J-A12017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ROBERT GENE REGA 

Appellant

v.

COMMUNITY HEALTH CHOICES, PA 

HEALTH AND WELLNESS, A BRIDGE 

TO INDEPENDENCE, AND THE 

GREENERY CENTER FOR 

REHABILITATION AND NURSING

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 506 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Civil Division at 3509 CV 2020

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: May 13, 2022

Robert Gene Rega (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order sustaining 

preliminary objections filed by The Greenery Center for Rehabilitation and 

Nursing (Greenery), Community Health Choices (Community Health), PA 

Health and Wellness (PA Health) and A Bridge to Independence (ABI)

(collectively, Defendants), and dismissing Appellant’s complaint with 

prejudice. Appellant further challenges the denial of Greenery’s motion to 

strike the complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2). After careful review, 

we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Relevant to this appeal, in March 2020, Appellant’s elderly mother, Joan 

Mary Rega (Rega), resided at The Greenery, a rehabilitative and nursing 

residence/facility and service provider for Community Health. See Complaint, 

7/22/20, ¶¶ 2-3, 16. ABI is a service coordinator entity and subcontractor of 

Community Health. Id. ¶ 4. According to Appellant, Rega suffers from earlystage Alzheimer’s Disease, resulting in “physical and cogn[i]tive disabilities[.]” 

Id. ¶ 8. On March 25, 2020, Appellant, a death-row inmate, sent Greenery a 

copy of a broad durable power of attorney dated April 9, 2019 (POA).

1

 Id.

¶ 14. The POA purportedly authorized Appellant to make decisions on behalf 

of Rega, including, inter alia, health care and financial decisions. POA, 4/9/19. 

On April 27, 2020, Appellant pro se filed a writ of mandamus to compel 

ABI to recognize Appellant as the lawful agent of Rega under the POA. Writ 

of Mandamus, 4/27/20. Appellant asserted ABI improperly refused to find

Rega an in-home healthcare provider, as directed by Appellant. Id. ¶¶ 14-

18. ABI filed preliminary objections challenging the validity of the POA. On 

January 20, 2021, the trial court denied the writ of mandamus, concluding the 

POA was invalid. Trial Court Order, 1/20/21. 

On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s Order. See Rega v. A 

Bridge to Independence, 260 A.3d 107 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished 

memorandum). Specifically, this Court concluded that the POA, as it existed 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant does not specifically allege he served the POA on the other

defendants. 
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prior to May 11, 2020,2failed to comply with Chapter 56 of the Probate, 

Estates and Fiduciaries Code, 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5601-5614 (POA Code): 

It is undisputed that the POA was not executed in compliance with

20 Pa.C.S.A. 5601(c) and (d), and Appellant failed to meet his

burden to prove the POA complied with the POA Code. See

id. § 5601(c) (“In the absence of a signed notice, upon a

challenge to the authority of [a purported] agent to exercise a

power under the power of attorney, the agent shall have the

burden of demonstrating that the exercise of [] authority is

proper.”); accord Vine v. Commonwealth, 607 Pa. 648, 9 A.3d

1150, 1162 (Pa. 2010) (“In its official comment regarding [the

pre-amendment version of subsection 5601(c)], the Legislature

specified that a primary purpose of the notice requirement is to

protect the principal; it was not evidently aimed at protecting third

parties.” (superseded by statute)).

Rega (unpublished memorandum at 10). This Court further concluded the 

deficiencies rendered the entire POA invalid, despite the presence of a 

severability clause. Id.

In the interim, on July 22, 2020, Appellant pro se filed the instant sixcount complaint. Appellant asserted causes of action against Defendants 

based on their failure to honor the April 9, 2020, POA. See Complaint, 

7/22/20. Appellant set forth the following causes of action:

Count 1 (against Greenery): Failure to accept POA and comply 

with an agent’s directives

Count 2 (against Defendants): Interference with a contract

Count 3 (against Defendants): Negligence 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant submitted a new POA Notice and Acknowledgment, which was 

executed on May 11, 2020. 
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Count 4 (against Defendants): Conspiracy

Count 5 (against Defendants): Alienation of a parent’s affections

Count 6 (against Defendants): Punitive damages

See id. 

Defendants each filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s complaint. 

