1

Filed 1/15/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDUARDO DELAVEGA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A154936

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 5-170874-2)

Defendant Eduardo Delavega was charged with murder and various 

enhancements, including three firearm enhancements under Penal Code

section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).1 The subdivision (d) 

enhancement applies when a defendant is found to have personally and

intentionally discharged a firearm causing death, while the subdivision (b) 

enhancement applies when a defendant is found to have personally used a 

firearm and the subdivision (c) enhancement applies when a defendant is 

found to have intentionally discharged a firearm. The enhancements under 

subdivisions (b) and (c) are lesser included enhancements of the enhancement 

under subdivision (d), in that a defendant who violates subdivision (d) 

necessarily also violates subdivisions (b) and (c).

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. In this 

opinion, we sometimes refer to these three firearm enhancements under 

section 12022.53 by their respective subdivisions only.
2

Although Delavega was charged with all three enhancements, the 

verdict forms did not reference the subdivision (b) and (c) enhancements, and 

the jury made no finding as to either of them. The jury did, however, convict 

Delavega of second degree murder and find true the subdivision (d) 

enhancement. At sentencing, Delavega asked the trial court to exercise its 

discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 

No. 620) to strike the subdivision (d) enhancement, which carries a term of 25 

years to life. The trial court declined to do so, and it sentenced Delavega to a 

total term of 40 years to life in prison. 

On appeal, Delavega argues that the trial court erred because it 

refused to strike the subdivision (d) enhancement on the premise that it could 

only impose or strike that enhancement, not strike that enhancement and

impose a lesser enhancement under subdivision (b) or (c).

2 The Courts of 

Appeal disagree about the circumstances under which a trial court has the 

discretion to impose a lesser enhancement when it strikes a greater 

enhancement under section 12022.53. The first published decision to address 

the issue held that courts have such discretion even when the lesser 

enhancement was not charged separately. (People v. Morrison (2019) 

34 Cal.App.5th 217, 222 (Morrison).) Subsequent cases have disagreed, 

holding that courts have such discretion only when a lesser enhancement was

charged and found to be true. (See, e.g., People v. Tirado (2019) 

38 Cal.App.5th 637, 644 (Tirado), review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257658.) 

We hold that when, as in this case, a lesser enhancement was separately 

2 Delavega also argues in both this appeal and a related petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus that his trial counsel was ineffective for telling the trial 

court that it did not have the option to impose a lesser enhancement under 

section 12022.53. We conclude that Delavega did not thereby forfeit his claim 

of error, and by separate order we accordingly deny the habeas petition. (In 

re Eduardo Delavega, A157982.)
3

charged under section 12022.53 but was not determined to be true, the trial 

court lacks discretion to impose it upon striking a greater enhancement

under the statute. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

A detailed discussion of the facts is unnecessary to our resolution of 

the appeal. Briefly, however, Delavega got into a fist fight with Justin Kroh

in August 2014. Later that month, Delavega, who was then 18 years old, and 

a friend were driving in Antioch when they spotted Kroh riding a bicycle on 

the opposite side of the road. Delavega, who testified in his own defense,

heard Kroh ask if he was ready for another fight, and Delavega instructed his 

friend to make a U-turn. 

Delavega’s friend parked, and Delavega got out of the vehicle and 

approached Kroh. After a brief confrontation during which Delavega claimed 

Kroh pulled a knife, Delavega shot at Kroh, striking him in the head. 

Delavega and his friend fled the scene, and Kroh later died of his injuries. 

Delavega was charged with murder and various enhancements. One 

alleged a gang special circumstance, and another alleged that Delavega

committed the offense for the benefit of a street gang.

3 In addition, under the 

heading “Enhancement 2 [¶] PC12022.53(d): Special Allegation-Principal’s 

Intentional Discharge of A firearm, GBI – Gang Case,” Delavega was charged 

as follows: 

“It is further alleged as to defendant, EDUARDO 

DELAVEGA, that as to Count 1 that a principal personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, which 

3 Murder was charged under section 187, subdivision (a), and the gang 

special circumstance was alleged under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22). 

The other gang allegation was under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). 
4

proximately caused great bodily injury and death to Justin Kroh 

within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53(d) and (e)(1). 

It is further alleged that a principal personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code 

section 12022.53(c) and (e)(1). It is further alleged that a 

principal personally used a firearm, within the meaning of Penal 

Code section[] 12022.53(b) and (e).” 

The jury acquitted Delavega of first degree murder, rendering a finding 

on the gang special circumstance unnecessary (see § 190.2, subd. (a)), but it 

found him guilty of second degree murder. It also found the remaining 

separate gang allegation untrue, rendering unnecessary a finding under the 

heading “Charge Enhancement 2a” on the verdict form, which addressed the

portion of the gun enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (e) (see

§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)(A)).

The jury found true that Delavega “personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm, . . . which proximately caused great bodily injury and 

death to Justin Kroh, a violation of Penal Code Section 12022.53(d).” The 

verdict form did not include separate spaces for findings under subdivision (b) 

or (c) of that statute or reference either subdivision, and there was no 

discussion on the record about how the section 12022.53 allegations should 

appear on the form. At the prosecution’s request, the jury was instructed 

under CALCRIM No. 3150, which is given “when the defendant is charged 

with an enhancement both for intentional discharge and for intentional 

discharge causing great bodily injury or death”—i.e., when enhancements are 

charged under both subdivisions (c) and (d). (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. 

Jury Instns. (2020 ed.) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3150, p. 856.)4 

4 The jury was not instructed under CALCRIM No. 3146, the form 

instruction pertaining to personal use of a firearm under subdivision (b),

CALCRIM No. 3148, the form instruction pertaining only to intentional 
5

At the May 2018 sentencing hearing, Delavega asked the trial court to 

exercise its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h)

(section 12022.53(h)) to strike the enhancement of 25 years to life under 

subdivision (d) and impose a total term of 15 years to life for the murder. In 

addressing the request, the court agreed with Delavega’s trial counsel that it 

had only “two choices, the 15 to life . . . or the 40 to life, and that’s it. There’s 

no in between. There’s no splitting the difference. Those are the options that 

face the Court.” Concluding that it was not “justifiable” to strike the

enhancement, the court imposed a total term of 40 years to life.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background

As we have said, section 12022.53 establishes three sentencing 

enhancements of varying lengths for the personal use of a firearm during the 

commission of certain felonies. Specifically, subdivision (b) requires a 10-year 

enhancement for the personal use of a firearm during a qualifying offense, 

subdivision (c) requires a 20-year enhancement if the firearm is personally 

and intentionally discharged, and subdivision (d) requires a 25-years-to-life 

enhancement if the firearm is personally and intentionally discharged and 

proximately causes great bodily injury or death.

“[A] sentencing enhancement . . . is not a complete offense in itself” but 

instead “prescribes additional punishment for the crime.” (People v. 

Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 115.) As a result, sentencing enhancements 

are not analogous to substantive offenses in many respects, including in the 

functioning of “greater and lesser included offenses and greater and lesser 

discharge under subdivision (c), or CALCRIM No. 3149, the form instruction 

pertaining only to intentional discharge causing death under subdivision (d).
6

degrees of the same offense.” (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. Majors (1998) 

18 Cal.4th 385, 410 [sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses 

does not extend to “so-called ‘lesser included enhancements’ ”].) Nonetheless, 

we use the term “lesser enhancement” to refer to an enhancement whose 

factual predicates are necessarily found true when a factfinder finds true the 

greater enhancement. (See, e.g., People v. Fialho (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 

1389, 1398 (Fialho).) In this sense, subdivisions (b) and (c) of 

section 12022.53 are lesser enhancements of subdivision (d), meaning that a 

true finding under subdivision (d) amounts to a true finding under the other 

two subdivisions. (Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) 

For any of these enhancements to be imposed, the requisite facts must 

“be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant 

in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (j); 

People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1124–1125.) In addition, an 

enhancement must “be pleaded in connection with every count as to which it 

is imposed.” (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 956–957 (Anderson).) 

“If more than one enhancement per person is found true under 

[section 12022.53], the court shall impose upon that person the enhancement 

that provides the longest term of imprisonment.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (f).) In 

such a situation, the proper course is to sentence the defendant on the 

greater enhancement and stay any lesser enhancements. (Gonzalez, at 

pp. 1122–1123.) 

Senate Bill No. 620 took effect on January 1, 2018. (People v. 

McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 424.) The legislation amended 

section 12022.53(h), which previously prohibited sentencing courts from 

striking a firearm enhancement found true under the statute. (Former 

§ 12022.53(h); McDaniels, at p. 424.) Now, subdivision (h) provides that a 
7

sentencing court “may, in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and 

at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise 

required to be imposed by this section.” (§ 12022.53(h).)

It is undisputed that if all three enhancements are charged and 

separately found true, a trial court can strike the greater enhancement under 

subdivision (d), reducing the firearm-related term to 20 years under 

subdivision (c), or also strike the subdivision (c) enhancement, reducing the 

term to 10 years under subdivision (b). (See People v. Wang (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1090–1091; Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) 

But if lesser enhancements are not charged and found true, Courts of Appeal 

are split as to whether a trial court may strike a greater enhancement under 

amended section 12022.53(h) and impose one of the lesser enhancements 

instead, and the issue is currently on review in the Supreme Court. (People 

v. Valles (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 156, 166–167 (Valles), review granted July 22, 

2020, S262757; People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 786, 788–789 (Garcia), 

review granted Jun. 10, 2020, S261772; People v. Yanez (2020) 

