Brenda Pearson

PuttingPeaceintoPractice

Can Macedonia’s New Government 

Meet the Challenge?

Briefly . . .

• Macedonia’s September 15 parliamentary elections were the first since the country

narrowly avoided an all-out civil war with the brokering of the Ohrid Framework

Agreement by the United States and the European Union (EU) in August 2001. Macedonia’s future as a unitary state largely depends upon the successful implementation of the Framework Agreement. The underlying problems that sparked the

seven-month conflict between ethnic Albanian insurgents and Macedonian security

forces remain unresolved and could again erupt.

• The recent polls were perhaps the most free and fair since Macedonia gained independence from the disintegrating Yugoslav federation in 1991. The new government led

by the Social Democrats has little time to waste in translating electoral promises into

reality. Ethnic Macedonians and Albanians alike expect significant economic improvements quickly. 

• Intra-Albanian rivalries in parts of Macedonia are marked by murders, bombings, kidnappings, and sheer banditry; gunfire exchanges between unidentified Albanians

and Western peacekeepers often go unreported. Macedonian paramilitaries pose a

threat to peace on the other side of the ethnic divide.

• Lingering bitterness about the conflict remains high in Macedonia, despite the relatively low number of casualties. Great damage has been inflicted on the social fabric

of the country. The uneasy coexistence between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians has

been ruptured, and incidents suggesting a breakdown in civil society are frequent.

• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) mission in Macedonia was extended for

a fourth time until December 15, 2002. The presence of 750 NATO soldiers, though

largely symbolic, has enforced a cessation of interethnic hostilities and anchors Western commitment to the peace agreement. 

• The West has avoided negotiations regarding the final status of Kosovo, but the 

constant deferment affects stability in Macedonia. The Kosovo issue remains open,

and ethnic Albanian insurgents in Kosovo and in Macedonia are likely to exploit the

instability in Macedonia for their nationalist agenda. 

www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

SPECIAL REPORT 96 NOVEMBER 2002

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines the current status of 

Macedonia’s peace agreement in light of the 

country’s September 15 parliamentary elections,

which brought a new coalition government 

to power. The report proposes a set of recommendations to Macedonia’s officials and to U.S. 

and European Union policymakers who are involved

with the agreement’s implementation.

Brenda Pearson is an independent political analyst

who focuses on southeastern Europe, preventive

diplomacy, and international development issues.

Having worked in the Balkans since the early

1990s, she is a frequent presenter at Balkan policy

conferences in the United States and Europe and

has served as a consultant to the U.S. Department

of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the European Commission, and the World

Bank. She was a senior fellow in the U.S. Institute

of Peace’s Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace from October 2001 to July 2002.

The information in this report is based on the

author’s observations and interviews she conducted

during a trip to Macedonia during the 

September elections. 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily

reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace,

which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

Background 3

A Peaceful Resolution to 

the Conflict 4

The Framework Agreement 6

Cost of the Conflict 9

Paying for Peace10

Final Exam: Elections10

The Next Government11

European Crisis Management12

Conclusions13

Recommendations14
• European management of the crisis has been mixed but greatly exceeds the low

expectations set a year ago. Claims of success in achieving 95 percent of the terms

laid out in the Framework Agreement, the cornerstone of the West’s peace initiative

in Macedonia, are misleading. The enormous gap between legislative adoption and

actual implementation of government reform has not narrowed.

• The new government’s first contentious issue will be managing the political implications of the census being conducted this month. The international community’s

inclination to treat the census results as a statistical exercise, without understanding the underlying politics of ethnic competition, could spark another round of

attacks from disgruntled Albanian guerrillas who remain outcast.

Introduction

In February 2001, a small group of armed ethnic Albanians took control of Tanusevci, a

tiny village on the Kosovo-Macedonia border, and rejected Macedonian and international

entreaties to withdraw. The insurgents identified themselves as soldiers of the National

Liberation Army (NLA) and claimed to be fighting for greater political and economic

rights. The Macedonian government accused them of trying to divide the country along

ethnic lines with support from ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Albania.

Fighting soon spread from isolated incidences in the predominately ethnic Albanian

parts of the country to within shooting distance of the capital, Skopje, pitting the ethnic Albanian insurgents against the predominately ethnic Macedonian government

forces. Large swatches of territory were embroiled in the seven-month armed struggle,

resulting in about 200 casualties and more than 180,000 internally displaced people

(IDPs). The overall security situation in the country seriously deteriorated as areas came

under NLA control; ethnically motivated riots spread to the hinterland, and the government distributed arms to ethnic Macedonian paramilitary groups and to citizens living in ethnically mixed cities.

The Macedonian military’s response to the crisis was largely inept. Inheriting an

extremely weak military structure from the former Yugoslav army when the country declared

independence in 1991, Macedonia’s military took a long time to organize its counteroffensive, which emboldened the Albanian fighters. Yet the country’s political leaders insisted upon a military solution to the conflict long after it became clear that Macedonia’s

security forces were poorly equipped and trained, resulting in a military response that

seemed intent on purposely destroying as much of the disputed villages as possible.

Western leaders feared that the botched military campaign would plunge Macedonia

into civil war. When it became clear that Macedonia’s only hope was to reach a quick

political solution, the United States and Europe dispatched envoys, who forged a peace

agreement among leaders from both ethnic communities at the resort town of Ohrid on

August 13. The agreement mandates that the country adopt sweeping reforms to decentralize government, increase ethnic minority rights, and amend discriminatory passages

in the constitution. The Framework Agreement thus reflects Western leaders’ belief that

interethnic tensions in Macedonia were the central cause of the war, rather than a larger

“pan-Albanian” problem stemming from the Kosovo conflict and the resulting diaspora of

ethnic Albanians from the neighboring Serbian province. 

