Opinion issued June 12, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-13-00964-CV

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IN RE DAVID A. CHAUMETTE, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

OPINION

Relator, David A. Chaumette, requests habeas corpus relief from a 

November 19, 2012 trial court “Judgment of Contempt-David A. Chaumette.”

1

 On 

November 13, 2013, after a preliminary review of relator’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, we ordered relator released upon his posting of a bond in the 

 

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The underlying case is Black Sigma, LLC v. John P. Benkenstein, David A. 

Chaumette, Howard F. Cordary, Jr., and Michael P. Robinson, cause number 

64769, pending in the 23rd District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, the 

Honorable Ben Hardin presiding.
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amount of $1000.00, pending a final determination of his petition. Because we 

conclude that relator is entitled to habeas relief, we grant his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, order relator released from the bond set by this Court on November 

13, 2013, and order him discharged from custody.

Background

The underlying suit involves the foreclosure of real property located in 

Brazoria County, Texas. In 2011, real party in interest, Black Sigma, LLC (“Black 

Sigma”), sought a temporary injunction to prevent Michael Robinson

(“Robinson”), the third-party defendant in the underlying suit, from conducting a 

trustee’s sale of the Brazoria County property. An order granting the temporary 

injunction was signed by the trial court on September 1, 2011. On October 7, 

2011, the trial court signed an amended order granting the temporary injunction, 

which “relate[d] back to, the Order granting temporary injunction of September 1, 

2011.” Subsequently, an interlocutory appeal from the amended temporary 

injunction order was filed in this Court, appellate cause number 01-11-00917-CV, 

by Robinson.

On May 22, 2012, Black Sigma filed a “Motion for Contempt and for 

Referral to the Trial Court to Enforce Temporary Injunction” in appellate cause 

number 01-11-00917-CV, arguing that relator, among others, should be held in 

contempt for violating the trial court’s temporary injunction orders. In its motion, 
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Black Sigma asserted that relator, while acting as substitute trustee, took bids as 

part of a substitute trustee’s sale on the Brazoria County property and transferred 

the property by substitute trustee’s deed in violation of the trial court’s temporary 

injunction orders.

On June 7, 2012, this Court issued an “Order of Abatement and Referral of 

Enforcement Proceeding to the Trial Court,” which referred the enforcement 

proceeding of the temporary injunction orders to the trial court for that court to 

hear evidence and grant appropriate relief. The contempt proceedings, which are 

the subject of relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, subsequently commenced 

in the trial court.

On November 19, 2012, the trial court found relator guilty of civil contempt 

for violating the temporary injunction orders. Specifically, the trial court found 

that relator violated the trial court’s orders:

1. By conducting a substitute trustee’s sale on September 6, 2011 

as described in the substitute trustee’s deed entered into 

evidence, in violation of this Court’s Order Granting 

Temporary Injunction of September 1, 2011; and

2. By executing and recording said substitute trustee’s deed in 

violation of this Court’s Order Granting Temporary Injunction 

of September 1, 2011, and Amended Order Granting 

Temporary Injunction of October 7, 2011.

The contempt order further provided that relator “shall be confined in the Brazoria 

County Jail until he purges himself of contempt by executing and recording a 
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document in form acceptable to the Court, vacating the said substitute trustee’s 

deed, effective September 6, 2011.”

On October 3, 2013, relator attempted to purge himself of contempt by filing

a “Rescission of Foreclosure Sale” in the real property records and notice to the 

trial court that he had done so. The trial court, however, did not find relator’s 

“Rescission of Foreclosure Sale” acceptable.

Instead, on October 7, 2013, the trial court presented relator with an “Order 

and Declaratory Judgment on Amended Motion to Vacate Substitute Trustee’s 

Deed,” as a means of reversing the September 6, 2011 substitute trustee’s sale. 

The order required relator to acknowledge by signature approval of both the 

substance and form of the proposed order. The trial court also presented relator 

with a document titled “Rescission of Deed,” which the trial court ordered relator 

to execute. The signed order, along with the “Rescission of Deed,” and other 

documents, were to be returned to the trial court by November 4, 2013.

In his petition, relator states that he could not sign the trial court’s proposed 

order or the Rescission of Deed because they contained inaccuracies. Relator 

attempted to execute such documents, in a form that relator was comfortable with; 

however, the trial court appears to have found relator’s attempt to be insufficient.

On November 8, 2013, the trial court issued a capias for the arrest of relator 

based on the trial court’s November 19, 2012 civil contempt order. Relator 
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subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court. We ordered 

relator released upon his posting of a bond, pending full submission of the matter. 

We also requested a response from Black Sigma, which was filed on December 12, 

2013.

Standard of Review

The purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is not to determine the ultimate 

guilt or innocence of the relator, but only to ascertain whether the relator has been 

unlawfully confined. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (orig. 

proceeding). In a habeas corpus proceeding, the order or judgment challenged is 

presumed to be valid. Ex parte Occhipenti, 796 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). For this Court to order the release of a 

relator in a habeas corpus proceeding, we must find that the trial court’s order 

directing the relator to be incarcerated is void because of a lack of jurisdiction or 

because the relator was deprived of liberty without due process of law. In re 

Butler, 45 S.W.3d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. 

proceeding). The relator bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to relief. 

In re Turner, 177 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. 

proceeding).
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Discussion

Relator asserts his confinement is illegal because: (1) the temporary 

injunction vitiated relator’s authority to conduct the foreclosure sale and, therefore, 

relator cannot be compelled to rescind a foreclosure sale that was itself void; (2)

the judgment of civil contempt is void because it lacks specificity regarding the 

acts relator must perform to purge himself of contempt; (3) relator was prevented 

from signing the order presented to relator by the trial court on October 7, 2013;

(4) relator already purged the alleged contempt as a matter of law; (5) the

September 1, 2011 temporary injunction order was too vague on its face and 

ambiguous to give relator proper notice; and (6) the capias was not issued 

sufficiently close in time to the trial court’s judgment of civil contempt. Because 

we sustain relator’s second issue, we do not address the other issues in relator’s 

petition.

In his second issue, relator asserts that his due process rights were violated 

because the trial court’s judgment of civil contempt did not specify in clear and 

unambiguous language what relator must do to purge himself of contempt. We 

agree.

The trial court found relator guilty of civil contempt in its November 19, 

2012 order of contempt. Civil contempt is considered remedial and coercive in 

nature. Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. 1976) (orig. proceeding); In 
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re Houston, 92 S.W.3d 870, 876 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, orig. 

proceeding). “The object of civil contempt is to coerce the contemnor to comply 

with some order of the court.” Ex parte Durham, 921 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding); see also Ex parte Zinn, No. 04-95-

00525-CV, 1996 WL 11423, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 11, 1996, orig. 

proceeding) (not designated for publication) (“The purpose [of civil contempt] is to 

persuade the contemnor to obey a prior order.”). 

A contemnor may procure his release from the restraint on his liberty by 

compliance with the provisions of the court’s order. In re Houston, 92 S.W.3d at 

876 n.2; see also Ex parte Zinn, 1996 WL 11423, at *4 (“Imprisonment is 

conditional upon obedience; the judgment provides that the contemnor is to be 

imprisoned unless and until he performs a specified affirmative act.”). Because of 

this, when civil contempt is imposed, the order must spell out exactly what duties 

and obligations are imposed and what the contemnor can do to purge the contempt. 

In re Tsertos, No. 01-11-00170-CV, 2011 WL 941571, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] Mar. 14, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Houston, 92 S.W.3d 

at 877; see also In re Johnson, No. 14-09-00775-CV, 2009 WL 4345405, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 3, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)

(“[O]rder must tell the contemnor in clear, specific, and unambiguous words how 

to gain release from contempt.”); Ex parte Williams, 866 S.W.2d 751, 753–54 
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(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (“[O]rder must specify in 

clear language the actions which the contemnor must perform in order to gain 

release.”). The failure of an order of contempt to specify in clear and unambiguous 

language what the contemnor is required to do to purge himself and escape the 

restraint on his liberty renders the order invalid. See Ex parte Zinn, 1996 WL 

11423, at *4–5; Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).

Here, the trial court’s civil contempt order stated the following with respect 

to the manner in which relator may purge himself of civil contempt: 

David A. Chaumette shall be confined in the Brazoria County Jail 

until he purges himself of contempt by executing and recording a 

document in form acceptable to the Court, vacating the said substitute 

trustee’s deed effective September 6, 2011.

This purging condition does not clearly or specifically notify relator of the 

action he needs to take to purge himself of contempt and escape the restraint on his 

liberty. The provision fails to specify the type of document relator is required to 

execute and record in order to vacate the substitute trustee’s deed and leaves open 

for interpretation the form of the required document, given that the only guideline 

is that it must be in a “form acceptable to the [trial court].”

We hold that the purging provision of the contempt order does not “spell out 

exactly” in clear and unambiguous language what relator must do to purge the 

contempt. See In re Houston, 92 S.W.3d at 877; see also In re Johnson, 2009 WL 
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4345405, at *2 (order must tell contemnor in “clear, specific, and unambiguous 

words” how to purge himself of contempt). Therefore, the contempt order is void. 

See Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d at 387 (order that does not clearly set out action 

relator must take is void). Relator’s second issue is sustained.

Conclusion

We grant relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, order relator released 

from the bond set by this Court on November 13, 2013, and order relator 

discharged from custody.2

Laura Carter Higley

Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.

 

2

Since the capias was issued to enforce the contempt order which has been found 

void, the capias is also hereby rendered void. See Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d 

382, 387 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).