NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL STEBBINS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-30066 

D.C. Nos. 

4:20-cr-00049-BMM-1 

4:20-cr-00049-BMM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 7, 2022

Portland, Oregon

Before: PAEZ and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,** District Judge.

Appellant Christopher Stebbins was charged with and convicted of

Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 and Attempted Possession with Intent to Distribute 

Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Stebbins 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District Judge 

for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 28 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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appeals his convictions and the district court’s 150-month sentence. We affirm both 

of Stebbins’ convictions and his 150-month sentence.

1. There was sufficient evidence to sustain Stebbins’ conspiracy conviction. 

Although Stebbins’ co-conspirator denied that they had explicitly agreed to sell meth 

together, a conspiracy may be inferred from the defendants’ conduct or other 

circumstantial evidence. United States v. Lapier, 796 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 

2015). At trial, the jury heard testimony that Stebbins received increasingly large 

amounts of meth and that his seller broke down the meth into two-ounce baggies. 

The shipments started with a quarter-pound package of meth and culminated in a

two-pound package of meth that led to Stebbins’ arrest. The jury also heard 

testimony that Stebbins’ seller connected him with other meth suppliers, relayed

Stebbins’ specific packaging instructions to the new suppliers, and assumed 

financial responsibility for a lost package of meth that was supposed to be sent to 

and paid for by Stebbins. 

Stebbins argues that there was only a buyer-seller relationship with his coconspirator, but a rational juror could have found that there was a tacit agreement to 

sell meth. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

2. The testimony of Stebbins’ fiancée, Troylynn Brown, was sufficient 

evidence to sustain his possession with intent to distribute conviction.

Although portions of Brown’s testimony contradicted her previous statements 
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to law enforcement agents, her testimony that she intended to use some of the meth 

that Stebbins bought was uncontradicted. The jury was properly instructed on its 

ability to determine Brown’s credibility and Stebbins has not demonstrated that her 

testimony was so incredible that we must overrule the jury’s determination. See

United States v. Yossunthorn, 167 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.

Leung, 35 F.3d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, a juror could reasonably 

conclude that Stebbins intended to distribute the meth to Brown, and the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain his conviction.

3. The district court did not err in imposing a 150-month sentence. The 

district court explicitly stated that it considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors when imposing the sentence that was 38 months below Stebbins’ guideline 

range. The district court also properly summarized and addressed that Stebbins’ coconspirator’s sentence did not warrant Stebbins receiving less than 150 months.

Stebbins’ sentence was therefore not procedurally erroneous and is substantively 

reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 49-51 (2007). 

AFFIRMED.