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NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING

BIOLOGICAL THREATS: DIPLOMACY AND

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 18, 2010

Serial No. 111–91

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE

BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

TED POE, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

DON MACDONALD, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JOHN BRODTKE, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

TOM SHEEHY, Republican Professional Staff Member 

ISIDRO MARISCAL, Subcommittee Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International 

Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State ................................ 7

Barry Kellman, J.D., President, International Security and Biopolicy Institute ........................................................................................................................ 37

Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies ................. 47

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, Member, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, Senior 

Counsel, BGR Group (Former Assistant Secretary of State for International 

Security and Nonproliferation) ........................................................................... 60

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen: Prepared statement ..................................................... 10

Barry Kellman, J.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 40

Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 50

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker: Prepared statement .............................. 63

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 76

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 78

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation 

and Trade: Extracted pages from a report by the International Security 

& Biopolicy Institute entitled, ‘‘United States Foreign Policies and Programs to Reduce Bio-Dangers,’’ dated March 2010 ........................................... 79

Written response from Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen to question submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman ...................................................... 88

Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D.: Comments for the record ......................................... 89

(1)

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL THREATS: DIPLOMACY AND 

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,

NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad J. Sherman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We are going to have a special treat at today’s 

hearings. In the past, witnesses have been confined to only 5 minutes. Today’s witnesses will be speaking for 7 minutes or less. That 

will bring a special entertainment value. We are in tough competition on C-SPAN for higher ratings. The questioning period will be 

5 minutes and opening statements will be five or seven or however 

long we take. 

There has been much recent attention to the threat that bioterrorism poses to our national security. Today’s hearing provides a 

broad overview of our diplomatic and international effort to counter 

that threat. Earlier this year, the Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Commission, chaired by Senators Graham and Talent, issued a report card that included an assessment of our progress in biodefense. 

Their initial report found biological weapons are more likely to 

be acquired and used by terrorist groups than nuclear weapons. Although I might add that it is my belief that bioweapons would 

cause a lesser number of casualties; a smaller though more likely 

disaster. 

Indeed, the commission found that unless the world community 

acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not 

that a weapon of mass destruction would be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. Since we have already seen the use of anthrax and the use of chemical and biological weapons in Japan over recent decades, this seems to be relatively safe prediction. 

The report further identified several weaknesses in our national 

biodefense, including the need for stronger Congressional oversight. 

This hearing is part of that oversight, and follows my request that 

the International Security and Biopolicy Institute prepare a report 

on our international efforts to counter biological threats. 

2

Without objection, I would like to put that study into the record 

of this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

The hearing also provides us an opportunity to examine the 

Obama administration’s national strategy to address biological 

threats. 

When the Graham/Talent Commission issued its assessment and 

report card on national progress in the WMD area, it contained 

sharp criticism of our national efforts to improve biodefense. 

The commission issued a failing grade, a grade of F, for U.S. efforts to mitigate the effects of biological attack. I do not fully agree 

with this grade. And it found that our international efforts, personified by our first witness here deserved a grade of between A 

and B; considerably better than most other aspects addressed in 

the report. 

It is important to note that others have countered that the commission has over-estimated the threat of biological attack. Some 

critics contend that we have spent too much on domestic preparedness, some $64 billion since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks. 

I have often said that the use of the term WMD is misleading, 

because it lumps into one category mustard gas and hydrogen 

bombs, along with all chemical, radiological and biological and nuclear threats. 

Even a crude nuclear explosive with a small yield could kill tens 

of thousands of people. Those uses of biological and chemical weapons against first world countries—here in the United States, 

Japan, and elsewhere, have involved dozens of casualties, rather 

than tens of thousands. 

I would hope our witnesses would be able to describe how they 

believe biological threats could lead perhaps to a mass casualty 

event; and it is important that we understand the nature and the 

possible casualties of different types of biological attacks. 

When it comes to biological threats confronting us today, we 

must consider the parallel threats from state-sponsored use of biological weapons, and from biological attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups. One of the longest-standing efforts to counter statesponsored biological weapons programs is the Biological Weapons 

Convention, the BWC, which went into effect in 1975. Since that 

time, the BWC has not had a verification regime anywhere similar 

to the verification regimes we have for nuclear and chemical weapons. 

Some, including past administrations, have argued that traditional verification protocol could not keep pace with rapid developments in biological research; that basically biological weapons can 

be created in so many different facilities, legitimate facilities like 

the vaccine plant, ‘‘too hard to detect,’’ say some. 

Most recently in December, our good friend, Under Secretary for 

Arms Control Ellen Tauscher, reaffirmed the U.S. position on BWC 

compliance without seeking a verification protocol. The administration instead—and I think this is somewhat controversial—is trying 

to control biological weapons by disclosing the bioresearch that we 

are doing in Maryland and elsewhere. 

Some were saying this is telling the terrorists what defenses we 

have. Others would say that this is reassuring other countries in 

3

the world that our bioresearch is only for defense and constitutes 

a confidence-building measure (CBM). 

I look forward to learning more about how the United States can 

promote greater BWC compliance and verification without letting 

the bad guys know what our defenses are. 

The threat of a biological attack from a terrorist group presents 

a more amorphous problem, and they have argued that recent 

progress in biological research has greatly reduced the barriers to 

the development of bioweapons by relatively small groups and even 

individuals; provided they have the necessary technical competence. 

United States Government programs seek to engage foreign scientists and give them something to focus on, and not be up for hire 

by those seeking to create proliferation, now focus on the biological 

sciences as well as the nuclear sciences. 

I am eager to hear about the State Department’s efforts in this 

regard through the Biosecurity Engagement Program and other 

diplomatic efforts. 

Finally, the ability to detect and assess infectious disease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or intentionally instigated, is 

both important from a global public health standpoint, and from 

the standpoint of mitigating the impact of a biological attack. 

The internal health risk posed by H1N1 and SARS indicate that 

pathogens show little regard for national borders, and modern jet 

travel can transport these infectious agents from anywhere in the 

world to the United States. 

The Obama administration’s national security strategy to counter 

biological attacks emphasizes the need for global disease surveillance as part of our national defense. Similarly, instruments like 

the International Health Regulations provide a framework for improving disease surveillance and reporting worldwide. 

In this regard, I continue to be concerned that Indonesia is not 

cooperating with the United States, particularly by not providing 

samples of avian flu found in that country; and I will address that 

in the questioning of the witnesses. 

Such efforts can simultaneously improve health, even in the most 

impoverished parts of the world; while at the same time fostering 

international biosecurity. I think I will conclude now, since my 

time has expired, and hear the words of our ranking member, Mr. 

Royce, from the great State of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this 

hearing. I think that bioterrorism really demands a lot greater attention by the administration, by the Congress, frankly, by everyone. 

This biological warfare really dates back to the beginning of recorded history. The world’s first true historian, Thucydides, almost 

lost his life as a result of a technique that Persians and Greeks and 

Romans used of throwing carcasses down a well to poison it. 

And I think Athens lost a greater percentage of its population in 

the war with Sparta to this biological effect, than they did to the 

Spartan war machine. So it has a long history of being used in 

warfare. 

And today, germs present really a mass destruction threat, if we 

think about it. Scientists have been able to assemble infectious viVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:38 Jun 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\TNT\031810\55516 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

ruses, including the formerly extinct 1918 influenza strain. That 

strain killed 30 million people. 

So every advancing technology and biotechnology just continues 

to proliferate. Several years ago, just outside of Moscow, I met with 

the so-called Father of the Plague; and I think his moniker might 

have been a bit overstated. But that is how the Russians referred 

to him. He was the top Russian scientist, and he had allegedly developed a genetically altered pathogen that had no antidote. 

He wanted us to meet with him, because he had been able to at 

least put an alarm system into the Moscow subways. He had never 

been outside of the country. But presuming we used subways, he 

wanted us to have this technology. 

You know, he really was sort of an insight. He wanted Jim 

Saxton and I to know the extent of what they had done. They had 

50,000 people in the Soviet biological weapons program at one 

point; a massive USSR violation of its BWC Treaty commitment, 

by the way. And he shared with me his concern that some of this 

legion had sold their expertise to Middle East countries. 

It is regrettable that the Russians have lessened their cooperation with our joint efforts to contain this proliferation. Over 10 

countries today may have bioweapons programs. 

Al-Qaeda has sought biological weapons. Evidence seized in the 

2003 arrest of Operations Chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed revealed impressive technical sophistication, including information on 

weaponizing anthrax. Now that is one of those subjects that I discussed with the Russian scientist. 

That was 7 years ago. By the way, one of his students subsequently defected, and we had a chance to talk with him here in the 

United States. He confirmed what his professor had taught him; or 

what his mentor had taught him in this technology, and he was 

now trying to help us better understand what had been developed. 

Unfortunately, I am afraid that there is a great deal of complacency; and maybe complacency is normal. But the 2001 anthrax attack—that little fiasco—cost us $6 billion and some American lives. 

Local officials speak of having to fight citizens’ indifference to bolster our resilience to attack; that is just a realty. 

Ringing an alarm is the Bi-Partisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism. 

It concluded that ‘‘our margin of safety is shrinking; not growing.’’ 

The commission believes that unless decisive and urgent action is 

taken, then a WMD terrorist attack is likely to occur somewhere 

within 4 years. ‘‘This attack’’ the commission speculates, ‘‘is more 

likely to be biological than it would be nuclear.’’

The commission reports that each of the last three administrations have been slow to recognize and respond to bioterrorism. The 

Obama administration, it found, lacks a sense of urgency. The commission gave the administration an ‘‘F’’ for not improving our biological attack response capabilities. 

I am looking forward to hearing from the administration today 

about why it thinks the commission gave it too tough a grade. 

Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We will now hear an opening statement, if he 

chooses to give one, from our vice chair, Mr. Scott. 

5

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very timely 

hearing; very important hearing. I think we do face a serious probability and possibility of a bioterrorist attack. 

In my capacity as chairman of our Agriculture subcommittee on 

food safety, it is an issue of soaring magnitude. Largely because of 

our food supply, the nature of it, the free movement of it, the international aspects of it, the fact that we are, in fact, the bread basket 

of the world certainly looms very large in terms of the 

attractiveness as a target by terrorist groups. 

So as scientific progress marches on, we certainly have the potential and increasingly the capabilities to address many of the threats 

that we are facing. From developing new strains of rice to address 

world hunger; for vaccines that prevent the spread of disease like 

H1N1, scientific knowledge can and largely has led to the betterment of mankind, and continues to raise our living standards for 

all. 

But, however, like any knowledge, there is the potential for those 

who would wish us harm to unleash devastating attacks. We must 

not only prepare for that chance; but do our very best to prevent. 

Our most recent attack from a chemical biological weapon shows 

the sophistication and the change of tactics of terrorists, from our 

Christmas Day underwear bomber over a plane in New York. Who 

would have thought that a mere mixing of a chemical in one’s 

under garments could blow a plane out of the sky? 

But this very serious scientific technological knowledge that we 

have to unleash great goodness across the world is the same technology that can be used in a warped backward evil sense, to cause 

us great harm. And we have got to be prepared to do everything 

we can to prevent this. 

In my travels to Russia and to Africa, every part of the nation 

we have been in, in the part of the world that we have been in, 

it just alarms me as to the laxness of our international approach; 

and trying to get an international cooperation, to understand the 

urgency of it; and our food supplies are so interchanged nationally. 

Just to take one example, 90 percent of all of the tomatoes that 

we use in this country come from outside this country. We are so 

inter-dependent internationally that we must move very rapidly to 

understand. 

As I said, biological science has led to great advances in addressing our food shortages and develop famine resistant crops. However, the agriculture sector in our nation’s food supply overall can 

be very enticing targets for acts of bioterrorism. 

As our agriculture sector, as I mentioned, is known as the bread 

basket of the world, it is important to note that any attack on our 

food supply could have the devastating effects for the rest of the 

world. 

And then I mentioned, we are moving very rapidly in our own 

home state of Georgia, where the University of Georgia’s very prestigious agriculture department is putting first a world class food 

supply, food security process that we are all going to be taking a 

closer look. 

And while, of course, we must make sure to address preventing 

the spread of disease outbreaks and protecting our water supply, 

or counter or avert direct attacks like the 2001 anthrax attack, 

6

which we thought was a systematic, well orchestrated attack from 

multi-faceted approaches. But we come to find out, it was by one 

man; one man responsible for that devastating anthrax attack. 

So this looms big, Mr. Chairman; and I am very delighted that 

you put this together. I think we can get some answers to some 

questions. We need to have uniform definitions. What constitutes 

a biological weapon; and is that constitution accurate for every 

country? How can we tighten our international cooperation? Because that is the key. 

They are very, very serious questions. I look forward to the witnesses; and thank you, Mr. Chairman for putting this together. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. At this point, we will hear from our 

first witness. Oh, excuse me, Ambassador Watson has come, and 

we wish to hear her opening statement. 

Ms. WATSON. I would say good morning to the chairperson; and 

thank you for convening today’s hearing to review our national and 

international response to countering biological threats. 

It is never too early to discuss and review the effectiveness of 

current policies and practices, so that we might learn what works; 

evaluate what does not; and revise or strengthen national and 

international efforts to prepare for and hopefully prevent the next 

biological attack. 

In recent history, when we think of a biological terrorist attack, 

it is not hard to forget the aforementioned anthrax attacks here in 

Washington, after the tragedy of September 11, 2001; where five 

people were killed and 17 others infected. 

Since then, agencies across Federal, state, and local governments 

have taken steps to address issues of prevention, training, evaluating resources, and coordinating efforts; as well as increasing public education, participation and awareness. 

Some have noticed that while there are many agencies in departments that have resources dedicated to prevention and mitigating 

damage and harm to the public, there is still a large gap in interagency and inter-governmental communications and coordinations. 

Others have also noted that while it is important to have regulation and oversight of bi-containment technologies and control of 

high containment laboratories, the Federal Government must not 

stifle or inhibit international academic collaboration in order for 

the scientific community to continue its study on biological chemicals. 

In this committee, we have addressed export controls and review 

of the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export Administration 

Act, which operates on the principal that the export of certain 

goods requires licensure specifically denying such licenses if the 

items will contribute to biological weapons proliferation. 

Mr. Chairman, as lawmakers, we have a responsibility to evaluate policy and close gaps in order to strengthen and protect our 

citizens. We also have an obligation to work toward international 

transparency and diplomatic efforts. 

I appreciate the panel for taking time to appear before this committee. I look forward to hearing and listening to the witnesses testimony. And I do indeed want to thank you, and I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

7

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the Ambassador for joining us here and 

for that opening statement. We now turn to our first witness. I 

want to introduce Vann Van Diepen. Mr. Van Diepen has been the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, PDAS, for International Security and Nonproliferation since June 2009. 

The International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau spearheads U.S. efforts to promote consensus on WMP proliferation 

through bilateral and multi-lateral diplomacy; Mr. Van Diepen? 

STATEMENT OF MR. VANN H. VAN DIEPEN, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 

NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today. The President’s new National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats signals a major development in our international efforts to combat those threats. And today, I would like to share 

more information on the activities that we conduct at the State Department to implement that strategy. 

I would like to request that my prepared testimony be included 

in the record of today’s hearing; and I will present a shorter 

version here in my oral statement. 

What I intend to do is to take a moment to outline the threat, 

and then describe some key activities that the State Department 

is undertaking internationally to implement the strategy. 

As already indicated in many of the opening statements, Congress is keenly aware that there is a real and present danger of 

biological attack, given the 2001 anthrax attacks. The most obvious 

and recent danger comes from terrorist groups that have expressed 

an intent to obtain biological weapons, especially al-Qaeda. And we 

are also concerned about the ambitions of some nation states to develop biological weapons. 

A successful attack using a pathogenic agent could not only result in sickness and death; but could cause panic, loss of public 

trust, and enormous economic damage. 

The President’s strategy complements our preparations to respond to biological events, by placing more emphasis on efforts to 

prevent such events; or at least to reduce the likelihood that they 

will take place. 

State’s efforts to implement the strategy internally are focused 

on reducing the likelihood that terrorists or states interested in biological weapons could obtain the experience or materials to develop 

and use them. Working with the international community to transform the dialogue on biological threats is a key objective in the 

strategy; and State plays a critical role in achieving this objective 

by working through existing multi-lateral mechanisms. 

Today, I am going to highlight our work in the Biological Weapons Convention, the State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement 

Program, and in the G–8 Global Partnership against the spread of 

WMD. 

In each of these areas, there is a new-found urgency related to 

the need to work together to strengthen our collective security 

against biological threats. 

8

A key element of the strategy is revitalizing the Biologic Weapons Convention, which we intend to use to promote and globally advance our biosecurity objectives, through using the BWC as our 

premier forum for global outreach and coordination. 

In particular, we will tighten the linkage between global security 

against infectious disease; through strengthening basic health capacities on the one hand, and on the other hand, the security community’s need to counter man-made disease threats. 

Last year, the Biological Weapons Convention States, Parties 

and experts from a wide range of health, science, and security organizations focused on disease surveillance and related capacity 

building, with a particular emphasis on implementation of the 

World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations. 

The focus of BWC meetings in 2010 is on providing assistance in 

the event of an unusual disease outbreak or an alleged use of biological weapons. On our part, we are going to have the FBI and the 

Centers for Disease Control brief on their efforts on training for 

joint criminal epidemiological investigations. 

And there will be several U.S. sponsored conferences on bio-risk 

management and on scientific and technical breakthroughs that 

can be applied to disease surveillance. And we are looking forward 

to the seventh 5-year BWC Review Conference in 2011 as an opportunity to further the objectives of the strategy. 

In addition to BWC, State’s Biosecurity Engagement Program 

(BEP) is working to reduce the threat of bioterrorism through cooperative activities to prevent terrorist access to potentially dangerous biological materials and expertise, while supporting legitimate efforts to combat infectious disease and enhance public and 

animal health worldwide. 

Since 2006, the BEP program has matured into a $37-million-ayear effort, focused on regions and countries where there is a nexus 

of terrorism, emerging infectious disease, and rapid growth in biotechnology in high containment laboratories. 

BEP provides support for and closely coordinates activities 

abroad with other U.S. departments and agencies, particularly Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, to directly address several key objectives of the strategy. 

BEP provides assistance to improve laboratory biosecurity and 

biosafety best practices, improves capacity for infectious disease detection, surveillance and control, and engages biological scientists 

and public and animal health experts to reduce the potential for 

exploitation of biological expertise, information, and material. And 

BEP not only improves international security; but provides a dualbenefit of improving global health. 

We are also addressing another key challenge identified in this 

strategy; that of reinforcing norms for safe and responsible conduct 

of biological activities. 

For example, we are sponsoring biological safety associations 

across Southeast Asia and in the Middle East that can provide a 

sustained mechanism for countries to provide training to life scientists and public and animal health professionals on bio-risk management and responsible scientist conduct. 

State also coordinates and promotes additional cooperative international efforts to counter the biological threat via the G–8 Global 

9

Partnership; a 10-year, $20-billion nonproliferation effort that was 

launched in 2002, and has thus far focused on programs in the 

former Soviet Union. 

This year, we are working closely with the Canadian G–8 Presidency and with the other G–8 partners, to extend the partnership 

beyond 2010. This expanded program will bring additional resources from partner countries to bear on addressing global biological threats and also threats beyond those in the former Soviet 

Union. 

We are also working to help U.N. member states manage biological security threats by helping them implement U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1540, which requires all U.N. members to have 

proliferation export controls and to secure dangerous materials. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that I have been able to provide you with 

a better understanding of the serious efforts by the Department of 

State against the biological threat. I have appreciated the opportunity to outline for the subcommittee what we are doing in concrete terms to implement the international aspects of the national 

strategy. 

State, of course, does not work alone, and relies on its close 

working relationship with other U.S. Government agencies, the 

Congress, and the international community to expand these efforts 

and make them more successful; thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you; I am going to recognize the other 

members of the subcommittee for questions first, and do my questioning last. So I first recognize Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much; welcome Mr. Van Diepen. Let 

me ask you this question if I may. In one respect, we have been 

very fortunate that we have not had a biological terrorist attack 

since 2001 and with the anthrax scare. How do you account for 

that? Why do you say that has happened? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I think there is probably a complex of answers to that question, Congressman. First of all there, of course, 

has been a very intensive U.S. counter terrorism effort, assisted by 

international partners, and various biological related activities 

have been disrupted, such as the anthrax activities in Afghanistan 

that are noted in my written testimony. 

Likewise, I think biological attack is more difficult for a terrorist 

to perpetrate, especially significant ones, than the kinds of conventional attacks that they are used to perpetrating. 

And of course, there has been a lot of effort to try and improve 

our export controls, border surveillance, other kinds of activities to 

try and inhibit and deter such activities. So I think it is probably 

a complex of a variety of different things that have been happening 

since 2001. 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you describe for us, and as a matter of 

fact, I would like for you to describe for us how the Federal Government works, from a standpoint of inter-agency cooperation? How do 

you coordinate what you do with other agencies, and what are the 

other agencies who work together with you to form this very strong 

front line defense of our country from a biological attack? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, that, of course, is something that is a center piece of the President’s new strategy to improve that interagency coordination. 

But in terms of the international activities that we engage in, everything that we do is very thoroughly inter-agency coordinated. In 

fact, many of the implementers of the State Department programs 

in this area are, in fact, other agencies such as HHS and Agriculture. 

There are various standing working groups where we try and coordinate and de-conflict our various programs. To help implement 

the strategy, the National Security Counsel staff has put together 

an ongoing effort to come up with detailed inter-agency implementation plans for each aspect of the strategy and those are in development right now. 

Also, we have in place a new special coordinator for cooperative 

threat reduction in the Department, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins. 

And part of her job is to make sure that State Department programs are well coordinated with those of other agencies, as well as 

with similar activities that other countries conduct. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now let me ask you about the funding level. Do you 

believe that we, in Congress, are giving you the necessary amounts 

of resources to get the job done; or are there areas or is there more 

funding that you feel we need to provide for you? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, Congressman, I suppose every bureaucrat 

would be remiss if he did not say that he could use more money. 

29

But I think realistically, in terms of the absorptive capacities of 

a lot of the countries that we are dealing with, in terms of trying 

to make sure that we apply our resources in places where there are 

clearly identified threats, and recognizing that there are all sorts 

of other tradeoffs and opportunity costs involved in these decisions, 

I think that we have got, you know, sort of a fair and reasonable 

amount of money allocated to these activities. 

And I would say that Congress has been very supportive of the 

BEP and, in fact, has had certain earmarks to make sure that certain amounts of money are spent on BEP. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me ask you about our level of international cooperation. If you could describe for us what that is, how would you 

rate it, and where are the weak links around the globe that we 

have to be concerned about—what countries, what areas are our 

most significant worries? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I think probably the areas of the highest 

direct threat potential are the areas that we in fact are working 

in in the BEP, because it is a threat directed program. 

Places where you have got a nexus of terrorist activity and substantial biotechnology—places in the Middle East, South Asia—sort 

of fall into that category. But bioterrorism is something that, for 

better or for worse, can happen almost anywhere, almost any country has within its borders a hospital or a scientific facility that has 

pathogens. 

And so where we can, we are reaching out to try and improve 

things in those areas, as well. So we have a new focus, for example, 

in trying to do some operations in Africa and Latin America, to 

help deal with that aspect of the problem, as well. 

Mr. SCOTT. And one of the areas that, as I mentioned, I am very 

much concerned about, of course, as the subcommittee chairman for 

Food Safety in Agriculture, is to keep our food supply safe. 

Does your agency work in collaboration with our Agriculture Department, especially in very critical areas where we are moving forward to help with this in the area, for example, animal ID, which 

we feel is very important? And how do you feel about that? Do you 

believe that we should have mandatory animal ID; or should we 

continue to leave that on a voluntary basis? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, Congressman, I would have to say on 

that specific issue, that that really, you know, has not fallen into 

my area of responsibility. So I am not sure I am in a position to 

give you a meaningful response. 

But on the larger question, I am very glad that you identified the 

potential threat of biotechnology against the food supply; because 

oftentimes, the discourse on this issue only focuses on the human 

aspect of it. And because of the indirect human aspect and the very 

significant economic impact of the agricultural part, I am very glad 

that you raised that. 

Because of that, that has always been a focus of our activities. 

Whether it is securing dangerous pathogens, those have always included pathogens against food crops and livestock. Whether it is 

building a culture of safety and security, we include the animal agriculture health communities in those activities. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Let me 

now recognize Mr. Royce from California, our ranking member. 

30

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Chairman Sherman. At least one of our 

witnesses today is going to speak of the importance of intelligence 

and the inadequacy of our intelligence in bioterrorism. And this is 

an issue that the chairman and I were very involved in at the time. 

But in 2007, the intelligence community produced a National Intelligence Estimate, which you were certainly involved with. You were 

the National Intelligence Officer for Nonproliferation. 

That NIE concluded with high confidence that Iran had halted 

its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in 2003; and it assessed with 

moderate confidence that Iran had not re-started this program. 

In a report last month, the IAEA recited a number of concerns 

about military related nuclear activity in Iran; and asserted that 

these activities seem to have continued beyond 2004. 

Now at the time the NIE was released, the chairman and I denounced it as naive and harmful; and you were centrally involved 

in that. I remember at the press hearing with Chairman Brad 

Sherman, holding up the Time magazine cover that exonerated the 

Iranians; exonerated them on the basis of your assessment, which 

turned out to be wrong. 

My question is, what went wrong? Is now the time maybe to revisit the issues addressed in the NIE? I do not think the stakes 

could be any higher. Let me ask you that question. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, thank you, Congressman. I guess the 

starting point on that is, of course, that is not the business I am 

in any more. But I think the fair way to answer that question is, 

the intelligence community right now is preparing a follow-on National Intelligence Estimate on that subject. 

And I think the thing to do is to wait for that to come out and 

see the extent to which that assessment differs from the one in the 

2007 NIE. I would suggest that that should probably be the basis 

of deciding what was right and what was wrong. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think the covert illegal enrichment facility at a 

military base outside Qom, that was disclosed last fall to all the 

world. So I think the case is pretty clear. Surely you agree that 

something went wrong, in your assessment. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, and one thing that is inherent is by definition. Information comes in after you publish. The intelligence 

business is one of working with the information you happen to 

have at hand at any particular time; comparing it to the old information, and trying to then project both what is actually going on, 

since objective reality is difficult to determine, and what you think 

is likely to happen in the future. And by definition, new information keeps coming in. It does not respect publication dates of NIEs. 

Basically, in the intelligence community, you are in the business 

of trying to predict the outcome of a movie that you only get to see 

glimpses of. You do not know how long the movie was going on before you started glimpsing. You do not know how long the movie 

is going to be going on; and half of your glimpses actually come 

from other people’s glimpses of the movie. So you have to sort of 

put all that together and put together a picture. 

I think that NIE was very clear and very responsible in its use 

of so-called intelligence trade craft—confidence levels; descriptions 

of alternative scenarios. In fact, I think there were eight alternative scenarios beyond the main line estimate that were included 

31

in that assessment. There was a very extensive discussion of, what 

if we are wrong; how could we be wrong? 

Mr. ROYCE. I think part of your argument basically was, the burden of proof to determine proliferation activity should be as high 

as in the average U.S. court room; at least that is the way I recall 

your assessment of the situation. 

As one press report said afterwards, there was never a sanction 

that Van Diepen liked, never, said one official. It was a point of religion for him. He thought anything we did outside of teacup diplomacy was counterproductive and wrong. 

There are decisions we are going to make, in terms of sanctions, 

on the basis of assessments which you helped make, that frankly 

turned out to be wrong. I would like to just add a couple of other 

concerns I have. 

I brought up Russia. The WMD Commission noted that over the 

last several years, Russia has been less and less interested in cooperating with U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Programs that had 

some success in re-directing former Soviet bioweapons scientists to 

peaceful activities. 

The commission expressed concern that ‘‘the large cadre of 

former bioweapons scientists remains a global proliferation concern.’’

You barely mentioned Russia in your testimony. And I was going 

to ask you, can you explain the Russian position and the United 

States response; and is there still a role for these programs? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Congressman; first of all, I do not 

think I can let go the first part of what you had to say; and frankly 

those quotes against me are utter nonsense. 

I, in fact, have been involved in sanctioning more entities and 

more countries for more acts of proliferation than any human being 

on the planet. So I am quite comfortable with——

Mr. ROYCE. But the bottom line, for the chairman and me, who 

were involved on the other side of the table from you in your last 

position, was a very, very different conclusion about what was 

going on in Iran and what we should do about it. So we just disagreed at the time. 

I think that all that is in the papers subsequently bear out the 

chairman’s and my observations on this. But you have got your 

opinion and I have got mine. But let us go to the question on Russia and the role of these programs. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I am very happy to do that. Anyway, yes, clearly, there is still an issue. You know, there is a fair amount or a 

substantial amount of biological weapons applicable material, 

equipment, and expertise in Russia. And you, in your opening 

statement, mentioned some examples of that being the case. 

And one of the long-standing objectives of our various engagement programs, including the Science Centers Program, the BEP 

and others, has been to work with the Russians to try and put in 

place better barriers to make sure that that expertise does not go 

to BW programs in other countries or to BW terrorism. 

You know, Russia now, however, is different than the Russia we 

dealt with in the early 1990s, in the sense that it is much more 

economically viable than was the case before. It is much more nationalist and resurgent than it was before. 

32

You know, frankly, the Russians are less interested in looking 

like they are supplicants and recipients of aid, than looking like 

they are partners. And they are less interested in looking like they 

are a potential source of proliferation; than they are looking like 

they are partners. 

And so the challenge that we face in continuing to pursue these 

programs in Russia, which we are doing and which we think we 

still need to do—because again, that repository of expertise is, you 

know, unquestionably there—is to try and work within the parameters set by the current Russian Government and the current situation within Russia, to continue to try to make progress. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you one last question. Why is it that a 

bi-partisan panel gave an ‘‘F’’ grade—there was a bi-partisan panel 

of nine experts. Why were they wrong; the WMD Commission in 

January, that gave you that grade? What grade would you give 

yourself, I would ask? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, as I recall, the ‘‘F’’ grade mostly focused 

on the domestic side of things which, of course, the State Department does not have responsibility for. As the chairman noted in his 

opening statement, the State Department’s end of this actually got 

relatively high grades. 

I guess what I would say is that it should be less of an issue of 

grades than to realize that this is an extremely daunting and challenging problem. The fact is that since bioterrorism ranges from everything from a disgruntled individual putting salmonella in a 

salad bar; all the way up to an all-out, strategic level attack by another country using ICBMs filled with genetically engineering 

pathogens. 

There are a lot of potential opportunities for a biological attack 

against the United States. And because we are sophisticated and 

inter-dependent with other countries, there are a lot of 

vulnerabilities that we have. 

And so, given all those opportunities for potential threat, given 

all the vulnerabilities that we have, it is a very daunting task to 

try and totally protect ourselves against every aspect of such a 

threat. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much; thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you; before I recognize Ambassador Watson, just a minute of personal privilege, since my name was so 

mentioned. 

I agree with the ranking member. I may even overstate his position by saying that the NIE was perhaps the worst example of a 

political document masquerading as an intelligence document. 

I do not know the degree to which our witness was involved in 

it. But we, in the Legislative Branch, are utterly helpless when it 

comes to missing the facts or mischaracterizing the degree of confidence. But it has the facts, and so we have to accept what the 

Executive Branch does in those two areas; and I cannot quibble 

with the NIE on that. 

But what makes a document political is where certain facts that 

are important are brushed off to the side, and facts that are not 

important are emblazoned as major reasons to affect U.S. policy. In 

that NIE, the most important fact was pushed to the side and mentioned in the first footnote, and most of the document, including 

33

the first three paragraphs, were all focused on facts that not only 

turned out to be irrelevant but were obviously irrelevant at the 

time. 

The key to developing a nuclear weapon is getting the fissile material; and only a political document would focus on other, far less 

important aspects of a nuclear program. 

With that, I yield to the gentlelady from not only Hollywood but 

so many other outstanding neighborhoods in the Los Angeles area. 

Ms. WATSON. Which will soon be addressed by—thank you so 

much, Mr. Chairman. Speaking of other nations and continents, I 

would like to go to Africa and talk about the October 2005 Kampala Compact, resulting from an African meeting. 

It states that it is illegitimate to address biological weapon 

threats without simultaneously addressing the enormous health 

crisis in Africa, such as HIV AIDS, TB, Malaria, and other infectious diseases. 

So what can the United States do to help African nations achieve 

the duo goals of improved global health and biosecurity? Can you 

just bring us up on that? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, to start off with, I guess I would not use 

the descriptor illegitimate. But certainly, we have always tried to 

take advantage——

Ms. WATSON. Oh, that was the State in quoting from the compact. But clearly we understand that we can get nonproliferation 

value out of help in global health; just as there can be global health 

value gotten out of doing BW nonproliferation. 

And so as I indicated in my testimony, you know, we are looking 

for opportunities to do both; and particularly where we are trying 

to promote improved disease surveillance, improve public health—

you know, we are doing that specifically because it also provides an 

important collateral benefit to protect us against potentially manmade biological threats. 

One example of an activity that we have conducted—in cooperation with DoD’s cooperative threat reduction program and with the 

United Nations, we organized an African Regional Workshop on 

biosafety and biosecurity. Experts from 20 African nations discussed the kinds of assistance they need in implementing better biological controls, pursuant to U.N Security Council Resolution 

1540. 

And we work not only with other agencies; but also the World 

Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. 

So I think that is a good example of how we are trying to do exactly that. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, thank you; because the need is so great, as 

you know, on the continent. In addition to an overarching Federal 

strategy, many agencies have developed their own strategic documents to address their responsibilities with respect to bioterrorism 

threats. 

Coordinating these strategies across multiple agencies is a challenge. So how is State working to harmonize its strategies with 

other agencies, so as to reduce unnecessary duplication and close 

security gaps; and let me just go on to my next. You can answer 

them all together. 

34

How did State determine the optimal level of funding against 

bioterrorism threats; and are there any areas that you feel are currently under-resourced or should otherwise be emphasized? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Congresswoman; in terms of coordination, I think the two main things we are doing is participating 

in the National Security Council-led process to come up with specific implementation plans for the President’s new bio-strategy. 

And then we participate and run a number of standing interagency working groups that deal specifically with the kinds of 

international assistance programs like our Biosecurity Engagement 

Program. 

In addition, under this administration, a new coordinator for cooperative threat reduction has been appointed, Ambassador Bonnie 

Jenkins. She works to make sure that our programs are well coordinated with those of other agencies and with other countries. 

In terms of determining the levels of funding, you know, that is 

a very complex issue. But I think the critical thing is what we try 

to do; to determine where we put that funding, based on a very 

clear assessment of the risk, informed by the U.S. Government scientific experts and by the intelligence community. So we are trying 

to identify and address the highest risks as a priority in our funding. Then, I am sorry, the last question? 

Ms. WATSON. The last question, are there any other areas that 

you feel are currently under-resourced or should otherwise be emphasized? And I want to just ask, do you work with NGOs or do 

you work with their State Departments in these various countries? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. A mix—we work with not just State Departments; but Ministries of Health, Ministries of Agriculture, as well 

as NGOs and international organizations like the World Health Organization. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, as we look at AIDS and look at the funding 

we have given, we are finding that a small amount of money in a 

village can go a long way when you use the NGOs. 

They know the customs, traditions. They know the people and 

how they respond. And I am finding that it looks like when we 

work through the actual inhabitants of a particular area, $1 goes 

a long way. So if you can respond to how the State Department 

looks at that, and will we do more business with the NGOs? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Again, a critical part of this new strategy is the 

idea of international partnership, and that is international partnership not just with countries; but with relevant organizations within 

countries. 

Ms. WATSON. I thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you; I will take a minute to address the 

witness’s statement that he has done more sanctions than anyone 

else. That may, in fact, be true; but it is pitiful. You are comparing 

yourself, for example, to the German Foreign Ministry. Their idea 

of sanctions is, let German businesses do everything they want. 

You are comparing yourself to the rest of the State Department. 

You are basically bragging about being the tallest jockey at the 

race. 

We are now being told by the State Department that they favor 

smart sanctions, by which they mean dumb sanctions, which is to 

35

say they are in favor of sanctions so long as it does not actually 

hurt the economy of Iran. 

And in fact, no one at the State Department has been able to 

point to a single publicly traded corporation anywhere in the world 

that is selling for one cent per share less as a result of American 

sanctions. So our idea is we are for sanctions as long as they do 

not inconvenience anyone or at least they do not inconvenience 

anyone that has the slightest amount of political clout. 

My best example is that we continue to import caviar from Iran 

because why should American Epicureans have to make due with 

Northern Caspian caviar? So you may be the tallest jockey. But 

that is hardly a reason for personal celebration. 

With regard to these hearings, putting aside the state sponsors 

of terrorism countries and looking at the countries that we would 

hope would be cooperative, which country is least cooperative, in 

terms of controlling biological proliferation; and is the most troublesome, as far as complying with U.S. Security Council Resolution 

1540? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I am not sure that——

Mr. SHERMAN. Aside from the state sponsors of terrorism, they 

are all doing a great job? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I think it is less an issue of being troublesome, than the fact that for a lot of countries, the 1540 mandates 

are a much lower priority than things like, you know, keeping the 

population fed, you know——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, which country is giving the lowest priority 

to meeting its obligations under Resolution 1540? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Again, I would not single out a particular country. But clearly, in places like sub-Saharan Africa, you know, you 

have got countries that, again, just are not in a position to put that 

kind of priority on that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Of those countries that are at least in the middle 

tier of wealth of countries, which ones are giving the least cooperation or priority to Council Resolution 1540? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I think probably the thing to do is to try and 

get back to you with a considered answer to that, Mr. Chairman. 

Off the top of my head, I am not sure I am able to. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, now of those countries, how long will it 

take for you to get back to us with an answer on that? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. A week? 

Mr. SHERMAN. A week is fine. Of the countries that are state 

sponsors of terrorism, which is the greatest biological terrorism 

concern, or biological weapons concern? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I think because of the nexus with terrorism, I think Iran would probably be near the top of my list of 

concerns. Because you have got the issues not only of the potential 

nation-state angle of that; but because they are a state sponsor of 

terrorism, and have provided other kinds of weapons to terrorists 

groups, you know, they would certainly be, for me, a concern. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean, there are two areas in the State Department. One is trying to coordinate our response to the spread of disease, such as avian flu. The other is your efforts. The pathogens 

do not even know whether they were deliberately created or not. 

36

How closely do you work in a coordinated way, so that we can 

respond internationally to the outbreak of a pathogen, whether it 

is intentional or unintentional? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. That is exactly a key part of the philosophy behind much of our Biosecurity Engagement Program activity; the 

idea that if we can assist in the detecting, surveillance, and fighting of disease regardless of its origin by definition, we are helping 

ourselves out in the biological weapons area. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now Indonesia has refused to let any of the developed countries in the world get adequate samples of avian flu. They 

have taken the peculiar position that this is a property right of 

theirs; which means they claim it as property on the theory that 

they can get money for it. 

But all legal systems provide that if an animal is your property 

and it causes damage, you are responsible for the damage; and a 

pathogen is an animal. 

So from that standpoint, is Indonesia willing to claim not only 

the rights of ownership of these strains of avian flue; but also to 

claim responsibility for the harm done by the avian flu; and have 

they adequately set up reserves to reimburse the world for the 

harm that may be done by the avian flu and their failure to provide 

developed nations with the samples necessary to develop a vaccine? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I am really not in a position to answer that 

question, Mr. Chairman. I just am not aware of what the answers 

to those questions might be. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, it is pretty apparent that we could see hundreds of thousands of innocent deaths because of the position of the 

Indonesian Government; a government where tens or hundreds of 

thousands of people were saved by the world aiding Indonesia after 

the tsunami. And the fact that the State Department is not making 

a bigger deal of this non-deliberate possible Indonesia-caused holocaust is surprising to me; and I will look forward to seeing the 

State Department making a bigger deal of this issue. 

With that, I do not think there is interest in a second round with 

our first panel. After all, America does not torture; and accordingly, 

we will allow you to leave. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let us bring up the second panel; and thank you 

for your testimony. 

First, I would like to introduce Barry Kellman, president of the 

International Security and Biopolicy Institute. Mr. Kellman is a 

professor of international law and director of the International 

Weapons Control Center at DePaul University College of Law. 

He has prepared for the subcommittee a report on United States 

foreign policies and programs to reduce bio-dangers. I want to 

thank you for that work. 

Our next witness is Jonathan Tucker, who is a senior fellow at 

the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the CNS, of 

the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he specializes in the control of biological and chemical weapons. He joined 

CNS’s main office in March 1996 as founding director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program. 

And finally, we will hear from Stephen Rademaker. I will try to 

pronounce your name correctly. It is not that tough. In 2008, he 

37

was appointed by the congressional leadership to the U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Proliferations of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism. He currently serves as senior counsel for 

BGR Group Government Affairs; Mr. Kellman? 

STATEMENT OF BARRY KELLMAN, J.D., PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND BIOPOLICY INSTITUTE 

Mr. KELLMAN. Chairman Sherman, Congressman Scott, thank 

you for the opportunity to discuss policies for preventing for the 

violent infliction of disease. 

Envision 10 terrorists spreading highly weaponized anthrax in 

10 cities around the world: Nairobi, Warsaw, Tokyo, Mexico City, 

et cetera. Assume not a single American is touched by any of these 

attack, none of which happen on American soil. Would anyone suggest that we are unharmed? 

If instead, a smallpox pandemic is ignited, killing perhaps millions worldwide, if Americans are effectively immunized, does that 

mean that we are okay? 

If I might, Mr. Chairman, I have to take issue with your opening 

statement that biological weapons will not kill more people than 

any nuclear weapon. I simply disagree, and we can come back to 

that, if you like. 

Bioattacks that devastate allies, transform developing societies 

into chaos, stop transport and trade cause trillions of dollars of 

losses; and so worldwide panic would catastrophically wound the 

United States. 

As to biothreats, Homeland Security is international security and 

vice versa. We cannot wall ourselves off from worldwide bioattacks. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, global preparedness must be a 

high foreign policy of the United States, working with our allies 

and the international system. By global bio-preparedness, I mean 

having a global network of stockpiled medicines, linked to delivery 

systems, to get them where they are needed quickly, with effective 

plans to ensure their distribution. 

A principal value of global bio-preparedness is deterrents. Why 

weaponize pathogens to populations can be effectively immunized 

or treated. The best outcome of global bio-preparedness is having 

medicines and delivery capabilities that are ready but never used; 

precisely because our enemies cannot advance their horrific goals 

by committing bioattacks. 

Moreover, allow me to say as the lead author of the Kampala 

Compact, global bio-preparedness can and must be a boon to public 

health. Global bio-preparedness is, in effect, a highway system. 

Once built, it can carry any medicines for any diseases rapidly and 

effectively. 

Consider the diplomatic implications of the United States making 

global bio-preparedness a top policy priority, as the United States 

approaches the seventh review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention next year. Strengthen security from biothreats; 

strengthen the convention; strengthen global public health—altogether, exercise U.S. leadership for multiple benefits. 

But there are challenges. In small part, there is a supply challenge; having sufficient drugs for the spectrum of potential agents. 

38

But at least with regard to anthrax antibiotics and vaccines, there 

is vast, untapped capacity. 

The greater challenger is delivery. If we turn to the hypothetical 

anthrax in tent cities around the world. The white powder must be 

collected and sent to diagnostic facilities for analysis. Once confirmed as anthrax, vaccines and antibiotics must be transported 

perhaps thousands of miles to the target site, where they must be 

dispensed to victims. All this must happen in less than 72 hours; 

outside perhaps two dozen countries in the world, mere fantasy. 

Of greater significance, I posit, is that the are legal potholes scattered all over this topic. Allow me to highlight a mere handful. 

There are legal challenges that disincentivize the bio defense sector from participating. Licensing requirements vary radically from 

country to country. How should medicines for weaponized pathogens be tested? What standards are there for emergency use authorization? 

Also, there is the prospect of ruinous liability for the manufacturers of such medicines, if they have adverse consequences. These 

issues must be resolved now, if we want the private sector to supply a bio-preparedness network. 

Two, there are legal challenges associated with stockpiling medicines. Regional stockpiling requires binding agreements, so that 

victimized nations can get what they need, when they need it. Also, 

stockpile managers must have proper authority for maintaining the 

surety of their contents. 

Three, there are legal challenges associated with delivery. What 

carriers will be involved? What are their rights and responsibilities? Who is authorized to decide how to allocate scarce supplies? 

A clear command and control architecture is imperative. Without 

elaborate planning, what will be the authority of public health officials to commandeer resources and triage patients? How will medical records be accessible? How will quarantines be enforced? 

Mr. Chairman, in the wake of bio attacks, we cannot tolerate 

delay, as officials question their legal authority to act. We would 

not tolerate such delays, challenges to domestic preparedness; and 

our Government deserves commendation for addressing many of 

these challenges inside the United States since 9/11. 

To call domestic preparedness a failure unjustifiably derogates 

the enormous effort of dedicated public servants, and suggests to 

our allies that they should not emulate our example when precisely 

the opposite message is required and appropriate. 

Mr. Chairman, global bio-preparedness is not about generosity. It 

is about protecting the American people from international threats 

in an inter-connected world. Taking the benefits of our experience 

and capacity to the international community epitomizes what 

America does best; promoting the rule of law. 

By building global bio-preparedness, we would engage all nations 

that share concern about biothreats. We would advance public 

health readiness, and we would establish a security framework 

upon which additional positive initiatives can be built for meeting 

evolving threats. 

Moreover, we would accelerate the development of biotechnology 

with positive implications for our economic recovery. 

39

I ask this subcommittee to consider three questions. One, does 

the State Department have all the authority it needs to plan, negotiate and implement global bio-preparedness? 

Two, does the State Department have the authority, resources, 

and capacity to develop optimal answers to the many legal challenges confronting global bio-preparedness? If not, how can these 

issues be addressed? 

Three, I have already mentioned the importance of taking global 

bio-preparedness to the BWC. But there are many opportunistic 

venues for advancing this objective, including the U.N. Security 

Council, NATO, the World Economic Forum and the G8. How precisely to do this is a matter for the subcommittee to consider. 

Finally, allow me to ask you all, what would Congress do, in the 

wake of biocatastrophies that relegate every other policy priority to 

insignificance? What would Congress do to prevent a second series 

of attacks? Amid mass deaths and huge economic losses that demonstrate the horrific implications of procrastination, what will you 

do? 

I respectfully ask you not to wait for the first attacks to prepare 

for the second attacks. Thank you very much for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kellman follows:]

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STATEMENT OF JONATHAN B. TUCKER, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION 

STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. TUCKER. Chairman Sherman and distinguished members of 

the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before 

you today. 

