Celeste J. Ward

The Coalition Provisional 

Authority’s Experience 

with Governance in Iraq

Lessons Identified

Summary 

• In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly 

organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to 

administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and 

uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way. 

• Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in 

the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance 

were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature 

of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.

• Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those 

who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the 

importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these 

lessons. 

• Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for 

developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks 

should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies 

and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should 

form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency 

plans. 

• Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater 

capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency planwww.usip.org

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SPECIAL REPORT 139 MAY 2005

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report is a product of the United States 

Institute of Peace’s Iraq Experience Project. It is the 

third of three reports examining important lessons 

identified in Iraq prior to the country’s transition to 

sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive 

interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and 

contractors who served there. 

This report is focused specifically on governance 

in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. 

The other two reports examine security and 

reconstruction, respectively. These reports are 

intended for use as training aids in programs that 

prepare individuals for service in peace and stability 

operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be 

translated into lessons learned by those assigned 

to future missions. 

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national 

security policy with the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, prepared the report. The Association 

for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the 

interviews under a contract with the Institute.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

SPECIAL REPORT

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which 

does not advocate specific policy positions.

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

Iraqi Governance under Saddam 3

Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 3

Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) 5

Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) 7 

Lessons Identified 9

Conclusion 12 
2

ning expertise, having access to greater logistical and transportation resources, and 

creating personnel systems to ensure that there are enough trained and qualified 

personnel available. 

• U.S. government agencies and other organizations involved in building governance 

structures should develop finance systems that allow them to get money moving 

quickly. Those working with indigenous governing bodies should leverage reconstruction dollars to empower local officials by allowing them to deliver real improvements 

in the lives of the population. 

• Establishing democracy requires not only setting up proper institutions but also 

education, long-term mentoring, and capacity building. People with no experience 

of civil society or democracy often have enthusiasm without the understanding of 

how to ensure fairness and transparency. Populations formerly dominated by dictatorial regimes may also lack the personal initiative and responsibility to truly embrace 

democratic institutions and become functioning members of them. 

• Building democratic structures requires an understanding of the cultural and historical context of the people in the country. Area experts can be of great assistance in 

the planning process by designing structures that are more likely to be accepted by 

local populations and integrated into the existing culture. 

Introduction

The U.S.-led coalition that invaded Iraq, toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, and occupied 

the country for thirteen months attempted to build the foundations of democratic governance. By the time sovereignty was returned to an interim Iraqi government in June 2004, 

the coalition had assembled provincial councils in all fifteen non-Kurdish provinces of Iraq 

and established hundreds of neighborhood, village, and city councils. Establishing these 

governance structures during the period of occupation was an enormously challenging 

and deeply flawed process. The coalition’s initial plan—to remove Saddam and his close 

associates from power and to hold in place the existing bureaucracy to administer the 

country—became untenable when those structures dissolved. Looters gutted seventeen 

of twenty-three ministries, stealing or destroying their records, while ministry personnel 

went home or disappeared. When the initial plan proved unrealizable, there was, by all 

accounts, no backup strategy. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated 

streams of activity to create governance structures got under way; the ad hoc nature of 

the ensuing process and the lack of coordination and shared objectives exacerbated the 

challenges of establishing legitimate, democratic governance in Iraq. 

Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the 

process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each marked a significant change 

in planning and policy:

• Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) saw the establishment of the Office of 

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and initial planning for postSaddam Iraq and ended a few weeks after the war.

• Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003) witnessed the creation of the CPA and 

the beginning of a longer-term occupation.

• Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004) began with the coalition’s 

November 15 agreement to return sovereignty to Iraq and ended with the establishment of the Iraqi interim government in June 2004. 

How postwar Iraqi governance was planned and executed, and the experiences of those 

who participated, offer lessons for future efforts to establish or strengthen democratic 

governance elsewhere. Of course, each situation is different, and the challenge in identiABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution 

created by Congress to promote the prevention, 

management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute 

meets its congressional mandate through an array 

of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs 

from high school through graduate school, 

conferences and workshops, library services, and 

publications. The Institute’s Board of Directors is 

appointed by the President of the United States 

and confirmed by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, 

ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, 

Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, 

D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker,

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School 

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S. 

Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. 

• Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel 

Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University • Mora 

L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, New York, 

N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former 

Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration • Michael M. Dunn,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National 

Defense University • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

fying lessons is to distinguish the unique from the general. This paper highlights some of 

the lessons identified in Iraq during CPA control that may be applied to future postconflict 

environments. The report begins by providing background information on Iraqi governance 

structures under Saddam Hussein and then describes how postwar Iraqi governance structures—from the local to the national level—were erected during all three phases. This 

report concludes by identifying lessons from the CPA’s experience in Iraq. 

Iraqi Governance under Saddam

Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq for three decades through a strict, highly centralized, regime. 

Saddam, his close relatives and associates, and the Ba’ath Party stood at its center. The 

ministries ran the country from Baghdad, and an elaborate security apparatus undergirded 

the regime’s absolute authority. The demonstrated brutality and vast reach of the security 

services ensured the Iraqi population’s obedience. While there were administrative divisions at the neighborhood, village, district, city, and provincial levels, these local and 

regional governments had little say over budgetary or policy matters. Governors were 

appointed by Saddam and were usually senior Ba’ath Party members. They collected taxes 

and maintained order in their province but were ultimately beholden to Saddam and the 

party. 

Provincial councils existed in all of the provinces, but they had little genuine power. 

Though by law the councils were supposed to be elected, in reality they were appointed 

by and took their marching orders from ministries in Baghdad, often through the directors 

general who represented ministries at the local level. At the lowest level of governance 

were municipal councils (or village elders in more rural areas), but their purviews were 

restricted to garbage collection, record keeping, and other such matters. Council members 

also served as informants for the regime. 

Beyond membership in the Ba’ath Party, very few forms of association were permitted 

in Saddam-era Iraq. Individuals learned through bitter experience that the wages of personal initiative were incarceration or worse. One’s success rested on the whims of Saddam 

and his cronies. Thirty years of dictatorship deeply penetrated virtually all aspects of life, 

leaving little foundation on which to build local, democratic, governance in Iraq. 

Phase One (January 2003–May 2003) 

In January 2003, the Bush administration created the Office of Reconstruction and 

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) by executive order and appointed Lt. Gen. (ret.) Jay 

Garner to lead the organization. As part of the Department of Defense, ORHA’s task was 

to develop and implement plans to assist the Iraqis in developing democratic governance 

and reconstructing the country once Saddam Hussein was deposed. In the two months 

ORHA spent developing these plans, Garner’s team consulted with experts on Iraq and 

worked with a number of Iraqi exile parties, such as the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the 

Iraqi National Accord (INA), Da’wa, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan 

Democratic Party (KDP), and other organizations.

The initial plan for a postwar Iraqi government was based on the assumption that the 

coalition would remove Saddam Hussein and his close associates from power, but that 

broad structures of the bureaucracy would remain in place. As administration officials said, 

“The coalition would cut off the head of the snake but leave the body.” ORHA and other 

coalition personnel would temporarily become the “head” and immediately recruit Iraqis 

to form a new leadership cadre that would assume control after a short period of mentoring. The coalition was led to believe (in part by Iraqi exile groups) that the country’s 

infrastructure, while aging, was still largely serviceable. As a result, the coalition was 

surprised when it later found Iraq’s infrastructure to be in a highly dilapidated state. 

The demonstrated brutality and 

vast reach of the security services 

ensured the Iraqi population’s 

obedience.

Thirty years of dictatorship 

deeply penetrated virtually all 

aspects of life, leaving little 

foundation on which to build 

local, democratic, governance

in Iraq. 
4

On March 19, U.S. and coalition forces launched their offensive to remove Saddam from 

power. On April 9, U.S. soldiers famously tore down a statue of Saddam in a central Baghdad square, bringing his rule to a symbolic end. Days later, Tikrit, Mosul, and Kirkuk—the 

last pockets of resistance—fell to coalition forces. 

Unfortunately, as the statues of Saddam crumbled, so did all semblance of public order. 

Looters razed public buildings, pulling pipes from the walls and making off with furniture, 

records, equipment, and even doorframes. Because U.S. military forces had not been 

ordered to maintain public order, they did not attempt to stop the looting, though they 

did secure the Oil Ministry. (This fact would later become a source of resentment among 

the Iraqi population.) With the Iraqi government effectively dissolved and seventeen of 

the twenty-three ministries destroyed, workers stayed home. 

Garner and his staff deployed to Baghdad in mid-April 2003. Though major combat 

operations had been over for two weeks, the staff was initially refused permission to 

enter the country because of concerns about security. The coalition planned to create an 

interim Iraqi administration as rapidly as possible. Though the details of the plan continued to evolve, the general idea was that an interim administration would be selected 

by a conference of influential Iraqis representing major segments of Iraqi society. This 

administration would write a new constitution, appoint provincial governors, and preside 

over the country until a new government could be democratically elected. 

The first step toward creating a new Iraqi administration was a conference held in 

Nasiriyah on April 15, 2003. Garner gathered roughly one hundred Iraqis to discuss the 

creation of a new Iraqi government. These individuals came from different ideological 

perspectives and various tribal, religious, and political groups. On April 28, there was a 

follow-up meeting with about 250 Iraqis. The second meeting ended in an agreement to 

hold a third meeting a month later to select an interim Iraqi administration. On May 5, 

Garner announced in a press interview that, by the second week of May, the nucleus of a 

temporary Iraqi government would be in place. 

Early Development of Local Government

After the coalition’s military victory, the country was divided into six major subordinate 

commands (MSCs): north, north-central, western, Baghdad, center-south, and southeast. 

MSC commanders were charged with securing their sectors and beginning the process of 

reconstruction. To carry out their mission, military units needed Iraqi interlocutors and 

thus began to build local and regional councils. 

Evidence suggests that the military units received only very general guidance about 

how they were to carry out their postcombat missions. In the absence of preplanning or 

guidance, commanders were left to freelance, making it up as they went along. Military 

civil affairs units are trained in reconstruction and democracy building, but they proceeded without a larger understanding of purpose and objectives. A noteworthy example 

of the military’s efforts to create local governance occurred in May 2003 in Ninawah 

Province. Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of the 101st Airborne, established a 

provincial council there that also served as the city council for Mosul. Petraeus gained a 

reputation for establishing law and order, gainfully employing Iraqis, and generally getting things done.

The MSCs were able to draw from three sources of funding to initiate reconstruction 

projects in their sectors—the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), Iraqi assets from oil 

exports and other sources of income, and the Commanders Emergency Response Program 

(CERP). Brigade commanders could disburse up to $100,000 and division commanders up 

to $500,000 without consulting higher authorities. The CERP funds provided commanders 

with ready resources to undertake local projects that would improve the lives of Iraqis. 

As the statues of Saddam crumbled, so did all semblance

of public order. 

Though major combat operations had been over for two 

weeks, the staff was initially 

refused permission to enter the 

country because of concerns 

about security. 

In the absence of preplanning or 

guidance, commanders were left 

to freelance.
5

Research Triangle Institute 

In April 2003, another initiative got under way to help establish local democratic institutions in Iraq. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) gave one of its 

largest contracts ever (worth a potential $236 million over two years) to the Research 

Triangle Institute (RTI), a North Carolina–based nonprofit organization experienced in 

the development of government institutions. RTI had four major tasks: (1) to help local 

governments restore essential services such as water, sanitation, sewage, and emergency 

power; (2) to improve the effectiveness of public servants responsible for administration and service delivery in their districts; (3) to strengthen access of citizens to local 

government and other mechanisms; and (4) to help the coalition bring Iraqis together to 

discuss the type of government they desired, the role of federalism, the election process, 

and other matters. Without coordinating with ORHA, the CPA, and the MSCs, RTI began 

its mission in late April, when it started work in Basra. By the time RTI arrived, British 

coalition forces had already set up a city council there. RTI soon relocated a substantial 

part of its effort to Baghdad, where it helped to establish councils at the neighborhood 

and district levels, and eventually a city and a provincial council. 

During this initial period, OHRA, coalition military commanders, and RTI operated 

independently with little effort at coordination. 

Phase Two (May 2003–November 14, 2003)

In early May, the coalition made its first major change in course on Iraqi governance. 

It abandoned Gen. Garner’s plan to hold elections and rapidly establish an Iraqi administration. On May 6, 2003, the administration appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III 

as head of the CPA, which subsumed ORHA. On May 17, 2003, a day after his arrival in 

Baghdad, Bremer (accompanied by British diplomat John Sawers) announced the coalition would remain in charge of Iraq for an indefinite period. Instead of a provisional 

government, the coalition would create an Iraqi interim authority that would assist the 

CPA in drafting a constitution and planning future elections. 

In late May and June 2003, members of Ambassador Bremer’s governance team fanned 

out across the country, looking for influential Iraqis who could represent critical elements 

of the society in the interim authority. One or more members of the CPA staff visited all of 

the country’s eighteen provinces. They talked to hundreds of individuals, including tribal 

sheiks, religious leaders, academics, engineers, lawyers, and businessmen. They selected 

twenty-five members, and, in July 2003, Ambassador Bremer announced the creation of 

the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC). 

