U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

71–820 PDF 2012

TSA OVERSIGHT PART 2: AIRPORT PERIMETER

SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 13, 2011

Serial No. 112–75

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

CONNIE MACK, Florida

TIM WALBERG, Michigan

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee

JOE WALSH, Illinois

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking

Minority Member

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JACKIE SPEIER, California

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN

OPERATIONS

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho, Vice Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Ranking

Minority Member

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 13, 2011 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Sammon, John, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Transportation Security

Administration; Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and

Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office; TJ ‘‘Jerry’’ Orr,

airport director and operator, Charlotte International Airport; Rafi Ron,

president, New Age Security Issues, former director of security Tel

Aviv-Ben Gurion International Airport; and William Parker, inspector,

K–9 Unit, Amtrak Police Department ........................................................ 9

Lord, Stephen M. ....................................................................................... 13

Orr, TJ ‘‘Jerry’’ ........................................................................................... 33

Parker, William ......................................................................................... 46

Ron, Rafi .................................................................................................... 41

Sammon, John ........................................................................................... 9

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Lord, Stephen M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S.

Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of ....................... 15

Orr, TJ ‘‘Jerry’’, airport director and operator, Charlotte International

Airport, prepared statement of .................................................................... 35

Parker, William, inspector, K–9 Unit, Amtrak Police Department, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 48

Ron, Rafi, president, New Age Security Issues, former director of security

Tel Aviv-Ben Gurion International Airport, prepared statement of ......... 42

Sammon, John, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Transportation Security

Administration, prepared statement of ....................................................... 11

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 5

(1)

TSA OVERSIGHT PART 2: AIRPORT

PERIMETER SECURITY

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND

DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Platts, Gosar,

Farenthold, Tierney, and Lynch.

Staff present: Thomas A. Alexander, senior counsel; Kate Dunbar, staff assistant; Linda Good, chief clerk; Christopher Hixon,

deputy chief counsel, oversight; Mitchell S. Kominsky, counsel; Justin LoFranco, deputy director of digital strategy; Laura L. Rush,

deputy chief clerk; Sang Yi, professional staff member; Jaron

Bourke, minority director of administration; Kevin Corbin, minority

staff assistant; and Carlos Uriarte, minority counsel.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Good morning. The committee will come to order.

We appreciate you all being here for this oversight hearing, part

number 2, regarding the TSA airport perimeter screening. I’d like

to welcome Ranking Member Tierney and members of the subcommittee and members of the audience who are here and participating with us, and those of you that are watching on television.

Today’s proceedings are the second in a series of hearings designed to evaluate the status of U.S. airport security and the policies employed by the Department of Homeland Security. There are

a number of concerns that have been highlighted to be drawn out

here today. First and foremost, we have learned that there have

been 25,000 security breaches at U.S. airports since November

2001. And I do appreciate the TSA in tracking and providing that

data, but obviously those are the ones that we know about, and the

deep concern is what about the ones that we don’t know about, and

the creativity and things that can happen in the future.

We also are deeply concerned about the TSA failing to conduct

threat vulnerability assessments in order to identify gaps in perimeter screening. In 2009 the GAO had concluded there were 87 percent of these airports that had not had these threat assessments

done, and that number really has not changed.

TSA also lacks a national strategy to secure commercial airports

and access control; this, again, coming from a GAO report that says

2

that the Nation’s 457 commercial airports have not, ‘‘been guided

by a unifying national strategy.’’

Also concerned about more than 900,000 security badges at these

457 airports, and the dangers that that can lead to and the challenges that that presents.

We’re also concerned about what’s happening at some of our Nation’s airports; for instance, at JFK the investigative reports show

that at least ‘‘a quarter mile of the perimeter fence is down, leaving

a gaping hole in security along a main JFK runway.’’ This project

is 4 years behind schedule.

Also concerned about what happened at Dallas Love Field. The

fence has been breached or damaged almost 20 times in less than

5 years. In fact, air traffic control tapes show that pilots on the

ground were unsure of what to do when a pickup truck crashed

through a fence and drove onto the tarmac on August 19, 2010.

One of the pilots inquired, ‘‘Tower, what’s the protocol for something like this? If he’s coming at us, can we move?’’ Airport control

tower responded, ‘‘Just hold position.’’

We are also concerned about what’s happening at LAX. They

have 8 miles of fence there, built in stages over the past decade,

and yet no one consistent standard has happened. We have spent

nearly—we will have spent nearly $500 million on AIT machines—

I call them the whole body imaging machine—by the time we get

to the year 2013. And yet these machines, there are parts and gaps

in that security that don’t work.

I happen to believe that there’s a better, smarter way to do this

that is more secure, less invasive, and we’re going to hear some

testimony today talking about the canine units and what they are

able to do. And I look forward to hearing that testimony.

We’re also concerned that these AIT machines, or whole body imaging machines, would not have found some of the weapons that

were attempted to be used in the December 2009 incident. And the

list goes on.

TSA has spent millions and millions of dollars in technology that

has not worked. You remember the 207 puffer machines. After

spending $30 million and having those deployed, those were put

back on the shelf.

The challenge before us is great. It’s immense. It’s real. And we

have to deal with that threat to our Nation. It’s not going to go

away. There is no end to the creativity of terrorists. And while I

have heard the press recount say that well, let’s remember the

25,000 security breaches are 1 percent, or even less than, 1 percent, unfortunately, we have to be right all the time. Terrorists

only have to get lucky once.

A lot of what we have been participating here, in my personal

opinion, has been security theater, and has not truly done the job

to secure the airports to the degree that we need to. And I think

one of the personal challenges that we have as a Nation is how do

we become more secure and yet less invasive; that we don’t give

up every personal liberty in the name of security. And we have to

find that proper balance. It’s a difficult one, knowing that the

threat is real.

So I look forward to this hearing today. We are going to also—

so rather than wax on, I’d love to hear from the panel. But at this

3

time I’d like to recognize the ranking member of this subcommittee,

the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for his opening

statement.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank our witnesses for being here this morning as well.

Look, we understand that we are going to address some important issues here today. And one of them, for instance, is the

Screening Passenger Observation Techniques [SPOT] program. Our

Government Accountability Office has criticized that SPOT program, saying that it lacks appropriate scientific validation.

The Department of Homeland Security has released a study that

it says showed SPOT is more effective than random screening, but

it does acknowledge that it didn’t address whether behavioral analysis is actually an effective way to detect potential terrorists. Now,

they’ve spent $750 million on it already; they’re asking for another

$250 million. I think it’s pretty critical that we, with that significant investment out there, that we take a good look and scrutinize

whether or not this program actually is effective at identifying potential threats to security.

We’re also going to discuss the screening of checked baggage

using the explosive detection technology. Congress mandated 100

percent screening of checked bags by the Transportation Security

Agency, but it’s been slow to implement those standards at airports

across the country,

Again, the Government Accountability Office said that despite

the regulations being in effect in 2005, the expositive detection

technology requirements weren’t put in place till 2009.

Turning to the issue of perimeter security, there have been some

high-profile breaches that we are all aware of. Specifically, we will

hear today about the tragic incident that occurred just outside of

Boston’s Logan Airport, where a young man fell from a plane as

it approached the airport for landing. According to news reports, he

likely gained access to the plane after breaching airport perimeter

security in Charlotte. This is not a unique incident, unfortunately.

We have also heard about serial security breaches by Mr. Ronald

Wong, who was somehow able to make it on to a plane leaving JFK

Airport in New York to San Francisco with a stolen boarding pass.

The Government Accountability Office has also raised concerns

about perimeter security at our Nation’s airports. In 2009 they

found the TSA had failed to implement a national strategy to address perimeter security, and that only a small percentage of airports had completed joint vulnerability assessments. This, again,

raised serious questions that have to be addressed.

So as we evaluate these incidents and the challenges, it’s probably important for us to take the time to understand what security

functions the Transportation Security Administration is not directly responsible for. And one of those is the perimeter area. They

are not principally responsible for perimeter security at airports.

That perimeter security is primarily the responsibility of airport

operators, while TSA’s role is to ensure that the operator is adhering to an appropriate security plan that meets Federal standards.

So, as I said at the last hearing on TSA, the Agency has a difficult and unenviable task, but it’s our responsibility, our role, to

provide constructive criticism with which you at TSA can strike the

4

balance between security, convenience and cost, hopefully, weighing heavily on the security aspect. I hope our hearing today can

help TSA do just that. And I thank the chairman again for bringing us together.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

5

6

7

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We will now recognize the chairman of the Transportation Committee, and also a member of this subcommittee, the

gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for his opening statement.

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.

Tierney, for your leadership and also pursuing very important

issues relating to transportation security and holding a very important Agency accountable.

Having been involved with the TSA and actually picked the

name for the Agency and helped craft its enabling legislation some

10 years ago, I’ve had a chance to monitor its activities closely. And

unfortunately, I become more and more concerned with the billions

of dollars that are being expended. Some of it just astounds me.

We’ve created an Agency that’s actually run pell mell away from

security and turned into a huge, unthinking, nonrisk-based bureaucracy. Everywhere I turn, I’m appalled at what’s taking place.

Recently I had the opportunity to go to our State Capitol, Tallahassee, and I left the airport to pick up a rental car. And the airport is located on about a 16-foot embankment that actually is an

embankment across the entire length of the airport. Here’s the

front of the airport. Here’s the embankment, 16 feet high. And just

to show you—we’re talking about airport security and perimeters—

how idiotic we could be in implementation of any requirement like

this. But this is the parking space for rental cars. This is a 16-foot

embankment. You can see up here where cars go through the entrance of the airport.

Now, there’s a new airport administrator. He wasn’t familiar

with all of the details, but we’re going to do a thorough investigation of this. This is just one instance, again, of a nonthinking Agency.

I don’t know of any explosive device that could possibly penetrate

16 feet here, except maybe a nuclear weapon. I don’t know how

much it cost to put these barriers here, but again, forcing a small

airport—or if TSA paid for an idiotic expense, not to mention the

cost to the taxpayer or the airport. But then, of course, they would

never consider the economic loss to the car rental firm or to the

revenue of the airport.