44 Cal.App.5th 452, 459–460 (Yanez), review granted Apr. 22, 2020, S260819; 

Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 644; Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 222−223.) No published decision has analyzed the situation presented 

here, where the lesser enhancements were charged but the jury did not 

separately find them true because the verdict form did not include them.5

5 In Garcia, all three enhancements were charged but the trial court 

“with the concurrence of the parties did not instruct on either of the lesser . . . 

enhancements.” (Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 789.) Although Garcia 

thus presented similar circumstances to ours, the opinion did not address 

whether the fact the lesser enhancements were charged was a meaningful 

distinction. Rather, in repeatedly referring to a “prosecutor’s charging 

authority” and “charging decision” not to pursue lesser enhancements, Garcia 

reads as if the lesser enhancements were not charged. (Id. at pp. 791–793.) 
8

Delavega’s claim that the trial court declined to strike the

subdivision (d) enhancement under the mistaken belief that it lacked the 

authority to impose one of the lesser enhancements presents issues of 

statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (John v. Superior Court

(2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95; Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) “ ‘Our 

primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s 

intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the 

words of [the] statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] We construe the statute’s words in context, and . . . [i]f 

we find the statutory language ambiguous or subject to more than one 

interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including legislative history or 

purpose to inform our views.” (John, at pp. 95–96.) 

B. We Will Consider Delavega’s Claim on the Merits.

As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General argues Delavega 

forfeited his claim about the trial court’s application of section 12022.53(h)

because no objection was made below. Generally, “[a] party in a criminal case 

may not, on appeal, raise ‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly 

make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the party did not 

object to the sentence at trial.” (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 

751.) In Yanez, Division Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal indicated 

that defendants, like Delavega, who do not “request to modify or reduce” an 

enhancement under subdivision (d) in the trial court forfeit their appellate 

claim that the court erred by not imposing a lesser enhancement. (Yanez, 

supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 460.)

Yanez’s treatment of the forfeiture issue was dicta, however, and we 

conclude that under the circumstances in this case Delavega did not forfeit 

his appellate claim by failing to ask the trial court to impose a lesser 
9

enhancement under section 12022.53.6 An exception to the forfeiture rule 

exists “ ‘ “ ‘where to require defense counsel to raise an objection “would place 

an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in 

the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where 

defendants might hope that an established rule . . . would be changed on 

appeal.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘In determining whether the significance of a change 

in the law excuses counsel’s failure to object at trial, we consider the “state of 

the law as it would have appeared to competent and knowledgeable counsel 

at the time of the trial.” ’ ” (People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 8.) 

At the time of Delavega’s sentencing, Senate Bill No. 620 had been in 

effect for a few months, but the contours of a trial court’s authority under 

amended section 12022.53(h) were unsettled. Morrison, the first case to 

address the possibility of imposing a lesser enhancement that was not 

separately found true, was not decided until April 2019, nearly a year after 

Delavega was sentenced. And it is hardly obvious from subdivision (h)’s text 

that the authority to “strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to 

be imposed” might include the ability to strike a greater enhancement and 

impose a lesser one that was not presented to the jury. Thus, we would not

expect knowledgeable and competent counsel to anticipate Morrison’s 

holding. Indeed, Delavega’s trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court

all thought the only options were either to impose the subdivision (d)

enhancement or to strike it altogether. We therefore conclude that trial 

counsel’s failure to object below is excused.

6 Delavega asserts that his trial counsel’s statement about sentencing 

options under section 12022.53 was not invited error, and the Attorney 

General does not argue otherwise. We agree the statement was not invited 

error. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49 [invited 

error occurs only if it is “ ‘clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not 

out of ignorance or mistake’ ”].)
10

Moreover, even if Delavega had forfeited the claim, we would exercise 

our discretion to decide it. “It is well settled that an appellate court may 

decide an otherwise forfeited claim where the trial court has made an error 

affecting ‘an important issue of constitutional law or a substantial right.’ ” 

(Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 963.) Delavega’s claim presents “an 

important issue of law” whose resolution has significant consequences for the 

length of many defendants’ sentences, including his. (In re S.B. (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293–1294.) Thus, we will consider his claim on the merits.

C. Trial Courts Lack Discretion to Impose Lesser Enhancements 

Under Section 12022.53 Unless They Are Separately Found True 

by the Jury.

We begin with an overview of the relevant case law interpreting 

amended section 12022.53(h). In an early case discussing trial courts’ 

discretion under the amended statute, Morrison, Division Five of this court 

held that even if the subdivision (b) and (c) enhancements were not alleged

and submitted to the jury, a trial court “[m]ay . . . impose one of those lesser 

enhancements in lieu of the greater enhancement under [subdivision (d)] if 

the court finds it is in the interests of justice to do so.” (Morrison, supra, 

34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 222–223.) Morrison reviewed case law establishing 

that a court “may impose a ‘lesser included’ enhancement that was not 

charged in the information when a greater enhancement found true by the 

trier of fact is either legally inapplicable”—such as where it does not apply to 

the crime of which the defendant was convicted—“or unsupported by 

sufficient evidence.” (Id. at p. 222.) The decision then concluded that there 

was “no reason a court could not also impose one of these [lesser] 

enhancements after striking an enhancement under [subdivision (d)], under 

section 1385.” (Id. at pp. 222–223.)
11

Tirado disagreed with Morrison, concluding that section 12022.53(h) 

does not “authorize[] a trial court to substitute one enhancement for another.” 

(Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 643–644.) Tirado provided two bases 

for its decision. First, it determined that “the plain language of sections 1385 

and 12022.53[(h)]” reveals that a “court’s power pursuant to these sections is 

binary: The court can choose to dismiss a charge or enhancement in the 

interest of justice, or it can choose to take no action. There is nothing in 

either statute that conveys the power to change, modify, or substitute a 

charge or enhancement.” (Id. at p. 643.) Although recognizing that the case 

law Morrison discussed authorizes a court to “impose a ‘ “ ‘lesser included 

enhancement[]’ ” ’ following trial ‘when the charged enhancement is either 

factually unsupported or inapplicable to the offense of conviction,’ ” Tirado

concluded this principle is inapplicable where “the enhancement at issue . . .

[is] neither unsupported by the law nor unsupported by the evidence.” 

(Tirado, at p. 644.)

Second, Tirado determined that its “conclusion [was] consistent with 

the well settled principle that ‘prosecuting authorities, exercising executive 

functions, ordinarily have the sole discretion to determine . . . what charges 

to bring,’ ” which “ ‘is founded, among others, on the principle of separation of 

powers.’ ” (Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.) Tirado explained, “[T]he 

prosecution could have alleged all three section 12022.53 enhancements, and 

if it had done so, the jury would presumably have found all three true. In 

that circumstance, the [trial] court would have had the discretion to strike 

the [subdivision (d)] enhancement and then either impose one of the other 

two enhancements or strike them as well. However, because the People 

exercised their charging discretion to allege only one enhancement, the trial

court was limited to either imposing or striking that enhancement.” (Ibid.) 
12

To date, Division Two of the Second District and two panels in Division 

Two of the Fourth District have agreed with the Fifth District in Tirado that 

section 12022.53(h) “does not grant a trial court the discretion to substitute 

lesser included enhancements, at least where the greater enhancement is 

legally and factually valid.” (Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 790–791;

Valles, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 165–167; Yanez, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 458–459.) Garcia and Yanez also agreed with Tirado’s separation of 

powers point, and Garcia provided a third basis for its holding: “the rules 

governing when to instruct the jury on lesser offenses and enhancements.” 

(Garcia, at pp. 791–792; Yanez, at pp. 459–460.) 

We agree with the Tirado line of cases that the plain language of 

section 12022.53(h) authorizes a sentencing court only to “strike or dismiss 

an enhancement,” not substitute a lesser enhancement for one found true. 

Delavega does not argue otherwise. Instead, he argues that case law 

establishes a court’s broad authority “to impose what [it] might deem to be an 

appropriate sentence.” We therefore turn to consider whether courts are 

independently empowered to substitute a lesser enhancement that was not 

separately found true for a greater one that was found true. (See Valles, 

supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 171 [conc. opn. of Menetrez, J.].) We conclude 

they are not. 

In claiming that trial courts are so empowered, Delavega relies 

primarily on People v. Marsh (1984) 36 Cal.3d 134 (Marsh), which Morrison 

characterized as “further buttress[ing]” its holding. (Morrison, supra, 

34 Cal.App.5th at p. 223.) The Marsh defendant was convicted of numerous 

crimes committed when he was 16 years old, including kidnapping for 

ransom with bodily harm under section 209, which then as now carries a 

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Marsh, at 
13

pp. 137–138; § 209, subd. (a).) The Supreme Court held that section 1385 

authorized the sentencing court “to strike the ransom and bodily harm 

allegations to reduce the required sentence for the kidnap[p]ing charge to 

allow [California Youth Authority] eligibility.” (Marsh, at pp. 137, 143.) In 

doing so, the Court noted that on remand the lower court would have “a 

broad range of sentencing options between [the two] extremes” of either 

striking both allegations or striking neither, since it could choose to strike 

one but not the other, which it turn might have ramifications for the 

defendant’s sentence on his other convictions. (Id. at p. 144.)

Delavega asserts that “under Marsh, since the sentencing court has the 

power to strike conduct allegations when imposing a sentence for a 

substantive offense, it has the power to strike similar allegations in a[] 

sentencing enhancement.” Thus, he appears to suggest that a court could 

strike the element of “proximately caus[ing] great bodily injury” from a 

subdivision (d) enhancement to reduce it to a subdivision (c) enhancement.