All Defendants challenged the validity of the POA’s “Notice” as noncompliant

with 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601(c). Preliminary Objections (Greenery), 8/27/20, ¶¶ 

13, 15-18; Preliminary Objections (PA Health), 8/31/20, ¶¶ 14-16; 

Preliminary Objections (ABI), 9/3/20, ¶ 12. Defendants also challenged the 

legal sufficiency of Appellant’s remaining causes of action.

3

 Finally, Defendant

Greenery included a motion to strike the complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

1028(a)(2). Preliminary Objections (Greenery), 9/27/20, ¶ 18. At oral 

argument, Appellant withdrew Count V, alienation of affections, and Count VI, 

punitive damages. Trial Court Opinion and Order, 4/8/21, at 3. 

The trial court denied Greenery’s motion to strike pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

1028(c)(2) without prejudice to file a motion for sanctions or similar relief. 

Id. at 15. The trial court sustained all of Defendants’ preliminary objections, 

and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. Trial Court Opinion and 

Id. at 17. Importantly, the court further stated:

____________________________________________

3 ABI averred that “Russell Rega, another son to [] Rega, has accepted 

responsibility of relocating [] Rega from Greenery to a facility closer to her 

family once the COVID-19 pandemic ends.” Preliminary Objections (ABI), 

9/3/20, ¶ 19 (citing Exhibit 7 staff notes)). 
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[T]o the extent that the complaint is an effort by [Appellant] to 

establish the validity of the power of attorney, that issue is an 

Orphans’ Court matter. ... Such matter has been previously 

transferred to that Division. (See Order 11/19/20, at docket 

2020-2288).” 

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 4/8/21, at 16.

Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents ten issues for review:

(A) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law by concluding that Appellant’s directives fell within the

purview of a monetary directive thus requiring 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5601(c) & (d) to be attached[?]

(B) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law in sustaining [Defendants’] preliminary objections as to 

[Defendants’] specious good faith belief that [Appellant’s POA] 

was not valid contrary to statute when 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601(e.2) 

exempted § 5601(c) & (d) thus negated § 5608.1, where § 

5608.1(b)(2)(i) did not apply due to § 5608.1(b)(2)(ii) waiving 

such requirements[?]

(C) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law in sustaining [Defendants’] preliminary objections by failing 

to issue an order compelling [Defendants] to accept the power of 

attorney pursuant to § 5608.1(c)(2) due to the POA being legally 

valid pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601(e.2)[?]

(D) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law in denying Appellant[] injunctive relief to compel 

[Defendants] to comply with Appellant’s directives to, inter alia, 

discharge [] Rega as the directives were not monetary in nature, 

but a medical and/or mental health directive; 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 

501(e.2)[?]

(E) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law in sustaining [Defendants’] preliminary objections as to the 

[Defendants’] interference with Appellant’s contract when the POA 

constituted a contract and [Appellant] also had a verbal contract 

to “manage all of her needs” as pled; (Cmplt. at ¶¶ 9-10)[?]
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(F) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law in sustaining [Defendants’] preliminary objections as to 

Appellant’s negligence cause of action where a duty of care existed 

pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5608.1(a), and when [Defendants] 

failed to comply with 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5608.1(a)(1)(B), and due to 

§ 5601(e.2) negating a good faith belief as § 5601(c) & (d) were 

not required[?]

(G) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law in sustaining [Defendants’] preliminary objections as to 

Appellant’s conspiracy cause of action when [] PA Health [] 

circulated a specious letter rejecting Appellant’s POA (without 

performing an independent determination) so as to maintain [] 

Rega in a nursing home against her will[?]

(H) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law by denying [] the Greenery’s motion to strike without 

prejudice solely for the purpose of allowing them to file sanctions 

when no legitimate grounds for sanction existed, the [Greenery] 

failed to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 1023.2(b) notice requirements[,] 

and the court deliberately failed to issue a time frame for such 

sanctions to be filed[?]

(I) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law by denying Appellant’s right to amend his complaint where 

said claims as raised therein are of arguable merit upon 

amendment[?]

(J) Whether the court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law by failing to hold and construe Appellant’s allegations to a 

less stringent standard in determining whether Appellant stated a 

claim upon which relief could be granted and/or Appellant’s filing 

satisfied the gist of Appellant’s intent pursuant to Pa.R.[C.]P. 

1019[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (issues reordered for disposition). 

Our standard of review in determining whether a trial court erred

in sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is well settled.

