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NEW DIRECTION OR OLD PATH?

CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE (CBSI)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 9, 2009

Serial No. 111–70

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JASON STEINBAUM, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ERIC JACOBSTEIN, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

FRED RATLIFF, Republican Professional Staff Member 

JULIE SCHOENTHALER, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Julissa Reynoso, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................... 11

Mr. Stephen Johnson (Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Western Hemisphere Affairs) .............................................................................. 30

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Ph.D., Provost & Senior Vice President for Academic 

Affairs, York College, The City University of New York .................................. 39

Anthony P. Maingot, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus of Sociology, National Security Scholar-in-Residence, Florida International University ............................ 65

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 5

Ms. Julissa Reynoso: Prepared statement ............................................................. 14

Mr. Stephen Johnson: Prepared statement ........................................................... 33

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................ 43

Anthony P. Maingot, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................. 67

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 102

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 103

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 104

Written responses from Ms. Julissa Reynoso to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel .............................................................. 106

Written response from Ms. Julissa Reynoso to question submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Bill Delahunt, a Representative in Congress from 

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ................................................................ 114

Written testimony of Mr. Anton Edmunds, Executive Director and CEO, 

Caribbean Central American Action .................................................................. 115

(1)

NEW DIRECTION OR OLD PATH? CARIBBEAN 

BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE (CBSI) 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot L. Engel (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ENGEL. The hearing is called to order. Before I begin, I want 

to acknowledge a number of distinguished ambassadors from the 

Caribbean, and we thank them for coming here today from Antigua 

and Barbuda, Ambassador Deborah Mae Lovell. If I mispronounce 

anything, please forgive me. From the Bahamas, Ambassador 

Cornelius Alvin Smith. From Barbados, Ambassador John Ernest 

Beale. From Guyana, Ambassador Barney Karran. From Jamaica, 

Ambassador Anthony Smith Rowe Johnson. From St. Lucia, Dr. 

Michael Louis. And from Trinidad and Tobago, Ambassador Dr. 

Glynda Patricia Morean-Phillip. 

So I thank all of you for coming. It is quite an honor to have you 

here and of course you are always welcome. I hope I didn’t butcher 

anybody’s name too badly. 

So the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere will come to 

order. I am pleased to welcome you to today’s hearing on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and to welcome Ms. Julissa Reynoso, 

the new deputy assistant secretary of state for the Caribbean, Central American and Cuban Affairs to what is I hope her first of 

many appearances before this committee. And Ms. Reynoso comes 

from the Bronx, as I do. So we have something in common. And 

I am sure your Bronx roots will help lay the groundwork for a 

great working relationship with this subcommittee. I know you are 

just a little bit smarter than most people because you come from 

the Bronx. 

Ms. REYNOSO. That is right. 

Mr. ENGEL. So today’s hearing provides an excellent opportunity 

to highlight the security concerns of the Caribbean. So often the region’s problems get overlooked except as a vacation spot or when 

there is a crisis. 

As chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere, the Caribbean has been a high priority for 

me, and I have been a strong proponent of making sure the Caribbean is at the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Not only do 

I have many constituents in my congressional district of Caribbean 

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heritage, including many from Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican 

Republic, and as I mentioned, my district is in the Bronx in New 

York and Westchester County and Rockland County, but I firmly 

believe that a strong bond with our friends in the Caribbean benefits the entire region. I was proud to lead the official congressional 

delegation to the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago 

in April, and since I have been chairman we have been to Trinidad 

twice. In Trinidad at the Summit of the Americas I met with the 

leaders of most of the Caribbean nations one-to-one with my delegation, a very, very good exchange of views and ideas. 

I strongly support President Obama’s initiative to strengthen cooperation on security with our neighbors in the Caribbean, and 

above all, I agree with his message that we need to listen to our 

Caribbean friends, and build on their strengths in areas they see 

as important. This is precisely what we must do to bolster the security of our Caribbean neighbors, enhance what works while creating new avenues for partnership. I know that security is the top 

concern of many Caribbean leaders and we must not delay. Prime 

Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago expressed to me personally a strong willingness to deepen security cooperation with the 

United States and hoped that resources and attention from Washington would follow our positive rhetoric. 

Now is the time for us to increase security assistance to the 

small and vulnerable countries of the Caribbean. What we need is 

an approach to security in the Caribbean that is cooperative, sustained, and well-resourced while working in coordination with existing efforts in the Western Hemisphere, like the Merida Initiative 

and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, or ACI. 

According to statistics released by the United Nations Office of 

Drugs and Crime and Interpol in 2007, the overall Caribbean murder rate of 30 per 100,000 is higher than that of any other region 

in the world. Aside from the human toll that crime has on society, 

it also acts as a barrier to development and investment, directing 

more resources to security and away from social improvement, thus 

fueling a vicious cycle that only encourages more crime. 

I saw this during a recent congressional delegation to Jamaica, 

a country with an alarmingly high murder rate. In my meeting 

with Prime Minister Golding, he stressed to me that 90 percent of 

the illegal guns confiscated in Jamaica come from the United 

States. President Caldern of Mexico reported similarly alarming 

trends. It is for this reason the United States needs to ratify the 

Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 

Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. This treaty, which has been negotiated but not yet 

ratified by the Senate, is called the CIFTA treaty. It has been 

stalled in the Senate and it directly targets illegal arms smuggling, 

an issue of great consequence for the Caribbean and the rest of the 

hemisphere. 

Ever since becoming chairman of this subcommittee, I have been 

increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Americas. We must not only work with our 

partners in the region to stem the supply of illicit drugs, but we 

must increase efforts to reduce demand here in the United States 

3

at home. Most importantly, we must figure out what works and 

what does not. 

I am therefore pleased that just yesterday the House of Representatives passed my bill to create a Western Hemisphere drug 

policy commission to evaluate the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in 

the hemisphere. It is my hope that the work of this commission 

will support our efforts to work with CARICOM on the scourge of 

drugs. And I might add that I was delighted to have as a strong 

supporter and sponsor of this legislation our ranking member, Mr. 

Mack. And I want to again—I did it yesterday but I want to publicly thank him for his support. This was truly a bipartisan bill and 

passed the House with voice vote. So thank you, Mr. Mack. 

I also believe that we need to take a holistic view of the entire 

region when we begin implementing CBSI. I am very concerned 

that if we don’t act quickly to bolster our friends in the Caribbean, 

the positive impact of the Merida Initiative in Mexico and Central 

America may push the drug trade further into the Caribbean and 

increase the already alarming rates of violence. 

In implementing CBSI we need to make sure our approach with 

the Merida Initiative and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative work 

together to combat the drug trade and insecurity throughout the 

region. It makes little sense for all three efforts to work in the 

Western Hemisphere without proper coordination. That is why I 

have added a section to legislation which has passed the House establishing a coordinator with State Department for the Merida Initiative. I am calling for an executive branch coordinator at the 

State Department to oversee and manage our counternarcotics programs in the Americas. 

Since CBSI was announced at the summit last April there have 

been three meetings held on this initiative. Initial United StatesCaribbean meetings were held in Suriname, Barbados, and the Dominican Republic in 2009, and a ministerial meeting is expected to 

take place in Washington in early 2010 in which a political declaration, action plan, and framework for the CBSI will be adopted. We 

must quickly move forward on this initiative and produce more detailed planning on the shape of CBSI. I also think that at next 

year’s meeting in Washington that President Obama should meet 

with the Caribbean leaders. This meeting would not only demonstrate support for CBSI, but it would go a long way toward showing our Caribbean friends that the United States stands shoulder 

to shoulder on the challenges we face together. 

I would like to commend President Obama for announcing $45 

million of initial funding for CBSI when he was at the Summit of 

the Americas. However, I am disappointed to learn that only $37 

million will be appropriated. I believe we have to fund the remaining $8 million to meet this important obligation to the Caribbean. 

It is hard to generalize about a diverse region about the Caribbean, 

but we can all agree that insecurity is a common threat to every 

nation in the region. These threats, drugs, gangs, violent crime, 

criminal organizations, and even natural disasters are magnified 

by the poverty, corruption, and limited opportunities. What is most 

important is that through CBSI, the United States demonstrates to 

the nations of the Caribbean that we will listen to your concerns 

about your security, learn from your experiences, and respond tanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:26 Mar 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\120909\53990 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gibly, effectively, and cooperatively to the situation you face every 

day. We cannot tell you what the problem is. We want to hear from 

you and learn from you what the problem is. 

While it is hard for any program to be an absolute solution to 

all the significant security problems found in the region, I think 

CBSI is a good step in the right direction, and I am looking forward to learning more about the initiative today. 

With that, I would like to call on the ranking member, Mr. Mack, 

for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Engel follows:]

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Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing today. It has been a pleasure to serve on this 

committee and to serve with you and your leadership in the hemisphere. We work well together, and we agree on a lot. Not on everything, but the things that we don’t agree on we have been able 

to talk about and to work on together. So I appreciate your leadership. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today. I 

would especially like to thank Steve Johnson for coming today as 

well. I know that he has a very tight schedule and he might have 

to leave before we get to him, but I believe that it is important that 

we hear his perspective. 

Before we begin, Mr. Chairman, I would like to touch on something that happened in Honduras yesterday. As some of you already know, Honduras’ top fighter against narcotrafficking was 

brutally assassinated. Like the Caribbean, Central America is 

fighting hard against narcotraffickers, and this is just another example of what we are facing: Cowardly thugs who will stop at nothing to weaken governments and terrorize the people. This is also 

a reminder to us all that the Obama administration must restore 

military cooperation with the Hondurans. They are flying blind in 

a tough fight against narcoterrorists, and the one country that 

could help them defeat the drug traffickers continues to stand 

while the innocent are killed. 

Mr. Chairman, the nations of the Caribbean are instrumental in 

our fight against narcotrafficking. My own State of Florida has 

firsthand experience with the repercussions of a violent Caribbean. 

In the 1980s drugs were flown from South America through the 

Caribbean with a destination point in Florida, creating great havoc 

across the streets of south Florida. History seems to be repeating 

itself. While narcotraffickers moved to Central America and Mexico 

in the 1990s, we have seen a shift due to the Mexican President 

Caldern’s tenacity. As Mexico works hard to defeat narcotraffickers, a balloon-like effect is triggered and trafficking is now originating in South America, cutting through the Caribbean and either heading to North Africa, Europe, or Florida. And as if a rising 

storm was approaching the islands of the Caribbean, we must 

make sure that these nations are prepared, Mr. Chairman. If we 

do not, this problem will not only affect the lives of the Caribbean 

people, but it will also affect the lives of thousands of Floridians 

and Americans across our great Nation. 

