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79–761PDF 2002

THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 22, 2002

Serial No. 107–92

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

HILLEL WEINBERG, Subcommittee Staff Director & Counsel 

DAVID S. ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DEBORAH BODLANDER, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL BERKOWITZ, Professional Staff Member 

MATTHEW ZWEIG, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Massachusetts .................................................................................................. 7

The Honorable Richard W. Murphy, Senior Fellow Middle East, Council on 

Foreign Relations, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1981–1983) .... 16

The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Attorney, Shea and Gardner, former Director of Central Intelligence (1993–1995) .............................................................. 23

The Honorable William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard, former Chief 

of Staff to Vice President Quayle (1989–1993) .................................................. 30

F. Gregory Gause, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Vermont ............................................................................................... 35

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia: Prepared statement ................................................................. 2

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 6

The Honorable Barney Frank: Remarks to the press on March 4, 2002 of 

Secretary Colin L. Powell and Assistant Secretary Craner on release of 

the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001 .............................. 8

The Honorable Richard W. Murphy: Prepared statement ................................... 18

The Honorable R. James Woolsey: Prepared statement ....................................... 26

The Honorable William Kristol: Prepared statement ........................................... 33

F. Gregory Gause: Prepared statement ................................................................. 38

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement ................................................................. 61

Copy compiled from wire service reports, dated March 26, 2002, entitled 

‘‘Saudi Police Face Deaths Criticism,’’ by Michael Ireland, Chief Correspondent, ASSIST News Service .................................................................. 62

(1)

THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 22, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m. in Room 2172, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. 

The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia is 

deeply troubled and needs to be explored frankly. We hope to be 

able to advance that process today. 

The differences between American and Saudi values are profound. Our interests, too, may come into conflict. 

Even before September 11, of course, there were many sources of 

friction: The near total lack of political and civil rights in Saudi 

Arabia has troubled many Americans for years as have the lack of 

religious freedom for visitors or even Saudi citizens who follow nonofficial strands of Islam, or a religion other than Islam. 

Saudi Arabia, while a moderating influence on fluctuations in the 

price of oil, has nevertheless been the mainstay of an illegal producers’ cartel. Saudi Arabia has been unreliable as a base for the 

U.S. military against Saddam and has not cooperated adequately 

in the struggle against the Taliban. It is one of only three nations 

which maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban. In the 

past it has attempted to procure weapons of mass destruction in 

the form of Chinese missiles. There are press reports of continuing 

concern about its capabilities and intentions in that regard. 

Saudi Arabia has been a wellspring of Holocaust denial and virulent anti-Semitism that undercuts our efforts to establish true 

peace and coexistence among the peoples of the Middle East. The 

anti-Semitism that is encouraged in Saudi Arabia diverts the attention of the Saudi people from the poor performance of their own 

government and economy. Tragically, much of the anti-Semitism 

occurs in the official media and comes out of the mouths of Saudi 

Government officials. 

As we consider these problems, we should, of course, balance the 

favorable features of our relationship with the Saudis. The Saudi 

peace plan, flawed as it is, is nevertheless providing an impetus to 

certain states to rethink their rejection of Israel. 

Saudi Arabia was on our side in the struggle against communism 

and has been a good customer for American goods. Individual 

Saudis have made important contributions to the United States as 

2

immigrants, investors, and religious leaders. And Saudi Arabia actually sells its oil to us at a little below the artificially high world 

price in order to maintain a market share here, hoping to gain influence. 

Actually it is the Asian economies that need Arab oil the most. 

All other things being equal, America would get its oil from less 

distant suppliers, minimizing high shipping costs. It is to protect 

the world’s economy and indirectly our own that we have become 

a guarantor that energy flows from the Persian Gulf. Astonishingly, though, our aircraft are not permitted to use Saudi bases to 

attack the Iraqi antiaircraft installations that threaten them. 

September 11 brought certain other aspects of our relationship 

with Saudi Arabia into sharp focus. While the Saudis initially cast 

doubt on the facts, it has developed that 11 of the 19 hijackers 

were Saudis, as was bin Laden, as are the great majority of those 

detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Saudi money, official or not, is behind much of Islamic extremist rhetoric and action in the world 

today. The Saudis poured funds into the madrassahs in Pakistan 

that spawned the Taliban fighters. They have given, in effect, every 

potential suicide bomber or other anti-Israeli terrorist a free life insurance policy. 

The Saudi Ambassador to the United States has said publicly that $50 billion in corruption may have resulted from the last $350 

billion that has poured into Saudi Arabia. The question of whether 

the Saudi royal family have been appropriate stewards of the 

wealth of the Eastern Province, or whether they have squandered 

it for questionable purposes that would never be supported by their 

people had they a say in the matter is ultimately a matter for the 

Saudis to decide. But if the Saudis are spending their money for 

causes that harm the United States, that is a matter of great concern to our Nation, and we must consider what steps we should be 

taking. 

We look forward to our witnesses for their recommendations, and 

we are pleased that we have an outstanding panel of witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia is deeply troubled, 

and needs to be explored frankly. 

Although a personal bond has been established between the President and the de 

facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah, the differences between American and Saudi values are profound. Our interests, too, may come into conflict. 

Differences in values or interests between nations need not always be a source 

of friction, but the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and the geopolitical realities mean that our differences may lead to something much worse. It may be that 

we will become rivals and even come into a form of conflict. 

Even before September 11, of course, there were many sources of friction.

• The near-total lack of political and civil rights in Saudi Arabia has troubled 

many Americans for years. The floggings, amputations, and beheadings meted 

out to criminals, the lack of religious freedom for visitors or even Saudi citizens who follow non-official strands of Islam or a religion other than Islam, 

and the lack of transparency in the justice system are matters of grave concern.

• Saudi Arabia, while a moderating influence on fluctuations in the price of oil, 

has nevertheless been the mainstay of an illegal producer’s cartel that has increased the price of oil around the world. And Saudi Arabia’s willingness to 

3

use predatory practices as its interests required has damaged marginal producers who dare to compete against it.

• The Saudi instinct for stability meant that is has been willing to compromise 

with the likes of Saddam Hussein, and the Iranians. It has been unreliable 

as a base for the U.S. military against Saddam. It has not cooperated adequately in the struggle against the Taliban. Of course, it was one of only 

three nations which maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban.

• In the past it has attempted to procure weapons of mass destruction in the 

form of Chinese missiles. There are press reports of continuing concern about 

its capabilities and intentions in that regard.

• Saudi Arabia is a wellspring of Holocaust denial and virulent anti-Semitism 

that undercuts efforts to establish true peace and co-existence among the peoples of the Middle East. It is clear that the anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli 

rhetoric that is encouraged in Saudi Arabia is a way to divert the attention 

of the Saudi people from the poor performance of their own government and 

economy. Much of the anti-Semitism occurs in the official media and comes 

out of the mouths of Saudi government officials.

As we consider these problems we must of course balance the favorable features 

of our relationship. 

The Saudi peace plan indicated Saudi Arabia’s willingness to express openly a vision of a real peace in the area. As flawed as it is, it nevertheless provided an impetus to certain states to rethink their rejection of Israel. 

Saudi Arabia, as a conservative regime, was certainly on our side in the struggle 

against communism. 

At varying points it has provided financial backing to the United States. 

The Saudis have been good customers for American goods. 

Individual Saudis have made important contributions to the United States as immigrants, investors, and religious leaders. 

Saudi Arabia actually sells its oil to us at a little below the artificially high world 

price in order to maintain a market share here. It does so in order to give the impression that we need Saudi Arabia—and to provide product for their refining and 

marketing investments. 

Actually, it is the Asian economies that need Arab oil the most. All other things 

being equal, America would get its oil from less distant suppliers, minimizing shipping costs. The world needs Arab oil because there is but one world oil market. If, 

for example, the Japanese economy falters because of a severe disruption in the oil 

markets, American exporters to Japan will suffer and our economy, too, could go 

into a recession. 

So to protect the world’s economy and our own we have become the ultimate guarantor of the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf. And yet our aircraft are not permitted to use Saudi bases to attack the Iraqi anti-aircraft installations that threaten 

them. They must take off from other places, whether or not they are more suitable 

and even if they are less safe. 

September 11th brought certain other aspects of our relationship with Saudi Arabia into sharp focus. While the Saudis initially cast doubt on the facts, it has developed that 11 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi, as was bin Laden, as are the great 

majority of those held in Guantanamo Bay. 

Saudi money—official or not—is behind much of the Islamic-extremist rhetoric 

and action in the world today. Saudis poured funds into the madrassahs in Pakistan 

that spawned the Taliban fighters. They have given, in effect, every potential suicide bomber or other anti-Israel terrorist a free life insurance policy. 

While the Saudis assert they are cooperating on tracing accounts and the finances 

of terrorist organizations, it is still not illegal to take any amount of cash across 

the Saudi frontier in a suitcase. Thus, tracing bank accounts will have little real 

effect on the funding of terror and extremism. 

The Saudi Ambassador to the United States has said in public that $50 billion 

in corruption may have resulted from the last $350 billion that has poured into 

Saudi Arabia. The question of whether the Saudi royal family have been appropriate 

stewards of the wealth of the Eastern Province, or whether they have squandered 

it for questionable purposes that would never be supported by their people—had 

they a say in the matter—is ultimately a matter for the Saudis to decide. But if 

the Saudis are spending their money for causes that harm the United States, that 

is a matter of great concern to our nation, and we must consider what steps to take.

Mr. GILMAN. At this time I will call on Mr. Lantos, our Ranking 

Minority Member, for an opening statement. 

4

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, first I want to commend you for 

holding this long-overdue hearing. 

One is really at a loss in dealing with Saudi Arabia as to where 

to begin. Minimally one ought to begin with the Persian Gulf War. 

Had we not sent 500,000 American troops to the Persian Gulf, 

Saudi Arabia today would be the 20th province of Iraq, and one 

would expect the government to show a modicum of appreciation 

for the fact that the United States saved the House of Saud. As I 

indicated on an earlier occasion, had we not done so, the House of 

Saud today would be a villa on the French Riviera, rather than an 

important country in the region. 

I find of all the many aspects of the society which are so contrary 

to our values the systematic discrimination against women the single most appalling one. During his recent visit, the Crown Prince, 

approaching his landing target in Texas, apparently had the plane 

call for a male air traffic controller to guide the plane down. This 

is not a society, ours is not a society, that takes kindly to such gestures in the 21st century. 

It is a fact of life that the Taliban social system of gender apartheid was adopted from Saudi Arabia, home of the original department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. 

Human Rights Watch says, and I quote,

‘‘Women in Saudi Arabia face pervasive discrimination ranging 

from strictly enforced gender segregation in public places, including schools, universities and the workplace, to unequal status with men in matters relating to marriage, divorce, and 

child custody.’’

It is clear that the American people are profoundly opposed to 

this pattern of discriminatory treatment of women. We are also opposed to the systematic media pursuit of the most vicious anti-Semitic propaganda to come out of the region. It is systematic, government-approved and nauseating, and it is simply unacceptable. 

I personally find it appalling that the President of the United 

States comes under the most vicious and severe denunciation. 

If I may close, Mr. Chairman, by quoting from an article by the 

Saudi Ambassador to London in the Arabic-language daily AlHayat,

‘‘From the very beginning it was obvious that little George 

wanted to come out from under the shadow of big George. The 

truth is that his complex was evident even before he entered 

the White House when he insisted on introducing himself as 

George W., as he pronounced it, so that no one would confuse 

him with his father. His complex became deeper when he needed the help of the old faces of his father’s Administration. If 

we take into account the Freudian problems, of which no family is free, one example of many is W.’s past alcoholism and his 

father’s disappointment with him. Another is the problem of 

the widespread belief that his younger brother is smarter and 

more talented than him. We will come to understand that his 

desire to prove that he has come of age is uncontrollable.’’

This of the President of the United States, and the Ambassador 

is still holding his place as the Saudi Ambassador in London. These 

5

are attitudes of arrogance which are nearly incomprehensible, and 

I think it is high time we recognize that in a society which is free 

to criticize everything and everybody, at long last Saudi Arabia is 

subject to the same treatment that any other country and any 

other institution is. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

Is there any Member who would like to make an opening statement? 

Mr. Cooksey. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have no statement to make except that I do not concur with all 

of the remarks of my colleague who just finished. Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. I don’t have an opening statement, but in listening 

to Mr. Lantos’ opening statement, I thought it was a hopeful sign 

that the Saudi Ambassador was viewing the world through the 

eyes of Freud, and of a very Western kind of orientation. I don’t 

know if the logical extension of that analysis leads to the role of 

women in Saudi Arabia, but it was quite interesting. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, any opening remarks? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I think that this hearing 

comes at an opportune moment, and I want to thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for the leadership that you have been providing in trying to find a peaceful settlement that respects the rights of all people in the Middle East, but a voice at the same time against tyranny and against terrorism which are dual threats to this modern 

era and should be of concern to all Americans, and a relationship 

especially perplexing when it comes to what our relationship with 

Saudi Arabia should be. 

I believe the Saudis were very good friends and allies of the 

United States during the Cold War. That debt, however, does not 

hold forever, and since the end of the Cold War, I think that there 

has been a drift. What used to be parallel interests are now drifting in different directions, especially in relationship to the Saudi 

influence on the Islamic world. 

Let me just say that I believe in the last 10 years the Saudis 

have had a negative influence on peace and freedom in the world, 

and it is something that we need to talk about, and if they still consider ourselves their friends, we should talk to them about those 

policies. 

But lastly, let me say since 9/11, and since this turmoil has 

taken place in the Middle East, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the 

peace plan that has been presented by Prince Abdullah is something that should be seriously considered. I believe what has been 

presented in the Saudi peace plan is something that should be seriously looked at by all sides, and we must look at this as a major 

step forward in that the Saudis have agreed that with certain understandings and agreements between the Israelis and the Palestinians, that they would be leading the effort to recognize Israel 

and to lead other Arab countries to do so. That should not be taken 

lightly. I think that is an important component of this discussion 

of our relations that we have with the Saudis. 

6

I look forward to looking into the issues that I just described. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Issa, any opening remarks? 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, Saudi Arabia has come under increased 

scrutiny since September 11, and for understandable reasons. 

There are many issues that need to be worked on, and there is 

plenty of room for improvement in our relationship with Saudi Arabia. However, we should not ignore some of the positive things that 

have come out of our relationship with Saudi Arabia. 

First of all and most currently, the Saudi peace initiative which 

has had a profound impact on the Arab States, has fundamentally 

shifted the way Arabs think of Israel. Crown Prince Abdullah has 

already and continues to pay a political price just for making this 

proposal. The Saudis have also engaged in serious revisions of their 

education system since September 11, but more needs to be done. 

Despite all the talk, the Saudis have not used oil as a weapon. 

They have kept a tight lock on OPEC. Kuwait has been far more 

willing to push the envelope in OPEC than Saudi Arabia. 

The key to fixing the problems we have with Saudi Arabia is to 

encourage and engage for more positive and progressive thinkers to 

emerge within the country of Saudi Arabia. We need constructive 

engagement, not heavy-handedness. 

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Issa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DARRELL E. ISSA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since September 11, none of our Arab allies in the 

Middle East have come under more scrutiny than Saudi Arabia. There is a growing 

concern among some policy makers in Washington that our Saudi friends are nothing more than strategic allies, who choose to have a relationship with us merely for 

the purpose of short-term self-advancement. The fear is that Saudi Arabia does not 

share the same values or long-term interests as the United States, and that this 

is a relationship of convenience rather than a real friendship. 

Mr. Chairman, I will be the first to argue that our relationship with Saudi Arabia 

could use improvement, and that we need to be more strategically focused on actively pursuing an improved relationship. But at the same time, it would be unwise 

to ignore the many positive results that have come out of our alliance with Saudi 

Arabia. 

One of these is the peace proposal made by Crown Prince Abdullah that offered 

normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for a return to the June 6, 1967 

borders. Contrary to what many critics of Saudi Arabia have predicted, this initiative has had a profound impact on the Arab world. It has fundamentally shifted the 

debate about Israel away from the existential question—whether or not Israel has 

any right to exist—to how the Arab world will relate to the legitimate state of Israel 

when, not if, peace is achieved. I believe that we will look back on this initiative 

20 years from now and recognize it as the start of a paradigm shift in Arab thinking 

vis-a ́-vis Israel. This is a bold step that Crown Prince Abdullah has taken, and he 

is paying a political price for it domestically. It is a very positive development for 

American interests in the region and it needs to be recognized as such. 

Mr. Chairman, it is important to recognize that there is a serious debate occurring 

within Saudi Arabia on all the issues that we will discuss today—not only the ArabIsraeli conflict. There are many progressive thinkers in the Kingdom who are gaining an increasing amount of influence in policy decisions. This type of thinking 

needs to be supported and encouraged. I believe we should avoid heavy-handedness 

in our relationship with the Saudis primarily because, by doing so, we undermine 

the efforts of those who are trying to enact positive changes. We need to encourage 

the Saudis to continue the process of economic liberalization as they look towards 

eventual membership in the World Trade Organization. We need to encourage the 

Saudi government to continue its sincere and critical self-assessment of the education system. And as we have discussed so many times in this committee, we need 

7

to encourage basic democratic reform within Saudi Arabia. There is still a long way 

to go toward building the relationship between our two countries, Mr. Chairman. 

We need to continue that process by through constructive engagement, not rhetorical grandstanding.