“[A] trial court’s decision to grant or deny a demurrer involves a matter of
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law, [and] our standard for reviewing that decision is plenary.” Donaldson

v. Davidson Bros., 144 A.3d 93, 100 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

When reviewing the dismissal of a complaint based upon

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, we treat as

true all well-pleaded material, factual averments and all

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Where the preliminary 

objections will result in the dismissal of the action, the objections 

may be sustained only in cases that are clear and free from 

doubt. To be clear and free from doubt that dismissal is

appropriate, it must appear with certainty that the law would not

permit recovery by the plaintiff upon the facts averred. Any doubt

should be resolved by a refusal to sustain the objections.

Stewart v. FedEx Exp., 114 A.3d 424, 426 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations

omitted). “The impetus of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of

the complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery if ultimately

proven.” Barton v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 124 A.3d 349, 354 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Additionally, we “will reverse the trial court’s 

decision regarding preliminary objections only where there has been an error 

of law or abuse of discretion.” Id.

Appellant’s issues (A) through (D) are based upon his claim that the

April 9, 2019, POA was valid and enforceable. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at

14-15 (arguing this Court erred in previously holding that the defective

portions of the POA were not separable); 16 (claiming Defendants did not

have a “good faith” belief the POA was invalid and unenforceable); 20 (arguing

the validity of the POA); 22 (again arguing the provisions of the POA are

separable); 23 (challenging the denial of injunctive relief because the
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provisions of the POA were not monetary in nature). Upon review, we

conclude Appellant’s claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

Our Supreme Court has explained: 

Collateral estoppel will bar a court from revisiting an issue decided 

in an earlier proceeding where it is identical to an issue decided in 

a prior action, the prior action culminated in a final judgment on 

the merits, the party to be estopped was (or was in privity with) 

a party to the prior action, and the party had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.

Mortimer v. McCool, 255 A.3d 261, 289 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). 

In Rega, supra, this Court addressed validity of the POA presently at 

issue; the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; Appellant 

was a party in both actions; and Appellant fully and fairly litigated his claim 

that the April 9, 2019, POA was valid and enforceable. 

Pertinently, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601(c) and (d) requires all powers of

attorney to include statutorily prescribed “Notice” and “Acknowledgment”

sections. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601(c), (d). However, subsections (c) and (d)

“do not apply to a power of attorney which exclusively provides for health care

decision making or mental health care decision making.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. §

5601(e.2). 

In deeming the POA invalid, this Court explained:

It is undisputed that the POA was not executed in 

compliance with 20 Pa.C.S.A. 5601(c) and (d), and Appellant 

failed to meet his burden to prove the POA complied with the POA 

Code. See id. § 5601(c) (“In the absence of a signed notice, upon

a challenge to the authority of [a purported] agent to exercise a

power under the power of attorney, the agent shall have the

burden of demonstrating that the exercise of [] authority is
J-A12017-22

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proper.”); accord Vine v. Commonwealth, 9 A.3d 1150, 1162 

(Pa. 2010) (“In its official comment regarding [the preamendment version of subsection 5601(c)], the Legislature 

specified that a primary purpose of the notice requirement is to 

protect the principal; it was not evidently aimed at protecting third 

parties.” (superseded by statute)).

Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the severability clause is 

irrelevant because the entire POA was invalid. Further, the 

record belies Appellant’s claim that subsection “5601(e.2) 

exempted the requirements of § 5601(c) & (d)” from the POA. 

Indeed, the broad, durable POA granted Appellant authority to 

make many decisions on behalf of [] Rega in addition to medical 

directives, including financial decisions. Moreover, even if 

Appellant is correct that he made only medical directives on behalf 

of [] Rega, this would not alter the fact that the POA as written 

was facially invalid under §§ 5601(c) and (d). We are also 

unpersuaded by Appellant’s reliance on the word “substantially”

contained in subsection 5601(d); the POA did not substantially 

comply with either subsection 5601(d) or subsection 5601(c), the 

latter of which does not contain the term “substantially.”

Rega (unpublished memorandum at 10-11) (emphasis added, citation to 

Appellant’s brief omitted). In Rega, this Court addressed and rejected the 

claims presently raised by Appellant. See id. Appellant is thus collaterally 

estopped from raising the same claims in issues (A) through (D). See 

Mortimer, 255 A.3d at 289. 

In issue (E), Appellant argues the trial court improperly sustained 

Defendants’ preliminary objections to Appellant’s action for tortious

interference with contractual relations. Appellant’s Brief at 25. Appellant 

asserts the POA qualifies as a “contract.” Id. Once again, Appellant argues 

Defendants did not, “either jointly or severally, have right, privilege and/or 

legal justification pursuant to § 5608, et seq. to refuse to accept the [POA].” 
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Id. at 27. Appellant claims he sustained the loss of his POA fees as the direct 

result of Defendants’ interference. Id. 

