Paymaster 

CUnnungham is, a.t present, detailed 8.S COlllllunication Officer, and he will continue at that 

capacity unUl such time as another officer can 

be sent for that duty. Paymaster Cunningham. has 

certain additional duties in connection with disbursements which he will continue to perform. 

A. separate letter rill be lfritten going into the 

duties of the Col'llUunicatlon Officer 1n more 

detail. 

15. The Communication Officer at each port 

will, under the instructions ot the Port. Officer, 

and with his advice, assistance and co-operation, 

handle all matters in regard to cOIllllunications, 

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make 	suggestions for improvement and make provision for keep1ng a secret file of all important 

messages; aleo, he will take steps to guard against secret COIIJtI.wUcat.1ons tal.l1.ng into the 

banda of IllY but CommiI8ioned Officers, or such 

member of the Coamunication Force as 1t may be 

found necessary, olling to eboi"tage of personnel, 

to entrust _ to. 

16. It 10 part1cularlJ' nece••arr that the 

prospecti... datos ot arr1nl ot Troop convoy. 

and SUpply convoys be kept secret, and be communicated to the French autnorities and the U.S. 

Army autharttie. onlJ' in suttic1.nt t1mo to pel'­

mit them to aake proper preparations for 

tbe1r reception. 

17. 	 REPORTS AI!Jl REOO!pIE!!PATIONS 

All reports IIIIdo by the NaYlll Port 

Officer should be made to you direct, the lDOat 

secret and rapid meana of COIIDWl1eation being 

utiUsed. The NaYal Port Officer should, howewr be authorized to comm.un1cate direct witb 

'IIl3' Stott Roprosantath" in Paris and with other 

NaYBl Port Officers in cases of urgent necesait,.. He .should, in all cases, i.DIIediately turniab you 

with copies at bill oolDllunications. 

18. 	 ARYED GUARDS 

Whenner a vessel oarrying a Kayal 

.A.rrIed Guard enters a Port Officer'. port b. 1s 

to inspect the Guard, or have it 1nspected by a 

competent representative, and should make to you, 

tor further transm1 ssion to me, a report covering 

the following points and any others that "tDJJ.Y suggest themselves 1n individual cases: 

(a) 	 Ves.el - from - to 

(b) 	 lIaster 

(e) 	 Officar or P.O. in charge of guard 

(d) 	 Number, calibre, and conditim or 

gun. 

( 8 ) 	 Arrangement and condition ot magazines 

(t) 	 Personnel 

(g) 	 Organization -y.

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(h) 	 Co-operation between guard and 

ship personnel 

(i) 	 Food 

Especial attention Will be paid to the 

question of uniforms and personal neatness of 

guards, as the appearance of these men nU have 

a considerable effect on the opinion ot a very 

large number ot people as to the general efti-' 

ciency of our Navy. 

19. As the appointment of Naval Port 

Officers is a n,"" departure, the duties of 'such 

Officers cannot be prescM-.bed completely: and 

with exactness. Iluch must be l,eft to the individual, and, in the discharge of his duties, it 

will be necessary that he exercise good judgment, 

tact and discretion, in order to avoid friction 

with the loeal autboritiesl both French and U.S• 

.Army. He must, on the one hand.. avoia umrarranted assumptions of authority, and he must, 

on the other hana, use every endeavor to advance 

the common cause, which 1s that or the safe and 

prompt entry ,and dispatch of Troop Ships, Supply 

Ships and other vessels. It i8 P&rticularlJr 

important that between you and the Port Officer 

there shall be 8 feeling of mutual confidence, 

and a constant exchange of lnfo:nnatlon. It 1s 

also very i mportant, as has a1ready been stated, 

that the prospective movements, both outward and 

inward, ot U.S. vessels, be protected by secrec,y, 

by the greatest possible use of the convoy plan, 

and by the proviSion of suitable escorts. If 

these objects are successfully acco~pl1shed minor 

difficulties and failings will have no bearing on" 

the final general. result. 

on October 19, 1917 Rear Admiral Fletcher communicated to COIm1al'lder Patton secret instructions as 

follows: 

1. You nll be the Port representative at 

Paulllac, Bordeaux and Bassens, Francej of the 

Coomland.er U.S. Patrol Squadrons Operating on 

French Coast. 
2. You wUJ., -as .far as la possible" be 

informed in advance o! the arrival at u.s. Shi~ 

ping Government chartered or private" bound for 

ports on the Glronde R1ver. 

5. You will silll1larly inform the Squadron 

CoIlllWlder as to the dates when such vessels are 

ready to leave your ports" and as far in advance 

of departure a8 possible. 

4. It such vessels are bound north or south 

along the French Coast" they will taka advantage 

of the regularly constituted convoys. 

S. You Will report the names" speed and 

1i!8 of vessels bound off shore in order that 

instructions ma;y be issued for them to proceed 

to such points as may be deSignated for assembly 

and e scort in convoys. 

6. You will arrange 8S may be necessary 

f or the departure of vessels in Coastal convoys. 

Informatlonconcerning submarines and mines 

should be obtained by the Masters of vessels at 

the latest possible moment before leaving your 

port, from the offices ot the French Port Authorities on the Gironde. Port authorities must 

also be kept informed of the sailings so that 

such preparations as are desirable and necessary 

may be assured by mine draggers and local escort, 

by air as well as by water. 

7. Should convoys proceed from sea direet 

into the Gironde, escorted by American vessels" 

this off i ce should be intonued as far in advance 

as is pOSSible, of the channels which are safe 

and can be used, through the Naval Port Officer 

and the C.D.P.B. 

8. Lines o~ communication from and to you 

are entirely French. It Will be necessary to work 

wi tn them and t hrough t hem in order that both 

'rench officials and ourselves may be informed of 

t.he existing situation. Every endeavor is being 

made by the Commandant Superieur to perfect the 

CODlllunication system. All delays in the receipt 

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or transaission of lie ssagea will be reported, so 

that the cause may be followed up. 

9. Report weekly the amoWlt of coal belonging "to the. Navy received and expended, and the 

IlraQWlt remaining on hand. At the end ot the 

month, report the amount neeived and expended 

during the month, and the amount remaining on hand. 

10. Your attention 11 invited to paragraph 

11 of Enclosure "Aw, Nference (al, and to enclosure "8". These .... tters Will be made the 

subject ot report to the Squadron ComIIander as 

soon as possible a.tter rec8~pt ot the information." 

Attention is also 1.nYited to paragraphs 12, 13, 

17, 18 and. 19 of reference <al, Enclosure "A". 

ll. In connection with the movements of 

vessels, attention is particularly called to the 

Mcassity ot absolute secrecy of your codes and 

cod1ng apparatus, and tne secrecy ot all despatches concerning the tIIOVements of all vessel". 

All. messages received or sent will be entered 

when decoded, or upon coding, in ink in a record 

book. Access to this book nil be had o~ h,­

yourself and such persons as are thoroughly reliable. Copies will be lim1ted to these absolutely necessary, marked secret. made only by a 

reliable person and delivered by such Ii penson, 

DlSrked "To be opened by addressee only." 

12. Every endeavor will be made to work to 

the common cause of producing effiCient service 

and cheerful. and loyal coope ration within our 

own force, and with the representatives of our. 

31ster :service, and with those of our Ally, the 

French. 

American ship amvals were not very nuraerou3 at 

Bordeaux in 1917, for the movement of troops and supplies across the Atlantic did not get well under way 

until the following year. lloreover the docks tben 

\Ulder com,trucUon at Pauillac and Bassen8 were not 

ready .(or use until the latter year. In December 1917 

there was discharged at Bordeaux 9,800 toms of general 

cargo, 28,300 tons of coal, and 6,600 tons of lumber. 
These quantities were to be multiplled man,. times in 

the next.. year. 

'!'be development. of the aViation program of the 

Navy in France resulted in the establiahment of several 

air atations 1n the Bordeaux region as a part of the 

system which eventually was completed along the coaat 

for patrol, escort, and recJnria1.ssanoe purposes. In 

view of the plan to erect at Pauillac an aviation assembly and repair plant, general storehouses, and barracks for the distribution of enlisted aviation 

personnel throughout France, Capt. Hutch I. Cone, Ccamander, U. S. Naval AViation Forces, Foreign Service, 

recommended to Admiral. Sima on November 22, 1917 that 

the naval base at that place be changed to an aviation 

center and placed under his comnand. A naval air stallon was colllllissioned at Pauillac on ~cember 1, and 

on the twenty-second Admiral 'Sims removed it trom the 

cxmnand or the u. S. Naval Base Bordeaux. The assembly 

and repair plant eventually spread over a considerable 

aCr81.ge of vineyards and occupied the Village of 

TrOmpeloup near which the air station was located. 

Here knocked-down aeroplanes received from the United 

states were assembled, tested, and. flown to the operating fielda. Other anation activities in the region 

included a ~ng school at lIoutcbic (Iacanau), and an 

operating field at A.rcachon. A lighter than air station 'Was begun at Gujan-Vestras, but it lI'8.S not completed before the end or hostilities. 

To effect coordination over American naTal activities in France, the Navy -Department directed Ackn1ral 

Sims on January 4, 19la to designate Rear Admiral 

Henry B. Wilson, who had succeeded Captain Fletcher in 

command of the U.S. Patrol Squadrons Operating on the 

French COaBt on November 1, 1917, as "Senior U. S. Naval Officer in France," and to direct him to organize his 

forces according to a general plan comprising six principal fields of activity. (1) naval forces afloat; (2) 

port organization and administration; (3 ) aviation; (4) 

intelligence; (5) c_un1cation; and (6) supp~ and pay_ 

In addition _to these matters he was also to take up 

with French author!ties and tbe U. S. Army any questions 

that arose, proVided they were not of such character 

that they should be handled by Sima or the department. 

He was directed in connection 'With the port organization 

13 

and adJo1nistration to divide the west coast of France 

into three districts with headquarters at Brest, St. 

Naza1re, and Bordeaux under officers of command rank. 

Upon receipt of this o rder Admiral Sims called WUson, 

Jackson, and Cone to U=lndon for a conference in, which 

an · agreement was reached relaUve to the reorganiu.tlon 

at the forces in France. Admiral Sims then drew up 

some detailed instruction" covering the organization of 

the forcee in France, which were sent to Wilson who, a8 

Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in France, was to bave 

charge of all floating naval forces permanently assigned 

to duty on the channel and Atlantic coasts of France. 

For the administration of the port organization he was 

instructed to establlsh district beac:1quarters at Brest, 

Lorlent, and Rochefort; these places were chosen by 

Sims instead of tho•• indicated by the Navy Departm~1lt 

because they were the French Prefectures Maritimes and 

the sites of French nav,y yards. The prox1'm.1tyof the 

American and French headquarters would facilitate liaison between the naval forces of the two countries. 

The district organization was considered desirable because it was believed that the direct routing of ships 

from the Un!ted States to ports of destination would be 

necessary. 

The district organization was Bet up by Admiral 

Wilson in an order of January 18 addressed 'to the district caumanders. Their mission W88 to safeguard the 

passage of American troop and store ships and to c0­

operate with the French naval forces ' for the protection 

of shipping and for the conduct of submarine warfare. 

The limts of the distriets were deecrtbed; those tor 

the Rochefort District extending from Fromentine on the 

north to the Spanish border on the south-a 280-mile 

stretch of coast. The district commanders were charged 

with the following duties! operations of vessels that 

might be placed \Ulder their command; command, administration, repairing, and supply of vessels assigned to ~ 

their districts; development and maintenance of .!idequate naval port facilities; establishment and maintenance of proopt and certain ~cationi supervision 

at American shipping and of United States naval personnel on merchant ships. The naval port officers were 

subject to their orders. Movements of ships were to be 

reported directly to the Commander, U. S. Nava1 Forces 

in France. Captain Henry H. Hough was placed in command 

14 

of the BrEst District, capt. Thanas P. Uagruder the 


Lorient District, and Capt. Newton A. lIcCully ,the 


Rochefort D1 strict. 


Captain ){cGully left Brest in the U. S. s. !!!!Z on 


January 20 to assume his command at Rochefort. He did 


not proceed directly to that place, however, for, pur­


suant to orders frOll Admiral Wilson, he nsited Lor1ent, 


St. Nazalre, Bordeaux, Paulllac, and I.e Verdon and con­


ferred. with officials at those places before arriVing 


at Rochefort at the end of the month. He went ashore 


. there on February 5 to organize and establish the district headquarters. His duties as district commander 

were in addition to his command of the Squadron 5, Patrol Forces, Atlantic Fleet, which he had been exercising since the prenou8 October. Upon completing his 

tour, VcCully reported that the district comprised the 

ports of La Pa.ll1ce, Rochefort, Bordeaux, Arcachon, 

Bayonne, and St. Jean de Luz, the most important section 

being that of the Gironde'. U. reCO!:mlended that eon tral 

direction of the work of the district would be best 

located 1n the entrance to that river at Royan, but the 

move was never approTed. Other suggestions included 

the location of a station ship for communications and 

escort duty and repair ship at La Verdon, port officers 

at La Pallice and BOrdeaux, and naval base eommander 

and rlaff at Pauillac. 

The district organization remained in use through­


out the war. To the original three districts was added 


in April 1918 a fourth at Cherbourg of which Gomdr. 


David F. Boyd was given command. After his experience 


with the district organization during the war, Admiral 


Wilson reported toward~ its close a strong approbation 


of the system, which provided the necessary decentral1r.ation of administration, particularly of details, re­


quired to successi\l.l.ly perform the operations of the 


Navy connected with the protection of American ships. 


It was not merely enough, in his opinion, to decentral1&8 matters, f or they also had to be placed ift ebarge 


of officers of considerable rank who could command the 


respect. and attention of French officials and U. S. 


