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i 

65–114 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–14] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 3, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

BEN RUNKLE, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN HOWARD, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 3, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests from the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command .................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 3, 2011 ........................................................................................ 35 

THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command ............... 5 

Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command .... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Mattis, Gen. James N. ..................................................................................... 62 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 39 

Olson, ADM Eric T. .......................................................................................... 43 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 119 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 121 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 119 

Ms. Sutton ......................................................................................................... 116 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 116 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 115 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL 

COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 3, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

We have been informed that there will be votes about 1:30 today, 

but it is just one vote, so maybe we can work out the—some can 

go vote and some can come back, and we can maybe do it without 

a break. 

This afternoon, the House Armed Services Committee meets to 

receive testimony from commanders of the United States Central 

Command [CENTCOM] and the United States Special Operations 

Command [SOCOM] on the posture of their respective commands. 

It is an understatement, perhaps, to say recent events give this 

hearing an even greater urgency. Developments in the past 6 

months and especially in the past 6 weeks present new opportunities and new uncertainties for our Nation’s security and the environment in which CENTCOM and SOCOM operate. 

Extremist Islamist groups and their use of terrorism directly 

threatens the physical security of American citizens at home and 

abroad. Consequently, in Afghanistan, 100,000 U.S. service men 

and women are fighting to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat Al Qaeda in the country from which it planned and conducted 

the 9/11 attacks. 

In the past year, our forces have reduced Taliban influence and 

arrested the momentum of Al Qaeda’s allies, particularly in the 

Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Expanded Special Operations 

Forces’ targeting of Taliban leadership and expanded local security 

measures at the village and district level have been an integral 

part of this momentum shift. 

Significant progress has also been made by the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Training Mission in the development of 

the Afghan National Security Forces. Yet it remains to be determined whether these gains will be lasting. Nevertheless, the President remains committed to redeploying troops in just 4 months. 
2 

Similarly, uncertainty surrounds the recent uprising in the Middle East. While inspirational and likely to undermine extremism’s 

appeal over the long term, they also potentially undermine several 

pillars of our strategic posture in the region in the near term. For 

example, I read with concern comments from opposition leaders in 

Egypt that the Camp David Accords are finished. 

Instability may undermine efforts to build our partners’ 

counterterrorism capacity, a particularly troubling scenario in 

Yemen, where Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP] continues to present the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland, 

according to the administration. 

Against the backdrop of these dramatic events, Iran continues research on key components for a nuclear weapon, the development 

of which alter the regional balance of power and allow Tehran to 

increase its longstanding support of terrorist proxies without fear 

of military retaliation. 

Also, we are scheduled to withdraw 50,000 U.S. forces from Iraq 

despite questions regarding that country’s ability to defend itself 

from both internal and external threats. 

The blistering pace of current events and the uncertainty they 

have created raise difficult and important questions for the future 

of our national security. To address these issues, we are fortunate 

to be joined today by two officers with long and distinguished careers of service to their Nation: General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command; and Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. 

Gentlemen, I thank you for appearing here today and for your 

many years of service, devotion to your country. I take great comfort in knowing that warriors such as yourself are at the helm of 

leadership over so many great people that are laying their lives on 

the line every day on behalf of freedom around the world. Thank 

you for your service. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With votes coming up so 

quickly, I will be very brief. 

I associate myself with the chairman’s remarks. I think he perfectly summed up the challenges the two of you face. 

I do want to give special recognition to Admiral Olson since he 

is from Tacoma. I always have to mention that. A graduate of Stadium High School—not in my district, but it is the high school that 

my children would go to, so very close by. 

And I also, you know, really enjoyed working with you during my 

time as chair of what was then the Terrorism Subcommittee, which 

had jurisdiction over SOCOM. I have the highest admiration for 

the job you do and the job the people you command do, as well. 

And I appreciate that. 

And, General Mattis, you have the greatest responsibility of the 

commanders right now in a very, very complicated part of the 
3 

world. And you are meeting those challenges very well and serving 

us well. 

I look forward to hearing your testimony and hearing the questions of Members about how we can help you to meet the challenges that both of you face. 

And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Olson, this, I guess, is your last appearance before this 

committee. Is that correct? Last scheduled? 

Admiral OLSON. It is the last scheduled appearance, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, maybe we will be fortunate and it won’t be 

your last. 

Would you please begin? And then we will hear from General 

Mattis. 

STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Good morning, Chairman McKeon and Representative Smith and 

other distinguished members of the committee. I do thank you for 

this opportunity to appear before you to present the current posture of the United States Special Operations Command. 

We at the Special Operations Command do recognize that we 

were created by Congress, and our ability to meet our Nation’s high 

expectations is due in large part to this committee’s continued 

strong support. 

And I am especially pleased to share this hearing with my friend 

and teammate, General Jim Mattis. General Mattis’ headquarters 

and mine are coincidentally located on the same base in Tampa, 

and we and our staffs work together quite closely. 

So, with your permission, I will submit my written posture statement for the record and open with some brief remarks. 

As Secretary Gates said in his speech at West Point last weekend 

and as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we do not know with certainty 

what the future of warfare will hold. The range of security challenges we face beyond Iraq and Afghanistan—the decentralization 

of Al Qaeda’s network; revolutionary activity in the Middle East; 

destabilizing elements in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast 

Asia; increased intertwining of violent extremism and criminality; 

and persistence of piracy—tell us that it will be complex, unpredictable, and unstructured. 

United States Special Operations Forces are universally recognized as key to our Nation’s ability to address all of these challenges and others. 

In many ways, USSOCOM is a microcosm of the Department of 

Defense, with ground, air, and maritime components, a global presence, and authorities and responsibilities that mirror the military 

departments, military services, and defense agencies. And we take 

pride in the diversity of our people and our mission. 

As the commander, I am responsible and accountable for the 

readiness of all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Special 

Operations Forces. With a dedicated budget and through my com-
4 

ponent commanders, I select, organize, train, equip, and deploy 

these forces to serve all of our geographic combatant commanders. 

With 85 percent of our deployed forces currently in the Central 

Command area of operations, my colleague to my left is by far the 

largest customer of our product. 

We include many forces of legend: Green Berets, SEALs [Sea, 

Air, Land], Rangers, Air Force Air Commandos, Army Night Stalker aviators, combat controllers, pararescue jumpers, combatantcraft crewmen, today’s version of Marine Raiders, and others. The 

Active Duty practitioners of civil-military operations and military 

information support operations are also in our ranks. These are 

Special Operations careerists. 

They are backed by a talented and dedicated assortment of administrative, intelligence, communications, engineering, logistics, 

and other specialists who serve in Special Operations units on a 

less permanent basis. And our various headquarters also include 

over 300 representatives from at least 15 other agencies within and 

beyond the Department of Defense. 

I am convinced that the forces we provide to the geographic combatant commanders are the most culturally attuned partners, most 

lethal hunter killers, and most responsive agile, innovative, and efficiently effective advisors, trainers, problem solvers, and warriors 

that any nation has to offer. In fact, we have become the model for 

many of our partners. 

Our value comes from both our high level of skills and our nontraditional methods of applying them, which is to say that our principal asset is the quality of our people. Whether they are conducting a precision raid, organizing a village police force, arranging 

for a new school or clinic, or partnering with counterpart forces, 

they do so in a manner that has impressive effects. 

In Afghanistan and Iraq especially, it is undeniable that they 

have impact far above their relatively small numbers. And they are 

in dozens of other countries every day, contributing to regional stability by advising and training with counterpart forces. 

The balance of direct and indirect operations must be carefully 

managed, but, because Special Operations Forces live in both of 

those worlds, we become the force of first choice for many missions. 

As Admiral Mullen said in his testimony yesterday, Special Operations Forces are first in and last out. 

I am proud of these forces, as we all should be, but I also acknowledge that there are challenges. Key among them is how to 

meet the increasing global requirement for their capabilities. The 

demand is outpacing the supply, but we can’t grow them more than 

a very few percent per year. 

Since 9/11, our total manpower has roughly doubled, our budget 

has roughly tripled, and our overseas deployments have quadrupled. And as I have said recently, this great force is beginning 

to fray around the edges. The fabric is strong, the weave is tight, 

it is not unraveling, but it is showing signs of wear. For some elements of our force, time at home has become the abnormal condition to which the family must adjust. 

Partial solutions include finding a process that will habitually 

and predictably assign units from the services to train and deploy 

with Special Operations Forces, ensuring our needs for local train-
5 

ing ranges are fully met, providing the buildings and facilities that 

our force needs and deserves, investing more heavily in capabilities 

that will relieve Special Operations Forces from duties that do not 

require our unique skills, expanding the services’ inventory of specific assets that are so essential to today’s complex and irregular 

warfare, and recognizing and incentivizing many nontraditional 

skills such as language and microregional expertise as essential 

military requirements. 

We must ensure that our forces have the specialized equipment 

and advanced training they need to survive and succeed in the 

complex, ambiguous, and often violent environments in which we 

ask them to serve, which requires professionalizing the acquisition 

workforce and streamlining procurement processes. 

Underlying all of this is the need to look after our people and 

their families. We must rehabilitate and return to duty those of our 

wounded who can, care for those of our wounded who can’t, along 

with their families and caregivers, and provide enduring support to 

the families of those who have died in action. 

I ask for your action to approve a defense budget for fiscal year 

2011 and for your support for the fiscal year 2012 budget proposal. 

I also ask that you carefully watch the Special Operations budget, 

particularly as forces eventually begin to draw down from major 

operations, because our Special Operations Forces will most likely 

be reallocated at the same levels to areas with pent-up demand for 

our unique capabilities, a point reinforced in Secretary Gates’ testimony just yesterday. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you. You 

have reason to take great pride in what the men and women of 

Special Operations Forces are accomplishing around the world 

today and every day. 

I remain humbled by my opportunity to command this formidable force and provide it to answer our Nation’s most daunting security needs. And, as I appear before you in this capacity for the 

fourth and most likely the last time, I am thankful for the profound 

honor of serving my country in this way. 

I stand ready for your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Mattis, I think this is your first time in this capacity. 

General MATTIS. In this capacity, yes, Chairman, it is. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The time is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General MATTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, 

distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the posture and priorities of U.S. Central Command, testifying alongside a friend and shipmate of many years, 

Admiral Eric Olson, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. 

I have submitted a written statement and request it be accepted 

into the record. 
6 

Thank you for supporting our troops and their families who have 

carried the brunt of the physical and emotional burden in this 10th 

year of war. Our forces today are among the most dedicated and 

skilled professionals I have served alongside in my 39 years in uniform, and they constitute a national treasure. 

I also recognize the commitment and sacrifices of our international partners who operate with us, from the waters off Somalia 

to the mountains of Afghanistan, where the largest warfighting coalition in recent history is engaged with troops from 49 nations 

united in the fight against our common enemy. 

The strategic landscape of the broader Middle East has been altered by recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere. We 

see pressure on government institutions from the aspirations of 

people seeking improved economic and social conditions. Young 

people born in the information age are exchanging ideas in realtime. 

While the long-term impact of this unrest is unknown, it presents as many opportunities as it does challenges. The changes 

that we are seeing will manifest differently in each country. People 

are seeking their rights and, for the most part, doing so peacefully 

and bravely. 

It is too early to say how it will all turn out. It is important that 

we work today with the people and the governments throughout 

the region. We don’t want to see this change slide into a new form 

of authoritarianism. So, while there is both opportunity and danger, it requires unrelenting engagement by our Nation. The central 

challenge for us, I believe, is how to make common cause with our 

friends throughout the region. 

There is one clear lesson we can draw from the dramatic changes 

under way: Now, more than ever, we must remain relentlessly engaged with our military partners across the region. While we know 

each country is different, we remain committed to strengthening 

our military bonds and advancing our mutual interests in peace 

and opportunity for all. 

Notably, in Egypt we have clearly seen the benefit of mature 

military-to-military relationships. The Egyptian armed forces continue to demonstrate exceptional discipline and restraint under trying circumstances, serving honorably. As Admiral Mullen recently 

noted, our assistance has helped the Egyptian military become the 

professional force that it is today, just as our military, in turn, has 

learned a great deal from our Egyptian counterparts who have contributed a stabilizing influence in this time of transition. 

Of course, we cannot achieve our broader objectives in the region 

through military means alone. Our efforts require coordination and 

a spirit of collaboration between highly integrated civilian military 

teams. Our civilian colleagues need your full support, even in this 

difficult fiscal environment, to undertake their essential role in today’s complex environment. 

