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*********************************************** 
CHARLES ILL v. ELLEN MANZO-ILL

(AC 42735)

Prescott, Alexander and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court

finding him in contempt and awarding the defendant attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly

found him to be in contempt, awarded the defendant attorney’s fees,

and improperly limited his defense at the contempt hearing and at the

attorney’s fees hearing. Held that the trial court abused its discretion

in limiting the plaintiff’s defense at the contempt hearing: the defendant

was afforded the opportunity to establish her prima facie case over a

period of four days, whereas the plaintiff was allowed, as a consequence

of the court’s scheduling order, only one day to call witnesses on his

behalf, his defense was largely limited to the introduction of exhibits,

and, given the lengthy postjudgment procedural history of the case

related to the court’s property distribution orders and the complexity

of the issues before the court, affording the plaintiff one day to present

his defense resulted in an unfair hearing in deprivation of the plaintiff’s

due process rights; moreover, the court’s scheduling order appeared to

be arbitrary and not based on the complexity of the issues before it or

on the reasonable needs of the parties to present their case, the court,

over repeated objections by the plaintiff’s counsel, having limited the

plaintiff’s case before he had an opportunity to present any evidence,

indicating that the cout’s scheduling order could not have been based

on a determination that some or all of the plaintiff’s evidence was

not relevant or inadmissible on some other grounds; accordingly, the

judgments on both the motion for contempt and the award of attorney’s

fees were reversed and a new contempt hearing was ordered.

Argued May 13, 2021—officially released February 1, 2022

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the the court, Shay, J.,

rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting

certain other relief; thereafter, the court, Hon. Michael

E. Shay, judge trial referee, granted in part the defendant’s motion for contempt, and the plaintiff appealed

to this court and the defendant filed a cross appeal;

thereafter, the court, Hon. Michael E. Shay, judge trial

referee, awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and

costs, and the plaintiff amended his appeal; subsequently, the defendant withdrew her cross appeal.

Reversed; further proceedings.

Norman A. Roberts II, with whom, on the brief, was

Anthony L. Cenatiempo, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom were Brendon P.

Levesque, James H. Lee, and, on the brief, Maria

McKeon, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this postdissolution matter, the plaintiff, Charles Ill, appeals from the judgment of the trial

court finding him in contempt and subsequently awarding interest and attorney’s fees to the defendant, Ellen

Manzo-Ill. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court

improperly (1) found him to be in contempt, (2) ordered

him to pay the defendant the value of certain shares

of a private corporation, (3) awarded the defendant

postjudgment interest, (4) awarded the defendant attorney’s fees, and (5) by virtue of its scheduling order,

limited his defense at the contempt hearing and the

attorney’s fees hearing. We agree with the plaintiff’s

fifth claim and reverse the judgments of the court and

remand the case for a new contempt hearing.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On August 19, 2008,

following a trial that took place over the course of five

days, the court, Shay, J., dissolved the marriage of the

parties and entered orders related to alimony and the

division of the parties’ marital property. These orders,

which were clarified by the court on October 3, 2008,

provided in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he following investment accounts, whether in sole or joint names shall be

divided as follows: Within two . . . weeks from the

date of this order, the parties shall divide the stocks,

bonds, and cash in the Glenmede CLI account (standing

in the sole name of the [plaintiff], less that portion

attributed to the inherited IRA in the approximate

amount of $72,000); Glenmede CLI/EMI account (joint);

Wachovia Securities account ([standing in the sole

name of the plaintiff]); Avaya/Sierra Holdings ([plaintiff]/sole); Gabelli CLI/EMI account (joint); Assets Plus

Investment account; and Deutsche Bank Alex Brown

(joint BEA stock) on a pro-rata basis 60 [percent] to

the [defendant] and 40 [percent] to the [plaintiff]. Any

fractional shares shall be sold and the net proceeds

divided in the same proportion.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

The court further ordered that ‘‘[t]he parties shall cooperate in the preparation and filing of the 2007 state

and federal income tax returns. Any tax due, including

interest and penalties for late filing, shall be paid from

joint funds, and any refunds shall be divided equally.’’

(Emphasis omitted.)