The IGC attracted criticism almost immediately. Iraqis who had been involved in 

Garner’s conferences had been encouraged by the prospect of an early handover of power 

and were disappointed by the change in course. The large number of exiles in the IGC and 

the opaque manner in which the council was appointed led to objections that it did not 

represent the Iraqi people. Further, it was difficult for the coalition to find Sunnis willing 

to join the IGC. Iraqis suspected that the IGC had no real power and was merely a puppet 

of the coalition. As a result, the IGC suffered a legitimacy gap that worsened over time.

The IGC’s role was set out in a seven-point plan. Significantly, one of its key tasks 

was to develop a process for drafting an Iraqi constitution by December 2003. According 

to this plan, after the document was written, it would be ratified in a referendum, and 

then a sovereign Iraqi government would be elected. The entire process would have taken 

several years. 

The large number of exiles in the 

IGC and the opaque manner in 

which the council was appointed 

led to objections that it did not 

represent the Iraqi people.

The IGC suffered a legitimacy 

gap that worsened over time.
6

United Nations

The United Nation’s postcombat involvement in Iraq was authorized by UN Security 

Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003. The United Nations was not new to Iraq. It 

had been in charge of the Oil for Food program (OFFP) that had been established in 1996 

to alleviate the hardships experienced by the Iraqi people as a result of UN sanctions 

against Saddam. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan appointed Sergio Vieira de Mello, a veteran Brazilian diplomat who had directed the highly successful UN mission in East Timor, 

as his special representative. Ambassador de Mello and twenty staff members deployed 

to Iraq in May 2003 and set up the UN’s headquarters in Baghdad’s Canal Hotel. The UN 

began a series of assessment tours and held meetings with prominent Iraqis. Several UN 

humanitarian agencies began reconstruction projects, among them the United Nations 

Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF.

Continued Development of Local Governance

Meanwhile, RTI, the CPA, and the military’s Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) 

began to establish local governance in Baghdad. They set up eighty-eight neighborhood advisory councils, nine district advisory councils, and a city advisory council. 

Iraqis elected the neighborhood advisory councils (in some cases they were appointed), 

which voted on representatives to the district advisory council. In turn, these council 

members voted on representatives to the city advisory council. 

With the success of the Baghdad process, the CPA sought to replicate this model 

throughout the country. It assigned small governance teams to all fifteen of the nonKurdish provinces. Though the composition of the teams varied, they generally included 

a CPA provincial coordinator and a deputy, as well as military personnel and staff 

from RTI. When the provincial teams arrived in the provinces, they found a variety of 

governing structures that had already been created by the military. They worked with 

those existing structures and created new councils where needed. Not surprisingly, the 

composition and procedures of these councils varied widely, as did their legitimacy 

among Iraqis. Over time, the CPA appointed regional coordinators to oversee activities 

in broad sections of the country. Significantly, the CPA divided the country into four 

administrative regions—north, central/Baghdad, south-central, and south—that did 

not correspond to the military’s six MSCs. 

A Growing Insurgency

During this period the security situation worsened considerably. This had a deleterious 

impact on the coalition’s ability to conduct its business. In the summer of 2003, CPA 

staff members could walk around Baghdad, eat in local restaurants, and talk freely with 

Iraqis on the streets. By fall, these activities were increasingly perilous, and CPA personnel were forced to spend more of their time working from inside their heavily fortified 

headquarters in the Green Zone. Virtually every aspect of the CPA’s mission required dealing with Iraqis, but leaving the Green Zone could be undertaken only with the greatest 

caution. Getting Iraqis into the zone meant causing them to wait in long lines (often for 

hours) and to be searched and escorted. As CPA personnel spent more time in the Green 

Zone, they became increasingly disconnected from what was happening in the country. 

Insurgent attacks were also effective in isolating the coalition from its international 

partners. On August 19, 2003, Ambassador de Mello was killed by a car bomb that 

exploded outside UN headquarters. Shortly thereafter, Secretary-General Annan decided 

to remove all UN personnel from Iraq due to the security situation there. The United 

Nation’s departure was followed by the exit of most international nongovernmental relief 

organizations and private companies. 

The CPA divided the country 

into four administrative regions 

that did not correspond to the 

military’s six MSCs. 

As CPA personnel spent more 

time in the Green Zone, they 

became increasingly disconnected from what was happening 

in the country.
7

Phase Three (November 15, 2003–June 28, 2004)

In late fall 2003, the CPA made another major course correction in its path to institute 

Iraqi self-governance. By then it was clear the IGC would not meet its deadline to develop a process for drafting a constitution. The growing insurgency also had convinced 

CPA officials that it would be better to turn power over to the Iraqis sooner rather than 

later. In November, Ambassador Bremer returned from a short-notice visit to Washington with an alternate plan for transferring sovereignty to Iraqis. After obtaining 

approval from the IGC, Bremer announced on November 15, 2003, that the coalition 

would hand over sovereignty to the Iraqis by June 30, 2004. 

This plan was based on a system of provincial caucuses. In each province, five 

members of the IGC, five members of the provincial council, and one member of each 

of the five largest city councils would form a fifteen-person organizing committee. 

This committee would oversee the selection of candidates for a provincial caucus. The 

caucus would then select delegates to an interim national assembly, which would select 

a government, form a cabinet, and prepare elections for a constitutional assembly. The 

number of delegates per province would be proportional to the province’s share of the 

national population.

The November 15 agreement had major implications for provincial councils, as they 

would play a central role in selecting a national government. Unfortunately, many provincial councils had been established by military commanders whose priority was finding Iraqi interlocutors quickly, not identifying the ideal individuals. Ambassador Bremer 

ordered that the councils be “refreshed” with new members and that new councils 

be created where none existed. This refreshment of existing councils meant removing 

former Ba’ath Party members and expanding the membership to make the bodies more 

representative. The process for appointing governors and the forty-member provincial 

councils was standardized. Tribal groups, political parties, and civic groups received 

twelve seats each, with women and religious dignitaries receiving two each. 

This refreshment exercise caused problems. Done in great haste to meet the timetable specified by the November 15 agreement, selection methods were not always 

viewed as fair. As a consequence, some councils suffered from a lack of legitimacy. 

There were elections in some cases and self-selecting caucuses in others. Despite the 

attempt to standardize the councils, a lot was left to the discretion of the local CPA 

coordinator. 

On April 6, 2004, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order Number 71, which described 

the authorities and responsibilities of the governorates and municipal and local governments. For the first time, local government structures were afforded a genuine role. CPA 

Order 71 did a number of things:

• It created governorate councils that could establish priorities for the province, 

impose taxes and fees, and initiate projects. Significantly, it made the governorate 

councils independent from the directors general of the ministries and gave them 

a role in determining the appointments of directors general for the ministries. To 

ensure independence from Baghdad, the governorate councils would be funded by 

the national government rather than through the ministries or their provincial departments. 

• It stipulated that those who already held office as members of the governorate 

councils would keep their office, but that should vacancies occur, there would be a 

fair, open, and competitive selection process. Governorate councils were authorized 

to elect governors and deputy governors for provinces where these positions had not 

been filled. 

The growing insurgency also had 

convinced CPA officials that it 

would be better to turn power 

over to the Iraqis sooner rather 

than later. 

Done in great haste to meet 

the timetable specified by the 

November 15 agreement, selection methods were not always 

viewed as fair.

To ensure independence from 

Baghdad, the governorate councils would be funded by the 

national government rather 

than through the ministries or 

their provincial departments.
8

• It established the roles and responsibilities of the governors and deputy governors. 

The governor would direct and oversee implementation of the council’s decisions; 

deputies would report to the governor and serve in his absence. 

• It allowed for the creation of municipal councils. Existing councils and incumbent 

officials would remain, but, in future, councils could be created according to regulations approved by a majority vote of the governorate council. Municipal councils were 

empowered to elect mayors and deputy mayors.

• It gave the governorate councils the ability to approve the appointment of chiefs of 

police for three-year terms. The Interior Ministry would nominate qualified candidates 

and the council would vote on their confirmation. 

While the order had its imperfections (for instance, the provincial councils could not 

fire the police chief ), one regional coordinator described it as “one of the most important 

orders written by the CPA, the order that actually decentralized governance in Iraq.” 

Adjusting the November 15 Agreement

Almost immediately after the November 15 agreement was announced, the CPA was forced 

to make yet another change of course. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the highest and most 

respected Shia religious authority in Iraq, objected to the proposed transfer of sovereignty 

to a body chosen through a series of caucuses. From the very beginning of the occupation, Sistani had advocated elections as soon as possible. It was unclear, however, when 

elections could realistically be held. After November 15, Sistani did not want to request 

that the coalition stay longer so that proper elections could be held, nor did he want to 

accept transfer of sovereignty to an unelected body. In early 2004, the UN appointed a 

special envoy, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, to help resolve the question of whether it 

was possible to hold elections in time to transfer sovereignty on June 30, 2004. 