Robust resourcing for the State Department’s mission is one of 

the best investments for reducing the need for military forces to be 

employed. Together, our military leaders and diplomats not only 

represent a symbol of America’s enduring commitment to this region, but they also build trust through partnerships that have an 

important stabilizing effect when trouble looms. 
7 

CENTCOM’s main effort is in Afghanistan, where, along with 

our Afghan and coalition partners, we are making undeniable security progress, though some of our gains remain fragile and reversible. Al Qaeda in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is under the most pressure they have experienced since 2001. 

Over the past year, our enemies have lost leaders, they have lost 

battle space, maneuver room, and the initiative. And the enemy’s 

strategy has been undercut by the clear commitment of the international community and the Afghan Government to begin, this 

summer, a process of fully transitioning responsibility to Afghanistan lead by 2014. 

I support the President’s ongoing analysis of further growth for 

the Afghan National Security Forces. Their quantifiable and 

qualifiable growth in capability has been one of our greatest successes over this last year. With this improving quality in combat 

performance by the Afghan security forces, we are seeing the enemy’s worst nightmare coming of age. 

The transition process will start with a limited, conditions-based 

withdrawal this year. Our overall campaign is on track in Afghanistan. Our successes, as General Petraeus has stated, entailed hard 

fighting and tough losses, and there will be tough fighting ahead 

as the enemy tries this spring to regain the initiative. Finally, we 

must also redouble our efforts in order to address the challenges 

in the areas of governance and development. 

Turning now to Pakistan, we are strengthening and deepening 

our security relationship with Islamabad, even as we work to overcome years of mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides. The 

Pakistanis have shifted a quarter of their army, 140,000 troops, to 

the western border. And we are now conducting hammer-and-anvil 

operations in close coordination with them on opposite sides of the 

border. 

Pakistan’s military has conducted significant counterinsurgency 

ops in the past decade, and having suffered 2,757 troops killed and 

8,549 wounded while also responding to urgent humanitarian 

needs following devastating floods in 2010. 

In Iraq, we are helping a new, more stable country emerge in a 

turbulent region. Our commitment there is transitioning from a 

military- to a civilian-led effort. I will note that the transition 

under way in Iraq has been enabled in large part thanks to the 

vital commitment and support of Congress for our troops on the 

ground, and I want to personally offer my thanks to you. 

As we transition to civilian lead in Iraq, it is essential that the 

State Department be sufficiently resourced to solidify relationships 

between the U.S. and Iraq. At CENTCOM, we need congressional 

authorities that enable us to continue advising, training, and 

equipping our Iraqi partners through the new Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq. 

Looking ahead, we will redeploy our military forces from Iraq 

this year, unless asked to stay by the Iraqi Government and the 

U.S. Government concurs. I anticipate Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-sponsored proxies will attempt to execute sensational attacks 

against us in the coming months. 

Next, Iran. The greatest threat to long-term regional stability is 

a defiant Iran in its current state. We are countering the malign 
8 

activities of the regime, while bolstering relationships with our 

partners. Iran continues to rebuff international efforts for engagement, continues to coerce its own population, and continues to pursue activities disruptive to regional peace and stability, including 

supplying arms to militant proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan and 

supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

But for the vibrant people of Iran, the regime is no giant. The 

regime’s actions have thrown the economy into disarray, destroyed 

rapport with the bulk of the world, and spread hate and discontent 

across the region, steadily eroding any international support the regime could once muster. 

Despite the shrinking stature of the regime, I have no reason for 

optimism about Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear-weapons capability, of 

its growing ballistic missile arsenal, and present destabilizing 

course. 

Across the region, we are disrupting Al Qaeda and other violent 

extremist organizations. We are actively focused on the threat of 

extremism in Yemen, especially Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the group that has twice attempted to attack our homeland 

in recent years. 

With our international partners, our Special Operations Forces 

are putting our most violent enemies and related networks under 

increasingly intense pressure. At the same time, the populistinspired changes that are taking place across the region undercut 

the message of Al Qaeda and other extremist groups, highlighting 

the bankrupt philosophies of terrorists who use violence and contribute nothing but mayhem to the innocent. In direct repudiation 

to violent extremists, young folks today have achieved more change 

in 10 weeks than 10 years of Al Qaeda’s murderous campaigns. 

So that is a snapshot of our major ongoing operations. We are focused on a number of other important mission areas, as well, to include countering piracy. There can be no more stark reminder 

about the need for more proactive diplomatic, legal, and military efforts against pirates than the brutal murder of four Americans by 

pirates last week. 

This is a defining moment for the people in this region and, by 

extension, a critical moment for CENTCOM to remain engaged 

with our partners and to clear away obstacles to peace and prosperity. 

On that note, while Israel and the Palestinian territories are not 

in my assigned theater, lack of progress toward a comprehensive 

Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM security interests in 

the region. I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this 

region is a viable two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. 

The issue is one of many that is exploited by our adversaries in 

the region, and it is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups. 

The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners 

and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by 

marginalizing moderate voices in the region. By contrast, substantial progress on the peace process would improve CENTCOM’s opportunities to work with our regional partners and support multilateral security efforts. 

We know that you face tough decisions in this constrained fiscal 

environment, ladies and gentlemen. In all of our activities at 
9 

CENTCOM, we honor the obligation to be the best stewards possible of our Nation’s monetary resources. CENTCOM has established stringent control mechanisms to execute our fiscal authorities and to apply increasingly effective oversight of all our programs. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, and Congresswomen, we 

must never forget the families of those who gave their last full 

measure in defense of liberty. 

Thank you once again for your support of our men and women 

serving in the Central Command region. I am prepared to answer 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 62.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Without objection, both of your statements will be entered in the 

record. 

The vote schedule has changed. It is now two votes, so we will 

have to recess. But I will hold my questions until later, and I will 

turn now to Ranking Member Smith. And, after his questions, we 

will recess for 10 to 15 minutes, as soon as we can get back. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I will endeavor to do this quickly, in light of that. 

And I just have four questions, and a couple of them—one of the 

things I am doing, with Congresswoman Giffords being out, I am 

working with her staff to ask questions that she has, as well. So 

two of these are hers, and two of these are mine. 

But the first one that I do want you to get to, Admiral Olson, 

as quickly as possible: You have significant MILCON [military construction] challenges. We have grown your force a lot in the last 

5 or 6 years. We have not grown the facilities to accommodate it. 

Could you say just a couple quick words about your needs in the 

MILCON area? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. We do have significant needs. There 

were disconnects between the growth of the force and growth in 

MILCON. 

And to add to that, we inherited buildings when Special Operations Command was created without inheriting a budget to recapitalize them. So we are in a period, a state over the next 10 to 15 

years of having to swallow this large chunk of MILCON recapitalization. 

Mr. SMITH. I just want the committee to be aware of that. And 

as we look at our budget efforts here, we should try to help out in 

any way we can. 

General Mattis, I have two questions, one of them from me, one 

of them from Congresswoman Giffords. She has an interest in 

the—well, sorry. Her interest is in the energy area. And you have 

considerable fuel requirements. You have been quoted as saying 

that you need to be ‘‘unleashed from the tether of fuel’’ and the 

challenges that that presents. 

Efforts at generating alternatives and efficiencies can make a 

huge difference in you being able to prosecute the fights you need 

to prosecute. Can you tell us a little about your efforts in 

CENTCOM to deal with the challenges you have in the fuel area? 
10 

And then, an area that I am particularly interested in is something that I read an article about just recently, and that is efforts 

to counter Al Qaeda’s messaging over the Internet. CENTCOM 

seemed to have gotten out front on that. I think this is critical. 

This is where they are spreading their ideology, certainly in your 

region, but throughout the world. This is how they are recruiting 

the people. They are doing it in an incredibly sophisticated way 

that we are woefully behind on. You guys seem to be stepping up 

and trying to address that. 

So could you talk a little bit about the fuel and about the Internet ideological battle? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, I will. 

On the fuel, it is a significant Achilles heel for us when you have 

to haul the amounts of fuel that we have to haul around the battlefield for the generators and for the vehicles. 

We are working with DARPA [Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency], we are working with a number of civilian organizations to try and find solutions. There are efforts under way to 

make more expeditionary bases which would actually generate 

some of their own energy requirements using, for example, solar 

power. In many of these places, there is a lot of sunshine. If we 

can get expeditionary capability to capture that and then basically 

recharge our batteries. 

I mean, it is an amazingly complex effort to maintain the fuel 

lines. And it also gives the enemy an ability to choose the time and 

place of attacking us. We are engaged with Science and Technology, we are engaged with DARPA, and we are looking at very 

pragmatic ways of doing this. 

We are also looking at what we can do to actually change how 

we distribute fuel, to reduce the enemy’s opportunities to come 

after us. And I could meet privately with you on some of those matters that I would prefer not to speak about in open session. 

On the Internet effort, the point I would make is that the enemy 

is using the Internet exactly along the lines that you defined. They 

use it for recruiting, is the one that comes immediately to mind. 

We can directly track some of this. 

In broad terms, we challenged their propaganda. We disrupt the 

recruiting. We have showed that it is silly to go down this line, that 

it just doesn’t make sense. We bring out the moderate voices; we 

amplify those. And in more detail, we detect and we flag if there 

is adversary, hostile, corrosive content in some open-source Web 

forum. We engage with the Web administrators to show that this 

violates Web site provider policies. 

And probably more telling about how we engage here, we have 

a Digital Engagement Team at CENTCOM. It is fully attributable. 

But we engage with the people in the region who come up on the 

Web and start exchanging ideas. And we give factual and accurate 

information to counter enemy propaganda and lies through using 

the Web and the blog sites. We do this in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and 

Pashto. 

But we are engaged in the Internet fight. 

Mr. SMITH. And this is something that I think DOD-wide and intelligence-community-wide we have to be engaged in. Because the 

way Al Qaeda has changed since 9/11, certainly the AQ senior lead-
11 

ership is still a threat, but the larger threat is the way they generate self-starters, sort of homegrown terrorists, who go on the 

Internet, get inspired by this stuff. And it has increased to a level 

that I think would shock a lot of people, and we need to be much 

more aggressive about that. 

Now, the last question I have is on nonlethal means of subduing 

the enemy. I will take that one for the record. It is something Congresswoman Giffords is interested in, as well. If you could just update us a little bit, Admiral, you know, send something to us on 

the record about what you have been doing with nonlethal uses of 

force. There has been considerable advancement there. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. And I do just want to conclude by making a special 

thank you to the Special Operations Command, and the Navy 

SEAL team in particular, that, shortly after the incident in Tucson, 

went out on a mission in Congresswoman Giffords’ honor. They actually flew a flag for that mission and then made sure that it got 

to her where she is rehabilitating. That means a great deal to her 

and to all of us. 

Your dedication and support for her and this committee is very 

much appreciated. And, certainly, the work you do for our country 

is very much appreciated, as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We will adjourn now for 10 to 15 minutes, in time to vote and 

get back. Mr. Bartlett will be the first questioner when we get 

back. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

That 10 or 15 minutes, I think, became about a half-hour. We 

had a few other things that happened over there. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

General, on page 9 of your written testimony, you say that China 

pursues its many energy-related interests throughout the region. I 

have a couple of slides that may help put that in context. 

If we can have the first one. Let’s see if it shows up on the 

screen. 

Three things of significance in this first slide while it is coming 

up. First of all, there is now general recognition—the large blue 

below—that we have reached the world’s maximum production of 

oil; that, from now on, it is simply going down. This is in the oil 

fields we are now pumping oil from. By 2030, they say that we will 

be getting considerably less than half the oil from those fields that 

we are getting now. 

There are two wedges there, the blue wedge and the red wedge, 

that say we are going to be getting a lot of oil from fields that we 

have now discovered but not developed and, surprisingly, fields yet 

to be discovered. This is a 2008 slide. And notice that they believe 

that, by 2030, they believe then that we would be getting about 106 

million barrels per day. 

The next slide, by the same people, the World Energy Outlook, 

they now have decreased their projection of what we will have. By 
12 

2035, 5 years later, they say we are only going to have 96 million 

barrels per day. They now believe that we are only going to be getting, what, about a fourth of the oil from the fields we are pumping 

now. We will only be getting about a fourth of that in 2035. And 

the wedges of the oil fields yet to be developed and fields yet to be 

discovered has grown even further. 

The next chart kind of puts this in context and tells us what the 

probability is that we are going to find all that new oil. This is the 

oil chart, and what it shows, the vertical bars show the discovery 

of oil through the years, most of it in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 

1970s. And from 1980 on, we every year use more oil than we 

found. We were then dipping into reserves. This was a 2004 chart, 

and what it shows is that they predicted, quite correctly, that we 

would be peaking oil about now. 

A 10-billion-barrel find of oil is pretty big, sir. Every 12 days, the 

world uses a billion barrels of oil. That means that 10-billion-barrel 

find will last the world 120 days. A big deal. 

