China

P O L I C Y F O C U S

Executive Summary:

The Commission traveled to China August 14-28, 2005 and engaged senior Chinese 

officials responsible for the protection of human rights in China, including Chinese VicePremier Hui Liangyu, senior officials from the Foreign, Justice, and State Ethnic Affairs 

Ministries, the National People’s Congress, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the 

State Administration on Religious Affairs, as well as provincial and local officials from 

the various Religious and Ethnic Affairs and other relevant bureaus. The delegation also 

met with leaders from the government-sanctioned Buddhist, Catholic, Taoist, Islamic, and 

Protestant religious organizations, and representatives of civil society. The Commission 

traveled to Beijing, Urumqi, Kashgar, Chengdu, Lhasa, and Shanghai. 

The Commission finds that the Chinese government continues to systematically violate 

the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, contravening both the 

Chinese constitution and international human rights norms. The room for political openness, public activism, and greater civil and individual freedoms is narrowing in China.

For believers registered with one of the five “patriotic religious associations,” there is 

an obvious “zone of toleration” that protects some religious practice and property. Chinese 

officials stated that they have considered allowing Orthodox Christians, Jews, Mormons, 

and Baha’is to gain official recognition. Nonetheless, the Chinese government continues to 

control the financial, leadership and doctrinal decisions of all registered religious groups 

and has intensified pressure on ethnic minorities and religious communities perceived as 

threats to “national security” or “social harmony.”

The Chinese government is using the “war on terror” as a pretext to monitor and control all Uighur Muslim religious activity. The government also used terrorist concerns to 

restrict Commission activity in Xinjiang—claiming that “elements of Al-Qaeda” were targeting the Commission and denying its requests to meet with some religious leaders and 

visit some religious venues. 

Crackdowns on religious activity are often harsherin Xinjiang and Tibet than in other 

parts of China. In Xinjiang, government officials admitted that they themselves must complete political education to avoid “paralyzed thinking” and to “distinguish between normal 

and illegal religious activities.” In Tibet, despite ongoing negotiations with the Dalai Lama’s 

representatives, government officials claimed that one of their goals was to eliminate the influence of the Dalai Lama, and public displays of devotion to the Dalai Lama are considered 

by the authorities as threats to public order. In both regions, government officials claimed 

that continued religious practice was either a 

hindrance to economic development or led to 

supporting terrorism or “splittism.”

Despite promises made to the U.S. government in March 2005 that religious education of 

minors was not contrary to Chinese law, there 

remain tight restrictions on the religious education of minors in Xinjiang and Tibet. 

The lack of either an independent media or 

the rule of law in China contributes to the absence of effective constraints on political power 

and the failure to protect human rights enshrined in the Chinese Constitutions or provide 

legal redress to victims of government human 

rights violations.

The Government uses vague “state secrets” 

provisions to arrest and detain religious leaders, 

journalists, and others who publicize or criticize government practice or publish materials 

The U.S. 

Commission on 

International 

Religious Freedom 

was created by 

the International 

Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 to 

monitor the status of 

freedom of thought, 

conscience, and 

religion or belief 

abroad, as defined 

in the Universal 

Declaration of 

Human Rights and 

related international 

instruments, 

and to give 

independent policy 

recommendations 

to the President, 

Secretary of State, 

and Congress.

U n i t e d S t a t e s C o m m i ss i o n o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l i g i o us F r e e d o m

visit our web site at 

www.uscirf.gov
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P OLI C Y F O C U S C h i n a

deemed embarrassing. The recent cases 

of Liu Fenggang, a Protestant investigating church destructions in Zhejiang province, and Shi Tao, a journalist reporting on 

press censorship, illustrate how Chinese 

law is being used to suppress information, expression, and association. Both 

were convicted of “supplying state secrets 

to overseas organizations.” Under such a 

vague definition anything can be “national 

secrets,” and “leaking secrets” covers virtually anything that the government does 

not want people to know or talk about.

Despite some recent legal and judicial reforms, including promises to ratify 

the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, establishment of the “rule 

of law” is hindered by corruption and the 

lack of accountability of officials. Lawyers 

who are outspoken in defense of defendant’s 

rights are themselves often harassed, threatened or disbarred. The law firm of prominent civil rights lawyer, Gao Zhisheng, was 

closed recently because he refused to curtail 

his defense of Falun Gong practitioners and 

unregistered Protestant pastor Cai Zhouana. Too often, the law is used as a tool to 

repress dissidents, religious believers, and 

others seeking to exercise the rights and 

freedoms protected by the Chinese Constitution and international norms.

China’s new Regulations on Religious 

Affairs were heralded as a “paradigm shift” 

in the protection of religious freedom in 

China. It is the Commission’s position 

that the new regulations do not adequately 

protect the rights and security of religious 

believers and are not fully consistent with 

international human rights norms. In fact, 

the Regulations extend the government’s 

control over almost all religious activity and 

provides fines and punishment for “unregistered” religious activity.

The Chinese government denied 

Commission requests for updated information and access to prominent religious 

prisoners. The Commission was allowed 

a brief interview with one of the famous 

Tibetan Buddhist “singing nuns”—Phuntsog Nyidron. Although she was released 

from prison in 2004, she remains under 

constant surveillance, is restricted in her 

movements and associations, and has debilitating health problems that cannot be 

addressed in her locality. The Chinese government, however, maintains that she is 

no longer under surveillance and “free to 

travel.” The Commission will continue to 

press for her freedom of movement to be 

restored so that she can get needed medical 

attention outside of China.

Given the continuing critical human 

rights problems in China, the Commission believes that these concerns must 

be raised at the highest levels and that 

U.S. officials should provide a consistent, 

candid, and coordinated message about 

human rights, including religious freedom, in their interactions with Chinese 

officials. Toward that end, the Commission has recommended policy options to 

strengthen U.S. human rights diplomacy 

with China which are highlighted at the 

conclusion of this report.

I

n August 2005, the Commission 

traveled to China to engage senior 

officials responsible for the management of religious affairs and the protection of human rights in discussions on 

Chinese policies and practices relating to 

religious freedom. For the past six years, 

the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom has recommended 

that China be designated as a “country of 

particular concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA). Each year, the Secretary of State 

has followed the Commission’s recommendation, finding that the government 

of China has engaged in systematic and 

egregious violations of freedom of religion. The Commission has compiled 

and published evidence that the Chinese 

government, as a matter of policy, monitors, controls, and represses the activities 

of members of all religious communities. 

The Commission continues to find that 

the Chinese government systematically 

violates the right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, contravening both the Chinese Constitution and 

international human rights norms.

Chinese law and policy restrict religious activities to those associated with the 

five officially sanctioned “patriotic” religious organizations. All other collective religious activities are illegal, and individuals 

from “unregistered” religious groups are 

subject to harassment, detention, and arrest. In regard to the officially sanctioned 

religious bodies, Chinese government agencies concerned with religious affairs maintain the final authority over leadership, 

financial,and doctrinal decisions. The Communist Party’s recent campaigns to “halt 

foreign influence,” stamp out “evil cults,” 

and strike hard against “ethnic separatism 

and religious extremism” have caused an 

atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among 

China’s religious communities and occasioned some of the country’s most brutal 

MICHAEL CROMARTIE, CHAIR

Vice President, Ethics and Public Policy Center

FELICE D. GAER, VICE CHAIR

Director, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement 

of Human Rights, The American Jewish Committee 

NINA SHEA, VICE CHAIR

Director of the Center for Religious Freedom, 

Freedom House

PREETA D. BANSAL, COMMISSIONER

Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

ARCHBISHOP CHARLES J. CHAPUT, 

COMMISSIONER

Archbishop of Denver 

KHALED ABOU EL FADL, COMMISSIONER

Professor of Law at UCLA

RICHARD D. LAND, COMMISSIONER 

President and CEO of the Ethics and Religious Liberty 

Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention 

ELIZABETH H. PRODROMOU, COMMISSIONER

Associate Director of the Institute on Culture, 

Religion, and World Affairs and Assistant Professor of 

International Relations, Boston University

BISHOP RICARDO RAMIREZ, COMMISSIONER

Bishop of the Diocese of Las Cruces, 

New Mexico

JOHN V. HANFORD III, 

EX-OFFICIO, 

NON-VOTING COMMISSIONER

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom, U.S. Department of State

JOSEPH R. CRAPA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

China Delegation staffed by:

Tad Stahnke, 

Deputy Director for Policy

David Dettoni, 

Deputy Director for Outreach

Scott Flipse, 

Senior Policy Analyst

Mindy Larmore, Policy Analyst

Commissioners
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P OLI C Y F O C U S C h i n a

human rights abuses. Particularly vulnerable are Catholics and Protestants engaged in 

unregistered activities, Tibetan Buddhists, 

Uighur Muslims, and members of spiritual 

movements such as the Falun Gong.

Commission Travel to China

The Commission’s visit to China followed 

several years of diplomatic effort by the U.S. 

government. An invitation was first promised during the 2002 U.S.-China human 

rights dialogue; however, two subsequent 

attempts to travel to China were postponed 

due to unacceptable conditions placed on 

these trips by Beijing, including denial of 

access to Hong Kong by the Chinese government.1

 Following further requests by 

the U.S. State Department, congressional 

leaders, and the White House, the Chinese 

government issued another invitation to 

the Commission in 2005. The Commission delegation was led by Chair Michael 

Cromartie and Vice-Chair Felice D. Gaer 

and included Commissioners Preeta D. 

Bansal, Archbishop Charles Chaput, Dr. 

Richard Land, Dr. Elizabeth Prodromou, 

and Bishop Ricardo Ramirez. During the 

two week visit, the Commission traveled 

to the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Urumqi and Kashgar in Xinjiang, and 

Lhasa in Tibet. The delegation met with 

Chinese Vice-Premier Hui Liangyu, senior officials from the Foreign, Justice, 

and State Ethnic Affairs Ministries, the 

National People’s Congress, the Supreme 

People’s Procuratorate, and the State Administration on Religious Affairs, as well 

as provincial and local officials from the 

various Religious and Ethnic Affairs and 

other relevant bureaus. The Commission 

also met with Chinese academics and 

lawyers, UN officials, and representatives 

of the government-sanctioned Buddhist, 

Catholic, Islamic, Protestant, and Taoist 

religious organizations. 

During the visit, the Commission 

raised questions on Chinese law and international human rights norms, the 

management of religious affairs, Chinese 

policies concerning unregistered religious 

organizations and the religious education 

of minors, new regulations on cults and religious affairs, the situations in Tibet and 

Xinjiang, and the conditions facing North 

Korean asylum-seekers in China. The 

Commission also raised several specific 

cases of concern with law enforcement officials and others. Notably, when in Lhasa, 

the delegation was allowed to meet briefly 

with recently released Tibetan Buddhist 

nun Phuntsog Nyidron, who was recently 

released after 15 years in prison and who 

remains restricted in her movements by 

the Chinese authorities. 

The Commission appreciated the opportunity to gain familiarity with several 

places in China, including Xinjiang and 

Tibet, as well as the efforts of its Chinese 

hosts, the State Administration on Religious 

Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

to arrange meetings with a range of senior 

national and local officials. Nevertheless, 

virtually all of the delegation’s interactions 

and activities were monitored and controlled by government representatives. 

Commissioners sought to have candid, comprehensive, and constructive discussions on international human rights 

norms and Chinese law and practice. The 

delegation recognizes the effort of several Chinese officials to respond to the 

Commission’s questions. Unfortunately, 

however, discussions were often far from 

candid. Chinese government officials were 

present at all meetings, including those 

with religious leaders and others who were 

not part of the government. At one meeting, the Catholic Bishop from Shenyang, 

affiliated with the government approved 

Catholic Patriotic Association, responded 

to a Commission question stating that he 

was aware of the harassment and arrest of 

neighboring Bishop Wei Jingyi, who was 

associated with the unregistered Catholic Church. Chinese officials present at 

the meeting did not allow the remarks to 

be translated and immediately ended the 

Bishop’s presentation.2 Moreover, the delegation was not able to meet and talk freely 

and privately with interlocutors of its own 

choosing. The Commission’s requests for 

access to prominent religious prisoners 

were denied. 

The “Patriotic 

Religious Associations”

The Commission met with representatives of 

the five officially recognized “patriotic” religious organizations, visited various religious 

The Commission continues to find that the Chinese 

government systematically violates the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, 

contravening both the Chinese Constitution and 

international human rights norms.

USCIRF Delegation and Buddhist Monks in Beijing
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To Contact the Commission :

United States Commission on

International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol St., NW, Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

Web site: www.uscirf.gov

E-mail: communications@uscirf.gov

Voice: 202-523-3240 

Fax: 202-523-5020

sites associated with these organizations, and 

observed their use. Chinese government officials and religious leaders told the Commission delegation that the number of religious 

believers associated with the five recognized 

groups was growing steadily. 

In order to operate legally, all religious 

organizations and “venues” for religious 

activities must be registered with the appropriate government agency. In order 

to do so, they must be affiliated with one 

of the five officially recognized religious 

organizations. Registration is thus limited in practice to the five recognized religions— Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, 

Protestantism, and Taoism. In response to 

Commission inquiries as to whether the 

Chinese government would allow other 

religious communities to register organizations or sites for religious activities, Chinese officials told the delegation that they 

are considering accepting registration from 

Orthodox Christians, Jews, Mormons, and 

Baha’is. The Commission was unable to 

verify with leaders from these communities 

whether Chinese officials have approached 

them to discuss this possibility. 

Registered religious organizations 

submit to government monitoring of their 

activities and the requirement of government approval of several religious activities—such as selecting a leader, printing 

materials, building or renovating religious 

venues, inviting religious leaders from 

other provinces, or holding a joint religious 

ceremony—that are explicitly protected 

from government interference under international human rights standards. In addition, most religious activities can only be 

conducted at registered venues. Religious 

groups that are legally registered in China 

have also accepted restrictions on what 

doctrines and traditions can be conveyed 

and taught. There are numerous credible 

reports, for example, of Christian leaders 

having to refrain from teachings involving 

the second coming of Jesus, divine healing, 

the practice of fasting, and the virgin birth 

because these doctrines or practices are 

considered by the government to be superstitious or contrary to the Chinese Communist Party’s social policies.3

In meetings with government officials 

in attendance, religious leaders in the government sanctioned religious organizations 

denied that any restrictions were placed 

on what they could preach or teach. They 

claimed, however, that direct criticism of 

government policy was disruptive to “social 

harmony,” and that they tried to emphasize 

the aspects of their faith traditions that, 

in their view, “strengthened socialistic society.” This is in line with official Chinese 

policy that religion must adapt to the development of a socialist society. 

Over the last decade, the Chinese government and the Communist Party have 

made some accommodation for the spiritual aspirations of the people of China, 

and have openly praised the contributions 

to society of government sanctioned religious organizations. The Commission was 

able to observe a “zone of toleration” where 

members of the approved religious organizations, working within the limitations 

described above, are given some latitude 

to practice their religion. The delegation 

was told that Chinese law now protects the 

property of registered groups, allows them 

to bring charges against abusive government officials, and permits them to perform some charitable and social service 

work in local communities. Religious leaders from the government approved organizations believed that these legal reforms 

were beneficial, though most could not be 

independently verified by the delegation. 

Commissioners met with religious leaders 

conducting social welfare work, noting that 

several programs of this nature have been 

started or are under development. 

Government relations with the five patriotic religious associations appear to differ 

from religion to religion and region to region. For example, official tolerance for Buddhism (among Han Chinese) and Taoism 

appears to be greater than for other groups 

in China. Religious leaders from these communities claimed that they face few restrictions. Nevertheless, Tibetan Buddhists and 

Uighur Muslims (see page 6), have more 

difficulties than their religious counterparts 

in other parts of the country, despite being 

affiliated with the government sanctioned 

religious organizations. 

Commissioners were able to gain 

some insight into the relationship between 

the Catholic patriotic religious organization and the Chinese government through 

their discussions with representatives of 

the government sanctioned Catholic Patriotic Association. Commissioners were told 

there was a growing communion between 

the Vatican and the clergy of the officially 

sanctioned church. At recent ordination 

ceremonies, clergy from the government 

approved church openly pledged fidelity to 

the Holy See. Catholic religious leaders in 

China told Commissioners that, though difficulties and suspicions remain, there was 

some reconciliation between the officially 

registered church and unregistered Catholics. However, most unregistered Catholics 

will not worship in churches of the Catholic 

Patriotic Association unless the bishop or 

priest is known to be in communion with 

Rome. The Chinese government does not 

allow Catholics to run schools or recognize 

openly the authority of the Papacy in many 

fundamental matters of faith and morals. 