But every time, everywhere I turn, I see a disregard for the taxpayer. This is just one instance and one small community. Again,

just an unthinking Agency. Their budget is, what, in the $8 billion

range?

Then I open the paper a week or two ago when I returned to

Washington, and I look at this ad. Now, of course, the Humane Society is looking for a vice president of Federal Affairs and they

have a little—I’d say it’s about a sixth of the page. But we have

a four-color, half-page ad for a Deputy Assistant Administrator for

Legislative Affairs in this and other Capitol Hill publications. Half

page. Only total disregard for taxpayers’ resources could you expend money on—whether it’s a venture like this at my State Capitol airport, or in a Capitol Hill publication. And I’m going to request, too, an accounting for expenditure of this money.

And let me just tell TSA, too, that if you refuse to cooperate with

my committee, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, I

have had and will continue to have the cooperation of both this

subcommittee on which I serve, and the full committee. Mr. Issa

8

and the chairman here have agreed to cooperate to get this information. And we will get the data, whether it’s this or other activities such as you’ve refused to provide information to us on regarding your expenditure of your national deployment force where you

can’t hire people, or people leave their jobs and you have to fly

them in, put them up at hotels, pay their expenses, and pay them

a per diem. Whether it’s that issue or more than a dozen pending

items, we will get the information. We will investigate. We will protect the taxpayers who are paying the bulk of the expenses for this

fiasco.

So thank you for holding this hearing. We’ll get to some issues

and questions in a few minutes. And I yield back.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. We’ll now recognize the gentleman

from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, if he’d like an opening statement.

We will recognize you for 5 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very briefly, obviously

the interest of airport perimeter security is a tremendous one for

all of us. I know that we have spent enormously on the safety and

security of the processes within our airports. But this is something

that—the security of our perimeters of these airports has become

much more of a concern since the fairly recent incidents that involved my district. The young man who was apparently stowed

away on an aircraft recently from, I believe it was South Carolina,

to Logan Airport in Boston, actually was found deceased in my district, in the town of Milton in my district. So I was able to see up

close the tremendous concern generated by this, the hardship on

the family, the concerns of all the law enforcement involved as

well, and obviously the concern within the aviation community.

So I think it is worthwhile to spend some time to redouble our

efforts to focus our resources on an area that we believe has been

neglected.

And I want to thank the witnesses here for their willingness to

come before us to help us with this task, to help the committee to

make sure that we’re being thorough in our examination, that

we’re not overlooking anything, and that, you know, as a result of

this incident and some others, that at the end of this process the

American flying public will be safer and our communities will be

safer, and our airports will be more secure. That’s the goal here for

both Democrats and Republicans. That’s our intent here.

And again, I want to thank the witnesses for coming before this

committee to help us with our work. I yield back.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

I’d like to now introduce our panel so they can be prepared for

their opening statements.

Mr. John Sammon is the Assistant Administrator with the

Transportation Security Administration. We do appreciate your

being here.

Mr. Stephen Lord is the Director of the Homeland Security Team

at the Government Accountability Office.

Mr. Jerry Orr is the aviation director at the Charlotte Douglas

International Airport.

Mr. Rafi Ron is the president of New Age Security Solutions, and

is the former director of security at Tel Aviv-Ben Gurion International Airport.

9

And Inspector William Parker is the commander of Amtrak Police Department’s K–9 Unit. We appreciate you being here as well.

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. Please rise, if you would, and raise your right

hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Please be seated. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative.

In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate if

you’d limit your verbal testimony to 5 minutes or less. Your entire

written statement will be entered into the record.

So with that, we’ll start with Mr. Sammon. You’re recognized for

5 minutes.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY

AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE; TJ ‘‘JERRY’’ ORR, AIRPORT DIRECTOR AND OPERATOR, CHARLOTTE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; RAFI RON,

PRESIDENT, NEW AGE SECURITY ISSUES, FORMER DIRECTOR OF SECURITY TEL AVIV-BEN GURION INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT; AND WILLIAM PARKER, INSPECTOR, K–9 UNIT, AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT

STATEMENT OF JOHN SAMMON

Mr. SAMMON. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the

Transportation Security Administration’s responsibility regarding

perimeter security at U.S. commercial airports.

I would like to emphasize three points. First, every airport has

an individualized security plan of which security—perimeter security is an important piece. Two, airport authorities are responsible

for executing the plan. Three, TSA is responsible for approving the

plan and inspecting airport compliance with the plan.

Unlike checkpoint security, airport authority people investments

play the lead role in carrying out airport perimeter security. TSA

conducts airport inspections to enhance security and mitigate risk

associated with perimeter integrity, including joint vulnerability

assessments, special emphasis inspections, and the testing of access control processes at airports. TSA analyzes the results of these

inspections and assessments to develop mitigation strategies that

enhance an airport’s security posture and to determine if any

changes are required.

Perimeter-related airport compliance has been inspected 27,031

times over the past 16 months. Every commercial airport receives

an annual security assessment, to include an assessment of perimeter and access controls. Earlier this year, TSA’s Office of Security

Operations initiated a special emphasis assessment and special inspection of all airports evaluating perimeter security, including

fencing, non-fence manmade barriers, natural barriers, closed circuit television, electronic intrusion and motion detection devices.

Assessments are complete for the largest airports, with the smaller

10

airports expected to be complete by September 30, 2011. The results of the inspection were collaborative improvements and also

violations which may result in civil penalties.

Going beyond compliance, we work collaboratively with airport

operators and airport associations, and in that collaboration, TSA

issued updated and improved security guidelines for airport design

and construction, as well as an innovative measures report which

highlights best practices from airports of all sizes across the United

States. The innovative measures report effort was the first of its

kind in working closely with airports across the Nation on base lining and best practices in airport perimeter, access control, terminal

frontages, and other key areas.

Over 700 measures and practices from over 100 airports were assessed as part of this groundbreaking initiative. Because of that effort, airports now have a self-assessment module and a resource allocation tool. The tool incorporates attack scenarios, vulnerability

scores, consequence scores, and countermeasure success probabilities. It allows airports to baseline their security programs

against other airports’ innovative measures that will directly inform decisions about improvements to provide the greatest risk reduction for their money at their location.

TSA’s goal is to work with airport authorities to stay ahead of

evolving terrorist threats, while protecting passengers’ privacy and

facilitating the efficient flow of travelers and legitimate commerce.

TSA’s airport perimeter security initiatives are one part of that

comprehensive effort.

I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss this

important issue. I’m pleased to answer any questions you may

have.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sammon follows:]

11

12

13

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize Mr. Lord, who’s from the

Government Accountability Office. We’ll recognize you for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD

Mr. LORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Tierney

and members of the subcommittee. Thanks for inviting me here

today to discuss aviation security issues.

The attempted 2009 Christmas Day attack provides a vivid reminder civil aviation remains an attractive terrorist target and underscores the importance of today’s hearing.

Securing commercial aviation operations is difficult, given the

hundreds of airports, thousands of daily flights, with millions of

passengers and pieces of checked baggage. But TSA spends several

billion dollars each year to help secure the system. However, risks

to the system remain.

Today I’d like to discuss three layers of the system. First, TSA’s

behavior detection program, also called SPOT; airport perimeter

and access controls; and finally, TSA’s checked baggage screening

system.

First, regarding TSA’s behavior detection program, DHS has

taken actions to validate the underlying signs of the program, but

based on our past reporting more actions are needed. As we reported in May 2010, TSA deployed this program on a nationwide

basis without first demonstrating that it was based on valid

science. According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a validation

was completed to help address potential threats such as those

posed by suicide bombers.

The good news is DHS completed an initial validation study earlier this year and found that the program was more effective than

random screening in identifying so-called high-risk passengers.

However, as noted in the study, the assessment was just the first

step. Additional research is needed, is going to be needed to fully

validate the program. And some of the recommendations made in

the latest DHS study mirror those we made in our May 2010 report.

In sum, it’s still an open question whether behavior detection

principles could be successfully applied on a large scale for

counterterrorism purposes in an airport environment.

I would now like to discuss some of the key findings from our

2009 report on airport perimeter security. In terms of progress, we

noted various steps TSA had made, including implementing the

random worker screening program, expanding requirements for

name-based background checks, and developing new biometric security standards. However, we found that TSA had not at the time

completed a comprehensive risk assessment as called for by DHS.

TSA subsequently completed such an assessment in July 2010;

however, the updated assessment did not include an assessment of

the so-called insider threat which TSA views as a significant

threat. The risks posed by insider threats will be included in the

next update due later this year.

We also recommended that TSA consider making greater use of

joint vulnerability assessments. These are a key tool in the TSA

tool box and are completed in conjunction with the FBI. The latest

14

data show TSA has completed joint vulnerability assessments on

about 17 percent of TSA-supervised airports, leaving about 83 percent of these airports unassessed.

The last point I’d like to discuss is TSA’s efforts to deploy

checked baggage screening equipment. This program is one of the

largest acquisition programs within DHS. As highlighted in the report released to Representative Mica yesterday, TSA has upgraded

the explosive detection requirements for this equipment but faces

challenges in meeting these requirements.

The explosive detection requirements for checked baggage machines were established in 1998, and subsequently revised in 2005

and 2010 to better address current threats. However, TSA’s current

checked baggage screening systems do not meet the 2010 requirements. Some of the machines are operating at the levels established in 2005. The remainder are operating at levels established

in 1998.

Our report describes some of the challenges TSA faces in procuring and deploying this very complicated technology. For example, DHS and TSA encounter challenges safely collecting data on

the explosives physical and chemical properties. Our report contains six recommendations for improving TSA’s process for acquiring these sophisticated systems. The good news is that TSA has

agreed to take action to implement all six of these recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, other distinguished members of the committee,

this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering your

questions. Thank you.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize Mr. Orr. He’s the airport director and operator of the Charlotte International Airport. We appreciate you being here, sir. You’re recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF TJ ‘‘JERRY’’ ORR

Mr. ORR. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my

name is Jerry Orr, and I’m the aviation director for the city of

Charlotte, at the Charlotte airport. I have worked for 36 years in

airport management and was a small business owner for 13 years

before that. I’m here today to testify on airport perimeter security.

