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*********************************************** 
DAVID ERIC EDER’S APPEAL FROM PROBATE*

(AC 39024)

Lavine, Alvord and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

D, the biological son of the settlor, J, appealed to the trial court from the

order and decree of the Probate Court concluding that the remainder

beneficiaries of J’s irrevocable trust included not only D, but also J’s

adopted adult children, S and M. J had created the trust in 1991, and it

terminated in 2011. The trust provided for distribution of the trust property upon its termination ‘‘to each child of the settlor then living.’’ J had

one biological child, D, born in 1963, and adopted S and M in 2010. J

had established a relationship with S and M as early as 1972 when he

first met their mother, R, and began to live with R, S, and M in 1975,

when S was six years old and M was four years old. Following J’s

separation from R in 1985, J continued his relationship with S and M,

and provided them with financial and emotional support. J and D had

a falling-out in 2009. In 2011, the trustees of the trust filed an application

in the Probate Court seeking a determination of the trust’s beneficiaries.

The Probate Court decreed that D, S, and M were all remainder beneficiaries of the trust. Thereafter, D appealed to the trial court, claiming that

by adopting S and M, J improperly added two remainder beneficiaries

to the trust to reduce the size of his share of the trust’s corpus. Following

a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Probate Court had properly

construed the trust and it rendered judgment dismissing the appeal,

from which D appealed to this court. Held:

1. D could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly concluded

that the intent of J in adopting two adults was not relevant to determining

whether the adoptions were a sham: that court, which found that, pursuant to the trust, D’s share could be reduced permissibly only if J had

another biological child or had adopted a child under circumstances in

which the adoption could be viewed as a natural expression of a desire

to recognize a preexisting familial bond between the settlor and the

adopted children, concluded that the adult adoptions in the present case

were not a sham or subterfuge just to hurt D, but were consistent with

J’s affectionate and long-term relationship with S and M, who at the

time of the adoptions could be considered natural objects of the settlor’s

bounty, and that the adoptions were a recognition of the desire of J, S

and M to continue that bond, independent of a desire to harm D; furthermore, J, as the settlor, adopted the two adults and brought them into

the class of remainder beneficiaries of the trust, which defined the

beneficiaries as J’s then living children, either biological or adopted,

adopted children are permitted under state law to take under a trust

unless it explicitly excludes them, the trust here unambiguously included

S and M, and their adoptions did not alter the intent of the trust or do

violence to public policy concerning adoption.

2. The trial court properly concluded that because S and M were the natural

objects of J’s bounty, their adoptions by J did not contravene the purpose

or intent of the trust, which had to be determined from the language

of the trust, not external factors; the trust provided that a remainder

beneficiary was, at the time the trust terminated, a child of the settlor

then living, biological or adopted, our statutes permit adult adoptions

and adoptees to take under a testamentary instrument, unless they are

expressly excluded, which did not occur here, and the trust contemplated that J could have more children after its creation.

Argued May 30—officially released October 10, 2017

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the Probate Court for

the district of New Haven determining the beneficiaries

of a certain trust, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of New Haven and tried to the court,
Hon. Thomas J. Corradino, judge trial referee; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

David R. Schaefer, with whom, was Michael T. Cretella, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Glenn W. Dowd, with whom, were Seth Morgan

Kaplowitz and Casey R. Healey, and, on the brief, Howard Fetner, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. David Eric Eder (David Eder), the biological son of the settlor, John Dennis Eder (settlor),

appealed to the Superior Court from a decree of the

Probate Court concluding that the remainder beneficiaries of the John Dennis Eder Annuity Trust (trust)

include not only the settlor’s biological child, but also

his adult adopted children.1 Following a hearing, the

Superior Court concluded that the Probate Court properly had construed the trust and dismissed the appeal.

David Eder appealed to this court, claiming that, as a

matter of law, the Superior Court erred by holding (1)

that the settlor’s intent in establishing the trust was not

relevant to determining whether the subject adoptions

were a sham and (2) that the adoptions did not contravene the purpose and intent of the trust because the

adoptees were the natural objects of the settlor’s

bounty. We affirm the judgment of the court.

The root cause of the present appeal appears to be

a falling-out between a father and his biological son.

The Court of Probate for the district of New Haven

succinctly set forth the crux of the appeal in its decree

issued on February 12, 2014. ‘‘[The settlor created the

trust] on October 21, 1991. The trust has terminated

as of October 21, 2011. An irrevocable trust, the trust

provides for distribution of trust property upon termination to ‘each child of the [settlor] then living.’ Though

the settlor has only one biological child, [David Eder],

the settlor recently adopted, on June 30, 2010, in the

[commonwealth] of Massachusetts, two adults, Sacha

[Richter] and Mischa Richter [Richter brothers]. On

November 3, 2011, the trustees brought an application

for the determination of the trust’s beneficiaries. At

issue is whether the settlor’s adopted children fall

within the trust’s class of beneficiaries and may thus

benefit from the distribution of trust assets as remainder beneficiaries, or are disqualified outside of such

trust by fraud or other cause.’’ (Emphasis added.) The

Probate Court determined that the remainder beneficiaries of the trust include both the settlor’s biological

son and his adopted children. The Probate Court

ordered the trustees to distribute the trust in equal

shares to David Eder, Sacha Richter, and Mischa

Richter.2

After the Probate Court issued its decree, on March

11, 2014, David Eder appealed to the Superior Court.

As reasons for the appeal, he alleged that he was

aggrieved by the Probate Court’s decree because ‘‘neither adoptee is a ‘Child’ of John Eder within the meaning

of that term contained in the [trust]; and even if the

term ‘Child’ in the [trust] could be interpreted to include

adopted children, the adoption of the Richter brothers

was a fraud/sham entered into for the sole purpose of

changing the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust.’’
The court found the following facts, which are not

challenged by David Eder. David Eder was born to the

settlor and Pearl-Ellen Bench (mother) in 1963, when

the settlor was eighteen years old. The settlor and

mother divorced soon thereafter. Throughout his childhood, David Eder lived in Connecticut with his mother

and her second husband, H. William Shure. Shure had

a parent-like relationship with David Eder, and they

remain close today. The settlor had little involvement

with David Eder and moved to Provincetown, Massachusetts, in 1970.

The settlor met Jill Richter in 1972 and began to live

with her and her sons, the Richter brothers, in 1975.

At the time, Sacha Richter was six years old and Mischa

Richter was four years old. For the next ten years,

the settlor, Jill Richter, and the Richter brothers lived

together in Provincetown. The settlor and Jill Richter

separated in approximately 1985, but the settlor has

continued his relationship, including financial and emotional support, with the Richter brothers to the present day.

In 1991, for tax planning purposes, Arthur Eder, the

settlor’s father, directed his attorney to draft a trust

instrument for the settlor.3 Pursuant to the settlor’s

trust, the settlor was to receive $114,000 per year for

twenty years at which time the trust ended; the corpus

of the trust was to be distributed in equal shares to

‘‘each child of the [settlor] then living.’’ The settlor executed the trust on October 21, 1991.

David Eder and the settlor had an amicable relationship until approximately 2009. For reasons that are not

directly relevant to this appeal, the settlor had a fallingout with David Eder and sought to disinherit him. He

consulted Michael D’Addio, an attorney trustee, to undo

the monetary gifts that he had made to David Eder.

Michael D’Addio informed the settlor that, for tax purposes, the trust was irrevocable and that the settlor did

not have the authority to revoke the trust or change

the beneficiary.

The court found that, in 2010, the settlor wished to

legalize his parental relationships with the Richter

brothers and talked to them individually about his plan.

The Richter brothers, who were adults, agreed to be

adopted by the settlor, and the Probate and Family

Court for the County of Barnstable, Massachusetts,

approved the adoptions on June 30, 2010. The settlor

admitted that the reason he adopted the Richter brothers at the time was ‘‘to include them in the [trust] before

the date expired.’’ The trust terminated on October

21, 2011.

David Eder claims that by adopting the Richter brothers, the settlor improperly added two remainder beneficiaries to the trust to reduce the size of his share of

the trust’s corpus. On November 3, 2011, the trustees,
Michael D’Addio and Gail D’Addio, filed an application

in the Probate Court seeking a determination of the

trust’s beneficiaries. After the Probate Court decreed

that David Eder as well as the Richter brothers were

the remainder beneficiaries of the trust, David Eder

appealed to the Superior Court.

The standard of review applicable to probate appeals

is well known. ‘‘In a probate appeal . . . the Superior

Court’s jurisdiction is statutory and limited to the order

appealed from. The issues presented for review are

those defined in the reasons of appeal. The Superior

Court cannot consider or adjudicate issues beyond the

scope of those proper for determination by the order

or decree attacked. This is so even with the consent of

the parties to the appeal because the court has subject

matter jurisdiction limited only to the order or decree

appealed from.’’ Silverstein’s Appeal from Probate, 13

Conn. App. 45, 58, 534 A.2d 1223 (1987). ‘‘[The Superior

Court] tries the questions presented to it de novo, but

in so doing it is . . . exercising a special and limited

jurisdiction conferred on it by the statute authorizing

appeals from probate.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 53–54.

The probate appeal was tried on July 27 and 28, 2015.

On March 2, 2016, the court issued a lengthy and comprehensive memorandum of decision dismissing the

appeal, holding that the Richter brothers, as adoptees,

are children of the settlor within the meaning of the

trust and that the adoptions were not a sham as the

adoptees were the natural objects of the settlor’s

bounty. David Eder appealed.

In this court, David Eder claims that, as a matter of

law, the Superior Court erred in holding (1) that the

settlor’s intent in adopting two adults was not relevant

to a determination of whether the adoptions were a

sham and (2) that the purpose of the trust was not

contravened by the settlor’s adopting the Richter brothers because they were the natural objects of his bounty.

We disagree.

I

THE TRUST

In adjudicating the probate appeal, the court first

construed the trust. ‘‘Where the language of the [trust

instrument] is clear and unambiguous, the [instrument]

is to be given effect according to its terms. A court

will not torture words to import ambiguity where the

ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . .

[T]he issue of intent as it relates to the interpretation

of a trust instrument . . . is to be determined by examination of the language of the trust instrument itself and

not by extrinsic evidence of actual intent. . . . The

construction of a trust instrument presents a question

of law to be determined in the light of facts that are

found by the trial court or are undisputed or indisput-
able.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Heath v. Heath, 150 Conn. App. 199, 203–204, 90

A.3d 362, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 921, 94 A.3d 1200

(2014); see also Heffernan v. Freedman, 177 Conn. 476,

481, 418 A.2d 895 (1979). An appellate court’s review

of conclusions of law is plenary. State v. Velasco, 248

Conn. 183, 189, 728 A.2d 493 (1999).

The court found that, at the urging of his father, the

settlor established an annuity trust in 1991, which was

to terminate in twenty years. The trust was to provide

the settlor with $114,000 per year and after twenty years,

the trust was to terminate and the trust assets were to

be distributed ‘‘into separate, equal shares, so as to

provide one share for each child of the Grantor then

living . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The court identified

the relevant provisions of the trust.

Subsection one of Article XIII of the trust is entitled

‘‘Definitions’’ and provides: ‘‘Lineal Descendants: The

term ‘lineal descendants’ used anywhere in this Trust

Indenture shall mean child, grandchild, great-grandchild, etc., whether so related by blood or legal adoption, including any of the aforesaid born or adopted

after the signing of this Trust Indenture. The grantor’s

only living child is David Eric Eder.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Subsection six of Article I contemplates that the grantor

may have other children at the time the trust terminated

in twenty years.4 Specifically, subsection six provides

in relevant part: ‘‘[u]pon the Termination Date, the

Trustees shall divide the Trust Property, as it shall then

exist, into separate, equal shares, so as to provide one

share for each child of the Grantor then living . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.)

Article XII of the trust instrument provides ‘‘[t]his

trust is irrevocable and the Grantor shall have no right

whatsoever to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the

trust created hereunder, in whole or in part.’’ Article

X, ‘‘Governing Law,’’ states that ‘‘Trust Indenture has

been accepted by the Trustees and its validity, construction, and all rights thereunder shall be governed by the

laws of the State of Connecticut.’’

The court consulted our General Statutes as they

pertain to adoption. Our statutory law permits the adoption of adults and provides that the adopted person shall

be the legal child of the adoptive parent. See General

Statutes § 45a-734.5 General Statutes § 45a-707 provides

in relevant part: ‘‘(1) ‘Adoption’ means the establishment by court order of the legal relationship of parent

and child . . . (5) ‘Parent’ means a biological or adoptive parent . . . .’’

The court concluded that pursuant to the trust and

the statutory laws of this state, the Richter brothers

are the settlor’s children pursuant to the Massachusetts

adoption decree.6 David Eder does not challenge the

validity of the adoptions or that the Richter brothers
are the settlor’s children. Rather, his claim is that the

settlor’s adoption of the Richter brothers was a sham

that altered the terms and purpose of the trust.7 We

disagree.

II

THE ADOPTIONS

The court recognized that under § 45a-731 (4), an

adopted child, unless expressly excluded by the trust,

shall be treated as a biological child of the adopting

parent, that § 45a-734 allows for the adoption of adults,

and that full faith and credit must be afforded to the

Massachusetts adoption. The court found that the trust

did not expressly exclude adopted children. It also

found that the trust identified David Eder as the settlor’s

only living child at the time the trust was established,

and that the trust contemplated that the settlor could

have other children living when the trust terminated

in 2011.8 David Eder claimed that the settlor had an

improper motive in adopting the Richter brothers that

required the court to determine whether the settlor’s

adoption of the Richter brothers was a sham and act

of subterfuge that violated the settlor’s original intent

in establishing the trust. The court found no Connecticut case on point and looked to the common law of

other jurisdictions, as suggested by the parties, for

guidance.

It has been stated that a sham or subterfuge adoption

occurs ‘‘when an adult is adopted for the sole purpose

of making him or her an heir and claimant to the estate

of an ancestor under the terms of a testamentary instrument known and in existence at the time of the adoption

. . . thwarts the intent of the ancestor whose property

is being distributed and cheats the rightful heirs.’’

Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419

S.W.2d 340, 343 (Ky. 1967).

The first sentence of Article XII of the trust provides

‘‘[t]his Trust Indenture is irrevocable and the grantor

shall have no right whatsoever to alter, amend, revoke,

or terminate the trust created hereunder, in whole or

in part.’’ The court determined that the settlor could

not ‘‘change the operation of the trust by a sham adoption done solely for the purpose of creating beneficiaries [that] has the effect of reducing the benefits that

would have otherwise accrued to a beneficiary absent

the adoption.’’

Generally, courts that disfavor adult adoptees from

taking under a testamentary instrument consider the

adoption an act of subterfuge. ‘‘It is of paramount importance that man be permitted to pass on his property at

his death to those who represent the natural objects of

his bounty. This is an ancient and precious right running

from the dawn of civilization in an unbroken line down

to the present day. Our adoption statutes are humanitarian in nature and of great importance to the welfare of
the public. However, these statutes should not be given

a construction that does violence to the above rule and

to the extent that they violate the rule and prevent one

from passing on his property in accord with his wishes,

they must give way. Adoption of an adult for the purpose

of bringing that person under the provisions of a preexisting testamentary instrument when he clearly was not

intended to be so covered should not be permitted

. . . .’’ Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,

supra, 419 S.W.2d 343–44. In a number of cases, an

adoption has been considered an act of subterfuge that

defies the will of the grantor when a beneficiary of a

trust or will adopted an adult, such as a spouse; see

Matter of Trust Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 460

(Colo. App. 1991); a same sex partner; see Cross v.

Cross, 177 Ill. App. 3d 588, 590–91, 126 Ill. Dec. 801,

532 N.E.2d 486 (1988), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 558,

541 N.E.2d 1105 (1989); or the adult children of a much

younger first spouse whom the beneficiary married late

in life; see Dixon v. Weitekamp-Diller, 365 Ill. Dec. 732,

737–38, 979 N.Ed.2d 98 (Ill. App. 2012), appeal denied,

367 Ill. Dec. 618, 982 N.E.2d 768 (2013); that had the

effect of enlarging the beneficiary class of lineal

descendants.