In September 2005, Bishop Wei and three 

other Chinese bishops were invited to Rome 

by Vatican officials to participate in a Vatican synod in October, but the Chinese government denied them travel visas, citing 

the need for Vatican consultation directly 

with the Catholic Patriotic Association for 

such invitations. 

The Chinese government continues 

to insist, as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations, that the Vatican 

renounce the Papal role in the selection of 

bishops and break all relations with Taiwan. The Commission was told that the 

Chinese government’s insistence on approving and selecting bishops has made 

the ordination process very slow. At least 

twelve bishops are needed to fill current 

openings. The Commission learned that 

USCIRF Delegation Meets with Vice Premier Hui Liangyu
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in the last year, the Chinese government 

has quietly arranged for the ordination 

of at least some bishops approved by the 

Holy See. In Shanghai and Xi’an, auxiliary 

bishops from the “unregistered” Catholic 

Church were chosen with the full right of 

succession and with the approval of both 

the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association 

and the Vatican. During its meeting with 

two bishops of the Catholic Patriotic Association in Shanghai, the Commission was 

told that the Chinese government and the 

Holy See cooperated quietly to reconcile 

the registered and unregistered Catholic 

communities in the Shanghai diocese.

Also in Shanghai, the Commission 

was told of improved educational and spiritual formation opportunities for clergy 

and nuns and of expanding Catholic social 

service programs. The Commission was 

shown a new government sanctioned Catholic seminary in Beijing and was told that 

it would expand the number and quality 

of clergy. The Commission noted, however, that the Chinese government monitors 

and inspects all the registered seminaries 

and has severely restricted foreign professors from teaching at these institutions. In 

addition, the transmission of traditional 

Catholic moral teaching on such subjects 

as abortion, contraceptives, and divorce is 

forcefully suppressed as contradicting official Communist Party policy.

The Problem of the Unregistered

Most of China’s religious practice occurs 

outside the system of government approved 

religious organizations. Yet, the Chinese 

government actively seeks to control and 

suppress the activities of “unregistered” religious organizations to prevent the rise of 

sources of authority outside the control of 

the government and the Communist Party. 

The Commission raised concern over these 

practices with Chinese government officials, but did not seek to meet with leaders 

of “unregistered” religious groups because 

concerns were raised regarding their safety 

and their continued ability to operate in 

the country.

Chinese law bans unregistered religious organizations and provides severe 

penalties for engaging in unregistered religious activities. The Commission pointed 

out to government officials that under 

international human rights standards, 

failure to register cannot alone justify government imposed limitations on religious 

activities, or the harassment, detention, 

and imprisonment of members of unregistered religious groups. A senior official 

with the Communist Party’s United Front 

Works Department said that because the 

process of registering all religious groups 

under the new Regulations on Religious 

Affairs (see page 8) would take time, he did 

not think unregistered groups should be 

harassed or punished during that process. 

Nevertheless, Chinese officials confirmed 

that unregistered activity was illegal and 

would continue to be suppressed.

Indeed, in the past several years, unregistered religious activity has been increasingly targeted for official repression. 

Protestants, Catholics, and members of 

spiritual movements such as the Falun 

Gong have experienced the most severe 

problems, including arrests, numerous 

detentions, torture, irregular trials, and 

imprisonment, often in the notorious “reeducation through labor” system of detention. Protestant and Catholic leaders, 

in particular, have come under increased 

pressure to register their churches and 

affiliate with one of the government approved organizations. Those who refuse, 

for theological or other reasons, are subject to intimidation, extortion, harassment, detention, arrest, and the closing of 

their religious sites. Security forces have 

recently targeted leadership training sessions, university Bible studies, missionary 

activity, and the religious activity of China’s intellectuals. Religious leaders who 

print reports or send information abroad 

about church destructions or arrests have 

been arrested themselves and sentenced on 

charges of “divulging state secrets.” Government relations with unofficial Catholic 

churches remain tense. There are at least 

33 bishops and priests in prison for their 

religious activity.

Since March 2005, there have been 

several large-scale raids resulting in the 

destruction of property of unregistered 

Protestant groups in Jilin, Henan, Xinjiang, and Shanxi provinces. While the 

Commission was traveling in China, there 

were credible reports of arrests and detentions of Protestant leaders in Hubei and 

of Protestant and Muslim leaders in Xinjiang for engaging in unregistered activities. Reports of arrests and detention have 

continued since the Commission’s trip and 

suggest that a concerted crackdown is underway targeting China’s unregistered religious communities.

Although Chinese law clearly prohibits unregistered religious activity, the 

actual conditions under which China’s 

unrecognized religious communities operate vary from place to place, and the 

intensity of repression is not uniform 

throughout the country. For example, 

despite tensions, there is some reconciliation between registered and unregistered 

communities of Catholics in some parts 

of China. In areas of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and some parts of 

Zhejiang province, Protestant churches 

are allowed to operate without government registration. In other areas, some 

unregistered groups are allowed to operate with minimal supervision and often 

The largest share 

of China’s religious 

practice occurs 

outside the system of 

government approved 

religious organizations.

Three Self Christian Bookstore in Shanghai

Daoist Monk in Beijing
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share clergy, buildings, and religious and 

educational materials with registered 

groups. These conditions, however, do not 

exist everywhere and are often subject to 

change as a result of political conditions 

or arbitrary enforcement of restrictions 

by security forces or local officials.

In addition to legal provisions that prohibit unregistered activity, the Chinese government also has reserved for itself the right 

to determine that religious activities should 

be suppressed because they are “heretical” 

or “cultic.” Groups determined to be “cults” 

are brutally suppressed, as is evidenced 

by the crackdown on the Falun Gong and 

other spiritual movements. In recent years, 

some unregistered Protestant and Catholic 

church groups have been banned and their 

activities suppressed following official designation as “cults.”

Tibet and Xinjiang

Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims 

face serious restrictions on the free practice of their respective religions and severe abuses of their human rights. China’s 

policies on religious affairs have produced 

ongoing tensions between the government 

and these religious communities in regions 

where they predominantly reside, including the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR or 

Tibet) and Sichuan province for Tibetans 

and the Uighur Autonomous Region, or 

Xinjiang, for Uighurs. Because the Chinese 

government fears secessionist activities 

and recent calls for greater autonomy in 

these regions, crackdowns on religious activities in Xinjiang, Sichuan, and the TAR 

are often harsher than in other parts of 

China. Although religion is an important 

aspect of ethnic identity for both Tibetans 

and Uighurs, Chinese government officials 

told the Commission that fervent religious 

practice among these groups was an impediment to economic modernization and 

an organizational pole around which terrorists or “splittists” may gather.

There are similarities in the methods 

used by the Chinese government to control 

the practice of religion by Uighur Muslims 

and Tibetan Buddhists. The 

Commission delegation was 

told that “patriotic education” of religious leaders 

continues to occur in both 

Tibet and Xinjiang. Muslim 

imams and Tibetan monks 

and nuns are required to 

attend patriotic education 

sessions, all religious publications are controlled, and 

there are tight restrictions 

on religious celebrations, the 

religious education of minors, as well as the number 

of religious venues and religious leaders. In Xinjiang, 

even government officials 

must participate in “patriotic education.” The Commission was told that government officials 

dealing with religious affairs in Xinjiang 

must complete political education to avoid 

“paralyzed thinking” and to “distinguish 

between normal and illegal religious activities” and, as in all other areas of China, 

are required to be atheists.

Xinjiang

In Xinjiang, all collective home worship 

services, afterschool religious instruction, 

and other unauthorized religious instruction are strictly prohibited. The Commission was informed that Uighur Muslims 

have not received permission to build new 

mosques for the past six years. The Commission was also told that all imams are required to undergo yearly political training 

seminars in order to retain their licenses. 

Commissioners learned of the existence of 

an “Islamic Affairs Steering Committee,” 

which is reported to author and approve 

sermons and censor religious texts and any 

material with religious content. The purpose of such oversight by the government is 

to create Muslim religious leaders who will 

“ardently love their country.”4

Chinese authorities in Xinjiang use 

the “war on terror” as a pretext to monitor 

and control Uighur Muslim religious activity. This manipulation of terrorist concerns 

was evident during the Commission’s visit. 

