FACTSHEET

FULANI COMMUNITIES

UNITED STATES COMMISSION on

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 N. Capitol Street, NW, Suite #A714

Washington, DC 20401

202-523-3240

September 2020

By Madeline Vellturo, Policy Analyst

Religious Tensions and Fulani Communities in West and Central Africa

The Fulani are one of the largest ethnic groups in the world. Predominantly Muslim and 

historically associated with cattle herding and livestock rearing, Fulani communities 

stretch across the African continent from Senegal to Sudan. Fulani groups and 

individuals are a critical aspect of the social, political, and economic fabric of west and 

central Africa.

In recent years, Fulani communities have become caught up in recurrent cycles of 

resource conflict and intercommunal violence in some areas of west and central 

Africa. According to many analysts and local civil society representatives, this violence 

has escalated religious tensions in a region home to many Muslim and Christian 

communities that have peacefully lived side-by-side for centuries. 

The following factsheet explores the role that religion plays in escalating violence 

committed by and against Fulani communities in west and central Africa. Although 

the extent to which religious ideology plays a direct role in driving violence involving 

Fulani communities remains a subject of debate, the trend of increasing violence by 

and against Fulani groups is clearly aggravating religious tensions. 

Who are Fulani?

Fulani, also commonly referred to as the Fulbe or the Peuhl, are often considered the 

largest nomadic ethnic group in the world. They reside in Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, 

Guinea Bissau, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African 

Republic (CAR), Chad, Sudan, and South Sudan, among other places.

Members of Fulani groups often speak dialects from a common language (Fulfulde), 

they are typically Muslim, and they often have a shared history of livestock herding or 

otherwise deal in the trading and rearing of livestock as a source of livelihood. Fulani 

are an ethnic minority in every country in which they reside.

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Gayle Manchin

Chair

Tony Perkins

Vice Chair

Anurima Bhargava

Vice Chair

Commissioners

Gary Bauer

James W. Carr

Frederick A. Davie

Nadine Maenza

Johnnie Moore

Nury Turkel

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director

USCIRF’s Mission

To advance international 

freedom of religion or 

belief, by independently 

assessing and unflinchingly 

confronting threats to this 

fundamental right.
USCIRF Legislation Factsheet: RELIGIOUS TENSIONS AND FULANI COMMUNITIES: September 2020 2

Image source: CTC Sentinel, 2017.

Despite these common characteristics, members of 

Fulani groups also demonstrate significant diversity 

across geographies, subclans, and individuals. While 

many Fulani live a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, 

many others practice farming or a hybrid livelihood

combining sedentary agriculture and livestock rearing. 

Still others have migrated to urban centers in search 

of jobs and opportunities. Fulani from elite clans have 

often resided in towns and cities and served as political 

figures and advisors. Heads of state like Nigeria’s President 

Muhammadu Buhari and Senegal’s President Macky Sall

claim Fulani heritage.

This intragroup diversity makes generalizations difficult. 

Estimates of the Fulani population in Africa range from 

five million to 65 million, in part because there is little 

consensus regarding the definition and boundaries of 

the Fulani ethnicity. Some analysts and practitioners 

argue that Fulani groups have more differences than 

they have similarities, and the insistence that they are a 

cohesive ethnic group is mainly driven by the need for 

outsiders to ascribe them a common identity. Others 

note that Fulani demonstrate remarkable cohesion of 

self-identity considering their geographic scope and 

demographic diversity. 

Fulani and Islam

Anecdotal evidence and qualitative research suggest 

that the vast majority of Fulani are Sunni Muslim. 

Fulani Muslims often practice Sufism, a form of Islamic 

mysticism that is prominent in west Africa and Sudan 

and around the world. Islamic practice among Fulani 

individuals ranges from moderate to conservative. 

Scholars report that some Fulani groups combine Islamic 

and traditional practices. For example, the traditional 

concept of Pulaaku, a “code of conduct” prominent across 

Fulani groups, continues to play a strong spiritual role 

in many Fulani cultures. There is also evidence of some 

Fulani converts to Christianity.

Some Fulani groups played a significant role in several 

violent campaigns to implement Islamic rule in west 

Africa in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Although 

these campaigns were predominantly Fulani-led, they were 

ethnically diverse. There are many instances of non-Fulani 

fighters taking part, and there are examples of Fulani 

groups and communities refusing to participate. Still, in 

several cases the resulting caliphates privileged people 

from specific, elite Fulani clans for political positions over 

non-Fulani individuals. This contributed to resentment

among non-Fulani communities in some areas born from 

the marginalization and discrimination they experienced 

under Islamic rule. In some countries today, this 

resentment lingers and is apparent in civil society rhetoric.
3 USCIRF Legislation Factsheet: RELIGIOUS TENSIONS AND FULANI COMMUNITIES: September 2020

Fulani and Religious Violence

In recent years, violence and insecurity have escalated 

in many countries with prominent Fulani populations. 

