U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–615PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 

Serial No. 116–19 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

KAREN BASS, California, Chair 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, 

Ranking Member 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

JANET YARWOOD, Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

PREPARED STATEMENT 

Prepared statement submitted by Chairperson Bass ........................................... 4 

WITNESSES 

Thomas-Greenfield, Linda, Senior Counselor, Albright Stonebridge Group, 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs .................................. 14 

Coulibaly, Dr. Brahima, Director, The Brookings Institution ............................. 34 

Meservey, Joshua, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation ................. 45 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Amnesty International report submitted from Representative Omar ................. 66 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 79 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 80 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 81 

Additional materials submitted for the record ...................................................... 82 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Questions submitted from Representative Smith ................................................. 87 

(1) 

LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in Room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass (chair of the 

subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. BASS. Good afternoon, everyone. This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony. And the 

title of our hearing is ‘‘Africa Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations.’’ Without objection all members may have 5 days to submit 

statements, questions, materials for the record, subject to the 

length limitation in the rules. 

I will now make an opening statement and then turn it over to 

the ranking member for his opening statement. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on Looking 

Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations. Basically, we are here to ask what 

U.S. engagement with African countries should look like moving 

forward. 

We mentioned in the first hearing that we wanted to take our 

first few hearings as an opportunity to really provide an overview 

of the jurisdiction that this committee covers. And recognizing that 

the only two members on this committee that have been on this 

committee for a while, we have all new members, and so for that 

reason wanted to take a step back and really provide an overview. 

The African continent is comprised of 50-plus countries and more 

than 1.2 billion culturally distinct peoples in different geographic 

regions. This diversity results in diverging political, economic, and 

social experiences across the continent. This means that our policy 

has to take that diversity into consideration. The continent cannot 

be painted with one brush. 

After years of democratic progress, African democracies have 

faced ups and downs. Some countries are progressing while others 

appear to be backsliding. Meanwhile, African citizens favor democracy and continue to take to the streets to demand responsive and 

accountable governance. 

How do we encourage countries to support the desire for democracy by their citizens? 

What tools should we be using? 
2 

Regarding issues around good governance, democracy, and 

human rights, there are a number of countries that I look forward 

to hearing about in your testimony or in the Q&A. Cameroon is 

very concerning at the moment, and the government’s reaction to 

protests in Sudan is also an area of concern. 

In addition, sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing major demographic changes, including a youth bulge and urbanization. People 

age 35 and under account for more than 75 percent of Africa’s population, with the continent expected to become the world region 

with the highest urbanization. While the continent is undergoing 

this major urban transition and youth bulge, some of the world’s 

fastest growing economies are in African countries. In fact, several 

international observers have named the continent the future economic growth engine of the world. 

Other nations are deepening their relationships with countries 

across Africa, and instead of critiquing, we have to find ways to 

show up and engage. I look forward to hearing witnesses’ recommendations on what this engagement should entail. 

Most of you know that I advocate for increased trade, investment, and business activity between Africa and the U.S. From my 

perspective this is a win/win situation. We help U.S. businesses 

again access to new markets while creating jobs and building capacity across Africa. And we know that this is increasingly essential, given the youth bulge. 

We are often critical of China’s involvement on the continent. 

And I am not sure what we expect the African countries to do, but 

the solution that I like to promote is that the United States needs 

to step up. 

In his December 2018 public remarks, National Security Advisor 

Bolton identified three core U.S. interests in Africa: expanding U.S. 

trade and commercial ties with African countries; countering the 

threat from terrorism and violent conflict; and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the 

region. 

My hope is that the witnesses can highlight other areas that we 

should focus on when we consider U.S.-Africa relations. 

I have been disappointed that the Administration has not emphasized democracy, good governance, or human rights. That said, 

the Administration has maintained most Africa-focused aid initiatives launched by previous Congresses and, in some cases, has 

sought to fund them, however, at far lower levels. These include 

the global President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS, or PEPFAR, and 

Feed the Future, and Africa-specific Young African Leaders Initiatives, and Electrify Africa. Electrify Africa and Feed the Future 

were initiatives that were put in the statute by the former Chair 

Ed Royce. 

And I am glad that those initiatives have continued, but concerned about the cuts in funding. 

I will conclude by stressing that U.S.-Africa relations with—that 

U.S. relations with Africa has always enjoyed bipartisan support 

here in Congress. And we expect to continue to work together. 

Each time the Administration has sought to reduce funding to the 

State Department or USAID, especially those that would impact 
3 

African countries, we have worked together in a bipartisan manner 

to restore that funding. 

I now recognize the ranking member for the purpose of making 

an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bass follows:] 
4 

Congressmember Karen Bass 

AGH Subcommittee Hearing 

Hearing: "Looking Forward: U.S.- Africa Relations" 

March 26, 2019 

This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global 

Human Rights and International Organizations will come to order. 

I note that a quorum is present. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on "Looking 

Forward: U.S.- Africa Relations". Basically, we are here to ask what 

US engagement with African countries should look like going forward. 

Without objection, all members may have five days to submit statements, 

questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement. 

I would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses who are here with 

us today. 
5 

The African continent is comprised of 54 countries and more than 1.2 

billion culturally distinct peoples in different geographic regions. This 

diversity results in diverging political, economic and social experiences 

across the continent. This means that our policy has to take that 

diversity into consideration. The continent cannot be painted with one 

brush. 

After years of democratic progress, African democracies have faced ups 

and downs. Some countries are progressing while others appear to be 

backsliding. Meanwhile, African citizens favor democracy and continue 

to take to the streets to demand responsive and accountable 

governance. How do we encourage countries to support the desire for 

democracy by their citizen's? What tools should we be using? 

Regarding issues around good governance, democracy and human rights, 

there are a number of countries that I look forward to hearing about in 

your testimony or in the Q & A. Cameroon is very concerning at the 

moment and the government's reaction to the protests in Sudan is also an 

area of concern. 

In addition, Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing major demographic 

changes, including a youth bulge and urbanization. People aged 35 and 
6 

under account for more than 75 percent of Africa's population, with the 

continent expected to become the world region with the highest 

urbanization. 

While the continent is undergoing this major urban transition and youth 

bulge, some of the world's fastest growing economies are in African 

countries. In fact, several international observers have named the 

continent, "The future economic growth engine of the world." Other 

nations are deepening their relationship with countries across Africa and 

instead of critiquing we have to find was to show up and engage. I look 

forward hearing witness recommendations on what this engagement 

should entail. 

Most of you who know me, know that I advocate for increased trade, 

investment, and business activity between Africa and the US. From my 

perspective, this is a win-win situation. We help US businesses gain 

access to new markets, while creating jobs and building capacity across 

Africa-And we know that this is increasingly essential given the youth 

bulge. 

I only highlighted a few areas, but I look forward to hearing what you all 

think we should be focusing on or emphasizing in our relations with 

African countries. 
7 

In his December 2018 public remarks, National Security Advisor Bolton 

identified three core U.S. interests in Africa: expanding U.S. trade and 

commercial ties with African countries, "countering the threat from 

Radical Islamic Terrorism and violent conflict," and imposing more 

stringent conditions on U.S. aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the 

region. My hope is that the witnesses can highlight other areas that we 

should focus on when we consider US-Africa relations. 

I have been disappointed that the administration has not emphasized 

democracy, good governance, or human rights. 

That said, the Administration has maintained most Africa-focused aid 

initiatives launched by previous Administrations, but in some cases, they 

have sought to fund them at far lower levels. These include the global 

President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPF AR) and Feed the 

Future (FTF) initiatives, and the Africa-specific Young African Leaders 

Initiative (Y ALI) and Power Africa. PEPF AR was first authorized by 

Congress during the George W. Bush Administration. FTF, launched by 

the Obama Administration and broadly backed by Congress under the 

Global Food Security Act, seeks to improve food access and agricultural 

development in developing countries. The Obama Administration also 

launched Power Africa, which seeks to expand electricity access in 

Africa, andY ALI, which aims to foster the development of young African 

business and civic leaders. 
8 

I will conclude by stressing that US relations with Africa has always 

enjoyed bipartisan support here in Congress and we expect to continue to 

work together. Each time the administration has sought to reduce funding 

to State Department or US AID funding especially those that would impact 

African countries, we have worked together to restore that funding. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member for the purpose of making an 

opening statement. 
9 

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank the 

witnesses for coming forward today and spending time with us. 

I believe I speak for all of us when I say that the importance of 

U.S. engagement in Africa cannot be overstated. I was pleased to 

see the Administration recognize this and release a dedicated Africa strategy in December. It’s critical for the American people to understand our interest in Africa, and for Africa to see our commitment to the continent. In my opinion, the strategy goes a long way 

in both respects. 

In recent years, policy and debate on Africa has centered on 

counterterrorism, foreign assistance, conservation, women empowerment, development, good governance, and human rights, 

among other things. While I am proud of the progress we have 

made in our counterterrorism efforts, we must continue to be 

proactive, particularly in the Sahel. As we have seen in the Middle 

East, left unchecked, extremist organizations have the potential to 

carry out deadly attacks across the globe and spur tragic humanitarian crises as people flee from harm’s way. 

The same can be said on development and women empowerment. 

The BUILD Act and the Women’s Entrepreneurship and Economic 

Empower Act, which were both signed into law last Congress, will 

have a tremendous impact, but we must do more. Africa continues 

to grapple with high poverty rates, food insecurity, insufficient 

healthcare and education systems, and infrastructure deficiencies. 

Addressing these issues is not only in the best interests of Africans 

but in the best interests of Americans. 

For this reason, I introduced the Digital Global Access Policy Act 

which promotes expanding internet access in developing countries 

and, in turn, will help Africa overcome many problems I just mentioned. It is my hope that this committee and the House of Representatives will soon take up this critical legislation. 

While many of the previous issues I have highlighted will continue to dominate our efforts in Africa, we must turn our attention 

toward countering China and Russia as they expand their financial 

and political influence across the continent. Through its Belt and 

Road Initiative, China has secured significant leverage over many 

African countries, and access to Africa’s precious natural resources. 

China’s construction of its first overseas military base in Djibouti 

is also a cause for concern, given its close proximity to ours. 

We see similar interest from Russia, albeit it even more defensefocused. 

Checking Chinese and Russian investment and influence in the 

region, and the rest of the world, is critical to U.S. national security. We cannot write blank checks or discount requirements that 

come along with U.S. assistance, but we must think critically and 

innovatively about how we can offer an alternative. 

I look forward to what will certainly be a productive and enlightening discussion about our next steps in Africa. Thank you, and I 

yield back. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member. I now 

want to introduce our witnesses. 

First, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield. She joined ASG as 

a senior counselor after serving as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs from 2013 to 2017. In this capacity, Am-
10 

bassador Thomas-Greenfield led U.S. policy toward sub-Saharan 

Africa with a focus on peace and security, democracy and governance, economic empowerment, and investment opportunities. 

Prior to this appointment she served as Director General of the 

Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources where she 

oversaw all personnel functions for the U.S. Department of State’s 

70,000-strong work force. Previously, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield served as the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia from 2008 to 2012, 

and held posts in several other African nations. 

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is also a distinguished resident 

fellow in African affairs at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy 

at Georgetown University. 

Dr. Coulibaly is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa 

Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institute. His research focuses 

on creating economic opportunities and prosperity in sub-Saharan 

Africa by improving development, finance, local trade, monetary 

policies, and banking, financial institutions, and markets. His most 

recent work includes the research papers ‘‘Mobilization of Tax Revenues in Africa,’’ ‘‘Meeting Africa’s Employment Challenges in the 

Changing World,’’ as well as serving as the editor for the Initiative’s Annual Flagship Report, ‘‘Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for 

the Continent.’’ 

Joshua Meservey is a Senior Fellow Policy Analyst, Africa and 

the Middle East, at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes in African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy. In 2009 he 

joined Church World Service based out of Nairobi, Kenya, and traveled extensively in East and Southern Africa interviewing refugees. 

He ended his time at CSW as, as field team manager responsible 

for a multinational team of nearly 100 staff. 

In 2012 he worked at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and helped write an Army concept paper. He is the lead author of a monograph on al-Shabaab’s insurgency, and his other 

work has appeared in many other publications. 

I want to thank the witnesses for taking the time. Again, I want 

to thank you for your patience. Apologize for the delay. And ask 

you to begin your testimony. 

We do not have a clock. I will be keeping track on my trusty 

iPhone here, and will notify you when 5 minutes are up. I know 

that you all have written testimony that you have submitted, so 

within 5 minutes if you could summarize your testimony. And 

could you begin, Madam Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD, 

SENIOR COUNSELOR, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, 

FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN 

AFFAIRS 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much. I will 

do my best. 

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Wright, and distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at 

this important hearing on the future of United States policy toward 

Africa. Allow me to thank all of you for your commitment and service to Africa, and some of you for your support during my tenure 

as Assistant Secretary from 2013 to 2017. 
11 

I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the dreadful situation in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as a result of Cyclone 

Idai which has led to hundreds of deaths, and thousands of displacement, and millions of dollars in destruction. This should be at 

the forefront of our thinking on Africa today. 

2019 is a critical time for Africa policy. There have been a series 

of long-term trends and recent developments which have put the 

continent at the forefront like never before. That is why it is crucial 

that there be sustained and consistent U.S. engagement on the content. 

The U.S. has consistently shown great bipartisan leadership on 

African issues. The bipartisan focus of our government led to the 

passing of programs as the—as Congresswoman Bass mentioned, 

such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, 

YALI, the Millennium Challenge Account, Feed the Future. All of 

these programs have withstood the tests across, of time across administrations. And these programs are laced with our value system 

at the core: democracy, good governance, human rights, and prosperity, all of which made the U.S. a major player on the continent 

of Africa. 

The positive bipartisan engagement with Africa continued with 

the current administration’s BUILD Act and PROSPER Africa initiatives. These initiatives seek to further strengthen trade ties with 

a still burgeoning Africa market full of opportunities. 

The United States brings many resources to the table that other 

countries do not. The United States hosts a large and vibrant African diaspora community who have made significant contributions 

to America, both economically and socially. And as we commemorate the 400-year anniversary since the first African arrived to this 

land in bondage, we must remember the deep historical connections between the U.S. and Africa. 

Allow me to touch briefly on a few issues we should address. My 

full testimony is provided in writing and gives a more fulsome list. 

First, Congressman Bass, you mentioned the youth bulge. Africa 

is facing an unprecedented demographic evolution with half the 

population under the age of 19. Estimates are that by 2050, the 

population of the African continent will have doubled from 1.2 million to 2.—1.2 billion to 2.5 billion, representing a quarter of the 

world’s population. It is vital that the United States work to help 

African countries use this growth to foster prosperity. 

Security and terrorism, maybe one of the most critical areas of 

collaboration with African States, involves security. Continued U.S. 

engagement with African stakeholders to tackle these threats is 

necessary. The proposed reduction of 10 percent of American troops 

deployed on the continent sends the wrong message to our partners. 

On democracy and democratic transition, the fact that the national security advisory did not mention democracy in his December Africa policy speech did not go unnoticed on the continent. The 

United States must continue to promote democracy programs 

across the continent. In the long-term, democracy contributes to 

better governance, human development, security, and economic 

growth. 
12 

Climate change. It is important that we engage African policymakers on climate change and adopting environmentally conscious 

policies. Renewed international commitments to elements of the 

Paris Climate Change Agreement would benefit Africa’s efforts to 

address some of the environmental changes it now faces. 

And while I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to engage on the entire continent, there are some countries that I believe decisionmakers should prioritize. 

First, Nigeria. The importance of the most populous country in 

sub-Saharan Africa and its No. 1 economy is self evident. And as 

President Buhari embarks on his second and final term, the U.S. 

needs to remain supportive of reforms that will help entrench 

democratic values. 

South Africa will hold elections in May of this year. And as the 

next administration in South Africa deals with institutional corruption and the tricky waters of land redistribution, the U.S. needs to 

support the country’s transition to let the South African people 

know we are standing side by side with them. 

Ethiopia. Ethiopia is an example of the profound change that African countries can go through quickly with principled leaders at 

the helm. The United States should ramp up its engagement with 

the Government of Ethiopia to ensure these reforms continue 

unhindered, and that they become institutionalized within Ethiopia. The United States should not squander the opportunity to 

build closer relationships with this vital player. 

South Sudan. In South Sudan the U.S. has fallen behind on diplomatic leadership, and I believe we have abdicated responsibility 

for a State we helped birth. The United States should designate a 

special envoy to provide U.S. leadership who can work with leaders 

in the region to break the cycle of continued conflict in South 

Sudan. 

I welcome in DRC the appointment of Dr. Peter Pham as the 

Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa in November 

2018. It is important following the election that the U.S. continue 

to engage with the Congolese president. 

And I see you are about to grab, so I am going to skip. 

But I have mentioned Ghana. And I do mention Tanzania, 

Sudan, Cameroon that I know in particular that you think is very 

important. 

But finally, let me just say that to achieve our goals in Africa 

and around the globe we must have sustained, strong diplomatic 

efforts. The visit, recent visit of Deputy Secretary Sullivan to South 

Africa and Angola, and Assistant Secretary Nagy to Cameroon, 

DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda, highlight the type of engagement that 

is needed. But they need help from more senior officials in the administration to engage. And I think for this reason it is time for 

a second Africa Leaders Summit. 

And also, we have, we have too many Ambassadorships in Africa 

that are still vacant. And many of them are in some of these important countries that I mentioned. And in order for us to have successful engagement with the African continent we need to invest in 

more diplomatic presence on the ground, particularly our Ambassadors. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 
13 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Ultimately, the United States 

should take a more positive, proactive approach to Africa, emphasizing the potential of the continent rather than its risks. It is absolutely in the interests of the United States to see the continent 

of Africa grow and thrive. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield follows:] 
14 

Testimony of Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy 

March 26,2019 

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members 

of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important 

hearing on the future of United States policy toward Africa. Allow me to 

thank you for your commitment and service to Africa and for your support 

during my tenure as Assistant Secretary for Africa from 2013-2017. I also 

want to take a moment to acknowledge the dreadful situation in 

Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as a result of Cyclone Idai. 

Indeed, 2019 is a critical time for Africa policy. There have been a series 

of long-terrn trends and recent developments which have put the continent 

at the forefront like never before. When looking at today's global 

challenges, they all have an impact on and are impacted by developments 

in Africa: migration and refugees, climate change, growing youth 
15 

populations, insecurity, and democratic transitions. African countries 

hold great promise but there are certainly perils that can undermine 

Africa's potential if many factors are not handled correctly. That is why 

it is crucial that there be sustained U.S. engagement on the continent. 

Over the years, the U.S. has shown great bipartisan leadership on African 

issues. The bipatiisan focus of our government led to the passing of 

programs like the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the 

President's Malaria Initiative, which have been crucial in the fight against 

these two pandemics in Africa. Likewise, the continued renewal of the 

African Growth and Opportunity Act has played a major role to further 

trade and investment with our African counterparts. In an even more 

exciting way, the Young African Leadership Initiative has seen the U.S. 

play host to some of Africa's youngest and brightest lights, strengthening 

our connections to the continent's future leaders and improving U.S. 

standings yet again in Africa. Power Africa brought to the forefront 

Africa's need for electricity to energize Africa's lagging economic growth. 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 2 
16 

The Millennium Challenge Account continues to have a major impact on 

Africa's infrastructure having invested in over 15 years more than $8.3 

billion dollars in 22 countries. 

All of these efforts were laced with our value system at the core. Our 

belief in democracy, good governance, human rights, and prosperity made 

the U.S. a major player on the continent of Africa. 

The positive relevance ofU.S. engagement with Africa will continue with 

the current administration's BUILD Act and PROSPER Africa initiative. 

While I will leave the more in-depth look at our bilateral economic 

relationship with the continent, to my fellow panelist Dr. Brahima 

Coulibaly these initiatives arc positive as the U.S. seeks to further 

strengthen trade ties with a still burgeoning African market full of 

opportunities. According to the World Bank, Africa is forecast to grow 

at 3.4 percent this year, with Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Cote d'Ivoire 

expected to lead the continent with growth rates over 7 percent. Political 

and economic reforms in countries such as Angola are also proving key 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 3 
17 

to development, as the same World Bank forecast predicts an incredible 

turnaround from -1.8 percent growth in 2018 to 2.9 percent in 2019. 

African states are also ever so closer to ratify the African Continental Free 

Trade Agreement, with only one country left to ratify getting to the 22 

needed to put the agreement in force with the purpose of boosting intraAfrica trade. Such a boost is also beneficial to our industries as stronger 

Afl-ican markets mean more possibilities for business as a growing 

consumer class takes root on the continent. Overall, the continent 

continues to move forward by improving its infrastructure, increasing the 

use of digital technology, upgrading its business and investment climate, 

and diversifying its economies - all of which present considerable 

opportunities for our private sector and will contribute to more progress 

in the future. We simply cannot afford to let the opportunity to work with 

our African partners slip away. 

The current administration correctly identifies that the "stability, 

prosperity, independence, and security on the African continent are in the 

national security interest of the United States." While I am encouraged 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 4 
18 

by this clear recognition, I would steer the policy away from framing 

Africa as merely a battleground for great power competition against China 

and Russia. I would argue that it is in our interest to view engagement 

with the continent as a key and important element in and of itself. Our 

interest in Africa should be judged on its own intrinsic value and not as a 

zero-sum race against other powers. We should be focused on building a 

strong partnership with Africa which is based on shared values of peace, 

prosperity, sustained economic growth and development, and a firm 

commitment to good governance, gender equity and the rule of law. 

The United States brings many resources to the table that other countries 

do not, whether within government, in our business community, and our 

non-profit organizations. Additionally, the United States hosts a large and 

vibrant African diaspora community, who have been great contributors to 

America both economically and socially. The African diaspora in the U.S. 

can also be a key plank of suppmi and a force multiplier for U.S. values 

on the continent. As we commemorates the 400-year anniversary since 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 5 
19 

Africans arrived to this land in bondage, we must remember the deep 

connection between U.S. and Africa. 

We, as a nation, are linked to the continent in ways that provide great 

strength, both domestically and in foreign policy. What the United States 

does well cannot be matched by competitors. Our values call for ordinary 

Africans to thrive along with the elites, our industries have more expertise 

to share with African states, and our genuine wish for partnership, and not 

subservience, set us apart. There are more opportunities on the continent 

for collaboration than there are for competition. The United States should 

be taking a more positive and pro-active approach to Africa, emphasizing 

the potential of the continent rather than its risks. With that in mind, there 

are four key trends that I could identify as pivotal to the future of our 

policy toward the continent. 

Four Key Trends 

}o!!lh Bulgi! 

As many of you know, Africa is facing an unprecedented demographic 

evolution. Estimates are that by 2050, the population of the African 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 6 
20 

continent will have doubled from 1.2 billion to 2.5 billion, representing a 

quarter of the world's population. In 2050, Africa will have 362 million 

young people between the ages of 15 and 24 years old. More to the point, 

today half of that population is under the age of 19. The huge propotiion 

of youth in African populations can either be Africa's golden ticket or its 

greatest challenges. To punch in that ticket, I believe there is a need to 

create opportunities for Africa's youth. That means creating jobs. It also 

means strengthening education systems. It means mentoring and 

providing opportunity, especially expanding opportunities for girls and 

women. 

It is vital that the United States work to help African countries to use this 

growth to foster prosperity. If there is not adequate education or jobs to 

meet demand, then the youth bulge could see an increase in scale in unsafe 

migration, insecurity, and radicalization . 

. S!!Clll'ity um/f('l'rOI·ism 

Maybe one of the most critical area of collaboration with African states 

involves security. It is undeniable that the continent has continued to face 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group 1 7 
21 

serious challenges in that regard, as recently evident by the horrific 

terrorist attack in Kenya in January this year. However, it is equally 

unmistakable that Africans are progressively stepping up to the plate and 

taking seriously their own security needs. The pulling together of the G5 

Sahel and the AU's offer to take on a higher share of fiscal responsibility 

in regional peacekeeping efforts are both positive signs. In the near term, 

continued U.S. engagement with African stakeholders to tackle these 

threats is necessary. The U.S. should not only focus on security assistance, 

but recognize the importance of helping Africa to deal with many of its 

pressing economic and social challenges as a way to combat and reduce 

the insecurity and instability that feeds conflict in Africa. The proposed 

reduction of 1 0% of American troops deployed on the continent sends the 

wrong message to our partners. Moreover, the presence of our troops 

encourages a professional demeanor from security forces with whom they 

work hand in hand in other African countries. It is also important to 

devote increased resources to diplomatic engagement, economic 

development and to reinvest in democracy promotion to highlight 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 8 
22 

universal values that we share with our African counterparts. Military 

solutions alone will not stop insecurity and conflict in Africa. 

nc/1/0CU/Cl' (f/l( I Dcnwcraf ic Tmnsil ion 

The rising number of youths also has an effect on what should be another 

American priority: consolidating democracy across the continent. 

America is about values. We must connect with populations on the 

continent to continue sharing the values we have in common with African 

populations. The United States must continue to promote democracy 

programs across the continent and hold leaders accountable to their 

increasingly youthful populations. While today, 70 percent of Africa's 

population is under 30, only 14 percent of the region's politicians are 

under 40. Democratic leaders make not only for better allies, but also are 

more likely to see their youth as an opportunity for their country, not a 

threat to be countered. Too many African countries still struggle with 

democratic transitions. Leaders need to focus on plans for a peaceful, 

political handover and stable elections from the minute they come to 

power. In the long term, democracy contributes to better governance, 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 9 
23 

human development, security, and economic growth. The vast majority 

of Africans want to live in a democracy, but the proportion who believe 

they actually do falls almost every year. 

Cl imntc 

As mentioned earlier, the fallout of cyclone Idai in southern Africa has 

shown the importance of engaging African policymakers on climate 

change and adopting environmentally conscious policies. As forests 

shrink and deserts grow, populations are ever more vulnerable in the face 

of increasingly unpredictable weather patterns. In response to Idai, the 

U.S. offer of assistance to the affected countries in what the UN has 

categorized as "one of the worst weather-related disasters ever to hit the 

southern hemisphere" is an important statement. Renewed international 

commitment to elements of the Paris Climate Change Agreement would 

benefit Africa's effotis to address some of the environmental challenges 

it now faces. 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 10 
24 

While I cannot emphasize enough how impmiant it is to engage on the 

entire continent, there are some that I believe decision makers should 

watch. 

Countries to Watch 

The Nigerian elections showed that states that are looking to consolidate 

democracy still have a long way to go. While there is widespread 

consensus that these elections fell short of the high standards set in 2015, 

the Nigerian people and its leadership still show a strong commitment to 

democracy. The importance of the most populous country in sub-Saharan 

Africa, and its number one economy, is self-evident. Its potential is 

boundless, with an established human capital, growing consumer class, 

and burgeoning private sector. Yet the country still struggles with 

insecurity, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure, among other things. 

As President Buhari embarks on his second and final term, the U.S. need 

to remain supportive of reforms that will help entrench democratic values. 

S'outh Afi·icu 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 11 
25 

South Africa will hold elections in May of this year. These elections will 

hopefully put the country back on a positive economic path after almost a 

decade of economic decline. South Africans hope that these polls will 

help reestablish democratic values, which they fought so hard to achieve 

during the apartheid regime, as a priority for the country. As the next 

administration in South Africa deals with institutional corruption and the 

tricky waters of land redistribution, the U.S. needs to support the 

country's transition to let the South African people know we are standing 

side by side with them. 

Uhiopia 

Ethiopia is an example of the profound change that African countries can 

go through quickly with principled leaders at the helm. The U.S. should 

be very pleased with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's decisions to 

implement reforms that we had been pushing for decades, including 

economic liberalization, opening up political space, and making peace 

within the region. The United States should ramp up its engagement with 

the government of Ethiopia to ensure these reforms continue unhindered 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 12 
26 

and that they become institutionalized within Ethiopia. The Horn of 

Africa is an increasingly important region geopolitically and the United 

States should not squander the opportunity to build closer relations with 

the vital player that is Ethiopia. 

::;outh ,\'udun 

In South Sudan, the U.S. has fallen behind on diplomatic leadership and 

abdicated responsibility for a state which we helped birth. While Horn of 

Africa member states in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 

have tried to fill the role, the level of influence that the U.S. brings will be 

the kind of strong leadership needed to ensure the terms of the recent 

ceasefires and treaties arc followed. As recommended by the 

International Crisis Group, it is critical for third-party mediation to help 

work with both sides to solve the intractable issues of reconciling armed 

groups and drawing internal boundaries if preparations to form a unity 

government in May 2019 are to succeed. The United States should 

designate a special envoy to provide U.S. leadership on this issue, an 

individual who can work with leaders in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 13 
27 

Sudan to break the cycle of continued conflict in South Sudan, providing 

peace for the long-suffering people of South Sudan. 

/)cll/ocmtic R('Jil!h!ic o/Congo 

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the first peaceful transition of 

power in the country's history remains fragile. This is an important period 

for Africa's sleeping giant. It remains unclear how much this transition 

will turn the pages on the DRC's past and show real change. The DRC 

still faces daunting challenges that must be addressed. I am especially 

concerned about lingering high levels of corruption, armed conflicts 

involving numerous militias in the east, and the presence ofEbola in that 

region of the country as well, which international health workers have had 

great difficulty to address due to the persistent insecurity. I welcomed the 

appointment of Dr. Peter Pham as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes 

Region of Africa in November of20 18 and it is in U.S. interests to engage 

Congolese leadership. Likewise, we should strengthen our ties to civil 

society groups working to support meaningful reforms that will help the 

country overcome its substantial challenges to take its rightful place in the 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 14 
28 

upper echelon of African countries. Through these engagements, the U.S. 

should work hand in hand with the Congolese people to make progressive 

change for the country and the region. 

/i111h11flli'C 

There were high expectations in 201 8 when President Mnangagwa was 

elected President. However, the behavior of the government in cracking 

down on dissent following the elections, and protests earlier this year, 

remains a grave concern. Though there has been increased engagement 

by Zimbabwean leadership with multilateral institutions such as the 

World Bank and IMF, much progress remains for Zimbabwe to prove it 

is embarking on a new path. There must be continued U.S. engagement 

with the government of Zimbabwe to show that the transition from the 

long-time Mugabe regime, recent disputed elections, and protests will 

ultimately give way to a more democratic and transparent process of 

governing that will justify removal of sanctions and increased investments. 

Glutll!t 

Confidential Albright Stone bridge Group I 15 
29 

I would like to speak about Ghana because it is a valuable partner to the 

United States and is many ways an example ofwhat U.S.-Africa relations 

are transitioning towards. Ghana is a model for African nations for its 

long history of resilient democratic institutions and strong rule of law. 

The new focus of Ghana to be a partner for "trade, not aid" should be 

welcomed by the United States. U.S. relations with Ghana are an emblem 

of what the U.S. should hope to have in the future with many African 

states. As the African middle class continues to grow, African leaders are 

more interested in economic partnerships rather than subsidiary 

relationships. To the many states that are developing economically and 

politically, Ghana shows that democracy and rule oflaw are vital to longterm prosperity for all nations. 

lhrcc ( 'onn't'fiill.f!, 1l f!'n/iuns 

Others where there have also been concerning developments and are 

worthy of more scrutiny on our parts include Tanzania, where there has 

been a surge in anti-democratic policies, Sudan, which is in the midst 

growing unrest and uncertainty, and Cameroon, a huge recipient of U.S. 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 16 
30 

security assistance and partner against Boko Haram where the conflict 

between the government and separatists is growing increasingly violent. 

Diplomacy 

To achieve our goals in Africa and around the globe, we must have 

sustained and strong diplomatic efforts. The recent visits of Deputy 

Secretary Sullivan to South Africa and Angola and Assistant Secretary 

Tibor Nagy to Cameroon, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda are welcome and 

highlight the type of direct engagement that is needed. However, too 

many ambassadorships in Africa are still vacant. Postings in South 

Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Chad, Egypt, Libya and Morocco, as 

well as others are yet to be filled. In fact, in order to have successful 

engagement with the African continent, we need to invest in more 

diplomatic presence on the ground, not less. Many of our embassies are 

still short-staffed and under resourced. Over the past five years, 

America's spending on core diplomacy has fallen by a third. A third! 

We should not scale back, but rather push on! Push on to confirm our 

friendship to the African people, push on to maintain critical ties with 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group I 17 
31 

communities who share an affinity for us, push on to support private 

sector investment and to showcase that American global leadership is 

truly alive and well. 

Cone! us ion 

Ultimately, how Africans define their future is up to Africans 

themselves, but we must partner with them to achieve our mutual goals. 

It is absolutely in the interests of the United States to see the continent of 

Africa grow and thrive. 

Confidential Albright Stonebridge Group Jl8 
32 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Dr. COULIBALY. 

STATEMENT OF BRAHIMA COULIBALY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, THE 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. COULIBALY. Thank you, Madam Chair Bass, and Ranking 

Member Wright. So let me begin by applauding your leadership as 

well as that of Congressman Smith, and your active role in fostering the bipartisan collaboration that has traditionally characterized the U.S. legislation in Africa. 

And my appreciation to the members of the committee for the opportunity to share my views on the subject. 

This is indeed an opportune time to reassess the future of U.S.- 

Africa relations because there is an emerging consensus, which I 

share, that the U.S. is falling behind in Africa. In my view, this is 

not because U.S. policies toward Africa have failed. In fact, and as 

was mentioned earlier, U.S. policies and programs such as AGOA, 

PEPFAR, the Malaria Initiative, Power Africa, YALI, have all been 

successful in impact overall. 

But whether it is because Africa is transforming rapidly and the 

architecture of our engagements needs to adapt to this dynamism 

and to the evolving aspirations of the African countries. So, following a period of political and social instability, as well as weak 

economic growth, Africa’s fortunes have begun to turn around the 

year 2000. Since then, thanks to better domestic policies and favorable global environment, economic growth has been strong, boosting commercial opportunities. 

Importantly, Africa is experiencing a demographic boom and 

rapid urbanization. By the turn of the century, 40 percent of the 

world’s population, and 42 percent of its work force will be African. 

And to better respond to the growing needs of the populations, 

Africa’s leadership and institutions are becoming more assertive in 

the ownership and advancement of the continent’s agenda. The unprecedented dynamism on the continent is creating tremendous 

commercial opportunities in trade and investment, and it is not an 

exaggeration to say that Africa is on a course to be the world’s next 

big growth market. 

Earlier this month the cover page of the Economist magazine 

read, ‘‘The New Scramble for Africa.’’ It was capturing what those 

following developments on the continent already knew. Commercial 

opportunities that Africa presents, as well as some of the 

transnational threats originating from the region are attracting interest from an increasingly diverse group of foreign countries working proactively to strengthen diplomatic, defense, and commercial 

ties with the continent. 

The most active foreign countries are non-traditional partners, 

and their emergence is challenging the partner of choice status 

that traditional partners, including the United States, have enjoyed. While diplomatic and the defense ties are broadening and 

strengthening, shifts in commercial ties have been the most significant. 

Between 2010 and 2017, Africa’s trade with countries such as 

Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and China, have risen very 

fast. In contrast, trade with the United States fell by more than 
33 

half over this period. And the United States is no longer among Africa’s top three trading partners. 

Although the United States still has the largest stock of foreign 

direct investment, this stock has barely increased since 2010, while 

investment from other countries, particularly China, has increased 

significantly. 

So, in this new scramble for Africa what can the United States 

do to keep up? 

First, I think the U.S. should articulate a clear bipartisan, longterm vision for its U.S.-Africa policy following broad consultation 

with key stakeholders, including U.S. and Africa businesses but, 

importantly, the African Union. The vision should align to the extent possible with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the U.N.’s 

Agenda 2030 that African countries have adopted. 

Given increasing interdependencies between defense, diplomacy, 

and development, the vision should encompass engagements on all 

three dimensions but with greater emphasis on the commercial ties 

with the most potential to yield the most significant mutually beneficial outcomes. 

Second, to accelerate the commercial engagement, the United 

States should appoint a high level White House official with a mandate to work across U.S. agencies to advance U.S. commercial policy. 

Third, the U.S. should initiate a regular high level summit between the United States and African States, as the external partners, including China, India, Japan, Turkey, and the European 

Union, all have held two or more high level summits in recent 

years which have advanced their engagement with Africa. In contrast, the U.S. has held only one high level summit, and that was 

in 2014. 

While not a panacea, I believe these recommendations will go a 

long way to provide the needed clarity, predictability, and stability 

in U.S. engagement with Africa. The presence of other countries on 

the continent will only strengthen with time. And the United 

States does have a solid foundation and the legacy in Africa on 

which to build. However, without more proactive approaches the 

U.S. is just falling further behind. 

Ultimately, the future of U.S.-Africa relations will be determined 

more by U.S. policy and actions, or lack thereof, toward Africa than 

by those of other countries toward Africa. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coulibaly follows:] 
34 

1 

1\larch 26, 2019 

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and 

International Organizations 

1 ,ooking Forward: ll.S.-},frica Relations 

Dr. Brahima Coulibaly, Senior l1ellow and Director of the ,\frica Crowth lnitiati\·e, Global Economy 

and Development, Brookings Institution 

Rayburn House Office Building 2200 

Thank you, Chairwoman Bass and Ranking 1\lcmber Smith, for your leadership with respect to U.S. 

engagement with ;\frica. Your acti\·e role in fostering the bipartisan cooperation that has historically 

characterized Ll.S.-Africa legislation is exemplary. Thank you to the rnembcrs of the subcommittee 

for the opportunity to testify on the way forward for lT.S.-Africa relations. 

Jam Dr. Brahima Coulibaly, Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Crowth Initiative at the 

Brookings Institution. 

This is an opportune time to re-examine the future of U.S.-Africa relations because there is an 

emerging consensus, which I share, that the U.S. is falling behind in ;\[rica. In my Yiew, this is not 

because U.S. policies toward Africa have failed, but rather because Africa is transforming rapidly and 

the architecture of the United States' engagement is not adapting fast enough to this dynamism and 

to the evolving- aspirations of African countries. 

Africa is transforming very fast 

Following a period of political and social instability as well as weak economic growth, Africa's 

fortunes began to turn around the year 2000. Since then, cconotnic policies and business 

cnviro1uncnts on the continent have, for the n1ost part, in1pnwcd signitlcantly. Today, institutions 

arc increasingly resilient and good governance is spreading. i\'lost notably, r\ (rica has etnbracccl the 

digital revolution. l 'or example, the number of mobile phone subscriptions in sub-Saharan "\frica 

increased to 75 per 100 people in 2017 from less than 2 in 2000. The ach-cnt of information and 

telecommunication tcchnologv is enabling economic and social inclusion, as well as unleashing 

innovation and entrepreneurial potential across the continent. These factors-along with a fawlfahle 

external environment, notably debt relief and higher commodity prices-have contributed to strong 
35 

economic growth over the past two decades. In addition, the middle class is expanding and is 

boosting consmncr and bu~incss spending, at a rate of altnost -+ percent a year. 1 

This momentum is expected to continue alongside sizeable demographic changes. Over the next five 

yean;, half of the world's 10 fastcst"'growing economics will be on the continent, and Africa's middle 

class will expand from 2115 million to 380 million people m·cr the next decade 2 ·rhe youth bulge will 

have C\Tn more significant conscc1ucnces: OnT the next three decades, the youth population will 

increase by over 500 million-more than offsetting the declines in youth populations outside of 

1\frica-and doubling the region's overall population by 2050.' Urbanization bas also been very 

rapid: The number of cities with 5 million or more inhabitants will triple to 17 over the next J(l 

years. 4 This rapid population growth and urbanization is increasing dcnund for goods and services~ 

as \veil as for infrastructure in \"at·ious sectors such as housing, health, transport, and power. Africa's 

infrastructure financing needs arc ;.;izeablc tanging fron1 $130 billion to $170 billion per year, about 

two-thirds of which is currently unfunded.' 

J\'leanwhilc, to better respond to the growing needs and demands of the populations, Africa's 

leadership and institutions arc becoming more assertive in the ownership and advancement of the 

continent's agenda. The region\> countries, through the African Union, adopted a cornrnon longterm plan-known as ,\,>cmb 211(>3-that outlines their economic and social vision and aspirations 

o\'er the next sc\-cral decades. Chief among its priorities is the need for greater integration of the 

region's markets and populations. Under the leadership of the ,\frican Union, regional integration is 

advancing, specifically through policies in support of the free movement of r\fricans across the 

continent and the ,\frican Continentall'rec Trade Agreement (;\fCFL\). The AfCl'TJ\, now one 

year old~ airns to create a single r\ frican n1arkct of over 1 billion consutncrs for goods and services. 

This unprecedented dyntunisln is creating Lrcn1cndous co1nn1crcial opportunities in trade and 

invest"n1ctH, ;tnd it is not an exaggeration to say that _;\fric:t is on course to be the \.vorld's next big 

growth n1arkct.r; 

strategies to succeed in the 

Priorities fnr tht: Continent in 2019, J\frica Growth Initiative, 
36 

3 

How much of Africa's potential is reabed depends on its success in addressing lingering and future 

challenges. Parts of 1\frica continue to struggle with the effects of climate change, extreme poverty, 

state fragility, and insecurity. Democracy is consolidating, although tensions and, in some countries, 

violence around elections point to areas for improvement. Despite progress on governance, more 

efforts are needed to eradicate corruption and elc,'ate the voice of women and young people in 

clecision,making. The demographic tidal wave looms closer, and job creation has not yet been able 

to catch up, contributing to emigration. 

Why Africa matters for the United States and the rest of the world 

Of the challenges outlined, the demographic boom is the most consequential. By the tnrn of this 

century, Africa will be home to 40 percent of the world's population, or 4.4 billion people, according 

to United Nations population projections. That is more than double the populations of Europe, 

North America, Oceania, and Latin "\mcrica and the Caribbean combined. At the same time, 

populations arc aging elsewhere, notably in adnmced economies and several Asian countries. As a 

result, cJ2 percent of the global working-age population will be in :\Erica, providing a large offset to 

this elderly bulge. This is a great opportunity for _c\frica and the global economy if this large labor 

force is equipped with the necessary skills for the jobs of the 21 '' centurv and beyond. i\s healthv 

and productinc members of the global economy, this workforce will signiticantly expand global 

economic opportunities; the African middle class will expand exponentially and create tremendous 

market opportunities for the bene tit of all. 

It~ on the other hand, i\ti·ica docs not OYercome its development challenges, docs not impart its 

young people with the education and skills of the futnre, and does not create enough good quality 

jobs for its young people, then the voulh bulge, which should be a global economic asset, could 

become a global liability. \\'e could experience mass unemployment among millions of desperate 

young people, leading to widespread social and political instability the likes of which we hm'e not 

seen before. ~!igration challenges will rise multi fold, as \\~11 insecurity, gh'en the prevalence of state 

fragility in parts of Africa. Terrorist organizations such as Boko I laram, al-Shabab, and al-Qaida in 

the Islamic lV!aghreb, among others, will exploit this instability. GiYcn that terrorism is global and 

increasingly sophisticated, no country "~ll be immune fi·otn the conseclucnccs of a signiticantly 

deteriorated security situation in Africa. 
37 

4 

Although the scenarios I have laid out assess the situation by the turn of the century, which may 

seetn \Try far a\vay, action is needed nuw. The actions we take or do not take oyer the next few 

years ·will determine which of the two scenarios materialize, and the problems or opportunities 

associat(,d with each scenario will play out long before the end of the century. In the end, U.S. 

engagement with Africa is not good just for Africa, but for the U.S. too. J\s the first \Vorld Bank 

president, Eugene Meyer, put it, "Prosperity, like peace, must therefore be viewed as indivisible. And 

even from the narrowest considerations of self-interest, each of us mnst be concerned with the 

economic clC\·dopmcnt of the world as a whole. For we shall prosper indi,·idually only as we prosper 

collectively." 

Unprecedented foreign engagement in Africa is shifting ties 

The opportunities that Africa presents and, to some extent, the transnational threats originating 

from the region ha•·e generated unprcceclented interest from an increasingly cli•·erse group of global 

partners looking to proacti.-cly strengthen diplomatic, defense, and commercial ties with the 

continent. 

In this "new scramble for Africa," as The Economist labelled it, more than 300 new foreign 

embassies opened in Africa between 2010 and 2016, the largest embassv-building boom ever, led by 

nontraditional actors 7 For example, Turkey opened rhe highest number of embassies, followed by 

Qatar and Inclia. Commercial tics \v~th Africa arc also shifting. Between 2010 and 2017, Africa's 

trade has risen particularly fast with Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and China. Meanwhile, 

trade with Japan and se\·etal European countries declined, and trade \\~th the United States more 

than halved. In 2000, the U.S., France, ancl Italy were Africa's top three tracling partners, in that 

order. In 2017, the top three trading partners wete China, India, and Prance. The U.S. still has the 

largest amount of toreign direct im·cstmcnt in Africa as of 2016, but that U.S. irl\'estmcnt has barely 

increased since 2010. By contrast, investment from some other countries has increased significantly, 

with that of China rising twofold over this period. )dong with increased diplomatic and commercial 

engagetnent, defense tics with nontraditional actors haYe also deepened and 111ore countries now 

possess outposts in Africa. 

7 The New ~cramblc for Africa, 2019. The Economist 
38 

5 

U.S. policies and programs toward Africa have been impactful 

Past U.S. policies and programs toward Africa, which have benefited from bipartisan support in 

Congress, have been positive and impactful overall. The African Growth and Opportunity Act 

(AGOA) has boosted trade between the U.S. and Africa, and created thousands of jobs in Africa as 

well as in the United States. The U.S. trade and investment hubs in J\frica arc facilitating 

intrarcgional as well as U.S.-J\frica trade. The President's Malaria Initiative has benefited almost 500 

million people and caused a significant decline in malaria cases, and the President's Program for 

Emergency AIDS Relief (PEP FAR) has helped contain the scourge of ll!V /AIDS. Jiccd the Future 

boosted crop yields and has saved 5.2 million from hunger. Meanwhile, through Power Africa, more 

than 12 million homes and businesses have gained electricity connections since 2014, and the 

program is on track to reach the goal of 60 million connections in 2030. The l\'iillennium Challenge 

Corporation (l\JCC) is also pr<widing tailored, country-specific support for economic growth and 

poverty reduction. The Young African Leaders lnitiath'c (known as YALI), has trained about 4,000 

of the next generation of J\frican leaders, and created a v·ast network among them across almost 50 

countries. YALI anticipates the rise of 1\frican youth and facilitates tics among these future !cadets 

and with the United States. In this way, Congress and the administration should continue to support 

cultural and educational exchange for ,\frica's youth as well as for young Americans to enhance their 

understanding of the continent. Each summer, we have been priv·ilcgcd to host at Brookings a 

cohort of the fellows. My colleagues and I have been impressed by theit energy, creativity, and 

commitment to the greater cause of the continent. 

The need to refine the framework for U.S.-Africa cooperation to keep up in Africa 

\Vllilc past U.S. policies toward Africa have been impactful, the architecture of the U.S. engagement 

requires modifications to keep up with the dynamism on the continent and the aspirations of the 

African people. In this regard, I would submit the following as priority areas for action and as 

guiding principles for an enhanced U.S.-Africa cooperation. 

liirst, the United States should articulate a clear, comprehensive bipartisan long-term vision for 

its U.S.-Africa policy following broad consultations with key stakeholders, including U.S, and 

African businesses, and the "\frican Union. GiYen the interdependencies between defense, 

diplomacy, and dcv·clopment, the vision should tlexibly balance engagement on all three dimensions, 

but with a greater emphasis on the commercial ties with the potential to yield the most mutually 

beneficial outcomes. The BUILD Act and the U.S. International Development Pinance Corporation 
39 

6 

that will soon replace the Overseas Private I m·estment Corporation have the scope to significantly 

transform Ll.S.~Africa relations, and are an important step in this direction. 

Given the expertise of U.S. companies in infrastructure development and the critical role of 

infrastructure in 1\frica's development, I see this sector as a key priority area in U.S.~.Africa relations. 

As noted earlier, ,\frica has verT large infrastructure financing needs of $130 billion~$170 billion a 

year, two~ thirds of which is currently unfunded. The economic benefits to "\frica from improved 

infrastructure arc substantial-up to 2 percentage points in income per capita growth.5 The 

empowerment of young people and women is another important area for the future of 1\frica, and 

hence U.S.~Africa relations, and should be considen'd among the priority areas for engagement. 

To ensure that this vision is in accordance with Africa's aspirations, it should align, to the extent 

possible, with the Africa Union's .\1>cnda 206} and the lTnitcd Nations' Agenda 2030, which 

encompasses the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that African countries 

adopted. China and the European Union bm·e already taken these steps. At the same time, 

indications suggest that the U.S.'s current bilateral, country~by~country approach does not reflect the 

preferences of the continent for a regional approach, consistent with the AfCFTA. In the planning 

for the Post~AGOA U.S. trade policies with Africa, it would be important to consider the regional 

approach. 

Second, the U.S. will benefit from leveraging USAID's regional trade and investment hubs 

more to strengthen U.S. commercial engagement on the continent, and from a high-level White 

House coordinator for U.S. commercial policy in Ati·ica. Currentlv, US AID bas regional trade 

and investment hubs in three countries-Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa-with an objccti\T to 

"deepen regional economic integration," "promote two~ way trade with the li.S. under /1.GOA," and 

"attract invcsttncnt that drives cotntncrcial expansion \Vithin the region and to global markets." 

Compared to some other external partners, ll.S. companies often lack an nndcrstand.ing of the 

African business environment, which is a barrier to entry. The mandate of the trade and investment 

hubs could be broadened to include collection of timely information on investment opportunities on 

the continent, guidance for U.S. bnsinesses looking to expand their acti,-ities on the continent, and 

assistance in identifying various risk mitigation and financing instruments available across U.S. 

agencies or elsewhere. ,\ high~lcnJ \Vhitc House appointee on U.S.~Africa commercial activities 

8 ~.-\frican Economic Outlook, 2018. African DeYelopmcnt Bank 
40 

7 

would supervise and operationalize the rccommenchtions of the President's Advisory Council on 

Doing Business in Africa, coordinate FS. commercial activities in "\frica across U.S. agencies, and 

help resokc problems, such as possible unfair competition, faced by U.S. companies doing business 

in Africa. 

Third, as part of the operational framework of the U.S.-.. \frica relations, a regular high-level 

summit between the United States and African heads of states will consolidate LT.S.-Africa 

cooperation and improve the narrath·e on Africa's importance to the United States. The venue can 

alternate between the U.S. and '\frica. The high-lev·el summit will go a long way in fostering U.S. 

1\frica cooperation as we have outlined in Foresight 1\frica 2019, Brookings' annual publication on 

Africa. Frequently mistaken for a little more than photo opportunities, these summits actually foster 

regular interactions between gonrnments, businesses, civil society, and other interested parties at 

various lev·cls. Summits also signal clear policy priorities of participating governments and, as a 

result, are important v·chicles for advancing national interests. Other external partners, including 

China, India, Japan, Tmkey, and the European l;nion, have all held two or more high-len,] summits 

as part of their engagement with Africa in recent years.' 

In fact, over the course of six .r\frica-EU summits, European and African leaders have addressed a 

number of issues including trade, migration, peace and security, and technological innovation. The 

most recent summit, held in November 2017 in Cote d'h-oire, yielded substantive results, including 

plans for the creation of a continenHo-continent free trade agreement between the EU and 1\frica.1

" 

Similarly, since 2006, there have been five l'orums for China-Africa Cooperation (FOC1\C) in which 

virtually every African head of state has participated. Over this time, China has become Africa's 

largest trading partner and, at each of the past two summits, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged 

$60 billion in financing. 

In contrast to the Ell and China, the U.S. has held only one high-level summit, in 2014, when 

former President Barack Obama hosted leaders from 50 "\frican states. It was a resounding success, 

resulting in $14 billion worth of commitments from U.S. companies to im-cst in Africa and 

Scl1neidn1an Witncd;•n1 <J\ ''ls the US Keeping pace in .. Africa?" Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 

The Rroc•kineo Institution. 

SUL1U1l!l l>nClt.mea the development by the EU of a trade ch·oh><W >ho> 

to the market and on the priorit:y i>tswc ol[ itTmligra6on, 

~~~;a~;::~:::o:~·:~~·:;~:~7. ~~~; soon build a $5.8 million improve the 
41 

8 

underscoring the potential of summits to boost U.S. commercial ties with Africa. More regular 

lower-level consultations would supplement the high-level summits to ensure effective 

implementation of the resulting agreements and to address challenges that arise. 

In closing, \Vhile not a panacea, l belic,·c that the recommendations outlined in this testimony will go 

a long way to pro,·ide needed clarity, predictability, and stability in the United States' engagement 

with Africa. They will underscore the importance of Africa for the U.S. and help to fast-track future 

administrations' strategies toward Africa. U.S. administrations do not generally unveil an Africa 

strategy until well into their first terms, and there are often delays in filling key personnel positions 

fm J\frica. This vacuum and uncertainty make U.S. policy appear passi,·e, leaving the impression that 

1\frica is not a priority. The attention Africa has been receiYing from other external partners will 

only increase with time. I belie,·e that the U.S. has a solid foundation and a strong legacy in Africa, 

through the success of its past programs and actions on the continent, on which to build. \v'ithout 

more proactiYc approaches, however, the l.J.S. risks falling fnrther behind on this \"astly important 

and strategic continent. l_iltimatdy, the future of FS.··;\frica relations will be determined more by 

li.S. policies and actions (or lack thereof) toward Africa, than those of other countries toward 

Africa. 

Thank you, and I look forward to yonr questions. 
42 

9 

References 

Africa Growth Initiative. 2019. "Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2019." The 

Brookings Institution. 

African Dc,·elopmcnt Bank. 2018. "African Economic Outlook." Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. 

Lekc Acha and Sign<'. 2019. "Spotlighting opportunities for business in 1\frica and strategies 

to succeed in the next big growth market." Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the 

Continent in 2019, Africa Growth lnitiati,·e, The Brookings Institution. 

Leke, Acha, !\1utsa Chironga, and Georges Dcsnux. 2018. "Africa's Business Revolution: How to 

Succeed in rhe \\'odd's next Big Growth !v[arket." Roston, i\IA: Harvard Business Rc,·iew Press. 

McKinsey Global Institute. 2016. "Lions on the Mm·e II: Realizing the Potential of Africa's 

Economies." McKinsey & Company. 

Schneidman Witney. 2019. "Is the US Pace in Africa?" Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for 

the Continent in 2019. The Brookings Im;tiruti,clfl. 

The Economist 2019. "The New Scramble for Africa." 

https: /(,,·ww.cconomist.com/kadcrs /2019/m /07 /the-new-scramble-for-africa 

United Nations \\'odd Population Prospects 2017 Revision, Medium Variant Projections. 
43 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY 

ANALYST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. MESERVEY. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Members Wright, 

and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify. Thank you as well for your continued focus on and championing of deeper U.S.-Africa ties. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any 

official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

In may remarks I will focus on what I consider to be the four 

most important U.S. strategic priorities in Africa. 

First, the U.S. must retain sufficient influence and positioning to 

protect its national interests on the continent. This is an evergreen 

challenge that has grown more urgent given the rising great and 

middle power competition in Africa. 

As is often commented upon, Djibouti is a good example of this 

problem. Its port is critical to U.S. military operations in East Africa, yet the Chinese government has built such influence there that 

there is concern the U.S. will be unable to maintain the necessary 

level of access. 

The U.S. is already far behind in the competition to develop and 

deploy 5G mobile network technology in Africa. The winner of this 

competition will gain great economic and other advantages. Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have built most of the existing 

telecoms infrastructure in Africa, and several large African telecom 

companies are already negotiating with Huawei on building 5G 

networks. 

Huawei’s and ZTE’s dominance in Africa is also an obvious counterintelligence problem for the United States. Relatedly, Chinese 

companies have built, or renovated, or Beijing has financed at least 

63 sensitive government buildings in at least 29 African countries. 

We should assume most, if not all, of those buildings are bugged 

or otherwise compromised, as was the Chinese-built African Union 

headquarters. 

Second, the U.S. should facilitate regulatory and normative environments that ensure U.S. companies can compete on an even footing in Africa. By 2030, an estimated 19 African economies will be 

growing by 5 percent or more per year and the continent will likely 

constitute a $3 trillion economy. It will harm the U.S. and ordinary 

Africans if anti-competitive behavior becomes the norm and further 

disadvantages U.S. firms. 

Third, the U.S. should encourage the growth of African democracy. It is the political system that best promotes human flourishing. And shared democratic values facilitate mutually beneficial 

relationships between the U.S. and other countries. After years of 

progress on the continent in this regard there has been worrisome 

backsliding in a number of countries. 

Finally, the U.S. must ensure terrorists cannot use Africa as a 

staging ground for attacks against the U.S. There have been gains 

against some of the continent’s worst groups, but we are also in the 

midst of a resurgence of terrorist activity in the Sahel region. The 

Islamic State West Africa Province and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam 

wal Muslimeen have been particularly active and ambitious. 
44 

A long-term component of the terrorism problem is the spread of 

the Wahhabist practice of Islam in Africa. Saudi Arabia in particular has proselytized this fundamentalist practice, important 

components of which most current Islamist terrorist groups subscribe to. 

Responding in a constructive way to the problems and prospects 

of Africa requires a thoughtful, committed approach. In that spirt, 

I think the U.S. should do the following, and this is not a comprehensive list: 

Assess with which governments it can reasonably expect to have 

a mutually beneficial partnership. Good candidates should receive 

a full suite of U.S. engagement, while poor candidates should be 

more economy-of-force operations. 

Assist African countries to become more business friendly; foster 

African entrepreneurs; aid African countries to get the best possible deals from Chinese investments; task U.S. embassies with 

identifying and facilitating commercial opportunity for U.S. companies, foster good governance in Africa by assisting civil society, 

fighting corruption, and deepening cooperation with non-African allies active on the continent; create a strategic messaging plan that 

explains to African countries the benefits of partnering with the 

United States; make the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit a routine 

event; and ensure that the new International Development Finance 

Corporation achieves its stated purpose of supporting the U.S. in 

its strategic competition with China. 

The U.S. already has a strong foundation of African engagement 

of which it should be proud. But it also can and should do more. 

I thank the committee again for doing its part to ensure that U.S. 

policies protect American interests and contribute to a safe, prosperous, and free Africa. 

I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:] 
45 

TfieRentage Foundation 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations 

Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

United States House of Representatives 

March 26, 2019 

Joshua Meservey 

Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle East 

The Heritage Foundation 

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, 

and members of the committee, thank you 

for this opportunity to testify before you. 

With your permission, I would like to submit 

my written testimony into the record. 

The views I express in this testimony are my 

own and should not be construed as 

representing any official position of The 

Heritage Foundation. 

U.S. Strategic Priorities in Africa 

In this testimony, I will focus on what I 

consider to be the four most important U.S. 

strategic priorities in Africa that should 

guide American engagement with the 

continent. 

First the U.S. must retain sufficient 

influence and positioning on the continent 

1 General Thomas D. Waldhauser, "Statement of 

General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States 

Marine Corps, Commander, United States Africa 

Command," testimony before the Senate Committee 

to protect its national interests there. This is 

an evergreen challenge that has grown more 

urgent given the rising great and middle 

power competition in Africa. Many 

countries are rapidly expanding their 

engagement on the continent-the U.S. 

should welcome that development in the 

case of its allies, but for aggressive American 

competitors such as China and Russia, it is a 

challenge. 

One example of this problem is the port in 

Djibouti. Ninety percent of the equipment 

the U.S. military uses to conduct its 

operations in East Africa flow through 

Djibouti. 1 Chinese companies now operate 

three of the five terminals in Djibouti port, 

whereas in early 2017 they did not operate 

on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 7, 2019, 

https:/ jwww.armedservices.senate.gov fimo j media/ doc(Waldhauser _ 0 

2-07-19.pdf. 

214 Massachusetts Avenue. NE • Washmg:on, DC 20002 • (202) 546-4400 • heritage org 
46 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

any. z Losing influence and leverage in a 

place like Djibouti and other strategic 

locations across the continent will 

negatively affect U.S. national interests. 

Another concern for the U.S. in this vein is 

the competition, of which Africa is a part, to 

develop and deploy SG mobile network 

technology. Whichever country dominates 

the provision of SG infrastructure will likely 

gain great economic benefit and a headstart 

on developing other future, critical 

technologies. 

China has an immense lead in Africa. Two of 

its national champion companies, Huawei 

and ZTE, have built more than 50 3G 

networks in 36 African countries.3 Huawei 

2 Chinese companies have recently built two of those 

terminals-the lloraleh Multipurpose Port and the 

terminal servicing the Chinese military base there, 

both opened in 2017-and China Merchants Port, a 

Chinese state*owned company, owns a stake in the 

Doraleh Container terminal and recently began 

running its daily operations. For a report on China 

Merchants Port running daily operations at the 

Doraleh Container terminal, see Costas Paris, "China 

Tightens Grip on East African Port," The Wall Street 

journal, February 21, 2019. 

https:ffwww.wsj.comjarticlesjchina-tightens-grip· 

on-east-african-port-115507 46800. 

:'"African Countries Close Cooperation with China 

Huawei," translated, Ministry of Comn1crce of the 

People's Republic of China, December 26, 2018, 

http:ffwww.mofcom.gov.cnjarticle/i/jyjl/k/20181 

2/20181202820364.shtml. 

-1 Amy Mackinnon, "For Africa, Chinese-Built Internet 

Is Better Than No Internet at All," Foreign Policy. 

March 19,2019, 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/for-africachinesc-built-internct-is-better-than-no-internet-atall/. 

5 "African Countries Close Cooperation with China 

Huawci." 

"lluawei and ZTE are supposedly private, but have 

so many links to the Chinese government that the 

distinction is likely meaningless. Huawei's founder 

was once the director of the People's Liberation 

Army"s Information Engineering Academy, in which 

capacity he had contact with a PLA unit dedicated to 

cyber espionage. In U.S. court filings, ZTE exercised 

alone has built around 70 percent of Africa's 

4G networks. 4 A number of large African 

telecom companies are already negotiating 

with Huawei on building SG networks.s 

Huawei and ZTE's dominance of the African 

telecommunications infrastructure also 

presents a significant counterintelligence 

problem for the U.S. Both companies have 

numerous links to the Chinese state. 6 

Huawei also built the ICT infrastructure 

inside the Chinese-built African Union 

headquarters that uploaded the contents of 

its servers every morning to mainland 

China, 7 and China's 2017 National 

Intelligence Law obligates individuals and 

the "State Secrets Privilege," a tacit admission, the 

plaintiff argued. that ZTE is part of the Chinese 

government Roth companies have received 

significant government subsidies and other forms of 

help, such as Chinese banks financing many of their 

projects in Africa. For Huawei's founder's links to 

the PLA, see Elsa Kania. "'Much Ado about Huawei 

(Part 1 ),"Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 

27, 2018, https:ffwww.aspistrategist.org.aufmuch· 

ado-huawei·part-1/. For ZTE asserting the "'State 

Secrets Privilege," see Plaintiffs Amended Motion to 

Vacate Arbitration Award, Request for Additional 

Time for Discovery, and Opposition to Confirmation 

of Arbitration Award, Universal Telephone Exchange, 

Inc., vs. XTE Corporation and ZTE USA, Inc., No. DC· 

10-07052 ( 44" Judicial Dist. Ct. Dallas County, TX} 

https:ffcourtsportal.dallascounty.orgjllALl,ASPRO 

ll/DocumentViewer/Embcddcd/3AuGlaii3Sr06C3Z 

ROTqiZnu03EWn98jvm0sxCmnzg9FZCcjaHw120C 

GQWDtPBh20djoc7n4kOvTObObGnCI.ikUf2i_HNMtqMSAW7VNal1?p~O. For 

reports of the subsidies and financing, see ''A 

Transactional Risk Profile of Huawei," RWR 

Advisory Group, February 13, 2018, 

https:ffwww.rwradvisowcom/wpcontentfuploads/2018/04/RWR-Huawei-RiskReport·2·13-2018.pdf. 

7 Danielle Cave. "The African Union Headquarters 

!lack and Australia"s SG Network,"' Australian 

Strategic Policy Institute, July 13, 2018, 

https:jjwww.aspistrategist.org.aufthe-african· 

union-headquarters-hack-and-australias-Sgnetwork/. 

2 
47 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

companies to help China's national 

intelligence work.B 

Another perhaps underappreciated 

problem for the U.S. is that Chinese 

companies have built or renovated, or 

Beijing has financed, at least 63 sensitive 

government buildings in at least 29 African 

countries. 9 Beijing is the world leader in 

economic espionage; all Chinese companies, 

state-owned or private, arc obliged to obey 

the Chinese Communist Party; and Beijing 

has already shown it will use its access to an 

important African building to hug it and 

compromise its ICT systems. U.S. officials 

should assume the many Chinese-built 

government buildings in Africa are 

compromised, and avoid divulging sensitive 

information inside the buildings or on their 

ICT systems. 

Second the U.S. should facilitate regulatory 

and normative environments that ensure 

U.S. companies can compete on an even 

footing in Africa. If unfair economic norms 

that reward anti-competitive behavior 

n Elsa Kania, "Much Ado about Huawei (Part 2)," 

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 28, 2018, 

https:/ /www.aspistrategist.org.aufmuch-adohuawei-part-2/. 

9 Author derived numbers from a variety of sources. 

"Sensitive government buildings" include, for 

example, presidential offices, various ministry 

buildings, parliaments, regional council offices, and 

auditor-general offices. The number cited does not 

include the African Union headquarters or the yetto-be-built ECOWAS headquarters, which Ileijing 

has agreed to fund and which a Chinese company 

will likely build. 10 Joshua Meservey, "Chinese Corruption in Africa 

Undermines Beijing's Rhetoric About Friendship 

with the Continent," The Heritage Foundation Issue 

Brief No. 4895, August 8, 2018, 

https:/ fwww.heritage.org/globalpo litics I rc port/ chinese-corruption-africaundermines-beijings-rhetoric-aboul-friendship-the 

and Nick McKenzie and Angus Grigg, "China's ZTE 

was Built to Spy and Bribe, Court Documents 

Allege," The Sydney Morning Herald, May 31, 2018, 

https:/ fwww.smh.corn.au/businessfcompanies/chi 

develop, U.S. companies will be at a 

disadvantage, and ordinary Africans will not 

reap as much economic benefit as they 

should. The U.S. will suffer too, as 

prosperous American companies 

strengthen U.S. economic might and 

contribute to American soft power. 

In fact, American companies have already 

lost some business in Africa because of 

rivals' anti-competitive behavior, 10 and the 

future opportunities on the continent are so 

significant that it is a matter of national 

importance that American companies have a 

fair chance there. l3y 2030, an estimated 19 

African economies will be growing by 5 

percent or more per year, and the continent 

will likely constitute a $3 trillion economy.11 

The African Development Bank predicts that 

consumer spending in Africa will grow to 

$1.4 trillion by 2020.12 Between 2015 and 

2040, about 30 percent of the world's 

increase in energy demand will be in 

Africa, 13 while experts forecast the 

continent's mobile internet connections will 

double between 2017 and 2022.1 4 

na-s-zte-was-built-to-spy-and-bribe-courtclocuments-allege-20180531-p4ziqd.html. 

11 Michael Lalor, et aL, "Connectivity Redefined," 

EY's Attractiveness Program Africa, May 2017, 

http:/ fwww.ey.com/PublicationfvwLUAssetsfeyafr 

ica-attractiveness-repo rtf$ FILE I eya fricaattracti vcness-report. pel f. 

u "Future of Africa's Youth Docs Not Lie in 

Migration to Europe, Adesina Tells G7," African 

Development Bank Group, May, 29, 2017, 

https:/ fwww.afdb.org/cnfnews-and-events/futureof-africas-youth-does-not-lie-in-migration-tocurope-adesina-tells-g7-17056/. 

u "2017 Outlook for Energy: A View to 2010," 

ExxonMobil, n.d., 

http:/ fcdn.cxxonmobil.com/~/media/globaiffiles/ 

outlook-for-energy /2017 /2017-outlook-forenergy.pdf. 

14 Tiisetso Motsoencng, "Africa Set to Top 1 Billion 

Mobile Internet Connections in Five Years: Study," 

Reuters, November 6, 2017, 

https:/ faf.reuters.comfarticle/topNews/idAFKBN 1 

D61SV-OZATP. 

3 
48 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Third the U.S. should encourage the growth 

of African democracy. The U.S. has 

recognized for decades the importance of 

promoting the global growth of democracy. 

It is the political system that best promotes 

human flourishing, and shared democratic 

values facilitate mutually beneficial 

relationships between the U.S. and other 

countries. 

The progress in Africa on this front is mixed. 

In 1991, there were only four African 

electoral democracies, but that number rose 

to 20 by 2014.15 However, in recent years 

democratic backsliding has beset some 

countries, with repressive laws designed to 

muzzle civil society and internet shutdowns 

by the authorities becoming more common. 

The pressure on African democracies is 

likely to continue in the coming years, not 

least because of China's influence across the 

continent. The Chinese Communist Party 

disdains democracy, viewing it as a threat to 

its own authoritarian model and as a chaotic 

and inefficient systemJ6lJnder President Xi 

)inping, Beijing is more aggressively seeking 

to persuade African rulers and thought 

leaders to embrace its own repressive 

governance model and eschew democracy.l 7 

We arc likely already seeing the effects of 

1; "Tracking Africa's Progress in Figures," African 

Development Bank Group, 2014, 

https:jjwww.afdb.orgjfileadminjuploadsjafdb/Doc 

uments/Publications/Tracking.Africa%E2%80%99 

s_Progressjn_Figurcs.pd[ 

16 Uza Tobin, "Xi's Vision for Transforming Global 

Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington 

and Its Allies," Texas National Security f?eview, Vol. 2, 

Issue 1, November 2018, 

https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-fortransforming~global-governance-a~strategic~ 

challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/. 

17 Aaron L. Friedberg, "Competing with China," 

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, VoL 60, No.3 

(June-july 2018), pp. 7-64, 

https:ffwww.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/s 

urvivalMglobal~politics-and-strategy-junejulyChina's efforts in the recent undemocratic 

trends in some countries.18 

Finally the U.S. must ensure terrorists 

cannot use the continent as a staging ground 

for attacks on U.S. soil or its overseas 

interests. One of the lessons of the 9/11 

terror attacks was that a terrorist safe haven 

even thousands of miles away can threaten 

the U.S. homeland. Unfortunately, the 

conditions in a number of African countries 

make them susceptible to use as safe havens. 

According to the 2018 Fragile States Index, 

four of the world's six most-unstable states 

are African. The best-ranked African 

country is the small island nation of 

Seychelles, which was the only African 

country in the "stable" category. 19 The 

prevalence of impoverished and poorly 

governed states contributes to this 

unfortunate reality. 

Despite some of the continent's most 

prominent terror groups such as al-Shabaab 

in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and ISIS 

in Libya suffering setbacks in recent years, 

the terror threat on the continent remains 

potent. According to the 2018 Global 

Terrorism Index, 12 of the world's 23 

countries most affected by terrorism were 

in Africa.zo The African Center for Strategic 

2018/603-02-friedberg, and Oenis M. Tull, "'China's 

Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and 

Consequences," The journal of Modern African 

Studies, VoL 41, No.3 (Sep., 2006),pp. 459-479, 

http:// archi vcs.ceri um.ca/ 1M G I pdf /Tul !.pdf. 

"'Adrian Shahbaz, "Fake News, Data Collection, and 

the Challenge to Democracy," Freedom on the Net 

2018, Freedom !louse, n.d., 

h ttps: //freedom house.org/ report/ freedom· 

net/freedom-net-2018/rise·digitalauthoritarianism. 

19 2018 Fragile States Index, Fund For Peace, n.d., 

http://fundforpeacc.org/globalf2018/04/24/fragil 

e~sta tes-index- 20 18~a n n ual- report/. 

20 Global Terrorism Index 2018, Institute for 

Economics & Peace, n.d., 

http: I/ visionoth uma ni ty.org/ app /uploads /2018/12 

/Global-Terrorism-lndcx-20 18-l.pdf 

4 
49 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Studies counts 27 discrete terror groups on 

the continent operating primarily in 11 

countries.Zl 

The resurgence of lslamist terror groups in 

the Sahel region is particularly worrisome. 

The collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's regime 

in 2011 poured weapons and trained 

fighters into particularly northern Mali, 

contributing to the surge in the capabilities 

ofSahelian armed groups. Reports of violent 

acts by lslamist terror groups in the Sahel 

have doubled every year since 2016, as have 

reports of fatalities linked to the violence2 2 

Two groups merit particular attention. The 

Islamic State West Africa Province 

conquered hundreds of square miles in 

Nigeria, Chad, and Niger at the beginning of 

this year alone, overwhelmed a dozen 

military bases, and has an estimated 3,500 

fighters. 23 jama'at Nusrat a! Islam wal 

M uslimeen is an alliance of four terror 

groups that formed in 2017, and was 

responsible for about half of all the terroristrelated violence in the Sahel in 2018.24 

21 "More Activity but Fewer Fatalities Linked to 

1\frican Militant lslamist Groups in 2017," Africa 

Center for Strategic Studies, january 26, 2018, 

h ttps: //a fricacenter.o rgj spotlight j activity -fewerfatalitics-linked-african-militant-islamist-groups2017/. 

u "The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant 

Isla mist Groups in the Sahel," Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies, February 15,2019, 

h ttps: // africacenter.org/ spot! igh l/ the-com pi exand-growing-thrcat-of-militant-islamist-groups-inthe-sahel f. 23 Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw," Islamic State, 

Seeking Next Chapter, Makes Inroads Through West 

Africa," The Wall Street journal, February 3, 2019, 

https:jjwww.wsj.comjarticlesjislamic-statesccking-next-chapter-makes-inroads-through ~west~ 

ati·ica-11549220824. 

21 "The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant 

lslamist Groups in the Sahel." 

25 Andrew L. Peek, "The Roots of Lone Wolf 

Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, january 12, 2016, 

A long-term component of the terrorist 

problem is the spread of the Wahhabist 

practice of Islam in Africa. Saudi Arabia in 

particular has proselytized across the world 

this fundamentalist practice of Islam zs to 

which most current Islamist terrorist 

groups subscribe.Z6(n many part of Africa, 

Wahhabism has pushed back Sufism, the 

syncretic and generally tolerant practice of 

Islam traditional to much of the continent, 

and has supplanted it entirely as the 

dominant practice in East Africa. 27 While 

only a small minority of Wahhabists ever 

radicalize to Isla mist violence, Wahhabism's 

spread has broadened the pool of people 

who share many theological tenets with 

lslamist terrorists.zs 

Saudi Arabia and other governments such as 

Qatar and Kuwait that financed terrorist 

organizations or Wahhabist proselytization, 

or whose citizens did so, appear to have 

decreased or largely stopped those 

activities. However, the challenge of the 

spread ofWahhabism in Africa remains, and 

any U.S. strategy towards the continent 

should address it. 

https:jjwww.foreignaffairs.comjarticlcs/middleeast/2016-01-12/roots-lonc-wolf-terrorism 

26 For an explanation of the (minor) differences 

between Wahhabism and Salaf1sm, another term 

.=1nalysts frequently use to describe the ideology of 

most current Islamist terrorist groups, sec Peter 

Mandaville, Global Politicallslam (London: 

Routledge, 2005), p. 247 

n Abdisaid M. Ali, "Isla mist Extremism in East 

Africa," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 9, 

2016, 

http:jjafricacenter.org/publicationjislamistcxtremism-east-africaf. 

zn "Kenyan Somali lslamist Radicalisation," 

International Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 85, 

january 25, 2012, 

https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.netjb085-

kcnyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.pdf and Mark 

Woodward, "Turning Up the Heat on Wahhabi 

Colonialism," Arizona State University, September 2, 

2009, http:j jcsc.asu.edu/2009/09/02/turning-up· 

the-heat-on·wahhabi-colonialismj. 

5 
50 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

The Stakes 

Africa will only increase in significance in 

the coming decades. In addition to its 

economic importance mentioned earlier, the 

continent touches three of the world's eight 

maritime chokepoints, abuts Europe and 

Asia, and has thousands of miles of Atlantic 

and Indian Ocean coastline. In 2014, the 

continent also had the largest or secondlargest known reserves of ten important 

mineral resources. 29 Included in Africa's 

share of the world's reserves are 22 of the 

33 mineral commodities the U.S. deems 

critical to its economy and national defense, 

and for which the U.S. is more than 50 

percent import reliant. 3D 

African countries are diplomatically 

important as well, comprising the largest 

geographical voting bloc in many 

international fora. Africa is also the world's 

fastest growing, and youngest, continent. Its 

population is projected to double by 2050 

and quadruple by 2100, which would mean 

one-third of the world's population would 

be African. 31 The only sure prediction 

surrounding this trend is that it will have a 

profound impact on the world, one 

policymakers need to be planning for now. 

"2014 Minerals Yearbook: Africa, U.S. Geological 

Survey of the U.S. Department of Interior, December 

2017, 

https:f /minerals.usgs.gov /minerals/pubs/ country 1 201 4/myb3-sum·2014·africa.pdf. 

;

10 The U.S. currently imports at least some of its 

supply of 15 of those 22 critical mineral 

commodities from China and/or Russia. China 

dominates the global supply chain for cobaltnecessary for making lithium-ion batteries which 

may be critical to powering self-driving cars, a 

potentially massive industry in the ncar future-50 

percent of which is produced in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo. For the statistics on cobalt, see 

Scott Patterson and Russell Gold, "There's a Global 

Race to Control Batteries-and China Is Winning," 

The Wall Street journal, February 11, 2018, 

For these and other reasons, powers such as 

China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, 

India, and many others are jockeying for 

influence on the continent. Seven different 

countries, including the U.S., have military 

bases in the Horn of Africa. Some of these 

countries are American competitors, and the 

U.S. needs a strategic and energetic 

approach to successfully manage the 

challenges they bring. 

The Way Ahead 

Late last year, National Security Advisor 

john Bolton unveiled the Trump 

administration's Africa strategy. Strategies 

focus on "big-picture" ideas and guiding 

principles, so it is unsurpnsmg the 

administration's Africa strategy lacked 

detail in some areas. We will have to wait for 

more specifics on some of the promised new 

programs before we can fully assess the 

strategy. 

For now, however, I believe the strategy got 

the "big-picture" themes correct. It 

acknowledged the paramount challenge of 

powerful and increasingly expeditionary 

geopolitical competitors such as China and 

Russia, but did not abandon 

counterterrorism altogether. Trade and 

investment is, happily, a central 

https:/ fwww.wsj.comfarticles/theres-a·global· 

race-to-co ntro 1-batteriesand -china-is-winning1518374815?mod=e2tw. The 22 critical mineral 

commodities found in Africa are Aluminum, 

Antimony, Arsenic, Rarite, Cesium, Chromium, 

Cobalt, Fluorspar, Graphite, Lithium, Manganese, 

Niobium, Platinum-Group Metals, Rare Earths, 

Rubidium, Tantalum, Tin, Titanium Mineral 

Concentrate, Tungsten, Uranium, Vanadium, and 

Zirconium. Variety of sources compiled by author. 

' 1 Gilles Pison, "There's a Strong Chance that One· 

Third of All People will be African by 21 00," The 

Conversation. October 10, 2017, 

http:/ jthcconversation.com/theres-a·strong· 

chancc-that·one-third-of-all·pcople-will-bc-african· 

by-2100-84576. 

6 
51 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

component-having as many of the U.S.'s 

world-class companies operate on the 

continent as possible will create jobs in the 

U.S. and Africa, give African governments 

value for their money, and create deeper 

and more equitable partnerships with 

African countries. 

The details of the strategy's "Prosper Africa" 

initiative will be key, as it appears designed 

to translate the strategy's vision for a trade 

and investment-centric approach to Africa 

into reality. Indications are that the 

administration is serious about the effort 

and is approaching it in a thoughtful way, 

but we will have to wait for the final details 

to emerge to know how effective it can be. 

The strategy is an important development 

for U.S.-Africa relations, but all branches of 

government, the business community, the 

African diaspora in the U.S., and civil society 

have an important role to play in making U.S. 

engagement with Africa as effective as 

possible. 

A smart approach to Africa requires the U.S. 

to stretch its limited resources farther. The 

U.S. should assess with which governments 

it can reasonably expect to have a positive, 

mutually beneficial, and strategic 

partnership. Considerations should include 

whether a government has a demonstrated 

desire and capacity to meaningfully improve 

its governance, and whether the country is 

strategically important enough to merit 

special engagement. That calculation should 

hinge on the country's geostrategic 

positioning, endowment of natural 

resources, economic potential, population 

size, and the presence of competitors, allies, 

and other relevant challenges. 

Countries that are good candidates for a 

strategic partnership should receive the full 

suite of U.S. engagements, such as: 

consideration for a free-trade agreement, if 

practicable; fully staffed U.S. embassies, 

including with a commercial attache; U.S. 

government -facilitated visits by U.S. 

business delegations; high-level U.S. official 

visits and interventions on behalf of U.S. 

companies; and mobilization of that 

country's U.S. diaspora to invest and engage 

in other constructive ways. 

There are additional ways the U.S. can help 

African countries boost their economic 

growth that will also benefit the U.S. Ideas 

include: 

Helping U.S. businesses identify local 

African partners, often a critical 

component for success; 

Facilitating linkages between African 

countries and U.S. state governments, 

which best understand their local 

companies and the opportunities they 

might enjoy in Africa; 

Fostering African entrepreneurs by 

facilitating exchanges or internships 

with them and U.S. tech companies; 

hosting innovation competitions in 

Africa; and persuading U.S. business 

luminaries to visit the continent or get 

involved in other ways; 

Assisting African countries to become 

more business friendly by helping them 

improve their regulatory environments 

by, for example, embedding U.S. 

technical experts in the central banks or 

commercial ministries of willing 

countries; and helping the regional 

economic communities more deeply 

integrate, thereby creating larger 

markets and lowering costs of doing 

business across borders; 

Aiding African countries to get the best 

possible deals from Chinese investment 

by helping build their capacity to assess 

contracts and ensure compliance; 

Tasking U.S. embassies with identifying 

and facilitating commercial 

opportunities for U.S. companies. The 

7 
52 

CONGRESSIONAl TESTIMONY 

Championing American Business 

Through Diplomacy Act has good ideas 

for achieving this. 

Fostering good governance must continue 

to he a critical part of U.S. engagement with 

African countries. The U.S. can: 

Assist civil society in Africa hy, for 

instance, facilitating exchange programs 

for African civil society leaders within 

the continent, or to the U.S., to learn 

from one another; 

Fight corruption by elevating the issue 

as part of U.S. development assistance, 

helping civil society organizations track 

and publicize corruption, and 

promoting economic freedom;32 

Deepen coordination and cooperation 

with allies active on the continent, and 

who are a positive influence towards 

good governance. 

Other efforts the U.S. should make to pursue 

its strategic priorities in Africa include: 

Creating a strategic messaging initiative 

that explains to African countries the 

benefits of partnering with the U.S. The 

initiative should refute the narrative that 

the U.S. is withdrawing from Africa. The 

U.S. remains the largest investor in 

Africa,33 is by far the continent's largest 

provider of overseas development 

assistance, has significant numbers of its 

major companies operating on the 

continent, and continues large, 

innovative initiatives-some now nearly 

two decades old-such as the 

32 For a more in-depth discussion, see Joshua 

Meservey, "The Impact of Corruption on Economic 

Development in sub-Saharan Africa" in 2017 Global 

Agenda for Economic Freedom, james M. Roberts 

and William T. Wilson, eds., The Heritage 

Foundation Special Report No. 188, 

https:/ jwww.heritage.org/international· 

President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 

Relief, the African Growth and 

Opportunity Act, the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation, Power Africa, 

and Feed the Future, that have saved and 

improved millions of lives across the 

continent. The initiative should also 

advocate for democracy as the political 

system with the best record of not only 

protecting individual rights, but also 

delivering economic prosperity; 

Making the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit a 

Routine Event; 

Pressuring any states still funding the 

proselytizing of fundamentalist 

interpretations of Islam to stop, and to 

crack down on their citizens' funding; 

Ensuring that the new United States 

International Development Finance 

Corporation achieves its stated purpose 

of supporting the U.S. in its strategic 

competition with China. Congress should 

vigorously exercise its oversight 

authority to ensure it does so. 

Africa is a hugely important continent, and 

U.S. engagement has not recalibrated to 

account for the rapid changes on the 

continent. There is still time, and hearings 

like this one and other activities happening 

across the government, private sector, and 

civil society give me hope that the U.S. is 

moving in the right direction. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to 

testify, and I look forward to any questions 

you may have. 

economies/ re port/20 17 ·glo ba !-agenda-economic· 

freedom. 

:n EY Attractiveness Program: Africa, EY, October 

2018, https:j jwww.ey.comjzaj en/issues/business· 

en vi ron mcnt/ ey-a ttractivcness-program-af rica2018#section4. 

8 
53 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

******* *********** 

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section 50 I (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no funds from any government 

at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2016, it had 

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Foundation's books are audited annually by the national accounting linn ofRSM US, LLP. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation stafftesti fy as individuals discussing their own independent research. The 

views expressed are their own and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board 

of trustees. 

9 
54 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. I want to thank all three of our 

witnesses today for your testimony. And would now like to begin 

with members asking questions. And I actually will hold my questions and ask them last, since I know members have numerous 

conflicts. 

So, I will go to the ranking member. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I was happy to hear 

you mention Cameroon in your opening statement because I also 

have very deep interest there. I have a number of constituents in 

my district from Cameroon. And I have heard from both sides. 

And there is a concern that as the resistance in Anglophone 

Cameroon continues that security forces of the Government of 

Cameroon will continue to clamp down which will cause even further growth in resistance and the whole thing will spiral. 

And so, my question is what can and should, in your opinion, the 

U.S. Government do in Cameroon? And, Madam, I am going to ask 

all of you that question. Madam Ambassador, I am going to start 

with you. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much. 

I think the first thing that we can do, and this has already, was 

already done by Assistant Secretary Nagy, was engage with the 

government on this issue. I think for a number of months and for 

the past year we have ignored what was happening in any consistent way. 

So Assistant Secretary Nagy was there and I know that he did 

raise this issue with the government. I do not know the gist of the 

conversation, but I can imagine that he expressed our concerns 

about this issue. 

I think in the long run we may have to take some actions against 

the government and other parties who are committing human 

rights violations. I am sure you have seen the pictures that we 

have all seen coming from that situation. And the pictures are coming from both sides. The atrocities are being committed by both 

sides, and people should be held accountable for that to send a 

strong message, that this is not the way you address these kinds 

of issues. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Dr. Coulibaly. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes, I would echo off Ambassador ThomasGreenfield’s sentiment for the U.S. to take a stronger stance where 

it deems there to have been some already violations of the human 

rights and an opportunity to put as much pressure on the government as possible to respect the rights of all. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Meservey. 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes, I agree with my colleagues comments. I 

think it is very important that the Cameroonian Government understand that the U.S. is watching. I think regional engagement is 

always very important in these sorts of conflict, so the U.S. should 

be working very actively with neighbors and other concerned countries, the Africa Union. 

This doubtlessly concerns many African countries, and the U.S. 

should be playing the unique role that it can as a facilitator and 

a convener to try to get them working or pulling in the same direction, working with a singular purpose on Cameroon. 

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
55 

Ms. BASS. Oh, wonderful. 

Representative OMAR. Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Very excited to see all of you and hear your testimony. 

Ambassador, I do not know if you remember me, but we met in 

Minneapolis right after I had been elected to the Minnesota House. 

And so, as you probably know, there is a little crisis right now that 

is happening to many of my constituents and friends and neighbors 

who are from Liberia, who are on a DED status. And I know that 

in your history that you served as an ambassador to Liberia. 

And so, I wanted to see if we can maybe chat about this particular crisis that is being visited upon many of my constituents. 

Last week was a recess week for us, and so I got home. And, you 

know, we visited many workplaces. There are the majority of the 

Liberians in my district and in Minnesota are healthcare workers, 

and so one of the places that I visited was an assisted living center 

where 177 of their employees were DED recipients. And their status ends on the 31st of this month. And so if that is not renewed, 

most of them are most likely going to be returned back to Liberia. 

And so I know that there is going to be a great impact on our 

community. There is going to be a great impact on my district. But 

I wanted to see if you maybe can help us sort of fully understand 

the impact that it might have on the folks in Liberia. 

Do you know how many, how much money in remittances do Liberians here in this country send back to Liberia? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I do not know that exact figure. But I know that it is significant, just as it is across the continent of Africa. It plays a huge role in the economy of Liberia. 

But I appreciate the question related to Liberians who are beneficiaries of DED. This was an issue that came up numerous times 

during my tenure as the Ambassador to Liberia. I will admit that 

at the time, given the fact that President Sirleaf was president of 

the country, and the country was going through significant transformation in a positive way, that I wanted to encourage Liberians 

who were living in the U.S. to come back and be part of the success 

that was Liberia. 

In the meantime, you know, as I have returned to the U.S., this 

is a much more comprehensive and bigger issue than Liberia. I met 

a young Liberian women a few—last week, in fact, who was a 

DACA recipient. And she had lived here in the United States since 

she was 4 years old. She does not know anyone in Liberia. She is 

currently a student at a university here in the United States, doing 

quite well, interning in Washington, DC. And she is fearful of what 

she will find in Liberia. 

And I tried to encourage her by telling her there is nothing to 

fear. But it is easy for me to say that sitting here without the fear 

of being returned to a place that I do not know. And I left that discussion with her extraordinarily sympathetic to her plight. And I 

do believe that as we look at the broader DACA issues related to 

all of the nationalities here in the United States, the Liberians 

have to be part of that comprehensive solution. 

Whether that can happen by the end of March, I do not know. 

But I do know that if they are to return to Liberia, right now they 

are going to return to a country that is at peace. But I think the 
56 

economy there is in a bit of a downfall. And so it will be very, very 

difficult for these individuals to reintegrate back into Liberia, having been out of Liberia as long as they have been out of Liberia. 

Ms. OMAR. Yes. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. In addition, their family 

members who have been dependent on their remittances will no 

longer have that benefit. 

Ms. OMAR. Yes. Thank you for that broad overview of the issue. 

And that brings me, actually, to the second question I was going 

to ask you is that while you say it is at peace, many of my constituents and my friends and neighbors say that it is not economically 

or physically safe for them to return. And we know that an assessment usually is done for a country before we decide to terminate 

the temporary status. And so, do you think that this president and 

Secretary Nielsen have done or at least asked for that assessment 

to be made before making a decision to terminate? That is the first 

part of my question. 

And then the second part is do you think Liberia is ready to absorb all of the people that are going to be returned back to it? And 

will that maybe harm any peace or stability it might currently 

have? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would assume, and I do not 

know, that any assessments that are required have been done either by our embassy or by the State Department. But I cannot answer that question with any—— 

Ms. OMAR. We have not been able to see one, so. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. So, again, I do not know the 

answer to that. 

Again, having lived in Liberia for 4 years and worked on Liberia, 

Liberian issues my entire life, I know the country quite well. I 

think the country will have difficulty absorbing a large number of 

people because they are having difficulty dealing with the economic 

challenges of the people who are living there now. 

That said, in terms of the safety factor, we were dealing with a 

country that was at war for 14 years, where people were being 

killed regularly. That does not happen in Liberia anymore. I did 

find Liberia to be safe. 

Ms. BASS. I am going to go to Mr. Burchett and then we will do 

another round. 

Mr. BURCHETT. I can yield a minute if she wants to finish her 

thoughts. I hate to come back. She might have to go somewhere. 

I have got to go somewhere, too, but I would be—— 

Ms. OMAR. I have got time. I am good. 

Mr. BURCHETT. You are good? 

Ms. OMAR. Yes. 

Mr. BURCHETT. OK. I thank the chairlady, ranking member, Ms. 

Omar. 

I have just about two or three different questions, and I will try 

to hit them pretty fast because I know our time is limited. 

As you all know, violent extremist groups threaten State stability, regional security, and international interests in Africa. And 

I want to focus mainly on the Lake Chad Basin region and Boko 

Haram. What are your thoughts on this terror group now that the 

Islamic State has recognized a rival faction as opposed to Abubakar 
57 

Shekau; does this fragmentation make them more or less of a 

threat? 

Go ahead, ma’am, in that pretty outfit. I am going to call on you 

first, if that is all right, Chairlady. Am I allowed to do that. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. You know, I think the threat 

that Boko Haram and any groups that have spiraled from that organization continue to have a major impact in the region. We have 

seen that impact in Northern Nigeria, we have seen that in Chad, 

in Niger, and further afield. And this is why I think it is important 

that we continue to engage with African countries to address this 

issue, because terrorism, wherever it happens, impacts all of us. 

When there was an attack on a hotel in Mali a couple years ago 

an American citizen was killed in that attack. So we are not safe 

if we are not working with those countries to address these issues. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. I think the Lake Chad region more broadly 

to look at it is basically where issues like terrorism, climate 

change, State fragility all come together. And the solution in my 

view today has to be a long-lasting one that is able to encompass 

both economics as well as security interventions. 

If you take the Lake Chad region, for example, in 1963 we have 

the bed shed of about 25,000 square kilometers. Now it is only 

2,500 square kilometers due to climate change. So it is now onetenth of what it used to be. So, what that has done is create conditions for conflict that is affecting now about 50 million people or 

so in that region. 

So, I think a comprehensive approach needs to be taken to a solution if we want it to be really long-lasting and impactful. 

Mr. MESERVEY. And I think the terrorism challenge associated 

with Boko Haram and its splinter group is profound. The good 

news is that Boko Haram has lost most of its strongholds over the 

last number of years because of this multinational force. 

But the Nigerian Government has been unable to deliver the security and the services and other things that are necessary to really stabilize the northeast, so Boko Haram has survived and is now 

actually resurgent, I would say, as is its splinter group ISIS West 

Africa Province, which just at the beginning of this year conquered 

hundreds of square miles of territory in three different countries. 

They are establishing a State. They are now administering it in 

some ways. They have—it is not nearly as extensive, of course, as 

the ISIS State in, or was in the Middle East, but those are clearly 

their aspirations. And they have made very serious gains in recent 

times. 

So it is a very difficult problem set in a belt, as my colleague just 

mentioned here, where you have all sorts of very negative trends 

converging that makes it very hard to eliminate these groups. 

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you. One more, if I have time, Chairlady, 

for one more question? 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you, ma’am. 

I am concerned about the investments that China is making. And 

I am wondering what the U.S. should be doing to counter some of 

the influence that they are having in Africa? And to what extent 

are some of these investments a threat to our interests, including 

our diplomatic development and security objectives? 
58 

And the followup of that, if the United States were to significantly reduce its foreign aid to Africa, would China, do you all feel 

like China would seek to fill the gap, and how they would do that? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. China, over I would say the 

past decade, has gone into Africa fast and furiously. They have 

changed their approach. It has evolved over, over time. 

Initially, they would go in and do a stadium or some small 

project and to buy influence. Now they are doing major 

infrastructural projects. The issue at hand is that all of these 

infrastructural projects, some of them better than others, are needed on the continent of Africa. Africans need railroads, they need 

roads, they need refurbished airports and ports. And we have ceded 

that space to China. 

And it is important if the U.S. sees its role as competing—and 

I do not see us as competing with China because I think we have 

different resources that we bring to the table; we are not going to 

bring those large projects—I think the better approach for us to 

take is to work with our African partners to ensure that they have 

the capacity to strike and negotiate better deals with the Chinese. 

Because, again, the kind of deals that they are getting with the 

Chinese, we do not have the wherewithal to do that. 

But we need to pay attention to what is happening because our 

influence on the continent is waning in comparison to China. And 

if we start to decrease our foreign aid the Chinese will come in in 

some way or another to support these countries. They are not going 

to come in with the same values that we bring to the table. 

And in my conversations with African leaders and business people alike, their preference is to have the United States there. And 

their question to us every day is: Where are you? Why are you not 

there? And you cannot tell us we cannot engage with the Chinese 

if you are not prepared to engage with us. 

Ms. BASS. Did anybody else want to respond to that? 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. I just wanted to underscore the Ambassador’s point. 

So, the really best way to counter China, if that was the objective, really is to solve Africa’s infrastructure problem. It is really 

huge. 

Mr. BURCHETT. Say that again. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Is to solve—— 

Mr. BURCHETT. I am sorry, I am from East Tennessee and I did 

not understand that. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Is to solve Africa’s infrastructure problems. I 

mean, the demand there is huge, huge because of the low point 

where they are starting from given the stage of economic development. But also huge because they are experiencing very rapid demographic growth and rapid rate of urbanization. Estimates put it 

at about $130 to $170 billion a year. That is what is needed for infrastructure financing in Africa. And two-thirds of that amount, or 

60 percent or more, is unfunded. 

And I think that is what China has aligned itself with the African nations, and that is why they are responding positively. But I 

am hopeful that at least as we roll out the Development Finance 

Corporations that was part of the BUILD Act, that is going to be 
59 

able to come in and allow the U.S. to begin to play more in that 

space. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Did you want to say something? Go ahead. 

Mr. MESERVEY. Just briefly. 

Ms. BASS. Sure. 

Mr. MESERVEY. I think it is I agree, I do not think the message 

to our African partners should be us or them. That is not going to 

work because China does provide certain things that African countries need. But helping African countries strike better deals, as the 

Ambassador mentioned, with China is really important, but also 

providing an alternative. 

We cannot do that, frankly, on most big infrastructure projects 

because we do not have a lot of companies that do that sort of 

thing. We do not heavily subsidize them as the Chinese Government does with its State-owned, obviously, enterprises. So, we need 

to look at competitive advantages that the United States has, 

which industries do we have a real, obvious advantage, focus on 

those. 

And I think that we need to in terms of the larger competition 

with China, where we do compete is around the model. And, you 

know, Beijing is increasingly pushing this idea to African countries 

that you can have economic growth but you just need to crack 

down on the pesky journalists and the civil society and things of 

that nature, as we do. And look at how successful we have been. 

So that is, there is an obvious competition there. And the U.S. 

needs to engage in that competition of ideas especially, and make 

sure we are messaging properly about the benefits of democracy, of 

the free enterprise system, and things of that nature. 

Ms. BASS. You know, I would continue with that because I think 

one of the big concerns right now is we are not really sending a 

strong message from the Administration in that regard to counter 

that. And, you know, my experience, along with the witnesses, and 

I am sure many people in the room, is that the African countries 

would rather do business with us. But we cannot, we are not in a 

position to tell them they should turn their backs on China when 

China is there and we are not. 

And really, the question is, you know, for us to step up our involvement. 

And so, to my colleague from Tennessee, two things. You know, 

one, hopefully, because you were asking the question about security, hopefully, if you are available, you could attend the CODEL, 

the congressional delegation. Because that is exactly what we want 

to look at. 

And then in terms of Africa’s infrastructure, we are working on 

a piece of legislation we are calling Move Africa that the purpose 

is to incentivize U.S. businesses to do transportation-related infrastructure projects. And so, I think that overall our perspective on 

Africa, we treat the continent, frankly, like we treat inner city communities, which is from a point of view of charity as a point of 

view, as opposed to partnership, and recognizing that on the African continent there are tremendous opportunities. 
60 

It seems like the rest of the world knows that but we are a little 

bit, you know, late to the party. So we need to, you know, improve 

our game. 

One of the—so my questions are really focused on what we need 

to do here in Congress to improve the situation. So, one of the 

issues is our designation of middle income countries that then 

make some countries not eligible for, like, MCC and other programs. And I wanted to know if anybody on the panel has any solution as to how we should come up with the—what formula we 

should use. Because if we just use income, it does not take into account the inequity. So, you know, the annual income of somebody 

might be $15,000 but we know that that is, that is averaged because people at the top are making so much. 

So, I would like to take a look at middle income countries, that 

designation, since I believe it excludes so many other countries. 

In terms of Mozambique, want to know your thoughts on if we 

are doing enough. Should we be providing more assistance? 

On the issue of Sudan, there is a lot of people that are concerned 

with what is happening in Sudan right now. And the Obama Administration and the Trump administration was continuing, I do 

not know about a rollback but, I mean, you know, the different 

phases, and we have not gotten to Phase 2. But there is some push 

here in Congress to actually move back to sanctions, you know, in 

a much bigger way as opposed to the movement forward toward 

normalization and relationships. 

And so my question is, given what is happening in Sudan right 

now, do you think the time is now for us to strengthen sanctions, 

strengthen State-sponsored terrorism in terms of that designation. 

And by strengthening it I mean in moving it from the administration deciding to, you know, having to have congressional approval, 

which is actually kind of the way it is now, but restating it and 

making it stronger, stricter before we would consider lifting it. 

So, I will start with those. And I will start with Madam Ambassador, go down the row. And then if Representative Omar has additional questions she would like to ask, we will go there. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I am going to bunt a little bit 

on the designation of middle income countries because I think, I 

am not sure it is a U.S., it is just the U.S. that makes that designation. And I do, I am aware of several countries who benefited from 

the MCC—— 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD [continuing]. And then suddenly they no longer benefited because they had moved up the 

scale. So, we punish them for their improvement. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. We do that domestically, too. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Yes. So we—— 

Ms. BASS. As soon as you get better we cut you off. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. So we need to look at, I agree 

that we need to look at it. I do not know how. 

Ms. BASS. But where does that designation come from? That is 

not—is it U.N. or? 

Mr. COULIBALY. No. I am not aware of really a precise scientific 

method that has allowed for that limitation. 
61 

Ms. BASS. Well, I am sure it is not scientific. I just wondered 

where it came from. 

I am glad you guys do not know. That means there is room there 

then. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. There is room there. 

Ms. BASS. OK. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. On Mozambique, Madam 

Chair, there is so much to be done there. The pictures that we are 

seeing coming out of Mozambique are just horrifying. And I know 

that the U.S. is there on the ground, along with others. I think we 

were a little bit late in responding. It was almost a week before it 

even started getting press coverage here in the United States. 

So, again, I think our colleagues from USAID and the State Department are actively engaged. Our military is engaged. But I 

think it is going to take more engagement and more resources for 

them. So I think we need to look at the resource, resource base 

that they are working from and see if there are any possibilities 

of increasing the funding and the resources that they have to respond to this. 

Ms. BASS. Well, it is appropriations season, so it is definitely 

time for us to look at that. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. And on Sudan, you know, 

your question was an interesting one. I think part of what is happening in Sudan is because of what we have been working toward 

in the Sudan. So I do think, and again I am coming from a position 

of having worked on this issue during the Obama Administration, 

but I do think that we should continue the path we are on with 

them, continue pushing and pressuring the government. Part of the 

reason the government is responding to our pressure is because 

they want this to continue. 

And on the issue of State sponsor of terror, they have regularly 

told us that we have continued to move the goalposts on them on 

that particular issue. And I believe that this is an unrelated issue, 

but I suspect that the handwriting is on the wall in Sudan, and the 

transition and the changes that are taking place are changes that 

we have all been watching and waiting for. And I think any efforts 

on our part to pull back now may send the wrong signal. The government may decide there is no reason that they cannot really 

crack down. And they have, I think they have been somewhat restrained. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. COULIBALY. On the issue of the middle income country, the 

limitation, so, although I am not aware of a scientific method that 

determines it, one of the guiding principles for this is that is these 

are countries that have reached a certain stage whereby they can 

now tap into the markets. They can use their other sources for financial needs. 

Ms. BASS. But it is not true; right? 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes, it is not exactly always true. 

One perhaps approach, and I think you are right that with inequality sometimes you may have the income and the country as 

a whole at a high level of income, but many parts of it are still 

struggling. And I think that was an important clause of the BUILD 

Act in setting the U.S. IDFC to recognize there could be needs even 
62 

for upper-middle income countries where it is showing that some 

segments of the population are still, still struggling. 

So one possibility then is to, to start there, but then to also look 

at the Sustainable Development Goals. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. COULIBALY. The Sustainable Development Goals trackers are 

now just coming out. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. Are you saying maybe look at both? Because if 

you look at, if you add in the Sustainable Development Goals then 

it goes south. You know what I am saying? Because just because 

you reached an income status does not mean you achieved those 

goals at all. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Well, I think the Sustainable Development 

Goals, of course, should be taken certainly into account, particularly some of the priority area targets. Right? So we can start 

there. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. COULIBALY. And then see, which are the countries that are 

way off track. 

If you look at, for example, sub-Saharan Africa, the poverty rates 

we have been tracking out of Brookings, some of my colleagues’ 

work, show indeed that the continent, the number of people, poor 

people is actually increasing. 

If you take a closer look, a large part of it is due to Nigeria, for 

example, which it would classify as being in a better income level 

than some other countries. But Nigeria is one of the countries that 

is way off track. 

Ms. BASS. Do you know a country where they graduated to middle income status where they cannot actually tap into the world 

markets? 

Mr. COULIBALY. So, I think you take a country like South Africa, 

I think they can tap into markets. And over the past years, since 

2006, we have had about over a dozen countries across Africa that 

have tapped into the global financial markets for the first time. 

But I also subscribe that some of them may have tapped into it 

while not being fully ready to—— 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. To take on more debt than they 

should be taking on. 

And you may very well know that there is now an issue of 

whether Africa is facing another debt crisis. 

Ms. BASS. To China? 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. Reminiscent—China is part of it. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. COULIBALY. But there is also the markets precisely, a lot of 

Euro bonds that have been issued. 

And then there is a question then as to whether we are facing, 

again, another debt forgiveness episode like what we have seen 

earlier in the decade. So I think starting with the SDGs, trying to 

see whether we can come in and then assess the alternative 

sources of financing that they might have. Do they really have access to markets at a reasonable cost like it is somewhat portrayed 

today. 
63 

And then speaking of debt and Mozambique, to get to your question on Mozambique, I think they could definitely use help because 

it is one of the countries that has had a debt level over 100 percent 

of GDP. And they are now classified as being in debt distress. 

So there is really not much scope from them to mobilize their 

own resources to deal with this tragedy. And I think they could use 

as much help as possible, especially through regional actors as well 

as the U.S., to step in a leadership role to galvanize more support 

for Mozambique. 

Ms. BASS. Mr. Meservey? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. On Mozambique I agree, I think the critical 

part of this will also be a sustained effort. Because the level of devastation is really extraordinary. And this is going to be a long-term 

challenge. So, yes, obviously the disaster response is crucial and 

the U.S. is involved in that and should continue to look for options 

to ramp up its engagement. But certainly thinking through, OK, 

after, you know, a week has passed, or two or 3 weeks, how do we 

continue to help ameliorate some of the fallout of this crisis. 

And then just quickly on Sudan. I think it is important to keep 

what is happening as far as protestor concerns separate from 

Phase 2 because they are in some ways separate issues. So, I do 

not think that the any sort of activity or actions by the U.S. to punish what Sudan is doing, and they have engaged in a brutal crackdown, to use the Phase 2 negotiations as a vehicle, I do not think 

that is the best vehicle to use. 

I think it is very appropriate to think about Magnitsky, for instance, or some other avenue that we have because the Sudanese 

Government has responded brutally and it should be held accountable. But it is a separate issue from the Phase 2 negotiations. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Representative Omar. 

Ms. OMAR. Dr. Coulibaly, you talked about the use in Africa on 

the continent that 40 percent of the world’s population are going 

to be in Africa and 42 percent of the work force will be in Africa. 

And when we were in Ethiopia and Eritrea just recently, a lot of 

the young people talked to us about the hopes and aspirations that 

they have as we move into the world in ways that we can invest. 

So, I just wanted to see if you had an idea of one particular investment we can make as a country to assist the youth in Africa 

that would make a real impact. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. I would emphasize the area of education 

and skills. I think, as I mentioned, 42 percent of the global work 

force, and now imagine that work force being imparted with the 

skills of the 21st Century. This would really be a global, not just 

African, economic success. And the opportunity is going to really 

expand the global middle class and create market opportunities 

that everybody is going to benefit from. 

But when you look at the educational systems they are being 

crammed because of demographic growth, the infrastructure in 

classrooms—we touched on that earlier—is not keeping up. So, in 

classes where they are supposed to have 40 students they now 

have, like, 80 students or 100 students. In that context, it is becoming difficult to test them. The quality of education itself, even the 

lucky ones who get one, could be decreasing. 
64 

And another area that could be helpful is to leverage technology, 

for example, initiatives that can bring technology to education can 

allow to maintain that quality and be able to scale up. 

Ms. OMAR. That is wonderful. 

I was just meeting with some tech folks from Africa. And when 

the Black Caucus has its conference in September I hope that that 

will be my sort of sessions around technology and investments that 

we could make in Africa. So, we will see how that goes. 

But I wanted to come back to something that was in the testimony of Mr. Meservey. Right? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. 

Ms. OMAR. All right. You had mentioned in your testimony that 

Saudi Arabia has promoted Wahhabism in Africa, and that has 

contributed to the rise of jihadist thinking and terrorist recruitment on the continent. I would say, you know, we could, we could 

sort of agree on that. 

Is it fair to say that our unwavering support for the Saudi Government has been counterproductive to our security goals in Africa? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Saudi Arabia is one of those very difficult situations because there is no doubt that they are an important counterweight to Iran in the Middle East which, as we know, is involved 

in all sorts of nefarious activities in Syria and beyond. But I also, 

as you referenced in my testimony, I think there is no doubt that 

their activities—and it is not just Saudi Arabia that is engaged in 

this but they have been the primary and the most aggressive in 

proselytizing this way, that I think that is a long, that presents a 

long-term strategic challenge to the United States, and to African 

countries frankly. 

There are African governments concerned about this phenomenon as well. 

So, I think that the U.S. has addressed this, or I know it has, 

with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Needs to do more. And I also 

think it needs to press Saudi Arabia to think, OK, how do you put 

the genii back in bottle so to speak because they have proselytized 

this all across the world. Now what? How do you start rolling this 

back? Because I think it is very much part of their responsibility 

to work on that. 

Now, whether their domestic politics will ever allow them to do 

that is an entirely different question. But I think that is part of 

the message the U.S. should be sending. 

Ms. OMAR. OK. So let me see if I understand. They are spreading 

this ideology. And then we have reports that they are actually 

funding terrorists. But we are partnering with them to help us 

fight the ideology and terrorism? Is that what you are saying? That 

is the suggestion? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Well, it is two separate ideologies we are talking 

about. 

Ms. OMAR. You are the problem and we need you to fix the problem? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. Well, so Iran is, is—— 

Ms. OMAR. No, no, I, I get that. I am just saying on Saudi Arabia,—— 

Mr. MESERVEY. Sure, sure. 
65 

Ms. OMAR [continuing]. So they are the problem but they are, we 

are also going to partner with them to fix themselves. And the 

problem that they are creating is precisely what you said; right? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Well, it is, I mean, unfortunately these are the 

sorts of decisions you have to make in foreign policy sometimes. 

And so in the Middle East arena we have this very obvious problem of a country, talking about Iran, that has, for instance, during 

the Khobar Tower bombings killed scores of American soldiers. 

They did it in Afghanistan. They have been aggressive enemies of 

the United States. 

Ms. OMAR. Yes. 

Mr. MESERVEY. So, so there is that sphere. And then you have 

this other sphere of this Wahhabist problem that I referenced. 

And I think you can do both. It is one of those strange bedfellow 

situations but it is the unfortunately reality, frankly, of the Middle 

East. 

Ms. OMAR. Right. 

Mr. MESERVEY. So I—— 

Ms. OMAR. No, I, I hear you. I appreciate that. It is a challenge 

but one that is not often looked at with clear lenses. 

So, in your testimony you also mentioned that 12 of the 23 countries most affected by terrorism are in Africa. In the report you reference Somalia, which is where my family is from and I was born, 

and it is ranked sixth in the world and second in Africa after Nigeria in terms of impact of terrorism. As you know, the major part 

of U.S. strategy of combating al-Shabaab in Somalia has been the 

use of drones. Under the Trump administration, drone strikes in 

Somalia have tripled, now totaling more than Libya and Yemen 

combined. 

AFRICOM denies any civilian casualties resulting from drone 

strikes in Somalia. But this is contradicted by reports from numerous investigative journalists and human rights organizations. Just 

last week Amnesty International released a report, which I will be 

submitting for the record, a report documenting the killings of 14 

civilians in just five drone strikes. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
66 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

"The noise of the plane was louder than before .. .The weeks before it used to come and 

leave, only that night it was not leaving. It was coming and coming and coming ... when the 

noise [of an airstrike] happened everything ceased ... I was so frightened. I couldn't keep 

watch on the farm at all. I went under the shelter of the tree and hid ... These three young 

men were not expecting to be killed by a plane, and we did not expect the world to be 

silent." 

liban, a farmer from Darusalaam village, lower Shabelle 

Since April2017, the United States of America (USA) has dramatically increased the number of air strikesfrom manned aircraft and unmanned drones- it has launched in Somalia, tripling the annual rate of attacks 

and, in 2018, outpacing US strikes in Libya and Yemen combined. Despite this escalation, the US 

government claims that it has not killed any civilians in Somalia during this period. In this report, Amnesty 

International provides credible evidence to the contrary. The report investigates five incidents in Lower 

Shabelle, Somalia, in which 14 civilians were killed and eight inJLJred. It provides credible evidence that US 

air strikes were responsible for four of these incidents and that the fifth was most plausibly caused by a US 

air strike. In the incidents presented in this report, civilians were killed and injured in attacks that may have 

violated international humanitarian law (IHL) and could, in some cases, constitute war crimes. The 

seriousness of the allegations underscores the need for the USA and Soma Ira to conduct urgent and 

transparent investigations 

The conflict in Somalia between Somali government forces and AI-Shabaab, an armed group which controls 

significant territory in the country, rs a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) under international law. 

Amnesty International considers the USA to be a party to this NIAC. Since at least 2016 it has claimed that 

its military operations are conducted at the request of the Government of Somalia, under the right of 

collective self defense. However, when asked by Amnesty International, both the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) refused to confirm or deny whether the US is at war in 

Somalia. This refusal is consistent with testimony given by General Thomas D. Waldhauser, the commander 

of AFRICOM, to Congress in March 2018. When he was asked about the nature of US mrlitary intervention in 

Somalia, he responded, "I wouldn't characterize that we're at war. It's specifically designed for us not to own 

that." 

In 2011, the USA launched its frrst drone strike in Somalia against AI-Shabaab, which controls large swathes 

of south-central Somalia, including of the Lower Shabelle region which surrounds the capital, Mogadishu. 

Between 2011 and March 2017, air strikes were infrequent. American airpower was originally used only to 

target "high value targets" (HVT, i.e. known 'terrorists' who the administratron argued posed a threat to the 

USA) and were justified initially as part for the global war on A!.Qa'ida and associated forces, and then, 

beginning in 2016, to support operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a United 

Nations (UN) and African Union-authorized peace enforcement force based in the country. In March 2017, 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMALIA CIVIliAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABEllE 

1\mnestylnternatlona! 
67 

President Donald Trump issued a directrve designating parts of Somalia an "area of active hostilities" (AAH), 

after which the number of reported air strikes increased dramatically. 

The directive has not been made public, but reports indicate it weakened the protections afforded to civilians 

in Somalia, increasing the likelihood of their death or injury in US military operations. Previously, under the 

2013 'Presidential Policy Guidance' (PPG), which established the operating procedures for action "against 

terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hostilities" and governed all air strikes in 

Somalia until the AAH directive, for an air strike to be approved in Somalia, there needed to be "near 

certainty" that the target "an identified HVT or other lawful terrorist target"- was present and civilians 

would not be killed or injured. Now, the content of the directive supersedes the PPG and reportedly gives US 

forces the greatest latitude to carry out strikes as is allowable under the USA's interpretation of IHL. As a 

result, those planning or deciding an attack are, according to the USA's own standards, permitted to target 

anyone who they are 'reasonably certain' is formally or functionally a member of a non-state armed group, 

regardless of whether he or she is directly participating in hostilities. Civilian fatalrtres and injuries are now 

permissible if they are lawful under IHL. 

Moreover, in a meeting with Amnesty International, retired Brigadier General Donald Bolduc, who served as 

Commander, Special Operations Command Afnca, from April 2015 until June 2017, but drd not oversee any 

of the five incidents detailed in this report, said that since the issuance of the AAH directive, individuals are 

now considered to be lawfully targetable based solely on four criteria: age, gender, location, and 

geographical proximity to AI-Shabaab. According to General Bolduc, all military-aged males observed with 

known AI-Shabaab members, inside specific areas·- areas in which the US military has deemed the 

population to be supporting or sympathetic to AI-Shabaab- are now considered legitimate military targets. In 

reply to a request for an official response on General's Bolduc's assertion, AFRICOM stated that: "BG 

Buldoc's [sic] purported articulation of targeting standards does not accurately reflect the targeting 

standards of AFRICOM or [Department of Defense]." However, if General Bolduc is accurate in how the 

policy is practically applied during operations, then US forces appear to be acting in violation of IHL, as well 

as the US's own laws and policies regarding who is lawfully targetable during conflicts. 

Despite this broadening of the strike mandate, a weakening of civilian protections, and a significant uptick in 

air strikes, the Department of Defense (DoD), in a June 2018 report to the US Congress, stated that its 

military operatrons- including air strikes- in Somalia in 2017 had resulted in zero civilians killed or injured 

A series of AFRICOM press releases, and a response from a DoD spokesperson to a specific request from 

Amnesty International in March 2019 asserted the same about the USA's 2018 military operations. 

This report investigates US strikes carried out in the Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. According to The 

Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a media organization which tracks and compiles strike data, the US 

military conducted at least 25 air strikes in Lower Shabelle between April 2017 and December 2018 

Security concerns and access restrictions prevented Amnesty International from conducting on-site 

investigations and severely limited the organization's ability to freely gather testimonial and physical 

evidence. All interviews took place in-person or over encrypted voice calls placed from phones located 

outside AI-Shabaab-held territory. 

Despite the difficulties, Amnesty International interviewed 65 witnesses and survivors of five alleged US air 

strikes carried out during this period. Amnesty International interviewed a further 77 witnesses and survivors 

of other alleged US air strikes in Somalia which are not detailed in this report. In addition to this first-hand 

testimony, the report draws on several types of evidence, including analysis of satellite imagery and data, 

photographic material, interviews with government officials, medical personnel and other experts, and an 

open-source investigation including analysis of traditional and social media, academic articles, and reports 

from NGOs and international bodies 

While AI-Shabaab controls the areas of Lower Shabelle where the attacks in this report took place, and 

members of AI-Shabaab were present in relatively large numbers in parts of Lower Shabelle that were 

attacked, in some cases the rural areas and villages attacked had no evident AI-Shabaab presence at the 

time of the attack. 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMAliA 

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE 

Amnesty!ntemational 
68 

The five incidents investigated in this report fall into two categories. The first category includes two incidents 

in which the US military appears to have targeted suspected AI-Shabaab members riding in vehicles, killing 

civilians near the targeted vehicle. On 16 October 2017, a US armed drone targeted a suspected AI-Shabaab 

vehicle travelling between the towns of Awdheegle and Barire. The first of two strikes missed the apparent 

target, killing two civilians, and injuring five civilians, including two children, who were residing in the Farah 

Waeys settlement next to the road at the time of the attack. The second strike destroyed the vehicle and 

killed the suspected AI Shabaab fighters inside. On 6 December 2017, five civilians, including two children, 

were killed when a truck carrying suspected AI-Shabaab fighters exploded in the isolated hamlet of lllimey. 

The explosion injured a further two civilians, including an 18-month-old girl. All those in the vehicle were also 

killed. Based on the evidence presented in this report, Amnesty International believes that the explosion was 

most plausibly caused by a US air strike. In these two incidents, it appears tt1at US forces had ample 

opportunity to avoid civilian deaths and injuries, by taking feasible precautions, as required by IHL, including 

by carrying out the attack before the vehicle entered, or drove by, the civilian areas. 

The second category includes three incidents in which civilians were killed apparently either after being 

mistakenly identified as AI-Shabaab fighters or another lawful military objective, or incidentally in a strike 

against a lawful military objective. The misidentification appears to have occurred either because t11e target 

was wrongly identified as a specific individual or individuals or because the target was wrongly targeted by a 

"signature strike" where the victim's identity was unknown by US forces, but their actions, as viewed from 

the air, were perceived to fit a suspicious pattern of behaviour. On 12 November 2017, three civilian farmers 

were killed by a US air strike outside the village of Darusalaam as they camped out on the edge of a road 

They had been irrigating their farm late into the night, a practice that is common at night in the region, where 

farmers rely on flood irrigation from the nearby Shabelle river. They were armed with nothing more than their 

fanning tools. On 2 August 2018, a US drone strike killed three civilians, including two well-diggers and an 

employee from Hormuud Telecommunications Company, as they drove a vehicle in a rural area near 

Gobanle village. Also in the vehicle was a suspected AI-Shabaab member, who was also killed and whose 

presence may have led US forces to wrongly conclude that the civilians in the vehicle were also AI-Shabaab. 

In the most recent attack documented by Amnesty International, in the early hours of 9 December 2018, US 

forces conducted an air strike near the village of Baladui-Rahma. One civilian farmer was killed and another 

injured as they irrigated their farm. In these three instances, civilians who were not directly participating in 

hostilities either appear to have been misidentified and then targeted and killed or killed incidentally. These 

attacks either targeted civilians, or those who planned the attack failed to take adequate measures to verify 

that the objectives were not civilian in nature, or those who carried out the attack failed to cancel or suspend 

the attack when it became apparent that it was wrongly-directed or that the attack may be disproportionate. 

As a result, the attacks appear to violate the principle of distinction or proportionality. 

US military operations are shrouded in secrecy. Although AFRICOM proactively issues press releases on 

some air strikes, others are only publicly acknowledged after AFRICOM receives a request for information on 

specific strikes. If no one asks questions, strikes may remain undisclosed, meaning the actual number of 

strikes conducted in Somalia is likely higher than current numbers suggest. Furthermore, AFRICOM's 

reports often leave out crucial details, including information about tt1e location and the intended targets, 

making it difficult to assess a strike's compliance with international law. 

On 15 February 2019, Amnesty International requested an official response from the USA to allegations in 

this report. On 12 March 2019, AtRICOM confirmed that US forces had conducted air strikes corresponding 

to the dates and locations of four of the incidents in this report. With respect to the allegations of civilian 

casualties in eacl1 of these incidents, AFRICOM stated they "do not appear likely based on contradictory 

intelligence that cannot be disclosed because of operational security limitations". In regard the incident in 

the hamlet of lllimey on 6 December 2017, AFRICOM stated that it did not match "AFRICOM records in 

regards to times, dates, and locations ot lethal strikes". 

Amnesty International's research points to a failure by the US and Somali governments to adequately 

investigate allegations of civilian casualties resulting from US operations in Somalia. A lack of transparency 

characterizes all aspects of US air strikes in Somalia, including the process employed by AFRICOM to assess 

the credibility of allegations of civilian casualties, and, when an allegation is deemed credible, how this is 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMALIA CIVIliAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE 

Amnesty International 
69 

then investigated. On 12 March 2019, AfRICOM provided Amnesty International with a description of its 

procedure for reviewing civilian casualty allegations. The description does not provide informat1on about the 

practical application of the guidance however, including on how 1t was applied to the incidents in this report, 

and does not contain clear criteria for assessing credibility of allegations. Furthermore, the US and Somali 

governments do not have adequate accountability mechanisms in place in Somalia for reporting and 

responding to allegations of civil1an casualties, including an accessible means for survivors and families of 

victims to self-report their losses. 

A failure to investigate adequately denies individuals and families the right to justice, accountability and 

reparation, including compensation and guarantees of non-repetition. 

In this context, Amnesty International is calling on the Government of the USA to: 

Conduct thorough, transparent, independent and impartial investigations into all credible allegations 

of civilian casualties of air strikes and other military operations in Somalia, including those 

documented in this report Where there is sufficient admissible evidence of crimes, bring suspected 

perpetrators to justice in fair trials without recourse to the death penalty 

Acknowledge civilian casualties caused by US attacks and offer compensation and explanation to 

survivors and families of civilians killed in US strikes regardless of whether the casualties were 

caused by a lawfu I attack. 

Provide victims of violations of international humanitarian law by US forces, and their families with 

access to JUStice and to full reparation, Including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction 

and guarantees of non-repetition from the US government 

Implement an effective mechanism to ensure a safe and accessible means for families and 

communities to self-report civilian casualties arising from US air strikes and other military operations 

Ensure the planning and execution of attacks fully respects international humanitarian law. including 

by reviewing its criteria for selecting targets, its definitions of "combatant" and "non-combatant", 

practices such as "signature strikes," and whether all feasible precautions to spare civilians are being 

taken. 

Amnesty International is also calling on the Government of Somalia to: 

Conduct its own thorough, transparent, independent and impartial investigations into allegations of 

civilian casualties resulting from US air strikes 

Seek reparations from the US government for survivors and families of victims of US air strikes. 

Implement an effective mechanism to ensure a safe and accessible means for families and 

communities to self-report civilian casualties arising from US air strikes and other military 

operations 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMAliA CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE 

Amnesty International 
70 

METHODOLOGY 

This report investigates five incidents in Lower Shabelle, Somalia, between April 2017 and December 2018 

where civilians allegedly were killed by US air strikes. The report draws on significant first-hand testimony 

from witnesses and survivors from each of the five strikes. The report also draws on several other types of 

evidence including analysis of satellite imagery and data, photographic material, interviews with medical 

personnel and other experts, and an open-source investigation including an analysis of traditional and social 

media, academic articles, and reports from NGOs and international bodies. 

The research for this report took place in an envtronment that was extraordinarily hostile to human rights 

research. Security concerns and access restrictions prevented Amnesty International from conducting onsite investigations and severely limited the organization's ability to freely gather testimonial and physical 

evidence 

The strikes all took place in areas controlled by AI-Shabaab. AI-Shabaab severely restricts national and 

international human rights investigators and journalists operatrng in areas under its control, and civilians 

living in its territory are forbidden from speaking freely with investigators and journalists. Moreover, the group 

monitors and restricts the movements of civilians, especially in and out of its territory. AI-Shabaab bans all 

smartphones that have the capability to take photographs, record audio, or access the internet in areas 

under their control. 1 According to people from AI-Shabaab territory interviewed for this report, the penalty for 

violating these rules can be severe and even fatal, especially in cases where AI-Shabaab believes the 

individual to be spying. 

Given the lack of access and the serious risks facing civilians who attempt to share information, researchers 

investigating the impact of the conflict on the population in AI-Shabaab-controlled territory face numerous 

impediments. To overcome access restrictions and to minimize the risks to Amnesty International staff, 

rnterviewees and their cornmunitres, the research for this report was conducted from government-controlled 

areas in-person in Somalia and remotely, from outside of Somalia 

In addition to the risks associated with AI-Shabaab. mobile communications within and from AI-Shabaab 

territories are reportedly monitored by the US and Somair governments 2 Information from these 

communications can be used to direct attacks inside AI-Shabaab territory. To reduce the likelihood of being 

monitored by AI-Shabaab or by the US and Somali governments, all interviews took place in-person or over 

encrypted voice calls from phones outside of AI-Shabaab territory. 

Many interviewees were afraid of reprisals from AI-Shabaab or the Somali government if they were identified 

as having spoken to Amnesty International. As a result, information that could identify interviewees, or 

members of their communities, as having spoken with Amnesty International has been removed from the 

report but remain on file with Amnesty International. This includes age, gender, occupation, and relationship 

to the victims and survivors. The names of all victims in the report are real. Pseudonyms have been used in 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMALIA CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE 

Amnesty International 10 
71 

all cases when quoting oeople who were interviewed. Specific dates and locations of interviews have also 

been withheld for security reasons. 

The investigation was carried out by four Amnesty International researchers, along with staff experts in 

remote sensing and photographic and video verification, and members of Amnesty International's Digital 

Verification Corps-' Amnesty International also hired individuals living in Somalia with extensive networks of 

contacts to locate survivors and witnesses and gather information about specific air strikes. For a strike to be 

included in the report, testimonial evidence had to be deemed sufficient and credible by Amnesty 

International researchers and needed to be corroborated by testimony from individuals identified by at least 

two independent entry points into the strike-affected population. 

In instances where significant testimonial information obtained from an individual could not be corroborated, 

the entire testimony was excluded from the report and did not form any part of the factual basis for any of 

the report's conclusions. Amnesty International researchers also determined that numerous interviewees 

knowingly and wilfully provided false information. Their testimonies, along with all other testimonies from 

interviewees brought from the same sources, even if the underlying information appeared reliable, were 

likewise excluded from tr1e report. 

Between August 2018 and February 2019, Amnesty International interviewed 65 survivors and witnesses of 

the five incidents documented in this report. Amnesty International interviewed a further 77 survivors and 

witnesses of a further 15 alleged US air strikes in Somalia which are not detailed in this report. Amnesty 

International also interviewed staff from international organizations, members of the US military and US State 

Department, Somali government officials, journalists, humanitarian workers, and local human rights 

monitors. 

Amnesty International interviewed survivors and witnesses individually. Interviews generally lasted between 

30 minutes and two hours. Interviews with survivors and witnesses were conducted in Somali and Garre 

languages, often with interpretation from Somali or Garre languages to English 

Potential interviewees were informed about the nature and purpose of the research, as well as how the 

information they provided would be used, before deciding to meet with Amnesty International researchers. 

This information was shared again by Amnesty International researchers before the start of each interview. 

Oral consent was obtained from each interviewee at the start of interviews. Interviewees were also given the 

option- both before and at the end of the interview- to choose not to have their names included in the 

report. No incentives or monetary compensation were provided to interviewees in exchange for their 

accounts. Individuals were told that they could end the interview at any time and that they could choose 

whether to answer any specific question. 

Some of the villages or hamlets referenced in this report do not appear on any publicly available map. The 

locations of these villages were determined by interviewing residents or former residents of the villages who 

described the geography of the village and the surrounding area in enough detail to allow Amnesty 

International to identify the village in high resolution satellite imagery. 

People's ages in the report are based on information provided by the interviewee. Referenced ages are often 

approximations. 

On 11 July 2018, Amnesty International filed a Freedom of Information Act Request with US Africa 

Command and US Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces Africa, asking for "all after action reports, debriefings, 

lessons learned, strike logs, mission summaries, white papers, research reports, and other documents 

related to air strikes accomplished in Somalia between 1 Jan 17 and 1 Jull8." Other than an 

investigations 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMALIA CIVILIAN CASUALTIES fROM AIR STRIKES IN lOWER SHABEllE 

Amnestylnternational ll 
72 

acknowledgement of receipt, Amnesty International had not, at time of printing, received a substantive reply 

to this request 

On 15 February 2019, Amnesty International formally requested an official response, from AFRICOM, to the 

allegations in this report On 12 March 2019, AFRICOM provided a formal response to some of Amnesty 

International's questions. On 13 March 2018, a DoD spokesperson provided an email response to some of 

the questions that Amnesty International put to AFRICOM. Relevant portions of Amnesty International's 

request and 1\FRICOM's response have been included in the report 

On 7 March 2019, Amnesty International formally requested an official response, from the Government of 

Somalia, to the allegations in this report. At the time of printing, the government had not replied. 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMAliA CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE 

Amnesty International 11 
73 

1. BACKGROUND 

1.1 BACKGROUND ON SOMALIA 

A former Italian colony and British protectorate, the Federal Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 and 

lies on the eastern horn of Africa, sharing borders with Kenya, Ethiopia and DJibouti. Somalia is currently 

composed of five Federal Member States: Jubaland,4 South Wesl, 5 Galmudug, 6 Hirshabelle' and Puntland8 

Puntland, in north eastern Somalia, declared itself a semi-autonomous state in 1998, but recognizes its 

status as a constituent part of Somalia. Somaliland, an area in north-western Somalia, declared 

independence from Somalia in 1991; however, its independence has not been formally recogni?ed by any 

country 9 

The Lower Shabelle region, the focus of this report, forms part of the South West state. It sits to the west, 

southwest and northwest of the capital, Mogadishu, and is home to around one million people, 10 most of 

whom live in rural areas. The region is home to many nomadic and semi-nomadic people, as well as many 

who are sedentary. Much of the population lives on the banks of the Shabelle River, which serves as an 

important source of livelihood, providing water for livestock and the irrigation of farms. More than 100,000 

people are currently internally displaced in the region due to drought, flooding and conflict.!! 

Lower Shabelle is the gateway to Mogadishu and is a very fertile region making it one of the most strategic 

regions in Somalia. Since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, the region has been characterized 

by inter-clan conflict over land ownership and political power. Since 2012, AMISOM alongside Somali 

government forces have taken over key towns from AI-Shabaab which had controlled the region since 2008. 

Due to these shifting political dynamics and the introduction of the federal system in Somalia in 2012, 

powerful clan militias started fighting to control the region and its resources, their alliances shifting frequently 

between the government and AI-Shabaab dependmg on who controlled their territory and who they thought 

would advance their interests at a given time; Somali government forces, AMISOM and AI-Shabaab have 

therefore also all fought against clan militias which they had previously supported. AI-Shabaab fighters 

4 This includes Gedo, Mtddle Juba and Lower Juba regions 5 This includes Lower Bay, and Bakool regions 

part of Mudug regions 

THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMALIA 

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE 

Amnesty International 13 
74 

Ms. OMAR. AFRICOM confirms that four of the strikes were conducted by the United States but denies any civilian casualties took 

place. Their spokesperson said that the way they determine civilian 

casualties is not available to Amnesty International or, indeed, any 

other non-military resource. 

My question to you is do you find this to be credible in the face 

of overwhelming reports that are to the contrary? And that we 

have not killed any civilians in the decades of drone strikes that 

we have had in Somalia? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Sure. Thank you for the question. 

So, a couple thoughts. One, it is I know that the U.S. military 

takes every effort to avoid civilian casualties. It is part of their 

SOPs, it is part of the ethic to which they subscribe. I also know 

that there is a fog of war in a place like Somalia and that, given 

the context of the conflict there, it is very difficult to sometimes 

distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. 

So it is, you know, you can either have indiv—— 

Ms. OMAR. Could a drone strike be 100 percent accurately, right, 

attacking? Or could—— 

Mr. MESERVEY. I think it is possible. 

Ms. OMAR [continuing]. A report that says 100 percent no civilians—— 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes, so that is actually—— 

Ms. OMAR. Would that be correct, is what I am asking you? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. I think it is possible. But I think it is, frankly, impossible to know given how, what a non-permissive environment it is. 

How do you even gather the facts on the ground in some of these 

places that are still controlled by al-Shabaab? You cannot go there 

safely. And, again, how do you distinguish between a combatant 

and a non-combatant when, you know, you have farmers who are 

armed sometimes? Some join al-Shabaab and leave, and then join 

again and leave. So it is incredibly difficult. 

And so I think it is possible that civilians have been killed. I also 

think it is possible, maybe not. For me it is, frankly, impossible to 

know, I think. 

Ms. OMAR. Right. I hope it is not. It is a very challenging thing 

which, you know, it is one of those situations where they were 

making an investment to infrastructure, or figuring out if we invest 

in education, or how to best fight terrorism if we are not truly finding a path to have partnerships with the individual countries that 

are being impacted. Then we sort of kind, you know, are short-ending ourselves and them. And any investment that we are making, 

really, truly it is not ever going to have the kind of impact that we 

want it to have because there is a correlation between every—some 

of the reports say that there are correlations between every drone 

attack and the increase of suicide bombs that happen in Somalia. 

And so when we are trying to be effective in combating terrorism 

but our actions could lead to an increase, and we get to have a 

problem for investing in education, and we, we are saying, you 

know, we are going to be sending you books but we do not really 

make the investment that the communities themselves need where 

they need the brick and mortar investment, then there is a problem if we are talking about diplomacy. And we are not really hav-
75 

ing a conversation about what it means for us to send thousands 

and thousands of Liberians back to a country that could be fractured by that, without having the proper conversations with the 

Government of Liberia whether they could sustain that. Then it is 

a problem. 

And I hope that as we continue to have a conversation about Africa, that we engage Africa and what that process looks like. 

Ms. BASS. OK. I just have one last question and then we will 

wrap up. 

I believe a couple of you mentioned the idea that we needed to 

have a second African Leaders Summit. And I wanted to know if 

you would just expand on that. How do we do that now? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I was part of the planning for 

the first Africa Summit that took place in 2014. I saw the positive 

impact that came from that summit, bringing African leaders from 

across the continent to the United States to engage with our leaders. 

Other countries are doing it on a regular basis. China has one 

I think every other year. The Japanese host one every other year. 

The Europeans are hosting one. 

Ms. BASS. So the question would be who would host it? 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Who would host that? 

Ms. BASS. Right. I mean, you know, the issue would be would the 

African leaders respond to Congress. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think they would. 

Ms. BASS. You do. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think they would respond to 

a request to come to the United States by President Trump. They 

want to engage with our leadership. They want to engage on issues 

that are important to them. And I think it will send a positive signal if the president were to invite them to attend. 

Ms. BASS. So, what I said was Congress. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Yes. 

Ms. BASS. I mean, you know, and I am just saying that just because I do not know. You know what I mean, in terms of the Administration, if the Administration was not interested in doing it, 

you know, is there another way you would convene a leaders summit. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. You know, when I think 

about the prayer breakfast and how many leaders come to that, I 

think an invitation from our Congress would probably—you may 

not get all 54 but you would get a significant enough number that 

it would, it would be successful. And others would be, the ones who 

did not come would regret that they had not come. And it would, 

you know, you can set some goals to achieve during this conference. 

And I think leaders would respond. 

Ms. BASS. You know, to my ranking member, when we, as Representative Omar mentioned, we went to Eritrea and Ethiopia. 

And, you know, just so excited about the potential in Ethiopia and 

the fact that the prime minister has established peace with Eritrea. 

And, you know, they are trying to come together in the Horn. That 

it would be nice to invite the prime minister over. Maybe he could 

even, you know, address both houses of Congress. We have that 

happen occasionally as to send a strong signal. 
76 

If either of you have any other closing thoughts? 

Mr. COULIBALY. I would like to even go a step further to suggest 

a regular, every three or 4 years, kind of a summit between U.S. 

and African head of States. That gives us an agenda to work toward and some clear targets to achieve by then. But then in between obviously lower level staff can engage across the different African governments and the U.S. agencies, et cetera, to prepare for 

the summit, also to work on what came out of the summit. 

And as the Ambassador mentioned, it has been a resounding success for all the countries who are holding those regular summits in 

terms of advancing their agenda in Africa. And it is really one 

place where there is a feeling that the U.S. is missing. 

So I think that is very critical. When the U.S. held the summit 

in 2014, I think about $14 billion or so was mobilized as far as U.S. 

businesses’ investments intentions in Africa. So, clearly, there is 

scope for it to really boost the U.S. commercial ties with the continent. 

Just one point in closing. It is basically the level of engagement 

with Africa, there is really a strong tendency now or aspiration for 

Africa to unite and then to take some regional approach to some 

issues that are of mutual interest. And you may be very well aware 

of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. I am familiar with that, yes. 

Mr. COULIBALY. That is advancing. And I think as of—— 

Ms. BASS. How many countries are left to sign on? 

Mr. COULIBALY. As of last—— 

Ms. BASS. Just one? Who is that? 

Mr. COULIBALY. As of last week we are one vote away, from it 

coming into effect. 

Ms. BASS. Good. 

Mr. COULIBALY. However, I think as outlined, too, in Ambassador 

Bolton’s strategy but also some commentary that came out of the 

AGOA summit over the summer, the U.S. approach and that of the 

African counterparts is not quite fully syncing yet. The U.S. is currently talking bilateral engagement while the African countries—— 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Are talking regional engagement. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. COULIBALY. So, hopefully, there could be some middle 

grounds where they will feel like—— 

Ms. BASS. That is a little bit of a disconnect. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. So they will feel like that their viewpoint 

is important—— 

Ms. BASS. The administration as Congress’. 

Mr. COULIBALY. But it is an important one because it is going to 

signal to what extent the U.S.—— 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Is supportive—— 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Of the regional initiatives for integration. And we know that they need that integration because the 

States are sort of small States—— 

Ms. BASS. Right. 
77 

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. And it is going to scale that integration that can help boost economic opportunities and competitiveness on the continent. 

For example, intra-Africa trade is only 17 percent. 

Ms. BASS. Uh-huh. 

Mr. COULIBALY. And if you look at intra-European trade, 70 percent. Asia, 60 percent plus. Here in North America you are looking 

at 30 percent or more. So it is indeed quite important and critical. 

So as I begin to think about the post-AGOA architecture for U.S.- 

Africa engagement, taking into account that regional dimension 

would be important. 

Ms. BASS. And I think it is right to think about post-AGOA. But 

we do still have a few more years left. And so I would also like to 

think about how do we maximize the time that we have. 

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. To be able to have something even earlier—— 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. COULIBALY. —I think that is better. 

Ms. BASS. It is right to think about that. 

Mr. COULIBALY. But clearly the thinking should be—— 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Going on now. And if you look at 

the European Union at their summit in 2017, they made a promise 

to actually go toward a continent-to-continent kind of arrangement. 

If you look at China during FOCAC, they try to align their programs with Africa’s aspirations such as the Continental Free Trade 

Area, for example. So it is important also in the U.S.’s engagement 

to incorporate the views and aspirations of the African people to 

align the two agendas. 

Ms. BASS. You would think? 

Any more thoughts? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. I think I would like to see a routine U.S.- 

Africa Leaders Summit as well for all the mentioned, or for all the 

reasons that Dr. Coulibaly laid out. 

I also think regular meetings between the presidents in the Oval 

Office with a head of state or African head of state maybe once a 

quarter or something. These high level engagements really matter. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. MESERVEY. The, you know, CODELs are important. I am 

glad when those happen. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. MESERVEY. Just to maybe give some—to put a point on this, 

you know, President Xi Jinping his, in each of his two terms his 

first overseas trip was to Africa. The Chinese foreign minister’s 

first overseas trip every year is to Africa. 

They understand the importance of this high level engagement. 

And the U.S. just, this is one of the areas the U.S. needs to be better. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. And I think, you know, one of our challenges is 

to, you know, as I have learned in Congress, administrations come 

and go but Congress stays the same. So I think all of us would love 

to see high level engagements but we cannot, you know, control 

that. 
78 

And so, and I do know from talking to a number of heads of 

State that they want to come over here. But, frankly, it is a little 

inappropriate unless they meet the head of State. And they have 

not received an invitation from the President. So a number of them 

have not come because it is like, you know, I cannot go over there 

until, you know. 

So that is, that is a little bit of a dilemma. And I would really 

like to—— 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would argue against that 

though, Madam. 

Ms. BASS. OK, please. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I know that the President of 

Ghana has been here several times. 

Ms. BASS. Yes, that is true. 

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. And he has had very good 

meetings on The Hill, with the private sector, with its diaspora. 

When I meet with African leaders and they tell me they do not 

want to come because they cannot get a meeting with the president, I tell them they are missing out on the opportunity to meet 

with you. 

Ms. BASS. OK. OK. And you know what, as actually the President of Ghana is in the U.S. right now. I mean, he is going to be 

speaking at Harvard in a day or so. And we both recently met with 

the President of Sierra Leone. And maybe we could ask them to 

take that message back. Because I could see us having consistency 

with leaders, but it is not—you cannot speak for whatever, you 

know, administration is going to come and go. 

Well, I want to thank everyone for the time, the patience. And 

just in closing, a couple of closing comments. 

You know, we have said that we were doing this hearing. And 

we are going to do several more that really we are calling Africa 

101. It is to just give the broad strokes as to where the continent 

is, where U.S. policy is, to figure out where we go from here, recognizing that we do have some immediate crises and issues that we 

need to attend to right away, but to provide the members of the 

committee with a broad overview of U.S.-Africa relations. 

So, I want to thank the witnesses and members for being here 

today. And if there is no further business, without objection, the 

committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
79 

APPENDIX 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASIUNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizations 

Karen Bass (D-CA), Chair 

March 26,2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available 

live on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.govD: 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Tuesday, March 26, 2019 

2:00p.m. 

Looking Forward: U.S.- Africa Relations 

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield 

Senior Counselor 

Albright Stonebridge Group 

(Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) 

Brahima Coulibaly, Ph.D. 

Director 

The Brookings Institution 

Mr. Joshua Meservey 

Senior Policy Analyst 

The Heritage Foundation 

By Direction of the Chairman 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, 

please call 202·225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special 

accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistit'e listening dn·ices) may be directed 

to the Committee. 
80 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Africa, Global Health, Global Humau Rigltts, nnd Iutemntlounl Orga11iwtiolls HEARING 

Day 0312612019 Date, ___ .::2:..;:0:..:0Pc_'::.:":_-~Room _ _.::llli=0='8=-=2:::.2::c00:..__ 

Stat·ting Time 2:50pm Ending Thne. 4:13pm 

Recesses [~J ( __ to__) (__to__) (__to __ } (__to __ ) (__to__) (__to __ ) 

Presiding Mcmber(s) 

Clwirma11 Karen JJass 

Cit eel; all oftflejollowing tllal app{v: 

Open Session IZI Executive ~sed) Session D Televised W 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Looking Forward: U.S.-Afl'ica Relations 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attaclted 

Electronically RecordS!!Jtapcd) IZI 

Stenographic Record W 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with a11 *({they are 110/members of full commlt/eeJ 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes£2] NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, deparlmenl, or organizationJ 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitledfor the recordJ 

IFR ·Rep. Michael McCaul 

QFR- Rep. Cltris Smitlt 

JFR -Rep. II !tan Omar 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE----

01' 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 4_:1....;3p:...'-"-
81 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL !lUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNAl'!ONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

COMMITTEE HEARING 

PRESENT PRESFNJ MEJ!BEII 

X Karen Bass, CA 

Susan Wild, PA 

X Dean Phillips, MN 

X llhan Omar, MN 

X Chrissy Houlahan. PA 

I Christopher II. Smith, NJ 

James F. WI 

X Ron Wright, TX 

X Tim Burchett, TN 

!------- i-·~~----------1 

~----~ -·!1-----------1 
82 

HEADQUARTERS 

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND 

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS 

UNIT 29951 

APO AE 09751-9951 

MEMORANDUM FORMS TIRANA HASSAN 

11 March 2019 

SUBJECT: AFRICOM RESPONSE TO LETTERDTD 15FEB2019, CIVILIAN CASUALTY 

ALLEGATIONS 

Thank you for your letter on February 15,2019, which seeks information about eight 

AFRICOM strikes in Somalia during 2017 and 2018. This letter responds to your request for 

information and provides additional information in the attachment. 

Although the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Amnesty International 

may at times disagree about the facts concerning an alleged incident or even the applicable law, 

AFRICOM respects the work of Amnesty International and other similar NGOs. Amnesty 

International's report ret1ects a sincere effort to address a very important issue, dangerous work 

in an unstable country, and a humanitarian concern for innocent civilians that is one of the main 

purposes of the law of war. 

In response to your questions regarding U.S. operations in Somalia, AFRICOM's use of 

military force in Somalia provides legitimacy to, and creates an opportunity for the Federal 

Government of Somalia to provide the security and economic growth required for long-term 

stability and prosperity. In Africa, Violent Extremist Organizations and criminal networks prey 

upon disenfranchised populations creating a cycle of recruitment and allowing extremist 

ideology to fester. Extremist networks also exploit criminal networks for the illicit transport of 

narcotics, weapons, and persons. Violent Extremist Organizations cultivate and encourage an 

environment of distrust, despair, and hopelessness to undermine governments, allowing for the 

expansion of their radical ideology. Violent Extremist Organizations on the African continent 

continue to be a serious threat to the shared interests of our partners, allies, and the U.S. In 

particular, al-Shabaab has extracted extreme costs on the civilian population in one attack alone, 

killing over 500 civilians in October 2017 using VBIEDs. 

Prior to conducting strikes, AFRICOM takes precautions to protect the civilian 

population and avoid civilian casualties by establishing positive identification of the target as a 

legitimate military target authorized by the law of armed cont1ict; ensuring the target complies 

with AFRICOM Rules of Engagement; and minimizing potential adverse effects of weapon 

impacts .. 

The AFRlCOM Combatant Commander has provided civilian casualty avoidance 

guidance, and has directed his staff to report and respond to civilian casualties. His guidance 

follows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStafflnstruction 3160.01C and is codified in the 
83 

SUBJECT: AFRICOM RESPONSE TO LETTER DTD 15FEB2019, CIVILIAN CASUALTY 

ALLEGATIONS 

Africa Command Instruction (ACI) 3200.03 Reporting and Responding to Civilian Casualties. 

Both of these documents are included in this response for your review. 

In accordance with the Commander's guidance, AFRICOM reviewed the eight 

allegations that Amnesty International submitted in February 2019. Four of the allegations do 

not appear likely based on contradictory intelligence that cannot be disclosed because of 

operational security limitations. The remaining four allegations do not match AFRICOM 

records in regards to times, dates, and locations of lethal strikes. In those cases, AFRICOM 

personnel have had continued dialogue with your representatives, Jonathon Loeb, Brian Castner, 

and Elle McKnight to ascertain additional information regarding the reported strikes. 

Protecting civilians is a fundamental part of AFRICOM's mission. Thank you for your 

efforts and emphasis on civilian casualties. We look forward to a continuing, productive 

dialogue with your organization as we seek stability and peace in Africa. 

Sincerely, 

WILLIAM P. WEST 

Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force 

Deputy Director of Operations, J3 
84 

Al!egc<t'on In the middle of the afternoon on or around 16 October 2017, 

an airstrike targeted a suspected ai-Shabaab vehicle travelling between the towns of 

Awdheegle and Bariire. The strike resulted in the death of two civilians, and the 

injury of five civilians, including two children, all of whom were residing in makeshift 

dwellings next to the road at the time of the attack. The vehicle was destroyed, and 

an unknown number of suspected ai-Shabaab fighters who were inside were killed. 

Amnesty International spoke to nine eyewitnesses and survivors of the attack, and 

assessed media reports, US government reports, and photographic evidence of 

injuries sustained by civilians during the attack. 

• AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that 

corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting a vehicle containing 

ai-Shabaab fighters. Social media posts alleged CIVCAS shortly after the 

event. AFRICOM conducted a CIVCAS allegation assessment regarding this 

strike and determined it is not likely to have caused the civilian casualties. 

Information gathered before and after the strike indicated that all individuals 

injured or killed were members or affiliates of ai-Shabaab. 

During the evening on or around 16 October 2017, at least two 

airstrikes hit the northern outskirts of the town of Awdheegle, near an AI-Shabaab 

police station, killing several civilians who were residing in the vicinity, and an 

unknown number of suspected AI-Shabaab fighters. 

rt!'SPO~J!;F· AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. The closest 

strike to this location was more than 3 km away and was not near any 

permanent structures such as a police station. 

In the early hours of the morning on 12 November 2017, the 

United States military conducted an airstrike in the farms to the southeast of the 

village of DaraSalaam, killing three civilian men who were sleeping under a tree after 

spending the evening irrigating the fields. Amnesty International conducted a total of 

18 interviews with residents of DaraSalaam and its vicinity, including six 

eyewitnesses of the strike, and relatives of the deceased; and we conducted an 

open source investigation using social media posts, satellite imagery, news reports, 

and photos posted online on a pro-AI-Shabaab website. 

• AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that 

corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting ai-Shabaab fighters. 

The Shahada News Agency, an ai-Shabaab media outlet, alleged CIVCAS 

shortly after the event and supported the claim using staged photos. 

AFRICOM conducted a CIVCAS allegation assessment and determined that 

the three men described in the allegation were not sleeping at the time of the 

strike and were members of ai-Shabaab. 

Between 10 and 17 November 2017, two civilians in the village 

of Bagdad were killed by an airstrike, and a further two civilians are missing and 

presumed dead following the strike. The strike was launched in support of a ground 
85 

raid against AI-Shabaab, and the men were killed as they swam across the river and 

a munition struck where they were in the water. Amnesty fnternationaf interviewed 

26 witnesses and relatives of the deceased, and consulted sate/fife imagery, media 

reports, and sociaf media to verify this attack and the civifian status of the four 

deceased. An unknown number of AI-Shabaab fighters were also killed during the 

raid. 

• AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. The closest 

strike was more than 7.5 km away against an ai-Shabaab group armed with 

mortars and RPGs. 

Between 10 and 17 November 2017, potentially at the same 

time as the above-mentioned strike in Bagdad village, survivors fled across the river 

to the neighboring village of Beledui-Karim. But at the same time, a US aircraft 

launched a strike on the village of Beledui-Karim itself. This attack hit two structures, 

killing a child, Mohamed Salah Mohamed, and an elderly man, Mahamood Osman 

Shaarib, and wounding at least four other civilians. To investigate this attack, 

Amnesty lntemationaf interviewed eight residents of Beledui-Karim, and consulted 

satellite imagery and social media accounts. 

AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. The closest 

strike was more than 7.5 km away against an ai-Shabaab group armed with 

mortars and RPGs. 

On 6 December 2017, five civilians were killed, including two 

children, and a further two civilians, including a small child, were injured, when an 

airstrike targeted a vehicle carrying suspected AI-Shabaab fighters in the isolated 

hamlet of 1/fimeey. All those in the vehicle were also killed. Up to seven homes and 

one shop were partially or completely destroyed in the blast and resulting fires. 

Amnesty International interviewed several people who were in 1/imeey or its 

immediate vicinity at the time of the attack, and reviewed photographs taken at a 

hospital and the burial, satellite imagery and media reports to corroborate 

testimonies. 

• AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. Additional 

information provided by Brian Castner of Amnesty International indicated that 

the strike in question involved secondary explosions. On 11 December 2017, 

one week after the alleged incident, AFRICOM did strike a VB lED 

approximately 35 miles from this location but no secondary explosions were 

observed. 

Ill On 2 August 2018, an airstrike killed three civilians, and one 

suspected AI-Shabaab member or former member, who were driving in a rural area 

approximately 1 km east of Goobaanle village. The three civilians included a local 

businessman, 35-year-old Abdisamad Sheikh lssack Mohamed Gabow, who also 

worked for the Hormuud Telecommunications Company in Goobaanle village. 

According to information gathered by Amnesty International, the target of the strike 
86 

was a suspected AI-Shabaab member in the vehicle. The van was destroyed. 

Amnesty lntemationallnterviewed five people including two who witnessed the 

attack as well as close relatives and friends of the victims. Amnesty International 

also reviewed a number of media reports about the attack and spoke to an official 

from Hormuud Telecommunications who confirmed that Abdisamad Sheikh lssack 

Mohamed Gabow was an employee of theirs. 

• AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that 

corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting individuals who were 

members of ai-Shabaab. The pro-ai-Shabaab media outlet, 

Somaliamemo.net alleged CIVCAS shortly after the event. AFRICOM 

conducted a CIVCAS allegation assessment and determined that the 

allegation was not credible based on the unreliability of the source and the 

fact that the individuals targeted were members of ai-Shabaab. 

In the early hours of 9 December 2018, a US airstrike near the 

village of Beledui-Rahman, killed one civilian farmer and wounded another. A 47-

year-old farmer named Dahir Abdi Qoriyow was irrigating his fields about 500 meters 

west of Beledui-Rahman. He had been in the fields since the afternoon. Relatives 

and neighbors explained to Amnesty International that he worked at night because 

many farms utilized the same canal and associated generators and watering 

equipment, forcing everyone to share and use each in tum; one businessman owned 

the pump and rented it to each farmer on a set schedule, which included times of 

darkness. At approximately 2am, Dahir's friend Rambow brought food for dinner, 

and at that moment the airsttike hit where the two men stood. Amnesty International 

interviewed 18 people, including eyewitnesses and relatives of the victims, and 

corroborated their testimony with social media posts, news accounts, US military 

statements, and NGO situational reports. 

• AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that 

corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting individuals attacking 

partner forces. 
87 

Questions for the Record from Representative Chris Smith 

Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations 

March 26,2019 

Question: 

At the hearing, reference has been made to the role played by China, and to a lesser 

extent, by Russia, in Africa. 

a) What about the role of Turkey, particularly in the Horn of Africa, and 

especially Somalia? 

b) What are Turkey's objectives? Are they strictly economic and 

geopolitical, or is there an ideological and religious aim as well? 

c) If ideological and religious, how would you characterize that- is it 

promotion of"neo-Ottomanism?" A variant ofSunni Islam? 

d) With respect to Turkish promotion of Sunni Islam, such as by engaging in 

mosque building projects and proselytism, how does this compare with 

respect to Saudi Arabia's promotion ofWahhabism? Is it more benign? 

Do the Turks see themselves in competition with other Sunni schools, 

particularly Glilenist interpretations? 

e) What about the role of other outside actors, including Gulf States such as 

Qatar? 

Answers: 

Am b. Linda Thomas-Greenfield: Turkey plays a significant role in the Horn of 

Africa through direct budgetary support, humanitarian relief, infrastructure 

development, and by training military forces. Nowhere is this more evident than 

Somalia. Turkey's involvement with the Federal Government of Somalia began in 

2011 ostensibly to provide famine relief. In the last eight years, the relationship has 

grown significantly: Turkey's largest embassy and largest foreign military base are 

now in Somalia. In addition to the increasing trade between the two countries, 

Turkey's heavy investment in Somalia's reconstruction demonstrates Turkey's 

desire to be seen as a leader in the Muslim world. Somalia is the most prominent 

example of Turkey's widespread diplomatic and economic investment in Africa. 

President Erdogan, who has already opened 26 new embassies on the continent, 

and has 41 embassies in Africa today, has stated that he wants Turkey to have a 

presence in every African capital. 
88 

Turkey's actions in Somalia, along with its ally Qatar, are one of many instances of 

increased militarization of the Red Sea. What began as a response to threats of 

Somali piracy, has grown due to the war in Yemen and the influence of Saudi 

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The proliferation of military bases 

surrounding the Red Sea is concerning given the massive amounts of global trade 

which passes through the Bab al-Mandeb strait each day. 

Some Gulf State activity has been productive for the African countries in the Horn 

of Africa. For example, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Estimates hosted and 

mediated successful peace talks between Ethiopia and Eritrea last year. Gulf States 

have an interest in promoting stability in the Hom of Africa as they increasingly 

invest in its growing economies and fetiile land. 

However, Gulf state competition can also be divisive. In theory, increased 

competition among investors could offer greater funding for African states in need. 

Unfortunately, competition has exacerbated internal conflicts. This has played out 

in Somalia, where Turkey and Qatar back the Federal Govemment while the UAE 

pours funding into the autonomous regions, creating an unproductive dynamic for 

rebuilding the fragile state. 

It is in the United States' interest that rivalries between the Gulf Cooperation 

Council and associated states not destabilize a region trying to get on its feet. The 

U.S. should work to empower domestic reform agendas and regional integration 

among states in the Horn of Africa to ensure increased foreign investment is in the 

best interest ofthe host country. Jn the future, U.S. diplomats and policymakers 

must recognize that developments in the Horn of Africa and on the Arabian 

peninsula are heavily co-dependent and should craft policy to reflect regional 

dynamics. 

Dr. Brahima Coulibaly: Turkey's influence in the Horn, and especially in 

Somalia, has steadily been growing since 20 I I through diplomatic, security, 

economic, and humanitarian channels. Though there can be several motivations for 

Turkey's increasing interest in the region, our reading is that Turkey's engagement 

is largely driven by the same factors as other actors in Africa, namely to become an 

important partner, capitalize on commercial opportunities and, help African 

partners address security challenges. 

Notably, President Erdogan has ramped up his country's presence on the continent, 

having made official visits to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Nigeria, 

Guinea, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Sudan, 
89 

Chad, and Tunisia. Turkey also opened the largest number of embassies on the 

continent between 20 I 0 and 20 I 6. The country also contributes $1 million to the 

African Union annually. The year 2019 will witness the third Turkey-Africa heads 

of state summit. 

Turkey sees the continent as a new, growing market for its products. As a 

nontraditional actor, Turkey's experience and emphasis on economics and trade 

relations makes engagement with the country appealing to fast-growing African 

nations. Indeed, Ankara has been careful to emphasize that Turkish-African 

relations are different than traditional donor-African ones, as partners rather than 

colonizers. Turkish Airlines operates 52 flights to Africa from Istanbul, more than 

any other airline. The "Anatolian Tigers," Turkey's small but quickly growing 

businesses, are particularly looking to Africa as the next frontier for their products 

and investments. In fact, between 2003 and 2017, Turkey's total trade with the 

continent grew by 400 percent, with particular growth in iron, steel, mineral fuels, 

and machinery. Turkey's experience in construction and infrastructure also make it 

attractive to African partners badly in need of infrastructure projects and upgrades. 

In October 2018, Turkey hosted the Second Turkey-Africa Economic and Business 

Forum, in which over 3000 delegates engaged each other over issues of energy, 

infrastructure, and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. 

Somalia is a microcosm of Turkish-African relations. Ankara's aid during the 2011 

famine in the Horn of Africa sparked a positive relationship that has been 

cemented by continued support for schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure 

projects. Turkey continues to be one of Somalia's top aid donors. In terms of trade 

and business, in 2014, the Turkish Albayrak Group became the managing company 

of the Port of Mogadishu. Renovation in 2015 of Somalia's only international 

airpmi-also in Mogadishu-was led by Turkey's development agency, TIKA, and 

is operated by Favori LLC, a Turkish company. Turkish Airlines is also the only 

international carrier flying into Somalia, which creates opportunities for Turkish 

businesses to enter the country. In 2016, Turkey opened its largest embassy in the 

world in Somalia's capital. In September 2017, Turkey opened a $50 million 

military base in Mogadishu, which will, among other tasks, be used to train Somali 

soldiers. Trade has been another aspect of growing Turkish-Somali relations: 

Between 2010 and 2016, Turkish expmis to Somalia exploded from $5.1 million to 

$123 million. 
90 

Other nontraditional, Middle Eastern actors have their roles to play in Africa. In 

fact, between 2000 and 2017, the Horn saw $13 billion in investment from Gulf 

states. Notably, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have 

been jockeying for increased influence in the Horn, with mixed results. In 

particular, Qatar is planning to build a port on the Sudanese coast along the Red 

Sea. Qatar has also provided financing for Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam. The 

UAE, while historically involved in Djibouti, has been facing legal push back from 

local authorities over its control of its port. The UAE is also under pressure from 

Mogadishu as the UAE engages leaders from separatist Somaliland and Puntland. 

Its buildup of military assets in Eritrea has aggravated relations with Ethiopia as 

well. 

Mr. Joshua Meservey: In 1998, Ankara promulgated a policy of increased 

engagement with Africa, and revivified it with an Africa initiative launched in 

2005. 1 As a result, its trade with Africa has dramatically increased, growing 

eightfold from 2000 to 2016.2 It is pouring investment into Somalia and Ethiopia 

particularly, with the latter being the largest recipient of Turkey's Africa 

investments, and its fourth-largest African trading partner. 

Turkey is lavishing its full suite of diplomatic engagements on the continent as 

well. As of 2018, Turkey had 44 embassies in Africa, nearly quadruple the 12 it 

had in 2009.3 As prime minister and president, Erdogan, as of2018, had visited the 

continent 40 times, which included visits to 23 African countries that had never 

received a Turkish leader.4 In 2005, the African Union granted Turkey observer 

status, and in 2008, designated Turkey as a strategic partner to Africa. 

Turkey has as well struck military training agreements with some African 

countries, such as Nigeria. Of particular significance is the recent announcement 

1 Unless otherwise noted, this response derives from Joshua Meservey, "The Saudi-Qatari Dispute: Why the U.S. 

Must Prevent Spillover into East Africa," The Heritage Foundation, November 29, 2017, 

https://www. heritage.org/ africa/report/the-saudi-qatari-dispute-why-the-us-must -prevent -spillover -east -africa 2 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "Turkey: Africa's friend, compatriot and partner, "Aijazeera, June 1, 2019, 

http:/ /www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/ 06/turkey-africa-friend-compatriot-partner160601070207148.html 

3 Akihiro Sa no, "Turkey jockeys with China for influence in Africa," Nikkei Asian Review, May 12, 2018, 

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/lnternational- Relations/Turkey-jockeys-with-China-for-influence-in-Africa 4 Yunus Paksoy, "Turkey's ties with Africa deeper, stronger in all areas," Daily Sabah, February 24, 2018, 

https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2018/02/24/turkeys-ties-with-africa-deeper-stronger-in-all-areas and 

Abdinor Hassan Dahir, "How effective is Turkey's Africa Initiative?," Daily Sabah, September 19, 2017, 

https ://www. dailysabah .com/ op-ed/2017/09/19/how-effective-is-tu rkeys-africa-i n itiative 
91 

that Turkey will pmticipate in restoring Sudan's Suakin Island in the Red Sea, and 

its agreement with Sudan to establish a military presence in Port Sudan.5 

Erdogan has particularly emphasized relations with Somalia. He visited Mogadishu 

three times between 2011 and 2016, and was the first non-African leader to visit 

since the fall of the dictator Mohamed Siad BatTe. Turkey established its largest 

African embassy and largest overseas military base in the world in Somalia, and 

Turkish Airlines was the only international carrier that flew to Somalia until 

November last year, when Ethiopian Air opened a Mogadishu route. Turkish 

companies also manage the Mogadishu seaport and airport that account for almost 

80 percent of the Somali government's revenue. 

Turkey has a range of objectives in its Africa engagements. As the Middle East 

remains unstable and Europe's economic outlook somewhat weak, Turkey is 

looking for new export markets. This includes prioritizing finding in Africa new 

markets for weapons sales.6 Turkish companies have also made investments in 

particularly agriculture and energy, and are managing and building ports and other 

infrastructure on the continent. 

Ankara may also be seeking African friendship as a hedge against potential 

diplomatic isolation from countries alarmed at Erdogan's increasingly authoritarian 

tum. The Turkish public sympathized with their fellow Muslims' suffering in 

Somalia during the 2011 famine, so there are also domestic political reasons for 

Erdogan to engage in Somalia. 

Ankara likely recognizes the strategic importance ofpatticularly the Hom of 

Africa, given its long Indian Ocean coastline and commanding position over the 

Red Sea and Babel Mandeb Strait. Turkey also positioned itself on the Qatari side 

of the Gulf States rift, and the increasing presence of Saudi Arabia and the United 

Arab Emirates in East Africa likely spurs some of Turkey's own activities in the 

region. 

Finally, Erdogan appears to have a certain nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire that 

had a presence throughout the Horn of Africa, and seeks to position Turkey as the 

defender of Muslims around the world. Suakin Island is a historic waypoint for 

5 Mohammad Amin, "Suakin: 'Forgotten' Sudanese island becomes focus for Red Sea rivalries," Middle East Eye, 

March 18, 2018, https:f /www.middleeasteye.net/news/suakin·forgotten-sudanese-island-becomes-focus-red-seariva!ries 

6 Abdirahman Hussein and Orhan Coskun,"Turkey opens military base in Mogadishu to train Somali soldier," 

Reuters, September 30, 2017, https:f/www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-militarybase-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCNlCSOJH 
92 

Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca, and Turkey has embarked on a global 

mosque-building spree. Given Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development 

Party's (AKP's) lslamist beliefs and affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood, these 

developments should concern the United States. 

Ankara's promotion oflslam does not appear to have been as extensive as Saudi 

Arabia's proselytization ofWahhabism. An estimate from 2004 held that Saudi 

Arabia had already spent over $75 billion proselytizing Wahhabism/ and there is 

no indication Turkey has spent comparable amounts. FUiihermore, the Saudi royal 

family's domestic political legitimacy relies in part on its propagation of 

Wahhabism, which gave Saudi leadership a strong motivation to vigorously 

promote it. Erdogan's domestic popularity is not as closely tied to his facilitation 

of the spread of Turkish Islam. Turkey's Islam has a strong nationalist component, 

however, which presents its own set of challenges, such as slowing the integration 

ofthe Turkish diaspora in Europe.8 

Erdogan used the foiled 2016 coup to press his campaign against Turkish cleric in 

exile Fethullah Gulen, a political rival he accuses of complicity in the coup. In 

Africa alone, the Turkish government took control of32 schools associated with 

Gulen,9 who leads the moderate Hizmet Islamic movement. 

Similar to Turkey, Gulf states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U .A. E. have 

dramatically escalated their involvement in particularly the Horn of Africa. The 

U.A.E. recently built a military base in Assab, Eritrea-also used by the Saudisand is building one in Berbera, Somaliland. Last year, it also delivered a $1 billion 

bailout to Ethiopia's central bank. Saudi Arabia has its own plans to build a base in 

Djibouti, and has made a range of large investments- particularly in agriculturein East African countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan. 

Qatar is increasingly active in Somalia, particularly since a falling out between the 

U.A.E. and Mogadishu. It also struck a deal last year with Sudan to develop the 

latter's Suakin Island port, the same island where Turkey plans to restore Suakin 

town. 

7 David D. Aufhauser, "An Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Terrorism Financing," testimony before the 

Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 15, 2004, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG108shrg95189/htmi/CHRG-108shrg95189.htm 

8 Gonul Toi,"Turkey's Bid for Religious Leadership," Foreign Affairs, January 10, 2019, 

https:/ /www. foreign affai rs.com/ articles/turkey /20 19 ·01-10/tu rkeys-bi d-rel igious-leadershi p 

9 'Paksoy,"Turkey's ties with Africa deeper, stronger in all areas." 
93 

Question: 

With respect to presidential elections which took place earlier this year in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, would you characterize them as 

"free and fair?" 

Answers: 

Amb. Linda Thomas-Greenfield: I will address these two elections separately. 

In the DRC, the electoral process encountered some well documented issues as 

evidenced by U.S. Treasury sanctions against officials of the electoral commission 

for obstructing the elections. This would not lead us to describe the elections as 

free and fair. Nevertheless, the victory of President Tshisekedi seems to have been 

widely accepted by many in the international community including the U.S., and, 

most importantly, heads of state on the African continent. The transition helped 

avert a much-feared escalation to electoral violence and allowed the country's first 

peaceful transfer of power. 

As I noted in my testimony, the Nigerian elections showed that states looking to 

consolidate democracy still have a long way to go. There is widespread consensus 

that these elections fell short of the high standards set in 2015. Unfortunately, there 

were some instances of violence and irregularities, though we can conclude that the 

disturbances did not ultimately upset the legitimacy of the results. Nevertheless, 

the opposition party is contesting the elections through the Nigerian court system. 

The Nigerian government still needs to make progress in future electoral reform, 

but the Nigerian people still show a strong commitment to democracy. 

Dr. Brahima Coulibaly: While there have been questions from trustworthy 

sources raised over the legitimacy of the recent elections in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo (DRC), after a Constitutional Court rejected a recount, 

leaders across sub-Saharan Africa have congratulated now-President Felix 

Tshisekedi on his victory. Though the elections' administration was not perfect, it 

seems that Tshisekedi did not play a role in the process: He was not involved in 

organizing nor overseeing the elections. Now, it is in the best interest of the 

country and the region as a whole to recognize the deficiencies in the electoral 

process, but note that the transition of leadership to the opposition, the first of its 

kind in the country, has been peaceful. I believe the best course of action is to 

engage him and provide the necessary support to steer his policies in the right 
94 

Æ 

direction, including creating the environment for more credible elections in a few 

years. 

In Nigeria, despite tensions and their controversial postponement, elections 

observers have largely agreed that the elections were free and fair overall. 

Importantly, according to observers, any irregularities have not been severe enough 

to have affected to outcome. 

Mr. Joshua Meservey: All available evidence shows that the December 2018 

elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo were not free or fair. The Catholic 

Church, Congo's most authoritative and legitimate institution, announced that data 

collected by its 40,000 election observers contradicted the electoral commission's 

results announcing Felix Tshisekedi as winner. Two other independent analyses 

determined Tshisekedi's win was a ''huge fraud," and that the probability of 

winning his announced vote share was "less than 0.0000." 10 

Tshisekedi's ascension is the likely result of a backroom deal between him and the 

former president, Joseph Kabila, who will continue to wield significant influence 

in the government. While the DRC is well rid of the kleptocratic and brutal Kabila, 

Tshisekedi may prove to be little of an upgrade given his apparent contempt for the 

rights of the Congolese people to choose their leadership. His uneasy detente with 

Kabila could also shatter, leading to a violent struggle for full control of the 

government. His lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the plurality of voters in the 

recent election will make it hard for him to be an effective leader as well. 

10 Joshua Meservey, "America Must Not Endorse Faulty Elections in the Congo," The National Interest, February 20, 

2019, https:/ /nationalinterest.org/feature/america-must-not·endorse-faulty-elections·congo-45122