The court cited and analyzed numerous cases from

other jurisdictions involving trust or will contests

involving the adoption of adults. ‘‘Adult adoptions in

estates and trusts cases have been rife with controversy.

This controversy has led to three lines of cases among

the jurisdictions in deciding the effect of an adult adoption on the construction of a testamentary instrument.

The oldest line presumes all adult adoptees to be

included in class gifts to children. A second line presumes all adult adoptees to be excluded from class gifts

to children. A third line takes the middle ground by

allowing exceptions to presumptive inclusion or exclusion depending on particular circumstances.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Davis v. Neilson, 871 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo.

App. W.D. 1993).

In resolving the appeal, the court adopted what it

called the commonsense test articulated in Davis.

‘‘[C]ommon sense tells us that a donor would normally

expect anyone partaking of his bounty to be a true

family member and not just some willing adult adopted

for the purpose of reducing or defeating a gift-over to

others. . . . Common sense tells us that [the testator],

by inserting adopted children in the class described as

[the settlor’s] issue, intended to include only individuals

with some familial bond to her family—individuals to

whom [the settlor] felt a familial bond of love and duty,

such as adult stepchildren.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Courts generally recognize the public policy and

humanitarian nature of adoption but also recognize that

those humane purposes can be thwarted by an adoption
of an adult for the mere purposes of bringing the

adoptee within the class of beneficiaries. It has been

stated that Kentucky’s ‘‘adoption statutes are humanitarian in nature and of great importance to the welfare

of the public. However, these statutes should not be

given a construction that does violence to [the rule that

prevents one from passing his or her property in accord

with her or his wishes].’’ Minary v. Citzens Fidelity

Bank & Trust Co., supra, 419 S.W.2d 344.

In the present case, the court reasoned that the purpose of adoption laws would not be thwarted by barring

a wife who had been adopted by her husband from

taking under a trust thus depriving a clearly indicated

alternate beneficiary from receiving trust proceeds. A

settlor’s intent, however, would not be thwarted if an

adoptee who was a natural object of the adopter’s

affections in a parental relationship over the years was

a trust beneficiary despite the fact that the adoption

took place after the parental relationship commenced

and when the adoptee was an adult. See, e.g., In re

Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 311

Minn. 403, 250 N.W.2d 163, 164 (1977) (foster children

adopted as adults).

On appeal to the Superior Court, David Eder contended that the settlor’s adoption of the Richter brothers was a sham to amend the trust thereby reducing

his share of the corpus when the trust terminated. The

court concluded that, pursuant to the trust, David Eder’s

share could be reduced permissibly only if the settlor

had another biological child or had adopted a child

under circumstances in which the adoption could be

viewed as (1) a natural expression of a desire to recognize a preexisting familial bond between the settlor and

the Richter brothers, who at the time of the adoptions

were adults and could be considered natural objects of

the settlor’s bounty and (2) a recognition of the settlor’s

and the Richter brothers’ desire to continue the bond.

The court then turned to the facts of the case before

it and made the following findings regarding the settlor’s

relationships with David Eder and with the Richter

brothers.

After David Eder was born, the settlor had little

involvement with him. David Eder never lived with the

settlor in Massachusetts, only visited him for short periods of time, and periodically saw him at the home of

the settlor’s parents in Connecticut. David Eder lived

with his mother and William Shure with whom he has

a father-son relationship that continues to the present

time. David Eder has a close relationship with his half

brother Andrew Shure.

The settlor clearly has a family-like relationship with

the Richter brothers. When he lived with Jill Richter,

he was a father figure to them and made substantial

contributions to their financial support. He did homework with them, taught them how to ride a bicycle, and
engaged in other age appropriate parent-child activities.

The settlor took the Richter brothers to and from school

and attended parent-teacher conferences. They ‘‘would

draw together’’ and create objects out of different material, which were activities not foreign to their future

careers; Sacha Richter is an artist and Mischa Richter

is a photographer. On several occasions, the settlor took

the Richter brothers to Connecticut to visit his parents.

