1

Filed 10/28/20 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

COUNTY OF SONOMA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES QUAIL,

Defendant;

U.S. BANK N.A., as Trustee, etc.,

Appellant;

CALIFORNIA RECEIVERSHIP 

GROUP, INC.,

Respondent.

A155837, A157245

(Sonoma County Super. Ct.

No. SCV256085)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

BY THE COURT:

It is ordered that the published opinion filed herein on October 8, 2020, 

be modified as follows:

The caption of the opinion should be modified to conform with the 

caption of this order.

On page 18, after the last paragraph in section B.i and immediately 

preceding section B.ii, insert the following language:

At oral argument and in its petition for rehearing, U.S. 

Bank emphasized the principle that a receiver “ ‘takes the 

property cum onere, in the plight and condition existing at the 

time of [the receiver’s] appointment, subject to all liens and 
2

equities.’ ” (Wright v. Standard Engineering Corp. (1972) 28 

Cal.App.3d 244, 248.) While we agree with this general 

proposition, we fail to see how it limits a court’s power to 

authorize super-priority borrowing in an appropriate case as 

recognized by Title Ins. & Trust. The receivership in this matter 

did not arise out of a private dispute between competing 

lienholders with purely monetary interests in the property, a fact 

U.S. Bank largely ignores. Rather, as noted above, the purpose of 

a section 17980.7 receivership “is to protect the health and safety 

of residents who might be substantially endangered by unsafe 

building conditions.” (Jen, supra, 135 Ca1.App.4th at p. 311.) 

The power of a court of equity to issue certificates of indebtedness 

on a priority basis has long been recognized at common law 

where the receivership addresses matters of public concern. (See, 

e.g., Clifford v. West Hartford Creamery Co. (Vt. 1931) [153 

A. 205, 209] [explaining that authority for super-priority 

borrowing exists in a railroad receivership because “the 

maintenance of the roadway and equipment and the continuation 

of the business and operation of the road are essential, not only to 

the preservation of the mortgage securities, but also to the 

welfare and comfort of the general public,” citing Wallace v. 

Loomis (1878) 97 U.S. 146, 162]; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois 

Midland Ry. Co. (1886) 117 U.S. 434, 455–456 [confirming 

authority of railroad receiver to issue certificates with priority 

over other lienholders and explaining that because a railroad “is 

a matter of public concern,” the court has the power “to make 

such repairs as are necessary to keep the road and its structures 

in a safe and proper condition to serve the public. Its power to do 

this does not depend on consent, nor on prior notice. Consent is 

desirable, but is seldom practicable, where the debts exceed the 

value of the property.”].) 

Finally, we reject U.S. Bank’s suggestion that the priority 

of its lien could not be impacted in these proceedings because it is 

not a formal party and did not consent to the subordination of its 

interests. U.S. Bank was notified that a receivership was being 

sought, appeared at the hearing on the receivership petition, did 

not object to the appointment of a receiver, and did not appeal 

from the appointment order. Thus, even if its consent were 

required—a question we need not decide—substantial evidence 

supports the conclusion that U.S. Bank acquiesced in the 
3

receivership proceedings below. (See Schreiber v. Ditch Road 

Investors (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 675, 679 [“where a receiver is 

lawfully appointed at the instance and for the benefit of lien 

creditors, all proper charges, expenses, and liabilities incurred as 

incident to duly conferred receivership powers and duties are a 

charge on the earnings and corpus of the property superior to the 

lien creditors, who take part in, or expressly or impliedly consent 

to, or acquiesce in, the receivership proceedings” (italics added)].)

On page 26, after the first full paragraph, add a footnote, which will 

read:

In its petition for rehearing, U.S. Bank suggests that we 

incorrectly rely on the bill author’s May 1990 statement quoted 

above to explain the later June 1990 amendment which replaced 

the term “judgment lien” with “lien.” That is incorrect. Indeed, 

U.S. Bank appears to misapprehend the purpose of our review of 

the legislative history in this matter. By expressly granting a 

section 17980.7 receiver the broad powers of a Code of Civil 

Procedure section 564 receiver and permitting borrowing secured 

by an unspecified lien with court approval, section 17980.7 on its 

face allows for super-priority borrowing in an appropriate case. 

We surveyed the legislative history to determine if it contained a 

clear statement of legislative intent contrary to this apparent 

meaning. Since the legislative history is, at best, equivocal on 

this question, it does not support U.S. Bank’s claim that the 

Legislature clearly intended to foreclose super-priority borrowing 

under both receivership statutes. In short, U.S. Bank needed a 

smoking gun to prevail on its claim. It failed to uncover one.

This modification does not change the judgment.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

Dated: ___________________________

Humes, P. J.
1

Filed 10/8/20 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

COUNTY OF SONOMA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

U.S. BANK N.A., as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

CALIFORNIA RECEIVERSHIP 

GROUP, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A155837

 (Sonoma County Super. Ct.

 No. SCV256085)

COUNTY OF SONOMA,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. BANK N.A., as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

CALIFORNIA RECEIVERSHIP 

GROUP, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A157245

 (Sonoma County Super. Ct.

 No. SCV256085)

After many unsuccessful attempts by the County of Sonoma (County) to 

compel James Quail to abate numerous hazardous and substandard 

conditions on his real property, the County sought and obtained the 
2

appointment of a receiver pursuant to Health and Safety Code1 section 

17980.7 and Code of Civil Procedure section 564 to oversee the necessary 

abatement work. In these consolidated appeals, U.S. Bank National 

Association, as Trustee, Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, 

Series 2007-2 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-2 (U.S. Bank), 

challenges the superior court’s order authorizing the receiver to finance its 

rehabilitation efforts through a loan secured by a “super-priority” lien on the 

property. U.S. Bank also challenges the court’s subsequent order authorizing 

sale of the property free and clear of U.S. Bank’s lien. 

It has long been recognized that trial courts enjoy broad discretion in 

matters subject to a receivership, including the power to issue a receiver’s 

certificate with priority over preexisting liens when circumstances warrant 

this extraordinary step. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in subordinating U.S. Bank’s lien and confirming the sale of the 

property free and clear of all liens so that the receiver could remediate the 

nuisance conditions on the property promptly and effectively. However, the 

court’s order prioritizing the County’s enforcement fees and costs on equal 

footing with the receiver finds no basis in the receivership statutes. We 

therefore affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for a 

determination of the sale distribution consistent with this opinion. 

I. FACTUAL AND 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Failure to Remediate Hazardous Conditions on Property

Quail was the owner of a 47,480-square-foot lot with two houses, large 

garages, and several outbuildings in an unincorporated area of Sonoma 

1 All statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless 

otherwise specified. 
3

County. The property came to the County’s attention in May 2013 when an 

inspection of one of its seven structures revealed hazardous and unpermitted 

electrical wiring, hazardous decking and stairs, unpermitted kitchens and 

plumbing, broken windows, and lack of power. In December 2013, this 

structure was destroyed in a fire and two large outbuildings, unlawfully 

being used as residential dwellings, were also damaged. One report 

described the conditions on the property as follows:

“The [p]roperty . . . exists as a makeshift, illegal mobile home park and 

junkyard. The list of unaddressed violations is extensive, and includes 

substandard building conditions, substantial fire damage and risk, and a 

massive accumulation of junk and debris throughout the homes and exterior 

of the [p]roperty. There are multiple motorhomes, trailers and other vehicles 

that are not currently registered and many of these are in very poor shape. 

The property consists of six buildings. In total, there are three dwelling-like 

units: one fire-damaged barn and two houses, each of these homes with 

occupants and multiple illegal and unsanitary living conditions. One of the 

buildings is being occupied by one James Quail and is a legal albeit 

non-conforming structure with four bedrooms and two bathrooms, that would 

require significant work to get it up to code. Another structure is being 

unlawfully occupied by a family, including several young children. . . . There 

is an additional motorhome and other trailers with occupants inside. The 

exterior of the [p]roperty alone has approximately 150 yards of debris, and 

the amount of debris inside of the structures (not counting trailers and motor 

homes) equates to a similar amount. There is an illegal homeless 

encampment across the street in a field that has been problematic to the 

[p]roperty, which occupants both relay concern over but simultaneously seem 

to involve themselves with.” 
4

Multiple attempts by the County to gain access to the property for a full 

inspection were unsuccessful. In December 2013, the County issued two 

notices and orders for substandard buildings, notifying Quail that the 

buildings were not to be occupied and directing him to obtain permits either 

to bring the buildings up to code or to remove them. After Quail continued to 

deny access to the property, the County filed an ex parte request for an 

inspection warrant. In support of its request, the County noted that the 

sheriff’s department had responded to 412 “events” concerning the property 

from 2008 to 2014, including suspicious persons, warrant attempts, and other 

disturbances. The fire department had responded to the property over 30 

times on calls for medical aid. An inspection warrant was issued in July 

2014. The resulting inspection revealed a litany of code violations and 

hazardous conditions. 

In September 2014, the County filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the 

code violations and abate the public nuisances on the property. The parties 

entered a stipulated judgment in December 2014 in which Quail was 

permanently enjoined from maintaining violations of the County’s building, 

fire, and zoning codes on the property. He was ordered to abate all violations 

on the property within 90 days. 

Quail failed to abide by the terms of the stipulated judgment. 

Following inspections in January and February 2017, the County sent letters 

requesting abatement of violations. When the County reinspected the 

property in June 2017, not only had the violations set forth in the stipulated 

judgment not been abated, but the County found more occupied trailers and 

recreational vehicles and more individuals living in uninhabitable structures 

that had been ordered vacated. Given these dire circumstances, the County 

notified Quail—with copies to U.S. Bank, its loan servicer, and all other 
5

lienholders on the property—of its intent to seek a court-appointed receiver to 

oversee the necessary abatement work on the property and to “record a lien 

against the [p]roperty for the amount of those clean-up efforts” if Quail was 

unable to pay them. (Italics and bolding omitted.) 

B. Appointment of Receiver and Request for Super-priority Lien

Over the next five months, the County received no response from any of 

the noticed parties. The property’s substandard buildings, unlawful and 

hazardous constructions, unlawful occupancies, fire hazards, and 

accumulation of junk, garbage, and debris had been left unattended. Finding 

an “urgent need” to abate the extensive code violations on the property, the 

County filed a petition in Sonoma County Superior Court in November 2017 

seeking appointment of a receiver under the authority of both section 17980.7 

and Code of Civil Procedure section 564. The petition sought authorization 

for the receiver to finance the necessary repairs and clean-up with a loan 

secured by a lien with priority over all other previously recorded liens on the 

property—i.e., a “super-priority lien.” The petition requested permission for a 

receiver’s certificate of $30,000 with first priority to cover the initial costs of 

securing the property and beginning the remediation process. And it asked 

that all receiver and County fees and expenses also be granted super-priority 

status, to be paid first out of any proceeds from sale. Copies of the pleadings 

and all supporting materials were served on U.S. Bank in early January 

2018. 

On January 19, 2018, the trial court granted the County’s petition for 

appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 17980.7, subdivision (c), and 

Code of Civil Procedure section 564. The court found that the property was in 

a condition which substantially endangered the health and safety of the 

public. The order authorized the receiver to exercise the powers granted to 
6

receivers by section 17980.7, subdivision (c)(4), and Code of Civil Procedure 

section 568. It authorized the receiver to borrow funds to finance the 

necessary remediation on the property and to fund a $30,000 receivership 

certificate to cover initial costs. The order further provided that the County 

was entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs and that such enforcement 

fees would be given the same priority as those of the receiver. The court 

denied, however, the County’s request to issue the receiver’s certificate on a 

super-priority basis.2 No appeal was taken from the appointment order.

In May 2018, the receiver filed a motion requesting authorization to 

obtain a receiver’s certificate in the amount of $115,000, secured by a superpriority lien, to ameliorate the nuisance conditions on the property. 

According to the receiver, he had attempted to negotiate a resolution with the 

owners and occupants of the property, as well as with U.S. Bank to foreclose 

on the property, to no avail. The receiver came to the conclusion that the 

occupants would not vacate and U.S. Bank would not foreclose.3 Moreover, 

the receiver was unable to obtain financing to carry out the abatement work 

because no lender would fund the $30,000 receiver’s certificate authorized by 

the court on a nonpriority basis, given the amount of debt already secured by 

the property. 

The receiver’s motion laid out three possible options for remediation of 

the property. The receiver recommended an intermediate option in which the 

junkyard conditions would be removed, the most damaged structure on the 

2 U.S. Bank had appeared at the hearing and objected only to the court 

issuing a super-priority receiver’s certificate. It did not object to the 

appointment of a receiver. 

3 Notices of default and sale had been issued against the property in 

2012, 2013, and 2016, but no lienholder, including U.S. Bank, had exercised 

its right of foreclosure. 
7

property demolished, the current occupants relocated, and the property sold 

as-is to a buyer with the resources to complete the remaining remediation.

The receiver estimated clean-up and demolition costs of approximately 

$46,000, and relocation costs and security of an additional $15,000. What 

remained would fund the receiver’s fees and other costs. The receiver 

informally estimated the market value of the property after partial 

remediation to be $249,000, and therefore the property would have sufficient 

equity to fund the intermediate option. However, since there were several 

existing liens on the property—including U.S. Bank’s recorded lien for 

approximately $663,000—no lender would fund the necessary receiver’s 

certificate without being granted priority status. 

A second option—complete demolition of all structures and sale of the 

property as a vacant lot with an estimated value of $250,000—was disfavored 

because it would cost more to complete the demolition and would remove 

potentially salvageable homes from the housing stock available to 

fire-damaged victims in the County.4 A third option allowing for complete 

remediation of all substandard conditions would result in an estimated 

market value of $450,000, but would substantially increase both demolition 

and remediation costs. This option appeared to be economically infeasible 

due to low property values in the area and a lack of lenders willing to fund at 

this level. The receiver believed the intermediate option would result in the 

best outcome for the parties and the community as it would address the 

nuisance conditions quickly and enable the property to be put back into use 

in an efficient manner. 

4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the fact that the 

Sonoma County wildfires occurred in October 2017. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 

subd. (h), 459, subd. (a).) 
8

U.S. Bank opposed the receiver’s motion, arguing that there was no 

statutory authority for issuance of a priority certificate and that granting a 

super-priority lien would be inequitable. U.S. Bank also asserted that the 

motion was premature and argued that a formal appraisal of the property’s 

value was needed before a determination could be made about the superpriority status of the receiver’s lien. 

At the June 2018 hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated that 

although it had the ability to authorize a super-priority lien, it needed more 

information before doing so. The County expressed concern that the property 

had remained in such horrible condition for years and emphasized that U.S.

Bank had refused to do anything to help clean it up. U.S. Bank suggested 

that any necessary remediation be financed by the County or Quail. The 

receiver responded that it had explored other options for funding, but there 

were no public funds or nonprofit monies available. After hearing, the court 

authorized a receiver certificate in the amount of $115,000, but denied 

without prejudice the request to give the certificate priority over existing 

lienholders. U.S. Bank was ordered to obtain an appraisal and file it with the 

court prior to the next hearing in September 2018. 