Macedonian leaders have reluctantly set about implementing the Framework Agreement. They grudgingly accept the tenets of the peace accord but have no real desire to

reward the Albanians for bringing their country to the brink of war. Most Macedonian

officials harbor two principal fears: first, that the Albanians’ appetites for more political and economic advantages will never be satisfied, despite the concessions made

under the Framework Agreement; and second, that the real goal of the Albanians is federalization of the country, essentially partitioning Macedonia between the overwhelm2

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution 

created by Congress to promote the prevention,

management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute

meets its congressional mandate through an 

array of programs, including research grants, 

fellowships, professional training, education 

programs from high school through graduate

school, conferences and workshops, library

services, and publications. The Institute’s Board of

Directors is appointed by the President of the

United States and confirmed by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), James R. Schlesinger

Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University • Seymour Martin Lipset (Vice

Chairman), Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder and 

former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians for

Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Marc E. Leland, Esq.,

President, Marc E. Leland & Associates, Arlington, Va. 

• Mora L. McLean, Esq., President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • María Otero, President, ACCION

International, Boston, Mass. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American

Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Douglas J. Feith, Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice

Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

ingly ethnic Albanian region in the west and the rest of the country. Most government

officials have no confidence that such a scheme, as proposed by many NLA commanders and supporters, would lead to the enduring preservation of Macedonia as a unitary state.

Not all ethnic Albanians want to see Macedonia divided into ethnic enclaves through

federalization. Some of the country’s political leaders on both sides of the ethnic divide

sincerely believe that complete implementation of the Framework Agreement will bring

lasting peace and preserve the territorial integrity of the state. Yet in many ways, the

conflict has succeeded in hardening each ethnic group’s perceptions of the other. Most

Macedonians still tend to view Albanians as guests in their house and expect them to

behave accordingly. The Albanians, on the other hand, no longer view themselves as a

minority, having achieved some significant concessions at Ohrid. 

Background

Macedonia has held together so far because of a very clear division of power among the

country’s political leaders. Since independence, Macedonia has been ruled by largely

unworkable coalitions comprising a majority ethnic Macedonian party and an ethnic

Albanian party, and both partners in these coalitions have understood that their mutual interests were best served by not interfering in each other’s sphere of influence. The

de facto ethnic division of political power was lucrative and promised great rewards to

those in power. 

Political party membership is the determining factor for employment in Macedonia.

Thousands of people are purged from their jobs in the public sector and from state

enterprises when political power changes hands. Governing parties rule absolutely and,

in return, do not really expect much work from their employees. Thus, the country’s

workforce is by and large untrained and lives on patronage. The politicians in power are

only too happy to comply with this Faustian bargain because it keeps them in office. 

Problems began when one Albanian political party, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), established complete control over the western part of the country and began

to extort money from individuals and businesses regardless of their political affiliation.

The level of graft and corruption increased significantly after the 1999 NATO military

campaign in Kosovo. The large international presence in Kosovo and Macedonia has

been extremely lucrative for those engaged in smuggling weapons, cigarettes, drugs,

and humans. The only way to break this stranglehold on power in western Macedonia

was to challenge it militarily, which is a short way of describing how the NLA showed

up on Macedonia’s doorstep last winter. 

Rumors abound and facts are few about the origins of the NLA. Many of its core

members are former fighters from the now disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),

who were locked out of the postconflict division of spoils and could not legally return

to Macedonia. Some of them, like political leader Ali Ahmeti, were born in Macedonia

but really belong to an odyssey familiar to Albanian nationalists: education in Pristina,

jail in Yugoslavia, exile in Europe, fund-raising within the Albanian diaspora, and return

to Kosovo during the war. 

“Greater Albania”—or perhaps more accurately, “Greater Kosovo”—has been an enduring concept among Albanian nationalists for some time. Except for a brief period—during World War II, when Fascist Italy expanded across the region—the dream has never

been realized. Ethnic Albanian intellectuals and political leaders in the region and abroad

tacitly agreed that independence for Kosovo was the priority, and that 

lesser issues, such as the discrimination of Albanians in Macedonia, could wait. Albanians living outside the country opened the new “Macedonian question.” 

The government coalition of the right-leaning ethnic Macedonian nationalist party,

the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian

Not all ethnic Albanians want

to see Macedonia divided into

ethnic enclaves through federalization. Some of the

country’s political leaders on

both sides of the ethnic divide

sincerely believe that complete

implementation of the

Framework Agreement will

bring lasting peace and

preserve the territorial integrity of the state.
4

National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), and the DPA, which came to power in 1998, was working

toward many compromises on ethnic issues. Prior to the outbreak of conflict, the issue of

access to Albanian-language higher education was close to being resolved and a revised

citizenship law was under negotiation. The current fifteen-year residency requirement for

citizenship and Albanians’ lack of access to proper documentation has long been problematic. Most of these pending achievements, however, were undermined by the conflict.

Thus, the timing of the guerrilla revolt appears to have been driven by something else.

One factor leading to the conflict was NATO’s decision to close the five-kilometer

buffer zone between the Macedonian border and the strip of southern Serbia that

served as the base of operations for ethnic Albanian guerrillas from the Liberation Army

of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (or UCPMB, in its Albanian acronym). This action

spelled the definitive end of the insurgency in the Presevo Valley, which borders Macedonia and Kosovo, and many ethnic Albanian field commanders and a host of unsavory

characters went looking for a new field of operations. The parallel sequence of events

that led to the buildup of the NLA and the collapse of the UCPMB culminated on March

16, 2001, when the NLA took control of the old fort in Tetovo and Serbian soldiers

simultaneously re-entered the Presevo Valley.

The origins of Macedonia’s conflict lie in the struggle among various ethnic Albanian

groups for domination of the territory and criminal enterprises of the country’s western

region. Several NLA commanders and supporters confirmed that they picked up weapons

primarily to challenge the DPA and that joining Ali Ahmeti’s NLA came as an afterthought

(author’s interviews in Skopje, Tetovo, and Struga, September 14–23, 2002). As such, the

conflict was really a civil war turned upside down, beginning as an intra-Albanian crisis

that suddenly engulfed the rest of the country; the interethnic dimension of the conflict

became the exit strategy for ethnic Albanians at war with each other. By trying to consolidate the fragmented political power of ethnic Albanians—first through an umbrella

group of Albanian parties, then by spearheading his own party—Ali Ahmeti filled a political leadership vacuum among Albanians who had lost faith in the country’s legitimate

political party leaders. In a rather perverse way, the leader of an armed guerrilla movement became the symbol of democracy and decency for the Albanians in Macedonia who

were tired of corruption.

