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TURKEY’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.–TURKISH RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 28, 2010

Serial No. 111–113

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Ross Wilson, Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, The 

Atlantic Council (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan) ......... 14

Michael Rubin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute ........... 21

Ian Lesser, Ph.D., Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund 

of the United States ............................................................................................. 28

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Director, Turkish Research Program, The Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy ............................................................................. 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Ross Wilson: Prepared statement ................................................. 17

Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 23

Ian Lesser, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................................. 31

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 41

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 74

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Mike Pence, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 77

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 79

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 82

(1)

TURKEY’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.–TURKISH RELATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. In a moment, I am going to recognize myself and the ranking member for 

up to 7 minutes each for purposes of making an opening statement. 

I will then recognize the chairman and ranking member of the Europe Subcommittee, if they wish, for 3 minutes each to make opening remarks. All other members will then have the opportunity to 

make 1-minute opening statements if they wish to do so. Without 

objection, members may also place written statements in the 

record. 

The purpose of this hearing is to gain insight into the changes 

in the foreign-policy direction of our long-time ally Turkey. Now the 

sixteenth-largest economy in the world, Turkey is a complex country, endowed by geography with circumstances that connect it to 

developments in at least a half-dozen regions and sub-regions. 

Turkish foreign policy is also complex. Turkey is an important 

ally to the United States in NATO and now particularly so in Afghanistan, where it has 1,700 troops, heads the Kabul Regional 

Command, and makes other important contributions. Turkey is 

also a critical transit point for provisions for our troops in Iraq. 

But it is Turkey’s recent and worrisome policy turns regarding 

Iran, Israel, and the Palestinians, and the larger implications of 

those policies, that are likely to form the basis for much of today’s 

discussion. 

One State Department official recently put it this way: ‘‘There is 

a lot of questioning going on about Turkey’s orientation and its ongoing commitment to strategic partnership with the United States.’’

I am among those that have such concerns, and that is why we 

are holding the first full committee hearing devoted exclusively to 

Turkey within my memory. 

For some people, concerns about Turkey’s direction first came to 

the fore almost immediately in November 2002, when the religiously-oriented AK Party won a powerful parliamentary majority. 

For others it was in March 2003, when the Turkish Parliament 

voted down the U.S. request to allow the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division to cross Turkish territory as part of the Iraq war. 

2

I was not in either of those groups. After the AK Party was elected, I was encouraged by their focus on internal reform and the European Union, as well as by the hopeful prospect that AK would 

be a model for a moderate Islam that would inspire others throughout the Islamic world. I have also been encouraged by what has, 

at times, been a foreign policy less rigid and less nationalistic than 

traditional Turkish policy. 

But for me the evidence of a negative foreign-policy shift by the 

AK Party government has been clear at least since February 2006, 

when Turkey invited Hamas leader Khaled Mashal for a visit. 

Until then, Turkey had seemed as solidly anti-terrorist as any 

country in the world. At the time, the Turks indicated they merely 

hoped to moderate Hamas, but now, with the passage of well over 

4 years of regular contacts between Hamas and Turkey, it is clear 

that Hamas has not changed at all—but Turkey has. And the contacts continue more intensively than ever. 

The intensity of Prime Minister Erdogan’s anger at Israel became clear for all to see at Davos in February 2009. Since that 

time Turkey’s growing closeness with Iran has added, for many of 

us, a new dimension of outrage and concern. 

Concerns about Turkey hit a new peak with the flotilla incident, 

the apparent ties of some AK Party and the Hamas-associated nongovernmental organization IHH, and the Turkish vote against U.N. 

Security Council resolution 1929, the historic sanctions resolution 

aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program. Earlier this week Turkey’s Finance Minister asserted that his nation would boost trade 

with Iran, while ignoring all non-U.N. sanctions. That is an upsetting position when Russia takes it, but it is appalling when it 

comes from an ally. 

All of these developments raise many questions. 

Is Turkey moving away from the West? Or is it merely taking 

independent positions regarding the Palestinians and Iran, however objectionable to us, while otherwise remaining committed to 

the Western alliance? 

Is the AK Party government seeking a greater leadership role in 

the Middle East, and, if so, what does that mean? 

What is the AK Party’s vision for Turkey? Is it committed to democracy? To European Union membership? 

And how crucial is Turkey to us as an ally? How important is 

the United States to Turkey’s interest? How does Turkey view its 

alliance with the United States? 

Certain points are beyond dispute: First, Turkey is indeed seeking to enhance its standing in the Middle East—some say, it is 

seeking to leave the Middle East—and it is using criticism of Israel 

and backing for Hamas to support that bid. 

Second, Turkish contacts with Hamas are deeply offensive. They 

undermine the pro-peace Palestinian Authority and therefore they 

ultimately undermine prospects for peace. And, although we can’t 

compel Turkey to view Hamas as a terrorist group—Prime Minister 

Erdogan has labeled it a ‘‘resistance’’ group—we should expect Ankara to at least respect the terrorism list of an important ally, 

namely, the United States. 

This is particularly true when the United States is actively aiding Turkey in its fight against the Kurdish separatist terrorist 

3

group known as PKK. The U.S. has been providing Turkey realtime, ‘‘actionable’’ intelligence against the PKK since December 

2007 in response to a direct appeal from Prime Minister Erdogan. 

Third, it is critical that Turkey acknowledge the genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people during World War I. That is why this committee has repeatedly passed 

measures recognizing the genocide and calling on the President to 

do likewise. I believe the Turks, once they come to terms with their 

past, will discover that they have relieved themselves and their 

children of an immense moral burden. 

Fourth, we also want to see more movement on the Cyprus issue. 

We want to make sure that the new Turkish Cypriot leader, who 

has always opposed a solution, negotiates in the spirit of the U.N. 

resolutions and inter-communal agreements that require a solution. It is time for Turkey to draw down its absurdly high troop 

level in northern Cyprus. And Turkey should cease settling Turkish citizens in northern Cyprus. Northern Cyprus is not sovereign 

Turkish territory. 

Fifth, we want to see true press freedom in Turkey. Press intimidation has no place in democracies. 

We also want full freedom for religious minorities in Turkey. It 

is time for Turkey to recognize the ecumenical nature of the Greek 

Orthodox Patriarchate and it is certainly time for Turkey to allow 

its Greek Orthodox citizens to reopen the Halki Seminary. 

Not all of these problems began with AK Party control of government. But the AK Party government has brought to the fore new 

issues of concern. I am eager to hear our witnesses’ views as to just 

how concerned we should be, what course Turkey is likely to take 

in the future, and what, if anything, our Government should be 

doing differently in its policy toward Turkey. 

Let me now turn to the ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for 

any opening remarks that she might like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Berman follows:]

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57688e-2.eps
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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this 

hearing. Since the days of the Truman Doctrine in the late 1940s, 

the United States and Turkey have had a strong relationship that 

has served both countries’ interests. This is not to say that there 

have not been serious disagreements. We have long called on Turkey to end its illegal occupation of the northern portion of the Cyprus and to implement more appropriate policies toward the Greek 

Orthodox ecumenical patriarchate in Istanbul. Still there continue 

to be areas in which our two countries reap significant benefits 

from this relationship. Although the Soviet Union is long gone as 

a NATO ally, Turkey still has U.S. guarantee of support if it is 

threatened militarily. 

As part of NATO, Turkey has the opportunity to participate with 

the United States and other member states in the area of missile 

defense. As Turkey’s ally, the United States, in turn is allowed to 

use Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base to support the military operations 

that we have in Afghanistan, and has Turkey’s active support in 

that operation. Both countries also actively cooperate with each 

other in fighting extremism, and that is extremely important both 

because our nations have been targets of horrible attacks and continue to face a threat of future very serious attacks. 

The U.S. and Turkey are significant partners in trade and commerce which is obviously an important fact in this kind of increasing global economic uncertainty. This hearing today however reflects a fact that we may be at a turning point in U.S.-Turkish relations. The policy disagreements that have emerged in recent years 

pose serious challenges to the bilateral relationship. These include 

Turkey’s opposition to the sanctions on Iran that have been sought 

by the United States and its other NATO allies in Europe. Turkey’s 

move instead to rapidly increase its commercial relations with Iran. 

I note this in regard that just this week it, was reported that Turkey and Iran have signed a new agreement on natural gas pipeline 

from Iran to Turkey in defiance of U.S.-led efforts to cut off energy 

investment development and trade with Iran. 

The Turkish Government’s provocation in supporting the May 

31st violation of the naval blockade on shipments to the Hamascontrolled Gaza strip. Turkish authorities then encouraged efforts 

at the United Nations to demonize and condemn our democratic 

ally, Israel. And that current Turkish Government verbal attacks 

on Israel and the Turkish Government support for Hamas, which 

is designated by the United States as a terrorist organization. 

No country has a foreign policy that is completely divorced from 

its domestic political affairs, and Turkey’s ongoing internal changes 

and their impact on its foreign policy are no exception to that rule. 

The relationship between Turkey’s internal developments and its 

foreign policy is, in fact, a subject of debate that makes this hearing today very timely. Everyone seems to agree that this is not 

your grandfather’s Turkey anymore. 

But the fundamental question for Turkey’s future foreign policy 

is how great a change in Turkey’s internal political government—

governance, and social and cultural practices does the current 

Turkish Government intend to seek. The majority justice and development are AK Party and Turkey is clearly an Islamic party. 

What is being debated is how far will it try to go in breaking down 

7

the separation of state and religion that has been the hallmark of 

Turkish governance since the Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ended the Islamic caliphate in Turkey in the 1920s. 

The ability of the Turkish military, a bastion of secularism to 

fend off the rise of dedicated Islamists, within its officer core, appears to be weakening. The manner in which the current Turkish 

Government has conducted its investigation into an alleged military plot to insight a coup has reportedly involved questionable tactics, including extensive wiretapping, alleged illegalities and the 

collection of evidence and lengthy indictments. There have been serious allegations of pressure by the current government on media 

organizations that do not support its policies. 

The government proposed constitutional reforms, if adopted, 

would appear to greatly increase its control over the Turkish judiciary, another traditional bastion of secularism. In fact, some observers say that the Turkish Prime Minister may be following the pattern of the current Russian Prime Minister in the past decade. 

That is steadily putting in place the building blocks for an authoritarian regime that would perpetuate the AKP’s hold on power. Is 

the AKP government seeking to be a more active party in Middle 

Eastern affairs? A more Islamic voice in world affairs, a stronger 

voice in global economic affairs in the G–20 group of nations, or a 

partner with Russia, China, India and Brazil in the so-called BRIC 

group. 

Ultimately, we need to ask, what does this mean for U.S.-Turkish relationships? In our committee’s hearing on trans-Atlantic security in March, I noticed some concern over the positions of several leading NATO allies in Europe in dealing with Russia’s aggression and corruption in contributing to the NATO operations in 

Afghanistan, in sharing with the United States the cost of fighting 

Islamic militants and maintaining global security. I said at that 

time Europe remains important to the United States, but our calls 

for support must not go unheeded. I suggest that that applies to 

our relationship with Turkey today as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely hearing. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

And now I am pleased to recognize the chair of the Europe Subcommittee of our committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We hear a lot these 

days about Turkey’s so-called drift. Drift from the West, drift from 

democracy, drift from secularism. But that is not surprising because there are multiple agendas at play in the world today. Some 

raise fears about the so-called Islamist influences. They speak of 

losing Turkey as if Turkey were about to spawn a new Calafat and 

destroy the Christian West. How absurd. The fact is that the 

United States and Turkey have cultivated a long-term, solid relationship, that has been critical in support of American national interests, as well as Turkey’s. That relationship is persevered and 

has been sustained in war. They fought at our side during the Korean War. During the Cold War, they were NATO’s southeastern 

flank against the former Soviet Union, and now they are playing 

a critical role in Afghanistan. And it continues in peace with efforts 

8

on both sides to increase the commercial relationship between the 

United States and Turkey. 

And importantly, it serves as a countervailing force to Iran in 

this volatile region. Absent Turkey, Iran would be a hegemon in a 

region where the United States has vital national interest. The alliance will persist because it is in our interest and it is also in Turkey’s interest. Of course, there are changes ongoing in Turkey and 

in its relationship with its neighbors. But today’s Turkey remains 

essentially as it was in the days of Ataturk, a secular Nation with 

a Muslim majority. 

What is changing is that Turkey’s becoming more democratic. 

Let’s not forget that the Turkish military regularly overthrew and 

manipulated elected governments. The most recent coup was less 

than 13 years ago. Under the current government, Turkey has 

brought more civilian control over the military and increased the 

participation of its citizens in the democratic processes. This government has made significant efforts to bring Turkey in line with 

the democratic standards of the European Union. So if you have a 

problem with changes in Turkey, while maybe you have a problem 

with democracy and the democratic processes. 

I noted that one of today’s witnesses suggests that we encourage 

the political opposition in Turkey, presumably we should choose 

sides. Well, we tried that in Latin America and it didn’t work very 

well. I suggest that we let the Turks decide what is in their best 

interest. It will work to our advantage in the long term. Ironically 

Turkey’s—I would ask the chair to indulge me for another minute. 

Chairman BERMAN. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 1 additional minute. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ironically Turkey’s democratic improvements 

come at a time when the EU is divided over Turkey’s accession. I 

agree with Secretary Gates who believes that this is one of the factors driving Turkey to expand its diplomatic and economic ties else 

somewhere. Just yesterday, the new conservative British Prime 

Minister, David Cameron, said that while advocating, he was advocating for full Turkish membership in the EU. Here is what he had 

to say, some people seem to oppose Turkey joining the European 

block because they willfully misunderstand Islam. Simple fact, the 

alliance between America and Turkey has served our national interest for over 60 years, let’s not delude ourselves, we need Turkey 

and Turkey needs us, and with that, I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman has yielded back his time. 

And do any members wish to make opening statements? The gentleman from New York—oh. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. No. 

Mr. ROYCE. I will just——

Chairman BERMAN. No, the gentleman from California is recognized in place of the other person from California for 3 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The reason I think I will 

make a few remarks here is because for those of us who are concerned about Turkey, I think we should recognize some of the recent events that have really called into question the intentions of 

the Turkish Government, and not to do so, I think, would be a mistake. I think for us to remain silent on the issue of dissidents in 

9

Iran pushing for democracy and there has been no outcry from the 

Turkish Government in order to try to show solidarity in any way 

with democracy in Iran with an election which was undermined. To 

me, this is hard to equate with the thought that what we are seeing in Turkey is more democracy. I don’t think that is necessarily 

true. 