Brahimi’s presence (and direct communication with Sistani) helped defuse the crisis. 

Brahimi struck an agreement with Sistani that elections would happen as soon as possible, but not prior to the transfer of sovereignty by June 30. Sovereignty would have to 

be transferred to another body. The CPA proceeded to draft a Transitional Administrative 

Law (TAL) that described the powers of an interim government. After marathon negotiations, the IGC signed the TAL in March 2004, enshrining a new process. 

The TAL stipulated that an Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) would preside over the 

country until elections could take place. These elections would be no later than January 

31, 2005. The IIG would be assembled by the IGC and the coalition. In the elections, 

Iraqis would vote for representatives to a 275-member National Assembly, which would 

then elect a Presidency Council from among its ranks. Significantly, the TAL enshrined 

devolution of power to the provincial level by, for example, protecting provincial officials 

from being fired by the central government. During the same elections, Iraqis would also 

select members to sit on their provincial councils (in the three Kurdish provinces, voters 

would elect the Kurdistan Regional Government). 

After further negotiations in the spring of 2004, the coalition, the IGC, and the United 

Nations reached agreement on the process that led to the appointment of the interim 

government. The precise nature of this process is still not well known and the small group 

who participated in it has been reluctant to offer details. On May 28, the IGC announced 

that Ayad Allawi, a former member of the IGC, had been selected as the interim prime 

minister. On June 1, 2004, the rest of the interim government was announced, including 

the president, two deputy prime ministers, and twenty-seven ministers. 

One regional coordinator 

described it as “one of the 

most important orders written 

by the CPA, the order that 

actually decentralized 

governance in Iraq.” 

Brahimi’s presence helped

 defuse the crisis. 

The TAL enshrined devolution of 

power to the provincial level by 

protecting provincial officials 

from being fired by the central 

government.
9

Lessons Identified

The coalition’s experience in erecting democratic structures in Iraq offers a number of lessons for efforts to create or strengthen democratic institutions in future stability operations. 

Foremost, the coalition discovered that it is extremely difficult to attempt reconstruction 

and the establishment of new governing structures in the midst of an insurgency. The 

coalition also encountered numerous shortcomings in the U.S. government’s organizational ability and capacity to conduct postconflict interventions. Among the most important lessons in this regard are the following.

The Roles and Missions of U.S. Government Organizations

The U.S. government should better define the roles and missions of its departments and 

agencies for postconflict reconstruction and democracy building. In some cases, roles and 

missions should be shifted from one organization to another; in other cases, necessary roles 

and missions from planning to execution have yet to be assigned. Further, the United States 

should better coordinate the roles and missions of these organizations with respect to coalition partner capabilities and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations.

If we define “roles” as those enduring purposes for which an organization is created, and 

“missions” as those responsibilities assigned by the political leadership, in the case of 

establishing Iraqi governance, neither the roles nor the missions were well defined. In 

Iraq, from the planning stage to execution, the division of labor among U.S. government 

institutions, both with respect to one another and with respect to the coalition and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, was never established or clear. 

U.S. and coalition combat forces began establishing local government structures in 

Iraq out of necessity. Some of the appropriate capabilities are resident in military organizations—for example, civil affairs units are trained to create governing institutions and 

begin reconstruction efforts. It is sensible, then, that in an uncertain security environment, military units should lead and the timing and criteria for transition to civilian 

administration should be defined. While the specific organizational arrangements may 

depend to a degree on the specific situation, establishing the appropriate organizational 

framework will be critical to future success.

Interagency Planning

Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for 

developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should 

be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies should 

participate in the planning process. The U.S. government should create interagency planning groups to develop political-military contingency plans that include multiple scenarios 

and identify the resources necessary to deal with worst-case scenarios. Planners should 

identify desired end-state governance structures based on long-term objectives, and governance plans should contain timelines, metrics, and divisions of responsibility between 

agencies. 

Many of the challenges in establishing governance structures in Iraq flowed from two 

fundamental problems. First, the assumption behind the prewar planning for governance was that Iraq’s bureaucractic and administrative structures would remain intact. 

In fact, law and order broke down and these structures ceased to exist, but there was 

no backup plan for this eventuality. Second, the United States suffered from an acute 

lack of accurate information about the state of Iraqi society and infrastructure. This 

information gap exacerbated a tendency to discount more pessimistic predictions concerning the postwar environment. 

The coalition also encountered 

numerous shortcomings in the 

U.S. government’s organizational 

ability and capacity to conduct 

postconflict interventions. 

U.S. and coalition combat forces 

began establishing local government structures in Iraq out of 

necessity. 

The United States suffered from 

an acute lack of accurate information about the state of Iraqi 

society and infrastructure.
Once the original plan proved untenable, improvisation and ad hoc approaches were 

the only options. Until the fall of 2003, there was no common vision for the nature 

of the various layers of governance from the local to the national level and how those 

layers would relate to one another. For most of the occupation, various actors lacked a 

shared vision or set of objectives or timelines. 

In a sense, the coalition military’s effort to establish local councils and to create 

democracy on the ground was a success story. In a number of cases, however, commanders inadvertently appointed individuals with questionable backgrounds or scruples, 

which undermined the credibility of the councils. Military commanders were operating in 

an unfamiliar environment and freelancing to meet their immediate goal of establishing 

security. To do this, commanders required a means for discerning the immediate needs 

of the community, locating insurgents, and recruiting Iraqi workers for reconstruction 

projects. An alternate set of goals—education on democratic principles and the development of transparent leadership—came into play when the process of establishing local 

government was taken over by civilians. 

Increasing the Capacity of Civilian Agencies

U.S. government civilian agencies need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out 

operations. This requires developing interagency planning expertise, having access to greater 

logistical and transportation resources, and creating personnel systems to ensure that there 

are sufficient trained and qualified personnel to be part of any effort. 

Even if planners had correctly anticipated the difficulty of establishing stability and governance in postwar Iraq, there is simply no capacity in U.S. civilian government agencies to 

mobilize large numbers of the right people quickly. One source of tension (and there were 

many) between the military and the CPA stemmed from the utter mismatch in capabilities. 

The CPA was the ultimate authority in the land and charged with rebuilding the country, but 

it had a staff, at its peak, of no more than five thousand people (70 percent of its planned 

target). Further, the organization was composed of a pickup team, and it underwent enormous turnover; it was not unusual for CPA employees to stay in Iraq for only a month. 

It was not until late fall 2003 that the CPA had a coordinator in every province in the 

country. The CPA’s provincial staffs were small—sometimes just a half-dozen people—while 

the military had between 130,000 and 150,000 people in the country to interface with 

Iraqis, dig wells, refurbish buildings, hand out school supplies, and establish local government councils. The occupation authority was known derisively in military circles as “Can’t 

Provide Anything.” Faced with civilian implementation, military commanders wondered 

aloud, “Isn’t this something the CPA should be doing?” 

The enormity of the tasks facing the CPA simply overwhelmed its small staff. Innumerable problems were never addressed for lack of time, including critical oversight of activities 

outside of Baghdad. Even when CPA coordinators arrived in the provinces, they were largely 

on their own, working with military counterparts and with little real connection to headquarters in Baghdad. This significantly hampered the CPA’s ability to link local and national 

government structures. As the CPA was invented on the fly and continued to reinvent itself 

over time, it was known to be bureaucratic, ponderous, and slow. This was particularly true 

when it came to providing funds for projects. This further undermined its credibility, giving 

it a reputation for lack of follow-through. Frustrated military commanders gave up working 

with the CPA and used CERP funds for small projects just to get them started. 

Streamlined Administrative Structures

U.S. government agencies and other organizations involved in building governance 

structures should develop financial systems that allow them to get money moving 

quickly. Those working with indigenous governing bodies should leverage reconstrucOne source of tension between 

the military and the CPA 

stemmed from the utter

 mismatch in capabilities. 

10

In a sense, the coalition 

military’s effort to establish 

local councils and to create 

democracy on the ground 

was a success story.

The occupation authority was 

known derisively in military

circles as “Can’t Provide 

Anything.”

The enormity of the tasks facing 

the CPA simply overwhelmed 

its small staff. 
tion dollars to empower local officials by allowing them to deliver real improvements 

in the lives of the population. If promised projects are not delivered rapidly to suffering publics, this undermines the credibility not only of the occupying authority but 

also of the emerging indigenous leadership whose credibility hinges on its ability to 

make things happen.

