IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 22, 2020 Session

SUZETTE MICHELLE GIBSON v. MICHAEL WAYNE GIBSON

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 138123 Gregory S. McMillan, Judge

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No. E2019-01051-COA-R3-CV

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In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court dismissed a Husband’s petition to modify or 

terminate the transitional alimony he was obligated to pay on the basis of the provision of 

the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement that made the alimony obligation nonmodifiable. Husband appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

RICHARD H. DINKINS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY, 

C.J., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

John K. Harbor, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Michael Wayne Gibson.

Jerrold L. Becker, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Suzette Michelle Gibson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Michael Gibson (“Husband”) and Suzette Gibson (“Wife”) were married in March 

1998 and were declared divorced on March 29, 2017; the divorce decree incorporated a 

Mediated Marital Dissolution Agreement that contained the following provision:

 

1 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals states:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm,

reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal 

opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum 

opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and 

shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

07/22/2020
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8. That the Husband shall pay transitional alimony to the Wife in the 

amount of $5,000.00 per month for a period of 27 months, beginning April 

2017 and through June 2019. Thereafter, beginning July 2019, Husband shall 

pay transitional alimony in the amount of $4,000.00 per month to the Wife 

for a period of 26 months, until the last payment in August 2021. Until the 

marital residence sells, the Husband shall pay the sum of $2,500.00 per 

month directly to the Plaintiff, plus the mortgage payment (property taxes 

and insurance included) for the marital residence, the agreed upon repairs 

and maintenance expenses for the marital residence, the utilities (water and 

electricity) in regards to the martial residence, including basic cable, and 

same shall satisfy his above enumerated alimony obligation. Upon the sale 

of the marital residence the Husband shall then begin paying the above 

enumerated alimony obligation directly to the Wife until his obligation 

herein terminates. This alimony obligation shall be non-modifiable, but 

taxable to the Wife and deductible by the Husband. That this alimony 

obligation terminates on Wife’s remarriage, or her death, or upon the 

termination of the above enumerated fifty-three (53) months, whichever is 

earlier in time.

A year and a half later, Husband filed a Petition to Modify and/or Terminate 

Alimony pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121, asserting that Wife 

resided full-time with her fiancé, was not in need of the amount of alimony awarded in the 

decree, and that Husband’s obligation to pay should be suspended all or in part. Wife 

moved to dismiss the petition, relying on the provision in the agreement that the alimony 

obligation was non-modifiable. The court granted Wife’s motion. Husband appeals.

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss by taking all allegations 

of fact in the complaint as true; we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo with 

no presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Owens v. Truckstops of America, 

915 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tenn. 1996). “A marital dissolution agreement is essentially a 

contract between a husband and wife in contemplation of divorce proceedings,” the 

interpretation of which is a matter of law and subject to our de novo review. Vick v. Hicks, 

No. W2013-02672-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 6333965, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2014)

(quoting Gray v. Estate of Gray, 993 S.W.2d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). We seek to 

ascertain and effectuate the parties’ intent as expressed in the MDA, giving each word its 

natural and ordinary meaning. Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2006).2

Husband argues that the trial court erred “by construing the transitional alimony 

 

2

 In support of her motion, Wife also filed the affidavit of her former counsel. Inasmuch as the motion was 

filed and the case resolved pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure, our review 

is limited to the allegations of the petition and pertinent provisions of the MDA. 
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paragraph in the parties’ Mediated Marital Dissolution Agreement to prohibit Appellant’s 

modification of his transitional alimony obligation as provided by T.C.A. § 36-5-

121(g)(2)(C).” A similar argument was raised in the case of Vick v. Hicks, where this Court

held:

When . . . parties expressly agree in a marital dissolution agreement 

that a transitional alimony obligation shall not be modifiable, such an 

agreement should be deemed to have force. The alimony statutes are not 

applicable where the parties agree in a marital dissolution agreement to terms 

different from those set out in the statutes.

2014 WL 6333965, at *4; see also Karsonovich v. Kempe, No. M2017-01052-COA-R3-

CV, 2018 WL 1091735, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018). 

Paragraph 8 of the MDA clearly states that the alimony is transitional, identifies the

three circumstances upon which it terminates (Wife’s death, remarriage, or the expiration 

of 53 months), and specifies that it is non-modifiable. We have considered the cases on 

which the parties rely and conclude that this is a case “where the parties plainly state that 

the agreed-upon transitional alimony is nonmodifiable, [and thus we] should hold the 

parties to their agreement.” Vick, 2014 WL 6333965, at *4.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition is affirmed. 

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RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE