18-3502

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Nelson, IJ

A205 935 204

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

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ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 27th day of August, two thousand twentyone.

PRESENT:

GUIDO CALABRESI,

STEVEN J. MENASHI,

Circuit Judges,

DENISE COTE,

Judge.1

_____________________________________

SUKHDEV SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. 18-3502

MERRICK GARLAND, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq.,

 New York, NY.

1 Judge Denise Cote of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York, sitting by designation.
2

 

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General; Russell J. E. Verby, 

Senior Litigation Counsel; John D. 

Williams, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department 

of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Sukhdev Singh, a citizen of India, seeks 

review of an October 23, 2018, decision of the BIA affirming 

a November 2, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sukhdev Singh, No. 

A205 935 204 (B.I.A. Oct. 23, 2018), aff’g No. A205 935 204 

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 2, 2017). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions 

“for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 

524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review the agency’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual determinations for 

substantial evidence. “In this context, Congress has 

specified that ‘the administrative findings of fact are 
3

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 

compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Singh v. Garland, 

No. 19-704-AG, 2021 WL 3744895, at *4 (August 25, 2021)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Under the “substantial 

evidence” standard of review, we “must defer to the 

factfinder’s findings based on ‘such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 

2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 

(1938)). “The scope of review ‘under the substantial evidence 

standard is exceedingly narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s 

decision unless the petitioner demonstrates that the record 

evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder 

could fail to find him eligible for relief.’” Singh, 2021 WL 

3744895, at *4 (quoting Mu Xiang Lin v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 156, 

159 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations, quotation marks, and 

alterations omitted)). 

An asylum applicant such as Singh who has suffered past 

persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of future 

persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2013). 2 The 

2 Citations in this order refer to the versions of the applicable 

regulations that were in effect at the time of Singh’s proceedings before 

the agency. 
4

“presumption may be rebutted” if an IJ finds that “[t]he 

applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to 

another part of the applicant’s country . . . and under all 

the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the 

applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (2013). 

When an applicant has established past persecution, the 

government may rebut the presumption with a showing, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the applicant can safely 

relocate within his own country. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii). The 

agency considers the reasonableness of the relocation, 

including “whether the applicant would face other serious 

harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil 

strife within the country; administrative, economic, or 

judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social 

and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and 

social and familial ties.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(3). 

We conclude that the agency’s finding that Singh could 

internally relocate was supported by substantial evidence. 

The record contains evidence, including country condition 

reports, indicating that there are sizable Sikh communities 

throughout India, including in almost every major Indian 

city. The record evidence also indicates that Sikhs face 
5

little discrimination in India and have access to housing, 

employment, and government services. Moreover, “[s]everal 

sources indicate that Sikhs do not face difficulties 

relocating to other areas of India.” A.R. 144.

After having evaluated the regulatory factors for 

relocation, the agency noted that Singh’s alleged persecutors 

were local members of the Congress Party in Haryana and that 

government officials were not involved. See Singh, 2021 WL 

3744895, at *6 (“An applicant’s allegation that he was 

persecuted by members of a political party . . . does not 

establish that the applicant was persecuted by the 

government.”). Because Singh allegedly suffered persecution 

only by local private parties—and because there are Sikh 

communities throughout India where Singh can reasonably

relocate—the agency’s finding that Singh could relocate 

internally to avoid future persecution was supported by 

substantial evidence.

Singh argues that it was erroneous for the agency to 

consider whether Sikhs could relocate within India because 

Singh’s claim was that he was persecuted on the basis of 

political opinion rather than religion. Yet the agency 

considered Singh’s claim of political persecution when it 
6

determined that the alleged persecution was localized and 

could be avoided by relocating within India. It was not 

erroneous for the agency also to consider whether Sikhs 

generally could relocate within India because, “[i]n the 

context of internal relocation, whether Sikhs are able safely 

to move throughout India was a relevant consideration.”

Singh, 2021 WL 3744895, at *7 n.6. The applicable regulation 

provides that in evaluating the reasonableness of internal 

relocation, the agency may consider, inter alia, “whether the 

applicant would face other serious harm in the place of 

suggested relocation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(2013).3

We have recently reaffirmed our holding that “[a]n Indian 

citizen ‘is unlikely to face persecution for his Sikh beliefs 

and his membership in Akali Dal Mann’ and ‘any threat faced 

by such an applicant in India is not country-wide.’” Singh, 

2021 WL 3744895, at *8 (quoting Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 

3 Singh also objects that the agency improperly placed the burden on him 

to show that it was reasonable for him to relocate internally within 

India. We disagree. The agency properly explained that “where the 

respondent has established past persecution, it is presumed that internal 

relocation would be unreasonable unless it is proven to the contrary.” 

A.R. 36. The agency also explained that Singh “was not required to 

establish that he could not reasonably relocate. Rather, based on 

[Singh’s] testimony and evidence of record, the Immigration Judge 

concluded that a preponderance of the evidence established that [Singh] 

could reasonably relocate to avoid persecution,” A.R. 4, and its analysis 

was consistent with that standard.
7

219 (2d Cir. 2006)). That holding requires us to conclude 

that the agency’s internal relocation finding was supported 

by substantial evidence. Because Singh’s CAT claim rested on 

the same factual basis as his claim for asylum and withholding 

of removal, the agency’s internal relocation finding is 

dispositive of all relief. “Singh’s ability to relocate 

internally means that he cannot establish a likelihood of 

torture.” Id. “In assessing whether it is more likely than 

not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed 

country of removal,” the agency considers “all evidence 

relevant to the possibility of future torture ... including ... 

[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the 

country of removal where he or she is not likely to be 

tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The agency properly 

relied on such evidence here.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court