Neither party was satisfied with the terms of the

dissolution judgment. This led to extensive postjudgment litigation. Much of this litigation was detailed in

an earlier appeal, Ill v. Manzo-Ill, 166 Conn. App. 809,

142 A.3d 1176 (2016). For example, on October 23, 2008,

the plaintiff filed a direct appeal from the judgment of

dissolution, which later was withdrawn on June 8, 2010.

Id., 813. On September 19, 2008, the defendant filed a

motion to open the judgment of dissolution, which the

court denied on April 20, 2010. Id. The defendant filed

a motion to reargue the court’s denial of her motion to
open the judgment, which the court denied on May 24,

2010. Id. On June 14, 2010, the defendant filed a motion

for extension of time to file an appeal from the court’s

denial of her motion to the open the judgment of dissolution, but she subsequently withdrew the motion on June

24, 2010, and did not bring an appeal from the court’s

denial of that motion. Id.

On April 6, 2010, while her motion to open the judgment was pending, the defendant filed a motion for

modification of alimony on the basis of a substantial

change in the parties’ circumstances. Id., 813–14. Specifically, the defendant alleged that, ‘‘[s]ince the date of

the [judgment of dissolution], the circumstances concerning this case have changed substantially in that the

plaintiff is currently employed and earning an income,

while the defendant is not currently employed, and that

a substantial amount of time has elapsed since the judgment was entered and that as a result of the plaintiff’s

appeal of the judgment, the defendant has been denied

access to the funds necessary to support herself.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 814.

Following a protracted course of litigation with

respect to the motion for modification, on May 14, 2014,

the trial court, Heller, J., granted the plaintiff’s second

motion to dismiss the motion for modification, noting

that ‘‘[t]he defendant has failed to show good cause for

her delay in prosecuting [the motion] . . . . Under

Practice Book § 25-34 [(f)], the defendant’s motion for

modification is stale, it has not been diligently prosecuted, and it will not be considered by the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 819. Following an

appeal by the defendant, this court rejected her claim

that the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss the

motion for modification. Id., 825. This court also

rejected the defendant’s claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that she failed to show good cause

to avoid dismissal and that she had failed to prosecute

her motion with reasonable diligence. Id., 828–30.

Against this backdrop of postdissolution litigation

between the parties, we turn to the litigation underlying

this appeal. On December 2, 2017, the defendant filed

an amended motion for contempt requesting ‘‘that the

court enter an order finding the plaintiff in contempt

for his refusal to transfer assets to the defendant in

violation of a court order . . . .’’ The defendant

claimed that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff did not pay to the defendant

her 60 [percent] share of the Glenmede CLI account

(standing in the sole name of the plaintiff, less that

portion attributed to the inherited IRA in the approximate amount of $72,000) until July 30, 2015 . . . [t]he

plaintiff did not cooperate in the payment to the defendant [of] her 60 [percent] share of the Glenmede joint

account and thus prevented distribution to her until

July 30, 2015 . . . [t]he plaintiff did not cooperate in

the payment to the defendant [of] her 60 [percent] share
of the Deutsche Bank Alex Brown joint account and

thus prevented distribution to her until October 20, 2015

. . . [t]he plaintiff did not cooperate in the payment to

the defendant [of] her 50 [percent] share of the 2007

federal and state income tax refunds until July 30, 2015

. . . [and] [t]he plaintiff did not cooperate in the sale

of the marital home causing the defendant a significant

loss of value.’’

The defendant further claimed that, ‘‘[a]s of the date

of this motion, the plaintiff has failed and/or refused

to transfer to the defendant the following funds/assets

. . . [the] defendant’s full 60 [percent] of the plaintiff’s

sole Wachovia accounts . . . [i]ncome generated by

the defendant’s 60 [percent] of the plaintiff’s sole

Wachovia accounts from the date of the dissolution

through the entry of judgment through the date of partial distribution and the present . . . [i]ncome generated by the defendant’s 60 [percent] of the plaintiff’s

sole Glenmede account . . . from the entry of judgment to July 30, 2015 (the date of distribution to [the]

defendant) . . . [i]ncome generated by the defendant’s

60 [percent] of the parties joint Glenmede account . . .

from the entry of judgment to July 30, 2015 (the date

of distribution to [the] defendant) . . . [i]ncome generated by the defendant’s 60 [percent] of the parties’ joint

Gabelli account from the entry of judgment to July 30,

2015 (the date of distribution to [the] defendant) . . .

[t]he defendant’s 60 [percent] of the Avaya/Sierra Holdings shares . . . [and] [i]ncome generated by the

defendant’s 60 [percent] of the Avaya/Sierra Holdings

shares from the entry of judgment to the present.’’

The plaintiff argued in his written objection that ‘‘the

defendant is not credible,’’ and addressed her claims

with respect to each account or asset at issue. With

regard to the Avaya/Sierra Holdings shares, the plaintiff

argued that ‘‘the defendant’s claim . . . must fail

because (1) the defendant is mostly at fault for the

failure of the transfer to occur . . . (2) there is no

evidence of even a theoretical transaction that could

have taken place, and the assertion that there was a

transaction available is pure, unsupportable speculation that is contrary to all admitted evidence . . . and

(3) there is no evidence of the fair market value of

the shares.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) With regard to the

Glenmede, Gabelli, and Deutsche Bank accounts, the

plaintiff argued that because these accounts ‘‘were

jointly held by the parties . . . [i]t was always . . .

within the defendant’s power to effectuate the judgment

related to these accounts . . . .’’ The plaintiff went on

to state that ‘‘[o]ver [eight] years ago, the plaintiff

attempted to get the defendant to sign authorizations

to transfer the amounts due from these accounts. He

did so on multiple occasions . . . .’’ With regard to the

Wachovia account, the plaintiff argued that he ‘‘was

precluded by a court order . . . from distributing the

Wachovia funds earlier than he did,’’ that ‘‘the amount
[he] paid [to the defendant] was in excess of the amount

due,’’ and that no interest should be awarded to the

defendant because she ‘‘was to a great extent responsible for the delay in implementing the orders . . . .’’

With regard to the sale of the marital home, the plaintiff

argued that the defendant ‘‘offered no real evidence in

support of this claim,’’ and that she failed to make a

prima facie case. Finally, the plaintiff argued that ‘‘[t]he

defendant was unresponsive to seemingly anything

involving the implementation of the property orders in

the judgment.’’

The plaintiff then concluded by stating that, ‘‘[b]ecause

of the defendant’s refusal to participate in a meaningful

way, the implementation of some of the property orders

contained in the judgment was delayed.’’ According to

the plaintiff, he ‘‘did everything he was supposed to

do,’’ and ‘‘[t]he defendant’s motions seek to retroactively place [him] in an impossible situation—on the one

hand, he would have had to circumvent or otherwise

compensate for the defendant’s lack of participation

. . . and implement the judgment on his own; or on

the other hand, face claims of contempt and interest.’’ It

was the plaintiff’s position that the defendant’s motion

should be denied because he ‘‘is not at fault for any

delays in implementation of the judgment, but the

defendant is.’’

The court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion for contempt over five nonconsecutive

days beginning on December 14, 2017, and continuing

on December 15, 2017, and August 1, 2, and 3, 2018.

On March 8, 2019, the court issued a memorandum of

decision in which it granted in part the defendant’s

motion for contempt. In its memorandum of decision,

the court found by clear and convincing evidence that

the judgment of dissolution clearly ‘‘provided for,

among other things, the division of marital property

including bank accounts, investment accounts, and

stock . . . as well as tax refunds and the proceeds

from the sale of the marital residence.’’ The court found

that the plaintiff failed to comply in a timely manner

with the division of the Wachovia, Deutsche Bank,

Glenmede, and Gabelli accounts, and that the plaintiff’s

failure to comply was ‘‘[wilful] and without good cause

. . . .’’ The court further found that there was a ‘‘clear

and unequivocal order of the court that the [tax] refunds

be divided 50 [percent] to the [defendant] and 50 [percent] to the [plaintiff]; that the [plaintiff] has failed to

comply therewith in a timely manner; that under all

the facts and circumstances, the [plaintiff’s] failure to

comply was [wilful] and without good cause . . . .’’