Mr. GILMAN. Our first witness today is the Honorable Barney 

Frank of Massachusetts. He is an important voice on human rights 

issues in the Congress. Some time ago he wrote our Committee 

suggesting that the Committee hold a hearing on our current relationship with Saudi Arabia, in which he set out several cogent observations, the gist of which was that our relationship with Saudi 

Arabia does not help advance our national interests. 

We are delighted to welcome Congressman Frank before our 

Committee. You may proceed. You may give your testimony in full 

or summarize it as you see fit. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARNEY FRANK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My thanks to you, the 

Chairman of the Full Committee, the gentleman from Illinois, to 

the Ranking Member, the gentleman from California, for having 

these hearings. 

Just as I listened to the opening statements and the range of 

opinions, I am struck by the wish that we would do this more regularly. This is exactly the role that Congress ought to be playing, 

airing important public policy debates, not necessarily because 

there is a decision pending, but, in fact, to bring some genuine level 

of thought. 

I think we have a seriously asymmetrical relationship with Saudi 

Arabia. As the gentleman from California said earlier, it was one 

thing when we were dealing with the Communist threat and there 

was a geostrategic imperative that was somewhat overarching. In 

the absence of that, we are suffering from cultural lag. I think we 

are acting as if we get a great deal more out of the Saudi Arabian 

relationship than we do, and that we err, in fact, in appearing and 

being more supportive of them than the facts justify. 

Obviously the Saudi Arabian regime has one of the worst records 

in the world with regard to human rights. Their lack of democracy, 

their absolute religious intolerance, their degrading mistreatment 

of women, all of these are troubling. They are not simply troubling, 

however, in themselves. Of course they are, but they have an impact on us. I cannot think of anything more appalling than the fact 

that we send American military personnel to that country primarily these days to protect that country and allow them to be subjected to a form of abusive treatment that we would not tolerate 

for a minute anywhere else. I salute the American military officer 

who said that she was not going to take it anymore. We ought to 

be rallying to her. 

They undercut our position. Let me read some excerpts from a 

recent, very important speech:

‘‘Opposition parties should have the freedom to organize, assemble and speak with equal access to all airwaves. All political prisoners must be released and allowed to participate in 

the election process. Human rights organizations should be 

8

free to visit. If the government truly wants to advance the 

cause of workers, it will permit trade unions to exist outside 

of government control. For open trade, we should have a government that is fully democratic which respects the rule of law 

and where the human rights are protected.’’

I am reading from President Bush’s speech recently about Cuba, 

and I do not understand why this applies to Cuba and not to Saudi 

Arabia; and I don’t understand how we can go before the world and 

say, footnote, Cuba only. We will get to China later. How do we 

make these arguments, legitimately critical of a dictatorial regime 

in Cuba, and then overlook what is probably worse with regard to 

Saudi Arabia? 

I would ask to put in the record a series of questions and answers—I take that back, a series of questions and nonanswers, 

with Assistant Secretary Craner, and I don’t blame him personally, 

he was carrying out government policy, for March 4, 2002, when 

the human rights report was released. The press very diligently 

tried to get the Assistant Secretary to talk about what we were 

doing to implement human rights in Saudi Arabia. Lacking bird 

dogs, subpoena power, and truth serum, they could not get an answer out of him. It is not his fault. The fault is the policy that 

makes a glaring exception in our human rights policy for this regime in Saudi Arabia. The argument might be okay, but you have 

to make devil’s bargains sometimes. 

[The information referred to follows:]

RELEASE OF THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001

Secretary Colin L. Powell and 

Assistant Secretary Craner, Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

Remarks to the Press 

Washington, DC 

March 4, 2002

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I am very 

pleased to be here with all of you today to release the State Department’s 26th Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. It is a special privilege to release 

the report with the Secretary of State, whom I have watched over the years work 

tirelessly in public, and now in private, to advance human rights around the world. 

The country reports we’re releasing today provide a snapshot of the human rights 

record in almost 190 countries, evaluated within a consistent set of internationally 

recognized human rights standards and norms. Virtually every aspect of human 

rights is covered, from transparency in government, to respect for the integrity of 

the person, to worker rights. The facts are simply and objectively presented for the 

reader to analyze. 

Before I discuss the content of the Reports, I would like to thank all of those who 

have worked so diligently to produce them. This is a massive endeavor. The work 

entails thousands of hours in research and information gathering by US diplomats 

abroad and Department staff here in the United States. Overseas, this information 

gathering can be hazardous, and US Foreign Service Officers regularly go to great 

lengths, under trying and sometimes even dangerous conditions, to investigate 

abuses, monitor elections, and aid individuals at risk. 

Additional sources for the report include domestic and international human rights 

groups, academics, jurists, international organizations, and domestic and international media. Within the Human Rights Bureau, I owe a special thanks to my 

deputies, to Bill Dilday, who heads the Office of Country Reports, and to his Deputy, 

Jeannette Dubrow, who ran the office during his unavoidable absence during part 

of last year. The staff of the Country Reports Office are a dedicated group of people 

committed to preserving and presenting the facts as accurately and objectively as 

possible. 

Over the last few months, I have heard the worry that the war on terrorism will 

sideline America’s interest in human rights. This is far from true. In fact, the proVerDate May 01 2002 10:58 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 079761 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MESA\052202\79761 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

tection of human rights is even more important now than ever. The US Government 

is deeply committed to the promotion of universal human rights and the development of pluralistic, accountable governments. 

As the President said in his State of the Union Address, and as you just heard 

the Secretary say, the events of September 11th necessitate that the international 

war against terrorism be fought not only to protect our rights and freedoms, but 

also to promote them throughout the globe. To my mind, this is most evident in Afghanistan, which a year ago was ruled by one of the world’s most repressive regimes. 

Liberated from the Taliban, Afghans have come to cherish the lives, society and 

freedoms they have regained. Women have begun to assume key roles in the political and economic recovery of their country. Schools have reopened for young 

women, girls and boys. Afghans no longer live in fear of violating some unwritten, 

arbitrary law of behavior enforced at the whim of the Taliban. There is still much 

to be done to ensure public security and reconstruct the country, but no one can 

doubt that 2001 was the year when Afghans began to regain their freedoms. 

We have mentioned a few examples of positive steps being taken around the world 

in the introduction to the Reports. The move towards democratic principles, such 

as transparent elections and accountable governments, continues. In 2001, we saw 

democratic political reforms taking root around the globe, from Peru, to Mexico, to 

Ghana, Senegal and Serbia. 

Still, in our less than perfect world, there is much room for improvement. Some 

of the world’s most repressive regimes, from Cuba to North Korea, have changed 

little over the past year. But elsewhere, some governments are beginning to understand the need for change to get their countries on a sound economic base, and to 

sustain a meaningful long-term relationship with the United States. 

This cannot be achieved without the rule of law, accountability in government, 

and the development of civil society. These are some of the matters we are pursuing 

in expanding dialogues with a number of coalition partners in the war against terrorism. Our alliance has given us wider avenues of discourse with several countries 

where previously we had very limited exchanges. 

The Reports were delivered to Congress earlier this morning. They will be posted 

to the State Department website and be immediately available after this briefing. 

We appreciate the discussion and debate generated by the Reports. We believe such 

discourse can only serve to advance the cause of universal human rights. And with 

that, I’ll open up to your questions.

QUESTION: . . . And then also, some of the allies that you’ve criticized in the report, such as Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, could you talk about how this translates 

into policy? I mean, we support them in financial and other ways, and how does 

that translate? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: . . . On the second question, how does it translate into policy? In a variety of ways. And that is why we try to be as accurate and 

objective in these Reports as possible so it can be a guide to policymakers. We use 

them in our diplomatic discussions with them, but we also use them in talking to 

our allies about the kind of programs we are undertaking in those countries. 

So, for example, in a number of countries that we have become more closely 

aligned with since September 11th, our programs of assistance, democracy assistance, are already ramping up to be able to help civil society, the press and others 

in those countries to try and make them more democratic. 

QUESTION: I’ll follow that. Just give us a couple examples what you’re doing in 

Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Egypt. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: I’ll throw out a few examples. In Uzbekistan, 

we’re undertaking a program to help a variety of civil society groups around the 

country come together to formulate future plans. In Kyrgyzstan, we talk about the 

press in Kyrgyzstan, and we’re going to help fund an independent printing press 

there, an independent printing press to be able to facilitate the printing of newspapers. Those are just two examples that are coming out of my office. 

QUESTION: What about Saudi Arabia? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: We’re getting there.

QUESTION: Lorne, I want to follow up on Saudi Arabia. I’m a little bit surprised 

by your glib answer. With the demise of the Taliban, there is arguably no government in the world that has as bad a human rights record as Saudi Arabia does, 

especially when you consider what it does with half of its population. Even North 

Korea and Iraq don’t put their women behind four layers of veils. 

10

What is the United States doing to actively promote democracy and human rights 

with Saudi Arabia, on the argument that it’s ever more important after 9/11? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: Well, I would say two things. Number one, I disagree that it’s the worst violator. 

QUESTION: Who is the worst violator? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: I would place Iraq and North Korea and Libya 

and a couple of other countries into that category. 

Number two, as the President said in this State of the Union Address near the 

end, in a paragraph that was not as noticed by some as the ‘‘axis of evil’’, we intend 

to begin working with governments to ensure that people who believe in these values have a voice in their country. That is something that, to the degree the President stated it, is new. And that is something we are going to be working on very, 

very much in the future. 

There are a number of countries in the Arab world—there are a number of countries in the Muslim world—that have already, on their own, demonstrated the capacity to begin pluralization and more democratic practices. You see it in Morocco, 

Jordan, Turkey, to a degree in Indonesia. You are also beginning to see it more and 

more in the Persian Gulf, in places like Bahrain and Oman and Qatar, which I mentioned in my introductory remarks in the report. 

It doesn’t mean that they’re perfect. You know, all of these countries I just mentioned in the Persian Gulf have a great problem with trafficking, for example. But 

where people are trying to become more pluralistic and to become more democratic 

on their own, that is something that I think is worthy of our support and can serve 

as an example to others. 

QUESTION: You didn’t answer my question. What is it that we are doing in Saudi 

Arabia to promote that greater voice and greater democratic participation? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: We are talking to the Saudi Government about 

how to do that, and we are going to encourage others in the Muslim world, in the 

Arab world, who are trying to make their societies more democratic. 

QUESTION: At what levels are we talking? I mean, there’s nothing that’s visible 

at all to us in the outside world. It’s different from in the past. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: Okay. I would look at the last paragraph, the last 

couple paragraphs, of the President’s State of the Union Address. 

QUESTION: But I heard this before. I’m asking specifically about one country. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: Yes. What are you asking? 

QUESTION: I’m asking what it is the United States is doing. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: And I think I’ve outlined that. We’re talking to 

them at many levels about these issues in their country. We’re talking to a lot of 

people across the Arab and Muslim world about these issues in their countries and 

about how they can serve as examples to others.

QUESTION: Can I go back to Robin’s question on Saudi Arabia? You mentioned in 

the State of the Union Address that the President wanted to support people who 

believe in our values, to give those people a voice. And in some countries, as mentioned before, such as Uzbekistan, you said that we’re supporting or funding programs. In Kazakhstan you mentioned a printing press. 

Can you point to any kind of tangible things? And when you say we’re talking 

to the Government of Saudi Arabia, are we talking to them about starting such programs up, or are we just simply mentioning that they have a human rights problem? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: Can I talk about tangible advances in particular 

countries? There are things I would point to. Pakistan’s decision to eliminate the 

requirement that religious minorities be elected separately from the mainstream 

electoral system. That is something that we have talked to them about for years. 

Is that something they did? 

QUESTION: Is that something we’ve talked to the Saudis about? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: They don’t have elections. Is that something that 

we’re doing? Is that something they did because we’re allied with them on the war 

on terrorism? I don’t know. But it’s something that we had asked them for for a 

long time that they have now decided to do. 

QUESTION: I’m talking about—and the reason Saudi Arabia is important is because they are a US ally and they are so touchy about what appears—you know, 

sort of American and Western values, particularly when it comes to women. So 

when you mention that you’re having discussions with the Saudis, I think that—

I mean, we’d like to know what specifically do you really plan to do to change 

things, or are you just going to sort of talk to them and talk to them, and keep 

it——

11

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: No. As some of you know, I don’t really enjoy long, 

extended conversations with no outcome, and we’d be looking for an outcome in the 

case with any country we were talking to. 

QUESTION: (Inaudible) before—that previous administrations have done before on 

Saudi Arabia. We’ve been talking for years with the Saudis. What’s different? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: How do you know that? 

QUESTION: Because other administrations told us that they’ve talked to the Saudis 

about human rights and democracy issues, participation in women’s rights and all 

of it. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: Well, yeah, I understand. Other administrations 

have talked about these issues. I hope you’re gong to see more of an effect from this 

administration. 

QUESTION: But what is it—that doesn’t answer the question. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: What is different currently? 

QUESTION: What’s different from what this administration is saying to them than 

previous administrations have said to them? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: You’ll have to judge by the outcome. You’ll have 

to see how we do it differently. 

QUESTION: Why can’t you give us some indication? What’s the big secret? You talk 

about what we’re doing tangibly in every other country but Saudi Arabia. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRANER: Because I don’t yet know the effect in Saudi Arabia. I can tell you an effect in Pakistan or I can tell you an effect in Uzbekistan. 

I don’t yet know the effect in Saudi Arabia. And you will have to judge us not by 

what we say we’re doing, but by what is accomplished in these countries.

Mr. FRANK. The gentleman from California said during the Cold 

War, we obviously had to deal with people when survival was at 

stake that we might not like to. The problem is that we get very 

little from the Saudis today. We do not get full cooperation when 

Americans are killed when they are trying to defend the Saudis. 

I was pleased to read the subsequent testimony from Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Kristol, and I will not preempt what they say, but with 

regard to Saudi Arabia, I agree with the thrust of what they have 

to say. The Saudis have made a kind of deal whereby in return for 

nothing troubling happening to them within their own nation, they 

will play a destructive role elsewhere. 

They are exporters of hatred, trouble and dissatisfaction. As to 

oil, yes, they sell us oil; and yes, we buy oil from them. I don’t believe that they do this as a favor to us. I don’t think the Saudi 

economy today could long sustain any interruption in their ability 

to sell oil. 

With regard to the question of peace in the Middle East, and I 

will close with this, I am pleased that the Saudi Arabia Government did this year, in what I suppose will be known in history as 

the Abdullah-Friedman Treaty, negotiated by the New York Times

columnist and Prince Abdullah, the Saudi Arabians graciously 

agreed to accept the fact that Israel exists. Two things ought to be 

said about this. A year and a half ago when there were serious negotiations going on between then Prime Minister Barak with the 

help of President Clinton and the Palestinian Authority—at least 

we were hoping that they would be serious negotiations; unfortunately I think largely because of the Palestinian Authority’s position, they were not serious—where were the Saudis then? If it is, 

in fact, big news that earlier this year, 2002, the Saudis announced 

that they would accept Israel’s existence, obviously that means in 

2000 when we were at that critical point, they didn’t accept it. 

I think it is an encouraging sign that they have come this far. 

They have moved. That is an encouraging sign. But the fact that 

that is hailed as big news today reinforces the fact that they were 

12

not a constructive force back when that might have had more of an 

impact. 

I remember being told that part of the problem was that Arafat 

was being asked to sign a peace agreement when he was not getting support for that in the Arab world. Well, the Saudis appear 

at that point not to have been supportive. Now they are moving 

better in that direction. There is still an unwillingness to condemn 

the anti-Semitism that the gentleman from California talked about, 

and an unwillingness to confront the attitudinal problems. 

I think we should reexamine our relationship with Saudi Arabia 

and ask more from them in terms of cooperation against terrorism 

and human rights. It cannot be credible for us to make legitimate 

criticisms of the autocratic aspects of the Castro regime, and then 

treat the Saudi Arabians as our best friends in the democratic fraternity. That undercuts our credibility entirely. We can insist that 

they treat Americans fairly when they are there, and ask them to 

be supportive in ways that they have not been in the fight against 

terrorism, and we can hope that this first tentative step—and one 

has to understand the attitude of many Israelis. When the simple 

fact that another nation nearby is willing to admit it has the right 

to exist is treated as an enormous concession, one understands the 

context. It is something that is an improvement, and I hope we will 

encourage it. I don’t think that we encourage constructive behavior 

by indulging unconstructive behavior, and I am afraid that is what 

our policy has been up to now with regard to Saudi Arabia. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Berman, any questions? 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, it was a very good statement. I 

have no questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, we will be able to speak with 

Mr. Frank later, so maybe we should get on with other witnesses. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Frank’s time is limited. I suggest that we ask 

him our questions. 

Mr. FRANK. Actually my time is not limited because you guys 

don’t have the votes to pass the supplemental, and we could be 

here all day. But you do have other witnesses, and I do not want 

to get in their way. 

Mr. GILMAN. Any questions? 

Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Frank, staying on your subject, I respect your concern about 

Saudi Arabia. I share that. I have visited Saudi Arabia both as an 

Army officer and afterwards. I have found it to be a very difficult 

place to do business for Americans and I don’t think that has 

changed much. 

I share most of your concerns about Saudi Arabia coming late to 

the party, although among the 22 members of the Arab League, 

they are not the latest. There are some that have not come yet. 

Last weekend—and you and I had a dialogue on this on the floor—

last weekend the Likud Party in Israel voted—their Central Committee, I think that is what it is called, voted not to recognize the 

right of 31⁄2 million Palestinians not to have a homeland of their 

own, regardless of the U.N. And the inevitability, and regardless of 

leader after leader within Israel over now 25–30 years who have 

13

said that there is an inevitability, that these people are not part 

of Israel, and they have to be given that opportunity, and since 

Oslo it has been considered the right direction. 

In a sense aren’t we faced with a certain level of coming late to 

the party or walking away from the party at the wrong time on 

both sides of this issue, and how do we keep Saudi Arabia engaged 

and ask them to do more if Israel seems to be losing its focus on 

peace? 

Mr. FRANK. First, I would not equate what a political party did, 

particularly when the Prime Minister, who is a member of that 

party, specifically disagrees with that position. I think what the 

Likud did was an error, and I think it was not in Israel’s best interest. I understand the frustrations that have led people to that, 

and I do know that since we are talking about history, we should 

be clear if at any time between 1948 and certainly 1966 the Arab 

world that you referred to wanted to create a Palestinian state, 

they could have done that, and no one would have stopped them. 

Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in fact, were under 

the control of Jordan and Egypt, and they could have done that. 

I do disagree with what Likud did. 

I don’t believe that Israel ought to be told that it has to reach 

an agreement, because it takes two willing parties being willing, 

mutually accommodating to reach an agreement, but I think it is 

in Israel’s interest to continue to try. 

I have to disagree that there is any kind of parallelism between 

the rejectionist position that was the Saudi position until recently, 

and what a political party does in Israel, particularly when all of 

the members of the government have repudiated it. And I also 

mention from the Israeli standpoint, they are not dealing only with 

Saudi Arabia. As you mentioned, Saudi Arabia is not the most 

rejectionist member. In fact, it has become more accommodating. 

Although from the standpoint of evaluating Saudi Arabia, being 

more reasonable than Syria is far too low a bar to set for any country. 

Mr. BERMAN. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ISSA. Yes. 

Mr. BERMAN. I am just wondering if the gentleman would want 

attributed to President Bush, or to himself, all of the positions 

taken by the National Republican Party, or more particularly the 

California Republican Party, and resolutions that they have passed 

over the years? 

Mr. ISSA. Reclaiming my time, I think the point is well taken. 

But to take it to the next logical question, Saudi Arabia has not 

been a partner for peace for a very long time at the level that it 

appears to be today. They are moving in our direction. Yes, it is 

late to the party. Shouldn’t we engage and try to take it to the next 

level? In your opinion as someone who has looked at this for a long 

time, shouldn’t we do that? 

Mr. FRANK. Yes. American continues to be a great friend. If it 

were not for the American military 10 years ago, there would be 

no Saudi Arabia today. It would have been incorporated by its 

brother Arab state, Iraq. 

I am not suggesting that we repudiate them and that we treat 

Saudi Arabia today the way we treat Cuba. I am suggesting that 

14

we have a more engaged relationship in which we put some pressures on them and make some demands on them. I think it has 

been very asymmetric. What they said is if Israel gives up on every 

issue in debate and dispute, we will agree that they can exist. It 

is relevant as a step forward, and it is relevant because it sets the 

context of how far people have to go. 

Yes, I would be encouraging that. I think we should say to the 

Saudi Arabians or anybody else, we want to work with you for 

peace, but we are still going to say that elections are as relevant 

in Saudi Arabia as they are in Cuba. 

I found myself in rare agreement with a spokesperson for the 

Palestinian Authority who was asked by a journalist what he 

thought about the Saudi Arabian call for elections. He said, oh, did 

he mean in Saudi Arabia? That seemed to be a pretty good question for which we ought to ask for the answer. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GILMAN. Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. No questions at this time. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me get this right, Barney. You are not in 

favor of recognizing Cuba until they have free elections and political parties and such? 

Mr. FRANK. No. I am not going to break off relations with China 

or Cuba. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you have a little double standard? 

Mr. FRANK. No. Perhaps you were not listening. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I believe we should be pressuring the Saudis 

toward a more democratic attitude. 

Mr. FRANK. Your problem is that you are equating pressuring 

with breaking off relations. What I am saying is we ought to treat 

all of these autocratic states similarly; that is, Cuba and China. I 

am not for breaking off relations and embargoing all three of them. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did you actually criticize Sadat’s background 

when he stepped forward and say, where were you 2 years ago, as 

you are doing with Prince Abdullah today? 

Mr. FRANK. No, for a very different reason. I thought what President Sadat did was much more forthcoming. Yes, I would note that 

one of the things that made it so extraordinary that President 

Sadat did that was that it reinforced the previous rejectionist theory. I think it is fair to point out that the Egyptians could have 

moved toward creating a Palestinian state for many years. Yes, I 

think it is relevant to say, yes, they are doing this now, and that 

is a good thing, but I think the fact that simple recognition is considered to be such a great thing, that sets context. I also believe 

that what Sadat was going to do, opening it up, exchanging embassies, even though that has not worked out as well as people hoped 

it would, he went further 20 years ago than Abdullah is doing 

today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me point out that when the United 

States decided at last to recognize Communist China, it was a monumental step which had taken a long time. I would suggest that 

the step taken by the Saudi Government in proposing a peace plan 

that includes recognition of Israel by all of the Arab states in which 

it would lead that effort is a monumental step forward, and that 

15

we should applaud it and should not try to minimize it or even to 

demean it. The fact is that we should encourage this and encourage 

progress perhaps based on that peace plan. Obviously it is not 

something that you can just hook in and just start it up and turn 

the key, and that is the end answer, but it is a very big step in 

the right direction. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, let me note that I certainly agree with 

my colleague and friend that we should be pressing not only in 

Saudi Arabia, but in all countries that have Muslims or anywhere 

else, a democratic path so that the people of those countries have 

the right to worship God, speak, have freedom of the press, and 

live their own lives the way they see fit not only in Saudi Arabia, 

but elsewhere throughout the world. 

Mr. FRANK. I am not talking about having a double or triple 

standard. I think with regard to all of these autocratic regimes. It 

ought to be that you have relationships, but within those relationships you put pressure. 

Secondly, with regard to the Saudi peace proposal, I said I welcomed it, but I would disagree if you consider describing it to be 

demeaning it. It is not a peace proposal that anyone would expect 

Israel reasonably to accept. Complete withdrawal from all of the 

boundaries, ambiguity on the right of return which would be 

threatening to Israel’s right to exist. I think it is a fair to say that 

it is a step forward, but also note what else needs to be done. 

My main point is to stress what it means historically. There has 

been this debate, why did we not get an agreement in 2000 when 

the Israeli Government made this very far-reaching proposal. I 

think the fact that the Saudi Arabians are getting so much credit 

today for changing their position, that ought to be noted as evidence that their position 2 years ago during the critical peace negotiations was still a rejectionist one. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If the United States had made any mistake 

in dealing with the Islamic world since the end of the Cold War, 

it has been that we have not championed the cause of democracy 

and the evolution toward a more democratic government in the 

states that are Muslim States, and I would certainly agree with 

you on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Chairman, I am going to pass until the next 

panel. 

Mr. GILMAN. We thank Congressman Frank for his very helpful 

review of the relationship and for bringing it to the attention of the 

Committee. 

The first witness on today’s second panel will be Ambassador 

Richard Murphy of the Council on Foreign Relations. Ambassador 

Murphy is very familiar with this room, where he appeared on 

many, many occasions as Assistant Secretary of State for Near 

Eastern Affairs during the 1980s. He also served as our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world. 

I would ask that you summarize your statement so that the 

Members may have the opportunity to engage you and your fellow 

witnesses. 

16

Further, on this second panel, we have R. James Woolsey, a partner in the law firm of Shea & Gardner, and who served as Director 

of Central Intelligence for 2 years during the Clinton Administration. Although he claims not to be an expert on the Middle East, 

he, in fact, has been involved in policy-making at the highest levels 

of our government for many years and is familiar with the balance 

that must be drawn between energy, security, stability and human 

rights. Mr. Woolsey is a leading voice for intervention against Iraq, 

and we would be interested in his views on how Saudi cooperation 

or lack of cooperation will affect our plans to deal with Saddam. 

Our third witness is William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard and former Chief of Staff to Vice President Quayle and previously to William Bennett when he was Secretary of Education. 

Mr. Kristol also appears frequently as a commentator on television. 

Mr. Kristol has written frequently on the Middle East and along 

with former Director Woolsey had the perspective of the White 

House on balancing our important relationships such as that with 

Saudi Arabia and our other interests around the world. 

Our final witness will be F. Gregory Gause, III, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont and Director of the university’s Middle East studies program. He has a Ph.D. 

from Harvard and worked at the RAND Corporation and Brookings 

Institution. He has published two books on the Gulf States and has 

published articles in a range of scholarly publications. 

Ambassador Murphy, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD W. MURPHY, SENIOR FELLOW MIDDLE EAST, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SAUDI ARABIA (1981–

1983) 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be back in this 

room and in front of your Committee for the first time since leaving 

government service and today with the protection of being just a 

taxpayer in New York. 

I have often said how much I enjoyed the hearings of this Committee. In fact, I have often added quietly that I felt I had to retire 

from government service when I reached the point that I was beginning to enjoy testifying too much. 

Let me start with two of the comments that were made earlier 

by Congressman Frank and some Members of the Committee. The 

issue of coming late to the peace party, well, this Congress may not 

remember, but there was something called the Fahd plan back 

some 21 years ago. It was more specific than that which the Crown 

Prince has proposed, and it had some very awkward points in it, 

but the essence was that Israel would gain peace with the Arabs 

in return for land occupied in 1967. The Crown Prince spoke more 

in terms of a vision. His was a very general statement about normal relations with the Arab world once the land had been returned, but the origin of that idea appeared in 1981, only 2 years 

after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. So let us remember that 

they have not come that late to the party. 

Mr. Lantos talked about getting Saudi pressure on the Taliban 

to conform to Saudi social practices. No, the Taliban had its own 

social practices in the villages of Afghanistan from which it sprang. 

17

They did not need any coaching about how to discriminate against 

women in their society. 

The other point on military support. I had in my written testimony listed with six charges commonly made against Saudi Arabia 

with which I do not agree. Take the question of military support: 

It is asserted that Saudi Arabia is no longer prepared to cooperate 

with the United States militarily, and in any case we do not need 

that support for a campaign against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 

The amount of logistical support given by the Saudis to our campaign in Afghanistan has never been addressed publicly in any detail. I am not a military man—I have no direct military experience, 

but the thousands of air clearances, the access to end utilization of 

the Sultan Command and Control Center near Riyadh was, I am 

told, of inestimable value. The Saudis did not permit American 

planes to take off on bombing runs of Afghanistan, as they have 

not permitted it against Iraq; but they have permitted Operation 

Southern Watch against Iraq all of these years, and when those 

planes are fired on, they fire back. 

The other points, and then I will leave it to the Committee to 

pursue the ones that it wishes: The assertion that the regime is 

tottering and does not deserve U.S. support given the level of its 

corruption and its human rights abuses; that Saudi oil is not that 

important to the United States, and we should be developing alternative sources; that Saudi Arabia or at least rich Saudis have contributed to al-Qaeda, funding terrorism, that they have contributed 

to Palestinian radical movements and suicide bombings; and in addition that Saudi Arabia does not cooperate on stopping the funding of terrorism; and finally, that Wahhabism is a fountainhead of 

international terror. 

As I wrote, I find these charges inaccurate and misleading, but 

let me go to my recommendations. What should we be pressing the 

Saudis to do? I think we ought to prioritize and focus on Saudi foreign policy rather than domestic policy for these reasons: What 

have we asked that they do, at least in the public debate? Revise 

their educational curriculum, change it. ‘‘You are raising the wrong 

kind of child in your schools, you are raising them badly.’’

First of all, it is too far a reach for any outsider to push any 

country on its school curriculum, and particularly in Saudi Arabia 

where the role of the religious leaders is so very strong in the curriculum. 

Second, the Saudis themselves recognize the problems in their 

system, and they are demanding change. No American visitor to 

the Saudi business community leaves without getting an earful of 

the complaints they have about the inadequacy of the educational 

system, the distortions that do not produce graduates able to fill 

the roles that are waiting for them in modernizing Saudi industry 

and Saudi commerce. Unemployment is up to some 30 percent. 

They are not qualified. 

Third, the Crown Prince himself has taken the lead on this, both 

on educational reform and other social and economic reforms. I 

submit that for the outsider to press is not advantageous. It is 

much better that we support what is being said by the leadership 

itself. 

18

In the international area, I think we do have more latitude. We 

should do everything possible to make it clear that Saudi money 

should not end up in schools or in mosques that preach hate, intolerance, and anti-Americanism. 

We should insist on continued monitoring by the Saudi authorities of donations to charitable institutions. This is not a question 

of challenging any precept of Islam, it is a political issue. 

We should take care not to appear to be opposing the spread of 

Wahhabism. Wahhabism is not a doctrine that is preaching bloodshed and violence. It is a very strict interpretation, some say narrow, some say rigid, but it is not out there preaching bloodshed 

against the non-Wahhabi practitioner of Islam or of other faiths. 

What we can do is to work with other governments, and particularly those in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, especially 

its Northwest Frontier Province. These are where the governments 

lack functioning ministries of education, or do not have the funds 

to develop adequate schools. With regard to the Saudi-funded 

madrassahs (those religious schools where all you really do learn 

is rote memorization of the Koran and some traditions of the first 

century of Islam), those governments would be delighted to get assistance in the planning and expanding of curriculum, training of 

teachers, et cetera. So we can do something directly there. 

Finally, as we try to shape the future of this relationship, let us 

not forget the fact that the Saudi leadership and its relationship 

with the United States was also the target of Osama bin Laden on 

September 11. He and his followers want us out of the Peninsula, 

and they assume that the House of Saud, the royal family, is going 

to collapse as soon as the Americans are gone. I think they are 

wrong. They believe that the House of Saud survives only due to 

American support, and it would be ironic for us to help them reach 

their goal through any misjudgment of our own. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Murphy. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD W. MURPHY, SENIOR FELLOW

MIDDLE EAST, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO

SAUDI ARABIA (1981–1983) 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to testify today on the subject of ‘‘The 

Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations.’’ I welcome the interest which your Subcommittee 

has shown in scheduling this hearing and look forward to our discussion. I consider 

the U.S.-Saudi relationship to be an important one for the advancement of U.S. interests in the region and have always been interested in how it could be improved. 

I have been engaged with Saudi Arabia in several different capacities ever since 

my assignment as political officer in the American Embassy to Saudi Arabia (1963–

66). My later service as Country Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs (1967–68), 

as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1981–83) and as Assistant Secretary of State 

for the Near East and South Asia (1983–89) kept me in close contact with the complicated issues defining Saudi-American relations. I have visited that country frequently since joining the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

What I would like to do is begin with a brief historical review of U.S. policy, discuss commonly held views about Saudi Arabia and then offer some recommendations. 

When I was in government service, ‘‘vital U.S. national interests in the Middle 

East,’’ referred to the security of Israel and access to the energy sources of the Gulf. 

To support that first interest, successive U.S. administrations have worked to advance the Middle East peace process recognizing that Israeli security could only be 

sustained when a general peace was established between it and the Arab World. We 

19

sought to develop the closest possible relations with key Arab countries and move 

them toward peaceful acceptance. 

As for the Gulf region, we stated that it was not in our interest to have any single 

country dominate the Gulf and its energy sources. We worked to assure the flow 

of oil at acceptable prices. This proved to be a complicated task since other foreign 

policy concerns frequently clashed with the principle of assuring the free movement 

of oil from the Gulf into the international market. For example, we led the campaign to impose United Nations sanctions on Iraq and have maintained our own 

sanctions on Iran. 

CURRENT CHARGES AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA

Rarely, if ever, has the Saudi American relationship been the target of such sustained and strident criticism. 

It is asserted that:

1. Dissidence is widespread within Saudi Arabia; the regime is tottering and 

undeserving of U.S. support given the levels of corruption and human rights 

abuse.

2. Saudi Arabia is no longer prepared to cooperate with the United States militarily and such support is unnecessary for a campaign to topple Saddam 

Hussein.

3. Saudi oil is not that important to the United States. For energy security we 

should develop alternative sources.

4. Saudi Arabia, or at least rich Saudis including members of the sizable Royal 

Family, fund terrorism including al Qaeda, Palestinian radical movements 

and suicide bombings of Israelis. In addition, Saudi Arabia does not cooperate in tracking and stopping the funding of terrorism.

5. Wahhabism is a fountainhead of international terrorism.

Crown Prince Abdullah’s peace initiative is a meaningless cynical attempt to ingratiate Saudi Arabia to the United States. 

I assume the Committee has heard these charges and perhaps more. I find them 

inaccurate and misleading. 

1. Dissidence 

Yes it exists. It showed itself in 1979 when a group of Islamic radicals, including 

Saudis, seized control of the Great Mosque in Mecca. They asserted they did so to 

confront a regime that they considered corrupt and impious. 

Eleven years later, as Operation Desert Shield was underway introducing 500,000 

American troops and many other foreign forces to the Kingdom, preachers in some 

Saudi mosques inveighed against the presence of those non-Muslims. This led to the 

jailing of a few of those preachers when they refused to stop their criticism. 

Apparently, neither the American nor the Saudi authorities realized how widespread anti-Western and, particularly, anti-American feelings had become after 

Desert Storm. In 1990, the Saudi leadership rejected Usama bin Laden’s proposal 

to bring a few thousand fighters from the Afghanistan war against the Soviets to 

expel Iraq without the help of other forces. His anger built as Washington continued 

to maintain approximately 5,000 military personnel in the country after the war. 

There were warning signs such as the bombing of the U.S. military advisory office 

in Riyadh in 1995, and the al-Khobar barracks in 1996. The events of 9/11, and the 

revelation that Usama bin Laden had gathered so substantial a following in Saudi 

Arabia, came as a shock to both our governments. 

Critics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship charge that America has supported a corrupt, tyrannical and failing regime against its own people. It is important to note 

that the Royal Family does try to maintain open channels of communication with 

its citizens. The mechanism for this has been the system of the Majlis, where local 

and provincial authorities, the latter being members of the Royal Family, meet with 

the general public at least weekly. At these sessions the officials receive petitions 

for redress, often against government decisions. This system retains its vitality although, admittedly, it works best as a way to address individual grievances and not 

to hold debates on national policy. In the mid-nineties, the King created a Majlis 

ashShura, or Consultative Council, to broaden popular participation in government 

councils. That membership is by nomination and brings together prominent citizens, 

none of them from the Royal Family, who are responsible for reviewing and amending draft government regulations before they are made official. It is a consultative, 

not legislative, authority and without budget powers. It does have the right to question cabinet members on the operations of their departments. 

20

The Saudi leadership knows better than anyone that its future can only be assured if it maintains the loyalty of its citizens. 

2. Military cooperation with Saudi Arabia 

In its effort to bolster Gulf security, Washington has for decades supported Saudi 

Arabia against external aggression. In 1980, just after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran 

war, the President sent American AWACs to provide early warning of any Iranian 

attempt to attack the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Those planes remained on 

station for several years, until the Saudi government had purchased its own AWACs 

and trained its personnel. In 1990–91, Washington asked for and received full Saudi 

support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm which forced Iraq out of Kuwait. 

There had been even earlier cooperation. Military training began in the early 

years of the Cold War. In 1963–64, we helped when Saudi Arabia came under pressure from the United Arab Republic for its support of the Yemeni royalists. And 

there has been Saudi support since Desert Storm for the operation of ‘‘Southern 

Watch’’ over Iraq and since last September for operations in Afghanistan. In this 

connection, it is useful to correct the allegation of non-cooperation by Saudi Arabia 

during the Afghanistan campaign. Riyadh did ban the use of Saudi territory as a 

base for planes engaged in bombing Afghanistan as it had done earlier in the case 

of Iraq. However, the Saudis did provide access to the command and control facility 

at Prince Sultan Air Base. The Pentagon found this facility invaluable to its air 

campaign, along with the thousands of overflight clearances provided by the Kingdom. 

Saudi support will be important to any future activity in Iraq. The need for Saudi 

support will depend on the plans developed by the National Command Authority. 

But Saudi backing can be given in a number of ways that can ease or hinder American operations. The kingdom can give or deny overflight clearances, logistical support, etc. In addition, other Gulf States will find it difficult to assist the United 

States if Saudi Arabia does not endorse such efforts. We should be wary of those 

who say Saudi support is unnecessary. Tacit support, at a minimum, will be very 

important. 

3. Oil Policy 

Gulf oil producers currently supply about 30% of our imported oil and Saudi Arabia about 10% of our total consumption. Saudi Arabia has recently reiterated its 

pledge not to use oil as a political weapon. The only occasion it did so was in 1973–

74, during a six month boycott of the domestic U.S. market. Its action on that occasion was in reaction to the widely publicized American air lift of arms to Israel and 

in response to an Arab World demand that every Arab country makes some sort of 

protest. 

Saudi oil exports make up the overwhelming percentage of its Gross National 

Product. With its vast reserves, estimated at 25% of proven world reserves, it can 

produce oil at the current level of production for another century. 

Saudi policy makers believe, for Saudi Arabia’s own self-interest, that their wisest 

policy is to maintain predictable prices of oil, avoiding spikes which stimulate research on alternative energies and which inevitably collapse, upsetting rational 

plans for the country’s development. They also are investing heavily in developing 

an excess production capacity which they have used to meet global shortfalls. That 

excess is currently about two million barrels per day. There is no other country with 

that excess production capacity. 

Today, the question is often posed whether we should decrease our reliance on 

Saudi oil and Arab oil in general. Alternative foreign sources are being urged in 

places such as Russia and the Central Asian states. These have important reserves 

but the consensus among oil experts is that by the next decade the world will need 

all the oil from all possible producers. Thus it is not a question of other sources replacing Saudi and Arab oil, but of supplementing it. And Gulf oil has the advantage 

in terms of ease of transport and of lower production costs; even though it’s cost 

advantage has shrunk in recent years. 

4. Saudi support of terrorism 

Riyadh was a generous benefactor of the Afghan mujahideen through the 1980s, 

matching the U.S. contribution dollar for dollar. It maintained diplomatic relations 

with the Taliban government until just after 9/11 although it had withdrawn its 

Ambassador in 1998 after the Taliban had refused to turn over Usama bin Laden. 

Throughout the nineties, Riyadh failed to install controls over contributions to the 

Taliban and probably to al Qaeda through Saudi charitable foundations, some of 

whose donors may have been unaware of the purposes to which their donations were 

being put. These donors very likely included not just rich private Saudis, but members of the Royal Family. 

21

Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks and the publication of evidence that 15 of the 

19 hijackers were Saudi citizens; the Saudi Foreign Minister visited Washington. He 

then dispatched representatives of the Saudi Ministry of Finance and Central Bank 

to meet with U.S. Treasury officials. The delegations focused on how to monitor the 

flow of money through charitable foundations to ensure that it did not go to groups 

or individuals supporting terrorism. 

Since those initial conversations with Saudi officials, U.S. Treasury teams have 

made several visits to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries identified as hosting 

organizations under suspicion of funding terrorism. I understand that the Saudis 

have been cooperative and have supported our efforts to close down two charitable 

organizations operating internationally. Secretary O’Neil has applauded the Saudi 

efforts to establish effective controls. 

As we have learned from our own experience tracking the flow of money is not 

easy. For example, it took seven years of investigation of the Texas based Holy Land 

Foundation before the FBI moved to close it down on evidence that it had funneled 

money to Hamas. 

Recently, the Kingdom has been accused of funding Palestinian suicide bombers. 

The fact remains that from the beginning of the intifada in 2000, the Saudi government encouraged its citizens to contribute to the families of the ‘‘victims’’ of the conflict. The government has made no distinction between helping those families whose 

sons and daughters had been suicide bombers and those who had been killed or injured in other actions. They have noted that the families were ignorant of the intentions of their relative to be a suicide bomber. Saudi religious authorities have condemned suicide bombers and the killing of innocent civilians. 

5. Wahhabi practice and the Saudi world view 

This is not the occasion to present anything more than a brief reference to 

Wahhabi practice and how it affects Saudi attitudes towards the outside world. 

They are an instinctively inward looking people. The heartland of the country, the 

Nejd province, where the Royal Family originated, was never colonized. In the eighteenth century, the Saud family leadership entered into a pact with a prominent religious leader, Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab. His followers who are termed 

‘‘Wahhabis’’ advocate a strict, literal interpretation of the Koran and the earliest 

traditions of Islam. 

Their pact is most simply described as a mutual support agreement. The Sauds 

exercise political leadership and the followers of Abdul Wahhab provide spiritual 

guidance. This agreement has persisted to this day with the leading Saudi religious 

family, Al ash-Sheikh, who are the descendants of Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab, 

dominating the clergy while the House of Saud maintains political control. Each legitimizes the other. 

With the conquest in the late 1920’s of what is today Saudi Arabia, the Royal 

Family became responsible for the governance of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. It takes that responsibility seriously and today the King’s official title is ‘‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.’’ The political leadership is wedded to its role as 

promoter of the Wahhabi practice of Islam and leads a highly evangelistic clergy. 

It spends massively on propagation of the faith abroad, a point I will turn to in my 

recommendations. 

6. Middle East Peace and Saudi Arabia 

The Saudi’s well publicized support for the Palestinians has been termed cynical 

on the grounds that it could have helped settle the Palestinian refugees and advocated a peace initiative such as that launched by Crown Prince Abdullah in February years ago. The fact remains that the ‘‘Palestinian Cause’’ is the single issue 

on which the Arab World agrees. Most Arab states for years have seen Israel as 

a state foisted on the region by Western imperialism seeking to dominate the Arab 

World. Ever since 1974, the Arab countries agreed to support the then Palestine 

Liberation Organization as the ‘‘sole legitimate representative’’ of the Palestinian 

people. Today they support the Palestine Authority and its goal of establishing a 

viable independent state of Palestine. 

Crown Prince Abdullah, in company with most other Arab leaders, has made 

plain that restarting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations after 18 months of the intifada 

is an absolute priority and has publicly spoken against any campaign to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. The need for Saudi assistance is debatable, as suggested earlier, but the Administration is clearly on the right course in working hard and persuasively to bring the intifada to an end and restart negotiations. 

Some Arab countries have come to terms with the reality of Israel’s existence 

more quickly than others. The Saudi instinct over the years has been to keep its 

distance from the negotiations between Israel and its immediate neighbors. HowVerDate May 01 2002 10:58 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 079761 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MESA\052202\79761 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
22

ever, it is little remembered that then Crown Prince Fahd did publish a peace plan 

in 1981 two years after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. I recall my own conversations about the Fahd plan with members of Congress in 1981–82 and how quickly 

they dismissed it. 

Abdullah’s peace initiative last February was important because of its simplicity. 

It proposed normal relations between the Arab World and Israel in return for the 

land occupied in 1967. There were grounds for concern that his initiative would be 

adulterated by amendments and ‘‘clarifications’’ at the Arab Summit in Beirut on 

March 27–28, but it survived in its essence. 

Some Israelis scoffed at the summit communique ́. However, more now see 

Abdullah’s initiative at least as the beginning point for a return to negotiations. A 

normal relationship with the Arab World has been the Israeli vision ever since 1948. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

What should we now press Saudi Arabia to do? 

Let me suggest that we prioritize our policy vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. Washington 

should reserve the bulk of its efforts to change Saudi foreign policy rather than its 

domestic policy, as some are advocating. 

Since 9/11, a chorus of ‘‘experts’’ has been urging that Saudi domestic reform, particularly in the realm of education and religion, become America’s primary foreign 

policy goal. They are arguing that we should demand that Saudi Arabia change its 

education curriculum. I believe, for at least three reasons, such an approach would 

be counterproductive. 

First, it is too far a reach for any outsider to fundamentally alter the school curriculum of another country, particularly in a case such as Saudi Arabia where the 

influence of the religious on education is so strong. 

Second, the Saudis themselves recognize the problems inherent in their own system and are demanding change. Even before 9/11, visitors to Saudi Arabia routinely 

heard complaints from their Saudi counterparts about the quality of primary and 

secondary education. Their children are graduating with college degrees and are 

completely unqualified for most jobs in a modern economy. Unemployment in Saudi 

Arabia is said to be upwards of 30%. Complaints by Saudi nationals are reportedly 

leading the government to review and to reform the curriculum. 

The third reason we should proceed cautiously on the domestic front is that the 

Crown Prince himself recognizes the need for change. Statements such as the one 

he made at the summit meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council last December 

showed he is well aware of the need for reforms. He shows every indication that 

he is trying to move his country forward and win back power from the more radical 

elements of the religious establishment. We should support him in his efforts. Our 

direct intervention would undermine a true force for change in Saudi Arabia. In the 

domestic realm, our goal should be to support and encourage change, but there is 

no need to proceed with a heavy hand. 

In the international area, we have more latitude and we should do everything possible to make clear that Saudi money should not end up in schools and mosques 

that preach hate, intolerance and anti-Americanism. We must insist on continuing 

and expanding Saudi cooperation in monitoring where the money of its donors to 

charitable foundations ends up. This is not a question of challenging the precept of 

Islam to be charitable. It is a political issue. Money funneled to al-Qaeda is as antithetical to the Saudi government and to Islam, as it is to the American government. 

On the other hand, Washington should take care not to appear to be trying to 

stop the spread of Wahhabi practices. The Saudi conviction that this is the best 

practice of Islam is not one for the non-Muslim to challenge. 

We can do something about the quality of the religious schools, or madrassas, 

funded by Saudi Arabia in poor countries such as Afghanistan and in regions such 

as the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. In those areas the national Ministries of Education have few official schools and little funding to improve the education offered. Today these madrassas offer the only education to local children and 

that consists of rote memorization of the Koran and the traditions handed down 

from the first century of Islam. Teachers that are exiled from Egypt and Jordan because they are too radical often turn up at schools in East Africa, Central Asia, 

Pakistan and elsewhere. Foreign aid should be directed toward the whole spectrum 

of education, from strengthening education ministries to teacher training to curriculum development. Foreign assistance to those Ministries would be welcome and 

help provide over the longer term a more rounded education. Decision-makers 

should consider the full range of bilateral and multilateral avenues to make this 

happen. 

23

To those who say that the day of the House of Saud is past I say don’t be so sure. 

So far it has maintained the loyalty of its people. If it cannot maintain that loyalty, 

the Royal Family will not last. In any case, it is not evident that a different leadership would better serve our interests or those of the Saudi citizenry. Any sensible 

observer should first consider who would be the likely replacements for the Royal 

Family. Today, they would probably come from the ranks of the religious extremists. 

As we try to shape the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship we should not forget 

the fact that the Saudi leadership and its relationship with the United States was 

also a target, and perhaps the real target, of Usama bin Laden’s followers on 9/11. 

They want us off the Peninsula. They assume that the House of Saud would soon 

thereafter collapse because they believe it survives only thanks to American support. It would be ironic, to say the least, for us to help them reach their goal 

through any misjudgment of our own.

Mr. GILMAN. Our next witness is the former Director of Central 

Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. JAMES WOOLSEY, ATTORNEY, SHEA AND GARDNER, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE (1993–1995) 

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, 

I will submit my full 5 pages for the record and speak from them 

as notes. 

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be made 

part of the record. 

Mr. WOOLSEY. Until 30 years ago our relations with the Saudis 

were generally smooth. We were on the same side in the Cold War. 

Of course, we had the oil embargo in 1973, but 1979 was really the 

crucial year. It was the year when both Khomeini came to power 

in Iran, and the Holy Mosque in Mecca was seized by fanatics and 

reclaimed by the Saudis, only with substantial loss of life and loss 

of face. 

I think that much of our difficulty in dealing with the Saudis 

dates from that period. Beginning around 1979, the Saudis ceded 

an even larger share of control over daily life in Saudi Arabia to 

the Wahhabis. They have, for all practical purposes, forged a 

Faustian bargain with the Wahhabis such that they, the Saudi 

elite, get a free ride in both their corruption and their life-style, 

and the Wahhabis are free and indeed funded to export their particular form of anti-infidel, and in many ways very hatred-based 

form, of Islam into other countries. We have seen this occur in 

Pakistan. We have seen it occur in Afghanistan, and it is occurring 

in other places throughout the world. 

As far as their own education system is concerned, certainly Ambassador Murphy is right, it has substantial disadvantages. Among 

them is that the New York Times cites a poll conducted by Saudi 

intelligence, an interesting polling entity, shared with the U.S. 

Government in January, indicating that over 95 percent of Saudis 

between the ages of 25 and 41 have sympathy for Osama bin 

Laden. Whether this is an accurate report of Saudi views of their 

young adults or is a distortion by their intelligence agency, in either case it says something substantial about their governmental 

or their popular attitudes toward us which have been spawned by 

the Wahhabi education. 

I would say that the thoroughly arrogant and nasty remarks 

about President Bush that were stated by the Saudi Ambassador 

24

in the U.K. and read into the record by Mr. Lantos are somewhat 

typical of this mindset and this attitude. 

I had in my office not long ago a leader, a Muslim leader from 

an Asian country. He was in the United States seeking money from 

foundations so that he could have printed elementary school textbooks to compete with the Wahhabi-funded textbooks which are 

flooding into his country and that are being made available to 

schools there at little or no cost. These preach, as the Wahhabis do, 

that all infidels are the enemy, the same attitude that we see reflected in the statements of the young students in the madrassahs 

in Pakistan on the evening news. 

Now, we also have in this country, I think, a substantial use of 

Wahhabi money for purposes of, in part, establishing institutions 

that are hostile to the United States and to our way of life. I do 

not believe at all that this attitude reflects the overall view of 

American Muslims or American Arabs. 

I might say parenthetically that I have spent several years representing pro bono eight Iraqis who were imprisoned by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on secret evidence charges. 

They were falsely imprisoned. They have been released by the Justice Department or by our victories in court, and I have seen ‘‘up 

close and personal’’ discrimination in the United States Government against Arabs and Muslims. It is ugly. It is as ugly as antiSemitism. It is as ugly as anti-African American expressions of 

prejudice. But that should not let us ignore what Wahhabi-funded 

institutions are essentially doing. 

They and a far more modern movement, the Islamists, are for all 

practical purposes the functional equivalent of the angry German 

nationalism of the period after World War I during the 1920s and 

the early 1930s that gave rise to Nazism. No, not all angry and extreme German nationalists of the 1920s and 1930s became Nazis, 

and not all Islamists or Wahhabis are inclined toward supporting 

al-Qaeda by any means, but that is the soil in which al-Qaeda is 

growing, very much as angry German nationalism was the soil in 

which Nazism grew in the period after World War I. 

The Saudis have expanded their concept of what former Secretary of State George Shultz calls their ‘‘grotesque protection racket’’ to protecting people from being charged even when evidence exists they have been involved in killing Americans. The Saudis 

clearly impeded investigations into both the Riyadh and Khobar 

Tower bombings, which killed 23 Americans in 1995 and 1996. 

They refused to participate in an FAA-run airplane manifest agreement that lets U.S. officials know who is arriving in the U.S. from 

abroad. They refused to take bin Laden into custody in 1996 when 

the Sudanese offered to deliver him there. They also refused to let 

the U.S. take Hezbollah’s Imad Mugniyah, who was responsible for 

bombing our marine barracks in Beirut and the death of a U.S. 

Navy diver, into custody. 

Time and space does not permit chronicling the extensive and 

hideous lies about the United States, and particularly about American Jews, that are spread by the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs and by Saudi Government-controlled media. 

What can be do about this situation? Of course we should not 

withdraw recognition or completely cool our overall relationship 

25

with the Saudi Government. We are condemned to partnership on 

some matters for some time. I think it is important to credit Crown 

Prince Abdullah in what appears to be some move to begin to work 

toward peace with Israel and to restrain some aspects of behavior, 

say, by the Government of Syria and others that are completely opposed to peace in the Mideast. But as Congressman Frank pointed 

out, the Saudis did not play a helpful—indeed they played a quite 

negative—role in 2000 during those crucial negotiations. 

I think we have to focus on steps that we can practically take 

to reduce their leverage and their influence over us. I agree with 

Ambassador Murphy. It would be very difficult for us to change internally the Saudi education system, although we can legitimately 

resist their export of some forms of hatred which they foster. But 

precisely because we cannot make some of the changes that I think 

would be in their and the world’s interest, we have to take, I think, 

at least three steps to undercut their leverage against us. The first 

of these in time I think they might favor. The second two they definitely will not, but none of the three requires confrontation. 

First of all, although we should not be seen to be withdrawing 

our military forces from Saudi Arabia under pressure from alQaeda or anyone else, I think we should steadily take steps to be 

ready at the appropriate point to reduce our presence there and to 

transfer our military activities to other places in the Persian Gulf 

where we already have some presence. 

I don’t believe that we, in any circumstances, want to look as if 

we are leaving Saudi Arabia under pressure. Therefore I think we 

should wait for some turn of events in our advantage. 

My favorite would be, as the Chairman mentioned, the replacement of the Baathist regime in Iraq. We should wait for some occasion such as that to move our military forces out of Saudi Arabia, 

but I think whatever the logistical advantages, and they are there, 

we can get the job done of keeping the peace and fighting as we 

need to fight in the Gulf without the Saudis. 

Second, a year ago I would not have said the following, but now 

I believe it is very much in our interest. President Putin, in his response to September 11, his acceptance of U.S. military deployments in Central Asia and, even more surprisingly, in Georgia, his 

reasonable response to President Bush’s withdrawal from the ABM 

Treaty, and his spurning of OPEC seem to indicate that he is casting his lot in important ways with the West. 

Now, the Russian level of oil production is high, but it could be 

even higher if it were not for the deplorable state of Russian oil 

pipelines. And there are certain limitations to the degree to which 

Russia can serve as a supplier of last resort in the world, the way 

the Saudis do, because of the temperature, the climate in Russia, 

and other factors about their oil; but we probably could do a good 

deal more than we have done to help the Russians obtain a substantially greater share of the world’s oil market to, I would hope, 

the disadvantage of the dictatorships and authoritarian regimes of 

the Persian Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia. I would very much 

like to see the Saudis perceive a coordinated Western effort to shift 

reliance on oil, at least to some degree, in Russia’s direction. 

I believe that Russian prosperity is far more likely than Russian 

poverty over the course of the years to come to encourage a growth 

26

of a Russian middle class and the kind of stability and rule of law 

that we need in Russia. 

There are still many problems, many difficulties in Russia, but 

on balance, I think this shift would be a very positive and reasonable one. 

Let me close with a final suggestion which is one that was made 

31⁄2 years ago by Senator Richard Lugar and myself in an article 

in Foreign Affairs magazine called ‘‘The New Petroleum.’’ I believe 

that together with a sharp shift toward improving vehicle mileage 

in the United States, including by encouraging, for example, hybrid 

vehicles, it is also important for us to move decisively to replace petroleum-based transportation fuels with domestically produced alternative fuels. 

It is of central importance that I am not—repeat, not; for a third 

time, not—proposing a movement toward increased reliance on ethanol derived from corn or from starches. Ethanol from starches will 

never provide more than a tiny share of our transportation fuel 

needs. Rather, what Senator Lugar and I proposed was a movement to fuels that can be produced from agricultural wastes, from 

prairie grasses, from other cheap and widely available feedstocks, 

in order to reduce costs and to make these fuels competitive with 

gasoline, even if the price of petroleum were down into the range 

of $10 to $15 a barrel. 

I believe this is practical once one moves toward these other 

waste-type feedstocks, rather than corn, as a source of ethanol and 

other types of bio-based fuels. 

Senator Lugar and I also stressed that unlike the case with fuel 

cells in the far-distant hydrogen economy, biofuels can be used in 

the existing transportation infrastructure, in vehicles that are currently in production, in fuel transport and storage facilities that already exist. 

And finally, if this effort is combined with the encouragement of 

higher-mileage vehicles, such as hybrids, we could not only relatively quickly have vehicles, including hybrid SUVs, that achieve 

around 40 miles a gallon in fuel efficiency, but that same vehicle, 

if it were using a substantial share of biomass-based ethanol, 

would be getting over 100 miles per gallon of gasoline since only 

a small share of its fuel would be gasoline. 

As a general matter, I believe these three steps, or steps like 

them, taken toward reducing our reliance on the Saudis, reducing 

our reliance on their bases, reducing our reliance on their oil, are 

very much in the security interests of the United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Woolsey. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woolsey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. JAMES WOOLSEY, ATTORNEY, SHEA

AND GARDNER, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (1993–1995) 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I was honored to be asked to testify 

today, all the more so since I do not pretend to be an expert on Saudi Arabia or 

the Middle East. I hope that nevertheless these observations are useful. 

Since the Saudi conquest of the Hejaz from the Hashemites in 1924 and the formal establishment of the state of Saudi Arabia in 1932—more or less simultaneously with the discovery of huge oil deposits in the kingdom—Saudi Arabia has 

been of substantial importance in the world. So although the Saudis have existed 

as a tribe and a family in control of a small portion of Arabia for centuries, their 

27

influence, even their existence as a nation, has come about within the life span of 

many now living, including the kingdom’s effective ruler today, Crown Prince 

Abdullah. 

Until less than thirty years ago our relations with the Saudis were generally 

smooth. We were on the same side in the cold war, and the Saudis valued our support (and we theirs) against Soviet influence in the Mideast. Of course the oil embargo of 1973 created major stress, but the watershed year was 1979, when Khomeini came to power in Iran and extremists took over the holiest of Islam’s shrines, 

the Mosque in Mecca, which was under the protection of the Saudi King; it was reclaimed by the Saudis only after substantial loss of both life and face. 

As recently as the late 70’s before these two events occurred the world of USSaudi relations was a reasonably close and relaxed one. A number of Saudis prominent in government, the military, and the oil business had been educated in the 

West and were on quite easy terms, at least privately, with Western values and 

ways. If you will permit me one personal but I think useful vignette, I was in the 

Kingdom on navy-related matters (I was Under Secretary of the Navy at the time) 

in 1978 and through a friend of a friend I was invited to a Saudi home for dinner. 

There were several Saudi men there, all of whom had been educated in the West; 

they were accompanied by their wives, who had also spent substantial time in the 

West, wearing modest but lovely Western dresses; everyone had an aperitif before 

dinner; the conversation about world events was informed, sophisticated, and urbane. It was very much like an evening I spent shortly thereafter in Israel. 

I dare say that sort of evening would not occur in today’s Saudi Arabia. Not only 

would the dinner be all-male (and certainly no aperitifs) but I would imagine that 

the Saudi participants would be far less likely to have either studied in the West 

or be familiar with many issues from a Western perspective. 

A major part of the reason for this and other important changes in the Kingdom 

was the Saudi royal family’s reaction to the tumultuous year of 1979. We are still 

feeling the after-shocks today. The Saudis chose after the twin shocks of that year 

to strike a Faustian bargain with the Wahhabi sect and not only to accommodate 

their views about propriety, pious behavior, and Islamic law, but effectively to turn 

over education in the Kingdom to them and later to fund the expansion into Pakistan and elsewhere of their extreme, hostile, anti-modern, and anti-infidel form of 

Islam. The other side of the bargain was that if the Wahhabis would concentrate 

their attacks on, essentially, the U.S. and Israel, the Saudi elite would get a moreor-less free ride from the Wahhabis and their corruption and their life-styles would 

be overlooked. 

As a result, as Adam Garfinkle puts it in a superb essay in the current issue of 

The National Interest (‘‘Weak Realpolitik’’) this Wahhabi sect, which would have 

been regarded as recently as fifty years ago as ‘‘exotic, marginal and austere to the 

point of neurotic’’ by a large majority of Muslims, is extremely powerful and influential in the Muslim world due to Saudi government support and the oil wealth of 

the Arabian peninsula. Former Secretary of State George Shultz, not known for either a propensity for overstatement or for hostility to the Saudis, calls this deflection of Wahhabi anger toward us ‘‘a grotesque protection racket.’’

This Faustian bargain has had a huge effect on opinion in the Kingdom. Bernard 

Lewis points out that throughout most of the history of Islam in most parts of the 

Muslim world, Muslims have generally been more tolerant than many other religions—Jews and Christians, as ‘‘People of the Book’’, were dealt with especially tolerantly. Today in the Kingdom, however, young people are systematically infused 

with hostility for infidels. Moreover, most young Saudis are not equipped when they 

graduate from school to perform the jobs necessary to operate a modern economy. 

Instead many are employed, if that is the right word, as, e.g., religious police—walking the streets to harass women whose veils may not fully cover their faces, for example. Young Saudis’ anger based on their lack of useful work and their indoctrination is palpable. It is not an accident that 15 of the 19 terrorists who attacked us 

September 11 were Saudis. The New York Times (January 27, 2002) cites a poll conducted by Saudi Intelligence and shared with the U.S. government that over 95% 

of Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41 have sympathy for Osama bin Laden. 

Whether this report from the Saudi government of their young adults’ views is accurate or distorted, it makes an important point about hostility to us, either by the 

government, the people, or both. 

The Saudi-funded, Wahhabi-operated export of hatred for us reaches around the 

globe. It is well known that the religious schools of Pakistan that educated a large 

share of the Taliban and al Qaeda are Wahhabi. But Pakistan is not the sole target. 

I had in my office recently a moderate Muslim leader from an Asian country. He 

was in the U.S., seeking to obtain funds from foundations, so that he could have 

printed elementary school textbooks to compete with the Wahhabi-funded textbooks 

28

that are flooding his country and that are being made available to schools at little 

or no cost. The Wahhabi textbooks in his country, like textbooks in Saudi Arabia, 

teach that it is the obligation of all Muslims to consider all infidels the enemy. As 

an illustration of the consequences of such teaching, I have heard that in some cases 

during the fighting in Bosnia in the early nineties, American churches and synagogues that were raising funds for food and other aid for the Bosnian Muslims 

would approach local mosques and suggest a cooperative effort. On a number of occasions they were turned down and didn’t understand why. The reason was that for 

a Wahhabi Imam (and Sheikh Kabbani, perhaps the U.S.’s leading moderate Muslim leader, says that a substantial share of American mosques have Wahhabi-funded Imams), it is normally not believed to be permissible for Muslims to work with 

infidels, even if the purpose is to help Muslims. I don’t believe at all that this attitude reflects the views of a substantial number of American Muslims, but it may 

indicate one way that the Wahhabi reach extends into this country as well. 

Americans are not normally comfortable distinguishing between what is acceptable and what is not acceptable within a religion, unless they are, say, debating 

views within their own church. Because of the First Amendment and American culture, most Americans tend not to make judgments about others’ religions. But the 

Wahhabis and the Islamists whom they work with and support have a long political 

reach and their views have substantial political effect. One analogue for 

Wahhabism’s political influence today might be the extremely angry form taken by 

much of German nationalism in the period after WW I. Not all angry and extreme 

German nationalists (or their sympathizers in the U.S.) in that period were or became Nazis. But just as angry and extreme German nationalism of that period was 

the soil in which Nazism grew, Wahhabi and Islamist extremism today is the soil 

in which al Qaeda and its sister terrorist organizations are growing. 

Some of the consequences of this ‘‘grotesque protection racket’’ have been quite 

lethal: American deaths and the failure to apprehend the terrorists who killed them. 

Garfinkle, supra, chronicles some of the history: The Saudis impeded the investigations into the Riyadh and Khobar Towers bombings that killed 23 Americans in 

1995 and 1996. The Saudis refuse to participate in an FAA-run airplane manifest 

agreement that lets U.S. officials know who is arriving in the U.S. from abroad. The 

Saudis refused to take bin Laden into custody in 1996 when the Sudanese offered 

to deliver him there. They also refused to let the U.S. take Hezbollah’s Imad 

Mughniyah (responsible for the bombing of our Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 

and the murder of a U.S. Navy diver in 1985) into custody when he had planned 

to stop over in Jeddah in 1995. Time and space does not permit chronicling the extensive and hideous lies about the United States and American Jews that are 

spread by the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs and government-controlled media. 

What can we do about this situation? 

Obviously there are issues on which we must work with the Saudi government 

and matters on which it is in our interest to maintain cordial relations. For example, insofar as Crown Prince Abdullah is now willing to attempt to restrain the Palestinian Authority from sponsoring and tolerating terrorism against Israel, this 

could contribute to progress in reducing the level of violence in the Mideast. Recent 

press reports of the Crown Prince’s efforts along this line, and of his effort to restrain the Government of Syria in its support for Palestinian terrorism, may suggest 

some encouraging beginnings of a new Saudi policy. Any such efforts would be a 

major departure from the negative role the Saudis played in 2000 during the IsraeliPalestinian negotiations of that year, but obviously the U.S. Government must try 

to encourage a new Saudi policy, and encouragement requires cordial relations and 

diplomacy. 

But this does not mean that we should not move to reduce the substantial leverage the Saudis have, and at times have used, as a result of their strategic location, 

their level of oil production and, even more importantly, their vast oil reserves. I 

would conclude with three measures that I believe could contribute to reducing their 

leverage over us. The first of these the Saudis might favor, the other two they definitely will not. But none requires confrontation, merely persistence in advancing our 

national interest. 

First, although we should not be seen to be withdrawing our military forces from 

Saudi Arabia under pressure from al Qaeda or anyone else, I believe that we should 

steadily take steps behind the scenes so that at a point when it is clear that we 

are not moving from weakness (e.g., a successful action on our part to remove the 

Baathist regime in Iraq would provide a good opportunity to take this action) we 

can transfer our remaining forces out of the Kingdom and into other facilities in the 

Gulf region. Not only do we not want our use of force constrained in the future by 

Saudi intransigence, and not only do we not want the women in our military forces 

subjected to restrictions and humiliation, but we have now seen the Saudis’ lack of 

29

cooperation on two occasions when American troops have been killed by terrorists 

in the Kingdom. In my view if for this reason alone, at the first appropriate opportunity we should move our forces elsewhere. 

Second, a year ago I would not have said the following, but in light of the events 

since September 11 I now believe it is a reasonable course. President Putin, in his 

response to September 11, his acceptance of U.S. military deployments (over important advisors’ objections) in Central Asia and, even more surprisingly, in Georgia, 

his reasonable response to President Bush’s withdrawal to the ABM Treaty, and his 

spurning of OPEC, seems to have cast Russia’s lot in important ways with the West. 

The Russian level of oil production capacity is high and would be even higher if it 

were not for the deplorable state of Russian oil pipelines, most of which are still 

government-owned, and the lack of pipelines in many places where they are needed. 

I believe that we should urge Russia to take steps to obtain Western investment 

to modernize and expand its pipeline network, urge Europe to take more Russian 

oil, give American oil companies incentives to cooperate with Russian companies, 

and generally seek to encourage both a greater Russian share of world oil production and to increase Russian capacity, as much as possible, to provide reserve capacity for the world. There are certain aspects of Russian oil production, including Russia’s climate, that will restrict Russia’s ability to move as far to provide surge production capacity as one might like. And Saudi, indeed Gulf, oil reserves will be central to the oil business as long as oil is used. But I would like for the Saudis to 

perceive a coordinated Western effort to shift to Russia as much of the world’s oil 

purchases and reliance as is practical. This would have the added positive effect of 

providing a tangible quid pro quo for some of the steps President Putin has taken. 

Moreover, for some years to come until other industries are successfully developed 

Russian prosperity will depend heavily upon its oil exports. Russian prosperity is 

far more likely than Russian poverty to encourage the growth of a middle class and 

the kind of stability in Russia that could now give solid roots to Russian political 

liberalization and the development of the rule of law. 

Finally, I believe that we should undertake in this country a sharp shift toward 

improving vehicle mileage and also toward the replacement of petroleum-based 

transportation fuels with domestically-produced alternative fuels, especially those 

derived from wastes and cellulosic biomass. Senator Richard Lugar and I published 

an article over three years ago in Foreign Affairs, ‘‘The New Petroleum’’ (Jan.-Feb. 

1999), on this subject, and I have provided a copy to the Committee. Briefly, our 

article assesses the strong advantages, from the point of view of national security, 

the environment, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, U.S. economic security, and 

rural development around the world of using the development of genetically-modified biocatalysts to enable us to move toward producing and using these fuels to reduce steadily our need for petroleum. 

It is of central importance that Senator Lugar and I are not proposing in this 

piece a movement toward increased reliance on ethanol derived from corn or other 

starches; the latter will never provide more than a tiny share of our transportation 

fuel needs. Rather we are proposing a movement to fuels that can now be produced 

from agricultural wastes, prairie grasses, and other cheap and widely-available feedstocks in order to reduce costs and to make these fuels competitive with gasoline 

even if the price of petroleum moves down into the range of $10–15/bbl. We also 

stress that, unlike the case with fuel cells and the far-distant hydrogen economy, 

these fuels can be used in the existing transportation infrastructure—in vehicles 

that are currently in production and in fuel transport and storage facilities that already exist. Finally, if this effort is combined with the encouragement of highermileage vehicles such as hybrids now on the market, we could not only relatively 

quickly have vehicles (including hybrid SUV’s) that achieve around 40 mpg in fuel

efficiency (a reasonable hybrid mileage), but that also achieve well over 100 mpg 

of gasoline mileage (since a substantial share of the fuel used in such vehicles would 

be cellulosic ethanol). 

As a general matter I believe that these steps toward reducing our reliance on 

Saudi bases and Saudi oil would be solidly in the interest of the security of the 

United States, especially in the world in which we have all lived since September 

11.

Mr. GILMAN. Our next witness is William Kristol, Editor of the 

Weekly Standard, and former Chief of Staff to Vice President 

Quayle. 

You may proceed. 

30

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM KRISTOL, EDITOR, 

THE WEEKLY STANDARD, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF TO VICE 

PRESIDENT QUAYLE (1989–1993) 

Mr. KRISTOL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my prepared 

statement be made part of the record. 

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection, your entire statement will be 

made part of the record. 

Mr. KRISTOL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is good to be here. Let me summarize my points briefly. 

Since the end of World War II, the United States has regarded 

the Saudi regime as a friend, an ally, or at least a partner for stability in the Middle East. I now believe that after September 11 we 

need to call this assumption into question. We need to rethink our 

relationship with Riyadh, for we are now at war, a war with terror 

and a war with terror’s main sponsor in the world radical Islam; 

and in this war, the Saudi regime is more part of the problem than 

part of the solution. 

It is part of the problem in a very specific way. The most recent 

instances of terror in the world have tended to be terror against 

Israeli civilians. The Saudis are financial sponsors of those terrorist 

acts. The documents produced by the Israeli Government, discovered by the Israeli Government in the West Bank, make this clear. 

I notice the State Department quietly verified yesterday the authenticity of these documents. 

More particularly, when you look closely at these documents, it 

turns out that the Saudi financial backing is focused particularly 

on Hamas, the most intransigent and the most bloody—if one can 

rank these different terrorist organizations—in terms of its willingness to kill Israelis and, for that matter, American citizens in 

Israel gratuitously. 

So there is precise evidence of Saudi backing of terror in addition 

to the broader point: Which is, in exporting Wahhabi Islam, the 

Saudis are exporting a kind of religious belief, or idealogy as it 

turns out, that encourages those who are educated in Wahhabi 

madrassahs or who fall into Wahhabi circles to a jihad-like incitement against non-Muslims and, in fact, against other Muslims as 

well. 

The combination of Wahhabi idealogy and Saudi money, I believe, has contributed more to the radicalization and anti-Americanization of large parts of the Islamic world than any other single 

factor; and in that respect, though the Saudis don’t present the 

kind of threat to us that Iraq and Iran or North Korea do, and 

therefore they may not qualify to be in the first tier of the ‘‘axis 

of evil,’’ in truth, in the war on terror, thinking about radical Islamic terrorism as a problem and thinking honestly and analytically about what government is more responsible for the growth of 

this problem over the last couple of decades than any other. I think 

the Saudis have a real claim, unfortunately, to being as responsible, really more responsible as any other government for fostering 

the climate in which these terrorists have been produced and, indeed, for turning at best a blind eye and at worst giving a wink 

and a nod to the development of terror in Islamic circles around 

the world. 

31

This has been a terrible disservice, among other things; apart 

from all the horrible death and grief and damage it has caused and 

the potential for instability around the world, it is, of course, a horrible disservice to the religion of Islam itself, which the Saudis 

have tried to hijack, in a sense, in the name of their own particular 

brand. 

I would emphasize that, though I am reasonably happy occasionally to put pressure on countries for their domestic human rights 

problems and policies—and Congressman Frank mentioned some of 

those—the issue here is not really Saudi self-government. As distasteful as many of us might find it, the issue is the Saudi export 

of Wahhabi Islam, which has helped destabilize nations around the 

world, which has clearly provided a breeding ground for terror, and 

which has been inimical to American interests and American principles. So we are not talking here about gratuitously deciding that 

we happen to dislike Wahhabi Islam. We are talking about the 

real-world, practical consequences of real-world, practical Saudi 

policy of exporting Wahhabi Islam. 

There is no law of nature that says the Saudis have to spend a 

billion dollars a year funding Wahhabi Islam around the world, trying to exclude and damage other forms of Islam in some of these 

countries. They could stop this. And one of the first things we could 

do, and should be doing, is pressuring the current regime to stop 

it. I think the only way to pressure the Saudis to stop is through 

a combination of public and private diplomacy. Moreover I think 

this public pressure could help those who probably are genuine reformers within the Saudi regime. 

Reports are that Crown Prince Abdullah is perhaps such a reformer. It would help his efforts to reform, just as it helped 

Gorbachev’s efforts to reform the Soviet Union, I would argue, for 

the U.S. to make clear that the status quo is unacceptable—that 

unless they reform, there will be real consequences. And just as 

Gorbachev was faced with the unappealing prospect of a big arms 

race that he couldn’t win and with President Reagan challenging 

the moral claims of the Soviet regime, I believe that, if you think 

there is a realistic prospect for internal reform in the Saudi regime, 

the single best thing we could do in addition to some private work 

is to pressure publicly the Saudi regime to change and make clear 

that the status quo is unacceptable. 

First, we should demand the cessation of the funding of radical 

Wahhabi Islam around the world, insisting on what President Bush 

has otherwise insisted on—either you are with us or you are 

against us, either you help us in the fight against terrorism or you 

don’t. And, as I say, this isn’t simply a theoretical issue. The 

Saudis actually are held, I think, reasonably responsible for much 

of the underlying educational infrastructure which has turned out 

to be a breeding ground for terrorism around the world. 

We have all been struck, Mr. Chairman, in the last few days by 

the warnings that the Administration has given us about the possibility, the likelihood—and sometimes they say the inevitability, although I hate to hear that word—of renewed acts of terrorism here 

in the United States. 

We have also seen renewed terrorism not just against Israel, but 

against Frenchmen and against Germans in Tunisia and Pakistan. 

32

The truth is, and I say this with regret, that with respect to the 

actual individuals who commit these acts of terrorism, if we trace 

back who funded them, who helped persuade them that terror was 

an appropriate instrument of policy, we are going to find Saudi 

money and Saudi support, just as we would if we actually investigated seriously the roots of September 11. 

Mohamed Atta left Egypt, went to Germany. What did he do in 

Germany? Who funded the mosques he attended in Germany? 

Whose money was it that helped put together the terrorist network 

that he was a part of? I suspect there is Saudi money and Saudi 

export of Wahhabi Islam behind much of this terror. And, if we are 

serious about the war on terrorism, I think we have to be really 

serious about telling the Saudi regime that this is unacceptable. 

We can, of course, offer to work with them to change their policies 

and we can pressure them to change their policies. Ultimately, 

however, we can’t count on them changing their policies. And that 

means, I think, that as a last resort, or as a possible resort, beginning to look for partners in the region other than Saudi Arabia, 

and preparing for a possible regime change in Saudi Arabia. This 

is not something we would attempt to bring about unilaterally, but 

of course it could happen in any case. But there are other nations 

with oil, and more important, frankly, nations in the region who 

could be and should be partners of ours. 

This is especially the case if we could liberate the people of Iraq 

from the horrible dictator under whom they have suffered. Iraq 

could become an extremely important strategic partner. A democratic and pro-Western Iraq would be an important model for the 

rest of the Arab world and for the Islamic world. 

In general, we have learned over the last 25 years that Persian 

Gulf dictators, whether in Tehran or Baghdad or, I would say now, 

in Riyadh, are very shaky partners for the U.S. to work with and 

to depend on. Indeed, they often cause major problems; and I think 

it would be prudent and important for the United States to begin 

making plans for other partners in the region than the current 

Saudi regime. 

Obviously, the first alternative is to be honest with the Saudi regime, to put pressure on them privately and publicly to mend their 

ways; and because I think we haven’t tried to pressure them in any 

significant way, we shouldn’t despair about the possibility of that 

working. 

Finally, I would simply say the one thing we have not done in 

this Nation, at least not publicly, is have a serious investigation 

into September 11—not just into U.S. intelligence failures, and not 

just U.S. policy failures. In addition, we should be looking into 

where did these people get their support, how did this network get 

put together, what nations—other than Afghanistan obviously—

what regimes other than Afghanistan helped directly or indirectly 

sponsor or harbor or foster terrorists and terrorism? And that is an 

investigation that could be carried out by the executive branch or 

it could be a congressional investigation. But, in any case, it would 

be worth taking a serious look at how this group got put together 

and was able to operate in the way it did. 

No one has mentioned this yet, so I will just raise this question 

regarding the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which we all agree 

33

we were right to remove from power as the host of al-Qaeda, why 

was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan? It wasn’t exactly an indigenous bunch of Afghans who decided that Wahhabi Islam was a 

wonderful way of life. 

They were funded by the Saudis. The Saudis were one of three 

countries that recognized them. The other main one was Pakistan. 

We went to Pakistan on September 12 and said, either you are 

with us or you are against us; either you change your policies fundamentally, General Musharraf, or you too will become a target in 

the war on terrorism. We can debate just how much Pakistan has 

succeeded in changing. General Musharraf has real challenges 

ahead of him, but it is clear that we at least went to him and gave 

him an ultimatum. We have done nothing similar with the Saudis, 

and I think it would be appropriate to do so. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Kristol. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kristol follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM KRISTOL, EDITOR, The Weekly 

Standard, former Chief of Staff to Vice President Quayle (1989–1993) 

Since the end of World War II, the United States has regarded the al-Saud regime 

as a friend, or an ally, or at least a partner for stability in the Middle East. After 

September 11, it is time to call this assumption into question. It is time for the 

United States to rethink its relationship with Riyadh. For we are now at war—at 

war with terror and its sponsor, radical Islam. And in this war, the Saudi regime 

is more part of the problem than part of the solution 

The case for reevaluating our strategic partnership with the current Saudi regime 

is a strong one. Begin with the simple fact that 15 of the 19 participants in the September 11 attacks were Saudi nationals. That’s something the Saudis themselves 

could not initially admit. A large proportion—perhaps as high as 80 percent, according to some reports—of the ‘‘detainees’’ taken from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay 

are Saudis. And although Osama bin Laden has made much of his antipathy to the 

Saudi regime, his true relationship with the royal family is certainly more complex 

and questionable. The Saudis refused, despite the urgings of the Clinton Administration, to take him into custody in 1996 when Sudan offered to deliver him. 

The Saudis also have been deeply implicated in the wave of suicide bombers that 

have attacked Israeli citizens—and American citizens in Israel—in recent years. 

Again, initial Saudi official reaction has been to deny the link. Even as documents 

captured by Israel in its spring offensive against the Palestinian Authority revealed 

the Saudi role, the kingdom’s ambassador to the United States denounced as ‘‘baseless’’ any suggestion that Saudi money ‘‘goes to evildoers.’’ The Israelis, Prince Bandar complained, were engaged in a ‘‘shameful and counterproductive’’ attempt to discredit his family ‘‘which has been a leading voice for peace.’’ The charge ‘‘that Saudi 

Arabia is paying suicide bombers’’ is ‘‘totally false,’’ he said. 

The prince’s claim is proven false not simply by the documents discovered by 

Israel but by the Saudi government’s own press releases. One from January 2001 

boasts how the ‘‘Saudi Committee for Support of the Al-Quds Intifada,’’ headed and 

administered by Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, the kingdom’s interior minister, has 

distributed $33 million to ‘‘deserving Palestinians’’ including ‘‘the families of 2,281 

prisoners and 358 martyrs.’’ Other releases from subsequent months detailed further payments to Palestinian ‘‘martyrs’’ totaling tens of millions of dollars. Public 

announcements in Palestinian newspapers have given instructions on how to receive 

payments from the intifada committee. And the documents make clear the close connection between the Saudis and the terrorist Hamas organization in particular. 

But even more important than funding terrorist acts has been the Saudi regime’s 

general and aggressive export of Wahhabi fundamentalism. ‘‘Saudi Arabia,’’ writes 

Michael Vlahos of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, has 

‘‘sought to make Islam a sort of wholly-owned subsidiary of the Saud family.’’ 

Wahhabi teachings, religious schools and Saudi oil money have encouraged young 

Muslims in countries around the world to a jihad-like incitement against non-Muslims. The combination of Wahhabi ideology and Saudi money has contributed more 

to the radicalization and anti-Americanization of large parts of the Islamic world 

than any other single factor. 

34

It has taken something like willful ignorance on the part of successive American 

administrations to ignore such developments or explain them away, and to maintain 

the fiction that the Saudis are our ‘‘strategic partners.’’ Clinton National Security 

Adviser Sandy Berger lamented—once safely out of office—that ‘‘the veil has been 

lifted [from over U.S.-Saudi relations] and the American people see a double game 

they’re not terribly pleased with.’’ Brent Scowcroft, always cautious, admitted, ‘‘We 

[Americans and Saudis] probably avoid talking about the things that are the real 

problems between us because it’s a very polite relationship. We don’t get all that 

much below the surface.’’ Former Secretary of State George Shultz bluntly terms the 

traditional U.S.-Saudi relationship ‘‘a grotesque protection racket.’’

Clearly, the long tradition of quiet diplomacy with the Saudi monarchy no longer 

serves American purposes. The royal family has taken silence as consent in its 

strategy of directing Arab and Islamic discontent away from the House of Saud and 

toward the United States, Israel and the West. This is a strategy inimical to American security and a dangerously crippling problem in President Bush’s war on terrorism. 

The first step in fashioning a realistic American policy toward Saudi Arabia is understanding the nature of the Saudi regime. We should begin by a public, detailed 

and thorough investigation—perhaps initiated by this committee—into the Saudi 

role in the events of September 11. This should be a broad investigation, addressing 

the ideological preparation, financing and recruitment of terrorists eager to commit 

suicidal attacks. Congress should not be deterred in this by any concurrent investigations by the Justice Department. 

Public knowledge can then be the basis for public diplomacy. Only by applying 

pressure can we encourage whatever modernizing movement there may be within 

the royal family and the armed forces while isolating the radical Wahhabi clerics 

and their supporters. Prince Abdullah is sometimes seen as a reformer. We should 

give him every incentive to reform the current Saudi regime, and the main such incentive would be to tell him, privately and publicly, that the status quo is unacceptable. 

Beyond speaking truth to the House of Saud and encouraging modernization within Saudi Arabia, the United States should demand that the Saudis stop financing 

and encouraging radical and extreme Wahhabism, beginning with mosques and 

charities in the United States but extending also throughout the Islamic world, including Pakistan, Afghanistan and other trouble spots. Given its role in providing 

a breeding ground for anti-American terror, the export of Wahhabism is a clear and 

present danger to the United States and its citizens. In general, we must make clear 

that the Saudis can no longer play both sides of the fence. What President Bush 

has demanded of others—to cut off all support for terrorists and to stand with the 

United States—applies also to Saudi Arabia. 

At the same time, it is clear that we cannot base our strategy for the region on 

the hope that the Saudis will moderate their behavior to suit our interests. To the 

Saudis we have been, at best, allies of convenience, shielding them from other 

would-be regional hegemons with greater conventional military strength, larger populations and more diverse economies. The Saudi desire to create a caliphate of 

money and religious extremism depends upon an unwitting American partner. 

So in addition to hoping for and encouraging change from within Saudi Arabia, 

we should develop strategic alternatives to reliance on Riyadh. In the military 

sphere, we have already begun to hedge, with agreements and deployments to other 

Gulf emirates. Although still the strongest influence on oil prices, other sources—

in Russia, the Caspian Basin, Mexico and elsewhere—can be developed and brought 

to market at a reasonable cost. The attacks of September 11 remind us that it is 

not just what we pay at the pump but what we pay in lives, security and international political stability that comprise the true price of Saudi oil. 

In particular, removing the regime of Saddam Hussein and helping construct a 

decent Iraqi society and economy would be a tremendous step toward reducing 

Saudi leverage. Bringing Iraqi oil fully into world markets would improve energy 

economics. From a military and strategic perspective, Iraq is more important than 

Saudi Arabia. And building a representative government in Baghdad would demonstrate that democracy can work in the Arab world. This, too, would be a useful 

challenge to the current Saudi regime. 

In sum, we should not be attempting to preserve our past relationship with Saudi 

Arabia but rather forging a new approach to the greater Middle East. We have 

learned at great cost that Persian Gulf dictators, be they in Tehran, Baghdad or Riyadh, are shaky partners at best and cause major problems at worst. In the future 

we must find an alternative—either through reform in Saudi Arabia and/or the fostering of other relationships with truer allies—to a Saudi regime that funds and foments terror.

35

Mr. GILMAN. Our final panelist is Dr. Gregory Gause, Associate 

Professor of the Department of Political Science at the University 

of Vermont. 