The next chart, General, really illuminates your area. It shows 

what the world would look like—and, boy, you own most of it—if 

the size of the countries were relative to the amount of oil they 

have. Now, you have to shrink Saudi Arabia a bit because 

WikiLeaks, a couple weeks ago, indicated they have been fibbing 

about how much oil they have. I suspect most of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] has. But look at the size of 

China and India there, how small they are. 

The next chart, again very relative to your area of responsibility, 

shows the chokepoints where the oil must flow through if they are 

going to get to other parts of the world. 

The 2010, the next slide, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 

makes a very sane statement: ‘‘Energy security means having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect 

and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.’’ 

The next chart, this is Joint Operating Environment 2010. It 

says, ‘‘Even assuming more effective conservation measures, the 

world would need to add roughly the equivalent of Saudi Arabia’s 

current energy production every 7 years.’’ 

General, those two wedges of developing fields we have now 

found but not developed and fields yet to be discovered, that is 

pure wishful thinking, sir. That ain’t gonna happen. 

The second statement there, ‘‘A severe energy crunch is inevitable,’’ put a period there, because there is no amount of money 

that you can spend to produce oil that isn’t there. 

And the last statement is just plain wrong, because oil has already peaked, conventional oil, in 2006. 

Sir, why is not this the perfect storm? The United States owns 

only 2 percent of the world’s oil; we use 25 percent of the world’s 

oil. We are not buying oil anywhere in the world. China is buying 

oil reserves everywhere in the world that they can find them. 

The peaking of oil occurs just at the time the developed world, 

us and the rest of the developed world, needs more oil to come out 

of the recession. The developing world, India and China, are demanding hugely increased amounts of oil. 
13 

The WikiLeaks thing indicates there is less oil out there than we 

thought was out there, and there is huge unrest in your area of responsibility. 

Sir, what do you think the odds are that we can avoid armed 

conflict over oil in the future? 

General MATTIS. Congressman Bartlett, I have—because I am 

born an eternal optimist, I think it is always a matter of choice. 

That said, I think that you highlight a critical point. Certainly, history would give a more pessimistic response than I just gave if we 

studied the results of competition like this. 

I think it does point to the need for looking at every energy resource that we have, not just oil, because this is, as you point out, 

inevitable. 

But I think that there are different ways to solve problems. And 

I think we may actually be on the cusp of a time when, if all this 

change goes in a positive direction, you may find collaboration. If 

it goes otherwise, then we are going to have to be ready. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have reached the period of peak oil, I think is what Mr. Bartlett was saying, and we are going to have to develop new sources 

of energy. What impact does it have if we are not doing basic research into that area? Either one of you, I would like a response. 

Because, of course, we have been cutting—we have been busy cutting Federal spending in every place other than defense. 

How does our vulnerability increase commensurate with the cuts 

that are being proposed, the drastic cuts being proposed to the 

budget, science? Can you respond? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, from a Special Operations perspective, I will 

just tell you that we can shift to alternative energy measures as 

rapidly as they can be developed and operationalized. But I am not 

an expert on the pace of that or the probability of that. But we certainly would look forward to development that would move us in 

that direction. 

General MATTIS. Congressman, I think that I can’t draw a direct 

line, I am probably not competent to draw a direct line between 

basic research and developing new sources. But, clearly, developing 

new sources reduces our dependency on the oil. And, if we do so, 

it reduces the potential for the outcome that Congressman Bartlett 

just mentioned, of conflict over diminishing resources, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

We have a role that we have adopted—that is, of a global policeman. And our forward posture around the world will have to be 

curtailed as we adapt to the new realities of our time. And one of 

those realities is our energy—or our dependence on current means 

of energy production. 

And, also, we have been nation-building for the last decade in 

one of the most inhospitable and lawless places on Earth. I am 

talking about Afghanistan. We have to accelerate the end game. 

We have to achieve an acceptable security environment soon. That 

means we cannot merely increase the capacity of the Afghan Gov-
14 

ernment to kill its enemies; we have to aggressively shrink the 

ranks of its enemies by bringing them back into the political fold. 

General Mattis, as General Petraeus, your predecessor at 

CENTCOM, has said, quote, ‘‘You don’t end an industrial-strength 

insurgency by killing or capturing all the bad guys. You have to 

kill, capture, or turn the bad guys. And that means reintegration 

and reconciliation.’’ 

As we approach the 10th anniversary of the Bonn conference, 

where are we on the reconciliation piece of that strategy? What will 

a likely political settlement look like? And, General Mattis, do you 

anticipate that we will have a sizable military footprint in Afghanistan through 2014? 

General MATTIS. Congressman, military success, such as we are 

seeing today, undeniable on the battlefield, sets the conditions for 

improved economics, improved governance. You cannot have those 

two unless you have military protection of the people. 

So, once you have that, we have a multi-pronged approach here. 

One is transition, where we actually start transitioning this July 

to an Afghan-led security structure in certain districts and provinces based on conditions, as the commander in chief has said. 

That transition is aided and abetted by reintegration of young 

men who are giving up the fight, recognizing they aren’t on the 

winning side, they no longer want to be with people who simply 

cause mayhem, and they see this new government gaining traction. 

So, from the bottom up, you see reintegration. Reconciliation is topdown. 

As we set the conditions where this enemy realizes they can’t 

wait us out—and the Lisbon declaration, where we said that the 

united force that is on the battlefield will be there through 2014, 

has helped in this regard—it means that they have got to start reconciling. We don’t reconcile with our friends; we reconcile with our 

enemies. So we are going to be working with the Taliban to bring 

them over as they sense they no longer have an opportunity for 

military victory. 

In order to come over—you asked what the settlement would look 

like. I think it is very simple: The Taliban must abandon Al Qaeda, 

they must quit using violence, and they must accept the Afghan 

constitution. At that point, they are welcome back into the process, 

a process led by the Afghan people, as it must be. 

But we will have significant military forces there for the near future. We will start bringing them down in July, but we are committed through 2014, by which time all of the districts and provinces will have transitioned over to Afghan lead. 

I think that addressed your question, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

Admiral Olson, I want to join in the accolades and the gratitude 

for your service in this capacity at a very important time when you 

have headed Special Operations Command. The country has been 

fortunate to have you there, at this point in particular. 
15 

I notice in your written testimony you talk about the shortage of 

readily available local training ranges for SOCOM and even that, 

too often, our operators have to travel to train, which means that 

is even more time away from their families and away from their 

homes. 

Does SOCOM have a plan to improve that situation? This is obviously an area where we can help, but we want to be consistent 

with what is in the long-term planning of SOCOM. 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir. 

I would say our intent is larger than our plan, at this point. Special Operations Command at MILCON can build ranges, but we 

don’t own them. We are building them in facilities that then we 

need to use. And, in many cases, we can’t build the ranges that— 

we can’t build all of the ranges that we need. We have to use 

ranges, preexisting ranges, that are controlled by the Army, Navy, 

Air Force, and Marine Corps. 

As you know well, we are in some places where those ranges are 

available nearby, but we are in some places where there just aren’t 

ranges nearby. And so my intent is to provide for our force, as 

much as possible, ranges on which they can train in the day and 

be home that night, in order to reduce this pressure on the force, 

sir. 

It is within our MILCON budget to make some progress on that, 

but we are also going to have to continue to work with each of the 

services to arrive at a better means of coordinating use. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, we want to assist in—I want to assist in 

that effort, anyway. And I think this committee can be of some 

help. 

General Mattis, yesterday Secretary Clinton testified in front of 

the Senate Appropriations Committee that Iran is, quote, ‘‘very 

much involved,’’ end quote, with the opposition in Yemen, they are 

reaching out to the opposition movement in Bahrain, they are having contacts with some of the opposition groups in Egypt through 

Hezbollah and Hamas. 

I guess the question is, have you seen reporting that would support that? And if there is increased Iranian influence in those 

places, what effect does that have on our counterterrorism efforts 

and our mil-to-mil connections? 

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir. 

I have seen the reporting that Secretary Clinton referred to. We 

have seen some influence in Yemen. In Bahrain, I think the Iranian, the Tehran regime—not the Iranian people, but the regime 

there—is incapable of not minding its own business, and I have no 

doubt that they are engaged in any way they can. That is not to 

say the bulk of the people in Bahrain are in any way stooges of the 

Iranians. The Bahraini people are quite capable of making up their 

own minds without malign influence out of Tehran. 

I think what the effect of this is, is negative on our 

counterterrorism campaign. But I would also say that this simply 

gives more credence to us staying relentlessly engaged across the 

region so that we not allow vacuums. And this means we are going 

to have to stay engaged at times when we don’t know the outcome 

of certain processes that these countries are going through in this 

transition time. 
16 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. 

Let me ask one other thing. Additionally, yesterday there was an 

article about Central Command and some information operations. 

I know there is not much we can talk about in that area, but I 

would be curious, for either of you, whether you have had your lawyers review the applicable laws and procedures to see whether they 

hamper your ability to do what you would like to do and might 

need some updating and modernizing. 

This article, for example, cites some operators complaining that 

there are too many hoops to run through and so forth. And I think 

one area in our bailiwick is looking at the law and seeing if it is 

consistent with operations but, of course, also our values. 

And my question is, have you had lawyers look at that issue? 

General MATTIS. For CENTCOM, we have had our judge advocates and our lawyers look at this and the authorities we need to 

conduct these operations. We consider that, in today’s changing 

world, these are now traditional military activities. They are no 

longer something that can only be handled by Voice of America or 

someone like that. So we do need the authorities. We are very careful right now to stay strictly within the guidelines of the law. And 

we do have ongoing blog fights, you know, where we go in and we 

contradict inaccurate information. And it is fully attributable, at 

this point. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Castor. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Tampa Bay area is a very patriotic community, and we are 

very proud to host SOCOM and CENTCOM at MacDill Air Force 

Base. 

And, particularly, Admiral Olson, being there for the past few 

years, you are just a beloved member of the community now. And 

they will be very sorry to see you transition out. 

So I will be a little parochial just to begin my questions. Along 

with my colleague, Congressman Bill Young, over the past few 

years, there has been great investment that has matched the 

growth in missions of CENTCOM and SOCOM at MacDill, but it 

still appears to be unfinished—parking issues, other complications 

right there. 

Can you spend just a quick moment on—I know that the greater 

MILCON needs for SOCOM are all across the country, but there 

on MacDill Air Force Base, what would be the top of your list that 

remains unfinished at this point? 

Admiral OLSON. Ma’am, as you know, we have had a fair amount 

of construction over the last several years, and we have some programs in the future. We have just, as you mentioned, built a parking garage, which we probably should have built first, but in the 

end it is serving us quite well. And we are finishing up a couple 

of other projects. 

I think that we are always—we are in the mode now of upgrading and recapitalizing, rather than expanding, within the base. And 

we are always interested in improvements to the base itself, on 

which we are tenants, that improve the quality of life and the quality of service for our people. 
17 

General MATTIS. Ma’am, as you know, thanks to the Congress, 

we are getting a new headquarters there to replace one that is 

really getting a little aged. 

The only thing I think I need right now is an issue we are working on, and that is for quality of life, is a parking area so our folks 

don’t have to walk a half-mile or further to get to work. 

But Congress has taken very good care of us, and we have excellent facilities coming on line by spring. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you very much. 

And I also wanted to ask you about Pakistan. We provide a lot 

of support to Pakistan through coalition support funds, through foreign military financing, Pakistan counterinsurgency and 

counterinsurgency capability funds. And yet we are still struggling 

to get the Pakistanis and the army to really be a better partner in 

helping us disrupt the Taliban headquarters or where they are 

meeting and plotting. They could be a better partner in the FATA 

[Federally Administered Tribal Areas] areas. They need to continue 

to reorient themselves from India toward Afghanistan and the 

other real threats in the area. 

What are you doing to—you know, with this great investment 

that the U.S. puts up, with those funds I previously mentioned, 

what kind of conditions do you put on that military assistance in 

aid to continue to convince the Pakistanis to be a better, more attentive partner? 

General MATTIS. That is an excellent question. 

The funds themselves, we track them. We track them—I have 

some very keenly attentive field-grade officers in Islamabad. They 

work daily with the Pakistani counterparts. And we routinely require additional confirmation that, in fact, the equipment we are 

giving or the money we are giving is going to support those operations in the FATA against our common enemies. That money is 

tracked very, very carefully. 

I think the growing rapport—especially with our hammer-andanvil operation, where we are doing something on our side of the 

border, they are doing something on their side, collaborating now 

down to lower-ranking officers as they talk back and forth across 

the border. And we have had some dramatic successes lately. 

I just came back from a meeting that Admiral Mullen and General Kayani held. We met in Oman with General Petraeus, Admiral 

Olson and I and several of General Kayani’s officers and the American officers. And I was impressed by the level of rapport between 

General Petraeus and General Kayani. 

I think the point to look at, ma’am, is that, after 1989 or 1990, 

we walked away from this area. During that period, history did not 

stand still. And when we came back in 2001, there was a sense of 

abandonment by the Americans. That has engendered a certain 

level of distrust that we have had to work to overcome. 

It is not perfect. In any war, as a British Prime Minister put it, 

the only thing more difficult than fighting with allies is fighting 

without them. But we have 48 allies in this battle, and Pakistan 

is the key ally. And they have suffered right now over 2,700 killed, 

they have suffered over 8,600 wounded. Their civilians, they have 

lost a presidential candidate, Mrs. Bhutto. They have lost nearly 

30,000 civilian casualties. 
18 

So it is not a perfect solution in the high country. Your question 

is valid. But I see it improving. And I think that is the trend line 

we have to be focused on, what they are doing up there. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral Olson, let me also add thank you from a grateful 

Nation for what you have done, standing in the breach. And, actually, thank you for the men and women you lead, who do the 

toughest of what needs to be done out there. 

Your comment—and I will get it wrong, but you said, ‘‘The fabric 

is strong, weave is tight, but it is showing some wear’’ on the team. 

In the rest of the forces, we understand dwell time and the standard that we set for deployments, and we are trying to get to 2:1 

Active Duty, 4:1—I think that is a proper metric. 

I am struggling with a metric for your team and the terms so 

that we can see what a standard would look like and then compare 

that to what you are actually doing. And I don’t know if you track 

operations per deployment or, you know, some—but in your realm, 

I don’t think just deployment is the same as a deployment in other 

areas, because of the every-night thing that your folks do. 

And so, have you guys looked at some sort of a standard that 

says, if we had all the SOCOM folks we needed, they would be deployed, during that deployment they would have X number of operations, and then they would come home and be there for some period of time in order to heal the mind—heal the bodies quicker, but 

heal the mind for all the stuff that goes on? Is there some sort of 

metric you can help us understand so we can compare where we 

are with where we want to get to? 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir. 

We have done a lot of work on metrics, and we are exceeding the 

pace of deployment against all of the metrics that we have worked 

up. There are a thousand different ways to get at this, no one solution. But we are trying to figure out all of the ways that we can 

chip away at each person gone each day, to see how we can back 

away from that in the many small ways that ultimately would 

make a real difference. 

But the short answer is, yes, sir, we have worked the metrics 

hard. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In the rest of the force, if they are doing 1:1 dwell 

time versus deployment and the goal is 2:1, I have a sense of where 

we have to get to. Can you share some of those metrics with us as 

to what the scope of the shortfall is, either the shortfall in folks 

and/or an over commitment of the team that—we work on both 

ends, but I don’t have any feel for what you are—— 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. We are working all ends, all sides. We 

try to build to 3:1. We understand surge deployments at 2:1. We 

have a red line of 1:1. But certain elements of our force are deployed more often than that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Well, if there is a better way to help Members of—I know you understand it and you get it. If there is a better way for you to help us understand it, create a sense of urgency 

as to what is out there, it would be helpful. 
19 

General Mattis, working off Ms. Castor’s comments, you may 

have said during your opening comments that the great benefit we 

had for 30 years of mil-to-mil interaction with the Egyptian military and the benefit that appears to have paid off in the way they 

have reacted throughout this change in government. 

Can you talk to us—and you mentioned briefly that we basically 

ceased mil-to-mil conversations in Pakistan for a 10- or 12-year period. What is going on—we have been there now 10 years, or almost, so we maybe have recouped that. But there is a whole 

tranche of folks who grew up without having any contact with 

America. They are now in charge. 

Can you talk to us just briefly about how that is impacting our 

mil-to-mil, as well as what the current dustup with our civilian 

with diplomatic immunity being held is having on your team? 

General MATTIS. I can, sir. And it builds on Congresswoman 

Castor’s question because, when you have from 1989 to 2001 broken contacts, those officers continue up in the ranks. Like I said, 

nothing stands still. 

Fortunately, the officers right now in command are still ones who 

went to Leavenworth, who went to Maxwell, who we did have relations with. Unfortunately, when they move 140,000 of their troops, 

a quarter of their army, off the Indian border and up into the high 

country, the majority of them are led, of course, by lieutenants, 

captains, majors, lieutenant colonels who we did not have that rapport with. 

Thanks to Admiral Olson’s folks, we very quietly work with our 

Pakistan counterparts, and, one by one, we are rebuilding the 

bonds of trust. But it is going to take a while to recover from the 

very point that you made, years of basically disenchantment between—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. Any direct impact on the issue with the diplomat who has immunity and being held, what you—the things you 

are trying to get done, day in and day out? 

General MATTIS. No, sir, I don’t believe so. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it. 

Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mattis and Admiral Olson, thank you for your testimony 

today. And the Congress and the American people certainly owe 

the both of you a great debt of gratitude, and the people that serve 

under you. And, obviously, you are very likely, currently and in the 

future, to remain the very tip of the spear in the fight against global terrorism. I want to thank you both for your service. 

Admiral Olson, SOCOM sits at a unique juncture in the military 

structure, in that it can benefit from ongoing efforts throughout the 

services as well as find its own unique ways internally to accomplish the mission. 

I would like to focus a little bit, if I could, on your science and 

technology efforts. In your testimony, you briefly mentioned 

SOCOM science and technology efforts. And I would like you to, if 

you could, take a moment to more fully explain how SOCOM con-
20 

tributes to, and benefits from, science and technology efforts within 

DOD [Department of Defense]. Can you, in particular, explain instances where SOCOM undertook its own S&T [science and technology] efforts in the areas where time-sensitive requirements 

exist? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Special Operations Command is a relatively small force, and our 

needs are often quite peculiar to Special Operations force requirements. So we do have an R&D—a research and development, a 

science and technology budget that we use to invest in some items 

that are, sort of, invented for Special Operations purposes. But we 

also use that to contribute to service investment in order to ensure 

that the services are making Special Operations considerations in 

some of their development projects. 

I have a senior science and technology advisor on my staff. He 

is in good contact with all of the services and the laboratories to 

ensure that our investment in that is made as wisely as we can, 

sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I see that your research and development, 

test and evaluation budget has been significantly increased this 

year, up to $496 million. Can you describe some of the RDT&E [research, development, test and evaluation] efforts that you are undertaking? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir, I do. These are—some of that is a general increase in R&D and science and technology, recognizing the 

Special Operations’ peculiar needs for that. But this year is a bit 

of an anomaly. Much of this year’s increase in the science and technology budget is directly related to an efficiency initiative that we 

made in order to back away from one, sort of, ponderous program 

and invest in a family of undersea mobility vehicles. And there is 

a peculiar requirement for science and technology R&D money this 

year for that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there any other examples that you could cite 

for us? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, there are many examples. Most of them are 

quite small, but I think one that we are particularly proud of now 

is a solar energy panel project that we have installed in a remote 

village in Afghanistan as part of a very small presence of Special 

Forces in that region and the difficulty of getting fossil fuel supplies to that region. And so the success of that has been encouraging. 

But there are any number of other projects that, again, are quite 

small, quite limited. No big appetite in the big services for what 

it is we are developing at the time. So our R&D budget is actually 

spread pretty thin across a number of projects. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. I am pleased to hear you mention the alternative energy project, in particular. I think that is important for 

a variety of reasons but, in particular, keeping our supply lines to 

a minimum if we don’t have to transport fossil fuels, obviously, any 

more than necessary to the front lines. And it keeps people safe 

and keeps us more independent, mobile, and effective. So I know 

that the other services are looking at developing those tools, as 

well. 
21 

Before my time runs out, Admiral, let me just ask—you know, 

one of the most important distinctions with our Special Operations 

Command—our Special Operations community is the focus on irregular warfare. At the Naval War College in Portsmouth, Rhode 

Island, we are lucky enough to have the Center for Irregular Warfare, which works at educating our special operators on the culture 

and strategic insights into the very areas they are being deployed 

into. And they also host a yearly symposium which brings together 

some of the best irregular warfare education across the country. 

Often, however, the educational training can be overlooked, especially in a year of budgetary constraints. What is SOCOM doing to 

ensure that special operators receive a high-quality training education background that is critical for them to remain the high-performance fighting force that we require? 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the gentleman’s time has expired. 

Could you please give that for the record? 

Admiral OLSON. I can get that for the record. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would appreciate it. 

And I want to thank you both for your service, gentlemen. Thank 

you. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Mattis and Admiral Olson. Thank you for 

being here and for your leadership. 

I have three questions that I am going to try to lump together 

and give to you, in hopes of getting answers to all three of them. 

Two are about Iraq, and one is about Afghanistan. 

On Iraq, yesterday I met with some brave government leaders 

from the Iraqi International Visitor Leadership Program that represented local government and state—or canton-level government. 

And during their visit, one, they expressed great appreciation to 

the United States and also, then, great concern about what will 

occur as our forces are drawn from Iraq and voicing I know the 

concern that you have of interference that might arise from their 

neighbors, particularly Iran. 

But, in doing so, they also indicated that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRTs] that had been deployed throughout Iraq 

made a big impact and were of great assistance in their ability to 

ensure that they could make a transition and remain stable. They 

reported that several of those are closing, and they are very concerned about them. They wanted me to raise the issue with you 

gentlemen to see to what extent you see that the PRTs may be able 

to remain and continue to have a role. 

Also yesterday, we had a hearing in the Government Reform National Security Subcommittee on the ‘‘U.S. Military Leaving Iraq: 

Is the State Department Ready?’’ I would love any comments that 

you have concerning the State Department’s efforts and the significant amount of contractors that they are going to be employing for 

security forces, some 17,000. 

My question on Afghanistan is I would like for you to comment 

on our efforts to reduce the drug trade. 
22 

In 2006, General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, stated that, quote, ‘‘The Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. I think the uncontrolled rise of the 

spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that 

it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, aiming to bring chaos and disorder.’’ He also says that it 

funds the corruption in the police, the corruption in local governments, corruption at high levels of government. 

Now, I would love, gentlemen, to hold up this chart. This is a 

chart of the historical production of opium production in Afghanistan. And if you fold the chart, you can see that, looking at the 

years when we first got to Afghanistan, that the subsequent years, 

up through 2009, are almost double what has occurred prior. 

When General James Jones made this quote in 2006, the level 

of 2006 is about the same it was in 2009. So, even though we say 

it is being reduced and coming down, it is still at astronomical levels and nearly double of our first 2 years in Afghanistan. I really 

think it gets to the heart of our ability to turn the circumstances 

around in Afghanistan. 

And I would love to hear your comments on those issues. Thank 

you, gentlemen. 

General MATTIS. Thank you. 

On the PRTs, they have got to come out, sir. This is something 

that we did to help Iraq get back on their feet. They have an educated population. They now have a government that they voted in. 

It was a very close election, so it took a while to get it set up. 

But these PRTs, as you know, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 

were there to bring government services during the tumultuous period as we fought it out with the enemy. That period is pretty much 

over now. The enemy can still set off an explosion anywhere in the 

country. That is just the kind of mentality that they have. But the 

Iraqi security forces have proven themselves capable, I think, to 

maintain security to a point that it is now the responsibility of the 

Iraqi Government. 

Is the State Department ready? Not yet, but I am confident they 

are on the right track. We have one of the finest ambassadors we 

have served with anywhere in Ambassador Jeffrey. 

And I think the 17,000 number, while this is still tentative, I believe that number is the total number on the ground from Department of State, and the number of contracted security personnel will 

be less than half that. I am—excuse me, go ahead, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. That was the number that was being used yesterday in the hearing. So I am not certain either, but we will see 

if—— 

General MATTIS. If I could get back to you for the record then. 

I need to also check the numbers and make sure I am giving you 

accurate data here. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

General MATTIS. But I think that, right now, the State Department and the Defense Department are working very closely together. I co-hosted with the Deputy Secretary of State a conference 

here in late January, where we got together with all of the right 

people from the military and from Department of State. And we 
23 

are working right down to what issues still need resolution, who 

is going to be responsible for them. It is on the right track, sir. It 

is going to be difficult, but we are on the right track. 

On Afghanistan, I will just tell you that we are making progress, 

significant progress, now that we have taken the Helmand River 

Valley away from the enemy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My apologies to Admiral and General for being late. It is one of 

those days. And I may pick up issues that you have already covered. If so, you can move quickly through them and go from there. 

The first deals with what is presently taking place in the Levant—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia. What is our posture there? What can 

we expect? How does it relate to the work that both of you gentlemen do? 

