In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

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No. 07-20-00039-CV 

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IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF ANTHONY BERNARD WILEY 

 

 

On Appeal from the 89th District Court 

Wichita County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 186,685-C; Honorable Charles Barnard, Presiding 

 

December 7, 2021 

 

ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

On August 11, 2021, this court affirmed a jury finding that Appellant, Anthony 

Bernard Wiley, is a sexually violent predator.1 Wiley’s motion for rehearing was denied 

on August 31, 2021, and his Motion for En Banc Reconsideration or to Recuse was denied 

on November 4, 2021. Pending before this court is Appellant’s Second Motion for En 

1 See In re Commitment of Wiley, No. 07-20-00039-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 6609, at *12 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo Aug. 11, 2021, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
2

Banc Reconsideration or to Recuse filed by Wiley.2 The issue of recusal was heretofore

certified to the four justices of this court and pursuant to Rule 16.3 of the Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, the request was denied. The court now considers the portion of 

Wiley’s second motion by which he requests en banc reconsideration of our prior opinion. 

The request is denied with these additional comments. 

Wiley contends this court incorrectly determined that he is a repeat sexually violent 

offender under the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predator’s Act.3 Without 

presenting any new arguments, he again maintains the evidence is insufficient to show 

that he has “more than one sexually violent offense” because he maintains that his 

burglary conviction is not a sexually violent offense.

The Act defines a “sexually violent offense” as an offense under section 21.02 

(continuous sexual abuse of a child), section 21.11(a)(1) (indecency with a child younger 

than seventeen), section 22.011 (sexual assault), or section 22.021 (aggravated sexual 

assault) of the Penal Code. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.002(8)(A). The 

Act also defines a sexually violent offense as an offense under section 30.02 (burglary) 

of the Penal Code “if the offense is punishable under Subsection (d) of that section and 

the person committed the offense with the intent to commit” an offense listed in paragraph 

(A) or (B).

4 See id. at § 841.002(8)(C). Wiley disputes that his 1995 burglary conviction 

qualifies as a sexually violent offense. For the third time, we disagree. 

2 As Wiley has acknowledged, Rule 41.2(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides

that en banc consideration is not favored. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.2(c).

3 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001-151 (West 2017 & Supp. 2021).

4 Paragraph (B) referencing section 20.04 of the Penal Code relates to aggravated kidnapping.
3

Pursuant to Wiley’s July 1995 conviction, without the effective consent of the 

owner, Wiley entered a habitation, and committed or attempted to commit aggravated 

sexual assault. The record speaks for itself, and that offense—the offense of burglary, 

punishable under subsection (d) of section 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code is, by 

definition, a sexually violent offense. It is simply not any more complicated than that.

Wiley’s Second Motion for En Banc Reconsideration is denied.

Per Curiam