alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CAUSE NO. 12-15-00139-CR

CAUSE NO. 12-15-00140-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

RONNY LEE WILLIAMS, } APPEALED FROM 145TH DISTRICT COURT

APPELLANT

V. } IN AND FOR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, } NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLEE

ORDER

Came on for consideration the Appellant’s Pro Se Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief in

the above-referenced causes, and it appearing that Appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders brief herein

and that Appellant has been unable to examine the record so that he can file a pro se brief, it is hereby

ORDERED that the trial court ensure that Appellant has the opportunity to fully examine the appellate

record on or before January 22, 2016, and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the trial court notify this

Court in writing as to the date or dates upon which the appellate record was made available to Appellant

and the amount of time for which Appellant had access to the record on each date. Appellant shall have

thirty (30) days from the day the appellate record was first made available to him to file his pro se brief

with this Court.

WITNESS THE HONORABLE JAMES T. WORTHEN, Chief Justice, Twelfth Court of

Appeals District, Tyler, Texas.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE at Tyler, Texas, this 23rd day of

December 2015, A.D.

Respectfully yours,

PAM ESTES, CLERK

By: _______________________________________

Katrina McClenny, Chief Deputy Clerk

FILE COPY
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.S.W., A 

MINOR

PETITION OF: A.M.

:

:

:

:

:

No. 579 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### TRAVIS *vs.*FRIERSON.

[bill in equity to correct errors in settlement op guardianship.]

1. *Averments of hill.*— In a bill to correct errors of law and fact in the final settlement of a guardian’s accounts before the probate court, (Code, $$ 2041,1915-16,) an averment “that said account was stated and filed to suit the embarrassed state of said guardian,” without a specification of the particular errors complained of, is not sufficiently precise and definite.

Appeal from the Chancery Court at Tuskaloosa.

Heard before the Hon. James B. Clark.

The bill in this ease was filed by the appellant, for the purpose of correcting alleged errors of law and of fact in the final settlement of the accounts of his late guardian, Gideon B. Frierson, before the probate court. It alleged, that the said guardian had removed from the State since the settlement was made; and Robert P. Frierson, as the sole surviving surety on the guardian’s bond,' was the only defendant. The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill, for want of equity, on account of the indefiniteness of its allegations; and his decree is now assigned as error.

"Wm. P. Webb, for appellant.

E. W. Peck, *contra.*

STONE, J.

We have looked carefully into the averments of this bill, and concur witb the chancellor, that it does not present a case for equitable relief. It should specify the errors complained of, and not leave them to be gathered inferentially from the vague charge, “ that said account was stated and filed to suit the embarrassed state of said guardian.” More precision is required in chancery pleadings, than is found in this bill. — Langdon v. Roane, 6 Ala. 518; Cowan v. Jones, 27 *ib.*317; Mays *721v. Steele, in manuscript. See, also, Cunningham v. Pool, 9 Ala. 615; Stewart v. Williams, 33 *ib.*492; Mock v. Steele, 34 *ib.*198.

Our attention was for a time attracted to the fact, that in the record from the orphans’ court, attached to the bill, the order of publication directs notice to be set up at the court-house door, and does not add, “at three other public places.” Looking into the bill, we find no averment which brings this question up; but, on the contrary, the bill avers, that “ on or about the 18th day of November, 1853, the said Grideon B. Erierson made a final settlement of his guardianship.” We must, then, deal with this case, as if the final settlement had, in form, conformed to the law. We will not, then, inquire whether the failure, if such was the case, to post notice at *three other public places*in the county, will furnish ground to invalidate the settlement. No such point is raised by the pleadings, and we will not discuss it. — Code, §§ 1805,2039.

Decree of the chancellor affirmed.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: 

CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION

SECURITIES LITIGATION.

This Document Relates

To All Cases.

 /

No. C 08-01510 WHA

ORDER DENYING THE UNION

MISSION’S REQUEST TO OPT

OUT AFTER THE DEADLINE

This order addresses The Union Mission’s renewed request to opt out of the certified class

after the deadline for requesting exclusion from the class has expired. The Union Mission 

previously filed a motion seeking permission to opt out late (Dkt. No. 476). The motion was

denied in an order dated April 9, 2010 (Dkt. No. 601). In that order, the Court explained that the

opt-out deadline for this class action was December 28, 2009, but The Union Mission made its

request to opt out on February 22, 2010, almost two months after the deadline had already passed

(Dkt. No. 601 at 1). The circumstances behind this untimely request, and the reasons why a

finding of excusable neglect was not warranted, was set forth in detail in the April 9 order.