I have been critical of the performance of the TSA since its inception. I am not critical of its mission. I am critical of its measures.

In my judgment, the effectiveness of the TSA is compromised by a

rigid attitude of arrogance and bureaucracy.

In November of last year, the body of a young man was discovered in Milton, Massachusetts, and was thought to have fallen from

an aircraft. I learned about a possible connection to Charlotte in

the media and, therefore, reached out to our Federal security director. He did not want TSA to take the lead and instead recommended I ask our municipal police department to head up an investigation and TSA would assist them.

Ultimately, the available evidence could neither prove nor disprove that a security breach had actually occurred at Charlotte.

The police and TSA theorized how the young man may have

accessed an aircraft. They came up with a reasonable assumption

about what might have happened that excludes entry through a

checkpoint. But the report fails to acknowledge that they could not

conclusively rule out this possibility because TSA had failed to preserve their surveillance video of the checkpoints, and some of it

was lost.

I’m not saying that the young man came through a TSA checkpoint. What I am saying is that the TSA failed to even admit the

possibility, and deflected attention elsewhere. This mentality

serves to protect the Agency at the cost of real security needs.

The investigation focused national attention on airport perimeter

security. In Charlotte we have 19 miles of 6-foot-high chain-link

fence with three strands of barbed wire enclosing the airport. This

fence meets all Federal requirements. We spend a half million dollars annually on maintaining the fence, all from the airport budget.

We spend an additional $3 million on 75 personnel with perimeter

security responsibilities. The fence is a deterrent. It says, keep out.

However, the final line of security is the eyes and ears of the

20,000 people who work inside the fence.

TSA seems to believe that airports are automatically in violation

of the regulations, even when they did everything they were obligated to do and it simply didn’t work. To me, that’s like saying that

Customs and Border Protection itself is violating the law each time

an illegal alien crosses into the United States.

Other examples of TSA’s lack of a partnership, we recently asked

TSA to explain their security basis and their legal authority for directing us to do something. But TSA failed or refused to respond

or even acknowledge our questions.

TSA has conflicting roles in operational and regulatory capacities

that are not kept separate. Having an Agency interpret the rules,

34

implement actions, and then judge their effectiveness, lends itself

to the possibility of abuse.

I am confident that I am not the only airport operator with significant concerns about the effectiveness of TSA. An adversarial relationship between airports and the very Agency entrusted to help

safeguard them is clearly detrimental to the goal of safety and security.

So what can be done to improve our ability to focus on the real

needs of our Nation’s airports? Congress should continue to support—its support of allowing airports to opt out of using TSA, and

ensure that the bureaucracy does not throw up arbitrary roadblocks to discourage us from pursuing this alternative. Any entity

working with airports and airlines to achieve security must do just

that, work with them. TSA’s current ‘‘because I say so’’ culture does

not foster respect.

I also believe Congress should redirect some of the available

funding for airport security from TSA directly to airports. The operator is most familiar with the airport’s vulnerabilities and

strengths and is well equipped to make effective enhancements.

Safety and security are always our number one priority. There

can always be more security, but the challenge is to provide better

security. We need to spend money where it counts, on things that

matter. The path forward to optimal security needs to be reasonable and collaborative. If airports are given the resources we need

and a true partner for security, the traveling public will be the beneficiary.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Orr.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Orr follows:]

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We’ll now recognize Mr. Rafi Ron, the former director of security at Tel Aviv’s Ben-Gurion Airport. Mr. Ron, you’re

recognize for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF RAFI RON

Mr. RON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me to testify today. I’d like to draw the committee’s attention to three factors that I believe they are playing a key

role in many of the shortcomings in airport security.

The first one is the imbalance that was created shortly after 9/

11 when the TSA had the overwhelming task of recruiting, training, and installing technology in airports around the country, something that has tended to be the backbone of the TSA operation and

influence over security at the airports. At the same time, the airport facility security has received much less attention, and not only

that of screening of passengers and bags where most of the attention and the funding went into, but it was also executed according

to the law by TSA, while the rest of it was left for the local authorities to take care of. Funding was relatively short. The standards

for performance of the security task on the local level are not very

clear and in many cases, do not even exist.

And the point of—or the issue of perimeter security is a very

good example for that, because I think that traveling around the

country, one can easily notice that, first of all, there is very little

consistency in our airports as far as perimeter security is concerned. Second, most of our airports today are still not protected

by an operating perimeter intrusion detection systems. In other

terms, we don’t know when a breach occurs. We get to know that

only when it is addressed by somebody or when we end up with

a stowaway making his way to the wheel well and, sadly enough,

losing his life after takeoff. And obviously, this is not a good reasonable standard compared to those that we implement on the passenger and bag screening operation.

The other aspect of that is that the issue of jurisdiction is not

very clear. When it comes to the security operation, security facility

operation at the airport, by law it is the local law enforcement

agency or department that is responsible to do this. But, yet, most

or many of the police departments that provide that service in airports are still implementing their own more as a law enforcement

agency rather than a security agency, and there is a major difference between the two.

And once again, if you look at perimeter as a reflection of this

problem, you can see that the role that the local police department

is taking on perimeter security at airports is minimal and is usually based on responding to calls rather than the early detection

and the prevention.

So I think that there are two areas that still need to receive

much more attention. One is the role and the funding of the local

authorities as far as the airport facility security is concerned. And

second, the need for standards that will create consistent, highlevel performance that will characterize the security in airports

around the country. I thank you very much.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Ron.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ron follows:]

42

43

44

45

46

Mr. CHAFFETZ. A little bit of explanation here as we introduce Inspector Parker. You may be curious as to why we would invite

somebody from Amtrak, Amtrak Police to be here at the hearing

regarding airport security. One of the questions, I think, that is a

legitimate one that this committee would like to explore is, while

the TSA has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in whole body

imaging machines and technology, there are those, particularly at

the Pentagon, that have come to the conclusion that dogs are the

single best way to find explosive devices.

I’d like to ask unanimous consent to introduce in the record—

there was a press conference by Lieutenant General Michael Oats.

It says, ‘‘Dogs are the best detectors.’’ And this, I would point to

this, I know all good Americans get this magazine, Airman, which

is the magazine of the U.S. Air Force. In their May/June 2011 edition, this little pull-out quote here says, ‘‘There’s no technology

proven more effective in the detection of explosives than the K–9.’’

And there are questions as to are we investing enough in technology that we know that works in K–9s, according to the Pentagon, having spent literally tens of billions of dollars.

So, again, without waxing on too much more, we do truly appreciate Inspector Parker being here. And as just a bit of explanation,

he’s going to give a bit of testimony and then we’re going to have

a demonstration. Don’t let anybody in here worry anybody in here.

But I’ll let him explain how we’re going to conduct this.

We would just ask that anybody here in the audience stay put,

and if you have some sort of, you know, something, we’re glad that

you’re here, Inspector Parker. But we’re going to do a bit of a demonstration. We just ask that you kind of hang tight while we do

this demonstration, and appreciate the leeway here of the committee as we do this demonstration. Inspector Parker, we’ll give

you great leeway for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PARKER

Mr. PARKER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member

Tierney. My name is William Parker, and I’m the inspector commander of the Amtrak Police Department’s K–9 unit. I’m honored

to be here today, and I appreciate the invitation to speak with you

about what dogs can do to improve airport security and detect explosives.

A well-trained dog is more capable, useful, reliable and effective

than equipment. Dogs do not depreciate like machines do. If dogs

are trained properly and if their training is consistent, their skill

level will increase with experience.

Perimeter security is of great concern to airports and the Transportation Security Administration. Many airports rely on surveillance beams and cameras to protect their perimeter. The problem

is, if nothing appears on the camera after the alarm goes off, you

can’t just assume nothing’s there. Someone has to respond and

make sure no one is hiding from the camera.

A well-trained law enforcement officer with a well-trained patrol

dog can find and address that threat immediately without waiting

for backup.

On and after September 11, 2001, we used explosive dogs intensively to sweep airport terminals. The dogs were used to sweep for

47

explosives in the morning before the terminal opened and in the

evening when the terminal closed. I saw a real surge in interest in

K–9s’ capability after 9/11 as people realized dogs were effective in

crowded environments where their explosive screening abilities

were better in crowds than technology.

At Amtrak, trains are randomly swept for explosives before

boarding. We keep an explosive team present at the boarding gates

to provide a detection capability and immediate response.

I think a dog on a jetway at boarding would improve security at

no inconvenience to travelers, and would provide an elevated sense

of security. Dogs are very effective not only in detecting explosives,

but as a deterrent in many environments, any environment when

deployed properly.

Amtrak has many challenges as airport authorities, particularly

the need to secure open-space areas that intruders could use to

come into our property. We have been able to implement some new

procedures that could be used in airports. I have helped pioneer a

new application of K–9 called ‘‘vapor wake.’’ Vapor wake is a dog

trained to smell the wake of explosives and material in the air

after a person passed by that area. Amtrak is working with Auburn

University and other agencies to develop this application, and other

agencies such as TSA are starting to use vapor wake K–9 methods.

In closing, I would like to reiterate my position that a K–9 program is an excellent investment for any agency that needs to secure high-traffic areas or facility perimeter, provided the program

is properly funded and supported with a strong infrastructure.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]

48

49

50

51

Mr. PARKER. To this point, I’ve brought two teams with me to

give a brief demonstration. After we conclude the demo, I will be

happy to answer any questions you might have. And thank you

again for this opportunity.

What you are going to see in this demo, sir, is that—I explained

to you about vapor wake technology. The dog will be able to detect

people that walk by. It is not intrusive. They will not stop anybody’s path.

You’re going to see two—from my right, your left, we’re going to

have people come through the door. As you see the dog is like pretending she’s at a checkpoint. People are going to come in and the

dog is going to be able to detect who came in with something on

them. We’re just waiting on a crowd of people. These are your staffers.

As you see, sir, the dog is not intrusively hurting anybody walking. As you see now, that’s a hit. As you see, that person walked

by. The dog is walking. Stop decoy. As you see, this is a response

that the dog would give. And that’s a person, and this individual

has ankle weights on that has explosives on his ankle. So you can

look at him physically and not see anything, but he has about 5

pounds of explosives on his ankle.

Could you show the committee, sir? And in that is smokeless

powder.

All right. The second demonstration we’re going to give—okay.

You can move. The second demonstration we’re going to give is,

like I say, when a person passes through an area. That’s Levi, our

chocolate Lab.

As a person passes through an area, you’ll see a person walking

through your room right there, over there to your left. She’s going

to walk and sit down. We’re going to have a dog come through that

same area. That person has already sat down. That dog is going

to come in and follow the scent where the person walked to and

determine where she’s located at. They’re just trying to give it a

little bit of time because in theory, it’s been known that somebody

could walk through the area, and 15 minutes after they have

passed through, the dog could still pick that up. And that’s a scientific fact that’s already been noted.

And that’s Zeta coming in. Good girl. Let’s give the dogs and

handlers applause, sir.

Again, I want to thank you for this opportunity, and any questions you may have.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Very impressive. Appreciate it.

I’m now going to recognize myself for 5 minutes as we move the

questioning. And we’ll go from there.

I want to start with Mr. Sammon here and the GAO. The GAO

in the report that’s released out today, it’s dated today, on page 12

and 13, it says, ‘‘Our analysis of TSA data show that from fiscal

year 2004 through July 1, 2011, TSA conducted JVAs, or joint vulnerability assessments, at about 17 percent of TSA-regulated airports that existed at the time, thus leaving about 83 percent of airports unassessed. How can that be?

In 2009, September 2009, there was a report issued saying that

87 percent of the airports haven’t been assessed. And over that

52

timeframe we’ve now only moved that number to 17 percent assessment?

Mr. SAMMON. The joint vulnerability assessments are done in

concert with the FBI. They are done—they’re extensive assessments. They are done in a limited number of locations, but every

single commercial airport receives an annual security assessment.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But wait, wait. Why aren’t there 100 percent

JVAs done, joint vulnerability assessments? Is the goal not to get

to 100 percent?

Mr. SAMMON. TSA does complete security assessments, including

the perimeter of all airports every year. Including—we’ve done

27,000 inspections.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I’m asking about the joint vulnerability. I recognize they’re different assessments.

Mr. SAMMON. There are different assessments, and it’s a different assessment.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is your goal? Do you have the goal of getting to 100 percent? Yes or no?

Mr. SAMMON. We will not get to 100 percent of 450 airports with

the FBI every year, no.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Not even every year. At some point. I mean—

okay. Mr. Lord, you’ve looked into this. What were your findings

in this particular area?

Mr. LORD. When we first looked at it, the number was actually

13 percent. And that was from the 2004–2008 timeframe. And we

asked TSA for some updated analysis. So the numbers have actually gone up. It’s now 17 percent. These are very intensive examinations focused on high-risk airports, and TSA considers them the

gold standard. They obviously conduct a whole host of other activities and inspections and testing. I mean, there’s quite a few things

they do. But you know, we thought this was worthwhile to single

out, given the significance. We do recognize, you know, they’re difficult to do quickly and you have to get the FBI involved. So it is

a lot.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What I don’t understand is, given the imperative,

given the knowledge and understanding that we’re only as strong

as the weakest link, and it may be that small airport, as we saw

on 9/11 when that person got on a plane, not at one of the major,

major airports initially, and got into the system, got behind the security line. Why is the TSA not demanding and working toward

getting to 100 percent? I don’t understand. There’s 457 airports.

Why aren’t 457 airports getting this JVA done?

Mr. SAMMON. This level assessment will be done with a limited

number of airports. Not all airports will be done. They will have

inspections and they will have a complete assessment every year.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I just, I absolutely don’t understand that. I don’t

understand. I think it’s unacceptable. Let me move on.

Mr. Orr, in your testimony, you said that the TSA has yet to approve this airport security program. I think you said in your testimony, ‘‘We have been trying to get revisions to our approval for

about a year now.’’ Can you explain that a little bit more, please?

Mr. ORR. Yes, sir. We’re required to amend our security plan

anytime there’s a change in our security procedures. And we submitted an amendment to the local Federal Security Director over

53

a year ago; heard nothing for 6 or 7 months; got comment, addressed that comment. It again lay idle for a couple of months. And

then our assistant security director that we had been working with

disappeared and a new one appeared. And then the process started

all over.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Sammon, do you care to respond to that?

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. As I understand, the request to rewrite, to

change the—amend the security plan—was in progress, was initiated about a year ago. There was a joint vulnerability assessment

with the FBI conducted in the fall of 2010. It’s my understanding—

I don’t know this personally—but it’s my understanding the parties

agreed to let’s hold off on completing the rewriting of the airport

security plan until we understand the results of the joint vulnerability assessment.

Now, the joint vulnerability assessment, in terms of its analysis

of perimeter security, was not particularly flattering. And so in

terms of where the amendment is, in terms of rewriting it, I think

both parties agreed——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, it sounds like he’s been waiting for a year.

Do you dispute that?

Mr. SAMMON. Both parties agreed to wait until—something you

brought up last time is the joint vulnerability assessment, and that

was an input. That should be very insightful in terms of what you

do with your security plan.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Orr.

Mr. ORR. We’ve had two joint vulnerability assessments, one in

2007 and one in 2010. At the conclusion of each one, we asked for

additional information; help us to understand what you’re talking

about here, and in both cases have not received that. We submitted

our plan, our amendment. We heard nothing. We checked on it a

couple of times. They said it was in the works.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And this is the frustration. You’re telling me that

you have no goal to get to 100 percent of joint vulnerability assessments on the 457 airports. You made improvement from 13 percent

to 17 percent. And then we have an airport where you have done

a JVA, a joint vulnerability assessment, and you’re not getting the

responsiveness. These should be collaborative efforts. You’ve got

people all across the country. You’re supposed to be the expert in

the middle. That’s my concern.

My time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman, Mr.

Tierney, from Massachusetts for 5 minutes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Lord, this joint vulnerability assessment, what’s your analysis of how likely it is that 100

percent of the airports could undergo that particular scrutiny every

year?

Mr. LORD. Well, we don’t think that it would be appropriate to

do every year, but perhaps on a rolling basis. That’s how they do

now. They have a target within a 3-year timeframe, they try to

focus, you know, complete JVAs on the high-risk airports. It’s a

matter of resources but obviously they’re expensive and you need

to get the FBI’s cooperation.

Mr. TIERNEY. Currently they’re on a 3-year rolling plan to do 100

percent of the high-risk airports within that timeframe.

54

Mr. LORD. That would be difficult to achieve under the current

process. I would defer to Mr. Sammon on that. He would know

more about that.

Mr. TIERNEY. But it’s your understanding that that’s the plan.

Mr. LORD. It’s not the plan. As Mr. Sammon stated, the current

goal is not to do 100 percent. My point is they do them on a rolling

3-year basis.

Mr. TIERNEY. So Mr. Sammon, how many of those high-risk airports would be done on the rolling 3-year basis?

Mr. SAMMON. I’d have to get back to our operations people and

get you an answer. I’m sure we’d be happy to respond to the committee on that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would it be close to 100 percent? Would it be 50

percent? Would it be 25 percent?

Mr. SAMMON. I would have to check with the FBI. We need FBI

cooperation. It’s not a TSA event. Getting FBI resources, review of

the project, sign-off, and so on and so forth; it’s not a TSA—we

don’t run this thing by ourselves.

Mr. TIERNEY. Okay. Mr. Sammon, let me—what we were talking

about, the Screening Passenger Observation Techniques program,

the SPOT program, can you differentiate that from the usual type

of random search?

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. Essentially I think your other witness on the

panel, Mr. Ron, is an expert in this. But what you’re looking for

are microfacial anomalies in terms of the way people are behaving,

particularly the kinds of facial movements they have as they approach the checkpoint. These SPOT programs resulted in more

than 2,000 arrests since 2006, again, for people who had perhaps

criminal and other kinds of fraudulent other illegal activities that

they were engaged in.

But the science is based upon microfacial anomalies and the way

that people look, and that’s what they’re trained to. So it’s more

than random. You’re looking for people. You’re looking at the

crowd, looking for people who have, in that context, somewhat aberrant looks.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Ron, we’re about a billion dollars into this, or

three-quarters of a billion dollars into a quarter we didn’t ask for.

Is that worth the money?

Mr. RON. Yes. I think that the investment in the behavior observation certainly makes sense because all the rest of what we are

doing is very much limited to the detection of items. And I think

10 years after 9/11, with the attempted attacks that we had during

this period of time, we reached the conclusion that we need to

spend more attention on people rather than just on items. And observing behavior is one of the basic tools that can be used at the

airport, but obviously it is only one single tool in a much wider and

more complex strategy.

Mr. TIERNEY. What kind of technology is involved in the SPOT

program?

Mr. RON. Well, it depends on the way you define technology. If

we’re looking at technology from the point of view of machines that

are involved, or computers that are involved in the process. This

is not a highly technological process. This is more a human-based

process. But there’s certainly room to expand that into the technoVerDate 17-JUN-2003 12:33 Jan 24, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\71820.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
55

logical area by use of surveillance technology, and I mean smart

surveillance technology, not just cameras out there, but those that

can identify certain types of events or behavior and may help us

respond to it in real time.

Mr. TIERNEY. So at the granular level, it could be done just with

trained human beings exercising the process that’s involved.

Mr. RON. Well, right now it is mostly training human beings,

yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I would imagine when you start getting remote possibilities in there and technology for that, the cost would

be enormous when you’re talking about all the airports that are

around.

Mr. RON. Yes, this is correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Orr, I just want to, just real quickly, you

talked about having the local entity be able to opt out of TSA on

that. And if your organization did that, would you be willing to

take the full responsibility and liability for failures to succeed?

Mr. ORR. Yes, sir. I have that anyway.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right. Good. I yield back.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I now recognize the chairman of the

Transportation Committee, Mr. Mica of Florida.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Sammon, you had as of last week, my

figures are you had 3,905 people in Washington, supposedly working for TSA, and 27 percent of them were in a supervisory or an

an administrative capacity, making on average, all of them, over

$104,000.

How many of those folks were dedicated to doing the vulnerability assessments that we’ve been talking about here?

Mr. SAMMON. In terms of the vulnerability assessment, I would

say a limited number. But we can get you the numbers.

Mr. MICA. How many?

Mr. SAMMON. I don’t know, sir.

Mr. MICA. A dozen, half a dozen?

Mr. SAMMON. I’d have to get back to you. I’d like to give you a

truthful answer.

Mr. MICA. Next you have 9,656 administrative personnel out in

the field. How many of those folks are involved in the vulnerability

assessment? Those are administrative people, not screeners.

Mr. SAMMON. I would have to give you the same answer in terms

of responding to the committee.

Mr. MICA. And they are having trouble getting back with people

like Mr. Orr I see because the FBI and other agencies don’t cooperate. That is your explanation today?

Mr. SAMMON. No, sir. In terms of the ASP, I will look into it. I

am not personally familiar——

Mr. MICA. You couldn’t possibly have an FSD or some of the people who are making over $100,000, and maybe you could get for the

record the number of people that are making over $100,000.

At Mr. Orr’s airport, none of those people could check off on a

security plan to protect the perimeter of the Charlotte Airport.

Have you set the protocols and standards in Washington?

Mr. SAMMON. The plan is worked out locally with the airport director and the FSD. And it is approved through Washington.

Mr. MICA. But it takes 6 months to even get a response.

56

Mr. SAMMON. I think the JVA——

Mr. MICA. Can’t you understand their frustration? The other

thing, Mr. Orr, too, if anyone contacts you and there is any intimidation after your testifying here today, or any indication that they

are giving you a hard time in any way, I want you to let this committee know immediately.

Mr. ORR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. I have seen the way these people operate, the intimidation. I mean, you’re pretty brave to be with us today. What is

the current most serious risk that we face?

Mr. SAMMON. I think right now in terms of non-metallic explosives on airplanes coming in from overseas.

Mr. MICA. Okay. That is a good point. Actually, Mr. Pistole said

that way back in November 2010, that we were in the risk management business, being a risk-based intelligence organization. That is

what he is trying to achieve and I support that goal.

Do we have a plan from TSA that you could share with us to

move toward that?

Mr. SAMMON. I don’t have a plan today, but I would recommend

the committee work with Administrator Pistole. His number

two——

Mr. MICA. Can you provide us with an update from him on where

you go—where you are going with that risk-based plan?

Mr. SAMMON. I will tell you that he is working on a number of

alternatives and he hopes to announce something soon this summer.

Mr. MICA. But we are looking forward to that. And you mentioned that most of the risk is coming in from out of the United

States. For example, Orly was the shoe bomber, Mr. Reid. Amsterdam, the diaper. Christmas Day bomber, the London liquid, the

Yemen toner. The last count I had—well, we had under 100 TSA

personnel overseas. It was really 54 when I checked. Do you know

what the number is now?

Mr. SAMMON. I don’t know off the top of my head.

Mr. MICA. Do you know if you had contact with the Secretary of

State and others in trying to increase the presence of TSA overseas?

Mr. SAMMON. We work with overseas countries. We have

people——

Mr. MICA. Would you provide the latest contacts with the Department of State and others to the committee on—because you

said the threat is coming from there.

Now, whole body imaging equipment, which we spent a half a

billion dollars on and the deployment of—I mean, we are probably

in the billion-dollar range.

At this March 16th hearing, I asked the question: We know that

terrorists are moving to body-cavity inserts with surgical implants.

Does the whole body imaging equipment direct this kind of—can it

detect this kind of threat? The answer from all of them, the experts, was that it does not.

Mr. SAMMON. It will depend. And I can’t discuss it in this setting.

It is classified. I would be happy to have a classified update.

Mr. MICA. They said that it did not. Now, we have known since—

this is a BBC news release—that from 2009, September 2009, that

57

terrorists were now moving. In fact, they used a bomb on a terrorist implant and it blew up in front of a Saudi prince, killed himself. I mentioned this back in—what is the date? March. And that

appears to be a threat, that they are moving.

Obviously they have gone from shoes, to diaper, to liquid, to cartridges. Wouldn’t you say that it looks like the body implant might

be a way to go?

Mr. SAMMON. I dispute that BBC report. But again, I can’t discuss it in here. We could do it in a classified setting.

Mr. MICA. There is no dispute. He blew the crap out of the guy.

Mr. SAMMON. Sir—I will be happy to discuss it in a classified setting.

Mr. MICA. Well, in any event—and I mention this—and it was

also mentioned that the equipment we spent a billion dollars on

can’t do anything about it. And TSA finally gets to July 6th, gets

recently briefed air carriers and foreign partners to provide greater

insights into intelligence indicating get you interested. There is terrorists to target aviation. And they name specifically the threat of

body implants as a threat. Is that something you issue?

Mr. SAMMON. I would be happy to discuss the specifics of that

in a classified setting, sir.

Mr. MICA. I mean, you can’t tell me that you——

Mr. SAMMON. We have spoken with the airlines and talked to

them about security procedures, yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. Did it take you to July to finally tell them, or did you

tell them that this might pose a threat before then?

Mr. SAMMON. We have been working on non-metallic threats for

the airlines for a considerable period of time. And this specific

threat was based on specific intelligence that was put together——

Mr. MICA. And most of the testing of that equipment, both by

this committee—directed by GAO has been unsuccessful both in reports that have been published and also in GAO reports that also

look at your backup system, which is the SPOT program, which

they termed almost a total failure——

Mr. SAMMON. I think Mr. Ron——

Mr. MICA [continuing]. In addressing this risk.

Mr. SAMMON. I totally disagree with you, in terms of what you

are looking for are other alternatives to get around technology as

people tend to try to design——

Mr. MICA. Are you aware of the hearing that was conducted by

the Science and Technology Committee where Mr. Broun from

Georgia, the chairman, questioned the use—the current application

of standoff behavior detection, which you employ now, versus the

active questioning, which is done under the Israeli system?

Mr. SAMMON. I think they are both very good.

Mr. MICA. Well, the—everyone who testified, every expert said

that the TSA current procedure is a total failure and they further

validated the findings of GAO.

Mr. SAMMON. I’m not familiar with the witnesses.

Mr. MICA. Again, I had the opportunity 2 weeks ago to be in Tel

Aviv at Ben-Gurion Airport to see how it was done. And it can be

done on an interactive basis, even with a large population, if we

go to risk-based rather than hassling innocent Americans, veterans, military, children and people who pose absolutely no risk.

58

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SAMMON. So I would encourage you to speak, to work with

Administrator Pistole. Thank you.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We try. You know, we try to get the senior most

people to come before this committee and they refuse. And that is

one of the great frustrations. That is no surprise to the TSA. I

would love to work with them, love to work with them. But that

doesn’t happen. That is the frustration of the committee.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, if they continue just to—a point of procedure. I would be willing and I will advocate that we do subpoena

the appropriate personnel. They send us people like this who cannot provide us with the information. This is the chief investigative

committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. And they are

going to appear one way or the other or cooperate one way or the

other. And I put them on notice again today.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr.

Farenthold, for 5 minutes.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. Sitting

on committees that have the most jurisdiction over the TSA, I sit

on this committee, Mr. Mica’s Transportation and Infrastructure

Committee, and the Homeland Security Committee. These are

issues that deeply concern me in my work with Congress and I am

happy you all are here. I’m happy to be able to discuss this again.

And I’m probably the recipient—I have gotten more TSA patdowns since I have been in Congress than I have gotten pat-downs

from my wife. Since the topic of this is perimeter security, I wanted

to start with that, Mr. Sammon.

To what degree does the TSA coordinate with the FAA, for instance, on spending on airport security? I know in Corpus Christi

we recently got about $5 million from the FAA to improve security.

But has there been any action with the TSA in determining where

the multiple dollars are best spent?

Mr. SAMMON. I think that is—since the GAO report you have

seen come out, a number of things we have been working for several years to address the specific issue you’re talking about. First

of all, we worked with the airport community to come up with recommended design guidelines for airport planning and construction.

A lot of the money the airports use for planning and construction

comes from the FAA.

Next we worked with the Homeland Security Institute to develop

a best practices from all of the airports.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I’m sorry. I have a real short amount of time.

But you are saying you’re now working regularly with the other

agencies to make sure the right hand knows what the left hand,

the government, is doing?

Mr. SAMMON. What we are doing is working with the airports.

They have a tool. It is a specific computer program they can run

through their system. The idea is for the FSEs to work with the

airports to come up with the optimal security spending per airport.

It is not the same everywhere.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Okay. And we talk about high-risk airports.

What is not a high-risk airport when I can get on a commuter jet

at any airport in the country and end up at a hub airport and be

59

on the biggest airliner in the world? What would not constitute a

critical airport?

Mr. SAMMON. I agree with you 100 percent. The report we got in

terms of the 700 innovative measures came from airports as small

as Asheville, from the airports such as Delta County, Minot. So it

is a mixture of big airports and small airports that have gotten into

best practices in terms of what are the kinds of things that are appropriate for each airport.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right.

Again, let me go on to Mr. Orr. I apologize for jumping around.

I have a lot of questions and a limited amount of time. You’re talking about spending on, for instance, baggage screening equipment.

I will just speak from experience. The airport I use most is the Corpus Christi Airport. We have 3 airlines, American and Continental

with small regional jets, and Southwest with 737s. Each individual

airline has a screening machine staffed by two TSA agents. We

bought three machines for the Corpus Christi Airport and there is

probably a fourth one because Delta used to come in there.