We have all seen the effects. High murder rates, increased air 

smuggling from Venezuela, overburdened prosecutors and judges, 

dead bodies in the canals and straits of the Caribbean. In fact, 

when looking at the statistics, it seems as if the battle between 

David and Goliath is occurring in the Caribbean nations. To add 

insult to injury, Venezuela’s leader Hugo Chavez has become a coconspirator in this fight. Unlike President Caldern of Mexico, President Uribe of Colombia, both of whom deserve great recognition for 

their efforts, Hugo Chavez has ceded his airspace to thousands of 

drug-smuggling flights. Not only that, Hugo Chavez and his family 

have become partners in the narco business, taking a once proud 

nation to what now looks more like an abyss. 

9

As we address the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, we must 

take a close look at some very important issues. For instance, do 

the Caribbean nations have the capacity to absorb the help they 

need? Is the new funding under the CBSI really new or will it simply replace old projects? How dangerous is it that some of the very 

countries that might be included in the CBSI are the ones that belong to ALBA, an organization that is led by Hugo Chavez? Although we might have our own views on what should be done in 

the Caribbean, what have those nations said they would like to see 

done? 

As we hear from our panel today, these are some of the points 

that I would like to address. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, this 

is an important hearing, and I think it has a huge impact on the 

United States and certainly our friends and neighbors in the Caribbean. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Mack. I want to acknowledge the 

Ambassador of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, La Celia A. Prince, 

who just walked in. I was in her lovely country several months ago, 

as was Mr. Meeks. 

So I call on Mr. Meeks for an opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your hard 

work and a hearty hello to our great friends, the ambassadors from 

all throughout the Caribbean. As I heard the chairman say, I was 

pleased to be at the most recent Summit of the Americas, where 

President Obama announced the creation of the Caribbean Basin 

Security Initiative. I in fact just recently returned from a trip to 

Haiti, where I saw firsthand the critical need for this kind of focus. 

When I pushed to have Haiti and the Dominican Republic inserted 

in the Merida Initiative, it was a step I hope in the direction of a 

broader coordination with the region. It is gratifying to see this initiative now on the horizon. 

I am certain that today our witnesses will lay out all of the many 

reasons why there is a critical need to work more closely in partnership with our Caribbean neighbors on issues of security. But I 

also hope to hear today not just about the numbers and crime and 

narcotics trade but also about the link it bears to economic development. I believe deeply that these are critically linked issues. 

Entrenched to poverty feeds the kinds of security questions we 

will consider today. We cannot consider security without discussing 

a comprehensive approach to addressing barriers to development. 

While poverty in the Caribbean has declined in the past, it remains 

high and many of the region’s impressive social gains are at risk 

of eroding. Unemployment, particularly of youth, is a major issue, 

and there is a growing concern about recent increases in crime and 

violence across the region. 

I know that CBSI includes a component focused on social 

progress, and I hope our witnesses can expound on ways to ensure 

that this is, indeed, an effective aspect of the initiative. 

There is no doubt that the Caribbean countries face unique development challenges arising from their small size, proximity to 

drug production, vulnerability to natural disasters and economic 

volatility. As globalization has become the reality, they continue to 

confront a changing international paradigm with a significant 

10

transformation and the production structure of most economies 

away from traditional agriculture. 

Despite all these challenges, until the recent global financial crisis, the Caribbean continued to see a sustained growth in per capita incomes, with most of them becoming middle-income countries 

and achieving high levels of human development. These achievements were complemented and enhanced by several small and deliberate moves in early targeting of universal primary education, 

strong traditions of democratic participation and political stability 

for many countries, and a significant degree of regional integration 

despite significant differences and economic and social characteristics. Yet the Caribbean still struggles to reach its potential and the 

reality of the drug trade and crime overtaking of even the Caribbean’s highest income countries puts the region at a comparative 

disadvantage in achieving international competitiveness. 

Unfortunately, it has been the case that just when many Caribbean nations find their footing in an industry and trade deepens 

in a positive direction, the rules change or the extra help isn’t provided to help sustain this advantage. Clearly we need to do a better 

job of helping advance trade and development. In such an environment business as usual no longer will suffice neither for the individual countries nor our own country’s sluggish efforts toward the 

region. 

Adapting to the demands of this new world will require a much 

greater focus on sustaining and improving growth and competitiveness. When all is said and done, nothing matters if the people of 

the Caribbean do not feel the impact of the democracies. It is easy 

to turn to a life of crime, as there is no other way to put food on 

the table. We cannot decouple security and social well-being. We 

never have and we never will. 

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses that will be testifying later today, listening and learning and working together 

with my friends from the Caribbean. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Meeks, and we welcome Mr. 

Delahunt here. I would like to invite him, if he would like, to make 

a statement. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, welcome to the CARICOM and representatives of the nations in the 

Caribbean. I know you and other members of the subcommittee 

give them high regard, as do I. I want to extend a personal welcome to them. 

Let me be brief since I am not a member of the committee, but 

let me associate myself with the remarks of the vice chair, Mr. 

Meeks, and let me commend the passage of your legislation and 

also the work of Mr. Mack and his sponsorship that creates a commission. I think there has to be a sustained review in real-time in 

terms of all of the issues impacting security in the Caribbean and 

neighboring countries. I think it really makes sense. Well done. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. And now it is my honor 

once again to welcome Ms. Julissa Reynoso, who is the deputy assistant secretary of state for Caribbean, Central American and 

Cuban Affairs. She has a wonderful resume. I won’t read it all because it would take too long. But she is an attorney by trade and 

11

prior to joining the U.S. State Department practiced law in New 

York, focusing on international arbitration and antitrust law. She 

has a wonderful record, a fellow at New York University School of 

Law and Columbia Law School, and I saw the University of Cambridge in the U.K. and J.D. from Columbia University School of 

Law, and you clerked for a Federal judge. And I could go on and 

on, but we really want to hear from you, and we welcome you and 

we are all ears. 

STATEMENT OF MS. JULISSA REYNOSO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member 

Mack, members of the committee. I am honored to appear before 

this subcommittee today so soon after taking up my new duties as 

the deputy assistant secretary responsible for Central American, 

Caribbean, and Cuban affairs. 

If it is acceptable to you, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to 

make a brief statement so I have more time to address any questions the committee may have and submit my full statement for 

the record. 

Mr. ENGEL. Without objection, so moved. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, CBSI, embodies a new approach and a tangible commitment, greater shared 

security throughout the Caribbean. We have achieved effective 

partnerships with Mexico, Colombia, and Central America. It is 

time for the Caribbean, the heart of key trafficking routes, to become part of this broader network of cooperation to protect our peoples and institutions. Stemming the flow of narcotics remains forefront in our national interests. 

Most of the drugs coming into the United States pass through 

Central America and Mexico. We expect, however, that as the 

Merida Initiative makes progress in Mesoamerica there will be a 

‘‘balloon effect’’ in the Caribbean. Governments in the region are, 

however, hampered by a lack of human, technical, and physical capacity. They cannot keep pace with cash flush transnational criminal networks. 

The danger of increased trafficking and negative spillover effects 

are too great to ignore. The question is not should the United 

States take action but how best to do so in partnership with our 

Caribbean allies and other international partners. 

A defining purpose of our policy in the Western Hemisphere is 

to build effective partnerships to better develop, mobilize, supply, 

and sustain the capacity of the region to accomplish shared objectives. In the security sector, this is reflected in a commitment to 

advance citizen safety. Insecurity is a widespread concern in the region, and it is felt by people in many different ways. By grounding 

our efforts in ‘‘citizen safety’’ we are underscoring that at heart all 

of our various concerns boil down to the safety of human beings. 

It is an effective way to link our specific concerns with the related 

concerns of people throughout the region. 

Although the nature of security challenges faced by countries in 

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ciently mobilize the efforts of all our agencies and partners to meet 

their goals in the most cost-effective way possible. A one-size-fitsall approach to the hemisphere won’t work. Instead, we are implementing distinct tailored initiatives that address the differing circumstances prevalent in different subregions, and ensuring they 

join up seamlessly. 

Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be useful to briefly highlight 

the trajectory that has brought us to this point. Work on CBSI 

began in earnest following unprecedented efforts by Caribbean 

countries, the United States, and international partners to provide 

security for the 2007 Cricket World Cup. That year Caribbean and 

United States leaders adopted the CARICOM–U.S. Initiative to 

combat illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In April 

2008 Caribbean leaders agreed to develop a regional security strategy and plan of action, focused on strengthening institutional and 

operational cooperation throughout the region and with international partners. We seized the opportunity presented by their 

initiative to foster a greater security partnership with them. 

At the Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s request for security 

assistance at the April Summit of the Americas presented another 

opportunity to advance our cooperative efforts. These examples 

demonstrate the confluence of events surrounding the genesis of 

this partnership. 

It is worth noting the United States’ successful engagement in 

these efforts was due to extraordinary cooperation, coordination 

among U.S. agencies, agencies that continue to play active roles in 

these new partnerships. 

President Obama recognized the need for deeper security cooperation with the Caribbean in the beginning of his administration. When he met with leaders from the hemisphere at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, he announced an investment toward this effort, the Fiscal Year 2010 request of $45 

million for CBSI pending congressional approval. 

We recognize that difficult economic times require difficult economic choices. We are planning programs based on realistic budget 

appraisals, keeping in mind the United States cannot bear all the 

cost. We understand that the conference report includes $37 million 

for CBSI, and we are optimistic that Congress will pass it in the 

coming week. 

We are pleased the Congress recognizes the importance of 

partnering with the Caribbean States on security. We look forward 

to working with you on further developing the CBSI. Since April, 

the State Department has led interagency teams to meet with Caribbean partners on three occasions in a consultative process to plan 

a bold initiative built on the fundamental premise of shared responsibility and unity of purpose. Together, we have developed a 

common regional strategy, an operational framework, and a comprehensive needs assessment that identifies the challenges, available resources, and institutions to address them and what would 

be required to sustain a long-term approach, focusing on three strategic objectives: One, substantially reducing illicit trafficking; two, 

advance public safety and security; and three, promote social justice. Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela, responsible for 

managing the development and implementation of our hemispheric 

13

security partnerships, will host the inaugural Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue in early 2010. He will subsequently meet 

with his counterparts on an annual basis to review progress made 

in implementing CBSI and developing this partnership. 

We envision CBSI as a multi-year, multifaceted security partnership, one which will require sustained resources and political will 

to succeed. CBSI, like Merida, and other hemispheric partnerships, 

will mature at its own pace and with its own particular needs and 

benefits. We have to build into it from the start the sort of flexibility that will let us adjust programs and shift our focus for regional capacity strengths. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate an important 

element of this partnership, our close ties to the Caribbean. Caribbean Americans have built lives throughout the United States enriching our society and communities. Through CBSI we can provide 

the next coming generations of Caribbeans in America the safety 

and security to which they are inalienably entitled to. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions you 

may have today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reynoso follows:]

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Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Madam Secretary. I am 

going to ask a couple of quick questions. You may have heard that 

the bells have gone off. We have a series of votes. So I am going 

to try to ask some quick questions and see if we can wrap it up 

so we can then go to vote and then come back after the vote for 

the second panel. 

