Opinion issued May 28 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

————————————

NO. 01
- 14
- 00524
- CV

——————————— DAVID GRUPA , Appella nt V. LILLIE D. BASSET, ST ANLEY E. DICKSON, CA ROLYN SPILLER, CLIFFORD DICKSON, AN D JANICE CRADDOCK , Appell e e s
On Appeal from the 506th District Court Grimes County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 32491

MEMORANDUM OPINION Lillie D. Basset, Stanley E. Dickson, Carolyn Spiller, Clifford Dickson, and Janice Craddock (collectively, the “Dicksons ”) filed suit against David Grupa, seeking to quiet title on certain property in Grimes County, Texas. Following a bench trial, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of the Dicksons. In four2 issues on appeal, Grupa challenges the legal and factual s ufficiency of certain inheritance matters related to the title dispute. We affirm. Background In 1895, James I. Kennard and his wife, Jennie Kennard, purchased a 100

- acre tract in Grimes County. At the time of trial in 2014, David Grupa owned 26 acres of that original tract. The underlying suit concerned the division of ownership of the remaining 74 acres. A central dispute between the parties was whether James and Jennie Kennard’s son, Sherman Kennard, had any heirs at the time of his death. Following t he bench trial, the trial court concluded that Sherman’s share in the property passed to his siblings upon his death and that “[t]he putative heirs of Sherman Kennard, being in fact not the heirs of Sherman Kennard, had no right, title or interest in the 1 00 acres of land.” Also at issue during the trial was whether the Dicksons had adversely possessed the 74 acres in question. The trial court did not make any conclusions of law on this matter. It did, however, make findings of fact concerning adverse
pos session. Analysis In four issues on appeal, Grupa challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of certain inheritance matters related to the title dispute. The Dicksons argue these3 issues are moot because Grupa has failed to challenge findings of fact con cerning adverse possession that would independently support the judgment. We agree. The parties submitted their dispute to a bench trial. Following the trial, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Unchallenged findings “are bin ding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the finding.” McGalliard v. Kuhlmann , 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986) ; see also T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1( i ) ; P at Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1998) (“It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment absent properly assigned error.”). Accordingly, “ an appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained

- o f ruling or judgment .” Britton v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal
Justice , 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) . If unchallenged findings of fact have support in the record and will fully support the judgment, then the findings are bin ding on the court and dispositive of the appeal.
See McGalliard , 722 S.W.2d at 696 ; Britton , 95 S.W.3d at 681

. The Dicksons point out that they included an adverse possession claim in their pleading. On that claim, the trial court made the following find ings of fact: Possession of the remaining 74 acres of land by Carolyn Dickson Spiller; Janice Dickson Craddock; Clifford Dickson; and, Stanley E. Dickson, and their predecessors in title was open, adverse and notorious to any other claimants. The 75 (now 7 4 acres) acres has been fenced since 1974 with a structure capable of tu rn ing and containing cattle and other livestock, cattle were maintained on the4 property continuously, with only infrequent lapses, from 1952 through the present time, and property taxe s were timely paid on the entire 75 acre (now 74 acre) tract of land through 2009 by Carolyn Dickson Spiller, Janice Dickson Craddock, Clifford Dickson, and Stanley E. Dickson. Section 16.026 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sets a 10

- year sta tute of limitations on recovering “real property held in peaceable and adverse possession by another who cultivates, uses, or enjoys the property.” T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 16.026(a) (Vernon 2002). The court’s finding
establishes that the Dicks ons and their predecessors developed and used the land to raise cattle from 1952 to the time of trial in 2014. There is evidence in the record supporting this finding, and the opposite is not established as a matter of law. See McGalliard , 722 S.W.2d at 696. These findings are sufficient to establish the 10

- year statute of limitations period had run. See C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. § 16.026(a). Accordingly, any claim to the property that any descendants of Sherman may have had has been extinguished. See id. A determination of adverse possession, then, would fully support the trial court’s judgment. In its brief, Grupa claims, “ Although [the Dicksons] had pled a theory of adverse possession, the trial court did not rule on that theory and it is not before
this c ourt. ” As we have identified, this is incorrect. While the trial court did not make any express conclusions of law on the adverse possession claim, this is not dispositive. If an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s conclusions of law5 “ determines a conclusion of law is erroneous, but the trial court rendered the proper judgment, the erroneous conclusion of law does not require reversal.” BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). As a result, even if we agreed with Gru pa that the trial court erroneously concluded that Sherman did not have any heirs, we would still have to review the remainder of the issues presented at trial. See id. Because Grupa did not challenge the adverse

- possession findings and there is some ev idence supporting them , they are binding on us. See McGalliard , 722 S.W.2d at 696 . Because the adverse

- possession findings would fully support the judgment, Grupa has failed to challenge all of the independent bases supporting the trial court’s judgment determining that title to the disputed property is vested in the Dicksons. See Britton , 95 S.W.3d at 681 . Accordingly, any error relating to the trial court’s determination of the transfer of title through lineage is moot, and we must affirm the trial co urt’s judgment. See id. ; B MC Software , 83 S.W.3d at 794

. We overrule Grupa’s four issues as moot. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Laura Carter Higley Justice6 Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.