You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF F. GREGORY GAUSE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF 

VERMONT 

Mr. GAUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to have 

this opportunity. 

September 11 has focused all our attentions on Saudi Arabia in 

a way that is unparalleled in the history of the U.S.-Saudi relationship even during the days of the Saudi oil embargo of 1973–74. The 

negative feelings among Americans toward the Saudis are certainly 

understandable, particularly given the originally equivocating response of many Saudi officials to the event and to American requests for Saudi assistance in our war against the Taliban and alQaeda. 

The intensity of those negative feelings toward Saudi Arabia, 

however, is at least somewhat based on what I think is a false 

premise, that Saudi Arabia is our friend in a way that Great Britain or Canada is a friend to the United States, sharing our cultural 

values, our system of government, our general view of the world. 

This belief, I think, stemmed in large part from our cooperation 

with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf War and the very close military and 

political relations we have had with Riyadh since 1991. Thus, in 

the minds of many, if September 11 and its aftermath have proved 

that Saudi Arabia is not a friend, then it must be something of an 

enemy. I think that conclusion is equally false. 

We should think of Saudi Arabia not as a friend nor as an 

enemy, but as a strategic partner on a limited number of very important issues for our national interests, most importantly on oil 

issues and the stability of the Persian-Arabian Gulf area. The Gulf 

War exemplifies this strategic partnership. We did not fight the 

Gulf War because we liked the Saudis or to do them any favors. 

We fought that war because we have a national interest, recognized 

since World War II and codified in the Carter Doctrine of 1980, in 

preventing any hostile power from dominating a region that contains two-thirds of the world’s known reserves of oil. Thus, we can 

work together on this centrally important issue. 

The fact that a majority of the 19 terrorists who perpetrated the 

attacks on our fellow citizens and our country on September 11 

were from Saudi Arabia has raised important questions about the 

Saudi domestic political system in the minds of Americans. It is 

undoubtedly true the official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia, what is referred to here in the West as ‘‘Wahhabism,’’ is doctrinally rigid, limited and extremely conservative in dealing with 

modern intellectual innovations. However, this has been true since 

the founding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and throughout the 

more than 50 years of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Osama bin 

Laden and those Saudis who perpetrated the events of September 

11 were animated not by the official Islam preached in Saudi Arabia today but by a transnational Islamist movement, based on an 

extreme, gross interpretation of Muslim history and philosophy 

36

that unfortunately has attracted adherence in small but significant 

numbers, from across the Arab world and across the Muslim world 

in the past 2 decades. 

There are certainly many Saudis who have been caught up in 

this movement, even some within the official religious hierarchy in 

Saudi Arabia, but also many Pakistanis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Algerians, Indonesians, and others. This dangerous trend is not 

Saudi or Wahhabi in any exclusive sense; it is unfortunately part 

of the zeitgeist of the whole Muslim world right now. 

The Saudi Government has for over a decade recognized the 

threat that this extremist Islamist current poses for its own stability and survival, more so since September 11. We can and should 

push them to police this current domestically more vigorously. If 

we have evidence that senior members of Saudi society, including 

of the ruling family, are directly supporting al-Qaeda and similar 

groups that are planning attacks on America, I don’t think you 

need some academic from the hinterlands to tell our government 

what to do. 

We can and should have forceful and productive discussions with 

the Saudi Government about the moneys, both official and private, 

that go from Saudi Arabia to Muslim charities and organizations 

abroad. The Saudi Government has already, since 9–11, taken 

some steps to exercise greater control over how Saudi charitable 

contributions are used abroad. 

However, we should be very circumspect about making domestic 

reform a major issue on the U.S.-Saudi agenda. Pushing for greater 

openness in the political system, like elections, right now will only 

give forces in society that are more sympathetic to extremist Islamic positions a greater role in Saudi society and will undercut 

those in both the ruling family and in the larger society, small in 

number but in influential positions, who see the need for changes. 

Saudi Arabia needs educational reform to produce graduates able 

to get jobs in the modern economy. This has been a matter of profound debate among Saudis long before September 11, but any educational reform that seems to be coming from American pressure 

will face many more obstacles to acceptance than plans generated 

from within Saudi Arabia itself. We need to avoid the hubris of 

thinking that we know how to govern Saudi Arabia society better 

than the Al Saud do, and to remember that any alternative to Al 

Saud rule in Arabia right now would be much less amenable to 

American interests and even, I would argue, to American values 

than the current regime is. 

Strategic partnership does not mean agreement on all issues, as 

the history of U.S.-Saudi relations demonstrates. For over 50 years, 

we have disagreed with the Saudis on Arab-Israeli issues. Only 

once in that history, however, have Arab-Israeli issues led to a 

breach in our relations with Riyadh that profoundly harmed our interests, the 1973–74 oil embargo. Riyadh has managed to deal with 

its differences with us on Arab-Israeli issues since then in ways 

that have not directly harmed our interests, and have allowed 

them to manage the real and important public opinion sentiments 

in Saudi Arabia on the Palestinian issue. 

Crown Prince Abdullah’s recent initiative, while hardly a panacea for Arab-Israeli problems, is at least a step in the right direcVerDate May 01 2002 10:58 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 079761 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MESA\052202\79761 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tion from our perspective, but for us to try to force the Saudis to 

get too far ahead of their population on the Arab-Israeli issue will 

not only not work, it will make obtaining Saudi cooperation on 

other issues of importance—oil, Gulf stability, future scenarios in 

Iraq—more difficult. 

The closeness of the last 11 years in the U.S.-Saudi relationship 

has been unusual. The Saudis have always preferred to keep their 

American connection, particularly in its military form, over the horizon. That bit of distance was seen as useful for them both in 

terms of regional politics and in terms of dealing with their own 

people. My sense is that the Saudi rulers would prefer returning 

to that kind of relationship—close, cooperative, not a divorce, but 

maybe not so close a marriage as they have had over the past decade. 

We have different societies, political systems, cultures. There is 

no strong constituency in our society that supports a close relationship with Saudi Arabia. Likewise, there is no real popular base of 

support in Saudi Arabia for close relations with the United States. 

This has always been a relationship built on mutual interests, 

not shared values, based on common understandings among elites, 

not general publics. I don’t think that is a bad thing. Those common interests are very important to us as a country. But putting 

a bit of distance back into the relationship, particularly regarding 

the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia, on the model of 

the 1980s, might not be a bad thing. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Gause. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gause follows:]

38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF F. GREGORY GAUSE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT

OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT


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Mr. GILMAN. One of our Members has a meeting within a few 

minutes, and with the Committee’s indulgence, I will call Mr. Pitts 

at this time. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your courtesy, and I will submit my opening statement for the record if that 

is agreeable. 

To the panel, when the Crown Prince visited the President in 

Crawford, Texas, recently, he brought a prominent government 

cleric named Sheik Saad Al-Buraik with him in his entourage. You 

probably read some of the things he said. Let me give you a couple 

quotes. This is what he said about America,

‘‘I am against America until this life ends. Until the day of 

judgment, I am against America. Even if the stone liquefies, 

she is the root of all evil, the wickedness on Earth.’’

This is what he says about Jews and Christians,

‘‘Don’t take the Jews and Christian as allies. Do not have any 

mercy, neither compassion on the Jews, their blood, their 

money or their flesh,’’

and I won’t read the more shocking statements about Jewish 

women. 

But my question is, why would Saudi Arabia act like our ally and 

support government clerics like this who have such blatant antiAmerican racist statements? Often in their official and semiofficial 

government organs they permit criticisms, anti-American statements that show a strong antipathy toward America. 

And would you comment on these remarks and what the U.S. 

Government should do in response, Mr. Woolsey? 

Mr. WOOLSEY. I think these are rather mainline Wahhabi views, 

Congressman. I think if one reads the translations by MEMRI and 

other services of statements from Saudi clerics and even some government ministries and certainly government controlled media, 

this is what they say. Sometimes they say it slightly less pungently 

than the Sheik did. Sometimes they say it more vividly. 

I understand there were a number of American churches and 

synagogues during the Bosnian fighting in the early 1990s that 

were collecting funds, as we do here in this country, for the relief 

of the Bosnian Muslims, and on a number of occasions they would 

go to a local mosque and propose that they work on it together and 

would be turned down. The reason was that the imam was 

Wahhabi and his view was that Muslims don’t cooperate with 

infidels even to help other Muslims. 

The view of such a Wahhabi imam might well parallel what you 

read. 

Now, not all Wahhabis are that pungent, but this is not outside—just following this as a reader of the Internet—not outside 

the range of mainline Wahhabi comment, particularly since September 11, but before that as well. 

Mr. PITTS. What about the comments of officials, Saudi officials, 

in their government? The Saudi Ambassador to London talked 

about our President. He said,

‘‘From the very beginning it was obvious that little George 

wanted to come out from under the shadow of big George. The 

53

truth is that his complex was evident even before he entered 

the White House when he insisted on introducing himself as 

George ‘Dubya,’ as he pronounced it. His complex became deeper when he needed the help of the old faces of his father’s Administration. If we take into account the Freudian problems 

from which no family is free—one example, W’s past alcoholism, his father’s disappointment, other problems, the younger brother is smarter,’’

et cetera, et cetera—is this appropriate language for government 

officials to use and do you know, yes, the Saudi Government tolerates such statements? 

Mr. WOOLSEY. I will defer to Ambassador Murphy on that. 

Mr. MURPHY. That is language that no Ambassador should use 

is the short answer. 

The malevolence—and this wasn’t malevolence; this man considers himself an outstanding satirist. Still, it is not language for 

an Ambassador to be using. I am with you on that, Congressman. 

I think that 9–11 and the aftermath came as a surprise to the 

Saudi rulers in one area they had not focused on, which was the 

malevolence towards them of some members of their own clergy. 

The clergy are all government employees, they are all salaried. So 

whether one is prominent or not so prominent, they are all government employees. 

There is this 250-year-old pact between the clergy and the ruling 

religious family and the House of Saud, which constrains both parties and gives legitimacy to both. The malevolence of some of them, 

which surfaced over the U.S. presence first in 1990–91, led to the 

arrest of a few—I couldn’t give you exact number; perhaps Dr. 

Gause has that—but I would estimate that a half-dozen clerics 

were locked up for refusing to stop preaching against the impiety 

of the leadership for having invited the American forces into the 

Kingdom. 

So the Saudi rulers were surprised by the growth of that malevolence in the 10 years that followed, the same 10 years that saw the 

growth of support for Osama bin Laden. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Do you want an 

additional question? 

Mr. PITTS. One other witness wanted to say something, Mr. 

Chairman and——

Mr. GAUSE. Right. Thank you. I think that the quote you cite 

from Saad Al-Buraik was during that telethon for the Palestinians, 

obviously at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian issue was at its 

height in terms of Arab public opinion—not that this is acceptable 

or anything, but I think that some of the things we are seeing in 

the translations in MEMRI and things like that are a result, ironically, of a slight opening up of the Saudi press. 

Now, this is relative to the Saudi system, but there has been in 

the last year a bit more freedom for Saudis to express themselves 

in the press, and unfortunately that means we see more of this 

stuff because, as Mr. Woolsey pointed out, this is not an unusual 

strand of opinion in Saudi Arabia. I don’t know if I would characterize it as mainstream Wahhabi, but it is not an unusual strand 

of opinion in Saudi Arabia. 

54

The other irony that one can point out is that twice members 

have referred to the Saudi Ambassador in London, in that editorial 

he wrote in Al-Hayat before September 11 critical of President 

Bush; and as the Ambassador said, it is not ambassadorial language, but the irony is, if you are going to have more openness in 

Saudi Arabia, if you are going to have a society that is more open 

to debate in which women play a greater role, actually that Ambassador, Ghazi Al-Qusaibi, is going to be one of the people in the forefront of that movement. And there is the irony. I mean, he actually 

is a Saudi liberal on domestic Saudi issues and it does get you into 

a very almost contradictory set of opinions that one hears in Saudi 

Arabia. 

Mr. PITTS. And if they want to improve their image, it might be 

more prudent to spend the $10 million on improving their human 

rights record rather than on a PR firm. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. That is a strange form of liberalism. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And before I begin, I 

want to announce the Chairman had passed me a note and my own 

staff had passed me a note that CNN is reporting that there was 

another suicide bombing in Israel just now, and at least 20 people 

were wounded and two killed in Rishon Letzion, south of Tel Aviv. 

So the killing of innocent civilians continues, and it continues with 

Saudi money and Saudi propaganda. 

Earlier this year the Saudis, the leader of Saudi Arabia, came 

out with the so-called ‘‘Saudi peace plan.’’ I say so-called because 

I frankly am very skeptical. Twenty months ago when Mr. Arafat 

was deciding whether or not he would choose the path of peace or 

the path of war, there was a proposal, as we all know, offered to 

him, which would have given his people a state of their own, billions of dollars of foreign aid, 100 percent of Gaza, 97 percent of 

the West Bank. And Mr. Arafat walked away and said no, and the 

intifada was unleashed. 

He didn’t offer a counterproposal. He didn’t offer any kind of alternative. He just said no. I would like to ask, where were the 

Saudis 20 months ago when perhaps, if they had embraced such a 

peace plan, they could have convinced Mr. Arafat to accept peace 

rather than war? 

So you will excuse me if I am skeptical of the Saudi peace plan 

which, first of all, I think is unrealistic because Israel cannot return to the pre-1967 boundaries which are indefensible and were 

simply armistice lines. There was not any significance to them at 

all. 

And when the Saudis mentioned that they had this so-called 

peace plan, Israel welcomed the proposal and suggested that Israeli 

and Saudi officials meet directly to discuss it. The Saudi response 

was essentially that the plan had to be implemented unilaterally 

by Israel, and then the Saudis would reciprocate by providing an 

unidentified type of relations which keeps getting vaguer and 

vaguer on behalf of the entire Arab world. 

So I would like to ask any of the panelists if they care to comment on how seriously we can take the Saudis so-called peace plan 

when they were nowhere to be found 20 months ago, when it would 

55

have mattered. And the fact of the matter is that the peace plan 

is essentially the demands of the Palestinians and none of Israel’s 

legitimate concerns are taken into account. 

Mr. KRISTOL. I agree with your scepticism about the Saudi peace 

plan. I think it was mostly a PR effort to repair their justifiably 

damaged image in the United States. One point that hasn’t been 

made is, as far as I know, every Saudi Government official, in explaining the so-called peace plan—which isn’t really a plan, but let 

us say the outline—when pressed, has insisted that it has to include the full right of return for Palestinians, which, in addition to 

the insistence that the 1967 borders be reestablished is a total nonstarter and really a code word for the destruction of Israel as a 

Jewish state. 

So I don’t put quite as much credence as some do in how helpful 

the Saudis have been to the Israeli-Palestinian effort. 

I would also emphasize that we are engaged in a war on terror. 

The Arab-Israeli problem, the Palestinian-Israeli problem is longstanding, and it isn’t going to be solved in the next few months. 

And, the truth is, it’s not going to be solved if the Saudis become 

wildly helpful. And it’s not going to get much worse, I suppose, if 

the Saudis are unhelpful. 

What is true is that the Saudis are funding terrorists who attack 

Israeli civilians; and I would come back to the fact that those documents recently released by Israel suggest a particularly close link 

between the Saudis and Hamas. So, even if you want to believe, 

which I don’t particularly, but even if one wanted to believe that 

the Palestinian Authority itself was interested in peace or that 

Arafat was trying to control terror, what everyone agrees on is that 

Hamas has no interest in peace, the recognition of Israel, or controlling terror against Israeli civilians. Hamas is the one organization which has the closest links and the most direct funding from 

the Saudis. So, if they really want to be helpful with regard to the 

Israeli-Palestinian problem, they could stop this support. 

But I would also say, from the U.S. point of view, it is their complicity in the broader problem of terror against Americans, as well 

as Israelis, that seems to me really worthy of investigation; that is 

the new fact, so to speak, since September 11 that people have not 

wanted to focus on, but I think we now need to really be serious 

about. 

To what extent is Saudi Arabia part of the solution to the war 

on terror and to what extent are they really part of the problem—

and more than part of the problem, to what extent are they really 

central to the problem? 

Put it this way: If you did not have the Saudi regime you currently have in place—incidentally, it is not that they have been the 

same for 70 years; they have been exporting Wahhabi Islam for 

only the last 20 years—would you have the terror network that developed and that produced September 11 and all the related terrorism? I think the answer to that is probably, no, actually. 

So the Saudis are central, I think, to the ‘‘axis of evil’’ if the axis 

of evil is the axis of terror as opposed to the axis of weapons of 

mass destruction. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

56

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, if I could have 20 seconds more, I 

just want to comment. 

I agree with everything you have said, Mr. Kristol, and I think 

your point about the full right of return is something that should 

be explored more because that obviously is a deal-breaker. And it 

is clear to me that Saudi Arabia, as you mentioned, has been 

throwing money at the terrorists saying essentially, leave us alone 

and we are going to look the other way. And they have been looking the other way too long, and it includes Saudi-funded schools in 

the United States, and the Saudi telethon for Palestinian martyrs. 

These are the things we need to assess when we look at the U.S.-

Saudi relationship. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

I agree with the statement that Saudi Arabia has been there and 

has been host to our airplanes to take care of the Southern Watch, 

but I can’t help but note that they were not there for us to use 

their bases to fly missions in Afghanistan, and had we not had our 

aircraft carriers, we would not have been successful. 

I guess my question to you is: What do you think the Saudi response would be if we took them up on their request, or their wish, 

to pull out and said, we are not coming back? 

Is there anybody who wants to answer? 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I think, Congresswoman, that you are leaping 

ahead of where we are. They have not, to my knowledge, asked us 

to leave; and I see no point in our asking to be asked to leave. I 

believe that the Pentagon is very sensible in diversifying our presence around the Arabian Peninsula. But I warn against any assumption, if we are ordered to leave that we are going to find hospitality elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula. We should not coast 

on that assumption. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Had some not made it clear that it 

might be their wish that we would leave? 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it was certainly the expressed wish of Osama 

bin Laden and those clerics who were locked up in the 1990s. As 

far as the Iraq situation goes, which is the reason we stayed there, 

the Saudis are not convinced that we are that serious. Eleven years 

later you are telling us you are serious? Well, obviously our dialogue on Iraq needs more attention. 

Mr. WOOLSEY. I agree with Ambassador Murphy on this point. 

I think we should prepare to leave, but only leave in a condition 

of strength on our part—for example, after having been successful 

in Iraq was the example that I used. 

I don’t think at all we want to be asked to leave, and I think that 

the Saudis are likely to be helpful, even if only modestly perhaps, 

in any move that we make against Iraq, really only in two cases. 

First of all, if they are absolutely and clearly convinced that we 

are determined to replace the Baathist regime and that we will 

commit the resources that will make it successful, reversing the decision we made 11 years ago. 

57

And, secondly, and I think this is also important, they need to 

be convinced that we do not need them, because I think only if they 

are convinced that we are absolutely determined to succeed, that 

we will succeed, and that we don’t need them—only in those circumstances will they show up and say, well, maybe we can be of 

some assistance. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Kristol, I would like to hear from 

you. 

Mr. KRISTOL. Well, I call attention to the following irony. 

Three thousand Americans were killed by hijackers, most of 

whom were Saudis. In addition, they were part of a terrorist organization which has some links to the Saudi regime, I would argue, 

including Osama himself, who certainly has had links to part of the 

regime. 

But then the President decides that he wants to consider removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq to prevent a second 9–11, 

and the one nation in the world where we have prepositioned our 

critical air power assets in anticipation for this eventuality, a nation whose existence we saved 11 years ago, decides they are not 

going to cooperate, or cooperate fully, in this endeavor. 

And obviously the Defense Department is, it is no secret, making 

plans to carry out operations against Iraq with little help from 

Saudi Arabia. That does tell you something about the relationship, 

and it does make me wonder. 

As a purely analytical matter, I think it is inconceivable that 10 

years from now we will have the same relationship with Saudi Arabia. It would be very imprudent, as a matter of defense planning, 

given this experience, to assume that these bases in Saudi Arabia 

are useful for very much. 

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

I want to mention to my colleagues, we are on a vote and this 

room has to be cleared at 4 o’clock, so I am going to ask our colleagues if you will indulge in just one question to the panelists and 

quickly. 

Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. That is a very tough request, Mr. Chairman, so I 

am going to try to make my one compound question, and preface 

it by saying that, Ambassador Murphy, I remember we dealt extensively in the 1980s and had a lot of contact then dealing with the 

State Department, who saw Iraq in a certain way—great respect 

for the expertise there, less respect for the accuracy of the conclusions. 

I am curious about both Ambassador Murphy’s and Jim 

Woolsey’s thoughts on this: That one of the reasons for the Saudi 

reluctance to see us invade Iraq, a regime change and depose Saddam, is a fear that in fact what the critics of it talk about as 

‘‘chaos’’ in fact could turn out to be a somewhat interesting institutional situation where people of Kurdish and Arab ethnicity and 

Sunni and Shiite affiliations might be able to put together a regime 

that starts the development of a democratic process right there in 

the heart of the Middle East and that nothing scares the Saudi 

leaders more than that thought of—not the vacuum that is left, not 

the chaos that arranges, not the civil war that ensues, not the role 

of Iran, but the realization of one of the underlying values of AmerVerDate May 01 2002 10:58 Aug 28, 2002 Jkt 079761 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MESA\052202\79761 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ican foreign policy—it has been for a long time—that actually 

starts to take hold of Iraq after a regime change. 

And this isn’t about insufficient dialogue. This isn’t about, we 

haven’t been nice enough to them. This isn’t about the suffering of 

the Palestinian people. By the way, the Saudis were the first ones 

to cut off the Palestinian people the day that they ended up supporting Saddam in the Gulf War. They weren’t worried about the 

plight of the Palestinian people then and for a time after. But anyway, enough rhetorical asides. That is the basic question. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if the question is, why are they reluctant to 

see us overthrow Saddam because of the chaos that——

Mr. BERMAN. No. It is because of the democracy——

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. Or the emergence, with his overthrow, 

of democracy. I don’t think that is their worry. I look at them looking down from Riyadh at Bahrain. Bahrain, the very small island 

just off the coast there, has taken some extraordinary steps on the 

path of democracy these last few months. The Saudis obviously 

posed no objection. What they are concerned about in Iraq is disintegration. You say it is a question of the different ethnic communities developing in a more democratic way. I think they are concerned that it would be the different ethnic communities pulling 

apart, and the country falling apart. Artificial as Iraq is historically, they don’t want to see, nor does anyone in the area want to 

see, Kurdistan independent, Baghdad separate and——

Mr. BERMAN. I am told that Kurdish Iraqis have no interest in 

secession, that the Kurds and the Arabs in Iraq are not fundamentally enemies and that, in fact, it is against——

Mr. GILMAN. May I interrupt the gentleman so that other Members can——

Mr. BERMAN. Well, can Mr. Woolsey——

Mr. WOOLSEY. I will say very briefly that I agree with Congressman Berman. I think democracy in Baghdad, a central country of 

the Mideast, is a very different thing for the Saudis than democracy in Bahrain; and I think Bernard Lewis is right that Iraq is 

probably reasonably well suited to democracy for an Arab state, 

and I think it strikes fear into the Saudis’ hearts to think that we 

might shift toward a focus of relying on a democratic Iraq rather 

than them as a centerpiece of our alliances in the Gulf area. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Cooksey. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will ask an easy 

question that requires only a crystal ball. 

Can you foresee any scenario in which there will be an overthrow 

of the existing monarchs in say four or five countries in a close 

time frame, and there would be a lot of turmoil in, say, three or 

four of those countries? They seem to have gone through a phase 

of monarchs and then they go to nationalism as Egypt and Syria 

and Libya have; and then they end up with these Islamic governments. And possibly Lebanon—and I was there last November—

has got some semblance of a democracy. 

But can you see a scenario in which there would be turmoil in 

all these countries in a close time frame and yet everything could 

shake up, they could separate church and state and end up with 

a democracy and have freedom of speech and rule of law, private 

59

property rights, human rights, and as the father of three daughters, treat women properly? 

Mr. Woolsey. 

Mr. WOOLSEY. Congressman, I will just say that I think progress 

toward democracy in the Mideast will be halting and slow and it 

will take a good deal of time. This is the last part of the world 

which is really largely untouched by democracy. 

After all, there are a lot of people who said in 1945 Germany 

could never be a democracy, nor Japan, and a lot of people said 

China wouldn’t, but Taiwan has made it, and that Russia never 

would. But Russia is kind of getting there. 

I think there are cultural reasons why the Arab Mideast has 

been quite resistant to democracy, there are about 45 predominantly Muslim countries; Freedom House says that of the half that 

are non-Arab, about 23 countries, half of them are democracies, including some of the poorest countries in the world—Mali, Bangladesh. They are not all perfect, but they are democracies. 

And I think this shows that the problem is not Islam. There is 

a certain cultural thing with Wahhabiism. There is the history of 

the way the British and French treated the Middle East. There are 

a lot of reasons why I think democracy is difficult in the Arab Middle East, but I don’t think it is impossible. 

I frankly think the regime in the Mideast that is in the most 

prerevolutionary situation, sort of like the Soviet Union in the mid1980s, is Iran. I think the mullahs are beginning to lose control; 

179 out of the 280 or 290 members of the parliament of Iran just 

in late April signed a petition to the the rulers, attacking them for 

having political prisoners and attacking the use of torture. 

The Iranian rulers have lost the women, they have lost the 

young people, they have lost a lot of the reformers, they have even 

lost a fair number of mullahs in the holy city of Qom. They had 

huge demonstrations last fall, tens of thousands of young people 

demonstrating against the mullahs and chanting, among other 

things, ‘‘Death to the Taliban in Kabul and in Tehran.’’ So I think 

the country in the Mideast, in that part of the world, that is the 

most likely to tremble and have a change in government is, frankly, Iran, not one of the monarchies of the Gulf. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will just be very quick here. First of all, I 

would like to say, I am sorry, Howard, you took a little too long. 

But let me just say, I am a little bit shocked at the people trying 

to minimize the importance of the Saudi peace plan. If Ronald 

Reagan were President of the United States, he would be trying to 

see what they could do to make progress based on a statement like 

this, rather than trying to minimize it. I think it is a horrible, horrible thing it for people to minimize an opening like this. 

Number two, there has been a lot said—terrorism, terrorism, terrorism—and certainly I agree that those people who target noncombatants. And as we have just heard, in Israel there has been 

another attack; it is a horrible crime against humanity that concerns us. 

But let us not forget there are other dead bodies on the ground, 

of noncombatants, and there are a lot of Arab and Muslim kids and 

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Palestinian bodies on the ground as well; and that affects the psychology of these people, and we need to make sure that we condemn the death of all noncombatants. 

I just don’t buy that all of the noncombatants that have been 

killed there that are Palestinians are just—that that was not intentional, every one of these kids who have been killed were nonintentional. So there is a problem there. We need to make sure that we 

don’t have a double standard. 

And I agree with you, Mr. Kristol, we need to go——

Mr. SHERMAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No. I have about 1 minute because another 

one of our colleagues talked over some important time. 

Let me say this, that you are absolutely right, we need to go to 

the Saudis and say, you are either with us or against us; and Mr. 

Kristol, you are absolutely right about the negative influence that 

the Saudis have had in spreading the kind of hatred that exists. 

We need peacemakers and we need to work with the peacemakers, 

and the Saudis are either with us or against us. Musharraf in 

Pakistan has changed, tried to change. We need to put that same 

challenge to the Saudis, and either they change or they are not 

going to be our friends. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired, so that I may 

have one question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. But let us not have a double standard here and let us try to be peacemakers so people will really listen to us when——

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

I want to, first of all, thank our panelists. I am sorry that we 

are relegated to the time factors here today and to the voting on 

the floor. 

I am going to ask our panelists if you would submit to us in writing just one response: What is the best thing that we could do to 

repair our relationship with Saudi Arabia, prevent the funding and 

support of terrorism, religious intolerance, human rights violations, 

anti-Semitism—all the things that we have pointed to today that 

have made a wider gap between our two nations? 

If you could give us a short written statement of how best we 

could repair our relationship, we would welcome it. 

The meeting stands adjourned. We thank our panelists. 

[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman, the Saudi government currently is spending over $10 million with 

a PR firm to improve their image in the United States. 

A primary reason for the negative Saudi image in the U.S. is the myriad human 

rights abuses in that nation, including the terrible oppression of women, the payment of thousands of dollars to families of suicide bombers; the widespread torture 

in prisons; the 40,000 plus Muttawah (or religious police) who roam the country; 

and the trafficking of women and girls for sex. 

The list goes on. 

It might be more productive for the Saudi government to spend that $10 million 

to actually improve the human rights situation and lives of the people of Saudi Arabia. 

Only by doing this will their image improve. 

The State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices emphatically 

state, ‘‘Freedom of religion does not exist’’ in Saudi Arabia. 

I receive numerous reports in my office detailing the arrest of individuals from 

Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria, the Philippines, India, and other nations simply for the 

peaceful practice of their religious beliefs. 

The Saudi government even arrested a pregnant woman, threatened and detained 

her, and would not allow her to leave the country until her husband came back and 

submitted to arrest and probable torture for his leading a Bible study in their home. 

Mr. Chairman, why is it that the Saudis fund and build numerous mosques in 

our country, but their government will NOT allow a single church, synagogue or 

temple to be built in their country? 

Further, domestic workers from other nations suffer at the hand of their employers—many young women are forced to serve as sex slaves to the Saudi men. 

Yet, because of racial discrimination, they are not able to take legal action against 

those employers. 

The Protection Project, at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in their comprehensive report on Trafficking of Persons, marks Saudi Arabia as 

a destination country for trafficked individuals. 

Young women and girls from Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Bangladesh, Nepal, 

and India are trafficked into Saudi Arabia for use in brothels. 

Mr. Chairman, the reason the Saudis want to improve their image in the U.S. 

and the international community is very well detailed in the State Department. Listen to this list of statements: 

‘‘There were credible reports that the authorities abused detainees, both citizens 

and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials are responsible for most incidents of 

abuse of prisoners, including beatings, whippings, sleep deprivation, and at least 

three cases of drugging of foreign prisoners. In addition there were allegations of 

torture, including allegations of beatings with sticks, suspension from bars by handcuffs, and threats against family members. Torture and abuse are used to obtain 

required confessions from prisoners (see Section 1.e.). There were reports that in detention centers some boys and young men were flogged, forced constantly to lie on 

hard floors, deprived of sleep, and threatened with whipping and other abuse.’’ Punishments include flogging, amputation, and execution by beheading, stoning, or firing squad. The authorities acknowledged 81 executions during the year.’’

‘‘The Government strictly limits freedom of assembly in practice.’’

‘‘The Government severely limits freedom of speech and the press.’’

‘‘Freedom of religion does not exist.’’

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The Shia community ‘‘are the objects of officially sanctioned political, social, and 

economic discrimination.’’

‘‘The Government restricts the travel of Saudi women. They are not allowed to 

drive inside the country and are dependent upon males for any transportation. Likewise, they must obtain written permission from their closest male relative before the 

authorities allow them to travel inside the country or to travel abroad.’’

‘‘Citizens do not have the right to change their Government. There are no formal 

democratic institutions, and only a few members of the ruling family have a voice 

in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system.’’

‘‘Although racial discrimination is illegal, there is substantial societal prejudice 

based on ethnic or national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia are subject 

to various forms of formal and informal discrimination and have the most difficulty 

in obtaining justice for their grievances.’’

Mr. Chairman, the Saudi Embassy has funded a massive project to get information about Islam into our nation’s schools. I fully support the right to freedom of 

speech, assembly and worship for all religious, ethnic and political groups in our nation. Yet, it raises grave concerns when other governments exploit these freedoms 

and do not allow the same freedoms in their own nations. What would happen in 

Saudi Arabia if Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Bahi’as, Shia Muslims, or 

other religious groups sought to get information into the schools to teach people 

about their religious beliefs? The Saudi government would never allow it and would 

severely punish anyone who attempted such a feat. 

Mr. Chairman, U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia are important. It is a complex 

relationship—one that is long-standing with many economic and defense ties. They 

were an important ally in the Gulf War and their strategic importance continues 

to this day. However, we cannot turn our backs to Saudi Arabia’s atrocious human 

rights record. 

If Saudi Arabia wants to be a legitimate partner with the United States in bringing peace and stability to the Middle East, the Saudi government must begin to address its image problem from within. 

I call on Crown Prince Abdullah to focus on improving the lives of the Saudi people. Then, the PR problem will take care of itself. 

As we examine the issues facing US-Saudi relations, it is absolutely vital that 

Congress and the Administration take seriously the human rights abuses in that 

nation. 

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Tuesday, March 26, 2002

SAUDI POLICE FACE DEATHS CRITICISM

SAUDI GIRLS BURNED ALIVE WHILE RELIGIOUS POLICE PREVENT RESCUE

By Michael Ireland 

Chief Correspondent, ASSIST News Service 

Compiled From Wire Service Reports

RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA (ANS)—In a rare criticism of the kingdom’s powerful religious police, Saudi media have accused the force of hampering efforts to rescue 15 

girls who died inside a blazing school, Reuters news service reports. 

According to a report from Reuters carried on CNN, Saudi media and families of 

the victims have been incensed over the deaths of the girls in the fire that gutted 

a school in the Muslim holy city of Mecca. Most of the girls were crushed to death 

in a stampede as they tried to flee the blaze. 

CNN reported that the al-Eqtisadiah daily said firemen scuffled with members of 

the religious police, also known as ‘‘mutaween,’’ after they tried to keep the girls 

inside the burning building because they did not wear head scarves and abayas 

(black robes) as required by the kingdom’s strict interpretation of Islam. 

CNN said the English-language Saudi Gazette, in a front-page report, quoted witnesses as saying that members of the police, known as the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, had stopped men who tried to help the girls 

warning ‘‘it is a sinful to approach them.’’

One civil defense officer told al-Eqtisadiah he saw three members of the religious 

police ‘‘beating young girls to prevent them from leaving the school because they 

were not wearing the abaya,’’ CNN reported. 

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‘‘We told them that the situation was very critical and did not allow for such behaviour. But they shouted at us and refused to move away from the gates,’’ the 

newspaper quoted the officer as saying in a report posted to CNN’s website. 

The father of one of the dead girls charged that the school watchman even refused 

to open the gate to let the girls out, the Saudi Gazette reported on CNN. 

CNN reports the newspaper said: ‘‘Lives could have been saved had they not been 

stopped by members of the Commission for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of 

Vice.’’

The feared mutaween roam the streets of the conservative kingdom wielding 

sticks to enforce dress codes and sex segregation and to ensure prayers are performed on time, said CNN.

Æ