As you mentioned, and as I mentioned, the Foreign Operations 

appropriations bill will fund CBSI for $37 million instead of the 

$45 million in initial funding which President Obama announced. 

I find this disappointing. I have conveyed that disappointment because I think we need to meet our commitments to our friends in 

the Caribbean. 

Will the State Department reprogram funds in order to reach the 

$45 million in order to fully fund CBSI? That can be done, and I 

will certainly support reprogramming funds to make this important 

commitment if it is done. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. We 

just learned of the $37 million as of last night. So at this point we 

are at the point of assessing if that is—if we can work with the 

programs we already have in mind and look at the budget we already developed. So the answer to your question is, we are still trying to figure out internally whether we will need to proceed with 

reallocation. 

Mr. ENGEL. Could you please take back that that would be my 

strong recommendation, and you certainly would have my strong 

support. If you were able to do that, I would appreciate that. 

Let me ask you, this is also a quick question. When the Merida 

Initiative was first announced, Congress was told that it was a 3-

year program, and now we are talking about a second phase of 

Merida beyond the 3-year period. And this makes sense to me, but 

it would be helpful for Congress to know from the start the length 

of any security assistance program announced by the administraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:26 Mar 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\120909\53990 HFA PsN: SHIRL

53990b-7.eps
21

tion. So let me ask you, how long do you envision CBSI to be? Is 

this a one-time appropriation or a multi-year program? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As of right now, we are 

not certain how many years CBSI will take. We are committed to 

setting forth a strong foundation and hence the request for the 

funds. We know that it will likely be a multi-year program, but we 

are not certain as to how many years that will be since as of today 

we haven’t officially launched the initiative. So as things are rolled 

out, assessed, how long each portion of the initiative will need in 

order for it to be fully developed and implemented. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this final question from me. How 

would you compare CBSI to the Third Border Initiative, which was 

implemented by the Bush administration? How is the focus, implementation, or resource allocation different in CBSI than in previous 

efforts? And let me combine that with, are projects similar to those 

once funded under the Third Border Initiative still funded by 

USAID’s Caribbean regional program or other spigots of U.S. assistance to the region? And how will you ensure that CBSI is not 

forgotten in a few years as was the case with the Third Border Initiative? 

I know those are a bunch of questions but they are all related. 

Ms. REYNOSO. I will try to answer, and please let me know if I 

don’t answer completely, Mr. Chairman. The Third Border Initiative, from my understanding, was a program designed to strengthen the capabilities of Caribbean institutions. We believe that the 

Third Border Initiative, or TBI, as it is known, was a predecessor 

to what we are now deeming CBSI. CBSI is an initiative that really came from our Caribbean partners as they organize and coordinate amongst themselves and came to us with an initiative that we 

believe is much more comprehensive and integrated than TBI. The 

major difference in my mind is the fact that the Caribbean nations 

themselves and Caribbean partners were able to coordinate and orchestrate this initiative, CBSI, as opposed to the TBI initiative, 

which wasn’t as integrated and comprehensive as what we are proposing here. 

Mr. ENGEL. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Mack. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your 

testimony today. You and I both talked about the balloon effect 

when it comes to drugs and the flow of drugs. Now that Mexico is 

working so hard to try to stop the flow of drugs and the drug cartels in their country we see this now moving back toward Central 

America, South America, and certainly there is a concern that 

where those drugs are going and whether it is to Europe, Africa, 

or the Caribbean, I would like to get your thoughts on what can 

we do to put pressure on Hugo Chavez to stop allowing Venezuelan 

airspace to be used for the delivery of drugs, to transport drugs 

through Venezuelan airspace. And specifically, will you be an advocate with the administration to ensure that we have a policy that 

doesn’t allow Hugo Chavez to continue to use his airspace as a way 

to let drugs go through his country that ultimately will affect the 

Caribbean and the United States? And also what is what your 

thoughts are since the United States has cut off aid to Honduras. 

We have seen drug trafficking increase in Honduras. Again, will 

22

you be an advocate to restore aid to Honduras so we can continue 

our partnership to stop the drug trade from moving through Honduras? 

So if you could answer those two questions, I would appreciate 

it. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Congressman. On the question about 

Venezuela, Venezuela is not a member obviously of the CBSI initiative. The Caribbean nations have come to us of their own will, have 

not asked Venezuela to be a part of this initiative. 

Mr. MACK. If I may, but you would agree that Venezuela—when 

you talk about the balloon effect that it is Venezuela’s airspace that 

these drugs are moving through that ultimately do come into the 

Caribbean. So I don’t know that you can separate the two issues. 

You have got to look at how are some of these drugs getting into 

the Caribbean in the first place? And if we know that they are coming through Venezuela, then certainly it would be in your interest 

and in our interest and in the administration’s interest to do something about that. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Yes, Congressman Mack. My colleagues at the 

State Department who are more familiar with the situation in Venezuela than perhaps I am have clearly indicated that we keenly 

promote that Venezuela, along with any other nations in the region, the Caribbean basin, do whatever they can to prevent the 

trafficking of illegal drugs either through air or through the maritime capacity. 

So I hear what you are saying, but I guess I agree that we have 

already indicated to the Venezuelans that that is something that 

we need their cooperation with. 

Mr. MACK. Well, I would suggest then that you might want to 

refocus on that issue because not only is Venezuela and Hugo Chavez not helping in stopping the drug flow but Hugo Chavez is actually helping, and we need to have a strong policy that says we are 

not going to stand for this. When he kicks out the DEA and others, 

clearly that is a sign that he doesn’t want to have a partnership 

in stopping the drug flow, and he is a part of the problem. 

Mr. ENGEL. I think we are going to hold it here. I am going to 

have to ask you to wait. I thought we were finished before. I know 

we will still have some questions. I know Mr. Meeks and Mr. 

Delahunt had some questions and Mr. Mack perhaps. We will go 

vote. There will be a series of three votes. So we should be back 

here in about 20, 25 minutes. We are in recess. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ENGEL. The hearing will reconvene. 

Let me ask one or two questions before I turn to Mr. Delahunt, 

who I know has some questions. 

Congress expanded the Merida Initiative to cover Haiti and the 

Dominican Republic. Does this mean that CBSI will exclude Haiti 

and the Dominican Republic, or are both countries eligible for funding under both efforts? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, Merida included funding for the entire island of Hispaniola, 

the Dominican Republic and Haiti. But we believe at this point, 

given the fact that the Dominican Republic and Haiti are integral 

23

parts of the Caribbean, that it is the best fit for them and they 

have themselves acknowledged as such, it is the best fit for them 

to be part of CBSI. And so we have been working with both the 

Dominican Republic and Haiti throughout the process in evaluating 

the CBSI Initiative. So they will be part of that initiative and no 

longer part of Merida. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

There have been existing bilateral efforts between the United 

States and various Caribbean countries to work on the issue of security and drug trafficking, and there have already been meetings 

in Suriname and Barbados to prepare for the CBSI. Could you comment on the state of existing cooperation and your views of areas 

that need to be strengthened in developing this Caribbean Basin 

Security Initiative? How does it compare with the support provided 

by the Department of Defense and of the U.S. agencies in the region? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have had several meetings already with our Caribbean partners, and of course, we have also met internally with other agencies—the Department of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security and 

USAID, and within State, the U.S. State Department internally as 

well to assess where we should go with the initiative. At this point 

we have come up with preliminary assessments of our objectives. 

And our objectives are, one, they are to reduce illicit trafficking. 

Secondly, to advance public safety and security. And thirdly, to promote social justice. 

We have preliminary documents that deal with the assessments 

and also a preliminary framework agreement and a plan of action 

that we are evaluating. And the goal is in early 2010 to have a 

meeting with our Caribbean partners which assistant secretary 

Arturo Valenzuela will chair, along with his counterparts in the 

Caribbean, whereby we will look at the documents and formalize 

and finalize them and officially launch the initiative. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you, based on what you just said, could 

you evaluate the progress made in the working group meetings 

made in Suriname and Barbados, and what is the next step for 

CBSI since the ministerial was moved to 2010, and what do you 

envision to be the main challenges in launching the CBSI? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have received documents and assessments from our partners, 

and we ourselves have done our own evaluations internally, and we 

believe we are at a point where we can officially launch the initiative early next year. 

In terms of our obstacles, we will continue monitoring the initiative and the rollout of the initiative. So we note that, of course, we 

will be mindful of how we roll out the initiative. 

Mr. ENGEL. What countries seem particularly interested in working with the United States on CBSI? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Well, at this point, Mr. Chairman, we have been 

working effectively with all of the members of the catacomb plus 

the Dominican Republic. So indeed we think we have been working 

effectively with all of the Caribbean nations. 

24

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. When we broke for the votes, Mr. Mack 

was in the middle of a series of questions, so I would like to turn 

the floor over to him. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We were having a discussion about Venezuela and the drug trafficking through Venezuelan air space, and we also touched on Honduras. I think we both expressed ourselves well about Venezuela, 

unless you have anything to add to that. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Just one thing. On the Venezuela question, I 

wanted to make clear that since our ambassador returned to Caracas, one of the primary objectives of our mission there is talking 

with the Venezuelans on counternarcotics and counterterrorism. So 

these are strategic parts of our policy at this point. 

Mr. MACK. Well, I hope we are successful because right now I 

don’t think Hugo Chavez has any intentions of standing with the 

United States and stopping the drug trafficking through Venezuela. 

It is a shame. 

We talked a little bit about Honduras and whether or not you 

would be an advocate for the return of aid and support to Honduras. Since the United States has stopped aid and helping with 

drug trafficking issues, we have seen an increase in drug flows into 

Honduras, and so I would like to see if you would like to comment 

on that. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you for the question, Mr. Congressman. 

Our goal is to work with Honduras as soon as we can. At this 

point we do not believe and we do not think that they have restored democratic order and we have been working with Honduras 

to get to that point. 

Mr. MACK. They are one country that has actually stood up and 

defended its freedom and democracy and because of their actions, 

democracy is alive and well and strong in Honduras, and I think 

they have proved to the world, by having this last election and by 

their actions, that democracy is alive and well. And I would suggest 

that a message to the Honduran people is that we support them 

in their continued effort to support their democracy. They have 

done nothing but defend their constitution and it is something that 

we should celebrate instead of pulling aid that ultimately has 

helped the increase of drug flow in Honduras. 

Just a couple of days ago we saw the top drug fighter in Honduras be assassinated. So I think the U.S. policy is wrong and we 

need to quickly show the Honduran people that we support them. 

I want to move on from that because I am a supporter of what we 

are trying to do in the Caribbean, and I signed a letter with the 

chairman about full funding and I think it is vitally important, but 

I have a few other questions. 

Some have said in Central America some of the reasons some of 

the money wasn’t able or the aid wasn’t able—it took so long to get 

out because they weren’t ready or capable of receiving it. Do you 

believe that the Caribbean countries are ready? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 

Based on the ongoing conversations and dialogues we have had 

with our Caribbean partners over the last several years, and the 

assessments that they themselves have conducted and we ourselves 

have also conducted in cooperation with other agencies, we do beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:26 Mar 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\120909\53990 HFA PsN: SHIRL
25

lieve that our Caribbean partners are ready to work with us and 

cooperate with us in the rollout of this initiative. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I heard the ranking member reference the fact that there 

has been an increase, I think he might have used the words ‘‘dramatic increase’’ in Honduras since the coup. I don’t know where he 

secures that particular information, but from your knowledge has 

there been a dramatic increase since the coup that occurred I think 

in July to now, is there any data that indicates that there has been 

such an increase or a spike up that you are aware of? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

I do not have an answer to your question. I am not aware of that, 

but I am happy to go back and research that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would be interested because in such a relatively 

short period of time, that information would be made available. 

I don’t want to spend too much time on Honduras. 

Mr. MACK. Would the gentleman yield on that point? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Of course. 

Mr. MACK. This is information I obtained when I took my trip 

to Honduras and spoke to members of our military in Honduras. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time, when did you take your 

trip? 

Mr. MACK. And by the way, I never called it a coup. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I know you didn’t call it a coup. I’m calling it a 

coup. You took your trip in August? 

Mr. MACK. I took my trip in August, and they already saw an 

increase. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. In 6 weeks they saw an increase? 

Mr. MACK. Yes. That is from our military mouth. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I find that rather stunning that our military 

could find in a 6-week period of time, when we were not there, that 

kind of a dramatic increase. But you and I should have a conversation about that, and you can educate me. 

Mr. MACK. I would be happy to. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But I find that remarkable. I find that stunning 

that we have that kind of information available. But let me get 

back to the Caribbean. 

I noted that the President indicated that he was open to having 

dialogue with Cuba on a variety of different issues, including the 

issue of drugs. I also note in the most recent State Department 

narcotics control strategy review, there is a statement that says the 

Government of Cuba regularly detects and monitors suspect vessels 

and aircraft in its territorial waters and air space. In cases likely 

to involve narcotic trafficking, it regularly provides detection information to the United States Coast Guard. Have we dealt with the 

Cuban Government in terms of the issue of drugs? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 

We do cooperate with the Cubans on the issue of maritime Coast 

Guard in particular. To my knowledge, we have not had formal 

conversations on this issue with them. But we do understand that 

Cuba, like the rest of the Caribbean nations, is very concerned with 

the trafficking that is occurring throughout the Caribbean. 

26

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess my point is that if we are concerned 

about drugs coming into this country, does it make sense to include 

Cuba in the effort to reduce the in-flow of narcotics, illegal narcotics to this country? 

Ms. REYNOSO. At this point, Congressman, specifically with respect to CBSI, the Caribbean, our Caribbean partners and we as 

their partner have not found it opportune to bring Cuba into the 

discussion. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess what I am saying, Madam Secretary, has 

the Caribbean community been surveyed? Have each of the countries, many of who, have ambassadors present in this room now, 

have they been inquired as to whether it makes sense in terms of 

the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States, to incorporate 

and develop a collaborative effort with the Cuban Government that 

according to the information that our State Department presents, 

has been extremely cooperative. In fact, in February, the Cubans 

notified the Coast Guard and it resulted in a joint multinational 

interception of significant drugs with a successful prosecution. 

And, in fact, the individuals were sent on to Columbia and then 

extradited back into the United States and are being prosecuted. 

How can we have a Caribbean drug Security Initiative with a focus 

on drugs if we don’t include the Cubans? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

We, again, as you noted, we do have cooperation, ongoing cooperation with the Cubans on coastal issues. And it is to my knowledge an effective collaboration. Of course, many of our Caribbean 

partners have relationships, in fact, all of them have place of diplomatic relationships with Cuba, and they do have cooperation narcotics and other forms of illegal activity. So there is an ongoing battle internally in the Caribbean in terms of the cooperation with 

Cuba. But with respect to this particular initiative, Cuba is not a 

member or part of this initiative. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. What I am saying, Madam Secretary, and I appreciate your answer, there is an opportunity that I think exists at 

this point in time to bring Cuba into this particular effort to make 

it, I think it was the chair of the committee who said we must take 

a holistic view. I think we have to take a larger geographical view 

in terms of maritime interdiction that puts aside the politics. Because if we are really concerned about drugs, attempting to do this 

without Cuban engagement makes no sense. And actually, that 

was an observation that was made by the former commander of 

SOUTHCOM, the retired General Hill, who indicated there is no 

reason not to bring Cuba into this equation to help our own national security interests and obviously that of the Cubans. 

So I would commend and recommend that you go back, speak to 

the Secretary and discuss this issue because otherwise we are 

doing a disservice, I believe, in terms of what I know is our efforts 

to work with our Caribbean partners in an effort to reduce that 

drug trafficking that everybody is concerned about. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about the 

Caribbean as the first part of my questions. As I stated in some 

27

of my opening remarks, I know that CBSI is supposed to be broader than say the Plan Colombia or the Merida Initiative was in that 

some of the funds should be able to be utilized for natural disasters, mitigation and recovery, and a full range of projects yet to be 

determined. 

If I understand it correctly, it is being drafted in broader terms. 

Moreover, we have individuals like the Department of Defense, the 

U.S. Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, who also 

provide support for counternarcotics and security-related activities 

in a number of Caribbean countries that traditionally have not 

been counted as foreign aid, and so it doesn’t go against money as 

foreign aid. 

And several United States agencies have supported port security 

improvements in the Caribbean in recent years, and several Caribbean ports participated in the Container Security Initiative of the 

Department of Homeland Security and megaports initiative with 

the Department of Energy. As a result, it is often difficult to get 

an accurate sense on how much support the United States is providing a particular country in the Caribbean or to the subregion as 

a whole. That being said, it seems to me it is unclear whether the 

programs to be funded under CBSI are ones that might have been 

funded anyway through an existing program under USAID’s Caribbean regional program or the State Department’s Western Hemisphere regional program. 

So I am trying to see, number one, are these things that were 

funded before? Is the CBSI going to be an addition thereto? Are we 

reducing some of the other money coming from other places, so we 

know what we are doing there? And also, what is also key, when 

you talk about all of these other agencies, and we had the problem 

here in America when we talked about homeland security, is the 

harmonization of all of these agencies within the United States 

Government so they can support the Caribbean? How do we know 

what the one hand is doing as opposed to the other so it is better 

coordinated so there is good outcome? 

Or has there been any talk about harmonization, and dealing 

with trade capacity, if there is no harmonization there is a problem. We don’t get the results that we are looking for or the best 

bang for the money. Let me just ask those questions. Can you tell 

me where the harmonization is? Can you tell me whether or not 

they take away from some of the things we are already doing, if 

you know? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Congressman. 

The initiative aims to do something different from the prior initiatives that we have had in the region on security, and that is coordinate in an integrated way with the different security ministries 

and the defense sector with all of the countries of the Catacomb 

and the Dominican Republic. It is much more exhaustive than prior 

initiatives and events that we have had on the security side with 

our Caribbean partners. It involves many more countries and it is 

much more elaborate. 

Also, as opposed to prior initiatives, and again, I can’t go into detail as to each one of those initiatives because I don’t have all of 

the information, but broadly speaking, as opposed to other specific 

initiatives, this initiative was really spearheaded by the Caribbean 

28

itself, by our Caribbean partners. They were the ones that started 

the discussion internally and then came to us with a vision that 

we ended up sharing with them. 

As to the point on the coordination with the agencies, we have 

been in continuous communication with the different agencies in 

the U.S. Government, and this is something that we take very seriously and that we think at this point we are doing effectively. 

Mr. MEEKS. That is my concern. I want to make sure that it is 

clearly defined so we understand what the harmonization is, because oftentimes I hear about harmonization, but when we go to 

follow-up, what has taken place, there seems to be something missing. 

So I hope at some point, especially as we get toward funding, we 

become clear on how we are harmonizing, and that there is the active and continued participation of the Caribbean governments that 

we are all sitting down at the same table, and making sure that 

we are moving in the same direction and not one going one way 

or the other. 

Let me ask quickly in that same vein, because this is supposed 

to be broader, when I talked to the distinguished diplomats sitting 

in the front row, one of the question that often comes up is the 

question of deportees. I am wondering within this initiative, they 

talk about whether or not there is some kind of reentry program 

or something of that nature in regards the deportees because we 

just send them and let them out and it has such a negative impact 

on drugs and other criminal activity. 

So within the CBSI, is there anything specific that we are looking at that can help with the deportees that we are sending back? 

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Congressman. 

With respect to the issue of criminal deportees, we understand 

our Caribbean partners have shared concern on that issue. We believe that CBSI, because it is so integrated and comprehensive, and 

because the relevant agencies of the respective Caribbean nations 

will be involved in a continuous dialogue, will serve as a platform 

for the Nations to talk about and assess how best to handle and 

integrate these citizens of their countries. 

Mr. MEEKS. But just be aware if we are trying to combat the 

transshipment of drugs, et cetera, we cannot, you know, just leave 

these countries where a lot of these individuals who get access here 

and learn their skills here and then go back to—are deported back 

to the Caribbean islands and then they start their own enterprises, 

we have to make sure that we are focused at the CBSI at least 

plays a role in trying to address that situation also. 

Without that, as I said in my opening statement, because we also 

have to figure out the lengths to the economic development of these 

countries. And to consider one without the other, I think we are 

spinning wheels. I think that is why the CBSI money should be 

broadly utilized and the coordination and harmonization is extremely important, and listening to the leadership in the Caribbean 

is extremely important. 

Ms. REYNOSO. Congressman, on the issue of the economic justice 

and social justice issues, which you care so much about and I do 

as well, of course, part of our agenda and part of the agenda of the 

Caribbean nations is assessing how best to deal with the root cause 

29

of the problems, as you stated. Therefore, it is, of course, a major 

priority throughout our development of the initiatives as we roll 

these programs out to deal with the social justice issues, with the 

justice reform and other root cause problems that will tackle the 

issues before they actually become criminal issues. 