Last November the Obama administration released a National 

Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, containing broad guidelines for U.S. policy. The challenge facing the administration and 

Congress in the months ahead will be to translate these guidelines 

into a set of concrete policy initiatives and to give them the political and budgetary support they require for effective implementation. 

A key strength of the national strategy is that it integrates public health and security concerns into a single paradigm. This approach makes sense from a policy standpoint because it promotes 

efforts to strengthen global public health infrastructure in a way 

that bolsters U.S. defenses against both natural epidemics and bioterrorist attacks. 

The national strategy also emphasizes the potential risks associated with emerging biotechnologies. Synthetic genomics, for example, provides the capability to synthesize long DNA molecules from 

scratch and assemble them into the genome of a virus. This ability 

raises security concerns because it could potentially enable sophisticated terrorist groups to circumvent stringent controls on select 

agents of bioterrorism concerns, such as Ebola virus. Because the 

gene synthesis industry is international, the United States will 

have to work with other countries to harmonize measures to prevent the misuse of this technology. 

Other international measures to enhance biosecurity revolve 

around the Biological Weapons Convention, which remains the cornerstone of efforts to prevent biological weapons proliferation and 

terrorism. 

The Obama administration’s assessment that biological 

verification is not currently feasible is no excuse for inaction or 

complacency. To move beyond the legacy of the failed BWC Protocol, a package of bold, innovative measures will be needed to 

build confidence in compliance and to deter violations. 

One critical element is to increase the transparency of biodefense 

research programs, which have expanded dramatically in the 

United States and other countries since the terrorist attacks of 

2001 and could theoretically serve as a cover for offensive bioweapons development. 

Enhanced transparency is in the United States’ interest for two 

reasons. First, it offers greater insight into the BWC-related activities of other countries, providing greater confidence that they are 

complying with their treaty obligations. Second, it mitigates international suspicions about U.S. biodefense programs that might 

drive other nations to pursue questionable research. 

Another useful approach to increasing the transparency of BWCrelated activities is to build cooperative relationships between biodefense scientists and institutions in the United States and those 

in countries of proliferation concern. 

48

In recent years, the Defense Department’s Biological Threat Reduction Program and other U.S. biological engagement programs 

have reduced their activities in Russia because of bureaucratic and 

political difficulties in dealing with the Russian Government. Nevertheless, these engagement efforts are crucial for transparency 

and should be reinstated. 

Another important biosecurity measure lies with the United Nations. Because of the failure to conclude the BWC Protocol, the only 

option for investigating an alleged use of biological weapons is a 

long-standing mechanism under the auspices of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral. 

At present, however, the U.N. lacks the resources to rapidly field 

teams of suitably trained and equipped investigators. To remedy 

this problem, the United States should lead efforts to update and 

strengthen the Secretary-General’s mechanism. This capability 

would have an important deterrent effect by making it more likely 

that a covert biological attack will be attributed to a state or nonstate actor. 

Yet another way to strengthen global biosecurity is to improve 

systems for infectious disease surveillance and response. In today’s 

globalized world, an outbreak of serious epidemic disease anywhere 

in the world poses a potential risk to Americans here at home. 

Global networks for infectious disease surveillance and response 

provide an extended defense perimeter for the United States by 

making it possible to detect and snuff out epidemics, whether natural or human-caused, before they reach our shores. But existing 

disease-surveillance networks still contain many gaps in coverage, 

preventing the timely detection and containment of outbreaks close 

to the source. 

The International Health Regulations, which were revised in 

2005, require the member countries of the World Health Organization to report in a timely manner all public health emergencies of 

international concern that could potentially affect more than one 

country. Nevertheless, because many developing countries lack the 

financial and technical resources to establish effective national disease surveillance and response capabilities, the United States and 

other advanced countries must be prepared to help out. 

A critical event for advancing all of these biosecurity objectives 

will be the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons 

Convention, which will convene late next year in Geneva, Switzerland. 

This comprehensive review of the treaty’s implementation will be 

a make-or-break political opportunity for the United States. But 

the U.S. delegation will also have to navigate some treacherous political shoals. 

It is likely that several BWC member states, including Iran and 

Russia, will seek to revive the protocol negotiations as a means to 

pursue their negative agenda of attempting to weaken the convention itself. To block these efforts, the United States will have to 

offer an alternative package of bold and compelling measures to 

strengthen the BWC. 

Given the high stakes involved in the review conference, it is imperative that the State Department resolve the current internal 

49

dispute over which Bureau is responsible for the BWC and begin 

preparing for next year’s meeting as soon as possible. 

Another important task for the Seventh Review Conference will 

be to address the institutional deficit of the BWC. The last review 

conference in 2006 established an Implementation Support Unit 

consisting of three people at the U.N. Office in Geneva. But this 

entity has limited authority and a temporary mandate that must 

be renewed by member states in 2011. The Obama administration 

should push to make the unit permanent, while expanding its staff 

and responsibilities. 

In conclusion, implementing the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats will require the White House to give the 

same level of political attention to biological security that it has devoted to crafting and promoting its nuclear security initiatives. It 

will then be up to Congress to review the administration’s agenda 

and pass legislation and funding needed to implement it effectively. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Rademaker? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, 

MEMBER, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM, 

SENIOR COUNSEL, BGR GROUP (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 

NONPROLIFERATION) 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Royce, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to again appear before your subcommittee. 

I served as one of the House appointees on the Commission on 

the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

Terrorism. Therefore, I especially welcome the opportunity to appear here to report to you and the other members of the subcommittee on the findings and recommendations of our commission. 

I have a prepared statement, which I have submitted for the 

record; and mindful of your observation that we do not condone torture in America, I will not sit here and read my prepared statement to you. Rather, I will summarize it. I also have copies of our 

commission report, which I would be pleased to distribute, if you 

have a clerk who wants to bring them to you. They are sitting right 

here. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do you have enough copies for all members of the 

subcommittee? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I have about a dozen copies, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That will cover the whole subcommittee, even 

those who are not in attendance; thank you. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes, I have them. 

The mandate of our commission extended to all weapons of mass 

destruction. But in our work, we focused on biological weapons and 

nuclear weapons, because it was our conclusion that those were the 

two classes of weapons of mass destruction that would most likely 

be used by terrorists if there is a WMD attack by terrorists against 

the United States. 

As I think you observed earlier in your opening remarks, one of 

our conclusions was that as between biological and nuclear weapons, we thought the greater likelihood was that biological weapons 

would be used by terrorists in any WMD attack on the United 

States. 

At the outset of my remarks, I want to stress a key point that 

informs the rest of our commission’s analysis. That is that nuclear 

weapons and biological weapons are very different. As a nation, we 

spend a lot more time thinking about nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons threat; and a lot less time thinking about biological 

weapons. 

If we apply some of the lessons that we have drawn from the nuclear area to the biological area, we will make some big mistakes. 

So it is important to bear in mind the differences between the two. 

The most important difference is that nuclear weapons inflict 

their damage the moment they are used. The destruction is immediate. It is irreversible. Mitigation measures are of extremely limited utility in dealing with the consequences. The damage has been 

done. 

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Biological weapons, on the other hand, do not inflict damage immediately. The damage will manifest itself fairly quickly. But there 

is a window during which mitigation measures can minimize, and 

if done properly, perhaps even eliminate the physical damage 

caused by a biological weapons attack. 

That window is of critical importance to us, and it affords an opportunity to basically reduce the utility of these weapons to terrorists or others who might consider using them against us. If we can 

construct a mechanism within our country to promptly detect and 

promptly take steps to counteract a biological weapons attack 

against us, the idea of using these weapons against us will be 

much less appealing to terrorists and to others. 

So that was really the principal recommendation of our commission: That the United States needs to take advantage of that window to make sure that we have measures in place that will minimize the consequences of a bio attack. 

The ‘‘F’’ grade that our commission gave in its report card in January to the efforts of the United States Government in this area 

was really focused on the domestic steps that have been taken to 

build up mitigation measures. Fundamentally, it was our judgment 

that not enough money was being put into the development of vaccines and other needed measures to permit us to minimize the 

damage caused by a bio weapons attack. 

Our focus today, however, is in the international area; and so I 

wanted to turn to that issue. As a commission, we looked at the 

question of the Biological Weapons Convention. We judged that it 

remains critically important as part of our international strategy 

for combatting the bioweapons threat. 

Our principal recommendation with regard to the Biological 

Weapons Convention was to re-double efforts to universalize the 

convention; to persuade other governments to adhere. 

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—today, all but four countries in the world have ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The picture is substantially less satisfying if we look at the Biological Weapons Convention. There is still about 40 or 50 countries 

that have yet to ratify. 

We also looked at the question of the inspections protocol that 

was negotiated during the late 1990s; and as Dr. Tucker indicated, 

something was likely to come back. The Bush administration killed 

the Biological Weapons Convention protocol that had been negotiated in the 1990s. But certainly efforts will be mounted to revive 

it. 

As a commission, we considered what the proper policy of the 

United States should be on this question of establishing an international inspections regime for biological weapons. 

As you know, this has been a very controversial issue. I headed 

the U.S. delegation to the continuation of the fifth review conference in 2002, and this was the focus of the entire review conference. Passions ran extremely high on the issue. 

Therefore, to me, it was surprising that within our commission, 

we came to the unanimous conclusion that the Bush administration 

had acted properly in killing the protocol in 2001, when it announced its policy on the protocol. And we also reached the unanimous conclusion that it would be a mistake for the next U.S. adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:38 Jun 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\TNT\031810\55516 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ministration, meaning the Obama administration, to agree to revive the inspections protocol. 

I was very pleased to see that the Obama administration accepted our commission’s advice on this issue. In December of last year, 

Under Secretary Tauscher announced in Geneva that the Obama 

administration will not support the revival of an inspections protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. 

I think this was a difficult decision for the Obama administration 

to come to. I think they were under a lot of political pressure to 

go in a different direction. So I have very high praise for them for 

taking the courageous and correct step to defy that pressure and 

to do what is right on policy grounds. 

I see that my time is about to expire, and so I think I will stop 

there and submit myself to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. I will recognize Mr. Scott first, if he prefers. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me start where you left off there for a moment, 

Mr. Rademaker; is that correct? The issue of the protocols, why do 

you say we are doing the right thing by refusing to engage in the 

protocols? What are the benefits and what are the downfalls for us 

doing so? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Perhaps first I should explain what the protocol 

would be. It would establish an inspections mechanism. There 

would probably be an international organization created. It would 

have inspectors working for it. 

And it would be their mission to conduct regular inspections of 

biological facilities; facilities all over the world where biological research is taking place. It would be their objective to seek to detect 

potential violations of the Biological Weapons Convention. 

There might also be a mechanism for challenge inspections. In 

other words, if there was a suspicion of cheating on the Biological 

Weapons Convention, there might be a way to dispatch inspectors 

to look into whether those allegations are well founded or not. 

On paper, all of this sounds very good. Our concern with it—both 

in the Bush administration and now I think I can probably speak 

for the Obama administration on it because they have embraced 

the policy of the Bush administration—it was our judgment that 

this idea simply would not work in the biological area. 

So a great deal of money would be spent. A false sense of security would be created. And there were also very considerable risks 

to the U.S. biotechnology industry. 

I do not know if you have ever talked to an executive of a biotech 

firm. But I have never spoken to one of them who, when he understood what was being proposed here, did not immediately jump to 

the conclusion that what was being proposed was international industrial espionage; that foreign inspectors were going to come to 

his firm to try to steal the intellectual property that they were creating. 

I have heard this from so many business executives that I am 

quite confident that we cannot dismiss that concern out of hand. 

There was also great concern about false positives; that unlike 

the nuclear area, unlike the chemical area, the things that biological weapons inspectors would be looking for—you know, an anthrax 

spore. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. These things occur in nature. Highly enriched 

uranium does not occur in nature. If an inspector goes to a lab and 

finds highly enriched uranium, there is not a legitimate explanation for that. It did not occur naturally. Somebody put it there, 

and there is a reason why they created it. 

In the biological area, when we are dealing with essentially 

germs of one type or another, they could be man made or they 

could be naturally occurring. So the fact that inspectors detect 

something really does not tell you much. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right; thank you for that explanation. So then what 

alternative do we have? What would you recommend we do in place 

of that, to ensure international compliance with the Biological 

Weapons Convention, if we do not use the protocols? What do we 

do? 

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Mr. RADEMAKER. Our commission’s report is full of recommendations about what should be done in this area to increase assurance 

and to increase the protections against the production of biological 

weapons. 

The range of measures required mostly are in the area of domestic implementation. Other nations need to do the kinds of things 

that we have started doing, but we have not finished doing, here 

in the United States. 

At labs where research in this area is done, we need increased 

protections against diversion of biological material. It used to be 

that you could essentially order this stuff on the Internet. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me just mention, I want to get another point of 

view. I want to ask Mr. Kellman, because he raised some issues 

about our lacks in this area, and it was very alarming in his assessment. 

Do you agree with Mr. Rademaker? Is this the way to go, or is 

there an other alternative to kind of get the international compliance? 

Mr. KELLMAN. The verification protocol would be an unnecessary 

and unproductive use of very limited resources. It would help us 

confirm where biological weapons are not being produced. It would 

not tell us anything about where they are being produced. 

So it would give us some security about information that we are 

really pretty secure about without the verification protocol. It 

would not really tell us anything about the threats that we face. 

If I might, Congressman——

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. 

Mr. KELLMAN [continuing]. I gave a presentation at the Biological Weapons Convention expert meeting that summer on the use 

of other techniques to detect non-compliance—to verify compliance. 

But rather, the important thing, I think, is to detect non-compliance. International law affords us a number of tools, and we do not 

have to go down the same road. And on this, I think all three of 

us agree. That road is not a productive road. But there are other 

ways that we can think about detecting non-compliance that could 

be advanced at the Biological Weapons Convention. 

Mr. SCOTT. All right; thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you; our current nonproliferation policy 

with regard to nuclear weapons is obviously a manifest failure. If 

we continue it, or even if we adopt those changes that are currently 

under discussion in the administration—either of those, I think it 

assures that Iran will have nuclear weapons this decade, and that 

will be the death knell of the NTP. 

I say that only because when you then come kind of collectively 

as witnesses and say our efforts to control biological weapons are 

the under-funded stepchild of our efforts to control nuclear weapons, it is indeed harsh criticism that our efforts in that area are 

worse than the manifest failure previously mentioned. 

Now, Mr. Tucker, we are dealing with this issue of confidencebuilding measures. The theory is, we provide this information voluntarily, more or less. This inspires certain countries, say Russian 

or China, to over-brim with confidence and then do less to develop 

ugly pathogens. 

69

Now Mr. Rademaker pointed out, this is already a problem from 

an intellectual property perspective. It is also a problem with regard to state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups. 

To what extent would these confidence-building measures provide information useful to terrorists and terrorists states? Looking 

at this threat from that angle, the confidence-building measures do 

not do any good. Ahmadinejad is not sitting there saying, well, gee, 

if only they had some confidence-building measures, I would not 

want weapons of mass destruction. 

So how do you confidence-build, vis-a`-vis Russia and China, 

while disclosing no information to Iran and North Korea? 

Mr. TUCKER. Well, I think you have identified a very difficult 

problem. But I do think the types of information that are, for example, included in the confidence-building measure data declarations, which are part of the Biological Weapons Convention process, 

are not particularly sensitive. They are not providing cookbooks on 

how to produce anthrax. They are simply identifying activities and 

facilities that are relevant to BWC compliance. 

And I think the argument can be made, as I said in my presentation, that if the United States demonstrates leadership with respect to the transparency of our activities, that puts us in a strong 

position to——

Mr. SHERMAN. A strong position to affect Russia and China—absolutely not a strong position to, in any way, affect the terrorists 

states. 

Mr. TUCKER. Russia and China are very serious——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, I mean, that begs the question that we do not 

have time for; and that is, what is our nightmare scenario—Russia 

or China or the terrorist states? I would say if Russia and China 

want to kill 1 million Americans, they already have a guaranteed 

way to do so without further research. It is called nuclear weapons. 

So my concern is these terrorists states confidence-building 

measures do nothing to diminish the threat from the terrorist 

states, and do give them a view or at least a road map to our 

counter efforts. 

Mr. Kellman, you say that our domestic preparedness deserves 

a grade far better than ‘‘F,’’ and Mr. Rademaker was part of the 

commission that gave it an ‘‘F.’’ We have spent $68 billion on this, 

and I think you correctly point out that if we spent $68 billion and 

get an ‘‘F,’’ other countries are hardly going to be inspired. But if 

it deserves an ‘‘F,’’ it deserves an ‘‘F.’’ How did they get it wrong? 

What grade to do you give our domestic prepardness, and why do 

you reach such a different grade? 

Mr. KELLMAN. In an op-ed, I used the term ridiculous with regard to the ‘‘F’’ grade. Let me see if I can justify that. 

I think what the commission was trying to get at was that we 

are extremely vulnerable to bio attacks; that probably each of us 

at this table—certainly, I can envision attacks against the United 

States for which our preparedness would be unsuccessful. There is 

no question about that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can interrupt, there are two types of attacks; 

those that are not deterrable. I mean, we have no counter measures to the Russian nuclear program. 

Mr. KELLMAN. Right. 

70

Mr. SHERMAN. So can you embellish a little and say, ‘‘Are there 

attacks for which we have no defense?,’’ and as to which we will 

not be able to effectively retaliate? 

Mr. KELLMAN. Absolutely, yes; so in the ultimate sense, we are 

not. And unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I do not think we seriously 

can be prepared. I think that what we have to think about here is 

risk management. I think what we have to think about is a combination of prevention measures and preparedness measures. 

But it would be folly of me and certainly disingenuous to testify 

before you today to say that there is a way to make America safe 

from biological threats. That cannot be done today. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can interrupt, you seem to be saying we 

should grade America on a curve; and if a series of counter measures that we have adopted would limit the deaths under a particular scenario to 100,000, rather than 100 million; that you can 

not give that an F and say, well, that is 100,000 dead. You have 

to say, well, that is 99.9 million saved. 

Are you saying that our counter measures are useful—not in preventing terrible results; but preventing a terrible result from being 

even more catastrophic? 

Mr. KELLMAN. I am saying that government officials must operate in the real world with real conditions. So yes, what the United 

States Government has done since the anthrax attack of 2011 [sic], 

it put us in a substantially better capability to save many American lives. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Rademaker, obviously, we are not safe. We 

spent $68 billion; but we are not safe. But have we done a good 

job of putting ourselves in a position where the deaths are catastrophic; but dramatically less than they would otherwise? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, I think we have made a good 

start. But there is a enormous amount of work that remains to be 

done; and that was the basis of the commission’s grade. 

