United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“Peace and regional 

security are integral to the 

multitude of U.S. interests in 

Colombia, and they should no 

longer be subsumed to other 

strategic interests. It is time 

to seek peace as a priority.”

January 28, 2010 

Time for a Peace Paradigm in 

Colombia

Summary

•	 Since the advent of Plan Colombia in 2000, U.S. policymakers have sought to help Colombian 

governments win their multiple wars against insurgents, drugs and terrorism. Conventional 

wisdom had suggested that pursuing these paths concurrently would lead to peace and 

security. 

•	 Colombia today is farther from a peace settlement than it has been in years. With national 

elections scheduled for the first half of 2010 and presidential candidates yet to be defined, 

peace does not appear on the government’s public policy agenda and it has yet to materialize 

as a campaign issue. Faith in a military victory appears deeply entrenched at a popular level.

•	 Illegal armed groups are retrenching and adapting to years of sustained military offensives 

and the increased capacity of Colombia’s armed forces. While security indicators had largely 

improved, violence in major cities last year jumped sharply, and internal displacement has 

reached crisis proportions. 

•	 Colombia’s conflict is increasingly affecting the Andean neighborhood, sending hundreds 

of thousands of Colombians across the borders. Patterns of violence and intimidation are 

emerging as illegal armed groups increasingly settle into these border regions. Sporadic 

incursions and incidents at the border have ratcheted up rhetoric and sparked diplomatic 

standoffs and movement of troops. A recent bilateral military accord between Colombia and 

the United States has also exacerbated tensions in the hemisphere. 

•	 Policymakers increasingly question whether staying the course in Colombia is in the U.S. best 

interests. Some are calling for an overhaul of U.S. policy. 

•	 Peace and regional security are integral to the multitude of U.S. interests in Colombia, and 

they should no longer be subsumed to other strategic interests. It is time to seek peace as 

a priority. This approach should emphasize respect for human rights and the rule of law; 

support for truth, justice and reparations for the victims of armed conflict; and the facilitation 

of processes conducive to peace as a key policy objective.

National Dynamics

With congressional and presidential elections respectively scheduled for March 14 and May 30, 

2010, electoral politics in Colombia will shape the prospects for peace in the coming months. 

Peace does not appear on the government’s public policy agenda and it has yet to materialize as a 

Virginia M. Bouvier

E-mail: vbouvier@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3884

peaceBrieF8
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

campaign issue. The continued stigmatization, surveillance and attacks on human rights workers 

and interlocutors for a peaceful resolution to the conflict make the climate for discussing political 

solutions more difficult. 

With the official slate of presidential candidates still undecided, there are concerns that a third 

term for President Alvaro Uribe—which requires a referendum to approve a change in the constitution to permit the incumbent to run again—would undermine democratic institutions and 

practices, and that mafia and drug trafficking interests have penetrated the system and will block 

democracy’s “natural cleansing process.” The courts, especially Colombia’s Constitutional Court, 

will continue to play an important role in maintaining a balance of powers, particularly as tensions 

between the executive and judicial branches simmer. 

Under the Uribe government, the Colombian Army has increased its budget, its ranks, and its 

logistical and intelligence capacity—and it has enjoyed commensurate military successes. Faith 

in a military victory remains deeply entrenched at a popular level, but the Colombian military’s 

reputation has been tarnished by human rights abuses, particularly some 1,766 cases of “false positives,” whereby 33 different Army brigades lured hundreds of impoverished youths with promises 

of jobs, “disappeared” and killed them, and dressed them in guerrilla garb post-mortem in order 

to elevate body counts and secure cash bonuses or days off. Four hundred plus members of the 

Armed Forces have been jailed and hundreds more are under investigation. While extrajudicial 

executions have declined significantly, the practice has not ceased and prosecutions have moved 

so slowly that cases are being thrown out of court. 

Increasingly, Colombian civil society is seeking a more proactive role in putting peace on the 

national agenda. One participant in a recent conference at USIP noted, “We can no longer look 

at peace simply as a negotiation at a table between the government of Colombia and the FARC 

[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. The question of peace has to do with supporting 

democratic institutions, the justice system, and land and other reforms.” Increasingly these are seen 

as the foundations that will create the conditions for a negotiated solution—not the other way 

around. Likewise, some Colombians challenged the idea that security must be in place in order 

for development efforts to advance—arguing that it is development itself that will create a more 

secure environment that could lead to peace. 