I understand the Navy is nearby now, and maybe one or the 

other of you want to take this one on. 

General MATTIS. Sir, Libya is not in my region; Egypt is. 

The Secretary has just given orders a few hours ago to commence 

an airlift of Egyptians who have been forced outside of Libya into 

Tunisia to help them get back home again. The reason we are 

doing this is, number one, we can; and, number two, I think it is 

indicative of the continuing close military-to-military relationship, 

that we are trusted in that part of the world to be the ones that 

can fly military airlift in, pick up refugees, fly them to another 

country, going past a country that is in disarray right now. 

So we are helping where we can on the humanitarian side, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That would be in the Tunisia and Libya situation. 

General MATTIS. Correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Could you speak to the Egyptian situation, since 

that is your turf? 

General MATTIS. I can, sir. 

We have maintained close relations with the Egyptian military. 

They have served with honor. They continue to serve with honor. 

I spoke to our Ambassador yesterday. She explained to me that the 

military is carrying out its caretaker role. And our relationship 

with that military strengthens in that role that they will turn this 

over to a civilian, elected government. And we still anticipate 6 

months. I think it is ambitious for any country to go through all 

that they have to go through to meet that timeline, but that is the 

military’s commitment. 

I talked to General Anan, the Chief of Defense of Egypt, a couple 

weeks ago. And he assured me that that is their intention, to keep 

the order, to not in any way restrict peaceful demonstration, to protect them in fact, and protect the process toward a democracy. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Apparently, the military-to-military relationship 

has been very beneficial. 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. Absolutely. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. 

Admiral, I don’t know if you have anything to do with what is 

going on a little further to the west of Egypt. If so, you can maybe 

bring us up to date. If not, we will just let it go. 
24 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, from a Special Operations Command perspective, I will just say that we have offered the menu of capabilities Special Operations can contribute to either turn down the heat 

or respond to a flare-up. And so, the commander of CENTCOM, the 

commander of AFRICOM have those, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ready and willing to go—does that mean—well, 

we don’t know what that means, do we? That is, the level of engagement that might be forthcoming. I will let that one go until we 

get some more information. 

I do have a question about Pakistan. It seems to me that while 

Afghanistan remains our major area or theater of operation, Pakistan is becoming increasingly—increased concern. Could you brief 

us on Pakistan and the situation as you see it in Pakistan, particularly the destabilization that is apparently going on? 

General MATTIS. Sir, frankly, I am concerned about Pakistan. We 

have very strong military-to-military links. We are working better 

than ever right now against our common enemies up along the border area. My concern with Pakistan is more along the lines of financial challenges for the government, of the disarray of the civilian government. It is more along the governance and economic 

lines, is my point. 

That is not to say there is not a severe enemy problem there. 

They have killed thousands of Pakistani troops, wounded thousands more, and attacked and killed and wounded upwards of 

nearly 30,000 civilians. So it is a concern. 

The Pakistan military is doing well. They have sustained for 24 

months now an offensive against our enemies that has taken a 

quarter of their Army up into the high country, some of the most 

forbidding and difficult terrain I have ever operated in. But, at the 

same time, I think the problems are much deeper and much broader than purely military can solve. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And my time is up, but therein lies my basic 

concern. It is the radicalization of Pakistan by all that is going on 

within the country and around it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra 13 seconds. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Olson, General Mattis, thank you so much for joining us 

today, and thank you for your service to our Nation. 

And, Admiral Olson, a special thanks to you, and the distinguished career—wow, what accomplishments. The first Navy SEAL 

to be SOCOM commander, the first Navy SEAL to attain the rank 

of four-star admiral. Thanks again for that distinguished service. 

I want to begin with you, Admiral Olson. Looking at where we 

have come with our Special Forces over the years, we know in the 

last 37 years that force has grown significantly. It has expanded 

in its scope, in its expertise. You know, back in the 1970s, nobody 

really knew what a Navy SEAL was or a Green Beret or a PJ 

[Pararescue Jumper]. Today they have an expansive range of operations, and they have become the weapon of choice in this 21st century of asymmetric engagement. 

So I wanted to, kind of, get your perspective on where will Special Operations go—Special Forces go in this next century? You 
25 

know, what are the challenges out there that we face? And, specifically, how do we make sure that we are doing all we can to recruit 

and train the best and brightest so we, indeed, have that force 

structure, that capability in years to come? 

And, you know, we are in a pretty special time in this Nation’s 

history, special in the sense that we have had now over 10 years 

of pretty high ops tempo deployment for our Special Forces. How 

do we make sure that that force is going to be structured to meet 

the challenges into the future? 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir. I have a lot of answer to that 

question. I will keep it brief. 

First, our recruiting and training is going very well. We are getting people who are smarter, harder, fitter, stronger than ever before, and at least as motivated, and I am quite satisfied with the 

quality of the force and the quality of our training. 

We need to do more to ensure that we are retaining them for as 

long as we need for them to serve. This is quite specialized work. 

We do invest heavily in their training. And the longer that we can 

keep them with us, the better, even well beyond the normal 20- 

year military retirement point. 

In terms of the employment of Special Operations Forces, it is a 

big, complex world. I think the threat of massive army-versusarmy, uniformed-formations-against-uniformed-formations kind of 

warfare is decreasing, and the probability of, as you said, asymmetric, cyber, nontraditional warfare is increasing. It is very much 

Special Operations Command’s—within our portfolio to be out 

there around the world turning down the global heat. We are in 

many countries on any given day at the invitation of other nations 

to help provide them local capability that contributes to regional 

stability. 

So, in my way of describing it, we have worked very hard in our, 

sort of, shoot, move, communicate network kind of skills. Our investment now is in our understanding, make sure that we are in 

the right places for the right reasons, doing the right things, with 

the ability to properly predict the outcomes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Mattis, I want to ask a little bit about 

what we are facing in Iraq. As you know, we are right at the face 

of more drawdowns. That is quickly approaching. We are at 50,000 

now, with no agreement past the end of 2011 as far as what our 

manning is going to be there in Iraq. 

The inspector general for DOD pointed out some concerns about 

Iraqi capabilities and ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] capabilities going 

into the future. And they pointed out that, with that transition, 

there might be little time to develop logistical systems and industrial capabilities that may leave the ISF and Iraqi forces with a 

lack of readiness in what they are going to be facing down the 

road. And they also noted some additional gaps in military training, Special Operations, and airspace management. 

Within that context, the question then becomes, how do we make 

sure that those forces are going to be ready? And what are our 

forces doing in making sure that that transition is going to be a 

smooth one and that we don’t lose what we have gained there? And 

we want to make sure that the ISF and the Iraqi forces are able 

to maintain what we have worked so hard to build there. 
26 

So I want to get your perspective on what challenges we are facing with that transition. 

General MATTIS. I think you summed up the challenges pretty 

well, sir. The three biggest challenges: logistics, including maintenance; intelligence and intelligence fusion and how they would use 

that for their special forces, their security forces, to continue an unrelenting attack against the enemies, the terrorists who are in the 

country and still capable of dramatic attacks; and, of course, air 

sovereignty. They will not have an air force yet. 

But we are using every day, working with them every day. We 

have specialized training programs for certain units to bring—if we 

can’t bring everyone up, can we bring up a cadre, certain units, up 

to full capability. That, too, is going to be challenging. Candidly, it 

is going to be very difficult. 

I think there will still be loose ends by December, but, absent a 

request from the Iraqi Government and agreement by the U.S. 

Government to stay longer, we are projected to come out with pretty much 99.9 percent of our troops. There may be a small office of 

security cooperation that would try to carry on some of the things 

that you just mentioned. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Admiral, for your years of service. 

And thank you, General Mattis, for being here. 

I would like to first begin with General Mattis. You made an interesting comment when I was here earlier, and you said that 

though not within, I think, your region, the Israel-Palestinian situation really affects your ability within what you are trying to do. 

Could you expand that for me? What is it about it, and what kind 

of stability would you like to see? 

General MATTIS. Yes, ma’am, I can. 

The extremist elements have seized this issue, and they use it 

for recruiting. So, if Middle East peace can be achieved, a two-state 

solution, which has been proposed by several American administrations, embraced by many moderates across the region and in the 

U.N., if this two-state solution can be achieved, then what you do 

is you remove this issue from the extremists. 

I think it is pretty clear to everyone that Iranian leaders in 

Tehran don’t care a whit about Palestinian Arabs, but they use this 

issue, and because other extremists use it, it limits the ability of 

some of our friends in the region to come out and support us because of the lack of progress on this issue. 

And I think that, in the terms of long-term security for Israel 

and for the Palestinian people to have their rights, we are going 

to have to make progress on the two-state solution. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. General, we all know that there is such a strong 

sense about the relationship that we have with Egypt, especially 

the relationship the military has developed and nurtured for 30- 

some-odd years. 

Do you see the potential for a similar kind of relationship developing in any of the other areas, like Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, any 
27 

of those areas? Do you see that we can do that or duplicate that 

relationship elsewhere? 

General MATTIS. I think we had that relationship in a couple of 

nations in my region, ma’am. 

I would start with Kuwait, where I was with Admiral Olson last 

week for the 20th anniversary of the battle that freed that country. 

I think that there were as many American flags flying at times in 

some parts of the young people out celebrating that night before as 

there were Kuwaiti flags. 

In Bahrain, where we have had our fleet headquarters for 5th 

Fleet since the late 1940s, in the midst of all the turmoil going on 

there, as reformers and others peacefully protest by and large, 

there has been no anti-Americanism there. We have a very strong 

relationship. 

We have very quiet and very robust mil-to-mil relationships with 

the United Arab Emirates, with Qatar. I can go on—the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia. 

I think you mentioned Iran. I could not imagine it right now—— 

Mrs. HANABUSA. No, no, I mispronounced ‘‘Bahrain.’’ 

General MATTIS. Oh, okay. Right. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. No, it wasn’t Iran, sorry. 

General MATTIS. Yes, ma’am. 

But, yes, ma’am, we have very good mil-to-mil relationships, and 

there are more than that. I can go on at some length. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Admiral, one of the things I am looking at, because this is a 

budget briefing, is I am so accustomed to seeing end strength right 

up front, and I am also accustomed to seeing the concept of the 

OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] budget versus the base 

budget. 

I was wondering, can you tell me what the figures that I have seen—is it $12.8 billion, which seems to be attributed to specific 

programs—what and how does this 2012 budget—what does it 

mean to what you are doing? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, ma’am. The 2012 budget request for Special Operations Command is actually $10.5 billion. This is about a 7 

percent growth over 2011. And it permits us to continue the rate 

of growth that we have been able to absorb. The demand is outpacing our ability to grow, continue in this relatively good pace of 

growth. It is essential to us. 

This gives us a force structure of—we are at about 60,000 people 

now. Over the course of the next 4 or 5 years, we will grow to about 

68,000 people total. About a third of those are careerists within our 

force. And about two-thirds are in our force for an assignment or 

two or three over the course of their careers. 

In terms of OCO to base, we are, I think, the highest percentage 

user of OCO funds. We are about 36 percent of our total budget is 

in OCO. And, as Secretary Gates testified yesterday, that he is 

making moves to, in fact, transfer our entire OCO into our baseline 

budget over the next few years. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. West. 
28 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral Olson and General Mattis, it really is an honor to 

be here with you today because you two are the epitome of the 

American warrior. 

My question, I think, is pretty simple. As I look across what is 

going on in the world right now—Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, 

Bahrain, Lebanon, Somalia, Gaza Strip, Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, 

Syria, Iran—there was one geographical thing that each one of 

those share, and that is the littorals. 

So, as we begin to move to away from this occupation/nationbuilding style of warfare, my concern really is, do we have the sufficient maritime forces? I know some of these countries may not be 

in your AOR [area of responsibility], but I am always concerned 

about the enemy being able to find the gaps and the seams by 

which he can exploit us. 

Do we really have the maritime forces to be able to have the 

power projection and potentially the forcible-entry capability to contend with the rising threats that could come out of those nations? 

Thank you. 

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir. 

We work the seams very closely, the combatant commanders. We 

speak to each other routinely. Our staffs are in constant contact. 

I get what I ask for. 

The concern you have, I think, is the longer term, and I will just 

say that your instincts are on target. I think I am right now commanding an increasingly maritime naval theater. As these numbers of troops on the ground come down, we are going to have to 

maintain a very robust naval presence. It is welcome, it is reinforcing, it is reassuring, and it tempers any mischief by certain 

people who might want to get meddlesome in other people’s issues. 

Admiral OLSON. So, from a Special Operations perspective, we 

are generally consumers and customers of the larger maritime 

forces. We ride and operate from the ships when it is appropriate 

to do that. And, therefore, we depend on the geographic combatant 

commanders to request and provide those ships. 