Mr. MEEKS. Lastly, and I just can’t refrain, my good friend, the 

ranking member, let me just say in listening to a lot of your questioning, we can’t have a policy I think that is just built on a onelegged stool. And Venezuela, everything focused on Venezuela, we 

are dealing with a one-legged stool. I have yet to see a stool that 

stands on one leg. I think we need to broaden it. Just quickly, I 

went to do some minimal research in talking to some of our folks, 

and I know that there is questions because of that whole area of 

the borders and the drugs, transshipments of the drugs going from 

various countries to others, and I am told there are at least 242 

illegal runways, we need to prevent criminal groups from using 

running strips and they have seized airplanes and they have seized 

over 1,100 kilograms of cocaine in recent operations. 

I think we need to take regional approaches, as we are doing in 

the Caribbean. If we are really going to fight drugs, we need regional approaches. And, yes, get everybody working together and 

make some improvements. We digressed from 2005, but we need to 

pick that up and move forward with that. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ENGEL. I am going to give the ranking member a chance to 

answer if he wants to. 

Mr. MACK. I welcome the debate on this issue because I think 

it is important to the discussion. I obviously have a different opinion. I believe that Hugo Chavez is not an honest broker, not a partner and, in fact, is using this drug trade to destabilize the region 

for his own benefit. I think it is very dangerous and we can have 

differences of agreement on that. Thank you for the opportunity to 

respond, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Madam Secretary, thank you so much for 

your testimony. I know this is your first time here since you are 

newly appointed but I am sure it will not be your last. I opened 

up by saying that I knew you had to be good because you are from 

the Bronx, but now I am really convinced. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman, as a New Yorker, I want to say welcome aboard. We are all very proud of you, and we know we will 

be working closely with you in the future. I stole my wife from the 

Bronx, so the Bronx can’t be a bad place. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, the only problem with the Bronx 

is that is where the New York Yankees reside. 

Mr. ENGEL. Someone once told me there is something called Red 

Sox Nation, but it is really confined to the nation of Massachusetts, 

whereas the Yankees are worldwide. 

I want to tell Mr. Delahunt, when I have been to some the Caribbean nations, I have seen many, many average citizens wearing the 

New York Yankees hat, but I haven’t seen any wearing the Boston 

Red Sox hat. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to embarrass our 

guest from the Caribbean, but I dare say if we asked for a show 

30

of hands, Red Sox Nation would far exceed anything that the rich, 

affluent Yankees of New York would be able to provide. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I am going to end the hearing on one note and 

that was I just wanted Mr. Delahunt to know what a good time I 

had at the World Series this year. On that message, we will allow 

our secretary to go and call the second panel. Thank you very 

much. 

I am now pleased to welcome our distinguished second panel: Dr. 

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, provost and senior vice president for academic affairs, York College, of the City University of New York. 

And I am a graduate of the City University of New York of Lehman College. He holds the rank of professor of political science and 

is a specialist on Caribbean and Inter-American security, drugs, 

crime and terrorism issues. 

Dr. Anthony Maingot is a writer and scholar on Caribbean 

issues. He was previously a professor and dean of international affairs at Florida International University and has taught at the 

University of the West Indies and Yale University. 

Stephen Johnson served as deputy assistant secretary of defense 

for Western Hemisphere Affairs from 2007 to 2009, in charge of 

U.S. Hemispheric Defense Policy and Security Relations. He is also 

previously appeared before this subcommittee. I want to welcome 

all three of you. 

We are going to let Mr. Johnson go first because he has to leave, 

and we want to get the benefit of his testimony before he has to 

leave. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN JOHNSON (FORMER DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS) 

Mr. JOHNSON. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member Mack, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very, very much 

for your invitation to be here, and certainly my commendations for 

what they are worth for this enterprise, for directing your attention 

to the Caribbean and also congratulations are due for your initiative on Western Hemisphere drug policy. 

I am delighted to be able to testify on this timely subject of the 

President’s new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. For the 

record, I would like to state that my views are my own and they 

don’t reflect the U.S. Government or any entities or individuals 

with whom I consult. 

In my experience as a foreign policy analyst and a former Department of Defense official, I have come to know the Caribbean 

as a complex region led by small governments that can be easily 

overwhelmed by big challenges. Today, those security challenges 

are local crime and transnational drug flows. To a lesser degree, 

the region is also a target of influence of other countries attempting 

to build alliances of their own, such as Venezuela, but those will 

only be successful if the United States ignores its friends in the region. 

Our alliances with our Caribbean neighbors are key to the security of the southeastern maritime approach to the United States, 

small but significant trade relationships, the freedom of sea lanes 

leading to the Panama Canal and the safety of the region as a 

31

major tourist destination. Friendly ties have evolved against a 

backdrop of past U.S. Intervention and questions over genuine interest. To strengthen security cooperation, we must keep promises 

that we have already made, build on relative strengths of each 

partner, and work smarter. 

The Obama administration’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative 

is a great start. However, it should be a multi-year effort and, in 

my opinion, $45 million may not be enough. 

Overall, the region is complex and diverse. It covers a whole lot 

of water. Most governments celebrate free regular elections with 

the exception of Cuba and Haiti. Free economies range from the 

Dominican Republic with a $44 billion gross domestic product to 

tiny Dominica with a $364 million gross domestic product. The Bahamas rank as one of the top countries in the world of annual GDP 

per capita at $30,700. Haiti is the poorest in the hemisphere with 

80 percent of the population under the poverty line. 

Capacities also vary toward cooperation on mutual interest. On 

one hand, the region benefits from a 15-member Caribbean community with five associates and 7 observers. The eastern Caribbean 

also hosts a 7 member regional security system. Yet, tiny eastern 

Caribbean countries have no tax base to maintain significant security operations. And Jamaica has the fourth highest per person 

debt burden in the world where the GDP to debt ratio stands at 

128 percent. For the last 20 years, Haiti itself has been a security 

challenge. 

The region’s security environment is also troubling. Sandwiched 

between North and South America, and consisting mostly of open 

water, the Caribbean is a smugglers paradise. Haiti and the Dominican Republic have borne the brunt of most of the trafficking. 

The good news is only about 16 percent of the flow is moving 

through that region. But the bad news is that if Mexico and the 

Central American countries improve their interdiction capabilities 

under the Merida Initiative, as Secretary Reynoso stated, trafficking routes could likely shift east. 

To the west, Jamaica has become the region’s prime marijuana 

producer and exporter if we believe the State Department’s annual 

INCSR report. Its homicide rate hovers close to 50 per 100,000 persons, rivaling Honduras, Venezuela and El Salvador. Trinidad and 

Tobago is not far behind. There the number of murders has risen 

from 118 in 2000 to 550 in 2008, or about 41 per 100,000 persons. 

In both cases there is a symbiotic relationship between smuggling 

and guns. 

Since 9/11, port security has become increasingly important in 

the region. Caribbean ports feature cargo container storage, petroleum and liquefied natural gas facilities, and cruise ship terminals 

as the region is one of the top tourist destinations in the world. 

Given the volume of maritime trade, infrastructure may be attractive targets for terrorist attacks. Finally, all Caribbean states 

except for Trinidad and Tobago are highly energy dependent, which 

raises costs for security operations and makes them subject to energy influence. Venezuela’s President has persuaded 14 nations to 

join Petrocaribe, an energy aid program that offers petroleum at 

concessionary rates. Should United States retreat from commitVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:26 Mar 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\120909\53990 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ments or ignore friendly ties in the region, Caribbean loyalties 

could shift. 

The administration’s CBSI package represents continuity from 

the 1980s: The Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Clinton administration’s Bridgetown Summit to the Bush administration’s Third Border Initiative. In this case, continuity is a good thing. Moreover, it 

is a great thing. However, we should not fool ourselves that what 

is being contemplated under CBSI is enough. Haiti is still not a 

fully functioning state, and its weak law enforcement represents a 

security challenge. And many economies throughout the region are 

too small to face down international drug trafficking organizations, 

money laundering, human trafficking, and the potential for terrorism all by themselves. 

We can work smarter building on what has worked in the past, 

like cooperative arrangements under the Joint Interagency Task 

Force South out of Key West, Florida; like Enduring Friendship, a 

program that SOUTHCOM has operated at about $67 million for 

3 years to provide go-fast boats to a number of Central American 

and Caribbean nations. It is still awaiting phase III which would 

address the eastern Caribbean countries. 

In all of this we haven’t even talk about the social programs that 

are needed to address such issues as gangs in Jamaica and in other 

countries. And we know that they have a large cost in terms of designing activities that will keep youth occupied in school and headed toward jobs. None of that is cheap. In sum, a $45 million package may be helpful, but it will only buy three helicopters. And air 

and maritime equipment is only one of the components contemplated in CBSI. 

Perhaps we cannot afford to do more now, but we must come up 

with a long term strategy to help our allies become more secure. 

Their safety and prosperity will only enhance our own. 

I regret the fact that I won’t be able to stay due to a previous 

commitment in the Capitol to answer any questions, but I will be 

happy to answer any questions submitted to me after the hearing 

and come back with any answers. Again, I consider this a great 

privilege to be able to testify before you, Mr. Chairman, and ranking member and distinguish members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

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Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. We appreciate 

your coming and understand that you have to leave. You have been 

to this committee before so we do appreciate your expertise. Thank 

you very much Mr. Secretary. We look forward to having you in the 

future. 

Dr. Griffith. 

STATEMENT OF IVELAW LLOYD GRIFFITH, PH.D., PROVOST & 

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, YORK 

COLLEGE, THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you. I want to begin by thanking you, Mr. 

Chairman, along with ranking member Connie Mack, and my own 

congressman and to say thanks to Mark and Julie who helped to 

facilitate the participation on my part this afternoon. 

I have a longer statement of about 20 pages, and that is a short 

for a political scientist, as you know, but with your permission, I 

would like to enter that into the record and use a few minutes to 

share some observations based on the topic at hand. 

Mr. ENGEL. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to add my sentiments of congratulations to the committee 

for holding a hearing on the region, a region that often gets under 

the radar screen attention because it is a relatively peaceful region 

compared to other parts of the world. I view this hearing as much 

as anything else a reality check, a reality check on Caribbean security, a reality security on United States engagement with the Caribbean. 

And as I think of reality checks, I am reminded of a statement 

made in 1936 by a British statesman, Anthony Eden, and he was 


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cautioning European colleagues about realities and what he said 

was this: There is nothing more dangerous than a foreign policy 

based on unreality. 

What he was advocating, Mr. Chairman, is the importance of 

conducting situational analysis, situational assessments when one 

wants to pursue new policy or to redesign, revamp policy. I think 

it is arguable what Mr. Eden said foreign policy extends beyond 

foreign policy. One can make that same argument about defense 

policy and health policy, and certainly about security policy. I am 

delighted to be able to add my voice in this reality check that this 

committee is doing. 

I thought maybe one contribution that I can make in helping the 

committee to undertake its reality check is to respond to three 

questions. The questions I have responded to extensively in the 

statement, but I will just tell you what the questions are and I will 

make a few observations on some of those questions. 