Despite this ruling, counsel for The Union Mission appeared at the hearing on class notice

held on April 26, 2010. Counsel stated very clearly at the hearing that “this is not a due process

issue” and that The Union Mission “d[oes]n’t deny that [it] received notice through the mail. 

This is not a question of whether they received actual notice” (Dkt. No. 723 at 27). Rather,

counsel argued that because the claims administrator did not follow the notice plan providing for

emailed noticed, and that The Union Mission supposedly would have received notice and opted

Case 3:08-cv-01510-WHA Document 822 Filed 05/27/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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out before the deadline had such emailed notice been given, it should be allowed to opt out late as

“a matter of fairness” (ibid.). 

While the Court understands counsel’s argument, it does not warrant reconsideration of

the prior order. The analysis set forth in the prior order did not hinge upon whether The Union

Mission received emailed notice. Rather, it focused on the actual mailed notice that had been

delivered in October 2009 to the authorized agent of The Union Mission, and whether the

circumstances underlying the untimely opt-out request supported a finding of excusable neglect

(see Dkt. No. 592 at 3–6). The April 9 order concluded that excusable neglect had not been

shown. In sum, whether an email was or was not sent to The Union Mission, it does not affect the

outcome of the excusable neglect analysis.

For these reasons, the ruling set forth in the April 9 order will remain undisturbed and The

Union Mission’s renewed request to opt out late is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 26, 2010. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-01510-WHA Document 822 Filed 05/27/10 Page 2 of 2
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 437 

To authorize and request the President to award the Medal of Honor posthumously to Captain Emil Kapaun of the United States Army for acts 

of valor during the Korean War. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 25, 2011 

Mr. POMPEO (for himself, Ms. JENKINS, and Mr. HUELSKAMP) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To authorize and request the President to award the Medal 

of Honor posthumously to Captain Emil Kapaun of the 

United States Army for acts of valor during the Korean 

War. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION AND REQUEST FOR AWARD 

4 OF MEDAL OF HONOR TO EMIL KAPAUN FOR 

5 ACTS OF VALOR DURING THE KOREAN WAR. 

6 (a) AUTHORIZATION.—Notwithstanding the time lim7 itations specified in section 3744 of title 10, United States 

8 Code, or any other time limitation with respect to the 


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•HR 437 IH

1 awarding of certain medals to persons who served in the 

2 Armed Forces, the President is authorized and requested 

3 to award the Medal of Honor posthumously under section 

4 3741 of such title to Emil Kapaun for the acts of valor 

5 during the Korean War described in subsection (b). 

6 (b) ACTS OF VALOR DESCRIBED.—The acts of valor 

7 referred to in subsection (a) are the actions of then Cap8 tain Emil Kapaun as a member of the 8th Cavalry Regi9 ment during the Battle of Unsan on November 1 and 2, 

10 1950, and while a prisoner of war until his death on May 

11 23, 1951, during the Korean War. 

Æ 


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I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4309 

To permit Federal officers to remove cases involving crimes of violence to 

Federal court. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2012 

Mr. REICHERT (for himself and Mr. PASCRELL) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To permit Federal officers to remove cases involving crimes 

of violence to Federal court. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Officer Safety Act of 

5 2012’’. 

6 SEC. 2. LIMITED LIABILITY. 

7 Section 1442 of title 28, United States Code, is 

8 amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the fol9 lowing: 


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•HR 4309 IH

1 ‘‘(c) For purposes of subsection (a), a law enforce2 ment officer, who is the defendant in a criminal prosecu3 tion, shall be deemed to have been acting under the color 

4 of his office if the officer— 

5 ‘‘(1) protected an individual in the presence of 

6 the officer from a crime of violence; 

7 ‘‘(2) provided immediate assistance to an indi8 vidual who suffered, or who was threatened with, 

9 bodily harm; or 

10 ‘‘(3) prevented the escape of any individual who 

11 the officer reasonably believed to have committed, or 

12 was about to commit, in the presence of the officer, 

13 a crime of violence that resulted in, or was likely to 

14 result in, death or serious bodily injury. 

15 ‘‘(d) In this section, the following definitions apply: 

16 ‘‘(1) The terms ‘civil action’ and ‘criminal pros17 ecution’ include any proceeding (whether or not an18 cillary to another proceeding) to the extent that in 

19 such proceeding a judicial order, including a sub20 poena for testimony or documents, is sought or 

21 issued. If removal is sought for a proceeding de22 scribed in the previous sentence, and there is no 

23 other basis for removal, only that proceeding may be 

24 removed to the district court. 


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•HR 4309 IH

1 ‘‘(2) The term ‘crime of violence’ has the mean2 ing given that term in section 16 of title 18. 

3 ‘‘(3) The term ‘law enforcement officer’ means 

4 any employee described in subparagraph (A), (B), or 

5 (C) of section 8401(17) of title 5 and any special 

6 agent in the Diplomatic Security Service of the De7 partment of State. 

8 ‘‘(4) The term ‘serious bodily injury’ has the 

9 meaning given that term in section 1365 of title 18. 

10 ‘‘(5) The term ‘State’ includes the District of 

11 Columbia, United States territories and insular pos12 sessions, and Indian country (as defined in section 

13 1151 of title 18). 

14 ‘‘(6) The term ‘State court’ includes the Supe15 rior Court of the District of Columbia, a court of a 

16 United States territory or insular possession, and a 

17 tribal court.’’. 

Æ 


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#### Michael J. Snyder et al., Appellants, v Charles J. Colletta et al., Respondents.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[716 NYS2d 634]

—Appeal unanimously dismissed without costs *(see, Tuff & Rumble Mgt. v Landmark Distribs.,*254 AD2d 15). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Frazee, J.— New Trial.) Present — Pine, J. P., Wisner, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Earvin Jones, Appellant.

[716 NYS2d 79]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrero, J.), rendered February 25, 1999, convicting him of assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress oral and written statements he made to law enforcement authorities.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the defendant’s conviction for assault in the third degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, he never invoked his right to remain silent. The defendant was unresponsive to questioning by the two detectives who initially interviewed him because he had a dream that they were demons and believed they would twist his words. However, when those detectives left the room and a different detective entered, the defendant stated that he felt much more comfortable and specifically stated that he wanted to tell the truth. Thus, the defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent *(see, People v King,*191 AD2d 513).

The defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree based on the same act. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for assault in the third degree *330must be reversed because it is a lesser-included offense of assault in the second degree *(see,*CPL 300.40 [3] [b]; *People v Garofalo,*192 AD2d 619).

The defendant contends that he should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender because he was sentenced on his prior felony conviction more than 10 years before the commission of the instant crime. However, the People correctly calculated that the defendant’s prior conviction occurred less than 9V2 years before he committed the instant crime *(see,*Penal Law § 70.04 [1] [b] [iv], [v]). Accordingly, the defendant was properly sentenced as a second violent felony offender *(see, People v Faust, 235*AD2d 430).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are not preserved for appellate review *(see, People v Tonge,*93 NY2d 838; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245), and we decline to review them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Goldstein, J. P., McGinity, Luciano and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 42 

To provide for a credit for certain health care benefits in determining the 

minimum wage. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 5, 2011 

Mr. ISSA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To provide for a credit for certain health care benefits in 

determining the minimum wage. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Health Care Incentive 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MINIMUM WAGE CREDIT FOR HEALTH BENEFITS 

7 PROVIDED TO EMPLOYEES. 

8 (a) RULEMAKING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

9 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Labor shall 

10 promulgate a rule requiring that, for any employer enVerDate Mar 15 2010 01:32 Jan 07, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H42.IH H42

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•HR 42 IH

1 gaged in interstate commerce that is required by Federal 

2 or State law to pay a minimum wage at a rate that is 

3 higher than the minimum wage required by section 6(a) 

4 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 

5 206(a)) as in effect on September 1, 1997, such employer 

6 be permitted, in accordance with regulations promulgated 

7 by the Secretary, to include the value of creditable health 

8 care benefits provided by such employer to an employee 

9 in determining the wage such employer is required to pay 

10 an employee. Such rule shall include the following: 

11 (1) CREDITABLE BENEFITS.—The Secretary 

12 shall define the categories of health care benefits 

13 provided by an employer to employees to be consid14 ered creditable for purpose of this section, which 

15 shall include a contribution to a health savings ac16 count or similar account. 

17 (2) VALUATION.—The Secretary shall establish 

18 a method for determining the value of such health 

19 care benefits for purposes of such credit. 