When we see the Turkish Government show solidarity with 

Islamist states like Sudan, for those of us who have worked on the 

Sudan problem, it is hard to figure out why the ruling party in 

Turkey would embrace that position while it takes shots at more 

moderate secular governments like Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. I 

remember a piece in The Wall Street Journal entitled ‘‘Turkey’s 

Decline Into Madness.’’ It may be overstated, but it points out all 

the conspiracy theories bouncing around within the ruling party in 

Turkey. Our own Ambassador to Turkey had to bring in the Turkish media to explain that the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004 

was not caused by the United States setting off a nuclear blast 

under the sea. Is the government in Turkey really trying to put 

these rumors to bed or are they feeding these rumors, and why do 

they do so? 

I spoke a little bit about the embrace of the position of Sudan 

in states like that. On the other hand, the Turkish Government refers to some of the actions of Israel as being driven by a terrorist 

state. This does not show balance or an attempt to help resolve 

problems in the regions. 

Chairman BERMAN. Does the gentleman—recognized for 1 additional minute. 

Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate that. 

On top of that, relations with Armenia and Greece are very 

frayed. If Turkey wanted to resolve some of these problems, it 

could put forth their best effort and move its foreign policy forward, 

but there is no rapprochement there that I see. Turkey’s blockade 

of Armenia remains intact. You still have 40,000 of its soldiers embedded in Cyprus. 

Clearly they could work out some kind of an arrangement where 

they could take a lot of those soldiers back into Turkey. And yet 

you have these policies that create plenty of problems for Turkey. 

And for us not to point these out and not try to encourage Turkey 

to take positions, which I think are in the long-term interests of 

peace and stability in that region, would be a mistake. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from New York, the chairman of the Middle East and 

South Asia Subcommittee. For purposes of our committee’s jurisdiction, Turkey is in Europe. You are recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Turkey’s foreign policy over the past few months has been a considerable disappointment. Turkey’s vote against U.N. sanctions on Iran, demagoguery 

over the Gaza flotilla, and President Erdogan’s embrace of the dictator from Syria and Iran and the terrorists from Hamas are all 

deplorable and grossly irresponsible. But I can understand Turkey 

wants good relations with its neighbors and hopes to play some 

sort of a mediating role. 

10

On Monday, however, the Financial Times quoted Turkey’s Finance Minister as saying with regards to Iran, ‘‘[t]he facilitation of 

trade that is not prohibited under U.N. resolution should and will 

continue,’’ he said. I want to be blunt, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is an absolutely vital U.S. national security 

interest, and any effort to undermine, undercut or circumvent or 

bypass U.S. or other international sanctions against Iran will have 

grave consequences for our bilateral relations, no exception, no excuses. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this very important and timely hearing. The Turkish Government’s foreign policy raises serious human rights concerns regarding Cyprus; its 

military occupies and promotes illegal migration into the northern 

part of the island where it destroys churches. Regarding Armenia 

Ankara has a policy of aggressive genocide denial. Ethnic Kurds 

are subject to assimilation pressures and the Ecumenical Patriarch 

and the Halki Seminary as well as Syrian Orthodox monasteries 

are under relentless pressure. 

Now the Turkish Government further realigning its foreign policy toward Iran. It has become openly hostile to Israel, broadcasting anti-Semitic programming on state-sponsored television. 

Prime Minister Erdogan’s statements just recently in June professing ‘‘understanding’’ for those who compare the Star of David 

to the swastika was deeply troubling, and hopefully did not represent further deterioration of his view and his country’s view toward Israel. And we are very—I am very—concerned as he is pursuing closer ties to Hamas. Again, I look forward to comments from 

our witnesses. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. For 

purposes of these 1-minute statements, we go in seniority order, 

and for the purposes of 5-minute question periods we go based on 

when members arrive, and therefore I recognize the gentleman 

from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 1 minute. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I think this is a very timely 

hearing. I have been one who has been very critical of Turkey’s occupation of northern Cyprus, I do believe that they should bring 

their troops out of Cyprus, although things have eased there, it is 

far from a settlement. So I agree that Turkey certainly needs to reveal its Cyprus policies. There is no question that Turkey is starting to flex its muscles. You may recall the Ottoman Empire controlled half of the known world at one time. I think Turkey is starting to reemerge as a power. We need to remind ourselves that they 

are very good friends of the United States, and we need to ensure 

that we continue to have that friendship; however, we do need to 

work on them to understand and the Sudan situation. Although, 

each Egypt also is not very supportive of south Sudan, so I think 

we need to work there too. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake. Do you seek recognition? 

Mr. FLAKE. No. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack, is 

recognized for 1 minute. 

11

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, we keep hearing about the relationship with Turkey and the United States and 

how important it is, but I need to remind people of the current actions and the recent actions Turkey has taken, whether it is in support of Hamas, opposition to sanctions with Iran and the role it 

played in the flotilla. These things we can’t ignore, we just can’t 

decide that we are going to continue to support a country that is 

working against our own interests. And I—you know, I can’t help 

but to think only in Washington can you look at a series of actions 

like this and turn around and say, oh, but we can try to work 

through these. I would say this to Turkey. The relationship with 

Turkey is hanging by a thread. If Turkey wants to have a relationship with the United States, then Turkey needs to change the 

course in which it is heading. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. And 

the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Start, thank you very 

much for holding today’s hearing over U.S.-Turkey relation. 

Chairman BERMAN. You are welcome. 

Mr. SIRES. During its nearly century of existence, the Republic 

of Turkey and the United States have had their ups and downs, 

but in recent years, Turkey has proven to be an important strategic 

partner to our country as a NATO ally contributing to operations 

in Afghanistan and serving as an important bridge between Europe 

and the Middle East. 

However, I believe in recent foreign policy decisions made by the 

Turks such as voting against the U.N.’s sanctions on Iran are 

rightfully called for us to address the direction of our relation. 

While I do not think we should overlook the severity of these actions, I believe there must be—that we must approach the issue in 

such a way that will not isolate Turkey, our critical ally in the region. As we have seen, Turkey is more capable of acting independently on the world stage—okay, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman BERMAN. Finish the sentence. 

Mr. SIRES. Critical relations between Turkey and the United 

States, but I am very concerned, I was going to get into Cyprus, 

but forget it. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 

McMahon. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Turkey and historical 

allies realigning its foreign policy goals, expanding trade relationships and redefining a strictly secular identity to domestic reform. 

These are, of course, seemingly positive moves for Turkey’s economy, populace and future. As a matter of fact, these moves were 

accepted and even encouraged by Western allies. But today we find 

that one ambitious goal after another is moving at an unexpectedly 

rapid, even unsteady pace. And perhaps what is even more perplexing is that even Turks within Turkey can identify multiple discrepancies in the policies of Prime Minister Erdogan and his government. 

After years of surprises, I believe that next year’s elections will 

be revealing to the United States, to Israel and the West as to TurVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:37 Oct 01, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\072810\57688 HFA PsN: SHIRL
12

key’s new direction. In the meantime, I hope that Turkish officials 

pay greater attention to messaging. Furthermore, assurances that 

any gains made in the Middle East will not be exchanged with traditional alliances would be welcome. And finally, Turkey will only 

prosper further if encouraged to solve disputes closer to home first, 

like Cyprus. I look forward to our distinguished witnesses’ assessments and yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. And 

the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me add my accolades to you for having a 

timely and instructive hearing along with the ranking member. I 

have always said that this foreign affairs committee has taken its 

responsibility to the highest level. We are engaged in the foreign 

policy definition of the United States. Turkey has been an enormously strong ally of this Nation, and particularly as a Muslim 

country. We are concerned, though, as a sovereign Nation the detour that Turkey has begun to take. 

And I think it is important in this hearing to recognize that our 

mutual interests are interrelated. Strong Muslim, a democratic nation with a Nation as the United States is that believes in humanitarian involvement. We want to solve some of the problems that 

Turkey considers problems. We want them to be a good neighbor 

in the region, and I believe that we can have this common ground 

and common good if we look at each other with mutual respect and 

continued interest in our working relationship. I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller. Do you seek recognition? No. The gentleman from Georgia Mr. Scott is recognized for 

1 minute. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, this is indeed a timely 

hearing and I think it is very important that we set the conversation on its proper axis from the very beginning. Number one, Turkey is an important ally to the United States, its role in Afghanistan, the role is plays on the war on terror, they have troops over 

in Afghanistan, they allow us to fly over, supply our troops is very 

important. Thirdly, their work in terms of making sure that they 

have pipelines that will eventually be able to get energy into Europe without being dependent on Russia. However, the people of 

Turkey and the leadership of Turkey are going to have to face a 

serious question at some point, and this is when it comes to Iran 

and Israel and the United States. The course they are headed on 

is a face-to-face showdown with the question whose side are you on. 

Iran cannot and must not have nuclear weapons, and hopefully the 

people of Turkey will reassess that. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All I want to say is, I 

think Turkey has been a great ally of the United States, we have 

NATO bases there and we need to keep that relationship strong. 

And at the same time, we need to make sure that we support Israel 

which has been one of the stalwarts and one of our best friends in 

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tunity to talk to the leaders from Israel and the Turkish Ambassador, and I urged them to take the time to sit down and try to 

work out their differences, especially because of the problem that 

occurred in the Mediterranean. 

But we support and really care about Israel and the stability of 

that country. We don’t want to see weapons going into Hamas 

through the Mediterranean. And at the same time, we want to 

make sure that our relationship with Turkey remains strong. So I 

would hope some kind of rapprochement can be worked out, so that 

our good friends, Israel and Turkey, can come to an agreeable solution so that we don’t have further problems in the Middle East, 

and we want to be sure weapons stay out of Hamas’ hands. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the ranking member for—everyone has acknowledged a timely hearing. I am looking 

forward to hearing the witnesses this morning as to the current 

status of our relations with Turkey. It truly has been noted by the 

various comments. We are talking about two sides of the coin here 

today, the one side, of course, being the reliable strong ally and 

NATO partner where we have done actions over the years, I think 

with some success, a relationship that I think we both support. On 

the other hand, concerns with the involvement in Cyprus, for me, 

the inability to resolve the situation with Armenia, their lack of 

willingness to allow us to participate on the northern border of Iraq 

and the previous involvement, the blockade in Hamas, the U.N. 

sanctions and their limited willingness to portray Iran for the nuclear threat that it is I think causes us all concern. This moving 

eastward, the problems with less secular governing is something 

that I want to hear the witness talk about this morning. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does 

anyone else seek recognition? The gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Green, is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding a hearing 

today, I want to welcome our panel. For decades the Republic of 

Turkey has been one of the Nation’s strongest and most important 

allies and friends. Strategically located between Europe and the 

Middle East, Russia, Turkey has been a linchpin with many of our 

Nation’s foreign policy initiatives going back to the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s entrance into the NATO in 1952. 

More recently, Turkey has been very helpful on fronts of U.S. 

policy, including its assistance with Iraq’s transition including its 

improved relations with the Kurdish regional government, and 

Turkey has been helpful in Afghanistan contributing troops, the allied forces and allowing resupplying and deployment through their 

country. Turkey has been a great friend of Israel; Turkey was the 

first Muslim majority country to recognize the state of Israel in 

1949. Over the past 2 decades, Israel has been a major supplier of 

arms to Turkey. Until very recently, Israel and Turkey’s militaries 

worked closely together, best shown through their numerous joint 

military exercises. Mr. Chairman, I have some concern about—my 

concern today at this hearing hopefully will learn that you can be 

friends with your neighbors whether they are Jewish, Christian or 

14

Muslim, and hopefully Turkey do well with that, I would like my 

full statement placed in the record. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Full statements will be included in the 

record. The time of the gentleman has expired, and now we will 

hear from our witnesses. Our first witness will be Ross Wilson. 

Ambassador Wilson is the director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia 

Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States. He completed 

nearly three decades in the U.S. Foreign Service in December 2008. 

Serving as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2005 to 2008 and 

Azerbaijan from 2000 to 2003. In previous assignments, he served 

at the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Prague and was American 

Consul-General in Melbourne, Australia. 

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise 

Institute, senior lecturer at the Naval Post Graduate School Center 

for Civil-Military Relations, lecturer on national security studies at 

Johns Hopkins University, and a senior editor of the Middle East 

Quarterly. Between 2002 and 2004, he worked as a staff advisor on 

Iran and Iraq at the Pentagon. Dr. Rubin currently provides academic instruction on regional issues, including Turkey, for senior 

U.S. Army and Marine officers deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and also lectures on Iran, Israel, and North Korea in supplementary classes to the U.S. intelligence community. 

Ian Lesser is senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington where he heads 

GMF’s work on the Mediterranean, Turkish, and wider Atlantic security issues. Prior to joining GMF, Dr. Lesser was a public policy 

scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

and vice president and director of studies at the Pacific Council on 

International Policy. A frequent commentator for international 

media, he has written extensively on international security issues. 

Dr. Lesser is also a former official in the State Department’s Policy 

Planning Bureau. 

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, Turkish identity, and Turkish nationalism, publishing both in scholarly journals and major international print 

media. 

Dr. Cagaptay has guest-taught at several major universities, including Princeton, and currently teaches the Area Studies course 

on Turkey for our Turkey-bound diplomats at the Foreign Service 

Institute. 

We are very pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses. 

Ambassador Wilson, why don’t you start off? All of your statements will be included in their entirety in the record, and if you 

care to summarize them, we look forward to hearing from you and 

then engaging with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROSS WILSON, DIRECTOR, 

DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

(FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY AND AZERBAIJAN) 

Ambassador WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the honor of 

being included in this hearing today. I have had the honor of testifying before your counterpart committee in the Senate being with 

15

the Senate House Armed Services Committee with the Congressional CSE Commission under Mr. Smith, and it is a pleasure to 

be here under your leadership today. 

I am also honored to be part of this panel. Ian Lesser, and Soner 

Cagaptay are, I think two of our country’s leading experts on Turkey. Michael Rubin is a scholar who has also written extensively 

on the Middle East and Turkish issues. I am very new to their 

world of think tanks, having joined The Atlantic Council just a few 

months ago. What I hope I add there and can add here is little bit 

of the practitioner’s perspective based, as you noted, on 30 years 

service as an American diplomat, including the last 3 as American 

Ambassador to Turkey in 2005 to 2008. 

When I arrived in Turkey, our relations were poor. My Embassy, 

my U.S. Government colleagues pushed a number of initiatives and 

efforts to work through some tough issues. Iraq was the most important that—to us given that it was the source of our biggest 

problems in Turkey and given the stakes for our country in Iraq. 

We made it, we transformed it into a source of agreement rather 

than disagreement. At least with the government and Turkey became an important and positive employer in Iraq as a result. 

Iran was also a poor picture. On arrival, I was struck by three 

things, how limited our information sharing was on Turkey with 

Iran’s nuclear program, how little we engaged with them on what 

to do about it and how much Washington complained about Turkey’s lack of support. That didn’t strike me as much of a strategy. 

And instead, we engaged in detailed, high level intelligence exchanges, consulted extensively on what to do, and got strong Turkish support for the approach taken by the United States and the 

other permanent members of Security Council especially in the 

years 2006 and 2007. 

On the Middle East, we got a dialogue going despite some ups 

and downs, and you noted some of them. We were kept fully informed on the mediation efforts with Syria and Israel. We managed 

our way through the 2006 Hezbollah war. Turkey helped with the 

evacuation of American citizens from Beirut. It joined the United 

Nations. It joined the United Nations interim force in Lebanon, the 

first deployment of Turkish forces to the Middle East since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 

The caucuses were a bigger problem. I know that you, Mr. Chairman, others on this committee and many Americans have strong 

views about the Turkey Armenia peace and about history that has 

not entirely been accommodated. I share some of those views. For 

that reason, I thought it was very significant in 2007 when Turkey 

and Armenia themselves initiated discussions about normalizing 

their relations and opening the border. 

As you are aware, that process now has stalled. If it moves forward before long, it can still help to build the confidence that is 

necessary to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh problem between Turkey—between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and to help Turks and Armenians deal more effectively with their past, their present, and 

their future in a forthright manner, and I hope Congress can support that effort. 

16

Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement that goes over these 

and other issues, I would like to see that entered into the record. 

Let just make 5 points. 

First, I think it is important not to over interpret recent events. 

I would not quibble with any of the negative images that you and 

that other members of this committee have highlighted. There have 

always been, as I think a couple members noted, ups and downs 

in U.S.-Turkish relations. Those who think they remember the halcyon days when everything with Turkey was easy and fine should 

probably reread their history. Turks have their own history, and I 

think we need to bear that in mind too. The idea that U.S.-Turkish 

relations is in great difficulty or is at a great turning point, frankly 

I don’t agree with. 

Second, I think it is important to fill out what is sometimes a 

simplistic picture about Turkey. Despite harsh rhetoric, Turkey 

does support Israel’s right to exist, it supports the goal of two 

democratic states living side and side in peace and security, and it 

supports negotiations to bring that about. On a wide range of other 

issues around Turkish periphery, in Afghanistan, and the Balkans 

and regarding terrorism, energy and other issues, Turkey’s policies 

and its work remain consistent with the goals and objections of the 

United States. We should not lose sight of that. 

Third, on Iran, Turkish leaders seem almost desperate to me to 

keep negotiations going because they fear a headlong rush to war, 

that their people will not support and that they believe will inflame 

the region in highly unpredictable ways. 

Stated another way, I believe that Iran is one issue on which are 

we must have the support of Turkey probably for our diplomacy to 

succeed, definitely if it does not. Figuring out how to restore our 

unity on this matter is, I think, one of our most important tasks. 

The dire political defense and security implications of Iran’s efforts 

under almost any likely scenario demand no less. 

Fourth, Turkey’s very success over the last several decades has 

had important consequences that, generally speaking, are a good 

thing. As others have noted, it has prospered, it has a vibrant 

urban middle class and its people no longer want their country to 

be a bystander or the object of others diplomacy, they want to see 

their country act, they expect their government to do so. This is 

new and in this new environment we will have to have more effective ways of engaging public opinion and Turkish opinion shapers. 

Having had some experience at this, I can assure you it will not 

be easy, but in the long run, it will be better for our interests. 

Finally, I will repeat an exchange had I with a senior military 

officer who asked me recently with some exasperation what in the 

world are we going to do with Turkey? My answer to him was that 

we have no choice but to work with it and work with it and work 

with it. It is hard, it is frustrating and it is messy. I know that 

U.S. officials, including President Obama just a month ago with 

Prime Minister Erdogan in Toronto, has made this a priority including with some very direct words. These efforts will have to continue, we will have a strategic partnership, we will have a problematic partnership. I think it is going to continue to be one of our 

most important time consuming relationships over the next couple 

17

of years and I am sure this committee will be discussing it regularly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Wilson. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]


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Chairman BERMAN. Dr. Rubin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. RUBIN. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, 

honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I have 

gone into detail about how Turkey has changed my written testimony, but for the sake of time, let me highlight just three points. 

The AKP government has reoriented Turkey toward more extreme 

elements in the Middle East. Turkey’s change is not reactive but 

deliberate. The AKP has made changes which will be difficult to reverse, even under new Turkish leadership. And for too long American officials have embraced Turkey as they wished it to be, rather 

than calibrate policy to what Turkey has become. The alliance with 

Turkey has become an article of faith. 

Despite growing evidence, Turkey is neither a reliable ally nor a 

force always for moderation. Trusting Turkey is not the basis of 

sound foreign policy. None of this means that the United States 

should dispense with its partnership. Turkey remains a member of 

NATO and conducts some heavy lifting in Afghan. Still, the U.S. 

Government should consider several issues relative to its future relationship with Turkey. Precisely because the F–35 will be the 

fighter the U.S. Air Force will most depend on to maintain air superiority in the coming decades. The decision to sell F–35s to Turkey whose future foreign policy orientation is in question, should 

be reviewed by appropriate Defense Department elements to assess 

possible loss of critical technology to states of concern. Congress 


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should mandate that review, specify that it be completed within 

the year, and then make it available to appropriate committees. 

Second, while Incirlik remains a key regional base, Ankara’s enthusiasm to seek unrelated concessions and to micromanage missions flown from Incirlik, suggests a lack of ideological affinity on 

some security concerns. It is a strategic malpractice not to advance 

contingency plans for the day when Turkey no longer allows the 

U.S. Air Force to us Incirlik or seeks to extract too high a price. 

The United States should develop contingency plans in NATO 

member Romania or develop another plan B. 

Third, while the United States welcomes Turkish involvement in 

the fight to stabilize Afghanistan, the current Turkish Government 

has not done enough to stop Turkish Jihadists from traveling to Afghanistan to fight for the wrong side, nor has it ceased providing 

safe havens to catch militants. 

Fourth, the United States should continue to support Turkey’s 

fight against Kurdish terrorism, but simultaneously must pressure 

Ankara to acknowledge that its willingness to legitimize foreign 

terrorist groups based on the AKP’s ideological affinity, hampers 

Turkey’s own fight against terrorism, and could ultimately undercut Turkey’s territorial integrity. 

Lastly, the Armenian genocide issue remains a hot button issue. 

Within the scholarly community, there is not consensus. While 

genocide study scholars say that the Ottomans committed deliberate genocide against Armenians, many Middle East scholars and 

military historians do not quite go that far. Congress should not silence debate among historians, rather, it should seek to facilitate 

it and demand that Turkey make its Ottoman archives open to all 

scholars, regardless of ethnicity or perspective, and also advocate 

that Armenia open its archives in the same manner. 

Thank you for your attention, I look forward to any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Dr. Lesser. 

STATEMENT OF IAN LESSER, PH.D., SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC 

FELLOW, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Mr. LESSER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

share some perspectives on Turkey’s evolving foreign policy and its 

implications for the United States and U.S. policy. With your permission, I will offer a brief summary of my remarks. I would also 

like to note that these remarks are my own views, not those of the 

German Marshall Fund of the United States. 

Let me make just three points to you. First, I believe that these 

changes—and we have heard about some of these dimensions already—these changes in Turkey foreign policy are durable, they 

are the products of significant forces in Turkish society, particularly the affinities and concerns of Turkey’s political leadership 

today and the rise of public opinion which counts in Turkish foreign policy today. All are playing a role. They have all played a role 

in where Turkey is going and they played a role in the flotilla crisis, and also Turkey’s no vote on U.N. sanctions. 

There is an important commercial dimension to this activism 

which I think we should recall. It is fueled by impressive economic 

growth in Turkey on the order of 7 percent annually, 11 percent 

in the last quarter, in the midst of a global economic crisis. This 

has fueled the confidence of the country and the political leadership, but it also is important to note that a lot of the growth in 

Turkey’s economy, the investment, the new export markets, are not 

in traditional Western places, they are in the Middle East, they are 


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in Eurasia. So to reverse a famous formulation, I think this is a 

case of ‘‘the flag following trade.’’

Second, I think there is no doubt Turkey’s current leadership is 

much more comfortable than its predecessors in conducting an active diplomacy across the Arab and Muslim world. Turkish public 

opinion, which does count today, increasingly reflects this. GMF’s 

Trans-Atlantic Trends project is an annual survey of opinion on 

both sides of the Atlantic. The data for this year, which will be formalized in September, found the percentage of those in Turkey who 

say on international matters, Turkey should act in closest cooperation with the countries of the Middle East roughly doubled this 

year; roughly doubled this year since last year. 

But I would stress to you that this attention to the Middle East 

and Turkish policy is not the only element in a changing Turkey. 

Increasingly AKP leaders and their foreign policy advisors talk in 

terms strongly reminiscent of other emerging economic and political actors, including India. South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil. There 

is this non aligned aspect to Turkish policy, even as Turkey remains a NATO member, obviously, but also a conservative actor in 

its views about NATO strategy. 

Third, these changes which we are discussing will be very consequential for U.S. interests across a wide area; from European security, to relations with Russia, from energy geopolitics to missile 

defense. And they are also going to have an effect on our interests 

in relation to key issues in the Middle East, including Iran and the 

Middle East peace process. 

Let me just underscore, though, that this new look in Turkish 

foreign policy is a mix of positive and negative elements. Some of 

the negative elements have been mentioned. Let me just mention 

on the positive side from our interest perspective, Turkey appears 

to be committed to the consolidation of detente with Greece, which 

is very important; stability in the Aegean, which is very important; 

a multilateral policy in the Balkans, which is very important to us 

and has been mentioned. It has contributed to operations in Afghanistan and has quietly allowed us to use Incirlik airbase for 

very extensive airlift operations to support our coalition operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Less positively, there has clearly been a decline in the weight of 

the trans-Atlantic flywheel, if I can put it that way, that is consequential for our interests. And particularly in the Middle East, 

although we share some basic interests and stability, we are clearly 

not on the same page when it comes to some key questions, including Iran and peace process diplomacy. 

Let me stress that Turkey itself has a very strong interest in preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran, or even a nuclear-izing 

Iran, or a nuclear-ready Iran. This would have very negative consequences for Turkish security. That said, the AKP government 

clearly has a different view of how to deal with this problem. 

Against this background, it was not surprising that Turkey voted 

‘‘no’’ on the U.N. Security Council resolution on sanctions on Iran. 

Again, on the Gaza flotilla incident, I think this underscores another shift in Turkish perceptions. My own view is that the strategic relationship between Turkey and Israel was the product of 

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terest in the containment of Syria and Iran, and a public opinion 

that didn’t count very much in those days, and was not very positive about Israel. All those conditions have changed. 

I think in some respect, these changes in Turkish-Israeli relations were inevitable, but clearly when it comes to the question of 

whether Hamas is a legitimate interlocutor, the peace process and 

other issues, we are simply not going to be on the same page. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by noting some specific implications for U.S. policy. First, let me just support very strongly something that Ambassador Wilson said earlier. There really was no 

golden age in U.S.-Turkish relations, this has always been a tough 

relationship to manage, and will continue to be so. As I look ahead, 

I think we will see a relationship that is much more ala carte, if 

I can put it that way, than automatic, but there are some things 

that we can do, and things that we can avoid doing. First, I think 

with Ankara on Iran, we need to shift the debate from the political 

to defense requirements. I mean, Turkey has an interest in preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran. 

As we look toward the NATO summit in November in Lisbon, I 

think we need to secure Turkish cooperation for the next steps in 

a ballistic missile defense architecture, which will cover them 

among others. 

Second, we need to rethink and possibly reinforce our cooperation 

in fighting the PKK and its bases of operation across the border in 

Iraq. We may even need to adjust to a situation in which PKK terrorism is not the only problem Turkey is facing in this quarter. The 

Kurdish issue is the biggest public policy challenge Turkey faces 

today, and it is developing a very troubling urban terrorism dimension. This is something I think we will be called upon to respond 

to, and will be a key test for the relationship in the future. It will 

affect our intelligence sharing and other things. 

Finally, a last point. The U.S. remains a very critical stakeholder 

in Turkey’s European Union candidacy. I think it is far too simple 

to blame a lack of progress in Turkey’s candidacy for Ankara’s 

growing interest in the Middle East. But if Turkey’s candidacy 

proves hollow, this could well interrupt or reverse Turkey’s convergence with the West, further complicating an already complicated 

relationship with the United States. 

This has been the big project for Turkey and Europe, and Turkey 

in the West, and without it I think there is a heightened risk of 

Turkey’s strategic decoupling from the trans-Atlantic community. 

And a lot of things, a lot of issues we would like to resolve, whether 

Cyprus, rapprochement with Armenia, closer NATO–EU cooperation, all will depend on progress in that area. So I think it is very, 

very important that our support for that process, Turkey’s EU candidacy, is not diminished or weakened by the recent and very real 

differences with Ankara over the Middle East. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lesser follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Dr. Lesser. 

Dr. Cagaptay. 

STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Congressman Berman, Ranking Member RosLehtinen, and honorable members of the committee, thank you for 

inviting me to testify at this very important hearing today. I will 

present here a summary of my prepared remarks. 

Much has been said earlier in this town in the last few years 

about how Washington is losing Turkey and Turkey is drifting 

away from the West. Today I would like to provide an alternative 

analysis, and also come up with some suggestions for what that 

means for U.S. policy. 

So let’s take a different view, and the view should be in 2002 

when the AKP came to power, the party promised to make Turkey 

a country fitting EU accession, a liberal democracy that is suitable 

for EU accession. To this end, the AKP would jettison Turkey’s traditional role as the voice of the West in the region, instead making 

Turkey a center country, a regional power that can talk to the 

West and all of the Middle Eastern states at the same time. 

