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© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“[L]egislative oversight of 

the security sector is crucial to 

ensure that security policies 

and expenditures are undertaken with full transparency, 

accountability and concern for 

other national priorities.”

January 7, 2010 

Congress and Parliaments in Security 

Sector Reform

Summary

•	 Legislative oversight of the security sector is crucial to ensure that security policies and expenditures are undertaken with full transparency, accountability and concern for other national 

priorities and popular attitudes. This is important in conflict states, particularly during peace or 

stability operations. 

•	 Establishing legislative oversight is difficult in conflict countries because of the absence of historical tradition, the complexity of security agencies, the technical nature of the issues, secrecy 

laws and the lack of expertise among parliamentarians and their staffs.

•	 The U.S. Congress provides a model for effective legislative oversight of the security sector for 

other countries to emulate. Congress has developed the legal authorities and the traditions 

required to form an effective partnership with the Defense and Justice departments, the U.S. 

military forces and civilian security services.

•	 Due to the importance of legislative oversight of the security sector to the democratic process, 

the U.S. Congress provides advice and training to foreign parliaments and parliamentarians in 

security sector reform. Congress has important partnership arrangements with parliaments in 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia, Kosovo and other conflict countries.

Parliamentary Oversight Is an Important Dimension of 

Security Sector Reform

It is generally agreed that security sector reform (SSR) involves improving the performance of 

the uniformed security services of the state and the executive ministries that are responsible 

for their oversight. What is overlooked in this definition is the fact that SSR is fundamentally 

a political process that concerns control of power, the exercise of authority, the allocation of 

critical resources and establishing legitimacy. This is especially true in conflict countries and 

particularly those engaged in peace or stability operations. In these cases, legislative oversight 

of the security sector is crucial to ensure that security policies and expenditures are undertaken 

with full transparency, accountability and concern for other national priorities. This is important 

to prevent the security services from acting as a state within the state or misusing economic 

resources required for development. It is also important to ensure that there is a link to the 

public and a conduit for inputs from civil society. 

Robert M. Perito

E-mail: rperito@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.4173

peaceBrieF1
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Establishing legislative oversight can be difficult because of the absence of historical tradition, 

the complexity of security agencies, the technical nature of the issues, secrecy laws and the lack of 

expertise among parliamentarians and their staffs. Even in Western Europe, there are few countries 

with a tradition of legislative oversight of the security sector. In some cases, this is a legacy of the 

Cold War when NATO member states with communist parties were unwilling to allow parliamentary involvement in issues related to national defense. In developing countries or conflict states, 

parliaments may have little legitimacy or institutional authority and may be seen as centers of 

corruption and influence peddling. Parliaments may be unable or unwilling to challenge powerful 

military and police establishments, or there may be political taboos against dealing with security 

or intelligence issues. Parliamentarians may be intimidated by the complexity of issues related to 

military procurement. They may also be barred by secrecy regulations from access to the information required to effectively challenge decisions taken by military professionals. 

In countries experiencing peace or stability operations, the critical decisions concerning security 

sector reform, such as the size of national security forces, the procurement of equipment and the 

provision of training, may be made by donor countries with little reference to the national government and none to the parliament. In Afghanistan, for example, decisions concerning the Afghan 

security forces are made in Washington, at NATO headquarters and allied capitals. The Afghan 

parliament has committees with responsibility for defense oversight and considerable expertise 

and experience among its parliamentarians. Parliament enjoys good relations with the interior 

and defense ministries. The Afghan government, however, does not have the last word in deciding 

issues related to its security sector and the Afghan parliament has no means to exercise oversight 

concerning decisions made by foreign governments. 

The U.S. Congress Is a Model for Effective National 

Legislatures

The U.S. Congress provides a model for effective legislative oversight of the security sector for 

other countries to emulate. Over time the U.S. Congress has developed the legal authorities and 

the traditions required to form an effective partnership with the Defense and Justice departments, 

the armed forces and civilian security services. Congressional hearings concerning these agencies 

and congressional adjustments in budget numbers, personnel ceilings and other administrative 

functions have become routine and accepted. Congress has developed extensive expertise on 

the part of elected representatives, professional staffs, the Congressional Research Service and the 

Congressional Budget Office, enabling it to understand the technical issues of complex weapons 

systems, property management and personnel policies. Congress is able to engage with the U.S. 

security sector to make policy, conduct real time oversight and evaluate programs. 

National security policy involves decisions about how the security sector is organized and functions as well as the goals and objectives it is supposed to achieve. The FY 2010 National Defense 

Authorization Act includes several examples of how Congress sets policy and indicates direction 

for the U.S. government, and how Congress determines through foreign assistance the way (or 

the ways) to organize the security sector of foreign governments. Through legislative initiatives 

such as the “1206” and “1207” programs (named for sections of the Act), Congress has sought to 

promote whole-of-government approaches to U.S. security assistance programs and to encourage 

the State and Defense departments to work together to develop programs that reflect political, 

security, and developmental considerations. Under 1206, a pilot program run by the Defense 

Department with State Department concurrence, Congress has sought to shift responsibility from 

State to Defense for military assistance programs that create the capacity in foreign military forces 

Congress and Parliaments in Security Sector Reform

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© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Congress and Parliaments in Security Sector Reform

page 3 • PB 1 • January 7, 2010

to conduct counterterrorism, peace and stability operations alongside U.S. forces. Under 1207, 

another pilot program, Congress has appropriated Defense Department funds that State can 

request for foreign civilian security assistance programs developed by embassy country teams 

abroad and approved by an interagency process in Washington. The Act includes an unprecedented number of requirements for the administration to file reports with both the congressional 

defense and foreign relations committees reforming the way Congress does business. 

Looking abroad, the National Defense Authorization Act all but determines the size and 

composition of the Afghan security forces. The Act provides funding that will enable the expansion of the Afghan Army from an estimated 95,000 to 134,000 soldiers and the Afghan police 

from some 93,000 to 97,000 personnel. For Iraq, the Act provides the authority for the U.S. 

military to transfer equipment from its own stores to Iraqi forces that will enable the expansion 

of those forces and prevent equipment shortfalls. Through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Fund (PCF), Congress has authorized funding that will encourage Pakistan to transfer its defense 

focus from its border with India to its border with Afghanistan by increasing the capacity of the 

Pakistan Frontier Corps and training the Pakistan Army in counterinsurgency operations. For the 

U.S. government, Congress determined that Defense will manage the funds for the PCF until 

State develops the capacity to manage the money starting in FY 2011, endorsing an agreement 

worked out between the two departments.

Legislative Oversight Is Critical to Setting Priorities

National security affects everyone and judgments concerning security policy should not be left 

exclusively to the executive and uniformed personnel. National security consumes a majority of 

the funds in national budgets. Funding for military and police forces can determine the amount of 

resources available for such essential programs as health and education. Given their dollar value 

and sensitive nature, weapons procurement and security infrastructure contracts can be a major 

source of corruption, particularly in conflict countries. Parliamentary oversight of security sector 

budgeting promotes transparency, accountability and public confidence in government decisions 

concerning the security sector. Through public and classified hearings, research and analysis and 

onsite investigations, the U.S. Congress exercises its legal authority to oversee security related 

budgets and evaluate the results of operational and assistance programs. 

In Iraq, for example, congressional members and staff have repeatedly visited military installations in the field to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. programs and the utility of U.S. assistance. 

As a result, congressional staff members have developed a level of expertise and experience that 

matches their counterparts in the executive branch of government and military. They have also 

built relationships with State and Defense officials that provide for a frank exchange of views on 

important policy decisions. Congress is something of a blunt instrument in that it is not responsible for policy implementation. It can, however, identify problems and demand that ineffective 

programs are revised or terminated. 

Congress Trains Foreign Parliaments in Security Sector 

Oversight

Given the importance of legislative oversight of the security sector to the democratic process, it 

is not surprising that the U.S. Congress provides advice and training to foreign parliaments and 

parliamentarians in security sector reform. The House Democracy Partnership was authorized in 

2005 to enable House members and staff to provide assistance to foreign parliaments, particularly 

those in conflict countries and emerging democracies. Currently, there are 14 partner parliaments. 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Congress and Parliaments in Security Sector Reform

page 4 • PB 1 • January 7, 2010

The Partnership has three programs related to security sector oversight: (1) one week seminars 

organized in cooperation with the Defense Department for visiting parliamentarians that include 

sessions with members of Congress and visits to the Pentagon; (2) congressional delegation visits 

to partner country capitals that involve two days of meetings with local parliamentarians; and, (3) 

staff delegations that hold extensive sessions with foreign counterparts concerning the technical 

aspects of budget analysis, procurement practices, and other topics related to oversight of the 

security services. 

Included in the list of partner countries are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon 

and Kosovo. In these cases, the Partnership has sought to encourage and strengthen local parliamentary involvement and oversight in national security policy and control of the armed forces. In 

Georgia, for example, congressional intervention encouraged the Georgian parliament to create 

a special commission to hold hearings on the August 2008 Russian invasion that included a full 

day of testimony by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and the announcement of the parliament’s finding on national television. In Pakistan, U.S. members of Congress have encouraged the 

National Assembly Defense Committee to become more assertive in its oversight, while keeping 

in mind well-grounded fears of a military backlash if parliament pushes too hard. Creating parliament to Congress relations encourages the democratic process and builds a network of relations 

between the U.S. and other countries. 

Recommendations

International donors cannot ordain effective parliamentary oversight in conflict countries, but 

they can lay the foundation and encourage the development of legal authorities and customary 

involvement. To ensure transparency, accountability and promote the public trust, international 

donors should encourage the following actions during post-conflict interventions: 

•	 Ensure that the constitution and basic legislative structure provide for executive accountability to the parliament and gives the parliament the authority to exercise oversight of 

the security sector. Legal authorities should be reinforced by the early establishment of the 

tradition of parliamentary review of defense and security policies and budgets.

•	 Ensure that parliaments have access to information and expertise to enable analysis and 

evaluation of security related programs and expenditures. This capability does not exist in 

all developed countries and will take time to develop in conflict countries, but there should 

be a start. 

•	 Ensure that parliamentary efforts are understood and supported through programs to 

educate and involve the media and civil society in oversight of the security sector. Such 

efforts will likely be resisted by vested interests, but international donors should support 

new governments to resist those alternative agendas. 

•	 Ensure that newly established parliaments have routine involvement through official visits 

and exchanges with parliamentarians from democratic countries so that advice and training 

can be provided and democratic practices reinforced. 

About This Brief

This report is based on an October 

29, 2009 meeting of the U.S. 

Institute of Peace’s Security Sector 

Reform Working Group on “The 

Congressional Role in Military 

and Police Reform.” The meeting 

featured presentations by a panel 

of distinguished experts including: 

Hans Born, director of the Geneva 

Center for the Democratic Control 

of the Armed Forces’ Working 

Group on Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector; 

Patrick Garvey, staff member on 

the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations; William Monahan, counsel on the U.S. Senate 

Armed Services Committee; John 

Lis, staff director of the U.S. House 

of Representatives Democracy 

Partnership Committee on Foreign 

Affairs; and Pat Towel, specialist in 

national defense at Congressional 

Research Service. Robert Perito, 

director of USIP’s Security Sector 

Governance Initiative, served as 

moderator. 

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

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