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant

$1,620,271, which included $1,088,380 in interest.1 Additionally, the court ordered that the plaintiff ‘‘shall be

responsible for his own attorney’s fees and costs

incurred in connection with this action; and further, on

or before March 28, 2019, the [defendant] shall file with
the court, with a copy to counsel, an affidavit of fees

in the proper format. Counsel for the [plaintiff] shall

have a reasonable opportunity to review same, and to

notify opposing counsel and the court of his intention

to challenge the reasonableness of the fees and costs

claimed, after which the court will schedule a hearing.’’

The plaintiff filed this appeal on March 26, 2019.

On October 24, 2019, the court held a hearing on the

reasonableness of the defendant’s claimed attorney’s

fees. The hearing continued on October 29, 2019, and

December 18, 2019. On February 19, 2020, the court

issued a memorandum of decision in which it concluded that, ‘‘having found the [plaintiff] in contempt as

to the Wachovia accounts, Deutsche Bank-Alex Brown

account,Glenmede accounts, Gabelli account, and the

2007 state and federal income tax refunds, it is equitable

and appropriate to award [the defendant] attorney’s

fees . . . .’’ The court further concluded that, although

it ‘‘did not make a finding of contempt as to the [plaintiff’s] actions concerning the transfer of the Avaya

Stock, it did find him in breach of the court order . . .

that it was equitable and appropriate to take into

account the [plaintiff’s] behavior and the resulting economic loss to the [defendant] . . . [and that] under all

the circumstances, including the [plaintiff’s] demonstrably dilatory behavior in complying with the court’s

orders, it would be manifestly unjust to require the

[defendant] to pay all of the attorney’s fees and costs

incurred by her during the protracted litigation, and

that it is equitable and appropriate to award her fees

. . . .’’ Thereafter, the court ordered that the plaintiff

‘‘shall pay . . . the sum of $1,206,825.10, as and for the

legal fees and costs of suit incurred by [the defendant]

in connection with this case.’’

The plaintiff filed an amended appeal from the court’s

judgment on the motion for contempt and its judgment

awarding attorney’s fees.2 Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

We begin our analysis by considering the plaintiff’s

claim that, by means of its scheduling order, the court

improperly limited his defense at the contempt hearing.3

Our resolution of this claim is dispositive of the appeal.

The plaintiff couches the present claim in terms of the

trial court having abused its discretion by terminating

the hearing before he had a fair opportunity to present

his defense. The plaintiff argues that the consequence

of the court’s abuse of its discretion was that he was

deprived of his right to present his defense. We are

persuaded that the plaintiff adequately preserved the

present claim by means of repeated objections to the

court’s order by the plaintiff’s counsel. We also conclude that the court’s discretionary rulings were harmful and that a new contempt hearing is warranted.

Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, ‘‘[a]s a result

of the trial court’s [scheduling] order [that limited the
contempt hearing to five days], [he] was forced to condense his case into less than one day after the [defendant] tried her case over four days. The [defendant]

had unfettered discretion to craft her presentation in

a manner she saw fit to best support her claims. [He]

was not afforded the same opportunity.’’ According to

the plaintiff, ‘‘[g]iven the heightened evidentiary standards and rigorous due process requirements for indirect civil contempt proceedings . . . the trial court’s

limitation of the [plaintiff’s] case constitutes reversible

error.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff also argues that the court (1) ‘‘erred

in limiting [his] presentation of his defense at the contempt hearing,’’ (2) ‘‘erred when it prohibited [him] from

cross-examining witnesses and otherwise limited [him]

from presenting his case and perfecting the record,’’ and

(3) that, ‘‘in the aggregate, the . . . court’s procedural

irregularities and rulings constitute an impermissible

departure from the . . . court’s proper role as a neutral

arbiter of disputes raised by the parties.’’

We next set forth the applicable standard of review

and the relevant legal principles that govern our resolution of this claim. It is well settled that ‘‘[m]atters involving judicial economy, docket management [and control

of] courtroom proceedings . . . are particularly within

the province of a trial court. . . . Connecticut trial

judges have inherent discretionary powers to control

proceedings, exclude evidence, and prevent occurrences that might unnecessarily prejudice the right of

any party to a fair trial.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Sowell v. DiCara, 161 Conn.