The NLA took advantage of the international predisposition to view the ethnic Albanians as victims of discrimination. Ethnic Macedonians often discriminated against the

country’s ethnic Albanians, but it is unfair to compare the situation to the repressive

atmosphere in Kosovo under the regime of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. On the

other hand, Macedonians consistently did little to better their political standing with the

international community regarding the country’s ethnic division. Government leaders

blamed the West for its mismanagement of Kosovo and simultaneously expressed their

desire to settle the crisis militarily while overstating their importance to the West as a

strategic ally. Needless to say, such a strategy did little to endear Macedonian officials to

Western leaders. The Albanians cleverly exploited the Western disaffection for the Macedonians throughout the conflict and during the peace negotiations.

A Peaceful Resolution to the Conflict

Political leaders from the European Union and the United States viewed the Macedonian conflict through the lens of the other Balkan wars. Macedonia was considered the

linchpin for either regional stability or chaos. The international community feared an

expansion of the conflict and worried that neighboring countries, such as Yugoslavia

(and particularly Kosovo), as well as Albania, Bulgaria, or even Greece, could be drawn

into the crisis. The large American contingent of NATO soldiers deployed in the Kosovo sector that bordered Macedonia presented a delicate situation as well. An escalation of violence across the northern border would put NATO soldiers at risk. 

The conflict was really a civil

war turned upside down, beginning as an intra-Albanian crisis

that suddenly engulfed the rest

of the country; the interethnic

dimension of the conflict

became the exit strategy for

ethnic Albanians at war 

with each other. 
5

In the early days of the conflict, tension rose between the diplomatic community in

Skopje and the NATO military contingent in Kosovo. The NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) tended

to view the conflict in terms of opposing Albanian criminal enterprises fighting over control of cross-border smuggling routes. Diplomats in Skopje, on the other hand, viewed the

conflict in terms of interethnic clashes erupting throughout the country. 

The international community unanimously agreed that something had to be done,

but it was divided on a precise course of action. The new foreign policy team in the

Bush administration, which had been in place for just two months, adamantly rejected

a new NATO commitment in the Balkans and believed the Europeans should shoulder

the burden of crisis management. The Albanians and Macedonians, meanwhile, were

veering dangerously close to dividing the country along ethnic lines. 

As with the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, European and U.S. leaders faced a familiar

choice in Macedonia: Should the West intervene militarily or sit by while the country

descended into all too familiar scenes of ethnic cleansing? The burden of military intervention was difficult in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. In Macedonia, it was

bound to be even more difficult—for one thing, it was unclear who the opponents were

and where the front lines were drawn. In the end, the West calculated that peace would

require the underlying guarantee of a NATO deployment. War seemed inevitable, so it

would be better to go in early on more favorable terms than to get dragged in later

when things were really a mess. 

British prime minister Tony Blair took the lead and persuaded the United States to

increase its presence through the eventual deployment of NATO troops and the immediate appointment of a hard-nosed special envoy; the Americans and the Europeans

would work in tandem to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Once the United

States was on board, the international community decisively intervened. 

Macedonian leaders were convinced that the Albanians were motivated by the wish for

territorial expansion rather than a genuine desire to expand their human rights within the

state of Macedonia. In light of the Macedonians’ limited capacity to wage an effective

counterinsurgency, the West tried to restrain the Macedonian military. The Macedonian

strategy was to completely destroy NLA-captured villages through relentless shelling. It

was a flawed plan somewhat similar to blowing up a plane filled with passengers in order

to kill the hijackers on board. 

Despite some ill-advised proposals from Macedonian intellectuals to simply partition

the country, the primary focus of the negotiations was to end the hostilities and to

maintain the integrity of the borders. The negotiators insisted that government reform

was the cornerstone of any peace agreement, and, indeed, the Framework Agreement

strengthens local government, gives the Albanian language official status, and contains

mechanisms to ensure that sensitive laws on cultural and distinctly ethnic issues require

minority backing. Yet Macedonian officials portrayed negotiations between the government and the two principal negotiators, U.S. special envoy James Pardew and the EU’s

Francois Leotard, as a fight for survival of the Macedonian identity. The media of the

two main ethnic groups portrayed the conflict in starkly ethnic terms; most of the Macedonian-language media depicted the negotiators as forfeiting Macedonian sovereignty

to reward the Albanians. 

The country’s four major political party leaders—representing the ethnic Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE and the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), and the ethnic Albanian DPA and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP)—met for a final round

of negotiations near Ohrid Lake in early August and reached an agreement on August

13, 2001. Only hours after the negotiators left Ohrid for the three-hour return drive to

Skopje, a fresh round of fighting broke out. The Macedonian military launched a lastditch effort to regain ground in a bid to rally public support and to restore their confidence. The intense fighting threatened to spiral out of control and spread to other

ethnically mixed communities. In fact, some of the worst fighting in the seven-month

conflict occurred just after the peace agreement was signed. The Albanians, who had

The burden of military intervention was difficult in other parts

of the former Yugoslavia. In

Macedonia, it was bound to be

even more difficult—for one

thing, it was unclear who the

opponents were and where 

the front lines were drawn.

The Macedonian strategy was

to completely destroy NLAcaptured villages through

relentless shelling. It was a

flawed plan somewhat similar

to blowing up a plane filled

with passengers in order to 

kill the hijackers on board. 
6

shrewdly negotiated their position, prevented the NLA from launching a major counteroffensive, which is probably the only reason the peace process was not entirely

derailed.

The Framework Agreement

Since last August, the European Union and the United States have watched in utter

disappointment as the Framework Agreement fell apart repeatedly, but they should

have expected some major rifts in the course of the agreement’s implementation. First

and foremost, Macedonian politicians rejected the proposed change in wording of the

preamble of the constitution, the original version of which specifically acknowledged

the Macedonian people as the country’s constituent nation. The Framework Agreement

removed this distinction. The EU and the U.S. quickly dispatched their special envoys

to work out a compromise on the wording of the preamble, and, once again, a lot of

negotiating and arm-twisting brought the peace process back on track.

After months of foot-dragging, Macedonia’s legislature reluctantly adopted the

peace accord on November 16, 2001. Significantly, this was the first time that ethnic

Albanians voted to accept the country’s constitution. In the past, ethnic Albanian parliamentarians abstained or boycotted the parliamentary sessions. The long delay

reflects the ambiguities and disagreements about the very essence of the Framework

Agreement; ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians view the Framework Agreement

from diametrically opposite viewpoints. 

Essentially, the Ohrid Agreement provides the architectural framework for equitable

representation of minorities in public administration, language rights, the strengthening of local government, reintegration of territory held or captured by the NLA, return

of refugees, and the conduct of an internationally supervised census. On balance, the

agreement preserves the unitary state of Macedonia and its territorial integrity. The

agreement may be flawed in many ways, but there are many flawed treaties in Europe

that function well in practice. Some Macedonians contend that the constitutional

changes introduced a type of consensual democracy that could have a negative impact

on the government’s efficiency and lead to manipulations regarding the ethnic origins

of parliamentarians. They argue that the Framework Agreement promotes collective as

opposed to individual rights. Thus, Albanians are now identified as a collective rather

than as Macedonian citizens. In such a light, the West will find it difficult to dismiss

ethnic Macedonians’ concerns that the full implementation of the Framework Agreement could encourage the country’s partition along ethnic lines.

The peaceful cohabitation of Macedonians and Albanians will depend on both sides

talking less about the division of country and more about the division of responsibilities under the Framework Agreement. The real risk is that implementation of the agreement will become hostage to familiar games of ethnic one-upmanship played by the

country’s political leaders. The significance of the agreement threatens to be chipped

away through a thousand semantic battles on the meaning of words rather than the

substance. In short, there is waning support for the agreement in Macedonia, and

intense pressure from the international community will be needed to keep it on track.

Two types of legislative changes are incorporated in the Framework Agreement. The

first type concerns constitutional revisions, which are included in Annex A of the agreement. The second type is legislative amendments, which are included in Annex B. All

of the proposed constitutional amendments were ratified by parliament last autumn.

June 20 was the deadline for adoption of the legislative amendments, but the parliamentary session ended inconclusively because of a language controversy regarding new

passports (see “Language Issues” below).

The international community declared victory in mid-July 2002 after reaching an

agreement on new parliamentary regulations. During a visit to Skopje, NATO secretary

The peaceful cohabitation of

Macedonians and Albanians

will depend on both sides talking less about the division of

country and more about the

division of responsibilities

under the Framework

Agreement.
general Lord George Robertson claimed that 95 percent of the Framework Agreement

had been adopted. Yet implementation of the agreement is likely to be quite difficult,

given that it has taken a full year merely to adopt the agreement’s principles. To date,

the most progress has been made in the return of refugees and IDPs. More than 155,000

people (or 95 percent) who fled their homes during the crisis have returned. Police are

returning to villages in ethnically mixed patrols, but the dearth of people on the streets

after dark in these areas indicates that considerable fear still prevails. 

The European Union has taken the lead in administering a census, despite warnings

from the SDSM, Ali Ahmeti’s Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), and the United

States that still very raw emotions may argue for postponing an ethnic head count of

the country’s populace. Although the census will be more professionally administered

than in the past, none of the political issues that derailed the 1994 census have been

resolved. The Albanian political parties will most likely stage strategic boycotts disputing the results.

Among the more difficult tasks confronting the new government and parliament will

be getting down to the basics in order to put some substance and vigor into implementing the essential parts of the Framework Agreement. Albanians, in particular, have

exceedingly high expectations that Western pressure will force Macedonia’s new government to reconfigure the state structure to their advantage. They believe that the

Framework Agreement will change their lives and bring them into immediate parity with

ethnic Macedonians. The real difficulty will come when implementation of the agreement shifts jobs and public spending from the central government to local authorities

and from cities populated mostly by ethnic Macedonians to those populated overwhelmingly by ethnic Albanians. 

New Laws and Ethnic Representation

Macedonia inherited from socialist Yugoslavia a highly centralized state in which municipal revenues are dependent upon taxes collected from construction and property sales

and public utilities revenues. Smaller municipalities often have no locally generated revenue and are by and large subject to the central government’s caprice. In many parts

of the country, local governments are simply incapable of providing needed public services; this is especially true in areas populated predominately by ethnic Albanians.

Although the Framework Agreement’s overall legislative framework was adopted, none

of the estimated 250 laws required to decentralize government functions has been drafted, according to the new parliamentary speaker Nikola Popovski (interview in Utrinski Vesnik, October 15, 2002). These laws are needed to reinforce the powers of elected local

officials and to substantially increase their competencies in the areas of public services,

urban and rural planning, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health

care. Popovski speculated that it would take a minimum of one year just to draft the

required legislation. The European Union and U.S. Agency for International Development

have been providing technical assistance for the drafting and implementation of these

laws since 1996, which gives some indication of the difficulty involved. 

In addition to the specific local self-government laws, three related laws must be

adopted: the Law on Local Finance, the Law on Municipal Boundaries, and the Law on the

City of Skopje. The International Monetary Fund, among other donors, recommended that

the Law on Territorial Division (or consolidation of the country’s 124 municipalities,

including Skopje) be implemented first, followed by the Law on Local Finance. However,

new municipal boundaries cannot be drawn until after a new census has been conducted.

(The most optimistic prognosis is that these two laws will be passed by the end of 2003.)

The Law on Territorial Division also affects the use of secondary languages in the

country. According to current law, in municipalities where a community constitutes at

least 20 percent of the population, the language of that community will be used as an

official language in addition to Macedonian. These constituents will also be allowed to

7

The real difficulty will come

when implementation of the

agreement shifts jobs and public

spending from the central

government to local authorities

and from cities populated mostly

by ethnic Macedonians to those

populated overwhelmingly by

ethnic Albanians. 
use their own language to communicate with government employees in regional

offices. For municipalities in which certain languages are spoken by less than 20 percent of the population, the local authorities will decide democratically on their use in

public bodies.

Ethnic Macedonians fear that these and related aspects of decentralization are the

first step toward federalization or partition of the country. They view the use of the

Albanian language throughout the country as a threat to their national identity and

believe that ethnic Albanians will simply refuse to communicate in Macedonian. Thus,

Macedonians fear that they will be at a distinct disadvantage in a new bilingual environment, given that almost no ethnic Macedonians can speak Albanian. 

Currently, international advisers from various European consulting firms are squabbling over how to best proceed with reforms. Technical experts are recommending a

model that is far too complex and unwieldy for a country of only two million people

that was largely agrarian only one generation ago. Rather than making the reforms simple and easy to implement, the technical process of evaluation and recommendations

is becoming an elaborate exercise.

Under the Framework Agreement, the principle of nondiscrimination and equal treatment is to be applied to public sector employment and access to public financing for

business development. The parliament adopted legislation designed to ensure equitable

representation of ethnic groups in public life, but, given the country’s ethnodemographic

complexity (including, in addition to the two major ethnic groups, Serbs, Turks, Roma,

Vlachs, and Bosnian Muslims), this mandate has led to some rather complex formulas for

bolstering ethnic representation in public institutions. For example, one-third of the

judges for the Constitutional Court are to be chosen by a majority of the total number

of parliamentarians who are not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 

Police services are supposed to reflect the ethnic composition and distribution of

Macedonia’s population by 2004. The new officers are to be selected on the basis of ethnicity and deployed to corresponding areas where ethnic groups other than Macedonians

constitute at least 20 percent of the community. According to a July 2002 article in the

monthly Vest, 70 percent of the first group of minority policemen failed the obligatory

state examination. Few of the country’s current police officers, regardless of ethnicity, are

properly trained or respect the rule of law.

The peace negotiations nearly collapsed last August when the country’s four principal political leaders could not agree on how local police chiefs would be appointed.

The National Assembly recently adopted a compromise solution: Local heads of police

will be selected by municipal councils from lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of Interior. 

Language Issues

The Macedonian parliament has been operating according to legislative and procedural

rules of the former Yugoslavia because it had consistently failed to adopt new rules

since the republic gained independence in 1991. The issue that had defied agreement

was the use of the Albanian language. On July 10, 2002, the four signatories to the

Framework Agreement assented to new parliamentary regulations. The Official Gazette,

which chronicles parliamentary decisions, was printed in bilingual text immediately

after adoption of the new rules.

Under the new regulations, only Albanian parliamentarians will be allowed to

address the parliament in the Albanian language. Albanian political leaders wanted the

new regulation to apply to all individuals who wished to address the parliament in

Albanian. The new agreement allows only spoken Albanian and does not apply to written communication or to the official use of the Albanian language by ethnic Albanian

ministers serving in government. Given the history of the language disputes in Macedonia, there are bound to be challenges from the Albanian quarter. 

8
The laws for bilingual personal identification documents such as driver’s licenses and

vehicle registrations have been adopted, but the issue of passports remains contentious.

Ethnic Albanian leaders are demanding that passports issued to Albanians be printed in

the Albanian language on the front cover, along with the current Macedonian and English.

Macedonian leaders insist that the country issue only one type of passport but that the

personal information inside may be in the Albanian language. Bowing to international pressure, the country’s officials and political leaders have deferred discussion of the issue. 

Macedonia’s education system is floundering on both sides of the ethnic divide. A

recent World Bank study concluded that the educational system is highly centralized,

inefficient, and of low quality. The World Bank and the Netherlands have pledged 20

million euros in assistance. The Framework Agreement stipulates that instruction in primary and secondary schools will be provided in the students' native languages; at the

same time, uniform standards for academic programs will be applied throughout the

country. State funding should be provided for university-level education in languages

spoken by at least 20 percent of the population, on the basis of specific agreements.

The principle of positive discrimination will be applied to enrollment in state universities until levels reflect the composition of the population.

Cost of the Conflict

The economic dimension of Macedonia’s conflict can be detailed with a fair degree of

accuracy: “82 members of the security forces dead, 16 civilians killed, 2 representatives

from the OSCE, 186,000 people evacuated, and about 1 billion euros spent as well as

80 percent of the NLA controlled territory still controlled by terrorist gangs” (Macedonia

Public Prosecutor Stavre Dzikov, press conference, October 5, 2002). These figures do

not include the costs or casualties incurred by the ethnic Albanians, the latter of which

may number around 200.

Nor do they include the less emotive but equally significant indirect costs—such as

the damage done to the Macedonian economy. Indeed, the country had seemed poised

for economic turnaround in 2001: strong economic performance the previous year yielded a first-time budget surplus and a modest decline in inflation. All the good news,

however, disappeared with the crisis, which has resulted in sharply lower industrial production, exports, and fiscal revenues.

The government appears to have spent a minimum of US$30 million in weapons, and

property damage amounts to about US$32 million (based on interviews in Skopje with

diplomats from Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, and World Bank officials, December 1–7, 2001). There are no known estimates of the cost of damaged electricity grids and transportation lines. Perhaps more noteworthy, there is no estimate

available for state expenditures related to the mobilization of more than 20,000 army

and police reservists who appear to remain on active duty more for political than security reasons (Vladimir Jovanovski, “Demobilization NOW!” Forum, October 19, 2001).

President Boris Trajkovski told foreign diplomats that he estimates the seven-month

insurgency to have brought losses of some $700 million to Macedonia’s economy. 

The harder cost to estimate is the lost opportunities for foreign investment. The hidden

costs of the conflict, such as people’s fear to go to work, lack of trust in a stable economic

and political environment, and questionable transportation lines, will most likely turn

investors’ attention to neighboring countries (Kapital, December 6, 2001). 

As a result of the conflict, about 13,400 people remain in temporary shelters; their homes

have been destroyed. Despite the residual bitterness left in the aftermath of the conflict,

the majority of ethnic Macedonians and Albanians believe that the biggest problems in the

country are poverty and unemployment—they view turbulent interethnic relations and

renewed violence as less urgent than shoring up the economy (Dnevnik, July 11, 2002, citing a telephone poll conducted by the Institute for Democracy, Solidarity, and Civil Society).

9
Paying for Peace 

About $500 million was pledged at a donors conference sponsored by the European Commission and the World Bank on March 12, 2002 to determine the extent of macro-financial assistance and toward funding reconstruction and peace-building projects. The

international community pledged additional financial assistance to Macedonia but set

two conditions: parliament must pass sweeping reform legislation to decentralize government, and the government and the IMF must agree on a budgetary oversight program. 

The World Bank has estimated the cost for implementing the peace agreement at

US$81 million; yet no one really knows how much money will be required for decentralization because it is nearly impossible to estimate accurately the capacity of local

governmental institutions and employees to adapt to the changes. According to the

World Bank, the cost for implementation of the peace agreement is likely to “entail

large fiscal costs over the next few years, while economic prospects are diminished

because of damaged business confidence. External financing for this year and the next

two years will be substantial” (World Bank, FYR Macedonia Transitional Support Strategy,

summary of Board of Executive Directors meeting, September 13, 2001).

With EU external affairs commissioner Chris Patten’s announcement that the union

would contribute 24.7 million euros, in addition to the 42.5 million euros pledged in

an agreement signed in Skopje on October 4, 2001, it is clear that the EU will be carrying the brunt of financial assistance for Macedonia’s reconstruction. In addition, the

European Commission announced in late July 2002 that an additional 3.6 million euros

would be available for reconstruction of an additional 200 houses, which would increase

the total number of reconstructed houses to 960. Nonetheless, the EU’s development

assistance to Macedonia has been criticized for its failure to devote sufficient resources

and oversight to combating corruption and to initiating civil society programs. 

The EU program itself, which has given about 500 million euros to Macedonia in the

past decade, has also been criticized as too bureaucratic, subject to infighting, and

lacking in focus. Two separate reports noted that only “about 58 percent of the amounts

allocated between 1991 and 2000 have been contracted and only 34 percent has been

disbursed” (Judy Dempsey, “Reports Blast Failure of EU Aid Programme for Macedonia,”

Financial Times, December 10, 2001). As of September 2002, only about 29 percent of

the 50.4 million euros pledged for the implementation of the Framework Agreement for

the current year 2002 had been used. The main reason is that the ministries and agencies in charge of implementing the agreement lack the technical capacity to design concrete projects, despite the May 2002 establishment of the Unit for Coordination of the

Implementation of the Framework Agreement.

Final Exam: Elections

The elections of September 15 were the international community’s final exam for Macedonia, and the country seems to have passed. Macedonia had to prove that it was capable of organizing and conducting free and fair elections. The outcome of the elections

was in many ways less important than the process: If the process broke down, there

was no obvious exit strategy other than renewed chaos. Voters needed to believe that

they have some influence over the political process. The average Albanian and Macedonian discovered this year that they are both miserable together, and the bitterness

is too deep for politics as usual.

The SDSM, which has been in opposition since 1998, won a surprisingly comfortable

majority but may find it still difficult to sustain a durable government. The large margin of victory for SDSM leader Branko Crvenkovski, a former prime minister, was attributable to the elimination of four smaller parties whose popularity stemmed largely from

their leaders. Voters were not willing to risk diluting their vote for a change in govern10

The elections of September 15

were the international community’s final exam for Macedonia,

and the country seems to have

passed. Macedonia had to prove

that it was capable of organizing and conducting free and

fair elections.

As of September 2002, only

about 29 percent of the 50.4

million euros pledged for the

implementation of the

Framework Agreement for the

current year 2002 had been

used. The main reason is that

the ministries and agencies in

charge of implementing the

agreement lack the technical

capacity to design concrete 

projects, despite the May 2002

establishment of the Unit for

Coordination of the Implementation of the Framework

Agreement.
ment, so they cast their ballots for the large coalition of Social Democrats and Liberal

Democrats, both progenies of the former Communist party.

The smaller parties received only 80,000 total votes. Voters saw the large bloc coalitions as the only viable alternatives. Under the d’Hodt calculation method used in proportional representation electoral models, the smaller parties that have an even

distribution of supporters throughout the country suffered, while the ethnic Albanian

parties, which are geographically concentrated, benefited under the new system.

The West, which sent 800 monitors, saw the elections as a breakthrough in the effort

to shore up Macedonia’s fragile peace. It is no secret that Western leaders wanted to

see a change in government, and there were justifiable fears that incumbent party leaders who were trailing badly in the polls would manufacture violent incidents to invalidate the elections. Indeed, murders, kidnappings, and physical attacks on parliamentary

candidates dominated the news in the run-up to the polling.

Election cheating in Macedonia usually occurs well before polling day. In 1994, about

150,000 residents who were in the process of obtaining citizenship were illegally added

to voter registration lists. In the 1996 local elections, many votes were bought with

five-kilo bags of sugar, flour, and meat. In the 2000 local elections, party activists died

in polling station attacks. The more than 100 percent voter turnout in the 1999 elections in some of the Albanian-majority communities also raised serious doubts about

the legitimacy of the polling. The international community’s position has been to

acknowledge that the elections were imperfect but that the general will of the people

was reflected at the polling stations. 

While the September 15 elections were not perfect, international and local observers

confirm that they were significantly more orderly and less rife with fraud than in the

past. The strong showing of both the Social Democrats and Ali Ahmeti’s new ethnic

Albanian party opens up new opportunities, especially as both parties support the

Framework Agreement and want to move forward. While some ethnic Macedonians do

not welcome it, the presence of the former Albanian guerillas in the National Assembly

will contribute to stability.

The Next Government

The new parliament and government will comprise all parties that signed or supported

the Ohrid Framework Agreement; the smaller opposition parties were thrown out. VMRODPMNE could still pose a forceful opposition to the realization of the Framework Agreement, but the other ethnic Macedonian parties will be under enormous pressure to

implement it. The absence of multiethnic parties in Macedonia has always resulted in

government coalitions made up of ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian parties that

have de facto control over ethnic spheres of influence. Ethnicity rather than competency has usually been the key criterion in filling government positions. 

Despite its large margin of victory, the SDSM had difficulty in forming a coalition

because of a decade of bad relations with the DPA and its obvious discomfort cohabitating with former NLA leader Ali Ahmeti. Ethnic Macedonians resist the reincarnation

of Ali Ahmeti as a credible and legitimate political leader because of their belief that

increased rights for Albanians and other minorities were the result of war and terrorism. Crvenkovski’s dilemma, and that of the country, is how to make peace with Ali

Ahmeti—who nearly started a bloody civil war one year ago—and his sixteen parliamentary seats. Crvenkovski’s decision on how to deal with Ali Ahmeti will in large part

indicate the degree to which the country’s wounds have healed.

The Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) was in power from 1991 until 1998, and

most ethnic Albanians believe that the party did little to improve their lives; allegations

of corruption and profits derived from smuggling tobacco, cigarettes, and alcohol are

widespread. The DPA, which took power in local government in 1996 and in parliament in

11

The strong showing of both the

Social Democrats and Ali

Ahmeti’s new ethnic Albanian

party opens up new opportunities, especially as both parties

support the Framework

Agreement and want to move

forward. While some ethnic

Macedonians do not welcome 

it, the presence of the former

Albanian guerillas in the

National Assembly will

contribute to stability.

Crvenkovski’s dilemma, and

that of the country, is how to

make peace with Ali Ahmeti—

who nearly started a bloody

civil war one year ago—and his

sixteen parliamentary seats.

Crvenkovski’s decision on how

to deal with Ali Ahmeti will in

large part indicate the degree

to which the country’s wounds

have healed.
1998, stands accused of the same charges, with heroin and human trafficking added to

the list. Ahmeti’s NLA was really fighting on two fronts: to break the DPA’s stranglehold

on political and regional power, and to increase ethnic Albanian influence and advantages

in Macedonian society. Ali Ahmeti was a leader on both these fronts. After the conflict,

he attempted to play a mediating role among all the ethnic Albanian political leaders

(author’s interview with Ali Ahmeti, April 20, 2002, Mala Recica, Macedonia).

Indeed, corruption was the buzzword of the summer leading up to the elections.

Government officials from both sides of the ethnic divide have been trading barbs with

leading nongovernmental organizations. The blossoming anticorruption drive has captured some headlines but has failed to move much beyond the accusation stages;

endemic corruption is plaguing the country, but the recent exchanges have far too often

contained elements of political bias.

The previous government coalitions made huge profits from the black market stemming from the Western-led economic embargo against the former Yugoslavia. Both ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians were quite adept at smuggling gas, cigarettes,

and other contraband across Macedonia’s northern border.

Both major ethnic parties in the new governing coalition promised protection to

their respective ethnic groups, and early moves to divide up not only ministerial posts

but also jobs in state-owned companies suggest that there may be no fundamental

change in the way politics are conducted in Macedonia. If they are to attract foreign

investment, the new leaders need to move quickly not only to re-establish security but

also to support interethnic reconciliation, turn anticorruption rhetoric into reality, and

establish the rule of law. Reform of the judiciary, customs, police, and tax authorities

is crucial; deep structural change is needed. Such an initiative will require not only

courage and imagination by the new government but also a vigorous political opposition and independent civil society organizations. 

The special police units that operate as a parallel paramilitary force, known as the

Lions, will have to be dismantled. Efforts are under way to retrain some of the Lions

and redeploy them to border patrol units, but this program will take time—not all of

these heavily armed thugs can be integrated into a legitimate police force. The government must also establish new lines of communication and cooperation among the

Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Army. At the same time, Albanian participation in

the security structures will need to be increased. And, finally, cooperation between the

government and the president, which has been nonexistent, will have to be restored.

More than anything else, though, adherence to the rule of law would be the greatest

source of legitimacy for the new government.

European Crisis Management

The co-management of Balkan crises such as Macedonia’s is giving way to a different

type of relationship between Europe and the United States. How well the Europeans

manage Macedonia will be a key test. To a great extent, success will depend on how the

European Union and the United States define their partnership. 

Washington has tremendous confidence in the new European team in the region:

High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia, Special

Representative of the UN Secretary General Michael Steiner of the United Nations

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and European Union Special Representative in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Alain Le Roy (who departed in October 2002). They bring new levels of seriousness and dedication to solving

the lingering problems endemic to postconflict countries torn apart by ethnically motivated violence. 

The Europeans are probably not ready to replace the NATO security force in Macedonia, but the process is in motion and it may be hard to roll it back. Therefore, the EU’s

12

The co-management of Balkan

crises such as Macedonia’s is

giving way to a different type

of relationship between Europe

and the United States.

More than anything else,

though, adherence to the rule

of law would be the greatest

source of legitimacy for the

new government.
proposed European Security Forces command will rely heavily on support from NATO;

there will be few discernable differences between NATO deployment and the future European one. Some type of NATO involvement will be needed to provide the nominal “American presence,” as requested by both Albanians and Macedonians.

On balance, the EU management of the region looks to be off to a good start. The

only real danger ahead is the far-off promise and slow pace of EU integration for the

Balkans. The slow process of integration favored by the EU may not be realistic. 

Conclusions

When Macedonia’s brewing crisis finally erupted, the West was caught largely unaware

because of a willful determination to view the country as the region’s one multiethnic success story among the scattered remnants of the former Yugoslavia’s nationalist wars.

Macedonian leaders began to believe the Western propaganda, but ethnic tensions continued to simmer despite government claims of ethnic integration. The country’s leaders

and most Western observers consistently underestimated the extent of the country’s ethnic problems. Everyone was living in a Balkan version of a Potemkin village.

NLA guerillas found fertile ground in Macedonia because of the Western governments’ recent experiences with Serbian repression against Albanians in Kosovo. To be

sure, Macedonian repression of its ethnic Albanian population was less harsh, and real

progress was being made in addressing some of the Albanians’ legitimate complaints.

Yet the slow pace of meaningful implementation of reforms allowed the NLA to frame

the conflict in ethnic terms and use interethnic tensions to gain regional and international attention. The consequent engagement of the West bettered the NLA’s position

domestically in far less time than legitimate political negotiations could. 

Perhaps ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians working together would have

reached something like the Ohrid Framework Agreement on their own. It might have taken

two years rather than seven months—the duration of the conflict—with proper Western

guidance. But more complex issues are the real culprits in this conflict—among them, the

larger “Albanian question” and the deplorable lack of good governance in Macedonia.

Neither stability nor prosperity appears to be coming anytime soon to Macedonia.

About 400,000 people are unemployed, and that figure does not take into account how

many people are employed but have not received a paycheck in months; one-fourth of

Macedonia’s households live on the edge of existence (A1 Television, August 7, 2002,

based on 1,200 interviews). Since the signing of the Framework Agreement, there have

been a few perceptible changes in public sentiment: Among average ethnic Albanians

and Macedonians, there is a growing acknowledgement that they are suffering together

at the hands of their respective political leaders. Public opinion regarding the presence of

the international community also has begun to shift. 

Macedonians and Albanians feel growing alarm that Macedonia’s leaders may have

willingly pulled their country into the conflict to hide large-scale theft of state-owned

enterprises and assets. One year later, it seems obvious that the country’s political leaders have done just about everything in their power to rescind their support for the

peace agreement. The delaying tactics, public posturing, and cat-and-mouse-type

deployments of police units into areas still considered to be controlled by the NLA can

only be viewed as a major rejection of the Framework Agreement. 

Nevertheless, the Framework Agreement is holding up better than expected. Much

of the credit must go to former EU representative Alain Le Roy, who introduced a more

flexible and pragmatic approach. The EU and the U.S. have taken a firm position that

is impossible to misinterpret: EU membership for Macedonia is predicated on full

implementation of the Framework Agreement. In reality, the agreement should hold up

for the next three to four years and be viewed as a step toward accepting a common

state. If the agreement does collapse, it will be for one of two main reasons: ethnic

13

The country’s leaders and most

Western observers consistently

underestimated the extent of

the country’s ethnic problems.

Everyone was living in a Balkan

version of a Potemkin village.

The Europeans are probably not

ready to replace the NATO security force in Macedonia, but the

process is in motion and it may

be hard to roll it back . . .

Some type of NATO involvement

will be needed to provide the

nominal “American presence,”

as requested by both Albanians

and Macedonians.
Albanians hold the parliament in a deadlock and de facto federalize the country, or

Macedonians choose partition.

The Framework Agreement could theoretically turn Macedonia into a civic state, but

it does not take Macedonia out of danger. Getting at the real roots of the recent crisis

will require a much broader definition of the problem, which must include Albanians

and Serbs living in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Kosovo and southern Serbia. The test of the EU’s ability to manage the region could not come at a trickier

moment. While Europe plans an entry strategy for the Balkans, the United States is

focused on its exit strategy. The U.S. war on terrorism may be positive in the short term

for the Balkans, but there is a danger that ethnic Albanians may perceive a shift in U.S.

foreign policy priorities as a cue for further military adventurism. 

Lasting peace in Macedonia remains elusive and may be downright impossible without

a strong Western security guarantee. The Albanian common base for the “national cause”

will be prevalent for a long time, while moderate Macedonians continue to lose ground.

Exchanges of gunfire are daily occurrences; large amounts of weapons and ammunition

are available to both ethnic Albanian rebel groups and ethnic Macedonian paramilitary

groups. Reintegration of the crisis regions in Macedonia is also mired in political manipulations designed to detract from criminal activities. Continual warnings of renewed fighting on the part of the country’s political leaders may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Recommendations

• Macedonia’s new government must move quickly to restore security and stability to

the areas of the country most affected by last year’s crisis. The internal security

structure—including the development and training of an effective counterinsurgency force—must be rebuilt. International assistance for weapons collection, perhaps based on some aspects of the UN Development Program’s initiative in Albania,

is required.

• NATO troops are needed in Macedonia beyond the December 15 expiration of their

mandate. An alarming number of citizens, both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, are heavily armed. An ethnic Macedonian paramilitary force loyal to the former interior minister is still in existence. Security in the country’s arc of crisis is low;

in 2003, only 80 monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe and 20 EU monitors will be deployed throughout the country, and they will

require rapid extraction support.

• The cornerstone of the Ohrid Framework Agreement is decentralization of the government. International technical experts should focus on developing a coherent,

manageable program that the Macedonian government can efficiently implement.

The current number of 124 municipalities is unsustainable, and a rational program

for territorial division is urgently needed. Technical arguments about the proper

sequencing of territorial division and local self-financing are wasting precious time.

.• The census will be ethnically and politically divisive. The governing coalition of the

SDSM and DUI has no ownership of or investment in this particular census. The staff

administering the census preparations has demonstrated a stunning lack of sensitivity to the political problems likely to arise and should be replaced. Seasoned political hands rather than statistical staff from Europe need to take over direction and

management of the process immediately rather than simply hope the problem will

go away. 

• Macedonia’s political elite has a historic opportunity to move beyond business as

usual. Professional competency rather than party affiliation and ethnicity must be

the standards for public sector employment. The West should work with the new government to develop a politically neutral civil service.

14

Getting at the real roots of 

the recent crisis will require a

much broader definition of the

problem, which must include

Albanians and Serbs living 

in the former Yugoslavia, 

and especially in Kosovo and

southern Serbia.

The U.S. war on terrorism 

may be positive in the short

term for the Balkans, but 

there is a danger that ethnic

Albanians may perceive a shift

in U.S. foreign policy priorities

as a cue for further military

adventurism. 
• The European Union must resist the temptation to view its role in Macedonia as one

of simply preparing the country for EU integration. Macedonia is unlikely to enter

the European Union before 2010. It is vital to the country’s stability to create more

immediate incentives for full implementation of the Framework Agreement.

• The indeterminate status of Kosovo very much affects stability in Macedonia. The

United States must remain sufficiently engaged in negotiations that will determine

the final status of Kosovo. The Europeans may favor a strong Serbian confederation

with Montenegro and Kosovo, but reality on the ground dictates otherwise. Ignoring Kosovo will put Macedonia at risk.

15
Of Related Interest

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues that

relate directly to Macedonia, the Balkans, and European security.

Simulating Kosovo: Lessons for Final Status Negotiations (Special Report 95, November

2002)

Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-Border Requirements (Special Report 91, July

2002)

Serbia Still at the Crossroads (Special Report 84, March 2002)

Taking Stock and Moving Forward: Intervention in the Balkans and Beyond (Special Report

83, February 2002)

Albanians in the Balkans (Special Report 77, November 2001)

Whither the Bulldozer? Nonviolent Revolution and the Transition to Democracy in Serbia

(Special Report, August 2001)

The Future of Macedonia: A Balkan Survivor Now Needs Reform (Special Report, March

2001)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-

3832; fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

For more information on this topic, 

see our web site (www.usip.org), which

has an online edition of this report

containing links to related web sites, 

as well as additional information 

on the subject.