J:rmy officers. Placing the districts 1.mder officers of 


rank also made it more difficult for the French to ob­


tain control of them. He believed that the character 


of the work performed by the district commanders 


15 

l 
justified the ron!< .of rear ac:Iniral and recommended that 

ron!< for IIcCully and Hough. 

On the 1511111.8 day that he issued instructions to the 

district ooZllllaruiers Admiral Wilson lesued· other directions to naval port officers, lIbich described their 

miasi.on and duties 815 foliOlfSI . 

1. Your miSsion and. duties are 


aa !ol..l.ows, 
 • 

MISSION. To facilitate the berthing, discharging, 

and pranpt sailing of O. S. troop and 

store ships. 

DUTIES. (a) To cooperate fully with the U.S. 

A:m:i and French authorities with a 

vin' to e_diting despatching ot 

vessels. 

(b) To lJmned1ately intom the COl:>­

mander in France and your District 

Canmander of the arrival of all U.S. 

vessels at your port. The F:orce COlamander and the Army headquarters will 

be Intormed by the Col!lmaIlder in 

FrRlce. 

(c) To interview Commanding Officers 

or Wasters of all U.S. ships on 

arrival as to incidents of voyage and 

their needs. 

(d) Inspect the U.S. Navy armed guard 

crews and radio men on V.S. vessels 

other than regular commissioned U.S. 

Naval vessels. 

(e) To assist in the supplying of 

vessels with fuel and supplies inso­

.tar a8 thi 8 can be properly handled 

by the Navy. 

(f) To ps,y naval """,hers of armed 

SUards on presentation or memorandum 

rolls or other necessary vouchers, 

and to £urnish them with clothing and 

small stores. 

16 
• • II! " >I 

(g) Investigate offe0888 com:nitted by 

U.S. Navy ~r50nnel on vessels other 

than regular commissioned U.S. Navy 

Tessels. 

(h) Investigate and take necessary 

action on A.dmiralty cases involving 

U.S. Navy. 

(i) Keep COlllll&mer in France informed 

o! the readines8 of vessels and of the 

speed of 1Ih1 ch they are capable th"""'h 

the danger zone. 

(j) Tranan,1.t sailing orders racel..,d . from t.he Commm dar in France or District Commander. 

(k) Indoctrinate Yastere: as to precautions to be observed ldthin the 

danger zone and familiarize them with 

yte prescribed convoy doctrine. 

(1) As near as possible prior to sailing, furnish convoy and escort commander 

with the latest information in regard 

to eubmarine and mine activities. 

(m) "Keep Commander in France intormed 

weekly as to the amount of f;Oal belonging to the Navy on hand, the aount 

expended and receivad. 

'!be foregoing instructions were t.ken al.most verbatim 

from Simls orders to Wilson, being modified slightly to 

auit the local situation. 

Some spacial instructions were sent by Wilson to 

CoDmander Patton at Bordeaux. These stated that the 

district oollll1llDder at Rochefort was responsible ror 

reporting U. S. ship movements in La Pallice, La 

Rochelle, and Rochefort and the Naval Port Officer at 

Bordeaux for those in tJle porta of Paulll..:o.c, Bassens, 

Bordeaux, and La Verdon. On!U direct telegraph and 

telephone communication was provided between Bordeaux 

and I.e Verdon be was to depend upon the French 

17 
conunandant. at the latter pl.ace for reports on ship 

movements there. 

Admiral Wileon was di8satisfied with the retention 

at Bordeaux of an officer, who had been assigned there 

for the purpose of establishing a repair base, as a 

NaV8l Port Officer and requested his replacement by a 

younger man ~th executive ability and lots of steam. 

London naval headquarters fina~ arranged with Vdlson 

and Cone for the transfer of Commander Patton to the 

post of commandant of th~ Aviation assembly and repair 

plant at Pauiliac. When the change ocourred on February 10, 19l8,he was succeeded temporarily as Naval Port 

Officer at Bordeaux by Lieutenar..~ Bernier. On May 2B 

the position was taken over by Co~der Ralph P. Craft, 

.ho was detached for the purpose from the U. s. s. 

A.phrodite on which he had been serving recently as escort commander on the Verdon convoy. In June the port 

office at Bordeaux embraced the following departmentSt 

naval port officerJ marine superintendent, assistant 

naval port officerJ patrols and i nspections, repair 

oflicer, med1cal officer, coding officer, radio repair 

station, pay and disbursing office. Shortly afterwards 

patrols and inspections ae'em to have been assigned to 

separate officers. .tn organization outline for September 21, 1918 lists the members of the staff as 

follo...,.s; 

Naval Port Officer Comdr., U.S.!l. 

Assistant Naval Port Officer Lieut., U.S.N.R.F. 

Engineer Officer l1eut., ( j.g. ),U.S.N. 

Inspections and Docks " U. S.N.R.F. 

Correspondence Officer Ensign • 

Patrol Officer • " Communication • • 

Radio Repai r, Bassens • • 

District Medical Inspection COllidr. (Yedical) 

Medical Officer ( 2) Lieut • 

Pay and Disbursing Officer • (pay), U.S.N. 

The enlisted personnel attached to the naval port 

office included a number of yoemen and seamen of different classes employed as correspondence, com:nunication. 

mail and ~ clerks, messengers, automobile, motor cycle, 

and truck drivers, repair gang, and in t he dispensary 

run qy the medical officer. nt l October 1918 these 

18 

men were put upon subsistence; they were then barracked in a remodeled. chateau about a mile .from the 

port office. As this building did nO'1;' provide sufficient accommodatlons, portable barracks were erected in 

a 	public park nearby. Suitable equi~nt was installed 

in these barracks t o keep them in proper sanitary oondition. Better discipline was pos31ble through having 

the men in barracks. 

The location at Pauillac -of the aviation assembly 

and repair station and its use as a port of discharge 

for mat erial destined tor the trans-Atlantic radio station being constructed b'J the U. S. Navy at Croix d'Hins 

greatlJ' increased the shipping at that place. The.acort vessels wbich convoyed-the ships that arriyed in 

tile Gi ronde obtained at Pauillac coal im.ported fran 

Cardiff, Wales. Water was available there, and fresh 

pro.:v1sions oould also be procured by ord~r1ng from Bordea~ where liberty parties could visit for amusement 

in its theatres and cafes. After his transfer to Pauillac, COmmander Patton acted as Naval Port Officer 

• 	 there untU the arrival of IJ.eut. Herbert R. A. Borchardt, U. S. !i. on March 10, 1918 to. perform the duties 

of that position. He was succeeded in June by L1eut~ 

George ~ Keene U.S.N'.R.F., who continued to serve Wltil 

lat e in the year. When Comdr. Frank T. EVans relieved 

Patton, who was invalided horne because of an attack of 

neun tis,' as coamandant of the aviation establisbnent at 

Pauillac In July, he removed his otfice to a more convenient location at Trompeloup, and at the request of 

the port officer, the eomm.wrl.cation officer, and the 

Anny Transport Service otficer who was stationed there 

provided them 'Wi th space i n the same building. When 

EnSign Andrew Robeson, U. S. N. R .. F. was ordered to 

duty as Naval Por t Officer at pauillac towards the end ' 

of October, he was placed under the milltary supervision 

and oontrol of the COl'QllWldant of the naval air station, 

but he was directed to make reports concerning ship 

movements and the like to the District Commander, 

Rochefort. 

The expansion of shipping on the Gironde R1ver and 

the system of operations which was developed to handle 

it resulted in the establishment of other port officer~, 

in pa rt according to Captain McCully' s original recommendations. At Bassens, 1d1.ich was operated as part 

19 
ot the Bordeaux otficaJ a U. S. Naval Dock Officer was 

station'8d to act as liaison between the captains and 

masters ot American ships and the French captain of 

the port in IIS.tters coMected with mooring and nangation. A Communication or Liaison Orficer was maintained on board the French station ship lIarthe 501gB 

at Le Verdon. A Naval Port Officer at Royan was used 

principally as a signal station to report ahips enterlog am leaving the Glronde. This place W8J!I under the 

cOlDmllnd or Lieut. William V. A.stor trota. Fabruary to 

November 1918... An. otficer in the Nava1 Reserve ForceJ 

Id.eutenant Astor had senoed during IIIOst of 1917 on his 

own yacht the Noma.. which he bad presented to the Navy, 

and on the staff of the Naval Port Offlce at Bordeaux 

during the early part of the lIinter. 

In add.!tion to the naval port. offices on the ai_I'­

ondaJ others were established in Rochefort District 

during the first part ot 1918 at Rochefort, La Pall1ce, 

St. Jean de Luz, and Sables d'Olonna. These ports were 

used by cargo vessels; La Pallice and neighboring l.a 

Rochelle and Marans being used particularly tor dis­ • 

charging ooal brought across trom Great Britain. 

Since the bulk of the American shipping to Fre.nch 


port.s during World War I was used to man and supply the 


AlIeriean Expeditionary ForceaJ the U. S. AntI;Y organized 


a transportation system in France. '!be first c'onvoy or 


troop transports reached st. lIazaire late in June 1917, 


and that was the scene or the earliest actinties of 


the .\rDI;)'" Transport Service. That oonvoy and all sub­


sequent convoys sailing directly troD, ports of em.barka­


tion 1n the United States to French ports escorted by 


cruisers attached to the U~ S. Cruiser and Transport 


Force, which was commanded by Rear Admiral Albert 


G1eaves, U. S. N. To supply and equip the 2, oooJ000 


troops that eventually made up t he A. E. F., it 11'"15 


necessary to build up a vast fleet of cargo carriers; 


most or these became attached to t he Naval Overseas 


Transportation SerVice, which was established in the 


NayY Department in January 1918, following an agree­


ment nth tile War Department and. the U. S. Shipping 


. Board by ~ioh the Navy was to man vessels entering the 

war zones. After ·studying the Sritish and French or-: 

ganizatlonsJ General John J. PerShing, Commander-lnchiaf, American Expeditionary Forces, decided that. the 

20 

responsibility for the movement of troops and supplies 

from. the hold ot the Tessel at the port to the end ot 

the railroad journey in the rear of the front lines 

should be vested in a transportation departJUent, and on 

I 

J~ 5, 1917 he e.tablished this system. William W. 

Atterbury, a tormer vice-president of the Penn~lvania 

Railroad, appeared 1n France at the end of August with 

orders from. the Secretary of War appointing him Director 

General. of Transportation, A. E. F. -In the follcm1ng 

month General A.tterbury and a party of American -and 

French ottlcers inspected the ports on the Bay of Biscay 

and the railroads connecting them. with the interior to 

seoure information upon which to determine ways to 1JD.­

1 

- .prove the systems for the use of the U. 5. Arm::!. The 

llst of projeots d.rawn up included the extension of 

faollities at Bas8ens and PauiUac. 

, 

The selection by the ATm¥ of ports to be used as 

ports of disembarkation for troops and discharge of ­

supplies resulted in the establisno.ent at those ports 

of supply organi zations known as Base Sections, superintendents of the Arr;sy Transport Service, and na,,"Rl port 

offices. Base Sections came to be organized at St. 

Nazaire, Bordeaux, Le Havre, Brest, Ilarseille, and La 

Palllce. That at Bordeaux, the second one established, 

was called Base Section No.2; it was commanded by Brig. 

Gen. v.-illiam S. Scott and later by Brig. Gen. Willl8Ll D. 

Connor. Here towards the end of October 1917, an A:rrsrl 

Transport Service Superintendent I s office was opened by 

a major, who was succeeded by other majors and lieutenant colonels. The Base Sect.ion headquarters at Bordeaux 

was a much larger organizati on than the Naval Port Offico, 'Whose task was a .subordinate one of considerable 

importance as it concerned the m.aintenance of the Ufe 

Une across the Atlantic. 

The actiViUes of the A.r!Iy in the Gironde region 

were widespread. At American Bassen! the Corps of Engineers constructed between August 1917 and April 1918 

a pile dock containing ten berths, which was the largest 

construction of this type undertaken by the Amy in 

·France and which made Bassens its most efficient port. 

To distinguish it from French (old) Bassens the new 

port was called Am.erican (or New) Bassena. 

The assignment of six berths for the at French 

21 
Bassens aided in the builcling of th.e new berths and 

provided a greater quantity of ""h~rfa e at thia favorable point on the right bank of the river, affording 

access to railroads rurning to the front. A refri e:erating plant was put up here by the Quartermaster Corps. 

Other c.ock installation"s were undertaken at nearby 

Lormont, at St. Loubes and St. Pardon on the Dorriogne 

River, and at Talmont near Royan, but these were not 

completed before the Armistice. A number of camps were 

built around Bordeaux, including camps for laborer!; 

near Bassens, Genicart Camp and Grange Neuva Camp at j lo:nnont, Camp I.e Htmt at Le · CoW"neau, a combined artillery and balloon training camp R.t Camp de Souge, and 

cantonrents at St. lDubes, St. Mp1ce, Gradignan, and I 

Begles. There "'"as a base hospit&l. for troop8 at Bordeaux, a veterinary hospi tal at Carbon Bl&nc, a remount 

depot at Y.arignac, and a rootor park at Bordeaux. To 

serve the port of Bordeaux, a great storage depot was 

begun at St. Sulpice, nine miles frca Bassens in March 

1918. 