Upon arrival in Xinjiang, provincial officials announced to the Commission delegation that “elements of Al- Qaeda” were 

targeting the Commission itself during its 

visit. The Commission requested that such 

threats be reported through official channels, and the unspecified threat, found later 

not to be credible by U.S. and Chinese security officials in Beijing, seemed to have been 

issued to restrict Commission activities and 

to monitor its contact with local people not 

approved by government officials. Commission requests to visit specific mosques, 

imams, and churches in Xinjiang were subsequently denied. There was particularly 

tight control on Commission movement 

during its visit to the city of Kashgar. 

At least nine different official campaigns to root out “illegal religious activities” have been carried out in Xinjiang over 

the past decade, including last year’s “strike 

hard” campaign against “separatism and 

A Conversation with Bishop Jin of Shanghai

Heitkar Mosque, Kashgar, XUAR
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religious extremism.” Government officials, 

as well as teachers, professors, and university students, are barred from engaging in 

daily prayers, wearing head coverings, distributing religious materials, and observing Ramadan.5

In March 2005, the Chinese government issued a press statement declaring 

that Chinese law does not prohibit the 

religious education of minors. Yet in 

Xinjiang, the Commission was told by 

provincial officials that the religious education of minors in mosques, madrassas, 

or any type of multi-family setting was 

prohibited until the child has completed 

the requisite nine years of compulsory 

general education. Officials stated that 

minors who have completed their education but were not selected to attend university could receive religious training 

and attend mosque, and that parents 

could give private religious instruction 

to their children. While the Commission 

delegation was in China, security forces 

arrested a woman in Xinjiang for teaching a religious class on the Koran. She was 

reportedly detained for “illegally possessing religious material and subversive 

historical material.”

The Commission noted that the 

Chinese government does allow some 

Muslim groups in Xinjiang to engage in 

social welfare programs. Commissioners met with imams who participate in 

alcohol, drug, and HIV/AIDs education 

programs. The Chinese government has 

praised the positive contributions of such 

officially approved religious organizations in meeting China’s growing social 

welfare and medical needs.

Tibet

The Chinese government continues 

to control tightly religious activity, including education and places of worship, in 

Tibet. Although the Commission was able 

to observe instances of private religious 

devotion at Tibetan Buddhist temples and 

monasteries, the activities and education 

of monks and nuns are closely monitored, 

monasteries are governed by government 

approved management committees, and the 

Communist Party continues to insist on approving the designation and training of all 

reincarnate lamas. In addition, Commissioners learned that monks and nuns are 

required to renounce the Dalai Lama as the 

spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists. When 

asked why this is required, government officials answered either that the Dalai Lama 

supported independence or “splittist” activities, or that continued public religious 

devotion to the Dalai Lama and his “clique” 

was a hindrance to economic modernization. Government officials claimed that the 

Dalai Lama’s influence had to be eliminated 

to protect “social harmony” and to raise the 

standard of living in Tibet and other regions 

with Tibetan Buddhist populations. 

Commissioners asked whether Tibetans were permitted to own or display 

pictures of the Dalai Lama or his chosen 

Panchen Lama, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, or 

hold prayer ceremonies for them. Religious 

leaders responded that Tibetans may own 

pictures of the Dalai Lama and hold private 

devotions for him, but that they may not 

publicly display or distribute the portrait or 

engage others in their ceremonies. In a separate meeting, public security officials agreed 

that private ownership of his portrait was not 

a punishable offense, only its public display 

was. Security officials conceded that no provision of Chinese law specifically prohibited 

arranging a prayer for the Dalai Lama, but 

told the Commission that the Dalai Lama’s 

political activities rendered any public recognition of him a threat to public order and 

social harmony and thus was prohibited. 

Owning pictures or holding ceremonies for 

the Dalai Lama’s chosen Panchen Lama was 

prohibited, they stated.

During its visit, the Commission asked 

to meet with the Dalai Lama’s chosen Panchen Lama. The young man has not been 

seen in more than a decade after being kidnapped by Chinese officials upon receiving recognition by the Dalai Lama. The 

Commission’s request was denied. Chinese 

government officials claimed that he was 

safe and studying Tibetan Buddhism but 

that his family was “unwilling for him to 

have a public life.” The Commission urged 

Chinese officials to end restrictions on access to the young man and his family and 

to allow them to receive visits from international representatives.

On the subject of the religious education of minors in Tibet, Commissioners 

were told that, with the exception of boys 

approved by the government and formally 

designated as reincarnate lamas, persons 

under the age of 18 were not permitted 

to receive religious education. Tibetan 

children must spend their time in public 

education and there was no time for both. 

When pressed on this issue by the delegation, one Chinese official said that “Tibet 

cannot be developed by chanting.” Yet, 

religious education of minors apparently 

goes on in some places despite official prohibitions. There have been reports of monastic schools in some remote parts of the 

TAR and other provinces with significant 

Tibetan populations. Government officials 

insisted, however, that such schools were 

prohibited from teaching religious subjects 

to minors.

During a visit to Drepung monastery in Lhasa, one of the largest in Tibet, 

the Commission was able to observe that 

a monk, sitting near where the delegation 

passed, was visibly younger than the other 

monks. When questioned in private by a 

Tibetan-speaking member of the delegation, the monk acknowledged that he was 

14 years old. He also said that he was a 

fulltime monk and had been at Drepung 

for “a few years,” and that there were some 

20 monks under the age of 18 at the monastery. Religious leaders at the monastery 

did not have any insight on the apparent 

Chanting at Drepung Monastery

Public Security Bureau Substation Located Directly 

Behind Drepung Monastery
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with violent separatist activity, extremism, 

and terrorism.

The National Regulations on 

Religious Affairs 

In March 2005, the Chinese government officially implemented new National Regulations on Religious Affairs. The regulations 

were introduced in order to clarify a patchwork of laws, ordinances, and regulations 

regarding religious practice. Chinese leaders heralded the regulations as “a significant 

step forward in the protection of Chinese 

citizens’ religious freedom.” However, when 

the new regulations were officially implemented, a senior official from the State 

Administration of Religious Affairs emphasized that the primary goal of the new 

regulations was to help expand government 

management of religious affairs.6

The new regulations have not 

been in place long enough to assess 

their implementation and actual 

impact. However, it is important 

to note that one year prior to the 

announced implementation of the 

present regulations and until the 

present, the crackdown targeting 

unregistered Christians intensified in several parts of China. It 

is the Commission’s position that 

until it is clear how the provisions 

of the new rules are interpreted 

and implemented, the new regulations threaten the rights and 

security of religious believers and are not 

fully consistent with international norms 

on freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief.

The new regulations contain provisions 

that could be used to limit the activities of 

registered religious groups and punish those 

who engage in unregistered activities. For 

example, criteria for the approval of registration of a site for religious activities includes an 

official determination that there is a “need” 

for local religious practitioners to “frequently carry out collective religious activities,” 

as well as that the site is “rationally located 

without interfering with the normal production and livelihood” of the local area.7

The new regulations also make clear 

on a national level that religious activities 

can only be conducted by registered religious bodies at approved religious sites.8

 As 

noted above, Chinese officials confirmed 

to the Commission that religious activities 

conducted by unregistered groups are illegal 

under the new regulations,9 which provide 

for civil fines for individuals who engage in 

such activities.10 The Public Security Bureau 

is also authorized to impose penalties if religious activity is being carried out at a venue 

that has not been properly registered with 

the relevant authorities.11 In addition, the Religious Affairs Department is authorized to 

disband any religious group that fails to gain 

official approval for its leadership, membership or management procedures; accepts 

donations without receiving prior approval; 

or refuses “to accept supervision and administration conducted by the Religious Affairs 

Department according to law.” 12 Individuals 

who participate in religious activities not authorized under the new regulations are subject to criminal punishment.13

In discussions with Chinese officials, 

the Commission raised questions about 

the clarity of the registration requirements 

in the regulations, the language used in 

regulating religious publications, and the 

Too often, the law 

is used as a tool of 

repression to harass, 

detain, and imprison 

dissidents, religious 

practitioners, the 

disadvantaged, or the 

politically suspect.

discrepancy between official pronouncements on religious education of minors 

and monastery practice.