In several cases, this violence has involved Fulani 

communities, both as victims and as perpetrators. This 

trend is driven by a complex confluence of climate 

variability, population growth, arms proliferation, poor 

governance, intercommunal tensions, illicit economic activity, 

and inequitable distribution of services and resources. 

Violence by and against Fulani groups is escalating and 

feeding into broader cycles of retaliatory violence and 

revenge, increasing the risk of atrocities in countries like 

Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Cameroon, and CAR.

Experts and practitioners continue to debate the extent 

to which religious ideology plays a direct role in driving 

violence involving Fulani communities and individuals 

in west and central Africa. However, violence by and 

against Fulani groups is clearly aggravating religious 

tensions in countries like Nigeria and CAR. A 2019 

USCIRF study found that narratives around the causes of 

violence involving Fulani communities in Nigeria’s Middle 

Belt “are some of the most polarizing between religious 

communities.” Violence involving Fulani communities 

continues to exacerbate Muslim-Christian tensions in 

CAR, a country that has been experiencing ethnoreligious violence for more than five years.

Fulani as Victims

Over the past several years, Fulani communities 

have frequently been victims of violence in west and 

central Africa. In Mali, attacks targeting Fulani in 

January, February, and May of this year killed 14, 31, 

and 43 civilians, respectively. Similar attacks on Fulani 

communities in neighboring Burkina Faso killed dozens

of civilians in the first half of 2020. In Cameroon, at least 

250 Fulani have been killed and 80,000 displaced since 

2016, with Fulani communities reporting they have been 

victims of intimidation, kidnappings, assassinations, and 

theft by Ambazonian separatist fighters. In Nigeria, youth 

attacked a Fulani settlement in January, killing 23 people, 

with smaller attacks on Fulani in May and July each killing 

three civilians.

The drivers of violence against Fulani communities are 

complex and multifaceted. Common drivers of this violence 

include intercommunal tensions, ethnic targeting, and 

escalating resource competition and land conflict. However, 

in a few instances, Fulani appear to have been targeted 

because of their religion or perceived religious affiliation. 

In southern Kaduna state, Nigeria, Fulani have accused

Christian militias of attacking them in an attempt to 

eliminate Muslims from the area. Fulani Muslims in 

CAR were some of the most affected victims of sectarian 

violence that broke out there in 2013. Fulani in CAR found 

themselves trapped in Muslim enclaves in various parts 

of the country for fear of facing violence if they ventured 

into areas controlled by predominantly Christian militias 

known as “anti-balaka.” 

In some countries, Fulani civilians are targeted because 

they are perceived to be affiliated with Islamic extremism. 

In some parts of Nigeria, those seeking to incite violence 

against Fulani communities frequently employ claims that 

Fulani are “jihadist herdsmen” attempting to “Islamize” 

the country—it is important to note that these claims are 

difficult to verify due to the lack of reliable information 

from the region. In Burkina Faso, counterterrorism 

forces deployed to fight jihadist groups have reportedly 

specifically targeted Fulani communities, committing 

human rights abuses and summary executions against 

Fulani civilians. 

Fulani as Perpetrators

Fulani individuals and militias have also been responsible 

for numerous incidents of violence against civilians 

in recent years. In Mali, the United Nations recorded 

that armed elements from Fulani communities were 

responsible for 47 attacks in the first half of 2020, claiming 

the lives of 162 civilians. In Nigeria, suspected Fulani 

gunmen staged an 11-day attack in Benue State in January 

2018 that killed at least 80 people. In Cameroon, Fulani 

individuals were alleged to be the perpetrators of the 

Ngarbuh massacre that killed 22 people. 

Once again, drivers of violence committed by Fulaniaffiliated armed fighters are multidimensional, and 

the role that religious ideology plays in Fulani fighters’ 

motivations is highly debated. In some areas, Fulani 

militants have been accused of deliberately targeting 

Christians based on their beliefs. As previously discussed, 

Fulani militia violence is commonplace in CAR, where 

political, ethnic, and resource-based violence has taken on 

sectarian dimensions. In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, incidents of 

suspected Fulani militants burning churches and attacking 

predominantly Christian villages and Christian religious

ceremonies have led to allegations that suspected Fulani 

fighters are committing genocide against Christians.
USCIRF Legislation Factsheet: RELIGIOUS TENSIONS AND FULANI COMMUNITIES: September 2020 4

However, intra-Muslim violence involving Fulani groups 

in these countries complicates claims that Fulani militias 

are religiously motivated. In northwest Nigeria, pastoralist 

Fulani “bandits” frequently face off against predominantly 

Hausa “vigilante” farmers, who are also primarily Muslim, 

with clashes reaching “critical levels” in recent years. 