In late December 1917 Captain Jackson wrote Admiral 

Sims from Paris tha:t the Navy would have to face the 

necessity of sending troop transports to Bordeawe, for 

the was preparing camps there for the reception of 

soldiers. Since t he Navy escorted the troopships, this 

plan gave it some concern. Captain Jackson believed it 

would be safer to route the convoy directly to Bordeaux 

than to shunt transports south from St. Nazaire to 

Bordeaux as the voyage alone t he coast would be dangerous. On the _last day of the year be nct. lfied Sims that 

General Pershing wanted Bordeaux used to the fullest 

extent for troopships and that the Army wa s then r eady 

to receive troops there. Although the troop convoys 

had not Yet become nearly as frequent as they would, 

dif.fi cuI t,;r was being experienced 1n handling those til a t 

were arriving at Brest and St. Nazaire, which were tile 

principal ports utili~ for the debarking o£ troops 

brought to France 1n American convoys. Hence the Arm;y"s 

desire to use Bordeaux as a port of debarkati on. Unwillingly the Navy yielded to Army pressure, for the 

I despatch of troopships to Bordeaux meant the division

of a convoy eom~nere in the eastern Atlantic Ocean, I which not only resulted in weakened escorts but put a 

severe strain on the Navy's ability to provide escort 

vessels. The dtspersion of the tro-op transports was 
a means of speeding up their return to the United States 

and so hastening the movement of troops abroad, and this 

was ....hat was wanted 1n Wa.shington. . 

Early in 1S18 tranaports began arrivine at Bordeaux, 

and in March 5,459 troops were landed principally from 

the Tenadores. llercuI'Y. and Mallory. Smal.ler numbers 

were brought in on freighters in that and subsequent 

months. A somewhat higher number, 6,161, was disembarked in April chiefly .from the Powhatan, Martha 

Washington. and Rochambeau. Some of ·these transports 

made repeated trips to Bordeaux. Although these vessels 

were among the smaller transports, some of the. had 

difficu1ty in 81tering and ascending the Gironde. The 

commanding officer of the Powhatan reported delays 1n 

wa1 ting for the ' high tide to get over the bar at the 

mouth of the river and at Pauillac in waiting for a 

berth. As the engines had to be kept rwming while at 

anchor at this place in order to shift the ship w.:l. th 

changing levels in the river, no opportunity _was offered 

for overhauling work. Transports continued to arrive, 

however, landing around 11,000 troops in both lIay and 

JWlB. From the Tenadores Admiral Wilson raceived word 

in July that it had rested in the mud. while unloading. 

F1nal1y the A:r:rrry, because of the difficulties encountered on the Gironde, adopted the policy in August of 

sending transports to Bordeaux only -when they carr1ed 

a large amount of cargo in addition to troops and their 

equipment and of occasionally sending transports there 

in order to return trOops to the United States. A 

total. of SO,(X)(} soldiers Vii..;; debarked on the Gironde. 

The Transport Service was represented on the 

Glronde not only at Bordeaux, where a superintendent 

had been stationed in October 1917, but also at Pauil1ac 

and at Bassens. Troop 'transports of too deep "draft to 

ascend to Bordeaux were discharged at Pauillac under thE 

direction of Major H. P.. Haines, Army Transport Service 

superintendent. He also boarded "transports on the way 

to Bordeaux to present orders to the officer in charge 

of the troops. The handling of the transports at Bassens 

where they were discharged by the Army, -.as in the hands 

of a Marine Superintendent, who was a lieutenant ~ 

J:l8Ilder in the Naval Reserve Force. The officer who reported for this duty on October 26, 19~7 was Henry W. 

Barstow, a former ship captain in the Clyde-Mallory 

2B 

LiM; he filled tbo po81tim until June 1918. Hia 

duU•• teok b1.m. on occasion to Bordeaux, Pauill.ac, and 

Blaiye. He 1I'8.S provided tOl this Army service at the 

request ot the general in command or the Line ot Conmunieationa, the term. then used for the J.nIrr Senrices ot 

8upply. 

Although the A_ and the Navy gperated moy U. S. 

Shipping Board vessels, that agency operated some itself. The U. S. Consu1 acted as the agent for the Shi.~ 

ing Board 'ftssels, but he had only limited supernsion. 

This position was filled throughout the war by George A. 

Bueklin. 'Ina Shipping Board ,..ssels ....ere asaigned to 

, French sh1pbrokera, to 'Whose financial interest it was 

to dela,y a ship in port a8 long as possible. 1Ir. 

Bucklin found it necessary to keep constantly on the 

watch to see +,hat the shipbrokers did not engage in improper practices and to insure rapid discharging, watering, coaling, ballasting, and clearing. He also r~nm.d , that through his intervention the pasHga of the ftl8sels 

up the r1ver through the hands of the various French 

otflci.&l! cou1d be expedited. His repeated requests 

that he be alloWed to handle the vessels officially and 

thus prevent delays ,;(8re denied by the gOV8nmlent in 

Washington because it was necessary to continue pea~e 

tima pract1ces in order to maihtain good relations nth 

the French. Special permission was given the Army to 

unload powder Ships, which were a menace to the installations and supplies at Bassens, but other ships loaded 

tor the accoWlt of the French government continued to 

be consigned to private companies. Soma improvement in 

matters resulted from the adoption of the suggestim 

made by Bucklin that the masters of the vessels be di.. 

rected to coOlllunicate nth the consul.ls office on their 

arrival IUld make it their· headquarters 1Ih11e in port.. 

In a report to the State Department sul:rni.tted in 

August 1918 wr. Bucklin enumerated the causes that delayed vessels in port a8 follows: awaiting permit and 

orders to sail; left American registry; repairs and. 

crew trouble; cargo for French goverment; awat ting 

berth; slow discharge and bunkering; 8waiting convoy. 

~OBt delay was caused by the unavailability of berths. 

Sbipping Board Tessels were subject to more delay because their cargoes were eftan for the French and SWiss 

governments, which made securlng berths more difficult. 

24 
l 

Stevedores were poor and hard to find. 

Despite these difficulties, the consul by collaborating closely with the Anny and Navy officers stationed 

in the locality was able to assist in speeding up the 

turn arc"md of thli ships. 

A turthar source of trouble for the consul was the 

I 

I crews of the Shipping Board ships which were necessarily 


a conglomeration of nationalities. SO msoy seamen ar­


rived in port without papers that in December 1917, Mr. 


Bucklin recommended trAt all Shipping Board vessels be

• 	 manned by the Navy, a step he considered des1rable to 

avoid trouble and delays to shipping. 

Certain services were performed by the consul for 

the Navy. He took acknowledgments of and admini stared 

oaths to naval and milltary personnel, charging fees 

only for private business. He assisted in the repatriation of member8 of naval CI'e'W5 and made advances of 

money to naval. signalmen. 

Shipping Board vessels caused more trouble for the -­

Naval Port Officers than either the Naval vessels or 

the Army transports. Their masters were often not ca­

' pable men, owing to the decadence of the American merchant marine which had diminished the supply of trained 

officers, and they were frequently indifferent to the 

I

• 

, neceesity for handling their vessels quickly. To the 

naval officers who reported upon activ:i:ties of these 

vessels, it looked also as if they were not well administe red,; masters operated many of the ships Without adequate inatructlona. Attempts by naval officers to 

expedite their handling brought forth exh.1bi tiona or 

ill wl_ll. 

In October 1918 Admiral Wilson was authorized by 

Admiral Sims, who had instructions from Washington, to 

"transfer to the N. O. T. S. any Shipping Board vessels 

on which CI'e"Po' conditions endangered the safety of lives 

or property. To accomplish this, District Commanders 

were directed by AdI:d.ral. Wilson to request tho necessary 

authority from him amd to appoint a board to report on 

the circumstances of taking over a ship. 

Just as the U. S. Navy and Ute U. S. Anay had to 

~ 25 
work together in handling American vessels in French 

ports, it was necessary .for both to work with French 

o1'fie1als, for in their hands reua1ned large!.:" the control of ship movements, pilotage, berthing, and !IOoring. The region comprised in the Rochefort District 

ooincided with the 4th Arrondissement or Depa.rt.ment de 

1a Gasco'gne _in which the supreme authority was the 

Pretet MariUme at Rochefort. His organization included 

four divisions: the Patrol Marine Defense, Collll1unlcations, and Land Defense. The Patrol Division a.dm1.n1stered the patrol and convoy syst.em through subordinatesat La Pallice, La Verdon, and St. Jean de Luz and the 

IlViation patrols operating from. bases along the coast. 

At La Rochelle, Bordeaux Wld Bayonne were commandants dn port, who were naval captains whose duties were 

principally those of information and communication. 

Commandants des Fronts de Mer were stationed at La 

Rochelle, Royan, and St. Je.,n de Luz for purpose s of 

sea defense and information. 

Among the French officials stationed at Bordeaux 

tha chief was M. Clavel, whose French title was le Lieut. 

Colonel du Ingenieur an Chef des Ponts at Chaussees Chef dl 

ExplOitation des Ports· de Bordeaux at de 1& Gir onde. 

He controlled American shipping in general but not in 

detail. Other French officers included a station commandant, a chief of Division of Patrol Ships of Gascogne, , 

which also had a lieutenant attached to the U. S. Navy 

as a liaison officer, and an Inspector General of Department of Civil Engineering and Assistant Chief of 

CentrAl Service of Military Ope rati ons of ?orts. Com.­

mander Patton sasras to have been 5u,)plled 1Jsned1ately 

"With a French li8l.son officer. A i·'rench naval port officer and an administrator of marine were maintained at 

Pauillac, the latter representing the Navy Commandant at 

Bor deaux.. At I.e Verdon a French station Ship, the 

Marthe Solange. served as an operation office for the 

convoy, and as a coaling, supply, and repair ship. The 

French Army of which the headquarters of the 18th Army 

Corps was in Bordeaux was also involved in the control 

of shipping a.s was the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce and 

the Pilots Association. 

The existence of war obliged the FI:ench to enforce 


certain requirements of vessels entering the Gironde in 


26, 

, 

J;, 

order 	to safeguard the interests "of the nation and to 

further its war effort. These requirements were enu­

::Jerated in printed instructions "Whi ell were preaented t o 

the masters of foreign· vessels. Upon their arrival at 

the entrance to the Gironde the vessels were requim 

to seal their Wireless apparatus; to fill in an exaaination form; to hand in all shipts papersj to sutmit a 

list of i:Jle na:nes of all persons on board; J3Jld to restrict persons from going ashore without the neces~ 

t peI"!U.ission. These requirements were designed to prevent 

the pommunicatlon of information hel.pful to the enemy; 

to prevent the entrance of enemy agents and sabateurs; 

to apprehend suspeoted persons; and to secure data use­ • i'ul for ha.'1.cUing the vessel while on the river. Atter 

:!lOoring i:1 the port the master had to furnish anotber 

list of t..he ruerabcrs or the crew ''Iith certain in!onnation 

and to restrict their landing without proper authorization. During the stay in harbor the movements of persons 

attached to the ship ~re strictly controlled through 

the issuance of identity carda and permits of circulation; communication with war prisoners was forbidden; 

only persons 'With the authorization of the marine authorities were to be allowed on board ship; persons 

boarding surreptitiously were to be reported, 8S were 

members of the crew leaving ships without permission. 

At sailing til'De irispectors bearded the ship to exar.1i.ne 

the identity Cards and to obtain their return; the captain was to insure that no suspicious person was on 

board and to furnish the names or missing members ot 

the crew, and before Sailing the ship had to have a 

"Sailing license." These regulations, established ac­ T cording to French laws, decrees, and orders of 1916 and 

, 	 1917 were enfcrced by the Navigation POlice, whose chief 

was stationed at PauiUac, where vessels were inspected 

on their way up the river. At this place a quarantine 

officer also boarded vessels to conduot a sanitary inspection. 

In the ports of Fran~e, American troop and store 

ships were obliged to pay for pilotage, ballast, water, 

towage, and handllng of lines. The French goverrment 

remitted the sanitary and qu..ay dues, and there were no 

custom house or passport charges. The pilotage fees 

were required by French laws and had. to be paid wheneTer pilot service was offered even tbJugh it was not 

accepted. Considerable correspondence was exchanged 

,;,i 
with the French go~rnment on this matter, the' U. S. 

Navy tal<: ing the stand that it should not have to pay 

and the French insisting that payment had to be made, 

exoept in the ease or American patrol vessels regularly 

assigned to the station. Admiral Wilson pointed out to 

the French the difficulty he would have 10 certify'ing 

to his government bills tor pilotage in cases where the 

pilot's services had been retused. The Chief of Staff 

ot the French U1.n1stry ot Ilanne took up the matter with 

Captain Jackson at Pari_ in April 1918 asking that it be 

referred to the government at Washington. In forwarding 

the communication from the Chief of Staff, Captain 

Jackson pointed out that the practice of ~ng the pi­ t lotage bill if required by port regulations even though 

pilotage had been refused was qu1te widespread and sug­ J 

gasted issuing instructioos aocordingly. TIle matter was 

referred by the Chief of Naval. Operations to the Judge 

Advocate General of the Navy Department who responded 

on Kay ll, 1918 by quoting a statement suba1tted by the 

State Department in the preceding year to the effect 

that the doctrine of international. law was that all vessels were subject to the revenue and polloe regulations, 

including those in regard to pilotage of the territorial 

waters which such vessels might enter. United State. 

vessels ware subject .to the rules and regulations ot the 

French ports,. and the oontrolling factor was not the 

nature of the certification or the pilo~age bill but 

that the port regulations made its payment opligatory. 

This opinion was accepted as the official policy of the 

Navy Department" a.nd Admiral Sim.s pubUshed it for the 

infor:nation and guidance of all forces in Europe in his 

circular letter no. 65 of July 16, 1918. 1 

The great increase in shipping on the Gironde River, 

the multipllcity or officers of various countries han­ J 

dling it" and the necessity for lmpoeing W8.l" time restrictions produced a oomplicated and contusing situation" which was never entirely free of dlfficulties and 

friction throughout the period of the war. For an understanding of this 6ituation, it is necessary to have a 

pioture of the conduct of operations on the river. 

Upon their arrival at the mouth of the Gironde 

River vessels were subjected to a rigid pro-cedure which 

lasted during their sojourn. Entrance to the river · 

through the protecting submarine nets stretched across 

28 

\ 

its mouth was under the watchful eyes of the escort 

vessels which had convoyed the ships to the river and 

the French patrol ship guarding the passage through the 

nat, which was kept open at all times. InfJide the net 

at La 	Verdon was the French station ship Yarthe Solange, 

an old sailing hulk, upon which was stationed the French 

offtcer in command of the convoy and the AMerican Naval 

COlllr.\unication or Uaison Officer, as he was later called. 

Inforooation as to the probable date of arrival of ~ssels 

was communicated to the Naval Port Of'ficer at Bordeaux, 

lfho notified the Army authorities when Arrrry cargoes were 

involved. At I.e Verdon roads the vessels were Vislted 

by the 'rench Navigation Police and by the American f 5aval 	Liaiaon Offl~er, the latter to present a cop,y of J 	 the Port Regulations and to receive a filled in form 

containing information about the ship neces~ for its 

handling. The radio apparatus was sealed and thereafter 

was unsealed only by the French authorities or by the 

U. S. naval district radio repair officer. Preparations 

were to be made for unloading the cargo while the vessels were still at the anchorage lnorder that no tilM 

would be lost after they reached the docks. Certain 

restrictions imposed upon the personnel of the ships by 

the French have been mentioned; others were stipulated 

by the U. S. Port Regulations. Liberty parties were 

allowed under no circumstances at Royan or St. Georges, 

but when vessels were to be at .I.e Verdon for several 

~s parties were permitted ashore Unde~ an oIricer 

accompanied by patrol. Data concerning the arri.als and. 

departures of ships was COlIItlWlicated to the CoISm.ander 

U. S. Naval Forces in France to whose staff it was useful. in planning and directing the movements of conVOY8 r and patrol and escort vessels. 

» The passage up the G1 ronda and the Garoru¥l was 

under the guidance or a series of French pilots each of 

whOI'D. collected a fae. Of:! the entrance the vessels were 

boarded by the Royan pilots, who saw them through the 

net to the anchorage at La Verdon. The I.e Verdon pilot 

took vessels as tar as Pauillac, Where inspections were 

made by the French Navigat10n Police and the san1tation 

autborit.ias. Vessels with cargoes for Bas8ens or Bordeaux ware takan to tho9:e places by tha PauiUae pilot, 

and tbe JIOorlng at tho8e places was in the hands ot 

still another pilot. The Bordeaux pilots had to be S8­

cured for subsequent changes of mooring at Bordeaux and 

29 , , 

~ 
Bassens and for entrance into the basin at the former 

place. On the voyage down stream this procedure was 

reversed. Dock regulations for the port on the river 

were issued by the French captains of the ports and 

C8!!1e to be incorporated into 'the U. S. Naval Port Regulations. So mauy pilots for a mere sixty mles of 

xi. ver were quite unnecessary, and the chief reason for 

having changes of pilot.s was to collect more fees..­

This, however, was not. a practice peculiar to French 

ports. 

Vessels were discharged by the service to which 

their cargoes were aSSigned. Uost of the vessels containing cargo for the U. S. Navy were unloaded at Pauillac, where a Transportation Department developed 

under ·the supervision ot a naval officer sUPordinate to 

the commandant of the Aviation Assembly and Repair Station. Crews of U. s. naval vessels wore requirod to 

assist in unloading in order to reduce the time spent 

in port. Work parties were organr.~d to di8charge certain holds on their ships, and when these were emptied 

the men were placed at liberty. The armed guard.8 on 

board the ships were used as sentrys at the gangways 

and at the holds from 'which cargo was being taken.. 

Assistance was giT8n by the Naval Dock Officer at Bassens 

and the ~Iaval. Port Orficer at BOrdeaux through 1Ibom. 

orders concerning the movements -of vessels were arranged. 

Daily reports were submitted to them as to the handling 

of the winches and gear, the consumption of fuel, and 

the progress of the unloading. 

Other services ware performed by the Naval Port 

Officer Bordeaux. He ha.'1dled all cable and telegraph 

oommunication and incoming and outgoing mall. He arranged for the transfer of naval personnel to-other 

bases in France and for the return of personnel to the 

United States. Fuel, water, ballast and ammunition 

were arranged for by the Naval Dock Officer at Bassens. 

,Arra::! cargo transports and troop transports were 

under the jurisdiction of the Army Transport Service 

from the time of their arrival at Le Verdon. Their 

berthing, discharging, .watering, fueling, ballasting, 

and guarding were handled by the representati'YeS of that 

service stationed at Pauillac, Bassens, and Bordeaux. 

'I11e reneed port. org811izatlon for base p:>rts such as 
that of Bordeaux-Sassens instituted by the Army in !lay 


1918 comprised Administrative, Operations, Troop and 


Cargo, Terminal Facilities, and Supplies Division, each 


having a number of officers. The responsioility for 


handling cargo from the ship's hold to cars, trucks, 


and warehouses was in the hands of the Chief Stevedore 


in the Troop and Cargo Division. The discharge of Army 


transports wa5 fatilitated by the practice of having on 


board an Army Quartemaster who was familiar '«1.th the 


manner in which they had been loaded. 


The Medical. Officer attached to the Naval Port 


Q.ffice had important duties connected with the health 


of shipsI creW and sanitary conditions on board _and 


ashore. Neither officers or crew !Ileaibers were allowed 


to leave the ship Wltil the medical inspection had been 


passed. Members of the crew found to be infected 1f:lth 


venereal diseases were confined to the ship; others 


having eontagious diseases were hOBpitallzed. A Naval 


dispensary was maintained at Bassens for the treatment 


of persons on the sick list and a dental office at Bor­


deaux. A report of the sanitary condition of the ship 


was made to the Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux. Aehes 


and garbage had to be placed on shore in proper con­


tainers-not dumped into the river. A medical officer 


acted. as liaison with the Army for the evacuation -of 


sick and wO'Wlded to the United States. Severe cases of 


sickness or injury were ' cared for in the ArmY BaSe Hos­ . pital at Bordeaux. 

By the middle of 1918 American naval per80nnel 

were a familiar sight on the streets pf Bordeaux, and 

at times there were h'Wldreds of them on liberty. Although the conduct or-these men was generally good, 

instances of disorderliness, rowdiness, and drunkenness 

in which persons were sometimes injured were sufficiently numerous to require the establishment of' a llaval 

Patrol by order of the Distri ct Comr.tander of June 21, 

1918. The duty o:f maintaining order and enforcing liberty regulations devolved upon the patrol, and by arrangement with the French the jurisdiction of the patrol 

was extended to the personnel of American merchant ships 

visiting the city. Liberty was allowod between the hours 

of 8 A. U. and 9:50 P. ~., but the patrol was on duty 

somewhat later in order to pick up strage1ers. Persons 

granted libert.y by the conur.anding officers of ships were 

31 

;j 
required to carry passes signed by their executive 

officers. Special. passes were granted tor attendance 

at theatres with the 1fB.nling that violations of the 

spirtt of the pass would result in diSCiplinary action. 

Ad.~.,-,:e as to the danger of infection from associating 

-Wi th prostitutes and the addresses of" Army prophylactic 

stations were supplied; badly diseased red light district.s were set up as restricted districts and men 

caught nth disreputable women were punished. Other 

causes of arrest were disorder, into:r1cation, refusal 

to obey orders of patrol, and absent overleave or 'lfithout leave. Tlle Naval Patrol at Bordeaux consisted of 

personnel attached to the Naval "Port Office. At 

pauillac no permanent patrol was formed, and patrols 

were !urn1Bhed by the ships landing liberty parties. 

A Naval Ferry operated between Bassens and Bordeaux 

was much used by naval persormel going to the latter 

on llberty. Since it was the largest city in the 

region, Bordeaux attracted liberty parties from. naval 

aoUvities t.hroughout that part of France. 

/ 

The Naval Port Officer held court two or three times 

a week, dispensing 'What "might be call.ed. naval justice. 

If Naval Regulations or the ru1es for courts and boards 

held, well and good, it not, he used his JJ1genuity, 

like a frontier judge of the United States, and devised 

penalties to fit the crime or misdemeanor. Private 

American citizens 'With grievances against the Navy or 

the French, and French citi zens, as well as Naval pet:'­

sonnel brought their troubles to the Naval Port Officer. 

In the military port of Bordeaux there were special 


dangers inCident to the liar ....hich baa to be countered. 


Deserters from the Allied forces were looking for means 
 I 

of escape, sometimes as stowaways on board ships in the 

harbor; Gennan prieoners were utill zed on the docks in 

labor gangs; spies sought means of communicating with 

ships; other agents attempted sabotage on ships and 

attempted to stir up dissatisfaction among their c~s. 

Consequently guards had to be maintained ccnstantly on 

ships and docks. American Naval personnel were "Warned. 

against bands of courtesans engaged in collecting :information for the enemy; these ....ere not only of the 

street walking variety but also the educated, welldressed type "Whose particular prey was Naval officers. 

32 1 
In 1916 a oounter espionage :!)"8t- wa6 beihg developed by tile U.S. Navy, which involved the assi_t 

of intelligence officers to the headqUarters ot the 

French milltary regions to cooperate witil the U. S. A.rray 

and French intelligence services. The dim-rict intelligence officer for Rochefort District was stationed at 

Bordeaux, and instructions were i8sued to the District 

COl!!!:l8ncier and the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux to 

£urni m him 'With i nformat ioo and to a ssist him in lds 

work. The officer assi gned to Bordeaux at the end ot 

February was Lieut. Comdr. William L. stevenson, 

U. S.N.R.F. He performed sane excellent work in organizing the counter espionage system in the 18th Army 

Region, in the opinion of his superior, Comdr. W ..R. 

S~les, the naval attache at Paris, but he did not 

establll5h proper relations 1Iith the District Cmunander 

at Rochefort and got i nto difficulties with his chief 

assistant, as a result of which bgth were dieenroUed . 

in June. 'ftle chief 8e:sistant became particularly unpopular with Commander Sayles because he represented 

himself as the naval attache in visits to ports south 

of Bordeaux. Ueut. Frede rick C. Havemeyer, U.S.N.R.F. 

succeeded stevenson at Bordeaux and remained there 

until tM end of the ~. 

The material condi tion of Bhips wall also a concern 

of the Naval Port. Officer. Repairs beyond the capacity 

of a ship t 8 force were handled by the repair officer, 

who fra:!.. the summer of 1918 had available for this ld.nd 

of work a repair ship, the U. S. s. Panther. There 

were dry dock and ship yards in Bordeaux, 1Ihere repairs 

were also made upon American vessels. The repair o.!fiear handled not only the naval vessels based on the 

I' 	 coast but also troop ships and cargo vessels whether 

Navy, Al'III3, or Shipping Board. Repair:s were al80 JDade 

by Arar:I establishments. The scareity of shipping made 

it imperative to keep all v88sels in operation as aueh 

of the time as possible. Radio repairs were taken care 

of b'J an affice at Sassen! . 

The estahl:1 sment of· adequate cO!:ll'lll.Ulications was 

of unusual inlpoz-t;.a.'1.ce to t he tJavalPort otfice at 

Bordeaux because of the distance of that port from the 

sea and be cause of its supervi. slon of other port o£­

fices on the river. For months the .tunerica.'1 naval port 

office ~stem was dependent upon the French lines ot 

, ~~ 
communication, which had never been planned for the 

load 'now put upon them. In the s'J."n:n.er of .1918 -wor'.{ was 

undertaken 'upon independent telephone and telegra;>h 

lines but progressed slowly, owing t o the lack of mate-. 

rial and to the indifference of the U.S. Arm.y to building purely Naval lines. In July 1918 a sul:rnar!ne cable 

was' laid between Royan and 19 Verdon; it worked a few 

days and then failed because of poor insulation. By 

the end of '1918 the Navy had cOIlstl"'.lcted a ccmplete . 

telephone circuit r~ Rochefort via Royan, La Verdon, 

Paull.l.3c, Borde~ux, aoo back to Rochefort. This system 

included two ~ables under the Gironde between Royan and 

I.e Verdon. All port officers could also cor.mtunf cate at 

this time by telegraph with the D1 strict COl!IlJlander. 

R:idi 0 schools were conducted at Bordeaux and Rochefort 

for coaching operators on ships. 

The last service performed by the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux and bis subordinates at Bassens and 

pauiliac for U. S. ships was to get them started on the 

haneward voyage. A. day or two before departure commanding officers called at the Naval Port Office for sailing 

orders. Ships ready to depart were required to make a 

search for stowaways, prepare a list of persons carried 

on board and a list of men left behind. After being 

cast off fran the docks vessels which had been di scharged .by the Army again came under naval author!ty. . The 

passage down stream was under the guidance of pilots, 

and at 18 Veroon French officials C8.1le aboard for an 

inspe ction. 

w Verdon was the assembly point for convoys bound 

for the United StatesJ "Which were referred to as the 

o. V. c:oovoys arrl which were made up of vessels from 

the Glronde River ports and other ports on t he southwest coast of France. No vessel.sJ except naval warships, were allOR"ed outside of tl'E nets guarding the 

entrance to the Gira1de without naval escort. The O. V. 

(V. for Verdon) oonvoy was established. towards the end 

of 1917 by the Commandant Superieur des Divisions de 

Bretagne at Brest, under a French naval officer on the 

Uartbe l§olange. As the French escort was inadequate, 

s6Te~al American yachts which had been serving farther 

north on the coast of France were based at La Verdon 

early" in 1918. The . vessels usually assigJ:led here during 1918 wore the Aphrodite. Corsair. Yay. Nokaois. 

34 

.... ~ 

"' . 

'! --' 

Noma. and the Wakiva. AlthouGh orders for the conyoxs .....ere issued by the French, the ocmmandcr of the senior _ 

Ameri ca~ escort ve ssel was given further infor.nation 

by the District c::mnander at Rochefort, on wOOse sta..fl 

the Operati ons Officer had charge of the escort vessels 

8ssi,gned to 1..00 di strict. The senior escort conwandBr.._. 

communicated his final and secret instructions in a 

meeting attended by the shipsI officers on the Marthe 

Solanee. The usual procedure was for a group of three 

American and one French escort vessel to accompany the 

ships to sea for two or three days when they disPersed 

on divergent. routes onthe open sea, and then the escort 

returned to the Gironde. For the first 50 :niles the 

escort, whose composition varied acoording to the number 

of craft available, was reinforced with gunboats and 

launches attached to the Gascony patrols. 

In the sUIJIIler of 1918 the num.ber of ships in a convoy ranged from; 22 to 56. With more or less regular .•" 

periods for libe.rty and repairs, the monotonous escort 

trips went on and on. In these more 3Outher.l water8 

there were few encounters 'With enemy submarines. Reports 

of the oonVQys were sent by the senior Ameri can officer 

to the District Ccanander. Between February and october 

1918 twenty-four O. V. convoys comprising 437 ships were 

escorted from La Verdon. 

After April 1918 ships sailing t'roo New York to 

Bay of Biscay ports weI'e convoyed directly in what were 

c&11ed H. B. convoys. The sa convoys were operated by 

the British Admiralty, as were all other eonvoys of 

cargo ships crossing the At lant1c, until September when 

the U. S. Navy, having acquired experience in running 

convoys, took over the operation of the "H. B. convoys; 

the more northern convoys traversing more dangerous 

routes remained under British control. The laden ships 

of the H. B. convoys were conducted by American or 

French cruisers to a rendezvous point off the French 

coast, where they were met by escort vessels which had 

brought out an O. V. convoy, and, whenever possible by 

destroyers from Brest, and takeri to La Verdoo for dis~" 

tribution t.o the ports to 'Which they were destined.. 

This systE!'D. required careful management and necessitat,ad a constant flow of communication between Admiral 

Wilson I s headquarters at Brest and Captain MecuJ.ly' 5 

headquarters at Rochefort, in addition to cocmun1cation 

~5 
I 

With tile Uldted stat•• and tile British Admiralty at 


London. An"angements at first were for convoys eVery 


1Jixt:.eeIi days, but by September there wau a fast store­
 , 	 ahip c<mwy tnery four days in add!tioo to slow con"'o~; 

they ccapr1eed an average of ten ships. The Navy 

Daparblent at t.ld.s time cmsidered increasing tJle mDber 

~ conw,-s.. but Acb1ral Sims advised an increase in the 

maher ot shipe on the conTOyS as the more numerous the 

CJalWO)'8 the _Bier it was tor the submarines to rind. 

and the JIOre escort vessels needed. ot the total 

of 255 aIllpa t.akon to tho Bay of Biscay in twenty H. B. 

CODYOTS 2~ were .lJIer1can. 

Sldp. oc:.1ng to La Verdon to. join the O. V. convoys, 

aIllpa brought to that place in H. B. convoys tor c!1.tribIlt.1on to other ports on t he coast, and ships engaged in 

coastw1ee traffic were escorted in coastal convoys which 

operated along th~ entire coast or the Bay of Bisc&;y". 

h_ cout.al emvoys were run by the French Navy, and 

tbe ottioer stationed on the Marthe SOlange at I.e Verdon 

:receiT8d orders pertaining to them. American naval 

...ssel.s CCIIpOaed three out of the eight units ot escort 

....saels empl.oyed on the coastal convoys. 

penn].c served "as a Sl'.pply base tor the American 

esoart fts8e1s. At the canplet1cn of each trip to 8ea, 

't.Iur ran up tbe river to coal from colliers anchored at 

that place or from tho coal pUs. at TrconpalOUj>. Hare 

tbB:r &180 cbt.a1ned other supplies, ino1uding water, 

, prOYi~on'" clothing, lubricating oil, gasoline, and 

engineering and ele otrlcal stores. Monthly visits were 

IIIIde by one or the yachts to Brest for other supplies 

not procurable at pauiliac. Because or the difficult,. 

of coaling the yachts there, due to the lac:k or bartha, 

tile D1etrict CUllllBnder reocmmended the acquisition ot _ lightens. To ....t the nosd which would snntuall.y 

exlst for a I!Ibore base for the vessels assigned to tile 

district, he suggestad, in a report of August 1, 1918 

TabIaDt p the IIOst sui.table place because of its 

nperlor locatioa. The construction of 011 tanka at 

Furt.wb1cb was progressing at this time, would have 

pnwldod a store tran which to supply oil burning 

de.troyers tor eacort duty-bad the war continued 

lmgsr. 

36 
American troop transports we!"le pl"O'f1ct.d with 


escorts. and routed by A.&D1ral Wilson I ~ beadqa.artera at 


Brest. These were g1ven preferential t.reat.-nt OYer 


the cargo convoys because they carried our .-:lpcM8l" aact 


becalS8 they ware larger and more valuable llhipa. 


Convoys of transports routed to the Oironcill andar the 


escort or destroyers, wh1 ch had met t.hea. at t.be re­ . dezvous in the At~tic, were re1nf'orced. at laDd tall. 

positions by the American escort vessels at.tacbed to 

the I.e Verdon station. It was 8OII.atilllBs neceaSU'7 to 

weaken the regular Vardon convoys in order to accoapUsh this. Instead. ot baing returned to the tbl1ted 

Statas 1n the regular O. V. convoys, the troopab1pa 

formad spacial O. V. COOToys and were given delltro,yer 

escort to a saf'a distance .rnm the coast, lIhanoa tba7 

proceeded alone, relying a'I tboir speed to ..- an;r 

chance submarines that JDight be encount.ared• 

.A1rplaoe escort ..... s alao prartded tor the COU¥0)8 


rra.. nearby naval air stations operated by t.bo. J'ral'" 


md the Americans. Tonrds the end of the war. attar 


airplane. escort had been regularlJ" provided ·tar _ 


time, it succeeded. in driving t.bs submarine. rro. 


the coast. out to sea, where ships were IIOre scat.tered 


and d1!f1cult prey. 


The O. V. convoys and the coastal· COlWOya ware 


largely compriIJed or Ameli can ships. For tbi. re&aGD 


and because the French did not operate tba cm'107S .. 
 efficiently as tboy lIl.ght bav., ~a1n 1Ic:Cul4 __ 


,.nded that control ot tbo _""Yo be acquired by t.bo 


U. S. Navy. He reportod.tbat the a.signaont or poaI.­

tiona to ships in the convoy was mt done. to the best \ 

advantage, that the French Tessels lacked aufficient 

signalmen, and that the conToy instructions _re ~ 

quently unsatisfactory. Should American control be 

establ1ehedJ he ·advised that the senior c<II1TU7 otl1cer 

should be stationed at Le Ver90n in· a veasel trca 1Ih1ch 

he could arrange the fonution of the C<lIlYO,J. to take 

care of t he increased number or vessels whl.ch st.at.1atic8 showed would bave to be handled, he propaaell the 

assignment of additional escort vessels and. 8tatlon1.ng 

·auxiliary vessels at paulll.ac and I.e Verdon. He 

believed that by means or American control efficiency 

'WOuld be increased. and. delays reduced. Adad.ra]. S1as 

directed Adm1ral1rilson on August 16, 1918 to as_ 

n _ 
I 

,-. 


, . 

full responsibility for handling the H. B. and O. V. 

convoys as soon as possible. The H.. B. · coo'tUte were 

taken over in the tollo1ldng lIIJnt.h, but lack of escort 

vessels appears to have prevented the adoption ot a 

s1ll1lar course tor the O. V.. and the coastal ConTOYS 

before the ArtD.stice ended the necessity for convoys. 

To develop the Garonne-Gironde system into an 

efficient port organization, in order to speed up the 

!::8~~O;t~s~~~ :.;u:d~t!0~~~~~~~tt~:Ver come numerous difficulties, Sa!l8 or which were physiC@l. 

1n character and others administrative. ~8ntlon has 

been made of the work Wldertaken .by the U.S. Arar:t to 

increase port and rail fac1lities) much was accorupllshed in this direction, but ship traffic on the ,ri'V9r was 

ccoge.ted after it got loto full SIring during 1918. 

The i.lDpOss:l.billty of constructing sufficient docks 

quickly enou.gh and the obstacles presented. by the river 

iteelf 1Ihlcb lJ as difficult to enter because of the tide 

and a bar, difficult to navigate because of sandbars 

and a narrow channel, and lack of depth, and di.fficult 

to anchor or moor in becau~ of the heavy tide, made 

it the more necessary to accelerate traffic by improving aonelitions tbat were not insurmountable. 

Among the causes of de~ encountered by American 

veese1s in steaming up the Gironde River were the police 

and san!.tatioo inspections cQlduatsd by the French officials at Pauillac. Nt American Naval. officer who investigated shipping conditions on the rivar in the 

spring of 1918 reported that these inspections re.sul.ted 1n delays amounting in some casas to 12 to 24 hours 

or even longer and nscassitated in 8Ot!l8 instances the 

return of ve~se18 to Le Verdon before they could proceed up the river. The azaelioration agreed upon for 

this oonditim will be referred to later. 

Vore irksome to the commanding officers of the 

ships 'WaS the necassity for stopping their progrel!ls 'utstream so many times to take on new pilots. Nor waa it 

agree8.ble to have to pay for pilotage that was not performed, yet the Pilots Association on the river kept 

track of the lOOVem.ents of ships and sent them bills 

dllWld1ng pafll8nt for pilotage. The refusal at first 

on the part of Americ.m Naval. authol'1ties to pay for 

38 
pilotacs 'When services were not performed irritated the 

French pilots and caused them. to perpetrate deliberate 

delays in handling 8h1p.. Waiting in midstream at 

Pauillac tor sBT8ral hours or overnight for a pilot and 

during the lIhole time keeping the engine running in 

order to shift the ship with changes in the tide was __ 

not calculated to promote good Franco-American relations 

nor the prosecution of the war. Not Wltll the s\IClIlLer 

of 1918 was thi 8 matter settled, after reference to the 

Na"IY Department and securing a legal opinion, by the 

issuance of instructiens ..nich directed ~he pa;yment of 

pilots whenever their services were offered. 

Once at the docks, delay was again likely to be 

lIet because of lack of b~rths, railroad cars, stevedores, 

equipDent, and harbor craft, and improper stowing or 

cargo at the ports in t he United states. Bertha wert! 

built, railroad cars, stevedores, and eq,uipment were 1mported, and tugs and lighters provided, and the tum 

around was improved. Battallons of negro laborers 

brought over by the Army for use as stevedores wore kept 

in camps near Bassens. Sme difficulty was 8lCperienced 

in converting cotton banda into cargo handlers, but the 

tran9JlUtation 'W8.S gradually effected. Additional German 

war prisoners -qre obtained for this work. In· their CJml 

country they 'Would have dale good l'IOrk, but in Frmce 

they did oot want to-and wouldn l t. Discharging VOlssele 

was more an Arm:3 problem than a Navy one, and t.ha 

remedies ..."" largely or milltary deviaing. TO speed 

up the unloading of its own vesselS, the Navy required. 

their crmrs to assist the labor availAble in port. 

Assistance was also afforded the Navy by officers of 

the A.l'my Transport semce. kong the forces of the 

latter organization a competitive system of discharging 

ships was· inaugurated to speed up the work, showing by 

means ot charts the progress made hy the various outfits 

in the "Race to Berlin." 

Reports submitt43d by the Dietrict Commander at 

Rochefort C«ltainad suggestions as to means of preventing delBiYs. A pem.anent Naval Port Detachment was 

reCCXllllllncied as a method of enabling Naval vessels to be 

discharged entirely by Naval personnel. More careful 

stooge of cargo in the United. states would make easier 

unloading in France. Each port should have a marine 

Superintendent who should be a Naval officer assigned 

39 

to tile I.rrq ror Uaison duty betw.oeIl Na ...l Port Orricor. 

_ &rq Tnnsport SeMiC8 officers. In the United. 

St.IItes there _uld be an ofUcer f ..lliar with oonctltiona aJ._ tbe French coast. A further way of expediting 1lhipp1Dg ........nt. 1IOUld be tho adoption of a demur­

........_. wII1ch would ontail tho. _t of charges 

ror tbe detont.1en of ships. 

, Occaa1.cnally it was necessary to supply coal or 011 

to a TaRsal. in order to enable it to leave the river. \ 	 1111. could be done only with great difficulty, for fuel 

had to he iJIpOrtod. A roc"",,"ndation by Captain IIcCully 

that. ships lNrlng the United State. be required to 

carr.r eoough tuel to make the return voyage was forwarded by Admral Sima to Washington with an endorsement to 

the effect that be understood it to be the department I B 

policy to 'fuel vessels for the round trip. When this 

was not possible, he stated that it WJuld be recessary 

for additional ruel to be sent 1n other vessels. He 

added that the construction of 011 tanks on the west 

coast of France lOuld make it possible to provide ema11 

quantities of 011 to vessels that might require it. .A 

practice follCM"ed wi. th fuel as with other supplies was 

to haft ships carrying an extra quantity \UllOM some 

Cor the use of ships that might be short. 