I think it is important that in any reality check we be reminded 

about why the United States should care about what happens in 

the Caribbean. We shouldn’t take for granted that we all appreciate and know what are the things, what are the interests, the 

intersection of interest between the United States and in the Caribbean. 

So that is the first question in my written statement that I spend 

some time addressing, national interest. 

I think it is important as well that in the reality check on the 

landscape we ask the question: What are the clear and present 

dangers facing the Caribbean in contemporary times? But going beyond that second question, vis-a`-vis the proposal by President 

Obama on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, I think it is important to ask the third question which is: What is the engagement 

backdrop against which this initiative comes? And what are some 

lessons learned from some recent engagements so as we go into 

this engagement we avoid those pitfalls. We don’t want to make 

the same mistakes again. 

So if you allow me, Mr. Chairman, I will make a few quick observations about what is the security landscape of the Caribbean, and 

what are some recommendations I might recommend and offer to 

you that as you contemplate implementing the initiative of this 

iteration, we keep in mind some lessons learned from particularly 

the third border initiative. 

I think it is fair to say if you take a look at the landscape of the 

Caribbean, you will find two sets of security concerns. You will find 

in one basket some traditional security concerns, and the traditional security concerns revolve primarily around border and territorial disputes. We still have within the Caribbean Basin about 30 

border and territorial disputes. The ones that are on the radar 

screen generally are the significant ones, so to speak, are the disputes between Venezuela and Guyana. Venezuela still has a claim 

for five-eighths of Guyana’s 213,000 square kilometers. 

There is a dispute still between Suriname and Guyana for 15,000 

square kilometers on the eastern side of Guyana. And you probably 

know most well of the recent developments in the GuatemalaBelize dispute. I make these observations to say as we focus on the 

landscape, while we are going to be talking significantly and have 

41

been talking more about the nontraditional threats, those traditional issues are still there. 

Guyana and Suriname resolved before the International Tribunal 

of the World Court recently the maritime dispute, but there is still 

a land dispute there. 

But if you were to make a comparative assessment of the relatively more significant present dangers of the traditional vis-a`-vis 

the nontraditional, I think both analysts and statesmen in the Caribbean and the United States would contend, and I think correctly 

so, that it is the nontraditional issues that are the clear and 

present dangers, and I spend some time talking about them. 

There is a dangerous Troika in that nontraditional basket, a 

Troika that includes drugs, a troika that includes crime, a Troika 

that includes arms smuggling and there is a certain synergy among 

and between them. They are not discrete silo elements in the nontraditional basket. Reality is that part of the difficulty of contending with each of those troikas has to do with the fact that each 

of those troikas is a multidimensional troika. 

We often think of the drugs issue as a trafficking issue primarily, 

but it is not. There are still significant people within the Caribbean 

society who are addicted for a variety of reasons. Money laundering 

is still an issue for the Caribbean. And, therefore, I am reminding 

us as we think of any of the three most significant clear and 

present dangers, keep in mind that each of them is multidimensional. The reality is multidimensionality is there. 

Much has been said about the connectivity among and between 

drugs and arms and crime. I spend some time in my written testimony explaining some of the contemporary realities, and we can 

come back and ask questions about that. But I want to shift in the 

time I have remaining, Mr. Chairman, to say a little bit about the 

security engagement backdrop against which this new initiative 

falls. In the paper testimony I offer three, but I want to confine my 

remarks to two recommendations of things you might take under 

advisement as we move into the realm of policy implementation. 

There is a wide range of existing, as you know, bilateral and 

multilateral initiatives. I think we have seen the success of Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos which has been around since 

1982. We have seen the relative success of Trade Winds, an annual 

exercise that goes beyond simply narcotics issues to a variety of 

other issues. And I think we also see the value of the Merida Initiative, and I was interested to hear that as the standing up of the 

CBSI comes into force, the Dominican Republic and Haiti will be 

moved away from the Merida Initiative into that. That is an interesting concept that I think we may want to talk about. 

So we have an existing landscape and a variety of engagement 

initiatives, many of which are wonderful ways of combating the 

interdependent issues facing the region. 

But as we move into this latest iteration with this new initiative, 

I think it behooves us to ask what are maybe one or two pitfalls 

of the third border initiative that this committee and the administration would be mindful to keep in mind as we move from design 

to implementation. This is what I want to offer as my two recommendations on the new initiative. 

42

My first recommendation is to avoid what I call a low investment, low results approach. The third border initiative had, I 

think, two ingredients for a recipe of limited success. One, it was 

a minuscule funding package. Two, it had some broad and extensive expectations and mandates. I think it has got to be a coincidence between what was intended as an outcome and what is invested on the front end. And I would hope not only would this committee be willing, as I have heard the chairman and others say 

they were willing to do, ask for a full restoration of the full funding 

of $45 million. But I think even at $45 million, we are being looking at low investments. Low investments that can only maybe 

sometimes allow us to practice the science of muddling through 

without seeing significant outcomes discerned over time. 

So my first recommendation is to avoid low investment approaches, whether by design or default. Go for the kinds of investments that can demonstrate outcomes of an appreciable kind. 

My second recommendation is try to avoid, to use an adage from 

parts of the Caribbean, robbing Peter to pay Paul. Taking money 

from Trade Winds to be able to fund the current investments in the 

Caribbean Basin Initiative. I am thinking not only would it be valuable to embrace the new initiative in its entirely, but be mindful 

of the fact that there are lessons from the third border initiative 

that should inform how we go about pursuing this initiative. 

Low investment is not the way I would recommend, and diminishing the current operations in OP VAT and Trade Winds would 

also not renown to the advantage of the Caribbean or the United 

States. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]

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Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Dr. Maingot. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY P. MAINGOT, PH.D., PROFESSOR 

EMERITUS OF SOCIOLOGY, NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARIN-RESIDENCE, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MAINGOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to be 

here. 

I must tell you, this is a very unique country. I testified four 

times before the House without even being a U.S. citizen. I think 

it is perhaps the only country in the world where that takes place. 

I am now a U.S. citizen. But my concern is less with the drugs 

coming into the United States as it is with the drugs remaining in 

the Caribbean because the old notion that it is an American problem which you heard from island to island, they will tell you in 

Haiti, has turned out to be a very costly myth. 

Every island now has a major problem of drug addiction which 

turns out to have two other impacts. Number one, it contributes to 

the Caribbean’s HIV/AIDS crisis which is second only to central Africa. And two, it contributes to crime. And crime is really wracking 

these islands. 

I submitted a paper, and just to show that sociologists are more 

verbose than political scientists, it is longer than Professor Griffith’s paper. I submit it for the record. 

I want to make several points. First, the allocation of what I thought was $45 million for this initiative turns out now to be $37 

million; it is a drop in the bucket. If anybody believes that $37 million, I don’t care how parsed in bureaucratic terms, is going to 

make any difference in a region the size of the Mediterranean with 

the kind of problems that we have is dreaming. That is number 

one. 

Number two, unless we solve two fundamental problems which 

directly relate to the Americans: Money laundering—which the 

banks on the border with Mexico and the banks in Miami have a 

great deal to do with—and the export of guns. Florida, the State 

where I live, has the laxest rules on gun sales. The coup d’etat 

which took place in Trinidad in 1990 was carried out with guns 

bought at a gun fair in Fort Lauderdale, 134 Israel rifles purchased 

with money taken in cash and taken to Trinidad. This flow of guns 

continues. 

Third, the issue of deportees. It is simply grossly unfair to deport 

these people to the islands which have completely overcrowded 

jails. I think if I would use any part of this money, it would be to 

build additional jails on the islands in which you could house some 

of these deportees. Fourth, and very important is the whole geopolitical initiative. We cannot have a major geopolitical initiative in 

this without including every country in the Caribbean, including 

Cuba. Just look at the map. Look at the border of Cuba. Look at 

the countries it borders, and you will realize what every country in 

the Caribbean realizes—since they all have excellent relations with 

Cuba—that Cuba has to be an integral part of this anti-crime initiative. 

Additionally, we cannot expect these islands to pick a fight with 

Mr. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. They are all, with the exceptions 

66

of Trinidad and Barbados, members of Petrocaribe. They are all 

beneficiaries of Operacion Milagro, which is the Cuban medical 

thing which is paid for by Venezuela. After all, we continue to buy 

oil from Venezuela. If we wanted to bring Chavez down, we would 

stop buying his oil. We are the only country that pays cash for the 

Venezuelan oil. Without our purchases, Chavez would have been 

finished a long time ago. How can we expect these small countries 

that are beneficiaries? So my recommendation is I understand fully 

the role of Venezuela. 

I am from Trinidad. I have been by both of these rivers; I know 

the smuggling has been going on forever. We cannot expect these 

countries to take a stand vis-a`-vis Mr. Chavez. We should keep our 

initiative on the Caribbean separate from our initiative in Colombia. It was a mismanaged public relations effort that the two were 

announced at the same time, the extension of the bases which are 

not American bases, they are Colombian bases. 

Finally, the Caribbean also is seeing the reentry of the European 

powers. We are seeing the Dutch reinforce their marines in Curacao. I just visited one of their destroyers that was visiting Miami. 

They are now housing and we are renting space in both the airports in Curacao and Aruba. The Brits are coming back in. The 

French are reinforcing their forces not just in Martinique and Guadeloupe but fundamentally in Guyana where they have moved now, 

the French Foreign Legion where President Sarkozy has had two 

meetings with President Lula da Silva of Brazil because Brazil has 

two fundamental fronts. One is the south Atlantic where its oil is 

and the other is the Amazon. We have to bring all of these elements into the play, both in terms of effectives and intelligence if 

anything is going to be made from a true effort in the Caribbean. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maingot follows:]

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Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Let me ask a question about the deportees, Dr. Maingot, since 

you mentioned them. One of my colleagues mentioned it before. 

Whenever I go to any of the Caribbean countries, the deportees is 

always a question that comes up. What should the United States, 

you mentioned the building of jails, some of the money would go 

to the building of jails in your testimony. But what is the actual 

impact of the increased deportations? What programs do the different nations have to deal with the reintegration of the deportees 

and should we be involved in them? Are there other countries that 

also send criminal deportees back in the Caribbean and what do 

they do with them? 

Mr. MAINGOT. Britain sends and Canada sends. But the French, 

I don’t think so because the French territories are departements 

d’outre-mer, Oversees Departments of France, so there is no question of deportation there. 

In terms of Canada, the U.K. and the United States. 

Now, as you go island to island, there is really controversy 

whether the deportees are a major part of the crime problem. 

I, frankly, doubt that they are a major part of the crime, but they 

are in the consciousness of the citizens of these islands. For instance, in the Dominican Republic, the so-called Dominicoyorks, 

the guys who are deported from your State, New York, they are 

feared. In Haiti, they are feared because they are part of the gangs 

that exist in Haiti, in the Bahamas and in Miami where the Haitian gangs are very well organized. So it varies from one zone to 

the other. 