App. 102, 132, 127 A.3d 356, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 909,

128 A.3d 953 (2015). ‘‘The [trial] court has wide latitude

in docket control and is responsible for the efficient

and orderly movement of cases.’’ Daily v. New Britain

Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 574, 512 A.2d 893 (1986).

The trial court has ‘‘inherent authority to control the

proceedings before it to ensure that there [is] no prejudice or inordinate delay.’’ Gianquitti v. Sheppard, 53

Conn. App. 72, 76, 728 A.2d 1133 (1999). ‘‘The trial

court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned

only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s

discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sowell

v. DiCara, supra, 132.

In reviewing the court’s exercise of its discretion, we

are mindful that ‘‘[d]iscretion imports something more

than leeway in decision-making. . . . It means a legal

discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit

of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to

impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . .

In addition, the court’s discretion should be exercised

mindful of the policy preference to bring about a trial

on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to

secure for the litigant his day in court.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 16,
776 A.2d 1115 (2001).

In order to put the court’s ruling in the present case in

necessary context, we note the nature of the contempt

matter that was before the court and the burden that

shifted to the plaintiff once the defendant proved her

prima facie case. Mindful that the plaintiff argues that

the court’s exercise of discretion resulted in a violation

of his due process right to present a defense, we also

set forth some basic principles related to the due process rights of the plaintiff to his day in court. ‘‘Contempt

is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court

which has power to punish for such an offense. . . .

‘‘[C]ivil contempt is committed when a person violates an order of court which requires that person in

specific and definite language to do or refrain from

doing an act or series of acts. . . . In part because

the contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . . such

punishment should not rest upon implication or conjecture, [and] the language [of the court order] declaring

. . . rights should be clear, or imposing burdens

[should be] specific and unequivocal, so that the parties

may not be misled thereby. . . .

‘‘To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party

has merely violated a court order; the violation must

be wilful. . . . The inability of a party to obey an order

of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense

to the charge of contempt. . . .

‘‘It is the burden of the party seeking an order of

contempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,

both a clear and unambiguous directive to the alleged

contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncompliance with that directive. . . . If the moving party

establishes this twofold prima facie case, the burden

of production shifts to the alleged contemnor to provide

evidence in support of the defense of an inability to

comply with the court order. . . .

‘‘In the absence of an admission of contempt, indirect

contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. . . . A judgment of contempt cannot be based

on representations of counsel in a motion, but must be

supported by evidence produced in court at a proper

proceeding. . . .

‘‘[D]ue process of law . . . requires that one charged

with contempt of court be advised of the charges against

him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by

way of defense or explanation, have the right to be

represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify

and call other witnesses [o]n his behalf, either by way

of defense or explanation.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Puff v.

Puff, 334 Conn. 341, 364–67, 222 A.3d 493 (2020).

‘‘A fundamental premise of due process is that a court

cannot adjudicate any matter unless the parties have

been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the
issues involved . . . . Generally, when the exercise of

the court’s discretion depends on issues of fact which

are disputed, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to

present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. . . . It is a fundamental tenet of due process

of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to

the United States constitution and article first, § 10, of

the Connecticut constitution that persons whose . . .

rights will be affected by a court’s decision are entitled

to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner. . . . Whe[n] a party is not afforded an opportunity to subject the factual determinations underlying

the trial court’s decision to the crucible of meaningful

adversarial testing, an order cannot be sustained.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Szot

v. Szot, 41 Conn. App. 238, 241–42, 674 A.2d 1384 (1996).

Accordingly, a court does ‘‘not have the right to terminate [a] hearing before [the parties have] had a fair

opportunity to present evidence on the contested

issues.’’ Id., 242.

In the present case, as we will explain in greater

detail, the defendant was provided an opportunity to

establish her prima facie case over a period of four

days. When the burden of production thereafter shifted

to the plaintiff to provide evidence of an inability to

comply with the court orders that were the subject of

the defendant’s motion, however, he was allowed, as a

consequence of the court’s scheduling order, only one

day to call witnesses on his behalf, and his defense was

largely limited to the introduction of exhibits. Given the

lengthy postjudgment procedural history of this case

related to the court’s property distribution orders, and

the complexity of the issues before the court, we conclude that affording the plaintiff only one day to present

his defense was an abuse of the court’s discretion that

resulted in a hearing that was unfair to the plaintiff,

depriving him of his due process rights.

The following facts are relevant to our analysis. The

hearing on the defendant’s motion for contempt originally was scheduled for four days. On the first day

of evidence, the plaintiff’s counsel, Norman Roberts,

expressed his reservations over the time limitations

given the lengthy postjudgment history of the case. He

repeatedly asserted that he would not have sufficient

time to present the plaintiff’s defense to the defendant’s

allegations. As early as the morning of the first day of

evidence, Roberts argued to the court that ‘‘it does

appear we’re going to need more dates . . . . I didn’t

think that we would be halfway through the first day

and be where we are.’’ Later during the first day of

evidence, Roberts renewed his concern that ‘‘[w]e’re

going to need more time,’’ and again expressed his

apprehensions that a hearing lasting only four days

was not going to be sufficient. The court responded to

Roberts’ concerns by saying, ‘‘maybe like a stone rolling
down a hill it’ll pick up speed . . . . ’’ The court

expressed its reluctance to allow additional time

because it was concerned that ‘‘[t]he work [would

expand] to fill the time allotted for its completion.’’ It

maintained that, ‘‘if we stay focused . . . we’ll get this

done and I’ll get a clear, cogent picture of why the

Avaya shares are still not transferred.’’

At the end of the second day of evidence, Roberts

again argued that the plaintiff would not be able to have

a meaningful hearing without additional time: ‘‘[G]iven

that we’re two days in and we’re still on . . . witness

number one, can we get extra dates . . . because we’re

not going to finish. . . . I mean, there’s just no possible

way we’re going to finish this.’’ The court reassured the

parties that they would be afforded ‘‘plenty of time

. . . .’’

Like Roberts, the court also expressed its concerns

with the pace of the defendant’s case-in-chief. On the

second day of evidence, the court admonished the

defendant’s counsel on her prosecution of the motion.

It stated: ‘‘[A]nd now we’ve got a problem. All right. On

something that should have taken a very short time,

probably thirty minutes on one side, thirty on another,

if that, and done. And now we’re doing it here, it’s 10:30

in the morning, we haven’t called our first witness, we’re

in the middle of a witness.’’ Once again, on the morning

of the last scheduled day, the court began by expressing

its expectation that the defendant would finish her casein-chief that day, despite noting that ‘‘this is our fourth

day,’’ as well as that ‘‘[w]e have just a limited number

of days assigned.’’ The court conveyed its frustration

by noting: ‘‘[O]ne of the things that I’ve experienced in

this job for almost nineteen years now, is that oftentimes one party basically sucks all the oxygen out of

the case. And there is no time for the opposing counsel

to defend their client . . . . One of the functions that

a trial judge has is to take charge of the case, balance

the interest of the parties, and get the case done as

expeditiously as possible. So we plowed the same row

for a while yesterday. And that just can’t happen. So,

we need to be more economical with our presentations,

and focus on what is really important. And then we’ll

have this case, basically, wrapped up tomorrow.’’ The

court further stated: ‘‘I just want people to understand

that this is a system that is under extreme stress. And

I expect counsel to focus on what is important, and

what is relevant, and what is going to get us from point

A to point B. Particularly the judge—you know—educating me in terms of the facts.’’

At the conclusion of the fourth day, after the defendant rested her case-in-chief, the court allowed for an

additional day in which the plaintiff could present his

defense. The court, however, preemptively placed

restrictions on the plaintiff’s ability to present his case.