20 (3) REQUIRED MINIMUM VALUE.—The Sec21 retary shall determine a minimum value of such ben22 efits that an employer shall provide to an employee 

23 in order to include any portion of such benefits as 

24 such a credit. 


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3 

•HR 42 IH

1 (4) MINIMUM CASH WAGE NOTWITHSTANDING

2 CREDIT.—In no case shall the credit permitted by 

3 the rule promulgated under this section exceed the 

4 difference between the minimum wage under section 

5 6(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 

6 U.S.C. 206(a)) as in effect September 1, 1997, and 

7 the wage rate otherwise applicable. 

8 (b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of the rule required 

9 under this section, the terms ‘‘employer’’, ‘‘employee’’, and 

10 ‘‘wage’’ shall have the meanings given such terms in sec11 tion 3 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 

12 U.S.C. 203). 

Æ 


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<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          58,726
<SECURITIES>                                     7,150
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,137
<ALLOWANCES>                                       361
<INVENTORY>                                      2,099
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                82,853
<PP&E>                                           2,253
<DEPRECIATION>                                     205
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  99,148
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           27,441
<BONDS>                                              0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,427
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,665
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,199
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,466
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<NET-INCOME>                                     4,446
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.32
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</TABLE>
#### Mid-Town Tennis Club of Rochester, Appellant, v Wallace J. Wagner, as Assessor of the City of Rochester, et al, Respondents.

Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: In this action to review and reduce the assessment on petitioner’s real property respondent served notice to examine petitioner before trial concerning its business operations, operating income, profits and losses, etc. Petitioner appeals from the order *1067denying its motion for a protective order. Because business profits depend upon many factors apart from the value of the real estate whereon the business is conducted, evidence thereof is not directly admissible on the question of its value and assessment (see *People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v Chambers,*298 NY 372, 374-375), unless such profits, by the terms .of a lease, are the measure of the rentals payable for use of the land *(Matter of Woolworth Co. v Commission of Taxation & Assessment of City of Plattsburgh,*45 Misc 2d 701, mod and affd 26 AD2d 759; *Matter of Hilton Inns v Board of Assessors of Vil. of Tarrytown,*39 Misc 2d 792, 793). If the property is a "specialty”, the method of evaluating it is to use the cost of reproduction less depreciation *(Matter of City of New York [Kramer Realty Corp],*16 AD2d 148, 150, affd 12 NY2d 1094; *Matter of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Kiernan,*49 AD2d 99, 102). That is recognized as the maximum basis for evaluation and tax assessment (see *G.R.F. v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau,*41 NY2d 512; *People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v Chambers, supra; People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v Miller,*287 NY 126, 130; *Matter of Federated Dept. Stores v Podeyn,*51 Misc 2d 555, 556, affd 32 AD2d 823). The record does not reveal whether petitioner’s property has been assessed as a "specialty” or whether petitioner claims that it has been. If upon the trial petitioner takes that position, it will have the right to introduce evidence of the profits of its business to establish that the structural improvements on the land are not fully suited thereto, that they do not contribute enough value thereto and that their full value (cost of reproduction less depreciation) should not be included in the assessment *(People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v Chambers,*298 NY 372, 375, *supra; People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v Miller,*287 NY 126, 129-130, *supra;*5A Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property [4th ed], § 2.03, p 451; cf. *Matter of Federated Dept. Stores v Podeyn,*51 Misc 2d 55, affd, 32 AD2d 823, *supra).*In order properly to prepare for trial to meet such potential claim, respondent is entitled to examine petitioner with respect to its business operations and profits. Petitioner has failed to show that the examination is not reasonably necessary *(Mosier v Van Der Horst Research Corp.,*25 AD2d 938; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of N Y, Book 7B, CPLR 3103:1, pp 298-299). (Appeal from order of Monroe Supreme Court — discovery, etc. — Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, art 7.) Present— Marsh, P. J., Cardamone, Dillon, Goldman and Witmer, JJ.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MORTIMER PHILBERT,

Petitioner,

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent.

______________________ 

2014-3029

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC0752130165-I-1.

______________________ 

ON MOTION

______________________ 

O R D E R

Mortimer Philbert moves for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis. 

Upon consideration thereof,

 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

The motion is granted. 

Case: 14-3029 Document: 7 Page: 1 Filed: 11/27/2013
2 PHILBERT v. MSPB

 FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Daniel E. O’Toole

 Clerk of Court

s24

Case: 14-3029 Document: 7 Page: 2 Filed: 11/27/2013