U.S. Bank did not file the appraisal as ordered. At the September 21, 

2018 hearing, the receiver reported that the appraiser had just recently been 

to the property. The receiver submitted pictures showing the continuing 

nuisance conditions on the site and explained that although he had sent 

letters requesting that the occupants vacate the uninhabitable structures, the 

receiver had no resources to enforce removal or enable relocation. The 

County reiterated its concerns regarding the ongoing health and safety issues 

on the property. The trial court stated it was very concerned about conditions 

on the property and did not intend “to delay this matter one minute further.” 
9

At U.S. Bank’s request, the court allowed a short continuance to October 5, 

2018. 

C. Order Authorizing a Receiver’s Certificate on a Priority Basis

In advance of the October 2018 hearing, U.S. Bank notified the court 

that the property had been appraised at $400,000. It requested permission to 

foreclose on the property and either retain possession and repair the property 

itself or sell the property as-is to a buyer who would remediate the existing 

code violations. At the hearing, the court stated that the condition of the 

property was unacceptable and that it “absolutely intend[ed] to move forward 

with action necessary to abate this condition.” The County objected to U.S. 

Bank’s proposal, fearing that U.S. Bank would not itself remedy the situation 

and might do a short sale to a party who would likewise fail to remediate the 

nuisance conditions. The receiver continued supporting its proposal as 

outlined in its May motion and report. He observed that U.S. Bank had 

failed to foreclose despite multiple default and foreclosure notices filed on the 

property. U.S. Bank explained that it had not foreclosed previously because 

several different bankruptcies had listed the property, requiring it to seek 

relief repeatedly from the automatic stay. It claimed it now wanted to 

foreclose, evict, bring the property up to code, and sell it. For his part, Quail 

maintained that he had control of the property, having lived there for 50 

years, and that there were no problems on it. 

The court remarked that the matter had not “been moved along in a 

reasonable manner” and had reached a stalemate because of “inactions” and 

the absence of funds. Although it agreed that the receiver’s request should 

not be done lightly, it granted the motion “based on the nature of this 

property, based on the nature of the current status, based on the history of 

the inability of the proper authorities[, and] based on previous Court rulings 

that were made months ago, if not longer.” On October 10, 2018, the court 
10

issued an order authorizing the receiver to obtain a receiver’s certificate in 

the amount of $115,000, secured by a super-priority lien, to finance the 

necessary rehabilitation of the property. U.S. Bank appealed from this order. 

The receiver filed its second report in advance of the December 2018 

status conference. After a lengthy and complicated process, the receiver 

reported that all residents on the property, including Quail, had been 

relocated or otherwise removed. In January 2019, the receiver reported that 

the demolition work had been completed, all buildings had been secured, and 

the property had been placed on the market, receiving several offers above 

the list price of $249,000. 

D. Order Confirming the Sale of the Property 

Prior to the February 2019 status conference, the receiver 

recommended that the court authorize sale of the property to a group of 

buyers, including a neighbor, for $315,000, the highest and best of five offers. 

According to the receiver, no one in the proposed buyer group had a history of 

code violations or other issues which might call into question their ability to 

finish the necessary remediation of the property, and the neighbor, in fact, 

had purchased the adjoining property from Quail 25 years before and 

successfully corrected the violations there. The receiver provided the listing 

agreement and sales contract to the court and asked it to confirm the sale. 

Given the lack of financial resources available from Quail5 or the property, 

the receiver saw no other option than to sell the property as-is with the 

assurance from the buyer that the remaining nuisance abatement work 

would be completed post sale. Since there was no way to pay off all of the 

liens on the property (which approached $1 million), the receiver requested 

5 The receiver had paid for a series of motels for Quail to assist in his 

relocation after his removal from the property. Quail’s whereabouts at the 

time of the report were unknown. 
11

that all liens be stripped from the property to effectuate the sale and be 

attached to the proceeds for later review and distribution by the court. The 

court continued the matter so that the receiver’s request to confirm the sale 

could be formalized by noticed motion. 

After the motion to confirm sale was filed and briefed by the parties, 

the court heard argument on April 12, 2019. In rendering its decision, the 

court emphasized the long history of the substandard conditions on the 

property, concluding that the property had “finally reached a stage, through 

the efforts of the Receiver and the County and others, to be in a position 

where, finally, it can be marketed for sale and to abate the numerous, 

ongoing nuisances and problems with the property.” 

The court observed that after initially denying the receiver a priority 

lien, it granted the request because of the ongoing substandard conditions 

and the inability of the receiver to “move forward in a meaningful manner to 

address the problems.” It noted that U.S. Bank was aware throughout the 

pendency of the matter of these problems and had opportunities at various 

points to act. Given “really what is an infamous history of this property and 

historic litigation,” the court found the sale of the property proper. Moreover, 

the court found that the receiver had been systematic in the manner in which 

he listed and marketed the property, while U.S. Bank had supplied nothing 

concrete to contradict the receiver’s efforts. 

On April 19, 2019, the court issued its order confirming the sale of the 

property as proposed by the receiver, free and clear of all liens and 

encumbrances. The order directed that unsatisfied liens on the property 

would attach to the sale proceeds. The receiver was authorized “to pay the

outstanding receivership fees and costs, including the County of Sonoma’s 

demand for fees and costs” per the terms of the January 2018 order 
12

appointing the receiver. All remaining sale proceeds were to be held by the 

receiver pending a court determination regarding appropriate distribution. 

Potential claimants were directed to submit their claim for funds to the 

receiver within 30 days. 

We granted U.S. Bank’s petition for a writ of supersedeas, staying the 

distribution of all proceeds from the sale of the property pending resolution of 

this appeal. The Bank then filed a second appeal from the sale order, and we 

consolidated both matters for argument and decision.6 In February 2020, we 

granted the request of Bay Area Receivership Group to file an amicus brief in 

this matter, supporting the actions of the trial court. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

U.S. Bank raises several issues involving statutory construction, which 

we review de novo. (Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc. v. D & M Cabinets

(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 59, 66 (D & M Cabinets); see City of Desert Hot 

Springs v. Valenti (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 788, 793 [“Our determination of the 

proper scope of the trial court’s authority and inquiry under section

17980.7(c) is a matter of statutory construction we review de novo.”].) 

However, “[m]ost matters related to receiverships rest in the sound discretion 

of the trial court” and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that 

discretion. (City of Sierra Madre v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (2019) 

6 In their initial briefing, the parties disputed whether the trial court’s 

order subordinating U.S. Bank’s lien was appealable under the collateral 

order doctrine. (See Koshak v. Malek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1545.) In 

light of U.S. Bank’s second appeal from the court’s order confirming sale and 

our consolidation of both appeals, there appears to be no dispute that the 

entire matter is now properly before us for review. (See Fish v. Fish (1932) 

216 Cal. 14, 16 [order to pay a receiver’s fees and sell property constitutes a 

collateral, appealable order].) 
13

32 Cal.App.5th 648, 657–658, 660 (SunTrust); City of Santa Monica v. 

Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 931 (Gonzalez) [court ruling on receivership 

matters typically “afforded considerable deference on review”].) “Such 

deference is the rule, even where the court confirms extraordinary action by 

the receiver, such as a sale of real property.” (Gonzalez, at p. 931.) 

As summarized by our high court, court orders in receivership 

proceedings rest “upon the court’s ‘sound discretion exercised in view of all

the surrounding facts and circumstances and in the interest of fairness,

justice and the rights of the respective parties. [Citation.] The proper

exercise of discretion requires the court to consider all material facts and

evidence and to apply legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent,

and just decision. [Citation.] Our view of the facts must be in the light most

favorable to the order and we must refrain from exercising our judgment

retrospectively.’ [Citations.] Where there is no evidence of fraud, unfairness,

or oppression, the court has wide discretion in approving the receiver’s

proposed actions.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 931.)