7

 

We agree with Garcia, however, that “Marsh simply recognized that the trial 

court had the discretion under section 1385 to strike both of the kidnapping 

sentencing enhancements at play in that case, to strike only one of them, or 

to strike neither,” and that Marsh “says nothing about whether the court also 

has the power to substitute lesser included enhancements for a valid greater 

enhancement.” (Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 793–794.) Although it

is true that the kidnapping enhancements at issue in Marsh were alleged 

under the same statute as the kidnapping charge itself (see § 209, subd. (a)), 

7 Since a person can “use” a firearm without “discharging” it, we do not 

see how any allegation could be “stricken” from the enhancement for 

“personally and intentionally discharg[ing] a firearm” under subdivision (c) to 

reduce it to an enhancement for “personally us[ing] a firearm” under 

subdivision (b).
14

Marsh concluded they could be stricken in the same manner as other 

enhancements “stated separately from the substantive charge” because “[i]t 

would be anomalous if this variation called for a different result since all that 

is missing is the placement of the enhancing allegations in a separate 

paragraph rather than in the one which describes the basic kidnap[p]ing 

offense.” (Marsh, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 143.) Thus, Marsh does not provide 

authority for the proposition that a court can strike portions of a single 

enhancement to reduce it to a lesser enhancement.

Having concluded that Marsh does not aid Delavega, we next turn to 

the case law discussing courts’ power to impose a lesser enhancement in 

other contexts. In People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946 (Strickland), the 

Supreme Court determined that an enhancement under former 

section 12022.5 for use of a firearm was improperly applied to the defendant 

because he was not convicted of one of the six felonies that the statute then 

covered. (Strickland, at p. 959.) The Court held that the defendant was

nevertheless “subject to additional punishment under [former] section 12022” 

for being armed with a deadly weapon, even though an enhancement under 

that statute was not charged, because “ ‘the jury did find that he used and 

thus was armed with a firearm’ ” in returning a finding under former 

section 12022.5. (Strickland, at p. 961.) And since the defendant was 

charged under section 12022.5, he “ ‘had notice that his conduct [could] also 

be in violation of [former] section 12022.’ ” (Strickland, at p. 961.)

Similarly, Courts of Appeal have permitted the imposition of a lesser 

uncharged enhancement when substantial evidence did not support the 

greater enhancement but did support the lesser enhancement. In People v. 

Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616 (Allen), the Second District Court of Appeal 

held that where a finding of personal firearm use under former 
15

section 12022.5 had to be reversed for insufficient evidence, an uncharged 

enhancement for a principal being armed under former section 12022 could 

be imposed because “[e]very gun use within the meaning of [the first 

provision] necessarily include[d] a violation of [the second provision].” (Allen, 

at pp. 626–627.) Drawing an analogy to a reviewing court’s power to reduce a 

conviction to a lesser included offense if insufficient evidence supports the 

greater (see § 1260), Allen perceived “no reason why the same rationale 

should not apply to” lesser enhancements. (Allen, at p. 627.) Other cases 

have applied similar reasoning in affirming the imposition of a lesser 

uncharged enhancement based on a trial court’s determination that the 

evidence did not support the greater enhancement. (People v. Dixon (2007) 

153 Cal.App.4th 985, 1001–1002; People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 

742–743.)

More recently, in Fialho, the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that 

where the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted 

voluntary manslaughter, the trial court properly struck enhancements found 

true under subdivision (d) of section 12022.53 and substituted enhancements 

for personal use of a firearm under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). (Fialho, 

supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1392, 1398–1399.) In so holding, Fialho 

rejected the defendant’s claim that “Strickland was, in effect, legislatively 

overruled by the enactment of the current version of section 1170.1, 

subdivision (e)” (id. at p. 1397), which then as now provides that “[a]ll 

enhancements shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either 

admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of 

fact.”8 (§ 1170.1, subd. (e).) Rather, Fialho concluded that under Strickland, 

8 Section 12022.53, subdivision (j), “restates [section 1170.1, 

subdivision (e)’s] same basic point” specifically for firearm enhancements. 

(Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 953.) Subdivision (j) of the version of 
16

“imposition of the uncharged enhancement is permitted” when “the charged 

enhancement is either factually unsupported or inapplicable to the offense of 

conviction,” since the charged enhancement provides notice to defendants

“ ‘that [their] conduct [could] also be in violation of’ an uncharged 

enhancement that ‘would be applicable in any case’ in which the charged 

enhancement applies.” (Fialho, at p. 1397, quoting Strickland, supra, 

11 Cal.3d at p. 961.)

After surveying Strickland and other decisions approving the 

imposition of an uncharged lesser enhancement if the charged greater 

enhancement “was unsupported by substantial evidence or was defective or 

legally inapplicable in some other respect,” Morrison perceived “no reason a 

court could not also impose . . . [an enhancement under subdivision (b) or (c)

of section 12022.53] after striking an enhancement under [subdivision (d)]

under section 1385.” (Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 222−223.) 

Justice Menetrez agreed in his concurring opinion in Valles, stating, “I am 

aware of no reason why the judicial power to impose an uncharged lesser 

included enhancement would exist in the one context but not in the other. If 

a sentencing court has a long-established power to impose an uncharged 

lesser included enhancement after striking a greater enhancement that is 

legally inapplicable, why would that power disappear when the greater 

enhancement is stricken in the interest of justice under amended 

section 12022.53?” (Valles, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 171 [conc. opn. of 

Menetrez, J.].)

In our view, there is a reason why the power to impose an uncharged 

lesser enhancement exists when a greater enhancement is contrary to the 

section 12022.53 at issue in Fialho is identical to subdivision (j) of the current 

statute, but Fialho did not address the provision.
17

law or evidence but not in other contexts. The reason is that a court’s power 

to modify a verdict or judgment emanates from legislation, not from any 

inherent authority. Two statutes—sections 1181 and 1260—confer on courts 

the power to modify a greater enhancement to an uncharged lesser 

enhancement when the greater enhancement is not supported by law or 

evidence, but no statute confers a similar power when the greater 

enhancement is supported by the law and evidence but is stricken in the 

interest of justice.

For the most part, Tirado and the decisions following it did not attempt 

to explain why the power to impose an uncharged lesser enhancement is 

limited to cases where a greater enhancement is legally or factually invalid. 

Tirado merely indicated that “the [subdivision (d)] enhancement at issue 

[there] was neither unsupported by the law nor unsupported by the 

evidence,” distinguishing it from the enhancements at issue in Strickland

and its progeny. (Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.) Valles and Yanez

provided little additional analysis. (See Valles, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 165–166 [Morrison’s holding “does not logically flow from a body of 

authority holding that a lesser enhancement may be imposed where there is 

a legal impediment to the imposition of a greater enhancement”]; Yanez, 

supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 460 [“no suggestion that the jury’s verdict was 

unsupported by the law or the evidence as would justify the imposition of a 

lesser offense”].) 

Only Garcia addressed the issue in some detail. While the Court of 

Appeal recognized the “line of authority—tracing all the way back to 

[Strickland]—acknowledging the power of a trial court to ‘substitut[e] . . . a 

charged enhancement with an uncharged “ ‘lesser included enhancement,’ ” ’ ” 

it determined that “this power is limited to situations where the greater 
18

enhancement is [legally or factually] defective. That is because this inherent 

power of courts serves a very specific purpose—that is, to enable courts to 

salvage as much of the prosecutor’s charging decision and the jury’s verdict 

as possible by allowing them to substitute a lesser included enhancement also 

found by the jury rather than to impose no enhancement at all. (E.g., 

People v. Crooks (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797, 811 [noting courts’ [‘]inherent 

authority to correct an unauthorized sentence[’]]; People v. Relkin (2016) 

6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1198 [same].)” (Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 793.) 

Garcia did not explain its statement that courts have an “inherent” 

power to reduce a charged enhancement to a lesser enhancement. The two 

opinions Garcia cited to support the proposition, Crooks and Relkin (Garcia,

supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 793), recognize a reviewing court’s authority to 

correct an “unauthorized sentence” (People v. Relkin, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1198; People v. Crooks, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 811)—that is, a 

sentence that “ ‘could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the 

particular case.’ ” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.) That power 

allows a court to strike a legally invalid offense or enhancement, which is 

different from the power to then impose an uncharged lesser offense or 

enhancement in place of the greater. And as for Strickland and subsequent 

decisions recognizing the power to impose an uncharged lesser enhancement, 

they say little about the source of that power and nothing about the 

justification for it.9 

9 To explain its conclusion that the defendant was “subject to additional 

punishment under [former] section 12022” even though the greater 

enhancement under former section 12022.5 “was improperly implied to 

[him],” Strickland merely quoted a statement it found “apropos” from an 

earlier decision, People v. Provencher (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 546. (Strickland, 

supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 961.) In the statement Strickland quoted, Provencher 

explained that even though an enhancement under former section 12022 was 
19

Allen hinted at the idea that courts’ power to impose an uncharged 

lesser enhancement is statutory, not “inherent,” by likening that power to a 

reviewing court’s power under section 1260 to reduce a conviction to a lesser 

offense when the greater offense is legally or factually unsupported. (Allen, 

supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 627; see § 1260.) In fact, both section 1260 and 

section 1181, the statute specifying the circumstances in which a new trial 

may be ordered, expressly convey the power to modify a verdict or judgment 

to impose a lesser “punishment,” not just a lesser included offense. (§§ 1181, 

subds. (6) & (7), 1260.) Garcia cited these statutes in explaining that 

section 12022.53(h)’s plain language does not include the power to modify an 

enhancement (Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 791), but the decision did 

not relate them to the power recognized in the Strickland line of cases. 

(Garcia, at p. 793.) The case law discussing sections 1181 and 1260 reveals, 

however, that the statutory power and the power discussed in Strickland are 

one and the same.