Jill Richter returned to England in 1985. The settlor

visited Mischa Richter there six or eight times, traveled

with him in Morocco for several weeks, and participated

in his wedding in England. Mischa Richter’s children

call the settlor ‘‘grandpa.’’ Sacha Richter lives in Provincetown, and sees the settlor frequently or speaks to

him by phone. The settlor also participated in Sacha

Richter’s wedding.

Other indicia of the settlor’s relationship with the

Richter brothers that were put into evidence include

cards and letters the Richter brothers had sent to him

when they were young men before the legal dispute

with David Eder began. The court reasoned that there

was no reason for the settlor to save the cards and

letters if there were no close relationship between him

and the Richter brothers. After the Richter brothers left

the settlor’s home in 1985, he provided financial support

for books, rent, and parking tickets when they were in

college. The settlor put into evidence a record of the

checks he wrote to the Richter brothers. Between 1991

and 2001, Mischa Richter received two checks; one in

the amount of $20,000 was to help with the purchase

of property in London. Between 1995 and 2005, the

settlor wrote sixteen checks to Sacha Richter totaling

$40,134 for a variety of purposes; one check was for

$20,000 to help purchase a home in Provincetown. In

addition to writing checks for the Richter brothers, the

settlor gave them cash. The court found that the settlor

made the monetary gifts before 2009 when the settlor

had a falling out with David Eder and are indicia of

a familial bond between the settlor and the Richter

brothers. The court concluded that the Richter brothers

were the natural objects of the settlor’s natural bounty.

The court found that the settlor’s financial gifts to

the Richter brothers continued after he adopted them.

The court concluded that such gifts were further evidence of the continuing close relationship between the

settlor and the Richter brothers.9 The court concluded

that the settlor gave the funds to the Richter brothers

because they were in need of them, which underscored

the court’s finding that they were the natural objects

of his bounty and confirmed the familial relationship

that had existed for years and was independent of a

desire to harm David Eder.10 The court found that the

settlor’s problems with David Eder may have been a

catalyst for him to consider adopting them given his

long relationship with the Richter brothers and David
Eder’s wealth.11 The court reasoned that common sense,

as described in Davis v. Neilson, supra, 871 S.W.2d 38,

seemed to dictate the adoptions were not a sham or

subterfuge just to hurt David Eder, but were consistent

with the settlor’s affectionate and long-term relationship with the Richter brothers.12

III

CLAIMS ON APPEAL

David Eder claims that the court erred, as a matter

of law, by holding that the intent of the settlor in adopting two adults was not relevant to determining whether

the adoptions were a sham. We disagree.

David Eder’s claims on appeal are grounded in the

principle of the law stated by the Illinois Court of

Appeals. ‘‘The adoption of an adult solely for the purpose of making him an heir of an ancestor under the

terms of a testamentary instrument known and in existence at the time of the adoption is an act of subterfuge.

. . . This practice does great violence to the intent and

purpose of our adoption laws, and should not be permitted. . . . We cannot condone such a use of the adoption process.’’ (Citations omitted.) Cross v. Cross,

supra, 532 N.E.2d 488–89. In support of his argument,

David Eder cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions that are factually distinguishable. In those cases,

it was a different generational beneficiary of a trust

settled by an ancestor who adopted an adult in order

to enlarge the class of beneficiaries. The various courts

of appeal declined to permit an adult adoptee to be a

part of the beneficiary class.13 These cases are distinct

from the facts in the present case in that it is the settlor

who adopted two adults that brought them into the

class of remainder beneficiaries of the trust. The trust

itself defined the beneficiaries as the settlor’s then living

children, be they biological or adopted.

The laws of the state of Connecticut permit adopted

children to take under a will or trust unless the testamentary instrument explicitly excludes them. See General Statutes § 45a-731 (4). The trust does not exclude

adopted children. To the contrary, it unambiguously

includes them. The adoptions did not alter the intent

of the trust, and they did no ‘‘violence’’ to our public

policies concerning adoption.