B. Trial Courts May Issue Receivership Certificates with Priority 

Over All Other Liens in Appropriate Circumstances

Section 17980.7 authorizes the judicial appointment of a receiver in 

situations where substandard conditions on a property substantially 

endanger the health and safety of the public, and the property owner has 

been unable or unwilling to remediate those conditions. The law permits the 

appointment of a receiver to assume control of the property and abate the 

nuisance conditions or to take other appropriate actions as may be authorized 

by the court. (§§ 17980.6, 17980.7; Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 912.) 

U.S. Bank argues that this remedial statute does not authorize the 

court to issue a super-priority lien to fund the receiver’s remediation efforts. 

According to U.S. Bank, lien priority is a creature of statute and the statutory 
14

language of section 17980.7, when read as a whole, supports the conclusion 

that the Legislature intended the ordinary rules of lien priority to apply. 

(See Civ. Code, § 2897 [“Other things being equal, different liens upon the 

same property have priority according to the time of their creation.”) Thus,

U.S. Bank contends, the trial court erred when it granted the receiver’s

request to borrow funds on a super-priority basis, thereby displacing U.S. 

Bank as senior lienholder. 

U.S. Bank’s arguments miss the mark for two reasons. First, 

U.S. Bank ignores that the receiver was appointed here under both section 

17980.7 and Code of Civil Procedure section 564, the general receivership 

statute. Under well-established principles, trial courts enjoy broad discretion 

in matters subject to a receivership, including the power to issue receiver’s 

certificates with priority over preexisting liens. Second, as we address in 

section B.ii. post, section 17980.7 is consistent with this established authority

and nothing about its statutory language or legislative history suggests that 

the Legislature intended to circumscribe the traditional powers of a 

receivership recognized under Code of Civil Procedure section 568. 

i. Traditional Authority Vested in a Receivership Includes 

the Power to Issue Certificates with First Priority 

A receiver is an officer and agent of the appointing court and is under 

the direct control and supervision of the court. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th 

at p. 930; see SunTrust, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 656 [“a receiver only has 

those powers granted to it by statute or an order of the court”].) The receiver 

is not an agent of any particular party but rather acts for the benefit of all 

parties interested in the property. (City of Chula Vista v. Gutierrez (2012) 

207 Cal.App.4th 681, 685; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1179(a).) 

“Section 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure—first enacted in 1872—

gives a receiver appointed under section 564 very broad powers.” (SunTrust,
15

supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 659.) Specifically, “[t]he receiver has, under the 

control of the court, power to bring and defend actions in his own name, as 

receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect 

debts, to compound for and compromise the same, to make transfers, and 

generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 568, italics added.) “Courts also have substantial 

discretion to authorize a receiver to borrow money to fund the preservation 

and management of property in the receivership estate, particularly where, 

as here, the estate does not produce income. In that circumstance, the 

receiver may ask the court to authorize the issuance of a receiver’s certificate 

to the lender as security for money loaned to the estate.” (SunTrust, at 

p. 657.) 

For over 100 years, these powers have been interpreted to include a 

court’s authority to fund a receivership on a super-priority basis in the 

appropriate circumstance. In Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California 

Development Co. (1915) 171 Cal. 227 (Title Ins. & Trust), the Supreme Court

affirmed a trial court’s decision authorizing receiver’s certificates with

priority over existing bonded indebtedness, stating that “there can be no 

question of the right of the court to give priority to certificates issued to 

enable the receiver to carry out the primary object of [the receiver’s]

appointment, viz., the care and preservation of the property.” (Id. at p. 231; 

see SunTrust, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 657, citing Title Ins. & Trust and 

quoting 12 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2018) § 41.12, p. 41-33

[“Receivership certificates are then issued as evidence of the indebtedness 

and become liens on the subject property when issued under the direction and 

control of the court, usually with priority over all other liens, including 

preexisting liens.”].) Decisions regarding the issuance and priority of 
16

receiver’s certificates are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

(Title Ins. & Trust Co., at p. 233; see ibid. [the trial court, “upon a 

consideration of all the facts, determined that the certificates should 

equitably be given priority over the bonds, and we think its conclusion should 

not be interfered with”]; 12 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, at

pp. 41-33 to 41-34 [“Whether receiver’s certificates should be issued, and 

whether those certificates when issued should be given priority over the other 

indebtedness already of record against the property, are decisions that rest 

largely in the discretion of the court.”].) 

U.S. Bank’s attempts to distinguish Title Ins. & Trust are unavailing. 

It argues that the case strictly limits the use of receiver’s certificates with 

priority over other liens to expenditures required for the “necessary care and 

preservation” of receivership property, and that such certificates are 

therefore inappropriate in the context of a section 17980.7 receivership, 

which by statutory design exists solely to improve property through the 

remediation of existing code violations. We have little difficulty concluding, 

however, that a receiver’s efforts pursuant to section 17980.7 to ameliorate 

property conditions which substantially endanger public health and safety—

the “primary object” of the receiver’s appointment—are taken as part of the 

“necessary care and preservation” of the receivership property. Similarly 

unpersuasive is U.S. Bank’s claim that Title Ins. & Trust is limited by its 

facts to situations where a majority of existing lienholders request the 

receivership and agree to subordinate their interests to fund it. Nothing in 

the Supreme Court’s analysis makes such facts necessary or controlling. At 

most, specifics regarding the creation of the receivership were among “all the 

facts” that were considered by the trial court in the exercise of its broad 

discretion. (Title Ins. & Trust, supra, 171 Cal. at p. 233.)
17

Indeed, the Second District recently followed Title Ins. & Trust under

facts strikingly similar to the present case. (See SunTrust, supra, 

32 Cal.App.5th 648.) Like the instant action, SunTrust involved the

appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 17980.7 and Code of Civil

Procedure section 564 to undertake remediation of a residential property

after the owners refused to abate existing nuisance conditions. (SunTrust, at

pp. 651–652, 658.) As here, the senior lienholder (SunTrust) did not

challenge the appointment of the receiver but objected only when the receiver

proposed to borrow $250,000 on a super-priority basis to fund the

remediation. (Id. at p. 652.) The receiver argued that because there was

insufficient equity in the property, no lender would loan funds to the receiver

unless the indebtedness was given priority over all preexisting liens. (Id. at

pp. 654–655.) The trial court granted the receiver’s request. (Id. at p. 655.)

On appeal, SunTrust argued that no statute allows the issuance of a

super-priority lien, pointing to the absence of any provision in section 17980.7

expressly authorizing such a funding mechanism. (SunTrust, supra,

32 Cal.App.5th at p. 658.) The appellate court concluded, however, that it

was “unnecessary to engage in a lengthy statutory analysis of [section

17980.7] because . . . the receiver was also appointed under Code of Civil

Procedure section 564.” (SunTrust, at p. 659.) Citing Title Ins. & Trust and

the broad language of Code of Civil Procedure section 564, the appellate court

concluded that this authority allowed a receiver to issue a super-priority lien

“in appropriate circumstances.” (SunTrust, at p. 659.) 

Although the SunTrust court acknowledged that “the use of superpriority liens should be infrequent because the disturbance of preexisting

liens may bring harsh consequences” (SunTrust supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at

p. 568), it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
18

authorizing super-priority borrowing under the circumstances presented. (Id.

at pp. 660–661.) The court pointed out that after the property owners refused

to abate the nuisance conditions, SunTrust chose not to take any action

against them, despite the fact that the owners were clearly in breach of their

deed of trust. (Id. at p. 660.) Because neither the owners nor SunTrust were

willing to fund the costly remediation and the property did not produce

income, no lender would finance the receiver’s remediation efforts except on a

super-priority basis. (Ibid.) Finally, in rejecting SunTrust’s contention that

its interest in the property was inequitably displaced, the court observed that

SunTrust’s lien was nearly worthless because the costs of remediation

exceeded the value of the unimproved land. It concluded that SunTrust’s

suggestion—that it should remain the senior lienholder and “benefit from the

increased property value provided by the remediation while bearing none of

the cost”—was “simply untenable.” (Id. at p. 661.)

We agree with SunTrust that the trial court may exercise its broad

discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 568 and Title Ins. & Trust to

authorize the issuance of a receiver’s certificate with priority over all

preexisting liens to fund the preservation and management of property in the

receivership estate. This authority applies equally to receiverships appointed

in parallel with section 17980.7 to remediate property conditions which 

substantially endanger the health and safety of the public.

ii. Section 17980.7 Does Not Circumscribe or Displace the

Traditional Powers of a Receivership

U.S. Bank faults the SunTrust court for failing to examine the

statutory language and legislative history of section 17980.7 and the broader

statutory scheme giving local governments many options for addressing

nuisance properties. It contends that the Legislature, by enacting section

17980.7, intended both to prohibit the use of super-priority liens and to
19

occupy the field with respect to these types of health and safety receiverships. 

Neither the language nor the legislative history of section 17980.7 supports

this view.7 

“The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the

intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.]

‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual 

and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity, then we presume 

the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language 

governs. [Citation.] If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we 

may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved 

and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumstances, we “ ‘select the

construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the

Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general

purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd

consequences.’ ” ’ ” (City and County of San Francisco v. Jen (2005)

135 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Jen).)

Sections 17980.6 and 17980.7 “compose a statutory scheme providing 

certain remedies to address substandard residential housing that is unsafe to 

occupy. Pursuant to section 17980.6, an enforcement agency may issue a 

notice to an owner to repair or abate property conditions that violate state or 

local building standards and substantially endanger the health and safety of 

7 In April 2019, we granted U.S. Bank’s request that we take judicial 

notice of selected portions of the legislative history for section 17980.7. On 

our own motion, we take judicial notice of the entire legislative history of 

Assembly Bill No. 3492 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 

subds. (a) & (c), 459; see Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 

1041, fn. 4, disapproved on another ground in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (Touchstone) (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 345, fn. 6.)
20

residents or the public. Section 17980.7 provides that, if the owner fails to 

comply with the notice despite having been afforded a reasonable opportunity 

to do so, the enforcement agency may seek judicial appointment of a receiver 

to assume control over the property and remediate the violations or take 

other appropriate action.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 912; accord City 

of Crescent City v. Reddy (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 458, 465–466.) “The obvious 

and stated purpose of section 17980.6 [and section 17980.7] is to protect the 

health and safety of residents who might be substantially endangered by 

unsafe building conditions.” (Jen, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.)

Subdivision (c)(4) of section 17980.7 enumerates a set of “powers and 

duties” that a receiver must follow in the “order of priority” listed “unless the 

court otherwise permits.” The receiver is empowered by statute to “take full 

and complete control of the substandard property”; to “manage the 

substandard building” and pay its operating expenses, taxes, insurance, 

utilities and debt servicing; to “secure cost estimates” and “enter into 

contracts” to abate the code violations; to “collect all rents and income” and to 

“use all rents and income from the substandard building to pay for the cost of 

rehabilitation and repairs”; and to “borrow funds to pay for repairs necessary 

to correct the conditions cited in the notice of violation and to borrow funds to 

pay for any relocation benefits authorized by paragraph (6) [of the statute].” 

(§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(A)-(G).) Moreover, “with court approval,” the receiver 

is authorized to “secure that debt and any moneys owed to the receiver for 

services performed pursuant to this section with a lien on the real property 

upon which the substandard building is located. The lien shall be recorded in 

the county recorder’s office in the county within which the building is 

located.” (§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(G).) 
21

U.S. Bank points out that section 17980.7 makes no mention of 

authorizing liens on a super-priority basis, and it notes that the law 

prioritizes paying “debt secured by an interest in the real property” 

(§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(B)) before borrowing funds and securing the debt with 

a lien on the real property (id., subd. (c)(4)(G)). “Far from showing an intent 

to allow receivers to extinguish the interests of secured creditors,” U.S. Bank 

contends, “the Legislature . . . affirmatively showed its intent to protect 

them.” We disagree. 

As discussed above, the primary object of a section 17980.7 receivership 

is to remediate code violations on a property that “are so extensive and of 

such a nature that the health and safety of residents or the public is 

substantially endangered” (§ 17980.6; see § 17980.7)—not to ensure that 

debt payments are not missed. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 912; Jen, 

supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.) While section 17980.7 generally directs 

that remediation expenses should first be paid out of the rents and income 

derived from the property before funds are borrowed, the statute expressly 

allows the receiver to proceed by another manner when “the court otherwise 

permits.” (§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(4).) This flexibility is further confirmed by 

section 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(H), which authorizes the receiver “[t]o exercise 

the powers granted to receivers under Section 568 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure.” By its own terms, section 17980.7 incorporates the traditional 

power of receivers “to do such acts respecting the property as the Court may 

authorize.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 568.) In sum, we do not read section 17980.7

to preclude the use of a super-priority lien when it is authorized by the trial

court in an appropriate circumstance.

The legislative history of section 17980.7 does not compel a different 

result. When first introduced as Assembly Bill No. 3492, the original draft 
22

provided an express procedure for super-priority borrowing by receivers. 

Specifically, before a receiver could borrow funds, the bill required the 

receiver to give existing lienholders the opportunity to increase their debt to 

pay for the necessary repairs or to foreclose. (See Assem. Bill No. 3492 (1989-

1990 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 3492) as introduced Feb. 28, 1990 at pp. 4–5.) 

The draft legislation further provided: “If the existing lienholders decide not 

to provide the funds for repair and if they choose not to foreclose their 

security, the receiver may borrow funds and secure the debt with an 

encumbrance on the real property upon which the substandard building is 

located which shall constitute a lien on that real property, superior to all 

prior liens and encumbrances, except taxes.” (Id. at p. 5.)

This language was later deleted after opposition from the California 

Bankers Association. (See Assembly Bill 3492, as amended Apr. 30, 1990 at 

pp. 5-6; see also Maurine C. Padden, Cal. Bankers Assn., letter to Chairman 

Dan Hauser, Assem. Housing and Community Development Comm., Apr. 11, 

1990.) U.S. Bank argues that this sequence of events evidences a legislative 

intent to disallow super-priority borrowing by section 17980.7 receivers. U.S. 

Bank omits an important part of the story. 

When Assembly Bill 3492 was amended to delete reference to superpriority borrowing, the relevant subsection of the statute was also amended 

to provide that receivers could secure debt only with court approval and only 

with a lien having “the force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien.” 

(Assembly Bill 3492 as amended Apr. 30, 1990, at p. 5.) Because a judgment 

lien is generally subject to the first-in-time rule of lien priority (Civ. Code,

§§ 2897, 2898; see Isaac v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 586,

600–601), the proposed amendment would not have allowed trial courts to

give receivership liens super-priority status. 
23

However, another amendment subsequently deleted the reference to 

judgment lien priority and required immediate service of any petition 

requesting appointment of a receiver on all persons with a recorded interest 

in the subject real property. (Assembly Bill 3492 as amended June 28, 1990 

at pp. 3–4.) This left the borrowing provision as it was ultimately enacted. 

(§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(G) [authorizing receiver to “borrow funds . . . and, 

with court approval, secure that debt and any moneys owed to the receiver for 

services performed pursuant to this section with a lien on the real property 

upon which the substandard building is located”].) 8 The removal of the 

specific authorization for super-priority borrowing from Assembly Bill 3492 

was explained by the author as follows: “I have added author’s amendments 

. . . to delete a first priority for a lien secured by a receiver. Such blanket 

authority may not be appropriate in certain cases, so the bill now specifies 

that any financing arrangement by a receiver would be subject to court 

approval.” (Assem. Comm. on Ways and Means, Author Hearing Notice for 

Assembly Bill 3492, May 6, 1990, at pp. 1–2.) 

This legislative history indicates that the Legislature did not foreclose

the use of super-priority liens to fund section 17980.7 receiverships, but 

rather intended any financing arrangement to be reviewed and approved by 

the court under the particular facts of each case and only after mandatory 

notice to all affected lienholders. The Civil Code defines “lien” generally as “a 

8 As enacted, Assembly Bill 3492 provided for service of a receivership 

petition on all persons with a record interest in the real property at least 

three days before the filing of any petition seeking a receivership. (See Stats. 

1990, ch. 1334, § 1, p. 5785.) Effective October 8, 2019, this requirement was 

amended to allow for notice by first class mail on all persons with a record 

interest, posting on the property, and service on the owner. (See § 17980.7, 

subd. (c); Stats. 2019, ch. 620, § 4 (Assem. Bill No. 957 (2019-2020 reg. sess.).)
24

charge imposed in some mode other than by a transfer in trust upon specific 

property by which it is made security for the performance of an act.” (Civ. 

Code, § 2872.) On the other hand, when the Legislature wants to treat a lien

like a judgment lien, it clearly knows how to do so. (See, e.g., Gov. Code,

§§ 25845, subds. (e), (g) [authorizing recordation of an abatement lien with

“the same priority as a judgment lien on real property”], 38773.1, subds. (a), 

(c) [authorizing nuisance abatement lien, which “from the date of recording 

shall have the force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien”] & 54988, 

subds. (a)(1), (c) [same].) 

That the Legislature chose to eliminate similar language from

Assembly Bill 3492, keeping the type of lien unspecified, argues in favor of a

construction which leaves lien priority in this context to the discretion of the

trial court. (See Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Assocs. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 507

[“ ‘ “It is a well recognized principle of statutory construction that when the 

Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has excluded it in 

another, it should not be implied where excluded.” ’ ”]; see also Campbell v. 

Zolin (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 489, 497 [“Ordinarily, where the Legislature uses 

a different word or phrase in one part of a statute than it does in other 

sections or in a similar statute concerning a related subject, it must be 

presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning.”].)9

9 U.S. Bank points to a statement in the Republican Analysis of 

Assembly Bill 3492 that “ ‘Senate amendments make any lien filed against 

the property a standard lien . . . so that it does not have priority over other 

loans.’ ” However, the full statement reads as follows: “Senate amendments 

make any lien filed against the property a standard lien, instead of a 

judgment lien, so that it does not have priority over other loans.” (Assem. 

Comm. on Housing and Community Development, Republican Analysis of 

Assembly Bill 3492, Aug. 29, 1990.) We disagree with this statement. As 

discussed above, the decision to omit how a receivership lien should be 
25

Our reading of the legislative history is further bolstered by the fact 

that, as enacted, section 17980.7 expressly authorizes section 17980.7 

receivers “[t]o exercise the powers granted to receivers under Section 568 of

the Code of Civil Procedure” (§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(H))—a statute that, as

discussed above, has long been interpreted to authorize the funding of a 

receivership on a super-priority basis in an appropriate case. (See Title Ins. 

& Trust, supra, 171 Cal. at p. 231.) “We do not presume that the Legislature

intends, when it enacts a statute, to overthrow long-established principles of

law unless such intention is clearly expressed or necessarily implied.” 

(People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199.) Thus,

nothing in the text or legislative history of section 17980.7 suggests an intent

by the Legislature to circumscribe or displace the traditional powers of a

receiver appointed under Code of Civil Procedure section 564. 

On the contrary, legislative committee reports repeatedly acknowledge

that section 17980.7 was intended to reconfirm the trial court’s authority

under Code of Civil Procedure section 564 to appoint receivers to remediate

substandard properties. (See, e.g., Concurrence in Sen. Amends. for

Assembly Bill 3492, as amended Aug. 24, 1990, at p. 1 [“Currently, Section

564 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the superior court to appoint a

receiver for a number[] of causes, including ‘. . . where it is shown that the

property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured.’ ”];

Sen Comm. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assembly Bill 3492, as amended June 28,

1990, at p. 2 (Sen. Comm. on Judiciary Analysis) [same].) Because judges

appeared reluctant to appoint receivers pursuant to the general authority of

Code of Civil Procedure section 564, Assembly Bill 3492 was proposed to

treated signals a legislative intent to allow the trial court to determine in its 

discretion the priority status of such a lien. 
26

make the authority for appointing a receiver under these circumstances

“more explicit.” (Sen. Comm. on Judiciary Analysis, supra, at p. 2 [“The

purpose of this bill is to give courts explicit authority to appoint a receiver to

oversee repairs of a substandard building where the owner has refused to do

so.”].)10

In sum, both the text and legislative history of section 17980.7 evince a

legislative intent to supplement rather than supplant the traditional powers

of a receiver under Code of Civil Procedure section 568. (§§ 17980.7,

subd. (c)(4)(H) [authorizing receivers “[t]o exercise the powers granted to 

receivers under Section 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure]; 17980.7, subd. (g)

[“These remedies shall be in addition to those provided by any other law”]; 

see City and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 

742, fn. 6 (Daley) [citing § 17980.7, subd. (g) in concluding that § 17980.7 

“does not affect the availability of a receiver under Code of Civil Procedure

section 564”].) 

Finally, having concluded that a court’s authority to impair property 

rights subject to receivership in an appropriate case has been recognized for 

over 100 years, we decline U.S. Bank’s suggestion that a different 

interpretation of the relevant statutes is required by the constitutional 

10 Since Assembly Bill 3492 was enacted to address an unmet need with 

respect to the rehabilitation of substandard residential properties, it is 

apparent that the existing tools available to local governments in this 

arena—such as abatement or eminent domain—were not always sufficient to 

ameliorate this significant health and safety issue. (See, e.g., Dept. of

Housing and Community Development, Enrolled Bill Report on Assembly Bill

3492, as amended Aug. 24, 1990, at p. 3 [noting “that many legal service

practitioners in the housing field share the belief that current code

enforcement mechanisms are often ineffective”].) U.S. Bank’s contention that 

the existence of these other options somehow argues against the availability 

of priority financing thus misses the point of the legislation. 
27

avoidance canon. (See People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161 [“a 

statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a 

serious constitutional question”].) U.S. Bank’s relatively undeveloped 

assertion that the exercise of such authority by a court supervising a health 

and safety receivership constitutes an unconstitutional taking (Cal. Const., 

art. I, § 19(a); U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) and/or an impairment of contract 

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 9; U.S. Const., art I, § 10, cl. 1), or “at least raise[s] a 

significant constitutional issue,” does not persuade us to part ways with this 

longstanding precedent. 

C. The Subordination Order Was Not an Abuse of Discretion 

Having concluded that the trial court was authorized to secure the 

receiver’s borrowing with a super-priority lien under both receivership 

statutes, we turn to the question whether the trial court abused its discretion 

by giving the receiver’s certificate first priority over all other liens. We 

conclude that it did not. 