Evolution of the Conflict 

The conflict in Colombia is evolving. Military strategies to control land, transportation corridors, 

and resources have accelerated displacement. In 2008, violence forced more than 380,000 individuals to abandon their homes, bringing the number of internally displaced to 4.6 million people 

for the period from 1985-2008. Illegal armed groups that seemed to be diminishing in strength 

are showing signs of rejuvenation and refining their tactics as they adjust to new circumstances. In 

mid-December 2009, the two major guerrilla groups remaining—the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—announced that they would be 

joining forces in a new alliance. 

FARC

Plan Colombia, Plan Patriota, and other military offensives have halved FARC membership since 

2002, when it was estimated at 16,000-18,000 members. There are signs nonetheless that the FARC 

is regrouping, particularly in the central cordillera and in the border zones with Venezuela and 

Ecuador. A Nov. 2009 report by the Fundación Nuevo Arco Iris/New Rainbow Foundation finds that 

the FARC has reactivated fronts in urban and rural areas, created a new front in Guaviare, and carTime for a Peace Paradigm in Colombia

page 2 • PB 8 • January 28, 2010
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

ried out 1,429 attacks in the first ten months of 2009 (an increase of 30 percent since the previous 

year).1 Furthermore, the FARC has stepped up its use of antipersonnel land mines (especially for 

offensive purposes), and has accelerated forced recruitment of minors and indigenous Colombians. 

ELN 

The window of opportunity for the government of Colombia to reach a settlement with the 

ELN appears shut after eight rounds of talks that started in 2005 came to a halt in 2007. In 

the absence of a political agreement, the ELN has begun to re-arm and increase recruitment. 

Reduced to some 300 troops a year ago, the ELN now counts some 1,000 members in its ranks, 

has deepened its involvement with the drug trade, and is showing renewed activity in the Cauca, 

Nariño, and Arauca provinces. 

Paramilitaries and Criminal Violence

The demobilization of 35,000 paramilitaries of the Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) 

has given rise to the proliferation of new criminal organizations. These new groups are locally and 

regionally autonomous and lack a national structure—and thus are more difficult to control. Like 

the AUC, they engage in the strategic use of massacres, selective homicides (particularly of Afro, 

indigenous, women, and other community leaders), forced displacement, territorial and social 

control, and drug trafficking. Estimates of their membership range from 5,000 to 10,000 members, 

including new recruits, demobilized paramilitaries who have re-armed, and paramilitaries who 

refused to demobilize in the first place. These groups have been responsible for a sharp rise in 

homicides in 19 cities, including Bogotá, Medellín and Cali.2

Regional Insecurity on the Rise 

The conflict is increasingly impacting Colombia’s neighbors. With more than a half million new 

refugees fleeing to Ecuador and Venezuela last year, the refugee situation in the region has 

reached crisis proportions. Regions bordering Colombia have long provided temporary safe haven 

for all of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. These groups are now settling in and battling each other 

for territory, resources, control and recruits. The northern Ecuadoran border in particular is beginning to mirror Colombian trends of criminality, intimidation, and displacement, as well as sexual 

exploitation and the trafficking of women.3

Colombia’s conflict has impacted diplomatic relations in the Andean region as well. Tensions came 

to a head in 2008 when Colombian planes bombed a rebel camp in Ecuador, causing Ecuador and 

Venezuela to break diplomatic relations with Colombia and send troops to the border.4 Border killings, kidnappings, and a litany of accusations of cross-border spying and support for illegal armed 

groups have abounded in recent months. 

The U.S.-Colombian Military Agreement 

A bilateral defense cooperation agreement signed on October 30, 2009, granting U.S. access to 

Colombian military bases, prompted Venezuela to send 15,000 troops to the Colombian border, 

and Argentina and Brazil to call for “formal guarantees that such accords will not be utilized against 

the sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability of South American countries.”5 U.S. and 

Colombian authorities assert that the accord merely updates a decades-old agreement. 

Colombian civil society leaders have expressed concern that the bilateral agreement will aggravate 

Colombia’s internal armed conflict and encourage militarization. They have critiqued the secrecy 

Time for a Peace Paradigm in Colombia

page 3 • PB 8 • January 28, 2010
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

and lack of consultation related to the accord, observing that the Council of State had determined 

on October 13, 2009, that the agreement required ratification by Colombia’s Congress, as it 

departed significantly from previous treaties in granting the use of bases, territory, and benefits to 

foreign military forces. Finally, civil society leaders have expressed concern over the consequences 

of the accord for human rights (especially sexual violence) and for the humanitarian crisis. 