I will second what General Mattis said, is that generally when 

we are employed the priority is high enough that we will get the 

maritime assets that are required. But that is in the theater where 

we are now; it may not be the same around the rest of the world, 

sir. 

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, gentlemen, very much. And, of 

course, being an old soldier, it is very hard for me to understand 

that and admit that that is an important aspect. 

But I yield back to the chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. By ‘‘old soldier,’’ he means he served several 

years, when he is talking, compared to an old guy like me. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mattis, first of all, thank you for your distinguished 

service as the U.S. Central Command combatant commander. 

You had mentioned in an answer—and I want to clarify this— 

about the Pakistani military that the Pakistani military had 

been—words to the effect that you gave—had been conducting com-
29 

bat operations for the last 2 years against our enemy. And I need 

to clarify that. 

Is it that they are conducting combat operations against the Pakistani Taliban? Because it is my understanding that the Afghan 

Taliban has sanctuary inside of Pakistan and that they are not 

prosecuting operations against the Afghan Taliban. 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. And they have been conducting the operations more than 2 years. It is not against all of those that we 

are up against. There are some they have not gone after. They are 

going after more today. It is in the last 2 years that they have 

shifted 140,000 troops and have taken a much more aggressive role 

here. But you are quite correct. There are some that they have not 

engaged. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Olson, I just want to thank you so much for your service 

as the combatant commander for Special Operations Command. 

And I think you mentioned that, prospectively, you saw that, you 

know, this—that you saw future combat operations as probably not 

being conventional force-on-force but being of the more asymmetric 

variety that would, in fact, involve Special Operations Command. 

And, in fact, the Secretary of Defense gave a recent speech at 

West Point where he talked about his doubts as to whether the 

United States in the future would engage in the kind of heavy-footprint operations as we are doing today in Iraq and Afghanistan. I 

think he said words to the effect that we are not—he didn’t see us 

as invading, pacifying, and I think building countries in the future 

as we have done recently. 

And, General Mattis, that goes to you. I am concerned that 

maybe we are too ambitious in Afghanistan. I see that we have two 

objectives there in order to meet U.S. security interests. I think 

number one is that we need to not allow the Taliban to control the 

country and that be a permissive environment for them in which 

they could leverage that in hopes of destabilizing Pakistan by aiding the Taliban on the other side of the Durand Line. And, secondly, the ability to use Afghanistan as a platform in which to, 

quite frankly, seek out targets in the tribal—in the FATA in Pakistan. 

But yet, if I look at the current policy, it seems to me that we 

are establishing a governance that I am concerned doesn’t necessarily reflect the political culture of the country but certainly reflects our values, that we are trying to restructure Afghan society, 

and that we are trying to build them the economy that they never 

had. And I refer to the Afghan infrastructure fund, certainly, as 

part of that. 

And I wonder if you can address that, because I am just very 

concerned that we, perhaps, have a policy that is more robust than 

is necessary to meet our security interests. 

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir. 

I engaged in the President’s policy review, strategy review in December. Your question was one of the critical ones that we examined there: Are we doing more than we need to do? Again, we are 

there for our reasons, our national security reasons. When we 

didn’t pay attention to it, we were attacked. And the FATA area, 
30 

the borderland region there remains the epicenter of Osama bin 

Laden’s efforts, obviously. 

So we fall back and say, what do we need to do to deny future 

attacks such as this? And we have very strictly looked even down 

to what are the key districts that we need to be focused on. It is 

not that we are all over the country. We are looking in every way, 

how do we ensure that the ends we require, we only commit the 

means necessary to do that? 

Now, it is not a precise science, and I think you can always find 

points where you might find where this doesn’t quite seem to coincide. But, basically, fundamentally, we are looking at how do we 

deny the enemy a position from which they can attack us in the 

future. 

Part of this is to ensure that, as we pull out, as we will, we leave 

in our wake something better than we left in 1989. It has to be designed with Afghan unique—Afghanistan’s unique history, culture, 

geography, economic opportunity all in mind. 

But right now I am confident that what we are doing is limited 

in scope to what needs to be done. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here before this Armed Services Committee 

meeting. 

I had the opportunity last week to participate in a congressional 

delegation trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a freshman, I 

found it to be very eye-opening, very informative. I would like to, 

for the record, before I get to my questions, point out a few things 

that I observed. 

First, I thought that our men and women in uniform, given the 

very challenging circumstances that they faced, were acting just as 

courageously and as professionally as anyone in America could 

hope for them to do. That is a credit to them, and it is also a credit 

to those, like you, who have trained them so that they are able to 

handle the situations that they face. 

Similarly, I was impressed with our Foreign Service personnel, 

who, to a large degree, are responsible for the nation-building that 

we are trying to do in both of those two nations. 

Third, in looking at the environment of Afghanistan in particular, I was struck by the poverty of the Afghan people. I was told 

that there are roughly 30 million people in Afghanistan. In the 

rural areas, people were living in huts, usually without windows. 

Fifteen percent literacy rate, i.e., 85 percent could neither read nor 

write. In the rural areas that I was fortunate to observe, there appeared to be no electricity. The roads in the rural areas were dirt. 

And that brings me to the Afghan economy. It was quite clear 

that the Afghan economy is nowhere near capable of being able to 

pay for its own defense, either militarily or internal security forces, 

police, or what have you. 

And with that as a backdrop, do you have a judgment as to how 

many years, in your opinion, it might be before the Afghan economy is strong enough for them to pay for their own internal security forces? 
31 

General MATTIS. Sir, I would have to give you an estimate. 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand it would be an estimate. Please do. 

General MATTIS. I would say it would be at least 10 years. And 

it will require international support throughout that 10-year period 

and perhaps longer. 

Mr. BROOKS. Yeah, I was informed by some of the folks that we 

met with that it would be in that neighborhood, perhaps even as 

long as 15 or 20 years, which means it is basically going to be a 

long time. We hope for the best, but we have to be prepared for 

the worst. 

With that as a backdrop, do you have any judgment as to how 

much America is going to have to pay over that next 10-year period 

of time out of our own Treasury to be able to pay for the cost of 

the Afghan security forces, the police, their military, or what have 

you? 

General MATTIS. Sir, as we fight this enemy and as governance 

picks up in areas that were once held by the Taliban, there are economic opportunities—agricultural extraction, mineral extraction— 

there are opportunities for people there. 

I think we will see a combination of the number of security forces 

needed dropping slightly as the enemy threat drops. And I think 

that right now we have 49 nations engaged there, and as some 

start coming out, our Foreign Service officers, who impressed you, 

as they have impressed me, will have to work with the foreign 

countries to make sure that, as they pull their troops out, they 

maintain the kind of fiscal support that the international community has to give to a nation that, with 30 years of warfare and hundreds of billions of dollars of damage to that country over those 

decades, simply it is going to take an international commitment to 

get them back on their feet. And I am very confident it cannot be 

the United States alone. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, do you have any judgment as to how much 

would be the United States share? 

General MATTIS. I do not, sir. If it is just for the security forces, 

it will cost us $12.8 billion this next year. That number will come 

down. I see that as a surge right now of their forces. And, at some 

point, once the enemy is beaten down, then they won’t need that 

size of a force. So that amount should come down, too, as the 

enemy threat recedes somewhat. 

But it is going to be a significant amount, I think is where I 

would agree with you. It is going to take an international effort, 

not America alone. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for your insight. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Mattis, Admiral Olson, thank you very much for 

your service. I was fortunate enough to be on the congressional delegation with Congressman Brooks. And I want to join with him in 

commending the servicemembers we met. General Austin gave us 

an excellent briefing, General Petraeus of course, there in Baghdad 

and in Kabul. We also had the opportunity to visit the sailors of 

the USS Lake Champlain in Bahrain. And it was just so encouraging to me to see our quality troops. 
32 

Also, I was encouraged because my former National Guard unit, 

the 218th Brigade of the South Carolina National Guard, had been 

there in 2007, 2008, training the Afghan National Security Forces. 

The progress that I saw of the personnel, the Afghan forces—and 

I know that the extraordinary defense minister, Abdul Wardak, has 

indicated that he wanted those forces to be increased, possibly to 

378,000. 

And so, General, do we have the capability to partner with a 

force that size with the current personnel we have? 

General MATTIS. If the President makes the decision to support 

President Karzai’s effort to grow the force, as Minister Wardak told 

you, yes, we have the capability to do so with the forces that we 

have there. 

Mr. WILSON. And, in fact, I gave a floor speech Tuesday, or Monday, where I indicated that I have supported the President’s surge 

by sending 30,000 troops. That has actually encouraged Afghanis 

to have faith in their future. And now an additional 70,000 Afghan 

security forces. 

Admiral Olson, on behalf of the Military Personnel Subcommittee, in your written testimony, you discussed the establishment of a pressure-on-the-force task force to survey and analyze 

the effects of repetitive combat deployment over nearly a decade. 

And I want to thank you for doing that. 

Particularly, though, I am concerned that there has been a higher percentage of officers leaving at the 8- to 10-year mark. Can you 

provide detail of what this task force will do? And in the coming 

months, would you share the results with the committee? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. 

The pressure-on-the-force task force is designed to get at what 

the data doesn’t really present. Responses generally lag data; data 

lags reality. We are really trying to be predictive and preventive 

in our approach. And to do that, we have to be able to trust commanders’ intuition, teammates’ sense of what is happening in the 

team room, families, children, as they sense our force. And so we 

are really on a survey mission to understand the plethora of factors 

that do affect the overall health of our force. 

I do expect that report in about 90 days, and I do—I would certainly be willing to share it. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

And, General Mattis, when we go, we go to encourage the troops, 

but we do fact-finding. On my last visit there prior to this, I was 

so impressed by the different teams that were performing route 

clearance, how brave they were. And I am really grateful to see the 

advances in technology, with the Mine Roller Program. 

What is the level of providing those so that we can face the improvised explosive devices [IEDs]? 

General MATTIS. Sir, the mine rollers work in most of the terrain 

where they can be employed on roads with the vehicles that carry 

the mine roller, that can use the mine rollers. As you know, not 

all vehicles can, because they are a very, very heavy piece of gear. 

Ultimately, Mr. Wilson, what we are going to have to do is, this 

country is going to have find a way to prematurely detonate IEDs. 

Right now, attacking the network, we are either finding, or the 

people are turning in to us, about 70 percent of the IEDs that we 
33 

run into. But about 30 percent are still going off against us. And 

it is the primary casualty-inducing weapon the enemy has. 

So this is a significant effort that we have under way to try and 

look at not just mine rollers but the entire scope of the problem, 

sir. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I want to thank you on behalf of my constituents. And I have had two sons serve in Iraq, and I want to thank 

you for your leadership in truly protecting our troops. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

My turn. 

Admiral Olson, as you noted in your opening statement, this is 

your fourth and final appearance in this capacity before this committee, in all likelihood. I want to thank you again for your years 

of service to the Nation. 

And I would like to ask you, for a moment, to take the long view, 

for the benefit of the committee and the record, and outline for us 

some of the future challenges that you see facing the force. I know, 

as we visited last week, I believe it was, or week before, I know 

you put a great deal of thought into this issue. 

In your opinion, what does the future hold for SOF, and what 

will the force look like? What challenges do you see, and what 

should Congress be concerned with? 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir. 

I think the future requirements for Special Operations Command 

will be in smaller teams, in more places, at the invitation, at the 

request of host governments who believe that highly skilled teams 

with a relatively small footprint are of great value in their regions. 

This does require a different kind of training program for us, it 

requires a different kind of education program for us, depending 

very heavily on the services, but understanding that we have to 

tailor some of that to our own requirements. 

It also requires a different kind of career management. It has to, 

as I said in my opening statement, recognize some of the nontraditional skill sets, those that are not necessarily platform-oriented 

but more knowledge- and experience-oriented, as essential military 

skills can incentivize people to gain and move within paths that reward them for having done that. 

I think that the force mix will remain relatively unchanged in 

terms of the balance across our force. I believe that our platform 

requirements as we have them programmed are relatively sufficient for our future needs. 

We will continue to require the ability to move in a way that is 

quite traditional, quite obvious in our movements, and we also 

need to be able to retain the capability to move in a clandestine 

manner when that is necessary. And I think Special Operations 

Forces are unarguably the force of choice for any kind of clandestine activity where that might be required in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Mattis, the LA Times reported that the President of 

Yemen, Ali Saleh, has agreed to a plan from opposition leaders that 

includes a demand that he step down by the end of the year. Can 

you comment at all on the accuracy of this report? 
34 

General MATTIS. I cannot right now, sir. I have seen the newspaper article, but I have not seen anything more than that. So I 

would prefer to learn a little more before I comment, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. We all need to learn that skill. 

Thank you very much, both of you, for your service, and all of 

those sitting behind you there that work with you every day. I 

wanted to talk to them and see how they—do they have special 

training for poker faces? I think they—I watched. They don’t give 

a thing away. And that is a great skill. 

Thank you all for your service. Appreciate it very much. 

And this hearing now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 3, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 3, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 3, 2011 

(115) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. In 2004, SOCOM chose the SCAR as its new individual carbine from 

among nine vendors and a dozen submissions. Over the following six years, SOCOM 

shepherded the SCAR program through continued RDT&E while the awardee invested $30M of its own capital in continuing to develop the program. Last summer 

SOCOM awarded full rate production. 

Given that the SCAR meets the established requirement, why isn’t SOCOM procuring the SCAR family of weapons in the quantities it originally intended and what 

has led to these delays in the acquisition of the system—were there mistakes in the 

acquisition process or is it a budget issue? 

Admiral OLSON. Following extensive testing and in-theater Combat User Assessments, USSOCOM decided to pursue full fielding of the MK17 (7.62mm) rifle, the 

MK13 (40mm) grenade launcher, and the MK20 (7.62mm) Sniper Support Rifle 

variants. The vendor also developed a Common Upper Receiver (CUR) kit that will 

allow the MK17 to fire 5.56mm ammunition by changing out several components of 

the base rifle. This allows SOF operators to fire multiple calibers of ammunition 

from the same base weapon; an original objective requirement of this program. 

USSOCOM began procurement of the CUR kit beginning this FY. The stand-alone 

MK16 (5.56mm) rifle did not provide enough of a performance advantage over the 

service-common M4A1 (5.56mm) rifle to be considered a SOF-unique capability. The 

total required quantity of weapons was adjusted based on the results of the Combat 

User Assessments. 

Mr. WILSON. If a lack of funding contributed to SOCOM’s decision to not procure 

the SCAR at the original intended quantities, at what point did SOCOM know that 

it would not have the necessary funding to procure this weapon system? 

Admiral OLSON. Lack of funding did not contribute to USSOCOM’s decision. 

Mr. WILSON. SOCOM competed a new carbine in order to field a weapon that allows our Special Operators to more effectively engage a target at greater distances. 

Have there been significant changes, over the last several years, in the way we are 

engaging the enemy that would cause SOCOM to revert back to their status quo 

capability? 

Admiral OLSON. The MK17 rifle provides SOF operators the capability to engage 

enemy targets at greater distances than the M4 rifle or MK16 rifles. 

Mr. WILSON. Did SOCOM, at any time, reprogram money from the SCAR program? If so, was Congress informed in a timely manner and what effect has that 

action had on your budget for the SCAR since the reprogramming action? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, $26M of SCAR procurement funds were reprogrammed from 

the SCAR program and put towards higher command priorities. Yes, Congress was 

notified in a timely manner. The reprogramming did not negatively affect the SCAR 

budget due to the elimination of the MK16 procurement. 

Mr. WILSON. What is the total amount of Major Force Program (MFP)–11 dollars 

does SOCOM spend from its own funding in order to make the Army-provided M4 

SOF specific? How does this amount of MFP–11 dollars compare to the total cost 

of a SCAR? 

Admiral OLSON. NAVSOC and AFSOC procure and sustain the M4A1 from the 

Army using Navy and Air Force MFP–2 dollars. USSOCOM does not procure or sustain the M4A1 with MFP–11 dollars. 

Mr. WILSON. Did SOCOM conduct a total life-cycle cost comparison between the 

M4 and SCAR before making its decision to not procure the SCAR at the original 

intended quantities? 

Admiral OLSON. No. USSOCOM decided not to procure the MK16 based on the 

decision that it did not provide a SOF-unique capability over the Service-common 

M4 and that more appropriate uses for MFP–11 funds existed within the command’s 

priorities. 
116 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SUTTON 

Ms. SUTTON. Recent developments in Northern Africa and the Middle East over 

the last few weeks have prompted significant discussion of our foreign policy objectives, as well as the importance of seeking stability in the region. At this particularly volatile time there also remains significant concern about Iran’s nuclear 

progress. 

How do you assess the internal stability of the Iranian regime in light of recent 

political change and uncertainty in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere? Do you believe 

this has had any impact on the likely time frame for when Iran could obtain a nuclear weapon? 

General MATTIS. We do not assess that the larger Middle East unrest has significantly increased the threat to Iranian regime stability. Iranian public discontent, 

however, remains and rifts persist among the regime elite, as highlighted by a recent dispute between Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadi-Nejad over 

the firing of the Minister of Intelligence. Since February 2011, the regime has effectively eliminated opposition activity and placed its symbolic leaders, Mir-Hosein 

Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi, on indefinite house arrest. The Supreme Leader remains firmly in charge of Iran’s nuclear portfolio, and Iran’s nuclear program has 

not been impacted by internal stability concerns. 

Ms. SUTTON. Our operations in Afghanistan certainly require significant logistical 

support to succeed, and we’ve had to rely heavily on Pakistan for much of this support. One aspect of sustaining this support is an alternative in the form of a Northern Distribution Network for transporting non-military goods to Afghanistan.What 

needs to be done to ensure the safety and viability of this network? What progress 

has been made so far and what issues your foresee for the future? 

General MATTIS. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) supports the movement of military cargo via commercial shipments on standard shipping routes. The 

cargo is containerized and looks like all other commercial cargo moving along the 

same shipping routes which greatly contributes to the safety and viability of the 

network. Over 43,000 containers have transited the NDN en route to Afghanistan 

with no reported pilferage or attacks. Global commercial carriers, under contract 

with U.S. Transportation Command, provide the Department a commercial channel 

to ensure reliable and repeatable deliveries. The NDN is a sound alternative to 

other distribution routes. 

Ms. SUTTON. You discussed in your prepared statement SOCOM’s utilization of 

female Cultural Support Teams, as well as the importance of the special operations 

forces (SOF) working with indigenous groups and the local population to accomplish 

their mission. As you note, this is demanding, high-risk, and valuable work that 

helps our military achieve their goals. As you know there are currently military occupational specialties open to women in the general purpose forces, such as aviation, 

that are not open to women in special operations forces. Apart from the female Cultural Support Teams, how do you see the roles and opportunities for women evolving in a special operations capacity? As other parts of the force reexamine the role 

of women in combat, what can you share about similar efforts in SOCOM? 

Admiral OLSON. USSOCOM views the roles and opportunities for women in a special operations capacity to continue to follow established Department policies. 

Women will continue to perform a supporting role to units whose primary mission 

is to engage in direct combat on the ground. Women may be attached to these units, 

but not assigned, in order to perform Combat Support and Combat Service Support 

missions. At this time, USSOCOM is not reexamining the role of women in combat. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Are you seeing any impacts of the CR on the battlefield? 

Admiral OLSON. There was minimal impact of the CR. The department was very 

supportive and provided adequate CR authority to support SOF deployed operations. 

Mr. TURNER. Are you concerned about the Department’s plans to reduce end 

strength? If so, please share those concerns. 

Admiral OLSON. In order to maintain SOCOM’s unique mission capabilities, the 

Command must have access to the Services for the brightest and most talented service members within the Department. Essentially, the men and women within the 

Army, Navy, USMC, and Air Force are SOCOM’s recruiting pool. End strength reductions potentially affect the availability of future SOF Operators. Additionally, the 

Command monitors Service capabilities that assist in making SOCOM successful via 

regular SOCOM-to-Service talks. Force structure and end strength reductions are 

always addressed within the context of impact to the Department and the wider national defense enterprise. 
117 

SOCOM is directly dependent upon the Services to provide support to SOF forces. 

The level of support required is reflected in the Service levels which directly affect 

SOF mission capability and critical skill requirements (high demand/low density) 

that are not organic to SOCOM. Foremost within among all Service capabilities is 

their ability to Support and Sustain SOF (CONUS and OCONUS). 

Mr. TURNER. In 2006 General James Jones (then the Supreme Allied Commander 

of Europe) stated that ‘‘the Achilles’ heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. 

I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings 

in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal 

elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder.’’ He further emphasized that the 

narcotics trade ‘‘funds the corruption in the police, the corruption in the local governments, corruption at high levels of government. And it actually is so pervasive 

that it’s preventing the legitimate economy of Afghanistan from developing apace.’’ 

Last year UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) published a 

study showing that opium production has rapidly increased over the past five years. 

If you follow General Jones’ reasoning, this would indicate that the enemy’s funds 

are growing. What actions are we taking to reduce the opium production? Has it 

been successful? 

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the 

committee. 

Mr. TURNER. Has the new Government of Iraq given any indication that it is interested in retaining a U.S. troop presence beyond 2011? If so, how many troops are 

we talking about and what functions would they undertake? If not, do you envision 

any sort of additional formal defense commitments between the United States and 

Iraq to provide protection for Iraq from external threats until they have such a capability? 

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the 

committee. 

Mr. TURNER. What conditions will you consider, in July 2011, to determine the 

extent of a U.S. troop drawdown? When do you expect to reach the next ‘‘decision 

point,’’ after July 2011, about possible further reductions in U.S. troop commitments? 

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the 

committee. 

Mr. TURNER. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution Network? 

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by both of the Combatant Commanders, General Mattis and ADM Stavridis, as they have shared responsibility for this area of interest by the committee. 

Mr. TURNER. How do you assess the threat of Iranian supported extremism and 

terrorist organizations to U.S. interests and allies in the region? 

Admiral OLSON. This is an issue that should be answered by the Combatant Commander, General Mattis, as he has the responsibility for this area of interest by the 

committee. 

Mr. TURNER. Are you seeing any impacts of the CR on the battlefield? 

General MATTIS. Yes, the CR had some impact on support activities, but did not 

affect the performance of combat units. To limit the CR’s impact on our mission, 

we relied in some cases on incremental funding for our annual contracts. We also 

developed plans to address potential funding shortfalls absent CR extension or 

budget approval. 

Mr. TURNER. Are you concerned about the Department’s plans to reduce end 

strength? If so, please share those concerns. 

General MATTIS. No. CENTCOM is prepared to successfully operate with reduced 

military end strength. 

From the warfighter’s perspective, it will be critical to transition seasoned activeduty military members into the Ready Reserve as end strength numbers are reduced. The Reserve and Guard provide an immediate surge capability and are combat multipliers that serve as a critical component of our all-volunteer force. The 

Services need continued support to retain this talent through benefits, incentives 

and appropriate Selected Reserve numbers in order to create sufficient dwell time 

between deployments. Reserve forces provide the ‘‘reach-back’’ capability necessary 

as our sight-picture evolves and as foreseen and unforeseen national-security scenarios emerge. 

Mr. TURNER. In 2006 General James Jones (then the Supreme Allied Commander 

of Europe) stated that ‘‘the Achilles’ heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. 

I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings 
118 

in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal 

elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder.’’ He further emphasized that the 

narcotics trade ‘‘funds the corruption in the police, the corruption in the local governments, corruption at high levels of government. And it actually is so pervasive 

that it’s preventing the legitimate economy of Afghanistan from developing apace.’’ 

Last year UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) published a 

study showing that opium production has rapidly increased over the past five years. 

If you follow General Jones’ reasoning, this would indicate that the enemy’s funds 

are growing. What actions are we taking to reduce the opium production? Has it 

been successful? 

General MATTIS. The U.S. Government and other international partners, including the Afghans, are reducing poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. UNODC’s Afghanistan opium survey reported poppy cultivation of 123,000 

hectares in 2010, representing a significant reduction from the recorded high of 

193,000 hectares in 2007. Moreover, UNODC’s April 2011 winter poppy assessment 

anticipates another small decrease in 2011 opium production. 

Our interagency counternarcotics strategy supports a comprehensive set of actions 

to reduce opium production. In 2010, a pre-planting public information campaign 

was executed which targeted 44 provincial conferences and district jirgas in an effort to dissuade farmers from growing poppy in favor of licit crops. In concert with 

the public information campaign, the Good Performers Initiative awarded a total of 

$25.7M to provinces that achieved poppy free status, reduced poppy cultivation by 

10 percent or more, and/or demonstrated exemplary counternarcotics progress. Complementary efforts in law enforcement and justice reform have proven equally important in reducing opium production. DoD supports capacity building within the 

Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan and specialized units such as the DEA-sponsored National Interdiction and Special Investigative Units. The Afghan Counternarcotics Tribunal and Criminal Justice Task Force are also in place to detain and 

prosecute offenders. Finally, USAID is heavily invested in activities that promote 

crop substitution and create viable markets for economic growth. 