Specifically, after Roberts stated that he intended to
call four witnesses in presenting the plaintiff’s defense,

the court responded by saying: ‘‘So, I think that—you

know—a lean, spare examination, so that we’re not

plowing that same old furrow again there. You know—

just let’s—you know—you’ve got tonight to think about

it. You know—sit down with [co-counsel], and just figure out what is important to you.’’ Roberts expressed

his frustration with the court’s decision to limit the

plaintiff’s case-in-chief to one day, arguing that ‘‘I don’t

see the possibility of closing evidence tomorrow. I

really, really don’t.’’ The court admonished the plaintiff’s counsel by saying: ‘‘This case has gone on way

too long. A ten year old case is—you know—it’s reached

its shelf life, folks. It’s expired. All right? So, for everybody’s sake—for the system—the least of our worries,

but the system, and for these two people whose lives

have been on hold all this time, we’ve got to get some

resolution. So, that’s the dose of reality . . . . You’re

a good lawyer. You’re—you know—you’re a creative

lawyer. You need to sit down with all your associates,

and figure out how it is that you get your case in, and

finish it tomorrow.’’

Alternatively, in light of the plaintiff’s objections to

the truncated scheduling order, the court threatened to

declare a mistrial. Specifically, the court said: ‘‘So, one

of the options that I have is—and I—I could—I’ve probably done it twice in my career, is to [mistry this proceeding], because this is not going to go—I am not carrying

this case over to October.’’ Thereafter, in compliance

with the court’s scheduling order, the plaintiff limited

the presentation of his defense by introducing exhibits

and limiting the testimony of witnesses to one day.4

In his appellate brief, the plaintiff asserts that he was

prejudiced by the restrictions that the court placed on

him because he ‘‘was required to submit numerous

documents as exhibits without the benefit of testimony

to explain and illuminate the salient portions . . .

[and] to limit the number of his witnesses, and limit

their testimony.’’ Furthermore, the plaintiff’s counsel

asserted at oral argument before this court that the

plaintiff was prejudiced by the restrictions placed on

his defense because he was forced to reformulate his

entire presentation in order to attempt to get all of his

exhibits admitted into evidence, he was forced to focus

on putting documents into evidence to support his trial

brief instead of using witnesses to explain or to give

context to the evidence for the benefit of the court,

and because his ability to call and to examine witnesses

was severely circumscribed.

The court’s scheduling order does not appear to have

been based on the complexity of the issues before the

court in ruling on the defendant’s motion or the reasonable needs of the parties to present their case. Indeed,

the record reflects that, over the repeated objections

of the plaintiff’s counsel, the court limited the plaintiff’s
case-in-chief before he even had an opportunity to present any evidence. Thus, the court’s scheduling order

could not have been based on a determination that

some or all of the plaintiff’s evidence was not relevant

or that it was inadmissible on some other ground, such

as its being cumulative in nature or likely to waste time.

See, e.g., Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3. Rather, the court’s

scheduling order appeared to be arbitrary, and its limitation on the plaintiff’s case-in-chief seemingly was the

result of the court’s frustration that the parties’ dispute

had been long-standing.

Although the court appears to have been frustrated

with the pace of the defendant’s presentation of her

case, it did not use the tools at its disposal to confine

her case-in-chief to relevant matters and to prevent

her from presenting what it believed to be cumulative

evidence. Instead, in an effort to bring the hearing to

a conclusion, it truncated the plaintiff’s presentation of

his defense. The court’s dissatisfaction with the presentation of the defendant’s case-in-chief, however, was

not a valid basis on which to infringe the plaintiff’s right

to be heard and to present a defense. The court may

limit the time allowed for an evidentiary hearing but

its limitation must be reasonable in light of the needs

of the parties to present their case. See, e.g., Dicker v.

Dicker, 189 Conn. App. 247, 265, 207 A.3d 525 (2019)

(‘‘we previously have determined that the court reasonably may limit the time allowed for an evidentiary hearing’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nothing in the

record suggests that the plaintiff agreed with the court’s

scheduling order or that he willingly accepted the limitations imposed on him by the court. In fact, the record

clearly shows the opposite; as discussed previously,

Roberts consistently and repeatedly expressed concern

that he would not have enough time to present the

plaintiff’s case in full. Furthermore, as we discussed

previously, the plaintiff specifically has claimed before

this court that the trial court’s restrictions severely circumscribed his ability to present his defense because

they hampered his ability to provide necessary context

for other evidence in the case.

We are persuaded that the court effectively terminated the hearing at the end of the fifth day and ‘‘before

the plaintiff had a fair opportunity to present evidence

on the contested issues.’’ Szot v. Szot, supra, 41 Conn.

App. 242. Although the court did allow for the parties

to file briefs after the conclusion of the hearing, it is

worth noting that the court also expressed its dissatisfaction with lengthy briefs, stating early in the proceedings that ‘‘[a] blizzard of paper is not going to be helpful.’’

Moreover, allowing for the filing of a posthearing brief

is not a substitute for an effective presentation of evidence, during which the court is able to assess the

credibility of witnesses, particularly in a case involving

numerous and complex issues that occurred over several years, and when the opposing party was nearly
unfettered in her ability to present her case.

All of these factors, considered together, make clear

that the court’s scheduling order reflected an abuse

of its discretion, the plaintiff was not afforded a fair

opportunity to present evidence on the contested

issues, and the hearing was fundamentally unfair.

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, as the plaintiff

argues, that he was hampered in his ability to present

testimony and to refute the defendant’s evidence generally. The record is abundantly clear that the plaintiff’s

counsel went to great lengths to express his concern

to the court that, as a result of its arbitrary decision to

limit his presentation of evidence, the plaintiff would

not have sufficient time to adequately present his

defense and explain to the court why he could not

comply with its orders. Under these facts and circumstances, the proper remedy is to reverse the judgments

of the trial court and remand the case for a new hearing.

The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded

for a new hearing.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the award as follows: ‘‘On or before

June 7, 2019, the sum of $850,000, without interest if paid in full in a timely

fashion, otherwise said sum shall bear simple interest at the rate of 5 [percent] per annum from the date of this memorandum of decision to and

including the date of payment. The balance due in the amount of $770,271

shall be paid by the [plaintiff] in full on or before January 7, 2020, together

with simple interest at the rate of 5 [percent] per annum thereon from the

date of this memorandum of decision to and including the date of payment

in full.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

2 The defendant filed a cross appeal from the court’s judgment on her

contempt motion. The defendant later withdrew the cross appeal.

3 As we stated previously in this opinion, the plaintiff also claims that the

court improperly limited his defense at the attorney’s fees hearing. Because

we conclude that the court improperly limited the plaintiff’s defense at the

contempt hearing and that the plaintiff is entitled to a new hearing, the

court’s award of attorney’s fees, which flowed from its finding of contempt,

also must be vacated. We need not consider the claim related to the attorney’s

fees hearing, or the remaining claims in this appeal, as the issues raised

therein are not likely to arise during the proceedings on remand. See Zheng

v. Xia, 204 Conn. App. 302, 308 n.10, 253 A.3d 69 (2021) (reviewing court

need not reach remaining claims if it is not persuaded that issues raised

therein are likely to arise during proceedings on remand).

Although we do not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that the court

improperly awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant, we note that it appears

on the face of the court’s award that the award of fees does not arise solely

from the motion for contempt that is the subject of this appeal; rather, the

court stated that its award encompassed ‘‘all of the attorney’s fees and costs

incurred by [the defendant] during this protracted litigation . . . .’’ Because

the trial court may be asked to award attorney’s fees during the proceedings

on remand, we emphasize that the court has the discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a contempt proceeding and that ‘‘[a]n

abuse of discretion in granting . . . counsel fees will be found only if this

court determines that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded

as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Malpeso v. Malpeso, 165 Conn.

App. 151, 184, 138 A.3d 1069 (2016). When contempt is established, ‘‘the

concomitant award of attorney’s fees properly is awarded pursuant to [General Statutes] § 46b-87 and is restricted to efforts related to the contempt

action.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

4 The defendant argues that, because the plaintiff did not ‘‘accept’’ what

it mistakenly characterizes as the court’s ‘‘offer’’ to declare a mistrial, and

proceeded to present his case, the plaintiff should not now be permitted to

seek reversal on the ground that the court did not afford him a fair hearing.

‘‘[A] party cannot take a path at trial and change tactics on appeal.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martone, 160 Conn. App. 315, 327, 125

A.3d 590, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 904, 127 A.3d 187 (2015). In light of the

repeated objections by the plaintiff’s counsel to the court’s scheduling order,

we are not persuaded that this claim is a departure from any tactical decision

made by the plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing or that the plaintiff induced

the alleged error at issue in this claim.