David Eder also claims that the court erred, as a

matter of law, by concluding that the purpose of the

trust was not contravened because the Richter brothers

were the natural objects of the settlor’s bounty. In

essence, what David Eder claims is that the settlor did

not intend the Richter brothers to be beneficiaries of

the trust when it was established. This argument fails

because the trust provides that a remainder beneficiary

is, at the time the trust terminates, a child of the settlor

then living. Intent is to be determined by the language

of the trust, not external factors. Heath v. Heath, supra,
150 Conn. App. 203–204. The trust defined child as a

biological or adopted child; our statutes permit adult

adoptions and adoptees are permitted to take under

a testamentary instrument, unless they are expressly

excluded. General Statutes §§ 45a-731 (4), 45a-734.

Moreover, the trust contemplated that the settlor may

have had more children in 2011 than he had in 1991, a

fact David Eder does not challenge. We conclude that

the court properly found that the settlor’s adoptions of

the Richter brothers were not a sham and that the

adoptions did not alter that intent of the trust.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Superior Court properly affirmed the Probate Court’s decree

that the corpus of the trust is to be distributed to the

settlor’s then living children, his biological son and his

adopted children. The decree is consistent with the

intent of the trust and the laws of this state.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In the Superior Court, the case was captioned David Eric Eder v. Appeal

from Probate. The judgment file, appeal form, and briefs bear the caption

David Eric Eder v. John Dennis Eder et al. The caption of the case that

appears here conforms to the convention our appellate courts use for appeals

from probate. See, e.g., Garrett’s Appeal from Probate, 237 Conn. 233, 676

A.2d 394 (1996); Baskin’s Appeal from Probate, 194 Conn. 635, 484 A.2d

934 (1984); Davis’s Appeal from Probate, 39 Conn. 395 (1872); Sanzo’s

Appeal from Probate, 133 Conn. App. 42, 35 A.3d 302 (2012); Nulman’s

Appeal from Probate, 13 Conn. App. 811, 537 A.2d 495, cert. denied, 207

Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988).

1 The following individuals were served with the appeal: John Dennis

Eder, settlor; Mischa B. Richter, adopted son; Sacha A. Richter, adopted

son; Gail D’Addio, trustee; and Michael D’Addio, trustee.

2 The Probate Court stayed the distribution of the trust corpus for thirty

days and, if appeals were taken, until the final order of a court.

3 The settlor testified, in part: ‘‘I had no help from a lawyer with this

document, I looked through the document. My father and I had discussions

before this document was given to me to be signed. I made sure that whatever

the discussions were that I had with my father were included in the document. There were two major points that I was concerned with, with the

document. He told me that I was going to get $114,000 a year, which was

included in the document. I never personally received it in my hand per

year. But, I don’t know, that’s one thing. And the other thing I would talk

to my father about at that time, when he had suggested doing this for tax

reasons, was that since I was in my forties, I believe, that I wanted to make

sure any future children, either by blood or adoption, was included within

this trust document, because I didn’t know what was going to happen, you

know, further on.’’ (Emphasis added.)

4 David Eder emphasizes that the trust identifies him as the settlor’s only

living child at the time the settlor signed the trust, but he does not dispute

that the trust contemplates that the settlor may have more children at the

time the trust terminates.

5 Section 45a-734 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person eighteen years

of age or older may, by written agreement with another person at least

eighteen years of age but younger than himself or herself unless the other

person is his or her spouse, brother, sister, uncle or aunt of the whole or

half blood, adopt the other person as his or her child . . . .

‘‘(b) . . . Upon the [probate] court’s approval of the adoption agreement,

the adopted person shall become the legal child of the adoptive parent, and

the adoptive parent shall become the legal parent of the adopted person,

and the provisions of section 45a-731 shall apply. . . .’’

6 The Superior Court held in part that not only were the Massachusetts

adoptions entitled to full faith and credit in Connecticut; see Maltas v.

Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 362, 364, 2 A.3d 902 (2010); but also found that General

Statutes § 45a-731 provides that ‘‘[a] final decree of adoption, whether issued
by a court of this state or a court of any other jurisdiction, shall have the

following effect in this state . . . (4) The adopted person shall . . . be

treated as if such adopted person were the biological child of the adoptive

parent for purposes of the applicability of all documents and instruments,

whether executed before or after the adoption decree is issued, which do

not expressly exclude an adopted person in their operation or effect. The

words ‘child’, ‘children’, ‘issue’, ‘descendant’, ‘descendants’, ‘heir’, ‘heirs’,

‘lawful heirs’, ‘grandchild’ and ‘grandchildren’, when used in any will or

trust instrument shall include legally adopted persons unless such document clearly indicates a contrary intention. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 David Eder devoted a number of pages in his appellate brief to the United

States tax code and argued that the trust was intended to achieve tax benefits

that could not be achieved if the trust were amended. His contention is that

by finding that the Richter brothers are remainder beneficiaries of the trust,

the trust was altered and the tax benefit lost. The settlor argues that David

Eder did not raise that claim in the Superior Court and, therefore, it is not

properly before us on appeal. See Practice Book § 60-5; Brehm v. Brehm,

65 Conn. App. 698, 702–704, 783 A.2d 1068 (2001). In his reply brief, David

Eder states that he did raise the tax issue in the Superior Court during

argument. The transcript reveals that David Eder’s counsel briefly mentioned

that a trust established for tax and estate purposes is not revocable.

Whether the claim was raised in the Superior Court, it is nonetheless

entirely without merit. Although the court found that the settlor’s father

had encouraged him to establish the trust for tax planning purposes, it found

no provision in the trust regarding taxes. Even if we were permitted to look

beyond the language of the trust to determine the settlor’s intent, which we

may not; see Heath v. Heath, supra, 150 Conn. App. 203–204; the court did

not consider, let alone find, that by adopting the Richter brothers the

intended tax benefits of the trust were negated. Moreover, David Eder has

identified no evidence to the contrary.

8 David Eder does not claim that the court erred in finding that the trust

contemplated the settlor’s having other children between 1991 and 2011.

9 After May 1, 2010, the settlor wrote checks to Mischa Richter totaling

$53,600 of which $50,000 was to purchase a home. After that date, the settlor

wrote checks to Sacha Richter totaling $12,880. All of the checks were in

the nature of ‘‘help me out,’’ typical of a familial setting or where a familial

relationship exists. The transfer of funds was made after the settlor adopted

the Richter brothers but before funds from the trust could be distributed.

10 The court also found that the settlor’s animosity toward David Eder

resulted in his leaving him nothing by way of his will. The settlor wrote a

will in 2013, in which he left a small portion of his estate to the Richter

brothers and the rest to charity. The court again found that the Richter

brothers were the natural objects of the settlor’s bounty. The bequest from

his estate would not accrue to the Richter brothers until he died. The trust

gave them funds that they needed in the present.

11 The settlor testified: ‘‘I mean the trouble I had with David Eder was a

catalyst for me to start paying more attention to things that I haven’t been

paying attention to. And when I realize that I had the opportunity to adopt

Sacha and Mischa, who were more or less my kids the way they grew up,

I thought why not include them in this if I could. Why not share my estate

with them? Why not make our relationship legal?’’

12 See also Estate of Pittman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 288, 292–94, 163 Cal. Rptr.

527 (1980), citing E. Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class

Gifts, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 971, 990–91 (1965) (urging replacement of ‘‘stranger

to the adoption’’ rule found in some jurisdictions for ‘‘loco parentis’’ rule);

and J. ten Broek, California’s Adoption Law and Programs, 6 Hastings L. J.

261, 275–82 (1955) (family experience and contact theory is when significant

percentage of adult adoptions, those in which stepparents have parented

children from early age, either learn belatedly of possibility of legally adopting stepchild or were prevented from doing so earlier by nonconsenting

biological parent).

13 See, e.g., Otto v. Gore, 45 A.3d 120, 128–29 (Del. 2012) (beneficiary

adopted former spouse); Matter of Estate of Nicol, 152 N.J. Super. 308, 377

A.2d 1201, 1203 (1977) (long unmarried beneficiary son married much older

spouse and adopted her children close to his age).