Has this happened? The answer is no. Turkey has become neither more liberal as a democracy nor has it become a truly central 

power in the region that can talk to the West and the regional 

countries at the same time. 

Here is what happened, and I will finish that up with some suggestions. When it came to power in 2002, the AKP promoted, at 

first, close ties with the West, although at the same time it openly 

bashed the United States and other Western countries. Some people looked at this and dismissed the rhetoric as domestic politicking; others did not. Now that rhetoric has shaped the minds of 

many Turks. Over 90 percent of the Turks do not read or write languages other than Turkish, so they see the world as reported to 

them and debated by their government. Rhetoric matters. 

In fact, I would say anti-Western rhetoric has been the periscope 

of the AKP’s foreign policy thinking, a vision that does not consider 

Turkey a member of the transatlantic community. 

After reining in domestic checks and balances, for instance, slapping politically motivated fines on media, using wiretaps to intimidate its opponents, the AKP now feels comfortable in power, and 

this is why the party’s foreign policy follows its previous anti-Western rhetoric. In other words, what happens in Ankara and Istanbul 

does not stay in Ankara and Istanbul. As the AKP has become 

more emboldened at home, it has felt freer to follow the foreign policy that it always desired. 

Now, there is good news. We have to start with the Turkish contribution to the United States on Iraq and Afghanistan. Without 

Turkey, operations in both places would be very difficult. 

Also good news on Cyprus. The AKP government aggressively 

pushed for a settlement of the Cyprus conflict, but that failed when 

the Greek Cypriots voted no. 

There is also a bunch of bad news. One of them is on the EU 

accession front. Turkey’s EU accession is not in the making. I am 

38

a strong supporter of this process, and I think it is time for me to 

admit that that process is not moving ahead, not so much because 

of the EU objections but predominantly because the AKP does not 

share the dream of the liberal western Turkey. 

Despite its branding as a pro-Western political force when it 

came to power in 2002, the AKP never had a strategic view of EU 

accession; rather, it had a tactical view of this process, where it 

viewed accession to shed its Islamist image, gain legitimacy in 

Western capitals, and curb the power of the secular military. Having thus made itself palatable for Brussel bureaucrats and liberal 

Turks alike, in 2005, just as Turkey was supposed to start implementing hard reform towards accession talks, the AKP dropped the 

EU process. 

In a public demonstration of its lack of interest in Europe, the 

AKP declared 2005 the ‘‘Africa Year.’’ Now, if I was getting into the 

European Union, I would declare the decade the ‘‘decade of Europe,’’ to focus my energies on that. 

As a result, Turkey’s reform process did not stop; it deteriorated. 

As the government resorted to jailing critical journalists under the 

pretext that they were planning a coup, Turkey dropped 20 spots 

in the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index in 2008. 

Moreover, the government has used plot allegations, most infamously in the so-called Ergenekon case, to target its political opponents in the media, military, and academia. 

The AKP has especially gone after independent media, slapping 

media groups that are critical of its policies with politically motivated tax fines. Under the AKP, I would say Turkey has become 

more like Russia than Europe in terms of government-media relations. 

Has Turkey become more democratic under the AKP? Turkey did 

not become a democracy in 2002. Turkey was a democracy, has 

been a democracy since 1946. In fact, it has had more democratic 

transitions of government than some West European countries, 

such as Spain. The question is, Has Turkey become more of a liberal democracy under the AKP? The answer is no. Not in terms of 

media freedoms, not in terms of Internet freedoms, and not in 

terms of gender equality. 

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, now to turn to the Middle East for at 

the same time the AKP dropped the EU process, it engrossed itself 

in regional conflicts in the Middle East, and this is where I think 

the problem lies. There is an incongruity between the idea that 

Turkey can get involved in all conflicts in the Middle East and the 

party’s alleged commitment to EU accession. When everything is a 

priority, nothing is; and no country has ever gotten into the EU 

without making membership a tough domestic and foreign policy 

priority. The AKP has instead made a 180-degree turn in Turkey’s 

Middle East policy, moving closer to Iran and its proxies, Syria and 

Sudan, cooling off toward Israel. 

This was followed with the recent flotilla incident where ties 

with Israel hit an all-time low after the unfortunate incident in 

which the Israelis killed nine Turkish citizens. I would say this 

very sad act will not be forgotten in the Turkish national psyche 

for a long time. 

39

Problems have continued. On the other hand, I think because the 

AKP’s foreign policy is guided—not because of religious sympathies, and there is often confusion on this in this town; this is 

not a party guided by Islam, it is a party guided by Islamism, an 

ideological view of the world. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 

Erdogan and his government believe that Samuel Huntington was 

right; that there is a clash of civilizations, except they are on the 

other side of the Islamists and not with the West. 

Therefore, since 2002, the AKP has routinely taken steps that 

conflict with U.S. policy. Many distinguished members of the panel 

have mentioned that, as well as many members of the distinguished committee. And I think, suffice it to say, that the AKP has 

damaged many of the anchors that tie Turkey to the United States 

and to the West, from energy and pipeline politics to EU accession, 

to Turkey’s traditionally pro-Western foreign policy toward the 

Middle East. 

Mr. Chairman, there is very little Washington can do to change 

the AKP’s foreign policy outlook. It is what it is. But we can at 

least start by recognizing the following: In 2002, a lot of people 

celebrated the idea that the AKP would be a tribune of the West 

to the Muslim world. Now it appears that the AKP is a tribune of 

a politically charged and, by fiat, anti-Western Muslim world to the 

United States. So it is really the other way around. 

Allowing such an Islamist view as a catalyst into Middle East 

conflicts has produced and will continue to produce negative results. Because the AKP sees a clash of civilizations everywhere it 

looks, it cannot be an impartial mediator. 

For example, when the AKP was allowed to inject itself between 

Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, or the United States and 

Iran, it quickly became an ombudsman for the Islamist side, rising 

in their defense. What is more, after 8 years of dominant and increasingly authoritarian AKP rule at home—and remember, what 

happens in Istanbul and Ankara does not stay there—many Turks 

now see the world through the Islamist eyes of a civilizational 

clash. It is very unfortunate. 

As a result, I would say the AKP foreign policy vision of making 

Turkey a center country which bridges the East and West, that can 

talk to Israelis and Palestinians, garners the trust of both Iran and 

the West, has failed as well as Turkey’s ambitions to become more 

of a liberal democracy. 

In order to contain the AKP Islamist influence, I would say not 

only in Turkey, but in the region, the West must deny the AKP, 

first, the influence and the prestige which comes with being promoted as a regional mediator. 

There is a way forward, Mr. Chairman. Turkey remains a 

multiparty democracy, and only one-third of Turkey’s population 

supports the AKP. Since the opposition Republican Peoples Party, 

CHP, elected a new, charismatic social democrat leader, Kemal 

Kilicdaroglu, the AKP has been sliding in the polls. As a result, the 

party has been using foreign policy more and more as a punching 

bag, creating vehement anti-Western rhetoric to boost its popularity. The elections are in Turkey next year. I would expect that 

the AKP will continue to use populist, anti-Western foreign policy 

and rhetoric to boost its standing in the run-up to those elections. 

40

This suggests that the United States must develop a nuanced 

policy toward Turkey because Turkey itself is a nuanced country. 

It is the only Muslim country that is part of the West; and the 

question is, how do you scale back the AKP’s policies while developing a real defense against its influence, and that would go 

through engaging the Turks? 

The alternative, a policy that targets the whole of Turkey, such 

as by passing the Armenian resolution or blocking military sales or 

other resolutions that would be seen as critical, would only push 

the Turks into the Islamists’ arms, fulfilling the AKP’s objective. 

In fact, what to do with Turkey first begs the question of what 

not to do with Turkey. In light of the AKP’s campaign of rallying 

Turkish public opinion behind its anti-Western foreign policy, I 

would say the cardinal rule of the new era is simple: Do not offend 

the Turks. In other words, do no harm to Turkey. 

Then it is time to signal to the AKP that its anti-Western policies 

have a cost. To this end, Washington should deny the AKP political 

access. This will cost the party prestige that matters greatly in 

Turkish politics. So far, the AKP has been invited to Washington 

even as it transgresses U.S. policy in multiple areas, creating the 

impression that either Washington approves of its policies or considers the party indispensable to U.S. foreign policy. That is why 

a new thinking on access is to be considered. 

Mr. Chairman, a final part of this new U.S. policy is engaging 

the Turks. This can be done through initiatives that target the 

media, NGOs, political parties and business lobbies. It requires 

close contact between U.S. officials and these various institutions. 

This policy should also build around a major charm offensive by 

the United States Government in hopes of winning over the hearts 

and minds of individual Turks. This is the only way Turkey stays 

with the United States. Washington should consider launching 

massive exchange programs for journalists, scholars, rising politicians, opinion makers, and students, as well as increase its public 

diplomacy presence in Turkey, all the while confronting the AKP’s 

policies and speaking up to ensure continued liberal democracy in 

Turkey. This can be done by focusing on press and Internet freedoms and continued gender equality, two sine qua nons of the future of Turkish democracy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you all very much. The presentations 

were very interesting and somewhat different from one another, 

the Ambassador’s and the three doctors’. 

I yield myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning period. 

Several of you said that Turkish public opinion matters these 

days in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. Sort of the 

unstated implication of that was that some of current foreign policy 

is driven by what presumably a majority, a large majority of the 

Turkish people want the government to be doing on these issues. 

At least, well, certainly one of you seems to reject that view and 

say it is the other way around: The party’s foreign policy goals 

have managed to persuade the Turkish people to provide that support. Thinking specifically of the opinion toward the United States, 

with the ups and downs of the relationship, by and large, it has 

been a pretty close alliance in many areas over the many years 

since the end of World War II and the establishment of NATO. 

Why is Turkish public opinion—if you measure it, it looks like 

Turkey’s public is perhaps one of the most anti-American of any of 

the countries of the world. I used to have this formulation that 

sometimes where the people disliked us the most, it was because 

we were the closest to the government and they were projecting on 

us their own hostilities toward their own government. 

I am not sure that is the conclusion in this context. But I am curious, if you can elaborate more on your view on the relationship 

of public opinion to the current Turkish foreign policy direction and 

the standing of the United States there. At least Dr. Cagaptay actually raised that issue at the end of his comments as something 

that we could affect by addressing it very directly. 


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Ambassador WILSON. My colleagues are looking at me, so I will 

start. Here is the way I looked at it when I was in Turkey. Obviously, this was a very vexing and complicated subject and one that 

troubled me. I think when I arrived in the United States, one of 

the organizations used a thermometer to measure positive, warmversus-cold feelings toward the United States. And the United 

States was around 8 degrees, which is getting pretty close to zero. 

And that obviously isn’t a positive thing and it is not something 

that an ambassador wants to see. 

After having served there for awhile, I came to the conclusion 

that anti-Americanism, although I am not sure that is quite the 

right word, is very, very broad and is very, very shallow. And it has 

primarily, in my opinion, to do with specific objections to specific 

policies that either the United States has or is believed to have, in 

part because of wild, crazy, and idiotic things that one of the members referred to that appear in the Turkish press. 

So on the one hand, you have this sort of 8 degrees, or I think 

when I left we had improved it to 12, so it is a 50 percent improvement, but you also have Turkey, a country that sends more students to the United States to study, more of its young people to the 

United States to study than any other country in Europe. 

It is a country whose young people and large segments of the 

rest of the population look to the United States. It is where they 

vacation. It is where they send their children to school. It is where 

they would like to do business, although they have had difficulty 

accessing the American market. 

They are not sending their children to Iranian schools, and they 

are not sending their children to Palestinian schools. That Western 

aspiration that Turkey has had for 80 years, and even before that, 

and I think a desire and interest in closer ties to the United States 

remains there, there are serious public objections to a range of policies. Ninety percent of Turks opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 

and at least as high a percentage oppose our continued presence 

there now. That is baggage; and there are a number of other elements as well. 

Chairman BERMAN. I hate to do it, but I have to cut myself off. 

I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Ms. RosLehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Excellent testimony, gentlemen. 

I want to focus on Israel-Turkey and Greece-Turkey relations. 

The Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul is facing an existential threat as a result of restrictive policies imposed 

by the Turkish Government. Gentlemen, what do you think is the 

likelihood that the AKP government will revise those restrictive 

policies? 

On Israel, it has been reported that the Turkish Government was 

itself directly involved with the IHH in the mission to smuggle 

goods into the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip. That was in clear defiance of the naval blockade. Israel rightly defended itself against 

this provocative and dangerous act, given the IHH ties to violent 

Islamic militants, and the possibility of weapons being smuggled 

through this flotilla to Hamas. 

48

So, Dr. Rubin—I know you have touched on this, and I believe 

this Turkey-supported act is unacceptable—what do you think was 

the motivation by the Turkish Government? What did Turkey seek 

to accomplish? Should Israel be concerned that Turkey may be 

adopting a more direct confrontational approach to Israel that 

could make the Jewish state a target of a Turkish-sponsored attack? 

The first question to all, and then the Israel question to Dr. 

Rubin. And we will start with the others. 

Mr. LESSER. Thank you very much. If you allow me to make a 

point about the public opinion issue that was raised earlier—and 

the thermometer, by the way, was the GMF, this poll that I mentioned earlier on transatlantic trends, and it is very striking; it was 

very low. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. But you can answer the chairman’s question another time? 

Mr. LESSER. I will come back to it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I would like to know about the relations with 

Greece and Israel. 

Mr. LESSER. On Greece and Turkey, I think you raise a very important point. I think there are unresolved issues in this relationship between Greece and Turkey which should have been resolved 

long ago. And you mentioned one of them, and it is a very important one. 

I was encouraged to think that this Turkish Government would 

move forward on the Halki Seminary issue and other things. I am 

now rather uncertain. I hope that does happen. I think what is important from our interest point of view, a decade ago the risk of an 

actual military clash between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean 

was something that we had to worry about on a daily basis. That 

is really not true anymore. We have unresolved political disputes, 

but both countries are devoted to tolerance. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. LESSER. And I think that is meaningful. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you. 

In Greece, I would say Turkish-Greek relationships are better 

than they have been in a very long time; although problems remain, that is primarily because both countries now perceive threats 

from different places. The countries do have to get over some of 

their differences such as the cultural rights of the Greek minority 

in Turkey and the Turkish minority in Greece, but I would say that 

is really not a flaring point. 

