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85–340PDF 2003

OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 27, 2003

Serial No. 108–8

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina, Chairman 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

CALEB MCCARRY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

PEDRO PABLO PERMUY, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

TED BRENNAN, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John P. Walters, Director, Office of National Drug Control 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 7

The Honorable Adolfo Franco, Assistant Administrator for Latin America 

and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ..................... 35

J. Curtis Struble, Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 51

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John P. Walters: Prepared statement .......................................... 12

The Honorable Adolfo Franco: Prepared statement .............................................. 42

J. Curtis Struble: Prepared statement ................................................................... 54

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 81

(1)

OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m. In Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cass Ballenger [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee will come to 

order. 

I want to thank our witnesses and the Members of the Subcommittee for braving the snowy weather to be with us this afternoon, and I am pleased that Director Walters of the Office of National Drug Control Policy would take time from his schedule to appear before us, before the Subcommittee. I also want to thank our 

old friend Adolfo Franco and thank Curt Struble for agreeing to 

testify this afternoon. 

There are some bright spots in the hemisphere. El Salvador has 

continued to make steady progress, and we have a good partner in 

the President of Nicaragua, Enrique Bolanos, who is here today. 

President Bolanos has set an example of how to tackle high-level 

corruption. 

President Bush deserves credit for extending a hand of friendship to President Lula da Silva of Brazil. 

The Bush Administration has stayed engaged in Colombia; and 

our excellent Ambassador in Bogota, Anne Patterson, deserves 

credit for serving our country with distinction. The same is true in 

Venezuela, where Charles Shapiro has done a superb job. 

Adolfo Franco and the men and the women of USAID do important work to support democracy and human dignity all over this 

hemisphere, even in Cuba; and we should take a moment to thank 

and commend all of our officers from USAID, the State Department, the Federal agencies serving in our embassies in the Western Hemisphere for their hard work. This thanks should also be extended to many dedicated Foreign Service nationals who work with 

our embassies. 

I hope that Mexico and Chili, who are now serving on the United 

Nations Security Council, will recognize that the time has arrived 

for Iraq to disarm or be disarmed by the civilized world. Supporting 

President Bush is simply the right thing to do. 

Now, all that having been said, the state of the Western Hemisphere is not good. Argentina and other countries are suffering 

2

what amounts to a great depression. Many people in the Western 

Hemisphere have lost faith in the free market reforms and in democracy itself. Criminals and drug traffickers are deeply entrenched in many places in the hemisphere. These criminals have 

corrupted governments at the highest level in Haiti and Guatemala. 

There are Middle Eastern terrorist networks in this hemisphere 

that represent a real danger to inter-American security. Indigenous 

terrorists and other violent elements threaten stability not only in 

Colombia but also in Peru and Bolivia. 

Venezuela’s economy is shattered. Venezuelan oil production will 

not return to last year’s level in the foreseeable future. Venezuelans need to act now to resolve their country’s crisis through 

a negotiated electoral solution. I have tried to help Hugo Chavez 

and all Venezuelans. Excesses committed by the opposition do not 

justify anti-democratic moves by the government. It is time to stop 

the violent rhetoric, cool down, and find a peaceful and democratic 

way out of this mess. 

U.S. foreign assistance to the Western Hemisphere was not adequate under the Clinton Administration, and it is not adequate 

under the Bush Administration. 

I am glad the White House has announced that it will nominate 

Roger Noriega to serve as the Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Western Hemisphere Affairs. Ambassador Noriega is the right man 

for the job, and we need to get him nominated and confirmed as 

soon as possible. But Ambassador Noriega is going to need real, 

sustained support from higher-ups to tackle these problems; and, 

quite frankly, we are distracted and we are not paying attention 

to what is happening in our own front yard. 

I would like to thank you; and let me recognize our Ranking 

Member, Mr. Menendez, for an opening statement. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank you for calling this important hearing to start our session of this Congress. It attests—

the earliness of the hearing attests to both the high priority in both 

word and deed that you place and have placed for many years in 

our friends, neighbors, and allies in the hemisphere, and I want to 

salute you for that. Since it is the first statement and we have a 

panoramic view of the Western Hemisphere, I hope the Chair will 

indulge me a few minutes beyond what I normally would do in an 

opening statement. 

Two years after the President took office, I have concluded that 

this Administration has failed to demonstrate that it shares your 

commitment, Mr. Chairman, and failed to follow through with actions that would indicate an appropriate prioritization of United 

States relationships with our friends and neighbors in this hemisphere. But what is worse in my mind is that it has committed a 

series of foreign policy missteps that has done damage in our relationships with specific countries. 

You know, the White House, through the Republican National 

Committee, has unleashed a $6 million advertising effort called 

Abriendo Caminos, or Opening Paths, intended to convince Hispanic voters that the White House is addressing its concerns. While 

our relationship with our hemispheric neighbors is certainly one of 

3

those concerns and putting aside the rhetoric and the television 

commercials, what is the reality? 

The reality is that the Administration’s policy toward the Western Hemisphere, in my mind, is in disarray. The reality is that the 

results do not even begin to approach the rhetoric. The reality is 

that serious foreign policy missteps have done lasting damage to 

our relationships in this hemisphere. The reality is that one of the 

issues that matters most to the Hispanic community in the United 

States and should matter to all Americans are our relations with 

our friends right here in this region. The Administration appears 

to have lost focus, appears to have lost interest, and even appears 

to have lost sight of the hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will take as much umbrage as I 

do to the absence of Under Secretary Grossman. I saw all the excuses. As far as I am concerned, it is an affront to the Committee 

that we do not have—with all due respect to the panelists today, 

we do not have and have continuously had very difficult times in 

getting the appropriate representation at the levels that are important from the State Department to come before this Committee on 

the vital questions of this hemisphere. I, for one, intend to raise it 

at every hearing until we get the appropriate response from the 

Administration to have the appropriate individuals as Under Secretary Grossman appear before the Committee. 

I personally am insulted. I know several of my colleagues on the 

Committee have spoken to me about their concerns that we cannot 

seem to get from this Administration the respect that the Members 

of this Committee deserve which has jurisdiction over an important 

part of American foreign policy. So I hope we can only move to do 

better in the days ahead. 

Now The Wall Street Journal, not known for its great sympathy 

for Democrats, had a very interesting piece on Latin America in 

this Monday’s edition. In it, Dr. Gabriel Marcella of the United 

States Army War College, which I doubt is populated with academic liberals, states the following: I would like to see: ‘‘I would 

like to see President Bush make good on his promise of making 

Latin America a first priority. But that is not going to happen.’’ 

That is the end of his quote. 

I agree with Dr. Marcella, who is an expert on the Andean region. 

Now let me elaborate on what I consider are serious policy 

missteps. I can only imagine how high the volume would have been 

from the other side of the aisle would these have occurred under 

a Democratic Administration. 

In Venezuela, the Administration’s track record leads one to conclude that its mismanagement of the relationship has directly affected where Venezuela is today, which is seemingly headed for political dictatorship possibly, economic disaster, and possibly social 

conflict, considering the recent bombings of the Colombian and 

Spanish embassies following President Chavez’s comments. Better 

diplomacy could have avoided the acute distress we now see in 

Venezuela. 

Two of the Administration’s senior-most Latin America officials 

served as Ambassador to Venezuela, they have great experiences in 

that regard, yet the Administration bungled its handling of the 

4

11th of April coup attempt last year. Last month, I and perhaps 

others called for a friends group effort to advise on a democratic 

and constitutional way out of the crisis acceptable to both sides. I 

am glad to see it has been convened, but I haven’t seen any tangible results flow from those efforts as yet. I believe this may be 

attributed to the lack of senior level attention at the foreign minister level, for example, that should have been deployed. But senior 

level attention to hemispheric matters has been distinctly missing 

in this Administration, with minor exceptions. 

Argentina—now, we are all aware of the shortsightedness of 

former Secretary O’Neill’s disparaging remarks—Argentina has 

been a great ally of the United States for nearly a decade, and I 

would submit that Argentina, one of our closest friends in the 

hemisphere over the last decade, deserves better and more dignified treatment than the talk and cold shoulder it got from the 

Administration. If they are even doing slightly better, it is because 

they have probably hit bottom economically, but they are still in 

dramatically bad shape and it has not been thanks to the efforts 

of this Administration. We must be much more constructively engaged after the presidential election in April. 

In Bolivia, 2 years ago Bolivia was hailed as a poster child for 

economic reform. A couple of weeks ago the democratically elected 

President, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, fled the presidential palace in an ambulance after a shootout between the police 

and the army. Twelve government buildings were left burning. And 

during the presidential election last year, our previous Ambassador 

threatened a reduction in U.S. Aid to Bolivia were Evo Morales, 

the head of the coca growers union and presidential candidate, to 

win. The Ambassador’s comments reflect the unilateralist bravado 

and tone of this Administration, and that misstep almost handed 

Morales that presidency. 

It now appears President Sanchez is close to giving in to the demands of the coca growers to legalize some of the coca production 

which would wipe out years of progress. 

In Colombia, we have apparently ignored the message of President Uribe that he places a premium on social development. This 

fiscal year budget request drives home this point. The development 

assistance and child survival account for the hemisphere is reduced 

by $24 million for Colombia, while spending for the military side 

has increased. Unless we successfully address the social sector in 

Colombia, we will not be able to consolidate a transition toward 

peace; and unless the Administration helps to produce results in 

this area, my sense is support for Colombia will soften. 

This is generally true of the whole account, as I said to the Secretary when he appeared before the Full Committee. The request 

for Latin America is simply in my mind outrageously unacceptable. 

It shows, I think, the type of disdain for the hemisphere that has 

existed, as you aptly pointed, Mr. Chairman, for some time now, 

but this is the worst, in my mind, that I have seen. 

Finally, in Guatemala, the darling of the international community during the peace accord negotiation has approached near pariah status and is already being called a narco state by some. Much 

of the stated deterioration has occurred over the last 2 years. We 

were asleep at the foreign policy switch. 

5

Now, I could go on and on. For example, I remember the verbal 

lashing we Democrats used to get on Haiti. Where is Haiti now? 

The answer is, it is as worse off as it has ever been. And I suppose 

we will hear about trade policy in coming trade agreements. Trade 

is important, but it is only a vehicle. Economic growth is down. Direct foreign investment is down. Poverty is higher. The United 

States cannot be expected to solve Latin America’s problems. That 

is the responsibility of leaders in the region, and they know it. But 

the U.S. can and should be expected effectively, if not creatively, 

to manage its set of relationships in the hemisphere. 

So, Mr. Chairman, we start off this session not in the way I had 

hoped, not with the response from the Administration to the Committee’s requests in terms of witnesses, not with the appropriation, 

a budgetary request that signifies the importance of the hemisphere, and certainly not in my review personally of the foreign 

policy of the hemisphere in the last 2 years as one that I can applaud. I hope that the next 2 years brings us some change in the 

course of events so that I could have more positive comments for 

the future, and I thank the Chairman for his indulgence. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I would—Mr. Walters, John, let me apologize. I 

have got one more Member on the Democrat side that would like 

to make a statement. Obviously, you can tell from the beginning 

of my statement that I feel somewhat similar to these guys, but I 

am not that far out, I must truthfully say. Thank you. 

Our gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this 

hearing entitled ‘‘Overview of U.S. Policy Towards the Western 

Hemisphere,’’ because I am interested to learn if in fact we have 

one. There appears to be a lack of a coherent vision regarding our 

relationships with our hemispheric neighbors. If one in fact does 

exist, it certainly lacks the commitment, the resources, and energy 

to make it effective. 

Problems are mounting, and it is becoming more difficult to find 

a basis for optimism anywhere in the Caribbean, Central America, 

or South America. 

Colombia is reminiscent of Lebanon in the mid-1970s. Powerful 

guerilla groups and paramilitaries continue to control large areas 

of that country. The economic collapse in Argentina has been devastating in human terms. And the prevalence of corruption in Guatemala recently forced the Administration to decertify that country 

as a partner in our counternarcotics efforts. Haiti’s collapse is on 

fast forward. Bolivia nearly had a revolution this past month. Even 

in those countries that have achieved a certain level of stability 

like Chile and Mexico, the sense of optimism that existed several 

years ago has begun to erode significantly. 

But nobody in the White House seems to be paying much attention; and given the President’s pledge to elevate the hemisphere as 

a paramount concern of American foreign policy, to me and to 

many this is profoundly disappointing. 

I recognize that our witnesses today are doing what they can, but 

they need help if they are to avoid crisis after crisis in our own 

neighborhood. 

As far as I can tell, the centerpiece of this Administration’s hemispheric strategy is pressing for free trade agreements. That simply 

6

is not good enough. Our relationship should be more than simply 

serving American commercial interests. We should be advocating 

for truly independent judiciaries, transparent financial practices, 

effective law enforcement, labor unions whose leaders aren’t routinely threatened and intimidated, social safety nets that actually 

deliver what they promise, and strong independent legislative bodies. Too many nations in Latin America lack some or all of these; 

and in those places where these institutions were developing, they 

are beginning to backslide. 

This is particularly troubling since at least in the last decade 

Latin America seemed to be emerging from its long night of military governments and revolutionary mayhem. There was hope for 

a better future; and much of that optimism was because we had 

elected governments in every country except Cuba. 

But elections don’t make democracy. Institutions make democracy. The rule of law makes democracy. Citizen participation 

makes democracy, as do leaders who put the good of their country 

ahead of their own petty special interests. 

This is not to say that the Administration has done absolutely 

nothing. For example, it supported the efforts of Members of this 

Committee led by Chairman Ballenger in working with the Venezuelan National Assembly to strengthen that particular institution, an effort I might add that should be replicated elsewhere 

throughout the hemisphere. But we are just a few Members of Congress. The Administration has to lead, not follow, as it promised to 

do so when it first came to office. 

I find it incomprehensible that a creative proposal with real potential that has been consistently put forth by the Ranking Member, Mr. Menendez, regarding the creation of a Latin American development fund has prompted no interest whatsoever from the Administration and has never even been the subject of a hearing since 

I have served on this Committee. 

Mr. Chairman, what happens in this hemisphere affects us directly. Just ask any of our constituents who, particularly if you are 

from the northeast, whose home heating oil costs are at their highest levels since 1969 because of crisis in Venezuela. Our kids are 

poisoned by the drugs that poor campesinos grow to survive. Our 

economy and investments are jeopardized by corruption and mismanagement. As we saw in Afghanistan, our security is threatened 

by chaotic and failed states. The backsliding on democracy in Latin 

America calls into question our ambitions for promoting democracy 

elsewhere in the world. 

Back in the dark ages, Mr. Chairman, when I was a young man, 

President John Kennedy initiated an Alliance for Progress in Latin 

America, a comprehensive regional strategy to help ourselves by 

helping our neighbors. That particular effort is part of what inspired my own interest in the region and my desire to go into government in the first place. What Latin America needs now is a new 

Alliance for Progress; and we do need it now, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank you for indulging me. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me just say other opening statements will 

be accepted and entered in the record. I think we have had enough 

of a tough time on you, John. 

7

First of all, let me introduce John Walters. He is the Director of 

the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. As the 

Drug Czar, Mr. Walters coordinates all aspects of Federal drug programs and spending. 

I am glad you could be here today, John; and, if you will, please 

proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN P. WALTERS, 

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY 

Mr. WALTERS. Thank you, Chairman Ballenger. 

I would like to thank you, I would like to thank Ranking Member 

Menendez, Mr. Delahunt and the other Members of the Committee 

for allowing me to appear before you and talk about drug control 

policy. 

If it is acceptable to the Committee, I would ask that my written 

statement be entered in the record, and I will summarize it——

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection. 

Mr. WALTERS [continuing]. And then follow your interests and 

comments about the topics that I have covered, or others. 

I hope I am going to be able to convince you there is some better 

news than you think. It is a daunting task to think about cheering 

you up after those remarks, but I will do my best, because I don’t 

think it is false hope. I think it is real hope. 

I will touch on the certification process, specifically your concern, 

as you expressed in your letter, on Guatemala and Haiti and the 

three primary countries that we have been working with in terms 

of drug control that also, aside from the Andean ridge, Colombia, 

Mexico, and Canada, where the U.S. Government is concentrating 

resources to disrupt the market, that is, the source of illegal drugs, 

and summarize some of the steps we are taking in regard to demand reduction. Because we believe this is a market and it is not 

a matter of either supply or demand, but supply and demand, 

where I think we are making some headway. 

I know that subsequent witnesses will speak to some of the other 

issues that you raised about broader matters of policy. I will do my 

best to answer questions you have of my area and rely on them on 

other places. 

First, certification, Guatemala and Haiti certification. As you are 

aware, both of these countries were judged to have failed demonstratively in cooperating with counternarcotics control. We made an 

effort for these countries to make progress and explained what that 

progress was over the last 12 months and in stages subsequent to 

the 12 months, and they have failed. In my written testimony I detail what the process is, as you all are, I know, very much aware, 

for certification. But we remain committed to trying to work with 

both Guatemala and Haiti to make this a relationship that works 

better. We don’t consider the decertification to be the end but the 

part of an effort—but to make this a cooperative arrangement that 

helps all of our nations reduce the threat of drugs, which does affect all the nations of the hemisphere. 

Guatemala specifically, counter-drug commitment deteriorated 

and a heightened level of corruption, as you have already referred 

to, impeded significant progress, in our judgment. A national interest waiver was granted because suspension of assistance would reVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
8

sult in further deterioration of institutions necessary to combat the 

influence of drug traffickers. In the Administration’s judgment, a 

potential for a turnaround is good, we think, based on past performance, but we haven’t gotten there yet. 

In terms of Haiti, nine specific counter-drug actions that were 

outlined to the Haitian government were failed to be acted on or 

failed to take action regarding anti-corruption legislation, prosecution of drug-related police corruption, the enforcement of Haitian 

Central Bank, anti-money laundering guidelines. Again, a national 

interest waiver was granted for the same reason in Haiti because 

suspension of assistance would result in, we believe, further deterioration. We continue to try to work with them on a variety of 

issues, including matters of preventing starvation, fostering education, and concerned about environmental degradation and the 

spread of HIV/AIDS. 

We are not turning our back on either of these countries, but I 

don’t need to tell you these are difficult situations. We welcome the 

help that you have already given in terms of trying to work with 

us on some of these governments in a bipartisan manner and to 

help in difficult situations. But I don’t think there are two more 

difficult cases, and certainly maybe the most difficult of all is Haiti 

in this case. 

Let me talk about our focus on Colombia and Mexico and Canada. Colombia, of course a democratic country, has been fraught 

with problems but has been extremely willing to try to help in recent years combat the drug problem. We know that 90 percent of 

the cocaine entering the United States originates or passes through 

Colombia. We also know there are roughly 6,500 hectares of opium 

poppy producing 4.3 metric tons of pure heroin. Illicit drug trafficking fuels terrorism efforts of extremists—FARC, ELN, on both 

sides of the spectrum, including the AUC on the right. 

President Uribe has been a very impressive bright spot. I think 

some of you know I have worked on this area of policy, not the 

whole hemisphere and all parts of policy but on drug policy for a 

number of years. I started working in President Bush’s father’s Administration. We have never had a stronger, more able, or more 

committed leader. We have never had a country I believe that is 

more strongly united, despite the terrible suffering that is going on 

there and the difficult task ahead. 

President Uribe has committed himself to fighting the terror organizations, destroying their capacity to continue to exact such a 

terrible price against the Colombian people and to drug trafficking 

people throughout the hemisphere. He has extradited 26 since last 

August; he has stepped up eradication programs; he has implemented plans to help restart a variety of investigative and security 

matters, including the Air Bridge Denial program that was suspended earlier; and he has made it clear that his commitment is 

to reform the society of Colombia so it serves all people. 

I think that is a significant change you haven’t seen in the past. 

Either there was not the strength or the vision to do that, to make 

rule of law a fact in all of Colombia, for all Colombians, to make 

security and education and health reform and economic development a long-term goal. 

9

I think he and we understand that you have to first reduce the 

extent to which Colombia is a war zone. It is hard to get effective 

infrastructure growth, it is hard to serve people’s humanitarian 

needs when they are suffering and threatened at the level that 

they are. 

The good news that I would like to announce today at this hearing is that our estimate of coca cultivation for 2003, the effort to 

try to reduce the source of a great deal of financial support for extremists on the left and right, violence, destruction, our estimate 

is that for 2003 there were 144,450 hectares of coca cultivation. 

This is a decrease of 15 percent from last year. If all the coca 

bushes that were eradicated were mature—excuse me. If all the 

coca bushes remaining were mature, they would produce a total of 

680 metric tons of pure cocaine. The 144,450 number does not take 

into account approximately 40,000 hectares of coca that was 

sprayed after satellite photographs were obtained in the fall of the 

year. So that would be added as a reduction to what we would have 

seen for the whole year. 

To put it slightly differently, in 2002, the State Department assistants, the Colombian national police, Colombian government executed an aerial eradication plan that sprayed almost 123,000 hectares of coca. The State Department estimates with the kill ratio 

that they calculate for the spray that 103,000 hectares were eradicated. The snapshot does again not include the 40,000 that were 

eradicated or sprayed after the original collection point. But if all 

that coca was mature and fully producing, the eradication program 

reduced the equivalent of 650 metric tons of pure cocaine. In other 

words, we have eradicated almost as much as was able to be produced with the remaining crop. The street value of that eradicated 

cocaine in the United States would have been equivalent to $65 billion. 

This is an historic achievement not only in terms of the magnitude but, more importantly, in the trend line. We have begun to 

shrink the expansion of the business, and we have begun to do that 

aggressively with the beginning of the new administration under 

President Uribe. 

I have to thank, as I know you and the other Members of this 

Committee and Americans do, the dedicated people in Colombia 

who put their lives on the line every day to make this happen, the 

Americans working with them that also take those risks together 

and are frequently not seen or heard until something tragic happens. But those people believe and they believe correctly that they 

are saving lives in this country, in their country, and throughout 

the world every day. They don’t do it for fame, and they don’t do 

it for fortune. They do it because it is their duty, and I think it is 

important to recognize them here and elsewhere. 

The other Andean ridge nations, Peru and Bolivia, we estimate 

that coca cultivation after significantly decreasing in the mid to 

late 1990s has a slowly rising trend. This trend does not reverse 

what has been achieved in Colombia for the next year, but we are 

concerned about it and we are working with those governments to 

make sure that they don’t return to the levels of production and 

they continue on a path that will allow them to enjoy a licit economic growth and not return to a greater threat than the threats 

10

associated with drug trafficking and the violence of terrorism associated with it. 

Brazil, Equador, and Venezuela remain major transit countries, 

and we continue to—their continued engagement with us will be 

required in the future. We have tried to do that, as you have mentioned in your opening comments. In some of those places, that has 

been difficult and will continue to be difficult, but we will continue 

to try to work with them as effectively as we can. 

In Mexico, we have had a national government that has been 

willing and committed to counternarcotics cooperation at a level I 

don’t believe has ever before been seen. It is a source of about 70 

percent of the cocaine entry into the United States based on our 

estimates, most of the foreign marijuana, black tar heroin, for the 

potential of 11 metric tons at 52 percent purity, and other gangs 

that control methamphetamine production in Mexico and retailed 

into the United States. President Fox has made historic efforts not 

only to do enforcement but to reform the institutions of Mexico that 

are responsible to remove the kinds of corruption that have been 

so debilitating. They have had more success in the last 2 years in 

going after major parts of major organizations than any administration in previous history. 

I have worked closely with Mexican authorities as well, who also 

risk their lives and put themselves in jeopardy in cooperation with 

our personnel in that country. We continue to be grateful and optimistic about what can be done, and we continue to have greater appreciation for the importance of Mexico in the market that is the 

hemispheric drug trade. 

In terms of Canada, as you know, Canada has now become a primary source of high potency marijuana and the precursor chemical 

pseudophedrine used to produce methamphetamine. We have 

worked with the Canadian government to try to make some improvements here. We do not believe that we are where we need to 

be; and I think, candidly, certainly the enforcement agencies that 

we work with in Canada don’t believe that we are, either. 

The diversion of pseudophedrine into markets that allow the production of methamphetamine needs to be stopped. The regulations 

the Canadians recently published, they admit, do not go far enough 

even as they implement them; and they need additional regulations. We will try to work with them to get those moving. 

But the danger here is we want to continue to have open, safe 

borders for trade, for licit movement of people; and to have a burgeoning drug industry in Canada is troubling, to say the least. Canadian officials have been asked by me and by others to consider 

the consequences of that in terms of their own population as well 

as the consequences in the United States. 

Let me close by mentioning demand reduction. The President 

recognizes and all of us recognize that to stop drug use we have 

to have a balanced strategy. We have to reduce demand. That is 

why our strategy holds us accountable as an Administration in 

terms of drug use. We have said clearly the problems of drugs in 

America is too many Americans use drugs. That is why the President made the measure of our success a 10 percent reduction in 

drug use in 2 years and a 25 percent reduction in 5 years. We do 

this through prevention. 

11

Everybody who has looked at this problem understands the best 

thing to do is to stop use before it starts. We are also doing it 

through treatment. The President has proposed an historic addition 

of $1.6 billion over 5 years to Federal treatment spending; and he 

proposed in the State of the Union, as you know, a $200 million 

component of that over the next 3 years to specifically expand and 

target treatment more effectively in the United States. 

The dependent user is the single largest consumer in terms of 

quantity, and we need to do a better job of making more Americans 

who suffer from the disease of addiction well and get back integrated into the rest of American life and the promise of American 

life. 

The good news is that recent surveys have shown that we are 

making progress with young people in reducing use. Monitoring the 

Future survey, released in December, a survey of eighth, tenth, and 

twelfth graders, showed an 11 percent reduction in overall drug use 

by eighth graders, 8.4 percent by tenth graders, and 1.2 percent by 

12th graders for last year. A comparable survey, PRIDE, gave results of youth drug use of a reduction last year of 14.3 percent. 

These are quite dramatic reversals of what had been increases or 

plateaued drug use. They bode well. They are a beginning. 

We have had serious, as you know, periods in the past where we 

have been able to push back. We have not been able to follow 

through with the kind of movement that we want. We intend, with 

your help, to try to do that more effectively in the future. 

We believe we stand at a point of historic opportunity both with 

regard to demand and supply, both with regard to preventing and 

treating and reducing the market on the supply side that is the 

source of this affliction to us and the rest of the world. We hope 

to be able to seize that opportunity. We recognize it won’t last forever. We are not as pessimistic as some of you about some of the 

circumstances that we face, although I know and you know they 

are not easy. These are—drugs try to—they exploit weaknesses, 

international boundaries, undermine safety and security, and they 

try to prey on the weak and the poor on both the supply and the 

demand side. 

So we need to try to be integrative, we need to try to stay at it, 

and we need to try to capitalize where we have success. I am 

pleased that we have begun to make headway, but I do not suffer 

under the illusion nor does the Administration that this is just a 

beginning and it is not the only thing we need to do. So I hope the 

good news is of some comfort to you, as I know it is to all of us, 

in terms of reducing the size of this problem to some extent, but 

I don’t intend to minimize the task ahead. 

We understand that is a real task. But I don’t think we could ask 

for better allies in some of the principal countries we are working 

with, and that I think is one of the most important strengths that 

we hope to build on in the months and the couple years ahead. 

I will be happy to take any questions. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walters follows:]

12

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN P. WALTERS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Chairman Ballenger, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished Committee 

Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you and provide an overview of the 

threat which drug trafficking poses to the Western Hemisphere and to discuss the 

counternarcotics efforts of the United States and our Western Hemisphere partners. 

We will also review the certification process and the deficiencies that led to the decertification of Guatemala and Haiti. Thank you for your strong and steadfast support for the fight against drugs, the social destruction they engender, and the terrorism they subsidize. 

We believe that this year we have an unprecedented opportunity, in cooperation 

with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, to cause a long-term reduction in the supply of illegal drugs. Our optimism is based on the strong anti-drug positions taken 

by the leadership of our partners in the region, including our key allies in Colombia 

and Mexico. There is a broadening consensus among many nations in the hemisphere that illegal drug production inevitably leads to poverty, corruption, and violence, and that no country is better off with drugs than without them. Perhaps more 

importantly, leaders in this hemisphere are acutely aware that terrorism is the 

greatest current threat to national security and stability. They understand that 

drug trafficking finances both terror and the corruption that undermines democratic 

institutions. 