Under section 1181, subdivision (7), a court may grant a new trial 

“[w]hen the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but in any case 

not technically a “ ‘lesser included offense’ ” of former section 12022.5 because 

both sections establish punishment, “ ‘section 12022 would be applicable in 

any case in which [section] 12022.5 applies. Basically [section] 12022.5 is a 

limited application of section 12022 with a heavier penalty. In the present 

case appellant did not come within the provisions of section 12022.5, as the 

crime of which he was convicted was not specified in that section, but the jury 

did find that he used and thus was armed with a firearm, a shotgun, at the 

time the offense was committed. Appellant was charged in the commission 

with the use of a firearm under section 12022.5, thus had notice that his 

conduct [could] also be in violation of section 12022.’ ” (Strickland, at p. 961, 

quoting Provencher, at pp. 549–550.) Provencher did not cite any authority 

for its determination that it could therefore modify the judgment to impose 

the lesser uncharged enhancement instead of the greater. (Provencher, at 

pp. 548, 551.)
20

wherein authority is vested by statute in the trial court or jury to recommend 

or determine as a part of its verdict or finding the punishment to be imposed, 

the court may modify such verdict or finding by imposing the lesser 

punishment without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall 

extend to any court to which the case may be appealed.” Similarly, under 

subdivision (6) of the statute, a court may grant a new trial “when the verdict 

or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but if the evidence shows the 

defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which he [or she] was 

convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included 

therein, the court may modify the verdict, finding or judgment accordingly 

without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to any 

court to which the cause may be appealed.” And finally, under section 1260, 

an appellate court “may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order 

appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the 

punishment imposed.” In short, if a greater offense or enhancement is 

factually or legally unsupported, appellate and trial courts have the option to 

reduce it to a lesser offense or enhancement instead of ordering a new trial.

As our state Supreme Court has explained, the power to modify a 

verdict or judgment is “purely statutory” and did not always exist. (People v. 

Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 678–679 (Navarro); People v. Lagunas (1994) 

8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038.) Subdivision (6) was added to section 1181 in 1927, in 

response to a decision in which the Supreme Court concluded that it did not 

have the power to modify a verdict of first degree arson to second degree 

arson upon holding that insufficient evidence supported the greater crime. 

(Navarro, at p. 676.) In 1949, a special commission recommended a further 

amendment to section 1181 by which courts would be given new “ ‘authority 

to change or modify the punishment in those cases in which the fixing of the 
21

punishment is part of the verdict.’ ” (People v. Odle (1951) 37 Cal.2d 52, 56.) 

The commission also proposed an accompanying “amendment to section 1260 

providing that [an] appellate court might reduce the degree of the offense or 

the punishment imposed.” (Id. at p. 57.) The amendment to section 1181 did 

not pass, but the amendment to section 1260 did, adding the language 

permitting a reviewing court to “ ‘reduce the degree of the offense or 

attempted offense or the punishment imposed.’ ” (Navarro, at p. 677, italics 

omitted; § 1260.) And within a few years, the failed amendment was 

incorporated into section 1181 as subdivision (7). (Stats. 1951, ch. 1674, 

§ 117.) 

Although section 1260 does not by its terms limit the circumstances in 

which a reviewing court may reduce the offense or punishment, and therefore 

“ ‘seems to confer plenary power of modification on a reviewing court[,] it was 

not so intended.’ ” (People v. Romo (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 589, 596.) Rather, 

the 1949 amendment of section 1260 was intended to “ ‘bring [the statute] 

into accord with section 1181(6) with respect to reduction of the degree of an 

offense and make clear that the court may reduce punishment in lieu of 

ordering a new trial, when there is error relating to the punishment 

imposed.’ ” (Navarro, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 678, quoting People v. Odle, 

supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 58, italics added; see Romo, at p. 596.) In other words, 

because section 1181 explicitly limits a court’s power to reduce a conviction or 

punishment to instances when the verdict is contrary to law or evidence, 

section 1260 has been interpreted to implicitly limit a court’s power to reduce 

a conviction or punishment to instances when the judgment is legally or 

factually unsupported. (Navarro, at pp. 678–679; see, e.g., People v. Eid

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, 659 [neither section 1181, subdivision (6), nor 

section 1260 gives courts “a general license to modify verdicts in accordance 
22

with the evidence”]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1080 [section 1260 

does not empower Supreme Court “to overturn a judgment of death simply 

because [it] disagree[s] with the jury’s penalty determination”].)