To be able to mitigate the consequences of a bioattack, we need 

detection capabilities. We need a way to mobilize state and local 

authorities to act in response to the attack. We need vaccines, and 

we need a way of dispensing the vaccines to the effected population. We need a national plan for responding, should something 

like this happen. 

Today, we have no national plan. We have invested a fair 

amount of money in this. But the commission found that the annual requirement for vaccines in this area, to be fully prepared, 

would come to over $3 billion a year to prepare the vaccines. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is a year. So you prepare them, and then you 

have got to prepare them again and again. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, we are spending probably 10 percent of 

that today. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, the issue did come up. It is a bit outside 

the jurisdiction of the subcommittee. But I am going to go further 

and ask each of you that feel that it is within your competence to 

submit how we would spend $10 billion or $20 billion a year to prepare. Because it is easy to come in and say, well, $68 billion total 

expenditures is not enough. You ought to be spending $168 billion 

a year. 

71

I need a budget responsible approach to bio-preparedness; and hopefully, for the $10 billion to $20 billion a year, we are getting 

not only a capacity to respond to bio weapons; but also to disease 

pathogens, as well. 

And many of the things that I think we should be doing do not 

cost us money. We would have to go to the American people and 

tell them, you honestly face a threat. In an emergency, your government will take the following highly controversial actions. You 

will not be as free the day after a biological attack as you were the 

day before. And as long as none of these are said in my district, 

I am fine. 

So we have to not only spend money on this; but we have to 

spend political capital. We have to overcome in-bred ideological dispositions, and that may be even more difficult. But I hope that the 

program you lay out is not just a list of things to spend money on; 

but a list of things to do that do not cost money, or cost only modest amounts, and where the reason we are not doing them is not 

budgetary, but political and psychological. 

With that, we have our ranking member, Mr. Royce, who is now 

recognized for 5-ish minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask Mr. Tucker—

you argue that actions by the United States to increase the oversight and transparency of its own biodefense program would not 

only demonstrate international leadership by providing a model for 

other countries to follow, but would put the United States Government in a position to demand greater openness from others. I am 

just wondering what evidence you will base that on. Is that a 

hunch? 

Mr. TUCKER. I would say it is a logical supposition that if we 

demonstrate leadership in this area, that puts us in a stronger position to pressure other countries to follow suit. Now I should clarify that confidence-building alone is not the solution. It is one of 

a complex of measures that will work together, that are synergistic. 

Mr. ROYCE. Apparently not, because, you know, I opened with 

my comments about the Russian scientist that Congressman 

Saxton and I met with. And in response to my questions, he said, 

no, we had been told in 1969 Nixon abandoned the program. The 

chemical weapons convention, that dates from 1972, right? 

So he told me that after 1972, they were pedal to the metal on 

this. He even told me a funny story, which is not all that funny, 

but it is definitely unique from the ones I have heard about him 

taking an elevator up to Andropov’s office, because Andropov wanted to make sure that he really had developed something for which 

there was no antidote. 

He said he was carrying the petri dish in there, going up the elevator; and then putting it on the desk and saying, do not open it. 

I mean, it really gave me an insight into what these 50,000 employees were doing. 

But given the fact that you testified that Russia is moving away 

from transparency in its labs; and given the fact that in the face 

of the convention, he is telling me that they were doing that, are 

you suggesting that Russia today is responding to our lab policies? 

Is that what has happened? Because that sounds fantastic to me 

given the dialogue that I had. I just do not sense a connection here 

72

between what you say and what was really going on in Russia then 

or now. 

Mr. TUCKER. Well, I think if you read, for example, Ken Alibek’s 

memoir——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. TUCKER [continuing]. He was the deputy director of a large 

component of the Soviet biological weapons program. 

Mr. ROYCE. I knew Alibek. He was a student of this. 

Mr. TUCKER. He claims that Soviet bioweapons scientists were 

led to believe that the United States was secretly violating——

Mr. ROYCE. That is what the Soviet state told them, right? 

Mr. TUCKER. And it was only when he came to the United States 

under the trilateral process, which was a series of reciprocal visits 

to suspected biological warfare facilities, that he suddenly realized 

that he had been misled and that the United States did not have 

an offensive program. 

Mr. ROYCE. But it was the collapse of the Soviet system that 

gave us the opportunity basically to swing him. 

Mr. TUCKER. He came before the collapse of the Soviet system. 

He came in early December 1991 under the trilateral process. 

Mr. ROYCE. Right. 

Mr. TUCKER. And then he later defected to the United States. 

But when he came to the United States for those transparency visits, he was still a Soviet official. 

Mr. ROYCE. Right, but here is the point. There was a window, as 

the Soviet Union was breaking up, when I got access to this scientist. That window is closed. I am just telling you. China is not 

going to open its labs. The Russians are not going to open their 

labs. 

You testified that expanding international research partnerships 

and personal exchanges can provide valuable insight into foreign 

biodefense programs. And I would like to ask if you speak from 

personal experience? Because cannot such exchanges also result in 

foreigners acquiring intelligence we would rather not have them acquire? 

I am thinking about China right now; and how much down this 

road we have already gone and what a cul-de-sac it has been for 

us, in terms of the consequences of it. 

Mr. TUCKER. I think obviously these programs involve a weighing 

of cost and benefits. They have to be very carefully designed so that 

they provide insights into foreign programs and the extent to which 

those programs are treaty-compliant, while limiting the risk of 

technology transfer. But I think they can be structured in that 

way. I believe it is important to engage with Russia. Because if we 

disengage——

Mr. ROYCE. Listen, I agree with you about engaging with Russia. 

But I just wonder about the naı ̈vete with respect to what I have 

found is going on, in China and Russia. 

Mr. TUCKER. I have spoken to many people who say that the best 

source of intelligence or information about what is going on in foreign laboratories of concern is the scientists themselves. And establishing personal relationships with these scientists makes them 

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tact their former colleagues that they met during an exchange program. 

Mr. ROYCE. Do you think that might happen in China? 

Mr. TUCKER. I think it is very possible that it would happen in 

China. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let us look at A.Q. Khan and what happened with 

our programs with Pakistan. How is that working out for us? I 

mean, anyway, let me ask Mr. Rademaker a question here. 

You served in the Bush administration, Mr. Rademaker. Dr. 

Tucker testifies that the Bush administration wrote off bioterrorism prevention efforts as too difficult. Would you care to respond 

to that? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I guess I do not know where to begin in responding to that. I think it is very rare for anyone to accuse the 

Bush administration of not doing enough to combat terrorism generally. Specifically, with reference to bioterrorism, that was a very 

high priority. 

Most of what the chairman was talking about—the billions of 

dollars that have been spent in this area—were spent during the 

Bush administration. So to say that the Bush administration wrote 

this off, I think I could bring in a whole raft of officials from the 

Department of Homeland Security who I think would take great offense at hearing such a comment. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you another question. Last question, the 

commission discussed the role of the citizen, and called for better 

engagement of the populace to combat the threat of bioterrorism. 

The commission found that the U.S. public has become complacent. What is the commission’s message to the average American, 

going about his daily business? What is the take-away? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I will tell you, that recommendation was something felt very strongly by the chairman of our commission, former 

Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who had a long career in public 

service, as you know. 

He felt, and persuaded the other members of the commission, 

that public engagement is critically important for our efforts 

against terrorism to succeed—civic involvement, neighbors looking 

after the neighborhood, being aware. 

When we start talking about this, the specific measures that 

would be needed to respond, for example, to a biological attack, an 

organized community is really the best preparation—a community 

in which it is possible, where mechanisms are in place to distribute 

vaccines if that needs to happen; where a public health infrastructure is in place to detect outbreaks when they occur; and citizen 

awareness of and involvement in all these matters. Senator 

Graham, I think, would speak very passionately on this subject if 

he were here today. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rademaker. I think I am out of time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is there anyone still here, listening from the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation? 

[No response.] 

Mr. SHERMAN. The chair sees none. Is there anyone here from 

the State Department? 

[No response.] 

74

Mr. SHERMAN. The chair sees none—one more demonstration of 

what the Executive Branch thinks of the Legislative Branch. I am 

going to send a copy of the transcript of these hearings to Mr. Van 

Diepen; and I am going to be asking him to confirm to me that he 

has read every word. 

The fact that we would put on a seminar directly relevant to his 

operation—and those of us who have responsibilities that go from 

A to Z and from Southern California, we are on different committees, I am missing Financial Services right now—that I have got 

the time to be here when this is a part of my job, and he does not 

have the time to be here or even have his number two here, that 

seems to indicate that he does not believe—and I realize that this 

is typical of the entire State Department—that anything useful 

happens here in Congress; that the sole purpose of Congress is to 

give them money after getting false information as to why we 

should do it. 

So in the future, we will comment on whether the State Department at least bothers to humor us by pretending to listen to hearings that we have. 

Is somebody indicating that they with the State Department? Oh, 

because I asked earlier, and I saw no response. Please identify 

yourself for the record—deputy director for what? 

Okay, well, then I hope that you will report to the PDAS and 

others what happened here. And I hope in the future that you will 

overcome your shyness when I ask whether there is someone here 

from the State Department, and perceptively identify yourself; and 

I do thank you for being here. 

I only partially take back my view of what the State Department 

thinks of what goes on in Congress. But the fact that they at least 

have you sit here and report back is slightly more positive than the 

statements I just made. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(75)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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PAGES FROM A REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & BIOPOLICY INSTITUTE

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE

[NOTE: The full report is available in committee records or on the Internet at:

http://biopolicy.org/sites/default/files/documents/ISBI%20Congressional%20Report

%20Final.pdf.]


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Æ


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