As the record makes clear, the subject property was not capable of 

generating income and was underwater, making standard secured borrowing 

impossible as a means of financing the remediation of the property. Quail 

had no resources to offer and the receiver reported that his efforts to obtain 

funding from nonprofits or other sources proved unsuccessful. Adding 

urgency to the situation, the property posed a significant hazard to the health 

and welfare of the public and its occupants, with several families living in 

unsanitary or uninhabitable conditions, a massive accumulation of junk and 

debris, fire damaged structures and other attendant fire risks, and frequent 

responses to the property by the sheriff’s department and the fire 

department. These conditions had persisted for years despite numerous 

attempts by the County to enforce the code violations. 
28

Against this backdrop, the receiver’s plan to obtain priority financing to 

fund a partial remediation of the property and to sell to a buyer willing to 

complete the remaining repairs appeared reasonably designed to address the 

nuisance conditions quickly and effectively, once and for all. “ ‘ “As a general 

proposition the costs of a receivership are primarily a charge upon the 

property in the receiver’s possession and are to be paid out of said 

property.” ’ ” (SunTrust, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 657, quoting Baldwin v. 

Baldwin (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 851, 855.) Here, the receiver’s plan allowed 

the costs of the receivership to be paid by the property, placing any risk of 

loss on those with financial interests in the property, and avoided the use of 

public monies to enhance the value of those private financial interests. 

U.S. Bank nevertheless argues that the court’s subordination order was 

an abuse of discretion because it had offered to foreclose and take care of the

problems itself, which would have avoided the need for the receiver and its

attendant costs. On this record, however, we see no abuse of discretion in the 

court’s rejection of U.S. Bank’s belated proposal. U.S. Bank had notice of the 

severe health and safety issues on the property since at least June 2017 and 

took no action to address the problems prior to the appointment of the 

receiver in January 2018, or before the receiver renewed its request for 

super-priority financing in May 2018, or even before the court finally granted 

that request in October 2018. It was only at the October 2018 hearing that 

U.S. Bank finally asked the court for permission to foreclose and either repair 

the property itself or sell to a buyer who could remediate the nuisance 

conditions. 

Prior to the October hearing, the court had ordered U.S. Bank to obtain 

an appraisal of the property, which it failed to do in a timely manner despite 

being given three months to do so. The County expressed concern that, if left 
29

to its own devices, U.S. Bank would not remedy the situation and might sell 

to a party who would likewise fail to fix the many hazards on the property. 

Given U.S. Bank’s extended history of indifference and inaction, we cannot 

fault the trial court for viewing its last-minute offer to foreclose with 

skepticism. In contrast, it was only through the efforts of the receiver that 

the conditions on the property started to improve. Within three months of 

the court’s order authorizing the receiver’s certificate on a priority basis, the 

receiver had removed or relocated all of the occupants on the property, 

secured all the buildings, completed the demolition work, listed the property, 

and was weighing several offers above the asking price. Under the 

circumstances, the court acted well within its discretion in concluding that 

the process most likely to result in the expeditious and total remediation of 

the health and safety issues on the property was the plan put forward by the 

receiver. 

D. Order Confirming Sale Free and Clear of All Liens Was Not an 

Abuse of Discretion 

In the second of these consolidated appeals, U.S. Bank attacks the 

court’s subsequent order confirming the sale of the property free and clear of 

liens. It asserts that the sale confirmation process failed to comply with 

statutory requirements. U.S. Bank also contends that the court’s sale order 

was not supported by the evidence, making it an abuse of discretion. Both 

contentions lack merit. 

It is beyond dispute that a court overseeing a health and safety 

receivership has the authority to sell receivership property. (See Gonzales, 

supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 930 [holding that section 17980.7 “empowers the 

receiver to sell the property or to take any other action respecting the 

property as the court may authorize,” citing § 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(H) & Code 

Civ. Proc., §§ 568, 568.5; see also Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. 
30

Brown Development Corp. (2008) 138 Cal.App.3d 268, 273–274 [“Code of Civil

Procedure sections 568 and 568.5 authorize the receiver to perform such acts 

respecting the property as the court may authorize, including the sale of real 

and personal property upon notice and subject to court confirmation.”].) 

According to U.S. Bank, any such sale must occur in accordance with the 

Enforcement of Judgments Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 680.010 et seq.) (EJL) 

because Code of Civil Procedure section 568.5—the statute authorizing a 

receiver to sell property—states that all sales must be “in the manner 

prescribed by Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of 

Division 2 of Title 9,” i.e., the sale provisions of the EJL. U.S. Bank is 

mistaken. 

What Code of Civil Procedure section 568.5 actually states is that “[a]

receiver may, pursuant to an order of the court, sell real or personal property 

in the receiver’s possession upon the notice and in the manner prescribed by 

[the EJL].” (Italics added.) Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 568 

grants receivers the general power “to do such acts respecting the property as 

the Court may authorize.” Read together, these provisions permit a court to 

tailor the method of sale of receivership property to the circumstances before 

it. Indeed, several courts have recognized “the broad power of a court to 

determine the manner in which [receivership] property should be sold.” 

(People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 584 (Riverside).) 

In Lesser & Son v. Seymour (1950) 35 Cal.2d 494 (Lesser), for example, 

the Supreme Court upheld a court’s authority to confirm a sale of 

receivership assets in a manner which conflicted with its prior order of sale. 

(Id. at p. 499.) In doing so, the high court reasoned: “[T]he main function of 

the court is to manage or dispose of the estate in the best manner possible 

and for the best interest of the parties concerned. To effectually perform that 
31

duty necessarily requires some flexibility and continuity of jurisdiction in 

giving instructions to the receiver as to the manner in which the property 

should be sold to meet exigencies as they may arise.” (Ibid.) In support of 

this conclusion, the court noted that “[t]he receiver is a mere agent and the 

property in [the receiver’s] hands is really under the control and continuous 

supervision of the court.” (Ibid..)

Thereafter, the appellate court in Riverside, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 

expressly addressed and rejected the argument U.S. Bank advances here. 

Relying on Lesser, the court opined: “In the absence of more explicit

language, we cannot read section 568.5 as a restriction upon the inherent

equitable power of the court to prescribe the manner in which a receiver may

sell property. To effectively discharge its responsibility of managing for the

best interest of the parties concerned the assets placed in the hands of a

receiver, the court must, as stated in [Lesser], necessarily maintain a degree

of flexibility with respect to the time and manner in which property should be

sold to meet exigencies as they arise. [Citing Lesser, supra, 35 Cal.2d at

p. 499.]” (Riverside, at p. 585.) Contrary to U.S. Bank’s position, the better

reading of Code of Civil Procedure section 568.5 is that “unless the court 

prescribes a different mode of sale, a receiver, when authorized, must sell 

property in the manner provided for sales on execution.” (Riverside, at 

p. 585.) Given this precedent, we have no difficulty concluding that the trial 

court possessed the authority to confirm the sale of the property in this case 

despite the receiver’s failure to follow the specific procedure outlined in the 

EJL. 

D & M Cabinets, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 59 is distinguishable. In that 

case, the receiver was appointed under the EJL itself— pursuant to Code of 

Civil Procedure section 708.620—to enforce a money judgment. (See D & M 
32

Cabinets, at p. 62.) The court held under those circumstances that certain 

homestead requirements set forth in the EJL applied whether the sale was 

conducted by a sheriff or an EJL receiver. (D & M Cabinets, at p. 73.) 

Indeed, the court distinguished Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th 905, stating that 

Gonzalez “involved a receivership to demolish uninhabitable property due to 

building code violations; it had nothing to do with the EJL.” (D & M 

Cabinets, at p. 76.)

Nor are we persuaded that, as a general matter, the court’s sale order 

amounted to an abuse of discretion. As discussed above, “[a]n order

authorizing the receiver to sell substandard structures that pose a

substantial health and safety risk is reviewed for abuse of discretion and is

afforded considerable deference.” (City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014)

223 Cal.App.4th 670, 683 (Horspool); see Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at

p. 931.) U.S. Bank argues that the sale order at issue was an abuse of

discretion because there was insufficient evidence to support the

reasonableness of the sales price or that the proposed sale would benefit the

receivership estate, facts critical to the trial court’s decision. Ample evidence, 

however, supports the court’s approval of both the sales price and the sale 

process. Certainly, there is no evidence of “fraud, unfairness, or oppression.” 

(See Gonzalez, at p. 931.)

The list price of $249,000 was based on a broker’s price opinion of the

market value of the property after the partial remediation was completed. 

The only other valuation evidence in the record was U.S. Bank’s appraisal of 

$400,000. It is not clear that the appraisal considered the ongoing nuisance 

conditions on the property or the need for any buyer to complete the 

remaining remediation post sale. Indeed, there is some evidence that the 

appraisal did not take these factors into account, as the highest of the five 
33

offers received after the property was marketed for sale was the $315,000 

offer the receiver asked the court to confirm. Moreover, U.S. Bank supplied 

no concrete evidence to suggest any irregularity in the receiver’s open market 

process. In any event, “other considerations may outweigh the need to 

maximize the sales price to the receivership.” (People v. Stark (2005) 

131 Cal.App.4th 184, 207.) Here, it was a matter of utmost importance that 

any potential purchaser be willing and able to work with the County to 

complete the remaining nuisance abatement, and the potential purchasers 

appeared to be excellent candidates in this regard. On this record, we see no 

abuse of discretion in the court’s confirmation of a $315,000 purchase price. 

(Riverside, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at p. 582 [“ ‘Generally speaking if no good 

reason appears for refusing to confirm a receiver’s sale, such as chilling of 

bids or other misconduct or gross inadequacy of price, the sale should be 

confirmed.’ ”].)

U.S. Bank’s additional argument—that the approved sale process was

improper because it had offered to foreclose and find a buyer willing to

address the nuisance conditions—is largely a rehash of the argument we

rejected above. It is true that “ ‘receivers are often legal luxuries, frequently 

representing an extravagant cost to a losing litigant.’ ” (Daley, supra, 

16 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.) In this case, however, U.S. Bank did not challenge 

the initial appointment of the receiver and proposed foreclosure only when 

the primacy of its lien was at risk. As discussed above, the trial court’s 

apparent lack of confidence that U.S. Bank would do what it said it would in 

a timely and effective manner finds ample support in the record.

Moreover, as the trial court found, the only way to complete the 

required rehabilitation was to sell the property to a third party with the 

resources to complete the remaining repairs. This, in turn, could only be 
34

accomplished by stripping the property of its existing liens, including the lien 

held by U.S. Bank. While U.S. Bank argues strenuously that such lien 

stripping goes beyond the court’s authority, precedent supports a contrary 

view. As our high court confirmed when it upheld a trial court’s decision 

under a section 17980.7 receivership to completely demolish a substandard 

building, receivership orders in this context may involve “extraordinary 

action,” and such orders are afforded substantial deference even when they 

are “drastic enough to extinguish an owner’s interest in property.” (Gonzalez, 

supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 931.) 

In Horspool, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 670, the Fourth District addressed

a situation similar to the instant appeal. The city sought appointment of a

section 17980.7 receivership after the property owner refused to abate

nuisance conditions on a residential property. The receiver obtained

permission from the trial court to sell the partially remediated property

“as-is” to a buyer willing to complete the repairs. To effectuate the sale, the

court stripped the property of its existing liens. (Id. at pp. 675–678.) In

affirming the actions of the trial court, the appellate court expressly opined

that “[a] court of equity has the power to order the sale of property free and 

clear of liens and encumbrances.” (Id. at p. 684.) And in the SunTrust case 

discussed above, the appellate court rejected many of the same arguments

that U.S. Bank advances here, upholding the subordination of SunTrust’s 

lien against the lender’s contention it was allowing the lien “ ‘to be essentially 

stripped to nothing.’ ” (SunTrust, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 660.) We thus 

conclude that the trial court here had the authority to authorize the sale of

property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, and its decision to do

so in this extraordinary case cannot be characterized as an abuse of its

discretion.
35

E. The Order Prioritizing the County’s Fees and Costs on an Equal 

Footing with the Receiver’s Was an Abuse of Discretion

We agree with U.S. Bank in one respect. Although we conclude that

Code of Civil Procedure 568 and section 17980.7 allow for the payment of a

receiver’s remediation fees and costs on a super-priority basis under

appropriate circumstances, we see no such authority for treating the County’s

attorney fees and costs in a similar fashion. As noted above, the receiver is 

an officer of the appointing court, in effect an extension of the court itself. 

(Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 930.) Although the County set in motion 

the appointment of the receiver in this matter, it does not occupy the same 

role as the receiver. Title Ins. & Trust and SunTrust support the notion that

a receivership created pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 564 and

568 may be funded, in an appropriate case, on a super-priority basis. (See

Title Ins. & Trust, supra, 171 Cal. at p. 231; SunTrust, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 657.) These authorities, however, do not address the fees and costs 

incurred by an enforcement agency. 

Nor does section 17980.7 assist the County. While a receiver appointed

under that statute is given the authority to borrow funds for necessary

repairs and, with court approval, to “secure that debt and any moneys owed to 

the receiver for services performed” with a lien on the subject property

(§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(4)(G), italics added), by its terms this authorization does 

not extend to payment of governmental costs of enforcement. On the 

contrary, the statute provides elsewhere that “[i]f the court finds that a

building is in a condition which substantially endangers the health and

safety of residents pursuant to Section 17980.6, upon the entry of any order

or judgment, the court shall,” among other things, “[o]rder the owner to pay

all reasonable and actual costs of the enforcement agency including, but not

limited to, inspection costs, investigation costs, enforcement costs, attorney
36

fees or costs, and all costs of prosecution.” (Id., subd. (d)(1), italics added; see

also id., subd. (c)(11) [“The prevailing party in an action pursuant to this 

section shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs as may 

be fixed by the court.”].)

As the trial court found, the County’s actions with respect to the 

property were instrumental in bringing it to the point where its numerous, 

ongoing nuisance conditions could finally be abated. Nevertheless, the trial 

court erred in equating the County’s enforcement costs with those of the 

receiver, allowing them to be paid on a super-priority basis without 

consideration of the competing claims of other lienholders. We therefore 

reverse the trial court’s sale order to that extent. (See Costco Wholesale Corp. 

v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 [a trial court abuses its 

discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard].) The County is of 

course free to raise any argument it sees fit before the trial court on remand 

with respect to its entitlement to a share of the remainder of the sale 

proceeds. 

III. DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s orders authorizing a priority receiver’s 

certificate and confirming the sale of the property free and clear of all liens, 

and reverse the court’s sale order to the extent it prioritized the County’s 

enforcement fees and costs on an equal footing with the receiver. The matter 

is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. Our previously granted stay shall dissolve upon issuance of the 

remittitur in this matter. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
37

_________________________

Sanchez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Humes, P. J.

_________________________

Margulies, J.

A155837/A157245 County of Sonoma v. U.S. Bank
38

Trial Court: Sonoma County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Patrick M. Broderick

Counsel: 

Reed Smith, Raffi L. Kassabian, Kasey J. Curtis, Zachary C. Frampton, 

Todd S. Kim, for Defendant and Appellant U.S. Bank N.A.

Bruce D. Goldstein, Robert Pittman, County Counsel, Diana E. Gomez, 

Holly E. Rickett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent

California Receivership Group, Mark S. Adams, Andrew F. Adams, for 

Defendant and Respondent

A155837/A157245 County of Sonoma v. U.S. Bank