alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed February 3, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20-1763 Lower Tribunal No. 94-20024A

________________ 

### Jean Desroses, Appellant,
vs. 

### The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lourdes Simon, Judge. Jean Desroses, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee. Before EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM.2

Affirmed. See Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 243 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the “could have been imposed” test is the proper one to apply to a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence resulting from a scoresheet error, and that “if the trial court could have imposed the same sentence using a corrected scoresheet, any error was harmless”); Masis v. State, 245 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).
#### Harry Wright, as Administrator of the Estate of Cecelia M. Wright, Deceased, Appellant, v N. Venugopal, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

— Appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, *681entered January 13, 1975 in Delaware County, which granted defendant Venugopal’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in each of the actions and (2) from the judgment entered thereon. We are concerned with two identical actions for medical malpractice and wrongful death involving only the defendant Dr. N. Venugopal. Special Term dismissed the complaint as abandoned in the action first commenced for the reason that plaintiff' failed to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after this defendant’s default (CPLR 3215, subd [c]). Having dismissed the first action, Special Term also dismissed the same action commenced thereafter on the ground that the second action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff argues on this appeal, as he did at Special Term, that by this motion the defendant is seeking to reverse a prior decision of this court on a similar motion in these same actions *(Wright v Farlin,*42 AD2d 141). When an action is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, *a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action,*or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff may commence a new action upon the same cause of action within six months after the termination (CPLR 205, subd [a]). When this matter was before us previously, we held that since the first action was dismissed for neglect to prosecute, the six months extension of time for the commencement of a new action had no application. We concluded, therefore, that the second action, commenced within six months after the termination of the first, was untimely. However, we also concluded that since the defendant Dr. N. Venugopal did not appear in the first action and did not move to dismiss the complaint in that action, he was not entitled to a dismissal of the complaint as against him in the second action. It is clear, therefore, that the first action had not been terminated as to the defendant Venugopal by our prior decision, as is contended by the plaintiff. Special Term properly concluded that plaintiff’s failure to comply with CPLR 3215 (subd [c]) in that he did not take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after defendant’s default in that action constitutes neglect to prosecute the action, requiring its dismissal *(Keyes v McLaughlin,*49 AD2d 974; *Bubin v County of Nassau,*31 AD2d 763). In consequence, plaintiff was not entitled to the extension of time to commence a new action (CPLR 205), and the second action was untimely. It is noted that an appearance by the defendant in the first action was not required for the purpose of the motion made pursuant to CPLR 3215 (subd [c]). Order and judgment affirmed, without costs. Koreman, P. J., Sweeney, Mahoney, Larkin and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1006 

CA 11-00388 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

JOHN TENCZA, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER, 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

GALE & DANCKS, LLC, SYRACUSE (CATHERINE A. GALE OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

BRINDISI, MURAD, BRINDISI, PEARLMAN, JULIAN & PERTZ, LLP, UTICA

(STEPHANIE A. PALMER OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County

(Bernadette T. Clark, J.), entered July 6, 2010 in a medical

malpractice action. The order, inter alia, directed defendant to pay

plaintiff costs, disbursements and interest on a judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order in this medical

malpractice action that, inter alia, denied its motion seeking to

vacate a judgment entered in plaintiff’s favor pursuant to CPLR 5003-a

and ordered defendant to pay costs, disbursements and interest on that

judgment. We affirm. Contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiff

satisfied his obligation pursuant to CPLR 5003-a by tendering a

general release and stipulation of discontinuance to defendant’s

attorney. The general release acknowledged the existence of a

Medicare lien and provided “that a portion of the settlement will be

paid to Medicare for [the] purpose[] of satisfying that lien.” The

parties thereafter agreed that defendant was permitted to withhold

only $50,000 of the settlement to satisfy the Medicare lien. “Neither

CPLR 5003-a, nor the parties’ stipulation of settlement, imposed any

additional requirement on the plaintiff or his attorney” (Klee v

Americas Best Bottling Co., Inc., 76 AD3d 544, 546). 

Entered: September 30, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           6,260
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   95,601
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,370
<INVENTORY>                                     30,587
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               157,136
<PP&E>                                          69,557
<DEPRECIATION>                                  29,735
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 290,671
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          103,142
<BONDS>                                         38,386
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           223
<OTHER-SE>                                     147,011
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   290,671
<SALES>                                        163,049
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               163,049
<CGS>                                          104,711
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  104,711
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                56,433
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,222
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,872
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,280)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,380
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (4,660)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,660)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.21)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.21)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3986 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3986

To provide relief for the victims of Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm 
                                  Lee.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 8, 2012

  Mr. Tonko introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide relief for the victims of Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm 
                                  Lee.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Irene and Lee Emergency Assistance 
Act of 2012''.

SEC. 2. UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an 
individual eligible to receive unemployment assistance under section 
410(a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5177(a)) as a result of a disaster 
declaration made for Hurricane Irene or Tropical Storm Lee on or after 
August 22, 2011, the President shall make such assistance available for 
39 weeks after the date of the disaster declaration.
                                 <all>
```
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Suite 1700
100 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1911

August 11, 1997

Carson, Inc.
64 Ross Road
Savannah, GA 31405

Dear Sirs:

At your request, we have read the description included in your Form 10-Q for the
quarter  ended June 30, 1997 of the facts  relating to the change in  accounting
for inventories from being valued at lower of Last-In,  First-Out  ("LIFO") cost
or  market to the lower of  First-In,  First-Out  ("FIFO")  cost or  market.  We
believe, on the basis of the facts so set forth and other information  furnished
to us by  appropriate  officials of Carson,  Inc.,  that the  accounting  change
described in your Form 10-Q is to an  alternative  accounting  principle that is
preferable under the circumstances.

We have not audited any consolidated  financial  statements of Carson,  Inc. and
its  consolidated  subsidiaries  as of any date or for any period  subsequent to
December 31, 1996.  Therefore,  we are unable to express, and we do not express,
an  opinion  on the facts set forth in the  above-mentioned  Form  10-Q,  on the
related  information  furnished to us by officials  of Carson,  Inc.,  or on the
financial position, results of operations, or cash flows of Carson, Inc. and its
consolidated  subsidiaries  as of any  date  or for  any  period  subsequent  to
December 31, 1996.

Yours truly,


Deloitte & Touche LLP
exv10w10






Exhibit 10.10




Share Transfer Agreement




     This agreement was entered into by the following parties in Shanghai on September 22, 2009:



     Transferor: Beijing A&I Advertising Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as “Party A”)



     Transferee: Beijing Auto Communication Information and Technology Company Limited (hereinafter
referred to as “Party B”)



     The registered capital of Shanghai Cheng Chen Media Company Limited (hereinafter referred to
as the “Target Company”) is RMB500,000, of which 350,000 was contributed by Party A, being 70% of
the total. According to the applicable laws and regulations, through friendly negotiation, the
parties agree upon the following:



     1. Subject and Price of the Share Transfer



     1.1 Party A transfers 70% of the shares (the “Shares”) that it owns in the Target Company to
Party B in consideration of RMB350,000;



     1.2 Any other rights associated with the Shares shall be transferred together with the
Shares.



     1.3 The Transferee shall make full payment to the Transferor within 5 days upon the execution
of this agreement.



     2. Representations and Warranties



     Party A represents that it legally holds the Shares to be transferred pursuant to article 1.1
of this agreement. Party A has full and legal rights to dispose the Shares. There is no mortgage
right or other security right upon the Shares to be transferred and no third party has claims upon
the Shares.



     3. Liability for Breach of Agreement



     Any party in breach of this agreement shall compensate the other party for such other party’s
damages caused by such breach.



     4. Dispute Settlement



     This agreement is governed by and shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the
People’s Republic of China.



     Any dispute arising from the performance of or in relation to this agreement shall be settled
through friendly negotiation by both parties. If such negotiation fails to reach an agreement, the
dispute shall be arbitrated by the Shanghai Arbitration Commission.



1









 






     5. Miscellaneous



     5.1 This agreement shall be executed in three counterparts. Party A, Party B and the Target
Company shall each hold an original in order to complete relevant legal procedures.



     5.2 This agreement takes effect only after it is affixed with seals by both parties.



     (Seals to follow)


Party B: (Seal) Beijing Auto Communication Information and

Technology Company Limited

Party A: (Seal) Beijing A&I Advertising Company Limited





2
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

        In connection with the Quarterly Report of Imperial  Petroleum  Recovery
Corporation; (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended April 30, 2005
(the "Report"), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof,  I,  Edward  C.  Gaiennie,  Chairman  of the  Board of the  Company  and
Principal Accounting Officer, hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge,  that
pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  Sec.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to Sec.  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        1.      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

        2.      The information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.


By: /s/ Edward C. Gaiennie                           May 16, 2006
   ----------------------------------------
    Edward C. Gaiennie
    Chief Financial Officer and Principal
    Accounting Officer


                                       29
#### Anderson and Lind Manufacturing Company, petitioner, v. Carpenters’ District Council et al., defendants. Thomas F. Church, appellant, v. The People of the State of Illinois et al., appellees.

Gen. No. 27,152.

Contempt proceedings against defendant for violation of an injunction. Defendant found guilty. (See 226 Ill. App. 505.) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Osear M. Torrison, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1921.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed November 29, 1922.

Hope Thompson, for appellant. Edmund M. Froehlich, for appellees.

Mr. Presiding Justice Thomson

delivered the opinion of the court.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 24-40095

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Michael Dale Campbell, Jr., 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CR-120-1

______________________________

Before Haynes, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Michael Dale 

Campbell, Jr., has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States 

v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Campbell has not filed a response. 

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 10, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 24-40095 Document: 38-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/10/2024
No. 24-40095

2

reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal 

presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s 

motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from 

further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5th 

Cir. R. 42.2.

Case: 24-40095 Document: 38-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/10/2024
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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G:\JLALL\CASES\CIVIL\08-0997\90daydismissal.wpd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Nicholas Robles,

Plaintiff,

v.

Edson Camacho, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 08-0997 JL

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties hereto, by their counsel, having advised the court that they have agreed

to a settlement of this cause, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this cause of action be

dismissed with prejudice; provided, however that if any party hereto shall certify to this

court, within ninety days, with proof of service thereof, that the agreed consideration for

said settlement has not been delivered over, the foregoing order shall stand vacated and

this cause shall forthwith be restored to the calendar to be set for trial.

DATED: March 10, 2010 

__________________________________

 James Larson

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00997-JL Document 76 Filed 03/10/10 Page 1 of 1
§ 1501.2 Background. ( a ) The African Development Foundation (“ADF”) is a wholly-owned corporation of the United States Government, created by the African Development Foundation Act (title V, Pub. L. 96-533, 94 Stat. 3151 (22 U.S.C. 290h)). It is a non-profit, non-stock issuing, tax-exempt corporation, and is subject to title I of the Government Corporation Control Act (31 U.S.C. 9101 *et seq.*).
( b ) The primary function of ADF is to extend financial assistance in the form of grants, loans and loan guarantees to African private and public entities to support self-help activities at the local level in African countries, and to fund development research by Africans. Priority shall be given to projects which community groups undertake to foster their own development and which involve maximum feasible participation of the poor. The maximum assistance which may be extended for a single project is $250,000.
#### Neal Shoopak, Appellant, v. United States Rubber Company, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied. Beldoek, Acting P. J., Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Nellie R. Saunders, Deceased. Helen End, Appellant; John Green, Respondent.

Motion by appellant for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, denied. Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Brennan, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2010-0031

Directorate Identifier: 2009NM266AD

767-54A0062, R6 ---11/5109

767-54-0069 --- 10/9/97

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW,

Renton, WA 98057

425.2271221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

FOlTTl Date: 03105/2008
#### L. Krimmer, trading as L. K. Thread Company, appellee, v. Gordon Brothers Cap Company, appellant.

Gen. No. 27,202.

Action for the purchase price of thread sold to defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Theodore E. Ehler, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1921.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed October 18, 1922.

Louis L. Gould, for appellant. Baker, Holder & Schmidt, for appellee.

Mr. Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the court.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 17, 2015

No. 04-15-00442-CV

IN RE Jose "Joe" HINOJOSA

Original Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

On July 17, 2015, relator Jose “Joe” Hinojosa filed a petition for writs of mandamus and 

prohibition and a motion for emergency relief. The court has considered the petition and is of the 

opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of 

mandamus and motion for emergency relief are DENIED. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). The 

court’s opinion will issue at a later date.

It is so ORDERED on July 17, 2015.

_________________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 17th day of July, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle, Clerk 

 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2014-CVZ-000338 D3, styled Jose "Joe" Hinojosa v. Firefighters and 

Police Officers' Civil Service Commission of the City of Laredo, Texas; Irma Mireles, Vidal Cantu Jr., Jesus Torres 

and Luis Dovalina, Individually, pending in the 341st Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas, the Honorable 

Rebecca Ramirez Palomo presiding.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Julio Santiago, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 7, 1976, convicting him of *802criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the facts, and indictment dismissed. The defendant, an attendant at an attraction in an amusement park, admittedly struck and physically injured the complaining witness with a baseball bat during the altercation which ensued when the complaining witness and his companions refused to leave the grounds. The jury acquitted the defendant of assault, but convicted him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree under a section of the statute which elevates the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree to the third degree if the person has previously been convicted of a crime (Penal Law, § 265.02, subd [1]). While a baseball bat is a dangerous instrument within the statutory definition (Penal Law, § 10.00, subd 13), its possession is not a crime unless such possession is "with intent to use the same unlawfully” (Penal Law, § 265.01, subd [2] [emphasis supplied]). The statutory presumption of intent in the case of a "dangerous instrument” is limited to an "instrument * * * made or adapted for use primarily as a weapon” (Penal Law, § 265.15, subd 4). On the entire record, the People failed to prove the necessary element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Martuscello, J. P., Damiani, Titone and Shapiro, JJ., concur.