### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 16 , 200 5 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . SHANNON A. HOLL ADAY
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Anderson County No. A4CR0044 Jam es B. Scott, Jr ., Judge

No. E2004-02858-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Fe bruary 8, 2006

An Ander son Countyg rand jury indicted the def

endant, Sha n n on A. Holladay , for one count of vehicular homicide by

intox ication, a Class B felony , and one c ount of vehicula r homicide by
rec klessness, a Cl ass C felony

. Be fore trial, the defendant filed a mot ion to suppress the e vidence obtained fr om the air ba g sensor module in the de fenda nt’s car , which the Ande rso n CountyCriminal Court gr anted. The state appe als , contending that the trial court erre d in gr anting the def endant’ s motion to s uppress. We dismiss thi s case for lac k of jurisdiction.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Case D ism issed

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., deli v er ed t h e o pinion of the court, in which R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., filed a c oncurring opinion.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . Bl e ds oe , Ass ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Jame s N . Ra mse y , D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; a ndJan H ic ks , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellant, State of Te nnessee
. J

. T h o m a s M ar s h a l l , J r
. , D i s tr i c tP u b l i c D e f e n d e r , f o r t h e ap p e l l e e , S h a n n o n A

. H o l l a d a y.
OP IN ION

This case relates to the defe ndant’s involvement in a fa t al car ac cident. The defe ndant alleg ed in her

motion to s uppress that Tennessee Hig hway Patrol office rs obtained a rea ding f rom her a ir bag sensor module during a war rantless sear ch of her c ar a nd that no exception to the ge nera l
war rant re quirement e x isted to justi fy the sea rch. The trial court g rante d the defe ndant’s motion, and the state a ppeale d pursuant to Rule 3 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e.
Tenne ssee Hig hway

Patrol Trooper

Bill Fox was the only

witness to testify

at the suppre ssion hearing. T rooper

Fox testified that he was a cra sh rec onstructionist fo r t h e C ritical I ncident Response Team of the Tenne ssee Hig hway Patrol. He said Troope r Crumpley contac ted him the day afte r the acc ident to r

un a test on the a ir bag sensor module in the de fenda nt’s car . He sa id Trooper-2-

Crumpley told him t hat the ca

r had c rossed the c enter line and hit a F ord pick-up tr uck hea d on but
re ve a le d n oth ing e lse abo ut the a c c ide nt. Tr oo pe r F ox sa id he ha d be e n tr a ine d to us e the c ra sh da ta retrie val sy stem but a cknowledg ed this wa s the first ac cident investig ation in which he ha d used the
e qu ipm e nt. Trooper Fox tes t i fi ed he me t Trooper Crumpley

at L owe’ s Towing in Cli nton, Tennesse e. Trooper Fox said the air bag sensor module in the de fenda nt’s car was located underneath the c arpe t under the passeng er’ s seat. He said he made a one or two inch c ut in the car pet to g ain ac cess to the module. He sa id he took a rea ding f rom the module that loade d the pre -cr ash data onto his laptop computer. H e testified that the pr e-c rash data was on l y fo r t h e five seconds be fore the air ba g deploy ed and that it consisted of speed, eng ine s peed, throttle, braking , seatbe lts, and the number of times the ignition was turne d on and off

. Trooper Fox testified that he did not run this test on the Ford pick-u p t ru ck b ec ause at the time, the highw ay

patrol only

had the e quipment to read the air b ag sensor modules in Gene ral Motors car s. He said that he had bee n certified to take re ading s off the modules since Fe bruary 5, 2003. He said he responde d to approxim ately six ty fata l cra shes in 2003, afte r he w as ce rtified, and this was the only acc ident wher e he used the cr ash data retrie val sy stem. Trooper Fox said he neither obtained a se arc h war

rant nor c onsidered obta ining one

. After arg ument by counsel, the trial court asked c ounsel to submit m emora ndum of law a nd t o o k t h e m o t i o n u n d erad v i s em en t

. T h e t ri al co u rt gra n t ed t h e d ef en d an t ’s m o t i o n , s t at i n g
Th e pa rt ie s h a ve sti pu la te d that the a uto mob ile in q ue sti on is subject to a re asonable expectation of privac y even in a dama g ed or
un mov e able c on dit ion

. Th e re fo re , th e bu rd e n s hif ts t o th e state to pr ov e the e vid e nc e ob ta ine d b y la w e nf or c e me nt ( Hi ghway Pa tr ol)
wa s o btaine d la wf

ull y a ndwi thi n the pr ote c te d re a lms of re a so na ble g ov e rn me nta l a c tiv iti e s. Th is b ur de n b y the state is u niq ue ly embra ced in the ga dg etry of the automobile indust ry and the computerized mec hanism measuring the per formanc e of the history of the ope ration of the ve hicle that may incriminate the driver.

The Court ca nnot find that the proof s upports any common exceptions to the require ments of issuing a sear ch wa

rra nt. A sea

rch
war r a n t w a s n o t u s e d in th is c a s e , a n d th e Co u r t f in d s th e r e are no rea sonable e x ceptions to a warra nt require ment. There fore , the Court suppresses the evidenc e obtained by the tapping of the internal re cord contained in the c omputer module.