The linkage between terrorists and the drug trade is most evident in Colombia, 

where FARC terrorists fighting for control of a drug transit corridor near the town 

of Bojaya ́ killed more than 114 last May, including 45 children, who has taken refuge in a local church. More recently, a terrorist bomb in Bogota’s El Nogal social 

club killed 35. The list of FARC abuses is a long one: they force child soldiers into 

service; they trick unwitting civilians into becoming human car bombs; and they 

kidnap thousands each year and summarily execute Colombian and foreign nationals—as in the recent killing and hostage taking after an American and Colombiancrewed plane crashed in an area of heavy FARC activity. 

With the election of President Alvaro Uribe, Colombia has accelerated implementation of its drug control program, eradicating record levels of coca and moving aggressively in several areas to weaken criminal and terrorist organizations, reestablish the rule of law in war-torn regions, and protect the rights and security of Colombian citizens. Significant drug control gains in Colombia will require—and President Uribe has committed to pursuing—restoration of the rule of law to areas that 

are currently terrorist-controlled and used to cultivate and produce illegal drugs. 

In Mexico, President Fox has both strengthened law enforcement cooperation with 

the United States and begun the process of reforming dysfunctional and sometimes 

corrupt institutions. He has arrested thousands of traffickers during the past two 

years alone, and has reconstructed entire police organizations to provide reliable 

forces to implement his administration’s goals. 

THE DRUG THREAT AND THE PRESIDENT’S COUNTER-DRUG OBJECTIVES

The threat of illegal drugs to the United States remains high, although we have 

made some progress in reducing the number of users, and the most recent surveys 

show a significant drop in the key population of young users. There is encouraging 

news from Colombia and Mexico, the two key drug producing and transit countries 

in the hemisphere. The news from Canada is less positive; stronger actions are 

needed to stem the flow of high-potency marijuana, and to reduce the traffic in 

pseudoephedrine, a key precursor chemical for methamphetamine. During 2002, two 

Western Hemisphere countries, Haiti and Guatemala, were listed as having ‘‘failed 

demonstrably’’ to meet their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. 

The drug trade imposes more than $50 billion annually in direct costs to the 

United States, and is responsible for almost 20,000 drug-induced deaths a year. 

Aside from its social consequences, the illegal drug trade fuels violence, terrorism, 

and corruption abroad, and contributes to the destabilization of democratic governments and their economies. For example, drug production and trafficking provides 

$150–$300 million per year to illegal terrorist groups in Colombia. These terrorists 

pose a particular threat to stability in Colombia and the entire Andean region. 

The President’s goals in addressing this threat are to reduce U.S. drug consumption by 10 percent in two years and by 25 percent over five years. Our strategy is 

to achieve these goals through prevention, treatment, and disrupting the market. 

13

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

Demand Reduction 

To reduce the demand for drugs, we must stop our children from starting drug 

use in he first place and we must provide treatment to get current users off drugs. 

Our budgets for prevention and treatment have risen significantly and exceed by a 

large margin what we spend on international supply reduction. 

Recent data from the University of Michigan’s Monitoring the Future survey show 

the first significant downturn in youth drug use in nearly a decade, with reductions 

noted among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders. Unfortunately, despite a substantial investment in drug prevention efforts, some six million Americans meet the clinical 

criteria for needing drug treatment, and the overwhelming majority of these users 

fail to acknowledge their need for treatment. Recognizing this problem, President 

Bush announced his treatment initiative that requests $600 million in new spending 

over three years to provide drug treatment to individuals otherwise unable to obtain 

access to services. 

Market Disruption 

Another key objective of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy is to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in the United States, making drugs less available 

and more expensive. We know that when drugs are less available, fewer young people will begin using them. We thus approach supply reduction as a problem in disrupting and destroying the drug market. 

That market is profitable, to be sure (though less profitable than often assumed), 

but it faces numerous and often overlooked obstacles that may be used as pressure 

points. To view the drug trade as a market is to recognize both the challenges involved and the hopeful lessons of our recent experience: that the drug trade is not 

an unstoppable force of nature but a profit-making enterprise where costs and rewards exist in an equilibrium that can be disrupted. Every action that makes the 

drug trade more costly and less profitable is a step toward ‘‘breaking’’ that market. 

Once the drug trade is seen as a type—admittedly, a special type—of business enterprise, the next step is to examine the way the business operates and locate 

vulnerabilities in specific market sectors and activities that can then be attacked, 

both abroad and here at home. Such sectors and activities include the drug trade’s 

agricultural sources, management structure, processing and transportation systems, 

financing, and organizational decisionmaking. Each represents an activity that must 

be performed for the market to function. 

Our plan is to identify and attack areas of vulnerability—to make drug production, for example, a high-risk enterprise for farmers that provides less income; to 

make it clear to major criminals and transporters that they are more likely to be 

arrested, incarcerated, and denied profits; and to increase the cost of seizures, security, money laundering, loading and unloading, bribery, and the other expenses involved in the criminal enterprise to make it less attractive to those who supply illegal drugs to American consumers. 

The key vulnerabilities of the cocaine industry are the cultivation phase (attacked 

through coca eradication), elements of the transportation network (attacked through 

interdiction, seizures, and arrests) and the major trafficking organizations (attacked 

through arrests, extraditions, prosecutions, seizures, forfeitures, and revenue denial). The heroin and marijuana industries have similar transit and organizational 

vulnerabilities, but are less vulnerable than cocaine during the cultivation phase. 

Synthetic drugs produced in this hemisphere by U.S. and Mexican trafficking organizations, with the help of precursor chemicals from Canada and other countries, 

present a different set of challenges best addressed by law enforcement processes. 

Our programs draw on the Department of Justice’s efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system through ongoing training and technical support to the prosecutors 

and police investigators, and through the development of specialized task force units 

of police, prosecutors, and technical support in Human Rights, Anti-Corruption, 

Narcotics, and Money Laundering/Asset Forfeiture areas. 

The Department of Justice has established the Bilateral Case Initiative, supported by a new enforcement group at DEA, the Bilateral Case Initiative Group, 

which develops significant international narcotics and money laundering cases for 

prosecution in the United States. These investigations are conducted almost entirely 

outside of the United States, rely on evidence derived through foreign police agencies and U.S. law enforcement agencies overseas, and typically involve 

extraterritorial application of U.S. drug and maritime law. 

They aim to dismantle the large organizations which threaten U.S. security, either by supplying vast amounts of controlled substances to domestic trafficking 

groups, or because of terrorism concerns. For example, this group has led the effort 

14

to file indictments against groups that use narcotics trafficking to fund their terrorist objectives, such as elements of the Colombia-based FARC and AUC, both of 

which are Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 

Our market disruption strategy relies on a high degree of cooperation from our 

allies in the region where illegal drugs either originate, are processed, or transit en 

route to markets in the United States. The certification process, in turn, is one way 

to assess that cooperation. 

Certification. On January 31, 2003, President Bush sent to Congress his annual 

report listing the major illicit drug producing and drug-transit countries (known as 

the ‘‘majors list’’). In the same report, he provided his determinations as to which 

of these countries had ‘‘failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts’’ during the 

previous 12 months to adhere to international counternarcotics agreements and to 

take the counternarcotics measures specified under U.S. law. 

This procedure is different from that used in prior years, and reflects changes resulting from the passage of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2002–2003 

(P.L.107–228) (FRAA). Section 706 of the Act makes permanent the ‘‘failed demonstrably’’ standard adopted last year for majors list country certifications, and consolidates the identification of the majors list countries with the certification process 

into a single report. As in previous years, this year’s certification determinations required the President to consider each country’s performance in areas such as stemming illicit cultivation, extraditing drug traffickers, and taking legal steps and law 

enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption that facilitates drug 

trafficking or impedes prosecution of drug-related crimes. The President also had to 

consider efforts taken by these countries to stop production and export of, and reduce the domestic demand for, illegal drugs. 

In his report, the President identified the following as major drug-transit or major 

illicit drug-producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, 

China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, 

Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, 

and Vietnam. The President also reported to Congress his determinations that 

Burma, Guatemala, and Haiti failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, 

to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and 

to take the measures set forth in U.S. law. The President determined, however, that 

provision of United States assistance to Guatemala and Haiti in FY 2003 is vital 

to the national interests of the United States. Therefore, under provisions of the 

FRAA, these two countries will receive assistance, notwithstanding their counternarcotics performance. The President did not make this determination with respect 

to Burma. 

Eradication. Aerial eradication of coca can be very effective in attacking and disrupting the cocaine business. Once killed, a replanted coca field takes approximately 

one year to mature and provide its first coca leaf harvest—a mature field provides 

four harvests annually. Moreover, coca is relatively labor intensive and expensive 

to replant. Establishing a one hectare (2.5 acres) field costs between $1,300 and 

$2,200, depending on whether the coca is replanted in an existing field or if a new 

field is cleared from native rainforest. Once mature, coca requires manual labor to 

pick and enormous quantities of chemicals to process into cocaine. 

Poppy in the Western Hemisphere is cultivated in small fields, typically less than 

0.5 hectares in size, in rugged high mountain regions where weather prevents efficient location and aerial eradication. The poppy plant is an annual that takes 3–

4 months to mature and can be replanted for about $5 worth of seed per hectare. 

Thus, when a poppy field is eradicated, within days the glyphosate eradication 

agent decomposes in the soil and a new field can be planted that will mature within 

3–4 months. Consequently, poppy fields have to be eradicated many times annually 

to eliminate the crop potential. Because of these difficulties, a significantly larger 

investment of time, equipment, and personnel is required for aerial eradication of 

poppy than for coca. 

Interdiction. Illegal drugs are also vulnerable when being moved or massed for 

shipment. Cocaine ‘‘chokepoints’’ include Colombia’s cross-Andean road and air 

links, while consolidation and transshipment points in Colombia include key locations on the north and west coasts and Colombia’s coastal waters, where the predominant mode of export-go-fast boats-depart toward the United States. 

Organizational Attack. Another vulnerability of the drug industry is its organizational hierarchy, financing apparatus, and accumulated assets. Attacking the industry’s leaders, their money and their assets increases their costs, reduces their profits, generally disrupts their operations, and deprives them of the ‘‘fruit’’ of their labors. 

15

REGIONAL ISSUES

Guatemala 

Guatemala’s overall counterdrug commitment deteriorated during 2002, and a 

heightened level of corruption impeded significant progress. Guatemala remains a 

major drug-transit country for South American cocaine en route to the United 

States and Europe in 2002. Significant shipments of drugs regularly move through 

Guatemala by air, road, and sea routes with very little law enforcement intervention. Cocaine seizures decreased by more than 40 percent and were far below historic averages. Historic problems of widespread corruption, acute lack of resources, 

poor leadership, and frequent personnel turnover in law enforcement and other Government of Guatemala (GOG) agencies continue to plague the GOG and negatively 

affect that nation’s ability to deal with narcotrafficking and organized crime. The 

National Civilian Police’s Anti-Narcotics Operations Department (DOAN) was eliminated due to frequent corruption scandals. The police, in two instances, stole quantities of drugs that they officially seized, and have been identified with drug-related 

extrajudicial executions of both narcotraffickers and civilians. 

The newly created narcotics police (SAIA) has had some small successes and has 

been very responsive to U.S. training and technical assistance. The USG will work 

with the GOG to professionalize the SAIA, with particular emphasis on leadership, 

investigations, and human rights issues. Similar efforts are underway to improve 

the performance of the narcotics prosecutors and judges. The President provided a 

vital national interest certification to Guatemala because the suspension of assistance to Guatemala would result in further deterioration of precisely those Guatemalan institutions that are essential to combating the influence of organized crime 

in Guatemala. 

Haiti 

The presidential determination listed nine specific counterdrug actions that Haiti 

failed to take after being asked to do so by the United States, among them introduction of anti-corruption legislation, prosecution of drug-related public corruption, and 

enforcement of the Haitian Central Bank’s existing anti-money laundering guidelines. It called Haiti ‘‘a significant transshipment point for drugs, primarily cocaine, 

moving through the Caribbean from South America to the United States.’’ Haiti continued to have massive politicization of the national police force, failed to commit 

additional resources to their coast guard, and did not increase the numbers of seizures and arrests over those of prior years. In the case of Haiti, a vital national 

interest waiver was provided to enable assistance to continue in order to alleviate 

hunger, increase access to education, combat environmental degradation, fight the 

spread of HIV/AIDS, and foster the development of civil society in Haiti. 

Colombia 

Because nearly all U.S.-consumed cocaine is manufactured in, or passes through, 

Colombia, and virtually all of Colombia’s heroin production ends up in the United 

States, we focus on Colombia as the center of gravity of our international counternarcotics strategy. 

If Colombia sprays 200,000 hectares (500,000 acres) of coca in 2003, as President 

Uribe has pledged, there should be a significant reduction in cocaine production, and 

it will be extremely difficult to motivate farmers to continue to plant coca—because 

so few of them will see any profit from their efforts. Our strategy calls for returning 

to previously sprayed areas to destroy any replanted crops before they can be harvested, and to further make coca farming unprofitable. President Uribe is committed 

to coca eradication and has demonstrated his desire to eradicate the drug trade in 

Colombia. In fact, in the Putumayo Department in southern Colombia, after the 

massive spray campaign that was conducted last year from August through November, there was evidence that about 10 percent of the coca-farming population had 

left the area because the coca economy could no longer sustain it. 

The U.S. strategy for dealing with Colombian heroin is focused on attacking the 

transportation and organizations themselves, while providing some level of poppy 

eradication. The strategy’s main elements are: the use of drug detection X-ray machines and computerized systems at all international airports in Colombia, intelligence collection and a law enforcement attack against the heroin trafficking leadership using DEA’s expanded Heroin Task Force in Bogota, and eradicating some 

5,000 hectares of poppy each year. 

Aerial interdiction capacity in Colombia will increase dramatically as the Air 

Bridge Denial program goes back into operation. Although a majority of cocaine is 

now transported across the Andes by land, a significant amount moves by air and 

stopping that flow will impose significant penalties on traffickers. Denying trafVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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fickers unhindered movement by aircraft will make it more difficult for them to collect coca cultivated in remote regions where air transport is the only efficient mode 

of transportation. 

Maritime interdiction and interdiction in coastal waters are promising because almost all cocaine is initially moved off the Colombian coast by go-fast boats (in the 

Pacific, some cocaine is later loaded onto fishing vessels). In 2002, the Colombian 

Navy seized the majority of the cocaine captured in Colombia, principally in those 

coastal waters. DEA is working with the Colombian Coast Guard and the Colombian 

National Police to establish a substantial North Coast capacity by July 2003. Similar efforts are also underway on Colombia’s West Coast, and we expect to see improved enforcement and interdiction results in 2003. 

President Alvaro Uribe continues to attack the drug trade; an unprecedented 26 

extraditions have occurred since August 2002. He has also reformed Colombia’s 

asset forfeiture laws, reducing substantially the time between asset seizure and 

final disposition of the assets. This has caused top traffickers to seek ‘‘special deals’’ 

if they turn themselves in, to avoid losing all of their ill-gotten drug profits. 

With new counterdrug-counterterrorism authorities from the U.S. Congress, it will 

be possible in 2003 to improve the information and assistance we provide to the 

Government of Colombia, allowing better targeting of the leadership of the drug industry. Our strategy also includes continued training and support to the Colombian 

military and the National Police, improving their ability to attack high-value drug 

and narco-terrorist targets, and allowing them to provide a security environment in 

which Colombia’s social development and judicial programs can mature. President 

Uribe is also streamlining, reforming, and expanding the Colombian military. His 

goal is a more effective and professional military, with a near-term capability to capture narcoterrorist leaders, secure critical infrastructure, disrupt the command level 

of the terrorist groups in Colombia, and seize or destroy high-value cocaine-related 

targets. The recently reorganized Colombian CD Brigade is more mobile, has greater 

reach, and is capable of operating throughout Colombia. 

Mexico 

The United States and Mexico continue to improve their ability to cooperate 

against a very serious drug threat to both countries. The Mexican Attorney General’s Office (PGR) and the military services are targeting the leadership of all 

major drug trafficking organizations, with the goal of disrupting their production, 

transport, and sale of drugs. Last year Mexican authorities continued to achieve impressive results in arresting leaders of major drug trafficking organizations. Since 

2001, over 50 top leaders of the Mexican major drug trafficking organizations have 

been arrested and thousands of other traffickers have been removed. During 2002, 

17 drug-related defendants were extradited to the United States for prosecution. 

Mexico maintains a very effective and intensive eradication program against 

marijuana and poppy. Internal to Mexico, interdiction efforts against marijuana and 

cocaine continue to be improved, as does the interface with U.S. forces in the Pacific 

that track the hundreds of tons of cocaine moved by maritime vessel from Colombia 

to Mexico. 

The PGR and Mexican military services continue efforts to strengthen their institutions and root out corruption within their ranks. The PGR’s Federal Investigative 

Agency (AFI) and the National Drug Planning Center (CENDRO) have developed 

more investigators to collect and analyze information on drug trafficking and other 

organized crimes. These investigators use document exploitation software provided 

by the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) together with computer hardware and software provided by the U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section. 

President Fox and members of his Cabinet unveiled an ambitious National Drug 

Control Plan in early November that called upon Mexican society and institutions 

to wage a frontal assault against all aspects of the drug problem, including production, trafficking, and consumption. We applaud these efforts, and are engaging Mexico to assist in all aspects of this major initiative. 

Despite these efforts, Mexico remains a transit country for 70 percent of cocaine 

reaching the United States; produces and delivers approximately 30 percent of the 

heroin and about 30 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United States; and 

is a significant source of synthetic drugs. In addition, numerous elements of the 

Mexican criminal groups are located throughout the United States and are the predominant distributors—within the United States—of cocaine, methamphetamine, 

marijuana, and heroin. 

The U.S. drug control program in Mexico during FY 2003 is aimed at: assisting 

the GOM to dismantle drug cartels and disrupt drug trafficking, supporting the 

GOM’s efforts to strengthen law enforcement institutions, and promoting 

anticorruption reforms. 

17

We support Mexico’s further strengthening of their federal law enforcement institutions, particularly the Special Investigative Units and the tactical analysis capacity of the Federal Agency of Investigations (AFI). Equally important is the transformation of the Center for Drug Control (CENDRO) into an independent intelligence analysis organization under the Office of the Attorney General. 

Canada 

Although the United States enjoys an excellent level of bilateral cooperation with 

Canada, the United States Government is concerned that Canada is a primary 

source of pseudoephedrine, which is exported to the United States. Over the past 

few years there has been an alarming increase in the amount of pseudoephedrine 

diverted from Canadian sources to clandestine drug laboratories in the United 

States, where it is used to make methamphetamine. 

The Government of Canada, for the most part, has not regulated the sale and distribution of precursor chemicals. The regulations to restrict the availability of 

pseudoephedrine, which the Government of Canada has just promulgated, should be 

stronger. Notwithstanding Canada’s inadequate control of illicit diversion of precursor chemicals, Canadian law enforcement agencies continue to work energetically 

to support our joint law enforcement efforts. 

We are also concerned with increasing amounts of high-potency marijuana exported to the United States. Hydroponic hothouse operations in Canada produce 

cannabis with high levels of THC, and the RCMP reports that Vietnamese groups 

may have mastered organic methods that rival the more technical systems. Moreover, Canadian law enforcement officials have seized a few aeroponic installations, 

where plant roots are suspended in midair and are sprayed regularly with a fine 

midst of nutrient-enriched water. While there are no official production statistics, 

the RCMP estimates that 800 tons of cannabis are produced each year. Authorities 

destroy over one million plants annually (the equivalent of roughly 200 metric tons 

of marketable marijuana). 

The Andean Ridge 

Peru and Bolivia reduced the cultivation of coca from 115,000 hectares to 34,000 

hectares and 48,000 hectares to 14,000 hectares, respectively, from 1995 to 2001. 

However, in both countries coca cultivation marginally increased in 2002. Most troubling has been the new politicization of the coca industry in both countries, and the 

difficulty the governments have faced in confronting the challenge from groups pursuing an illegal agenda. Although less than two percent of the cocaine seized in the 

United States is identified as coming from Peru and Bolivia, the resurgence of coca 

and the illegal groups that produce it, including the Shining Path in Peru, are 

threats to regional stability and cause for serious concern. 

Ecuador continues to hold the line against cultivation, but is still a major transit 

country for illegal drugs, arms and precursors. Newly elected President Gutierrez 

has recognized the threat from drugs and has pledged to help the United States 

counter trafficking through Ecuador. He has also promised to honor our treaty for 

the use of Manta for counterdrug flights in the region. 

Venezuela is another major transit country for illegal drugs, allowing about 100 

metric tons of cocaine to flow through its borders en route to Europe and the United 

States. Its pressing political problems have created an opening in which 

narcoterrorists can operate with impunity. 

CONCLUSION

We have an unprecedented opportunity to seriously reduce the availability of illegal drugs in this country by focusing efforts on the drug trade’s vulnerabilities and 

on the key countries—Colombia and Mexico—that are involved in the production 

and movement of most of the drugs destined for the United States. The inauguration of President Uribe has ushered in a new level of Colombian commitment and 

dedication to eliminating illicit coca production and the income it provides for terrorists and international criminals. 

President Uribe has committed an unprecedented level of resources, and has enabled Colombia to eradicate most the coca in the Putumayo/Caqueta regions during 

the last quarter of 2002, and he intends to eradicate 200,000 hectares per year. This 

rate of eradication—coupled with the credible threat to continue it indefinitely—has 

the potential to destroy existing large-scale coca production, to convince farmers 

that coca production is not worth the risk, and to reduce replanting rates. The end 

result will be significantly reduced cocaine availability in the United States, and significantly decreased financial support for terrorist organizations. 

To accomplish these objectives the United States must help Colombia achieve the 

security it needs, provide aerial spray support, and help with training and intelVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ligence for law enforcement and interdiction forces. Similarly, we have an opportunity to help President Fox as he continues his progress in reforming counter-drug 

institutions, moving directly against the leadership of major drug trafficking organizations, and disrupting drug transportation networks throughout Mexico. Success in 

these areas will make a real difference in the availability of drugs in the United 

States. 

This year promises to be a pivotal one for our strategy against drugs, both in 

terms of reducing the consumption in the United States, and disrupting the drug 

market within the Western Hemisphere. It will be a crucial year for our relationship 

with our partners in the region, especially the leadership in Colombia and Mexico 

that are engaging in this difficult effort. We must continue to fund those strategies 

that are working, and keep the pressure up on all fronts. We will continue to assess 

our efforts and report our progress to the Congress.

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me ask you a question. Ephedrine, I think—

is that not the drug that killed the ball player, the Baltimore Oriole, Steve Bechler? 

Mr. WALTERS. The precursor is pseudophedrine. Ephedrine is a 

variant. I am not a pharmacist, and I don’t want to play one in the 

Committee, but they obviously—these are related substances, yes. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, do you need a law or something? I mean, 

all of a sudden it turns out those are available. I hate to say it, 

but 10 or 15 years ago I thought that was pretty great stuff. It is 

kind of a sick feeling. But the truth of the matter is, should there 

be a law to prevent the use of this specific area? I know it is an 

over-the-counter sales of this stuff right now. 

Mr. WALTERS. Well, there should be laws. There are laws in the 

United States, and we are trying to aggressively enforce them, 

about diversion of these substances. There needs to be better laws 

in Canada and some of these other countries where these are being 

diverted. 

What Canada has on the books requires reporting of imports, so 

we know there have been a manyfold increase in the amount of 

pseudophedrine coming into Canada. It also requires people who 

are going to export from Canada to file for approval. There have 

been no formal requests for legitimate export, the last time I talked 

to Canadians, and there hasn’t been a sufficient population growth 

or any other legitimate reason to explain the massive increase in 

pseudophedrine importation into Canada except that it is being diverted and moved into the United States. 

For large-scale producers, yes, you could buy it in a drugstore, 

in a supermarket as a cold remedy. But to produce large quantities 

you need more than is easy to get by grabbing stacks off the shelf. 

Although there is some diversion at that level of that by small-time 

methamphetamine labs, and in some areas we are working with retailers on that. 

But the big problem we are talking about and a big part of the 

methamphetamine problem, when you see small labs, the biggest 

part of the methamphetamine problem is supplied by so-called 

super labs, large quantities that are made up that are made from 

large quantities of diverted pseudophedrine. It needs to be controlled. It can be controlled. 

The Canadians do not have adequate controls in place. They 

admit that. But they haven’t moved very rapidly to get an effective 

handle on this. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Do we have any idea where the major manufacturers of this are located? 

19

Mr. WALTERS. Much of the pseudophedrine is coming—I believe 

a substantial portion—we can send you the specifics, but substantial portions are coming from the Netherlands, which is why the 

Netherlands was also mentioned in this year’s certification process. 

And some of it is being diverted from countries in the Middle East. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me ask you, President Lula of Brazil was 

here a couple weeks ago, maybe a month ago; and several of us had 

gone down to the Brazilian area that connects with Colombia and 

met with the Brazilian anti-drug police down there. They seem to 

be doing a comparatively good job, except the government itself—

this is before Lula—was trying to act like they didn’t have a drug 

problem. When he was here and I sat down and talked with him 

about the idea of the drug problem in Brazil, he said specifically 

that, yes, there was a very definite drug problem in Brazil and that 

it was his intent to work in every way he could to help us with the 

drug problem. 

Have you heard—I mean, and that was just a short time ago. 

But is there any effort that you have been able to recognize that 

they are working with us in Brazil? 

Mr. WALTERS. There has been some greater cooperation, and 

prior to his administration there also was some denial. 

We now estimate that Brazil is the second largest consumer of 

cocaine in the world as a nation after the United States. It is not 

as large by any means as our estimate of the United States but is 

serious and has been growing. I think there has been, as in our 

country, there is a period of denial in these things because of the 

terrible consequences one has to face. 

But, yes, we are hoping to work more directly with the Brazilians 

once the new administration gets set up. I have spoken to our Ambassador when she was here. I have spoken to the Colombians 

about better cooperation, both because of the border area there, 

but, as you know, it is also—part of this problem is linked to, also, 

again terror groups, movement of arms, movement of arms into 

groups into Brazil. So I think the Brazilians are aware of parts of 

the security threat. 

We also have had many more meetings about sharing demand 

reduction information. The Brazilians have been at some of those. 

I have met with some of them in connection with OAS auspices. We 

are seeing the harsh reality, which is no nation has ever been a 

major source or transit country without developing its own consumption problem over time, and they are more interested. Some 

of them, like Mexico, have quite sophisticated research programs 

that we have learned things from in regard to some treatment and 

prevention, but we are also sending a lot of information, some of 

which we provide in Spanish language and in other languages for 

subpopulations in the United States that can be adapted. So we are 

becoming more of an engaged ally on both the supply and the demand side. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. 

Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, thank you for your testimony. 

20

Let me ask you, we are in the third year of Plan Colombia; and 

I would like to ask you, what is your assessment of the progress 

we have made in quantifiable terms? 

Mr. WALTERS. I think this year’s data, which I just referred to, 

shows that we have begun to substantially reduce the production 

of cocaine. It is historic at this magnitude and level. 

I recognize that the great problem in the past has been the socalled balloon problem, that when you push on one place, it just 

grows in another place, that there is no net shrinkage, there is simply movement and that that means that the efforts to control the 

market are doomed. 

I think what this shows is that the movement out of Peru and 

Bolivia of large cultivation areas back into the central processing 

and most established organizational structures in Colombia, which 

were seen as part of an example of the balloon problem, have now 

been attacked aggressively and rapidly in Colombia. The challenge 

that we have begun to change the inflection point in the magnitude 

of the world cocaine market, this is an historic achievement. But 

it is only in part of this where we need to be. 

We need to accelerate the effort for the next year. We are working with the Colombians with the goal of being able to eradicate 

200,000 hectares. The goal is to discourage the cultivation and to 

move people into licit activity who had been pushed into illicit activity. And the goal—and that is why I mentioned the amount involved, which of course the street value of the United States does 

not translate into the groups in Colombia, but the wholesale money 

does, the millions of dollars that this year’s eradication represents 

that was taken out of the hands of right-wing paramilitaries of the 

FARC and to other terrorist groups and drug organizations to prey 

on other people. 

We are doing what many have called for in the past: Take the 

money away from them. We could—they are addicted to the money. 

The money is the power for them. The money is the vehicle for the 

weapons. The money is the key to the corruption. We begin to pull 

that money away. It is not the only source of money, but we have 

begun to kind of pull the dimension of the market and make it in 

net terms smaller and to a significant degree. 

It is not the only thing we need to do. We need to have development. I take your point from your opening statement. We do believe that the key to making that long-term successful, as you 

know, is to continue to expand trade, to have stability where we 

could get, as President Uribe says, investment. We don’t have capital fleeing countries because of instability and problems with institutions. But we also can get investment flowing because of the 

enormous resources in people and things and the natural resources 

that these countries have. 

I mean, some of them are not as wealthy as others, places like 

Haiti. But Colombia, as you know, is a very wealthy country. It 

ought to be doing better than it is. I think if we can get to where 

we want to be with some of the provisions in Plan Colombia and 

the other economic and social policies that we are trying to help 

Colombia realize, we will be successful. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, your answer in part said that you want to 

have people pursue licit activities. But how do we achieve proVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

ducing the opportunities for licit activities that will be sufficient to 

sustain both families and help promote growth in Colombia when 

we go ahead and have $34 million less in the fiscal 2004 request 

for alternative development than we had before and we are moving 

in the reverse direction? How do we believe that that is part of our 

policy makes sense? 

Mr. WALTERS. I can’t speak to all the programs off the top of my 

head in that account, and you have my able colleague from USAID 

who can talk about what the program mix is. My understanding 

generally from my responsibilities in this area of policy is that 

what we are trying to do is provide opportunities both with aid and 

trade that will bring people——

I would point to the example of the Andean Trade Preferences 

Act. When I served in the President’s father’s Administration and 

this act first came into place, to come back into government and 

see what has happened to the flower business in Colombia and the 

millions of dollars that have been added to that, the extensive jobs 

in connection with that, that is an example of success. I think that 

President Uribe’s proposals to work in environmental preservation 

as well as try to provide in some places opportunities for people to 

move back to centers where they migrated from and sometimes 

were forced to grow coca are promising and necessary. 

We have had a review in the last year of some of the aid programs to try to make sure that we weren’t trying to get people into 

an economic market or activity that could not be sustained, given 

either the soil conditions or the infrastructure that could move 

goods and services to market; and we found in some places I think 

we had to work with the Colombians to reassess how we were deploying programs. We don’t want to give people false hope. We 

don’t want to tell them that this is going to work, if it is not going 

to work. 

But, look, I know we need resources here, and I am not going to 

shy away from the fact. I wish we had more resources, too. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, I appreciate you acknowledging that. Because trade needs a variety of factors to flourish and to produce the 

licit activities that you would hope would flow from it. It needs stability, it needs transparency, it needs a rule of law that observes 

the investments of those who were made by foreign entities. It 

needs a variety of things. I won’t list them all. 

So I know it is so easy to designate trade as the panacea for all 

of the challenges that face us in the context of a Colombia. It is 

nice to talk about the Andean trade preferences, but I must say 

that in the context of Colombia that is a whole different set of circumstances. 

So I will wait for the next panel, but I simply find it increasingly 

difficult to understand how we will spend enormous amounts of 

money to eradicate and to continue to achieve the successes that 

you have cited and then not go the next step which is to ensure 

that people have something to turn to that are licit activities, that 

can promote growth within the country, and that can provide a legitimate alternative. And, on that, we are sadly failing. 

So I know this may not be specifically within your bailiwick, but 

in the context of a drug control policy in the countries that we are 

dealing with this needs to be one of the fundamental pillars, and 

22

it is a pillar that, as far as I am concerned, is crumbling. It has 

never been particularly strong, and it is crumbling. It is of great 

risk, and I think it creates the strong possibility for the rest of 

what you are trying to achieve to be undermined. 

But I appreciate your answers, and I look forward to continuing 

to engage with you in the future. 

Mr. WALTERS. In the interest of being candid with you as well, 

we are also aware that the world economic situation that we don’t 

as easily control plays a big factor here. And I am not diminishing 

the development aid. We need to build roads. I think one of the 

most impressive things, as I said, about President Uribe is it is not 

just about securing Bogota or small areas or doing something once. 

He really has committed—in some ways some people think it is too 

ambitious—education, health, social welfare as well as enforcement. He understands that when things are a war zone, kids don’t 

have the same incentive to go to school, that it is very hard to provide support for a government, that if you stand up for it, you are 

likely to get killed the next day or that has no stability. 

But we recognize—and I do think, though, that while we can disagree about the levels of mix here, coming back to government, I 

am kind of impressed with how much development assistance is 

going to Colombia. Eight years ago when I was here—the level of 

aid that is going into Colombia now is much greater than what was 

there. Is it adequate? There may be disagreement, but I guess what 

I am disagreeing with is I don’t want to leave with the impression 

that I think we are turning the other way, and we don’t understand the seriousness. I do think we may need to do more and 

there may be pressures on budgets, as there always are, but there 

also lies the world is not growing and this hemisphere is not growing economically as rapidly as it could. 

I also think that the other part of this is I think you have got 

to have a greater kind of—I think you are right. The institutional 

structure that supports some of these things has to be stabilized. 

So there may be a difference between us about the kind of priority——

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, let me close by saying I appreciate your 

comment. But, you know, budgetary crutches always seem to exist 

for Latin America even when are there no times of crisis. And we 

are going to give how many billions of dollars to Turkey? An enormous amount. 

Mr. WALTERS. I don’t know. That is not my job. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. I know. It is mine in part. So, you know, there 

is always an excuse. I have heard the excuses for a decade that I 

have sat here, and I personally am not going to allow them to go 

unchallenged. We are making a huge mistake. 

I would be happy to sit with you on a scale one day—and you 

may think development assistance has dramatically increased. I 

would be happy to sit with you on a scale and show you, in the context of all of our resources, it is insignificant to what we are spending on the one side of the equation. It would be like having a drug 

control policy that only talks about interdiction or only talks about 

eradication but doesn’t talk about demand control. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Representative Harris. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

23

Thank you for your testimony today. It has been enlightening, in 

some ways discouraging, but we know we have our efforts cut out 

for us. 

Speaking of additional assistance, the coca that you discussed 

that had been eradicated, if it had been produced, according to Ambassador Patterson, last year, nearly half of that would have gone 

to Europe. What are the European nations doing to assist us? I 

mean, are we filling in for them? What are their efforts with regard 

to this interdiction? 

Mr. WALTERS. I don’t have—I will be happy to supply for the 

record the levels of assistance for some European nations. 

It has not been very great. I know the Colombians in my meetings have expressed disappointment even in terms of discussions 

and what they thought were commitments that were not ultimately 

provided by European countries. 

This is not new. This has gone on for a long time, and I don’t 

think it is particularly limited to Latin America. But we do have 

some countries that have been working with us in selective areas, 

more where they have some jurisdictions. The British. We have 

had some cooperation with—extensive cooperation in some of the 

region with Spain. We even had some cooperation that has been 

very helpful with the Dutch government in terms of interdiction in 

some of the areas of territories that they are responsible for. 

But, yeah, I don’t believe that the level of engagement by the Europeans is what I would like to see, but it never has been. So in 

a certain way—we continue to try to engage them, but I think we 

are not holding out any illusions on this front. 

Ms. HARRIS. As a follow-up on Colombia, I think in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental we are giving an additional $25 million to 

the national police for trucks and training in terms of search and 

rescue operations. 

We now have three Americans being held hostage by the FARC. 

Yesterday, I met with the Colombian Ambassador, and the Colombian police tell us what they really need are helicopters because 

there aren’t roads to get to some of these. Is your department going 

to be able to provide that kind of transport, that kind of access 

with helicopters? 

Mr. WALTERS. Yeah. We are scheduled to finalize our supplemental request in the next couple of days, and we are looking at 

airlift as well as other kinds of support. So I can’t tell you exactly 

what is going to be in the final package because it hasn’t been decided yet, but we will get that up here promptly, and we are aware 

that airlift is an issue. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may, just for a second, on April the 11th it 

will be 2 years that the Air Bridge Denial Program has been—that 

has been suspended. When can we expect that something is going 

to happen along those lines? Do you know? 

Mr. WALTERS. Well, people have done predictions for a little 

while now and been wrong. So, to the best of my knowledge, we 

now have basic and virtually final agreements with the Colombians 

on the procedures and the zones. We will do final application of 

those procedures, complete the training and do the necessary certifications. I would guess realistically—we hope it is going to be in 

24

the neighborhood of 2 months. I would not be surprised if it 

stretches out a little bit longer, although, believe me, the President 

of the United States, the President of Colombia, and all of us want 

this to move more quickly. 

But we also are acutely aware that this is a complicated issue, 

and we want it to be done safely, and we want it to be done under 

the law. So we are trying to make sure that we meet all those requirements and we are aware that this is an urgent need and that 

it has taken too long, and there is a lot of frustration. But we will 

try to get it done in that period. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome. I would just like to make an observation, and I really 

do genuinely appreciate your appearance here and the data and the 

information that you provide us. But, as I attempted to articulate 

in my opening statement, what I am interested in hearing is a holistic, comprehensive understanding and picture of this Administration’s policy toward Latin America; and I am concerned that with 

your appearance here, the lead-off witness, that we are reinforcing 

the concept that our policy toward Latin America is only about 

drugs. 

Now, it is a significant subset of what ought to be a much larger, 

comprehensive holistic policy; and we are falling into a trap—and 

I guess I am speaking as one of 435—to simply look at Latin America as a bunch of nations that are producing drugs, that are coming 

into our streets and our neighborhoods. That is a mistake, and I 

think we go in that direction too frequently and reinforce a stereotype, that when the American people think of Colombia, they think 

of drugs. I would hope that we would think of Colombia as a democracy, and I am sure you and the representatives of the Administration that are here think of it that way. 

But it is time to talk in thematic, comprehensive language about 

a real policy, about a policy that builds institutions. As the Ranking Member indicated, if we had these institutions, we would have 

economic development. We would have respect for the rule of law. 

We wouldn’t have the instability that we see. 

It is not just about drugs, but we continue to talk just about 

drugs when it comes to Latin America. We are talking about helicopters. We have been talking about helicopters for the 7 years 

that I have served here. 

I think what Mr. Menendez talks in terms of the balance, in 

terms of our drug policy—you know, Mr. Walters, I would like you 

to come in front of my other Committee sometime, which is the Judiciary Committee, and talk about drug policy. Because it isn’t, as 

you know, just about Latin America, it is about Europe. In fact, the 

reality is the United States has become an exporter of some drugs. 

Is that a fair and accurate statement? 

Mr. WALTERS. We do supply some drugs to other countries. Yes, 

sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. So I mean——

Mr. WALTERS. We are more of an importer, though. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Unfortunately, we are more of an importer. 

Let me just ask you a question. 

25

Mr. WALTERS. Could I answer that one first? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure. 

Mr. WALTERS. Look, I understand the frustration that you are 

talking about. But in fairness I have to say I have to respectfully 

disagree. Now I am here because the invitations the Committee 

sent included me, and my rank is such that I am going to be the 

first witness. There are subsequent witnesses from the State Department. I am not trying to say that you don’t have issues perhaps with my colleagues at the State Department, but——

Mr. DELAHUNT. No. But Mr. Walters——

Mr. WALTERS. But—just let me finish the answer. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure. 

Mr. WALTERS. I sit in Administration meetings with policy in 

this area. We may not be perfect. We have areas we are frustrated 

with and we may not have gotten to. There may be reasons why 

they may not be satisfactory to some, that senior officials have had 

to spend some time on on some other parts of the world and other 

parts of issues even now. But we do not understand the hemisphere of Latin America as drugs. We do not understand our responsibilities solely as drug control, although it is an important 

matter. 

I don’t want to leave the impression to the people who may be 

watching on television that I believe or I believe the President believes or I believe the Secretary of State believes or I believe the 

U.S. Trade Representative believes that Latin America is about 

drugs. Because we work awfully hard on a lot of other issues. We 

agree there has to be balance here, and I don’t want the fact of the 

timing of people’s appearance and my being the lead witness to 

suggest that we did this because we want to tell you and the rest 

of the world——

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not being critical of you, Mr. Walters. I 

think this is a shared responsibility. Okay? Because Members of 

Congress, the Administration, and the Executive Branch—what I 

am saying is that we have to start presenting to the rest of our 

neighborhood a whole different face, if you will. 

You know, as Mr. Menendez said as he ended his questioning, in 

terms of the balance, the reality is that Plan Colombia was 80 percent military assistance and 20 percent social development. As he 

indicated, there seems to be a reduction in terms of the social development side. And where—is that being made up anywhere? Is 

it being made up within Colombia itself? 

We met yesterday with the Vice President of Colombia. And I understand these are difficult and tough choices. But then we talk, 

and you mentioned budget pressures. Well, of course that will always be an answer, a rejoinder. As Mr. Menendez indicated, it has 

always been the response: These are budget pressures. Yet here we 

are on the verge of engaging in a war in the Middle East. The figures that I read in the newspaper are $30 billion in terms of loan 

guarantees and assistance to Turkey. 

What we are saying from this Committee, it is time to recognize 

that there has to be a commitment of resources as well as support 

and technical levels to Latin America because there is real serious 

problems in our own neighborhood; and if we don’t do something 

about it soon, we will rue the day. 

26

Let me just ask one question. How many addicts are there in this 

country today? 

Mr. WALTERS. We estimate that there are approximately six million Americans who have an abuse or dependence problem to illegal 

drugs such as they need treatment. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I just want to understand the President’s 

hope is that he is going to reduce that six million by 10 percent 

in a 2-year time period? 

Mr. WALTERS. The goals that I stated were for the number of 

people who use. That is not just addicts. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. What is that number then, Mr. Walters? 

Mr. WALTERS. About 16 million Americans ages 12 and over. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. Where are we today? 

Mr. WALTERS. The goal was set about a year ago, so we only 

have data for young people. As I said, there are several surveys. 

Some show a 14 percent decline in 1 year, some show an 11 percent 

decline. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Where are we in the aggregate? Where are we 

in the total number of drug users in this country? 

Mr. WALTERS. I don’t have the same corresponding year, because 

the survey lags. I won’t have 2002 until August of this year. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I hope you can come back in August, whether it 

is in front of this Committee or the Judiciary Committee, and just 

give us the numbers. 

Mr. WALTERS. Sure. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is what we are interested in. We have got 

16 million, we have six million addicts. Have there been a decline 

in the number of addicts in the past 2 years? 

Mr. WALTERS. I don’t mean to sound like the number game here, 

but the reason I can’t answer that question adequately is the measure that the Department of Health and Human Services uses to get 

that estimate has changed. So we believe the six million number 

is truer, but it is not comparable over multiple years now because 

of a change in the way they do the survey to include more people. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You can see the difficulty that we have as Members of relying on particular data. 

Mr. WALTERS. Well, here I can say unambiguously I feel your 

pain. We have to construct policies to present to you as well, and 

we are trying to—I spent the morning at a hearing in this building, 

I believe, on the treatment proposal. So, you know, I understand——

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I——

Mr. WALTERS. We are trying to do the best we can with the 

right—with the data we have, and we want to improve the data 

and we want to improve the focus and effectiveness of all the programs. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I think it is important to get the data down 

so we can operate on the same page and really know what is happening, because it is my own sense we don’t know what is happening. But what we do know, for example, is that while there 

might be a few in number—or an eradication effort that has resulted in fewer hectares in Colombia, we now have a situation in 

Bolivia where there is efforts underway within their Congress to 

recultivate, to legalize recultivation. 

27

Mr. WALTERS. I understand, but let me say one thing. On the demand side we have said what we think are ambitious goals. There 

are levels of decline, though, that the country saw at the latter part 

of the 1980s and the early 1990s. We have done these rates of decline before. It is not pie in the sky. We have measures that measure some subpopulations, although the aggregate measure is not as 

consistent because of a particular technicality, but we will give you 

and we will be candid about all the data here. 

But I want to be clear about what happened with coca here. We 

said on the market side, on the supply side, our goal was to treat 

this as a market. Our goal was to use what legitimate business always worries government is going to do to them, use regulatory 

and criminal pressures of government to create a recession and a 

depression in the drug trade. 

What these results from last year show, largely work done by the 

Colombians, I am not saying otherwise, is there is a recession in 

the cocaine business in the world. That is a historic achievement. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. In terms of eradication or in terms——

Mr. WALTERS. In terms of output. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But I think you said something that I want to 

come back to, because along with the Chairman—if I may just indulge you for one more question. Yesterday we sat down with Vice 

President Santos. You indicated yourself it is really not for them—

for those that are benefitting—profiting from the drug trade, it is 

about money. It is about money, and we are long overdue to use 

the influence that we have in this world to create a system of 

transparency and accountability among nations everywhere. We 

know how to use our power so that we find ourselves better situated to track the dollars, and I dare say it might be a hell of a lot 

easier doing that than sending planes all over Colombia, but it is 

something that has to be pursued vigorously. 

Mr. WALTERS. We agree entirely, and we are trying doing both. 

We are supporting Vice President Santos and the Colombian effort. 

In their own country, we have ramped up efforts with money laundering as a result of legislation that Congress has given us, and we 

are more focusing this on the organizations that are in the drug 

trade in addition to the tools that we are using against terror organizations. 

We don’t see this as either/or, but we are being more aggressive 

and more effective. These are important tools. I agree with you entirely. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I believe my colleagues from New Jersey 

and Massachusetts have given some very credible substantive 

issues for discussion this afternoon, and I certainly want to thank 

you, Mr. Walters, for your statement. We should be concerned 

about drug production given the fact that some 16 million Americans use drugs monthly. We conduct a $200 billion trade relationship with Latin America. I noticed in your statement that the drug 

issue that we have with Latin America runs somewhere around 

$50 billion, but I have also seen figures that it is about an $80 billion-plus industry that goes on between our countries. 

I do compliment the Administration for earmarking—at least hopefully to propose $731 million to conduct the Andean 

28

Counterdrug Initiative for the countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, and I do support the Andean 

counterdrug initiative. 

But I do have some problems, and I wanted to ask, Mr. Walters, 

if you could help me. I happen to have the largest tuna canning 

facility in the world. Not a Banana Republic, but a tuna republic 

in that respect. Last year some of my colleagues introduced a 

measure to allow Andean countries to export canned tuna duty free 

to the United States. I might also add that even textiles were also 

included in what you know as the Andean Free Trade Agreement. 

What bothers me about expanding the Andean Free Trade Agreement was that this was all done in the name of curbing drug production. From the outset, I wish to say that I am all for curbing 

drug production, but I take issue with placing American workers 

at a disadvantage simply because the districts that we represent 

have no past or present affiliation with drug production. 

To my knowledge, the good State of North Carolina is not known 

for growing coca to produce cocaine, but also my understanding is 

North Carolina is known for producing textiles and, regretfully I 

might add, Congress voted last year to disadvantage the good people of North Carolina and probably South Carolina by granting 

duty-free treatment for textiles exported from the Andean countries. 

Fortunately, my district, we were able to save our canned tuna 

for now. I raise this issue, Mr. Walters, because there seems to be 

a contradiction here. A country like Ecuador conducts an export or 

trade relationship with our country at about $6 billion, including 

duty free textiles and now tuna packed in pouches, and yet if the 

United States wanted to export tuna or other products to Ecuador 

or Mexico we would have to pay a duty or tariff freight of some 20 

percent or more. This doesn’t make sense at all, and in my book, 

Mr. Walters, this is not free trade nor fair trade if you want to put 

it in that context. It is not fair trade for the working people in 

North Carolina or in my district or anyone else in the United 

States, and I am very concerned about this. 

I do not believe that one-way preferential trade agreements can 

or should be used to counter drug production, particularly when we 

already allocate billions of taxpayers’ dollars to sustain programs 

like the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement. 

So we are earmarking $731 million of U.S. taxpayers’ money to 

supposedly curb drug production. How much are we spending as a 

government to crack down on the cartels here in the United States? 

One of the statements that I always hear from our Latin American 

neighbors, it is not our fault. It is the American demand for consumption of drugs that is the problem, not so much of us producing 

it. If it wasn’t so much the demand and supply by Americans, then 

maybe we won’t have a drug problem. 

Can you share with us your thoughts on that? 

Mr. WALTERS. Yes. Just a couple issues in there I will respond 

to. One, we understand it and take seriously that it is American 

demand. In fact, we have used the reality of American demand as 

a prevention tool in a series of prevention advertisements that we 

have used through our antidrug media campaign. We have told 

29

people on this Committee no, drugs fund terror. The reason that 

the drug business funds terror, international terror, foreign terror 

or domestic terror, is because it is a business that requires that you 

market a dangerous addictive substance to children and to young 

adults. If you do not start using drugs through your teenage years, 

you are unlikely to go on and have a problem later. And the biggest 

market is dependent people, those who are enslaved to drugs. No 

civilized society can make that a legitimate business, and so it has 

to be opposed by efforts and institutions of civilization, and to stop 

that opposition the drug trade must use violence, terror and intimidation. 

So we have brought the American consumer face to face with the 

harms that drugs do for you through a period of advertising, but 

we are also making it undeniable that drugs harm the principles 

of democracy, civilization and decency. We are spending money on 

both prevention in terms of the media, in terms of our programs 

in schools and our programs and communities. 

We are also spending money on treatment to reduce those who 

are dependent, which I alluded to earlier. We spend the largest single share of this money on domestic law enforcement, and our 

goal—and we are not satisfied despite the tireless efforts, as I am 

sure you are aware of as well as I am, of thousands of Americans 

in law enforcement who every day put their lives on the line in our 

streets. 

But we are not happy with the cynicism and the acceptance of 

the view that we can’t reduce this market in the United States. So 

I have been working with the Justice Department and the Attorney 

General and the ONDCP organized task force program as well as 

the HIDTA program, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, in my office to target the organizational structures in the 

United States more effectively. 

We have created now a combined target list of the organizations 

that operate, some with routes abroad, some here, to go after those 

structures here. We are not doing this in a one-sided way. Of the 

overall drug budget, it is 53 percent, the one we—the President 

submitted now—53 percent supply reduction, including international and domestic enforcement programs and 47 percent demand reduction prevention and treatment. 

We believe we have to have balance here. We believe that U.S. 

demand if attacked by both prevention, treatment and supply control in the United States is the key, and we have to do better. And 

the President tried to make this as clear as he possibly could by 

saying the way you can judge our Administration is are we going 

to reduce the number of users in the United States, and he said 

what I think people generally believe who have looked at this are 

ambitious goals. 

On the issue of trade, yes, I am aware that the Andean bill is 

a preferential trade treaty, that we went out of our way to say for 

certain kinds of goods from these countries, we are going to give 

you a preferential access to American markets to expand that trade 

as you go through the costs of fighting the drug trade and under 

the sense in which there is some obligation because of American 

demand. 

30

I certainly understand there is disagreements where those preferences should be and where they ally, and the Congress made 

changes to the request the Administration made, and I know that 

they do cause real dislocations and real harms to some people. It 

is not a free ride here. So I respect the reasonable difference that 

you have on some of these issues and the fact that Congress 

changed them by saying we don’t want to do this this way. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you give us your best assessment on 

the degree of success that our own government is doing to crack 

down on the U.S. distributors of the cartels? It seems that the 

media always seems to make a big play when we get a cartel in 

Latin America, but maybe I am reading the wrong papers, but I 

hardly see the media saying, hey, we have caught some major distributors here in our own country. Would you say that we are doing 

a very effective job or we are not doing enough or you don’t have 

the resources? 

Mr. WALTERS. No. I think we have the resources. I don’t want 

to criticize—I don’t want to blame people or make it, you know, no 

good job goes unpunished here. People are working very hard in a 

very difficult way. I don’t think we have been focused enough. The 

change we have made if you look at the drug strategy today, we 

have said we are going to reorient law enforcement to look at markets and we want a measure of production. The reason we created 

a combined targeting list is I am working with the Attorney General. My goal—I will tell you it is my goal. We haven’t made this 

Administration policy—of the major organizations and the people 

that we have looked at, I want them brought to justice in 1 year. 

That would be all the major organizations we have been able to 

identify, combined Federal agencies, intelligence and investigative 

files, and we want to do that to destabilize this market at the Federal level. 

That is not the only thing we need to do. We also need to close 

open-air drug markets. It is I believe unacceptable that in every 

major city in the United States there is de facto legalization of 

drugs. That is what an open air drug market is, low risk of being 

apprehended, highly available drugs, openly accepted by society. It 

is a blight in every community. Where those exist there is high levels of all the consequences, addiction, crime, economic deprivation, 

child abuse and abandonment, local educational attainment. We 

need to close those markets. We can help State-local law enforcement and communities through the programs that we have and 

others, but we also need to make sure that they understand what 

they are going to do. We are going to provide more data about what 

is going on in the major cities of the United States and the States 

about these indicators, prevention, treatment and law enforcement, 

because we want Americans to not have—the single greatest 

enemy we have is cynicism, that nothing works, that we can’t make 

headway. That is why these numbers are important. We have got 

a program that is working. Everything doesn’t work. That is why 

the decline in drug use is important and it is real for young people, 

and we have to follow up on it, but it also is important for us to 

get more people into treatment, and it is important to control the 

supply and the market of drugs in the United States. 

31

I have gone to schools in the United States. I have had students 

stand up in an assembly and say, Mr. Walters, it is great about 

what all we are doing. Why is it easier for us to buy marijuana as 

a 16-year-old than it is for us to buy beer? I have to tell them that 

is a failure of adults. That is not your failure. We have to fix that. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman Payne, let me just say we understand we might have a vote at 4 o’clock, so if we can move on. John 

is doing a wonderful job, but we are wearing him down. 

Mr. WALTERS. I will be briefer. I am sorry. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Well, let me continue to wear 

you down. I have some concerns in regard to the spraying. We do 

have helicopters there. I know there are—the gentlelady from Florida has some more helicopters, but they are spraying, they are killing coca, but they are also killing bananas. Children are getting 

sick. Cattle, livestock are being affected. And so it is kind of disruptive in a way, and I would just like for you to comment on how 

much of that negative ecological problem is there. 

The second thing, since we do have—since this is probably the 

second or third largest program of our foreign assistance, I think 

we do have a responsibility to try to deal with the authorities. Now, 

the military in Colombia has been less than what we would consider, what we would expect to reflect a national force. With the 

infrastructure and the AUC and the ELN and so forth, there is a 

lot of disruption of people in Colombia as we know. 

However, one of the disturbing moves is that much of the gun 

firing or the bombing or the spraying has had a disproportional impact on Afro-Colombians. I understand between 25 and 40 percent 

of the population are African Colombians, and when they ask for 

support from the government forces, it has lacked. The FARC is all 

over, so they are pushed around. You have those paramilitaries 

that are supported by the business community, and so those people 

are left with no one to turn to, and it would appear to me that 

since we are spending so much, since this is like our second or 

third largest foreign assistance program in the world, we ought to 

I think have some sensitivity to the by-products of our program, 

and so I wonder if you would comment on that quickly. 

Thirdly, they can’t make those drugs without getting the chemicals from the U.S., and I haven’t heard anything much about any 

clamping down of chemical companies that are selling these products that assist in making the drugs in Colombia. I mean, without 

these products, without these chemicals, that cocaine cannot be 

made into the paste and so forth. 

And just quickly on Haiti, I see that we decertified Haiti, and 

them being the only one of two countries decertified. Colombia is 

not, but Haiti is, so I guess Haiti is more of a threat than Colombia 

is, because they have been decertified, Haiti hasn’t. I am just wondering if you could quickly go over the reasons why the decertification has occurred. You said there were nine reasons. If you could 

just see whether the government has just refused to work with you, 

or is it that perhaps they don’t have the capacity for investigating 

and fingerprinting and the kinds of law enforcement that we are 

accustomed to in the United States of America that we might give 

them failing grades because they are unable to apprehend. Could 

you just touch on that for a half second? 

32

Mr. WALTERS. Sure. I will take those in order. On the spraying, 

we have been more diligent, I think, than any other activity in 

monitoring the environmental impact of spraying. We are using 

herbicide that is used commercially in the United States, and that 

is rigorously being tested for its effects on individuals when there 

are complaints, effects on livestock, effects on the environment. All 

those reviews, including one done by our own EPA, shows that it 

is a safe and effective herbicide. 

Now, I know that there is some debate and concern about this. 

We continue to monitor it. It is also important to note that the 

same herbicide is used in greater quantity in illicit agriculture in 

Colombia to control weeds and other things. 

Are we spraying food crops? There is in some cases interspersing 

of illicit crops with food crops, but there is a very careful effort 

made to not only map but to monitor and test, and we monitor exactly where spray occurs with global positioning systems. And we 

go back and check what has been sprayed to make sure that we 

are putting the spray on the illicit crops that are the targets. It is 

not entirely perfect, but I have been down to take a look at this. 

I know some Members of the Committees have. We spent an awful 

lot of time with the Colombians to make sure we are spraying the 

right things and it is not done willy-nilly, even though I recognize 

this is a lot of spraying. 

But the safety, the efficacy and also I think the other factor that 

I would be remiss if I didn’t mention here, the destruction to the 

environment done by the chemicals that you mentioned, which I 

will come back to answering where they come from, is many times 

over more destructive to Colombia than anything you could possibly attribute to the eradication program. 

Indeed, the effort to defoliate huge parts of the jungle, to move 

processing chemicals and dump them into these fragile waterways, 

some of which flow into the Amazon and other rivers have caused 

serious problems. So stopping the trade, putting this market out of 

business, is one of the single greatest contributions we can make 

to environmental quality in the area that has been affected here. 

On the military in Colombia, we have, consistent with the direction from Congress and the Administration, worked diligently to 

monitor and improve the human rights training and monitoring, 

the effectiveness of that training and the behavior of military and 

police in Colombia. We have gone through several incidents where 

we have asked for further follow-up, prosecution, investigations. In 

some cases it has been painful, but we have been firm in that regard. 

I have also asked my office to begin monitoring the reports of violations and atrocities to civilians and to others in the country that 

are done both by allegedly government forces and by guerrillas of 

right and left extreme and otherwise. We will be happy to begin to 

provide those to the Committee if you would like. 

But I will also say if you look at the record of the Colombian government forces, they have improved dramatically. They have been 

doing an outstanding job in some areas. Can we do some more improvement? Do we have to monitor? Of course we do. 

But I also think that when you look at the viciousness with 

which some of these extreme right and left groups behave and conVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
33

tinue to behave, forced conscription, murder, massacre, indiscriminate bombing, kidnapping and then using kidnap victims to drive 

car bombs unwittingly that would be detonated, the conscription of 

children and the use of children under force conscript in combat, 

I think there also has to be—I am not saying any of that justifies 

a single violation by government forces, but I also think that we 

ought to be clear that the government is fighting an effort to really 

change the climate and threat to a population that is being preyed 

upon by a very vicious right and left combination of groups. 

I don’t know the answer, and I will get the answer for the record 

about the effect on Afro-Colombians specifically, because I don’t 

have that information right off the top of my head. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY THE HONORABLE JOHN P. WALTERS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, TO QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONOR- ABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF

NEW JERSEY

Question: 

‘‘However, one of the disturbing moves is that much of the gun firing or the bombing or the spraying has had a disproportional impact on Afro-Colombians. I understand between 25 and 40 percent of the population are African-Colombians, and 

when they ask for support from the government forces, it has lacked. The FARC is 

all over, so they are pushed around. You have those paramilitaries that are supported by the business community, and so those people are left with no one to turn 

to, and it would appear to me that since we are spending so much, since this is like 

our second or third largest foreign assistance program in the world, we ought to I 

think have some sensitivity to the by-products of our program, and so I wonder if 

you would comment on that quickly.’’

Answer: 

Afro-Colombians comprise about 25 percent of the Colombian population. This includes mulattos and people of Afro-Indian mix. The Afro-Colombian community’s 

traditional settlement zones are along the Caribbean and Pacific coastal lowlands, 

although there are important Afro-Colombian communities in the main urban centers of Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Medellı ́n and Bogota ́. Nearly 30 percent of the 

Afro-Colombian population is based in the Choco ́ region that borders with Panama. 

The Afro-Colombian communities are not in traditional coca growing areas, with the 

exception of the state of Narin ̃ o in southwestern Colombia that became a major 

growing area when spraying increased in Putumayo and Caqueta ́. Most of the large 

coca growing areas are east of the Andes, therefore, the Afro-Colombian community 

has not suffered significantly due to the coca spraying operations. It has suffered, 

however, due to the armed conflict between the FARC and the AUC who are fighting for control of the areas that are strategic corridors for moving coca base and cocaine from the growing and processing areas to the coasts for shipment to the U.S. 

or Europe. One very sad example of this occurred when the FARC killed 119 civilians with a cylinder bomb while they were hiding in a church to avoid a battle between the FARC and the paramilitary AUC in the town of Bojaya ́ in Choco ́ department.

Mr. WALTERS. In terms of chemical monitoring, we have made an 

effort to monitor chemicals that appear in this site all the way back 

to the United States and other suppliers. My impression is that we 

have a pretty good handle on control, but I will supply a detailed 

answer for the record on those coming from the United States. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY THE HONORABLE JOHN P. WALTERS TO QUESTION

ASKED BY THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE

Question: 

‘‘Thirdly, they can’t make those drugs without getting the chemicals from the U.S., 

and I haven’t heard anything much about clamping down on chemical companies 

34

that are selling these products that assist in making the drugs in Colombia. I mean, 

without these products, without these chemicals, that cocaine cannot be made into 

the paste and so forth.’’

Answer: 

The Drug Enforcement Agency has a chemicals policy for Colombia that went into 

effect in 1996. It directs that any U.S. company that wants to export certain chemicals to Colombia must file its request with DEA. DEA vets this request through its 

representative in the U.S. Embassy in Colombia who circulates it through the Government of Colombia to ensure that the prospective customer in Colombia is legitimate. DEA and the Government of Colombia keep lists of businesses that have potential ties to illicit activities and they are refused permission to import the requested chemicals from the U.S.

Mr. WALTERS. There is regional diversion and we continue to 

work with the Colombians. We changed the quality of and made 

less attractive cocaine in some of the other two neighboring countries precisely by controlling precursor chemicals to the point 

where the quality diminished and damaged the market. We want 

to continue to do that. Some of these chemicals like sulfuric acid 

are quite widely available where that is used in industry. So there 

is a little bit more problem, but some of them are much rarer and 

it is much easier to control. 

The issue of Haiti you raised, Haiti was not decertified because 

it was a greater threat than Colombia. No country is because of the 

nature of the threat. They are decertified because of the nature of 

their cooperation. The problem we had was, as my written testimony details, is the pervasive corruption and unwillingness to enforce the laws that are on the books or effectively cooperate, failing 

to enforce a follow-up on deployment of resources that could be deployed and promise to be deployed in terms of interdiction and arrest and follow-through and failure to take steps for changing the—

reducing the problem of corruption. 

We don’t expect they will disappear overnight. We worked, as 

many of you know, for years with a lot of these governments to 

build institutional capacity, to train, to put in place cooperative 

agreements, to work with them from where they begin to where we 

all want to go, but the Haitian government has in the last year 

been unwilling to make reasonable steps, and so we have decertified them. 

Now, we have given them a national interest waiver to make 

sure the decertification doesn’t harm fragile populations and others 

in Haiti, and we will continue to try to work with then, but we 

have to be honest with you and with the American people, the leaders of the Haiti government need to be more serious, and they are 

not. So the consequences are actually quite limited here, and then 

Haiti is becoming a much greater threat because of the weaknesses 

that are being allowed to continue there. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I would just like to thank you, John. You have 

done an excellent job in my considered opinion of presenting this 

whole thing. I would like to throw one question out, because alternative development has come up several times, and I realize that 

it will fit the next group, but you mentioned at the end that the 

AUC, the ELN and the terrorist organizations there are all over 

the country. 

Am I wrong in making the suggestion that it is very difficult to 

have alternative development; when the FARC decides they want 

35

to have coca growing here, are you going to try to get them into—

when they say we will kill you if you don’t do it the way we tell 

you, alternative development can only be done in the area where 

there is peace, and I know President Uribe told me that he recognizes this problem and that the basic idea, until we get law and 

order throughout the country, they are going to have a really tough 

time. 

But I would like to thank you personally myself for having done 

what I consider an excellent job, and without further ado, we will 

ask the next panel to come forward. 

Mr. WALTERS. Thank you all. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. 

As our two friends settle down, first of all, let me introduce 

Adolfo Franco. He is the Assistant Administrator for Latin America 

and the Caribbean of the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

Before joining USAID, Mr. Franco served as the counsel to the 

majority on International Relations Committee and is the former 

President of the Inter-American Foundation, an independent government agency dedicated to the promotion of grassroots development in the Western Hemisphere. Welcome back, Adolfo. 

And next we have Curt Struble. Curt is the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, and 

I would like to thank Curt for being here today. We look forward 

to his testimony. And Adolfo, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to 

come home to the International Relations Committee. Maybe I 

should save that till the end of my testimony. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I hope so. 

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Menendez, as well for this opportunity to appear before the Committee. 

I am here, Mr. Chairman, today to speak a little bit about 

USAID’s role in promoting hemispheric prosperity and also in promoting the President’s vision for a safer and better hemisphere. 

With the Committee’s permission, I will summarize the testimony I have submitted for the record. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection. 

Mr. FRANCO. Mr. Chairman, President Bush’s national security 

strategy reflects the urgent needs of our country following the September 11th terrorist attacks. It states clearly that the United 

States Government’s aim is to help make the world not just a safer 

but a better place. 

At USAID we work closely with our colleagues and other agencies and departments, including the Office for National Drug Control Policy, the State Department, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, to promote political and economic freedom for all nations and particularly among our closest neighbors with whom we 

have such a strong social and cultural tie. 

36

The President has said that the future of our hemisphere depends, ‘‘on the strength of three commitments: Democracy, security 

and market-based development.’’

USAID’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean supports 

the President’s goal of market-based development with a comprehensive program of trade capacity building programs to support 

the President’s goals of a Free Trade Area of the Americas and a 

U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement this year. 

Both the President and the Secretary of State have said that free 

trade will lead to the sustained economic growth essential for development to occur. I wish for you to know that I have made our 

efforts at trade capacity building a priority for the Bureau this 

year. 

However, I must state that I agree with the Members of the 

Committee that trade capacity building is an instrument to an end 

of bringing greater prosperity to the region. Other issues of social 

development that have been discussed with the Committee today 

so far before Director Walters are issues that USAID also considers 

essential to bring about the full promise of free trade. For that reason the Bureau also supports the President’s other priorities. 

I would like to tell you about our efforts to promote democracy 

and good governance and reduce corruption in the countries of the 

hemisphere and also tell you what we are doing to promote health 

and education, both essential for the hemispheric security about 

which the President has spoken. 

The President’s national security strategy recognizes the important role of development assistance. In his landmark March 14th, 

2002 speech to the community of donor nations in Monterrey, Mexico, the President pledged to create a Millennium Challenge Account which can make additional development assistance available 

to countries that show progress in ruling justly and promoting economic freedom and investing in people. The Administration has forwarded legislation authorizing the MCA to Congress, and I hope 

that this Committee will act quickly to enact it. 

At USAID we know that the best way in which we can do things 

is also to improve our systems. During his tenure as USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios has taken the President’s challenge to 

heart in trying to make foreign assistance more effective and results-oriented, and I work toward this goal daily in my role as Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean. 

To that end, I have initiated a substantial review of management 

practices in each of the 16 missions and the region for which I am 

responsible, with a view to increase efficiency and reduce duplication of effort. 

USAID is proud of its contribution to the broader government 

policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean, which I do 

believe to be holistic. We have been working diligently to respond 

to the development challenges in the region and to promote the 

President’s priority for the hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, over the past several years, Latin America and 

the Caribbean has faced increasing development challenges that 

threaten the national security and the economy of the United 

States. Contracting economic growth rates, extensive poverty, unemployment, skewed income distribution, crime and lawlessness, a 

37

thriving narcotics industry and a deteriorating natural resource 

base continue to undermine the stability of the region. 

The risks of HIV/AIDS and drug resistant tuberculosis on our 

borders also affect the United States as well as our neighbors. Civil 

unrest threatens countries in Central and South America, while political instability in Colombia, Venezuela and Haiti continues 

unabated. 

As events earlier this month illustrate only too clearly, Bolivia is 

also a country where democracy is now at risk. Increasingly, the 

confidence of citizens and the ability of democratically elected governments to provide security and prosperity is waning. Although it 

is heartening to also note that continuing commitment on behalf of 

the hemisphere’s leaders to the principles of democracy as represented by the signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter 

and the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption of the Organization of American States remains firm. 

USAID’s programs in the region focus on promoting equitable 

trade-led economic growth, strengthening the democratic process I 

have spoken of, improving health and education standards and fostering cooperation on issues such as drug trafficking and crime. 

Through our programs, USAID seeks to help achieve the U.S. policy goal of an entire hemisphere that lives in liberty and trades in 

freedom. 

Mr. Chairman, President Bush, Secretary Powell and Administrator Natsios have all said that trade and investment are essential 

to economic growth and poverty reduction, and I could not agree 

more wholeheartedly. 

Our efforts are resulting in an improved enabling environment 

for trade through a strong program in trade capacity building that 

addresses many of the concerns Members have expressed today. 

USAID activities, many in conjunction with the Office of the 

United States Trade Representative, build trade negotiating capacity, develop markets and provide assistance for business development in the countries of the region. 

Programs will help these countries comply with the so-called 

rules of the trade, including sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 

customs reform and intellectual property rights. Because remittances constitute an increasingly large source of development and 

finance, USAID will continue programs to lower remittance transaction costs in the region. 

In addition, the Latin American-Caribbean Bureau at USAID 

promotes rural economic diversification and competitiveness, including nontraditional agricultural exports and access to specialty 

coffee markets. 

Still, Mr. Chairman, economic growth, and I cannot agree with 

Messrs. Menendez and Delahunt more, cannot take place without 

governance institutions that encourage investment and which respond to citizens’ needs. USAID programs strengthen the administration of justice, commercial and contracts law, property rights 

and related legal and regulatory reforms that are necessary to 

stimulate the enabling environment for investment and increase investor confidence, as well as maintaining peace and encouraging 

broader development. USAID sees a very strong link between ecoVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
38

nomic growth and trade on the one hand and good governance and 

the rule of law on the other. They are not mutually exclusive. 

USAID programs also work to combat the corruption which eats 

away at the very heart of a society and weakens both public and 

private sector institutions and confidence. USAID’s anticorruption 

programs emphasize prevention and capacity building as a part of 

attacking weak governance, entrenched political institutions and 

poor public sector management. 

In Guatemala a coalition of nongovernmental organizations has 

advocated the creation of a national plan to attack corruption as 

part of local implementation of the Inter-American Convention 

Against Corruption. 

In Nicaragua, USAID provides assistance to improve the capacity 

of the Attorney General’s office to tackle high profile corruption 

cases against former government officials. 

Only a combination of citizen oversight and improved capacity for 

government inaction will increase the costs of fraud and illegal behavior sufficiently to reduce corruption. Therefore, USAID is working with other U.S. Government agencies, international financial 

institutions and international nongovernmental organizations to 

that end. 

We have also placed great emphasis on two of the President’s 

other stated goals for our region, health and education. In health 

USAID has contributed to significant progress in raising vaccination coverage, reducing or eliminating childhood illnesses such as 

measles and improving an access to primary education. Also because of USAID assistance, affected countries are now more willing 

to discuss and address the HIV/AIDS problem. This is particularly 

relevant in our region as the Caribbean has the second highest rate 

of HIV/AIDS in the world, second only to sub-Saharan Africa. Because diseases do not respect geographic boundaries, I believe 

USAID assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean in health 

care at the policy level is critical to the health and security of the 

United States as well. 

In education, the quality and relevance of primary and secondary 

schooling in Latin America and the Caribbean continues to cause 

concern. USAID education and training programs aim to improve 

the poor state of public education systems where the majority of 

youth attend weak and underfunded public schools and fail to acquire basic skills in mathematics, language and science. 

USAID has begun to implement the President’s vision for centers 

of excellence for teacher training, referred to as CET, in an initiative the President announced in April 2001. As part of CET, three 

subregional training facilities, one in Peru, another in Honduras 

and one in Jamaica, will improve the skills of teachers from 23 

Latin American and Caribbean countries and advance education 

policy reform throughout the region. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus on particularly 

difficult development challenges facing several specific countries 

and describe our efforts to help those countries meet those challenges, first in Colombia, which has been the subject of considerable discussion this afternoon. 

As the other witnesses and Director Walters have attested today, 

Colombia faces many problems, not the least of which is a lack of 

39

state presence in 40 percent of the countries you have noted, Mr. 

Chairman. This has allowed illegal narcotics trade, guerilla armies 

and paramilitary forces to flourish. This is particularly worrisome, 

as events in Colombia affect the entire Andean region. 

Ecuador’s northern border is vulnerable. The intensive eradication efforts by the government of Colombia may create incentives 

for the narcotrafficking industry to resume, as we have heard 

today, in Peru and Bolivia. Colombia’s President Alvaro Uribe is an 

invaluable ally in the war against illicit drug trade, and he is actively pursuing policies to eliminate that trade and expand the 

reach of democracy and the rule of law in Colombia, his vision for 

democratic security on the ground, a necessary component for development to flourish. 

In conjunction with President Uribe’s efforts, USAID’s Alternative Development Program in Colombia seeks to increase legal 

income opportunities for small producers of opium, poppy and cocaine. By strengthening licit economic opportunities, alternative development gives small producers a way to abandon illicit crop production permanently. The program is on track and progressing 

well. Alternative development has now benefitted more than 20,000 

families and supported the cultivation of nearly 16,000 hectares of 

licit crops such as rubber, cassava, specialty coffee and cacao in 

former coca and poppy growing areas. 

USAID also supports numerous activities to assist Afro-Colombians. I know of the concern that Mr. Payne raised today. These 

include activities that improve governance and management and 

accountability to this disadvantaged group and strengthen citizens’ 

participation by this population. Fifteen social infrastructure 

projects such as water and sewer system improvements, schools 

and community centers constructed recently have benefitted approximately 7,500 Afro-Colombians. 

In Bolivia, poverty and social unrest are eating away at the 

democratic processes and the economic stability that that country 

has been trying to maintain for the past 2 decades. From 1998 to 

2001, due to the success of counternarcotic efforts in Bolivia, there 

was a 70 percent decline in coca production, at a cost of $200 million to the Bolivian economy, and the government has had, make 

no mistake about this, difficulty replacing coca income in many 

rural areas. USAID alternative development activities in Bolivia, 

as in Colombia, seek to generate licit economic activity through 

technical assistance to diversify crops and infrastructure construction needed to provide physical access to markets. 

The uprisings of early February have highlighted the importance 

of and the need of the sort of development activity USAID is currently carrying out in Bolivia. In the aftermath of the recent upheaval in Bolivia, USAID participated in the interagency process to 

devise ways to support President Sanchez de Lozada, and we intend to obligate $10 million of economic support funds to enable the 

government of Bolivia to pay multilateral development debt and leverage additional bilateral and multilateral contributions at this 

critical time. 

Mr. Chairman, I have cited the number of democracies and hemispheres as an indicator of progress in the region. Many of the democracies are fragile, and USAID is working in concert with other 

40

U.S. Government organizations on a variety of ways in which we 

have—through an interagency response such as we had in the Bolivian crisis, can strengthen these democracies. 

In addition to Bolivia, I would just like to briefly highlight several countries where complex development problems make them of 

special concern to USAID. 

As Members of this Committee are well aware, lack of cooperation with U.S. antinarcotics efforts and continuing levels of corruption in Guatemala continue to frustrate development efforts there. 

When I appeared before you last on October 10th, I told you about 

our USAID programs, working through nongovernmental organizations, to increase transparency in the court system and to promote 

accountability in public institutions. Since that time, I have travelled to Guatemala and expressed yours as well as the President’s 

concerns to the Vice President of Guatemala and the Chief Justice. 

I intend to continue to raise these concerns once again during a 

meeting of the consultative group with the Inter-American Development Bank later this year and to address these concerns very directly. 

Development in Haiti continues to be frustrated by a democratization process which first stalled and which is now actually moving in reverse. 

A decade of poor governance and economic mismanagement has 

brought the country to a near standstill, and illegal migration to 

the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and the United States is 

again on the rise. Severe drought in the country’s northwest and 

central plateau regions has made things even worse and placed additional strains on our humanitarian relief efforts in that country. 

When President Aristide and his Lavalas Party frustrated 

USAID efforts to the Department of Justice’s ICITAP program to 

bolster the Haitian judiciary and national police, USAID shifted 

emphasis to helping civil society resist the growing 

authoritarianism of the Haitian government. USAID keeps in close 

contact with the Haitian human rights community and incorporates these groups whenever possible into our activities. 

In addition to our work in governance in Haiti, USAID programs 

continue to meet Haiti’s humanitarian needs, including the PL–480 

Title II food program, which is essential to meeting the nutritional 

needs of Haiti’s most at-risk citizens, and they are rural children 

under 5 and nursing and/or pregnant women. 

Overall, we plan to ensure that despite great—as you know this 

Committee knows—great pressures on food commodities at this 

time, that funding in fiscal year 2003 holds steady at a $52.5 million, including $22 million in food aid in spite of the elimination 

of economic support funds for Haiti. 

President Hugo Chavez’s increasing disregard for democratic institutions and intolerance for dissent have also seriously shaken 

confidence in Venezuela’s economy and threatened the development 

of that country. The 2-month strike that recently paralyzed the 

country has now ended, but President Chavez is moving against 

strike leaders. The arrest of prominent strike leaders such as Carlos Fernandez, President of the Venezuelan chamber of commerce, 

undermine the dialogue that you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Delahunt and 

41

others have promoted, as Chavez and his opponents seem farther 

away from seeking a solution to their differences. 

We are, therefore, working with the State Department and other 

U.S. Government agencies to help facilitate an end to the conflict 

in Venezuela. USAID, through its Office of Transition Initiatives, 

supports nonpartisan activities aimed at bringing the two sides together by lowering tensions and bridging the divisions among the 

population. 

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, the only nondemocratic government in the 

hemisphere, sadly, remains Cuba. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity, LIBERTAD, Act of 1996, enacted by the Congress 

and signed by the President of the United States, provides important guidelines for helping promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. I am very proud to say that, since 1997, USAID has 

provided more than $20 million to U.S. universities and other U.S. 

nongovernmental organizations to implement section 109 of the act. 

USAID assistance has been indispensable in helping increase the 

flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights and free 

enterprise to, from and within Cuba. I believe that USAID is 

uniquely positioned to continue to facilitate progress toward a 

peaceful transition to democracy on the island. 

In accordance with the President’s Initiative for a New Cuba, announced in his landmark speech of May 20th, 2002, USAID has 

plans to expand its assistance. Additional support will enable 

USAID, working with U.S. universities, to offer scholarships in the 

United States for Cuban students and professionals who try to 

build independent civil institutions in Cuba; and scholarships are 

for family members of political prisoners as well. USAID is currently working with Georgetown University to implement this type 

of scholarship program for Cuba. 

There is much work to be done in Cuba, and I thank the Committee for its continuing support of USAID efforts there. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, hemispheric commitment to democracy 

remains high for the President, with the signing of the OAS Democracy Charter and agreement to an ambitious democratic reform 

agenda each time the hemisphere’s leaders meet. The political crises of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru are all very 

different, yet they have not caused permanent ruptures in the 

democratic processes of these societies. They demonstrate, however, 

the fragility of institutions and the need to strengthen the building 

blocks of democracy if the progress of the past 2 decades is not to 

be undone. 

As President Bush has said, this hemisphere of 800 million people strives for the dream of a better life, ‘‘A dream of free markets 

and free people and a hemisphere free from war and tyranny. That 

dream has sometimes been frustrated, but it must never be abandoned.’’

We at USAID, along with millions of men and women in America, share this vision of a free and prosperous hemisphere. USAID’s 

programs in trade capacity building, health, education and support 

for good governance are helping our friends and neighbors in the 

hemisphere fulfill their aspirations. 

42

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to 

answer your questions or those of other Members of the Committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Franco follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINIS- TRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTER- NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure once again to appear 

before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House International Relations Committee to tell you about the ways in which USAID’s Bureau for Latin 

America and the Caribbean is promoting the President’s vision for the Western 

Hemisphere. 

President Bush’s National Security Strategy reflects the urgent needs of our country following the September 11 terrorist attacks. It states clearly that the U.S. Government’s aim is to help make the world not just a safer place but a better place. 

At USAID, we work closely with our colleagues in other agencies and departments, 

from the Department of State to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, to promote political and economic freedom for all nations, and particularly among our 

closest neighbors with whom we have such strong social and cultural ties. 

The President has said the future of our Hemisphere depends ‘‘on the strength 

of three commitments: democracy, security and market-based development.’’ 

USAID’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), supports the President’s goal of market-based development with a comprehensive program of trade capacity building programs to support the President’s goals of a Free Trade Area of 

the Americas (FTAA) and a U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). 

Both the President and Secretary Powell have said free trade will lead to the sustained economic growth essential for development to occur. I wish for you to know 

that I have made our efforts at trade capacity building a priority for the Bureau 

for this year. 

The LAC Bureau also supports the President’s other priorities for our region. I 

will tell you about our efforts to promote democracy and good governance, and reduce corruption, in the countries of our Hemisphere. I will also tell you what we 

are doing to promote health and education, both essential for the security about 

which the President spoke. 

The President’s National Security Strategy recognizes the important role of development assistance. In his landmark March 14, 2002 speech to the community of 

donor nations in Monterrey, Mexico, the President pledged to create a Millennium 

Challenge Account (MCA) which would make additional development assistance 

available to countries that show progress in ruling justly, in promoting economic 

freedom and investing in people. The Administration has forwarded legislation authorizing the MCA to Congress, and I hope this Committee will act quickly to enact 

it. 

At USAID, we know that the way in which we do things is as important as what 

we do. During his tenure as USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios has taken the 

President’s challenge to heart and tried to make foreign assistance more effective 

and results-oriented, and I work toward this daily in my role as Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean. I have initiated a substantial review 

of management practices in each of the sixteen missions in my region with an eye 

to increasing efficiency and reducing duplication of effort. 

Despite the continuing challenges, USAID is proud of its contribution to the 

broader U.S. Government policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean. We 

have been working assiduously to remold our program to respond to the development challenges in the region and to promote the President’s priorities for our 

Hemisphere. 

CONTINUING CHALLENGE

Over the past several years, the Latin America and Caribbean region has faced 

increasing development challenges that threaten the national security and economy 

of the United States. Contracting economic growth rates, extensive poverty, unemployment, skewed income distribution, crime and lawlessness, a thriving narcotics 

industry and a deteriorating natural resource base continue to undermine the stability of the region. The risks of HIV/AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis on our 

borders also threaten the population of the United States. Civil unrest due to poor 

economic conditions threatens countries in Central and South America, while political instability in Colombia, Venezuela, and Haiti continues unabated. Increasingly, 

43

citizens’ confidence in the ability of democratically-elected governments to provide 

security and prosperity is waning. Bolivia has also recently emerged as a country 

where democracy is at risk. 

The region’s GDP shrank by approximately 0.8% in 2002, the worst economic performance since 1983. Inflation has edged up after eight years of steady decline. Mediocre economic performance has caused per capita income in LAC countries to decline significantly since 1998, while poverty has increased. These woes have brought 

discontent and political turbulence, raised questions about the health of democracy 

in the region, about investment priorities, social sector policies, and the benefits of 

a decade of liberal reforms. The effects in the poorest countries—Haiti, for instance—and even regions within countries with generally solid economic performance—the Northeast of Brazil, for example—have been even more disheartening. 

Still, it is important not to portray the region in a single-minded negative light. 

LAC’s economy overall is expected to recover slightly in 2003. The Argentine economy is expected to grow about 2% this year. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and the Dominican 

Republic are expected to top the growth league in 2003, with expansion of 3% or 

more, assuming that the slowdown in the United States abates and strong growth 

resumes. Countries which adopt sound fiscal policies and orient their economies toward foreign investment, and rules-based trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO), have tended to resist the recent downturn. The result of NAFTA has 

been phenomenal growth for all three partners. Since 1993, trade among NAFTA 

nations has climbed drastically, and U.S. merchandise exports have nearly doubled. 

This has had a positive development effects on Mexico, in particular. 

Another area of progress is commitment of LAC countries to good governance as 

represented by the signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the InterAmerican Convention Against Corruption of the Organization of American States 

(OAS). Nicaragua is striving to curb government corruption, and other countries, 

such as Mexico, have also made important commitments to reduce official corruption. Recent elections conducted in Jamaica, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador 

were all judged to be free and fair. 