Mr. TURNER. Has the new Government of Iraq given any indication that it is interested in retaining a U.S. troop presence beyond 2011? If so, how many troops are 

we talking about and what functions would they undertake? If not, do you envision 

any sort of additional formal defense commitments between the United States and 

Iraq to provide protection for Iraq from external threats until they have such a capability? 

General MATTIS. The Government of Iraq has not requested a U.S. troop presence 

beyond 2011. U.S. Forces in Iraq operate under two approved diplomatic agreements. The first agreement is a Security Agreement which dictates that all U.S. 

forces will be removed from Iraq by December 31, 2011. The second agreement is 

a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). This second agreement describes in broad 

terms the longer term strategic relationship between our two countries concerning 

security assistance and security cooperation. In addition to setting the stage for our 

enduring partnership, the SFA describes how we intend to normalize our relationship with Iraq with strong economic, cultural, and diplomatic ties. 

Mr. TURNER. What conditions will you consider, in July 2011, to determine the 

extent of a U.S. troop drawdown? When do you expect to reach the next ‘‘decision 

point,’’ after July 2011, about possible further reductions in U.S. troop commitments? 

General MATTIS. The conditions-based troop drawdown will be closely linked to 

the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume the lead for security tasks with less assistance from International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). 

The President will decide the extent of the July 2011 troop drawdown based on recommendations from his military chain-of-command, including the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, myself, and GEN Petraeus. As always, 

I will continue to provide my best professional military advice regarding possible 

further reductions. 

Mr. TURNER. What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution Network? 

General MATTIS. Enhancing the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) requires 

increased host nation permissions for bi-directional ground transportation of unqualified cargo to include wheeled armored vehicles. Additionally, improvement of 

key en route infrastructure would also bolster the NDN. This endeavor requires 

interagency support to work directly with the host nation governments. The State 

Department conducts the majority of negotiations with host nations on behalf of 

CENTCOM and U.S. Transportation Command, and we are actively working with 

them. 

Mr. TURNER. How do you assess the threat of Iranian supported extremism and 

terrorist organizations to U.S. interests and allies in the region? 
119 

General MATTIS. Within the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility, threatening activity from Iranian-backed proxies is prevalent and increasing. 

Iran is exploiting vacuums and relationships in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, 

Gaza, Egypt, Bahrain, and other Gulf states. 

These threats are enduring and will persist after the anticipated draw-down of 

U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a high potential for miscalculation and provocations with Iran as our forces operate throughout the Central Command region. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. To accommodate this growth in demand and address ongoing concerns with Pakistani supply lines, U.S. planners opened the Northern Distribution 

Network (NDN), a commercially based logistical corridor connecting Baltic and 

Black Sea ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The 

U.S. Transportation Command reports that about one-half of the non-lethal surface 

shipments to Afghanistan are being transported via the NDN. The importance of 

this route was illustrated in October 2010 when Pakistan closed a key border crossing into Afghanistan. The NDN South, beginning in Turkey or the European Union 

and moving on to the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti. Those supplies are then 

transported by rail to Baku, Azerbaijan, and across the Caspian Sea to the Kazakh 

ports of Atyrau and Aktau. Cargo then moves on to Uzbekistan and finally Afghanistan. The overall view among Georgian and Azerbaijani decision makers is that the 

Caucasus supply route is of mutual benefit to the United States, NATO, and the 

two national governments: 

What can be done to enhance the Northern Distribution Network, specifically the 

Caucus supply route? 

Does a Caucus centric supply route pose less risk and potential for greater efficiency? 

General MATTIS. The Caucasus route, which requires the cooperation of 

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (or bypassing Turkey via 

the port of Poti, Georgia) poses a challenge because of individual state restrictions— 

which vary from country to country. The most significant restriction affects cargo 

including vehicles that appear to be for military use. Successful State Department 

engagements aimed at expanding commodity types and bi-directional transits would 

significantly enhance the Caucasus supply route. The risk associated with the 

Caucasus route is similar to the excellent safety record demonstrated across other 

Northern Distribution Routes (NDN) routes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Allies and partners in the Middle East have shown a strong interest in acquiring missile defense assets and cooperating with the United States. 

CENTCOM conducts an annual ballistic missile defense exercise and the Missile Defense Agency is in discussions with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia regarding missile defense cooperation. Patriot air and missile defense batteries and 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships with Standard missile (SM)–3 Block IA 

interceptors currently deploy to the CENTCOM AOR to support the command’s missile defense requirements. 

Please discuss CENTCOM’s missile defense requirements; are they being met? 

What are your most significant missile defense capability gaps or shortfalls? 

Discuss opportunities and challenges for missile defense cooperation and integration in the Middle East and what specific countries you feel would most adequately 

benefit from FMS sales of missile defense capabilities, specifically Patriot Missile 

systems. 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Mattis, what is your current assessment of the threat 

posed by Al Qaeda to the United States? Are they respected as a legitimate regional 

group? Do you see support for Al Qaeda growing in the Middle East? Are violent 

extremist organizations growing in the CENTCOM region? How many Al Qaeda 

members are left in CENTCOM’s AOR? How is Al Qaeda marginalized by the 

uprisings occurring throughout the Middle East? 

General MATTIS. Estimates on the number of Al Qaeda (AQ) members vary widely. We believe 50–100 AQ members are in Afghanistan, with approximately 100 currently operating in Pakistan. AQ affiliates in Iraq and Yemen have several hundred 

members respectively. While AQ remains a significant threat to our national secu-
120 

rity, it is suffering through its most challenging period since late 2001. Al Qaeda 

has experienced considerable setbacks over the past three years, having lost numerous leaders, facilitators, and operatives in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other 

areas in the Middle East. AQ is generally not recognized as legitimate, and its violent extremism is unfavorably viewed by the majority of people living in the region. 

In fact, it has only limited support from a very small minority of Muslims, and polling data suggests support for al Qaeda’s ideology has been declining since 2003. 

Many extremists and militants, including AQ leaders, were surprised by the Middle East/North Africa uprisings. These uprisings are contrary to what AQ desired, 

and we assess the group’s leadership is struggling to make sense of them and react 

appropriately. We anticipate, however, that AQ leaders will attempt to frame these 

uprisings within their own skewed religious context and possibly claim AQ’s revolutionary invective was the real catalyst for Middle East unrest. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Mattis, last year the Congress passed a requirement for 

a national military strategy to counter Iran as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. How is that plan progressing? Does Iran remain your single biggest concern in the region? 

General MATTIS. Iran is my most pressing concern and Iran’s nuclear weapons 

ambitions and arming of proxy fighters represent the greatest long-term challenges 

in the Middle East. We are keenly aware of these destabilizing efforts and are working assertively to build regional security and counter Iranian influence. The Gulf 

Cooperation Council is also taking significant steps towards building a regional security approach to counter Iran. 

Like all Combatant Commands, CENTCOM is conducting prudent military planning to address the threats defined by the Secretary of Defense in the Guidance for 

the Employment of Forces. We update the Secretary of Defense regularly, and on 

our planning continues to mature based on our evolving assessment of the threat. 

Mr. COFFMAN. There is clearly unrest throughout the Middle East. There have 

been numerous instances where a people have chosen to rise up and assert their 

right to the governance they choose. While this may be good in some sense, it can 

result in an unstable and uncertain security environment within the region and for 

U.S. citizens abroad. General Mattis—can you discuss the potential advantages you 

see an amphibious force bringing to an environment like this? How do you see these 

forces being used to prevent conflict and respond to crises? Admiral Olson—what 

are your thoughts on how SOCOM would work from the sea to contribute to our 

interests in this environment? 

General MATTIS. The ongoing unrest throughout the Middle East presents unique 

challenges and opportunities for our command. The advantages of using an amphibious force are clear. They deliver a sea-based air ground taskforce capable of rapid 

and self-sustaining operations and provide operational flexibility across our region. 

Their ability to adapt to changing conditions while in support of these missions is 

without a suitable substitute and key to their effectiveness. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Recently the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 

put out a study titled ‘‘Tough Choices—Sustaining Amphibious Capabilities’ Contributions to Strategic Shaping’’. ‘‘It represents an in depth examination of how U.S. 

amphibious capabilities contribute to strategic shaping activities . . .’’ The major findings of the report include: 

a. Amphibious capabilities—the ships, aircraft, ‘‘connectors’’, ground vehicles, 

and forces that enable and conduct sea-based operations on land—make substantial contributions to strategic shaping activities. 

b. The breadth, mobility, persistence, and responsiveness of these capabilities 

are highly relevant to the conduct of strategic shaping activities and suggests 

that if those capabilities were cut, most alternatives would likely involve 

higher operational risk and/or higher costs. 

c. The operational risk of alternative approaches are highest for regional assurance and deterrence missions in general, and for the full range of strategic 

shaping activities in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in particular. 

d. If those risks are deemed acceptable and/or are mitigated in some way the 

alternative approaches are likely to involve, some and likely substantial, additional cost. These costs should be decremented from any cost savings expected to be realized from any reductions to amphibious capabilities. 

Please share your perspective on these findings and how they apply to your responsibilities particularly in the prevention of conflict. 

General MATTIS. These findings are an excellent highlight of a strategic imperative to maintain our full range of core military capabilities, including a fully-capable 

amphibious force to respond in any part of the world. Amphibious capability has 

long been a valuable component of our strategic deterrence message; one our potential foes understand well. It is the backbone of our strategic shaping activity. These 
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capabilities also allow us to conduct bilateral training and exercise events with our 

regional partners to further increase their own capabilities. These combined activities support the security assistance and cooperation requirements in the region. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The United States has invested an incredible amount of blood and 

treasure in bringing stability to Iraq. On the cusp of peace in that nation, it seems 

we are more focused on the withdrawal of our forces rather than safeguarding our 

investment there. Other nations such as Turkey and Iran are greatly expanding 

their influence within Iraq, but they did not make commensurate investments in the 

security of Iraq; they are merely exploiting the stability our efforts have brought. 

What do you see as the optimal military footprint to remain in Iraq to support Iraqi 

Security Forces and maintain U.S. influence in Iraq? Please describe this military 

force in terms of numbers and capabilities. 

General MATTIS. As we continue to shift to a State Department-led partnership 

with Iraq, we are drawing down our forces by the end of the year unless Iraqi leadership asks us to stay and President Obama directs. We remain committed to sustaining our strong military-to-military relationship with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 

through the establishment of our Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC–I). 

OSC–I is intended to continue security assistance and security cooperation missions, and will be critical to creating a normal mil-to-mil relationship for the years 

ahead. With 157 permanent personnel and 763 trainers, OSC–I will leverage the 

service components, key senior leader relationships, and our unique Information Operations capacity to support interagency operations. 

I believe ISF will be capable of handling most of the required security tasks beyond 2011, to include sustaining significant pressure on Al Qaeda in Iraq. At this 

time, however, Shia Extremist Groups are not currently under the same degree of 

restraint as Al Qaeda in Iraq. 

Beyond 2011, any U.S. military presence in Iraq (in addition to the planned OSC– 

I) would be designed to address identified Iraqi capability gaps in the near- to medium-term. In concert with United States Forces-Iraq, CENTCOM is conducting 

prudent mission and risk analysis for extending the U.S. military footprint, if invited by the Government of Iraq and approved by the U.S. government. Specific 

force numbers will depend on the specific mission sets(s) to be conducted, which in 

turn depend on pending U.S. policy decisions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the command and control role of JSTARS in Afghanistan? Is 

it under-utilized? 

General MATTIS. The JSTARS has no formal command and control role in Afghanistan; however, its inherent command and control capability is a key enabler of the 

Theater Air Control System within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. Consequently, crews flying missions in support of CENTCOM accomplish command and 

control/battle management tasks on a moment’s notice. Moreover, JSTARS crews 

regularly assist other elements of the Theater Air Control System when Joint and 

Combined missions are conducted. JSTARS is extremely valuable and fully utilized 

in support of CENTCOM’s missions. 

Mr. SCOTT. As you assess your ISR requirements and the various systems available to you to fulfill these requirements, how critical is Joint Stars? Specifically, 

could you perform the wide area surveillance mission without it? 

General MATTIS. CENTCOM could not adequately provide wide-area surveillance 

without Joint Star’s (JSTARS) capability. The border regions between Iran and Iraq, 

the Gulf Coast of Iran, and Afghanistan and Pakistan require near-continuous collection that cannot be sustained via space-based systems and other airborne capabilities. JSTARS provides a unique capability for which there is no suitable alternative. 

Mr. SCOTT. If more JSTARS were available in theater, could our warfighters and 

tactical intelligence units benefit from its wide area surveillance capability? In 

short, could you use more Joint Stars in theater? 

General MATTIS. Yes. A shortfall in Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) support, which JSTARS provides, is the primary intelligence collection shortfall reported by commanders in the field. 

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