To provide st~bili ty, proper immersion to the 

screw, and manueverability, it was nece ssary to ballast 

ships returning to the United states 80S there were few 

goods t.o be eXjXlrted. Ballast, chiefly iron pyrites, 

lI'Mt avauable at a reasonable price, but it required 

labor, rolling stock, and animal transport to load it, 

and thBse things were dirficult to obtain and were 

needed for unloading cargoes. Tbe Shippine Board and 

the Amy Transport Service during swruaer months required 

ships to ca.rr'7 water ballast 1n their double bottoms, 

but ~he Navy app&rently did not favor such an infiexibl. 

rule, which did not distinguish between oil burners and 

coal burners.. the .latter of which had coal to serve a,s 

ballast. Free water 1n tlE holds 'Was tried but proved 

.,re dancerous than no ba1last at all. Some vessels 

successfully used box tanks in tb9 holds, lI'hich could 

be utilized .ror carrying cargo, and consic.eration of 

this method Wu.s reCOl:lnended by Captain McCully. The 

amount of ballast to be carried by naval vessels was 

determined in a oonforence between their casters and 

40 , 
the naval port ~uthoritie.. a method regarded b.r COpta1n 

McCully as being unsatisfactory becau~ not eact. Hie 

proposal ..... for an inspection of eaoh ehip b.r a _­

col board in lbited state. ports to decide the -.unt of 

ballast to be carried for various ccndit10D8 and t.be 

mesne of carrying it. 

The increase of ahipping on -the G1ronde. the 1nelliperience or IlI8I1Y of the officer8 and crews OIl Ute ab1pe~ 

and their unfalliliarity witil the region 08_ cal.l.1­

siona, resulting 1n damages to U.S. Naval "'S8818 ..d 

French vessels. Pursuant to U.S. NayY Regulations. 

such cases were settled according to the French Port. 

Regu.laticne 'by special boards, which were appointed to 

determine the re5ponslbl11ty and the amount ot tJ:. 

damages. When French vessels were responaible for 

d4mage to U.S. Naval vessels, they made pro.pt pa;yment., 

but there 'Was no wfJY in lIhich the same treatll8nt could 

be accorded thea. when the circumstances were nneraed. 

Pay officers refused to make p8¥ment for repairs becauee 

they had no appropriation frc1ll which it oould be pe1d, 

nor did the Navy Department have any appropriation 

available. Some French shipping companies paid large 

amounts to the United States, but cOUld eecure no p&l'"­

menta from it for dQm.ages caused thei r ships by U. s. 

Naval vessels. Such cases, reported Captain ).fcCul1y, 

. brcught the geod n&I1le of the United States into di.... 

repute. He recommended in May and again in August 1918 

that funds be made available for t he prompt pa;yment in 

cash for damages caused by U.S. Naval vessels. 

"further 

Even 

delay 

when 

saIlltimes 

a ehip had 

happened. 

been discharged 

Departure 

and 

U-

~ 

arriyed, and t~ officers arid crews were not on board. Tba 

maintenance of d1scipline among g:r"een shipe' f'orces, 

hard enough at best, was made more difficult. by t.he lmcertain and complicated control and administration on 

the river. When it lias not knolm what to do, the role 

was do as you please. Lax discipline was espea1ally 

bad on Shipping Board ehips, whose masters at t1.aes 

interposed triflinF reasons for delaying their departure. 

As a means of promoting diSCipline, Captain JI~ 

recommended a system of observation and report <Xl the 

masters of vessels and an improvenent of the SY8t«l1 uSed 

for the cornmandine officers of U.S. Naval TBssela • .Of' 

sterner character was his proposal that all cargo 

41 

I 

._ i 
vessels operating in the war zone be taken over and 


manned by the Navy. 


At the convoy station at Le Verdon, vessels assembled for the west'tiard voyage and .....aited for the 

-escort vessels, if they happened not to be on the spot, 

lI'hich was the case at times because there never were 

enough vessels for the duty. To facilitate the arrangecent of the convoy, captain Mccully attetlpted to keep 

_an Ac.erican Naval vessel stationed at La Verdon, but it 

was necessary at times to send it away on other duty. 

P.aJ there been a Naval vessel with a suitable staff 

stationed at La Verron, the time spent here by ships 

waiting to go up the river or lI'aiting for convoy could 

have been utili zed 1n exercie1ng and training signalmen 

and radio menJ conducting boat drills, and to inspeet 

the ships to see that regulations were complied with.. 

Captain YcCully wanted to statim there an ofn cer of 

the rank of commander with experience in convoy work 

to t1Ake up ClJrNOYs and iSBue their- inetructions.- Had. 

the ",ar continued longer this step probably would have 

been taken, and the convoys placed under American Naval 

control. 

Better results mieht ~ve been obtained at Bordeaux 

and at other port offices in the Rochefort District, if 

additional personnel had been provided. The Dietrict 

Conttander pointed out that communicating info~tion 

about the arrival of ships to all the persons ooncerned 

was a complicated matterJ requiring more personnel to 

accomplish properly. 

In the latter part of 1918 :lome processed Port 

Regulation5 'Ware issued by the Naval Port Officer, 

Bordeaux for the instruction and guidance of masters of 

vessels arriving on the river. The first edition clearly sho1rs the origin of the ·regula.tions by a ppending to 

it num.erous French and American orders regulating traffic on the river. Revi5ions issued in Jaruary and 

!larch 1919 were less of a compilation and more of a 

finished product and embodied further experience. 

These were undoubtcd1y of great assistance to shipsI 

officers. 

The primary cause for the delays to shipping on 


the Gironde was the lack of a coordinated systEm of 


42 

TiTTY -- = __,
cootrol during most of the war. Reaching an agreement 

was, in itself a difficult matter becau!e of the divereified character of the shipping and the multiplicity 

of the authorl ties attempting to handle it. The 

folloong classes of vessels arrived 1n t he district: 

-u.s. Naval Transports 

U. S. Navy Chartered Transports 

U.S. 	 Naval Tessels with cargoes for Army, Navy, 

and French 

U.S. 	 cargo vessels for Amy, Navy, French, and 


neutral powers 


A.llied ve " ssels with cargoes for AI'1J'/Y and Navy 

Neutral vessels with cargoes for Amy and Navy 

U.S. 	Shipping Board vessels ·with cargoes for 


Army, Navy, and French 


U.S. Shipping Board vessels chartered to Frencb " government 	 .' 

U.S.. Shipping Board vessels operated by private 

.American parties 

U.S. 	 Shipping .Board vessels chartered to pr1vate 

French parties 

Special 	vessels in service ot,U.s.. Arrrr::r, U.S. 


Navy and Aviat1. on 
 " Private ve5sels chartered to various parties 

Special methods were necessary for handl:ing each class ~ 

or vessel. For the two first classes procedures were 

eventually 'WQriced out which opP.rated with litUe dU'­

ficulty . 

The &uthorities conoerned 1n handling the shipping 

from the United States-were as follOtrSf 

u.s. Naval Port Officers 

U.S. Military 8u:thortties (A%'1n1 Transport Service) 


French Naval authorities 


French e1vil authorities (Ponts et Chaussees) 


U. S. Consul:! 


Calsuls of Allied and Neutral Powers 


Naval Port Officers of Allied Powers 


U.S. Naval. Information Service (Office of Naval 

Intelllg1mce) 


Printe consignees, ship brokers, etc. 


4S 


k 

In "- at Ws aixture of 1II111tary and ciVil authori­

-t.iea of 'Yarlous countries and French private 1ntereets, 

it 18 not surpria1ng that it ..... dift1 cult to reacb an 

....0' It tor the control of eh1pping. Tbe Fromcb 

author.l.ties and intereats had been running things and 

..tural4 wmlted to oontinue doolng eo. The American 

authoriti•• ""re inotructed to opeec! up the tum around 

or Tessels SJ they were das1.rou8 of removing aU obstacl.es to the "'Wllents of shipe. A1l parties were intluanced br political considerations, by local ~actic.8, 

lIT internat!.onal 10" and custaa, and by jealou01•• or 

tha1r reapect.in ser'lioes. 

IPng before the vol,""" of trotfic on tho G1ronde 

began to be _anded by the arrival Of American cargoes, 

the need tor agree:nent as to·its control was reaU Md. 

C_der Patton 1n September 1917 1ll'1led upon Admiral 

Sills the neC8ss1v for g1"rlng attention to the question 

of A.nI;r and Hay ach1n1straticn and cooperation at 

Bordeaux and that suitable inltructions be sent to b1a. 

At the t!.ae tbo U. S. N&V7 Dop..,.;"'nt set up the distr:1ct orgard..uon in France, it was g1:v1ng consideration to the .attar ot reaching an agreement whereby aU 

_rican _po enterlng tl'" districts lIOuld he subject 

to the orders of U~ S. Naval authori ties and asked. tor 

the rec....wndatlcns of Aarlrals Sima and WUBCIll on the 

eubject. 

After jMrican Naval. forces had been operating for 

several months en the French coast, recommendations 

began to be received at the headquarters in Brest. coqcarning the bandllng 01 shipping. In an endorsement 

dated Karch 16, 1918, to a OOlIIIunication from Lieut. 

Ccndr. &sra o. Allen, of the U.S.S. WakiTa, perte1.ning 

to tbe lllission of U.S. Naval Port Officers, captain 

McCul.l¥ ad1'Oeated the extension of the actl vities ot 

the port officers to include all American veslMls. He 

believed Shipping Board vessels were capable of t nce 

the work they were performing, if their movements were 

under a leU systematized cootrol. An extension of 

the port officer system would be necessary to establish 

this cantrol. In place of absolute control of shipping 

by the U.S. Ma-.y, which might not be necessary or des1reble, be thought that the sh1l'plng could be managed 

ef'f'1.c1ent.l.y b7 disseminating information concerning 

....&IQlts or ships through NaYal. headquarters at Brest, 

44 

where a Transportation Officer would be necessary. A 

representative of this office would be needed in the 

Un1 ted states for coordinating purposes. !kJth of these 

letters 'Were COtIIIlunicated by Admiral Wl1son to District 

Commanders for their information and guidance. He 

planned at this time to make Allen the Transporatlon 

Officer 1n charge of the Naval Port Officers. 

~er1encE15 subsequently' met by troop t.ran3pOrt8 

in ascending the Glronde ellcited reports n-o. tbeir 

ca:amand1ng offieers on the need for improved raetboda 

of ccntroll1ng shipping. Upon the arrival. of the 

U. S. A.. T4 Q. Oriente at I.e Verdon report'W3JJ _de 

to tl)e Naval Port Officer at .Bordeaux, Lieutenant 

Bernier, who sent sailing orders _to tm captain of ta 

ship, and Lieutenant COIllIMllder Barstow, lfar1.ne SUperintendent, A. T. S. at Sassens, also sent sailing orders 

to the master of the ship. From. the mouth of the river 

to the docks, four pilots were taken on board, and a 

visit was made by police authorities to inspect personnel. An A.my officer cae 00 board at Pau1llac and 

delivered orders to the captain who turned thaa onr 

to the senior naval officer. As vessels were being unnecessarily delayed in their passage up the riTer ,by 

this diversity of control, Lieut. Comdr. R. R.. Smith 

of this 'Vessel, recQDr.lended the establishment of the 

office of commandant of the Gironde district under a 

captain or the U4 S. Navy in order to centrall., the

control of lJ. 54 ships under Naval authority. In the 

same month, K~ 1918, the u. S.. S. Martha Waahington 

upon reaching Pauillac was directed by the A:nq representative to proceed to American BasS8Ds nth a favol'­

able tide, but the Fnlneh barbormaster retused to allow 

it to continue Wltil the next tide which was DOt until 

the following lIOrning. Lieutenant Bernier's explanaticn for this delay was that it was the result or dBWlderstanding and lack of coordination betwem the 

Nav;r and the Army and confiict of author!ty between 

French civil and naval authorities. 

The difficulty experienced by the Martha lIaahin'!ton 

and other Army transports apparant~ led to an agree­

:::Lent betlfgen the ArrAy Transport Serv.1ce Super1nt.endent 

and the Naval Port Officer concerning the extent ot 

their authority. It was arranged that infomation about 

ships arriving at La Verdon would. be communicated to 

4S 

, 


the ArmY at Bordeaux via the "Naval Communication Oft:lcer at La Verdon and the Naval Port Officer, Bordeaux, 

and that, instructions as to the movements of the ships 

'WOuld be trm1s:nitted by t IE Naval authorities. After 

the ships received these instructions at I.e Verdon, 

their further handling was Wlder the A:t'my Transport 

Service. ' The Navy was not to be involved again until 

the ships we re discharged and cast off from the docks. 

Thus a definite agreement was attained, which was designed to avoid conflicting or duplicating orders. 

After the establishment of the Naval Overseas 

Trm sportation Service in the Navy Departm.ent in January 

1918, to direct the operations of. the cargo vessels 

operated by t he Navy, greater interest developed i n the 

department in t he turn around of Naval vessels i n t hE' 

ports of France. The Director of the N. O. T. S. , 

COIUdr. Charles Bellmap, Jr., wrote Admiral Sims concerning this matter, expresa1.ng approval of the appoint :nent 

of port offi cers, 'Which he indicated correspond to t he 

District Supervisor~ of the N. O. T. S. in ports of ~ 

United Stat... In April 1918 the Chief of Navel operations, under whan the N. O. T. S. functioned, ordered 

a party of officers headed by Ueut. COmdr. Daniel 

Bacon, U. S. N. R. F., a man of considerable experience 

in merChant shipping, to duty in Francs as representatives of the N. O. T. S. Admiral 51me was sanewhat uncertain wha.t to do with these officers and requested a 

report with recommendation from. Aaniral Wilson, who 

responded on !.lay 9 in a letter in "Which he referred to 

the increaso of shipping in Frencb ports and. to the inadequate facilities for handling it. As these facilities could be obtained only with great difficulty, 

except through the Naval Port Officers, they had assumed control of American vessels in French ports and 

of foreign vessels in American servioe. He continued 

as follows: 

4. There appears to be a strong tendency 

toward separation of t~ control of vessels of 

these various classifications.- Fran previous 

correspondence and from the daily press, it 

seems to be intended that there shall be in each 

port separate representatives to control each of 

these ' classes of vassels. This will lead to confusion of effort and to oonsiderable delay in the 

46 

• 
handling of vessels whose port rapreaentatives 

have not a control of the pO!rt facilities. 

Wh,p,t 1s required is an organi zation to insure 

that each vessel, regar41ess or classification, 

shall be boarded at 1ts first anchorage on the 

coast of France by an English speaking official 

caapetent to give the Captain or master tull information as to his f'uture movements, and infor­

:nation as to the bertbihg of the ship, repairing, 

fueling, hoapitaJ. and ballasting !acillties ot 

the port, pUotage, etc. The organization must ke~ the vessel under constant scrut1nywh1le in 

" port to insure that no till!8 i8 "WUlecessarl1y 

lost in discharging the ysssel"or 1n dispatching 

frem the port. Charts and hydrographic infor.nat10n must be available. Such an organ! zat10n 

can be handled only by the Navy, and there haB 

been established for this purpose a aystem. of 

Naval Port Officers. For the further development of this system. there j,.s nOW' required 1n the 

office of the Commander U.S. Naval.. Forces in 

Frm ce an officer of eJq)erience and rank whose 

function will be to direct and coordinate the 

activities of the Naval Port Ofticers and to 

control in all respects American merchant shipping except in matters or convoy and escort and 

matters pertaining to ~rcmnt seamen which will 

"be handled through the Operations Officer and by 

the U.S. consuls as at present. In order tha't 

this officer have the necessary power it 

seems necessary that the Commander U.S . Naval 

Forces in Frat ce be constituted the representa· 

tive in Fra'lce for t;.he United States Shipping 

Board and for the Naval Overseas Transport 

Service. 

Upon the arrival of Ueutenant Cocma.nder Bacon 1n 

London, Admiral Sims ordered hi.rn to Paris for conferences lIith representatives of the Navy, the Army and 

the U.S. Shipping Control Committee, and to Brest for 

consultation with Admiral Wilson, then to return to 

London. Atter canpleting th1:s tour Bacon was assigned 

to Pauillac with his party of six men to investigate 

conditions there and to prepare suggestl00.s for managing ships at other porta. The party reached pauillac 

on M~ 18, and on the 23rd Bacon was back in London 

47 

again reporting to Admiral Sims. In an mdorsement 

or tJ1e !ollCJllfing da¥ to Aaniral Wilson I s report of 

May 9, Admiral Sims Wl"Ote to the Secretary of the Navy 

as follows: 

The s1.tuatioo in European ports, and parti·cularly 

the Fre:l.ch ports with respect to control ot United 

States ah1pplng 1s unsatisfactory, and it is 

thought that the movements of ships could be very 

much expedited if all vessels were placed under 

the control of the Navy. The ideal plan to r:'\eet. 

wartime requirements would be to have all vessels 

reg~arly commissioned Naval vessels, but 1n the 

absence of such an arranganent, which 1s recognized as impracticable at present, the next best 

thing would be to have all vessels when in port 

subject to Naval jurisdiction in all matters concenrlng their movements and discharge. 

He referred to the establishment of Naval Port Officers 

in Europe and to the fact the t they lacked authoti.ty 

to deal with any but regularly cor:mUsai.oned Naval vessels. He regarded the creation of the N. O. T. S. as 

a step in the right direction. He did not endorse 

Admiral Wilson's suggestion that he be designated as 

representative of the Shipping Board and the N. O. T. 5., 

but be did reconmend. that the Na"V"y be given 

authority to control the movements, 1'Ihile in 

port, of all vessels flying the United States 

nag. or under marter to the United States 

Qovemment, including vessels in the service of 

t..he U.S~ ArtIy. With respect to the last named 

'983sels, it seems deSirable, under present con- · 

dit.1ons, that the discharge of cargoes and the 

landing of troops be under Army authority. 

The letters of Admirals Wilson and Sims were 

re.ferred by the Chief of Naval Operations, who was 1n 

accord with their views, to t.he war Deparbnent and 

were considered by the staff of the A.. E. F. 1n France. 

General James G. Harboard, he» of the Serv.l.ces of 

SUpply, reported to General Pershing that tIE oper:ation 

of the tl'Clsports while in French ports, including 

their discharge, was so closely related to the work of 

the te:r.n1nal faCilities, warehousing, railroading, and 
, 


dealing wi th the various supply departments that it 

should remain under Army control. It was no ti._ to 

substitute something new for a SI!1oothly working organi zation. Upon reading the foregoing statement. in a 

letter from Pershing, Admiral Sim3 1'f:i. sely concluded 

that a change fran A.rmy to Navy control was inadrlsable. 

By t.hi" time closer cooperation had doveloped between 

the two services. 

Admiral Wilson had also been in touch with the 

Director of the Arnry Transport Service concerning the 

discharging of Naval vesselsJ ~ich was difricult tor 

the Na"Vy to e.ffect since the Army had contro1 or. .,Bt 

of the facilities. The willingness of the A:rr;q to unload or assist in unloading Naval vessels whenever 

practicable apparently made it unneces~ for Admiral 

Wil80n to carry through a plan he had for t.l"e establishment of a Naval organi zation for for dischargi..ng 

vessels. 

Lieutenant C~~der Bacon ret urned to Pauillac 

for duty in connection with the handline of shipping. 

but remained there only until the mi,ddle of June, beine 

detailed then to Brest, whence he returned to the 

United States in the following month. He became cooneeted thereafter with the aciuinistratlon of N.. 0 .. "!'. S. 

matters in the Navy Depart."Dent, giving it the benefit 

of the knowledge he had acquired of conditions in 

France. Four members of his party became penaanently 

attached to the station at Pauillao, while the others 

were soon sent away. 

In a letter of Ma,y . 27, 1918 to Admiral 11118On, 

Adniral Sims re~rked about the shipping problea in 

France that "It is not in the least our fau1t. There 

is evi:jent lAck of coordination of tilese various !unctions in ·Kashington." There was evidently soce truth 

in this statement, for early in 1919 the Director or 

the N. O. T. S. and the Shipping Board corresponded 

concarning the designation of a liaison representati..e 

to expedite business bc~'!':;:.en the two a gencies. 

The situation a~ Paulllac was L~roved towards 

the end of Ma:t 1918 as a r e sult of an agreement betaeen. 

the Army and the Navy. In deali.ne vrith American or.ricers at Ulat place the French port officers were 

49 
Wlcertain whether to take up matters lti.th the Naval 

Port Officer, -the commandant of tl'.e air station, or the 

AnIry Transport Sem ce officer. After the French called attention to the Pauillac situation at a meeting in 

Pari8, Brigadier General Atterbury proposed to Admiral 

Wilson that a trial be made or having the AI'TJrl" officer 

detemine priority for ships berthing there. This 1f88 

agreed to as a tElllporary fOOasure by the Navy, which was 

willing to try anything to better cond1t1on~ at Pauillac 

docks. As late as October 1918, however, trouble was 

still being experienced-at Pauillac in the discharge of 

vessels. 

Early in June an agreement was reached 'With t he 

French as to the whole shipping situation on the Giron<ie. 

This seems' to have resulted pr1:narily from the effor ts 

of Lieutenant Commander stevehson, the Intelligence 

officer who had been assigned to Bordeaux, whose instructions directed hill to investigate the causes fo r 

the dela,ys to shipping on the Gironde River. Poe looked 

into the matter and discussed it with Bernier, Barstow.. 

and Major C. A. Stern, ArrII¥ Transport service officer 

at Bassens, all of whOm stated that political conditions 

had prevented improvement. Eelieving ULat SOI:I.ething 

could be accomplished, Stevenson went to Brig. Cen. 

~. S. Scott, commanding Headquarters Base section NO.2, 

Bordeaux, presented the matter to him and discussed the 

remedies. At a meeting called by General Scott, attendee by the French admiral, the Army Transport Service 

officer, the Marine Superintendent at Bassens, the 

U. S. Naval Port Officer, and the Uo. S. Consul, a prelicinary arrangement was made to overcome delays to 

shipping. 

Not long after the foregOing arrangement had been 

effected, Admiral Wilson oo~unicated to the District 

Commanders in France a letter from the Dir~ctor General 

of Transportation, U. S. Army, to General Scott, embodying an arrangement which had been negotiated nth 

the French ror increasing the efficiency ot U. S. Shipping on the Gironde, providing as follows I 

A. 	 Direct American telephone service between the 

French port offices and the American o.ffices. 

B. 	 Sanitary and pollce inspection of Arm::! and 


Navy transports at La Verdon instead of at 


50 
Pauil1ac. 

'!'J 

C. 	 Shipping Board vessels 'With mixed and civilian 

crews carrying col'!!Cl.ercial cargoes were to submit. to the same rcgulatior.s as the ships 01' 

French and Britisb merchant ships. Such ~sJll:ele as carried careo for the French government were to be considered and treated as 

military vessels. 

D. 	 U.S. Transports to be boarded by U.S. Naval 

Orficer at La Verdon, representing both Army 

and. Navy, to secure infornatlon and to give 

movenent and bert..~ing instructions. A direct 

line of commWlicatlori was thus established 

betlreen transports arriving at Le Verdon and 

the offices at P&uillac, Bordeaux, and Ba~sens. 

The ArnW Transport S'3rvice off~ cers were to 

inform ttE Naval Port Officer of expected arrivals and tm berths to be used, which information the Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux 1fa8 

to transnit to t.he French -authorities. 

E. 	 French pilots were to take vessels from 

Le Verdon to their berths at Pauillac, Eordeaux, 

and Bassens lti.thout stoppine for change of 

pilots or for inspections; the pilots to be 

returned by boat or by train to La Verdon It. 

the experu;e p£ the United States. 

F. 	 Transports were to be allcwed to move during 

the night as soon as Colonel Clavel lJa8 

eatisf'ied that there was sufficient. tar-boat 

pOll'er. 

G. 	 All pilots lIere to be under the control of 

the French Naval authorities. 

H. 	 Berthing was to be arranged and decided between officers of the AnDy Transport Service 

and the U.S. Naval Service, and berthing 

orders were to be transmitted to the French 

port authorltie. throu@j1 the Naval Port 

Ofticer at Bordeaux. 

I. 	 Berthing of' either Naval or Army transports 

containing exploslves was to be handled by 

the Army, lVb.ose job 1t was to get the exploeives away from docks. 

This disposition of matters covered many of the problems 

that had arisen, but it was unfortunate that it had not 

51 

been 8CcaIlplished earlier because the bulk of the troop 

tran3pO~ had already arrived and departed. 

11le series of agreements 1\Ihich have been described 

did no1:. settle all of the difficulties on the Gironde. 

Soae or tiE stipulations of the accord with the French 

did not f!P into effect. The Port Regulations issued 

subsequent thereto indicate, for instance, that the 

p1.1otage system continued as before, as do entries in 

~og books or ships that visited Bordeaux, although 

changes in pilots do not al....ays seem to have been made. 

JudginE .from the follOlfing line5 in the Port Regul.at.iOllS of January 1919, the A.~ and the NaVY' had a 

dl.f'1'erence of opinion ooncerning Sailing orderst 

The Ifarine Superintendent, Army Transport 

Serrl.ce. Bassent3, is endeavoring to usurp this 

proper duty of the Naval Port Officer. That 

ol'1'icer bas been infoIlBBd that such ordere are 

not proper. 

eo.mand1ng Officers of U.S. ships are 1nst~cted nat. to :receive "5team" or "sailing orders" 

.f'rOI:a the Army, e,xcept in case of emergency. If 

5Ildl an oroer is delivered to a U.. S. ship it 1'1'111 

be returned with the following endorsement: 

-aet.umed.. By direction of the U.S. Naval Port 

Of'flc:er, Bordeaux, you are informed- that no steam 

order or sailing order fro:n your office will be 

obeyed, e%Capt in an e:ner&ency case. Such order 

should originate fI'OCl U. S. Naval Port Officer, 

Bordeaux, or his representative. tt 

"ntis t.ype or direction would seem to be the kind that 

sboul.C. !!9! have been put in the port Regulations. 

J. I18tbod of getting around the Fre1'ich Navigation 

~llce inspection of personnel attached to U. s. ships 

t.ba:t. was considered by U. S. Naval authorities is 

..rthy of 8eI'lt.ion. This pro}X)sal was that to avoid 

the inspection of suspected persons by the French, 

sbips' personnel should be thoroughly examined before 

l.eawing tbe Un1ted States, and a certificate issued to 

the -.ater or cOllimanding officer to a&tisfy the French. 

P..egul.&r Hll'ral personnel serving on U. S. ships had 
I 

means of identification, but this was not allf8.ys trl!e , of civilian Cl"8'W'S. 

Although the lfar ended 'Trith the ar.nistice or 

November 11, 1918, the U. S. Naval Port Officer at 

Bordeaux was contim,1.ed for almost a ~ar longer. The 

naval port organization built up during the war was 

used afterwards in returni ng soldiers to the Un1ted 

States, handling Bt.oreships bringi ng in suppUes fo~ 

the troops remaini ng in France! assisting Shipping 

Board vessels, which began arriving YI'1th ca:werc:i.al 

careoes, and ships lIi th careaes of relief food and suppUes sent over by the Food Administration and the 

American Relief Administration. All of these act1vities 

made the Naval Port Office at Bordeaux a busier organization than it had been before. 

CCI'!mlander craft 'Was relieved as Naval Port Officer, 

Bordeaux, on NOV8l:!lber 2:5. 1918 by Capt. Frank D. Berrien, 

who had been engaged in strenuous duty as a destroyer 

escort cotDJllMder. No long afteI"l'fard Captain Berrien was 

instructed that his author!ty covered the supervision 

and control of American shipping in the Gironde RiTer 

from Bordeaux to the Bea, except for the paufllac air 

~ station. IJ.e'ltenant Bernier continued to seI"'le as executive officer, being concerned also nth the settlement 

of cl.a:iIil.s. The personnel on duty in the office in 

December 1918 totaled 546 men, of whom 102 were comprised in the Naval Patrol. 

V/hen Captain McCUlly lfa!! ordered to northern 

Russia, he was succeeded as District ~cmr.ander at 

Rochefort on October 5" 1918 by Comdr. r.-ar R. Leahy, 

who had been,attached to the district office since the 

previous February. The district organization in France 

was demobilized on November 25, but a Naval Port 

Officer was continued at Roche!'ort. The Naval Port 

Officer at Royan was aboUshed at this time. That at 

pau1llac operated under the coJrlllandant of the Aviation 

Assembly and Repair Station froc. about tb.1s time until 

February 1, 1919 when it was returned to the jurisdiction of the Naval Port .Off1 cer, Bordeaux. 

The embarkation or- troops 'from France was placed 

by General Pershing 'W'lder the Chief Quarte.rmaster, and 

ports of embarkation were designated at Brest, , 

55 

l 
St. Naza..1re, -8nci Bordeaux. It was planned to make more 

axtensi.ve use of Borc:teaux than had been made in bringing t _roops to France. At the embarkation camps atBordeaux, -]mown to the soldiers as "The Mill;" they 

were deloused, clean"ld, and clothed for the journey home. TO facilitate its operations in this region, -the 

Arm1 took over in January 1919 the considerable plant, 

including barracks, which the NaVj had cont;;trueted at 

pauil1ae. The haDeward mOTeID.ent of troops began at the 

end of November 1918 and continued for over seven months, 

more than a quarter of a million troops being erabarked. 

/lUch quicker tw.'n arounds were made now than when troops 

had been disembarked. The Cape Vay remained at Bordeaux 

only 1 hour and 19 minutes on Yay . I?, 1919 auring which 

time it took on 1928 troops. 1ft-er the embarkation of 

the last of the troops in July, the Army still had some 

occupation for the Navy in connection with the return 

of Army cargo "Which could not be d.1 sposed of abroad. 

Over $7,OOO,(X)() worth of Army surplus stock at Bordeaux 

was purchased by the American Reliet Administration 

from the U. S. Uquidati en Ccr.miss1.on, loaded on board 

eh1ps for transfer to Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Esthonia, 

Jugoslavia, RUssia, and other parts of France. 

The Naval Port Cfficer, BoEdeaux, was still being 

assisted in Uarch 1919 by_8 U.S, Liaison Off~cer at 

La Verdon stationed on a submarine chaser, a port 

officer at Pauillac, who waS t hen an officer in the 

A'rirJy:, and the U.S. Naval Dock Officer at Bassens. The 

PauillAc office "Was demobili zed to"lfards the eOO of 

that month. In MoW" Rear Admiral Alexander S. Halstead, 

who had succeeded Admiral Wilson on January 50, visited 

Bordeau~ where it seemed that demobilization or the 

Naval Port Office had not proceeded as fast as it might · 

have, CaPtain Berrien was relieved on June 6, 1919 by 

Captain Frederick (Julius F.) Hellweg, who after 

service in. European lIaters, part of the time as comcanding officer of the Marietta 00 the Gironde, had 

recently been District Supervisor of the N. O. T. S. 

at r~ orfolk, Virginia. Captain Hellweg found the port 

offi ce at Bassens to 1thich it had. been rEmoved because 

the transports berthed Ulere'. 'I11e office ""'as in a 

buildine on the smte flcor at whl~h ,.:s.s the Army Transport Service office with which it. cooperated in handling 

the transports. By August the port of'fice at Bordeaux 

was reduced to 5 officers and 25 men. Lieutenant 

54 
Bernier renained with the office until thebeg1nn1ng:, .. 1 ~ 

ot that !IOnth 1rQen he was placQd on active duty at h:l.1 .. 01111 request to take a Job with the Shipping -..d .t"" " ~"­

Paria. On September 30, 1919 both the Naftl. Port or., 

fice and tbejArmJ Transport servia_were closed. 

Captain Hell....g tranaferred to the baa. at Breat 1IhJ.ch 

was dem.obill fJ8d -tit the next aonth, but the Naftl Port. 

Offioo cmtinued at that place until July 1920, being 

the last one to be disbanded. The fum!ture which. had 

been used by the Naval Port' Office, Bordeaux, was 

tramlrerred to the off! ce of the recently established 

port representative of the U.S. Shipping Board. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

ManU8Cript Sources 

Navy Department 

Orfice of Naval Records and L1brar.y 

NO' files of the Navy Port Office at Bordeaux exist 

as such, nor are there fl1es for the port offices at 

Pauillac, Le Verdon, and Royan, nor for the District 

CCRm&nder's Headquarters at Rochefort, nor for the 

. Headquarters of the Naval Forces in France at Brest. 


At the time the Naval Port Office was closed at
 r Bass8na, Stiveral filing cases of records were bOXEd 


I 


, tor shipnent to the Na"Y Department in W&ehington.. 


The earns step was taken, presumably, by the other of­


ficeD mentioned above since instructions were i ssued 

b,. the Navy Department to this effect. When received 

in Waeh1ngton, these records and all other reoords 

pertaining to the act1titles of the Navy in Europe 

during the war, together with recorda of the Navy Department, were "arch1ved." The process of "archivine" involved making Belection~ of 'What were considered the rl)oorde of permanent value and filing 

them by subject in a classification devised for the 

purpose.. An enonnous chronological tile was also set , 	 up, consi~ing to & large extent of dupUcate copies· 


but including documents not to be found 1n tile sub­


ject file. This i s called t.he "area tile," and tor 


area 3, which covers Great Brital n and France. it 


comprises six filing cases of material. An additional 


file c:( material selected for a publ1cat.ton that never 


55 

< 
appeared was abo built up and 1. still pre.erved 

ae tbD "Print file." Sane fragllents of the recorda 

or the d:U'terent headquarters and bases in Europe 

baft! reaa1ned intact, but the bulk of them 'Were 

placed. in the subject tile, in one of the other 

·tllea" or destroyed. Thus disappeared the riles ot 

the lIanl Port Office, Bordeaux; Ure Dietrict Ccrt­

.lllBDClerl s Headquarters, Rochefort; the Naval Headquarters, BrestJ the Naval Headquarters, LondonJ 

and the 1'1les of all the other bases, port offices, 

Bold naval air stations' established by the U.S. NaT)' 

in Europe during the First World War. The student 

desiring to investigate a topic connected with the 

U.S. Na..,. in that war is therefore obliged to consul.t 

a cCIlsiderabie number of widely scattered subjects; 

to examine amazedly the chronological file only to 

conclude that. tor his subject as well as for most 

otberB it 1s impossible to wade through S) many filing eases because of the soortness of one'! life. 

In the collections of the Offloe of Naval Records 

and Library, folders bearing the following file de&­

19naticns and labels were used: 

. ro Mercantile Convoys, H. B., from New York 

CO Mercantile Convoys, O. V., Verdon, Frmce 

KD Vos8els, Disposition of, ForcelS 1n ,France 

KN Forces in France, Organi zaUon, Charts and 

Orders 

KN Organi 2S.tion of Naval Forces 

IQi Organization, .Forces U.S. & Allied 

XC U.. S.. Naval Forces in France, Demobilization 

XC Sbips' Movements, Foreign Ports 

P Bordeaux ' 

P Rochefort, General 

P Rochefort, Organization, Plans 

P Rochefort, General Reports 

PA Pau1.llac, General 

PA PahUlac, Arrival, POSition, Character &: 

Departure of Vessels 


PM Four Districts ofr French Coast 


PM Rochefort District 


PO Bordeaux 


PO IA P&ll1ce 


PO Pauillac 


PO Rocbefort 
 . PO Royap 

56 

WX-5 	 u.s. In France, Intelligence, Service, 

and PubUcation 

ZP Rochefort, France 

Z?A pauillac, France 

ZPA Pauillac, France, Transportation Department 

U.S. 	Naval Forces in Fr8'lce, War Diary, 1917-1918 

Bureau of Naval. Personnel 

General flIes (officers' records) of the following: 

William V. Astor, David F. :SOyd, Alexander S, 

rlalstead, Lamar R. Leahy, Newton A. YcCully, 

Charles B. Sm1 th 

Office of the JudEa A.dvocate General 


Court of inquiry record, 7591 


natlooal Arch1ves, Division of NaV'J Department Archivfls 

3ureau of Naval Personnel 

F1tnes8 reports of the follatrlng Uaval Reserve 

Officers: Henry W. Barstow, Lolli!! L. Sernier, 

George F. Keene, Alfred K. Schanze 

Gene ral files (officers 1 records ) of the follOwing: 

Daniel Bacon, Henry W. :Barstow, Louis L. Semler, 

Frank D. 3errien, Herbert ~. A. 90rchardt, Ralph 

P. :raft, Frederick C. :{avem.eyer, Julius F. 

Sellweg, George F. Keene, John B. Patton, Andrew 

Robeson 

Log books of the following U.S. ships! Aphrodite. 

Beauto;:1, CorS<tu:, El capitan, ;:1 occide:nt.e. May. 

Panther. PO'JIrhatan, Ienadores, and Uar1etta 

Log books of Nav!il air stations: Arcachon, Pauillac 

!.{uster roll of U' ~. ;-.!aval Base, :3ordeaux, 1917-1918 

or fice of the Judge Advocate General 

Naval exanining board records of the following: 

Frank D. Serrisn, Herbert rt. ~. Borchardt, R~ph 

p. Graft, Julius F. Hellweg, John B. ?&ttonJ 

Lamar R. Leahy 

Office 	of the Secretary of the Navy, Gener~l tile, 

1917-1918 

Departloont of state 

Corro~pondence between Geor ge 3ucklL~, U.S. Consul at 


Sordeaux,and the Depart.lle!'lt of State, 1917-1918 


57 

t 

I 
~ Department of War 

U.!:.. Army, J\.'leri::!.l.1 Expediti onary Forces, 

File l8563-A 

Baedeker, Karl. mthert}, f'r~.L):.I'!~lud.ing C~~j 

_ Handbook for Travellers. Leipsic, Karl Baedeker, 1902 

Courteault, Paul. La Vi e EC<l,nomigue .i Bords<!!!!...Q.E!nqan,li; 

1a Guerre. Paris, Les Press"!s Uni versitares de France; 

~8W Haven., Yale University press, 1925 " 

Crowell, Senedi~t and Wilson, Robert F. Denlobili@.~: 

Our Inwstrial "andAUtm De;rn.obiUzation after the 

.A.r:nistice, 1918-1'320. New H8.ve~, Yale University 

Press, 1921 

Crowell, Benedict and Wilson, Robert F. The Road to 

Fran.£.e.J.._the T!:anspor4Uon of Troops and ~4il)."tary 

Supplies... 1917-1918. New Haven, Yale University Press, 

1921. 2 vols. 

Dell'nas, G.. Americans ll..B.0rdeauxi. a Practical GuiAe-Book 

with Q.ol.:bogui~"kences. Bordeaux, 1917 

Edwards, W. Atles. liThe U.S. Naval Force in Action, 

1917-1918, II Un!ted states Naval Institute Pro~sdings. 

XLVIII (NOV. 1922), 1863-1882 

Frothingham, Thomas G. The Nava.l.-.J:th~.of the World 

War; the United States in the ~, 1917-1~. 

Car.lbrldge, Harvard Universi ty Press, 1927 

Gibbons, Herbert Adam:!. port:t of ....E.t..~. New York, 

London, ~entury, 1926 

Gleaves, Albert. 

Harbord, Ja:ues O. The An!!!rican Am in France, 1917-1919. 

BoSton, LittIe, Brown, 1936 

Hurley, Edward il. The Bridge to france. Philadelphia, 

J. 	B. Lippincott, 1927 

Husband, Joseph. On the Coast of France; the story of 

the United states Naval Forces in b:ench waters. 

ChiCAgO, A. C. UcC1urg, 1919 

Paxson, 	Frederic 1. Amerlca at War, 1917-1918. Boston, 

Houghton Mifflin, 19~9 

Thomas, Shipley, The History of"the A. E. I. New York, 

George H. Doran, 1920 

58 
":",, "__- .- -r.~ -.;>..~~c-~. 

" 

u. 	 S. Anly. America!') EXpeditionar:t Forces. Chief 

EngL~eer. Historical Report of t he Chief Engineer; 

i."l cl uding All Operati~of t he Engineer Department 

American Emeditionary Forces. 1917-1919. 

Washington, GovenlllEnt Printing Office, 1919 

U.S. Navy Depar~ent. Annual Report. 1917-1920. Washington, Government Printin g Office, 1919-1920 

U,S. 	Navy Department. Navy ;iegister...L 1917-\919. 

Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918-1919 

U.S. War Department. Aru!ua1 R'Wlrt, 1918-1920. 

~ Washington, Governll1ent Printing Office, 1919-1921 

Wilgus, William J. Trm soortine the A. E. F. y! 

Western Europe, 1917-1919. New Yark, Columbia
 r Universlty Press, 1951 


Interview 

September 2, 1945 with Capts. Frederick !1el11l'8g 2nd 

Vaughn K. Gaman, last Naval Port Officer at Bordeaux 

and member of Admiral Wilson's staff, resp~ctively, 

now attached to the Naval Observatory. The writer' 

wishes to 8J1Press his thanks to these officers for 

certaL'l information relating to the period after 

the war. 

~~ .;< 

.. 

" 

59 


1