I t is therefor e ordere d , adjudged, a nd decr eed that the evidenc e addr essed in the Motion to S u ppress is suppresse d for
rea sons give n.-3-

On app e a l, the state c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in g ranti ng the de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to suppress. It claims that the defe ndant had no r easona b l e ex p ec tation of privac y in the equipment or saf ety features of the defe ndant’s vehic le. The state asserts that the d ef en d an t ’s car was a n instrument of the crime in w hich the defe ndant could have no expectation of privac y . The de fenda nt asserts that she had an ex pectation of privacy in her car and t hat t he st ate sti pulated she had such a priva c y int e re st at th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng . T he de fe nd a nt a lso a ss erts th a t th e se arc h d oe s n ot f it
a ny of the e xce pti on s to the g e ne ra l w arr a nt r e qu ir e me nt.
We believe we first must address whe ther thi s court has jurisdiction over the state’s appe al fr om the tr ia l c ou rt ’s su pp re ssi on or de r p ur su a nt t o Ru le 3( c ) o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re . T he state ’s no tic e of app e a l sta te s: “Co me s the Sta te pu rs ua nt to T.R .A .P. 3 an d a pp e a ls the Orde r her etofore enter ed in this case on November 2, 2004 suppressing all the State’s evide nce in this case. The Suppression hearing w as held on Aug ust 20, 2004.” Rule 3(c) provides only

the following circ umstances in w hich the state may appea l a s of rig ht in c ri min a l a c tio ns :

I n criminal ac tions an appea l as of rig ht by the state lies only from an order or judg ment enter ed by

a trial c ourt from whic h an appea l lies to the Supreme Court o r Court of Criminal Appea ls: (1) the
su bs ta nti ve e ff

e c t of wh ic h r e su lt s in dis mis sin g a n in dic tme nt, information, or c ompl ai n t ; (2) se tting aside a ver dict of g uiltyand entering a judgme nt of ac quittal; (3) arr esting judgme nt; (4) g ranting
or re fusing to revoke probation; or (5) rema nding a child to the juvenile court. The state may also ap p eal a s of rig ht from a f inal judgme nt in a habea s corpus, extradition, or po s t -conviction p ro ce ed i n g.
T. R.A .P. 3( c ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . Ru le 3( c ) do e s n ot r e qu ir e a n o rd e r o f d ism iss a l a s a pr e re qu isi te t o t h e s t a t e ’ s ap p e a l

. S t a t e v
. S t e p h e n U d z i n s k i , J r
. , N o
. 0 1 C 0 1

- 9 2 1 2

- C C

- 0 0 3 8 0 , D i c k s o n C o u n t y, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 1 9 9 3 ). F or example, if a tria l court’s orde r has the
su bs ta nti ve e ff

e c t of dis mis sin g the ind ic tme nt, the n a n ap pe a l pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 3( c ) i s p ro pe r. Sta te v. Phill ips, 30 S.W .3d 372, 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2 000); State v. Collins , 35 S.W .3d 582, 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . Howeve r, whe n the trial court’s s u p p ression of evidence does not automatically

result in dismiss al of the case , “the rec ord should contain unambig uous information as to how the c ourt’s ruling aff ects the c ase.” Udzinski , slip op. at 2; see also Philli ps, 30 S.W .3d at 374 n.2 (stating the court would enterta in a Rule 3(c) appea l as of right because the state’s de nied motion for an interloc utory appea l stated that it c ould not car ry its burde n of proof at trial without the suppresse d statements bec ause the victim was very y oung and ther e we re no othe r witnesses)

. The a ppellant bea

rs the burde n of providing an adequate re cord in orde r to allow mea ningf ul revie w on appe al. State v. Ba llard, 855 S.W .2d 557, 560-61 (Tenn. 1993). I n this reg ard, w e do not be lie ve the state me nt i n th e no tic e of app e a l c on sti tut e s e vid e nc e of the fa c t a sse rt e d. We al so no te-4-

that althoug h the state stated in its notice of a ppeal that t he trial c ourt’s orde r suppre ssed “a ll the State’s evidenc e in this c ase,” it a ctually suppressed only “the evidenc e obtained by the tapping of the internal rec ord contained in the computer module.” The rec ord ref lects that the def

endant wa s indicted on alternative counts of vehicular homicide by intox ication and by rec klessness. To convic t a def endant of vehicular homicide by

intox ication, the st ate must prove that the defe ndant drove or wa s in ph y sic a l c on tr ol of a mot or ve hic le on a

pu bli c ro a d o r i n a n a

re a fr e qu e nte d b y

the pu bli c while under

the influenc e of a n intox icant or w hile the alcohol c o ncentr ation in the defe ndant’s blood
wa s . 08 % o r m or e . Se e T. C.A