The Shifting U.S. Context 

With the Obama administration in place and its Latin American team settling in, there are calls 

to reassess U.S. policies on Colombia. Congressman Eliot Engel, D-NY, chair of the House Foreign 

Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, authored a bipartisan bill (H.R. 2134) to create 

an independent western hemisphere drug policy commission to evaluate U.S. counternarcotics 

programs. In December, 53 members of Congress, under the leadership of Democratic Representative James P. McGovern of Mass., called on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to embrace a comprehensive new approach to Colombia that emphasizes human rights, democracy, humanitarian 

needs and peace initiatives. On January 21, 2010, Democratic Senators Russell Feingold, Patrick 

Leahy, and Christopher Dodd urged Secretary Clinton to evaluate current policies and to seek ways 

to work with the Colombian government to “improve the climate for peace.” 

Conclusions: A New Peace Prism for Colombia Policy 

The stake of Colombia’s neighbors and the broader international community in the conflict’s resolution is growing, and the situation favors international engagement on behalf of peace in Colombia. 

While the U.S. policy agenda is driven simultaneously by a multitude of interests, peace and regional 

security are integral to each. Secretary Clinton’s recent acceptance of the invitation to meet with the 

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) will provide a timely opportunity to explore how the 

United States might work with Latin American leaders to support peace in Colombia. 

Colombian civil society leaders urged the United States not to wait for a peace process before 

backing a political solution to the conflict in Colombia. The United States should seek ways to 

leverage peace initiatives and the efforts of civil society to build pressure for a political solution, 

and should make the facilitation of processes conducive to peace in Colombia a key policy objective. Civil society leaders echoed the need to revise U.S. counternarcotics approaches, and urged 

U.S. policymakers to proactively support democratic institutions and human rights (particularly 

human rights defenders); bolster judicial efforts to address impunity; and support truth, justice 

and reparations for the victims of armed conflict. 

Such support will help create the context within which peace options can be more successfully 

explored. 

Endnotes

1. León Valencia. “La seguridad democrática en crisis,” in Observatorio del Conflict Armado/Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, El declive de la Seguridad Democrática? Informe Especial, November 2009. 

2. In Medellín, for example, after a trend that cut homicides sharply from 2,012 (2003) to 709 

(2006), the homicide rate has more than doubled in the last two years when it rose from 790 (2007) 

to 1,044 (2008) to 1,717 in the first 10 months of 2009. Valencia, “La seguridad democrática.” While 

the national police figures show an overall decline in homicides (from 16,140 in 2008 to 15,817 in 

2009, coroners’ offices, ombudsmen, and other municipal authorities have challenged the figures 

and reported an alarming increase in homicides, particularly in Colombia’s largest cities. See “Que 

Time for a Peace Paradigm in Colombia

page 4 • PB 8 • January 28, 2010
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

202.457.1700

www.usip.org

pasa en las ciudades?” Semana, Jan. 23, 2010, and Adriaan Alsema, “Colombian Police Claim Lower 

Murder Rates, Other Entities Report Alarming Rise,” Colombia Reports, January 4, 2010. 

3. “Conflict Beyond Borders: Humanitarian Impact of the Colombian Conflict in Ecuador?” Internal 

Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, October 10, 2009, p. 4-5.

4. “History of Tensions Between Venezuela, Colombia,” Reuters, Nov. 6, 2009.

5. Responses to the release of a May 2009 U.S. Air Force presentation to the U.S. Congress which 

described access to Colombian military bases as “a unique opportunity for full spectrum operations in a critical subregion of our hemisphere where security and stability are under constant 

threat from narcotics-funded terrorist insurgencies, anti-U.S. governments [emphasis mine], 

endemic poverty and recurring natural disasters.” Cited by Adam Isacson, “CIP Colombia News,” 

November 24, 2009. 

About This Brief

This report is based on meetings 

held at USIP on December 1, 

2009 with Colombian civil society 

leaders and members of the U.S. 

government and nongovernmental 

sectors. The meetings were part of 

USIP’s Citizen Dialogues for Peace 

Project and were co-sponsored 

with the Colombia Committee for 

Human Rights, Consultancy for 

Human Rights and Displacement 

(CODHES), and the Permanent 

Assembly of Civil Society for 

Peace. Virginia M. Bouvier, senior 

program officer in the Center for 

Mediation and Conflict Resolution 

and director of the Colombia 

Conflict Team at the U.S. Institute 

of Peace, and Jorge Rojas, director 

of CODHES, moderated the 

sessions. 

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

Time for a Peace Paradigm in Colombia

page 5 • PB 8 • January 28, 2010