PRIORITIES

To address the myriad challenges in the LAC region, the United States is committed strongly to helping build an entire hemisphere that lives in liberty and 

trades in freedom. U.S. foreign policy priorities in the Western Hemisphere, to 

which USAID is an important contributor, include promoting equitable trade-led 

economic growth, strengthening democratic processes, improving health and education standards, and fostering cooperation on issues such as drug trafficking and 

crime. 

TRADE AS THE ENGINE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Sustained development depends on market-based economies, sound monetary and 

fiscal policies, and increased trade and investment. Our efforts in LAC are resulting 

in an improved enabling environment for positive and peaceful changes. We are 

mindful of the critical need to continue these efforts and build on our experiences 

in order to encourage further economic development. President Bush, Secretary 

Powell, and Administrator Natsios have all said trade and investment are essential 

to economic growth and poverty reduction. Without an increase in trade and investment, the region’s substantial development gains will be put at risk, and hemispheric stability could falter. 

Since the 1980s, USAID has played a lead role in the LAC region by supporting 

programs aimed at strengthening the enabling environment for trade and investment as the twin engines for economic growth and poverty reduction. In August 

2002, President Bush signed the Trade Act of 2002. On January 8, 2003, Secretary 

Struble and I participated with U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Robert 

Zoellick in launching the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement negotiations, 

and negotiations continue on track to establish an FTAA agreement by January 

2005. USAID has responded to these opportunities by moving quickly to assist 

LAC’s smaller economies and developing countries strengthen their enabling environment for trade and investment as the essential foundation for building greater 

capacity to participate effectively in the global trading system. 

Whatever the final shape of the FTAA agreement, the result will mean more 

trade, more jobs, and more income for the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and the other 31 

FTAA countries of the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. 

44

TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING

The following provides an overview of USAID support for trade capacity building 

in the LAC region. From FY 1999 through FY 2001, USG support for trade capacity 

building in the LAC region averaged in excess of $50 million per year, with an estimated 70% (approximately $35 million annually) provided by USAID. For FY 2003, 

USAID plans to increase its support for trade capacity building in the LAC region 

to the extent that funds are available. Let me highlight some of the current USAID 

program highlights in trade capacity building across LAC sub-regions: 

USAID activities will continue to build trade-negotiating capacity, develop markets, and provide assistance for business development. Programs will assist with 

complying with the ‘‘rules of trade’’ such as sanitary/phytosanitary measures, customs reform, and intellectual property rights. Support for legal, policy, and regulatory reforms will improve the climate for trade and investment. Recognizing that 

remittances constitute a potentially large source of development finance, USAID will 

continue to support and implement mechanisms for remittance transfer with lower 

transaction costs. Assistance will expand in the area of commercial and contract law 

and property rights. USAID will continue to build on its successful efforts with promoting rural economic diversification and competitiveness, including non-traditional 

agricultural exports and access to specialty coffee markets. Business development 

and marketing services will help small and medium farmers and rural enterprises 

improve competitiveness and tap new markets. 

In Central America and Mexico, USAID will continue the Opportunity Alliance 

(formerly the Partnership for Prosperity), emphasizing trade-led rural competitiveness through diversification and penetrating agricultural niche markets. The Alliance was initiated in FY 2002 in response to a protracted drought, collapse of coffee 

prices and resulting unemployment of seasonal agricultural workers. An estimated 

52% of the population, more than 14 million people, is poor and chronically foodinsecure in Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. USAID activities in 

FY 2003 and FY 2004 will continue to support democratic governance, trade and 

employment creation, agricultural production, sound environmental management, 

and training. USAID is assisting the Central American countries in their efforts to 

prepare for the FTAA and, more recently, to prepare for negotiation and implementation of US–CAFTA. As part of this process, USAID worked closely with other donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank to assist each Central American 

country in preparing a national trade capacity building strategy in support of their 

participation in the CAFTA process. 

For the Caribbean, USAID has added a trade component to the Third Border Initiative (TBI) efforts to strengthen trade capacity and competitiveness of Caribbean 

countries. It will build on modest trade activities underway for several years in a 

sub-region with many small island economies lacking diverse sources of income. 

When launched in 2002, TBI aimed to strengthen political, economic and security 

ties between the U.S. and the nations of the Caribbean. The majority of interventions and bulk of funding thus far have supported USAID’s HIV/AIDS program. 

Working closely with the development assistance community, USAID is now moving 

quickly to mobilize trade capacity building support to respond to countries’ priorities 

including technical training of government trade officials; developing trade-related 

databases; implementing trade agreement commitments in such areas as customs 

reforms and sanitary and phytosanitary measures; providing assistance for small 

business development; and fostering greater civil society outreach. USAID’s Caribbean Regional Program is developing initiatives to strengthen the competitiveness 

of CARICOM countries in hemispheric and global trade, and will be assisting eight 

CARICOM countries in preparing their national trade capacity building strategies 

under the FTAA Hemispheric Cooperation Program. 

In South America, USAID has added a trade emphasis to the Andean Regional 

Initiative (ARI). USAID initiated trade capacity building activities in FY 2002 and 

is expanding the program for trade in the sub-region in FY 2003. USAID/Peru is 

developing an Andean Regional trade capacity building program to assist Andean 

Community countries in addressing ‘‘rules of trade’’ and competitiveness issues, 

with an initial emphasis in providing technical assistance in a variety of trade disciplines areas including customs reforms, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 

competition policy, and services. 

At the bilateral level, more of our missions are developing new or building upon 

existing economic growth programs to address trade and investment issues. For example, in the Dominican Republic, USAID has supported technical training on trade 

issues for government trade officials, while in Jamaica USAID has supported a private sector-led program that provides succinct information to private and public sector leaders on the benefits of free trade. As a result of these USAID-supported trade 

45

capacity building efforts, the Dominican Republic has offered better market access 

in recent rounds of negotiations, while both the private sector in Jamaica and the 

broader English-speaking Caribbean now have a better understanding of the potential benefits of free trade and have become stronger advocates for the FTAA. 

At the hemispheric level, USAID has a new ‘‘quick response mechanism’’ to provide greater capacity to address technical assistance and training needs arising from 

trade negotiations. Through this mechanism, we are working with FTAA countries, 

initially in Central America and Brazil, to provide government officials and civil society-including business leaders≤with information on the benefits of free trade. 

An important aspect of building trade capacity is broadening the education base 

for a more productive workforce. USAID will support advancements at the secondary level and in workforce training that will improve the quality of instruction, 

increase worker productivity, and help youths prepare for entering the workforce. 

For example, USAID’s Training, Internships, Exchanges, and Scholarships (TIES) 

program in Mexico will enhance capacity of Mexican scholars and institutions to respond to the objectives and strategies of NAFTA and the Partnership for Prosperity, 

which together define the emerging U.S.-Mexico Common Development Agenda. 

DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND ANTI-CORRUPTION

The key to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction, I believe, is fostering a strong enabling environment for trade and investment. This requires a mix 

of ‘‘economic governance’’ institutions vital for attracting investment, creating jobs, 

and expanding trade. These systems are predicated on democratic systems of governance with leaders responsive to citizens’ needs and supportive of transparent 

public administration. Administration of justice, commercial and contracts law, 

property rights, and related legal and regulatory reform are key to stimulating the 

enabling environment and increasing investor confidence. USAID will continue to 

reinforce linkages between economic growth and trade on the one hand, and good 

governance and the rule of law on the other. 

While support for democracy remains solid in the LAC region, popular disillusionment is growing with those governments that cannot reduce poverty, corruption, 

crime, and violence. Although significant strides have been made (with the exception 

of Cuba every country in the Hemisphere has a democratic, constitutionally-installed government), many of these democracies remain fragile and must make a 

concerted effort to reinforce the institutional building blocks of democracy. Economic 

difficulties tend to weaken support for free market reforms and the fabric of whole 

societies. 

An independent, efficient, and transparent judiciary is not only fundamental for 

a functioning democracy but also a prerequisite for increased external investment. 

USAID continues to support a broad range of institution-building efforts to strengthen judicial systems and increase respect for the rule of law. Increased crime and 

violence is consistently ranked as citizens’ primary concern, next to unemployment. 

The rise of violence in Jamaica has become so paralyzing to the country’s touristdriven economy that the private sector and civil society are joining to help combat 

the problem at the community level with USAID assistance. The endemic problems 

of impunity for violent crime, as well as corruption, money-laundering and narcotics 

crime, undercuts social and economic growth in many LAC countries. USAID is responding in more than a dozen countries in the Hemisphere by providing direct assistance for the modernization of justice sector procedures, systems and institutions. 

Over the last decade, these countries have worked to change systems of justice 

where crimes were not investigated and legal files were lost. Instead, countries have 

created new transparent procedures, are retraining professionals, and are gradually 

implementing the use of oral, public trials to determine guilt or innocence for a 

range of crimes. In Honduras, for example, USAID supported a group of local reformers who began work in 1995 to change the justice system. In 2002, after years 

of effort, the old system was swept away, and Honduras now has a new code that 

entirely restructured the criminal court system and requires open trials with defense, prosecution and the public presentation of evidence. Although it will take 

years to implement these procedures fully, Hondurans are justifiably proud of reforming a system that responds uniquely to local needs, adapts the best solutions 

from many countries, and establishes the framework for confronting and reducing 

impunity. 

USAID also helps strengthen the capacity of national and local governments to 

demonstrate that responsible regimes can deliver benefits to their citizens. With the 

direct election of local mayors and the devolution of authority to municipalities, 

USAID is helping citizens and elected leaders devise community development plans 

that respond to local needs and generate growth. In fourteen countries, USAID is 

46

helping mayors hold public hearings about annual budgets and allow citizen involvement in public decision-making. Mayors in many towns have also established transparent accounting and financial management procedures with USAID assistance to 

create the framework for greater revenue generation at the local level for roads, 

schools, health centers, and job creation. In turn, citizens monitor the use of public 

funds and devise ‘‘social audits’’ in countries such as the Dominican Republic and 

Bolivia to track spending in accordance with local development plans in order to 

keep officials accountable to the public. 

USAID’s anti-corruption programs emphasize prevention and capacity-building as 

part of attacking weak governance, entrenched political institutions, and poor public 

sector management. Higher levels of corruption are associated with lower growth 

and lower levels of per capita income. Since corruption increases the cost of doing 

business, failure to act will seriously threaten the benefits likely to accrue through 

the FTAA. To improve transparency and decrease opportunities for corrupt behavior, USAID supports multi-faceted approaches to anti-corruption programming. In 

Guatemala, a coalition of non-governmental organizations has advocated creation of 

a national plan to attack corruption as part of local implementation of the InterAmerican Convention Against Corruption. In Ecuador, the Anti-Corruption Commission has the investigative authority to uncover cases of corruption and with USAID 

support has played a leading role in exposing scandals in banking, municipal budget 

transfers, and illicit enrichment of public officials. In Nicaragua, USAID provides 

assistance to improve the capacity of the Attorney General’s Office to tackle highprofile corruption cases against the former government. USAID is also helping the 

new Office of Public Ethics in the Nicaraguan Presidency which will have responsibility for setting norms and standards for ethical conduct, training public employees 

and monitoring government agencies’ compliance with internal control systems. 

Only a combination of citizen oversight and improved capacity for government action will increase the costs of fraud and illegal behavior sufficiently to reduce corruption. USAID is working with other US agencies, international financial institutions and international organizations to that end. 

HEALTH AND EDUCATION

The LAC Bureau has placed great emphasis on two of the President’s other stated 

goals for our region-health and education. In health, there has been significant 

progress in raising vaccination coverage, reducing or eliminating major childhood illnesses such as measles, and improving access to primary education. Also, because 

of USAID assistance, affected countries are more willing to discuss the HIV/AIDS 

problem. This is particularly relevant in our region, as the Caribbean has the second 

highest rate of HIV/AIDS in the world, after sub-Saharan Africa. USAID programs 

have had some success in reducing the social stigma attached to the disease, and 

prevention campaigns, including those which promote abstinence, hold even greater 

promise for lowering transmission rates. While steady progress is being made in 

lowering maternal mortality, and in applying proven cost-effective protocols for combating malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases, rates remain unacceptably high, while new strains of the causative organisms are increasingly resistant 

to treatment. Because diseases do not respect geographic boundaries, and due to the 

high numbers of legal as well as illegal immigrants traveling to the United States, 

I believe USAID assistance to the LAC countries in health care at the policy, institutional and technical levels is considered critical to the health and security of the 

United States. 

In education, the quality and relevance of primary and secondary schooling in 

LAC countries continue to cause concern. The proportion of students who complete 

secondary school is low compared to the number in Asian countries, and many of 

those who do finish lack adequate skills to compete in the workplace. USAID education and training programs aim to improve the poor state of public education systems where the majority of youth attend weak and under-funded public schools and 

fail to acquire basic skills in mathematics, language, and science. USAID will continue to provide support for improving the environment for education reform, enhance the skills of teachers and administrators, and improve the relevance and 

skills of the workforce. USAID will also continue support to the newly launched 

Centers of Excellence for Teacher Training (CETT) initiative announced by Presidential Bush in April 2001. Established in Peru, Honduras, and Jamaica, the three 

sub-regional training facilities will improve the cadre of teachers in 23 LAC countries and advance education policy reform in key countries. Advancements at the 

secondary level and in faculty and workforce training will improve the quality of instruction, increase worker productivity, and help youths prepare for entering the 

workforce. 

47

PERENNIAL ISSUES

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to focus on the particularly difficult development 

challenges facing some specific countries and describe USAID efforts to help countries meet these challenges. 

ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE

Colombia 

Colombia faces many problems, not the least of which is the lack of state presence 

in 40% of the country which has allowed the illegal narcotics trade, guerilla armies, 

and paramilitary forces to flourish. Colombia’s civil war has the potential to destabilize other countries in the region if guerilla activities and/or drug production spills 

over the borders. Events in Colombia affect the entire region. Ecuador’s northern 

border is vulnerable, and intensive eradication efforts by the Government of Colombia may create incentives for the narco-trafficking industry in Peru and Bolivia. 

Colombia’s President Alvaro Uribe is an invaluable ally in the war against the 

illicit drug trade who is actively pursuing policies to eliminate that trade and expand the reach of democracy and rule of law in Colombia. USAID’s Alternative Development (AD) program in Colombia seeks to increase legal income opportunities 

for small producers of opium poppy and cocaine. By strengthening licit economic opportunities, alternative development gives small producers a way to abandon illicit 

crop production permanently. The program is on track and progressing well. AD has 

now benefited more that 20,000 families and supported the cultivation of nearly 

16,000 hectares of licit crops such as rubber, cassava, specialty coffee, and cacao in 

former coca and poppy growing areas. 

Infrastructure initiatives are an important component of the program as they provide short term employment for laborers during construction projects as families 

make the transition to licit crops. Infrastructure projects also provide communities 

with the physical access to markets necessary to make a viable, licit economy sustainable. To date, 208 social infrastructure projects including roads, bridges, schools, 

and potable water have been completed under the Alternative Development program 

in Colombia. 

Closely associated with the Alternative Development program in Colombia is our 

Administration of Justice program which is modernizing and increasing access to 

the judicial system. Thirty-one casas de justicia (or ‘‘justice houses’’) currently operate. These centers have handled approximately 1.5 million cases. This year at least 

12 oral trial courtrooms will be established—making the judicial system more accessible and accountable. 

Respect for human rights is an important aspect of the rule of law and administration of justice. Approximately 672 municipal human rights officials have been 

trained in basic concepts of human rights, family violence prevention, and the rights 

of indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups. In addition, USAID has helped 600,000 

internally displaced persons reintegrate into Colombian society. 

USAID supports numerous activities to assist Afro-Colombians. The projects are 

focused on improving governance management and accountability; expanding social 

infrastructure; and strengthening citizen participation. Fifteen social infrastructure 

projects such as water and sewer system improvements, schools and community centers constructed recently have benefited approximately 7,500 Afro-Colombians. 

Training and assistance is being provided to the mainly Afro-Colombian Pacific portcity of Buenaventura (Valle de Cauca) to reduce crime and violence and foster local 

economic development. In Bogota, USAID is working with one of the most significant Afro-Colombian NGOs (AFRODES) to build a community/child education center 

and develop income-generation projects. 

Peru 

Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo has taken steps to promote democracy and 

a market-based economy. He has also promised new anti-narcotics efforts. USAID 

is working closely with the Government of Peru to help it strengthen the capacity 

of its counter-narcotics coordinating body, the organization which is charged with 

implementation of the Government’s counter-narcotics strategy. Projects supporting 

economic growth and more effective and responsive state presence in the coca-producing regions link alternative development to eradication and interdiction efforts 

directly. 

In Peru, USAID’s alternative development activities focus on: providing immediate economic and social impact through short term, income producing activities; 

community organization in areas where coca has been eradicated; promoting sustainable economic and social development in and around the primary coca growing 

area through major road rehabilitation and other infrastructure works; and assistVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
48

ance and training for local/regional governments, other Government agencies, private entrepreneurs and small farmers. To date, USAID’s Alternative Development 

program has provided assistance to approximately 18,000 families to grow licit crops 

on more that 32,000 hectares; given credit to 4,800 clients; completed community 

infrastructure projects such as schools, health clinics and sanitation systems; and 

rehabilitated and maintained 1,400 kilometers of roads. This year USAID will rehabilitate a 172 kilometer segment of the principal national highway thus dramatically reducing transportation costs to producers and increasing the region’s competitiveness. 

Complementing the Alternative Development program are economic growth activities aimed at increasing access to markets for micro-entrepreneurs and small producers of licit crops and goods. Occurring mainly in the seven-department area 

where Peru’s coca production is concentrated, USAID will help identify markets for 

local products and then link entrepreneurs/producers to organizations that improve 

their productivity and competitiveness in the marketplace. USAID will also continue 

to support sustainable forest and protected areas management including concessions 

for forest products. 

Ecuador 

In Ecuador, President Lucio Gutierrez has only recently assumed power but has 

made anti-corruption one of his top priorities. President Gutierrez seeks to increase 

transparency in government procurement; oblige public officials to declare their financial assets and facilitate the processing of citizen complaints on corruption. 

USAID has been actively promoting anti-corruption efforts through strengthening 

citizen oversight of local governments, developing more secure and transparent information systems and procedures for Customs, the Ministry of Finance, the domestic tax authority and the Superintendency of Banks and eliminating frivolous and 

redundant laws to make the legal system more transparent. We have just completed 

an assessment of the corruption problem and will be working closely with the government to develop strategies for addressing it. 

Ecuador’s President Gutierrez also faces economic challenges. He must fight in 

order to keep dollarization afloat and strengthen the country’s financial stability in 

order to address long standing social issues and to reduce Ecuador’s vulnerability 

to spillover from Colombia’s narcotics-related problems. USAID is assisting the Government of Ecuador to develop a strong and sustainable microfinance sector in Ecuador and improve the macroeconomic climate for more equitable growth. 

USAID is also paying particular attention to the northern border with Colombia. 

USAID’s Northern Border program is improving the lives of people living in six 

provinces adjacent to Ecuador’s northern border by strengthening their communities. Principal activities include support for social infrastructure such as water, 

sanitation, and roads; activities to strengthen civil society organizations; and assistance to displaced Colombians and receiving communities. Future activities include 

improving local government capacity, strengthening democratic governance, and increasing employment and income. To date, more that 132,000 Ecuadorians have 

benefited from water systems or improved access to markets via bridges. About 

50,000 Ecuadorians, mostly Afro-Ecuadorians and members of the Ecuadorian indigenous community have benefited from better-led community organizations. During 

his recent trip to Washington, President Gutierrez committed himself to a continued 

fight against illegal narcotics and closer cooperation with Colombia to combat 

narcotraffic. We will continue to support him in these efforts. 

Bolivia 

In Bolivia, poverty and social unrest are eating away the democratic processes 

and economic stability that the country has been trying to maintain for the past two 

decades. I will refer later to USAID’s efforts to stabilize the economic situation following civil unrest earlier this month but wanted here to mention Bolivia’s development problems. The fact is, many Bolivian citizens feel neglected by their Government. From 1998 to 2001, due to the success of counternarcotics efforts, there was 

a 70% decline in coca at a cost of $200 million to the Bolivian economy. The loss 

of this illicit income was felt most by the small-scale farmer. Financial problems in 

neighboring Argentina and Brazil are exacerbating the economic problem, and illegal coca replanting is a growing threat to the successful implementation of Bolivia’s 

anti-narcotics strategy. There is also concern that the intensive spraying program 

in Colombia will translate into pressure from the narcotics industry for new production in Bolivia. These concerns and the uprisings of early February have heightened 

the importance of and the need for USAID’s Alternative Development program in 

Bolivia. 

49

USAID is working closely with the Government of Bolivia (GOB) to find ways to 

meet these challenges. We are working to eliminate illegal and excess coca from Bolivia by establishing sustainable, farm-level production capacity and market linkages for licit crops; increasing licit net household income; and improving municipal 

planning capacity, social infrastructure and public health in targeted communities. 

The Alternative Development program is focused on reducing the poverty level of 

former and current coca producers to allow them to make a successful transition to 

licit income generation and bringing the benefits of the Government of Bolivia’s 

anti-narcotics strategy to the community level.

• In the coca-producing Chapare region of Bolivia, road maintenance and improvement assistance will reduce transportation costs for licit crops, while 

marketing services and grants will address the shorter-term problems of farm 

families in the areas where coca is eradicated.

• In the Yungas region, USAID will introduce improved agricultural technologies for selected products to improve competitiveness. The adoption of low 

cost forestry and agro-forestry practices will improve soil fertility and increase 

licit crop yields. USAID will also focus on highly visible, high-priority projects 

such as road improvement and bridges. These projects will be defined by the 

communities themselves and be contingent on coca reduction.

Complementing the Alternative Development program is reform of the criminal 

justice system through support for implementation of the new Code of Criminal Procedures. The new code makes justice more accessible and transparent through use 

of an oral system and citizen judges. The previous written, inquisitorial system lent 

itself to corruption and delays and discouraged the average citizen from seeking judicial redress. Improved court processes have reduced case processing time by twothirds. 

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY/COUNTRIES OF CONCERN

I have cited the number of democracies in the Hemisphere as an indicator of 

progress in the region. Many of these democracies are fragile, however, and USAID 

works in concert with other U.S. Government organizations, in a variety of ways, 

to strengthen these democracies. 

Bolivia: As I have said, Bolivia has significant development challenges, many of 

them linked to the narcotics trade. However, as we all saw earlier this month, Bolivia faces significant immediate challenges to its democratic process. Bolivia remains a strategic ally of the U.S. in Andean counter-drug efforts and played a leading role in South America in democratic reform and trade liberalization. Its current 

economic difficulties are in significant part a result of external factors. Although Bolivia has achieved unprecedented success in reducing illicit coca, this has also contributed to economic hardship. The crisis began with Bolivian President Sanchez de 

Lozada’s February 9 announcement of an austerity budget and payroll taxes aimed 

at securing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Coming on the 

heels of a multi-year economic downturn and high unemployment, these fiscal measures triggered violent demonstrations which left 32 dead and over 205 injured. Of 

particular concern was a nationwide strike by the Bolivian National Police who demand overdue salaries and a lifting of the salary freeze imposed by the new budget. 

The army finally mobilized to restore order. Despite the turmoil, democracy held 

and the elected government remains in control, although the situation remains fragile. President Sanchez de Lozada requested immediate support from the U.S. and 

other donors. The IMF indicated it would consider a more flexible short term solution to the budget as part of a standby agreement, provided that additional donor 

funding became available immediately to meet the financing gap. USAID intends to 

obligate $10,000,000 of Economic Support Funds for an economic stabilization program in Bolivia. USAID’s assistance will be used by the Government of Bolivia for 

payment of multilateral development debt and will leverage additional bilateral and 

multilateral contributions. 

Guatemala: As the members of this Committee are well aware, Guatemala is of 

continuing concern because of lack of cooperation with U.S. anti-narcotics efforts 

and because of continuing levels of corruption. When I appeared before you last October 10, I told you about USAID efforts, working through non-governmental organizations, to increase transparency in the court system and promote accountability in 

public institutions. Since then, I have traveled to Guatemala and expressed my continuing concern to the Guatemalan Vice-President and Chief Justice. I intend to 

raise these issues again during a meeting of the Consultative Group later this year. 

Haiti: I would now like to shift to the continuing challenge presented by Haiti, 

where the democratization process has stalled and is now actually moving in reVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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verse. A decade of poor governance and economic mismanagement has brought the 

country to a near-standstill, and illegal migration to the Dominican Republic, the 

Bahamas, and the United States is again on the rise. A pernicious drought the country’s Northwest and Central Plateau regions has made things even worse and placed 

additional strains on our humanitarian relief efforts in the country. In the late nineties, USAID channeled tens of millions of dollars through the Department of Justice’s ICITAP program to bolster the Haitian judiciary and national police. With the 

overwhelming dominance of President Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party, however, these efforts bore little fruit, and we shifted our emphasis to helping civil society resist the growing authoritarianism of the Haitian government. We are continuing in this vein, and recently have added activities to strengthen political parties and the independent media. The country’s direction now depends on whether 

the government can establish a climate for free and fair elections in 2003 and secure 

the participation of Haiti’s opposition parties, many of which boycotted the election 

of President Aristide in November 2000. We also keep in close contact with the Haitian human rights community and incorporate these groups whenever possible into 

our activities. Last but not least, we are actively engaged with the Haitian Diaspora, seeking ways to help them foster democracy in Haiti. 

In the meantime, USAID will continue with programs designed to meet the population’s essential humanitarian needs, generate employment in a difficult economic 

environment, and strengthen civil society’s ability to resist growing 

authoritarianism and lawlessness. Overall, we plan to ensure that Haiti’s funding 

for FY 2003 holds steady at $52.5 million (including $22 million in food aid) in spite 

of the elimination of ESF funding. The P.L. 480 Title II food program is a key element of USAID’s support for humanitarian needs in Haiti. Some food is distributed 

outright—formerly through school feeding programs but now principally through 

maternal-child health facilities located in remote areas. This shift in the program 

is important to ensure that U.S. food aid is reaching the neediest and most vulnerable Haitians—rural children under five and nursing and/or pregnant mothers. The 

bulk of the Title II food commodities are sold to local millers and the proceeds used 

to finance projects in health care (including assistance to orphans), primary education, and food production. 

Venezuela: Political conflict over the policies of President Hugo Chavez has seriously shaken Venezuela’s economy and threatened development in the country. 

Since taking office, Chavez has demonstrated increasing disregard for democratic institutions and intolerance for dissent. Venezuela now stands at a dramatic juncture 

in its democratic history. The two month strike that recently paralyzed the country 

has now ended, but President Chavez is moving against strike leaders. Carlos 

Fernandez, President of the Chamber of Commerce was arrested recently for his 

role in the strike, and there is a warrant for the arrest of Carlos Ortega, the President of the Confederation of Venezuela Workers. The arrest of prominent strike 

leaders could undermine the dialogue between the two sides. Acts of violence 

against strike leaders and participants raise concerns about respect for human 

rights in Venezuela. 

USAID, through its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), supports non-partisan 

activities aimed at bringing the two sides together, lowering tensions, and bridging 

divisions among the population. USAID has expanded opportunities for government 

and opposition forces to meet at the bargaining table and helped them identify common interests. USAID is also providing training in conflict mediation and negotiation techniques to government and opposition representatives involved in the national dialogue. We have also assisted government institutions to increase transparency and better respond to the needs of their constituents. 

CUBA: THE ONLY NON-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN THE HEMISPHERE

The ‘‘Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, enacted 

by the U.S. Congress and signed by the President of the United States, provides important guidelines for helping promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. 

I am very proud to say, since 1997, USAID has provided more than $20 million to 

U.S. universities and other U.S. non-governmental organizations to implement Section 109 of the Act. USAID assistance has been indispensable in helping increase 

the flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise 

to, from, and within Cuba. Among other actions, grantees have: sent more than one 

million books, newsletters, videos and other informational materials on democracy, 

human rights and free enterprise to the Cuban people; provided more than 7,000 

short wave radios to Cuba’s human rights activists, independent journalists and 

independent Cuban non-governmental organizations; provided more than 50, 000 

pounds of food and medicine to the families of political prisoners and other victims 

51

of repression; helped train over one hundred of Cuba’s independent journalists and 

published thousands of their reports on the Internet as well as in hard copy for distribution on the island; sent international human rights monitors to the island to 

help build solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists and to report to the international community the Cuban Government’s violations of human rights; and developed research papers, conferences and seminars on transitions to democracy in 

other countries to exchange information relevant to the future Cuban transition and 

share those lessons with the Cuban people. 

I believe USAID is uniquely positioned to continue to facilitate progress toward 

a peaceful transition to democracy on the island. In accordance with the President’s 

Initiative for a New Cuba announced in his landmark speech of May 20, 2002, 

USAID has plans to expand its assistance. Additional support will enable USAID, 

working with U.S. universities, to offer scholarships in the United States for Cuban 

students and professionals who try to build independent civil institutions in Cuba, 

and scholarships for family members of political prisoners. USAID is currently 

working with Georgetown University to implement this type of Cuba scholarship 

program. There is so much work to do in Cuba, and I thank the Committee for its 

continuing support of USAID efforts there. 

CONCLUSION

Hemispheric commitment to democracy remains high, with the creation of the 

OAS Democracy Charter and agreement to an ambitious democratic reform agenda 

each time the Hemisphere’s leaders meet. So far, democratic systems have persisted 

even in the face of severe economic crisis and, in some cases, either very weak or 

even virtually no effective governance. The political crises of Colombia, Venezuela, 

Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru—all very different—have not yet caused permanent ruptures in democratic practices. They nonetheless demonstrate the fragility of institutions and the need to strengthen the building blocks of democracy if the progress 

of the past two decades is not to be undone. As President Bush has said, this hemisphere of eight hundred million people strives for the dream of a better life, ‘‘A 

dream of free markets and free people, in a hemisphere free from war and tyranny. 

That dream has sometimes been frustrated—but it must never be abandoned.’’ 

President Bush knows there are millions of men and women in the Americas who 

share his vision of a free, prosperous, and democratic hemisphere. At USAID, our 

programs in trade capacity building, health, education, and support for good governance are helping our friends and neighbors in the Hemisphere fulfill their aspirations. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any of 

your or the Committee’s questions.

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Struble, you are next. 

STATEMENT OF J. CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. STRUBLE. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

let me first begin by expressing the regret of Under Secretary Marc 

Grossman, that he is not here today. As you know, Under Secretary Grossman had intended to testify before this Committee but 

was asked, following the tabling of the U.S.–U.K. resolution in the 

United Nations Security Council earlier this week, by the Secretary 

to travel to the capitals of some of our friends and allies to discuss 

that resolution. 

President Bush, speaking before the Organization of American 

States last year, said, ‘‘We are committed to building a prosperous, 

free and democratic hemisphere. Nothing will distract us. Nothing 

will deter us in completing this great work.’’

The United States has a vision of the hemisphere united in democracy, peace and prosperity. Through the Summit of the Americas process, our pursuit of that vision has been joined by 33 other 

nations, representing 800 million people. For three Administrations 

we have persevered in this effort, adjusting our focus as needed. 

52

Because our engagement is so wide-ranging, Mr. Chairman, I 

have prepared and would like to submit for the record a written 

statement addressing in greater the detail the issues confronting 

our hemisphere’s nations and the Administration’s steps to address 

them. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection. 

Mr. STRUBLE. There are three elements forming the framework 

of our hemispheric policy: Democracy, security and development. 

The core is increasing freedom, freedom for the individual to grow 

and develop, for societies to determine their own future and for the 

state to advance its people and interaction with the world. 

While free elections are now the norm throughout most of the 

Americas, elections alone are not enough to establish responsible 

democratic government. The people of the hemisphere want and we 

promote reforms to deepen democratic institutions and invest in 

people. To deepen and develop democracy, we negotiated and 

signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter adopted on September 11th of 2001. The Charter acknowledges collective responsibility to promote, protect and advance democracy in this hemisphere, and it has been the basis for more active regional engagement in crises in the region. 

The President announced on May 20 of last year an initiative to 

promote a transition to democracy and the only nation in the hemisphere that did not sign the charter was Cuba. 

The people of the hemisphere express discontent with the quality 

of their democracy and the perceived inability of their governments 

to deliver higher standards of living, safe streets and good schools. 

Efforts to deliver these objectives require responsible government 

stewardship. To improve governance, we offer enhanced help in the 

fight against corruption across the hemisphere. 

For example, when President Bolanos of Nicaragua sought to 

beat back impunity in his nation, it was a U.S. Government funded 

and trained anticorruption unit in the police that carried out initial 

investigations against tainted high-level figures. 

We have also used the new authorities of the Patriot Act to revoke visas of corrupt public officials who have laundered money 

through the United States, assuring that those who steal from 

their own people will find no safe haven here. 

Promoting hemispheric security remains a key U.S. objective, as 

it is a precondition to so many other interests that we share with 

our hemispheric partners, including stopping terrorism, ending 

trafficking in arms, illicit narcotics and trafficking in people, 

strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, halting 

environmental degradation, ending lawlessness and criminality, 

and developing economies. 

Following the September 11th attacks, the hemisphere invoked 

the Rio Treaty, our collective security agreement. The OAS, with 

strong U.S. leadership, also revitalized the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, known as CICTE, transforming it into 

an effective body of counterterrorism experts that can take concrete 

action. 

In just 1 year, OAS member states negotiated and signed the 

Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, a binding legal instrument that establishes mechanisms for coordinated action 

53

against terrorism. We are improving other forms of cooperation 

with our friends as well, including strengthening the Financial Action Task Force’s efforts to combat money laundering. 

In December 2001, the U.S. and Canada signed the Smart Border Action Plan, creating a more secure and more efficient border. 

To the south we enhanced our shared border security with Mexico 

by signing and implementing a similar border partnership plan. 

Over the past year, we have made significant progress toward 

our mutual goal of keeping North America safe from terrorism 

while sustaining trade and transportation flows crucial to our 

economies and citizens. To further combat the Western Hemisphere’s terrorists, we sought and obtained new legal authorities 

for actions in and with Colombia; and, with this body’s support, 

since July 2000, the U.S. has provided Colombia with almost $2 

billion to combat drug trafficking and terrorism, problems that are 

inextricably intertwined. 

These resources have also strengthened Colombia’s democratic 

institutions, protected human rights, fostered socioeconomic development and mitigated the impact of violence on civilians. Democratic and political stability promotes financial stability, trade and 

investment, but the reverse is also true. We have exercised leadership, both bilaterally and with international financial institutions, 

to assist nations suffering from financial crises. 

The United States provided Uruguay with a $1.5 billion bridge 

loan last fall that was repaid with interest in 1 week. 

Argentina has now stabilized its economy and with crucial help 

from the United States reached a transitional accord with the IMF 

and begun the long climb back to economic recovery. 

We have also assisted Brazil and Bolivia in their efforts to obtain 

significantly greater resources from international financial institutions. 

Presidents Bush and Fox launched the U.S.-Mexico Partnership 

for Prosperity in September 2001 to promote development in the 

more remote areas of Mexico. This innovative public-private initiative tackles the root causes of migration by fostering an environment in which no Mexican feels compelled to leave his or her home 

to find work. 

In its first 17 months, the Partnership has reduced the cost of 

sending money home for thousands of Mexicans in the U.S. It has 

trained Mexican entrepreneurs in the use of electronic commerce 

and launched a $100 million fund to finance environmental 

projects. The Partnership has also provided over a million dollars 

for feasibility studies for Mexican infrastructure projects and initiated a $50 million 7-year scholarship program. 

Bringing markets together will benefit all citizens of the hemisphere, which is increasingly integrated into the world economy. 

That is why the Free Trade Area of the Americas is one of the 

President’s top worldwide trade priorities and serves as a key to 

our hemispheric partnership, but it is not the only such key. The 

Andean Trade Preferences and Drug Eradication Act, mentioned 

several times already, is encouraging alternative development 

throughout a troubled region. We negotiated and signed a free 

trade agreement with Chile, and our negotiations with the five 

54

Central American nations for free trade area are encouraging more 

rapid integration to accelerate and sustain their development. 

The Third Border Initiative unveiled by President Bush at the 

2001 Quebec Summit of the Americas is a comprehensive framework of cooperation with the Caribbean region on issues that affect 

vital mutual interests, including security. It also provides funding 

and training for disaster preparedness, environmental management 

and the fight against HIV/AIDS. 

Nations in our hemisphere must also focus on better primary 

education to promote upward mobility. Just as in his domestic initiative, No Child Left Behind, President Bush made clear that education is the key to progress, growth and stability. So our ongoing 

educational programs in the region include the creation of such 

successful programs as the Centers for Excellence in Teacher 

Training. We also support grassroots community organizations in 

building schools, sponsor scholarships and early childhood programs and work actively to combat child labor. 

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Assistant Secretary Lorne 

Craner and I launched the Cuba Children’s Book Project on 

Human Rights Day this past December 10th to empower Cuban 

children through learning. 

In conclusion, the weaker and more vulnerable economies of 

Latin America were badly hit by the Brazilian downturn in 1998, 

the U.S. economic slowdown, a more risk-averse attitude among 

international investors and the impact of September 11th on tourism and hemispheric trade. The ensuing financial crises have been 

contained for now, although there are no grounds for complacency. 

Even during the good times hemispheric growth was too low outside of star performers like Chile, El Salvador, Mexico and the 

Democratic Republic who embraced reform and moved to open their 

economies. 

Too many of our hemisphere’s citizens have begun to question 

whether the recovery of democracy, which has been the crowning 

achievement of this hemisphere in the past 20 years, can better 

their lives. 

Through the initiatives I have outlined which promote good governance, investment in people and economic growth, the Administration has laid a policy foundation to address these problems. We 

are committed to achieving prosperity based on political and economic freedom that broadly distributes its benefits through more 

transparent governance, investment in health and education of people and the creation of millions of new jobs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Struble follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss Administration priorities for the hemisphere. Our relationship with this region is rich and varied, affecting and affected 

by all that we do. Nearly thirty-three million people of Latin American descent live 

here, representing twelve percent of the U.S. population and the fastest growing 

ethnic group in the country. Our ties with our neighbors will become even more important in the future. President Bush reminded us of this when he said, ‘‘. . . we 

55

are committed to building a prosperous and free and democratic hemisphere. Nothing will distract us, nothing will deter us, in completing this great work.’’

From protecting our security with Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean, to helping 

the Southern Cone cope with economic crises, to working to create a Central American Free Trade Agreement, our interaction with the countries of the Western Hemisphere increases every day. Outside of Cuba, the countries of our hemisphere share 

a remarkable consensus for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and open 

markets. Indeed, the member states of the Organization of American States adopted 

the Inter-American Democratic Charter on September 11, 2001. However, some of 

our neighbors are undergoing difficult times and others face crises in their faith in 

democracy and free markets. We must deepen and broaden not just support for 

these values, but every citizen’s involvement in his or her nation and its future. Our 

policy toward the hemisphere rests on three pillars: democracy, development, and 

security. The core of each of these is increasing freedom—for the individual to grow 

and develop, for the society to determine its own future, and for the state to advance 

its people and its interaction with the world. 

This hemisphere’s problems have been a long time in development. The 1990s 

were less prosperous for the region than they were for the U.S. and the growth of 

that period disguised underlying problems of weak democratic institutions and incomplete economic reform. We have been active in ameliorating crises, such as those 

in Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay, but solutions—transparency, delivery of 

human services, and economic development—are all long-term efforts that will require sustained engagement by the United States. 

While free elections are now the norm throughout most of the Americas, elections 

alone are not enough. The people of the hemisphere are expressing discontent with 

the quality of their democracy and the perceived inability of their governments to 

deliver higher standards of living, safe streets, and good schools. They want, and 

we promote, the second-generation democratic reforms of deepening democratic institutions and investing in people. Secretary Powell has said, ‘‘Promoting integrity 

in government and the marketplace improves the global governance climate, nurtures long-term growth, and extends the benefits of prosperity to all people.’’ People 

cannot have faith in institutions whose officials steal from them. There can be no 

justice when rule of law is for sale. The U.S. has adopted a ‘‘no safe haven’’ approach to corruption. We will deny U.S. visas to corrupt officials as appropriate 

under existing law, we will monitor aid to ensure it is used transparently, and we 

will assist countries in recovering stolen funds. We have also developed a comprehensive program to combat corruption in the hemisphere, not just through bilateral and multilateral programs, but also through collaborative actions with our partners. 

Democratic and political stability promotes trade and investment, and vice versa. 

Over the past two decades, countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean 

reformed and opened their economies. The region’s nations grew over three percent 

annually, on average, during the 1990’s. Unfortunately, the U.S. and global economic slowdown, falling coffee and other commodity prices, natural disasters, and 

the post-September 11 declines in tourism and remittances now are hurting many 

economies in our hemisphere. 

For democracy and development to thrive, a nation must be secure. Promoting 

hemispheric security remains a key U.S. objective, as it is a precondition to every 

objective we share—stopping terrorism; ending trafficking in arms, illicit narcotics, 

and people; strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; halting environmental degradation; ending lawlessness and criminality; and developing economies. Terrorist organizations operate in the hemisphere, most notably in and 

around Colombia and in Peru. Terrorist sympathizers work to raise funds and provide other logistical support from the tri-border region of Argentina, Paraguay, and 

Brazil. Terrorists with international ties abuse the Caribbean financial system to 

move money. We are improving bilateral cooperation with our allies, strengthening 

the Financial Action Task Force’s efforts to combat money laundering, and improving border controls. We can only create a secure environment by working together 

and the Western Hemisphere has been notably active in this effort. 

MULTILATERAL EFFORTS

The Summit of the Americas process has been the vehicle for regional political, 

economic, and social cooperation, based on our shared hemispheric values of democracy, open markets and ensuring a better life for all our citizens. The 2001 Quebec 

City Summit led to the creation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which 

was adopted on September 11, 2001—at the very moment of tragedy, the free nations of the Western Hemisphere reaffirmed the principles of democracy the terrorVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ists had targeted. The Charter acknowledges a collective responsibility to promote, 

protect, and advance democracy in this hemisphere and has been the basis for more 

active regional engagement in crises in the region. Other Summit achievements 

since Quebec range from cooperation on airport security, health care, and disaster 

management to the establishment of fellowship programs and centers for teacher 

training. 

The momentum of regional cooperation generated by the Summit of the Americas 

has created a growing consensus among member states in favor of joint political action. In the past eighteen months, the OAS member states have strengthened their 

ability to fight terrorism, played an active role in promoting dialogue and national 

reconciliation in Venezuela and Haiti, and fortified activities in key areas such as 

human rights. The OAS also is widely respected for its technical electoral assistance 

to member states and its Electoral Observation Missions, such as recent missions 

in Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador. 

The OAS is readying itself for future challenges by undertaking a management 

study with funds made available by the payment of U.S. arrears. This study will 

promote the long-term U.S. goal of reforming and modernizing the administration 

of the OAS. The OAS is playing an increasingly important role in advancing hemispheric objectives that are both widely shared by member states and strongly supported by the U.S., including a Summit-mandated Special Conference on Security 

aimed at strengthening the architecture of hemispheric security. States Parties to 

the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption are evaluating four states during the first round of evaluations under a newly approved Follow-Up Mechanism. 

The Western Hemisphere responded to September 11, 2001 with great resolve, 

adopting at the June 2002 General Assembly the Inter-American Convention 

Against Terrorism, a binding legal instrument that establishes mechanisms for coordinated action against terrorism by the states of the Americas. It has now been 

signed by all but one OAS member state, ratified by Canada, and is before the U.S. 

Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The OAS also revitalized the InterAmerican Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) and endowed it with a comprehensive work plan. We are completing CICTE’s transformation into an effective body 

of counterterrorism experts that can translate member states’ political will into concrete actions. 

Multilateral action at the OAS also is an effective instrument for coordinating national, regional, and international steps to counter the threat of narcotics trafficking. By working regionally as well as bilaterally in the fight against narcotics, 

the U.S. underscores the mutual dependence of the nations of the Hemisphere in 

seeking solutions and broadens popular support for counter-drug measures. The 

Inter-American Commission Against Drug Abuse (CICAD) attacks the links between 

drug money laundering, terrorist financing and illicit arms trafficking. 

We have also worked closely with hemispheric partners to strengthen the Community of Democracies. Chile, host of the next Community of Democracies ministerial 

meeting, is committed to use the event to share lessons with emerging democracies. 

UNIFYING MARKETS

Our multilateral efforts are not limited to political bodies. Bringing markets together will benefit all citizens of the hemisphere, which is becoming increasingly integrated into the world economy—we sell more to Latin America than to the EU. 

In the last five years, our exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have grown 

twice as fast as exports elsewhere. Freeing hemispheric trade has benefited our citizens directly as well—according to the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA and the 

Uruguay Round saved a family of four between $1300 and $2000 per year. 

I can understand why many people in the hemisphere might wonder whether they 

can rely on markets, trade, and investment to lift them from poverty. The United 

States is committed to helping the people of Latin America and the Caribbean in 

their quest for greater economic growth with equity. Private investment is a crucial 

element of development and we work with hemisphere nations to help them improve 

their economic environments in order to attract more foreign investment. 

Among the Summit initiatives, none is more advanced or ambitious than the Free 

Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA is one of the President’s top worldwide trade priorities and serves as a key to our hemispheric partnership. Rapid 

progress toward hemispheric economic integration will enhance investor confidence, 

strengthen democratic institutions, and improve political stability, as well as increasing economic growth. A Hemispheric Cooperation Program (HCP), consisting of 

trade capacity building assistance helps smaller developing countries prepare to participate in the FTAA. Under the co-chairmanship of Brazil and the United States, 

we have entered a critical phase of the negotiations, as we work to meet the goal 

57

of completing negotiations no later than January 2005. The FTAA countries submitted their initial market access offers in Panama last week. Hemisphere trade 

ministers are scheduled to meet in Miami next November to review progress. 

I would like to explore in greater depth the variety of efforts and issues that make 

our relationship with the hemisphere so robust. 

MEXICO

President Bush has stated that, ‘‘. . . we have no more important relationship in 

the world than the one we have with Mexico,’’ and that complex relationship continues to grow stronger. The unprecedented cooperation we now enjoy with Mexico 

is essential to address the concerns that arise when two nations share a two thousand-mile long border. President Fox has emphasized the importance of working 

with the U.S. to resolve challenges in our relationship, which have domestic and foreign policy implications. He is also determined to reform domestic institutions and 

fight corruption, trafficking in drugs and people, and human rights abuses. 

While trade disputes have arisen under NAFTA, our governments have resolved 

these differences through negotiation and NAFTA and WTO procedures. Recognizing that a strong Mexican economy is a Mexican and U.S. interest, Presidents 

Bush and Fox launched the U.S-Mexico Partnership for Prosperity in September 

2001 to promote development in the more remote areas of Mexico. This innovative 

public-private initiative addresses the root cause of migration by fostering an environment in which no Mexican feels compelled to leave his home for lack of a job 

or opportunity. In its first seventeen months, the Partnership has reduced the cost 

of sending money home for thousands of Mexicans in the U.S., trained Mexican entrepreneurs in the use of electronic commerce, launched a $100 million fund to finance environmental projects, provided $1.5 million for feasibility studies for Mexican infrastructure projects and initiated a $50 million, seven-year scholarship program. 

The U.S. and Mexico have an ongoing dialogue on transboundary rivers and we 

continue to press Mexico for full compliance with its treaty obligation to deliver Rio 

Grande water to the United States. We are working to develop measures that will 

reduce the outstanding water deficit and prevent deficits of this magnitude from occurring again. 

From the Mexican perspective, the principal issue on our bilateral agenda is migration. The need to address border security on a priority basis constrained progress 

on this agenda, but we are working to find ways to protect both the Mexican community and U.S. security. Mexico has helped enhance our shared border security, 

signing and implementing a Border Partnership, or ‘‘Smart Border’’ Plan, similar to 

the plan we have with Canada. In the current environment, Mexico is particularly 

concerned about possible attacks against the United States from Mexico or against 

American citizens or property in Mexico in connection with U.S. military action 

overseas. Secretary Ridge met recently in Washington with Mexican Home Secretary Santiago Creel to discuss this and other vital matters. 

As a United Nations Security Council member, Mexico plays an important role 

in confronting the threat posed by Iraq. Underlining Mexico’s more active role in 

the region, the Fox Administration conceived Plan Puebla-Panama, a regional economic development and integration plan to promote trade, tourism, education, environmental protection and strengthen infrastructure links in southern Mexico and 

Central America. As members of the ten-country Convening Group of the Community of Democracies, the United States and Mexico continue to work closely to promote democracy throughout the world. 

CANADA

On our northern border, the relationship between the U.S. and Canada is perhaps 

the closest and broadest in the world. Support from the people and government of 

Canada in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States was tremendous. In December, we established a new binational planning group to prepare contingency plans for threats, attacks, and other major emergencies in either country. 

We consult on possible Canadian participation in the missile defense program. Canada has naval and air assets supporting Operation Enduring Freedom and announced its intention to assume co-leadership of the international peacekeeping 

force in Afghanistan (ISAF) in August 2003. Canada is very concerned about Iraq’s 

failure to comply with resolution 1441 and participates with the U.S. and others in 

planning for possible military action. While reserving its decision on joining a U.S.-

led coalition to disarm Iraq, Canada has been supportive of efforts to secure NATO 

support for Turkey against potential attack. 

58

In December 2001, Office of Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and Deputy 

Prime Minister John Manley signed the thirty-point Smart Border Action Plan to 

create a more secure and more efficient border. The goals of the Plan include joint 

development of more secure travel documents; joint inspections and facilities; sharing intelligence, passenger, and customs data; revising rules for refugee and asylee 

processing; visa policy coordination; and advance clearance of travelers and goods. 

Over the past year, we have made significant progress toward our mutual goal of 

keeping North America safe from terrorism while sustaining the trade and transportation flows that are crucial to our economies and citizens. 

Although we have trade disputes with Canada over a number of products, including softwood lumber, both sides are committed to finding solutions through bilateral 

or multilateral mechanism. 

Canada continues to have differences with us over economic sanctions and HelmsBurton Act penalties against Canadian companies. Elsewhere, we are cooperating 

closely: Canada has been particularly engaged in Haiti and Venezuela and we work 

together in multilateral groups like the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the OAS, the OECD, 

APEC and the G–8. 

THE ANDEAN REGION

The Andean region faces serious challenges as its nations struggle to institutionalize democracy and develop their economies. Our goals are to strengthen democratic institutions and promote human rights, enhance security through counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, and foster social and economic development 

through trade and investment. 

The Colombia conflict affects the entire region. President Uribe moved quickly to 

combat terrorism and drug trafficking while promoting human rights. His National 

Security Strategy shows his determination to deny terrorists drug-related resources 

to finance their operations. He lifted limits on aerial eradication, leading to a record 

sixty thousand hectares of coca sprayed in the first four months of his term. He 

beefed up resources for security, boosting security spending from 3.5 percent of GDP 

to a goal of 5.8 percent in his 2003 budget. He also made tough decisions that will 

improve Colombia’s economic prospects and reached an agreement with the IMF. 

We and the Colombians have initialed an agreement, currently undergoing interagency review, which will enable us to restart the Air Bridge Denial program following a determination by President Bush that all relevant U.S. statutory requirements are met. This program denies traffickers the use of Colombian air corridors 

to move drugs and is a top priority for both Colombia and the U.S. 

We are now in the third of Plan Colombia’s six years. We are making a difference, 

but the situation clearly requires sustained engagement. With your support, since 

July 2000, the U.S. has provided Colombia with $1.893 billion to combat drug trafficking and, more recently, terrorism. These resources have also strengthened Colombia’s democratic institutions, protected human rights, fostered socio-economic development, and mitigated the impact of the violence on Colombian civilians. Last 

year, you approved new authorities to help us do a better job in aiding Colombia’s 

unified campaign against drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. You also 

passed the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act that will promote 

the creation of new jobs in Colombia. Efforts to promote Plan Colombia internally 

have proven remarkably effective—Colombian support for the U.S. remains high at 

seventy-four percent. Colombians also maintain a fifty-five to sixty percent approval 

of the aerial spray program and an eighty percent approval of alternative development programs. 

On February 12, the OAS Permanent Council met in special session to consider 

an appropriate response to the February 7 attack that killed thirty-six people in Bogota. The United States and Colombia co-sponsored a resolution condemning the attack, which was adopted by the Council and represents an important watershed, 

marking the first hemispheric consensus to condemn the threat posed by Colombia’s 

terrorist groups. 

On February 13, a U.S. government aircraft crash-landed in Colombia. All five 

crewmembers, four Americans and one Colombian, survived the crash. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a terrorist organization, murdered two crewmembers, the Colombian and an American, and says it is holding the other three 

captive. We called for their immediate release, unharmed. We are working closely 

with the Colombian authorities to bring these men safely home. We continue to respect Congressional limits on the number of U.S. military personnel deployed in Colombia. We have deployed additional personnel in support of ongoing search-andrescue efforts, increasing the total number of U.S. military personnel in country, but 

at all times respecting the caps. 

59

To the east, the situation in Venezuela continues to deteriorate, undermining Venezuela’s democracy and economy while threatening regional economic and political 

stability. We must help Venezuela find a solution to the current impasse to avoid 

further harm. The only politically viable solution to the crisis in Venezuela is a 

peaceful, constitutional, democratic, and electoral solution agreed upon by both the 

government and the opposition. The dialogue led by the OAS Secretary General remains the best hope for Venezuelans to reach such a solution. The electoral proposals tabled January 21 by former President Carter—either a constitutional 

amendment to enable earlier elections or an August recall referendum, as provided 

for in Venezuela’s Constitution—present viable options to break the impasse. 

Four OAS member states (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the U.S.) and two leading 

OAS observer states (Portugal and Spain) have joined to address the current situation in Venezuela through the Friends of the OAS Secretary General’s Mission for 

Venezuela. The Group of Friends plans to monitor and verify the implementation 

of any agreement brokered by the OAS. I was in Caracas four weeks ago with senior 

officials from the Group of Friends governments and had useful meetings with the 

government and the opposition. President Cha ́vez told us that the Carter proposals 

are constitutional and acknowledged that his government was obligated to provide 

funding and protection for constitutional elections and political activities. We are 

pleased that both sides to the dispute in Venezuela endorsed a non-violence pledge. 

Still, President Chavez’s incendiary rhetoric and the violence that has followed the 

signing of the pact, including the bombings outside the Spanish Embassy and Colombian Consulate in Caracas, cast doubt as to the government’s commitment to 

honoring this pledge. It is imperative that this commitment, which is key to creating 

a climate conducive to dialogue, be respected. We hope to meet again soon with our 

partners in the Friends Group to discuss concrete initiatives to advance the dialogue. 

In Bolivia, President Sanchez de Lozada faces daunting challenges. In January, 

Bolivia’s ‘‘cocaleros’’ set up blockades and at times resorted to violence in the illegal 

coca-growing region to protest the government’s illegal cocaine eradication policies. 

The blockades and riots led to a number of deaths; however, Bolivia continues to 

pursue eradication complemented by alternative development. This one-two punch 

makes illegal cultivation less profitable—and riskier—and creates viable, legal options for farmers. U.S. assistance has been and will continue to be essential to their 

success. On February 12, police on strike protesting unpopular budget actions by the 

government clashed with military units protecting the Presidential Palace. The confrontation quickly escalated into looting and rioting, leaving several dozen dead and 

over 100 injured. In an extraordinary session February 14, the OAS member states 

expressed full support for the constitutional government of Bolivia and its democratic institutions following the riots. The White House and the Department of State 

issued similar expressions of support for the government. 

We enjoy a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Peru, with mutual interest in issues from counternarcotics to trade. We seek to strengthen Peru’s 

democratic institutions, enhance the government’s counternarcotics capacity, and 

promote economic and social development. Our democracy assistance promotes civic 

and voter education, support for press freedom, election monitoring, and judicial 

training. We work to increase political participation of women and citizen participation in local government. The U.S. receives excellent cooperation from the government in counternarcotics activities, resulting in a seventy-two percent decline of potential cocaine production from 1992 to 2001. Our counternarcotics assistance provides training and assistance for interdiction of drug shipments, enhanced law enforcement, alternative development assistance, drug education, and demand reduction. We also work closely with the Government of Peru to help in its campaign 

against Shining Path, which continues to threaten Peruvian democracy and U.S. interests. 