Why couldn’t there just be one and a couple of TSA agents?

There are never that many people there. Why are we—do we have

any clue why we are spending multiple——

Mr. LORD. That is a great question. TSA has an electronic baggage screening program which they are trying to move to what

they term ‘‘optimal solutions’’ for each airport. And essentially

what that means is in many cases they are trying to remove the

stand-alone machines and use more efficient systems or even socalled in-line systems, which require less personnel to operate. I’m

not sure if that particular airport is on track to get an in-line system.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right.

And let me go to Mr. Ron for a second. One of the—one of the

things I hear consistently from my constituents—try saying that

three times fast—is why don’t we follow more of the Israeli model

of dealing with people instead of things? The answer I have gotten

from a lot of people within our government is Israel only has a couple of airports and not nearly the amount of traffic that we have.

Could we implement the Israeli system for a reasonable cost in the

United States?

Mr. RON. Well, first I would like to say that the Israeli solution

is not really an issue when it comes to volume. And I don’t think

that this is the main consideration. I think that the main consideration is that the Israeli legal culture, the environment is very different from the American one, and therefore I would not recommend to adopt the Israeli model as is.

But at the same time I strongly recommend that the concept that

is driving the Israeli solution, which is identifying the level of risk

of individual passengers and responding to them with a comparable

level of search and an interview, as necessary, is the right way.

And I think that an American solution that would be more comparable to the American environment can and should be developed

and implemented.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. I am out of time. I’m

hopeful we will have a second round of questioning because I have

at least 5 minutes more. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

60

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from

Arizona, Mr. Gosar, for 5 minutes.

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you. Inspector Parker, you know, we have

spent—we have deployed 500 advanced imaging technology devices,

spent $121—$122 million on the advanced imaging technology. We

have also spent another $30 million on the puffer machines that

shoot air blasts at passengers and sniff for explosives, but they

rarely work properly.

Tell me what the end return on investment of dogs is. I mean,

I see some problems with this, because you have to move everybody

through these technologies, but that animal moves. It covers a wide

range of ground. So tell me what the return on investment is.

Mr. PARKER. The return on it, sir, is mobility. You don’t have to

spend money to integrate any new odor to it because a dog is a little bit better than machinery, because technology—we can introduce odor that you come out anything new to a dog, and in 2 or

3 weeks they are proficient at it, as long as you keep that proficiency up.

Like I say, you can take the dog to an area, versus you have to

bring people to an area, as you say. And it gives a lot of people

more sense of security when they see a dog and especially when

they can see a dog working. As you saw, the dog was standing

there, people walk through. And we do it at Amtrak all the time.

People come out on the Acela with that dog at the boarding gate

and people are happy to see him and it is not intrusive and the dog

is working. And who don’t like dogs?

Mr. GOSAR. The person who doesn’t like dogs I don’t want to

know. Tell me the average lifetime of an active K–9.

Mr. PARKER. Without any medical problems, we get a dog at a

year old. I like to have the dog work until they are about 7 or 8

years old, because after the first 2 years or so, that is when the

dog really gets into its prime again if he is well trained and proficient training is there. So you will get a good 5 years, without

adding any software to him or getting a new breed because something else then came out. We just add it to a dog. We just add it

to a scent pitcher and that is another odor that he is able to detect

and perform.

Mr. GOSAR. You know, I’m a businessman, so tell me what the

cost of that K–9 cost is.

Mr. PARKER. Well, it ain’t the same cost as technology, sir.

Mr. GOSAR. Interesting. Would you say a little bit or a lot less?

Mr. PARKER. A lot less. And you have to understand dogs, like

I say, don’t depreciate. If anything, they go up more in value and

they will be more effective when they get all of the training that

they need.

Mr. GOSAR. Now, they are also very keen about detecting behavior, are they not?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir. And that is why the vapor wake dogs are

very important right now, because they can screen people without

them even being known. If you come to Amtrak, we do it all the

time. And I know you know about the rush that comes through our

gates. And these dogs screen people, and they keep on going without even being aware they are being searched.

61

Mr. GOSAR. Can they detect an implant, a bodily implanted device?

Mr. PARKER. Well, sir, scientifically right now, there is no data

that says the dog can or cannot. But given the schematics of a person’s body and, you know, dogs can detect cancer on people’s bodies, tumors, the dogs can detect anything that they are taught. I

think if the dog is taught to do that, he would be a very real good

asset for that.

Mr. GOSAR. They are very innate about picking up differences in

how people, as you said earlier. One of the biggest things, Mr.

Sammon, I have seen in my limited time on the Hill is

uncoordination of coordination. In fact, I had to put a bill just to

break down jurisdictional boundaries of two different agencies. So

it seems to me like the biggest problem that we have here is tell

me who the lead is in all of this. Who is the kingpin? Who actually

dictates how all surveillance or a perimeter security should be dictated?

Mr. SAMMON. As I said in my opening point, the airport—every

airport has a plan. The airport is responsible for executing a plan

with their people and——

Mr. GOSAR. I’m going to interrupt you again. Who is ultimately—

that is not it. Is it Homeland Security? Who oversees the whole

process of these whole aspects of a perimeter surveillance?

Mr. SAMMON. TSA oversees the plan and inspects the plan.

Mr. GOSAR. Okay. So you have the jurisdiction to do so?

Mr. SAMMON. We can—if there are deficiencies in the plan, we

can levy fines of civil penalties, yes, sir.

Mr. GOSAR. So it seems to me that you could ante up all agencies

to say, on a timely basis, that you do this. I mean, I have seen it.

And just to give you a quick example, I have seen a flood, and I

have seen an agency head from the Forest Service make sure that

everybody is lined up in time, in real perspective, without delays.

I have seen it happen. So I know it can happen. So it seems to me

like the buck stops with you, then.

Mr. SAMMON. So, again, what we want to do—and I think one

of the things that—with GAO, is a comprehensive look at what——

Mr. GOSAR. I’m very aware of what government does. It studies

and studies and studies. And by the time you get a study out, it

is antiquated. It seems like there should—wait a minute. It seems

like there should be a minimum standard that is equating all the

way across the board. And it seems like we are missing the point,

because I think we need to be using Mr. Ron and Inspector Parker’s ideas within this, because we have to have some minimal

standards.

And I’m also from Arizona and so I know that those numbers are

not right. I suspect that—well, just to give you a quick example.

We are talking about those that you know about, security breaches.

They are not the ones that you’re not talking about, that you don’t

know anything about. And you can’t tell me that those don’t occur.

We sit on the border and we are saying that we apprehend one in

about every four.

I hope those aren’t the same kind of numbers here. Because from

what we have had in previous testimony, there is a lot of people

carrying badges out there that we don’t have any recollection of

62

and who they are and background. Seriously. That was brought up

in this committee.

Mr. SAMMON. What you have is under about 850,000 people who

have criminal history background checks and terrorist watch list

checks in addition to other checks.

Mr. GOSAR. And it is inadequate. That is because—I can point

to you that we take a grandmother and strip her down who is—

because it must be the grimacing that she is going through terminal cancer—and that we also have another foreign national that

gets through with an invalid visa. The problem is that there’s problems with that aspect because we are not nimble enough and we

are not working at associating with local and regional communities

better. And that needs to stop. I’m out of time, sir.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Sammon, if you wanted to——

Mr. SAMMON. No, no. I think—again, this effort—the tool which

basically allows every airport, in conjunction with the Federal Security Director, to do that evaluation of what their vulnerabilities

are, because they are unique, there isn’t one standard that applies

across the whole country. But you take those standards, apply

them based upon the vulnerabilities, the attack scenarios that are

possible at that airport, so on and so forth, for each airport to come

up with an optimal solution so that every dollar that they have

that they can apply to security, they do it in the optimal way, the

best way, the best bang for the buck for that particular airport—

that tool exists. It is done in collaboration with the airports and the

airport authorities.

We had over 100 airports apply. Charlotte was not one of them.

Charlotte is not particularly active in AAAE, which is a national

organization which has security committees. They are not active in

ACI, which is a national airport organization that has security

committees. So of all of the people that worked on this, Charlotte’s

name is not in there. So there are people who are working on this.

As a matter of fact on Monday, I had the CEO of Dallas/Fort

Worth Airport fly in with his senior staff to sit down with John Pistole and our group to tell us that they are very happy working with

TSA, and what they wanted was to volunteer for any pilot security

projects that they could have that we would work with them on.

So in terms of how the relationship with airports and working

with local authorities, it may vary across the country, but there are

a lot of them who put a lot of work into all of these reports to get

a tool that will enable them to do the best, most optimal security

assessments and reports and ways forward for each of the airports.

Mr. GOSAR. Well, then it seems to me that you just told me that

you want a nimble approach. So maybe Charlotte needs a little different TLC and maybe that’s what you need to look at, is that

you’re giving an individualized plan, so make sure that you’re elevating that to an individualistic plan as well. You know, be careful

what you ask for there. Okay?

Just because somebody is complying—to give you an example,

you know, as a teacher, a teacher only is asking you to repeat what

they want you to. It doesn’t tell you about the knowledge about the

student. You have to go a little bit further sometimes, and that is

the exact case that I’m looking at is that sometimes the squeaky

wheel is actually the one that is doing something a little bit difVerDate 17-JUN-2003 12:33 Jan 24, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\71820.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
63

ferent that I want to know about. And I think that behooves you

at the top to understand what they are doing, why they are doing

it, as well as all the different other models.

Mr. SAMMON. And that is why what we did is go beyond compliance with this report to get the best innovative security measures

from airports around the country, because compliance is not sufficient.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I agree. And we will probably have this ongoing

discussion, but the idea that you haven’t conducted joint vulnerability assessments in 83 percent of our Nation’s airports is not acceptable. It is just not acceptable. We need to figure out how to

solve that. And I appreciate the follow-up with that. As it relates

to Dallas, I would hope that Dallas would be the first ones in here.

They have had 20 perimeter security breaches in the last 5 years.

They had a truck that actually came out across the field, as I noted

in my opening statement. So there is a lot that needs to be done

on security with such a big airport such as Dallas, for instance.

Let me go back to the dogs here. My understanding of the dollars

and the metrics here,and, again, if we can correct the record here

as a follow-up, my understanding is it costs roughly about $175,000

per whole body imaging machine, but the dogs are something like

$20,000 to $30,000 to have a fully trained dog ready to go. Those

aren’t the numbers. Let us go ahead and correct the record. But I

am pretty darn sure those are the records.

But to Mr. Gosar’s point, the whole body imaging machines have

something that the dogs don’t have. They have lobbyists. And what

is infuriating to a person like me is I think the challenge is we

have to increase the security. We have to become more secure. But

we can’t give up every civil liberty. We shouldn’t be looking at

every passenger naked in order to secure the airplane. What we do

need are these good dogs because the Pentagon, having spent $19

billion, came to the conclusion, as I pointed out with the lieutenant

colonel’s comments, the single best way to find a bomb-making device or bomb-making materials is the K–9. And we are not putting

enough emphasis on expanding the use of K–9s. They are friendly.

They are noninvasive. They are effective. They are the single best

weapon, according to the Pentagon, in order to fight and find these

explosive devices.

Mr. SAMMON. Would you like a response?

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Sure.

Mr. SAMMON. In terms of the dogs you saw here, the TSA supports the Amtrak program. In fact, we probably have supported up

to about a third of the dog teams that Amtrak has. The dog—a

fully equipped dog team with training, trainer, dog, so on and so

forth, is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars because you

don’t—the dog doesn’t—it does. You pay for the salary of the

trainer——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Per year?

Mr. SAMMON. Yes.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You think that is per year? Hundreds of thousands of dollars? Hold up.

Inspector Parker, can you give me a sense of just—what does a

dog handler make there at Amtrak? What is their annual salary?

Do you have a guess of generally what they are making?

64

Mr. PARKER. It depends on their rank. They are probably at 50-

to 70,000.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So how do you come up with hundreds of thousands of dollars? I mean, Alpo only costs so much.

Mr. SAMMON. We oversee the Transit Grant Program where we

provide dog teams to agencies around the country, and it is in excess of $100,000. We provide——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You said hundreds of thousands of dollars per

dog. I challenge you—I challenge you to verify that number.

Mr. SAMMON. We will get you the numbers that we——

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Will the gentleman yield for just 1 second?

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Sure.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I assume that your whole body imaging machines require an operator, too, that requires a salary as well. They

don’t—it actually in Corpus Christi requires at least two, actually

three, one to stop you going through, one to listen on the radio, and

the one in the back that—it requires three operators for a whole

body machine.

Mr. SAMMON. They all require—they are all expensive systems.

They each have their role.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You’re suggesting that the whole body imaging

machine is a cheaper alternative than using the K–9s. I tell you

what, let’s do this. I would love to do this. I would love to do this.

You take 1,000 people and put them in a room, I will give you 10

whole body imagining machines. You give me 5,000 people in another room, you give me one of his dogs, and we will find that bomb

before you find your bomb.

That is the problem. There is a better, smarter, safer way to do

this. And the TSA is not prioritizing it. And if you look at who

those lobbyists were that pushed through those machines, they

should be ashamed of themselves, because there is a better way to

do this and it is with the K–9s. And I’m basing that based on what

the Pentagon did. That’s what the Pentagon did. They studied all

the technology, all the information; and that is what they are

doing, they are deploying—you don’t see whole body imagining machines in Kandahar, but you do see dog teams because those guys,

their people—their lives are on the line every day. That’s what we

should be doing.

And you brought it up and I will challenge it. Let us go look at,

dollar for dollar, what is more expensive, a whole body imaging

machine, which we know is not effective, and a K–9. Let’s see who

can find more bombs and let’s see who is less expensive. Let’s move

on.

Mr. SAMMON. And the dog does not work all day. Thank you.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Inspector Parker, how long does the dog work?

Mr. SAMMON. The dogs will work 2 to 3 hours a day, sir. And you

take a break, and they work 2 to 3 hours more is how you condition

the dog to work.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let us keep going because I really do believe that

the dogs are a better, smarter solution.

One of the challenges that the TSA is having to deal with is the

fact that we have over 900,000 security badges out there. My unVerDate 17-JUN-2003 12:33 Jan 24, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\71820.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
65

derstanding as I was told, there are roughly 16,000 just at Dulles

Airport alone. What sort of background checks are they going

through? How often are those rechecked? And how are you going

to deal with the fact that we have closing in on a million people

with security badges all across the airports?

Mr. SAMMON. There are probably 850,000 badges out there that

are active. They go through a criminal history background check.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Who does that check?

Mr. SAMMON. The—that check is—it goes through the airport authorities, AAAE to the FBI. Then they do a watch-list check, which

goes through AAAEs, right. Currently the channeling mechanism

goes through TSA. We run a watch-list check on them. They are

perpetually vetted from the watch-list basis.

In addition, there are other immigration checks on those people

versus when they originally apply. They are redone every 2 years.

And at that time, the security awareness training is required at

the time of the badge reissuance.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you have a plan to deal with the

vulnerabilities of an insider attack?

Mr. SAMMON. There are a number of things in terms of insider

attacks, in terms of the security awareness training.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, but I’m saying is there an actual plan?

Mr. SAMMON. In terms of—what particular kind of attack?

Mr. CHAFFETZ. An insider attack.

Mr. SAMMON. Well, there are many—it can take many forms.

What kind are you thinking of?

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I just wonder if there is a plan to deal with the

fact that you have 900,000 people who are——

Mr. SAMMON. Yes.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You do. Mr. Lord, what is your understanding of

that situation?

Mr. LORD. Our commentary was related to the combined risk assessments, something called TSARA, the latest edition released

last year. A notable caveat was it excluded the threat of the insider

attack in various forms and TSA acknowledged it needed to look

at that. And the next iteration due later this year will include that

threat.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But Mr. Sammon just said he already has it.

Mr. LORD. Well, I’m not sure he meant it in terms of this one

analysis I’m referring to. They may look at it in other forms or——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Is Mr. Lord wrong?

Mr. SAMMON. No. Two different things. Your question, as I took

it, is what goes on daily in an airport environment. The TSARA is

a—the first of its kind across all modes risk comparison, based

upon 500—in excess of 550 attack scenarios. Insider attack was not

part of the first one. It will be included in the second version.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I look forward to seeing that. The 25,000 perimeter breaches, I would appreciate—is this—it is very difficult to get

any sort of analysis of this over such a long period of time. Is there

a month-by-month analysis that you can share with us?

Mr. SAMMON. I don’t have it with me. That is 2,500 a year. It

could be anything from a bag left behind, a door left open——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. That’s where we are hoping that the TSA can provide us—introduce some details and understanding where the

66

trend is going. Is this an upward trend, downward trend? That sort

of thing. Is that something that you will provide the committee?

Mr. SAMMON. I will go back and we will check into that, yes, sir.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes, you will provide that to the committee?

Mr. SAMMON. In terms of—if it is security-sensitive material, we

will talk to the committee about that, yes.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. All right.

Let me keep going. The perimeter fence at the JFK Airport,

based on an investigative report done by a news organization, my

understanding is that the project to fix the perimeter fence is running 4 years behind schedule. What is your knowledge of that situation?

Mr. SAMMON. I’m not personally aware of that. I do know that

JFK and the New York Port Authority Airports are looking at deploying state-of-the-art intrusion detection technology in addition to

fencing because of the kinds of things that people have talked

about. The fence can be cut. You want to have a technology tied

into camera systems that will alert cameras and patrols if there is

an intrusion.

We deploy extensively in the subway tunnels, intrusion detection

in key tunnels, and particularly underwater tunnels.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I know. We are getting off topic here. I’m worried

about the quarter mile of fence at JFK and it being 4 years behind

schedule.

Mr. SAMMON. I don’t know right now, today, what the status is,

but we’ll get back to you.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Please describe for the committee your role and

responsibility. What is your responsibility?

Mr. SAMMON. My responsibility is working with the various

stakeholders, the various people in pipelines, in mass transit, in

railroads, in highways, in air freight carriers generally——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So it is not exclusive to just airports?

Mr. SAMMON. No, sir.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And would you say that JFK is one of the most—

I mean, it has to be one of the largest targets out there.

Mr. SAMMON. JFK is.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The committee would appreciate more understanding from their perspective of why this project is 4 years behind schedule. I understand there is a local component. But from

the TSA side, that would be much appreciated.

At Los Angeles International Airport, LAX, an airport official

noted that although the current 8-mile perimeter fence complies

with Federal regulations, that it has been built in stages of the

past decade, it has no one consistent security standard. Is there a

consistent security standard for perimeters?

Mr. SAMMON. The standard varies based upon the location of the

facility——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But it is not going to vary in an airport, right?

It may vary between LAX and Bozeman, Montana.

Mr. SAMMON. It may vary based upon where the location of the

airport is, what the surrounding geography is.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Are there standards for all those various components?

67

Mr. SAMMON. Those standards are again—what we have done—

the work I showed the committee earlier today in terms of developing what those—for each airport based upon their

vulnerabilities. But they do vary with an airport. Some parts

are——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Lord, what is your understanding of this situation?

Mr. LORD. I will have to defer to Mr. Sammon on that, whether

just standards vary within the actual airport. I don’t have the

expertise——

Mr. CHAFFETZ. In 2009, the Government Accountability Office

issued a report stating that TSA lacks, ‘‘a unified national strategy.’’ Where is that today?

Mr. LORD. Well, first of all, that is a great question. At the time

we did the work, we were concerned about the variety of players

involved—multiple layered ports, multiple industry stakeholders—

TSA had more of an indirect oversight role. And we thought it was

important to come up with an overall game plan to unify the current efforts. And it is our understanding that draft strategies currently have been included as a model annex to a document called

the TSIP, but that is currently under agency review. So they are

close to releasing it. We have not seen it yet.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. One more question and then I will recognize Mr.

Farenthold.

The software updates. As Inspector Parker pointed out, the hardware needs software, and that software needs updating. Some of

this software is as old as 1998, is my understanding based on what

I have read. Is that your understanding? And what is the agency

doing to update the software?

Mr. SAMMON. So as I understand the—all new equipment being

purchased is being purchased at the 2010 standard, the 1998

standards are more stringent than anything in the world, and that

there is a plan to update, incrementally, machines that are out

there, in phases to the 2010 standard. That is my understanding.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Lord, do you care to comment on that?

Mr. LORD. I agree with that characterization.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So are you prioritizing the 1998 machines? Is

there a——

Mr. SAMMON. I will have to get back to you with the specific plan

to update those machines. I don’t have that with me.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. All right. Let me go to Mr. Farenthold to be recognized.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity for a second round of questioning.

Again, I want to start with the actual topic that—we have kind

of gone into a whole lot of areas here. Perimeter security. Once you

are within the perimeter of the airport, there is a real potential of

you being able to do some damage. What is being done to address

much more ease of access to the tarmac area from those involved

in general aviation as opposed to those in commercial aviation? For

instance, I drive into the general aviation area to board my friend’s

private plane, and then I wander over and sneak something on a

plane, a commercial plane.

68

Mr. SAMMON. The first thing we have done, about 2 years ago,

required extending the badging requirements to people in general

aviation. That caused quite a fuss. There was a lot of pushback on

that.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. But now there’s no photo IDs for a pilot to access his or her plane——

Mr. SAMMON. If he is regularly on that airport, he has to have

a badge, yes, sir. If—based upon where it is. But if he has proximity to the tarmac, the commercial airport—and this caused quite

a bit of ruckus I think back in 2008, when we extended the badging

requirements for larger populations within the airport——

Mr. FARENTHOLD. But I don’t need a badge to get onto the

tarmac in a general aviation area. I don’t need anything.

Mr. SAMMON. You either have to be accompanied to your aircraft

back and forth or in and out of that facility. But if—you can be

challenged, just as anyone else on the facility if you are there.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. It seems like—again, I am just

speaking from what appears to me to be common sense, that there

really ought to be a focus on the ground staff that doesn’t go up

in the airplanes. The 9/11 box cutters were potentially put on the

plane by ground crew. The ground crew doesn’t go up with the

plane, so their life isn’t at risk in an attack. It seems like there

ought to be a strong focus there.

Mr. SAMMON. That is why they are all badged, and they have security awareness training. That is why there is covert testing of

those—and random screening of people on the tarmac, yes, sir.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. And let us talk a little bit about the

behavioral detection. You know, before I was elected to Congress,

I actually had time to watch TV and watch Lie to Me. Is this really

a science that works, or is it a pseudoscience? You mentioned that

we were able to apprehend hundreds of criminals. Have we seen

any positive results of that in apprehending anybody with contraband at the airport?

Mr. SAMMON. We did. I believe it was in Orlando several years

ago, a person had actually explosive material in his bags. He attempted to get them onto the belt. He was detected as he came

through the door by his behavior. He had not been screened. His

bags had not been screened. He was pulled over and found that he

had—was attempting——

Mr. FARENTHOLD. So we have gotten one. Mr. Lord, did you want

to comment?

Mr. LORD. You know, I would like to respectfully disagree with

Mr. Sammon on that. I’m not sure he was detected through the

BDO program. He had such an unusual appearance, I think he

alarmed the passengers waiting in line, and a ticket agent may

have alerted locals. I’m not sure that was truly a BDO behavior detection success.

Also, as I recall from reading his case file, he is an Iraqi war veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and wasn’t on

his medication.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Ron, would you like to comment on that?

I know the Israelis were pioneers in this.

Mr. RON. Yes. The Israeli—the principle of behavior is part of a

wider principle of identifying level of risk of the individual pasVerDate 17-JUN-2003 12:33 Jan 24, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\71820.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
69

sengers, and it is also based on looking at other sources of information rather than just observation. So you have to look at it in that

context.

But I still have to say that the BDO program, despite the fact

that it has been noted that they—both by GAO and the Academy

of Science, that there is no scientific support. But I need to say that

there has not been serious research into this. So that by itself

doesn’t prove that it doesn’t stand.

In empiric terms, I think that at least those airports here in the

United States that we have worked with on this issue, mostly with

local police officers, there has been a reasonable level of success in

detecting people with malicious intentions.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Let me just ask you one more question, Mr.

Ron. If for some reason I were to become President tomorrow, and

I appointed you the head of the TSA, what are the top five changes

you would make to improve security and improve the efficiency of

the system? Can you list maybe five off the top of your head?

Mr. RON. Well, I will start with two. The first one is a—I would

redirect the strategy toward a risk-based—real risk-based strategy

that identifies the level of risk of the individual passenger by the

access to information that we have starting with, prior to his arrival, his or her arrival at the airport. And later on the—with the

ability to talk to those very few passengers that we find as highrisk passengers based on our earlier analysis and not just search

them, but also talk to them and interview them to a level that

would provide us with more information.

Mr. FARENTHOLD. It is really interesting. I did this just kind of

as a thought experiment and I will just give you—I walked—I went

from Corpus Christi to Washington, DC, without saying anything

other than thank you to a person at the airport. That was it. No

interaction beyond saying thank you to people who helped me.

Mr. RON. This is a critical point because I think that the lack of

contact between the security—between the security people and the

passengers is one of our greatest shortcomings, because we just

focus on items, and that is doomed to failure because the technology that we have at this point is not good enough to provide us

with a reasonable level of detection.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I now recognize Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Sammon, I just wanted to give you

an opportunity to make some comments with respect to that.

Mr. SAMMON. Again, I don’t disagree with what Mr. Ron is saying. The first thing in terms of what—the fundamental part is access to information; and that is the more information you have, the

more you know about people and you can say—because most of the

people going to the airport on any given day are all trusted. I

mean, there is not—there is not a—they are fine. They just want

to get on their way.

The challenge is to have information that differentiates people,

one group of people or individuals from the larger group, and getting that, as he said, that information prior to their arrival at the

airport. Right now we know, we know their name, we know their

date of birth, and we know kind of where they are coming from and

where they are going through. We can’t, even through secure flight,

track where they have been for the past 3 years. So it is—right

70

now we are in the situation of looking at how do we do better riskbased security, but also what kind of information can you have access to to do a better job? And that is one of the challenges.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Just some very quick things. The

committee would appreciate the opportunity, particularly with Mr.

Sammon here, to ask some additional questions. Would it be all

right that we submit those. I would ask all Members of the panel—

some of them weren’t able to be here today—to submit those within

the next 7 days.

We would also appreciate the TSA providing us a copy of each

of the incident reports. I know it is a massive amount of paper, but

we would like to pour through those. And we would appreciate it

if you would provide those to us.

We would also like to have a briefing on this risk-based approach. It is something that you had offered earlier. I recognize

that it probably needs to be in a secure setting, but it is something

we would like to schedule and work out with the TSA, moving forward.

I would also appreciate some definitions, if you will, and some

specific statistics on the number of stowaways. It is something that

we have asked for. It is something that TSA has not yet provided

to us but this committee would appreciate those.

Of those things that I asked, is there any reason to think that

those things can’t happen?

Mr. SAMMON. I will go back and check and make sure that

they—the status of those requests and where they are.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. And a couple of those are new. But

the stowaways was a previous request.

The last question here about transportation security inspectors

[TSIs], as it’s referred to in a lot of the documents. How many of

them are there? And I know that they can impose civil penalties.

So how many civil penalties have we imposed over the years? I

don’t know what timeframe to ask, but——

Mr. SAMMON. I think that would be a good request in terms of

what we have. I don’t have data with me today, so it would merely

be conjecture on my part. But we could give you the total number

of inspectors that are out there and the number of penalties, the

number of open cases. Also we do it in terms of findings. In some

cases the airport, on the spot, resolves the issue. In other cases

they do go to civil violations and civil fines and that kind of thing.

But I think it would be good to get you a good breakout on that

that is concise and accurate.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We would appreciate that.

As we conclude here, I would like to give you just each a moment. Please, brief. But we’ll start with you, Mr. Sammon, and

kind of go down the line.

What is the kind of number one thing you would like to see happen, whether it is your biggest concern or what specifically you

would like to see happen? And then we will close the hearing.

Mr. SAMMON. Again, with the committee and all committees in

Congress, is to support and work with Administrator Pistole as he

goes forward with the risk-based security. He is definitely focused

in that direction. And it is going to take—there are going to be

challenges as we referred to in terms of information: How do we

71

go forward? But he definitely is going in this direction. And I would

say to give him the benefit of the doubt and work with him in

terms of where he is trying to go.

Mr. LORD. I would just like to say on behalf of GAO, we stand

ready to support the committee’s efforts to oversee TSA’s effort to

move to more of risk-based approach. I agree with Mr. Ron; we

need to spend more time worrying about dangerous people versus

dangerous objects and there’s various ways to do it. And we need

to do it in a way that makes sense.

Mr. ORR. I would like to note that both of our joint vulnerability

assessments noted no compliance issues. We were in full compliance with all of the regulations. What I would like to see is a collaborative partnership between us and the TSA to address the real

issues.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Mr. Ron.

Mr. RON. Beyond the need for a better risk-based approach to

passenger and bag screening, I would strongly recommend to create

a better balance between the airport facility security and the passenger and bag screening operation, because right now we are

spending most of our efforts on the front door when the back door

is not secure at all.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Inspector Parker.

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir. Thank you.

I would like to see continued support for the K–9 programs because, as I stated before, that Amtrak is doing a lot and we definitely appreciate what Congress has done for us to fund us.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. I appreciate it. It takes a lot of time and effort in preparation of your testimony and for you being here today. We do appreciate it. And thank

you and I wish you the best.

Our mutual goal on both sides of the aisle is to make this country as safe and secure as possible, but at the same time we need

to make sure that we are filling those gaps and asking the hard

questions. That is what makes this country great, is our ability and

opportunity to do that.

So, again, I appreciate you all being here. The committee stands

adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