Given the development of sections 1181 and 1260 and the case law 

discussing them, we are left agreeing with the Tirado line of cases that a trial 

court does not have authority, under section 12022.53(h) or otherwise, to 

strike a greater firearm enhancement that is legally and factually sound and 

impose a lesser one that was neither charged nor found by the jury. Rather, 

a trial court’s general power to reduce an enhancement is statutorily limited 

to instances when the enhancement “is contrary to law or evidence” under 

section 1181, subdivision (7), and section 12022.53(h) does not expand that 

power. Thus, if a trial court strikes an otherwise legally and factually 

supported enhancement “in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385” 

(§ 12022.53(h)), it lacks the power to impose a lesser enhancement that was 

not charged or found by the jury.10

Having so concluded based on the plain text of sections 12022.53(h) and 

1181, we need spend little time discussing the two other justifications for this 

conclusion offered by the Tirado line of cases. The separation-of-powers point 

does not apply here, because the prosecution did allege the lesser

enhancements. (Cf. Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 644; but see Garcia, 

supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 791–792 [relying on separation of powers to 

justify holding where lesser enhancements were charged but not submitted to 

jury by parties’ mutual assent].) Our record is silent as to why the lesser 

10 The power to dismiss under section 1385 “is quite broad,” and it may 

also be exercised when a charge is legally insufficient. (People v. Hatch

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 268, 273.) Thus, if a trial court dismissed a firearm 

enhancement under section 12022.53(h) for this reason, section 1181 would 

presumably authorize the court to impose an uncharged lesser enhancement 

instead.
23

enhancements were not included on the verdict forms, and we cannot 

conclude that their omission represents an exercise of prosecutorial 

discretion. 

Similarly, Garcia’s discussion of “the rules governing when to instruct 

the jury on lesser offenses and enhancements” has no application here. 

(Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 792.) Garcia reasoned that if there is not 

substantial evidence from which a “rational jury could find that [the] 

defendant engaged in conduct warranting the lesser included enhancements 

. . . but not the greater enhancement,” a trial court must deny a request to 

instruct on the lesser enhancements. (Ibid.) Thus, the decision concluded 

that interpreting section 12022.53(h) “to allow a court to substitute a lesser 

included firearm enhancement would empower a court to do on the back end 

what a court is prohibited from allowing a jury to do on the front end.” 

(Garcia, at pp. 792–793.) Here, it is likewise true that no rational jury could 

have found that Delgado personally used or intentionally discharged the gun 

but that his use of the gun did not cause death. But we are aware of no 

authority suggesting that in such circumstances a trial court is barred from 

instructing on the lesser enhancements if they were actually charged. To the 

contrary, juries routinely return separate findings on lesser enhancements 

under section 12022.53 even when it is clear that defendants are liable under

subdivision (d) if they are liable at all. 

Finally, because the enhancements under subdivisions (b) and (c) were 

absent from the verdict form, we are unable to conclude that the jury 

effectively found them true such that the trial court could impose one of them 

if it struck the subdivision (d) enhancement.11 In certain contexts, reviewing 

11 We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on 

this issue.
24

courts have recognized that “the form of the verdict is to be regarded as 

immaterial, provided the intention to convict of the crime charged be 

unmistakably expressed.” (People v. Tilley (1901) 135 Cal. 61, 62; People v. 

Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 447.) Rather, “[a] verdict is to be given a 

reasonable intendment and be construed in light of the issues submitted to 

the jury and the instructions of the court.” (People v. Radil (1977) 

76 Cal.App.3d 702, 710; accord People v. Chevalier (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 507, 

514; People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 710; People v. Mackabee

(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1250, 1256.) 

In isolation, these statements could be read to suggest that the jury 

here did make a separate finding under at least subdivision (c) of 

section 12022.53. Even though subdivision (c) was not specified on the 

verdict form, the jury found the subdivision (d) allegation true after being 

instructed under CALCRIM No. 3150 pertaining to both subdivisions (c) and 

(d). We agree with the Attorney General, however, that the decisions cited 

above establish that “courts may excuse missing findings in an appropriate 

harmless error context,” and that verdict forms need not be overly detailed,

not that “the finding of a greater crime or enhancement is . . . generally the 

equivalent of a freestanding lesser finding.” (See, e.g., People v. Webster,

supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 447 [defects in verdict form excused if defendant’s 

substantial rights not prejudiced]; People v. Chevalier, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 514 [properly instructed jury made one of sentencing enhancement’s 

required factual findings even though finding not expressly included on

verdict form].) Since Delavega’s claim of error does not involve the omission 

of subdivisions (b) and (c) from the verdict form, these decisions do not assist 

him.
25

We recognize that there are compelling policy arguments in favor of 

increasing courts’ sentencing discretion under section 12022.53, and we 

assume the Legislature is aware of them. But without express statutory 

authorization, courts lack the power to strike a greater enhancement found 

true by the jury and supported by the law and evidence and impose a lesser 

enhancement that the jury did not find true. When the verdict forms omit 

charged lesser enhancements, as they did here, a sentencing court is left 

under current law with the all-or-nothing choice of imposing or striking the 

greater enhancement.

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
26

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Banke, J.

_________________________

Sanchez, J.

People v. Delavega A154936
27

Trial Court:

Superior Court of the County of Contra Costa

Trial Judge:

Hon. Anita L. Santos

Counsel for Defendant and Appellant:

Law Offices of Beles & Beles, Robert J. Beles, Paul McCarthy, Manisha 

Daryani

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent:

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General

Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General

Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General

David H. Rose, Deputy Attorney General

People v. Delavega A154936