Despite some ambiguity regarding the 

religious education of minors in Tibet, it is 

the Commission’s conclusion that Chinese 

government controls on religious practice 

in Tibet and Xinjiang contravene both 

China’s own constitution and its international human rights obligations. Policies 

enforced by Chinese officials that restrict 

human rights in order ostensibly to protect 

“national unity” or “national security” exceed those restrictions permitted under 

international standards and override other 

protections in Chinese law. Like other governments, the Chinese government does 

have a duty to protect its nationals from 

terrorist attacks, but it too often conflates 

peaceful political opposition or efforts 

to maintain religious and ethnic identity 

Drepung Monastery, Lhasa, Tibet

Commission Delegation Meets with Officials in Shanghai 
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P OLI C Y F O C U S C h i n a

official oversight required with regard to 

leadership decisions.

The new regulations do include several 

provisions that are, on their face, potentially significant advances. These include 

establishing conditions under which religious organizations can provide social services in local communities, protect their 

property, bring complaints against abusive 

government officials, accept donations 

from overseas religious groups, and receive 

prompt responses from government agencies on registration applications. However, a 

group must be registered in order to engage 

in these activities or take advantage of the 

provisions under the regulations.

It may be a positive step that the 

planned release of implementation guidelines for Shanghai was withdrawn, reportedly so that Chinese government officials 

could study reservations raised by the 

Commission and other international legal 

scholars and commentators. The Commission plans to offer Chinese officials a detailed analysis of the new regulations and 

to compare them with international human 

rights standards regarding the freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief.

The Rule of Law

Although Communist Party leaders have 

made it clear that they intend to strengthen 

the one-party state, they have also promised 

to move toward a system governed by the 

rule of law. Similar promises were expressed 

in almost all of the Commission’s meetings 

with Chinese government officials. However, although many statements have been 

made about legal reform and establishing 

the rule of law in China, few concrete steps 

have actually been taken, particularly in 

the area of protecting the rights of the individual. Thus, despite promises of legal reform, redress for violations of human rights 

by government officials is not available on a 

consistent basis. Reform of the legal system 

is an important issue, both for the expansion of business practices as well as for the 

rights of individuals. Engagement in the 

global economy has forced Chinese leaders 

to review some of their laws and practices. 

Legal reforms in the areas of commercial 

law and property rights have played a role 

in sustaining economic growth in China 

and lifting portions of the population out 

of poverty. 

There has been some discussion by 

Chinese officials of extending greater 

legal protections to individuals. In 2002, 

the Chinese government called for a complete review of its civil, administrative, 

and criminal procedure codes. In recent 

years, the Chinese government has also 

shown a willingness to permit some independence of the courts in cases involving 

official corruption, to hold qualifying examinations to raise the competency level 

of judges, and to consider amending laws 

to protect detained suspects. Notably, in 

March 2004, China amended its Constitution to include a provision that the state 

should protect human rights. This last 

measure is largely symbolic because the 

Constitution is not enforceable in Chinese 

courts, but it signals, at the very least, a 

growing awareness in official circles of 

human rights concerns. It represents an important commitment, but at present there is 

no way to require its implementation.

In the last year, the Chinese government has permitted public criticism of the 

criminal justice system after cases of wrongful prosecution and death in police custody 

became national scandals. In response to 

the scandals, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) has taken steps to investigate 

cases of illegal detentions and to punish law 

enforcement officers who use torture to extract confessions. These reforms may bring 

more badly needed transparency and accountability into legal proceedings.

Yet, Chinese legal reforms appear to 

be hindered by the widespread and persistent corruption and lack of official accountability. The Chinese legal system 

does not provide individuals the means to 

seek full or fair redress for human rights 

violations though the courts. In addition, 

the criminal system still relies on confessions, which are frequently obtained 

through torture; lawyers who are outspoken in defense of defendants’ rights are 

themselves often threatened, disbarred, or 

imprisoned. Too often, the law is used as 

a tool of repression to harass, detain, and 

imprison dissidents, religious practitioners, the disadvantaged, or the politically 

suspect. For example, vague criminal law 

provisions prohibiting acts “endangering 

national security,” “subversion,” or “inciting splittism” are often used to detain 

individuals for political offenses.

One of the more significant steps that 

could be taken by the Chinese government 

to provide legal protections for human 

rights is to ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR), which was signed by China 

in 1998. In response to questions about the 

status of ratification, the Commission delegation was told that, while China intended 

to ratify the ICCPR at some point, changes 

to the legal system had to be considered first 

in order to bring Chinese law into line with 

international standards. The parameters of 

needed legal reforms are, the Commission 

was told, currently under study by the National People’s Congress and others. Despite 

The Commission is convinced that many reforms are 

needed to bring Chinese law in the areas of religious 

affairs and protections for human rights into conformity 

with international standards.

Commissioners Ramirez, Gaer, Bansal and Prodromou 

with Imams at a Mosque in Urumqi

Commissioners After Meeting with Protestants at Chongwenmen Church 

in Beijing
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P OLI C Y F O C U S C h i n a

specific questions, no one could identify for 

the Commission the items in need of further study or provide a timetable for the 

ratification process.

The Commission is convinced that 

many reforms are needed to bring Chinese law in the areas of religious affairs 

and protections for human rights into 

conformity with international standards. 

China’s Constitution, its new regulations 

on religious affairs, and its Criminal Code 

are all at odds with standards set forth in 

the ICCPR. Prompt legal reforms in these 

areas, rather than being delayed for further discussion, should be implemented. 

Prompt ratification of the ICCPR would 

demonstrate China’s commitment to protecting the rights of individuals.

The Commission discussed the issue 

of arbitrary detention and the use of torture 

to gain confessions with senior officials 

of the Justice Ministry and the SPP. The 

Commission discussed potential changes 

to Article 306 of the Criminal Procedure 

Code, which provides penalties for lawyers 

whose clients are accused of perjury and 

has been used to curtail the active legal 

defense of individuals accused of political crimes. Noting allegations of irregular 

trial procedures and/ or reported evidence 

of torture in the cases of Pastor Gong 

Shengliang of the South China Church and 

Tibetan Buddhist Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, 

the Commission reiterated requests by the 

U.S. government and others in the international community for a review of the 

cases by the Supreme People’s Court. The 

Justice Ministry and the SPP agreed to accept further evidence from the Commission in these two cases. One senior official 

stated that investigations should be opened 

if there was evidence of torture and legal 

irregularities in these cases.

Religious Persecution: 

A Sampling of Cases in the PRC

L iu F enggang

Background: House Church leader arrested 

and tried in secret on charges of “gathering 

and illegally providing state intelligence to 

foreign entities.” Sentenced to three years 

imprisonment in 2004.

Chinese government response: Liu Fenggang was imprisoned on charges related to 

“spying.” The trial was conducted in secret 

in accordance with PRC criminal law regarding national security cases.

USCIRF assessment: Response from the 

Chinese government includes no new information. Implies evidence of the use of 

national security provisions to quell information that may be deemed embarrassing 

to the government. Liu Fenggang was actually arrested for publishing a story about 

church destructions in Zhejiang province. 

Using such vague definitions of “state secrets,” authorities can charge persons with 

criminal activity for virtually anything that 

the government does not want people to 

know or to discuss.

Wei Yumei and Wei Yufen

Background: Sisters and Falun Gong

practitioners. Arrested in May 2004 after

they were found producing and distributing Falun Gong literature. Both were 

convicted of “using a cult to undermine 

implementation of the law” and sentenced 

to 10 years imprisonment.

Chinese response to USCIRF: Both taken 

into custody “on suspicion of committing a 

crime” and sentenced to 10 year terms on 

charges as specified above.

USCIRF assessment: Response from the

Chinese includes no new information. 

Fails to detail the justification for the government’s restriction on the manifestation 

of religion or belief, Chinese criminal law 

contains vague restrictions related to socalled “cults.”

Gedun Choek yi Nyima

Background: Recognized by the Dalai Lama 

on May 14, 1995 as the Panchen Lama. Chinese officials denounced the choice as “illegal and invalid” and named another boy as 

Panchen Lama. Gedun Choekyi Nyima and 

his parents were taken into Chinese custody 

on May 17, 1995 and remain in incommunicado detention. The Chinese government 

has not revealed the precise location where 

they are being held, nor has anyone been 

permitted to meet with them.

Chinese response: Request to meet with 

him denied. The boy’s parents do not want 

him to have a public life. The boy, age 16, is 

studying and in the care of his parents.

USCIRF assessment: Response from the 

Chinese government includes no new information. Continues pattern of repeated denials for access by international observers to 

Gedun Choekyi Nyima. Shows government 

interference with leadership decisions of a 

religious community, as well as the rights of 

Gedun Choekyi Nyima.

ToHTi Tunyaz

Background: Uighur historian sentenced in 

1999 to 11 years imprisonment on charges 

of inciting splittism and illegally acquiring 

state secrets for compiling documents used 

in his thesis on Chinese government policies towards ethnic minorities. In 2001, the 

UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 

ruled that the detention of Tohti Tunyaz 

was arbitrary.

Chinese response to USCIRF: Regarding 

this case and all other enquiries involving 

Uighurs, the Chinese government gave no 

response, continuing a pattern of failure to 

comment on Uighur prisoners.

USCIRF assessment: Policies that restrict 

human rights in order to protect “national 

unity” or “national security” in Xinjiang 

Uighur Autonomous Region exceed international standards and often override other 

protections in Chinese law. The Chinese government should establish a mechanism for 

reviewing cases of persons detained under 

suspicion of, or charged with, offenses relating 

to state security, disturbing social order, “splittist” activities, or organizing or participating 

in “illegal” gatherings or religious activities.

Bishop Su Zhimin

Background: Unregistered Catholic bishop arrested in 1996 along with auxiliary 

Bishop An Shuxin. Neither have been seen 

publicly since 1997, nor has the Chinese 

government offered information on their 

status or whereabouts.

Chinese response: Relevant departments 

have taken no coercive action to punish 

the Bishops and they are not under Chinese 

government control.

USCIRF assessment: Response from the 

Chinese government includes no new information. Both Bishop Su and Bishop An 

were detained without trial and have been 

in custody without acknowledgement by 

the Chinese government for nearly a decade. Commission requests to meet with 

them were denied. Bishop Jin of Shanghai 

told the USCIRF delegation that Bishop Su 

was in good health and was being held in a

government rest home in Hebei.
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Meeting with Phuntsog Nyidron 

and Cases of Special Concern

During its visit to China, the Commission raised a number of individual cases 

with Chinese authorities of alleged arbitrary 

detention or “enforced disappearance” on 

account of religious belief or practice or of 

other religious freedom violations in China. 

The Commission discussed in detail with 

Chinese officials a list of known religious 

prisoners, including Buddhists, Muslims, 

Protestants, Catholics, and members of the 

Falun Gong. The delegation asked for information on the current status of these cases 

and requested they be considered for immediate review and/or release. The Commission also asked to meet with several 

prominent religious figures whose detention or disappearance has raised international concern, including the Dalai Lama’s 

chosen Panchen Lama, Gedun Choekyi 

Nyima; Catholic Bishops Su Zhimin and 

An Shuxin; Tibetan Buddhist monk Ngawang Phuljung; Protestant “house church” 

leader Cai Zhuohua; and Uighur historian 

Tohti Tunyaz. The Commission also asked 

to meet with former Tibetan nun Phuntsog 

Nyidron, in light of reports that her freedom of movement and association remain 

highly restricted, despite her release from 

prison a year earlier.

The Commission’s requests to meet 

with all but one of these prisoners were 

denied. In addition, the information that 

the Chinese government eventually formally transmitted to the Commission on 

the status of the individuals on its list was 

cursory, adding nothing to previous statements by the Chinese government on the 

status of these persons. The Commission 

also did not receive any information on the 

list of Uighur prisoners it submitted to Chinese officials. In a formal response to the 

Commission, the Chinese government continued to claim that “no one has ever been 

punished by law or put into prison for his/

her religious belief” and that information 

on “criminals involved in separatist activity...was an internal affair” of China. Such 

responses clearly indicate that Chinese law 

and practice do not fully allow for religious 

activities that are protected by international 

human rights treaties to which China is a 

signatory, not least because such activities 

are often interpreted by the government as 

illegal political acts of subversion or separatism. The Commission called on the Chinese 

government to release all those imprisoned 

or detained on account of the manifestation of religious belief in contravention of 

international human rights standards, and 

to establish a mechanism for a 

full and fair review of cases of 

persons detained under suspicion of, or charged with, offenses 

relating to state security, disturbing social order, “counterrevolutionary” or “splittist” activities, 

or organizing “illegal” gatherings or religious activities. This 

mechanism should also review 

cases of detained or imprisoned 

religious leaders, many of whom 

have been charged with specious 

criminal offenses related to national security.

The Commission was 

granted a brief interview with 

Phuntsog Nyidron in the presence of Chinese officials, who 

rejected the Commission’s request to conduct the interview 

in private. In 1989, Phuntsog Nyidron was 

sentenced to nine years in prison for holding a peaceful demonstration celebrating 

the Dalai Lama’s Nobel Peace Prize award. 

Her sentence was extended by eight years 

after she recorded songs about Tibet and 

the Dalai Lama that were smuggled from 

prison. According to numerous witnesses, 

Phuntsog Nyidron and the other nuns 

imprisoned with her were beaten during 

their imprisonment.

During the interview, Phuntsog Nyidron told the Commission that she had 

debilitating health problems that required 

special medical attention and limited her 

ability to make a living as a farmer in the village where she now resides. She was unable to 

address these health concerns, however, because of a lack of money and restrictions on 

her movement. In response to the Commission’s question of whether a passport might 

facilitate needed medical treatment, she said 

that it was impossible for her to travel because of her conviction on “counterrevolutionary crimes.” She also stated that due to 

her status as a “counterrevolutionary criminal,” security officials accompany her at all 

times. She did not discuss whether she was 

subjected to other restrictions.

The day after the meeting, ostensibly to “clarify” Phuntsog Nyidron’s 

statements, government officials told 

Commissioners that public security officials no longer accompany her because 

her parole was completed in February 

2005. Commissioners were also told that 

she was now “free to travel.” If she is indeed “free to travel,” the Commission believes Phuntsog Nyidron should be issued 

a passport immediately.

Commissioners Land, Gaer, Bansal and Ramirez 

After Meeting with Phuntsog Nyidron (center)

Zhongnanhai, Where Chinese Leaders Live And Work

The space for political openness, public activism, and 

greater civil and individual freedoms is narrowing 

in China. Over the past year, the Communist Party 

has tightened its control over religious leaders as well 

as journalists, intellectuals, the Internet, and nongovernmental organizations.
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North Korean Asylum Seekers

The Commission raised with Chinese officials the issue of North Koreans 

in China, who, after fleeing starvation and 

persecution, face harsh conditions when 

they cross the border into China. Many 

have been forcibly repatriated to North 

Korea, where they face severe penalties 

upon their return.

The Chinese government refuses 

to allow representatives of the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

to interview North Koreans. China views 

North Koreans as “economic migrants” 

and therefore does not recognize them 

as asylum seekers under international 

law. This policy, coupled with China’s 

active repatriation of North Koreans to 

their country of origin where they face 

reprisals, contravenes China’s obligations 

under the 1951 Convention Relating to the 

Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol 

which states that “no Contracting States 

shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee 

in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 

of territories where his life or freedom 

would be threatened on account of his 

race, religion, nationality, membership of 

a particular social group or political opinion.”14 Forced return to a country where 

they face a risk of torture would also contravene the Convention Against Torture to 

which China is a party. In addition, Chinese policy violates the 1995 UN-Chinese 

Agreement stating that “UNHCR personnel may at all times have unimpeded access to refugees and to the sites of UNHCR 

projects in order to monitor all phases of 

their implementation.”15

Chinese security forces reportedly 

guard the UNHCR office in Beijing and 

a number of foreign consulates in order 

to prevent North Koreans from entering 

them and seeking asylum. Chinese officials 

told the Commission that they must repatriate North Koreans under terms of a 1961 

agreement with North Korea.16 Commissioners responded that repatriated North 

Koreans face harassment, mistreatment, 

detention, torture, and possible execution. 

Chinese officials claimed that they had no 

evidence of such conditions and have repeatedly asked North Korean officials not 

to mistreat those repatriated. Some officials suggested that the fact that North 

Koreans often enter and re-enter China 

numerous times was evidence that they did 

not face bodily harm if repatriated.