If I could make a point on Turkish-Israeli ties, I think that is 

more crucial for our debate today. It appears to me that having a 

civilizational view of the world, the AKP government regards the 

Arab-Israeli conflict from the perspective of Hamas versus Israel 

and not Palestinian versus Israel. That guides the party’s policies, 

which means the AKP has indexed Israel policy to Israel’s Hamas 

policy. So that is really bad news for Turkish-Israeli ties in the 

midterm, although a lot of people, including able Turkish diplomats, are trying really hard to save that relationship and bring 

it to where it was. It is going to pick it up and bring it back to 

where it was. 

49

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Dr. Rubin. 

Mr. RUBIN. With regard to Greece, we see a pattern that has 

emerged elsewhere on other Turkish issues where there is a rhetoric of progress but no willingness to make substantive decisions 

behind the scenes. 

With regard to the Israel issue—and this also relates to the 

chairman’s question—there is a chicken-and-egg situation; incitement does matter. It matters in Turkey; it matters in Palestine; it 

matters in Iran; and it matters in Pakistan. To cite public polling 

and so forth and not recognize the impact of a constant barrage of 

government statements is somewhat ridiculous, all the more so 

when the Turkish Government has made it the forefront of their 

strategy in absorbing—taking over newspapers and very much reducing the freedom of the press. This is one thing which we very 

much need to pay attention to if we are going to reverse the rhetoric—the incitement, which leads to Turkish public opinion being 

what it is. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Chairman BERMAN. We will have a second round for the unanswered part of members’ questions. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. 

The chairman properly noted in the opening remarks part of the 

hearing that for purposes of the committee, Turkey was in Europe. 

The immediate policy ramification of that was that I got 1 minute 

instead of 3 minutes for jurisdictional purposes. But I think that 

goes to part of the crux of the issue and the dilemma in which we 

find ourselves. Where is Turkey? Who is Turkey? Turkey seems to 

have this benefit as we saw at times as being in both worlds. ‘‘Bi’’ 

means both. Sometimes people who are bi have to make choices, 

not always. And sometimes you think being bi means being both 

so you can have the best of all worlds, if that be the case. But as 

is the case with people who are, say, biracial, they often have to 

make a choice of who they are for societal purposes. And as my 

kids would say, you hang with those with whom you are more comfortable. 

Turkey is bi. It is bicontinental. And for purposes of, shall we 

say, military association, we recognized them as a brother in arms 

and welcomed them into NATO. But for purposes of joining my European family, you got to be kidding, you ain’t marrying my sister, 

and they were rejected. 

So you hang with whom you are more comfortable. I mean, it is 

okay to have a foot in both worlds, but if suddenly you realize that 

each of your feet are on different banana peels and they start moving in different directions, you have got a problem. I think that 

Turkey’s identification problem and our relating to it are part of 

the problem, not the entire problem, but certainly a part of a very 

complicated formulation. 

I would like to get Turkey back. I think they are important for 

any number of a host of critical reasons. We took great bragging 

rights on having Turkey as part of the West, and it seems like the 

dynamic is readily changing. And part, of course, is due to a change 

50

in leadership and its predisposition, I would suppose, but the population seems to be following that direction more than enthusiastically, and that is rather troublesome. 

Part of the way to get it back, I guess, is in our hands. What can 

we do to get Turkey back? How do we make it part of our world 

without the demand that it completely reject the other world, and, 

at the same time, insisting on key policy issues that it does not go 

to the dark side? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman Ackerman. You have 

given us a lot of food for thought. Turkey has two identities. Let 

me ask a question: What is it that makes Turkey special? 

A lot of people will say because it is a Muslim country. 

No. There are 57 other Muslim countries. What makes Turkey 

special is it is a Muslim country with a Western overlay. It is a 

liberal democracy, a NATO ally, has good ties with Israel and the 

United States, and wants to get into the European Union. All of 

that is what makes Turkey special, not its religion, because there 

are so many other countries that share that religion, but not its political values. 

Under the AKP, it is those political values that have come under 

strain, from EU accession to ties with Israel to strong ties with the 

United States. So a message to get across to the Turkish Government would be what makes Turkey special for members of the 

United States Government and the Congress is not its religion; we 

don’t care. It is its political values that we care. This is what distinguishes Turkey, its Western overlay. 

So how do we get Turkey back? Emphasize its NATO membership and EU accession as key elements of Turkey’s new foreign policy direction. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to direct my question to Ambassador 

Wilson. I would love to hear from all of you, but there is not 

enough time. 

Religious freedom is a universally recognized human right enshrined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Turkey ratified that in 2003. Article 18 couldn’t be clearer on the religious freedom issue; yet the Turkish Government systematically 

suppresses both the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and especially His 

Holiness Bartholomew, and has forcibly closed the Halki Seminary. 

Has the United States, and especially the Human Rights Council, 

done enough to reverse this religious discrimination? 

Secondly, it has been said by George Santayana that those who 

cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Prime Minister Erdogan’s government’s denial of the Armenian genocide has 

been compounded by its denial of the genocide in Darfur. When the 

ICC indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who was scheduled to attend an OIC conference in Istanbul late last year, the 

Turkish Prime Minister said no Muslim could perpetrate a genocide. What does that say about his judgment? 

And, thirdly, very quickly, Natan Sharansky gave a famous 

speech at the OSCE on anti-Semitism. He said anyone can disagree 

51

with the Knesset, anybody can disagree with the government policies of Israel, but the line is crossed when any one of the three 

Ds—demonization, delegitimization, or where the double standard 

is applied. Based on what I would think is a rising tide—and I 

would appreciate your thoughts on this—is there a rising tide of 

anti-Semitism by the government in Ankara and by the state 

media? 

Ambassador WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Just to answer your questions briefly in reverse order, Turks 

that I talk to generally do not talk about a rising tide of anti-Semitism. In the last meeting I had with members of the Istanbul Jewish community, people were quite emphatic that conditions are better now than they have been for a very long time in Turkey. There 

are problems and they are serious problems, but I think that is 

noteworthy. 

Second, your comments about Turkish policy with respect to 

Sudan and comments that the Prime Minister has made, I can’t try 

to defend any of that or explain any of that. I thought it was important when Erdogan went to, I think it was an AU or Arab League 

meeting in Khartoum, probably in 2006. He was the one and only 

person in that group who went to Darfur, who met with people. He 

delivered a couple of plane loads of assistance, and Turkey has continued to do that. Those are good things and we should be happy 

about them, even as we recognize some of the other problems. 

Mr. SMITH. What does that say about his judgment? When we 

look at any leader anywhere in the world, obviously truth-telling 

has to be a mainstay of that administration or that leadership. 

What does it say about it? 

Ambassador WILSON. I can’t really account for that, Mr. Smith. 

I wish I could. 

On the issues related to the Ecumenical Patriarch, has the 

United States and have other Western countries done enough? If 

you judge by the results, and I think your question answers itself, 

no. The situation remains difficult in some respects. Not as bad as 

it might have been a couple of years ago. I think the government 

very recently announced actions to confer citizenship on all of the 

members of the Synod, which addresses an issue of the eventual 

election of a successor to Bartholomew when he should pass from 

the scene. That is a positive. It is not a good enough story. 

Mr. RUBIN. Before I ever wrote my first article on Turkey, I went 

out from Iraq through Turkey, and some Turks mentioned to me 

that my name was in the Turkish newspaper as a Jewish enemy 

of Islam. It was in the newspaper Yeni Safak, a newspaper that 

has been endorsed by Prime Minister Erdogan. There was a constant stream of incitement when I met with the Jewish community, 

not just the leaders but Jewish community activists and so forth, 

at various trips. People, they don’t perhaps share the opinion that 

the Ambassador just left. 

And I should also note, lastly, that in 2005, ‘‘Mein Kampf’’ became a best seller in Turkey. Part of it was because it was cheap. 

It was subsidized. The Turkish Government never tried to see 

whom it was subsidized by. 

And the last thing is that anti-Semitism and the anti-Americanism have come part and parcel. We have seen this in the ‘‘ValVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:37 Oct 01, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\072810\57688 HFA PsN: SHIRL
52

ley of the Wolves,’’ a film, a vile film that was endorsed by the 

Prime Minister’s wife. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahon. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Cagaptay, could you give us a snapshot or maybe even a little more detailed snapshot of the local political climate in Turkey, 

some handicapping on the outcome of next year’s elections, and 

more detail, as you mentioned in your testimony, more detail how 

the foreign policy of the current administration plays into those 

elections? Sort of give us the ‘‘all politics is local’’ review. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman. 

Obviously, like in all countries, in Turkey foreign policy matters 

in domestic politics. But like in all countries, it is really domestic 

politics that determines the outcome of the elections. 

Until recently I would say there were two problems of Turkish 

politics: An increasingly authoritarian ruling party that goes after 

checks and balances, media freedom, gender equality, independent 

courts; and an ineffective opposition on the other hand. So you had 

two problems. 

The second problem now looks like it is being alleviated. The opposition has elected a new, charismatic leader and it is rising in 

the polls. One poll even shows the opposition party catching up 

with the AKP and passing it for the first time in 8 years. And so 

no wonder that before and after the flotilla incident, and since 

then, the AKP has been using vehement anti-Israeli rhetoric to create hysteria, which I think it will use in the run-up to the election. 

So I would say for the next year, unfortunately, although we 

don’t want to see that, we will probably witness strong anti-Western, anti-European, anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric coming 

from the government in an effort to turn politics at home, where 

it is more competitive now, into a ball game where they can bring 

foreign policy in with the hope that it will help them. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you. 

I was just thinking, I don’t know if has ever happened before, 

where a leader of a democracy would try to use foreign policy to 

generate support at home and rally patriotic sentiments for the 

homeland toward outlying enemies. I guess that has never happened before. 

Anyway, Dr. Lesser, you mentioned some polling numbers and 

that you saw an increase in some anti-American or anti-American, 

anti-Israeli sentiment. You said there was a doubling of the numbers. Can you tell us what those actual numbers were? 

Mr. LESSER. We will release the full data in September, but just 

roughly, as a preliminary analysis, that was referring to a question 

where we asked Turks who they would like to work most closely 

with in international affairs, and we give them a range, the United 

States, Europe, Middle Eastern neighbors, Russia, et cetera. The 

number for the Middle East, which I know is of a concern to us 

here, roughly doubled since last year. 

So, last year, if I have that correct, it was about 10 percent said 

we should work most closely with the Middle East on international 

affairs. This year it was around 20 percent. 

53

I could give you my view, why I think that is. I think the political rhetoric, the fact that a lot of the key developments going on 

around Turkey have been in that region, it is in the news and everybody is focused on it. There are a lot of different explanations, 

but those are the numbers. 

Mr. MCMAHON. What are the numbers for those who wanted to 

keep working with the Americans on the foreign policy of the West? 

Mr. LESSER. Those are also fairly high. If you look across a lot 

of these different potential partnerships, it is pretty well distributed. It is not as if we are very low down. Although when you come 

to ask the kind of thermometer-like questions of ‘‘Who do you like 

out there in the world?,’’ we have not done well. Last year when 

we did the survey, there was a tremendous Obama bounce across 

Europe. As you went east, until you got to Turkey, this bounce got 

lower and lower and lower. And I am afraid to say in Turkey it is 

essentially nonexistent. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I look forward to the release of those numbers. 

I may have to add that into that basket of questions to be answered later, but it seems that the administration has gotten way 

too cozy with Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime. 

What is Turkey doing to keep asylum for those who fled the 

purges after the revolution, and are they working in any way to 

persecute those who violated human rights in Iran? 

Mr. LESSER. Turkey for many, many years had a large number 

of e ́migre ́ Iranians living inside the country. Some of them are 

there for political reasons, some of them are there for economic reasons, and some of them are simply tourists. Of course, it is a visafree regime now that has been put in place. I don’t have the precise 

number, but there are very large numbers of Iranians who have 

been living in Turkey for some time. Some number are refugees. 

There is also a lot of commercial activism—and this is an important point for our policy discussion. One of the problems is that we 

have had a very security-heavy relationship with Turkey. A lot of 

the focus these days for Turkey is commercial. We don’t play very 

much in that game, but countries like Syria and Iraq and Iran do. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to thank 

the witnesses, the panel, for being here today and giving us their 

insight. 

I would like to start off again by saying, reminding people of the 

actions that Turkey has taken with the support of Hamas, with the 

opposition to the sanctions with Iran, and their role in the flotilla. 

I don’t know how anybody on this committee can overlook those 

things. I don’t know how anybody on the panel can overlook those 

things. I don’t know how any American can overlook those things. 

And I certainly don’t see how anyone who believes that freedom is 

the core of all human progress can overlook those actions. 

A minute ago we heard a question: What can we do to get Turkey back? Give me a break. We need a paradigm shift in this committee, in this discussion. We are the United States of America. We 

are the land of the free and the home of the brave. I believe it is 

time that the administration take a firm stance on the side of freedom. President Obama’s Middle East diplomacy has gone from 

54

weak to dangerous. He has taken our relationship with Israel for 

granted, and his administration has chosen to hedge its bets with 

countries not aligned with the United States’ principles of freedom 

and our interests. In a desperate attempt to reach out to the Muslim world, he has turned his back on one of our Nation’s most 

trusted allies. Still, Turkey’s flippant behavior has not changed. 

Under the Obama administration, our allies have distanced 

themselves, and our allies have become further entrenched. We 

cannot continue on this path. Our success lies in our ability to preserve and fight for our freedom and our principles. Countries like 

Israel have proven that they are truly allies in an unstable Middle 

East. Turkey’s actions, with what I have mentioned earlier, are not 

forgivable. 

If Turkey wants the support of the United States to get into the 

EU, then it needs to stand on the side of freedom; and for us to 

support Turkey without them changing their position is a mistake. 

So my question to you is: What does Turkey have to do to get 

America back? That should be the question that we ask in the 

United States Congress. I look forward to your answers. 

Mr. RUBIN. I tend to agree with the Representative from Florida. 

If I may say, we should then implement is a whole host of Plan 

B strategies. Turkey has become over confident in its relationship 

to us. It believes it is more important to us than it actually is. This 

doesn’t mean we should necessarily dispense with partnerships, 

but if we make alternate arrangements with, for example, air support through Romania and elsewhere, at the very least, even if we 

do keep our presence in Incirlik Air Base, it makes Turkey all the 

less able to pursue the slash-and-burn negotiation strategy which 

it has. 

I would also second your cry, if I may, for moral clarity. And this 

is something that we should hold President Erdogan accountable 

for. The United States tends to not like to engage in bullhorn diplomacy, but there is no reason why we can’t call a toad a toad, and, 

when it comes to some of Prime Minister Erdogan’s more noxious 

statements, to call him on that, to call the Turkish Ambassador in 

the United States on that, and use the full force of our diplomacy 

for U.S. interests and for the interests of our allies. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. If I may, Congressman, what can Turkey do to 

get the United States back? I would say, the chairman mentioned 

earlier for the purpose of this committee, Turkey is in Europe. Turkey should go back to Europe where it belongs. Both in its domestic 

politics, the AKP government should be called to judgment on respecting media freedoms. If Turkish media is free, Turkey remains 

a democracy and it is okay. 

And second, it should go back to Europe in its foreign policy. We 

have to take Turkey out of the Middle East to take the Middle East 

out of Turkey. That means Turkey’s involvement in Middle East 

conflicts is not good for Turkey and it is not good for the United 

States, because the AKP government is not an impartial mediator 

and has failed in producing outcomes. 

On Iran or Israeli peace, I would say to bring Turkey back to Europe in domestic policy and foreign policy. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

55

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Like Mr. Mack, I think the United States should be on the side 

of freedom. But if freedom means democracy and governments reflect the will of their people, that may be part of our problem in 

Turkey right now. One of the worst parts of democracy is that 

sometimes elections lead to unpalatable consequences for us, and 

that may be what we are dealing with in Turkey now. Certainly 

within our own country, support for secular institutions and separation of church and State waxes and wanes, and it is unrealistic 

to think that it will not in other parts of the world as well. Certainly throughout the Muslim world, there has been more support 

for Islamic policies and away from secular policies. So it is not surprising that is affecting Turkey to some extent as well. 

There is, in September, a package of constitutional changes on 

the ballot. The government describes those changes as necessary to 

meet some of the qualifications for admission to the EU. They include increasing government control over what have traditionally 

been autonomous institutions: The judiciary and the military. 

Philosophically we may support an autonomous judiciary, but it 

certainly is not consistent with American political philosophy to 

support an autonomous military. In fact, we have traditionally seen 

autonomous military power, for instance, in Pakistan, as entirely 

an unwholesome influence. But we probably have benefited from 

the autonomy of the Turkish military. They seem to be more proWestern and they seem to be more pro-secular. They have worked 

closely with Israel’s military when probably the people of Turkey 

are less sympathetic to Israel than their military. 

Do you believe that this package of constitutional changes will go 

through? Do you believe that the stated reason for those changes 

is the real reason; and what do you think the effect will be, particularly the effect of less autonomy for the military? Dr. Cagaptay, Dr. 

Lesser? 

Mr. LESSER. Just briefly, I do think this question of civil-military 

relations is absolutely critical for us here. Many of the things we 

have been discussing would not have happened under the old 

setup, the old regime. So the change, the shift, is very, very important. I think in September the vote on the referendum, on the constitutional package, is probably likely to go the way the AKP government would like, but it will be a very important test and a harbinger of how a general election in Turkey might go in the future. 

One final point. I think we need to be aware that with these 

changes in civil-military relations, who are we now dealing with 

when it comes to security and defense issues in Turkey? It is not 

so simple anymore, and they simply don’t have that vibrant debate 

that we would like to see on things like the consequences of a ‘‘nuclear-izing’’ Iran. So we may be able to do some things to encourage 

a more vibrant debate about this. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman. I would say the question about Turkey is not that Turkey is becoming more democratic 

and we have to bear the consequences; Turkey has been a democracy since 1946. The question is: Is the AKP a democratic force? 

56

A democratic force is not one that comes to power democratically; 

it is one that respects democracy after it comes to power, including 

checks and balances. Just as the party has gone after media, taken 

ownership of a lot of media in the hands of its supporters, which 

is creating incitement—and Dr. Rubin noted that—but also the 

constitutional amendment package which is coming up for a vote 

is a mixed bag. It has a lot of good things such as gender equality 

which I would vote for, but also a lot of things that would allow 

the government to eliminate checks and balances, such as appoint 

most of the members of the high courts without a confirmation 

process or other checks and balances. This is a government that already controls the Parliament, the executive branch, and the legislative, and it would give it the third branch of government. After 

that it is going for control of the media, the fourth estate. That is 

not good news for the future of a democracy. 

So the question is: Is this a party that respects democracy after 

it comes to power democratically? And I think this is how we 

should frame it. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I have so little time I will yield it 

back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I recognize, out of order, for a moment, the ranking member. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to 

let the witnesses know that our side of the aisle has a special conference right now in the Cannon Caucus Room; and that is why so 

few, but the brave, are here. Our brothers and sisters are somewhere else. 

Chairman BERMAN. How can Turkey get them back? 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me put forward a word of caution here that as we make this assessment of 

Turkey, let us be careful not to rush to judgment. 

Secondly, if we are going to measure Turkey, let’s make sure that 

we measure them correctly. With that in mind, Mr. Ambassador, 

let me ask you your assessment of Turkey’s assistance in the war 

on terror? How would you evaluate that? 

Ambassador WILSON. Let me begin by expanding my answer a 

little bit beyond your question. I think as we assess Turkey, we 

also need to assess the many ways in which we need its help. On 

very practical issues where Americans are dying today in Afghanistan and Iraq, we need that help. It is critical to the U.S. national 

interest. And it is also critical to the national interest that we get 

Turkey’s help on the problem of Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts. 

So as I said in my prepared remarks, getting them back on 

board, getting them back, not in line, but together with us ought 

to be a big priority. 

War on terrorism issues is certainly a central part of what I was 

doing while I was in Ankara. Turkey has been extremely helpful 

on a range of—frankly, very sensitive on al-Qaeda-related issues. 

It has been very helpful on a number of other terrorism matters 

concerning Iraq. 

57

Dr. Lesser noted earlier our work with Turkey—I think it was 

Dr. Lesser—on PKK. We have few partners who are closer with us 

and more effective with us on these issues. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

Now let me ask each of you to respond to this. Throughout the 

ages and the centuries, even going back to ancient times in the 

Middle East, they have often asked the question: Is there no balm 

in Gilead? Gilead is a land on the east side of the Jordan that produced a particular kind of plant that had extraordinary healing 

power, and I think that is what we ought to talk about a bit here, 

and I ask your assessment. 

Do you feel that we have healing power? Is there no balm there 

now that could heal this wound that has ruptured between our two 

most foremost allies in the region, Israel and Turkey? Could each 

of you briefly respond to that? Is there balm? Can we do it? What 

must be done to heal this wound? That is what has to be done. 

Mr. Rubin. 

Mr. RUBIN. I would say we can’t heal until we diagnose and come 

to agreement on the diagnosis and recognize reality. 

Mr. LESSER. I think there has been a very natural recalibration. 

By healing, if we have in mind something that existed between 

Turkey and Israel 10 years ago, probably there isn’t a route back 

to that. The question is, How far does this deterioration go, and 

where will it stop. 

I think it needn’t go that far, and a lot of this is about the political messaging between both countries, because there still is a core 

of strategic interest there, and cooperation on many things. Israel 

and Turkey are cooperating to this day on the PKK in northern 

Iraq, just as we are. 

Mr. SCOTT. So you believe there is balm? 

Mr. LESSER. I believe there is balm, but it is balm within reason. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. This is a very important question because the 

good ties between Turkey and Israel are not just good ties but is 

something that makes Turkey unique by adding this Western overlay and making it unique among all Muslim nations, together with 

its NATO membership, liberal democracy, EU accession, good ties 

with the United States. So the fact that it is becoming undone, it 

is quite worrisome, because it means something special about Turkey is disappearing. 

So is there a balm? I would say because the AKP government’s 

world view has indexed Turkish-Israeli ties to Israel’s Hamas policy, and because that is not changing anytime soon, unfortunately 

in the short term there is no quick fix to this. 

Perhaps Turkish diplomats are working really hard to save the 

relationship. Perhaps we will witness that it won’t deteriorate any 

further, but if it is where it is, for the near future, I would say we 

should be content with the hope that long term, other Turks who 

see the world differently decide to build a different relationship, or 

back on the same relationship of the past with Israel. But short 

term, I think this government will stay on track with this idea of 

Israel versus Hamas and Turkey versus Israel. 

Ambassador WILSON. Very briefly, I think time heals a lot of 

wounds. This particular one will require some time. 

58

Second, it was very important that Israeli Minister Ben-Eliezer 

met with the Turkish Foreign Minister, I think 2 or 3 weeks ago. 

It ignited a little bit of controversy in Israel, but it was the right 

thing. That is why that step was taken. 

Third, Ambassador Tan, the Turkish Ambassador here, just came 

from Israel. Israel has fewer better friends in the Turkish system. 

I think he can be helpful, too. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, Mr. Delahunt, is recognized. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it is interesting to note that since the flotilla incident, 

trade has increased between Israel and Jordan, according to media 

reports, by some 40 percent over the previous year. Forty percent. 

And that the sale of the aircraft, the Heron, was actually consummated post the flotilla incident. I would suggest that those particular examples state something about the relationship. I think 

both sides know that they need each other. Much as I said in my 

opening remarks, we need the Turks, they need us. 

But I want to get to the polling data for just a moment. I understand the polling data. I chair the Oversight Subcommittee of this 

particular committee, and we did a whole bunch of hearings in 

terms of the image of the United States. I think it is important to 

note that we weren’t doing very well anywhere. It wasn’t just Turkey. We weren’t doing well with the Brits. We weren’t doing well 

with the French. We weren’t even doing well with the Irish. 

Now, I think it is important to provide context here. I am not 

happy with the fact that there is overwhelming sentiment in Turkey regarding the United States. We can do a lot, and I even think 

that some of the remarks and some of the notes or the insights, 

rather, recommendations as far as public diplomacy, yes, they 

exist. I visited Turkey recently, and they want to come here and 

do business. They are doing business in Tel Aviv right now. 

But the issue I really want to address is, and let me address this 

to Ambassador Wilson, do you view this shift in Turkey foreign policy as pragmatism, nationalism; or as Dr. Cagaptay indicates, generated by the ideology of Islamism? 

And can you give us your definition, Ambassador, of Islamism? 

Is this some nefarious plot that is going on all over the world? I 

think it is important that we start to be precise about what we 

mean because multiple interpretations can be drawn. 

Ambassador WILSON. I am not sure that I would want to try to 

define a term that I didn’t use. I think that one important thing 

to remember is that there are a large number of countries with 

large or overwhelming majority of Muslim populations. They are all 

different. They all pursue different goals and they pursue them in 

different ways. And the idea that there is something out there, I 

think is misleading, and will take U.S. policy in the wrong direction. 

To your question, the origins of Turkish foreign policy and 

changes that we see today, is it pragmatism, is it nationalism or 

is it ideology; my answer would be yes. All of those things are going 

on, and there are probably some other things going on. 

59

Mr. DELAHUNT. So it is really not a black-and-white situation, it 

is much more nuanced than what some might indicate? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, sir. That is exactly what I believe. 

There are a number of things going on that motivate the government. It has to do with public opinion and it has to do with pragmatism. It has to do with the pushback from Europe and it has to 

do with economic opportunities. There are a complex of things 

there. I don’t think that they are seen as intentionally taking Turkey away from NATO and away from a close relationship with the 

United States, but rather adding things to Turkey’s international 

tool bag. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I found it interesting, and I think Dr. Rubin in 

fact has written about this, dating back to that March 2003 denial 

of American deployment through Turkey. Ironically it was 

Erdogan, the Prime Minister, that seemed to be advocating to allow 

America to transit Turkey into northern Iraq; am I correct on that, 

Ambassador Wilson? 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Can you 

answer with a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’? 

Ambassador WILSON. I can’t answer it with a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no.’’ 

Erdogan was not Prime Minister at that time. The Prime Minister 

at that time, yes, advocated for approval of that measure. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The ranking member of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize. I had another 

committee hearing and they were having votes and so I had to run 

back and forth, so I apologize for not being here. 

I think one of the things that should be asked is: What should 

the Obama administration do to engage Turkey and the administration over there to reestablish a closer relationship? I am very 

concerned that we see Turkey moving maybe closer to countries 

like Iran, which is a real threat to the entire stability of the Middle 

East and the administration. And the Secretary of State, it seems 

to me, should be doing everything that they can to make sure that 

our NATO ally, Turkey, stays close to the West as much as possible. So what should they be doing in your opinions, and any one 

of you can answer this, to stabilize and solidify our relationship. 

Mr. LESSER. If I may, Congressman, I think that this is a very 

important question and has a very practical side to it which we 

should be pursuing. I think the Turks, for all of their engagement 

with Iran, which troubles us, also at the end of the day view Iran 

as a troubling strategic competitor in the long term. And they do 

worry about a nuclear Iran. What are we going to do about it in 

NATO terms, what are we going to do about it in terms of ballistic 

missile defense architecture? All of these things that matter very 

keenly to us matter very keenly to the Turks. 

I think that, instead, we move beyond the sanctions issue. The 

Turks are never going to like sanctions, for a lot of reasons. There 

are things that we can be doing together in the defense realm 

which would build a lot of confidence, and show that we are dealing 

with the issue in a way that makes sense for both of our interests, 

as a very practical suggestion. Thank you. 

60

Mr. CAGAPTAY. If I may, Congressman, as well thank you for 

your question. I would say Turkey’s AKP government’s foreign policy involvement to become a mediator in Middle East conflicts has 

not produced positive results for Turkey, because the country has 

not become a regional power, as suggested by the AKP, nor has it 

produced positive results for the United States. The AKP appears 

to be a tribune to the Islamist world view to the West. And I would 

say the Obama administration should take Turkey from the Middle 

East and put it back in Europe, which is where it belongs both in 

terms of its foreign policy orientation and liberal democracy. That 

would mean making EU accession the key driver of U.S.-Turkish 

relationship, together with Turkey’s NATO commitment. Turkey is 

a NATO ally; we don’t ask for them anything that we don’t ask 

from other allies. And I think that is only fair that their commitment should not be withering away. 

Mr. BURTON. Anybody else? Yes, sir. 

Ambassador WILSON. Congressman, I would echo what my colleagues have said, but in a slightly different way. I think the 

Obama administration should engage very, very vigorously with 

the Turks with the problem of Iran and what we are going to do 

about it. 

Some of the ideas put forward here in terms of talking about this 

as a defense and security issue as opposed to a political issue I 

think is one useful avenue to explore. The administration should 

continue to talk very intensively about Iraq: What are our plans 

there; how do we see things developing; what kind of a role Turkey 

can play. 

Likewise on Afghanistan and, I would add, likewise on the Middle East. Turkey is a Middle Eastern country. To pretend otherwise 

is misleading and geographically incorrect. So having some of those 

intense conversations and extended discussions I think is extremely important. 

Last part. Tough words are needed when tough words are deserved. And where we see problems, we should talk about them. 

Primarily we should talk about them in private. There are times 

and places and ways in which we do this in public as well. 

Mr. BURTON. Just one real quick question and it relates to the 

Mediterranean problem when the ships came in, the Turkish ships 

came in, and the Israelis, because they were concerned about weapons getting into Hamas, were checking on that flotilla. 

We are big supporters, all of us, of Israel. It is our big ally over 

there. We want to make sure they remain strong and free. What 

should we do to try to ameliorate the situation that exists currently 

between Turkey and Israel? What can be done with the United 

States trying to help put a little oil in the water, pardon the expression—bad choice of words, I guess, but you understand what 

I mean. 

Mr. RUBIN. One thing which we should do is enforce the idea 

that terrorism and what is a terrorist group is not an ala carte 

proposition; that Turkey cannot simply legitimize certain groups 

and expect other groups to be delegitimized. Terrorism is a problem 

to all democracies and we should work with Turkey for a common 

definition. Hamas is a terrorist group; so is the PKK. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

61

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I listened—I listened to the statement that the foreign policy 

of Turkey is really based on the opinion of the Turkish people. And 

I was just wondering if the projection that the Turkish people want 

of Turkey—through my eyes, I see Turkey as the bully in the corner, especially when it comes to Cyprus, when it comes to Armenia, 

and when it comes to even Greece at times, now even Israel. 

This cavalier attitude also—I thought I heard them say that they 

are not really interested, they don’t really care if they get in the 

European Union or not. Is this the projection that the people of 

Turkey want the government to project in the world? Can anybody—I just think they are kind of bullish. 

I went to Cyprus, they got 43,000 troops in Cyprus. Do they have 

to go on a mountain and put a Turkish flag the size of this building 

on that mountain just to show the people of Cyprus like who is 

boss? I mean, that is what I mean by the bullish attitude of Turkey. Can anybody——

Mr. LESSER. If I could make a comment on that, I think when 

you ask Turks today whether they still support being a member of 

the European Union, a majority still say yes. That number has 

been going down, but a majority still say yes. 

If you ask on the issues, for example, one of the ones you mention on Cyprus, whether Turkey—whether they are willing to pay 

a cost to resolve that—they say no. Eventually those are not reconcilable things. If Turkey is going to become a member of the European Union it is going to have to solve those problems. 

I think this is where political leadership comes in, and political 

rhetoric comes in. I think a lot of what you are seeing today is simply because public opinion is being reinforced in its view that Turkey has ‘‘other fish to fry,’’ if I can put it that way, and that the 

European Union is not as important a project as it used to be. I 

hope we can change that. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I would continue, Congressman, along the point 

that most Turks want EU accession. When opinion-polled, they are 

asked why they want the process. They say, and I agree, that it 

is good for Turkey because it will make Turkey more of a liberal 

democracy and more prosperous and finally they can go to Paris on 

their honeymoons without visas. It kills the romance when you 

have to wait on line. 

But on top of it, I think Turkey’s support for EU remains strong. 

The Cyprus issue, though, is a highly emotional issue for both people on the island. It really depends on who you ask where history 

starts. Turkish Cypriots will tell you about the sixties when they 

were persecuted by Greek Cypriot militia, and Greek Cypriots will 

tell you about the 1974 war when Turkey landed on the island to 

end hostilities. And I think the unification of the island will be the 

best thing, together with EU accession for Cyprus and Turkey; but 

that failed in 2004 when Greek Cypriots voted against that plan 

despite the fact the Turkish Government and the Turk Cypriots 

supported it. So that was a missed opportunity. We may not have 

that again in the future, unfortunately. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Ambassador. 

62

Ambassador WILSON. I am not sure that there is a lot that I can 

add to what has already been said. I hadn’t thought about the 

analogy, bully in the corner. I am not sure I agree with it, although 

I think I understand where you are coming from. 

On Cyprus, which I didn’t particularly address in my remarks, 

my impression certainly in the time I was there was that Turkey 

was fully supportive of the U.N. negotiating process. It remained 

very interested in the Annon plan proposals that had been rejected 

by the Greek Cypriots in 2004; deeply, deeply frustrated about an 

inability to figure out how to move things forward; frustration that 

I certainly shared, and I believe the State Department, U.S. Government as a whole, shared in moving this thing forward. 

Since then, things have moved forward a little bit in terms of a 

new U.N. process. But at least there I am not sure that I would 

be comfortable talking about Turkey’s throwing its weight around 

trying to change things. The status quo, although no one likes it, 

has served a certain purpose and Turkey is not certainly one of 

those that is trying particularly to change it. 

Mr. SIRES. Dr. Rubin. 

Mr. RUBIN. Two very quick points. Turkey’s narrative is one of 

foreign powers victimizing them, and historically there is some 

merit to their argument, although there are two sides. The more 

important issue is with regard to this Turkish concept of neoOttomanism. Turkey believes that surrounding countries have a 

much different—much more positive opinion of Turkey historically 

than they actually do. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A lot of questions, little time. 

Dr. Rubin, I want to—maybe I did not hear your testimony correctly, but I thought you said the issue of the Armenian genocide 

was in question. I think there is pretty overwhelming historical 

consensus that it actually occurred, although that is still a debate 

within Turkey and among some other scholars, I guess. 

Since that is obviously a focus of the issue of Armenian and 

Turkish relations, what do you think it will take, since the 2009 

protocols have been signed, to get that relationship to a stage 

where they can have the kind of exchanges and country-to-country 

relations that we would like to see them have. 

Mr. RUBIN. There has been progress between Turkey and Armenia on a whole host of issues. Much of that has been because of 

a very quiet diplomacy and the quiet diplomacy tends to be more 

fruitful. 

With regard to the other issue, it would also be good to have 

some real reconciliation, which, as I said in my testimony, would 

involve both sides opening their archives completely, regardless of 

what they deem to be the ethnicity or political perspective of the 

historian. 

Mr. COSTA. Dr. Lesser, Dr. Cagaptay, do you agree that this 

quiet diplomacy is making progress on the 2009 protocol? 

Mr. LESSER. I would agree that this is certainly the route that 

it would have to go. I think we are dealing—you heard this in so 

63

many comments today—with a mood of heightened nationalism, 

not only in Turkey but in the region, and it makes it difficult to 

do these big projects, like the historic rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. 

My answer to the question of what is necessary to get it moving 

again is really a significant recommitment by the political leadership in Turkey, but also on both sides I would say, to that rapprochement, without it necessarily being linked to other things. It 

just complicates matters—it is valid and worth doing in its own 

right, or it is not. I think it is. I just have to say that. 

Mr. COSTA. Is this the Turkish Government that could do that, 

like Nixon going to China? 

Mr. LESSER. Turkey is in a position—Turkey is a very, very powerful actor in the region, and so for Turkey to take that step, as 

it did at one point, is very significant. To recommit to it would be 

important. 

Mr. COSTA. I have got other questions. 

Ambassador Wilson, when I was last in Turkey and seeing the 

new government come into power, we—I think there is consensus 

among all of you that the relationship with us and Turkey has always had its ups and downs, but the secular role of the military 

seems to now come into question. 

And what are the internal issues that are taking place, in your 

view, within Turkey that is causing this change? 

Ambassador WILSON. That is causing which change? 

Mr. COSTA. Between the secular-military role that has traditionally played with in Turkey and the government. 

Ambassador WILSON. Well, clearly one of the important sets of 

reforms that Turkey had to undertake to make a credible bid to 

join the European Union was adjusting civil-military relations and 

really putting the Turkish military in sort of the lane that is normal for I think most Western democracies, where the military 

works on security and defense matters and has a limited role, if 

any role at all, in other domestic affairs. The military—that is one 

point. 

I think, second, at least my perception and certainly what people 

talked about in Turkey while I was there was a significant diminution in the military’s role, in the kind of respect that was accorded 

to the military. That was quite different from what I heard even 

in 2005, to say nothing of what Turks tell you looking back to the 

last decade or the period before that. 

I think the military interventions have created part of that situation. The military’s intervention in 2007 I think was, generally 

speaking——

Mr. COSTA. Before my time expires, the situation with Iran and 

them obtaining nuclear weapons—I mean, where does Turkey see 

this different than we do? I mean, they state openly that they don’t 

want to see them obtain nuclear weapons, but they obviously see 

it differently. 

Ambassador WILSON. Turkey does not want Iran—in my opinion, 

Turkey does not want Iran to become a nuclear power. There are 

rivals in the region. They fear the dangers that will produce, and 

they fear all of the implications that means for the region. They are 

deeply fearful of war and of conflict, and view the possible acquisiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:37 Oct 01, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\072810\57688 HFA PsN: SHIRL
64

tion of an Iranian nuclear weapon—which they don’t entirely believe—the legacy of faulty Iraq weapons of mass destruction intelligence affects this here—the possibility of a possible Iranian weapon is not as threatening to them as the prospects of war. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, this is again an important hearing, and I would like, to 

Ambassador and to Dr. Cagaptay—forgive me, Doctor; I will focus 

on doctor, but thank you. 

Let me focus in on some of the issues mentioned by my colleagues and that I am very interested in. First of all, I would like 

to think of the relationship between the United States in particular 

and Turkey as a two-way street. I think we get off kilter if we believe, or if Turkey believes, that we are getting more than we are 

giving. And we had a pretty good relationship, pre-political 

changes, and every nation has a right to elect the person of their 

choice. 

But, Ambassador, let’s start with you. What role would the 

United States play in fixing this schism now between Turkey and 

Israel, which is a key element in terms of where we are as Western 

allies? And I say that because we advocated for Turkey to be in 

NATO. It is not all about they have an air base and they are helping us in Iraq. We hope to be out of Iraq in the next couple of 

months. And so we hope they will be helping us generally keep 

peace around the world. 

The other point that I think is enormously important is, what is 

the next steps of our relationship? The British Prime Minister, part 

of Western allies, just rooted for Turkey to be part of the EU. They 

are getting benefits. And I consider Turkey a friend, but I don’t 

want to be a friend with my hat in hand as if I am begging. In fact, 

I hate that kind of foreign policy, period. We either work together 

as equals, we respect the fact that we have individual foreign policies, but we don’t try to strangle each other and get mad at every 

drop of the hat. 

So, Ambassador, if you would answer that question and also Doctor, if you would answer that question, I would appreciate it. 

Ambassador WILSON. Sure. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. 

On Turkey-Israel, I think the administration has already taken 

some steps to try to ease the tension by facilitating a return of the 

Turks who were on board these ships, or the Mavi Marmara, back 

to Turkey, and, I think just in the last few days, to facilitate the 

return of the ships themselves or at least the Turkish ship back to 

Turkey. I have also read——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You know, this is an important point that sort 

of gets lost and it is an important point that Israel is negotiating. 

But go right ahead. 

Ambassador WILSON. I read in the papers that we also helped to 

facilitate this meeting between Foreign Minister Davutoglu and 

Israeli Minister Ben Eliezer. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So we need to be engaged. 

Ambassador WILSON. We need to be engaged and help them put 

this issue behind them. There are issues, fundamental issues, that 

65

Dr. Rubin raised that do need to be addressed and considered, certainly, as we figure out how to go forward. The practical matter. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If you can go quickly to our next steps—because I want the doctor to be able to respond—the next steps of our 

relationship between Turkey and the United States. 

Ambassador WILSON. As I think I have suggested earlier, I think 

what is extremely important is for us to engage on the substantive 

issues and the substantive problems that we have, the substantive 

problems we have with Turkey and the priority international 

issues where we need Turkish help and support. You are absolutely 

right; foreign policy is a two-way street, it is a give and take. We 

need Turkish assistance in a variety of ways, and we get it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And they need ours. 

Ambassador WILSON. Turkey needs our assistance in a variety of 

ways, and they get it as well. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Doctor, if you would, two-way street.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congresswoman. Put this together 

across the view that they need us as much as we need them. It is 

a two-way street. And that hasn’t really gotten across, I would say, 

because every time the AKP government transgressed U.S. policy, 

inviting Hamas, defending Sudanese genocide, establishing contacts with Hezbollah, defending Iran’s nukes, it got away with it. 

And it got the perception, therefore, that it is so indispensable that 

it can continue. 

That is why this hearing is so important, as well as rethinking 

U.S. policy to say, how do we get across the message that all of 

these things are not acceptable, but we still keep Turkey as an 

ally? And I think that would require a tough talk, as Ambassador 

Wilson mentioned, an honest conversation; but also a pushback on 

these certain issues, where having witnessed over and over in the 

last 8 years that AKP’s involvement in the Middle Eastern conflicts 

does not help Turkey or the United States—doesn’t get them out 

of Middle East conflicts—and the role of a mediator, which obviously has not produced results then, I think, bear the consequences. So take Turkey back out of the Middle East in order to 

take the Middle East out of Turkey. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. My final words in concluding, let it be clear 

to all of the Turkish people listening, we are your friend. But let 

us be a friend of equality and let us move forward together on behalf of the Turkish people and the people of the United States of 

America. And I say that to my friends who are Turkish-Americans 

as well. 

Thank you and I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize for being late, and maybe this question was already 

asked, but I think it is worth repeating. 

For the entire panel, while many EU countries fear Turkey is 

turning its back on Europe and question Turkey’s respect for Europe’s democratic culture and Christian heritage, can you discuss 

whether you believe Turkey understands the concerns in light of 

how they treat the religious and ethnic minorities in Turkey and 

northern Cyprus? And are they truly committed to making the necVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:37 Oct 01, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\072810\57688 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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essary reforms to alleviate these fears and show greater respect for 

the rights of these communities? 

Moreover, in light of this question, as the EU Foreign Affairs 

Chief makes her first visit to Turkey amidst a crumbling bid for 

membership, can you discuss how realistic Turkey’s membership in 

the EU really is? Thank you. 

Mr. LESSER. Well, thank you. 

I think this is a critical question for a number of different reasons, in part because we have a very, very strong stake in Turkey’s 

continued convergence with Europe, sector by sector, whether it is 

foreign policy or the economy or it is human rights. I think if Turkey is off of that path, all of those things will be much tougher to 

do. 

I used to be optimistic about this. I am somewhat less so today, 

because if I look at the way the debate is going in Turkey, and the 

way the debate is going in Europe, there is increasing ambivalence 

on all sides. And I am afraid we may, unfortunately, without a lot 

of effort, wind up with something that looks like ‘‘privileged partnership,’’ as the German Government and the French have been 

talking about, rather than something that looks like full membership. 

Final point. I think it is very important that the Turkey that 10 

or 15 years from now could join Europe is not going to be the same 

Turkey. It is not going to be the same Europe either. We have to 

take that into account when we think about this problem. 

Mr. RUBIN. I would just add that I was once very, very outspoken 

in favor of Turkey’s European Union bid, but I don’t think it is, 

anymore, realistic. If anything, some of the events of the last few 

years will play to the opponents in Europe who are afraid of Turkey for political or religious reasons. 

And as to the British Prime Minister’s recent comments, a lot of 

those comments we hear from Britain and other states are positioning, knowing—the fact that they are made so outspokenly is 

more a factor of knowing they will never have to pay the consequences for it because Turkey will never join the European 

Union. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

I have one more question, if I may. The U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom has listed Turkey on its watch list 

for the past 2 years. In its April 2010 report, they documented the 

persecution of minority religions in Turkey, including Christians 

whose churches are not granted legal status. Both the Greek and 

Armenian churches are prevented from training clergy, as you 

know, in Turkey. 

When will religious tolerance and freedom become a reality in 

Turkey, in your opinion? For the entire panel. 

Mr. RUBIN. Shortly before Saudi Arabia gets religious freedom.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I am more optimistic than Dr. Rubin, and this 

why I would say the eye has to stay on the ball on EU accession. 

If you honestly want Turkey’s record as a liberal democracy to improve, you have to make Turkey’s EU accession as a strategic goal. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Anybody else? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman has yielded back. 

67

The gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Berkley, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

putting together this remarkable panel. As usual, your leadership 

of this committee is astonishing to behold. 

Chairman BERMAN. 7 minutes. Well, 5. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I don’t know 

when I have enjoyed or learned more from a panel than this one, 

and I appreciate the information. What I would like to do, since I 

wasn’t here for opening statements, let me make a brief opening 

statement so you know where I am coming from, and then I have 

some really amazing questions to ask that you will be delighted to 

answer. 

Over the last few years we have seen Turkey turn sharply away 

from the Western world and carry favor with the Iranians and 

Hamas, both of whom seek the destruction of our ally, Israel. They 

voted against the most recent U.N. sanctions against Iran, when 

even China and Russia, not exactly our NATO allies, voted for 

them. And Lebanon occupied by Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy, abstained. 

In May they sent a flotilla to Gaza to break Israel’s self-defensive 

blockade of Hamas, creating an international incident, and, as far 

as I am concerned, directly caused the death of nine people that 

were participating in the flotilla. Add that to the refusal to acknowledge Armenian genocide, the continuous and ever more lethal 

incursions into neighboring Kurdistan, the treatment of the Greek 

Orthodox Patriarch, and the extraordinary gall of criticizing Israel 

for occupying the Gaza, when they themselves have occupied Cyprus for 36 years. 

It is becoming increasingly evident to me that we need to take 

a hard look at our relationship with Turkey, reassess whether it is 

in our continuing national security interest to continue it; whether 

they in fact have our interest in mind, and whether or not they can 

continue to be thought of as truly reliable allies. 

I think you can assess from my statement where I am coming 

from. 

These are my questions that I would like to ask. One is about 

EU membership. I chair the Transatlantic Dialogue which is Congress’ ongoing relationship with the European Union Parliament. 

The EU has a set of criteria that has to be met before any country, 

including Turkey, becomes a member of the EU. 

Do you think that is humanly possible, as long as Turkey continues to occupy Cyprus? Whoever would like to answer. 

Mr. LESSER. Well, the answer to your last question is no, it is 

not possible. You know, this is not a negotiation for membership 

in the European Union that Turkey is conducting. They are joining 

a club, and one of the rules of the club is that you have to recognize 

all the members. And this is not going to change. So a settlement 

of the Cyprus problem has to be there. 

But let’s remember this is a 10- or 15-year problem for Turkey 

at best; a lot can happen. But the point you make is absolutely 

valid. Without progress on that issue, it is just not going to happen. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Okay. Another question—this is a very sensitive, 

ticklish one, and I am hesitant to even bring it up publicly—a number of my constituents during the flotilla crisis came over to me 

68

and they said, well, Turkey is getting signals from the United 

States that the United States’ and Israel’s relationship isn’t what 

it once was; that the administration is trying to distance itself from 

Israel; and consequently there would be no price to pay for Turkey’s, I guess, initiating this crisis. 

Do you think that has any validity whatsoever? Because I don’t 

know what to tell my constituents that approach me with that, 

that Turkey kind of felt empowered to do that because they didn’t 

think that the United States would stand by its most reliable ally, 

Israel. 

Mr. RUBIN. We should recognize there is an intrinsic value in 

and of itself to alliances and standing by friends. However, I would 

defer to what some of my co-panelists have said; that the flotilla 

wasn’t an item in isolation; it followed, for example, a whole trajectory that began with Prime Minister Erdogan’s embrace of Khaled 

Mashal, the most militant, not just Hamas leader, but the most 

militant Hamas leader at the time, as well as his embrace of 

Bashal Asad at a very sensitive time during the revolution. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. If I may, Congresswoman, and this would also 

allow me to clarify an earlier comment about what Islamism is. I 

know Congressman Delahunt has left, but he will get a copy of our 

remarks. 

To me the flotilla incident is part of the——

Chairman BERMAN. I am sorry. I’m going to have to interrupt 

you. The time has expired. 

Ms. BERKLEY. That 7 minutes promised didn’t mean anything? 

Chairman BERMAN. No, that was just a gesture. I took that away 

really quickly. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Oh. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, welcome 

to the panel. 

You know, listening to some of the rhetoric here, one might forget that this is an important relationship at stake between the 

United States and Turkey irrespective of what problems there may 

be. No relationship is problem free. Some of those problems are serious and some are irritants. 

Mr. Ambassador, you were the Ambassador to Turkey. Is there 

a strategic nature to the relationship between Turkey and the 

United States? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, sir, I believe that there is. I think that 

is appreciated in Washington. I believe it is appreciated in Ankara 

by Turkish officials, certainly, in the Foreign Ministry, in the military and in the government. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Ambassador, do we have a military base in 

Turkey? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes. Well, we have a presence at Incirlik 

Air Base and also a smaller presence in Izmir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Ambassador, are there Turkish troops in Afghanistan next to American troops? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, sir. Approximately 1,700 at present. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is that a new phenomenon? Turkey has never 

done that before, has it? 

69

Ambassador WILSON. Turkey has been present in Afghanistan——

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, no, no. I am asking a different question. Has 

Turkey ever placed troops in other conflicts in which the United 

States found itself? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, sir. Of course, Korea. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Korea. How many years ago was that? 

Ambassador WILSON. 55. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is Turkey a member of NATO? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was that pretty important during the Cold War 

to the United States’ strategic interest? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, it was. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Does Turkey share one of the largest borders 

with Iran? That is to say, if you look at bordering states, isn’t Turkey’s largest single border with Iran? 

Ambassador WILSON. I would expect that Iraq probably has the 

longest border. But it is a significant border, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. A very significant border. So they are neighbors. 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, they are. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, for example, if there were military incursion, 

God forbid, involving Iran, Turkey would necessarily, given its 

proximity to Iran, somehow be—it certainly would not be unaffected? 

Ambassador WILSON. Turkey would certainly be on the front 

lines. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So it might be reasonable to expect Turkey has 

its own point of view about that relationship and what ought to be 

done about it, even taking into account your point that they certainly do not want Iran to become a nuclear power? 

Ambassador WILSON. Correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is Turkey a flourishing democracy? 

Ambassador WILSON. Turkey is a democracy; like many countries, it is a developing one. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Competitive party situation from an electoral 

point of view? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Historically, has Turkey had a strategic relationship or what could be viewed as a positive relationship, if not a 

strategic, within with the state of Israel? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Has it played any kind of role behind the scenes, 

or more prominently, in trying to possibly affect the peace process 

since the founding of the State of Israel? 

Ambassador WILSON. With respect to the peace process, I don’t 

have personal knowledge. I know that Turkey tried to be helpful 

in securing the release of Corporal Shalit and on some other detainee or hostage issues. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Historically, has Turkey had diplomatic relationships with the State of Israel? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Has it recognized the right of the State of Israel 

to exist within peaceful borders? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, it does. 

70

Mr. CONNOLLY. Moving forward, does Turkey still wish to become 

a member of the European Union? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is it in the United States’ interest that that happen? 

Ambassador WILSON. I believe it is. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. When you were an ambassador, what were your 

instructions from the State Department with respect to that issue? 

Ambassador WILSON. To encourage the Turkish authorities to 

take all the steps that they needed to, to make a credible bid for 

EU accession and to encourage the EU governments through their 

representatives in Ankara to work with Turkey toward that end. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Turkey is a Muslim majority population overwhelmingly; is that correct? 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is there another model in the Muslim world of 

a secular democratic form of government? 

Ambassador WILSON. There is no other country in the Muslim 

majority world that has a secular democracy. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Indonesia might want to disagree. 

Mr. RUBIN. So would Mali, which is ranked above Turkey by 

Freedom House. 

Chairman BERMAN. Mali can’t have as many people as Turkey. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, since I have 12 seconds, Mali and 

Indonesia, the modern State of Turkey was founded how many 

years ago Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador WILSON. About 85. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. By Ataturk. 

Ambassador WILSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. How long have the democracies in Indonesia and 

Mali been in operation? 

Ambassador WILSON. I can’t speak to Mali. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Or the secular—I guess I am particularly interested in the secular aspect. 

Ambassador WILSON. Can’t speak to Mali. Indonesia’s current 

politics I think date somewhere from the late 1980s. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. 

And the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutch, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for assembling this panel. 

I wanted to circle back, Ambassador, to a comment you made 

about—if I understood correctly—the Turks are more concerned 

about a possible war with Iran, the nuclear weapons with Iran. 

And I would like to expand a broader discussion of those relations 

with Iran and the ultimate goal of the Turkish Government. 

How important are the relations? And in light of the broader geopolitical issues surrounding Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons, 

Turkey having voted against the Security Council resolution because of its relationship with Iran, raises other concerns. 

If you could speak—and I actually throw this open to the panel—

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ship and whether it is merely an attempt to continue to have a safe 

border; whether there is some greater concern that others might 

have when Ahmadinejad—given the relationship with Ahmadinejad 

and others. If you could speak to that relationship, and I then I 

have a follow-up with the relationship with Mashal and Hamas. 

Ambassador WILSON. I think one important thing is Turkey borders on Iran. They are neighbors. They have to cooperate with Iran 

in a way that a lot of others do not. Turkey regards Iran as a problematic country; they have been rivals in the region for hundreds 

of years. 

They are, I think, concerned about rising Iranian influence in the 

region which they believe is largely driven by the United States’ invasion of Iraq and the events that followed, as well as by the ongoing stalemate between Israel and the Palestinians. They regard 

that influence and Iranian action as counter to their interest. I 

think there is a dynamic there that is probably generally underestimated. 

As I said earlier, I think their priority with respect to the nuclear 

issue has obviously been somewhat more tilted to the negotiations 

track than to anything else. Public opinion plays a factor there. It 

is a fact that the legacy of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction 

intelligence failures have an effect in Turkey, both on the public, 

and also in the military and across the board among Turkey’s elite; 

great doubt about the accuracy of Western information here. That 

is a problem that one has to work on. 

But it leads Turks I think largely to conclude that they fear the 

consequences of war, which looks to them like the obvious alternative to the possible Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. They 

fear that former a lot more, and they are determined to turn over 

every leaf, obviously going somewhat beyond where American policy would like for them to go, to turn over a leaf to try to make 

that not happen. 

On the Security Council vote——

Mr. DEUTCH. If I may. I just want to follow up on the legacy of 

weapons of mass destruction argument in Iraq and why—I want to 

understand the relevancy of that with respect to Iran, given the 

knowledge that we have about the Iranian nuclear program. Why 

is that the relative comparison? And I would open this up to others 

in the panel who might have thoughts. 

Ambassador WILSON. I am interpreting Turkish thinking and 

what Turks tell me. But almost to a man, in officialdom and outside of officialdom, they believe that the intelligence or the information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was exaggerated 

and turned out not to be entirely true. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Rubin. 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. With regard to the WMD issue, that is partly 

a failing of U.S. public diplomacy, because the information coming 

with regard to Iran is a result of IAEA inspections and Iran declarations, rather than super secret intelligence. 

With regard to Turkey and Iran, Turkey cooperates with Iran 

with far more enthusiasm than any other of Iran’s neighbors. 

And lastly, with the exception of Iraq—lastly, Ahmadinijad 

doesn’t stand with the Iranian people. He was one—Erdogan was 

one of the first leaders to recognize Ahmadinijad’s reelection back 

72

in June 2009 at a time when Ahmadinijad was massacring the Iranian people. It seems that Erdogan is more pro-Islamic Republic of 

Iran than he is pro-Iran. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. I yield back Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. All time of all people has expired, and I am 

going to resist the irresistible urge—well, at the behest of the ranking member, I would just like to raise one issue and if anybody—

it is not really a question, it is more of a response to something 

you just said, Ambassador. 

It is hard—I met the Foreign Minister of Turkey several times. 

This is a very bright and sophisticated guy. I don’t know what the 

people of Turkey think, but I don’t—I can’t buy that the leadership 

of Turkey is hugely skeptical of what Iran’s intentions are in the 

wake of Qom, in the wake of how they pulled back from the October 1st deal, in the wake of the IAEA findings and reports, all far 

more extensive and manifest than was Iraq in the early part of this 

decade. 

This isn’t a U.S. play; this is a pretty internationally accepted 

thing. So I just wanted to—all kinds of reasons, and legitimate 

ones, they may not like our approach and all that stuff. But I don’t 

buy that they don’t think there is a basis for the conclusion Iran 

is pursuing a nuclear weapon. 

All right, I guess I had the last word, unless somebody else 

wants it. Thank you all. This has really been a very interesting 

panel. 

All of you, nothing about my last comment should diminish my 

appreciation for your testimony and all of your testimonies. Thank 

you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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