Ecuadorians face different challenges. We work with the newly elected Gutierrez 

government on a range of issues, including strengthening security along Ecuador’s 

northern border. We also do counternarcotics surveillance from the Manta forward 

operating location. We work with the government to ensure that it continues to 

meet eligibility criteria under the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication 

Act. President Gutierrez pledged to combat corruption at all levels; we support his 

campaign. President Gutierrez has demonstrated leadership and resolve in tackling 

his nation’s economic difficulties. He has adopted strong measures to restore fiscal 

and financial stability and reached agreement with the IMF on a program that will 

provide $200 million in balance of payments and fiscal support and unlock further 

World Bank and IDB development assistance. 

60

BRAZIL AND THE SOUTHERN CONE

Economic concerns, to varying degrees, affect Brazil and the Southern Cone nations of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 

The new administration of Brazilian President Lula has shown a clear understanding that sound economic policies and strong commitment to social concerns can 

go hand in hand and markets have responded positively. We have some differences 

with Brazil in trade, but what unites us is far greater. This is particularly important as Brazil and the U.S. co-chair the FTAA process. In September 2002, the 

United States supported a $30.4 billion IMF program. The peaceful turnover of 

power in January after new elections testified to the stability of the Brazilian system. President Bush met the President-elect Lula on December 10 and they agreed 

on a summit later this year to deepen the bilateral relationship. 

Argentina, long one of South America’s most prosperous societies, was hit by a 

crushing economic depression that impoverished many hard-working Argentines. Argentina has now stabilized its economy, and with help from the U.S., reached a 

transitional accord with the IMF. The country has begun the long climb back to economic recovery. The transitional IMF program approved in January is a step toward 

a more comprehensive program that Argentina needs to restore growth and place 

the economy on a sustainable path, which we hope will be developed by the next 

government. It is important that a smooth presidential transition occur as scheduled: April 27 with a likely run-off on May 18, and inauguration on May 25. We 

encourage economic reform in Argentina, while cognizant of the needs of those who 

have suffered most in this crisis. 

A commitment to free trade is one of Chile’s most valued economic principles and 

Chile completed several free trade pacts over the last year, among them the Free 

Trade Agreement reached with the United States. We look forward to rapid congressional consideration and, hopefully, ratification and implementation of this important pact as another sign that free trade is the future of this hemisphere. Chile is 

a key U.S. partner in the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Community of Democracies, and other fora. 

Uruguay also suffered economically over the last year, in large part due to spillover from its neighbors. The U.S. supported Uruguay by encouraging conclusion of 

an IMF pact last August that helped stabilize its financial system. As part of this 

effort, the United States provided Uruguay with a $1.5 billion bridge loan that was 

repaid—with interest—in one week. Uruguay needs continued economic reforms and 

we work closely with the government and others, including the international financial institutions, to ensure its future prosperity. 

In its seventh year of recession, Paraguay faces continued economic hard times. 

The United States encourages sustainable economic reform. As with all the nations 

of the Southern Cone, we are examining ways we can assist on trade, including 

through the Generalized System of Preferences. 

Beyond these bilateral efforts, we are intensifying our engagement with Brazil 

and the Southern Cone nations in other areas. The region took strides to counter 

corruption, recognizing that good governance and the rule of law are key to prosperity and fairness; we support their efforts. We also cooperate internationally—Argentina remains the hemisphere’s only major non-NATO ally, Uruguay and Paraguay have been active in international peacekeeping, Uruguay sponsored last year’s 

UNCHR resolution on Cuba, and Chile is on the UN Security Council. All these nations work with us to tighten laws on terrorist financing, and Argentina, Brazil and 

Paraguay invited the United States to form a ‘‘three-plus-one’’ working group to 

counter terrorist financing in the Triborder and other areas. 

CENTRAL AMERICA

We continue to assist Central America’s young democracies, particularly in the 

areas of human rights and the rule of law. We are pleased the UN Secretary General has declared the UN observer mission in El Salvador closed and agree with the 

extension of the UN mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) to 2004. Efforts to fully implement the Guatemalan Peace Accords continue. We press the Guatemalan government to take necessary steps to confront those responsible for threats and violence 

against human rights activists, labor leaders, judicial personnel, journalists, and forensic anthropologists. With OAS facilitation, Belize and Guatemala have agreed on 

a process to end their long-standing border dispute. When implemented, this ‘‘facilitation process’’, as it is known, could serve as a model for peaceful resolution of 

other border disputes. 

Regional integration is a priority for Central America; it is essential to the region’s further political and economic development. Our free trade negotiations with 

five of the countries of Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, HonVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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duras and Nicaragua), called CAFTA, are encouraging more rapid integration. Free 

trade will help accelerate and sustain development of the region and we are working 

at an accelerated pace so the benefits of an agreement can be enjoyed by all as soon 

as possible. In addition to promoting enhanced trade, other objectives for the free 

trade area include strengthening the rule of law and democratic political institutions, consolidating economic reforms, promoting workers’ and children’s rights, and 

enhancing respect for the environment. U.S. agencies are also engaged in a broad 

trade capacity building effort with these nations. 

Our Central American partners also are dealing effectively with threats from organized criminals. They are extremely responsive to our requests for cooperation on 

border security, counternarcotics, and fighting transnational crime—although Guatemala remains an exception in some areas and the President recently determined 

that Guatemala’s counternarcotics performance is less than acceptable. We assisted 

the governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in building a border station and outfitted it with the newest technology and equipment, which they have used to intercept drugs and contraband. We are beginning programs in both Honduras and 

Belize to improve control of travel documents. The Forward Operating Location 

(FOL) at Comalapa Airbase in El Salvador is an excellent example of counternarcotics cooperation. Authorities have intercepted over fifty tons of narcotics since 

the base’s inception. 

We also work with the region to combat terrorism. We are pleased that in January, El Salvador assumed the leadership of the reinvigorated Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE). El Salvador, under President Francisco Flores, 

has proven itself to be the regional leader across a broad spectrum of issues. The 

Andean Counterdrug Initiative includes Panama, where we work closely with the 

government to prevent narcotics traffickers and terrorists from using its territory, 

particularly the remote Darien region, for criminal activity. The recent raid by Colombian paramilitaries on villages there is a stark example of Panama’s vulnerability, and we were glad to be able to help Panama meet the immediate humanitarian needs of the villages. Panama and its Central American neighbors have 

pledged to help Colombia in the battle against terrorism: on February 11, they 

adopted a zero-tolerance policy toward Colombian rebels. To help prevent stockpiled 

weapons in Central America from falling into the hands of Colombian or other terrorist groups, we continue to actively combat illegal arms trafficking from this region. The recent OAS investigation of the Nicaraguan arms shipment diverted from 

Panama to Colombian rebels emphasized the need to destroy weapons stockpiles 

and improve regulations on arms brokering. 

Fighting corruption in Central America is a top priority. The region’s new Presidents—Flores of El Salvador, Maduro of Honduras, Bolan ̄ os of Nicaragua, and 

Pacheco of Costa Rica—have demonstrated their resolve in this effort. We support 

their commitment through anticorruption programs in each country and by revoking 

the visas of money launderers and alien smugglers, assisting local governments in 

criminal investigations, and bolstering domestic prosecutorial capacity. For example, 

a U.S. government-funded and trained anticorruption unit in Nicaragua carried out 

initial investigations against corrupt high-level figures. With our assistance, the 

government of El Salvador drafted a code of government ethics and proposed an Office of Government Ethics to control, identify, and prosecute corruption among public officials. In Honduras, President Maduro has reinvigorated the National AntiCorruption Commission and fired high-level officials for corruption. 

The Central American nations are proud of their ties to the United States, and 

we must keep these close friends and allies in mind as they build on hard-won successes. 

THE CARIBBEAN

We share a vital third border with the Caribbean. Our objective in the Caribbean 

is to ensure that democracy and stability remain firmly entrenched, leading to economic prosperity. 

The Third Border Initiative, unveiled by President Bush at the 2001 Quebec Summit of the Americas, is a comprehensive framework of cooperation on issues that 

affect vital mutual interests such as security. The Third Border Initiative also supports the fight against HIV/AIDS, and provides funding and training for disaster 

preparedness, environmental management, and aviation security. The President’s 

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, announced in his State of the Union address, lays 

out a bold and innovative approach to further help countries in the Caribbean confront the threat posed by HIV/AIDS. 

In the Dominican Republic, President Mejia leads a vibrant democracy interested 

in strengthening our already robust trade relations. The Dominican Republic has 

62

also taken a lead in the region by fighting corruption, supporting the global war on 

terrorism, and signing an Article 98 agreement. 

Though democracy reigns in most of the Caribbean, it remains at risk in Haiti. 

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) worked closely with us on OAS Resolution 

822, which provides clear guidelines to restore a climate of security to Haiti and enable a return to full democracy via holding of free and fair elections. We call on all 

the political actors in Haiti to fulfill the elements contained in the resolution, on 

the international community to support it, and on the government to create the conditions conducive to new elections. The Haitian government must also combat corruption, including corruption in the police force connected with drug trafficking. 

This will help promote security, democracy, and a hope of economic improvement 

for Haiti’s long-suffering people. 

Despite economic limitations and vulnerability to the currents of the global economy, the nations of the Caribbean stand resolutely with us in the fight against terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and money launderers. Narcotics trafficking remains a 

major challenge and cooperation is not uniformly good. Haiti, in particular, continues to have difficulties, but throughout the rest of the region there is generally 

less a problem of lack of will than lack of resources. Caribbean countries have also 

strengthened regulation of the offshore banking sector, and although some countries 

continue to struggle to bring their regulatory systems up to modern standards, others have made great strides in reducing their vulnerability to abuse. 

Cooperation on interdiction and repatriation of illegal migrants in the region is 

sometimes challenging, but generally good. Our treatment and disposition of illegal 

migrants is fair and effective and has helped prevent massive outflows from countries in crisis. We intend to enhance our regional cooperation on this serious problem. 

CUBA

Cuba is the lone stain on the hemisphere’s unified democratic record. We are optimistic about the prospects for a transition to democracy in Cuba, based in part on 

the clear consensus internationally and within the United States that change must 

come. Our policy is aimed at fomenting democratic transition by aiding the development of Cuba’s fledgling civil society, the building block of democracy. In supporting 

democratic, labor, and human rights activists, independent journalists, independent 

libraries, and other free voices, we are preparing for the future. For example, Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Assistant Secretary Lorne Craner and I 

launched the Cuba Children’s Books Project on Human Rights Day, December 10, 

encouraging the development of knowledge to empower Cuban children and Cuba 

itself. 

The growth in truly independent civil society over the last several months also 

fuels our optimism about prospects for democratic change. Oswaldo Paya ́’s Project 

Varela, in which eleven thousand Cubans call for basic freedoms, shows that the 

Cuban people are losing their fear of the regime. The regime is trying to ratchet 

up the pressure: it just sentenced Jesus Mustafa, Paya ́’s valiant organizer in the 

eastern part of the island, to eighteen months in jail for ‘‘resisting authority’’ by organizing for peaceful, democratic change. The communist government is fighting a 

losing battle to deny the Cuban people their rights. 

Our policy includes elements, notably the embargo and the travel restrictions, designed in part to pressure the regime to change and to deny it the resources it seeks 

to sustain itself. These are not the policy—they are tools. President Bush made clear 

last May that we are prepared to work with Congress to ease restrictions on travel 

and trade if the Cuban government takes steps towards democracy, fundamental 

freedoms, and open markets. The Administration will not support expanded trade 

with or tourist travel to Cuba absent real political and economic change on the island. We do not believe that Castro’s bankrupt regime represents a good market for 

U.S. firms and we are deeply concerned that the regime would use the proceeds 

from U.S. tourist travel to further strengthen the current elite in their positions. 

Further, it is clear that tourist travel has not had the hoped-for effect of expanding 

democratic development. Millions of European and Canadian tourists have visited 

Cuba over the last decade, but Cubans have no more rights, and the economy is 

no more open. There is no reason to believe American tourism would yield different 

results. Until the Cuban regime is required to respond to the insistent demands for 

change from us, Europe, Latin America, and now within Cuba itself, we will maintain our policy tools of encouraging civil society development while denying an 

unreformed communist regime the financial wherewithal it seeks to maintain itself 

in power. 

63

CONCLUSION

Admittedly, all is not rosy in the Western Hemisphere. Although we have come 

a long way, there has been backsliding and growing democracies face threats from 

all sides. We are optimistic, however, because this hemisphere is different. Our 

problems are not intractable. We do not face thousand-year-old conflicts, religious 

persecution, or societies that have given themselves over to anarchy. We can overcome existing challenges together and bring a free, secure, and bright future to all 

the peoples of the hemisphere. President Bush believes that freedom is the key to 

unlocking potential. Freedom allows the creativity that is the essence of human nature to express itself and be realized. Freedom is the path of political, social, and 

economic progress. We know that throughout the Americas, men and women share 

this belief. Freedom is the cause that American heroes from George Washington to 

Jose ́ Martı ́ have championed, and faith in the power of freedom is an integral part 

of the culture of the Americas. As President Bush said, this hemisphere of eight 

hundred million people strives for the dream of a better life, ‘‘A dream of free markets and free people, in a hemisphere free from war and tyranny. That dream has 

sometimes been frustrated—but it must never be abandoned.’’ He knows there are 

millions of men and women in the Americas who share his vision of a free, prosperous and democratic hemisphere. Working together as partners, I am confident 

that we will achieve this goal.

Mr. BALLENGER. A couple of things. 

First of all, by unanimous consent Members have 5 days to submit, revise and extend their remarks for the record; and if we use 

our time wisely, I think the best way to go about this is use our 

little electric lights. Each of us have 5 minutes. 

I will start this with Mr. Franco. There is a great deal of aid 

being used in Cuba, but do you have a representative in Cuba, or 

do we have any other place that doesn’t have a representative that 

we give aid? 

Mr. FRANCO. We don’t have an individual based in Cuba, per se. 

We have a Cuba office and a Cuba office director at USAID, and 

that individual travels to Cuba when he can. 

The broader question, globally we do have what we refer to as 

nonpresence countries, Mr. Chairman, beyond Cuba where USAID 

has some activities but does not have a full-fledged mission, as we 

call it, which is the President’s physical presence with U.S. directhires. But in the case of Cuba, the Cuba director resides here in 

Washington and travels to Cuba. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Would it be a help to you if we were allowed to 

have somebody stationed in Cuba, since there should be somebody 

there to inspect how they are spending our money? 

Mr. FRANCO. Well, this is something we could discuss. 

Normally, when we look at programs beyond the peculiarities of 

Cuba, we look at the size of the program, whether we can manage—as I mentioned, there are what we refer to as nonpresence 

countries where we can manage the program from either another 

country or from the United States for cost savings. 

In the case of Cuba, however, we do take our oversight seriously; 

and the Cuba funding section 109 programs are actually carried 

out in the U.S. through organizations that try to provide information and support to organizations on the island. But it is important 

for the representative to—our Cuban representative to travel to 

Cuba. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, on that, and I think it is 

very critical that he do so. 

Mr. BALLENGER. When is the next time you can have somebody 

over? 

64

Mr. FRANCO. Well, the last time that the Cuba representative 

traveled to Cuba was in January 2002, which is too long of a period 

for my judgment, sir. So we would like to have a representative 

there as soon as possible. We will require State Department assistance because of the peculiarities of working with the Cuban government to ensure that that is conveyed to the Cuban government 

as a priority. So to have that support would be important for us. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Maybe Mr. Delahunt can get that worked out 

for you. 

One thing I would like to bring up, because we talked about alternative development, and I know that if we had never said anything about the coffee situation in the world, but we have really destroyed the way poor people in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 

and Nicaragua used to be able to earn spending money, a little bit 

of money by picking coffee, and then all of a sudden, the Vietnamese have destroyed the market. 

What I would like to say is—and I don’t know how many people 

here have seen the Fortune Magazine story. The French don’t do 

everything wrong. Every once in a while they do something right. 

And in this particular case, there is a French coffee roaster who 

has offered extremely high prices to be able to get very pure coffee. 

And what I didn’t find out until yesterday, when this was brought 

forward, and your organization provided me with pictures, is how 

the coffee was grown with coca in between. 

Mr. FRANCO. Right. 

Mr. BALLENGER. And that these people that signed up with this 

Frenchman have agreed to pull up their own coca, so that they can 

sell their coffee to this Frenchman. 

Mr. FRANCO. Right. 

Mr. BALLENGER. And I am supposed to make a speech to the coffee roasters. 

Mr. FRANCO. I understand that. 

Mr. BALLENGER. And I thought I would burn them a new one 

and say, if the French can do it, why can’t you? That might assist 

you along those lines. 

Mr. FRANCO. Right. Could I comment on that, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. BALLENGER. Certainly. 

Mr. FRANCO. The French firm is Care For in Colombia, referring 

to, and it is a problem in terms of the coca interdisciplines. If you 

have seen the pictures—I know they were shown to you yesterday—in terms of a couple of provinces, Nadino, for example, in Colombia is a very serious problem. And I will have to commend Care 

For for its vision. 

We are also working, I want you to know, at USAID, with U.S. 

firms such as Green Mountain. Administrator Natsios has signed 

an agreement with Green Mountain to work with them as we provide technical assistance, as in the case of Colombia, to find specialty coffee niches, organic coffee, and fully provide the incentives 

and ability, because these producers, as you know, are really interested in exporting in coffee. That is what they know. 

So we are working with them, sir. We are working with them in 

Colombia. And a large part of our opportunity alliance, which is the 

President’s $30 million initiative for Central America, has been on 

the coca issue, but is focused on specialty coffee. And Nicaragua, 

65

I know, is of interest to you, has been a country where we actually 

have been able to award the Cup of Excellence Award to a producer 

we worked with, which is a specialty coffee recognition of level of 

quality. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Great. 

Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I hope we 

can get concise answers because of the 5-minute limitation I have 

here. 

And let me start off by commending both of the gentlemen at the 

table for your service, for your professionalism. I always appreciate 

when we are calling upon your respective offices the responses that 

we get and the responsiveness. I wish others would be as responsive. I want to appreciate your professionalism. And also just for 

Mr. Franco, in your case, one of your staff members, I want to commend Mr. Mulcher, who I think does a fantastic job in the section 

109 program, which is unique in and of itself, but has never necessarily, over several Administrations, been—or the last two, this 

and the last, necessarily been the darling of the seventh floor. But 

I think it is an incredibly important one and one that nurtures the 

attempts for civil society inside of Cuba. 

Now, having said all of that, let me—and since you are the representatives of the State Department and USAID here—start off 

with Mr. Franco. Could you tell me, for the Western Hemisphere, 

what was the development assistance actually signed by the President last week in the omnibus bill? What is the actual figure? 

Mr. FRANCO. Well, we are in the process right now, after the 

President actually signs the bill, we are working with our State colleagues on making allocations, because there are various spigots to 

bill. I mean, in terms of what we do globally at USAID, we have 

Economic Support Funds which are globally available for the region. We have the ACI money we refer to the Andean Counter-Narcotics Initiative money. We have Development Assistance, Child 

Survival. They are different spigots, Mr. Menendez, that we now sit 

down and actually, with the State Department, get what we call 

the operating year budget. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. But I am talking about—I am not talking about 

your operating budget. I am talking about development assistance 

for the Western Hemisphere. In the presentation that the Secretary 

today brought before the Committee, there is a breakdown. And in 

the breakdown, under development assistance for the Western 

Hemisphere, there is a 2002 actual, a 2003 request, and a 2004 request. We now must have a 2003 actual as a result of the signing 

of the omnibus, and I would like to know what that figure is. Are 

you telling me you can’t tell me that now? 

Mr. FRANCO. Well, from the all spigot for fiscal year 2003, the 

number would be 893,523,000. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. That is not development assistance, though. 

Mr. FRANCO. That is——

Mr. MENENDEZ. From all spigots. 

Mr. FRANCO. For Child Survival and from Development Assist- ance, the request was $417 million. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. How about just development assistance? Which 

is the way in which the Department presented it to the Congress. 

66

Mr. FRANCO. For the development assistance for 2003, the request would be 268.5. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. That is actual? 

Mr. FRANCO. For 2003. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. For 2003, 268. 

Mr. FRANCO. Point five. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Point five. 

Mr. FRANCO. Sometimes we have different ways of presenting it. 

I apologize. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. I understand that. And now let me ask you, for 

child survival and health programs—that is all I want to know, not 

all the rest. 2003, actual? 

Mr. FRANCO. 148.5 million. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. So, in both cases, your requests became virtually 

the actuals? 

Mr. FRANCO. Well, these are not final yet. I have to tell you, 

these are the request levels. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Because what you are giving me is exactly what 

was listed here as requests. And I hope you achieved your requests, 

but I have a feeling you may not have. 

Mr. FRANCO. Well, they are not finalized yet. But that is our requested level for fiscal year 2003. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. That is why words are important. I asked you 

for the actual amounts signed into law in the omnibus. 

So the answer is, you don’t have those numbers now? 

Mr. FRANCO. No. Because we are in a process. I really cannot 

speak to that now until—I am just saying for our Bureau. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Since you can’t give it to me, I would like that 

in writing when you have—as soon as you have it. 

Mr. FRANCO. I would be delighted to provide that, Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Because as far as everything I can see, we are 

going in the wrong direction. And I would also like you to give me 

on the child survival and health programs how much is AIDS and 

how much is non-AIDS in the context of that child survival program. 

Mr. FRANCO. Very good. I would be happy to do that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TO A QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT

MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Question: 

What are the FY 2003 actual levels for Development Assistance and Child Survival/Health? Of the CSH funding, how much is for HIV/AIDS and for non-HIV/

AIDS? 

Answer: 

We expect the breakouts for funding from all accounts will be made available to 

Congress via the 653(a) report after Hill consultations.

Mr. MENENDEZ. And Mr. Secretary, I read your opening remarks. 

And I hate to disagree with them. You quoted the President as saying: I am committed to building a prosperous and free and democratic hemisphere. I don’t doubt that. But he said: Nothing will distract us, nothing will deter us in completing this great work. 

67

Well, this Administration has been terribly distracted. I think we 

certainly have been deterred. And depending upon if we have another round here, Mr. Chairman, to observe your 5 minutes—if not, 

I am going to just submit questions in writing and I would like a 

response for them. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. 

Ms. Harris. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your testimony very much, and have been working 

closely in my previous capacity with Latin America, principally, in 

the arenas—working closely with USAID and the Assistant Secretary’s office on diplomatic programs, cultural, academic, and intellectual. So I appreciate all you have done. You both mentioned 

FTAA, some of the Americas. As you well know, we had the opportunity to host it for 3 years. It really is the cornerstone to economic 

partnerships within this hemisphere, and we hope indeed that it is 

completed by 2005. 

There was a Sense of Congress signed in 2000 that stated that 

in all the U.S., should the United States be selected, that that permanent location would be in Miami, Florida. The purpose being because of the security aspects, transportation, and just the general 

overall feeling of other countries to our south, our neighbors that 

we share a culture and families and history with, that that would 

be the ideal location. Do you know what the status of that potential 

location? As I know, we worked closely with Ambassador Zaleg before his USTR. 

Mr. STRUBLE. No. In fact, I had the privilege of meeting the Congresswoman when she was in her previous elected office, and we 

discussed then Florida’s interest in serving as the permanent home 

for the Executive Secretary. That is of great interest to us. As you 

know, there are other countries that have likewise put forward 

their bid for this. In the recent ministerial, Panama, for example, 

promoted its bid on this. And if I might, I would like to get back 

with you, for the record, on where things stand at this point after 

consulting with my colleagues in USTR. But I don’t know of any 

recent developments. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY J. CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO A

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE KATHERINE HARRIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Question: 

What is the status of a decision on the permanent location of the secretariat for 

the FTAA? 

Answer: 

The mechanism within the FTAA process for choosing the permanent location of 

the secretariat has not yet been decided. Nonetheless, the Administration favors locating the FTAA’s permanent secretariat in the United States. Several U.S. cities 

have expressed an interest in hosting the secretariat, as have foreign countries including Mexico, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. The Administration has not yet 

reached a decision on which U.S. city it prefers for the site.

Ms. HARRIS. And secondly, I know that within Latin America, 

sometimes perceptions are as important as realities. And as far as 

in the last 4 years, we haven’t had a confirmed Assistant Secretary 

68

for the Western Hemisphere. I am also concerned just with regard 

to the impact made by the State Department without that confirmed Assistant Secretary of State. Are we able to raise to the 

level—I mean, obviously the issues going on in the Middle East 

and other distractions have occurred. But what is the impact of the 

absence of a confirmed Assistant Secretary of State within the 

State Department itself? 

Mr. STRUBLE. Well, if I may, Congresswoman. I would like to 

combine part of your question with a little bit of Congressman 

Menendez’s remarks. I think, in fact, that the problem has not 

been that the President is not engaged in this hemisphere. He is 

extremely engaged. He has seen almost every President of this 

hemisphere. He has traveled to a number of our countries. I have 

listed a series of initiatives that are fruits of this Administration’s 

policy focus on Latin America. 

Within the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, I have been 

assigned domestically to this Bureau for nearly 4 years now, and 

there has not been 1 second in that 4 years that we had a confirmed Assistant Secretary at the helm of the Bureau. And I do, to 

be frank with you, worry about our ability as a Bureau to sustain 

the President and the Secretary of State in an adequate manner 

in the execution of their policies. And I think that we run the risk 

of missing opportunities, to take advantage of opportunities in this 

hemisphere by not having at the helm a confirmed Assistant Secretary. 

As you know, the Administration in January forwarded to the 

Senate its intention to nominate Ambassador Roger Noriega, who 

is a very well qualified candidate for the position of Assistant Secretary, and I hope the Senate has an early opportunity to provide 

its advise and consent to that nomination. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. Let me echo the kudos that were directed to both of you personally. I concur. I know you both have 

done yeoman’s service for your country. There obviously are areas 

where we have disagreements. But then I even disagree sometimes 

with my friend, my Ranking Member, Mr. Menendez on certain 

issues. 

But having said that, let me ask you a question, both of you. 

How would you assess the perception of the United States currently by the peoples of Latin America? Mr. Struble. 

Mr. STRUBLE. Yes. Thank you. It varies of course by the issue. 

To give one example, in Colombia, we have seen the image of the 

United States very steadily improve over the past 2 years. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do we take polling data? 

Mr. STRUBLE. Pardon me? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do we conduct polls? 

Mr. STRUBLE. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt you then because, again, of the 

time limits. I would like to have forwarded to me all of the polling 

data regarding——

Mr. STRUBLE. The image of the United States? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The image of the United States. 

Mr. STRUBLE. Yes. 

69

Mr. DELAHUNT. For each of the countries within the hemisphere. 

Mr. STRUBLE. I would be happy to do that, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY J. CURTIS STRUBLE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO A

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Question: 

How would you assess the perception of the United States currently by the peoples 

of Latin America? 

Answer: 

The Department’s Office of Research gathers information on public opinion in 

Latin America by contracting opinion surveys from polling firms and buying polling 

data from other pollsters, as well as monitoring polls published in regional media. 

They have not conducted any major polling in Latin America yet in FY 2003, but 

plan to do so as soon as they receive their full funding for the year. Reports as of 

late 2002 showed large majorities (65–75%) had a favorable U.S. image, particularly 

in Central America, Mexico, and the Andes. Unquestionably that image has been 

adversely affected by events in Iraq, as has been borne out in some commercial polls 

that have appeared over the last few months. Whether this downturn will have 

long-term effects on how the U.S. is viewed in the region will depend, we believe, 

on perceptions of the U.S. in the post-war reconstruction period, and whether or not 

evidence comes to light of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And earlier we had been talking where the drugs 

are relative to data. And maybe you can help in this regard. Adolfo, 

you indicated that there has been an issue in terms of replacement 

income for those campasinos that historically were growing coca 

and poppy. Do we have quantifiable data in terms of the amount 

of income lost by the failure to date of the ability to replace that 

income? 

Mr. FRANCO. The income of the campasinos? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Um-hmm. 

Mr. FRANCO. Well, I would like to answer that, Mr. Delahunt, in 

a positive way. And that is, that when we—that is why we call it 

an alternative development. What we have strived to do—and I do 

have some statistics here on it. For example, we have helped 

20,000 families so far this year and their program is—in terms of 

alternative development in Colombia——

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know——

Mr. FRANCO. I know——

Mr. DELAHUNT. No. Let me interrupt you, if I can, because if we 

go to a second round—which I am sure we will—we will have more. 

But I am looking for, you acknowledge that there was a problem 

with the alternative development program in that replacement income which incentivizes campasinos not to grow illicit crops, that 

has been a problem. Again, what I would like to know is what has 

happened. Do we have some quantifiable data? 

Also, in terms of development, infrastructure, roads, public education. Those are the kind of data that I think we need as a Committee to really understand what our policy is and how we are 

moving. Have literacy rates been impacted at all by our policy? 

Again, I am sure that you can submit most of this to the Committee in written form. 

Mr. FRANCO. I will. 

[The information referred to follows:]

70

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TO A QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE WIL- LIAM D. DELAHUNT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSA- CHUSETTS

IMPACT OF ALTERNATE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Question: 

For campesinos who historically grew coca and poppy, what amount of income lost 

by the failure to replace that income under the Alternative Development (AD) program? What impact has the program had on infrastructure, roads and public education? Have literacy rates been at all impacted by our policy? 

Answer: 

• Legal crops and legal employment activities generally are not expected to provide farmers with incomes that are equivalent to the amounts they earned 

from illegal crops. In addition, as income levels for campesinos who produce 

drug crops or licit crops show substantial variability depending on the variety 

of crop grown, the number of hectares produced and the agro-climatic characteristics of individual farms, it is impossible to develop reliable statistics on 

‘‘lost’’ income.

• Farmers generally prefer legal production activities, in spite of the supposed 

lower income, because licit crops: 

— are accompanied by lower levels of violence in many areas; 

— are accompanied by greater family and community cohesion; 

— are accompanied by development programs through the Government or 

USAID; 

— are not subject to seizure by police or military officials resulting in 

zero—income; 

— (in Colombia) are not destroyed by the Colombian Police (i.e., spray operations), resulting in zero income.

• AD programs provide funding for local infrastructure construction in addition 

to production of alternative crops or livestock. Infrastructure improvements 

include roads, bridges, schools, potable water and sewage systems, in addition 

to social infrastructure including health and education facilities. All projects 

are designed to improve the productive infrastructure of the area and provide 

jobs and income.

• Support for public education—school construction or improvement—is an important activity under all AD programs. In Colombia the Internally Displaced 

Persons program and other components of the Democracy program have a 

wider range of educational activities that include providing educational materials, equipment, uniforms and improving teaching methodologies for traumatized children.

• AD programs are designed to transition communities from reliance on illicit 

crops to legal activities and to provide opportunities for an improved quality 

of life. These programs are not focused narrowly on improving literacy rates. 

Additional, targeted literacy components would have to be added to current 

activities before the program could have a significant impact on literacy rates. 

Even so, to have any impact on literacy rates would take significant investments over a sustained period of time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And with that, an opportunity to have discussions both personally as well as through your appearances here. 

Let me go back to the issue of good governance. And again, let 

me extend my gratitude for the ad hoc efforts that have been made, 

such as your efforts to assist myself and Congressman Ballenger 

regarding bringing members of the Venezuelan National Assembly 

to my district. 

Mr. FRANCO. Boston. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I hope that we could count on you for continuing support. But my point earlier was, it is time to really understand that good governance I think—and this is just my opinion—is the foundation for all of the other goals that you described 

as your policy. And it is simply time to start to think out of the 

71

box. For years, there was controversy here surrounding the School 

of Americas, where we brought military officers here to this country for training. Many in this Congress were extremely concerned, 

including some of my colleagues from Massachusetts, like the 

former beloved Joe Moakley. But isn’t it time to think about a 

School of Americas for legislative bodies, for judicial branches of 

fledging and embryonic democracies? That is the kind of creative 

thinking we need. It is just something that came to my mind as 

I was sitting here listening to you. That is what we are looking for 

in terms of the government’s policy and this Administration’s policy. 

Mr. FRANCO. I would like to comment if I could, Mr. Delahunt, 

on that. And I certainly will try to provide the statistics first on 

the alternative development program in writing to make sure that 

what I say is absolutely accurate, and beyond just the number of 

families that we are helping and the progress we are making. And 

I do believe it is significant progress. 

On the good governance and anticorruption. Sometimes—and you 

and I have talked about this. Sometimes I really honestly believe 

that we are saying—not saying the same things. We mean the 

same things; we say it differently. The President, when he announced his vision for the region—and this is not a red herring I 

know on the challenge account. At the forefront, has talked about 

good governance and anticorruption as the pillar and the necessary 

essential element for free trade or anything else that we do in the 

hemisphere. 

I have talked a lot about free trade and trade capacity building. 

And I believe Mr. Menendez said this is an instrument. If he 

didn’t, I will say it. It is an instrument. And when we talk about 

trade capacity building, we are talking about good governance. We 

are talking about issues of corruption, we are talking about issues 

of institution building. You asked about Colombia where we have—

we talk about alternative development. We have three major programs there, alternative development and generally displaced people and a justice program. And this is a society under a lot of conflict. 

We have the Casas de Justicia, which reach the poor which is 

bringing justice to the grassroots level. We are talking about judicial reform, working with the Attorney General’s Office. We are 

doing this in Nicaragua, with the government of Enrique Bolanos. 

We are extremely concerned about it, have met with the Chief Justice in Guatemala. Now, often, I will be candid, this is under the 

rubric of trade capacity. Not that we are trying to build trade capacity and trying to sell that as the panacea you have said. But 

good governance and institution building——

Mr. BALLENGER. I hate to interrupt, but I think we are going to 

run out of time. And Congressman Leach, and we have got two 

more Congressmen before the bell goes off, I think. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. And let me 

also express my appreciation for the Department’s work in this 

area. The Congress, most of all, wants professionals, and we are 

fortunate to have one of the finest secretaries in the history of the 

United States leading the Department. And one of the great questions is, how do we build up professional diplomacy? And the two 

72

of you symbolize that within the Department. A former American 

political investor, but a great man named John Kenneth Galbraith, 

once commented about an American Embassy that had worked well 

with a good Ambassador, a weak Ambassador, but best of all, with 

no Ambassador at all. What he meant by that was the professional 

DCM ran the show. And we might have the same thing here in the 

Bureau of Latin American Affairs. 

But having said that, I think basically the Department works 

best with fine appointments of the administration in power. And it 

is important that the Senate give consideration to the appointments of the President on that timely basis. 

That being said, I would only stress that Latin America is a classic example of the importance of the arm of the United States government dealing cohesively with a region. And it is quite clear that 

one of the bizarre happenstances that may or may not be shortlived is a real paradigm shift in attitudes toward the United States 

in world affairs. And we are going to have to be looking much more 

carefully at the department’s budget in a sympathetic way than I 

think we have ever looked at before. This is a time for professional 

diplomacy, and we are hopeful that that can be the benchmark of 

our relations with Latin America as well as the rest of the world. 

But it is—what is happening in the rest of the world gets reflected 

in all other parts of the world. And so you have peculiar problems, 

but they are also generalized ones. And we appreciate your efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no particular questions. Your time is difficult. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I too would like to offer the same sentiments expressed by my good friend from Iowa concerning both of 

you gentlemen, your professionalism, and the outstanding job that 

you are doing in your capacities. 

Some of the thoughts and questions I would like to share with 

both of you gentlemen, are that my good friend from Iowa and I 

are assigned to the task of looking after the Asia-Pacific region 

where one third of the world’s GNP comes from and two thirds of 

the world’s population is in the Asia-Pacific region. And in a similar fashion, I am curious, and I expressed my—being a novice as 

a Member of this Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, what is 

the total population of the Latin American in the Caribbean? I 

don’t want to put you——

Mr. STRUBLE. I cited 800 million as the figure in my testimony 

and would have to subtract from that the population of the United 

States and Canada. So roughly 500 million, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So it is roughly 500 million. And with the 

total GNP? I am looking primarily at Latin America and just the 

Caribbean, and not necessarily Canada and our country. 

Mr. STRUBLE. The total GNP of South America should on the 

order of about one and a half trillion dollars. And then Central 

America and the Caribbean would add in—so roughly one and a 

half trillion dollars I would think for the region. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I was very interested in both of you gentlemen’s comments, when you mentioned the word ‘‘scholarships.’’ I 

don’t know if it was the Chinese who invented the proverbial exVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
73

pression: You give a man a fish and he will live for days, and teach 

a man how to fish and he will live forever. 

One specific area that I really would like both of you to help me 

with, and this is in reference to the indigenous Indian populations 

throughout Latin American and the Caribbean. And I am very, 

very interested, keenly interested. I say this in a similar sense. You 

know what happens in our own country and where native American Indians stand as far as economics, the worst of the worst if 

you want to put it in those terms. And I suspect the indigenous Indians in Latin America and Caribbean are probably in the same 

status. But I would really appreciate if you could—Mr. Franco, 

does USAID have a similar scholarship program for indigenous Indians similar as to what we are trying to do with the Cubans? 

Mr. FRANCO. We don’t have a specific scholarship program for indigenous people per se. However, our work with indigenous populations, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous populations, not the Afro 

population, is extensive. And I will say that I can provide you with 

statistics, sir, and tell you what we are doing throughout the region. There is, I would say, happily, a sea change under way in 

Latin America, more inclusiveness. And I believe the United States 

Government and USAID, in particular, has contributed significantly over the years to promote that equity and access, particularly, I would say, in Central America and in the Andean region. 

I would be happy to provide you with that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TO A QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE ENI

F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

EQUITY AND ACCESS OF INDIGENOUS AND AFRO-COLOMBIANS

Question: 

In Central America and the Andean region, how has USAID contributed to promoting equity and access of indigenous populations and Afro Colombians? 

Answer: 

The USAID program for the LAC region involves efforts to deepen and broaden 

the participation of all groups, particularly those who are socio-economically disadvantaged. These include indigenous populations and Latin Americans of African 

descent (or Afro Latinos). In some countries these groups have faced legal or official 

discrimination in employment, access to education, access to property and other 

basic rights and services. To address these injustices, USAID has continuously supported efforts to reach out to indigenous and Afro-Latino populations, both through 

targeted programs and through larger efforts to support marginalized populations. 

Some examples include:

• USAID/LAC provided, in April 2000, a $500,000 cooperative agreement to 

Partners of the Americas (POA) to work with the Organization of Africans in 

the Americas (OAA) to support leadership training and institutional strengthening for Latin Americans of African descent whose communities in Honduras 

and Guatemala were disproportionately affected by Hurricane Mitch.

• In Nicaragua, USAID has supported Creole communities of African descent, 

as well as indigenous Miskito and Mayangna groups, through the Bilingual 

Intercultural Education program. The program has trained teachers from 28 

bilingual model schools in second language teaching, linguistics, and culture. 

USAID also provided training to Creole teachers in how to teach reading and 

writing. These bilingual education activities have expanded access of minorities to schooling and fostered respect for local culture, language and history.

• In Guatemala, the USAID Mission is working with public and private sector 

partners to use land titling as a primary means of giving local indigenous 

74

communities a stake in the conservation and sustainable use of surrounding 

biodiversity and archeological assets. USAID/Guatemala has also supported 

intercultural bilingual education for 100,000 Mayan children and trained 

1000 teachers in intercultural bilingual education. This activity included a 

scholarship program to encourage Mayan girls and at-risk indigenous boys to 

stay in school.

• In Bolivia, with USAID support, the Izoceno Indeans worked with their government to establish a 3.4 million hectare national park and integrated management area—the country’s largest. The Izoceno organization now co-administers the park, is consolidating indigenous territory adjacent to it, and has 

leveraged $1.5 million from private companies that negotiated the BoliviaBrazil gas pipeline.

• In Peru, all of USAID’s programs have been explicitly designed to promote 

greater participation of groups traditionally marginalized from the economic, 

social, and political processes. These groups include indigenous populations 

and Afro-Peruvians, as well as women and the rural poor. Activities include 

the ‘‘Opening Doors’’ girls’ education project in rural, predominantly indigenous areas; USAID’s health projects which are concentrated among indigenous, rural populations; the ‘‘Participa Peru’’ project, which focuses on civil 

society participation in the decentralization process and includes pilot activities with indigenous populations, especially women and minority ethnic 

groups; and USAID’s Environmental Program, which is working to create economic alternatives and improve the living standards of indigenous communities living in natural protected areas and buffer zones. The Peru-Ecuador 

Border Development Program’’ is also improving the capacity of 50,000 people 

from 170 indigenous communities to participate in and manage their own development.

• In Colombia, USAID/Colombia provides extensive assistance to Afro-Colombians through its Human Rights (HR), Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), 

Local Governance and Alternative Development (AD) Programs. Assistance is 

typically provided through international non-government organizations 

(INGOs) or U.S. contractors that channel grants to local NGOs and/or work 

directly with Afro-Colombian communities. A few of the many activities being 

carried out with USAID support include:

— USAID local governance activities are benefiting Afro-Colombians by 

strengthening citizen participation, improving municipal management, 

expanding social infrastructures, and promoting transparency and accountability in governance. To date, fifteen social infrastructure projects 

in the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta have benefited approximately 7,477 Afro-Colombians through a participatory process of project 

identification and planning, as well as citizen oversight of project implementation. These projects include the construction of or improvements 

to water and sewer systems, bathrooms, bridges, schools, sports, and 

community centers. 

— Through a grant with Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies, USAID supports local governance programs in the mainly 

Afro-Colombian Pacific port city of Buenaventura. Activities focus on 

strengthening public participation, fostering local economic growth, and 

developing and implementing local policies for crime and violence prevention. 

— To strengthen human rights of Afro-Colombians, USAID has provided 

support to nine organizations, including three major networks, dedicated 

to the promotion and protection of Afro-Colombian interests. Activities 

included advocating for the rights of Afro-Colombians, analyzing compliance with Law 70 dealing specifically with Afro-Colombian rights, support for networks promoting human rights, and conferences to bring together Afro-Colombian organizations to formulate their development 

agenda for 2003. 

— USAID’s IDP program has been at the forefront of assistance to AfroColombian displaced persons. Immediately after the May 2, 2002 massacre in Bojaya, Choco, four USAID-funded grantees initiated assistance 

activities targeting thousands of families displaced by this event. These 

organizations supported the Government of Colombia in providing food, 

shelter, health care, and psycho-social attention to the families relocated 

to a refurbished shelter. 

— Since 2000, USAID IDP grantees have worked to resettle Afro-Colombian families, enhance agricultural production to combat food shortages, 

75

improve their access to justice and government resources, and provide 

services to displaced Afro-Colombian communities, including complementary support to address the economic and psychological costs of 

displacement.

• In Honduras, USAID provides extensive support to both indigenous and AfroLatino Garifuna populations. USAID health programs serve both Indian and 

Garifuna communities; is providing assistance to strengthen the Ministry of 

Health to better serve the Garifuna community on HIV/AIDS prevention and 

treatment; and supports an NGO Umbrella organization that provides direct 

technical assistance to a variety of NGOs serving the Garifuna populations.

• USAID/LAC has a three-year regional agreement with the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, the leading regional human rights organization in 

the Americas. A strong component of this initiative is to provide $360,000 to 

NGOs to expand the full participation of marginalized groups, including AfroLatinos, indigenous groups and women in political life; and to strengthen 

mechanisms to combat discrimination and promote inclusion.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. I am not wanting to lose my train 

of thought here. 

Mr. FRANCO. Sure. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would respectfully request both of you gentlemen to submit to the Committee and a copy to me, an assessment report on the educational, economic, and welfare status of the 

indigenous native populations throughout Latin America and the 

Caribbean. I am really, really very interested in this, and I really 

would appreciate if you could help me with that. 

Mr. FRANCO. Sure. 

[The information referred to follows:]

ANSWER SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY THE HONORABLE ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TO A QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE ENI

F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

STATUS OF INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS IN LAC

Question: 

What is the educational, economic, and welfare status of the indigenous native populations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean? 

Answer: 

The educational, economic, and welfare status of Latin America’s indigenous people is well below that of the non-indigenous people. While this is widely known, it 

is not well documented, there has been almost no systematic study, and what little 

is known is confined almost entirely to South and Central America. 

While many countries in the region have sizeable indigenous populations, few include questions to identify the ethno-linguistic characteristics of individuals in their 

household or labor force surveys. Three different definitions identify indigenous respondents—language spoken, self-identification, and geographic concentration. Language identifies the indigenous population in Bolivia and Peru, for instance. In Guatemala the indigenous population is identified by self-perception, and in Mexico it 

is geographic concentration which is then filtered by language and self-perception. 

Add to this melange the problem of defining and measuring poverty populations, 

and it is understandable why so little comparative or comprehensive analysis has 

been done. 

What follows below is based largely, but not entirely, on a recent World Bank update of work done for the Bank in the mid-1990s to assist in the design of poverty 

alleviation activities in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru (see footnote at end). 

What is known about the socio-economic conditions of Latin America’s indigenous 

people is that they make up a significant portion of the rural poor. These groups 

live on the periphery of marginal areas, and are often landless. In Latin America, 

indigenous people make up only 8 percent of the total population, but about 27 percent of the rural population. 

The indigenous people are, therefore, a large and distinct portion of the population. As a percent of total population, based on various censuses in the 1980s and 

1990s, the indigenous were 54 percent in Bolivia, 42 percent in Guatemala, 25 perVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
76

cent in Peru, 9 percent in Mexico, and lesser but measurable percentages in Colombia, Honduras, Paraguay, and Venezuela. 

Poverty is pervasive among the indigenous. In urban Bolivia 64 percent of the indigenous are poor compared to 48 percent of the non-indigenous, while in Guatemala 87 percent of the over-all indigenous population is poor, compared to 54 percent for the non-indigenous. In Mexico the difference is dramatic: 81 percent of the 

indigenous are poor, while only 18 percent of the over-all population is poor. In Panama the figures are 84 percent and 32 percent respectively, and in Peru 79 percent 

and 50 percent. 

In comparison, in Paraguay the poor are a relatively ‘‘modest’’ 37 percent of the 

indigenous population, compared to 11 percent for the total population. It is well 

documented that the mal-distribution of income in South and Central America is 

comparable to sub-Sahara Africa. Among the former’s indigenous population the distribution of income is even worse. 

Recent experience in Panama, Bolivia, and Ecuador suggest that the indigenous, 

especially the poor indigenous, can and will organize to press for their economic interests and better services from their governments. The indigenous understand that 

investment in human development, especially education, allows a way out of their 

poverty trap. 

Because of discrimination and high drop-out rates, however, this is not fool-proof. 

In urban Bolivia for instance, 50 percent of indigenous males and close to 70 percent of indigenous females fail to complete primary school. Given the pervasive lack 

of services in rural areas across the region, the rates for rural indigenous populations must be even higher. In Guatemala, for instance, average schooling years 

for the indigenous are 1.8 years versus 4.9 years for the non-indigenous, and in Ecuador the figures are 5.9 years and 7.2 years respectively. Peru’s indigenous average 

6.7 schooling years, compared to 10 years for the non-indigenous, and Paraguay the 

respective figures are 8.2 years and 11.2 years. 

These disparities then show up in returns to investment in education and wage 

differentials. In Bolivia average wages for the indigenous are 61 percent of wages 

for the non-indigenous. In Guatemala and Peru the ratios are 42 and 43 percent 

respectively, and 63 and 64 percent in Ecuador and Paraguay. The differences would 

be even greater for indigenous females, suggesting that they are the most disadvantaged populations in South and Central America. 

Finally, incomplete and anecdotal information strongly suggests that disparities 

in education and income are compounded by disparities in living conditions. In Guatemala less than one-third of all indigenous households have water piped to their 

homes for their exclusive use, compared to almost half of non-indigenous households. 

Approximately one-half of all indigenous households have no sanitary services, 

and three-fourths have no electricity. In Peru only 46 percent of indigenous homes 

have public water, while 31 percent use wells and 15 percent use rivers and 

streams. Only 21 percent of indigenous homes in Peru have public waste disposal. 

One of the results is that a greater proportion of the indigenous, and the indigenous 

population as a whole, is chronically exposed to water-borne diseases and their debilitating effects. 

Sources—

(1) International Fund for Agricultural Development, 1992. The State of World 

Rural Poverty: An Inquiry into its Causes and Consequences. New York: New York 

University Press. 

(2) Psacharopoulos, G. and H. A. patrinos, eds. 1993. Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis. Report No. 30. Washington, D.C.: The 

World Bank. 

(3) patrinos, H. A., 2000. Indigenous Peoples and Poverty in Latin America (Lecture presented April 11, 2000, to Human Development Network). Washington, D.C.: 

The World Bank.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. About 2 years ago, I went to Havana, Cuba 

under the auspices of the United Nations conference that was held 

there on decolonization. To my surprise, I think I could come—we 

probably had over 100 foreign service officers that live and work 

in Havana. And I will bet probably 90 percent of the American people don’t know that we have an unofficial presence right there in 

Havana with foreign service officers. 

77

Mr. FRANCO. It is official. It is a U.S. interests section. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. But we come under the auspices of the 

Swiss Embassy to make it unofficial in the same way that the 

Cuban Embassy is called unofficial in New York through the Swiss 

Embassy that is official. And correct me if I am wrong on that, Mr. 

Franco. But I say this because we make it as if we pretend like we 

have no relationship whatsoever, and yet physically we have a 

four-story building there with about 100 foreign service officers 

with an unofficial Ambassador that does a lot of work there. Can 

you share with us, does USAID have presence in that unofficial capacity that we have there in Havana, Cuba? 

Mr. FRANCO. As I mentioned earlier, we—and Secretary Struble 

will comment about the U.S. interests section, and I believe it is 

a little lower than 104. It is 52, I believe. But we do have an interests section there. We do have a principal officer there. We work 

closely with the U.S. interests section, very closely in terms of 

USAID. USAID does not have an individual station there. As I 

mentioned earlier, our program is a small program. We have the 

individual travel to Cuba. It is important in my view and I appreciated very much Mr. Menendez’s comment regarding Dr. Mulcher, 

which the administrator and I share fully a complete confidence in 

him and his ability to carry out the program. He travels there. He 

carries on oversight as we do in other non-presence countries. But 

we do not have a station or a mission there at this time. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. STRUBLE. And if I may just add, Congressman, a couple of 

notes. There is a limit on the number of U.S. personnel that the 

Cuban government allows to be assigned to our interests section. 

I can’t remember what the exact figure is now. I think it is either 

52 or 55? 52. And in addition to that, there is also a limit on the 

number of people that we can send temporarily to Havana every 

year, which is one reason why it is difficult for some of our people 

who have a need to travel more frequently to be able to do so. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. BALLENGER. We will do a quick turnaround here. 

Let me just ask one question. Curt, as you know, I have been 

asking about helicopters for the drug war in Guatemala for quite 

some time. Is there any likelihood that they are ever going to be 

given to the DEA in Guatemala? 

Mr. STRUBLE. I think there is no near-term likelihood of that, 

Mr. Chairman. Because as you know, after our decertification of 

Guatemala this year, we engaged—even before the decertification—

in a very intensive dialogue with the government of Guatemala 

about trying to rebuild our law enforcement relationship and their 

capacity to be an effective partner in the war against narcotics. 

Guatemala formerly had, despite its limited capabilities, a very effective program. They interdicted a lot of cocaine. They did a much 

better job at prosecutions. That has, as you know so well, deteriorated in the last 2 years. 

Our near-term focus, Mr. Chairman, is on achievable results that 

demonstrate political will and will help us to rebuild that relationship of trust. Things like destruction by the Guatemalans of the 

thousands of pounds of cocaine that are in warehouses, much of 

which has been stored in warehouses pending resolution of court 

78

cases. Improvements on extradition. Reestablishment of an effective anti-narcotics police unit. An increase in seizures. More effective measures against money laundering. And these steps, I think, 

are needed before we get into the equipment business. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I understand. 

Congressman Menendez? 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, the clock—I mean, the bells have 

rung for votes. So I would like to commend to your consideration 

two separate hearings, one in which Mr. Franco and/or the administrator are brought here to talk about Latin America. Because I 

think it is very difficult to do it in the synthesis of the time frame 

we have had. And one in which Mr. Struble or hopefully if it comes 

quickly the newly-ratified Assistant Secretary. 

Or maybe we might be blessed by Mr. Grossman to come here 

to testify before the Committee. And separately, Mr. Chairman, if 

I would urge to your consideration. Because talking about a whole 

hemisphere, we are talking about a lot of issues. It is very difficult 

to glean the type of information that we would like to have and 

share in the time frames that we are permitted if we are going to 

pursue the 5-minute rule, which I understand why the Chair is 

doing it. 

So if we could break these out. Because I would like to know 

whether the net terms of foreign assistance, when you take the millennium challenge account, the famine fund, the AIDS Initiative in 

2004, I want to know what we are doing net at the end of the day. 

I want to know what you actually got, not in your request, but 

what you got in actual dollars for 2003. And I want to be able to 

compare those. And I don’t want to hear just simply consolidations. 

I want to know specifically in net terms what is happening in the 

hemisphere financially in terms of our commitments. I would like 

to be able to have Mr. Struble or someone else to talk about some 

specific country-specific issues so we can look at our policy in terms 

of some of these countries. 

So, instead of asking questions at this time we would be pressed 

for, I really hope the Chair would consider having those types of 

hearings, because I think they can be very fruitful for the Committee as a whole. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I understand, and I will do my best. But it took 

us four tries to get this one. It is not the easiest thing in the world 

to get done. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I know that you can be persuasive. And if the Chairman needs any assistance in trying to achieve 

it, I would be more than happy to join my voice and I am sure we 

could add others to the Department to make sure that we get the 

appropriate representation here before the Committee. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Were you going to say something? 

Mr. FRANCO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if I can. Honestly, Mr. Menendez, I would like to come back, personally, in a couple weeks when 

we do have the allocations. Many of these budget items, we are not 

ducking them, are just agencywide, and we have to have intra-bureau allocations done. So the next time we do have a hearing, you 

will have specific numbers. 

I do want to dispel one thing I had heard earlier when Director 

Walters was speaking. I can assure you that funding levels for CoVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:26 May 12, 2003 Jkt 085340 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\022703\85340 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
79

lombia are not being reduced in fiscal year 2003. They are not 

being reduced. The Colombian funding source is—our entire 

USAID budget is derived from the Andean counter-initiative resources, and they are approximately a third of what is provided 

under Plan Colombia, and that level will be sustained. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me just say thank you, both of you gentlemen, for being here and lasting as long as you did before you came 

before us. And we will check and see how we can put it back together again. But thank you again because it was really an educational meeting. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you. 

Mr. STRUBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a pleasure. 

[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(81)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM LANTOS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Chairman Ballenger, I first would like to thank you for your extraordinary work 

that you and Members of the Democratic Caucus, like my good friends and colleagues Bill Delahunt and Greg Meeks, have been doing in the Western Hemisphere. Your joint efforts are a testament to congressional capabilities to strengthen 

bilateral relations between our country and our southern neighbors, particularly in 

the absence of strong policy direction from the Administration. 

I also appreciate the opportunity to make some brief remarks on an evolving development in Colombia. 

Mr. Chairman, on February 13, 2003, a single-engine Cessna aircraft crashed in 

the dense forests of Colombia after reportedly experiencing engine failure. Unfortunately, forced landings by small aircrafts are not uncommon in this part of the 

world. This particular episode was significant, however, because four of the five passengers were Americans on an U.S.-sponsored anti-drug mission. 

Although the facts of what happened next are still unclear, we know that machine-gun-wielding FARC rebels quickly surrounded the plane and murdered the 

American pilot and his co-pilot, a Colombian intelligence officer. The FARC then 

charred the plane, kidnaped the surviving three Americans, and fled into the jungle. 

The Colombian government immediately launched an extensive search-and-rescue 

operation with over 2,000 of their troops and a number of American soldiers, especially trained in counter-insurgency and rescue operations. 

Mr. Chairman, these actions by the murderous FARC rebels and leadership are 

deplorable, unjustifiable, and beneath contempt. The terrorists should be hunted 

down and brought to justice like the common criminals that they are. 

I encourage our Administration and that of President Uribe of Colombia to work 

together to ensure that not only the terrorists who actually committed these heinous 

crimes, but also their leadership who instructed or condoned of such actions are 

brought to justice in the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, I do want to raise one cautionary note, however. 

Although the Bush Administration properly has notified Congress of its increased 

military activity in Colombia as it conducts search-and-rescue operations for the 

three missing Americans, I strongly urge the Administration to continue to consult 

with the appropriate congressional committees as its troop commitments in the 

country exceed the limit carefully established in law. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Æ