The Commissioners reiterated to Chinese officials that North Koreans in China 

should be considered refugees, either as 

persons who have a well founded fear of 

persecution had they remained in North 

Korea, or as persons who may not have 

fled persecution in the first place but who 

nonetheless are refugees because they risk 

persecution upon return to their country of 

origin. In addition, Commissioners offered 

to provide Chinese government officials 

with evidence that significant numbers of 

North Koreans face persecution because of 

their family connections, political views, 

or religious beliefs. The Commissioners 

also discussed the ways in which the vulnerable status of North Koreans in China 

encourages human smugglers, trafficking 

in women and children, and a host of other 

social problems. At least one Chinese official, Minister Li Dezhu of the State Ethnic 

Affairs Commission, acknowledged in a 

meeting with the Commission the growing 

problems associated with North Korean 

asylum seekers in China and expressed the 

need to find humane solutions to these and 

other problems occurring on the border.17 

Nevertheless, Commissioners pressed Chinese officials on the need for representatives of the UNHCR to be allowed access 

to North Koreans in China and for unimpeded humanitarian assistance to the affected regions.

Human Rights and the 

U.S.-China Relationship

The space for political openness, public activism, and greater civil and individual 

freedoms is narrowing in China. Over the 

past year, the Communist Party has tightened its control over religious leaders as well 

as journalists, intellectuals, the Internet, 

and nongovernmental organizations. President Hu, in a speech to the Central Committee in September 2004, warned against 

“hostile forces” seeking to undermine the 

Party by “using the banner of political reform to promote...parliamentary democracy, human rights, and the freedom of the 

press.” The Chinese President warned that 

the Soviet Union fell because of the policies 

of “openness and pluralism” and because 

of “international monopoly capital with 

the United States as its leader.”18 Chinese 

political leaders view pressure to guarantee 

individual and political rights as evidence 

of a “strategic plot to Westernize and split 

China.” From the Chinese perspective, 

global concerns regarding human rights are 

at worst subversive and at best peripheral to 

improving economic ties.

In the past, Chinese officials have argued that slow progress on civil and political rights was a temporary trade-off to 

achieve economic modernization. Given 

China’s impressive economic growth, this 

argument can no longer be sustained. The 

Chinese government has embraced some 

of the benefits of the free market with 

dramatic results. The Chinese people now 

have greater mobility, increased property 

rights, and somewhat greater access to information than in the past. These advances 

have raised the aspirations of the Chinese 

people and the international community, 

but fulfilling these hopes will require a 

commitment to respect civil and political 

rights, in addition to economic and social 

rights. It will also require an acknowledgment that human rights are indeed universal and are currently not protected in 

Chinese law and practice, despite the Chinese government’s international commitments in this regard.

Respect for human rights is also important for regional security and prosperity, 

both in China and throughout theregion. 

Such respect is a critical element in any 

In the past, Chinese officials have argued that slow 

progress on civil and political rights was a temporary 

trade-off to achieve economic modernization. Given 

China’s impressive economic growth, this argument can 

no longer be sustained.

Tibetan Prayer Flags
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peaceful outcome to the Taiwan issue, successful management of Hong Kong under 

Beijing’s control, and final resolution of security concerns on the Korean peninsula. 

Any social or political crises in these areas 

will certainly involve Western and other actors in spheres China considers its exclusive 

national interests.

Human rights concerns remain on 

the agenda of U.S.-China bilateral relations. In the past, critics of a vigorous 

human rights diplomacy have argued that 

economic liberalization would eventually 

lead to political change. This has not happened. Although China has gotten richer, 

economic freedom has not led to political 

liberalization. China’s achievements in the 

economic sphere represented a key component in Beijing’s successful bid to host the 

Olympic Games in 2008. After securing 

the right to host the games, Chinese officials made promises to create an open and 

free environment. The Chinese government should now be held to those promises. Clearly, reliance on market forces alone 

will not secure progress toward human 

rights and political openness. Given the 

continuing critical human rights problems 

in China, the Commission concludes that 

these concerns must be raised at the highest levels and that U.S. officials should provide a consistent, candid, and coordinated 

message about human rights, including religious freedom, in their interactions with 

Chinese officials. The U.S. government 

should therefore continue to pursue broadranging policy options and discussions to 

ensure that progress on human rights and 

the rule of law remain core components of 

the bilateral relationship with China.

How the Chinese government responds to the aspirations of its own people 

is important for the future of China itself, 

for the flexibility and scope of future U.S.-

China relations, and for China’s standing in 

the international community. The United 

States should continue to help foster political, economic, and legal reforms in China. 

To this end, the Commission presents the 

following recommendations for U.S. policy to strengthen the protection of human 

rights, in particular the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, in China.

Recommendations to 

Advance U.S. Human 

Rights Diplomacy 

with China

I. Ending Human Rights Abuses in China

1. The U.S. government should urge the Chinese government to end severe violations of religious freedom and other human rights.

To this end, the U.S. government should urge the Chinese government to:

• end its current crackdown on religious and spiritual groups throughout 

China, including harassment, surveillance, arrest, and detention of persons 

on account of their manifestation of religion or belief; the detention, torture, and ill-treatment of persons in prisons, labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other places of confinement; and the coercion of individuals to 

renounce or condemn any religion or belief;

• release all those imprisoned or detained on account of their manifestation 

of religious belief in contravention of international human rights standards; and

• establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or charged with, offenses relating to state security, disturbing social order, “counterrevolutionary” or “splittist” activities, or organizing or 

participating in “illegal” gatherings or religious activities. This mechanism 

should also review cases of detained or imprisoned religious leaders, many 

of whom have been charged with specious criminal offenses.

2. The U.S. government should raise publicly concerns about Chinese human 

rights abuses in multilateral fora, including at appropriate UN bodies or 

other international and multi-national fora, and ensure that preparations 

for such actions be made at appropriately high levels.

3. The U.S. government should fully implement the March 2005 bilateral 

agreement between the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. 

Department of State. To this end, the U.S. government should urge the Chinese government to:

• issue a national decree guaranteeing the right of minor children to manifest 

their religion or belief and the liberty of parents to ensure the religious and 

moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions;

• undertake measures to ensure that this decree is implemented fully and fairly in all regions of the country and among members of all religious groups;

• provide a clear definition of “religious gatherings at home,” including the 

circumstances under which such gatherings are required to register as religious venues; and

• determine dates for a visit to China by the new UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, in accordance with the terms of reference 

required by the Special Rapporteur.
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1 4 II. Building on Existing Efforts to Improve the Rule 

of Law in China

4. The U.S. government should make the promotion of the 

rule of law a greater priority of U.S. human rights diplomacy in China.

To this end, the U.S. government should continue to urge the 

Chinese government to:

• ratify and implement the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed 

in 1998;

• amend or repeal Article 306 of the Criminal Procedure 

Code, which has been used against attorneys who have 

vigorously defended the rights of their clients;

• amend or repeal Article 111 of the Criminal Procedure 

Code, which labels as “state secrets” any published information deemed embarrassing to the government, and 

raise the issue of China’s use of “state security” as a rationale for suppressing dissent in bilateral and multilateral discussion; 

• investigate allegations of abuses of power by law enforcement officials and the use of torture to extract confessions 

in criminal cases, including the cases raised by the Commission with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, report publicly on the results of the investigations, and punish those found responsible for such 

abuses; and

• end the use of government filters on Web sites and email and remove official restrictions on Internet message 

boards and text messaging, including blockage of access 

to certain Web sites related to religion, belief, or human 

rights; revise the September 2000 State Council regulations on Internet Content Providers (ICP) and offer ICP’s 

clear and consistent guidelines for Web site content and 

usage to ensure that Chinese law and practice in this area 

conform to international standards on the freedoms of 

opinion and expression.

5. The U.S. government should appoint a new Counselor 

for Human Rights and the Rule of Law at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

China’s leadership has publicly committed to ratify the 

ICCPR and carry out legal and other reforms to enhance 

the rule of law in China. In order to support these goals 

and to manage the growing number of rule of law programs 

funded by the U.S. government, a new permanent Counselor for Human Rights and Rule of Law should be established at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. This individual would 

identify and oversee projects that seek to enhance judicial 

independence; promote human rights awareness among 

the Chinese people; monitor direct elections at the village 

level; support judicial, legal, administrative, and regulatory 

reform in the areas of human rights, including freedom 

of religion; promote citizen participation in local government and civil society; and provide technical assistance to 

Chinese lawyers and officials to promote understanding of 

international human rights norms. The Counselor would 

also ensure that U.S.-funded rule of law programs advance 

the priorities of U.S. human rights diplomacy, including the 

promotion of religious freedom, with China.

6. The U.S. government should vigorously promote international human rights norms in legal reform and religious affairs. 

Because the Chinese government has publicly committed to 

promote the rule of law in the areas of criminal procedure and 

religious affairs and to review its laws and consider legal reforms as necessary to ratify the ICCPR, the U.S. government 

should support and encourage a wider and more effective 

array of activities in this area, including:

• programs with U.S. human rights experts and Chinese 

government officials, academics, representatives of religious communities, and non-governmental organizations on international standards relating to the right of 

freedom of religion or belief, and the importance and 

benefits of upholding human rights, including freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief;

• programs with international human rights experts and 

Chinese scholars, judges, attorneys, and government officials on reforms to the Chinese criminal justice system, 

including planned changes in the criminal procedure 

code, the role of defense lawyers, and international norms 

on criminal justice standards; and

• consultations between international human rights experts and Chinese officials and others on the compatibility of Chinese laws, regulations, and practices with ICCPR 

standards on freedom of religion or belief. These consultations should occur within the 2006 calendar year.

7. The U.S. Congress should authorize the State Department’s 

Human Rights and Democracy Fund to initiate new human 

rights and rule of law programs on freedom of religion or 

belief, targeting both religious and ethnic minorities. 

Authorizations should be commensurate with ongoing rule 

of law programs funded by the State Department regarding 

the rights of Chinese workers, women, and public interest 

law training. In formulating all such programs described in 

recommendations 6 and 7, the Administration should consult 

with the Commission and with the Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom.

III. Strengthening International Coordination 

for Technical Assistance Programs

8. The U.S. government should encourage international coordination of internationally funded technical assistance 

programs in China.

Mirroring coordination efforts of countries engaged in bilateral 

human rights dialogues with China, the State Department should 

organize regular meetings of the approximately 15 donor countries 

that currently fund technical assistance, rule of law, and economic 

development programs in China in order to coordinate programs 

already in place, share “best practices,” and to ensure that programs 

advance 1) Chinese compliance with its international human rights 

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1 5 commitments, and 2) the objectives of the bilateral and multilateral 

human rights initiatives with China.

IV. Expanding U.S. Outreach and Public Diplomacy 

in Tibet and Xinjiang

9. The U.S. government should work to increase the U.S. diplomatic presence in Tibet and Xinjiang.

The U.S. government should urge the Chinese government to 

allow a U.S. government presence, such as a consulate, in Lhasa, 

Tibet and Urumqi, Xinjiang to monitor religious freedom and 

other human rights conditions.

10. The U.S. government should strengthen its efforts to 

highlight conditions faced by Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists.

The U.S. government should continue to raise the profile of 

the conditions experienced by Uighur Muslims and Tibetan 

Buddhists by:

• addressing religious freedom and other human rights 

concerns in bilateral discussions;

• increasing the number of educational opportunities in 

the United States that are available to religious and other 

leaders from these regions, in order to enhance their understanding of religious freedom and other human rights 

according to international standards;

• creating legal clinics to assist those in areas of high concentrations of Uighur Muslim and Tibetan Buddhist 

populations to enforce their human rights under the 

Chinese Constitution and international law, building on 

existing programs that serve other ethnic minority areas 

in China; 

• expanding ongoing assistance to civil society programs 

that promote Tibetan culture, language, and social welfare and develop similar programs for Uighurs;

• increasing the number and frequency of broadcasts in the 

Tibetan and Uighur languages by the Voice of America 

and Radio Free Asia; and

• using official U.S. delegations traveling in the region 

and other means to disseminate among local populations documents on international human rights standards in local languages.

V. Enhancing the U.S.-China Bilateral Human 

Rights Dialogue

11. The U.S. Congress should ensure that congressional 

oversight of U.S.-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue is maintained.

Because the U.S.-China bilateral dialogue has been criticized in 

the past for not producing sufficient concrete results, the U.S. 

Congress should require the State Department to submit an 

annual public report to the appropriate congressional committees detailing issues discussed at the previous year’s U.S.-China 

human rights dialogue and describing progress made toward a 

series of “benchmarks” specified by Congress.

VI. Addressing the Conditions of North Koreans in 

China

12. The U.S. government should continue to urge the Chinese 

government to protect North Koreans in China.

To this end, the U.S. government should urge the Chinese government to:

uphold its international obligations to protect asylum seekers 

by (1) working with the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) to establish a mechanism to confer at least 

temporary asylum on those seeking such protection; (2) providing the UNHCR with unrestricted access to interview North Korean nationals in China; and (3) ensuring that any migrants who 

are being returned pursuant to any bilateral agreement are not 

potential asylum seekers refouled in violation of China’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol;

• grant legal residence to the North Korean spouses of Chinese citizens and their children; and

• allow international humanitarian organizations greater 

access to North Koreans in China to address growing social problems experienced by this vulnerable population, 

including child and sexual trafficking and forced labor. 

13. The U.S. government should place a higher priority on 

working with China and other countries in the region to 

provide safe haven, secure transit, and clear resettlement 

procedures for North Koreans.

14. The Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security should work with China, South Korea, 

and other countries in the region to resolve quickly the 

remaining technical and legal issues surrounding the 

resettlement of North Koreans in the United States and 

other countries. 

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ENDNOTES

1

 The Commission traveled to Hong Kong in January 2004, at the 

invitation of the Hong Kong government.

2

 Attempts by Commissioners to gain further information about 

this incident were rebuffed. The Commission remains concerned 

about the safety and independence of Bishop Wei and other Chinese bishops and will continue to monitor this situation closely. 

3

 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 

Annual Report 2001,”China”, May 2001.

4

 [“PRC: Qinghai Enhances Religious Work to Guard Against 

Separatist Infiltration,” Qinghai Daily, 8 September 04 (FBIS, 11 

January 05). Ma Pinyan, “The Implementation of the Party’s Religious Policy in Xinjiang,’ Xinjiang Social Sciences, No. 1, 2005, 

49–55. 

5

 “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch/Human Rights in China, March 2005. 

6

 Nailene Chou Wiest, “Religious Groups Get More Room to 

Move,” South China Morning Post (Online), 20 October 04. Wang 

Zuoan, “Establish the Idea of Managing Religious Affairs According 

to Law,” Chinese Religions, 26 February 05 (FBIS, 26 February 05). 

7

 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Article 14.

8

 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Article 20.

9

 The only exception to this were ad-hoc home meetings among 

family members that occurred on a non-regular basis to read the 

Bible and sing hymns, although the precise description of what was 

permitted varied and was nowhere contained in the new regulations or otherwise committed to written law or regulations. 

10 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Articles 43, 44, 45. See 

also Congressional Executive Commission on China, “China’s New 

Regulations on Religious Affairs; A Paradigm Shift,” Transcript of 

Congressional testimony from March 14, 2005. 

11 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Articles 41, 43, 46.

12 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Articles 39, 43.

13

 Criminal law provisions regularly used to prosecute those associated with unregistered religious activity include the Regulations 

on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations; the 

Law on Assembly, Procession and Demonstration, Regulations on 

Public Order Control and Punishment; the Law on Protecting State 

Secrets; and Chinese Criminal Code Articles 111, 277, 282, 300, 398. 

See: Human Rights Watch. “Appendix II: Laws and Regulations to 

Crackdown on Falun Gong,” from Dangerous Minds: China’s Campaign Against the Falun Gong, January 2002 (http://hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-09.htm). 

14 The Status of North Korean Asylum Seekers and the U.S. 

Government Policy Towards Them, Report issued by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration 

pursuant to section 301 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 

2004 (P.L. 108-333) (March 11, 2005). 

15 Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic 

of China and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees on the Upgrading of the UNHCR Mission in the People’s Republic of China to UNHCR Branch Office in the People’s 

Republic of China (December 1, 1995), (United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 1899-1-32371).

16 1961 China-DPRK agreement entitled “Mutual Cooperation 

Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social 

Order in the Border Areas.”

17 Minister Li invited the Commission to travel to the ChinaNorth Korea border on a return visit and provide him with information on both humanitarian need and ongoing human rights abuses. 

18 Philip Pan, “Hu Tightens Party’s Grip on Power,” Washington 

Post, April 24, 2005.

For additional information 

on this issue contact: 

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy

202-523-3240, ext. 18

tstahnke@uscirf.gov