Now in Trinidad, my island, there is a whole section a whole 

neighborhood of deportees but there is no evidence that they are 

a major part of the crime wave that we are experiencing. Our murder rate now is higher than Jamaica’s, if you can believe that. And 

Jamaica’s is 30 times that of Britain. So you know we have a serious problem. Now Trinidad of course is 9 miles off of Venezuela 


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and the planes and the boats are coming in all the time. They are 

bringing in weapons and bringing in drugs. So the question of the 

deportees, frankly, I don’t think there is any solid evidence that 

they are a major part of the problem. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Let me ask Dr. Griffith. What countries 

in the Caribbean face the greatest security threat from drug trafficking? And what measures and approaches are these measures 

taking to deal with the high levels of violence? And what should 

we do with all of that? How is the CBSI looked upon in the Caribbean by the leaders of the Caribbean? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. 

Maybe I can respond to the last question first. I think there is a 

view within the Caribbean, as best as I can tell, that this new initiative is welcome and it is welcome not only because it is coming 

at the time of resource deficiency and the part of continuing resource deficiency on the part of Caribbean countries. It is coming 

because any and all of the problems based in the Caribbean countries are not amenable to any individual country solution, even if 

they had the resources. Even if the United States had all the resources invests, the nature of the problems is transnational. They 

are not amenable to one country resolution. 

Having said that, I think there are degrees of difficulty on the 

part of countries in the Caribbean. The crime problem is a significant problem for Jamaica. It is a significant problem for Guyana. 

It is a significant problem for Trinidad and Tobago, but it is also 

important to recognize that not all the crime in any individual Caribbean countries or across the region are related to drugs. Some of 

the crime in many parts of the region as is true in other parts of 

the world have to do with poverty and people pushing the envelope 

for survival. Some of the crime has to do with social enemy. When 

people are hungry, they sometimes take it out on their spouses. 

When husbands can’t provide food for the families, they take out 

on the kids. So you are seeing some of the criminality that is really 

social enemy caught up in a larger wave of drugs-driven crime. And 

I think it is important to recognize that all the crime in the Caribbean, as is true in other parts of the world, is not crime related 

to drugs. But the availability of weapons complicates and facilitates 

that criminality. The inability of the government to provide training adequately, to provide equipment. There are many parts of the 

Caribbean when you call the police, they ask, can you come and get 

me. I was in Trinidad last week, 1,400 people short in the police 

force. This was announced by the commissioner of police who was 

acting. 

So you ask the question, what are the capability resources on the 

part of the societies in the region to deal with it? The fact that not 

only the good guys know that the police don’t have the resources, 

the bad guys know as well. So therefore they are emboldened. It 

is a question of degree across the region. It is not amenable to any 

one country resolution. 

Mr. ENGEL. So a lack of 1,400 police; it is due to lack of resources? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. As well, I think, it is not simply a lack of resources. It is a combination of resources and management. The 

irony of Trinidad and Tobago is that it is the wealthiest of the 

92

countries in the Caribbean but you have got some also management issues. You have got corruption issues. You have got a variety 

of issues complicating the ability of the law enforcement and different forces to really make a dent on the criminality in the individual country and in the subregion itself. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Mack. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I first want to, if I 

could, Dr. Maingot, I would like to respond to your statement about 

we should not be asking the members of the countries in the Caribbean to take on Hugo Chavez. I agree with you. That is something 

the United States should do. We should take a stand when it comes 

to Hugo Chavez. And I wanted to ask you a question. You had 

talked about the French and the Dutch, I think, and their involvement. If you could quickly kind of talk about what they are doing. 

And the second part of my question to both of you is what would 

be the consequences if the U.S. did nothing? 

I think both of you had indicated that you thought the resources 

that are putting forward are a drop in the bucket or you know indicate that it is not enough. What would you do to enhance it? Where 

would you go with it? What would the number be? What would the 

other resources be that you would think would be needed to carry 

out this initiative?

Mr. MAINGOT. Well, there is a very interesting phenomenon taking place in the Caribbean where issues of sovereignty, sensitivity, 

saving face—after all, these are tourist economies. The last thing 

in the world you ever want to hear about is a shark attack. We 

don’t have any sharks in the Caribbean. They are all friendly 

sharks supposedly or crime because it directly affects the tourist 

industry. Jamaica is facing this in a major way right now. One of 

the interesting things that is occurring is the invitation of, for instance, of retired members of the British Scotland Yard special 

branch. We see them now in island after island. 

In fact, one of the most successful anti-drug programs in Jamaica, the Kingfish program, which was to stop the fast boats coming in from San Andre ́s Providencia, which are the Colombian islands which are within reach of these fast boats, is led by an Englishman. And we see that now with the Dutch Marines in the 

Netherlands and in the Netherlands Antilles. I went to high school 

in Kurasawa, a Dutch high school. And the last thing in the world 

that Kurasalenos ever wanted to know was, Dutch coming in. Now 

they welcome them. 

And with the Brits, we see the way the Brits acted in the case 

of the British Virgin Islands where they closed down the government and they returned to crown colony. So what we are seeing in 

the Caribbean is a re-entry of the European imperial powers, if you 

want, invited by us. And I think we could get a lot of lessons in 

terms of how they interact with the islands from the Europeans. 

I think we have got to do that rather than going off like lonesome 

cowboys, thinking that the Caribbean is still our area of ‘‘can do,’’ 

which it always has been. But that is over. It is too complicated. 

Every island, as we saw in the case of Grenada—look, there is 

a case taking place in Dominica right now. They have an election 

coming up. Somebody mentioned the amount of Dominica’s gross 

domestic product. The amount of money being spent in Dominica 

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for these elections is nearly $9 million U.S. Where is this money 

coming from? And this is what we are seeing in island after island. 

The amount of money is ratcheting up—and you mustn’t think that 

corruption is only at the lowest levels. Corruption in the Caribbean 

is at the highest levels of society, the highest levels of the society. 

Mr. MACK. Dr. Maingot, if I could, because I only have 1 minute 

left. I would like, Dr. Griffith, if you could talk a little bit about 

what happens if we do nothing? And then on the other side of that 

question is, what do you think we need to do to enhance it and to 

make sure that we are successful? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. If nothing happens, several consequences will result. I will give you five or six of them. Consequence number one, 

an increase of crime that scares tourists away, affecting tourism 

which is the bread and butter for most countries in the Caribbean. 

And this is even for a country like Jamaica that has bauxite, even 

for a country like the Dominican Republic that has minerals, even 

for a country like Trinidad and Tobago that has oil, tourism is a 

critical variable. Crime would have an impact not only on tourism 

that will undermine economic stability. It will have a deleterious 

effect on foreign investment. 

Foreign investors do not want to go into an insecure opportunity 

environment because the amount of things it is going to increase 

the cost to do business. One of the phenomena we are seeing in the 

Caribbean—and it started with anglophone Caribbean in Trinidad—is a dramatic increase in private security partly because government forces, public citizens aren’t able to do their job, people 

are now turning to it. If the foreign investor has to come and invest 

in private security just to have a sense of peace of mind, it will add 

to the cost of doing business. It will also be a disincentive. 

So I think those are critical aspects of what are likely to happen. 

When you have an increased amount of crime, given the Internet 

that we have got, given the linkages between the United States 

and the Caribbean and the rest of the world, you are going to find 

increasing networks. Many people from the Caribbean are deported 

from the United States. What happens? They end up right back in 

the United States. There is a case where a guy was deported 13 

times. Why? There is a network of document falsifications. So there 

is, beyond the criminal act, other illegal entities, other illegal activities like document falsification which are going to complicate 

the ability of the society as to the way they do business. 

But I will tell you what else would happen if nothing else happens on the part of the United States of foreign investment. Other 

societies globally are going to try to fill the void. We saw it happening with China 5 or 6 years ago, and China is now in many 

parts of the Caribbean in significant ways. I was in Guyana last 

week, and I was surprised that there were two massive complexes. 

They said what are they doing here? The Chinese are going to be 

coming back more significantly. You are going to be finding it with 

the absence of an American inclusiveness the willingness of Hugo 

Chavez to be a little more bold and to push the envelope of engagement. 

That would be deleterious to American geopolitical interests, but 

I think you are also likely to find that it may be an opportunity 

for other countries, some of whom would like to get a piece of the 

94

Caribbean action. Russia is a significant investor and there is nothing wrong with foreign investment from Russian. In Guyana in the 

mining operation in the bauxite operation, the coal operation in 

Suriname, there are other players who are going to seize the opportunity where the United States will either stagnate its engagement 

or not to increase its engagement. 

Let me spend 1 minute, Mr. Chairman, in responding to the 

other part of the question. What should the investment be? I say 

start with $100 million. Start with $100 million with the recognition that none of these problems is amenable to a short-term fix. 

Give it a 6-year duration. Make that two phases but critically do 

something else. Reduce the administrative costs of managing these 

programs. The reality is, in very many occasions, so much of the 

money does not get to the region because of administrative 

overheads, the way in which things are managed. One of the things 

I argued in the statement is, please don’t create a new bureaucracy. Creating new bureaucracies are going to divest the sufficiency 

of funds for things to actually happen in the region. 

So limit administrative overhead. Keep few conferences. Use existing instruments rather than having another conference of signed 

documents. Focus on the deliverables getting to the region to make 

a difference but do not think that these things are amenable to 

short quick fixes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first, at the outset, acknowledge the presence, sitting in the audience, of Mr. Earl 

Simon who is a good friend and working hard at York College, and 

clearly, Dr. Griffith, we are proud of you. Your college sits in the 

heart of the Sixth Congressional District of New York. We like to 

say it is the brain of the district, and I think Dr. Griffith is exhibiting that today. We are proud of you and your work at York College. 

So I just want to make sure that is clearly on the record. I also 

want to thank both of you for your testimony. I think that it has 

been quite excellent and enlightening, and I look forward to working more closely with you, with my friends, the diplomats from the 

Caribbean as we move forward. I know that the number one economy maker in the Caribbean is tourism. 

But second to tourism, tell me, where is the violence? Because I 

think that both of have you indicated to me, unless we have some 

real economic development, unless people are able to have some 

money in their pockets to provide for their families, there is no way 

you are really going to reduce crime. 

So we have got to create jobs. The other way that we have to justify, to be quite honest with you, some of the expenditures that we 

give in aid, et cetera, to some of the American citizens, we have got 

to show that there is some kind of relationship to the United States 

and the effect of it. What other industries would you say are being 

affected by drugs and/or crime in the Caribbean that we should 

have a focus on so that we can try to make sure that we have some 

development in creating opportunities? I was wondering if there 

have been any studies to quantify the economic impact and insecurity in other areas. I know tourism is number one, but other than 

tourism also. 

95

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Congressman, for kind sentiments and 

endorsement for the work we are doing at York, which is a value 

not only to Queens, but to the entire New York City. There is a 

reality in many parts of the Caribbean where agriculture is a significant player and it is a significant player in the eastern Caribbean. It is a significant player in Jamaica. Agriculture is a significant player in Guyana. Part of that reality is a reality where in recent times but not only in recent times, the global impact is making it difficult for agricultural businessmen to make profits. One of 

the interesting outcomes of that is—and I know for a fact in Guyana—is that people have been shifting from agriculture to drugs. 

Why plant rice or bananas where you have got investments to 

make in having those products come to market when there is a low 

investment in marijuana? The point is then that the production of 

illegal substances—and again, production is a reality of the narcotics phenomenon. It is not simply trafficking, money laundering 

use. There is legal production in many parts of the Caribbean. To 

the extent that one produces more marijuana and less rice or less 

bananas, you are affecting the capability of the society as a whole 

but you are affecting the earning power of decent citizens to do 

their job in credible ways. 

I wrote a book in 1997 called Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege. I will be happy to send you a copy. 

And I spent part of that study making an estimate of some of the 

economic and social policy consequences of crime and drugs, consequences that have to do with a more significant need for investment. Jamaica had a reality, I think, in the year 1994, that it 

spent more money on national security and crime than it spent on 

education. What crime and drugs do is they skew the allocation of 

resources to social products. You have got to invest more in fighting crime. You have less to invest in education in potable water in 

housing. 

So the reality of drugs has a multidimensional impact on society 

not only in focusing, shifting away from one area of the economy, 

maybe agriculture to something that is legal because it is more 

profitable. But it also impacts the availability of resources on the 

part of the government to be able to do things that are really in 

the interest of the people whether those things are education, 

whether those things are health or other things. I would be happy 

to send you a copy of that. 

Mr. MACK. Let me just ask Mr. Maingot one question. That is 

simply, what do you see as the biggest challenges that we face in 

implementing CBSI, other than, I know, dollars? I heard that. But 

what is the biggest challenge you think in actually having an implementation that would be effective? 

Mr. MAINGOT. The biggest challenge is that the forces of law and 

order in much of the Caribbean have lost all legitimacy. People do 

not believe in the police anymore. My paper is full of evidence from 

Trinidad. The exception is Barbados. But Barbados is the model for 

the rest of the Caribbean if we could only look at ourselves instead 

of going off to Singapore all the time to find a model. Barbados is 

the developed country of the third world, and they have no major 

natural resources. It is all based on education. And that is where 

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cause we are a high wage region and we cannot compete with Mexico, much less with China. 

We have to go with services but services require technical education. The biggest challenge we are going to face is the fact that 

the forces of law and order, you go to Jamaica and you sense it. 

It is called the tight lips culture. Nobody wants to testify against 

anybody. Nobody in Trinidad wants to testify against anybody. The 

police is completely distrusted, and that is the biggest challenge we 

have, that the local forces—because we can’t go there and do it. We 

can’t put boots on the ground. That, to me, is the biggest. And if 

we had more time, we would look at Jamaica as a case which really 

exemplifies what many of us could become where the drug dons 

rule, and that is why some of them cannot be extradited because 

if they are ever extradited, the people would come into the street 

and they would stop. They would stop that government. 

There are big extradition cases going on right now, which is the 

talk in Jamaica, why is it that they are not extradited? They cannot because what has happened is the patronage that the politicians used to give out of their pockets or out of their collections 

have now been jacked up by the patrons given by the drug people. 

There is no competition, which makes the political system more or 

less captive of the drug money. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to agree 

with an observation by Dr. Griffith, and then I want to ask Mr. 

Maingot some questions. I can’t agree more that we have to deal 

with what the realities are. I would submit that realities have to 

be fact-based to begin with and to rely on assumptions or opinions 

or platitudes gets us in trouble. I can’t agree more. That is why we 

have to really examine the facts. Let’s start with facts. 

Dr. Maingot, you made a statement about who has a higher rate 

of homicide than Jamaica? 

Mr. MAINGOT. Trinidad and Tobago. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Trinidad and Tobago. 

Mr. MAINGOT. And we have one-fifth the population of Jamaica. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. In Trinidad? 

Mr. MAINGOT. Yeah, 1.2 million. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And you indicated the most significant problem 

facing these countries is confidence in law enforcement because of 

the level of drugs. 

Mr. MAINGOT. Absolutely. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. We heard a lot about Hugo Chavez today. Is he 

responsible for that lack of confidence in the police in Trinidad and 

Tobago? 

Mr. MAINGOT. Well, there is no doubt that Venezuela is the big 

exporter of drugs. Oh, massive. Air and boat. Of course, 90 percent 

of the drugs—Venezuela doesn’t produce or manufacture drugs. 

Ninety percent come from Colombia. My opinion, and I put it in the 

paper—is that Mr. Chavez has lost control over his forces of law 

and order. The level of corruption in the Venezuelan Guardia 

Nacional especially is total. He also has some people pretty close 

to him that are benefiting from the trade. Whether Mr. Chavez has 

a design to undermine these countries, I doubt that very much. I 

have very serious doubts about that thesis. 

97

Mr. DELAHUNT. All right. Let me get back to my original line of 

questioning, and you referenced the two about does it make sense 

to look at the Caribbean area in terms of security, specifically in 

terms of dealing with the interdiction of drugs without implicating 

Cuba into the equation? 

Mr. MAINGOT. It makes no sense at all. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is dumb, is that basically what you are saying? 

Mr. MAINGOT. Exactly. By the way, Cuba has an incipient drug 

problem. My last trip there, I was astonished to hear drug talk. 

[Speaking Spanish.] Let’s go and take a snort of a line. That is 

drug talk that you hear in Miami, well, other places. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You hear it in Miami, but you don’t hear it——

Mr. MAINGOT. You hear it in Cuba now. The drugs are penetrating Cuba. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, no authoritarian state countenances drug 

use because it erodes the state. This is obviously, you know, describing Cuba as a democracy where there is freedom of travel, 

freedom of information, et cetera, that falls outside. How would you 

recommend—would you recommend to the United States Government that on the issue of drugs that it makes common sense to 

work with the Cuban Government? Where we have had a very 

positive experience—and maybe you can answer that, and then 

maybe you, Dr. Griffith. 

Mr. MAINGOT. Congressman, I regard American policy toward 

Cuba as one of the most shortsighted policies. It is based on vindictiveness and punishment, not on serious geopolitical measures because the fact of the matter is, I am not advocating diplomatic relations. Cuba has over 300 political prisoners of——

Mr. DELAHUNT. What you are suggesting is that it is in our best 

interest to work on these particular interests. It is about our security? 

Mr. MAINGOT. Lift the embargo. Our policy toward Cuba poisons 

our relations with the rest of Latin America. The silver bullet 

would be to remove that policy and we would be much better off. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me ask you this, do you think, given your experience—and Dr. Griffith, I would appreciate your response as 

well—do you think engagement on Cuba on these discrete, specific 

issues would be welcomed by the Caribbean community? 

Mr. MAINGOT. Absolutely. That is my opinion. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Griffith? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. One of the regional forums in the Caribbean that 

is part of the counter crime, counternarcotics is enterprise is something called the Association of Caribbean Commissions of Police, 

and I regularly attended the meetings. And I remember when we 

met in the Cayman Islands in the 1990s. There was a concerted effort to reach out to Cuba because there was a coincidence of interest between the Caribbean and Cuba. The stumbling block was the 

United States that said, were you to reach out to Cuba, your funding on X, Y, and Z would be pulled. Cuba recognizes the drug problem is a transnational problem. Cuba recognizes that it has not 

only the addiction consequences but criminality consequences. 

Cuba is in the business of trying to survive dealing with this reality. I think it would make sense that absent diplomatic relations 

98

being fully restored that there be selective and graduated collaboration. 

It has been going on for more than a decade. I remember 1997, 

there was a ship called The Limerick. It left Colombia with drugs 

into Cuba. Cuba actually confiscated and turned the drugs over to 

the United States. Now the folks in Miami where I was living at 

the time were not very happy. The Cubans even sent people to 

Miami to testify. They are willing to engage. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But we had to be quiet about that. We had to 

do it in whispers. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Very much. All sorts of things had to be not said. 

I think it is the persistence of a foolhardy approach not to embrace 

the players, and Cuba has been willing. If you look at the allocation of funding from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

that has helped Caribbean countries and other countries over the 

years, Cuba is one of the biggest beneficiaries because they recognize they have a got a multitude of problems. They are domestic 

political realities to be contended with but I think notwithstanding 

those realities, it is in the Caribbean’s national interest, it is the 

United States’ national interest, it is in Cuba’s national interest to 

have a coincidence of those interests that allows for a selective but 

graduated engagement on the business of drugs. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. And maybe we can accomplish that 

if we do it in whispers. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I don’t know if that should be the last 

word, but it will be. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. You are the chairman. You have the last word. 

Mr. ENGEL. I want to thank our witnesses for the very excellent 

testimony. This is one of those hearings where you listen and you 

learn a lot, and it seems very easy to me that we need money to 

solve a problem. You can’t just throw good money after bad. But 

if we are careful in how we spend it and what we use it for, it is 

clear to me that we can do some really good things with our neighbors in the Caribbean. I heard President Obama at the Summit of 

the Americas in Trinidad, and he was a rock star there. I told him 

when I saw him after that, ‘‘You were a rock star,’’ because everyone hung on his every word. 

And the words were very good. Now we have to make sure that 

the words are not just words and that we all, working together, 

make those words a reality because it has always occurred to me 

that while we do have pressing problems all around the world, the 

problems that we have at home are really the problems that we 

should take care of first. 

When I talk about home, I mean, the Western Hemisphere and 

particularly since we have such a close relationship with our Caribbean friends, it is really very, very important to put our heads together and work again with them—not tell them but work with 

them in finding out what the best way to combat these problems. 

Because they are not just problems that affect the nations of the 

Caribbean. They affect the United States as well. 

I always give this speech when I talk about Mexico but what is 

said about Mexico is the same thing for the Caribbean as well. 

When I sat with the Prime Minister of Jamaica and he gave me 

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mitting crimes come from the United States, well, you know that 

is not just a Jamaican problem. It is a problem for the United 

States as well. So I thank our witnesses. Again, I thank all the distinguished ambassadors who came and stayed. Very impressive. I 

have to report back to your governments and say that they have 

appointed some good people in Washington. We are happy to have 

you. 

And as always, you know that I always have an open door policy. 

I am happy to speak with any or all of my friends from the Caribbean any time you want to talk about it because it is a subject that 

is very, very important to me. So again, I thank you. I thank Mr. 

Mack, Mr. Meeks and Mr. Delahunt. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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