In CAR, militias claiming to protect Fulani interests, 

like the Union for Peace in CAR (UPC) and the Retour, 

Reclamation et Réhabilitation (3R), have often clashed 

with other predominantly Muslim groups like the Popular 

Front for the Rebirth of CAR (FPRC) and the Central 

African Patriotic Movement (MPC).

Some cite Fulani participation in violent jihadist 

organizations as evidence of religious motivations. 

Fulani are disproportionately represented among some 

jihadist groups operating in the central Sahel, like the 

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al-Qaeda 

affiliates Macina Liberation Front and Ansaroul Islam. 

In Nigeria there is increasing geographic overlap and 

evidence of relationship building between jihadist groups 

and organized criminal bandits that are known to include 

Fulani fighters. 

Yet several analysts familiar with the situation on the 

ground who were interviewed by USCIRF reported 

that religious ideology plays only a minor role in the 

motivations of most Fulani fighters, even those associated 

with jihadist groups. Common objectives between Fulani 

fighters and Islamic extremists include overthrowing 

regional governments, disrupting the perceived 

inequitable status quo and distribution of resources, and 

pilfering from illegal mining and trafficking activities. In 

some areas, jihadist leaders have relaxed their expectations

of local fighters, including Fulani fighters, to adhere to 

strict religious practices where necessary. In general, 

jihadist groups and ideologies reportedly do not enjoy 

much popular support in Fulani-majority areas.

Fulani as Peacemakers 

There are also many examples across west and central 

Africa of Fulani individuals and communities living 

peacefully with members of other groups. For example, 

Guinea—the only country where Fulani make up the 

largest ethnic minority at 38% of the population—is 

not affected by jihadism, and Fulani there “are not and 

have not been particularly involved in violent conflicts.” 

In northern Ghana, scholars have reported that Fulani 

and non-Fulani exist as “cultural neighbors” and cooperate 

more frequently than they conflict with one another. 

Even in Nigeria, where Fulani are often associated with 

violent conflict, many Fulani communities actively 

promote peaceful solutions and social harmony across 

groups. For example, in the aftermath of divisive comments

by a Fulani fighter that claimed that “Nigeria belongs to 

the Fulani,” key Fulani leaders dissociated themselves 

from this statement. The Chairman of Fulani Chiefs in 

the South-West, Alhaji Bambado, said that this claim 

did not represent the views of all Fulani, and encouraged 

Fulani to “ignore this bogus claim” and continue to live 

harmoniously with other groups in Nigeria. 

Conclusion

As one of the largest ethnic groups in the world, Fulani 

represent a diverse and widespread group of people 

spanning across west, central, and parts of east Africa. 

While generalizations regarding Fulani are difficult, in 

recent years violence committed by and against Fulani 

communities has become more deadly in several areas. 

The drivers of this violence are complex and multifaceted, 

and the extent to which religious ideology plays a 

prominent role remains a subject of debate. Yet, violence 

involving Fulani communities is aggravating religious 

tensions in a region where religious freedom violations 

are common. 

Consequently, the U.S. government should invest in 

analysis that identifies the perpetrators of violence by and 

against Fulani groups and their motivations, especially in 

regions where these dynamics overlap with interreligious 

tensions. The U.S. should then enact targeted sanctions 

against individuals and identifiable armed groups that 

are found to be systematically targeting civilians based 

on their religion or belief. An approach focused on 

individuals and identifiable armed groups would delink 

violence from perceived religious or ethnic identity, 

thereby deescalating interreligious tensions and sectarian 

violence. The U.S. can also support regional governments 

to build their capacity to identify specific violators 

of religious freedom, distinguish them from broader 

religious and ethnic groups, and hold them to account. 
UNITED STATES COMMISSION on INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 N. Capitol Street, NW, Suite #A714

Washington, DC 20401

202-523-3240

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The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan federal government entity established by the 

U.S. Congress to monitor, analyze, and report on threats to religious freedom abroad. USCIRF makes foreign policy recommendations to the President, 

the Secretary of State, and Congress intended to deter religious persecution and promote freedom of religion and belief.

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