To state a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual 

relations, a plaintiff must prove the following elements:

(1) the existence of a contractual relationship between the 

complainant and a third party;

(2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by 

interfering with that contractual relationship;

(3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the

defendant; and

(4) the occasioning of actual damage as a result of defendant’s

conduct.

Salsberg v. Mann, 262 A.3d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations 

omitted). Upon review, Appellant failed to establish the third element — the

absence of justification.

The POA Code further provides:

A person may not be required to accept a power of attorney if ... 

[t]he person in good faith believes that the power of attorney is 

not valid or the agent does not have the authority to perform the 

act requested, whether or not a certification, a translation, an 

affidavit under section 5606 or opinion of counsel under section 

5608(e) has been requested or provided.

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5608.1(b)(6). 

In his complaint, Appellant expressly recognized Defendants’ contention

that the POA “is invalid purportedly due to the Notice and Agent

Acknowledgement not reiterating the exact text as depicted in 20 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5601(c) & (d).” Complaint, 7/22/20, ¶ 35. Further, this Court confirmed
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the invalidity of the POA. Rega, (unpublished memorandum at 10-11). Under 

these circumstances, Defendants properly relied on Section 5601(c) and (d)

as justification for not accepting the POA. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5608.1(b)(6)

(“A person may not be required to accept a power of attorney if ... [t]he person 

in good faith believes that the power of attorney is not valid.”). Appellant’s 

tortious interference claim fails. 

In issue (F), Appellant argues the trial court improperly sustained 

Defendants’ preliminary objections to his negligence cause of action. 

Appellant’s Brief at 28. Appellant argues:

Pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5608.1(c), [Defendants] had a duty of 

care to comply with Appellant’s directives, as they were medical 

in nature, and did not encompass a monetary matter, thus no 

Notice and/or Agent Acknowledgment was required as 

§ 5601(e.2) exempted those requirements[;] thus [Defendants] 

did not act in good-faith as they were required to do an 

independent review of the [POA] Statute (20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601, et 

seq.), to determine whether an exemption existed before they 

rejected the [POA].

Id. at 28-29. Appellant again asserts that by previously accepting the POA, 

Defendants were precluded from later challenging its validity. See id. at 29-

30. 

We have explained:

“Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably 

prudent person would exercise in the same or similar 

circumstances.” Schemberg v. Smicherko, 85 A.3d 1071, 1075 

(Pa. Super. 2014). To prove a negligence claim, “the plaintiff 

must prove the following four elements: (1) a legally recognized 

duty that the defendant conform to a standard of care; (2) the 

defendant breached that duty; (3) causation between the conduct 

and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damage to the 
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plaintiff.” Reason v. Kathryn’s Korner Thrift Shop, 169 A.3d 

96, 101 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Zimmerman v. Alexander Andrew, Inc., 189 A.3d 447, 452-53 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (emphasis added).

Here, the trial court explained,

[Appellant] fails to identify an existing legal duty [D]efendants 

breached. ... [D]efendants had grounds to refuse to accept the 

power of attorney [Appellant] claims to possess. [Appellant] has 

not pointed [to], and [the trial] court has not found case authority 

that imposes a common law duty on [D]efendants to capitulate to 

[Appellant’s] demands.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/21, at 11. 

Further, Section 5608(f) of the POA Code provides:

A person who has accepted a power of attorney ... and has acted 

upon it by allowing the agent to exercise authority granted under 

the power of attorney, shall not be precluded from requesting at 

later times a certification or opinion of counsel ... with regard to 

any further exercise of authority by the agent under the power of 

attorney.

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5608(f). Accordingly, Defendants had no legal duty to continue 

to accept the invalid POA. See id. As Appellant failed to establish that 

Defendants breached a legal duty, his negligence claim fails. See Reason, 

169 A.3d at 101. 

In issue (G), Appellant argues the trial court improperly sustained 

Defendants’ preliminary objections to Appellant’s conspiracy cause of action. 

Appellant’s Brief at 28. Appellant claims he established conspiracy based on

PA Health’s April 29, 2020, letter to all Defendants asserting the POA was 

invalid. Id. at 32. Appellant relies on the averments of his Complaint. Id.
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at 31-32. However, all averments are premised on the validity of the POA. 

See Complaint, ¶¶ 88-95 (averring Defendants acted to prevent Appellant 

from performing under the POA, thereby causing harm and damages). 

The essential elements of a claim for civil conspiracy are as follows: (1)

a combination of two or more persons acting with a common purpose to do

an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means or for an unlawful

purpose, (2) an overt act done in pursuance of the common purpose, and (3)

actual legal damage. Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 590

(Pa. Super. 2004). “[A]bsent a civil cause of action for a particular act, there

can be no cause of action for civil conspiracy to commit that act.” McKeeman

v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 660 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Here, Appellant’s claim for civil conspiracy is based on allegations that

Defendants improperly interfered with the exercise of a valid POA. Because

we held the POA is invalid, Rega, supra, no predicate cause of action exists

to sustain this claim. Accordingly, Appellant’s conspiracy claim fails as a

matter of law. See Phillips, 959 A.2d at 437; see also id. (“The mere fact

that two or more persons, each with the right to do a thing, happen to do that

thing at the same time is not by itself an actionable conspiracy.”). 

In issue (H), Appellant argues the trial court improperly denied without 

prejudice the Greenery’s motion to strike the complaint without prejudice. 

Appellant’s Brief at 32. Appellant claims the trial court denied the motion 

without prejudice to allow Greenery “to refile a frivolous motion for sanctions 
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upon remand.” Id. Appellant proceeds to argue the merits of a motion for 

sanctions not yet filed by Defendants. See id. Appellant inappropriately 

requests that this Court transcend the boundaries of its review and issue 

an advisory opinion. As we are precluded from rendering advisory opinions, 

we decline to address the issue further. See Crystal Lake Camps v. Alford, 

923 A.2d 482, 484 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to issue an advisory opinion 

on the merits of a hypothetical motion). 

In issue (I), Appellant argues the trial court improperly dismissed his 

complaint with prejudice, thereby denying his “right to amend his complaint,

where said claims as raised therein are of arguable merit upon amendment.”

Appellant’s Brief at 34. Appellant argues that once the defects of the POA 

were cured and he issued new directives, he should have been allowed to 

amend his complaint. Id. We disagree.

The trial court explained:

[Appellant’s] claims, though novel, are futile. Though he has 

attempted to “cure” a deficient notice, he has not provided a 

proper Acknowledgement. Despite a Complaint including 101 

allegations, which combine prolix prose embellished by conclusory 

claims, he does not set forth a single actionable claim or specify a 

properly recoverable item of damage.

Further, to the extent that the Complaint is an effort by 

[Appellant] to establish the validity of the [POA], that issue is an 

Orphans’ Court matter. The Pennsylvania Decedent, Estates and 

Fiduciaries Code [] provides that mandatory jurisdiction lies in the

Orphans’ Court division for:

(22) Agents. All matters pertaining to the exercise of

powers by agents acting under powers of attorney as

provided in Subchapter C of Chapter 54 (relating to health
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care agents and representatives) or in Chapter 56 (relating

to powers of attorney).

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711. Such matter has been previously 

transferred to that Division. (See ... docket 2020-2288). 

Clearly, a court sitting in the Civil Division may not determine such 

matters under the cloak of facially deficient civil action.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/21, at 16-17 (emphasis added). Upon review, we 

adopt the trial court’s reasoning.

Finally, in issue (J), Appellant argues the trial court improperly failed to 

construe Appellant’s pro se allegations under a “less stringent standard.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant argues he has stated claims upon which

relief can be granted. Id. at 13. Appellant takes exception to the trial court’s

failure to directly refer to his complaint. Id. According to Appellant, “the trial

court was partial toward [Defendants] as exhibited throughout the record (the

court inter alia, constantly telling Appellant to be quiet), and adopted in its

opinion, each and every pleading deficiency (although legally meritless),

[Defendants] raised so as to [s]ustain their preliminary objections[.]” Id. 

“[A]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a

pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit.” Commonwealth

v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017). “[A]ny layperson 

choosing to represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some 

reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise and legal 

training will prove [his] undoing.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 

1011, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted and some formatting altered). 
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Upon review, and treating as true “all well-pleaded material, factual

averments and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom,” Stewart, 114 A.3d

at 426, Appellant’s issues are collaterally estopped or legally insufficient. 

Liberal construction of Appellant’s complaint does not alter this result. As

such, there is no merit to Appellant’s final claim. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/13/2022