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NEITHER APPEASEMENT NOR IMPROVEMENT?

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 21, 2010

Serial No. 111–99

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

VACANT 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

HOWARD DIAMOND, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MARK WALKER, Republican Professional Staff Member 

DALIS ADLER, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (Former United States Ambassador 

to Lebanon) ........................................................................................................... 15

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia: Prepared statement ................................................................. 4

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement ..................................... 18

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 42

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 43

(1)

NEITHER APPEASEMENT NOR IMPROVEMENT? PROSPECTS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT 

WITH SYRIA 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:44 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary Ackerman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Committee will come to order. There has been a 

lot of news about Syria lately, but that is not why this hearing was 

scheduled. Work on this hearing began well before SCUD missiles 

were once again in the news. In fact, the conceptual roots of this 

hearing go back to May 2008, when Hezbollah waged a brief, but 

effective, street war against the legitimate, constitutionally framed, 

democratically elected Government of Lebanon. We should all remember that event because that was the point when American 

dreams and illusions about Lebanon should have been laid to rest. 

In a region where politics is a deadly business and no quarter is 

given to the weak, the United States, throughout the period from 

the Seda revolution to the Hezbollah insurrection pursued a policy 

ripe with bombast and bluster, but backed only by empty words. 

Facing vicious, determined foes playing for the highest possible 

stakes, the previous administration offered only token opposition 

while maintaining a fierce, hard line, at least in words. Even as 

U.S. forces turned the tide in Iraq by allying with previously adversarial Suni insurgents to defeat al-Qaeda, our official policy remains fixed for the principle that speaking to our foes was an insufferable dishonor. 

As Vice President Cheney put it: We don’t negotiate with evil, we 

defeat it. A very admirable sentiment, but what happened during 

this period of toughness and ideological zeal? When U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1701, which prohibited arms sales or transfers 

to Hezbollah, was violated almost instantly, what was the U.S. response? Empty words. When the March 14 majority in Parliament 

and liberal journalists began to be assassinated one by one, what 

was the U.S. response? Empty words. When the March 14 majority 

was unable to convene Parliament to name a president of their 

choosing, what was the U.S. response? Empty words. When 

Hezbollah took to the streets to challenge the authority of the GovVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:01 Jul 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\042110\56093 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

ernment of Lebanon, what was the U.S. response? Again, empty 

words. 

When Saudi Arabia and France changed policy and began to 

court Damascus, what was the U.S. response? Empty words. When 

Syria refused to cooperate with the IEA’s investigation of the 

bombed al-Qaeda reactor, what was the U.S. response? Empty 

words. In terms of U.S. credibility, the Obama administration inherited not a partial failure, but a total collapse. Even as the Seda 

revolution was progressively swallowed up by insurrection from 

within and subversion from without, previous administration 

changed the rhetoric or its belief that speaking directly to Damascus was an unwarranted gift. They certainly believed in the efficacy of coercion from the moral high ground, but somehow never 

actually got around to doing very much of it when it came to Syria. 

Sadly, what counts in the world and nowhere more so than the 

Middle East, is power, hard and soft, and the will and capacity to 

use it. During the years from 2005 to 2009, all the bluster, notwithstanding our foes, took our measure and found the United States 

clearly lacking. Nearly all the reverses Damascus and its allies suffered from the Seda revolution have now mostly been undone. 

From the policymakers and supporters of the previous administration, who, in decency, ought to have slunk off in shamed silence for 

having watched fecklessly as this disaster, like Iran’s steady march 

toward nuclear weapons capability unfolded under their watch, 

what do they have to say today? Appeasement, appeasement, they 

cry, attempting to evoke the days leading up to World War II. 

This charge is grotesque. Apart from the indecency of the comparison with the unique horror and evil of Nazi Germany, the 

cheap demagoguery of the word utterly fails to capture what the 

Obama administration is actually doing. Where, one might ask, is 

the long list of concessions from Americans to Syria? Where is the 

surrender and the sellout of our allies? Where is the retreat in the 

face of challenge? A few airplane parts? A few inconclusive meetings? The string of defeats and failures that brought us to the current impasse occurred, let us not forget, during the previous administration. The seeming limits of American power were brutally 

exposed well before Barack Obama was even elected to his high office. 

Appeasement? That is shameless nonsense and more empty 

words. It is true that the Obama administration is pursuing a different policy than the spectacular failure of its predecessor, but 

that is just good sense. Everywhere but Washington, not repeating 

mistakes is considered a good, or even a very good thing. There is 

one criticism of the administration’s Syria policy that I do hold 

with and hope can be corrected today. The explanation of it has 

been poor, and the defense of it even worse. Though I have focused 

heavily on foreign policy during my time in Congress, my professional background is as a public school teacher and as a publisher 

of community newspapers. From both positions I learned a lot, but 

nothing more important than these two truths. Nothing explains 

itself, and nothing sells itself. 

If you want to understand that our policy with Syria is not predicated on compelling major changes in Syrian behavior in the short 

term, that has to be explained. If you want people to understand 

3

that our policy of sanctions and political pressure will be sustained 

until there are changes in Syrian behavior, that has to be explained. If you want the people to understand that dispatching an 

American ambassador to Syria is a tool to send and receive messages and to gather political intelligence for our own use, that has 

to be explained. If you want people to understand that trying diplomacy with Syria is not a betrayal of our values or our friends, that 

has to be explained. That is why we are here today. Hopefully to 

make things clear, to make things plain, to give the Obama administration its chance to explain a policy which I suspect will be frustrating and slow, but at least at the very least it will be one founded on more than just empty words. Now I am happy to call upon 

my friend and partner in the hearing, Dan Burton. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]

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56093b-2.eps
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56093b-3.eps
7

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I make my formal remarks I would just like to say since the previous administration has been somewhat castigated, let me say the support for 

Israel and Bibi Netanyahu and his administration has been wanting by this administration. This administration, in my opinion, has 

shown very little support and respect for Mr. Obama and Israel, 

and that is of great concern to me today. Let me now get to my 

statement. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for convening today’s hearing to examine future relations with Syria. I find it very 

important and timely in light of the recent troubling reports surfacing in the media that Syrian President al-Assad is continuing 

the country’s dubious precedent of sponsoring terrorism in the region. 

Despite little evidence to suggest that the Syrian Government 

has actively sought to improve upon its track record as an international sponsor of terrorism, the Obama administration, in concert with its overall misguided policy toward the Middle East, has 

sought to improve bilateral relations through enhanced diplomatic 

efforts. This is a terrorist state. Just like the administration’s policy toward Iran and Israel, I find these efforts to be not only imprudent, but also extremely counterproductive to U.S. policy in the region. Now we see another of Obama’s diplomatic efforts, the engagement with Syria, come back to bite us in the end. I would use 

stronger language but think you get the message. 

Syria has not altered its hostile behavior, nor provided any assurances that they are willing to do so as it continues to undermine 

Lebanese sovereignty; pursue their own covert nuclear program; 

support not only Hezbollah, but other Islamist extremist groups, 

such as Hamas and al-Qaeda in Iraq; stockpile both ballistic and 

unconventional weapons; preserve its close relationship with Iran; 

and obstruct the investigations of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency of their alleged nuclear site that Israel targeted in 2007, 

among other things. In my opinion, these illicit activities pose a 

substantial threat to U.S. troops in the region, as well as the security of U.S. allies throughout the Middle East. 

In fact, Syria’s behavior, like its sponsor, Iran, has become increasingly belligerent and threatening, as evidenced by the recent 

reports of its supplying Hezbollah with medium-range SCUD missiles. This development comes a little more than a month after U.S. 

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns met 

with President al-Assad in Syria and held additional talks shortly 

afterwards. During these talks, the United States demanded that 

Syria stop the smuggling of weapons in Syria to Hezbollah. Clearly, 

the administration’s policy of engagement, like in Iran, is not working. According to some experts, as of this past December, Hezbollah 

was known to possess missiles capable of reaching Haifa and Tel 

Aviv. 

Now, as one recent Los Angeles Times editorial notes, this new 

acquisition makes the Lebanese militants the first irregular army 

to possess such weapons and enables them to target virtually every 

bit of Israel. The administration warned that such a move could destabilize the region, and clearly, such a threat creates yet another 

setback for the President’s Middle East policy, a dangerous course 

of action that has been one concession after another, rather than 

8

defending our allies, like Israel, and our critical national security 

interests. It would appear that this administration believes the 

problem with Syria is an American failure to communicate with or 

to ‘‘engage’’ the Syrian regime, but the fact of the matter is it is 

not the American willingness to talk to Syria that is a problem, but 

Syria’s refusal, like its patron, Iran, to halt its hostile actions. 

If the Los Angeles Times report is true, Syrian President alAssad, like Iranian leader Ahmadinejad, is saying one thing, last 

month, for example, he reaffirmed his commitment to seeking 

peace with Israel, while his actions indicate another. Michael 

Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute puts this threat and its 

broader implications into perspective when he said this past December that Iran may be Hezbollah’s chief patron, but Syria is the 

linchpin that makes Iranian support for foreign fighters possible. 

While Israel may be the intermediate target of the Iran-Syria 

nexus, the partnership threatens broader U.S. interests. 

This relationship was further evident in February in a meeting 

in Damascus less than a week after Under Secretary Burns’ visit 

when President al-Assad, President Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah 

Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah were the triumvirate, guaranteed their resistance against the U.S.-Israeli alliance, and, as one 

foreign policy article put it, openly mocked U.S. efforts to distance 

Syria from Iran and stated that his government is preparing ourselves for any Israeli aggression. Engagement with rogue regimes, 

like those of Syria and Iran, does not work and undermines every 

U.S. and international effort for peace and stability in the Middle 

East. 

The United States, and other nations, must hold the al-Assad regime, and others like it, accountable for its continued support of 

terrorists and subsequent efforts to destabilize the region. I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses, Assistant Secretary 

Feltman, as he sheds more light on the issues before us, but I 

think it is extremely important, Mr. Chairman, that we state as an 

administration, and as a government, our unequivocal support for 

Israel in making sure that Israel’s right to exist is guaranteed, and 

we are going to do everything in our power to make sure that Iran 

and Syria and their actions are not going to be jeopardizing our relationship. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You will get no argument from me. 

Mr. BURTON. I love you, man. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would ask unanimous consent that Mr. Issa be 

allowed to participate in the hearing, speaking and asking questions at the end of each round. So ordered. Ms. Berkley? 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my points of 

view are very well-known to this committee, and certainly to the 

Mr. I just want to welcome the ambassador. Anxious to hear what 

he has to say, less anxious to hear what my colleagues have to say 

before we hear you, so let me be the first to pass. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Royce? 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just when you think that 

it can’t get any worse, it does. Syria has gone from supporting terrorism against U.S. troops in Iraq to political murder in Lebanon. 

It then collaborated with North Korea to build a nuclear reactor designed for weapons production. Now we have allegations of SCUD 

9

transfers to Hezbollah, which is a significant escalation of the 

threat that Nasrallah presents to the region, especially given the 

fact that he could now lob those SCUDs into Israel. I was in Israel 

in August 2006 during the Hezbollah war and I was in Haifa. I remember at that time the lack of restraint on the part of the rocket 

attacks into the civilian sector of that town, into the business districts. 

At one point the trauma hospital was targeted. I remember going 

into the trauma hospital and talking with some of the victims of 

those attacks, and Syria, of course, had manufactured the weapons, 

the rockets. There were 70,000 ball bearings on each one of them. 

When those crash into the business district or crash into people’s 

homes, you can imagine what it does. I think there was a presumption in Haifa, because it was such a cosmopolitan town with such 

a lot of Arab-Jews, Druze, Arab-Israelis, Jewish-Israelis, and 

Druze-Israelis, that perhaps the civilian sector wouldn’t be targeted. It was. 

So now, looking back, I remember going into a bunker at one 

point when we were shelled by rocket fire. I think ahead of the fact 

that if that was problematic, what is it going to mean when 

Hezbollah has this option with the SCUDs? Well, it seems the lure 

of a temperate Syria is a very enduring one because when Bashar 

al-Assad came to power a decade ago there was hope that his stint 

studying abroad and his interest in computers would signal openness to the West. That was not to be. More recently, The Economist 

noted that the increasing popularity of sushi restaurants in Damascus was a sign that different winds are blowing in Syria. That 

is an interesting theory. 

For some time it has become fashionable in diplomatic circles to 

believe that U.S. engagement with Syria would help to flip Damascus out of Iran’s orbit. This remains a theory. Days after the 

Obama administration announced its intention to return a U.S. 

ambassador to Damascus, Assad hosted Iran’s Ahmadinejad and 

publicly ridiculed U.S. policy in the region. This was just after Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, joined them for that meeting. 

Our witness today will present the case that increased U.S. engagement with Syria is key to curtailing Syrian behavior. But it is important to remember that the current debate over the fate of the 

ambassador designee to Damascus is not a debate of diplomatic 

presence versus no presence. We currently have a full and functioning embassy in Syria that is engaging in all the things that our 

embassies around the world do, just without an ambassador at its 

helm. A full ambassador might get involved to more parties, but I 

am hard-pressed to see how that would have curtailed the assassinations, the terrorism, the proliferation. I just thought I would 

take a moment and make that point. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. Mr. Ellison? 

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this 

hearing. Although I won’t exactly follow the fine example set forth 

by Ms. Berkley, I hope to be close to her in terms of being quick 

and brief. I want to admire and thank President Obama’s efforts 

to establish dialogue or improve dialogue between Syria and U.S. 

officials. This is an important step in trying to mend relations, and 

I believe that both Syrian and American people gain from our two 

10

governments working together. I also applaud the efforts of our 

witness, Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman, for being the first 

high level State Department official to visit Syria since 2005. Efforts like this are critical to trying to improve that relationship. 

I also want to note that I don’t believe that improved dialogue 

between nations, even where there are clear and legitimate conflicts, precludes efforts by either side to pursue its national security 

interests. I don’t think that dialogue undermines either country’s 

ability to see to the well-being of its own citizens, and therefore, 

I don’t think that the efforts by the Obama administration to improve dialogue in any way undermine U.S. interests. I think they 

stand a good chance of improving them. Of course, there is no guarantee, but without dialogue, it is certain that things will not proceed on a productive course. So, with that, I thank the witness for 

being here, and I look forward to the witness’ presentation and to 

the questions. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ellison. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling this hearing. I think that it is vital for us to 

understand what is going on in that part of the world because that 

is, of course, very involved with American security, as well as 

Israeli security and the cause of peace. I am looking forward to 

hearing the testimony. Let me just note, I would like to know what 

will it take, what will it take to turn Syrian policy around? What 

are we expected to do, and what can we do that will take Syria and 

perhaps have it come in the same course as Jordan and Egypt? Jordan and Egypt have now made their peace, and they are certainly 

just as Arab as Syria, and that is one thing that I would like to 

know. 

Also, how do we promote friendship with a government like Syria 

without sending a message of weakness? What can we do to promote friendship, head them in the right direction, without appearing to be weak? Our goal isn’t continued, and shouldn’t be, some 

sort of hostility toward Syria or anybody else in that area. Our goal 

should be is turning people from enemies, or at least from hostile 

powers, into friends. During the Reagan administration, let me 

note, there was nobody who was more aggressive in dealing with 

the Communist threat than Ronald Reagan, and by the end of his 

administration we had turned the Soviet Union into a friend, or 

into a potential friend anyway. 

So what is it going to take? Is the Syrian prerequisite to peace 

with the United States and peace in that region, is it eliminating 

Israel? If that is it, obviously, there is going to be no peace. We 

need to know. Are you insisting that Israel as a Jewish nation 

ceased to exist? Otherwise, we are going to continue having this 

belligerency. We need to have that answer, we need to study that. 

We have heard the litany of things that Syria is doing that we disagree with, or not disagree with, but find unconscionable: The supplying of weapons, especially if they are rockets; support for groups 

that actually target civilians, read that terrorism; support for 

groups that kill American soldiers in their deployment in that part. 

These are things that are just unacceptable, but how do we get the 

Syrians then to stop those things? Not just prove it, but how do we 

get them to change that policy? 

11

One last note. I would like to know whether or not we have a 

solution that would encompass the water issue. Very few times do 

I come to hearings about Syria and this part of the world where 

water is discussed with the degree that it should be discussed, because I see that as a major factor that is never really dealt with. 

Now, obviously the Syrians would like back the Golan Heights. My 

reading of various people in Israel is that the Golan Heights issue 

really isn’t a national security issue as much as it is a water issue. 

Is that the case? If that is the case, how can we deal with that? 

Is there a way to deal with the water issue, thus, the Golan 

Heights and the security issue? Is there a way that we can actually 

compensate or in some way mitigate what is going on so that people won’t be giving up water rights that they believe are their own 

in order to have peace? These are some of the questions that I hope 

we get at today, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate you having this hearing 

so that we can have a better understanding and better promote 

peace and stability in that region. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Good questions, Mr. Rohrabacher. Hopefully we 

will get some good answers. Mr. Engel? 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I appreciate it very much. I think it is timely, and I think there are important issues to talk about and be answered. Ambassador Feltman, I am glad you are appearing before 

our committee today. Often we hold hearings at regular intervals 

to review U.S. policy toward one region or another, but today 

things are different. The events are more complicated, the situation 

is more dangerous and the worst actors are more heavily armed. 

Early last decade I was pleading with the Bush administration to 

develop a policy toward Syria. It was unclear what our goals were 

toward the Assad regime or how we would accomplish them. 

Then, its support for terrorists groups, development of weapons 

of mass destruction, support for guerillas entering Iraq and occupation of Lebanon were the most destabilizing policies coming out of 

Damascus. You may recall that in 2003 Congress passed into law 

the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration 

Act, which I wrote. It enshrined these factors as conditions for improving relations with the United States. Since the passage of that 

law, Syria withdrew its forces of occupation from Lebanon. Unfortunately, it continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, and 

support terrorists, and reports indicate that Syrian influence inside 

Lebanon is growing. Lebanon once again seems to be held hostage 

to Syria. 

Syria was a charter member of the State Department’s list of 

state sponsors of terrorism back in the 1970s and remains on that 

list today. Less than 3 years ago, Israel was forced to destroy a 

Syria nuclear reactor based on a North Korean design that was the 

center of a nuclear weapons program, and now we hear that Syria 

has sent SCUD missiles to Hezbollah. I am not sure how things 

could be much worse. At the same time, there are indications that 

the Obama administration has taken observable steps to improve 

the relationship with the Assad regime, including expediting requests for waivers of sanctions and sending an ambassador back to 

Damascus. Frankly, I don’t know why. Leopards don’t change their 

spots. 

12

Unless there is something I don’t know about, unless something 

has happened behind the scenes, unless there is a wink and a nod 

by the Assad regime that they want to work with us and cooperate 

with us to stabilize the area, not destabilize the area, I don’t know 

why we are sending an ambassador at this time. You know, right 

after we announced we were sending an ambassador, it is an olive 

branch, what happens? Assad welcomes Ahmadinejad of Iran to 

Damascus. It is almost like he is poking a finger once again in the 

eye of the United States. So I don’t know why we are doing this. 

I will ask the same question that I asked of the previous administration: Do we actually have a policy toward Syria, and is it in our 

best interest, and what are we doing? 

I am glad that the State Department has condemned the shipment of advanced weapons, including SCUD missiles, to Hezbollah, 

but I want to hear what we are going to do about it and how warming up to Syria is going to make things better. As for me, Representative Mark Kirk and I will introduce a resolution today condemning Syria’s shipment of SCUD missiles and other advanced 

weapons to Hezbollah. Our resolution calls on the administration 

to put additional pressure on Damascus, including imposing all remaining sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act. To this day, 

I remain unclear as to why the Syria Accountability Act has not 

been fully enforced. It wasn’t fully enforced under the previous administration, it is not being enforced under this administration, 

and, in fact, I am hearing that some of the sanctions that had been 

imposed are now being loosened. I would like to know why. 

So, Mr. Ambassador, I thank you for appearing today, and I look 

forward to addressing the basic question: What is our policy toward 

Syria? I don’t think an answer is that we want to make nice with 

them so they will be our friends. I would like to have as many 

friends as we can have, but I also like to be realistic. Unless Syria 

has indicated to us that it is willing to work with us to stabilize 

the area rather than work with its friend, Iran, to destabilize the 

area, I don’t know what we get out of talking with them and somehow pretending that that is going to make things better. If the 

Assad regime really wants to change, then I think we should work 

with them, but if it is going to be the same old stuff, we have been 

down that dead end before and I really don’t think that is a solution for the future. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Mr. McMahon? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Feltman, it 

is an honor to see you again, and thank you for being here. As we 

know, examples of civil unrest throughout the Middle East, the 

Gulf States, Iraq, and even Bosnia, have been tied to Iran, yet 

these examples are of autonomous states sort of battling extremism 

within their borders. Unfortunately, Syria’s partnership with Iran 

stands out against these examples and seems to be one of the most 

direct and mutual alliances. In fact, President Assad at the Trilateral Conference even referred to the Iran-Syria partnership as a 

circle of cooperation that is expanding. Unfortunately, with the 

most recent news of Syria transferring SCUD missiles that have 

been modified to be fit with chemical warheads to terrorist proxies, 

13

like Hezbollah, Assad is right, this relationship is definitely expanding. 

Syria’s support for Hezbollah, an Iranian-controlled entity in 

neighboring Lebanon, leaves Lebanese Christians and moderate 

Muslims in fear of raising their voices against the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon reversing the gains made in the Seda revolution 

that resulted in the end of Syrian occupation of Lebanon. I hope 

that increased engagement will eventually bring about a Syrian 

Government that is not compelled toward violence and belligerence 

by Iran and one that decides to finally move toward peace with 

Israel and its neighbors. Secretary Feltman, I would appreciate 

your insight into the administration’s vision for Syria going forward, particularly after the most recent revelation, and also your 

views on Syrian influence on Lebanon given your previous position 

as the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. I cannot help to think that we 

almost needed to include Iran in the title of this hearing given its 

hand in these disturbing matters, and look forward to probing the 

Iran-Syria relationship further with you under the chairman’s leadership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. McMahon. Mr. Green, did you 

want to make a statement? 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this particularly timely hearing. I would like to welcome Ambassador Feltman 

to our committee. Five years ago the U.S. removed its ambassador 

from Damascus in protest to the Assad regime’s presumed role in 

the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister. Now, as the administration prepares to reinstate diplomatic ties, we must once again 

reassess the situation in order to move forward with a policy toward Syria that also meets our regional goal of a safe and secure 

Middle East. While it has been no easy task addressing the challenges posed by the Syrian Government, it is in our national interest to seek the change to these troubling policies. Unfortunately, 

the Obama administration’s first year of engaging with Assad has 

yielded few substantive achievements. 

While Syrian facilitation of insurgents in Iraq has slowed, top 

U.S. generals and senior Iraqi officials say the problem still remains. At the same time, an increasing body of evidence suggests 

that Damascus has provided the terrorist organization Hezbollah 

with a new generation of sophisticated weaponry that changes the 

equation along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Therefore, Ambassador 

Feltman, I hope you will share with us whether the President is 

ready to renew the sanctions on Syria under the Executive Orders, 

or whether there is consideration in allowing the Executive Orders 

to expire. Is the administration considering lifting any of the sanctions on Syria, including those imposed pursuant to the Syrian Accountability Act? While I appreciate the steps of the administration 

to normalize U.S. relations with Syria, in absence of any tangible 

changes in the Syrian Government, we must continue to be steadfast and insist in order to achieve serious bilateral relations. Again, 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing. I look forward 

to the testimony of our witness. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Green. Mr. Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After my long absence and 

my current leave of absence, it is good to be back. Mr. Chairman, 

14

I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I think nothing could 

be more timely than to have an Assistant Secretary whose experience as the Council General in Jerusalem, and then during perhaps 

the worst of all times to be Ambassador in Lebanon. Like an earlier 

speaker, I was in Israel during the 2006 war. Unlike the earlier 

speaker, I was also in Lebanon. I saw that because of the actions 

of Hezbollah, paid for and funded by a combination of Iran and 

Syria, both Israel and Lebanon suffered greatly in that war. We 

could push blame toward the Lebanese for not doing enough to secure their borders or we could push blame toward Israel for using 

cluster bombs on areas of Lebanon, including civilian areas, but 

neither would have occurred without Iran’s constant support and 

use of its proxy in Damascus. 

I do support engagement. I even go so far as to support that after 

this long hiatus, I was with Ambassador Scobie just before she was 

withdrawn, I do support it could be time to send an ambassador 

back. Mr. Chairman, Secretary, it is very clear that ambassador 

must go back with the kind of tough language and plan that will 

make a difference in the behavior. I believe in engagement, I believe in meetings, I have met with Bashar Assad from the first 

meeting after he was President through perhaps one of the last to 

be made, but a little bit like our former chairman, Mr. Lantos, I 

believe we need to walk in and say we could perhaps be your best 

friend, and then give them hell. 

We need to make it very clear that Syria’s behavior, both in their 

support of al-Qaeda fighters going into Iraq to the detriment and 

the loss of American lives and their continued relationship with 

Iran, they have put us in a position where we cannot ease sanctions, we cannot support that government in its current form. 

Nothing stops us from having constructive engagement, nothing 

should stop us from recognizing that there are Americans who have 

families in Syria, and, of course, conversely, Syrians who have families in America. We have deep ties in the region. They are long. 

We even have a period of time in which Syria was our ally, but 

that period is now long ago. 

Mr. Secretary, I have known you, I have known you to be a fighter, I have known you to be a survivor, I have known you to care 

about these people and their well-being enough to tell them what 

they don’t want to hear. I hope that with your guidance the new 

ambassador, if confirmed, would, in fact, go with the kind of understanding that we must change Syria’s behavior, and that the 

Obama government must recognize that engagement should not 

turn into a simply blind eye toward the behavior of one country, 

particularly when this country has a history of turning a blind eye 

to Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, and their continued support of 

Hezbollah for a long time in the country and a very, very clear 

movement by the current, well, by the same Syrian regime now to 

reassert itself in Lebanon. 

I do have to note that we left Syria because of the assassination 

of Rafic Hariri. Saad Hariri has gone to Damascus in order to try 

to improve relations between these two countries. That is a brave 

move for a man who truly believes he went to meet with somebody 

who had a hand in the assassination of his own father. We need 

to be as brave, but we also need to support the bravery of the peoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:01 Jul 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\042110\56093 HFA PsN: SHIRL
15

ple of Lebanon and the people of Israel who have put up for too 

many years with the kind of attacks in violation of international 

law by a country who enjoys full diplomatic status around the 

world. So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing Ambassador 

Feltman’s statements, I look forward to working with him in his 

current position, as I have in the past, but I join all the rest of the 

speakers—the opportunity to speak last is actually very good because I got to hear and agree with every statement made before. 

With that, I thank the Mr. and yield back. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

Mr. BURTON. Can I make one comment real quick, Mr. Chairman, before we go further? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Absolutely, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. I just want to say that he is Lebanese. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In that case, I want to reconsider my——

Mr. ISSA. I was born in Cleveland. Let us make that perfectly 

clear. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes, I understand, but he is of Lebanese descent, 

and so is my wife, so, you know, I have to be real careful about 

what I say around this place. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The record will so indicate. 

Mr. BURTON. My wife is better looking. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman was not recognized for that purpose. I am delighted to welcome back to the subcommittee a very 

distinguished diplomat and dedicated public servant, Ambassador 

Jeffrey Feltman, who was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State 

for Near Eastern Affairs on August 18, 2009. A career member of 

the Foreign Service since 1986, Ambassador Feltman served as 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs from February 2008 to his present assignment, serving 

concurrently as Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau since 

December 2008. From July 2004 to January 2008, Ambassador 

Feltman served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon. Prior to his assignment in Lebanon, he held posts in Iraq 

and Israel at both the U.S. Embassy and the Consulate in Jerusalem and Tunisia, among other countries. It is always a pleasure 

to welcome you back, Mr. Ambassador. Your entire statement will 

be placed in the record. You may proceed as you will. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON) 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Ackerman, Ranking Member Burton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 

to discuss U.S. policy toward Syria, and thank you for allowing me 

to submit a longer statement for the record. In holding this hearing 

on Syria, the committee is examining a policy area where the 

United States faces a number of challenges and adverse conditions. 

Syria is a nation with which we have grave concerns and a number 

of serious disagreements ranging from human rights practices to 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

16

We also believe, however, that we should test the proposition of 

whether we might find some long-term interests in common 

through the practice of clear eye diplomacy. After all, Syria has 

said, just one example, that it wants to see a stable, sovereign, secure, prosperous Iraq. That is our goal. And unlike the Iranians refusal to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, Syria’s leaders have 

also said repeatedly over the past 16 years or so that they view a 

comprehensive peace in the Middle East as being in Syria’s interest. To that end, the Syrians have pursued a number of rounds of 

peace negotiations with Israel. We, of course, want to see a comprehensive peace in the region, and that would, of course, have to 

include Syria. 

You know, I share what all of you have said today, the feelings 

that you have expressed today. Syria’s actions fall far short of its 

words in favor of peace in the region and a stable and prosperous 

Iraq. Syria’s Government also denies its citizens many essential 

rights and freedoms. It maintains an alliance, as you have all 

noted, with Hezbollah, one of the most dangerous and destabilizing 

elements in the region. It facilitates many of Iran’s aggressive policies. For many years, the United States has sought changes to 

these and other Syrian policies. The question is what are the tools 

that we should use when seeking changes to Syrian policies? What 

tools might lead to a more constructive U.S.-Syrian relationship to 

the benefit of both of our countries? 

You know, I know that by virtue of my tenure as Ambassador to 

Lebanon I am sometimes, often, personally associated with the period when the United States was a leading member of a coalition 

determined to isolate and to pressure Syria into withdrawal from 

Lebanon. I believe that the tools that we used at the time were appropriate and effective. After all, Syria did withdraw from Lebanon. That approach worked in a particular context. There was an 

extraordinary unity of purpose at the time among the majority of 

Lebanese in the aftermath of the murder of Prime Minister Rafic 

Hariri, and that same extraordinary unity among the key regional 

and international players. Such remarkable unity of purpose 

among so many different players is not sustainable indefinitely. 

Today, the Lebanese are pursuing a number of different, often conflicting, agendas, including reproachment by many with Syria. 

The international consensus of not talking to Damascus has dissipated. The French, the Saudis, the Turks, many others, have all 

moved to have more robust dialogue with the Syrians. For over a 

year the Israelis engaged Syria in several rounds of proximity talks 

facilitated by Turkey. Clearly, the intense regional and international consensus that made our isolation approach so effective 

back in 2005 no longer exists. We must find the tools that are 

going to work today. I believe that the United States must have 

principal engagement with Syria as one of our tools, though let me 

add that engagement with Syria does not come at the expense of 

our friends in the region, such as Lebanon and Iraq. We are moving cautiously. By using incremental steps focused on areas of mutual interest, we are gauging the Syrians’ sincerity. 

We have discussed a number of the areas where we believe we 

may be able to make progress. In return for positive steps on the 

parts of Syria, we are prepared to consider steps we might take 

17

consistent with reciprocity, consistent with our principles and consistent with our commitments to our allies in the region. The most 

important part of engagement is to discuss directly, firmly and at 

authoritative levels those parts of Syrian policy that most trouble 

us. When President Obama directed that American officials engage 

Syria’s leaders directly, he was under no illusion that face to face 

dialogue would instantly, from one day to the next, overturn Syrian 

policies with which we disagree. 

Indeed, the most disagreeable and dangerous of these policies is 

not likely to be fully reversed unless, and until, Syria and Israel 

resolve the differences that separate them, a process that we are 

trying very hard to facilitate. Now, to those who would point to 

periodic visits of senior American officials to Damascus, who would 

cite continued Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas and then 

declare engagement a failure, I would say the following: The 

United States and Syria have been substantially at odds for several 

decades. The decision of our President to draw on a full inventory 

of diplomatic tools at his disposal does not anticipate instant success. Rather, it marks the initiation of a sustained effort to succeed 

where in the past we have failed to make progress. 

We need, I think, to proceed with patience and persistence. If 

confirmed by the Senate, Ambassador Robert Ford should soon be 

posted to Damascus, enabling him to proceed with his work as the 

President’s personal representative. As we try to minimize the 

prospects of war and maximize the chances for peace in a region 

where our national security is defended by American men and 

women in uniform, we have no choice but to use all the tools of 

state craft at our disposal. In closing, I would like to recall President Obama’s words last December in Oslo when he said that engagement lacks the satisfying purity of indignation. 

He said,

‘‘But I also know that sanctions without outreach, condemnation without discussion, can carry forward only a crippling status quo. No repressive regime can move down a new path unless it has the choice of an open door.’’

We simply must make sure that the leaders in Syria and elsewhere 

understand fully and accurately the position of the United States 

before they act. This is not something to be left to rumor, or left 

to second or third-hand knowledge, or to others. This is our job, 

and to do less would amount to negligence. It would amount to unilateral diplomatic disarmament. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

I look forward to taking any questions you and the committee may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:]

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Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I have not 

seen you that animated for a while. I suppose you feel pretty 

strongly about this. I guess if you don’t have an ambassador, then 

you don’t have an ambassador that you can recall. I suspect there 

are quite a few that I have seen that I wish we had an ambassador 

just for that purpose. Let me ask you, there have been reports in 

the media that the President of Israel while on a trip overseas, I 

believe, proclaimed that Syria has had some traffic over missiles 

intended for Hezbollah. What can you tell us about that? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, the specific issue, reports 

in the press on SCUD missiles, I need to discuss in a different setting than this one, but let me make some comments on this area. 

We have been concerned about the provision of weapons to 

Hezbollah for some time. It reinforces the point about needing to 

sending an ambassador back to Damascus. We don’t normally say 

everything that we are doing behind the scenes publicly, but I need 

to make a couple of references here. On February 26, I asked the 

Syrian ambassador, Imad Mustafa, to come see me in my office because we were so concerned of information we had that Syria was 

passing increasingly sophisticated ballistic weapons to Hezbollah. 

On March 1, a couple days later, the NSC delivered a similar 

message to the Syrian ambassador. On March 10, Bill Burns delivered a similar message to the Syrian ambassador, who then has 

gone publicly and said we have never delivered such message. Either he is not listening, or he is not delivering the message to his 

castle, or something else, but it reinforces the point that when we 

have an issue of this urgency, we need to be having access to the 

leadership in Syria to express our concern. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me get a clarification. You said that you said 

to the ambassador that we had information about the transference 

of ballistic missiles. You did not say SCUDs, is that correct? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. But a general point here. President Assad 

is making decisions in a very volatile and dangerous region. Syria 

has made mistakes before, and Syria has, in fact, paid the consequences for those mistakes that they have made before, but not 

only Syria, it has affected the region. He is listening to people like 

Hassan Nasrallah, he is listening to people like Ahmadinejad, you 

know, people made reference to the February so-called summit he 

hosted. We need to be making our message to him loud and clear 

and directly. It is not the same to have an embassy without an ambassador. I know. I have been in the diplomatic service for well 

over 20 years. 

You go in in the Arab world, and many times at a lower level 

if you are not the ambassador, and that lower level official is not 

going to give bad news higher up. When President Assad is taking 

decisions that could affect war and peace in his region, he needs 

to have a clear understanding of what the implications are, what 

the U.S. positions are what the red lines are. That is one reason 

why we are sending an ambassador back to Damascus, assuming 

the Senate confirms Ambassador Ford. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have spent a large part of the time discussing the sending back of an ambassador. There are no votes in 

28

this House to confirm an ambassador or otherwise. Could you give 

us an understanding of where you think this sits in the Senate? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Of course. It has been voted up the Committee of the Ways, confirmation by the full Senate. There are consultations ongoing with many of the same questions that some of 

the members of this committee asked about it. We would like to see 

him confirmed and in place as soon as possible. We would like to 

have had him in place now. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is there a question that he won’t be confirmed? 

Is that why you are that concerned? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Well, you remember it took me a few 

months to get confirmed, so I could be talking from my own personal experience. I think we need to make the case firmly to everybody about why it is that having an ambassador in Syria allows us 

to be effective in our diplomacy. It is not a reward to this or that 

party. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, my time is just up. I am going to keep 

other members to the time, so I will call upon Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. You know, I have great confidence in the Mossad. 

They are pretty good. They tell me that their intelligence gathering 

capability is about as good as the CIA, which, incidentally, is under 

assault right now which is kind of unfortunate, but nevertheless, 

the Mossad, I am sure, told their top officials that they had information that SCUD missiles were being transported through Syria 

to Hezbollah. So I know you want to do this in a closed meeting, 

and Mr. Chairman and I have just talked about that and I am sure 

we will probably do that, but just assuming, assuming that is the 

case, why in the world would we want to reward Syria with an ambassador? You know, this kind of thing smacks of appeasing somebody that is kicking you in the teeth or someplace else even more 

severe. 

I remember in my history that Lord Chamberlain went to Munich trying to pacify Hitler by saying, you know, if we sign an 

agreement, we will, you know, maybe give you an ambassador or 

whatever it is, that you won’t expand beyond the Sudetenland, and 

we ended up with 60 million people getting killed in World War II. 

I just don’t understand that. Maybe you can explain to me why you 

think this is a positive step. Now, I don’t have any problem with 

Syria getting an ambassador if they show some real reasons why 

they should have diplomatic relations with us, but they are still labeled a terrorist state, they have been supplying Hezbollah, and 

Hamas and possibly al-Qaeda, and that really troubles me. 

Then, I just said in my opening statement, I want to read this 

one more time, it said this relationship was further evident, talking 

about the Syria-Iran relationship, in a February meeting in Damascus less than 1 week after Under Secretary Burns’ visit between President al-Assad, President Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah 

Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah where the triumvirate guaranteed ‘‘their resistance against the U.S.-Israeli alliance,’’ and as 

one foreign policy article put it ‘‘openly mocked U.S. efforts to distance Syria from Iran,’’ and stated that his government ‘‘is preparing ourselves for any Israeli aggression.’’ This was just not too 

long ago and right after we had Under Secretary Burns visiting 

and talking to them. 

29

I mean, it is like they just spit right in our face, the three of 

them together. So, you know, I understand that the President has 

a different approach to foreign policy, you know, he has a softer approach saying he wants to reach out and try to make, you know, 

the world a safer place because we are having, at least attempting 

to having relations with everybody, but these guys are continuing 

to give aid and comfort to the enemy of Israel, our strong ally, they 

are giving them weapons, SCUD missiles that can reach any part 

of Israel, at least this is what I think, and we are going to go ahead 

and confirm an ambassador over there? 

Now, you know, I have talked to the Syrian ambassador here and 

he seems like a nice guy, and he has got a lovely wife, and I would 

like to see us have a positive relationship with Syria, but I don’t 

see how in the world we can take steps in that direction if this kind 

of crap is going on. Pardon my vernacular, but I just would hope 

that you would take that message back to the administration, and 

I certainly will convey it to my colleagues in the Senate saying, 

hey, you know, let us let them know that we would like to have 

relationships, but we certainly don’t want to reward them when 

they are kicking us in the teeth or spitting in our eye. You can 

comment, if you would like. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative Burton, with all due respect, I disagree that sending an ambassador is a reward. President Assad, as I said, he is making decisions. He is making decisions that could send the region into war. He is listening to 

Ahmadinejad, he is listening to Hassan Nasrallah. He needs to listen to us, too. 

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me. Let me interrupt. I want to read you 

this one more time. This is important. President Ahmadinejad, 

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Assad said 

they guarantee their resistance against the U.S.-Israeli alliance, 

and, as one foreign policy article said, openly mocked U.S. efforts 

to distance Syria from Iran and stated that his government is preparing ourselves for any Israeli aggression. That doesn’t sound like 

he is willing to start talking. Now, go ahead. I am sorry. Go ahead. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Engel? 

Mr. BURTON. Can we let him just respond real quickly? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, but you are going to have to keep it brief 

or allow us each extra minutes to tell whether we have a lovely 

wife. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. Well, you can respond later then. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Go ahead, Ambassador. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I would just like to make a comment on 

that awful meeting in Damascus that took place because it is interesting. If you watch the sort of travel politics of the Middle East, 

you will find there is a pattern that as Western visitors go to Damascus, you know, the French, the Americans, even the Saudis in 

some place, you soon see the Iranians showing up, and it is interesting. It may be telling that, in fact, there is the sudden sort of 

summits after there has been a U.S. visitor, or a French visitor, a 

Saudi visitor. It suggests to me that there is more going on, and 

it is not all negative, behind the scenes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Feltman, 

you have had a long and distinguished record that I have admired, 

30

other people have admired, so I mean no disrespect to you, but I 

listened to your words very carefully in your opening statement 

and you said, ‘‘engagement with Syria will not come at the expense 

of our friends in the region, such as Lebanon and Iraq.’’ Does that 

also include Israel? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes. Absolutely. Unequivocally. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. I am glad it does because sometimes I wonder 

if the administration still considers Israel a friend. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Absolutely. Our desire to get the comprehensive peace is because it stems from our commitment to 

Israel’s security. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. You know, I am glad to hear it. You have 

heard a lot of consternation here on both sides of the aisle about 

Syrian transfer of missiles to Hezbollah. I know you said you 

couldn’t really say a lot of this publicly, but what can you tell us 

publicly? What did the Syrians actually transfer to Hezbollah and 

when did they do it? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, I really am sorry. I am just 

not able to give you a very satisfactory answer in this setting on 

that. I hope that we would be able to in other settings, or perhaps 

in the future. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If the gentleman would yield? 

Mr. ENGEL. Yes. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We will be inviting the Ambassador, the Secretary, to meet with us in a different setting. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I mean, what I can say is this is a really, 

really serious concern of ours. If these reports turn out to be true, 

we are going to have to review the full range of tools that are available to us in order to make Syria reverse what would be an incendiary provocative action. You know, I think the United States has 

shown in the past that we are able to act when there has been actions like this. I expect that all options are going to be on the table 

looking at this, but this is a serious allegation. If this proves to be 

true, I would argue that Syria has made a mistake. Syria has made 

mistakes in the past, Syria has paid the consequences for mistakes 

in the past. 

The trouble is it is not just Syria that pays for the consequences 

of Syria’s mistakes when we are talking about this volatile region. 

It is an argument, Congressman Engel, why I think it is so important that we have an ambassador who is explaining all this to the 

senior leadership of the Syrian Government. An ambassador is not 

a reward, it is a tool for us, among other tools, to advance our policies. Not a single one of these waivers that you have mentioned has 

been lightened, has been canceled, has been set aside. They are all 

still in place. We are talking about taking an additional tool out 

of the toolbox to use. 

Mr. ENGEL. But with all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, I mean, 

I understand the logic of, you know, everybody else is talking to 

them, why shouldn’t we be there, why shouldn’t we do it? You 

know, that is really great, but, you know, what are their responsibilities? I don’t think it should be a reward that we send an ambassador. I think we should send an ambassador when it is in our 

best interest. Now, you and I are going to disagree about whether 

31

it is in our best interest because I think that if Assad thought that 

there was any real chance of any kind of a reproach moment with 

the United States, he wouldn’t have welcomed Ahmadinejad shortly thereafter, I think it was the very next week, in Damascus and 

made all the statements that Mr. Burton mentioned. 

I agree with what Mr. Burton said. You know, the SCUD missiles are the last in a long line of egregious behavior by Syria. Several years ago we all remember Israel and Lebanon, Israel and 

Hezbollah, actually, fought in a war that everyone was mortified 

that such a war would happen, and as part of the agreement ending that hostility, there was not supposed to be any kind of a rearming of Hezbollah. Now, I am told, and again, the SCUD missiles 

is just the last straw that broke the camel’s back, but I am told 

that in the past 3 years Syria has been facilitating rearmament of 

Hezbollah in Lebanon, which undermines the Lebanese Government, and that Hezbollah is, in essence, stronger than ever before. 

I would like you to comment on that. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Three years in which we didn’t have a 

U.S. ambassador able to even make the point——

Mr. ENGEL. Surely you don’t think having an ambassador or not 

having an ambassador had anything to do with that. Assad cannot 

be trusted, and what are we doing—you know, when you sleep with 

the dogs, you get fleas. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. You know, it is——

Mr. ENGEL. Could I get an answer, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. On the next round. Members may ask their 

questions in one round and get an answer in the next round, but 

they are going to receive their 5 minutes. I can give the witness 

a chance to testify, but that is up to the members. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Syria has had a chemical 

weapons program for many years, and according to the Director of 

National Intelligence, it has the capability to deliver chemical 

agents either by plane, ballistic missile, or by artillery rockets. 

Keeping in mind my opening comments about the fact that I saw 

the results of those, of the transfer from Syria of the Katyusha 

rockets with 70,000 ball bearings in every one of those and they 

were coming down like rain in Haifa, here is my question: Would 

Syria hesitate to transfer such weapons, given what they have 

transferred in the past to Hezbollah? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, I don’t know. We have to 

make the case for them not to do it. We have to make the case 

internationally, regionally. It is not like we are sitting around here 

passively just saying, huh, will they do it, will they not do it? I 

have had a long conversation this morning with the Foreign Minister of Syria, with Walid Mouallem, who categorically denied it, by 

the way, and said I could share that more publicly. We are not 

being passive as we wait and analyze will they, will they not do 

it? We are trying to find all the ways to show the Syrians why it 

is firmly not in their interest to carry through with such transfers, 

trying to show the Syrians why it is not in their interest to permit 

or to facilitate giving of weaponry to Hezbollah, transferring weaponry across the Lebanese border. 

Mr. ROYCE. The international community is engaged as well. I 

am thinking of the IAEA——

32

Ambassador FELTMAN. Exactly. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. And their engagement with Syria. But 

Syria has continued to stonewall the IAEA with respect to their reactor, right? What is our assessment of the Syrian nuclear program? We have had the destruction of that reactor, but is the program continuing? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Well, I mean, we would share the concern 

that the IAEA has expressed, that the international community 

has expressed about Syria’s intentions. Syria is a signatory to the 

NPT. Being a signatory provides certain obligations onto Syria not 

to develop nuclear weapons and to provide the access to IAEA inspectors to show, with confidence, that they are complying with the 

NPT. Clearly, that hasn’t happened. I have seen reports about 

Syria permitting access to another previously declared facility, but 

it is not related to the Alkhabar one that you are referring to. In 

order for Syria to be able to restore confidence by the international 

community in the nature of its nuclear program, in its compliance 

with its NPT obligations, it needs to give full access to the IAEA. 

You know, we await the next reports of the IAEA, but we understand, you know, the concerns right now. 

Mr. ROYCE. Have we seen any further North Korean/Syrian contact, by the way, to your knowledge? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. To my knowledge, no, but I may not be 

the——

Mr. ROYCE. Okay. Let me yield the balance of my time to my colleague from New York who wanted to have his question answered 

and he ran out of time. I am going to do that at this time. If you 

would like to respond to Mr. Engel’s question. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Engel? 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Engel? 

Mr. ENGEL. Yes. I thank the gentleman. I was asking about, you 

know, engagement. You know, you just said that you picked up a 

phone and you spoke to Walid Mouallem, a former Ambassador 

here, Syria’s ambassador to Washington, who is now the Foreign 

Minister, and you argue that only by sending an ambassador to 

Syria could we have top level discussions with the Syrian Government. Well, you just said that we currently do not have an ambassador, he is being confirmed, and you were able to pick up the 

phone and speak to the Foreign Minister. Who is more top in the 

Assad government than the Foreign Minister? So I don’t understand why you keep saying that only by having an ambassador can 

we have communications with them. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, I am sorry if I implied only 

by an ambassador. What I am saying is that it enhances our ability 

to get our message across. The way that it works in the Arab world 

in a lot of the places, I hate to generalize, is that, you know, you 

go in and a message doesn’t go very far, particularly a negative 

message, a bad message. An ambassador can go in at a very high 

level on a regular, continual basis. When we have issues of such 

national security concern, as we have with Syria, I think it is ever 

more important that we maintain a dialogue at the top level, particularly if we know who else is——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Royce’s time is now up. I would ask the Ambassador if he could conclude. If the members want, we will do 

33

more than 5 or 10 minutes or 15, but I think we have to try to be 

consistent. Ambassador, please continue. Finish your thought. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. No. It is just, my thought was that—I am 

repeating myself, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize, but when we 

know where President Assad is getting his information, which is 

the constant contact with the Iranians, with Hezbollah, with 

Hamas, he needs to be able to hear from us directly and continually as well. That is my argument. We are not doing engagement 

because it is a pleasurable experience with the Syrians. We are 

doing engagement because it is in the U.S. national interest. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Costa? 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I mean, 

I think we get what is in our national interest, but are you telling 

us that we have no other contacts with the Syrian regime? I mean, 

no intermediaries, no third channels, no indirect conversations that 

are currently taking place? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Representative Costa, you are absolutely 

right. We have other channels to the Syrians. When I meet with 

any of my colleagues in Europe, for example, we often talk about 

Syria, compare notes, because we all recognize the challenges that 

Syria poses. We have a variety of ways. These issues are so important to us that the Syrians shouldn’t always hear from second 

party, from third party, from whatever their ambassador in Washington may tell them we are saying, they shouldn’t hear about 

rumor, read about it in the paper. They need to understand from 

us what are the implications of what they are doing, the potential 

dangers of what they are doing. 

Mr. COSTA. But through these, and I am not talking about 

through third parties, but I am talking about Americans that are 

conveying either through, I mean, we have had Americans visit 

Syria and others, that there is any ambiguity as to what this administration’s policy is toward Syria and what the possible consequences are, you think that President Assad doesn’t understand 

that there is consequences to his actions? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Maybe I could use a positive example. We 

have had several references to Iraq. Iraq is something that was 

high on my list when I went to Syria in March, and May and then 

later last year. Now, I think you will hear U.S. generals will talk 

about the number of foreign fighters that are coming through the 

pipeline through Syria into Iraq to do really bad stuff in Iraq has 

dropped. It was, you know, like over 100 a couple years ago, it is 

less than 10 a month now. 

Mr. COSTA. Has that dropped because of our efforts or because——

Ambassador FELTMAN. It is in part of our efforts, it is in part the 

Iraqi efforts, but it is in part the Syrian efforts as well. The Syrians have shut down some of the foreign fighter pipelines that go 

through Syria that exploit Syrian territory. I believe firmly that 

they have done that because we are talking to them about it. We 

are talking to them about, you know, where we see our interests, 

where we see their interests, and of something that perhaps could 

have been done more quickly had we been able to have the continued high level dialogue that we now have when we have visitors 

but we aren’t able to sustain on a continual basis. You know, one 

34

of the members mentioned about how would we define progress. 

Well, if I could, speaking of Iraq, I would like to borrow a line from 

one of our most esteemed diplomatic colleagues whom we all respect, Ryan Crocker. Ryan Crocker was once asked how do you define progress in Iraq? He said, well, it is not going to be linear. You 

know, you are going to see some progress here, you might see some 

progress here, and then some stagnation, then something else here. 

I think that is what we are talking about. We are not talking about 

that we are going to see just because we have sent an ambassador 

back to Damascus, that just because we are sending visitors, a line 

that goes from A to B to C to D. I think we are going to see a nonlinear reaction. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. I get that. I get that response. Okay. So let 

us put a little more meat on the bone. When Under Secretary of 

State William Burns traveled to Syria in February, I guess he was 

questioned afterwards candidly. We can discuss areas of which we 

disagree, but we also identified areas of common ground on which 

we can build on. So if we talk about it not being linear and something here and something there, then what are the something here 

and something there that we can build on, in your opinion, that 

would I guess at some stage include an ambassador to Syria? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Well, frankly, I think that the Iraq portfolio is extremely important. 

Mr. COSTA. The what? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. The Iraq portfolio is extremely important. 

Not only the issue of security of our forces in Iraq and the foreign 

fighter pipeline, but also the situation of Iraqi refugees. Syria hosts 

hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees. They have provided them 

healthcare, education. We would like to see them open up the labor 

markets so they can provide income, loosen up on some of the NGO 

restrictions to be able to help them, but it is an area where I believe that we have a national interest in working with the Syrians, 

and I believe that is optimistic. This may sound minor to the committee, but I am always concerned about the safety and security of 

the NEA family, our Americans and Syrians, Americans and anyone who are working overseas. The Syrians have been very responsive to our request to try to find new property to build a safe and 

secure working facility. This has happened since we have started 

talking to the Syrians. It didn’t happen for years before. As I said, 

it is not linear. We are not talking Hezbollah weapons progress 

right now, but there are areas where talking to the Syrians have 

led to some positive developments. 

Mr. COSTA. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Costa. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, with all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, I don’t think your approach has any significance at all in the 

major issues to be solved there. Making it a little easier on the Syrians this way or that way and how they can deal with some influx 

that came in from Iraq, I am sorry, that is not what is keeping us 

in a belligerent relationship with Syria. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. And what have we eased up on, with all 

due respect, Congressman? There are four Executive Orders in 

place. The Syria Accountability Act remains in force, the IranVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:01 Jul 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\042110\56093 HFA PsN: SHIRL
35

North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation remains in force, the Treasury 

rulings remain in force. Where have we given them a gift? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I got your point. You are saying the stick 

doesn’t work, and I am trying to tell you that the let us make 

things here easier, give you some sweets at the end, doesn’t make 

it better as well. What I would like to ask you is the questions I 

asked in the beginning. What are the central issues, the central 

issues that need to be solved in order for us to take Syria, which 

is now in a belligerent position, there is—all these egregious behavior things that have been detailed today are absolutely accurate. I 

will tell you that in the Soviet Union that long list existed, but we 

turned the Soviet Union into at least someone wasn’t belligerent 

anymore toward us. What are those specific things that we can do 

that need to be solved? 

Do the Syrians demand that they are not going to be friends with 

the West until a Jewish state of Israel no longer exists and the Palestinians are able to go home? Is that a prerequisite? If it is, what 

the hell are we even worrying about them for, because that is never 

going to happen. If it is short of that, what are those issues? I mentioned the Golan Heights. I have talked to Israelis, I have talked 

to Syrians, and they tend to think that the actual security element 

of the Golan Heights is not something that is the biggest stumbling 

block. Their reasoning Israelis don’t want to make the deal is because it is also the water issue, which is vital to the Israelis as 

well, I might add. Is there something? Okay, the Golan Heights. 

That is an issue that needs to be solved. What else? Is that the 

only issue? If it is, let us try to solve that. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. No, I agree with you, Congressman, that 

it is the peace issue that is going to take away the worst problems 

that we have. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. It is the peace issue. You know, the disarming of Hezbollah, the hosting of Hamas, all these issues are 

going to be probably solved most easily through a comprehensive 

peace. That is why we are pushing so hard. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Correct. Correct. If you take them from a belligerent country into a country like Jordan or Egypt, all of those 

issues will be solved. So how do we do it? We don’t do it and just 

say we are going to send an ambassador and rah, rah. No. What 

is the specific issues the ambassador has to solve? Golan Heights 

is one. We know that, right? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. You know, Senator Mitchell has been 

going to Damascus because of the very issues that you are identifying here. We want to get to a comprehensive peace. The Syrians 

are different than the Iranians. You talked about the question 

about are they going to remain belligerent until Israel disappears? 

That is not what they say, that is not how they are negotiating, 

history has indicated. They have said they want to live in peace in 

the region. They have gone through a number of rounds of talks, 

direct and indirect, with the Israelis on how you get to that peace. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. So it is a different stance than Iran has. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you are convinced that with Syria at least, 

they have not made an ultimate demand about the nonexistence of 

36

Israel by permitting the right of return of all the Palestinians, they 

haven’t made that as part of their demand of being nonbelligerent. 

Okay. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Their acts don’t suggest that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So thus, we should then proceed knowing that that is a possibility, because peace is not a possibility if 

that is their position. So there are specific things that we need to 

tackle. First of all, talk to me about the Golan Heights. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. The first thing is how do you get the Syrian and Israeli track started again? That is extremely important. 

Senator Mitchell has been spending a lot of time on it. The Israelis 

and Palestinians right now are, I am sorry, the Israelis and Syrians right now are starting from a different perspective. The Syrians are saying we want to start from the presumption that the 

territorial issue, the Golan Heights, is going to be solved, we are 

going to have all the land restored to us in 67. The Israelis are saying we want to start without such preconditions, we want to explore where we can go. So we have differences in how they want 

to start, but both sides do want to start. Senator Mitchell has been 

working on how we bridge that gap. It is extremely important to 

get to that process. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And if we bridge that gap, you think that we 

could actually make that turn from belligerency into possibly nonbelligerency——

Ambassador FELTMAN. It is not going to be like a light switch. 

It is not going to go from one side to the other overnight. It is going 

to be a long process. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am not sure you are right about that. I 

have seen other countries do light switch changes, so thank you 

very much. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. It 

has been an interesting day, Ambassador. We first had a hearing 

at Homeland Security with former Senators Graham and Talent 

who are on the committee that dealt with weapons of mass destruction, and today, this morning, two of your members from the State 

Department were here on the Nonproliferation Treaty and the nuclear summit that was held last week. By coincidence, our brilliant 

Mr. has a hearing on Syria. I take no connection, but it allows you 

to think carefully on some of these very important issues that we 

have. First of all, do we have an ambassador from Syria to the 

United States? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes. He has been here several years, 

something four, five, six. His name is Imad Mustafa. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And has he been consistently here for those 

6 years? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So he has been through the Bush administration. To your knowledge, the previous administration was engaging 

that ambassador? He was not blackballed? He was moving around 

in the country? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Well, he was moving around the country, 

certainly. He is a very active blogger, if anyone follows his blog. 

The previous administration minimized contact with him. 

37

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so he was here, present, but had minimal 

contact. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Even though I had chances, I believe, to interact. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I think he is very active up here. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think he was very active up here. So I want 

to dispel the myth that the Obama administration is soft on protecting this nation or soft on engagement. I think it was a very 

bold move for the meeting that was held last week. Obviously, 

there needs to be an end solution to that meeting, and that would 

be that we get agreements that would put us as allies against nuclear proliferation. I think the idea of an ambassador to Syria is 

certainly one that is an obvious, that we have to engage and know 

what is going on, but at the same time, we have to be firm in 

knowing what is going on, and our positions need to be strong. 

So in our engagement with Syria can you restate for me, and if 

I missed it in your testimony, what is going to be the firm position 

of the United States. If this ambassador happens to be confirmed, 

what will their role be in Syria? Many of us have been in Damascus, we have met with Dr. Assad and we have been told many good 

things, that I want to work, I want to be collaborative, but what 

will be our position? Then I want you to answer the question as 

to, it seems like you had an answer that said I may not be able 

to speak about it, but the point is we have heard that there is some 

transit opportunities for Iran to provide resources to Hezbollah in 

Lebanon. 

We see a denial by the Prime Minister of Lebanon. So what is 

it? Is it unspoken? Whatever the case is, I think we have some 

challenges with the destabilization of that region. I would like for 

Syria to be a good neighbor. I frankly believe that there is so much 

work to be done for the Syrian people in their economic status and 

otherwise that that is a full plate. So how will we manage our position, and what will that position be with the new ambassador in 

Syria? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you, Representative. In terms of 

having a chief admission, an ambassador, back in Damascus for the 

first time in more than 5 years, he is going to be pursuing, I think, 

a fairly simple formula. Syria says it wants to live in peace in the 

region. I think that he will be working to see how we could promote 

the type of actions that would prove Syria’s words. How could we 

help change the calculus so that Syria would see that it is in its 

interest to be doing actions that are consistent with those words 

that they want to live in peace. These are really tough issues. Also, 

Syria, I would expect, wants to be accepted as a more respected 

member of the international community. That means living up to 

international obligations and also having a certain respect for 

human rights inside Syria, giving respect to its own people. The 

ambassador is going to be pursuing all those sorts of——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And what will they be pursuing with respect 

to Lebanon and Hezbollah and the alleging interaction between 

Syria and Iran? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I mean, our policy is firm. Lebanese sovereignty is for the Lebanese. The Lebanese should be in control of 

38

Lebanon’s fate. That is a message that we deliver to all the parties 

in the region, but particularly Syria. All of us have an obligation 

to help in the stability of Lebanon, all of us have an obligation to 

enforce the arms embargo incorporated in 1701. This is one of the 

most serious issues that we have got to deal with with Syria every 

day. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Well, you guys have changed people 

in that chair in one hearing more than the Mets change pitchers 

in 20 innings. Mr. Fortenberry? 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I will just throw strikes, all right? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Throw strikes. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Ambassador, welcome. My best to your 

Deputy, Michael Corbin. We had a very productive visit in Nebraska, particularly with the Iraqi refugee community. He did an 

excellent job. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Heads a sports event too, I hear. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Wow! That got back to you? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, he was very generous with his time. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. He had a great trip. He had a great trip. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Good. Good. I am glad to hear that. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you for hosting him. He is a good 

guy. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. It was very helpful for him to be here, he was 

very well-received, so thank you for doing that. Let me ask you to 

take this to a little bit higher level. What is President Assad’s end 

game? Clearly Syria meddles with destabilizing elements in the region. They have some type of partnership with Iran, they have, at 

least in the past, sought nuclear weapons capability. Is this to preserve power, is this to cut a bet with those who he perceives are 

going to have power so that he is protected, or is this some other 

hegemonic intention? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Congressman, your question is a difficult 

one. I would make a few comments. First, Syria is not Iran. We 

don’t accept the proposition that Syria and Iran alliance is a permanent fixture in the Middle East. Syria is a secular state. Iran 

is not a secular state, shall we say. Syria has said it wants peace 

with Israel and has even engaged in talks with Israel. Iran rejects 

it. So there is obviously a different calculus at play when President 

Assad is making his decisions than when the Iranians are making 

their decisions. I look now at what seems to be a growing reproach, 

an ongoing friendship between Syria and Saudi Arabia. 

That must be putting some tensions in the relationship between 

Syria and Iran because certainly Iran and Saudi Arabia do not see 

eye to eye on a lot of issues in the region, including relations with 

Iraq and the sort of government that would be emerging in Iraq. 

So far it looks to me as though the Syrians try to hedge their bets 

a bit, try to keep the door open in one direction while keeping their 

alliance with Iran. I would argue that it is part of our diplomatic 

job to try to show the Syrians why it is in their interest to moderate the behavior that we find so troubling in the region. You 

know, the Syrians aren’t going to simply act because the United 

States asked them to act. The Syrians are going to want to see that 

39

something is in their interest. That is how we all are as countries. 

Our job is to show them that it is in their interest to have the 

words that they say about living in peace in the region match by 

their actions. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. First of all, I think it is important to reflect 

on this very question in order to get to the mechanisms by which 

we could potentially invite Syria to join the responsible community 

of nations internationally, to be a responsible player that does want 

to live in peace in the Middle East, but what are those leverage 

points, if you will, that would help turn the relationship to one that 

is productive, stable and has continuity in the future for the long 

range goal of peace, and particularly peace with its neighbors? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. The most important thing, frankly, is the 

Israel-Syria peace track. Comprehensive peace, of course, is set on 

a two state solution between Israel and Palestine, but a comprehensive peace would include Syria because that is where we 

really have the leverage to show the Syrians that it is in their interest to move in a different direction, when they can see that they 

could actually achieve some of their goals in a Syria-Israel peace 

process. That is the big game. That affects Hezbollah, it affects 

Hamas, it affects everything. I don’t think that we should be simply waiting for the breakthrough which we hope happens to tomorrow on a Syria-Israel track. We need to be working with the Syrians on a whole variety of issues. I mentioned a couple where I 

thought that there was some potential now to move ahead, you 

know, vis-a`-vis Iraq and things like that, but there are a lot of really tough issues where we need to be dealing with them. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And there is a disposition to do this? An 

openness? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. You know, the Syrians don’t like the fact 

that we have four Executive Orders, the Syria Accountability Act, 

the Treasury ruling, that they are a state sponsor of terrorism. 

They don’t like any of that, but frankly, the ball is in their court. 

They would like to see us move away from those things. Well, for 

that to happen, they have got to take some actions that correct the 

troubling behavior. We do have some things to talk about, we do 

have some leverage with them. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. There is a vote on in the House and 

we are just about out of time. Maybe 1 minute a piece for anther 

round for those who might want to ask a quick question. I have a 

very quick question. Not that we need to or seek other people’s advice or guidance in determining U.S. policy, especially with the appointment or assignment of ambassadors, but certain of our friends 

are not very reluctant to express their opinions or objections from 

time to time. Much has been made of Israel during this hearing 

this morning. Have we heard any objections from the Israelis or 

any concerns about us looking to reappoint an ambassador? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. In all my discussions with the Israelis, 

Mr., this has not come up. They have not raised this. I don’t think 

this is a serious issue for them. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Engel, 1 minute. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to do this all. 

The unanswered question I had was that while we are concerned 

40

about the SCUDs that have come in recently, for the past 3 years, 

Syria has allowed the rearming of Hezbollah in Lebanon. That is 

very upsetting, that Hezbollah is now stronger than it was before 

the war. So, you know, I would like you to comment on that. Many 

friends of Lebanon, which I consider myself to be one, believe that 

Syria is exploiting the end of its isolation in order to stage a political comeback in Lebanon. I would like you to comment on that. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I mean, you know, I, too, Congressman 

Engel, share your concern about Lebanon. I have, you know, deeply 

felt feelings about Lebanon from the time that I was there, and I 

am proud of what we all did together under the leadership of the 

courageous Lebanese people, but what is happening is that Lebanon has some real assets, the pluralism of Lebanon, the openness 

of Lebanon, and these are being exploited by forces who are using 

this pluralism of openness to promote an agenda that is not Lebanese. The best thing we can do for Lebanon is to solve these regional conflicts that allow others to make a mess inside Lebanon 

by exploiting the benefits of Lebanon. 

Mr. ENGEL. I will let it go because I know we have a vote, Mr. 

Chairman. I do look forward, Mr. Ambassador, to that private 

meeting. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ms. Jackson Lee, do you have a——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, I do. Ambassador, we were on the line 

of questioning about what the forceful position would be for our 

ambassador. What position or what interaction with Dr. Assad 

forcefully would we be taking as it relates to Syria’s relationship 

with Iran? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. You know, these are not going to be easy 

conversations that our ambassador has on a subject like Iran. We 

profoundly disagree with Syria’s promotion of Iran’s aggressive behavior in the region, and that is going to be clear from day one that 

our ambassador is on the ground. As I said earlier I don’t think we 

can talk about a light switch turning Syria from one side to the 

other. This is going to be a long, long haul. We believe that it is 

important to make the case to Syria why the path they are on is 

so dangerous for Syria and for the region and how there are other 

aspects, there are other ways that Syria can go that are more 

promising. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is what I hope I will hear. Thank you 

very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. That was the final word. Ambassador, thank you very, very much. It has been enlightening and 

more exciting than I suspected. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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