Though attempts were made to streamline contracting procedures, the CPA was maddeningly slow in delivering funding for projects. Reconstruction efforts that would have 

delivered vital goods and services to Iraqis remained in limbo, waiting endlessly for 

funding. Failure to deliver timely—and promised—improvements in the lives of ordinary 

citizens undermined the credibility of both the CPA and Iraqi officials. Military commanders were successful in building credibility among the population because they were able 

to use CERP funds to make quick improvements. In many cases, regional CPA coordinators 

turned to the military for CERP funds, knowing how long it would take to get money from 

the CPA. 

Mechanisms for ensuring the responsible disposition of funds are essential, but transporting Pentagon contracting procedures to Iraq was counterproductive. Streamlined 

accounting systems should be designed in advance to ensure the timely delivery of goods, 

services, and reconstruction projects.

Rebuilding Civil Society

Building democratic structures requires understanding the cultural and historical context of 

the country. People with no experience with civil society or democracy often have enthusiasm but lack knowledge of processes that will ensure fairness and transparency. Furthermore, 

populations formerly dominated by dictatorial regimes may lack the personal initiative and 

responsibility required to embrace democratic institutions and to quickly become functioning 

members of society. Establishing democracy requires more than just setting up structures 

and institutions—the skeleton of a democratic government. It also requires training initiatives, long-term mentoring programs, and institutional capacity-building measures.

Under Saddam, Iraqis learned to seek official approval for virtually everything. Individual 

initiative under the Ba’ath regime could get one killed. In one region, a battalion commander had trouble getting Iraqis to do things without something in writing. Lacking an 

official seal, he began using a “no slack” battalion stamp on documents. He found that 

once the Iraqis had a stamped document in hand, they could move around the region 

and get things done. 

CPA officials discovered that Iraqis had been so downtrodden and terrified, individual 

initiative was almost totally lacking. Because Saddam had effectively stamped out civil 

society, Iraqis did not understand the concept of volunteering for community service. 

The mushrooming of local government structures, for all of its problems, was one of the 

success stories of the occupation. Iraqis leaped at the opportunity to be part of new 

neighborhood, city, district, and provincial councils. Once there, however, they did not 

know what to do. 

Area specialists can be of great assistance by designing structures that are likely to 

be accepted by local populations and easily integrated into the existing culture. They are 

also critical in the execution stage, particularly those with language skills. Additionally, 

attempts should be made to break certain local habits. For example, when Iraqis completed job applications, they often provided their ethnic background and religious sect, 

an undemocratic practice the CPA wished to discourage. Taking local practices and culture 

into account can smooth the transition toward democracy.

11

Though attempts were made to 

streamline contracting procedures, the CPA was maddeningly 

slow in delivering funding for 

projects. 

Transporting Pentagon contracting procedures to Iraq was

counterproductive. 

CPA officials discovered that 

Iraqis had been so downtrodden 

and terrified, individual initiative was almost totally lacking.
Conclusion

President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously said that “plans are nothing; planning is 

everything.” The original U.S. plan for establishing an Iraqi government could not be 

implemented after the bureaucratic and administrative structures collapsed and looting destroyed government ministries. Further, the lack of accurate information about 

the state of Iraqi society and infrastructure led to overly optimistic projections. Prior to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was substantial evidence, however, that looting was typical in immediate postwar environments. It would have been useful if coalition planners 

had anticipated such an outcome and devised a contingency plan. Even if this plan had 

proven imperfect, the process of planning would have better prepared the coalition for 

establishing governing structures. The coalition’s efforts to establish democratic governing structures in Iraq were marked by ad hoc approaches, reversals, course corrections, 

and playing catch-up. In the future, the United States will be involved in assisting other 

nations establish or strengthen democratic governance. Success will be more likely if we 

are able to “operationalize” what we learned in Iraq. 

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to Iraq and postconflict governance.

Recent Institute reports include:

• The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: 

Lessons Identified (Special Report, April 2005)

• The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified (Special Report, April 2005)

• Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country's Future (Special Report, 

February 2005)

• Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy (Special 

Report, May 2004)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of 

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832; 

fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Recent books from USIP Press include:

• Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction, by Colonel Garland 

H. Williams (2005)

• Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force, by Robert M. Perito (2004)

For book sales and order information, call (800) 868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or (703) 

661-1590, or fax (703) 661-1501.

An online edition of this report can be 

found at our website (www.usip.org), 

together with additional information 

on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

The lack of accurate information 

about the state of Iraqi society 

and infrastructure led to overly 

optimistic projections.