alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §285m–6. Limitation on administrative expenses

With respect to amounts appropriated for a fiscal year for the National Institutes of Health, the limitation established in section 284c(a)(1) of this title on the expenditure of such amounts for administrative expenses shall apply to administrative expenses of the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title IV, §464F, as added Pub. L. 100–553, §2(4), Oct. 28, 1988, 102 Stat. 2774, and Pub. L. 100–690, title II, §2613(a)(1), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4238; amended Pub. L. 100–690, title II, §2613(b)(2), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4238; Pub. L. 103–43, title IV, §403(b)(2), June 10, 1993, 107 Stat. 158.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Pub. L. 100–553 and section 2613(a)(1) of Pub. L. 100–690 contained identical provisions enacting this section. See 1988 Amendment note below.

#### Amendments

1993—Pub. L. 103–43 substituted "section 284c(a)(1)" for "section 284c(b)(1)".

1988—Pub. L. 100–690, §2613(b)(2), amended this section to read as if the amendments made by Pub. L. 100–690, §2613(a)(1), which enacted this section, had not been enacted. See Codification note above.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1988 Amendment

For effective date of amendment by section 2613(b)(2) of Pub. L. 100–690, see section 2613(b)(1) of Pub. L. 100–690, set out as an Effect of Enactment of Similar Provisions note under section 285m of this title.
§ 1508.515 What specific information is in the EPLS? ( a ) At a minimum, the *EPLS* indicates— ( 1 ) The full name (where available) and address of each excluded or disqualified person, in alphabetical order, with cross references if more than one name is involved in a single action;
( 2 ) The type of action;
( 3 ) The cause for the action;
( 4 ) The scope of the action;
( 5 ) Any termination date for the action;
( 6 ) The agency and name and telephone number of the agency point of contact for the action; and
( 7 ) The Dun and Bradstreet Number (DUNS), or other similar code approved by the GSA, of the excluded or disqualified person, if available.
( b ) ( 1 ) The database for the *EPLS* includes a field for the Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) (the social security number (SSN) for an individual) of an excluded or disqualified person.
( 2 ) Agencies disclose the SSN of an individual to verify the identity of an individual, only if permitted under the Privacy Act of 1974 and, if appropriate, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, as codified in 5 U.S.C. 552(a).
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 5, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50303 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JIMMY ARREOLA RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:95-CR-64

-------------------- Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jimmy Arreola Ramos, federal prisoner # 58020-080, pleaded guilty and was convicted in 1996 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Ramos moves for in forma pauperis (IFP) status to appeal the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of coram nobis challenging the referenced 1996 conviction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Ramos is presently incarcerated pursuant to a sentence on a different, subsequent conviction. Upon expiration of that sentence, he will begin serving the 12-monthNo. 06-50303 -2- sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release on the 1996 conviction. The district court certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving for leave to proceed IFP, Ramos is challenging the district court’s certification decision. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); FED . R. APP . P. 24(a)(5). However, Ramos has not demonstrated any nonfrivolous ground for appeal. A petitioner who is serving two consecutive sentences is “in custody” for purposes of challenging the second sentence via a habeas petition while he is serving the first sentence. See Peyton v. Rowe , 391 U.S. 54 (1968) ; Maleng v. Cook , 490 U.S. 488, 490-93 (1989) ; United States v. Shaid , 937 F.2d 228, 230 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that Ramos’s in-custody status made coram nobis unavailable to him. See United States v. Drobny , 955 F.2d 990, 996 (5th Cir. 1992). Ramos has failed to establish that he seeks to present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, his motion for IFP is denied, and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. MOTION FOR IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Joseph A. Knapick, Respondent, v Village of Endicott Fire Department et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeals from decisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, filed December 31, 1975 and April 16, 1976. Claimant, a captain in the Village of Endicott Fire Department with 31 years of service, became ill while taking a shower on September 13, 1971 following the performance of strenuous fire-fighting duties earlier that day. He proceeded to the emergency room of a local hospital complaining of shortness of breath and fatigue. He was sent home, but the symptoms persisted and he sought further medical attention about a week later which resulted in hospitalization for diagnostic testing. Subsequent cardioangiography under the direction of an expert in the field, as supplemented by the history presented by claimant, culminated in the opinion that he had suffered a myocardial infarction as a result of his activities while fighting the fire on September 13, 1971. This expert also opined that he suffered from a permanent disability, was unable to perform his firemanic chores, and should lead a sedentary life. There was other expert medical opinion to the contrary. The board has found that claimant’s firemanic duties undertaken on September 13, 1971 resulted in a myocardial infarction, thus constituting an accidential injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and that the ensuing disability was causally related thereto. *904An amended decision found total disability for such duties subsequent to January 1, 1972, but otherwise affirmed the prior decision. Upon a review of this record we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the determination of the board. Conflicting medical opinions were offered and, under these circumstances, we must affirm the board’s resolution of such factual matters *(Matter of Prue v Empire Scrap Metals,*32 AD2d 680). As to the issue of claimant’s disability, it is clear from the record that he is totally disabled from employment in the occupation for which he is qualified (see *Matter of House v International Talc Co.,*51 AD2d 832, mot for lv to app den 39 NY2d 708). Decisions affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Koreman, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Kane and Mahoney, JJ., concur.
§ 401.29 Hearings. ( a ) A hearing or hearings may be held whenever in the opinion of the Commission such action would be helpful to the Commission in complying with the terms of a reference. Subject to any restrictions or exceptions which may be imposed by the terms of the reference, a final hearing or hearings shall be held before the Commission reports to Government in accordance with the terms of the reference.
( b ) The time, place and purpose of the hearing or hearings on a reference shall be fixed by the chairmen of the two sections.
( c ) The secretaries shall forthwith give written notice of the time, place and purpose of the hearing or hearings to each Government and to persons who have advised the Commission of their interest. Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, the secretaries shall also cause such notice to be published in the Canada Gazette, the Federal Register and once each week for three successive weeks in two newspapers, published one in each country and circulated in or near the localities which, in the opinion of the Commission, are most likely to be interested in the subject matter of the reference.
( d ) All hearings shall be open to the public, unless otherwise determined by the Commission.
( e ) At a hearing, the Governments and persons interested are entitled to present, in person or by counsel, oral and documentary evidence and argument that is relevant and material to any matter that is within the published purpose of the hearing.
( f ) The presiding chairman may require that evidence be under oath.
( g ) Witnesses may be examined and cross-examined by the Commissioners and by counsel for the Governments and the Commission. With the consent of presiding chairman, counsel for any interested person may also examine or cross-examine witnesses.
( h ) The Commission may require further evidence to be given and may require printed briefs to be submitted at or subsequent to the hearing.
( i ) A verbatim transcript of the proceedings at the hearing shall be prepared.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Laqarisha Williams, Also Known as Rhonda Turner, Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 53]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Burton Hecht, J.), rendered October 13, 1998, convicting defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing her, as a second felony offender, to a term of 4V2 to 9 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly imposed a prison sentence despite its original promise that a more lenient disposition would be substituted in the event that defendant successfully completed a drug program. The terms of the plea agreement were *17unmistakably clear that defendant could not leave the program without permission, and there was no implication that in the event defendant became dissatisfied with the program she was entitled to simply abscond. Since, at sentencing, defendant admitted that she left without permission and offered no excuse for failing to seek such permission, there was no need for an inquiry into her belated, unsupported assertions that she absconded from the program because of a problem with her medical treatment. Concur — Williams, J. P., Mazzarelli, Ellerin, Wallach and Saxe, JJ.
### §3796dd–2. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796dd–2 was editorially reclassified as section 10383 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
#### In the Matter of Byron Fugate, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[715 NYS2d 770]

—Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

*627Petitioner was found guilty of violating the prison disciplinary rule which prohibits the possession of a weapon after a search of his cell revealed a 6V2-inch metal shank in a box labeled Domeboro found hidden behind a locker. The record reveals that petitioner had been issued the Domeboro medication three months earlier. The fact that petitioner did not have exclusive control over the area where the weapon was found is insufficient to defeat the inference of impropriety *(see, Matter of Mendez v Jones,*176 AD2d 423). Significantly, petitioner’s cellmate had only been in the custody of the Department of Correctional Services for two weeks. Furthermore, petitioner testified that his friendship with a homosexual inmate had caused a rift with other inmate friends. Given this evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, substantial evidence supports the finding that petitioner was in possession of the weapon *(see, Matter of Tarbell v Goord,*263 AD2d 563; *Matter of Scott v Coombe,*238 AD2d 648). Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be without merit.

Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Exhibit 32

Certification

Each of the undersigned officers of Allin Corporation (the Company), certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | the Companys report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This Certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by
the Company for the purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.



|                |  |                        
|--------------- |  | -----------------------
|August 14, 2006 |  | /s/ Richard W. Talarico
|                |  | Chief Executive Officer
|                | 
|August 14, 2006 |  | /s/ Dean C. Praskach   
|                |  | Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will
be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



63
§ 229.435 Employment assistance to students. ( a ) *Assistance by recipient in making available outside employment.* A recipient that assists any agency, organization, or person in making employment available to any of its students: ( 1 ) Shall assure itself that such employment is made available without discrimination on the basis of sex; and
( 2 ) Shall not render such services to any agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of sex in its employment practices.
( b ) *Employment of students by recipients.* A recipient that employs any of its students shall not do so in a manner that violates §§ 229.500 through 229.550.
§ 181.10 Definition of “text”. ( a ) In accordance with 1 U.S.C. 112b(k)(7), the term “text” with respect to an international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument includes: ( 1 ) Any annex, appendix, codicil, side agreement, side letter, or any document of similar purpose or function to the aforementioned, regardless of the title of the document, that is entered into contemporaneously and in conjunction with the international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument; and
( 2 ) Any implementing agreement or arrangement, or any document of similar purpose or function to the aforementioned regardless of the title of the document, that is entered into contemporaneously and in conjunction with the international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument.
( b ) 1 U.S.C. 112b(k)(7) further provides that, as used in this definition, the term “contemporaneously and in conjunction with”: ( 1 ) Shall be construed liberally; and
( 2 ) May not be interpreted to require any action to have occurred simultaneously or on the same day.
#### Thomas P. Reis, Respondent, v Jeannette Gadson et al., Constituting the Board of Education of Community School District No. 23 of the Board of Education of the City of New York, et al., Appellants.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, *inter alia,*to compel appellants to reinstate petitioner to his position as a teacher, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered May 10, 1977, which, *inter alia,*directed appellants to reinstate the petitioner, with appropriate back pay. Judgment affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. Petitioner, a tenured teacher, was placed on probation from December 1, 1975 to November 30, 1976 as a penalty for having participated in a teachers’ strike (see Civil Service Law, § 210, subd 2, par [f]). In October, 1976 the community school board decided to terminate petitioner’s employment because he had pleaded guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct. The notice of termination stated that, "in accordance with Section 2573 of the N.Y.S. Education Law”, petitioner’s employment would terminate on November 5, 1976. This procedure was improper. The discharge occurred during the probationary term, with some 24 days remaining thereon, and petitioner was therefore entitled to a hearing at which his misconduct or incompetence had to be established by the board of education. According to the Civil Service Law (§ 210, subd 2, par [f]), teachers who have been placed on probation for engaging in an illegal strike in violation of the Taylor Law, are entitled to the pretermination rights of nonteacher probationary public employees (see Civil Service Law §63; 4 NYCRR 4.5). Such rights include the right to a hearing at which incompetence or misconduct must be proven if the employee is discharged during his term of probation (see 4 NYCRR 4.5 [a] [1]). Petitioner, however, was treated as though his discharge merely constituted a refusal to grant tenure; a determination which does not require a hearing (see 4 NYCRR 4.5 [a] [3]; see, also, Education Law, § 2573). In order to accomplish that design, the board should have waited until the completion of the probationary term (see *Tuller*v *Central School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Conklin, Binghamton, Kirkwood & Vestal,*40 NY2d 487). Having acted 24 days before the end of the one-year probationary period, however, the board should have conducted a hearing pursuant to section 75 *1043of the Civil Service Law. Its failure to do so means that petitioner was wrongfully discharged and was properly reinstated to his position by Special Term. Titone, J. P., Rabin, Gulotta and Margett, JJ., concur.
STEAM ELECTRIC

CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE

EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819

DCN: ________________________________________

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT 

CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION 

(CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.

SE04360A196
#### Joseph Pertofsky, Respondent, v. Murray Drucks, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated and entered November 8, 1961 after a jury trial, which granted plaintiff’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict in defendant’s favor on the ground that it was contrary to the weight of the evidence and contrary to law, and which directed a new trial. Order reversed, with costs, plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict denied, verdict reinstated, and judgment directed to be entered dismissing the complaint on the merits. Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant. The two parties are brothers-in-law. Defendant’s wife was sitting in the front seat, between them. Plaintiff was the only one who testified as to how the ■accident happened. Neither the defendant nor his wife testified. Plaintiff’s version was that the car was being driven on the left-hand lane of a highway, ■on a rainy afternoon, when it suddenly veered to the right as it approached an exit ramp which was on the right side of the road; that the speed of the ear then was at a rate of more than 50 miles an hour; that the car bounced from parapet to parapet on both sides of the roadway; and that he (plaintiff) fell out of the ear when the door on his side opened. Despite the fact that plaintiff’s testimony constituted a prima facie showing of negligence on the part of defendant, and despite the fact that no evidence was offered on defendant’s behalf as to how the accident occurred, the jury was not required to resolve the issue of negligence against the defendant *(Foltis, Inc.,*v. *City of New York,*287 N. Y. 108; *Lo Piccolo*v. *Knight of Rest Prods. Corp.,*7 A D 2d 369, 374, affd. 9 N Y 2d 662). If a jury’s verdict is in defendant’s favor, a motion to set such verdict aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence stands on a different footing than a motion to set aside a jury’s verdict in plaintiff’s favor. When the motion is by the plaintiff to set aside a verdict in favor of defendant, the motion should not be granted unless the evidence preponderated so greatly in plaintiff’s favor that the jury could not have reached its conclusion on any fair interpretation of the evidence *(Olsen*v. *Chase Manhattan Bank,*10 A D 2d 539, 544, affd. 9 N Y 2d 829; *Areson*v. *Hempstead Bus Corp.,*14 A D 2d 790; *Musumeci*v. *Pillsbury Mills,*12 A D 2d 941; *Holpp*v. *Carafa,*8 A D 2d 617). The credibility of an interested witness, and the truthfulness and accuracy of his testimony, whether contradicted or not, are matters exclusively for the jury, the triers of the facts *(Lee*v. *City Brewing Corp.,*279 N. Y. 380, 384; *Piwowarski*v. *Cornwell,*273 N. Y. 226; *Mercatante*v. *City of New York,*286 App. Div. 265, 268). In view of these principles, we believe the trial court here erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict in defendant’s favor (cf. *Delano*v. *Duhart,*14 A D 2d 739). Beldock, P. J., Christ, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, David P. Eichler, dohereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to: 

 

•                  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qof the Intellisync Corporation for the quarter ended October 31, 2005,fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

•                  the information contained in suchQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Intellisync Corporation. 

 

 
| Dated:  December 12, 2005 |
|--------------------------------|
|                           |
|                           |
| /s/ DAVID P. EICHLER           | ** ** |
| **David  P. Eichler**          |
| *Chief  Financial Officer*     |

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan WELLS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-50501

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 18, 2007.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Adrienne Urrutia Wisenberg, Solomon L. Wisenberg PLLC, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.

*256Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Counsel appointed to represent Nathan Wells on appeal has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as required by *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Wells has not responded to counsel’s motion. Our independent review of counsel’s brief and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.