. §§ 39 -1 3- 21 3, 55 -1 0- 40 1( a ). B e c a us e the a ir ba g se ns or

mod ule would not show the defe ndant was u n d er the influence of an intoxi cant or had a blood a lcohol
conce ntration of .08% or

higher, the f

irst count of the indictment cha rg ing ve hicular homicide by intox ication had to have been ba sed on evide nce in addition to the air bag sensor module. The state’ s assertion in it s notice of a ppeal is not supported by the re cord. Reg arding the v eh i cular homicide by rec klessness count, the tria l court’s orde r does not p re cl u d e t h e s t a t e fr o mi n tro d u ci n g ev i d en ce fr o mt h e a cc i d en ti n v es t i gat i o n o r c al l i n g a re c on str uc tio n e xpe rt

to g ive his or he r op ini on on the c a us e of the a c c ide nt. We n ote that e xpe rt s g ive op ini on te sti mon y a

bo ut the ve ry e vid e nc e su pp re sse d in this c a se wi tho ut r e ly ing on the data retrie ved fr om air bag sensor modules. See State v. F arne r, 66 S.W.3d 1 8 8 , 2 0 6 -0 8 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that a police of

fice r’s testimony

using a scientific formula to de termine the speed of car s involved in an acc ident was admissible); see also State v. Charles Dr ake, N o. E2004-00247-CCAR3-CD, Knox County , slip op. at 5 ( Tenn. Crim. App. J une 6, 2005) (discussing the methods used by acc ident rec onstructionists for both the state and the defe nse); State v. Jerome D. U p m an, No. 03C01-9402-CR-00052, Hamblen County , slip op. at 3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug . 2, 1994) (holding that an ac cident re construction is t’ s testimonyabout the spee d of the de fenda nt’s car was a dmissibl e). Tr oo pe r F ox te sti fi e d at th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng that si nc e he ha d b e e n tr a ine d to us e the c ra sh data retrie val sy stem, there ha d been a pproxi mately

six ty fata l acc idents investigated and th at t h is was the only acc ident in which the cr ash data retrie val sy stem was used. Nothing in the r ecor d exis ts to indi cate that the s uppression of the inf ormation taken f

rom t h e a i r b a g s e n s o r

m o d u l e e f

f e c t i v e l y r e s u l t s i n t h e d i s m i s s a l o f e i t h e r c o u n to f

t h e i n d i c t m e n t

. In fac t, the rec ord indicate s to the contrary . At the motion to suppress hearing, the state told the trial
c ou rt that the po lic e se ize d the c ar “a s a pie c e of e vid e nc e in a ve hic ula r h omi c ide c a se ,” no t th a t it was the only evidenc e it had. The state also told the court that the reason officers took the r eading from the air bag sensor module is be cause they knew “ the ca

r we nt acr oss the cente rline and y ou had
a he a d- on c ra sh

. Th e y are do ing a n inve sti g a tio n. ” Th e a ir ba g se ns or mod ule wo uldno t ha ve tol d office rs what lane the ca

r wa s in or how the impac t o cc u rr ed. The prosec utor’s statements a t the motion to s uppress he aring are inconsistent with the state’s a ssertion in its noti ce of appea l that the information from the s en s o r constituted “a ll the State’s evidenc e,” and we de cline to g ive the incre dible assertion the w eig ht ne cessa ry to make this appea l proper unde r Rule 3. We conclude that this court does not have Rule 3 jurisdiction. S ee Collins, 35 S.W .3d at 584 (stating that an appe al pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 9 o r R ule 10 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of App ellate Pr oc e du re are “ the on ly proce dures a vailable f

or the State to se ek revie w of an interlocutory order which does not have the substantial effe ct of dismissing the c harg es”)

.-5-

We now determine whether we should suspe nd the rules pur suant to Rule 2 of the Tenne ssee Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re to ad dr e ss the app e a l. Rul e 10 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Procedur e allows a n extraordinary appea l of interlocutory order s when it is established that 1) the
ru lin g of the c ou rt be low re pr e sent s a fun dame nta l il le g a lit y , 2 ) the ru lin g c on sti tut e s a failu re to proce ed ac cording to the essential re quirements of the law, 3) the ruling is tantamount to the denial of either party of a day in cour t , 4 ) t h e ac tion of the trial judg e wa s without lega l authority , 5) the action of the trial judg e constituted a pla in and palpable abuse o f d iscretion, or 6) either pa rty has lost a ri gh t o r intere st that may never be re captur ed. State v. Willoughby , 594 S.W .2d 388, 392 (Tenn. 1980) . Upon revie w, we conclude that the trial court did not depart fr om the acc epted a nd usual cou rs e of pr ocee dings. The Advisory Commi ssion Com ments to Rule 10 note that the
c ir c u ms tan c e s in w h ic h r e v ie w is a v a il ab le u n d e r Ru le 1 0 ar e v e r y n arr o w
. Se e T

. R. A

. P. 1 0

. We conclude that the state ha s failed to esta bli s h an y of the a

bove fa ctors allowing a Rule 10
e xtra or din ary

app e a l. We be lie ve thi s a pp e a l is imp ro pe r, a ndwe dis mis s th e state ’s app e a l.

CONCL USI ON

B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g a ndthe re c or d a s a wh ole , w e dis mis s th e state ’s app e a l.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE