U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

53–829PDF 2010

U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 2 AND 10, 2009

Serial No. 111–78

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

JASMEET AHUJA, Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

DECEMBER 2

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 5

The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of 

Defense .................................................................................................................. 14

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ................... 20

DECEMBER 10

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, U.S. 

Department of State ............................................................................................ 67

Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan 

(USFOR–A), U.S. Department of Defense ......................................................... 86

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARINGS 

DECEMBER 2

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton: Prepared statement ............................ 8

The Honorable Robert M. Gates: Prepared statement ......................................... 16

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN: Prepared statement ...................................... 23

DECEMBER 10

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry: Prepared statement .................................... 70

Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal: Prepared statement ....................... 90

APPENDIX 

DECEMBER 2

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 132

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 133

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 135

The Honorable John Boozman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arkansas: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 136

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 137

The Honorable Gus Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 139

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 140

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia: Prepared statement ............................................................... 141

The Honorable John S. Tanner, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Tennessee: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 143

Page

IV

The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 145

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas: Prepared statement ................................................................... 146

The Honorable Ron Klein, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Florida: Prepared statement ............................................................................... 149

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and responses from: 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton ............................................................ 151

The Honorable Robert M. Gates and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN ........ 155

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Gus Bilirakis and responses from: 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton ............................................................ 167

The Honorable Robert M. Gates and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN ........ 170

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee 

and responses from: 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton ............................................................ 177

The Honorable Robert M. Gates ......................................................................... 180

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN ...................................................................... 184

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and responses from: 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton ............................................................ 189

DECEMBER 10

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 191

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 192

The Honorable Howard L. Berman: Prepared statement .................................... 194

The Honorable Ron Paul, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 196

The Honorable Diane E. Watson ............................................................................ 198

The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina: Prepared statement .............................................................. 199

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee: Prepared statement ..................................... 200

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Michael E. McMahon, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and responses 

from: 

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry .................................................................... 206

Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal ...................................................... 207

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and responses 

from: 

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry .................................................................... 209

Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal ...................................................... 212

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and responses 

from: 

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry .................................................................... 214

Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal ...................................................... 220

(1)

U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN, PART I 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Before beginning my opening statement, I would like to make 

several brief announcements. As most of you know, our colleague, 

Robert Wexler, will resign from Congress at the end of this year 

to become president of the Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation. Effective today he is resigning as chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Europe, and he will be succeeded in that position by Bill Delahunt. Looking at Bill Delahunt you would think 

he is going to be focused on old Europe, but he is going to be focused on old and new Europe. 

Russ Carnahan will serve as the new chairman of the International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Subcommittee, following in the footsteps, believe it or not, of his grandfather, who chaired the same subcommittee in the 85th Congress, 

a contemporary of Bill’s. 

We thank Bob for his service in the Congress on this committee, 

a very good friend to many of us, and wish all three of our colleagues the best of luck in their new positions. 

Second, I want to welcome the Prime Minister of Hungary Gordon Bajnai, who is here with us today. Hungary is one of our 

staunchest allies, and I want to thank the Prime Minister for his 

country’s leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in 

Baghlan Province in Afghanistan and for the brave men and 

women of Hungary who are serving there. 

Welcome, Mr. Prime Minister. 

Finally, given the time constraints on the witnesses, they must 

leave at 4:15 wherever we are, and to ensure that as many members as possible have a chance to ask questions, we will limit opening statements to myself and the ranking member. And I will not 

be taking all of my time. And without objection, all other members 

may submit written statements for the record. 

And now I will recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Last night President Obama spoke eloquently to the Nation 

about his plan of action in Afghanistan. Today we are pleased to 

welcome three senior officials to testify on the President’s proposed 

strategy: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of 

2

Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Admiral Michael Mullen. We greatly appreciate your participation. 

As the President stated, it is clear that the United States has 

vital national security interests at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Determining the best policy to serve those interests is the 

most difficult foreign policy challenge before this President, before 

this Congress, and before the American people. It is a situation 

with no easy answers and no predictable outcomes. 

Our goal in the region, as defined by the President, is to ‘‘disrupt, 

dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 

to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.’’ Many news reports suggest that there was a healthy debate 

in the administration about whether this critical objective could be 

met by pursuing a targeted counterterrorism strategy as opposed 

to a more extensive and robust counterinsurgency strategy. 

Could the United States succeed in Afghanistan by employing 

relatively small numbers of Special Operations Forces and hightech weapons systems to disrupt and defeat al-Qaeda and reverse 

the Taliban’s momentum while also accelerating the training of Afghan security forces? Or does the deteriorating security situation in 

Afghanistan call for a more ambitious strategy—one that includes 

military, political, and economic dimensions—to protect the people 

of Afghanistan and instill confidence in that country’s fragile national government? If we pursue the latter approach, then, as the 

President indicated, success will hinge on a substantial deployment 

of civilian resources. 

The President also noted that success in Afghanistan is dependent on what he referred to as ‘‘an effective partnership with Pakistan.’’ What more will we expect Pakistan to do that they are not 

already doing? What more will the U.S. have to do to nurture that 

important relationship? 

And finally, is the full cost of our efforts in both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, in terms of military and civilian resources, something we 

can afford and are willing to pay? 

The President took the time to consult carefully with his generals, his diplomats, his national security team, and numerous others to form a complete picture of the situation in Afghanistan. 

Now begins the deliberative period for Congress and the people 

we represent. Now is the time for us to evaluate the strategy, to 

test its coherence, and to raise the questions that will examine the 

assumptions on which it is based. We cannot shirk our responsibility to ask the tough question; the stakes are simply too high. 

I now turn to the ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for any 

opening remarks she would like to make. And following that we 

will proceed immediately to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And before I begin my opening remarks, I wanted to state for the 

record and inform our distinguished witnesses today that our colleague Mr. Manzullo is unable to be at the hearing today because 

he is at a briefing that Senator Durbin is hosting on bringing 

Gitmo detainees to Thomson in Illinois. Mr. Manzullo will make 

every effort to join today’s hearing following the conclusion of the 

briefing on Gitmo detainee transfers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

3

Our security and vital interests are at stake in Afghanistan. As 

the President said in his speech last night, ‘‘This is no idle danger, 

no hypothetical threat. This danger will only grow if the region 

slides backwards and al-Qaeda can operate with impunity.’’

Our brave men and women in uniform understand this reality 

and stand ready for duty. They embrace the opportunity to defend 

our Nation and protect our homeland by defeating the enemy in a 

convincing manner so that they cannot ever again rise against us. 

It is our obligation to provide them and all of our personnel on the 

ground with the support and the resources necessary to win the 

war in Afghanistan and prevail against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 

other militants. 

I am, however, concerned that before the strategy has been implemented, the President has placed a deadline on our commitment 

and a timeline for the withdrawal of our troops. What message 

does this telegraph to the enemy? How does it impact the morale 

of our troops and the mind-set of our Afghan counterparts and our 

other allies in this effort? 

This is a fight that we cannot afford to lose. General McChrystal 

wrote on August 30th that the next 12 months are critical, yet onequarter of that time is already gone. As President John F. Kennedy 

said, and I quote, ‘‘There are risks and costs to action, but they are 

far less than the long-range risk of comfortable inaction.’’ Now that 

the President has articulated the administration’s approach toward 

Afghanistan, we must fully commit to doing everything possible to 

succeed there. 

I ask that our distinguished witnesses address the following: 

What are the key differences between the strategy that the President articulated yesterday and those that he articulated last 

March? What action is the administration taking to ensure that 

those who have pledged to provide multilateral and bilateral assistance to Afghanistan actually fulfill their commitments? 

And, Secretary Clinton, what is our anticorruption strategy in 

Afghanistan? What is our strategy for promoting a more capable, 

accountable and effective government in Afghanistan that truly 

serves the Afghan people? 

Secretary Gates, what is our strategy for expanding the numbers 

and building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces? 

What is our strategy for supporting Afghanistan in disrupting and 

dismantling narcotraffickers and breaking the narcotics/insurgency 

nexus? 

I would like to refer to an editorial appearing on Monday in the 

Wall Street Journal Europe section where the author refers to a 

discussion he had with the chief prosecutor for the International 

Criminal Court. The ICC’s chief prosecutor said that he already 

has jurisdiction in Afghanistan because the Afghan Government 

ratified the Rome statute in 2003, and that he is already conducting a preliminary examination into whether NATO troops, including our American soldiers fighting the Taliban, may have to be 

prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. 

Secretary Clinton, this past August you expressed ‘‘great regret 

that we are not a signatory’’ to the International Criminal Court. 

Then just a few weeks ago, the U.S. sent an observer mission to 

the ICC Assembly of States. What is the administration’s current 

4

position concerning the ICC, and what protections are being provided to our personnel in Afghanistan to ensure that they are not 

subject to ICC prosecution? 

And in closing, Mr. Chairman, because the administration is concerned about cost and wants to put a price on the defense and the 

security of our Nation, I would suggest that we withhold U.S. contributions to the U.N. until reforms, accountability and transparency measures are actually put in place. I am confident that the 

American people would prefer that their limited taxpayer funds 

would be provided to our personnel in Afghanistan so that they 

have the tools needed to win rather than have it squandered away 

by a U.N. system hijacked by enemies of freedom and democracy. 

Just yesterday the U.N. General Assembly passed multiple antiIsrael resolutions in their International Day of Solidarity with the 

Palestinian People, and the U.N. vote just continues to astound us 

every day. 

The challenges in Afghanistan are great, Mr. Chairman, but they 

are not insurmountable. I look forward to the immediate implementation of a strategy that provides us the highest chances for success 

with the lowest risk to the safety and well-being of our brave patriots serving and about to serve us in Afghanistan. 

Thank you very much for the time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. The time of the gentlelady has 

expired. 

And I would like to introduce the witnesses, as if they need an 

introduction. I will not go through your colleges and first four or 

five jobs. But Secretary Hillary Clinton is the 67th Secretary of 

State of the United States. Previously Secretary Clinton served as 

the junior Senator from New York for two terms, where she was 

known for working across party lines. As First Lady she was a tireless advocate of health care reform and worked on many issues relating to children and families. 

Secretary Robert Gates is the 22nd Secretary of Defense of the 

United States. Dr. Gates is the only Secretary of Defense in U.S. 

history to be asked to remain in that office by a newly elected 

President. President Obama is the eighth President under which 

Dr. Gates has served. Previously, just before becoming Secretary of 

Defense, Dr. Gates was the president of Texas A&M University. 

Secretary Gates joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1996—

1966 and spent nearly 27 years as an intelligence professional. 

Admiral Michael Mullen is the 17th Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. He serves as the principal military advisor to the 

President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council 

and the Homeland Security Council. Prior to becoming Chairman, 

Admiral Mullen served as the 28th Chief of Naval Operations. His 

last operational assignment was as Commander, NATO Joint Force 

Command, Naples Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and he 

did graduate Notre Dame High School in Sherman Oaks, California. 

Secretary Clinton. 

5

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM 

CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee. I am grateful for this opportunity to testify today. And I also want to acknowledge the leader of one of our very strong allies, the Prime Minister of Hungary, 

who the chairman has recognized and to whom we show our appreciation. 

Yesterday President Obama presented the administration’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today we will be answering 

your questions and providing additional details. But let me speak 

briefly at a more personal level about why we are making this commitment. 

Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, we believe this is 

the best way to protect our Nation now and in the future. The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to the very 

same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have a greater 

capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag an entire region into chaos. Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan 

have reported that the situation is serious and worsening, and we 

agree. 

In the aftermath of September 11th, I grieved with sons, daughters, husbands and wives, those whose loved ones were murdered. 

It was an attack on our country; it was at the time an attack on 

my constituents. And I witnessed the tragic consequences in the 

lives of thousands of innocent families, the damage done to our 

economy and our sense of security. So I feel a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from such violence. 

The case for action against al-Qaeda and its allies has always 

been clear, but the United States’ course of action over the last 8 

years has not. The fog of another war obscured our focus. And 

while our attention was focused elsewhere, the Taliban gained momentum in Afghanistan, and the extremist threat grew in Pakistan, a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal and 

more than its share of challenges. 

It was against this backdrop that the President called for a careful thorough review of our strategy. I was very proud to be a part 

of that process, and our objectives are clear. We will work with the 

Afghan and Pakistani Governments to eliminate safe havens for 

those plotting attacks against us, our allies, our interests. We will 

help to stabilize a region that is fundamental to our national security, and we will develop long-term, sustainable relationships with 

both Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. The duration of our military presence may be 

limited, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our 

troops will begin to come home. 

Now, accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the 

American people will not be easy. It will mean sending more civilians, more troops and more assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our civilian efforts in Pakistan. And the men and 

women carrying out this mission, both civilian and military alike, 

are not just statistics on a PowerPoint slide, they are our friends 

and neighbors, our sons and daughters, our brothers and sisters, 

6

and we will be asking them and the American people who support 

them to make extraordinary sacrifices once again. I want to assure 

this committee we will do everything we can to make sure their 

sacrifices make our Nation safer. 

The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is 

not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. The 

beginning of President Karzai’s second term has opened a new window of opportunity. We do have real concerns about the influence 

of corrupt officials in the Afghan Government, and we will continue 

to pursue them. But in his inauguration speech last month, which 

I attended, I witnessed President Karzai call for a new compact, a 

new compact with his country and a new compact with the international community. He pledged to continue to work with us, and 

he pledged to combat corruption, improve governance and deliver 

for the people of his country. His words were long in coming, but 

they were welcome. They now must be matched with action, and 

we intend to hold the Afghan Government accountable. We will 

work with our Afghan partners to strengthen institutions at every 

level of society. 

The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan 

responsibility. As he said in his speech last evening, the additional 

American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the 

transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011. Just as we 

have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. 

A timeframe for transition will provide a sense of urgency in 

working with the Afghan Government, but it should be clear to everyone that the United States, our allies and our partners will have 

an enduring commitment, a civilian commitment, to Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. Our resolve in this fight is reflected in the substantial new increase in troops, but also in the significant civilian surge 

that will also accompany it. 

The civilian effort is bearing fruit. The civilian experts and advisors are helping to craft policy inside government ministries, providing development assistance in the field. And when our marines 

went into Nawa Province this last July, we had civilians on the 

ground with them to coordinate assistance the very next day. As 

our operations progress, our civ-mil coordination will grow even 

stronger. 

We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions to 974 

by early in January. On average, each of these civilians leverages 

10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to experts with 

U.S.-funded NGOs. It is a cliche ́ to say that we have our best people in these jobs, but it also happens to be true. When I was in 

Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American colonel who told 

me that while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers under his 

command, none of them had the 40 years of the agricultural experience of the USDA civilians serving alongside his battalion, or the 

rule of law and governance expertise of the civilian experts from 

the State Department. The colonel said to me, I am happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need, and we need 

more of them. 

7

That is part of our strategy, our combined civilian-military strategy. We will be delivering high-impact economic assistance and bolstering the agricultural sector; we will be helping to support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those Taliban who renounce alQaeda, abandon violence and want to reintegrate into society. We 

know that regional diplomacy is essential, and it will complement 

our approach. 

I will be going to Brussels tomorrow to work with our allies to 

obtain additional commitments of troops and civilian aid. We also 

know that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan is a necessity as 

a key partner in this effort. People in Pakistan are increasingly 

coming to the view that we do share a common enemy. I heard that 

repeatedly during my recent visit there. So we will significantly expand support to help develop the potential of the people of Pakistan, and we will do more to demonstrate to the Pakistani people 

that they must continue their efforts to weed out and defeat the 

Pakistani Taliban. 

As we are moving forward with our international efforts, we have 

a great deal of commitment to troops, trainers and resources that 

will be reported in the days and weeks ahead. Ambassador 

Holbrooke, our Special Representative, is already there consulting 

with our allies. And we are especially reaching out to Muslims everywhere to make clear that those who pervert a great religion do 

not represent it, and everyone has a stake in ensuring that they 

do not dominate the message and the narrative of what Islam 

stands for. 

So let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult 

choices, but the President’s plan represents the best way we know 

to protect our Nation today and tomorrow. The task is as complex 

as any national security challenge in our lifetime. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the responsibility of a single party 

or a single agency within our Government or a single country. We 

owe it to the troops and civilians who will face these dangers to 

come together as Americans along with our allies and international 

partners to accomplish this mission. I look forward to working with 

you to ensure that we do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]

8


53829a-1.eps
9


53829a-2.eps
10


53829a-3.eps
11


53829a-4.eps
12


53829a-5.eps
13


53829a-6.eps
14

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary Gates. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. GATES, 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of 

the committee, thank you for inviting us to testify today. I would 

like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context 

behind the President’s decisions, in particular the nexus among alQaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and our objectives 

on how the President’s strategy aims to accomplish them. 

As the President first stated last March and reemphasized last 

night, the goal of the United States and Afghanistan and Pakistan 

is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies, and to prevent its return to both countries. International military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this 

overarching goal. Defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered 

from one another as much as we might wish that to be the case. 

While al-Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on 

the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al-Qaeda’s message to 

the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the winning side 

of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and the mythology of the 

other. Al-Qaeda leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly. 

The lesson of the Afghan Taliban’s revival for al-Qaeda is that 

time and will are on their side; that, with a Western defeat, they 

could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory as 

long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to inspire 

and attract followers and funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now 

necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda. 

At the same time one cannot separate the security situation in 

Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation 

of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists. Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led to the 

resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated and sophisticated 

attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for extremists in 

southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on 

a Pakistani Government already under attack from groups operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban in just the 

last year or so has become a real threat to Pakistan’s own domestic 

peace and stability, carrying out, with al-Qaeda’s help, escalating 

bombing attacks throughout the country. 

Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, 

if not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil war. A 

Taliban-ruled area could in short order become once again a sanctuary for al-Qaeda as well as a staging area for resurgent militant 

groups on the offensive in Pakistan. 

Success in south and central Asia by Islamic extremists, as was 

the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts. It would 

strengthen the al-Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fundraising and more sophisticated operations. 

15

It is true that al-Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to London to Denver. What makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location, including Somalia, 

Yemen and other possible redoubts, is that this part of the world 

represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism, the historic place 

where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in 

their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have 

severe consequences for the United States and for the world. 

Some may say this is similar to the domino theory that underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we 

have very real and very recent history that shows just what can 

happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing 

space, safe havens and governments complicit with and supportive 

of their mission. Less than 5 years after the last Soviet tank 

crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, Islamic militants 

launched their first attack in 1993 on the World Trade Center in 

New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again. 

The President’s new strategic concept aims to reverse the 

Taliban’s momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the 

time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country. 

The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build and 

transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in the summer of 2011 is critical and, in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur district by district, province by province, depending on conditions on the ground. The process will be 

similar to what we did in Iraq, where international security forces 

provided overwatch first at the tactical level and then at the strategic level. 

Making this transition possible requires accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan Army and 

police through extensive partnering with ISAF forces especially in 

combat. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States must 

continue to support their development as an important partner for 

the long haul. We must not repeat the mistakes of 1989 when we 

abandoned the country only to see it descend into civil war and 

then into Taliban hands. 

Let me offer closing thoughts. The President believes as do I that 

in the end we cannot defeat al-Qaeda and its toxic ideology without 

improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. 

The President’s decision offers the best possibility to decisively 

change the momentum in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the 

strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia, all necessary to 

protect the United States, our allies and our vital interests. And so 

I ask for your full support of this decision to provide both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources they need 

to be successful. 

As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women 

who have volunteered and often revolunteered to serve their counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
16

try in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds and 

prayers as we take on this arduous, but vitally necessary mission. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]


53829b-1.eps
17


53829b-2.eps
18


53829b-3.eps
19


53829b-4.eps
20

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen 

and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your 

time today. 

Let me say right up front that I support fully and without hesitation the President’s decision, and I appreciate the opportunity to 

contribute to what I believe was a healthy and productive discussion. I have seen my share of internal debates about various national security issues, especially over the course of the last 2 years, 

and I can honestly say that I do not recall an issue so thoroughly 

or so thoughtfully considered as this one. Every military leader in 

the chain of command, as well as those of the Joint Chiefs, was 

given voice throughout this process, and every one of us used it. We 

now have before us a strategy more appropriately matched to the 

situation on the ground in Afghanistan and resources matched 

more appropriately to that strategy, particularly with regard to reversing the insurgency’s momentum in 2010. And given the stakes 

in Afghanistan for our own national security as well as that of our 

partners around the world, I believe the time we took was well 

worth it. 

Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates have already walked you 

through the larger policy issues in question. I will not repeat them. 

From a purely military perspective I believe our new approach does 

three critical things. First, by providing more discrete objectives, it 

offers better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to 

employ their forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle and 

defeat al-Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe 

haven; they will still strive to protect the Afghan people, who remain the center of gravity; they will still pursue major elements of 

the counterinsurgency campaign desired and designed by General 

McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves at least some measure 

of active counterterrorism operations. But now they will tailor this 

campaign and those operations by focusing on key population 

areas, by increasing pressure on al-Qaeda’s leadership, by more effectively working to degrade the Taliban’s influence, and by 

streamlining and accelerating the growth of competent Afghan National Security Forces. 

At its core our strategy is about providing breathing space for the 

Afghans to secure their own people and to stabilize their own country. It is about partnering and mentoring just as much, if not more, 

than it is about fighting. Where once we believed that finishing the 

job meant to a large degree doing it ourselves, we now know it cannot truly or permanently be done by anyone other than the Afghans themselves. Fully a third of the U.S. troops in theater are 

partnered with Afghan forces, and I expect that number to rise significantly over the course of the next year. 

Secondly, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives commanders on the ground the resources and the support they need to 

reverse the momentum of a Taliban insurgency and to accomplish 

these more limited objectives. I have said it before, and I believe 

it still today, this region is the epicenter of global Islamic extreVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
21

mism. It is the place from which we were attacked on 9/11, and 

should we be hit again, it is the place from which I am convinced 

the planning, training and funding will emanate. Al-Qaeda may, in 

fact, be the architect of such an attack, but the Taliban will be the 

bricklayers. 

Though hardly a uniform body, Taliban groups have grown bolder and more sophisticated. We saw that just a few months ago in 

the Khorangow Valley, where Taliban forces attacked coalition outposts using what I would call almost conventional small-unit tactics. Their fighters are better organized and better equipped than 

they were just 1 year ago. 

In fact, coalition forces experienced record high violence this past 

summer with insurgent attacks more than 60 percent above 2008 

levels. And through brutal intimidation the Taliban has established 

shadow governments across the country, coercing the reluctant 

support of many locals and challenging the authority of elected 

leaders and state institutions. Indeed we believe the insurgency 

has achieved a dominant influence in 11 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. 

To say there is no serious threat of Afghanistan falling once 

again into Taliban hands ignores the audacity of even the 

insurgency’s most public statements. And to argue that should they 

have that power, the Taliban would not at least tolerate the presence of al-Qaeda again on Afghan soil is to ignore both the recent 

past and the evidence we see every day of collusion between these 

factions on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 

The cost of failure is then grave. That is why the President’s decision for an extended surge to Afghanistan of 30,000 additional 

forces is so important. It gets the most U.S. force into the fight as 

quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal everything he needs 

in 2010 to gain the initiative. It validates our adherence to a 

counterinsurgency approach, and it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible chance to set the security conditions for the 

Afghan people to see our commitment to their future; for the 

Karzai government to know our strong desire to see his promised 

reforms; for the Afghan Taliban to understand they will not, they 

cannot take back Afghanistan; and for those beyond Afghanistan 

who support the Taliban or would see the return of al-Qaeda to realize the futility of their pursuit. 

I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the 21,000 

troops the President ordered shortly after taking office, troops 

which have already made a huge difference in the southern 

Helmand Valley. 

But as I have testified before, Mr. Chairman, no amount of 

troops and no amount of time will ever be enough to completely 

achieve success in such a fight. They simply must be accompanied 

by good governance and healthy public administration. This, not 

troop numbers, is the area of my greatest concern. Like everyone 

else, I look forward to working with the Karzai government, but we 

must have the support of the interagency and international communities as well. 

And that brings me to my final point. The President’s new strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broad-based approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in isolation any 

22

more than he views the ties between al-Qaeda and the Taliban as 

superficial. He has called for stronger and more productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is likewise under threat 

from radical elements, and whose support remains vital to our ability to eliminate safe havens. He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort, more contributions by other NATO nations and 

a realistic plan to transition responsibilities to the Afghans. 

His is a more balanced, more flexible and more achievable strategy than we have had in the past, one based on pragmatism and 

real possibilities. And speaking for the 2.2 million men and women 

who must execute it and who, with their families, have borne the 

brunt of the stress and the strain of 8 years of constant combat, 

I support his decision, and I appreciate his leadership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]

23


53829c-1.eps
24


53829c-2.eps
25


53829c-3.eps
26


53829c-4.eps
27


53829c-5.eps
28

Chairman BERMAN. Well, I thank you and thank all of you. 

We have 2 hours to go at our distinguished witnesses. As is the 

custom, the gavel will go down after 5 minutes. Members can make 

comments; we can ask questions. As a matter of common courtesy, 

if we expect an answer to the question, we might give the witnesses something more than 71⁄2 seconds of that 5 minutes to answer. 

I yield myself 5 minutes. I would like to ask a couple of short 

questions and then a little more time on the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

relationship. 

First, and you sort of made it evident by your testimony, but, 

Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do you believe a civilian 

surge is an essential part of the President’s strategy? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Admiral MULLEN. Absolutely. 

Chairman BERMAN. Secretary Clinton, are you in a position at 

this time to know the resources you will need to accomplish this? 

Secretary CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, we do not know specifically, 

but we will be submitting budget requests in order to achieve the 

numbers that are going to be needed. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. 

Turning now to Afghanistan and Pakistan—that connection—the 

administration has described the current situation in Afghanistan 

as detrimental to the stability of Pakistan. It is publicly reported 

that elements of Pakistan’s intelligence service continue to have 

ties with a number of the insurgent groups that seek to destabilize 

Afghanistan. Don’t many in Pakistan see these groups as a means 

to maintain influence in Afghanistan? What incentive does Pakistan have to cut these ties and join us in going after these groups? 

We do know that the Pakistan military is conducting unprecedented operations in Waziristan, but the way it looks, these operations are focused on the Pakistani Taliban and not against those 

extremists and Taliban that are using Pakistan as a sanctuary to 

launch operations in Afghanistan and against our troops. Do you 

see evidence that Pakistan will act against these groups? And for 

whoever and how many of you care to respond to that. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I would say that, first of all, 

there is—one of the significant political developments in Pakistan 

over the last 7 or 8 months has been a strong shift in public opinion in support of the actions that the Pakistani Army is taking in—

first in Swat and now in South Waziristan. 

As I indicated earlier, there has developed over the last year a 

nexus between al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Tariki Taliban 

in Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and they are mutually 

reinforcing both in their narrative and in their operations. What 

we have seen is the Pakistani Army going after the Taliban and 

other extremists in western Pakistan. There is no question but 

what it has put pressure on some of the insurgent groups that are 

acting against the United States. A number of these people have 

fled from South Waziristan into North Waziristan, some may be 

going into Afghanistan. So there clearly is a value to what the 

Pakistanis are doing. 

The Pakistanis’ relationship with these groups dates back, frankly, to when I was dealing with them more than 20 years ago when 

29

we were taking on the Soviet Union in Pakistan. These relationships between the Pakistanis and these groups were established 

then as a vehicle for taking on the Soviets. They have maintained 

some of those contacts and those relationships, frankly, as a hedge 

because of their uncertainty whether the United States would be 

a reliable partner and ally for them going forward, and whether we 

would remain in Afghanistan until we were assured of success in 

taking care of the extremists. 

I think as we make progress and as they make progress, their 

incentive to change this approach to opt strategically to partner 

with the United States becomes significantly more powerful. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add that as I watch Pakistan, Mr. 

Chairman, that they have made great progress and great changes 

certainly compared to 12 months ago, and that from my perspective 

it is their view—how they will proceed will be based on in many 

ways how Afghanistan turns out. That is why stabilizing Afghanistan, having an Afghanistan that isn’t a threat to them, stability 

in the region, I think that offers great opportunity for them to continue to change and break some of these relationships or change 

some of these relationships over time. 

And I just remain extremely concerned about the collaboration—

the collaborative aspect of what has happened with all these separate terrorist groups over the last couple of years who have joined 

hands in ways that we just haven’t seen before. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much. My time is expired. 

The ranking member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you to our distinguished panelists today. 

In his speech the President stated, ‘‘We will pursue a military 

strategy that will break the Taliban’s momentum and increase Afghanistan’s capacity over the next 18 months.’’ How would we 

measure Taliban’s capabilities, and what are the specific indicators 

that we are monitoring to assess the Taliban momentum? And if 

the Taliban momentum is not broken within 18 months, what are 

our contingency plans? 

If you could care to comment on reports that U.S. assistance has 

made its way into Taliban coffers, what oversight mechanisms do 

we have in place to prevent funds from being diverted to pay for 

Taliban protection rackets, for example? 

Lastly on Iran, would you agree that Iran plays a destabilizing 

role related to the security and stability of Afghanistan? Would you 

agree that we have seen an increase in the level of support that 

Iran has provided to the Taliban and insurgent groups, including 

lethal aid? What is our strategy in Afghanistan as it relates to the 

threat posed by Iran? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary GATES. Let me take on the second and third parts of 

your question and ask Admiral Mullen to take on the first part. 

First of all, there is no question with respect to your second question. One of the concerns that I have, we talk about the narcotics 

trade being the source of a great deal of income for the Taliban 

and, frankly, also for corruption in Afghanistan. And one of my 

concerns is that another source of corruption and support for the 

30

Taliban, I fear, is the enormous amount of international money 

coming into Afghanistan through our own efforts and those of our 

partners in Afghanistan, the 42 other nations that are contributing 

troops, the hundreds of NGOs and international organizations and 

so on. 

There is a huge amount of money flowing into Afghanistan at 

this point, and one of the things that we have to think about is the 

way in which we approach our contracting, and the way we deal 

with the Afghan Government, and the way we use the funds that 

are available to us to reduce their contribution both to corruption 

and potentially some part of it flowing to the Taliban themselves. 

The place we can start is the place where we have control, and that 

is where we write the checks, so that is the place to start now. 

It has been a long day, so remind me of your third question. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is about the influence of Iran. We had 

talked about the Pakistan——

Secretary GATES. That is good enough. I would tell you that we 

do have evidence of Iranian involvement, particularly in the western part of Afghanistan. But I think based on the intelligence and 

the information available to us from our commanders, it is still a 

relatively small and not significant—making a relatively small and 

not significant contribution to the Taliban effort. 

I think that the Iranians are trying to straddle a very narrow divide. They want to support the Afghan Government, they want to 

have a friendly relationship with the Afghan Government, but 

there is no question they would like to inflict pain on us. And so 

I think trying to target their efforts in ways that are aimed at 

ISAF and not at the Afghan Government is what they are trying 

to do, but it is still at a very modest level. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And, Admiral Mullen, just how we can calibrate success? 

Admiral MULLEN. Ma’am, it happens through security, there is 

no question about that. And that is why flowing these forces as 

rapidly as we can, literally starting in a couple of weeks, but over 

the course of the next 6 or 7 months, is so critical. 

And in General McChrystal’s routine travel around the country, 

the elders tell him, the leaders tell him security is first. And 

through that comes training and equipping the Afghan security 

forces. And we will have very strong indicators over the next 12 to 

18 to 24 months where we stand with respect to that. 

And I really think it is a momentum piece. And we had an operation; there is a reconciliation, a reintegration piece of this as well, 

and we will know how well that is working. 

We had a situation a couple of weeks ago where upwards—you 

know, there were tens of Taliban who said, I am done. And there 

are a lot of people out there that are tired of fighting. And I am 

not basing it all on that. The point is that will be a piece of this 

as well. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, the 

gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

31

I am really struggling with this one. It seems a bunch of years 

ago I participated in a clunkers for cash program. My President 

sold me a clunker, and I paid for it with my children’s and my constituents’ children and grandchildren’s cash. We are still paying for 

that one. And I just want to make sure the best that I can that 

we are not buying another clunker. 

I am trying to think this thing through. I think the best I come 

up with is that we have a shack that is on fire, but it is located 

next to the dynamite factory. And the question that I think I know 

the answer to, but my constituents keep asking, is it worth risking 

the lives of those who respond to the fire in a place that may or 

may not hold a lot of value in and of itself, and what is going to 

be the result, and what would happen if we don’t respond to that? 

I guess the question I would ask is this: As of 8 o’clock last night, 

do we have a new war, or do we have an old war under new ownership, or is it the same war with a new management strategy to 

muscle up and have a more elegant exit plan? Maybe we could 

start with that. 

Secretary GATES. I think we have inherited the same war, but 

it is a dynamic war, and frankly the situation is getting worse. The 

fire is getting hotter. The situation in Pakistan, as we have seen 

in the last year or so, a number of terrorist bombings, a clear intent on the part of al-Qaeda to work with the Taliban in Pakistan 

to destabilize the Government of Pakistan with nuclear weapons 

and a much larger population. We have seen the Taliban, as Admiral Mullen said earlier, becoming more bold and more aggressive. 

And it is clear, I think, to the President and to the rest of us that 

we need to do something to change the dynamic, to change the momentum. And what I think the President has done is narrowed the 

mission. 

One of the concerns we had coming out of March, one of the concerns that I had, was that those decisions were interpreted by 

many as saying, well, we are going into full-scale nation building, 

and we are going to try and reestablish or establish a strong central government in Kabul. 

I think what we have done in this process, and one of the things 

that has taken us some time, is figuring out how to narrow the 

mission so that it is focused on the threat to the United States. 

How do we keep al-Qaeda and that terrorist nexus on that border 

from becoming an even greater danger to the United States? How 

do we disrupt them? How do we dismantle them? How do we defeat 

them? And the conclusion is we must stabilize the security situation in Afghanistan. 

Of course, we don’t need to build a 21st century country in Afghanistan to accomplish that objective. And so the purpose I think 

of what the President has announced is to narrow our mission, 

focus it on our security and as well the future of both Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. 

Secretary CLINTON. I think, Congressman, the process that we 

have gone through has been aimed at testing every assumption, 

asking all the hard questions. I think it is fair to say that if the 

President could have concluded that this was an old war that could 

be wound down and walked away from, that would certainly have 

been an easier choice. 

32

He is, as we all are, well aware of the political and the economic 

and the loss of young men and women that this decision presages. 

But the dynamite factory is there, and, unfortunately, it has been 

stocked with even more dynamite in the last couple of years, and 

therefore we think we have to address it. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The ranking member of the subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I believe that commitment is extremely important, and the civilian commitment the Secretary of State talked about is important, 

but they have to be covered by the military. And today, at 12:59 

p.m., Admiral Mullen said, in part, that by roughly the July time 

frame we will have 20 to 25,000 troops in theater, and there will 

be 5,000 troops, Marines that will be over there very shortly. 

Now, if the time frame is correct in my mind, the President has 

indicated he wants to start removing troops in July 2011, and you 

are telling us that they are not going to be there until July 2010. 

That gives 1 year before they start removing the troops. 

Now, I understand that this can be adjusted, and the witnesses 

have indicated that this can be adjusted if the need arises, but 

what kind of a signal does it send to the Taliban and al-Qaeda 

when you know that the troops aren’t going to be there until July 

and you are going to start moving them out 1 year from then? 

Even if you reassess, you have given them a time frame within 

which to work. And I just think that is a terrible mistake. 

And, you know, there is another issue that I want to raise. Last 

night, I was watching my good friend, Representative Poe, on the 

floor; and he raised an issue that has not been talked about in the 

media very much. You know, back in World War II, if the Japanese 

had killed and mutilated four Americans, hung them from a bridge, 

and then we captured one of the people that did that, one of the 

ringleaders and they got a split lip and a smack in the stomach, 

I don’t think they would have been court-martialed. I think if the 

Germans in World War II had killed and mutilated American 

troops and hung them from a bridge and somebody busted them in 

the mouth when they captured them, they wouldn’t have been 

court-martialed. 

And yet, right now, one of the ringleaders of al-Qaeda, Ahmed 

Hashim Abed, was captured in Operation Amber. He was wanted 

for the murder of four U.S. contractors in Fallujah that were mutilated and hung, dragged through the streets and hung from the 

bridge there, and those Navy Seals that captured him in Operation 

Amber on December the 7th, the day we were attacked at Pearl 

Harbor, are going to be court-martialed. 

I think that is insane. What kind of a message are we sending 

to our troops in the field when they do their duty, risk their lives, 

capture a terrorist that is wanted, one of the top 10 terrorists, and 

we are going to court-martial them? 

I don’t care if they broke the guy’s nose or broke both his arms 

and his legs. This is insane. The troops need to know there is total 

commitment by the people of this country and the military leaders. 

And for us to start court-martialing people who capture a leader in 

33

al-Qaeda who mutilated Americans and hung them from a bridge 

and we are going to court-martial them for capturing this guy and 

punching him in the stomach and giving him a broken lip? This is 

crazy. 

We need to send a signal we are going to do whatever is necessary to protect our troops and protect the people of this country 

in this war against terror. And I hope that you will be able to give 

me a satisfactory answer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as 

to why these gentlemen are being court-martialed. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I have great faith in our judicial system. 

Mr. BURTON. But why are they being court-martialed in the first 

place? 

Admiral MULLEN. I have got great combat leaders out there, 

great leaders in the SEAL community specifically that I have tremendous faith in; and I await the results of whatever that leadership recommends and the procedures that would follow. And I 

wouldn’t be involved in any more, in any way, shape, or form, in 

those proceedings. It would be improper for me to get involved in 

any way, shape, or form at this point. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just follow up by saying, sir, I think it is 

improper that these men are being court-martialed after capturing 

this guy in Operation Amber and him having a split lip and getting—and was hit in the stomach. Because that is what we were 

told happened. And if security is job one, then I think an artificial 

timeline in Afghanistan is improper as well. It sends the wrong signal, in my opinion, to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

Respond if you like. You have 23 seconds to respond, if you like. 

Admiral MULLEN. The timeline is one that gets—the decision is 

one that gets forces there very, very rapidly. The decision, the 

timeline in July is set to transition, transfer security responsibility, 

start to do that, and transition. And it will be a responsible transition, and it will be based on conditions on the ground. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The representative from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, I would like to personally express the deepest 

gratitude and appreciation to you and your office for the splendid 

assistance that was given after the recent crisis in the earthquake 

and the tsunami in the Samoan Islands. I deeply appreciate that. 

There was an article last month in the Washington Post which 

expressed some concerns that Ambassador Eikenberry had given, 

to the fact that his feeling was that if we increase our force structure in Afghanistan it will mean that the government will be more 

dependent on our support and our assistance. And I guess out of 

frustration President Karzai was noted in the same article in the 

Washington Post, and I quote: ‘‘U.S. Officials were particularly irritated by an interview this week in which a defiant Karzai said that 

the West has little interest in Afghanistan and that its troops are 

there only for self-serving reasons.’’

And the quote from President Karzai was, ‘‘The West is not here 

primarily for the sake of Afghanistan. It is here to fight terrorism. 

The United States and its allies came to Afghanistan after SepVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
34

tember 11th. Afghanistan was troubled like hell before that, too. 

Nobody bothered about us.’’

And I guess there is a sense of negligence that we had given because we were focused on Iraq and the problems that we have encountered there in that terrible conflict. What is your sense on this, 

Secretary Gates? Is there some truth in President Karzai’s sense 

of frustration that after 6 or 7 years’ absence all of a sudden we 

refocused, now suggesting Afghanistan is a very important issue 

for us to consider as far as our national security is concerned? 

Secretary GATES. I think the frustration on the part not just of 

the Afghans but also on the part of the Pakistanis does not refer 

just to the last few years but rather goes back to 1989, where one 

of the major proponents in this House of providing support to the 

mujahedin to take on the Soviet Union similarly took on the cause 

of trying to provide additional U.S. help and support after the Soviets left. And of course I am talking about Charlie Wilson. And 

there is no question in my mind, and I have said before publicly 

that I was in the administration, I was the deputy of national security at the time, had the——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, I didn’t mean to 

interrupt, but my time is so limited. Would you basically agree——

Secretary GATES. My point is their frustration dates from 1989, 

not from 2003. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And the frustration is well taken. I mean, 

there is some truth in what——

Secretary GATES. Absolutely. And that is why the emphasis in 

the President’s policy on a long-term relationship with both of 

these countries. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Okay. General Petraeus appeared before a 

joint committee hearing that we had a couple years ago, and I expressed some real serious concern about the strained—severely 

strained military force structure that we currently have. Nobody 

wants to talk about the draft. We are going to be putting in an additional $30 billion for these 30,000 soldiers and about 100,000 soldiers that we are going to be sending to Afghanistan. Are we still 

working on the cheap as far as sending this number of soldiers? 

Some have estimated it is going to take a lot more than 100,000 

soldiers from the U.S. 

Secretary GATES. Let me make two quick comments and then 

turn it to Admiral Mullen. 

First, the previous administration and this administration have 

significantly increased the size of the Army and the Marine Corps, 

65,000 for the Army, 27,000 for the Marine Corps, another 22,000 

for the Army just a few months ago. So we have tried to put in 

place some measures that will relieve the strain. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And on the voluntary force structure, if I 

might add also, we have had to use about 30 percent of our National Guard and Ready Reserves to assist in fighting the war in 

Iraq. And is this really the intended purpose of our reserves, to 

fight a war? Admiral? 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, from what I have seen, I mean, the National Guard and Reserves have contributed at such high levels we 

would not be where we are. They actually are enthusiastic about 

this. 

35

We have to achieve a balance. We can’t deploy them in some 

cases as frequently as we have, although I don’t think we are that 

far off. And I do think there is no question that the additional force 

structure that has been added over the last couple of years has 

made a huge difference, and I think it is about right. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to identify myself with the remarks of 

Mr. Burton concerning court-martial of our military personnel who 

were involved in the capturing of terrorists. What we need to say 

very clearly, either we support our troops or we don’t send them 

in. And, quite frankly, we shouldn’t send them into a no-win situation. And I believe what I have heard today and heard from the 

President last night is not a strategy that will bring any type of 

victory to our efforts there in Afghanistan. 

Let’s note that there was a quick defeat of the Taliban after 9/11, 

and that was a tremendous, low-cost victory, and it was not accomplished by U.S. troops. It was accomplished with only 200 U.S. 

troops on the ground when Kabul was liberated from the Taliban. 

The rest of the fighting was done and almost all of the fighting was 

done by the Northern Alliance, which was basically mobilized village militias. 

In the aftermath of that great victory, and contrary to their traditions and their culture, we, the United States Government, forced 

a centralized Kabul-based government structure on the Afghans, 

and then our military took over the fighting. It was a strategy that 

has not worked. And what we hear today, Madam Secretary, with 

all due respect, it just seems to me that we have got the same policy that has not worked with perhaps a few more troops, perhaps 

some more money, but basically the same strategy that has not 

worked. But yet we are going to send 30,000 more of our boys and 

women into Afghanistan to do the fighting that should be done and 

could be done by the Afghan villagers themselves. 

I wonder if any of you have read—and I submit this, Mr. Chairman, for the record—a report by Major Jim Gant. Have any of you 

read this report? It is a report—he was embedded in the villages 

in Afghanistan. He comes up with a strategy that will work. And 

what will not work is simply having more U.S. combat troops doing 

the fighting or building, which we heard here today, this centralized Afghan military that is based in Kabul, the Karzai military establishment. We are going to bolster that and we are going to expect that that is going to bring the villagers and the tribal people 

over to our side? That is going to drive them into the arms of the 

Taliban, just like if we just sent in more U.S. troops to do the fighting. 

[NOTE: The report referred to, ‘‘A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan, One Tribe at a Time,’’ by Major Jim Gant, United States 

Army Special Forces, is not reprinted here but is available in committee records.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Again, why is it—what is different about 

what the President has said? Even today I don’t hear anything difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

ferent. But maybe a different facade, but it is the same old policy. 

U.S. troops do the fighting. 

Americans are war weary of doing the fighting for other people. 

We would not have succeeded originally in Afghanistan had we 

sent in all of these major military combat units and done the fighting against the Taliban originally. So if it wouldn’t work then, how 

come it is going to work now? 

Secretary GATES. Two quick points. 

First, there is recognition in the President’s decisions of the importance of working with the locals. And I personally think that a 

big part of our progress going forward, particularly in terms of 

being able to transition responsibility for security to the Afghans, 

is not necessarily the Afghan National Army or even the police but 

local law enforcement, local police, local security people who are 

working with the government. They may not be in a chain of command, if you will, but clearly a major part of the President’s strategy is more attention to the subnational government, to working 

with the tribes, working with the villagers. 

And the second point——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Those are words. Those are words. But we 

haven’t changed the structure a bit. 

The provincial leaders are basically appointed by Kabul. Our 

State Department insisted on a centralized structure that is totally 

contrary to Afghan tradition. Then we expect that the Afghan people are just going to swallow it, especially when their government 

is so corrupt they can’t even have an honest election? How can we 

expect our men and women to go over there and put their lives on 

the line when we haven’t been willing to actually be tough with 

Karzai and force the restructuring of that system so it is more consistent with what the Afghan culture is all about? 

Secretary GATES. We have to build consonant with the Afghan 

culture. And I think one of the things we have talked about is focusing our efforts in dealing with the existing tribal and other—

and local structures, and trying to strengthen them rather than 

build something new. 

Second, a big part of the President’s strategy is, frankly, training 

up the Afghan Army as quickly as possible so that they can take 

over responsibility for the security from our troops. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

I certainly would like to say that, you know, if we had done the 

right thing before we had gone into Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

where Osama bin Laden was and al-Qaeda, we would not be in the 

situation we are in today. We have the shock and awe, we go into 

Iraq, it had nothing to do with al-Qaeda, and now we find ourselves 

stuck in Afghanistan. 

They criticized President Obama for taking a long time to come 

up with this plan and then secondly criticized him for having a 

date to come out. President Bush said that the mission was accomplished after 3 months, and we are still in Iraq. At least President 

Obama knows when he has a plan, and it wasn’t 3 months after 

we go into Iraq that we get on an aircraft carrier saying the misVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
37

sion is accomplished and we are still there. So I don’t think there 

is any comparison. 

Secondly, we talk about the cost. We had a President that reduced taxes at a time we are increasing the war, and now we wonder why we are in this dilemma and all this criticism. I don’t like 

the increase in troops. I don’t think we can win a war in Afghanistan. I think that we have to hopefully transition the Afghans to 

be able to be trained, as it has been indicated, and fight for themselves. 

We have three choices: One, stay the course and go nowhere. 

Two, withdraw and be criticized. Three, to increase troops. I mean, 

he had to pick one of the three, and so we made this one. But we 

have to quickly transition into having the Afghans take care of 

themselves, and I hope that that will happen. 

I wonder, finally, if in your opinion do you believe that this time 

up until June 2011 is enough time? 

And, secondly, I would like to mention that I would hope that we 

would also focus on other areas where al-Qaeda is coming in, like 

in Somalia. If we stay there and do not put in the assets, we are 

going to have the same problem with Kenya and Eritrea and Ethiopia there. If we stand up Sheik Sharif’s militia now, we can prevent the al-Shabab and Hezbollah from taking over Somalia. We 

can prevent a lot of money being spent and destabilizing all of East 

Africa. So I would hope we would giving give that some consideration. 

What about the fact do we have enough time and manpower to 

train the Afghans to prevent our troops from being in harm’s way 

and have them take over? Because, like I said, I just feel very troubled that more American troops are going to be sent into Afghanistan. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I share your concern about other places 

where al-Qaeda is growing. Somalia and Yemen are two in particular, although their core leadership and their heart really beats 

in that border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why it 

is so critical. 

With respect to enough time, the entire military chain of command believes, including the Joint Chiefs, that we will know where 

we are by summer of 2011 whether we can succeed here or not. 

And that we know we have got to get these forces in. We have to 

secure—turn the security situation around. It is really under that 

umbrella that we will be able to develop the Afghan security forces, 

the Army, and the police. 

We have got goals set to do that. There are some challenges associated with that. There is some significant risks associated with 

that. But we really think this is the right answer and that in fact 

is the way that we turn their own country over to themselves. Actually, in many ways not unlike Iraq. 

We don’t underestimate the challenge. But that really is the 

path, and we think there is enough time between now and then to 

really step out in that direction and know whether we are going 

to make it or not. 

Mr. PAYNE. Just a last question, is there any way we can impress 

Pakistan that India is not their biggest enemy about Kashmir and 

38

have Pakistan concentrate more on Pakistan and stop worrying 

about India and some India and Pakistan conflict? 

Admiral MULLEN. President Obama in March, his strategy then 

focused—and I was a big supporter of this—on the region and 

greatly focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it really is the 

region. And India is a big player in that region as well. And I think 

all of us international players, particularly the regional players, 

have to take steps to stabilize. And the relationship between Pakistan and India is critical and leadership there must I think step 

forward to stabilize that border more than anything else. And I 

think that would be a great step forward in stabilizing the region. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

I would ask the witnesses this. General McChrystal notes in his 

assessment that the Afghan insurgency is clearly supported from 

Pakistan and that insurgent groups are reportedly aided by some 

elements of Pakistan’s ISI. Now, for the longest time, as I can remember, we have had a dysfunctional relationship with Pakistan 

in which many of the presumptions that the Pakistani ISI or intelligence service have made have not actually been in the interests 

of Pakistan, such as originally training and recruiting the Taliban. 

Now we face a situation where the Taliban not only is a threat 

to Afghanistan but is also a threat to Pakistan. And since Pakistan 

has 100 nuclear weapons, that becomes quite problematic since alQaeda wants to get its hands on these nuclear weapons. 

I guess at the end of the day the question is, what are we prepared to do to bring pressure to bear on that government in Pakistan to assure that they do not continue this practice of allowing 

the Taliban that kind of sanctuary, or at least support for certain 

elements of the Taliban inside Afghanistan? 

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, that is obviously a critical 

question. Here is how we see it. 

We think that in the last year the Pakistanis have really stepped 

up. Their military action against the Pakistan Taliban in both 

Swat and South Waziristan is an abrupt about face from their prior 

policies. And it has been a unifying policy, supported by the people 

of Pakistan. So they have taken an important first step, but they 

need to take more steps in their own best interests. And that is the 

case we have been making to them, that there has to be a recognition of the connection between those elements of the Taliban who 

have attacked their military headquarters, their intelligence headquarters, indiscriminately killed and maimed so many hundreds of 

Pakistanis and all the other elements of this syndicate of terrorism. 

Obviously, we think al-Qaeda is not only the inspiration but the 

funder, the equipper, the trainer, the planner. And so our task, 

which Admiral Mullen has been particularly and deeply involved 

in, is to make that case. 

And so, if I could, let me turn to Admiral Mullen. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I am just going to ask another question and 

make the point that I don’t think to date we have been very effective in bringing the type of pressure to bear on Pakistan, and I 

would suggest that all of us think anew about a strategy that 

might work. 

39

Now let me bring up the other point which was touched on earlier. But that is the report that Navy SEALs secretly captured one 

of the most-wanted terrorists in Iraq. The consequences of that, 

when they captured him, they are now facing charges because reportedly he told—the terrorist told the investigators he was 

punched by his captors and he had a bloody lip to prove it. So the 

three SEALs, Navy elite commando unit members, they have refused nonjudicial punishment. They called a captain’s mast. They 

requested a trial by court-martial, is basically what has happened. 

And their attorney is saying, ‘‘I don’t know how they are going to 

bring this detainee to the United States and give us our constitutional right to confrontation in the courtroom.’’

But, again, we have terrorists getting their constitutional rights 

in New York City, but I suspect that they are going to deny these 

SEALs their right to confrontation in a military courtroom in Virginia, which is what the SEALs are requesting. 

The question I would put to Admiral Mullen, and certainly to 

Secretary Gates, goes to the issue of rules of engagement. When we 

are at war with terrorists abroad and you have the types of rules 

of engagement being dictated to our troops and you have this kind 

of action against our Navy SEALs at a time when we are talking 

about trying to stop the insurgency in Afghanistan, I do not think 

it is helpful. And I would like to hear any commentary on your part 

about what could be done on the issue of bringing terrorists to trial 

in New York City while the constitutional rights of our own American servicemen, in my view, are being violated. 

Chairman BERMAN. Unfortunately, the time has expired. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. It hangs out there. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. 

And, first, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your very kind 

words earlier in the hearing; and I very much want to acknowledge 

what I think is an extraordinary privilege for all of us, to serve on 

this committee, particularly with your leadership and the leadership of Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. Both of you exhibit the kind 

of character that I think the American people justly deserve. 

I also very quickly would just simply say that I have cherished 

the opportunity to develop wonderful friendships not only with my 

fellow Democrats but with so many Republicans as well who I 

deeply respect, and I think the American people should understand 

the degree of respect and camaraderie that exists on this committee and that they are well served by it. 

If I may, to Secretary Clinton and Secretary——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? I ask that the 

gentleman’s full time be restored. 

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, he is entitled to respond to the criticisms of him that were made earlier. 

Mr. WEXLER. Once you say you are leaving, people are much 

nicer to you here. 

If I may, to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, this morning 

when you appeared before the Senate and Senator McCain, in his 

usual eloquent and sincere fashion, questioned you, he seemed to 

40

be making the point that the President’s creation of a timetable for 

transition and the consideration of conditions on the ground are 

mutually exclusive points of reference; and it would seem to me in 

the manner in which the President has constructed his plan that 

in fact that is not, respectfully to Senator McCain, the case and 

that the way the plan is constructed that both the creation of a 

timetable for transition and the consideration of conditions on the 

ground in fact will happen together. And I was wondering if you 

could explain that so that there will not be any confusion in that 

regard. 

Secretary GATES. The President was very clear last night that 

his decision is that we should begin the transition to Afghan security control in July 2011. The key word here is ‘‘begin.’’ This will 

be a process. And it will look a lot like Iraq, where some districts 

and provinces will be able to be turned over fairly quickly, with us 

in a tactical and then strategic overwatch, sort of the cavalry over 

the hill, if you will, for a time, and that that will spread in the 

country. 

And so you will have situations where security control has 

been—responsibility has been taken over by the Afghans in one set 

of districts or one province, while there is still heavy combat going 

on in other provinces that are more contested with the Taliban. 

The key here is, and one of the things that was central to our 

deliberations, how do you demonstrate resolve and at the same 

time convey a sense of urgency to the Afghans that they must step 

up to the plate and begin to take responsibility for their own security and to protect their own country against these extremists? 

And I think that, you know, the interesting thing for me, appearing before the Congress now on my second surge, is that the Bush 

administration accepted firm deadlines for the withdrawal of U.S. 

forces in Iraq. The President is suggesting and is proposing a 

timeline for the beginning of a transition of responsibility for security in Afghanistan. We will review this formally in December 2010 

and decide then whether our strategy is working and whether we 

think we are in a position whether we need to make adjustments. 

But the President’s clear intent and his decision is that we will 

begin that process. 

But the key is to realize that—I guess another point I would 

make is that, in Iraq, as soon as the surge was clearly going to be 

successful, the Iraqis wanted us out as quickly as possible. That is 

not entirely clear in Afghanistan. The Afghans live in a very tough 

neighborhood. They have been at war for 30 years. It would be understandable if they would enjoy having the United States Army 

and Marine Corps there for an extended period of time to provide 

protection. 

We are not prepared to do that, and so what the President has 

tried do is set in place something that demonstrates resolve on the 

one hand but on the other puts the Afghans on notice that they 

need to step up the recruitment of their soldiers and their police. 

They need to get them trained, they need to get them experienced 

in combat, partnering with us, and then they need to begin to take 

responsibility. And we will do this in a gradual and conditionsbased way. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. 

41

And if you could share with us the administration’s expectation 

as to the participation of our NATO allies, given the President’s 

speech last night. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. We are encouraged by the response of 

a lot of our NATO–ISAF allies. We have 43 countries that are 

troop-contributing countries. Working with the Secretary General 

of NATO, I will be going to NATO tomorrow to be there on Friday 

in Brussels. We anticipate a significant commitment of additional 

forces by our NATO–ISAF partners, as well as additional money. 

Because, of course, we want to establish a robust trust fund for 

both the Afghan National Army and the police so that the funding 

needs can be not only carried out in the next couple of years but 

be maintained after that. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul. 

Mr. PAUL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I welcome the panel today. I wish I could promise you an eloquent statement where I could convert all of you to a noninterventionist foreign policy and a policy where we are not nation building, 

but I don’t think I can promise you that. 

I wish I could come up with some profound questions for the 

panel so that I could point out the inconsistencies not of the current foreign policy but the foreign policy that has been going on for 

quite a few decades. 

But all I can think about are some terms that come to mind that 

I have learned all the way back in the 1960s when I was serving 

as a military officer, an Air Force officer for 5 years; and I come 

up with thoughts: Quagmire, perpetual war for perpetual peace, 

war is the health of the state, war is a racket, truth is the first 

casualty of war. And I think there is some profoundness to that, 

and I had to plagiarize them. Those are not my thoughts. 

But today we are in a mess, and we are trying to figure out how 

to do it. We had a war going on for 8 years, and I think it has a 

lot to do with the way we get into the wars, and then we try to 

justify why we are there later on. 

One thing that almost all debates are prefaced by is don’t come 

off as an extremist. Can we have a military victory? Have 500,000 

troops go in there and win like we used to? No, that is off base. 

But do you want to just come home? No, that is not allowed. We 

have to have this balancing act, which guarantees the politicizing 

of the war. 

This is why we end up with courts-martial and arguments that 

are justified. We end up with military tribunals and secret prisons, 

because we are not precise of what our goals are and why we are 

involved, and I think that is the biggest problem that we have. And 

what we need to do I think is try to be more precise about why 

we are going to war. 

Now, the question I have for the panel, and I hope each and 

every one of you can answer this question, is I would like to know 

whether or not you endorse the Bush doctrine. Ironically, last night 

the speech was given, which truly was eloquent, but it was given 

in the same place that the former President gave a speech in 2002 

and emphasized a profound, dramatic change in our attitude toVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
42

ward the world. And it is recognized now as the Bush Doctrine. I 

think it is something, maybe one of the most important events in 

our history when it comes down to foreign policy. 

So each and every one of you, do you endorse the Bush Doctrine 

of preventive war or do you reject it? 

Secretary GATES. I think that the term ‘‘preventive war’’ is a very 

important one, because it differentiates from preemptive war. A 

preemptive war in my view is one where you know you are about 

to be attacked and you strike first. My personal view is that the 

standard for intelligence and for confidence for preventive war is 

an extraordinarily high one; and there are very, very few instances 

where I think it is justified. If the experience of the last 8 years 

has taught us anything, it is to reaffirm the historic lesson that 

war is inherently unpredictable. 

Mr. PAUL. Okay. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I think that Secretary 

Gates draws an important distinction. There are times when it is 

appropriate for a country to protect itself from what it knows would 

be a devastating attack. But that standard should be so high, and 

obviously we didn’t see that standard met in the last 8 years. But 

let me just add that is not the situation in Afghanistan. We were 

attacked from Afghanistan. So even if the doctrine is or is not an 

appropriate one, it is not applicable to the situation before us. 

Mr. PAUL. But we were never attacked by an Afghani. 

Secretary CLINTON. That is not true. Al-Qaeda was embedded in 

Afghan society. It was given safe haven by Mullah Omar and the 

Taliban leadership. They were given a chance to turn over alQaeda and bin Laden before we attacked them, and they refused. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our minimum objective in Afghanistan is so uninspiring that no 

one will embrace it or acknowledge that we have actually achieved 

it. That minimum objective is to make sure that Afghan territory 

is not used for a successful major attack against the United States 

and to achieve that objective 1 day at a time. 

It may also be our minimum objective to make sure Afghan territory is not used successfully to destabilize Pakistan; and we have 

achieved that 1 day at a time for many years with a much, much 

smaller force than we have at the present time, let alone planned. 

There is a bolder objective, and that is that we achieve our minimum objective without having to have troops there, that we have 

a functioning Afghan Army achieving that goal or those two goals 

for us. And then there is the maximum objective of a functioning, 

perhaps even democratic Afghan state. 

We have rejected the idea of a smaller number of troops for a 

longer number of days because it clashes not so much with our 

strategic objectives but with our national culture. Playing defense 

and having to do it for as long as you have something to defend 

may be the Roman way; it is not the American way. 

I have got a number of questions, and I will ask for responses 

for the record if time doesn’t permit. But I will start with the Admiral. 

43

This plan is based on roughly 5,000 additional allied troops, 

which may or may not materialize. If we don’t get but a small percentage of those 5,000 troops, do we need to abandon this plan? Do 

we need to put in more American troops? Or are those 5,000 really 

not essential? 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, every indication I have—and this isn’t 

hope, this has been through an awful lot of work—that we are 

going to achieve some level of increased support from NATO sort 

of at the minimum levels of 5,000, and it could be more than that. 

And that has been worked by myself, Secretary Clinton, Secretary 

Gates, Admiral Stavridis, Secretary General Rasmussen. And so I 

am confident that we will see some level—at least some level 

around that number. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you relying on any French troops as part of 

that total? 

Admiral MULLEN. I wouldn’t speak to any specific country right 

now. They have to speak for themselves. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The risk of the strategy that is being announced 

is that we are telling the American people there will come a day 

when we don’t need to have any troops in Afghanistan. Now, if the 

strategy works, we are going to have a functioning government in 

Afghanistan sometime after the middle of 2011, and that will prevent the Taliban’s return. But the achievement of that strategy is 

outside the control of the United States. It relies in large part on 

the Afghan people and the Karzai government, which may be as 

bad as detractors indicate. 

Secretary Clinton, are we prepared to go to the American people 

and say we tried counterinsurgency, it didn’t work, not a fault of 

the U.S. military, and that we are returning to counterterrorism? 

Or are we promising the American people that by 2012, 2013 we 

will be out of Afghanistan? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I think it is important to 

draw the contrast between combat troops and between support 

troops, the kind that would be continuing to train, provide logistics, 

perhaps intelligence, airlift, the support that the Afghans might 

need going forward. 

We have certainly determined that we have to stand up the Afghan security forces as quickly and effectively as possible so that 

the combat mission can transition. That is exactly what we are attempting to do. But there may well be in the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Secretary, if I may interrupt and rephrase 

my question. Let’s not talk then about whether we still have troops 

on the ground but whether we are still sustaining casualties every 

day or every week. What if in 2013, 2014 the Afghan Government 

isn’t doing what we want and the only way to have counterterrorism is to incur casualties? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I am not going to speculate about what is going to happen in 2013 or 2014. I happen to 

believe that as we implement the strategy that the President outlined last night we will change the reality on the ground. We will 

improve the chances of success in this mission. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I can only wish you well. 

I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

44

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake. 

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chair. I thank the witnesses. 

First, I want to compliment the administration for taking the 

time to study this. I know there has been some criticism about the 

length of time that it took. That has not come from me. I think we 

would do well to study and deliberate more around here. 

Having said that, when you look at the policy that was enunciated last night, there is an old adage that a camel is a horse designed by committee. And in many ways I think this looks to be 

a policy designed by committee, a little something for everybody. 

For those who want to get out, there is the timetable. For those 

who want to get in, we have the surge. But it may not work very 

well. 

How would you respond, Secretary Clinton, to that assertion that 

this smacks of the problems of policy designed by committee? 

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, camels are very sturdy animals. They are patient and may be plodding, but they eventually 

get to where you hope they will arrive. I think that this policy is 

the result of a very intense discussion that questioned every assumption, that put everything on the table, that invited the most 

vigorous debate. 

I think, as Admiral Mullen said, for those of us who participated 

in I think it was ten meetings with the President and probably 

three times that many among ourselves, it was an exhausting and 

thorough process that led us to the decision that the President announced last night. 

I don’t think any of us believed that there were any easy or simple or quick options that we thought responsibly could be adopted. 

This is the best result of all of our efforts. And I am sure that there 

are many who can, you know, pick at it, but I think that it reflects 

an extraordinarily honest assessment. 

And I think the time frame, which is often at the core of the concerns people reflect, is intended to do two things, because there are 

so many audiences for this policy. It is intended to send a message 

of both resolve and urgency. The resolve that we are committed, we 

are going to put additional troops in, our young men and women. 

We want a long-term civilian commitment. But that there is an urgency to this, that we cannot just have the Americans and our 42 

other nation contributors bear this burden, that the Afghans, both 

governmentally and among the people, have to step up. And that 

is what we are attempting to deliver here, and we will be assessing 

it very closely for the months ahead. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you. 

In terms of that assessment, General Jones said just less than 

2 months ago in answer to a question on CNN, well, I think this 

is one of the central issues that, you know, obviously the good news 

is that Americans should feel good about is that in Afghanistan 

that the al-Qaeda presence is very diminished. The maximum estimate is less than a hundred operating in the country. No bases, no 

ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies. He says the 

problem is with sanctuaries across the border. He said, ‘‘But I don’t 

foresee the return of the Taliban; and I want to be clear that Afghanistan is no longer in danger, imminent danger of falling.’’

45

Now, if you have a statement like that, it might suggest caution 

in inserting 30,000 more troops. And then 1 year from now, or 18 

months from now, in July 2011, what constitutes success? Is it 50, 

a maximum of 50 al-Qaeda operating in Afghanistan? And if we already acknowledge that Afghanistan is not in danger, imminent 

danger of falling, what constitutes success in July when we are 

going to decide whether we should pull troops out or not? Secretary 

Gates. 

Secretary GATES. I think no one thinks the government in Kabul 

is in imminent risk of being overthrown. But it was certainly the 

conclusion of General McChrystal’s assessment that the situation 

was serious and deteriorating. And we have seen the Taliban get 

more aggressive and more bold with each passing week. 

What we want to do is, in helping the Afghans, make sure that 

that government doesn’t fall and that we are able to sustain a 

friendly government in Kabul that will help us deny al-Qaeda a 

safe haven. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank all 

our distinguished witnesses for testifying. 

I listened very carefully to the President’s speech last night, and 

I am willing to give the President the benefit of the doubt. But my 

fear, as is the fear of so many others, is that we could easily get 

bogged down in an endless war. 

What happens if this doesn’t work? Do we leave in 3 years, as 

the President is stating, or do we stay longer? What happens if 

General McChrystal makes another public speech saying that he 

needs 10,000 more troops in attempting to back the President into 

a corner? What do we do then? 

We talk about Afghanistan and Pakistan. I noted that just last 

week their representatives abstained in the recent resolution, the 

IAEA resolution critical of Iran’s nuclear program. If these are our 

allies, I hate to see what our enemies think. So there are all these 

questions. 

And, finally—and I would like anyone to comment on anything 

I have said—where is Osama bin Laden and why can’t we seem to 

get him? If we are relying on our intelligence to tell us that this 

is what we should be doing next in Afghanistan and our intelligence can’t even tell us where he is—there was a recent Senate 

report that says shortly after the war in Afghanistan began we had 

Osama bin Laden and we let him slip through our fingers—how 

much can we count on our intelligence now when we can’t even 

capture one guy in 8 years? 

Admiral MULLEN. Let me start with the last one first. 

Actually, there has been a considerable diminishment of alQaeda over the last couple of years in terms of their leadership, obviously not bin Laden or Zawahiri specifically. And what I have 

learned over the years, and particularly in the last several years, 

is individuals like him—and it is not unique, quite frankly, to him 

in this area—that their job one for them is survival, and they do 

it really well. And so it is not—and we have good intelligence and 

good agencies, and it has improved a great deal, and I rely on them 

46

tremendously. That said, it is still a big problem. And it doesn’t 

mean we are not trying to find him and the rest of the leadership. 

With respect to—I am sorry—the first part of your question? 

Mr. ENGEL. Getting bogged down in an endless war. 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. It is just not going to happen. It is 

very clear—this President has said it, the military leadership understands it—that this is not open-ended, and we are not going to 

escalate. We believe that these troops, this strategy, the civilian 

surge that goes with it, the opportunity we have because Pakistan 

is making progress, we have got a new President in Afghanistan, 

we have got the right leadership on the ground, we have got the 

right leadership in the embassy, that now is the time and we can 

actually turn this thing around. And so I don’t have an expectation 

that we are going to get bogged down there or that there will be 

requests for any additional troops. 

Mr. ENGEL. Secretary Clinton? 

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, I think that your focus on bin 

Laden is absolutely appropriate. I share your frustration that 8 

years from the attack that devastated New York has not led to the 

killing or capturing of bin Laden and his principal lieutenants. 

As Admiral Mullen said, we have degraded their leadership, we 

have been successful in going after a number of the mainstays of 

his organization, but we haven’t gotten him, and we haven’t gotten 

Zawahiri, and we haven’t gotten Mullah Omar. And I think that 

that has to be a primary goal of what it is we are doing. And it 

certainly is for me, and I think it is for the President, and part of 

the strategy that we are unfolding we think will assist us. 

And I would just add that, you know, this strategy has been 

largely on the military side influenced by General Petraeus and 

General McChrystal, one of whom is our foremost expert on 

counterinsurgency, the other on counterterrorism; and I think that 

there is reason to put a lot of stock in their opinion. 

Secretary GATES. I would just add one thing. The President gives 

the orders, but every man and woman that is deployed overseas is 

deployed over my signature. And if I came to conclude that we 

were bogged down and stalemated and we were sending young men 

and women into a maw with no purpose and no hope of success, 

I wouldn’t sign any more of those orders. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I welcome this distinguished panel. I thank you all for your service to the United States, and I greet you with respect. 

Specifically, I have a question I want to direct first to Secretary 

Gates and then to Admiral Mullen having to do with some military 

aspects and issues arising out of the President’s address last night. 

First, let me say I, like many have said before, I welcome the 

President’s call for reinforcements; I appreciate the President’s embrace of this same surge strategy that worked in Iraq. Despite the 

fact that, as a candidate, the President opposed it, and I think 

every Democrat on this committee opposed it, the surge worked. 

47

And as a point of clarification to Secretary Gates, you said this 

is your ‘‘second surge,’’ I think that is an affirmation of that assertion that I made. 

But I want to specifically talk about this issue of timetables for 

withdrawal and get your reaction. You made mention earlier that 

the Bush administration did embrace a timetable for withdrawal. 

Of course, that was after the surge worked. When President Bush 

announced the surge in Iraq, he did not announce a timetable for 

withdrawal. The timetable was negotiated in the status of forces 

agreement following what was universally accepted to be the success of the surge. 

And so my question is really about this business of timetables. 

Because my Democratic colleagues I think made more than a dozen 

efforts in 2007 and 2008 to impose specific timetables for withdrawal on our efforts in Iraq, fortunately unsuccessfully on the 

floor. And the President made reference to July, 2011. 

Secretary Gates, you said in April 2007 with regard to Iraq, ‘‘I 

have been pretty clear that I think the enactment of specific deadlines would be a bad mistake.’’

In September of this year, you told CNN, ‘‘I think the notion of 

timelines and exit strategies and so on, frankly, I think would be 

a strategic mistake.’’

I am someone who believes it never makes sense to tell the 

enemy when you are going to quit fighting in a war. Mr. Secretary, 

I wondered if you might elaborate on that—and then I have a quick 

question for the Admiral—on what has changed in your view here? 

What am I missing that distinguishes your opposition to timelines 

in Iraq, your opposition to a timeline you expressed here in September with regard to Afghanistan to the President’s enunciation 

of July, 2011? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, there may not have been a specific 

timeline associated with the announcement of the surge in Iraq, 

but it was quite clear that domestically it could not be sustained 

indefinitely. And the reality is the surge in Iraq lasted 14 months. 

The President is talking about at least 18–24 months with this 

surge. 

I would say that—well, first of all, I have adamantly opposed 

deadlines. I opposed them in Iraq, and I opposed deadlines in Afghanistan. But what the President has announced is the beginning 

of a process, not the end of a process. And it is clear that this will 

be a gradual process and, as he said last night, based on conditions 

on the ground. So there is no deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan. 

Mr. PENCE. Reclaiming my time—Secretary Gates, forgive me for 

the constraints of our time here—your line to CNN was you opposed ‘‘timelines and exit strategies,’’ but I will leave that there, 

and I will accept your response. 

Admiral Mullen, last night the President said in his speech, 

‘‘Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal 

with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did 

not arrive.’’ The Secretary’s predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld, this 

afternoon called that a ‘‘bald misstatement’’; and former Secretary 

Rumsfeld said he was ‘‘not aware of a single request.’’

48

I wonder, Admiral, are you aware of a request for reinforcements 

from 2001 to 2006 or 2008 that was not heeded? Can you tell the 

committee who made those requests? Can you tell the committee 

who in the chain of command denied those requests? Because I find 

the President’s assertion, having been a part of a very strong bipartisanship support for Afghanistan, really astonishing. 

Chairman BERMAN. Unfortunately, another issue left hanging. 

The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. PENCE. I would ask unanimous consent to permit the Admiral to answer the question. 

Chairman BERMAN. Any objection? 

Admiral MULLEN. Just in my tenure here, sir, that General 

McKiernan specifically had a fairly substantial request for upwards 

of 20,000 forces, which we couldn’t meet because they just weren’t 

there. They were in Iraq. 

I spoke out very early that Afghanistan had been under 

resourced and that, from where I lived, the heart of that was under 

resourced with military forces. We didn’t have them because they 

were pushed to Iraq, and we couldn’t—we really didn’t have the 

flexibility to move them. That was the priority of a previous President. We do what the President says. And that is what we did. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the chairman. 

And I would note, in response to the answer by Admiral Mullen, 

that I would submit that we are here today because over the course 

of the past 8 years we have been distracted from focusing on Afghanistan, and that is why we find ourselves in this terrible situation that we are discussing here today. 

I think it was you, Admiral Mullen, that talked about turning it 

around. We have been there 8 years now, and we are still talking 

about turning it around. Is 18 months going to be sufficient? We 

have been talking about training the Afghan Army, the Afghan police. The rates of desertion have been particularly disturbing during the entire 8 years, and here we are in 2009 going into 2010 

talking about training and building an Army. What has happened 

over the course of 8 years? 

Admiral MULLEN. In my view, when you under resource an effort 

for an extended period of time, when you in many ways starve an 

effort, the impact—and I don’t just mean with forces because we 

have done it with training, we have done it intellectually, we have 

done it diplomatically, politically, you name it. We were focused on 

the other war, and that was a priority. And the impact of that, I 

think, is evident in where we are right now. 

So I understand better than anybody that this is our 9th year of 

war and we are losing people, and every single one is a tragedy, 

and I understand that. But in many ways this strategy is a new 

strategy, and it is as if we were starting over. And I know we are 

not. But what I said earlier with what Pakistan has done, moved, 

we have got a new government—or, I am sorry, new leadership, a 

freshly elected leadership in Afghanistan, we have got new leaders 

on the ground and all those things. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Admiral Mullen, let me interrupt you. That is a 

very difficult tale to tell to the American people that have been 

49

there going on 9 years, and here we are still talking about turning 

it around. I respect what you have said, I concur with what you 

said. And let me indicate all three of you have served your country 

very well. But we are here to make a policy decision at some point 

in time in terms of what our position is going to be. 

The President talked about consultation in conversations with 

world leaders, with our allies in NATO. Maybe, Secretary Gates, 

you can respond. Have we got hard commitments from our allies 

in terms of dollars, in terms of the civilian side? Do we have hard 

commitments in terms of incremental numbers of military personnel being assigned to this new surge, if you will? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir, we do, and we anticipate getting more 

during the meeting that Secretary Clinton is going to tomorrow 

and at the London conference in January. 

I would point out that the Japanese have committed $5 billion 

for Afghanistan. We have some firm troop commitments. Those 

countries have not announced them to their own public, so we are 

not in a position to announce them for them. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The President has also used the figure of $30 billion last night in his remarks to the American people. I was unclear as to is that additional monies that the American taxpayer 

will have to put on the table? And what period of time does that 

cover? And if we are talking about an 18-month surge, can you give 

us an estimate of the additional monies that it is going to cost the 

American people? 

Secretary GATES. The additional cost for Fiscal Year 2010 is between $30 billion and $35 billion, and it is additive to the overseas 

contingency proposal that the appropriations committees have in 

front of them of $130 billion. I would point out as a result principally of our drawdown in Iraq the supplemental in Fiscal Year 

2008 for Afghanistan and Iraq was $185 billion. This OCO for 2010 

will be about $165 billion. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me conclude by just commenting on an observation by Mr. Payne of New Jersey regarding India. Secretary Clinton, if you have time, have we consulted with the Indians in terms 

of their relationship with Pakistan in reducing the concern that the 

Pakistanis have relative to India? 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Yes, 

no questions are very good for the last 7 seconds. 

The gentleman from Florida Mr. Mack is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our 

witnesses for being here today and for your service to our country. 

I agree with many of the President’s points in his speech. I, too, 

believe that with every fiber of my being that we as Americans can 

still come together behind a common purpose. Nonetheless I disagree with the President’s decision to personally relay to our enemies when they can regroup and when they can retake Afghan 

territory. I simply cannot understand and cannot agree with this 

approach. For President Obama to indicate that he has already 

made a decision that will take effect in 18 months irrespective of 

what the situation is on the ground not only emboldens our enemies, but allows them to prepare and plan. Imagine if the Taliban 

50

leadership telegraphed to the world that on a certain day they 

would reinforce a certain region, and on another day they would 

withdraw their forces. That doesn’t make sense, and neither does 

President Obama’s decision to tell our enemies what our plans are. 

And, in fact, when the President says that we will begin to withdraw troops in July 2011, doesn’t that, in fact, say to all of you to 

begin your plans to withdraw troops, which in effect takes our eye 

off the ball? Shouldn’t our purpose, shouldn’t it be what we are 

looking for is to win the war? I will ask each one of you to answer. 

Secretary GATES. Well, first, I think it is. We wouldn’t be in this 

if we didn’t think we could be successful and if success was not—

and victory in terms of achieving our objectives was not possible. 

Again, I would say that, you know, are the Taliban going to be 

more emboldened than they already are because of this announcement? I don’t think so. They are moving as aggressively now as we 

have ever seen them. And what are they going to do? Are they 

going to lie low for 18 months? That would be terrific news because 

that would give us open-field running. Are they going to go back 

to Pakistan and wait for 18 months? Terrific. It gives us the opportunity without opposition to help the Afghans build. Are they going 

to lie low in Afghanistan? 

If they are not attacking Afghans, if they are not blowing things 

up, if they are not attacking our coalition troops, then, again, that 

gives us a huge opportunity. On the other hand, if they are going 

to engage, if they are going to be as bold and as aggressive as they 

have been over the past year, then they will encounter 150,000 foreign troops and a couple hundred thousand Afghan troops who will 

root them out, and we will reintegrate those that are willing to 

come over to the government side, and we will take care of the rest. 

But the point is they are going to confront a very aggressive and 

very capable military force not just for the next 18 months. 

Again, July 2011 is not a cliff, it is the beginning of a gradual 

process of turning over responsibility for security to the Afghans 

over a period of time as conditions on the ground permit. 

Mr. MACK. Mr. Secretary, and Madam, that is probably a sentiment shared by all of you. So if I may, then, what is not terrific 

and what is not great is if at the end of 18 months we begin to 

withdraw and these terrorist groups then begin to retake Afghanistan. That is not something that I think the American people want 

or the administration wants. 

But let me just say this then. It is well known that the President 

took his time, and I am not faulting taking time, to come to this 

decision. And I hope this means that you can answer some of these 

questions. When will the training begin, how many trainees does 

it take, how many trainees are available, what are the benchmarks, how long does it take to train the trainees, and do we have 

a schedule of how this training is going to take place? 

Admiral MULLEN. The training has begun. And probably the 

most significant shift that General McChrystal put in place is to 

partner with the Afghan forces, the Army and police. We are at 

about 95,000 for both the police and the Afghan Army right now 

to get to increased goals of about 134,000 for the Army by the end 

of 2010. We have got specific goals; we assess it annually. We are 

very focused on what it is going to take to retain them—train 

51

them, retain them, recruit them and retrain them. We know those 

are concerns as well. We have got strong leadership in place to get 

at this, new leadership to get at this. So this is really for General 

McChrystal, after security, his top effort. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

It is clear we will not finish giving all members an opportunity 

to ask questions. The panel has another 35 minutes. Next week we 

will be having a hearing with top—we hope to be having a hearing, 

it is not all tied down yet—with leaders in the field both on the 

military and civilian side. It will be the intention of the chair to 

start the questioning at that hearing where we leave off today. And 

I am going to ask Vice Chairman Ackerman to preside while I 

leave and be right back. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect on behalf of 

myself and the rest of the senior members——

Chairman BERMAN. I am worried. 

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Who chair subcommittees, we will 

defer down the line to Mr. Wexler to chair the rest of the hearing 

on this his last day as chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. And while he is walking over here, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, is recognized. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, first please give my heartfelt congratulations 

to the youngest Clinton on her decision to make a monumental 

move in her life. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. It was a very long, thoughtful 

process. 

Mr. MEEKS. I also want to thank the President of the United 

States for, as he ended his speech last night, talking about the 

American people coming together and being unified. I think that 

we have forgotten that right after 9/11 the American people and, 

in fact, this Congress almost unanimously wanted to go into Afghanistan to make sure that we start doing the work that is being 

done now. The only time that when we became divided as a Nation 

is when this President decided that Afghanistan was not to be our 

focus, that Iraq should be. 

And so I want to—and I think that part of what the President 

is trying to do is to bring this country back together so that we can 

refocus on where we was in the beginning when this horrific act 

took place that killed so many American people, American citizens. 

And I think that is the direction that we need to be going, moving 

back into in uniting as a country. Democrats and Americans were 

together at that particular time, and we should be together again 

as we move forward to do what we have to do, and not, as Secretary Gates says, just abandoning Afghanistan for several reasons. 

So I want to compliment the President on that. 

With that being said, I also know that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have indicated that we need to show the American 

people a shift in momentum within 12–18 months to ensure public 

support. And my question is what do you think will demonstrate 

such a shift in momentum so that we can make sure that we have 

the confidence of the American people? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it starts, sir, with security, and the 

first individual who will be able to tell us that is General 

52

McChrystal. It is what they seek, it is what the Afghans seek more 

than anything else as he travels through Afghanistan, because it 

is going in the wrong direction from security that gives us an opportunity to train and transfer security responsibility to the Afghan 

Security Forces. 

But I also think it is very clear we need to see progress on the 

part of the Karzai government. This gets to the ministers, the provincial governors, things like reconciliation, reintegration, local 

governance, how that is going as well. 

We need to look at—and I am optimistic—look at continuing contributions on the part of our international partners as a measure. 

And this is 43 countries. We are not in this alone at all; 43 countries are here. 

So those are some of the areas that we would look at for progress 

over the next 18 months. 

Mr. MEEKS. Well, let me ask. Our current policy that the President espoused, do you describe that as removing counterinsurgency 

or counterterrorism? 

Admiral MULLEN. It is principally counterinsurgency. It is very 

focused. It is focused on key population centers, key production centers, key lines of communications. It is not focused throughout the 

country. And, in fact, we are going to ask our coalition partners to 

focus in the north and west, because the worst part of the insurgency is in the south and the east, in the Pashtun Belt, and that 

is where we have sent the Marines in the south, and we will put 

forces in there to turn the tide there. 

But there is a counterterrorism piece of this as well that is resident not just in the east and the south, but will be part of operations throughout the country. 

Mr. MEEKS. The prior strategy, I don’t know whether it is the 

same, I guess General McChrystal had indicated that we would 

need about 400,000 Afghan security forces. Is that figure still what 

we are shooting for, aiming for? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, there is an aspirational goal out there 

that is somewhere in that number, but where we really are in this 

strategy is to look at it year to year. We know what we need, we 

know what we have, we know the things we have to fix with Afghan security forces right now, and we know where we want to be 

1 year from now, 2 years from now, and we are going to assess 

that. And that is a high-risk area for us. So rather than put something out there that we couldn’t achieve, we are going to look at 

it constantly, but literally year to year, and focus on achieving our 

annual goals. 

Mr. MEEKS. And lastly, real quickly about the payment of that, 

but I heard some of that. I know that it worked with reference to 

the surge in Iraq. It was because the Sunnis turned against alQaeda, and that was the Awakening. And I was wondering if there 

is any such momentum that can be felt on the ground now in Afghanistan to show that that kind of shift is about to take place? 

Admiral MULLEN. There is some of that. I would not say it is at 

the level of the Sons of Iraq at this point. 

Mr. WEXLER [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

53

Madam Secretary, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you 

for appearing today. 

Afghanistan is not America’s challenge alone, it is the world’s 

problem. And right now our ratio of U.S. troops to NATO troops is 

2 to 1. After this surge it will be 3 to 1, assuming no other NATO 

input. 

The President last night was not exactly clear in the nature of 

the commitments that are going to be forthcoming. Many of the 

world’s powers are content to sit while America sacrifices on their 

behalf. You have touched on this today, but I think the question 

deserves further unpacking. I believe you, Mr. Secretary, mentioned Japan is going to contribute $5 billion. There is a move toward meeting with other NATO allies to harden those commitments. But we are leading with our chin right now, and the American people need to know this is not a disproportionate burden that 

we are undertaking. Can you comment on that? And I will pivot 

to some other questions. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I think it is important to 

recognize that until relatively recently, the ratio between American 

and non-American NATO ISAF troops was very close, because, as 

Admiral Mullen was saying in response to, I think, Congressman 

Pence’s question, we were at a level of 30,000 for a very long time. 

And the NATO troops, Bob, I think were about that or a little bit 

more all together. And so now before this latest decision by the 

President, we were at 68-, they were about at 42-, something like 

that. So it has been certainly a comparable commitment given the 

relative size of our respective force levels. 

And I think if, as Admiral Mullen said, we get the kind of response we have reason to believe we will, yes, we will have additional support from our NATO ISAF allies, we will still be, at the 

end of our troop commitments, about 2 to 1, but there will also be 

a collective presence that is very significant since it was the United 

States that was attacked, and all these other countries under Article 5 of NATO, others like Australia coming in, have really seen 

this fight which was picked with us as their fight as well. 

Secretary GATES. Congressman, I would just like to make one 

other point. Since 1941, the United States has borne a disproportionate responsibility for peace and security around the world. This 

is not a new development. And it has gone with our assumption of 

world responsibility along with our world power. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Let me thank you. Let me pivot to another 

question. 

What is the definition of success, and, given his current plan, 

what is the probability of success? 

Secretary GATES. I believe that success in Afghanistan looks a lot 

like—from a security standpoint looks a lot like success in Iraq, 

and that is the gradual transfer of responsibility for security to the 

indigenous forces and the local government, and with the United 

States being able to pull back into first a tactical and then strategic 

overwatch and then withdraw our troops to the point where we 

have a minimal presence. 

I think we ought to think about, if the Afghans want us, a prolonged partnership well into the future of training and equipping. 

But fundamentally it is the transfer of this responsibility to an AfVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
54

ghan security force that is able to sustain that security and protect 

their own borders. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And the probability of that outcome? 

Secretary GATES. I think if we did not believe that this outcome 

had a strong probability, we would not have supported it. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Let us go back to the earlier point about 

international commitments. Now, you mentioned a London conference. You mentioned that you are clearly trying to be nimble 

enough to allow other countries to manage their own internal political dynamics as they make these commitments. But how hard and 

real is the momentum toward burden sharing with us? 

Secretary CLINTON. I think it is very real. Before coming into the 

hearing, I spoke with Secretary General Rasmussen, the Secretary 

General of NATO. He has been working very hard to help shape 

the commitments that NATO members will be making. I know everyone at this table——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And other world powers as well. 

Secretary CLINTON. And other world powers as well. And it is not 

only the commitment of troops, which are very important, but also 

the commitment of resources. And there will be a number of announcements over the next days and weeks that we will be sure 

that this committee has notice of. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. WEXLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you 

here today. 

Secretary Clinton, you said this was one of the most complex foreign policy challenges you have ever seen. And, Admiral Mullen, 

you said you have never seen an issue so thoughtfully and thoroughly reviewed. Well, I want to thank the President, all of you, 

the entire team of the administration, for giving this issue the time 

and really the thoroughness that our troops, our values and certainly our security deserves. 

Secretary Clinton, this past month you were in Afghanistan. You 

delivered a sharp message to President Karzai about needing to 

clean up the corruption to really address the needs of the Afghan 

people. What is it going to look like? What kind of benchmark 

should we be looking for in the weeks and months ahead to see if 

we are making progress on that front? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman Carnahan, there are 

some areas where we can actually measure the progress. For example, in education there has been significant progress. The United 

States has been quite involved in moving from a school population 

of a little less than 1 million, nearly all of whom are boys, to a population of 7 million, 40 percent of whom are girls, and there is 

about 5–6 million more. So we are going to be able to measure that. 

In terms of agriculture, which we think is a key strategic imperative because it is the best way to raise incomes to wean people from 

poppies, the United States and other allies have been contributing 

to better seeds, better fertilizer, working with a really quite competent and effective minister of agriculture. 

The minister of finance has begun to move against a lot of the 

petty corruption. There are 1 million cars in Afghanistan. It took 

55

a month and a half to get a car registered, and you had to go 

through a lot of different hands to get there. The process has been 

streamlined. It has been not only cleaned up, but it is now benefiting the Treasury of the country to the tune of about $50 million 

a year. 

So there are specific areas where we can see with a transparent, 

accountable partnership the progress being made. We are now certifying agencies. We are not going to put a penny of American assistance into any agency that is not certified. So I think that as we 

go through this, we will be submitting reports to this committee 

and other relevant committees demonstrating how our civilian assistance program, support for governance, the anticorruption efforts 

we are undertaking are working and what kind of expectations we 

have for them. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. 

And we also heard the President talk about these new resources 

that can allow us to make a final push that is necessary to train 

the Afghans so that we can transfer responsibility. I have big concerns about the training. We have heard some of the same discussion in Iraq. I visited there in 2005. We saw big claims about how 

quickly we were going to be able to train up the Iraqi troops and 

police. We were way off on those estimates in terms of quality, 

quantity, in terms of the time to train. 

What lessons have we learned from that, and what kind of measure should we be looking for to be sure we are getting the Afghan 

Army and police trained in the numbers that we need? For Admiral 

Mullen and Secretary Gates. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that we have learned those lessons. We 

see similarities in the sense that police are not coming nearly as 

quickly as the Army, for instance. That was the case in Iraq. We 

have really taken those lessons and used them to focus on what we 

need in Afghanistan. But it is a big challenge. And I indicated earlier that is a high-risk part of the strategy is training and equipping the Afghan security forces. 

That said, it is a good fighting force. We have had a considerable 

amount of progress on the Army. We are way behind on the police 

side. There are several programs in place to get at this, and I don’t 

mean just brand new. And then the fundamental shift, as I said 

earlier, about partnering with them in the field, getting them off 

the bases so they are in the fight in the villages. Together with our 

coalition forces we think that will accelerate the ability to transfer 

that responsibility. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And Secretary Gates. 

Secretary GATES. I think exactly what Admiral Mullen said. I 

think, as he mentioned, we have changed the personnel, the leadership of the training program. The key about the training that is 

important is the best part of the training is not the basic training 

where they learn how to march and learn how to shoot, it is when 

they partner with us in combat. And it not only teaches them the 

skills, what we saw in Iraq is that it gives them confidence. And 

the more confidence they have, the more ability they have to operate on their own. 

Mr. WEXLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. McCaul. 

56

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first say to Secretary Gates, Texas A&M misses you, but 

we need you exactly where you are today. And thank you for the 

great job and your service to our country. 

To Secretary Clinton, Admiral Mullen, I was over in Pakistan, 

Afghanistan last 4th of July when the conditions were starting to 

deteriorate, and I remember coming back and visiting with President Bush about this and making the recommendation that we 

need more resources. I know in the transition team this is one of 

the recommendations that was made, was to do exactly what you 

are getting ready to do, and that is a surge in forces. In my view, 

we either get all in to win, or we get out, and I think that is how 

most Americans feel about this issue. 

To Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the way you turn the 

Iraq war around and many others, I think there are many lessons 

to be learned by that. The counterinsurgency mission, the surge, 

the Sunni Awakening, many of these actually turned it around so 

that we can say that we have won that war. 

The one thing that we fought very hard in Congress was the idea 

of timelines. The President has announced an 18-month timeline 

before withdrawal. I sensed a bit of inconsistency in the message 

last night between withdrawing based upon conditions on the 

ground and a withdrawal based on an 18-month timeline. My concern is the Afghan people and the tribal leaders are trying to weigh 

who their alliance, allegiance is going to be with, and if they don’t 

see a long-term commitment or a sustainable commitment on our 

part, and if they feel that we are going to abandon the mission at 

any given point, that they are going to side with the Taliban, because if we leave, they are dead. And that is a simple message. 

And I want to pose that first question, if you can explain to me 

the inconsistency between withdrawing based upon conditions on 

the ground versus a withdrawal based upon an 18-month timeline. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think the absoluteness of it is not intended 

at all. And I think withdrawal exit strategy, we are done, good-bye, 

that is just not going to happen. It is a transfer and transition 

strategy. And the decision is show strong resolve. This is a huge 

commitment. It is the right commitment. It gives us the forces to 

turn this thing around, we know we can do that, and at the same 

time it creates an expectation we are not going to be there forever. 

And to the discussion about telling the enemy what we are doing, 

I mean, this insurgency has gotten worse every year since 2006. It 

is not going to significantly get better or worse based on July 2011, 

at least that is my view. So it is a signal that we are in, we can 

win this thing, and at the same time, Afghanistan, you have to pick 

up on this. And we cannot win this if the Afghan Government and 

the Afghan people don’t reach out and share this. Another 30,000 

troops on top of this wouldn’t make any difference. That is the message. And that has got to happen over the next couple of years. 

And General McChrystal, I am sure, and he will tell you this personally when he is here, feels this way as well. We have got to turn 

this thing in the next 18–24 months. 

Mr. MCCAUL. With respect to what we did in Iraq with the Sunni 

Awakening, can you tell me what this plan proposes? Because in 

57

my view, winning the hearts and minds as we did with the tribal 

leaders in Iraq is critically essential in Afghanistan. 

Admiral MULLEN. Great focus there. We have seen some of that. 

I think it is way too early to say that it is going to happen per se, 

but part of this strategy is the reintegration and reconciliation aspect of it at senior levels right down into the villages. And so we 

expect that will be a part of this as well, but it is not going to happen until we start turning security around. 

Mr. MCCAUL. With the last minute I have, there have been reports that—and I believe we win this with good intelligence—there 

have been reports that terrorists are captured on the battlefield in 

Afghanistan and are taken to the detention facilities and then read 

their Miranda rights. The first line is, you have the right to remain 

silent; the second, you have the right to an attorney. 

I don’t know whether, in fact, that is happening. If it is, in my 

view, that cuts off the intelligence flow because we can’t get inside 

the terrorist’s head like we did with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 

Will the panel comment on that? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t think that is true. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And it would be good to verify whether there is a 

lot of perhaps it is misinformation out there that this is occurring. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, we will try to find out for you, but I 

don’t have any reason to believe that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Nor do I. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is good to have that answer. Thank you. 

Mr. WEXLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the 

panel for being here and the Secretary for all of your dedication to 

this country over the years. Admiral Mullen and certainly Secretary Gates, you could have been watching Texas play Texas 

A&M, and it would have been a lot easier. 

Secretary GATES. That is the most painful thing to say in this entire hearing. 

Mr. SIRES. I was watching a report the other day, and you see 

all these reports on television, and it goes to the question that my 

colleague asked before. It is regarding our U.S. soldiers, whether 

they have a difficult time building trust and confidence with the 

Afghan forces that they are supposed to train. If there is a lack of 

trust as an issue of our soldiers working with the Afghanis, isn’t 

that going to imperil our efforts for the next 18 months? 

Secretary GATES. Let me answer and then ask Admiral Mullen. 

I think that one of General McChrystal’s central—one of the central themes of his new strategy is a genuine true partnering of 

ISAF and Afghan forces where they are working together, living together, operating together. Too often in the past, the Afghans were 

set over here, and we did the fighting or we did whatever was 

going on, and we didn’t give them very much intelligence, they 

were starved for equipment, but mainly they were kept apart by 

some of our forces and by some of the other ISAF partner forces. 

General McChrystal is determined to bring them together, and it 

is in that relationship that the trust builds. And that is exactly 

what we saw happen in Iraq. 

58

Admiral MULLEN. And the stories that I hear based on this shift, 

which is focusing on partnership, are very positive, but it is very 

early. I mean, a significant—over about 80 percent of the Afghan 

units right now, we are partnered with them, and there were none 

in June. So that shift is really significant, and that will build a 

trust. And it is basically living with each other, planning, fighting, 

all the things that the Secretary mentioned. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

And I know the President mentioned the other day that we must, 

and I quote, ‘‘invest in our homeland security and improve and better coordinate our intelligence.’’ I certainly believe in this. What 

are we going to do differently now that we haven’t been doing for 

8 years in terms of gathering intelligence? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I think it is continuing to improve. We 

have learned a lot since 2001 with respect to all that. And I think 

in particular our intelligence has gotten better and better, and I 

think we just need to keep that up. And I would—I think our agencies, I think there are 17 intelligence agencies, and they are much 

more integrated, and they share much better than they have in the 

past, and we need to continue to do that. And this is an intelligence-driven—the counterinsurgency efforts is an intelligencedriven operation, and our ability to gather intelligence, teach the 

Afghans how to do this, and turn it around so with that fresh intelligence we can continue to succeed in terms of countering the 

Taliban is core to our ability to reverse this momentum. 

Secretary GATES. I would also say that over the last 15–16 

months, I have made it a high priority to send more intelligence 

surveillance and reconnaissance assets into Afghanistan. So Predators, Reapers, Warriors, all the different kinds of collectors and capabilities that we have were flowing in now, Liberty airplanes that 

are being put together in Texas to provide full-motion video. So 

there has been a huge influx of ISR assets to help our commanders 

in the field. 

Mr. SIRES. And I assume we are doing the same thing with Pakistan in terms of the intelligence improvement. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I mean, we are in support of them in 

many ways in terms of training. We actually have had a relationship with their intelligence service. And I recognize that there are 

views of that, but we have actually—there is a very positive side 

of that historically and recently as well. And these same kinds of 

things the Secretary is talking about, to work to try to share with 

them on our mutual objectives, is a big part of where we are and 

where we need to continue to go. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. Thank you for your service to our country. 

Chairman BERMAN [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has 

expired. We will have, I think, time for two more questions if that 

works, two more questioners. 

Mr. Bilirakis, the gentleman from Florida, is recognized. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I thank 

the panel staying, and I really appreciate your service to our country. 

I would like to address this question to all the witnesses. I know 

we have touched upon it, but maybe a little more detail. A 34-page 

document signed by General McChrystal and Ambassador 

59

Eikenberry outlines an integrated civilian-military plan which contains 11 counterinsurgency transformative effects. Does the plan 

President Obama articulated last night execute these worthy goals, 

such as improving population security and reducing insurgent capability while advancing governments? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, it does. And the difference is that it is focused—our strategy has focused very heavily, particularly from the 

United States standpoint, on the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. And we have taken significant steps to 

actually accomplish the integrated civilian-military approach that 

both General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry have proposed. For example, we have beefed up the embassy in Kabul. We 

have assigned different responsibilities so that, for example, there 

is one ambassador there working with Ambassador Eikenberry who 

is responsible for coordinating aid. 

There is a lot of work that brings together our military and civilian personnel. I met with a group of the teams that were out in 

the field when I was there for the inauguration and heard about 

how well they are coordinating and the fact that we are embedding 

civilians with our military units. So we are on the way to trying 

to implement exactly that kind of integrated strategy. 

Admiral MULLEN. If I can just say briefly, I was in Helmand with 

the Marines right after their operation in July. And Secretary Clinton has said this, and she has seen this. I watched our civilians 

from the State Department literally go in right behind the fight, 

first of all. 

Secondly, I have seen it in Iraq, I see it in Afghanistan, the multiplier that those civilians are. I am not sure what the right number is, but one civilian who can make a difference is just hugely 

impactful in terms of the overall strategy. I don’t know if it is a 

company of marines or a battalion, but, I mean, in an area of expertise, that makes a difference, agriculture, et cetera. 

So I just can’t say enough about the shift and the focus and the 

difference that it is making in this strategy, and it needs to continue to do so. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

One last question. Is President Obama’s specific—is this a specific plan, counterinsurgency plan, outlined by General McChrystal 

in August? 

Secretary GATES. I think it is fair to say that the assessment 

that General McChrystal submitted in August was the basis of the 

entire dialogue that we have had for the last 31⁄2 months. And 

what we have been working on is how do we—the assessment was 

based on his view of what he was being asked to do by the President’s decisions in March. 

What troubled me fairly early on was that those decisions were 

being interpreted fairly broadly as full-scale nation building and 

creating a strong central government in Afghanistan, neither of 

which was our intent, nor was it our ability to do in any reasonable 

timeframe and at any reasonable cost. 

And so a good part of the debate and the discussion we have had 

is how do we focus that, how do we narrow the mission so that we 

are focused on selective capacity building in the government, capacVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
60

ity building that is essential to our success and the transition of 

security responsibility and ultimately the defeat of al-Qaeda? How 

do we protect the population? What populations do we need to protect? How much of the country do we need to do that in, and so 

on? And so that was a good part of the discussion, but I would say 

that the starting point was his assessment. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia Mr. Connolly. I am sorry, no. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sorry, you said. 

Chairman BERMAN. No. I withdraw it. 

Mr. McMahon of New York. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is not the first 

time the good gentleman from Virginia has tried to do that to me. 

Chairman BERMAN. That you know of. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Hello, Madam Secretary. It is great to see you 

again. And, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I am Mike 

McMahon. I am a new Member of Congress from Staten Island and 

Brooklyn, New York. 

We all remember September 11th with clear, vivid and sad 

memories, but for us in Staten Island and Brooklyn, the tragedy 

really hit home. A third of the firefighters who were killed that day 

came from my district, over 10 percent of the individuals. I will 

never forget the day because it was my first election. It was primary day in New York, and we were out campaigning. We heard 

the news of the first jet, then got down to the harbor, got on the 

ferry and watched the second jet come in, and then watched the 

buildings fall. And we kind of felt like that is what it would like 

to be in World War II. 

As civilians we rallied, and we set up triage centers, and we set 

up blood banks and waited for the injured to come. Staten Island 

is the logical place to bring them, and a lot of people came that 

were not injured. We waited and waited, and no survivors ever 

came. And that was the most eerie feeling I think that any of us 

ever felt. 

I say that because I think we all realize on that day or the next 

day or the next day, as a Nation, that we had a sacred trust, a mission that we had to complete. And it was simply, as you said here 

today, Admiral, to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity and the 

Taliban’s to threaten America and our allies from either country in 

the future. 

Unfortunately, 8 years later we are still sitting here talking 

about this because we as a Nation were distracted. We were led 

down a pernicious primrose path by the prior administration, God 

knows why. So many lives were lost, so much treasure, as people 

say, were lost, our standing in the world. And here we are back 

again completing this mission that it is indeed our sacred trust to 

do. I want to thank you on behalf of the people that I represent 

for your resolve and the President’s resolve to do this. 

And, Madam Secretary, obviously from your testimony, from your 

statement, and for the way you have answered the questions, you 

have not forgotten what we have lost that day. It was a tragedy. 

61

And if we were here in November 2001, we would not be having 

the distracting questions you are hearing today, like questions 

about individual cases of military justice. They are certainly important, but this should not distract us again, and issues of the 

timeline and whether that should distract us again. We must be resolved. And I am so proud of you that you have that resolve. 

I do want to ask a question just from sort of a geopolitical point 

of view. If you look at the map of Afghanistan, if you look around 

and you see the countries that surround it, many are Muslim, including Turkey. And clearly the Turks in particular, because they 

are Muslims as well, have had great success in Afghanistan in 

dealing with the people there in gaining their trust. 

What are we doing to encourage more help from Turkey, and 

help from Turkmenistan, and help from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 

and from China, and from India, and obviously Pakistan, all these 

countries that border Afghanistan? It would seem to me that their 

responsibilities should be raised, and their involvement should be 

raised. Could you just tell us is there hope there that a regional 

solution can be here as well as a global? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, thank you for what you 

said and for your leadership. And we are certainly working to add 

to the list of countries who are working on behalf of this mission. 

Turkey has been a great ally, and they have been with us from the 

very beginning. They are a NATO ally, and they are a true contributing country in Afghanistan. United Arab Emirates has also contributed troops and money. We expect that other countries will be 

as well, and we will be announcing some of those. 

I think that the regional picture is a little more challenging, but 

we have gotten a lot of good help from the Central Asian countries 

in assisting us with the transit of material, with the use of military 

bases. 

The Admiral just reminded me Jordan has also been working 

with us. 

So we think that our renewed effort, the President’s resolve, is 

actually going to bring more countries into this fight. 

I happen to agree, unfortunately, with the thrust of your comments that, you know, we just took our eye off the most important 

ball. And there is no doubt in my mind that had we stayed with 

it, had we, you know, paid more attention to our commanders on 

the ground in Afghanistan, because it is a longer history—I know 

some of the people who did have command responsibility in Afghanistan, and there were very frequent requests up the chain of 

command for additional resources, but we are where we are right 

now. And just because it has been a frustrating and challenging 8 

years, and it is unfortunate that this President has to face up to 

the hard decisions that we as a country have to make, doesn’t 

mean we shouldn’t be doing what we are doing, and that is why 

we are here today. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Our three witnesses, you wouldn’t know it by listening to them, 

but they had to do this for 21⁄2 or 3 hours earlier today. You were 

superb advocates on behalf of the administration’s position. We 

thank you very much for being here. We will start our second hearing on this subject with field leaders from where we left off in 

62

terms of questioning. Thank you all very much for being with us 

today. 

[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

(63)

U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN, PART II 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. Before beginning my opening statement, I would like to make two brief announcements on procedure. First, given the time constraints on the 

witnesses and to maximize the time members have for questioning, 

only the ranking member and I will make opening statements; 

after that we will turn to the witnesses for their testimony. Without objection all other members may place written statements in 

the record, and, as I mentioned at the end of last week’s hearing, 

I will recognize members for questioning at the point where we left 

off last week. So those who did not have an opportunity to question 

our witnesses last week will get the first chance to ask questions 

today. The staff has sent out specific information about the order 

in which members will be recognized. And now we will go to the 

hearing. 

Last week the committee heard from Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen, three of the President’s top national security advisors. They did an excellent job in making the 

administration’s case for the new strategy in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

Today we welcome the top American officials on the ground in 

Afghanistan: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, the chief of mission 

at our Embassy in Kabul, and General Stanley A. McChrystal, the 

commander of all United States and international forces in Afghanistan. 

The President and his team have made it very clear that our efforts to degrade the Taliban and defeat al-Qaeda cannot stop at the 

Durand Line. Indeed, nearly all of the jihadi groups operating in 

Pakistan and Afghanistan—al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the 

Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, LET, and others—have 

joined together in an extended terrorist network that shares the 

same goals, including destabilizing Afghanistan and destroying the 

Pakistani state. 

Fortunately, there appears to be a growing recognition in Pakistan that it is impossible to differentiate between different terrorist 

groups, and that the same people killing American, international 

64

and Afghan troops are now arming suicide bombers in the streets 

and markets of Pakistan and killing Pakistani civilians. 

We sympathize with the plight of the Pakistani people who have 

suffered great losses from the growing number of terrorist attacks 

in that country. As reflected in the legislation recently passed by 

Congress, we are committed to doing what we can to improve their 

economic and physical security. 

As all of our witnesses emphasized in last week’s hearing, the 

President’s military strategy in Afghanistan can only succeed if it 

is accompanied by a robust ‘‘civilian surge’’ designed to improve 

governance, strengthen the rule of law, and promote economic development in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This fact often gets 

lost in the debate about troop levels and the time frame for withdrawal, and we must make sure that these critical civilian programs aren’t shortchanged. 

To that end, Ambassador Eikenberry, will you have enough capable civilians on the ground to help strengthen governance, build 

rule of law, and promote economic enterprise? Will these civilians 

have sufficient knowledge in these areas to be effective? Will they 

have sufficient experience operating in dangerous environments 

like Afghanistan? And are 974 civilians, as the administration has 

proposed having on the ground by next year, all we need? If not, 

when will you be able to tell us exactly how many are required? 

What will your new civil-military campaign plan include that the 

August plan did not? 

With regard to the military strategy, I am curious: One of the 

keys to our success in Iraq was the ‘‘Sunni Awakening,’’ in which 

thousands of Sunni tribesmen, many of whom had participated in 

or aided the insurgency, essentially switched to our side. Is there 

any prospect of a similar shift in Afghanistan? Can we succeed in 

Afghanistan without such an ‘‘awakening’’? 

Finally, General McChrystal, will 30,000 troops—even with an 

additional 7,000 apparently pledged by other nations—be sufficient 

to break the Taliban’s momentum? Can we meet the President’s objective of degrading the Taliban by focusing primarily on the south 

when the Taliban is already operating in the north? What types of 

soldiers—trainers, civil affairs, infantry—will comprise this 30,000 

increase? 

Now I am pleased to return to the ranking member, Ms. RosLehtinen, for any remarks she would like to make. And following 

that, we will proceed immediately to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, General 

McChrystal, and Ambassador Eikenberry. For months we have 

been requesting your presence before the committee to discuss the 

Afghanistan strategy, so we are extremely pleased that the administration has now authorized you to provide testimony. Welcome, 

sirs. Last week we received a broad presentation. When the chairman asked Secretary Clinton if she knew the resources that will 

be needed for the civilian surge she was unable to provide specifics, 

adding that the administration, and I quote, ‘‘will be submitting 

budget requests in order to achieve the numbers that are going to 

be needed.’’

65

So we anxiously await a more detailed assessment on what you 

need to prevail against our enemies. Before we look forward, we 

must present an accurate portrayal of the last 8 years in Afghanistan, the progress that has been achieved, and the challenges that 

lay ahead. Claims of failure from some are an affront to our brave 

men and women, such as my daughter-in-law Lindsay who served 

as a Marine officer in Afghanistan in 2007, it minimizes their accomplishments. 

And let me briefly contrast Afghanistan in 2001 to Afghanistan 

now. The Taliban is not in power, does not control Afghanistan. 

While our enemies are rebuilding, Afghanistan has not been used 

to launch attacks against the United States homeland. There are 

serious problems with corruption, but there is a duly elected government in power, one that is an ally of the United States. And Afghan women and girls have unprecedented access to the health and 

education services and are integrated into Afghan society. 

As Ambassador Eikenberry noted this week, Afghanistan has 

come a long way since the dark days of the Taliban, and I have 

witnessed this progress during my travels there. Turning to the 

strategy announced by the President, I have five main issues for 

our distinguished panel. First, I am concerned about the delays in 

the decision making, the impact on our ability to succeed in disrupting, defeating, dismantling al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 

General McChrystal, you wrote on August 30th that the next 12 

months from that date were critical, yet one quarter of that time 

has already gone, and by the time the surge is expected to reach 

its full capacity three quarters of that time would have elapsed. 

Operations such as the Marine offensive Operation Cobra’s Anger 

are being undertaken. Is this illustrative of the counterinsurgency 

strategy that will be carried out as part of the surge? And how does 

this compare to the counterterrorism strategy? 

Secondly, General McChrystal, has the President provided you 

enough troops and other resources to successfully complete our 

mission? There have been reports that the mission’s goals have 

changed from your original proposal focusing on the elimination of 

the Taliban to instead ensuring that insurgents could no longer 

threaten the Afghan Government’s survival. Also, are our rules of 

engagement robust enough to repel and permanently eliminate the 

Taliban as a threat? And as the chairman asked, Ambassador 

Eikenberry, do you have the necessary tools to carry out the civilian component of this strategy? 

Thirdly, I have concerns about the July 2011 trigger for withdrawal that has been highlighted in the President’s speech. Talk of 

transition and exit ramps with an 18-month target to begin withdrawing telegraphs to our enemies that all they need to do is persevere and through a few difficult fighting seasons because the 

U.S. will retreat. Some also argue that withdrawal time lines make 

our troops wonder about the determination of Washington to succeed and could undermine our efforts to secure greater cooperation 

from our allies. 

The New York Times recently reported that the President’s time 

table for withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan rattled 

nerves in that country and in Pakistan as well, prompting diplomats to scramble to reassure the two countries that we would not 

66

in fact cut and run. A fourth concern involves the problems of command and control, coordination with our allies, and burden sharing. Our allies are being asked to provide more troops to help push 

the Taliban out of center and north. 

Some such as the Dutch, Canadians, British, and French shoulder a greater burden. Do you foresee difficulties in securing a 

greater commitment from our allies to contribute to the war effort? 

Do the forces that the NATO Security General identified have the 

combat capabilities that you require? And what actions has the administration taken to convince countries to give you more flexibility 

in placing troops where they are most needed rather than leaving 

them in safe zones? 

And fifth and finally, our Afghanistan strategy does not exist in 

a vacuum. At last week’s hearing I referred to statements by the 

chief prosecutor for the international criminal court that he already 

has jurisdiction in Afghanistan, that he is already conducting a 

preliminary examination into whether NATO troops, including our 

American soldiers, may have to be prosecuted by the ICC. Also, as 

you know, three Navy SEALs, part of a team that captured the 

ringleader of those responsible for the 2007 brutal murder of four 

of our American contractors in Fallujah, are facing court-martial 

after the killer initially complained that he suffered a bloody lip 

while in U.S. custody. 

So combined with the reinvestigation of our U.S. intelligence activities, the prosecution of CIA operatives, the transfer of Gitmo detainees for trials in the United States, the negative impact of our 

activities in Afghanistan could be dramatic and could undermine 

critical intelligence gathering that could save, save the lives of 

Americans serving there. Despite these concerns, our nation’s safety is at stake, and we must ensure that the brave Americans serving in Afghanistan as well as our critical allies are provided the 

support that they need to win this war decisively. I thank you both 

gentlemen for appearing before us. Thank you so much for the 

time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much. And now to introduce 

our witnesses. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry retired from the 

United States Army with the rank of Lieutenant General on April 

28th, 2009, and shortly thereafter was sworn in as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. Prior to this assignment, General Eikenberry 

served as the deputy chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium. He has served 

twice before in Afghanistan, first as U.S. Security Coordinator and 

Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in Kabul, and then as 

Commander of the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan. 

General Stanley McChrystal is the current commander, International Security Assistance Force and commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. Previously, he served as director of the joint staff from 

April 2008 to June 2009, and as commander, Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008, where he led the operation 

that resulted in the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of 

al-Qaeda in Iraq. Ambassador, General, we are honored to have 

you here. Ambassador, why don’t you begin? 

67

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KARL W. EIKENBERRY, U.S. 

AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Thank you, Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and distinguished members of this committee. Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan today. I would ask that my full statement be submitted 

for the record. 

Last week, in a speech at the United States Military Academy 

at West Point, President Obama presented the administration’s 

strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His decision came after an 

intensive, deliberative, and a far reaching review, and I am honored to have been part of that process. I believe the course that the 

President outlined offers the best path to stabilize Afghanistan and 

ensure that al-Qaeda cannot regain a foothold to plan new attacks 

against us. I can say without equivocation that I fully support this 

approach. 

I consider myself privileged to serve as the United States Ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats, development 

specialists, and civilian experts who form the most capable and 

dedicated United States Embassy anywhere in the world today. I 

am extraordinarily proud of them. I am also honored to testify 

alongside General Stan McChrystal, my professional colleague and 

friend of many years. I want to say from the outset that General 

McChrystal and myself are united in a joint effort where civilian 

and military personnel work together everyday, side by side with 

our Afghan partners and with our allies, and we could not accomplish our objectives without this kind of cooperation. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the United States is at a critical 

juncture in our involvement in Afghanistan. On December the 1st, 

the President ordered 30,000 additional troops to deploy to Afghanistan on an accelerated time table with the goal of breaking the 

insurgency’s momentum, hastening and improving the training of 

Afghan national security forces and establishing security in key 

parts of the country. 

On the civilian side we aim to increase employment and provide 

essential services in areas of greatest insecurity, and to improve 

critical ministries and the economy at the national level. These 

steps taken together I believe will help to remove insurgents from 

the battlefield and to build support for the Afghan Government. As 

the President said, we will be clear about what we expect from 

those who receive our assistance. After a difficult election the Afghan Government does show signs of recognizing the need to deliver better governance and security. We await urgent, concrete 

steps in a number of areas. 

I would like to briefly discuss the three main pillars of our efforts 

in Afghanistan, which are security, governance, and development. 

General McChrystal will address our plans to improving security 

and building the Afghan national security forces. Since assuming 

my post, I have made a special point of getting outside of Kabul 

to see conditions first hand, and I fully concur with General 

McChrystal’s assessment that the security situation in Afghanistan 

remains serious. 

Sending additional United States and other NATO ISAF forces 

to Afghanistan is critical to regaining the initiative, and I am conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
68

fident that if these troops arrive the situation will stabilize and 

turn in our favor. Additional troops will also permit us to expand 

our work with the Afghan army and the Afghan police so that they 

can take a larger role in providing for security for their own people. 

As President Obama said, the transition to Afghan responsibility 

will begin in the summer of 2011 when we expect Afghan security 

forces to begin assuming lead responsibility for defending their 

country. 

Moving on from security, the second pillar of our comprehensive 

strategy focuses on governance. At the national and subnational 

levels, our overarching goal is to encourage, improve governance so 

that Afghans can see the benefit of supporting a legitimate government, and the insurgency loses support. As General McChrystal 

points out, one of the major impediments our strategy faces is the 

Afghan Government’s lack of credibility with its own people. To 

strengthen this legitimacy, our approach at the national level is to 

improving key ministries by increasing the number of civilian technical advisors and providing more developmental assistance directly through these ministries’ budgets. 

By focusing on ministries that deliver essential services and security, we can accelerate the building of an Afghan Government 

that is sufficiently visible, effective, and accountable. At the provincial and the district levels, we are working jointly with our military 

teams, through our provincial reconstruction teams, our district development working groups, and district support teams which help 

build Afghan capacity, particularly in the areas of greatest insecurity in southern Afghanistan and eastern Afghanistan. 

Underpinning all of these efforts is the need to combat corruption 

and to promote the rule of law. With our assistance, the Afghan 

Government is steadily building law enforcement institutions to 

fight corruption, organized crime, and drug trafficking. In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated his intention to make merit 

based appointments in his new cabinet and to implement an 

anticorruption strategy, and we are encouraged by his statements. 

The cultivation of poppy and trafficking in opium also continue 

to have a debilitating effect on Afghan society. Our strategy is 

multipronged, it involves demand reduction, efforts by law enforcement agencies and the military to detain traffickers and interdict 

drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural development. The 

narcotics problem of course will never have a solution though without economic development, and this leads to the third pillar of our 

effort, which is development. 

In recent months we have adjusted our approach to focusing on 

building key elements of the Afghan private sector economy, increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government revenue collection, and improving the coordination assistance within 

the United States Government and the international community. 

These steps were taken to produce improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans and to contribute directly to more effective government and lessen support for the insurgency. 

Rebuilding the farm sector in particular is essential for the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men who form 

the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that some 80 

percent of the Afghan population derives their income either diVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
69

rectly or indirectly from agriculture. Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that we are concentrating on what is essential and what 

is attainable. The President’s strategy is based on a pragmatic assessment of the security interest of the United States and our belief that a sustainable representative government and a sustainable economy are essential to success. 

We need a viable Afghan Government so our forces can draw 

down and the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars can be reduced. 

In closing, I need to mention two important risks that we do face 

in carrying out this strategy. The first is that in spite of everything 

that we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the essential 

task of governance and security on a timely basis. The second is 

our partnership with Pakistan. The efforts we are undertaking in 

Afghanistan are likely to fall short of our strategic goals unless 

there is more progress at eliminating the sanctuaries used by the 

Afghan Taliban and their associates in Pakistan. 

If the main elements of the President’s plan are executed, and 

if our Afghan partners and our allies do their part, I am confident 

that we can achieve our strategic objectives. I say this with conviction because for the first time in my three tours in Afghanistan all 

of the elements of our national power are being employed with the 

full support of the President and increasingly of our allies. Achieving our goals for Afghanistan will not be easy, but I am optimistic 

that we can succeed with the support of the United States Congress. 

Our mission has been under resourced for years, but it is now 

one of our Government’s highest priorities with substantial development funds and hundreds more civilian personnel. We will soon 

have increased our civilian presence in Kabul threefold and in the 

field six fold just over this past year. And we will of course though 

need more. U.S. foreign assistance is also a comparatively small 

but essential fraction of the total amount that is being spent in Afghanistan and has been spent over the last 8 years. 

Additional resources will be necessary, and we look forward to 

sharing more details on our anticipated needs with Congress in the 

coming days and weeks. Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a daunting 

challenge. Success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the 

additional troops and other resources provided by the President 

and with the help of Congress, we will work tirelessly to ensure 

that al-Qaeda never again gains refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country. And thank you, sir, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eikenberry follows:]

70


53829d-1.eps
71


53829d-2.eps
72


53829d-3.eps
73


53829d-4.eps
74


53829d-5.eps
75


53829d-6.eps
76


53829d-7.eps
77


53829d-8.eps
78


53829d-9.eps
79


53829d-10.eps
80


53829d-11.eps
81


53829d-12.eps
82


53829d-13.eps
83


53829d-14.eps
84


53829d-15.eps
85


53829d-16.eps
86

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much. 

General McChrystal? 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STANLEY A. 

MCCHRYSTAL, COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES AFGHANISTAN (USFOR–A), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member RosLehtinen, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for 

the chance to appear before you today. I welcome this opportunity 

to testify on our way ahead in Afghanistan, and I am pleased to 

do so with Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, an old friend. Let me 

begin by saluting the bravery of the men and women of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. They are anchored by over 68,000 courageous Americans, our close partners in 

the NATO alliance, and a 43-nation coalition. We honor the sacrifices of the fallen, the veterans, and their families. 

We also recognize the toll paid every day by our counterparts in 

the Afghan security forces and by Afghan civilians, who ultimately 

suffer the most from this insurgency. It is for them and for all of 

us that we seek a stable Afghanistan, a defunct al-Qaeda, and a 

secure future in that vital region of the world. I first deployed to 

Afghanistan in 2002 and have commanded forces there every year 

since. Despite that experience, there is much in Afghanistan that 

I have yet to fully understand. For all of us Afghanistan is a challenge that is best approached with a balance of determination and 

humility. 

While U.S. forces have been at war in Afghanistan for 8 years, 

the Afghans have been at it for more than 30. They are frustrated 

with international efforts that have failed to meet their expectations, confronting us with a crisis of confidence among Afghans who 

view the international effort as insufficient and their government 

as corrupt or at the very least inconsequential. We also face a complex and resilient insurgency. 

The Quetta Shura Taliban, or Afghan Taliban, is a prominent 

threat to the Government of Afghanistan, and they aspire to once 

again become the Government of Afghanistan. The Haqqani and 

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin insurgent groups have more limited geographical reach and objectives, but they are no less lethal. All three 

groups are supported to some degree by external elements in Iran 

and Pakistan, have ties with al-Qaeda, and coexist within narcotics 

and criminal networks, both fueling and feeding off instability and 

insecurity in the region. 

The mission in Afghanistan is undeniably difficult, and success 

will require steadfast commitment and incur significant costs. I 

participated fully in the President’s assessment and decision making process and was afforded multiple opportunities to provide my 

recommendations and best military advice, which I did. Combined 

with insights and policy considerations from across our Government, I believe the decisions that came from that process reflect a 

realistic and effective approach. 

To pursue our core goal of defeating al-Qaeda and preventing 

their return to Afghanistan, we must disrupt and degrade the 

Taliban’s capacity, deny their access to the Afghan population, and 

87

strengthen the Afghan security forces. This means we must reverse 

the Taliban’s current momentum and create the time and space to 

develop Afghan security and governance capacity. The President’s 

decision rapidly resources our strategy, recognizing that the next 

18 months will likely be decisive and ultimately enable success. I 

fully support the President’s decision. 

The President has also reiterated how this decision supports our 

national interests. Rolling back the Taliban is a prerequisite to the 

ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda. The mission is not only important, it 

is also achievable. We can and will accomplish this mission. Let me 

briefly explain why I believe so. My confidence derives first from 

the Afghans’ resolve, since it is their actions that will ultimately 

matter most in ending this conflict with their interests and by extension our own secured. 

Second, we do not confront a popular insurgency. The Taliban 

have no widespread constituency, have a history of failure in 

power, and lack an appealing vision. Third, where our strategy is 

applied, we have begun to show that we can help the Afghans establish more effective security and more credible governance. Finally, Afghans do not regard us as occupiers. They do not wish for 

us to remain forever yet they see our support as a necessary bridge 

to future security and stability. 

I have been back in Afghanistan for 6 months now. I believe that 

with the President’s decision and ongoing reforms I outlined in our 

initial assessment, our efforts are now empowered with a greater 

sense of clarity, capability, commitment, and confidence. Let me 

start with clarity. The President’s recently completed review of our 

strategy to include its deep and pointed questioning of all assumptions and recommendations has produced greater clarity of our mission in objectives. 

We also have greater clarity on the way forward. Additional 

forces will begin to deploy shortly, and by this time next year new 

security gains will be illuminated by specific indicators, and it will 

be clear to us that the insurgency has lost the momentum. And by 

the summer of 2011 it will be clear to the Afghan people that the 

insurgency will not win, giving them the chance to side with their 

government. From that point forward, while we begin to reduce 

U.S. combat force levels, we will remain partnered with the Afghan 

security forces in a supporting role to consolidate and solidify their 

gains. 

Results may come more quickly, and we must demonstrate 

progress toward measurable objectives, but the sober fact is that 

there are no silver bullets. Ultimate success will be the cumulative 

effect of sustained pressure across multiple lines of operation. Increasing our capability has been about much more than just troop 

increases. For the past 6 months we have been implementing organizational and operational changes that are already reflecting improvements in our effectiveness. 

But the additional forces announced by President Obama are significant. Forces to increase our capacity to train the Afghan national security forces and forces to partner with Afghan army and 

police in expanding security zones in key areas will provide us the 

ability to reverse insurgent momentum and deny the Taliban the 

access to the population they require to survive. Our commitment 

88

is watched intently and constantly judged by our allies and by our 

enemies. The commitment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces along 

with additional coalition forces and growing Afghan national security force numbers will be a significant step toward expanding security in critical areas and in demonstrating resolve. 

The commitment of all coalition nations will be buttressed by a 

clear understanding of how we will mitigate risks. I will briefly 

mention three. The first is the Afghan Government’s credibility deficit, which must be recognized by all to include Afghan officials as 

a critical area of focus and change. Equally important is our ability 

to accelerate development of the Afghan security forces. Measures 

such as increased pay and incentives, literacy training, leader development, and expanded partnering are necessary to position the 

Afghan national security force to assume responsibility for long 

term security. 

Third, the hazard posed by extremists that operate on both sides 

of the border with Pakistan with freedom of movement across that 

border must be mitigated by enhanced cross border coordination 

and enhanced Pakistani engagement. Looking ahead, I am confident we have both the right strategy and the right resources. 

Every trip around Afghanistan reinforces my confidence in the coalition and Afghan forces we stand alongside in this effort. But I 

also find confidence in those we are trying to help. That confidence 

is found where an Afghan farmer chooses to harvest wheat rather 

than poppy or where a young adult casts his or her vote or joins 

the police or a group of villagers resolves to reject the local insurgency. 

We face many challenges in Afghanistan, but our efforts are sustained by one unassailable reality: Neither the Afghan people nor 

the international community want Afghanistan to remain a sanctuary for terror and violence. And if we are to be confident of our 

mission and our prospects, we must also be accurate in our assessment of progress. We owe ourselves, our leaders, and the American 

people transparency and candor because the price to be paid is 

high and the stakes are even higher. 

In closing, my team and I would like to thank you and your colleagues for your support to the American men and women currently serving in Afghanistan and to tell you a bit about them. We 

risk letting numbers like 30K roll off our tongues without remembering that those are fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters serving 

far from home, selfless in their sacrifices for each of us. The other 

day I asked a young but combat experienced sergeant where he 

was on 9/11, and his answer, getting my braces removed, reminded 

me it has been more than 8 years since 9/11, and many of our service members and families have experienced and sacrificed much. 

But as I see them in action at remote bases, on patrol, partnering with Afghan forces, recovering in combat hospitals, they don’t 

talk about all they have given up, they talk about all they are accomplishing and their determination in this endeavor. This is not 

a force of rookies or dilettantes. The brigade commander in coast 

is completing his fourth combat tour in Afghanistan, and his experience and expertise is reflective of the force that represents you. 

All have felt fear and loneliness, most have lost comrades, none 

have lost heart. In their eyes I see maturity beyond their years, in 

89

their actions I see a commitment to succeed and a commitment to 

each other. I am confident that I share your pride in what these 

great Americans are doing for our country in Afghanistan, and it 

will be my privilege to accept your questions on their behalf. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General McChrystal follows:]

90


53829e-1.eps
91


53829e-2.eps
92


53829e-3.eps
93


53829e-4.eps
94


53829e-5.eps
95


53829e-6.eps
96

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you both. And, General McChrystal, 

you are commander of the International Security Assistance Force 

as well as U.S. Forces, would you be willing to introduce a few of 

our NATO representatives who are here with us today? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Yes, sir. This is part of my personal staff, 

of course I have got Colonel Charlie Flynn who is a U.S. Army officer. Kristoff is my German aide, I have two aides, one American 

and one German. Bill Rafferty is one of our planners, a British officer. Another allied officer from the U.S. Navy, Greg Smith, runs 

our communications. Jake McFarren is our political advisor in the 

headquarters. KC Welch is my other aide, my American aide, had 

27 months in Iraq before he came to Afghanistan with only 5 

months off between those two deployments. And then Dave Silverman works in my personal staff as well, obviously another naval 

officer. 

Chairman BERMAN. Great, thank you very much. We will begin 

the questioning now, and I am first going to recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for continuing the hearing. And I want to thank both Ambassador 

Eikenberry and General McChrystal for what you do and your 

leadership for our young men and women, not only serving in the 

military but obviously on the civilian side. Having been to the Embassy in Afghanistan a couple of times and having been hosted 

there, it is not the plush area anyone ever thinks. But I appreciate 

what you all do and I know Members of Congress do. 

General McChrystal, there are currently 94,000 Afghan soldiers 

on the ground, and current plans call for increasing that number 

to 134 by October of next year. There are currently about 91,000 

Afghan police officers on the ground and there are current calls for 

boosting that to 96,800 by next October. This would make a total 

Afghan security force of around 230,000 police and military. During 

the strategic review you advocated for boosting the number of Afghan security forces to 400,000. Security forces in Iraq, with a 

much easier terrain, now total about 600,000. Do you think 400,000 

with tougher terrain in Afghanistan is realistic? It is a lot more 

than 230—the estimate—but is it still within range of what we 

really need for the Afghans? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, as everyone knows Afghanistan must ultimately be secured by Afghans, that is what they 

want and that is the right answer. We did a detailed analysis of 

what it would take using basic COIN doctrine to secure Afghanistan, and the number reaches up near 600,000 total Afghan security forces of all kinds, police and army. But the insurgency is not 

in the entire country, not all the country is threatened. 

So as we refined our focus, in fact we were able to reach what 

we believe is a better longer term instate. We came up with about 

400,000 combinations of army and police as being the right number 

for Afghanistan to have as coalition forces drop down to a fairly 

small number of advisors or for the long term. That would of course 

be adjusted or could be adjusted based upon whether there is an 

insurgency at that point and the size of that insurgency. A number 

of 400,000 divided between the army and the police of 240,000 ultimately in the army and 160,000 in the police would not be really 

97

out of range for that part of the world for standing armies and police. 

But I think we need to view that not as a hard number at this 

point but as a goal we work toward and adjust constantly. The 

President’s decision is to grow those forces like we are growing the 

army to 134,000 by next fall, and we will clearly continue to grow 

the police, but to relook that every year will allow us to reflect 

what the state of the insurgency is and then of course what their 

ability to grow is, can they make those numbers. We are getting 

some very heartening feedback here recently, there have been pay 

raises for both the army and the police implemented by the Government of Afghanistan with the international community’s help, 

and we are seeing a significant improvement. But we have got to 

see whether that is sustainable long term. 

Mr. GREEN. And you recognize that our goal is to make the Afghans protect their own neighborhood, and you share that and the 

President I know shares it and I know Congress does. General 

McChrystal, in your testimony you write ‘‘additional forces will 

begin to deploy shortly, and by this time next year new security 

gains will be illuminated by specific indicators. It will be clear to 

us that the insurgency has lost momentum.’’ Other than generally 

saying conditions on the ground and knowing that the security situation will never be perfect, what specific criteria can the American people look to that we are basing that decision on sometime 

next year? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, we collect a tremendous number of 

metrics, but we try to pull those together in a number that is understandable both to us and then communicable. The first and biggest will be the security situation by district across the country 

within the 34 provinces, whether the district is in fact under solid 

government control, whether it might be contested or whether it 

might be under insurgent control. So we do a map that is fed by 

a tremendous amount of data that allows us to look at those districts. If we are seeing progress in those, that will be one of the 

major indicators. 

I believe the other major indicator will be the growth and development of the Afghan national security forces or increasing capacity of Afghanistan to secure itself. In addition to those two major 

indicators that I believe will be most illustrative, we feed that with 

a tremendous amount of information from polling data of what the 

Afghan people think, which is key because ultimately this war will 

be won in the minds of the Afghan people, and indicators of their 

ability to go about their lives, whether they can drive through secure areas to market, the cost of goods, and things like that. 

Mr. GREEN. And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Boozman. And the 5 minutes 

allotted includes questions and answers. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you 

being here, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal. We 

do appreciate the service to your country, and then also your families, and I think that was so illustrated by your staffer when you 

mentioned that he was in Iraq and now in Afghanistan and the 

time away from home. 

98

General McChrystal, following the President’s March speech to 

Congress, the President developed a series of metrics to judge 

progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Are those metrics still useful? Did they have any influence on the strategy and assessment 

that you did in August? Are these metrics still useful based on this 

President’s new strategy? Do the metrics have any influence on the 

July 2011 withdrawal? And do the metrics need to be revised as 

a result of the new planning? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I believe the metrics, they 

are still in place, they are useful. I do believe they will evolve over 

time because of the conditions on the ground evolve and we collect 

even more data and look at it I think it is important we keep being 

willing to evolve those to understand it. So I expect those to be 

baseline metrics, but I expect to inform that with many others as 

well, sir. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. I know that you all are very metric driven. We 

have had many come and testify before Congress that President 

Karzai is going to be held accountable. Do the metrics that you 

have developed, do they specifically include assessment for President Karzai? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congressman, our assessments, yes 

they include the effectiveness of the Government of Afghanistan at 

the national level and, as General McChrystal said, assessments 

that are at the subnational level as well, that we have a robust 

plan of assessments at all levels. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. I know that Prime Minister Brown has reportedly 

given President Karzai a list of milestones and metrics that he will 

judge him by. Have you seen the list? Are we trying to replicate 

and work with them in that regard? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I have not seen the specific 

list, but I am roughly familiar with the intent of it. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Good. Lastly, the other guys who were here and 

testified, Secretary Gates and also Admiral Mullen, and I think 

that, I know in my district, I think throughout the country, there 

really is a great concern of the four guys that are under indictment 

or whatever you call that in the military, and I think the concern 

is that somehow we are being caught up in political correctness. I 

wanted to tell Secretary Gates, I didn’t get a chance to ask a question of him, but Arkansas played Texas A&M earlier in the year 

and beat them in Texas stadium. 

But you know, in the heat of that battle, if somebody hit somebody in the mouth they would be suspended for a game. And I 

know it is different, the situation, but it is not that different. And 

I guess what I would like from you is just your reassurance, I know 

through the years people have stood up for me, your reassurance 

that you are looking into that, you know, and shepherding that 

process. 

I know you can’t get involved directly at the point it is now. Admiral Mullen indicated that he had confidence with the people that 

were taking care of it, and again my comeback to that is that I 

know that he had confidence in the people at Fort Hood and yet 

a third grader could have told that there was something going on 

there that was not right. And I think again the American people 

are concerned that that is due to political correctness. 

99

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I am not familiar because 

the incident that happened in Iraq, with the current one that you 

mentioned, with the specifics of that case, but I will tell you we 

stress to all of our people the importance of how they act, but there 

is also an absolute loyalty to people as well. So I think the balance 

is about right. I feel very good particularly, we have learned a lot 

over these years as we go through this. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. I know that is an Iraqi situation, but it does make 

a difference in the sense your guys now, when they are deciding 

whether or not to do an action or this or that, the easiest thing to 

do is to not do, okay? It does make a difference as far as decision 

making and things, and so I would hope that you would work with 

your cohorts, and I know that you have got tremendous influence 

in various areas but that really is an important thing, it is an important thing with the American people and their support of the 

military. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, General 

and Ambassador. Let me start off with the mission as it was articulated by General Gates and Secretary Clinton last week was 

this, that our mission is to go in, destroy, dismantle, defeat alQaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and see to it that they do 

not return. That being the case, what about Pakistan? Pakistan is 

where the crux of the problem is, but yet it is the least emphasis 

where we have seen our strategy. That is where al-Qaeda is, that 

is where the real apex of the situation is. Will our troops be able 

to go into Pakistan and do exactly what the mission says, destroy, 

dismantle, and see that it doesn’t return to Pakistan? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, the importance of the mission against 

al-Qaeda is about clear. As commander of ISAF my responsibility 

or my authorities stop at the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

We do however work very hard, and I personally spend a lot of 

time with General Kiyani, developing a strategic partnership to enable them to meet their strategic objectives. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well let me just ask you because I only just have a 

few minutes here and I have a number of questions. To your 

knowledge, of your involvement with the joint strategy with Pakistan, to your knowledge will our troops be able to go into Pakistan? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, I am really out of my lane to discuss 

that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Let me ask you about NATO and our troops. 

NATO has said they are sending around 7,000, 6,000 7,000 troops. 

Those troops come with caveats. Can you comment very briefly on 

what that presents to you, where a nation may send soldiers but 

they tell them, you can go, you can see, but you can’t conquer, you 

can’t get into battle, you must sit on the bench. What does that do 

to our strategy? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, many of the 43 nations’ forces come 

with no caveats and they operate just like ours. 

Mr. SCOTT. What percentage of that? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. I am sorry? 

Mr. SCOTT. You said 40 percent? 

100

General MCCHRYSTAL. No, sir, many of them. I don’t know the 

percentage; I would like to get that back to you for the record. The 

caveats are something that I work with all our NATO partners and 

ask them to reduce to increase our flexibility, and I think it is important that we continue to reduce those so that they can prosecute 

operations, particularly counterinsurgency, effectively. 

Mr. SCOTT. Going back for a moment to you, Ambassador, you 

mentioned some things, there has been a hesitancy to stay away 

from the word nation building. But as I listened to you as you 

talked about setting up the Afghan Government, as you talked 

about your three corners which were security, which was governance, which was building up the economy, if that isn’t nation building I don’t know what is. Is not that nation building? Can we not 

be successful unless we do that? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congressman, I think our goals are 

clear, they are narrowed. What we are seeking to achieve in partnership with our Afghan allies is a government that has the capability of providing for the security of its own people. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me just ask you though because I only have a little bit of time, are we in nation building in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. I think that what we have established 

are clear goals that are narrow that have to do with establishing 

sufficient security. 

Mr. SCOTT. But I am asking you, yes or no, are we in nation 

building in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. No, I would not characterize what we 

are doing, we are providing assistance to the state of Afghanistan, 

no I would not characterize it as open ended nation building, clearly not. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, all right. Let me go back to you, General 

McChrystal. You mentioned, and you spoke eloquently and I agree 

with you, of the sacrifice and the great job that our soldiers are 

doing, but here is what concerns me. There is a terrible strain on 

our military. Many of our young men and women are going on their 

third and fourth tours of duty. There has been an ugly side to this. 

Every time I have gone over there—for four times I have been to 

Afghanistan—I go back to Lonstall Air Base; I care about our military. The situation in Fort Hood was just the tip of the iceberg in 

terms of excessive stress, the mental strain, the suicide, the divorce 

rates. Tell me how deep is the strain on our military and what are 

we doing about it? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, the strain is significant, 

but the force is holding up extraordinarily well. I think the things 

we are doing to take care of families back in the states, the things 

we are doing to look after service members while they are there, 

to get leave, all those things to take care of wounded warriors, to 

me all of those come together to give the force much more resiliency than it would otherwise have and historically would have. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you both. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Wilson, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. General, Ambassador, thank you very much for 

being here today. I have a special appreciation of your commitVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
101

ment. As a Member of Congress I am grateful to be the co-chair 

of the Afghan caucus. I appreciate your hospitality at the briefings 

that I have had with both of you, I just have great faith in your 

service. Also I am very happy that we share that our army careers 

began together in the 1970s, and so I appreciate as a veteran your 

service, more particularly as a parent I have got four sons serving 

in the military of the United States today, I am very grateful for 

their service and military service means a lot to our family. 

And that is why I want military families to know that I have 

faith in your integrity, I have faith in your ability, you truly are 

looking out for the troops, I believe you are going to be victorious 

in this second surge where we will be defeating the terrorists to 

protect American families at home. On Tuesday I was honored to 

be at the Armed Services Committee meeting, Ambassador, and 

was pleasantly surprised when you said that there has been 

progress in Afghanistan. 

And sometimes I have to read about progress in unusual places 

like Rotary Magazine, and they were giving indications of rotary 

projects around the world, and one that they are backing up are 

schools, the number of schools have increased from 650 to 9,500. 

Can you tell us what you see as progress, and then what is the role 

of a provincial reconstruction team? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Thanks, Congressman. There has been 

remarkable progress since the very dark days of Taliban of 2001, 

you mentioned one, education. In 2001 there were 1 million children going to school; they were almost all boys; they were receiving 

a certain persuasion of education. Today there are 6.5 million Afghan children who are going to school; about 35 percent of those 

are girls. In 2001 very little of the Afghan population had access 

to any healthcare, now 80 percent of the population has access to 

primary, albeit rudimentary, but access to primary healthcare. 

I could go on with the development of roads, I could go on with 

now 10 million Afghans have cell phones. And there have been profound changes. Against that, we know where the challenges are. 

General McChrystal and I both share our views of where those 

challenges are, but there is room to have great hope as we move 

forward, there is much to build upon. The provincial reconstruction 

teams; the provincial reconstruction teams have a very important 

role both as civilian-military combined effort in many of the provinces of Afghanistan under NATO ISAF command, and their roles 

are to assist the local government in strengthening their government to help them develop capacity in order to improve their distribution of basic services to the people in the area. 

Mr. WILSON. And something that would be very helpful, I served 

with Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee in the Afghan caucus, if 

you could provide to us say a bullet type of presentation that we 

could distribute to our colleagues on items of progress that you see, 

that would be very helpful. And, General McChrystal, I have had 

the opportunity to visit the police training academy in Jalalabad, 

my former National Guard unit, the 218th, helped train the police 

units across the country, and I saw really dedicated persons but I 

am very concerned about their pay, the pay is so low that it certainly would call into question loyalty and then lead to some level 

of bribery. What is the status of pay, training; who is paying? 

102

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, well timed. The Government of Afghanistan just increased the pay of Afghan national 

army and police, didn’t quite double it but brought it almost to 

twice. It is still, the design is to get to a living reasonable wage 

so that we don’t have people who are forced to resort to corruption 

or family support to go forward. And it is foreign money that helps. 

The Afghan Government is required to pay 34 percent of their 

budget according to the London Compact 1996 toward their Afghan 

security forces, but that clearly does not cover the major part of the 

cost. 

Mr. WILSON. And the cost largely covered, you say, by foreign 

contributions, it is my understanding that Japan has been a major 

contributor and should be given credit. Again people do not know 

the extraordinary efforts and support from around the world as unlikely as Japan supporting the police of Afghanistan. Thank you 

again for your service. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Ross, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McChrystal, the 

Arkansas National Guard, like those in other states, plays an important role in responding to natural disasters and other domestic 

emergencies in Arkansas. It is not uncommon for them to respond 

in other states as well, such as Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina. 

In addition to these domestic roles, the Arkansas National Guard’s 

39th infantry brigade combat team has twice been deployed to Iraq, 

and while this team has to date not served in Afghanistan there 

is a significant National Guard presence in Afghanistan. 

In fact the 39th has been to Iraq not once but twice and I think 

most of them have a pretty good idea of what may be in their future. I am grateful for the service the men and women of the National Guard provide our country. Their continued deployment 

leaves the National Guard fewer troops and equipment needed to 

respond to domestic issues. How many of the 30,000 additional 

troops do you envision coming from the National Guard? And how 

soon will National Guardsmen and Guardswomen return home 

after the planned draw down begins in 2011? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, I will have to take for record the 

number of the 30,000 and get back to you that look like National 

Guards. The Services will determine that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL STANLEY A. 

MCCHRYSTAL TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE

MIKE ROSS

Force Packages 1, 2, and 3 presently include the following National Guard Forces: 

Combat Service Support Battalion (78), Engineering Company (Route Clearance) 

(122), Military Police Law and Order Detachment (45), Maintenance Company (173), 

and Communications Detachment (77). It is important to note that the sourcing 

process continues, and additional capabilities from both the Active and Reserve 

Force, in support of all three Force Packages are still being identified and sourced. 

We are continuing to work with USCENTCOM, USJFCOM, USTRANSCOM, the 

Joint Staff, and the Services to ensure the timely deployment of these troops. The 

pace and intensity of the transition that commences in 2011 is to be determined, 

as stated by the President, by conditions on the ground.

103

General MCCHRYSTAL. I would like to take a second though to 

talk about National Guardsmen in service, because they were extraordinary across all of the different disciplines, engineers, infantry, trainers, a significant number of people training the Afghan 

national security forces are National Guardsmen. And then the agricultural development teams that are there as well from many 

states, they provide a linkage to practical agriculture expertise that 

we can provide, and they also develop a sense of partnership with 

the Afghan people that is a combat multiplier, not just developmental assistance, it actually helps security as well. So I can’t say 

enough about what National Guardsmen do or the sacrifices they 

have made. 

Mr. ROSS. In my time remaining, approximately three quarters 

of the food, fuel, and other provisions that supply NATO forces 

passes through Pakistan. In the face of increased Taliban attacks 

on the supply routes the Pakistani Government has been unable to 

increase security. Since September 2008 the attacks have forced 

several temporary closures of NATO supply routes through the 

Khyber Pass. As a result of these attacks and the decreased security in Pakistan, NATO was forced to seek alternative supply 

routes into Afghanistan. 

The continuing attacks raise concern for the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan which will require a significant 

increase in supplies. While some of the additional supplies will be 

transported via other ways, such as the northern distribution network, much of the additional supplies will have to pass obviously 

through Pakistan. What will be done to ensure American and 

NATO forces receive the supplies necessary during their deployment in light of this? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, that is an important point. 

We look at very hard what we call the ground lines of communication that go through Pakistan are essential to our effectiveness 

there. And so what we work with is our strategic partnership with 

the Government of Pakistan to continue to secure those. We actually have a very good track record of amount of equipment that 

makes it through without any issues, it is a very, very high percentage, it has been a very strong, predictable flow. That said, we 

always understand that instability could threaten that, and that is 

why the northern distribution network was developed, not because 

we absolutely had to have it but we wanted to have alternate 

means so that if one means was threatened or one line of communication was threatened we would have the additional. 

Mr. ROSS. And, Mr. Chairman, my goal in life remains keeping 

you happy, and with that I will yield back my remaining 40 seconds. 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, I hope it is contagious. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, you lead 

an awesome group of folks and we thank you for your service and 

for their service. You mentioned that our commitment as a nation 

is being watched intently, and you called it a significant step to 

commit 30,000 troops, is it sufficient? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I am confident that it is. 

104

Mr. INGLIS. And with the commitment being watched intently, 

what do we signal by a time line for transfer, does that undermine 

the signal of commitment or does it, what is the impact of talking 

about a date certain for transfer? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. There are several points I would like to 

make on that. There is first a vulnerability in any date that is set, 

the enemy can take that date and use it for propaganda purposes, 

but I believe we can combat that. But there are a number of 

positives in where we are right now, and I would like to stress 

those. The first is that the date does serve as somewhat of a forcing 

function for the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan people 

to understand that their responsibility for security is absolute and 

we need to move toward that, and I think we have already begun 

to see some of the effect on that, so that is positive. 

But I would also step back and talk about the more important 

part to me at the security standpoint, the President has outlined 

his commitment to a strategic partnership over time, long term, 

which provides assurance to the people of Afghanistan and the government that we are partnering with them. Were I an insurgent 

and I saw that solid assurance from the United States, then I 

would understand that a date doesn’t change anything. 

In the near term, the 30,000 additional American forces combined with coalition forces is going to allow my force to turn this 

momentum and very seriously push back on the insurgency, and I 

think very effectively, and I think that will be clear to everyone. 

At the same time the growth of Afghan national security forces will 

be rising during that period so that any point whatever pace the 

President decides to draw down our combat forces, I think that is 

met with growing Afghan national security force and government 

capacity. So I really think we don’t leave much of a window of opportunity for the insurgency, particularly when they see the long 

term commitment. 

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you. And, Ambassador, you also lead an impressive group of folks and we thank you for their service and your 

service. And the General mentioned that the wonderful decision by 

a farmer to decide to harvest wheat rather than poppy, do you have 

any idea what the per acre profit margin is comparing those two 

crops? I mean what can a farmer make on wheat as opposed to 

poppies? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. It changes from year to year, it 

changes from region to region. I will submit for the record, Congressman, the most current data. The fluctuation of the price of 

wheat, one of the main staple crops of Afghanistan, has an extraordinary amount to do with decisions by farmers. But I would also 

emphasize there is a direct correlation, a known direct correlation 

between areas of insecurity in Afghanistan where there is no legitimate Government of Afghanistan presence and high poppy yields. 

We see that very clearly in southern Afghanistan. In one province of southern Afghanistan, Helmand, over 50 percent of poppy 

production for the entire country occurs there, and it is exactly the 

area where General McChrystal’s forces right now and the Afghan 

national security forces have part of their main effort. Part of that 

success that we will have there will have to do with pushing the 

Taliban back and securing the Afghan population, part of the sucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
105

cess will also yield reductions in poppy production and narcotrafficking, and there is a clear nexus between the two. 

Mr. INGLIS. Yes, it seems to be a clear nexus between the security, the imposition, our ability to project forth so that we stop that 

poppy production. Because otherwise the unpopular, as a general 

statement, unpopular Taliban becomes more popular by comparison 

if you can feed your family selling an illegal crop as opposed to 

slaving away on a low profit margin crop that maybe isn’t going to 

feed your family. So it is crucial I suppose to have these things to 

together, that we have to push to say that, well you can’t grow this 

anymore, but also provide some hope that other crops will work 

and you can make a living. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. One of the key first principles of our 

developmental strategy is in the area of agriculture, and I think, 

Congressman, it gets exactly to what you are talking about. 

Mr. INGLIS. Okay. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CROWLEY. I thank the chairman, I thank both of you gentlemen for being here before us today. Like many of my colleagues I 

have some very serious reservations about additional troop buildup 

in Afghanistan, especially in the midst of a tough economic cycle 

that we are under right now here, our first and foremost responsibility I believe is to the American people. In addition to the cost, 

the geopolitical realities of the Afghanistan and Pakistan and the 

greater region all raise questions about U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 

I am also concerned about the well being certainly of our troops. 

I had the opportunity to travel to both Afghanistan and to Iraq last 

year. Probably the sharpest distinction that I could draw after coming back was that the different assets that appear upon landing in 

Afghanistan. And I want to thank, I don’t know if it has been done 

already, I noticed behind you, General, there are representation of 

the coalition of forces that are engaged in Afghanistan, I want to 

thank them for their participation, for the sacrifices that they have 

made as well, I know this is not just an American cause. 

But having said that, we will be sending many, many more 

American troops than coalition forces from abroad. With that in 

mind, I just want to ask and just to follow up on the last questions 

that were brought up to both General McChrystal and to you, Ambassador, in terms of your initial report to Secretary Gates you said 

that the narco profits were a major earner for the insurgency. If 

we were to displace that as a profit mode for the rebels and for alQaeda, do you believe there are other alternative resources that 

they would be able to use to supplant that? And would they be 

enough to carry out the work they are doing right now? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, we calculate that the 

Taliban get about a third of their funding from the narcotrafficking, but that they could operate without it. They essentially tax the 

narco trade, they could tax licit crops as well. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Right. 

General MCCHRYSTAL. So we don’t think that that would cripple 

them. The greatest threat from the narco trade is the corrosive corVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
106

ruption that it brings into governance. So what we need to do first 

is get security and bring all of those down together. 

Mr. CROWLEY. I just thought it was important to make that 

point, and I appreciate you doing that, that that in and of itself will 

not end the problems we have. Yes, Ambassador? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Just briefly, Congressman, another 

source of revenue of course for the Taliban comes from outside of 

Afghanistan, funds that come from the Gulf, funds that come from 

different elements in Pakistan, and there is a full out combined intelligence, military, and law enforcement effort to try to choke that 

off. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you. I have limited time so I just want to 

get to another point. Testimonies by numerous government witnesses have pointed out that the United States is going to increase 

the number of trainers working to expand the Afghan army. Over 

time, if the plan works, the size of the Afghan army will grow substantially. Going forward, how will the Afghan army sustain itself 

financially? And does your plan include a measure of self sustainability so that American taxpayers are not footing the entire bill 

for decades to come? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, in the near term it is clear that Afghanistan will not have the funds to pay for security forces of the 

size that they need. As their economy grows, that would be the 

hope, but in the foreseeable future, that does not appear possible. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Also, Congressman, important to note 

that when we talk about the Afghan national security forces, the 

army and the police, I don’t think we could tell you precisely what 

is the ratio of cost of having a U.S. Army soldier or Marine deployed to Afghanistan versus the cost of sustaining an Afghan national army soldier or policeman, but it is probably on the order of 

30 or 40 to 1. So obviously the way forward of developing an Afghan national army and police that can provide for the security of 

their own people, it makes good sense for a lot of reasons. 

Mr. CROWLEY. I appreciate it. Looking at my clock, I have less 

than 1 minute, so, Mr. Chairman, your work has been incredibly 

important in terms of the level of witnesses we have had before 

this committee, and I too want to stay in your good graces, and I 

will yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman BERMAN. Well that is nice, thank you. The time of the 

gentleman has been relinquished to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Poe, recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you both for being 

here. I am from southeast Texas, I represent a guy by the name 

of Charlie Wilson’s old district, and so I have a few questions. I just 

got back from Afghanistan on Tuesday, I met with our generals, 

German, Canadian, and British NATO allies and our troops down 

on the Pakistan Afghanistan border. I was pleasantly really surprised to learn that the Afghan people appear to me to be very supportive of our presence in Afghanistan, that they fear the Taliban, 

they fear the reprisals that they have lived under the Taliban, and 

they supply us a lot of information about the Taliban, good intelligence. 

The question, several questions. We have heard about the President’s position on more troops, I call it the surge and retreat policy, 

107

but now that has been hedged a little bit, in the summer of 2011. 

General McChrystal, what is our policy now? Is it to reevaluate our 

troops, our position, in 2011, the summer of 2011, is that what it 

is as you understand it? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, my understanding is in 

July 2011 we will begin the reduction of U.S. forces. The pace of 

that and the scope of that will be based on conditions on the 

ground at that time. 

Mr. POE. So we will start bringing troops home but we won’t necessarily bring them all home then, is that what you understand? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Exactly, Congressman, there will be some 

slope, some pace that is determined by conditions. 

Mr. POE. And if the conditions are worse, what happens then? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, the President can always make decisions based upon conditions on the ground, but it is my expectation 

that beginning on July 2011 we will start a reduction. 

Mr. POE. You believe that you can accomplish the mission you 

have when you receive the troops, which is in several weeks or 

even months, maybe just a year time that you have to do that? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I do. I think that with the 

forces we have, the additional forces and that time, I am comfortable that we will be able to do that. 

Mr. POE. Well I think it is obvious to anybody that goes to Afghanistan and Iraq too that our troops are just the best, there is 

no comparison to the quality of our troops. How many members of 

the Taliban are there? We would like to know how many of the 

enemy we are trying to defeat. How many of them are there, General? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, it varies based upon their 

popularity. We assess between 24 and 27,000 members of the 

Taliban, but I believe as momentum is turned that affects their 

ability to retain their force. So I think it is not people with long 

term enlistments, I think it is more flexible than that. 

Mr. POE. Having been on the Pakistan Afghanistan border and 

talking to just regular troops, just my opinion is that the Pakistan 

Government isn’t doing enough to ratchet up protecting their side 

of the border, that the Taliban come over in to Afghanistan and 

woe be to them if they do because the military is going to find 

them, but they run back over to Pakistan and have sanctuary, and 

it appears to me we know where they are, Pakistan gives lip service to doing something about it. I met with their people and I am 

not convinced that Pakistan is engaged in helping defeat the 

Taliban. Can you give me some insight on that? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, I believe our long term way ahead is 

with a strategic partnership with Pakistan. They are absolutely focused against the TTP, or Pakistani Taliban internal to Pakistan. 

They have not focused on the Afghan Taliban that use sanctuaries. 

Interestingly, and I have a very close relationship with the Pakistani military and building this relationship 

Mr. POE. Excuse me, General, for interrupting, I just have 30 

seconds. 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. So they take care of business with the Taliban that is 

the homegrown folks that just stick around in Pakistan to do misVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
108

chief, but people running back and forth across the border into Afghanistan, they don’t consider that their problem? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I think that may oversimplify it, I think they do but I wish they would do more against 

the Afghan Taliban. 

Mr. POE. The only other thing I want to mention, and I am sorry 

we can’t go into it, I too am concerned about the rules of engagement, the Navy SEALs capturing one of the worst guys in history, 

and it seems they ought to be getting medals rather than being 

court-martialed, but we don’t have any time to talk about that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Let me welcome you and say good morning to both 

you, Ambassador and General, it is good to see you again. We were 

with you only a few weeks ago. We have talked a lot about 30,000 

extra, but what about the civilian surge side of this, could you 

elaborate on that, Ambassador Eikenberry, what is our projected 

number, what are we hoping to arrive at, and how is that process 

going along? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Thanks, Congressman, good to see you 

again. 

Mr. ELLISON. Absolutely. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. We have made very significant 

progress over the last 12 months in increasing our civilian numbers 

and our civilian capabilities in Afghanistan. By January of next 

year here in about a 7-week time frame, if you look back over the 

last month we will have had a threefold increase in our civilian increase in Afghanistan, very importantly in support of General 

McChrystal’s efforts, a six-fold increase in the field. Numbers 

roughly then that we are talking about early next year, January 

February time frame, we will be looking at about 1,000 civilians 

overall in Afghanistan, about 400 of those we project to be out in 

the field. 

It is a very diverse group of civilians. These are civilians not only 

from the Department of State as you know, but USAID development specialists, Department of Agriculture specialists around the 

country, members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation mentoring 

and helping establish an Afghan FBI. We have brave members of 

the Drug Enforcement Administration, members of the Federal 

Aviation Administration, a really impressive array. 

We have had innovations over the course of the past 6 months 

in which the way that we organize our civilian efforts and multiply 

the effects of wherever they are through hiring Afghans and then 

through those Afghan organizations amplifying the effects, we have 

very close collaboration with General McChrystal in the integration 

of these efforts. Projecting ahead, Congressman, we are set to build 

to 1,000. Right now we are in discussions with the Department 

about what additional capabilities and numbers will we need on 

the ground, that is also in collaboration with General McChrystal 

understanding his campaign so we can support that. I don’t have 

an exact number for what we will grow to, but it might be on the 

109

order of needing several hundred more over the course of the next 

6–9 months beyond what we have projected currently. 

Mr. ELLISON. Well I guess my question is, I mean that is very 

impressive and I thank you for that, and the movement in education, girls’ education, there are a lot of good stories to tell and 

I thank both of you for that. But as I look at what we are trying 

to arrive at at a civilian number and what we are trying to arrive 

at at a military number, it is like 100 to 1, is that the right ratio? 

I mean shouldn’t we have a greater, I mean if we are trying to help 

stabilize the country, harden the country so that it is more impervious to, you know, these forces that would overthrow the government and hurt the county, shouldn’t the proportion be a lot greater 

when it comes to civilian representation? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Representative, numbers are important at one level, but you have to look at the effects that they are 

going to be achieving. When we talk about the military we talk 

about mobilizing platoons, companies, battalions of 600 to deploy to 

Afghanistan to achieve effects. Remember when we are talking 

about civilians we are talking about individuals, three good Department of Agriculture specialists working in the Ministry of Agriculture of Afghanistan can help transform that entire ministry and 

its delivery of services, of agricultural services, throughout the 

country. And so, yes numbers matter, but at the end of the day it 

is how do you organize them and what effects are you trying to 

achieve? And if you wish, for the record I can give many more examples of that, Congressman. 

Mr. ELLISON. Yes, and I would like that, but not now because I 

have got one more question for you. You know, when I was in Afghanistan only a few weeks ago, our mission as part of the House 

Democratic Partnership Commission, was to interact with our 

counterparts, other legislators there, and I was really impressed 

with many people I met including several women legislators. One 

of them was from Helmand province, she told us, this is what she 

said. She reported that without the intervention of the U.S. Marines she probably couldn’t even be a member of the Parliament, 

and I guess my question to you is, you know, how is security related to women’s rights in Afghanistan, in your view? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Security is a very critical dimension of 

the advancement of women’s rights in Afghanistan certainly. There 

are many other factors, but security is fundamental. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the last 3 

months the current prosecutor for the International Criminal Court 

has been making public statements that he has jurisdiction over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan and 

is performing a ‘‘preliminary investigation into operations by U.S. 

and other NATO forces.’’ This could lead to ICC prosecution of 

American soldiers even though the United States has never ratified 

their own statute. 

Among other things he has declined to rule out ICC prosecutions 

based upon unmanned drone strikes against leaders there in Afghanistan. However, this administration has been moving the 

110

United States closer to International Criminal Court, the Secretary 

of State has expressed great regret we are not a signatory to the 

Rome statute, and last month for the first time since their own 

statute entered into force the administration sent a delegation to 

participate in a meeting of the ICC assembly of parties. It is my 

understanding that the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes, 

Ambassador Rapp, was at the meeting, said nothing to protest or 

dispute the ICC’s prosecutorial jurisdictional claims. 

We understand that there is an Article 98 agreement with Afghanistan that exempts Afghanistan as signatory to the Rome 

agreement from turning our troops over to the International Criminal Court, however the soldiers there in member states such as 

Japan, Germany, and even the U.K. may be subject to jurisdiction. 

I would like to hear your opinions on whether you agree or disagree with the ICC’s prosecutorial claim of potential jurisdiction to 

prosecute U.S. and NATO troops over actions taken in Afghanistan. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congressman, let me just speak from 

a United States perspective. We do have a bilateral agreement with 

Afghanistan, Article 98, as we do with certain other states that are 

parties to the ICC, and this precludes the Afghan Government from 

surrendering U.S. troops to the ICC. The bottom line is here, and 

the important bottom line is, our troops are protected from being 

turned over to the ICC, a commitment of this administration. 

Mr. MANZULLO. While they are in Afghanistan. What if they are 

in other countries that are not signatories to an Article 98 agreement but the countries themselves are signatories to the Rome 

agreement? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Let me get back for the record on that 

important question, Congressman, I know it is a complicated legal 

issue. 

Mr. MANZULLO. General McChrystal, do you have an opinion on 

that? I mean I think we need a definitive answer because young 

men and women are being asked to go overseas to Afghanistan to 

engage in combat, they need to know whether or not they can be 

arrested in countries that are signatories to the Rome agreement. 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I absolutely agree we need 

clarity. I would like to along with Ambassador Eikenberry take this 

for the record to ensure we get you an accurate answer. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Well I had hoped that we would have it today. 

I mean we are concerned about the prosecution of the Navy SEALs. 

A lot of people contacted us, they don’t think the military is standing behind the young men and women in uniform, they don’t think 

that because some terrorist got punched out that they should be 

subjected to a court-martial that is taking place in this country. I 

would like the assurance of both of you that if there is no clarity 

on this that we will have clarity, especially in light of the fact that 

the Secretary of State is expressing regret that we are not a party 

to the Rome agreement. Ambassador, both of you, are you on 

record as saying that you are absolutely opposed under any circumstances to men and women in uniform being arrested anywhere 

in the world and tried before the ICC court as a result of their actions in either Iraq or Afghanistan? 

111

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congressman, yes. And we will get 

back with you for the record on the very specifics of what you are 

talking about. 

Mr. MANZULLO. And, General, your answer would be yes also? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Same position, Congressman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Klein, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you for 

being with us today and thank you for your service to our country, 

difficult challenges and we appreciate you taking these challenges 

on. General McChrystal, this week when you testified before the 

Armed Services Committee, you explained that the Taliban may 

react to the arrival of reinforcements with a shift of asymmetrical 

tactics, suicide bombers, increased use of improvised explosive devices, strategies other than traditional large scale operations. Can 

you share with us what are we doing to prepare our troops who are 

already there to confront these types of asymmetrical threats and 

what are we doing to get the Afghan military to prevent these as 

well? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, on the direct tactical end 

we are doing extensive training on combating improvised explosive 

devices. We are using a number of technical means from engineer 

equipment to intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, drones 

and what not looking, we are using human intelligence as well. So 

we are doing the tactical things to try to combat the problem as 

it already arises. I think more widely the real way to get rid of 

things like IEDs is to secure an area. 

When you secure an area it is like reducing crime in a neighborhood, rather than trying to stop each crime you can increase overall security, and so what that does is the population becomes intolerant of IEDs because they suffer the most casualties from IEDs, 

civilians do. So we are working in that way to improve. Our partnership with the Afghans is the same; we are trying to provide 

them equipment and training as well so they have the same expertise. Again, suicide bombers, it is mostly intelligence, sir. 

Mr. KLEIN. Okay, and as a follow up, I think that one of the discussion points that many people are raising about the whole effort 

and the tactic and strategy is whether there is a different way to 

do this, which would be to continue with success to train the Afghan military, we know the police continues to be more complicated 

and a lot more effort, but continue to build the quantities of players 

there, and then use our military in a tactical way, special force tactical way to go after al-Qaeda where they are in those areas. 

And of course this lends itself to the question of these organizations do not respect national boundaries, we understand that and 

the discussion has been Pakistan Afghanistan, but also they can 

also be more nimble and they can pick up from one area and go 

to another area, Yemen, Somalia, other weak states if you will. 

What is to stop them and what are we doing tactically within the 

territory that we are talking about here to prevent them from going 

to other areas and how do you assess those threats of those other 

112

areas as being hospitable if we have success in eliminating them 

from Afghanistan? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, terrorists and insurgents 

do best in under governed or ungoverned areas. They thrive on 

that and they don’t survive in areas that have effective rule of law 

and governance. So what we are trying to do inside Afghanistan is 

create first areas of security into which we can fill that vacuum 

with effective governance development hope for the Afghan people 

so that it becomes more durable. When you talk about outside Afghanistan, the same thing applies. 

We see terrorists moving to places like Somalia, Yemen, where 

there is less effective governance. I think our best way forward is 

to partner with those nations to try to increase governance. We 

still need to complement that as we do in Afghanistan with precision strikes. So you can’t allow leaders or sanctuaries to emerge, 

so you have got to keep them under pressure as you do these other 

things. So the thing about counterinsurgency or counterterrorism, 

because there are a lot of similarities, is there is no single answer. 

It is security, governance, development, precision strike force. 

Mr. KLEIN. And I agree with that. I think that those people who 

are questioning in our communities back home about the effectiveness of the strategy in Afghanistan, also recognizing the threat of 

the Taliban’s influence and the nuclear issue which is extremely 

important and is obviously part of the whole strategy here, is this 

question about, you don’t necessarily need a whole nation state for 

al-Qaeda to operate in. I mean this notion of, it is all about Afghanistan or all about Iraq, you know, they need territory but it doesn’t 

have to be large, it could be square miles, to train and to do some 

of the things, and they can very easily move to another place even 

if we were 100 percent successful in Afghanistan. So how do we respond to that notion, other than the nuclear issue, which is important, how do we respond to that notion of them picking up and 

going to other places and stopping them from doing that? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Sir, the best way is very extensive intelligence sharing with all our partners and then staying after them. 

It is like following a criminal gang around. 

Mr. KLEIN. Ambassador, do you have any other thought on that? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. No, I share General McChrystal’s assessment on that. It is a comprehensive diplomatic intelligence and 

military approach that is needed to defeat this network. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

both for your extraordinary leadership and for your extraordinary 

service. Let me just ask a few questions. Number one, the Iraq 

surge of 2007 deployed, as we know, 20,000 combat troops, extended the tour of 4,000 Marines already in Iraq, and constituted 

intervention to help the Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to 

help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that 

Iraqi forces left behind were capable of providing security. 

Notwithstanding Senator Reid’s infamous statement that the war 

is lost and that the surge is not accomplishing anything, stated 

back in April of ’07, the surge did create space for a political soluVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
113

tion and reconciliation. My question would be, did the success of 

the Iraqi surge inspire the Afghan surge? What lessons learned 

from that surge, pro and con, were incorporated into the new 

beefed up troop deployment? 

Secondly, I agree that we need an exit strategy, but shouldn’t it 

have been kept secret? Why announce it to the Taliban so they can 

craft and employ strategies, especially after redeployment begins 

some 18 months from now? And did either of you recommend that 

it be kept secret or go public? Third, what is Iran’s role in Afghanistan today, including EFPs? Is it increasing, diminishing, or staying the same, and what are we doing about it? And fourth, is it 

true that the primary source of funding for the Taliban is no longer 

the opium trade but foreign donations from the Persian Gulf countries and others? What is our counter-threat finance strategy for 

Afghanistan? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I will start on those, starting with the last first. We think that the funding for the Taliban 

is probably about evenly split between external donations, narco related raising, and then money that they can raise from kidnapping 

and other things inside both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Neither 

the loss of one of those three would stop them from operating, they 

don’t cost a lot and we think they could make out. But we do have 

an extensive counter-finance task force that focuses on this and 

tries to reduce that. So I think we are focused pretty hard on it. 

Sir, back to the first one on the surge, Iraq is very different from 

Afghanistan, but it is clear that we were informed by the experience in Iraq, and I was having spent so much time there, into the 

situation in Afghanistan. What I learned in Iraq that I think is applicable is that you must have an approach that is both 

counterinsurgency and includes counterterrorist capacity in it, and 

then of course the counterinsurgency has to be holistic. The governance and development parts, Ambassador Eikenberry’s team has 

got to be shoulder to shoulder with us as we go forward, and I 

think we are pulling all of that together here. We were late doing 

it in Iraq, I think that we are doing that now here, and I think it 

postures us well. 

And just last point, on the time line on July 2011, the key point 

for me is the President and the Secretary’s very public pronouncement of long term strategic partnership for Afghanistan. I think 

that changes everything, I think that gives the Afghans and the insurgents, the Afghans hope and the insurgents a lack of hope because there is not going to be daylight in the long term. And I 

would turn it over to Karl. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Two quick points, thanks, Congressman. First of all on the threat financing, we have a very integrated, robust effort both within Afghanistan and outside of Afghanistan to look at the challenge of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

beyond, which is an integrated effort, which includes our intelligence agencies, Department of Treasury, our military diplomatic 

efforts. I also want to highlight that within Afghanistan itself our 

Department of Treasury agents on the ground are actually building 

within the Afghan Ministry of Finance and within their central 

bank their own independent threat finance capability, we are menVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
114

toring with them and they are starting to get some impressive results. 

Secondly, with regard to the emphasis that you placed on the 

date, the July 2011, the transition date, I am absolutely aligned 

with General McChrystal in how we look at this. Afghanistan, they 

have a lot of insecurity based upon their history, their people are 

insecure people based upon their history, based upon other nations 

withdrawing their support from them over time, they live in a very 

uncertain neighborhood. So they have an ambivalence about the 

long term presence of the United States, they want us here in Afghanistan because of that insecurity, but increasingly they want to 

stand up and take charge of their own security. 

That was reflected in President Karzai’s inauguration speech 

where his own aspirations over the next 5 years for Afghanistan to 

stand up and be in charge of its own security with their army and 

police. So that 2011, I agree with General McChrystal, it is a very 

good forcing function kind of date to get the Afghans moving forward, and President Karzai has shown his support for that date 

publicly. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have now set ambitious goals for training and equipping Afghan army and police 

forces, but the Karzai government by anyone’s estimation remains 

a very weak government. You said earlier much of Afghanistan is 

ungoverned still. Having a weak government and a strong military 

frequently leads to unhappy results in many parts of the world. We 

have also had at best mixed success in trying to build a military 

as a unifying national institution in nations that don’t have a 

strong national identity. 

We tried to do that in Iraq, and it appeared that we effectively 

armed and equipped every side in the sectarian civil war. The cell 

phone video of the execution of Sadam Hussein and the taunting 

by the Shi’a military but obviously also members of the Shi’a militia that was more loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, did us great damage. 

It created the impression that that was a sectarian revenge killing, 

not the execution of justice in a society with a legitimate rule of 

law. What is the desertion rate now, where are those folks going, 

how are we going to make sure that the military we build is not 

going to dominate the government, and how are we making sure 

that we are not training and equipping the forces that will be fighting for warlords in a short time? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. I think that it is important that I start 

with the fact that one of the things Afghans fear most is militias 

and warlords. There will be security forces that form in Afghanistan whether we form them or not. They will form in their own defense, and I think that it is important we form a national army and 

national police capacity, a recognized legitimate defense security 

apparatus, or the vacuum will be filled by exactly what the Afghans fear, which is a return to strong militias that in many cases 

are ethnically based and rose with the departure of the Soviets. 

I think that there is an absolute national identity in Afghanistan. They don’t expect the same things from their central government that many Western nations do, they expect less. But they do 

115

have an absolute sense of being Afghans before they are any other 

ethnic or local identity. They take huge pride in the Afghan national army even though it is still a developing entity, they would 

like to be secured. 

And when I talk to Afghan elders, they thank us for being there 

and then they always say, we would like to be secured by the Afghan national army, we are proud of them, but we will welcome 

you just until they are strong enough to do it. So I think that rather than being a threat to the Government of Afghanistan, I think 

it is a major source of credibility as they go forward. Now clearly 

it has to stay under civilian control, and I have seen no indications 

that that is not likely to be the situation. I would ask Ambassador 

Eikenberry to jump in. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Thanks, Congressman. My views are 

the same as General McChrystal on this. The Afghan national 

army was established on first principles of being all ethnic and all 

national, and indeed it is. It is a symbol of pride for the Afghan 

people, it is a sign of hope that this country after 30 years of warfare and fighting can come together, the Afghan national army is 

a manifestation of that. Secondly, the principles upon which the Afghan national army were established were good principles inspired 

by us, and that was that this military would be under civilian control, it would respect the rule of law, respect the people. I believe 

very much that those principles are still in place. 

Mr. MILLER. What is the desertion rate? I have heard it is 25 

percent. What is the desertion rate? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I will get you that for the 

record, it is not that high. One of the things about desertion is, 

many of the young Afghans who enlist in the army go home because there is not yet a good leave policy established. There is also 

we are still working through issues of how they are paid, electronic 

pay is clearly the wave of the future, but in many cases they go 

home to take pay or to see family, great sense of family there. So 

it is something, and a significant percentage come back. So it is a 

significant problem, I don’t want you to believe that it is not, but 

it is something that is less clear than it might be in another army. 

Mr. MILLER. I will take the cue from my colleagues and yield 

back to curry favor with the chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. I thank the gentleman. We have had a little 

misunderstanding. My intention always was that every member 

gets to ask questions alternating between Democrat and Republican. We are now at the point, treating these two hearings as one, 

where every member of the Republican Conference on the committee who is here has had a chance to ask a question, a number 

of Democrats have not yet had to. It was my intention to proceed 

so that everyone gets to have time before we go back to alternating, 

but we did not make that clear with the minority. 

So the compromise I would propose is we alternate but those who 

have asked a question get 1 minute for a statement and then we 

go back to the others. In the future it would be the intent that 

these rights are individual more than group and that every member should get a chance to question before we go back to the alternating. And at this point I will recognize the ranking member for 

1 minute. 

116

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I would 

like to yield my minute, and he can add his own minute, to Mr. 

Burton of Indiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 2 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was a question 

asked a while ago about the international court, and both of the 

witnesses said that they would get back to us on that. There is a 

story I want to talk about that they wrote a book about. Have you 

heard of Petty Officer Marcus Luttrell, have you heard of him? He 

was on a mission, and they were supposed to kill an al-Qaeda leader, and they went up there and they ran into two people and a boy. 

And they couldn’t decide whether they should kill them or not because they were afraid they would alert the Taliban to their mission and that they would all be killed. 

Well they decided after an argument, Luttrell said, ‘‘Okay, we 

will let them go because we trust them, they won’t say anything.’’ 

Fifteen minutes later 200 of the Taliban came across, and al-Qaeda 

I guess, came across, killed him, killed his partners, and left him 

for dead. Sixteen Navy SEALs, other Navy SEALs, came in a helicopter; they shot them down when they came to rescue them, and 

killed all 16. 

Now we have got these three Navy SEALs that are on trial right 

now. How do you say to these troops who were sent on a mission 

out there to kill an al-Qaeda leader what they should do? Should 

they have killed those three people? Should they have shot them 

right on the spot so they wouldn’t alert the enemy that they were 

coming over the hill? And if they had, would they have gone to the 

international court? Would they have been court-martialed by the 

United States? 

And here we are court-martialing three guys who in Operation 

Amber attacked one of the leaders and arrested him, turned him 

over to the Iraqi military, they turned him back over, they said he 

smacked him in the mouth and they hit him in the stomach and 

you are court-martialing, it makes no sense. And you are the General in charge and you are the Ambassador over there, and I talked 

to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs the other day, I just do not understand why somebody doesn’t say, this is bologna. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATSON. I want to thank our two witnesses for the service 

to our country and the image that you serve to fill abroad. I want 

to thank you for your experience and wish you well. Now my question goes to the Afghans. In the 8 years that we have been involved 

and more, what is it that is lacking in their government and their 

experience and their commitment to their own where they could 

not train their people to stand up and defend their own country? 

Let me start with the Ambassador first. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Well, Congressman, first there has 

been as we said extraordinary progress that has been made. 

Ms. WATSON. Hold. How many years has it been and how many 

years will it take to train them? You see, I am looking ahead too, 

that is why I ask this question, and I am looking at our financial 

commitment to be there at a time of growing deficit, you know, how 

117

long do we have to commit for them to bring their defense force up 

where they can protect their own country? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Well, Congressman, let me turn to 

General McChrystal for the specifics, but the President’s strategy 

is very clear in that regard. 

Ms. WATSON. No, I want you to tell me from your experience 

what is it with the Afghans where they don’t seem to be able to 

succeed on their own. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, they are succeeding, 

they have had great success. 

Ms. WATSON. Then why do we have to have additional forces? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Well the context over the last 8 years, 

Congresswoman, is this mission over the last 8 years until recently 

has never received the adequate resources that have been needed. 

Ms. WATSON. I am not talking about our resources, I am talking 

about their own. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, starting where they 

were in 2001 and 2002, we are talking about a country that had 

been at war for 30 years, two generations of Afghans without education, we are talking about——

Ms. WATSON. Okay, let me stop you there because I am watching 

my time. General McChrystal, you have asked for additional forces 

to go in. We are giving a great deal, the life of our military, our 

finances, to a country that operates based on war, and they can’t 

seem to bring their people to a point where they can defend their 

own nation. We are shedding blood, limbs, and building a tremendous deficit that will probably never be closed in my lifetime. What 

is the element that is missing among their own people? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, I agree with Ambassador 

Eikenberry, this was a society literally torn apart for 30 years, the 

tribal parts of society, the governance. And they die at a higher 

rate than coalition forces now. 

Ms. WATSON. I would hope. You know, why do we have to be the 

international police? And that is what I don’t get. With Iraq, and 

now with Afghanistan, maybe Pakistan, maybe Iran. But there is 

something in their psyche, and what I think is happening is that 

we are fighting an ideology rather than at the end of a gun kind 

of thing. And I don’t know, if we knock out every Taliban village 

and kill them all, if that ideology doesn’t continue among the 

Taliban and spread in the area. I don’t know how we identify them 

as they go over their boundary lines into other areas. Are we having to maintain a force there in perpetuity, General? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. I don’t believe we will. I do think we need 

to have a strategic partnership to reassure the Afghan people, but 

they want to defend themselves. What they want is time and space 

and opportunity to build their nation. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, and I am going to give you back my time, Mr. 

Chairman, I don’t see any end to it. If we are going to put our people on the front line and put the resources behind, why would they 

put up, you know? I just think there is a lack somewhere in their 

ideology that, you know, we need you to help us defend ourselves. 

And so I would rather invest the money elsewhere than there. I 

yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

118

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized 

for 1 minute. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, let me just 

note for the record that I am very disturbed with a policy that has 

ended up with giving me 1 minute to express my opinions and to 

ask questions at this very important hearing considering my background on Afghanistan. So I am sorry, I apologize to the two witnesses, I am going to say some things and I just have to say it 

quickly. Number one, 30,000 troops, more troops in Afghanistan 

means $30 billion more a year. 

My experience in Afghanistan tells me for a small portion of that 

we could buy the allegiance, we could earn the good will through 

payments to tribal leaders and village leaders throughout that 

country without putting anybody at risk. Number one, I would like 

your reaction to that. Number two, General, your statements about 

Afghans fearing their militias is disturbing to me, dramatically disturbing. Militias there are nothing more than all the male children 

in their villages. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chairman, and want to welcome both 

the Ambassador and the General to this committee, and indicate 

that at least speaking for this Democrat, I am generally supportive 

of the policy that is emerging from the White House. And after 

your deliberations, having been to Afghanistan, I believe that there 

are large swaths of the country that are not sufficiently secure and 

that the introduction of additional troops actually could make a dispositive difference. I don’t believe this is like Vietnam, and I think 

our new President deserves the benefit of the doubt at least at this 

time in history. 

Having said that, the policy deliberations were a little unusual. 

General McChrystal, a paper you wrote got leaked in advance of 

the President convening formal review and deliberations. And, Ambassador Eikenberry, your memo, or in the old days we would have 

called it telegram, also got leaked. And they represented seemingly 

very different points of view. And I just wonder if each of you 

might comment on what you think about, you know, developing foreign policy by, you know, leaking and counter-leaking, and what 

you think, you know, we should learn from that experience. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Thanks, Congressman, I will go first. 

The review that the President led was an extraordinary review. It 

was a very open, it was a deliberative process, everyone that participated was encouraged freely to provide their analysis and their 

best advice. We did that in a variety of ways, through video teleconferences, face to face meetings, and in writing. The leaks that 

occurred are absolutely regrettable. 

Now, against that, my own views, during this process I want to 

emphasize, Congressman, at no time did I ever oppose additional 

troops being sent to Afghanistan, indeed I fully shared and share 

General McChrystal’s security assessment. As he had written and 

is his analysis, security in parts of the country were deteriorating, 

security situation is serious today in many parts of the country. 

Against that, the only way then to move forward with regard to 

119

troops is additional troops are needed to deal with those security 

issues. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ambassador, I am going to come back to you on 

part two here about governance, I take your point. General 

McChrystal, did you want to respond? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. I would, I agree with Ambassador 

Eikenberry. The leaks made our job harder. The difference between 

our views is really not very large at all, but selected leaks made 

it look like they were. We were shoulder to shoulder on this thing 

throughout, and I absolutely regret the leaks. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, thank you. Let me go back then to I think 

where you were headed, Mr. Ambassador and General McChrystal, 

you also talked about, you know, the desire of Afghans is essentially to have some kind of government that functions in a particular way that protects the security. Mr. Ambassador, you expressed some skepticism about the current circumstances being 

able to meet even that kind of threshold. I want to give you both 

an opportunity to talk about, because some of the skepticism up 

here is, we are backing a government that is seen as frankly organized thuggery, it is corrupt, it doesn’t deliver services efficiently, 

and frankly the Taliban unfortunately is an effective alternative. I 

would like your comments. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. We both share the importance of the 

need for a legitimate government respected by its people, credible. 

We have two challenges on the civilian side, the Afghans have two 

challenges. One is at the national level, the establishment of national level governance. There, Congressman, we do really have a 

lot to build upon, there are good functioning ministries, they need 

more capacity. We think our programs that we have moving forward are well focused. 

Our greater challenge, though, is at the local level, the areas 

where General McChrystal’s forces and the Afghan national army 

right now are dealing with these areas of insecurity out in some 

of the provinces, especially in the east and the south. We are working closely with the Afghan Government and our military to try to 

develop the right kind of combinations of service delivery and governance that as security is brought to a provincial area or to a district, that shortly behind that government can start to take hold, 

service delivery can take hold, and you start to have credible governance. I don’t want to underestimate though the challenge that 

we are facing in this second category. Last point, Congressman, 

President Karzai’s inauguration address that he gave several 

weeks ago, it does show some promise. Of we are waiting for action 

now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. General, you get 12 seconds. 

General MCCHRYSTAL. I agree with Ambassador Eikenberry, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, has been recognized 

for 1 minute. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, General. I want to second my colleague’s 

concern about the treatment of the three Navy SEALs now facing 

the court-martial for actions taken while apprehending a terrorist 

who cost the lives of four American security guards. Court-martial 

120

is very serious business, I don’t think it had to be this way, and 

I would like to ask what alternative actions might still be taken 

in place of a court-martial, informal councils, formal councils, nonpunitive letter of reprimand. 

Now the point I want to make is that there is ways of dealing 

with this issue, assuming there is an issue here at all, far short 

of a court-martial. And second, if acquitted, General, will these 

SEALs be given the opportunity to be restored to full fitness and 

duty, will their careers be spared a black mark which has a very 

harmful effect on morale? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, that incident happened in 

Iraq, so appropriately I don’t have the details of the incident, nor 

do I have any responsibility and it would be inappropriate for me 

to talk about that case. I do believe, however, that the chain of 

command in the process has been extraordinarily good across the 

Services in providing fair hearings for people. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Terrorists and terrorism thrives in poor economies, in futures where the citizens consider their future hopeless, where there is lack of infrastructure, 

education, healthcare, roads and sewer systems. And terrorism 

thrives in areas where the citizens believe that they are being occupied by outside forces. I am concerned about the lack of focus on 

the civilian surge in this regard, because I think that is the balance 

to what being an occupier requires. 

In his speech at West Point, the President dedicated most of his 

time to military might, and he just only once mentioned the civilian side of the equation. And so, you know, you both have said and 

other leaders in the military and throughout the diplomatic corps 

really agree, that one major way to secure stability is through the 

use of smart security where we win the hearts and the minds of 

the civilians, and we are talking about Afghanistan right now of 

course. 

So I ask you, what resources are currently being dedicated, you 

said a little bit about that, to smart security? And in the years to 

come, here is the main question, what additional resources do you 

need? How will the administration promote this smart approach 

over a military solution? And will a smart approach ever be able 

to win over military? Start with you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, the President’s strategy has been clear that the military effort is a necessary effort, it 

is not a sufficient effort. Ultimately, the need for good governance 

to be established in Afghanistan, for economy that allows Afghanistan to have a sustainable country all important. I do believe that 

the President’s strategy and this way we are going about now, the 

implementation, does address the essential government services 

that are needed, the essential pieces of the economy. Again, I will 

just quickly mention agriculture. We see the absolute need for agriculture to help improve security, to help improve the economy, that 

is where our emphasis is. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay, let me just interrupt a minute, because you 

did say this and I really respected it, but tell us where our civilian 

121

surge will come. Of course we want the Afghani civilians to do all 

this and we need to help them. How will our civilians help and how 

many? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, the civilian surge has 

been ongoing, we are soon to triple our presence over the ground 

in the past year. So the surge is not something that we are ready 

to launch. We are going to add to our capabilities on the ground. 

Our areas of emphasis are in the areas focused on what is necessary in the economy, in the areas of agriculture, we are focused 

in the key areas of government and helping the Afghans develop 

further rule of law, law enforcement, we are focused in the financial sector helping the Afghans to develop the capability for more 

revenue collection, critical if it is going to be a sustaining economy, 

sustaining government. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well let me interrupt 1 more minute because we 

only get a little bit of time. We know we are sending 30,000 troops. 

Are we talking about a tripling of the surge from one to three people or from 100 to 300, 1,000 to 3,000? I mean give us some idea 

of what we are talking about. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, at the start of this 

year, before the President announced his strategy in March, reflecting the under-resourcing of Afghanistan, we had a little over 300 

civilians in Afghanistan. At the end of January of next year we will 

have 1,000 and we are continuing to grow beyond that. It is an impressive gain that we are making, and it is an all-government effort. Department of Treasury is on the ground, the Department of 

Agriculture, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of State, USAID, this is truly 

an impressive effort. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. General? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. The one point I would make, because I 

agree with Ambassador Eikenberry, when you talk about military 

it may not look like what you traditionally think. We have got military partnered with his who are out doing agricultural development, helping with governance, enabling the civilian expertise. And 

so I think it is key that we understand we are really trying to do 

this with every part of our capacity that we have. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized for 

1 minute. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

gentlemen, for appearing today. Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your 

emphasis on agricultural development, the Nebraska National 

Guard has helped lead some of this and I think that is noteworthy. 

Before my question, I want you all to succeed, the gravity of the 

downside to not succeeding is very apparent. With that said, Mr. 

Ambassador, and this was touched upon a moment ago, your cable 

to President Obama a month ago was decidedly pessimistic about 

Afghanistan’s governance capacity as well as the potential for success of our military efforts. What changed? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. I wouldn’t characterize my views ever 

as decidedly pessimistic concerns express. With the President’s decision, we have a refined mission, we have clarity at this point now 

122

with what means we are going to use to move forward, resources 

appropriately matched against that, and you have got with a proper combination of ends, ways, and means, I am confident now as 

we move forward, Congressman. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

convening this hearing and the way that you have done it, you 

have been true to your word and I appreciate your leadership. Let 

me thank both of these distinguished public servants. I had the 

chance to greet them and I want to thank them again for their 

service, and it was good to see both of you in uniform today, 

Amabassador, you are not. It was good to see you, General, in Iraq, 

and of course you know that I have visited Afghanistan. Today the 

President received the Nobel Peace Prize, and I salute him and believe in him that he is a man of peace. 

He defined for those esteemed audience members a question of 

a just war. But let me quickly say to you that I believe that we 

have a major dilemma, and I would call for as I speak, right now, 

an immediate beginning of negotiations to end this conflict, and 

that would be the only way that I could concede the possibility of 

any troops being added to Afghanistan, and I will tell you why. I 

would like to submit into the record very quickly, Mr. Chairman, 

an article by Jonathan Godomi, ‘‘Lessons from the Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan to the United States and NATO,’’ I ask unanimous consent. 

[The information referred to is not reprinted here but is available 

in committee records.] 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me indicate what was that came out of 

that article which is so true, the Afghan Government urgently 

needed to establish legitimacy, ethnic tensions were underestimated, Afghans were highly intolerant of foreign troop occupation, 

and a military solution was proven not sufficient. The Vietnam 

War in 1966 saw 200,000 troops committed to Vietnam, and at the 

peak of the war, 543,000 with 53,000 of our treasure lost. General, 

the CIA has indicated that Afghanistan is 4,000 feet up in the air, 

versus Iraq that is flat. You asked for 40,000 troops, you got 

30,000. What is your commitment to protect troops as they travel 

up into those mountains and to save lives? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. My commitment is absolute. Our rules of 

engagement provide them every responsibility and right to defend 

themselves, we believe that the equipment we are providing them 

is as good as we can, and we will continue to do that better, and 

I will push for every asset we need to protect their well being. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you for that. I think the terrain is so 

difficult it brings to mind the Pat Tillman story that opportunities 

for friendly fire and loss of life are heightened. There is a theory 

of clear, hold, build, and transfer. President Karzai today said this 

week with Secretary Gates that it will be 15 years before he can 

maintain a military with his own resources. 

Ambassador, why are we engaged with a country, of which I 

have great appreciation and want to see helped with political help 

123

and social help and economic help and constitutional help and helping to make sure that they treat their women right and keep their 

schools open, how are we going to in essence fight against this concept that Afghans do not want foreigners on their soil and have a 

government that says it will take 15–20 years before they can 

maintain their own military? That is 15–20 years that the United 

States will have to be there guarding them. Why can’t we go the 

political and social and economic route, Ambassador? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, the Afghans first and 

foremost, they do want to take control of their own sovereignty. We 

have to appreciate the baseline that they begin at and have already 

articulated that the Afghans though they need security right now 

to help them get the time and space so that they can fully take 

charge, I think we are on a good path forward as we see our articulation of this July 2011 time line where the Afghans will start to 

move and take responsibility for security, President Karzai clear in 

his inauguration speech about his own goals. But we have to be 

clear, the Afghans beyond that period of time, they are going to 

need our assistance. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me have a quick intervention please, if 

you don’t mind. This article says that by the time the Soviets realized that only a political solution could end the conflict, they had 

lost the ability to negotiate. Ambassador, what is the strategy for 

going in now and getting the parties to sit down and be engaged 

with Karzai, warlords, Taliban, governors, and this very weak government and the United States and NATO? Where are we now sitting down and beginning the negotiation to hand over the responsibility to the Afghan Government? Are we doing that as we speak? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Well, Congresswoman, we have a very 

clear way ahead right now with the eventual transfer as Afghans 

develop national security force capability, yes we do have a clear 

plan. Politically, President Karzai has made clear again in his inauguration speech, he would like to move forward with reconciliation and reintegration with Taliban leaders, with Taliban fighters, 

and we are working in support right now of the Government of Afghanistan to help achieve those goals. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. He needs to do that now. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Pakistan has always 

been in my view the epicenter of this war on terror, it is where alQaeda has sought safe haven, Ramzi Yousef, the World Trade Center bomber, his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The history with 

the Pakistani ISI has not been a good one. They tend to side with 

the extremists, at the same time help us with high valued targets. 

Has this improved, and what do you plan to do to work better with 

the Pakistan intelligence service? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, my official responsibility 

ends at the borders of Afghanistan. We do, however, have a close 

relationship with the Pakistani military so that we build up a partnership against the problems on both sides of the border. It still 

has a long way to go. I am absolutely committed, like our intelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
124

ligence agencies are, to improve in that so that our shared strategic 

goals are met. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, and what is the influence of Iran in Afghanistan right now? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. It is both positive and negative. There are 

a number of positive things they do economically and culturally. 

There is always the threat that they may bring illicit or inappropriate influence in, and we watch for that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, General. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, again, good 

hearing, it is timely. I thank both of you for your service to our 

country. Mr. Ambassador, a lot has been discussed this morning 

about metrics and milestones, and on the leger of our milestones 

and the Afghan, the Karzai government’s milestones as we try to 

achieve these metrics, one of the early I think determinations as 

to whether or not they are achieving them is in the naming of his 

cabinet. 

Defense Minister Wardak I guess is leaving and another minister 

is leaving as well I have heard, and whether or not President 

Karzai is able to turn the page, it seems to me, is going to be evident in these early appointments. When will they be completed and 

what is your sense of that process? I mean will we be able to determine for example by the end of January when he finishes that 

process how that milestone has been achieved? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Congressman, President Karzai in his 

inauguration speech that was attended by Secretary Clinton, he 

made a commitment in that inauguration speech to the appointment of qualified, responsible individuals in his second administration. 

Mr. COSTA. Right, and proof is in the pudding. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. It is. It is interesting, though, Congressman, when he said that he got a spontaneous round of applause from the Afghans in attendance, so it is the Afghans who 

have high expectations. Well to answer your specific question, we 

expect his cabinet announcements to be made relatively soon within the next several days before the Parliament goes on its recess, 

because these nominees would have to be approved by the Parliament. 

Mr. COSTA. But we should get a good judgment here very soon 

as it relates to the cabinet selection. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Yes, and it will be very important. 

Mr. COSTA. And then how does that relate then, follow through 

to the governors, some that have been closely associated we believe 

with this narco trade? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. We believe, Congressman, that after 

the initial announcements of cabinet ministers that subsequently 

there will be changes in the governors. Congressman, if I could 

though, I would like to emphasize that the cabinet of Afghanistan, 

President Karzai’s cabinet, it has got a lot of very well qualified 

people in it, the Minister of Defense, Interior, Finance, Commerce, 

Agriculture, Education, Health, these are world class ministers. 

125

They are challenged because they don’t have the human capital 

right now given the 30 years war at they have underneath, but we 

are making progress. 

Mr. COSTA. Because of my time I want to shift over here. Thank 

you, Mr. Ambassador. General McChrystal, we talk about the army 

and the police force and the training that is taking place there, and 

I don’t want to get into a discussion of semantics, but I think that 

part of this whole effort is akin to nation building because you are 

not going to be able to have a solid military or a police force unless 

you have got the credibility and you are relatively corrupt free. 

Since we are now taking over the training especially in the police 

force, and I have been there several times and I have heard all 

sorts of anecdotal stories I won’t go into those talks about the dismay of our ability to do so, we are taking over the complete training of the police force now, is that correct? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Well NATO Training Mission Afghanistan 

is part of that, so it is the whole coalition is doing that, sir. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay, but are these people with police backgrounds 

training the police or is this the military training the police, and 

are we going to end up with a paramilitary police force? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. It is a combination, there are policemen 

that have been hired to do it, there is Jan Cambareet from European partners, and then there is some military as well. 

Mr. COSTA. Ambassador, back to you, on the smart power issue, 

and I have been a big proponent of that and I have talked to the 

Secretary of State about this, we saw about the investments of the 

housing that got involved in corruption and $8 million, other anecdotal stories where money has been wasted, the housing hasn’t 

been occupied, it has been substandard. What efforts are we pursuing to correct those kinds of investments and infrastructure, 

learning from Iraq? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. We have many, let me highlight two. 

First of all, in terms of how we are contracting, we think that we 

are designing contracts in a much better way that improve performance and transparency. Secondly, in terms of audit and oversight, we have many means for that. I want to emphasize that we 

think the most important is exactly with the United States Congress, as you know, you have the special investigator for Afghanistan reconstruction which provides oversight for DOD and State 

and USAID efforts. We think that it is a very important oversight 

area. 

Mr. COSTA. Quickly, Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the 

Abstar Hospital in Kabul? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Sir, I am not. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay, I want to make you aware of that, it is a success story that really we have not participated in but the Americans have made it happen. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your extraordinary service to our nation. General 

McChrystal, in response to Senator McCain’s question the other 

day about the inability to defeat al-Qaeda unless bin Laden is capVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:57 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\120209\53829.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
126

tured, did you mean that there would be U.S. presence in the theater until bin Laden is captured, and can your plan ever fully succeed if bin Laden is not captured? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity 

to expand on that because that was a very short question in a long 

hearing. I believe that al-Qaeda can be defeated overall, but I believe it is an ideology and he is an iconic leader. So I think to complete the destruction of that organization it does mean he needs to 

be brought to justice, it will be another of the steps. However, I 

don’t believe that simply getting him ends that organization either, 

I think it is one step in it. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this hearing also. Let me just say I do very clearly remember your saying 

at the last hearing that those who didn’t have the opportunity to 

speak would be in that order of priority today, so thank you again 

very much. I want to welcome and thank our witnesses and just 

say to you that, I have to say as the daughter of a military veteran, 

25 years, served in World War II and Korea, I strongly support our 

troops, I want to thank all of you who are with us today for your 

sacrifices and your service, and my belief that the sacrifices made 

by our men and women in uniform should always be acknowledged 

and honored. 

Let me just say from the get-go, I think many of you may know 

that I opposed the war in Afghanistan from day one for many reasons. But now moving ahead, many of our military national security experts agree that the presence of our troop continues to fuel 

the insurgency in Afghanistan and give residence to al-Qaeda recruiters around the globe. I also happen to believe that, and disagree, respectfully disagree, with this overall prior 8-year strategy 

and the strategy today. 

I was glad to hear you respond, because I was going to ask you 

about Osama bin Laden and if in fact his capture is part of the 

strategy and a benchmark in terms of the success or failure of this 

effort. But let me ask you, how does an increasingly expanded and 

costly role for United States troops in Afghanistan serve United 

States national security interests in combating al-Qaeda if it feels 

anti-American sentiment among populations sympathetic to extremist insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, 

and elsewhere in the world? 

Also let me just say that many have said, and you probably disagree but I would like to hear your response to this, to complete 

this mission will require about 400 to 500,000 troops, possibly 8–

10 years, possibly $1 trillion, do you believe that to be the case or 

not, or why do we hear that so often now? And finally let me just 

say I am extremely concerned about the strain on our military 

members and their families in the face of this expanded indefinite 

commitment in Afghanistan. 

The physical, psychological, and logistical strain in the U.S. 

Armed Forces under the stress of two wars to me seems to be untenable. And so just know that we are going to do everything here 

127

to support our troops and to help them transition back, hopefully 

soon, to life with their families, but I am very concerned about the 

stress and strain it has taken. Thank you. 

General MCCHRYSTAL. Congresswoman, thanks for the support 

for the troops and know how much it is appreciated, particularly 

this time of year. I think to step back, I think in terms of our national interest the eventual destruction of al-Qaeda is critical, and 

not just for the U.S. but for the world and that region as well. I 

think the role of Afghanistan first is denial of location for al-Qaeda 

to return to, which I believe they would. But I also believe that the 

Taliban have an absolute linkage to al-Qaeda, and for them to resume power even over significant areas of Afghanistan would create instability in the region, opportunities for al-Qaeda but also 

wider instability that would cause significant problems for the 

world, it would not be localized at that point. 

I believe that it is important that Afghans secure Afghanistan. 

Your point about the concern about foreigners, there is an almost 

antibody-like response in many cultures to foreign forces there, and 

that is understandable. Xenophobia is a natural part of any society, 

even greater in that area. I think it is therefore important that we 

work as hard as we can to enable the Afghans to secure themselves, they want to secure themselves, they don’t want the Taliban 

there, and they want us there only long enough and only in large 

enough numbers to enable them to get there. I wouldn’t ask for a 

single force more than we had to have simply to give time and 

space to get the Afghan national security forces. 

Ms. LEE. Sure, but the anti-American sentiment that is spurred 

by this in Pakistan and Yemen and Somalia and other parts of the 

world, I mean you try to nip it in the bud here, it pops up somewhere else. 

General MCCHRYSTAL. It is a danger. I would offer that one of 

the greatest resentments in Afghanistan and Pakistan now is their 

perception that we deserted them in 1989. When the Russians 

pulled out we ended our involvement with them, and they believe 

that we walked away from them. So I think it is a balance, I think 

we need to give as much help as they need to get on their feet, and 

then I think we need to help them stand by themselves. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentleman from California has graciously agreed to 1 

minute. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Elton is on for 5 minutes. 

Chairman BERMAN. He is entitled to 5 minutes——

Mr. GALLEGLY. I have 1 minute, I have like 52 seconds left. I 

would just like to say, General and Ambassador, thank you for 

your service, I know you face challenges that are in some people’s 

views very difficult if not more so from Alexander the Great to the 

Soviet Union, but I appreciate the job you are doing and we want 

to try to give you all the support that we can here. As a member 

of the Intelligence Committee I have a little insight about some of 

the challenges that you have that maybe others don’t know. But I 

would like to take my remaining time and yield to the gentleman 

from California, Dana Rohrabacher. 

Chairman BERMAN. 10 seconds. 

128

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that 

those who did not get a chance to ask questions would have 5 minutes; Mr. Elton Gallegly did not have that chance to ask questions. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Tennessee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Point of parliamentary inquiry. 

Chairman BERMAN. State your point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is that point that I just made not correct? 

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Gallegly was entitled to 5 minutes; just 

listen for a second. I was told he sought 1 minute. I am now recognizing the only person left in this committee room who, unlike you, 

has not had a chance to speak yet, the gentleman from Tennessee, 

Mr. Tanner. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Points of parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman, as you know, have precedent over other decisions. Point of 

parliamentary inquiry. 

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, sir? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think this has turned out fair? 

Chairman BERMAN. I think because of you it hasn’t. The gentleman of Tennessee, 5 minutes. 

Mr. TANNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General 

Eikenberry, it is awfully good to see you again, and I remember 

many of our visits to Brussels with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. And, General McChrystal, I appreciate your conversation 

with me on the phone at the last NATO PA meeting. I see and am 

very encouraged by the reaction of the NATO parliamentarian 

members at the last meeting 3 weeks ago in Edinburgh, there is 

a new spirit and a new cooperation I think for the first time in several years. 

It is my impression, to use a football analogy, that they realize 

and have no problem with the United States being the quarterback 

of NATO, they would just like to be in the huddle when the play 

is called. And you and I think the administration have done a good 

job of including them in the huddle and it makes a tremendous 

amount of difference, let me say, in the attitude and the atmosphere where all of these parliamentarians from member nations 

gather. And as a president of that organization for the next year, 

I want to thank you both for doing that. I would encourage you 

every way you can to always speak of this as a coalition led by, and 

not us going it alone. 

I was on active duty during the Vietnam days, and I saw that 

critical mass of public support that is necessary for a prolonged 

overseas deployment sort of just fritter away, and I have been worried that that would be the case in Europe. And we have of course 

some people here with our situation in terms of our own economics, 

but it is important in my judgment to maintain this critical mass 

of public support for the coalition. And so anything you all could 

do, including reiterate from time to time that we are not there to 

westernize anybody, we got off the beam in Iraq. Talking about we 

are going to create this western style democracy won’t work. 

We are not there to westernize Afghanistan in my view, and I 

think that appeals to the European allies and NATO. We are there 

to enable the Afghani people and their institutions to say no to 

Taliban and al-Qaeda. And that is why we are there and if they 

129

can do that and we can limit the sphere of influence that this poisonous philosophy has and hopefully limit it to an area where we 

can monitor and contain it, hopefully it will wither and die like a 

plant without water. Two questions real quick. On the civilian 

surge, talking with some of my colleagues and people who have 

been there, there seems to be a bottleneck on the civilian side with 

respect to getting projects actually on the ground. 

You get people there but they can’t get through the maze of 

okays or whatever, I know we were stolen blind in Iraq sometimes 

because we didn’t have some protections. But if you could really 

take a close look, both of you, at the coordination of the commanders, the SERP money and how that can be streamlined with 

the civilian money and coordinated, I would really encourage you 

to do that because I think that is, both of you have said, is a critical part of our success. The other thing I would like to talk about 

is the reintegration, I think General Petraeus talked about it yesterday, and I knew him when he was at Fort Campbell in our district. 

I think that is down the line maybe a part of it, and I would be 

encouraged to have your insight into what you think the chances 

there are. The state of play in Pakistan of course is a large, large 

part of this particularly if we are going to try to contain on the border in some physical manner these bad guys so that we can monitor and contain their sphere of influence if that is possible. And 

then finally, is there any thinking about what will happen if we 

pull back into the more populated areas in terms of our concentration of troops, how do we maintain in the rural areas the security 

that necessarily brings up? I know I have talked about a lot, and 

it is really great seeing you, General Eikenberry. 

Chairman BERMAN. I think the important questions to be unfortunately answered at some other point because our time is expired, 

and we have zero time remaining on the clock on the floor. 

The gentleman from Arizona for 1 minute. 

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman, and I am sorry, this is ground 

that has been ploughed. General Jones less than 2 months ago, less 

than 2 months ago, gave a pretty rosy assessment of the situation 

there, stating that there were fewer than 100 al-Qaeda members 

in Afghanistan at present, that there was a diminished capability 

of the Taliban to destabilize the government. The question I have 

is, 18 months from now, will we be in a better position than that? 

Or maybe you disagree with the assessment in the first place, but 

General McChrystal, do you have a comment there? 

General MCCHRYSTAL. I outlined in my initial assessment my 

view of the situation, and I think that it has improved slightly 

since that was published. I think we will be in a much better place 

18 months from now, Congressman. 

Mr. FLAKE. All right. Ambassador Eikenberry, any comment 

from you? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. I share General McChrystal’s assessment there, Congressman. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Our 

prayers are with you for your success. Ambassador, yes? 

130

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. I wonder, Congressman, if you would 

give me 1 minute here, just not in response just one point I wanted 

to make for the record with your permission? 

Chairman BERMAN. I think we owe it to you, sure, absolutely. 

This is not an effort to keep us from voting on the floor though is 

it? 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. No it is not. 

Chairman BERMAN. No, okay. 

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Chairman, a lot has been said over the 

course of the morning about the great sacrifice of our men and 

women in uniform and our allies. I also wanted to say for the 

record just emphasize the great sacrifice that our great civilian 

team is making on the ground. On the 13th of October we had two 

civilians, one from USAID, Travis Gardner, 38 years old from Nebraska, and Jim Green from the Department of Agriculture, 55 

years old from Oklahoma, they were in a convoy with the United 

States military in a striker, a unit, their convoy was hit by IEDs 

down in Spin Boldak. 

I always make a point when I learn of that kind of trauma that 

our civilians are facing, giving them a call. I gave them a call both 

that night and asked how they were doing. They said they are 

doing great, and they said that very humbly and with great sincerity, we are just doing what we were sent over here to be doing. 

And we couldn’t be more proud of our civilian force on the ground 

too. 

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, our ranking member. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, gentlemen, and, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you so much, and some of our members would like to submit 

some questions to our great panelists. 

Chairman BERMAN. We thank you both very much. Our prayers 

really are with you for the success of these efforts. And with that, 

the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(131)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

132


53829n1.eps
133


53829m-1.eps
134


53829m-2.eps
135


53829f.eps
136


53829i.eps
137


53829k-1.eps
138


53829k-2.eps
139


53829h.eps
140


53829r.eps
141


53829j-1.eps
142


53829j-2.eps
143


53829q-1.eps
144


53829q-2.eps
145


53829l.eps
146


53829o-1.eps
147


53829o-2.eps
148


53829o-3.eps
149


53829p-1.eps
150


53829p-2.eps
151


53829s-1.eps
152


53829s-2.eps
153


53829s-3.eps
154


53829s-4.eps
155


53829s-5.eps
156


53829s-6.eps
157


53829s-7.eps
158


53829s-8.eps
159


53829s-9.eps
160


53829s-10.eps
161


53829s-11.eps
162


53829s-12.eps
163


53829s-13.eps
164


53829s-14.eps
165


53829s-15.eps
166


53829s-16.eps
167


53829t-1.eps
168


53829t-2.eps
169


53829t-3.eps
170


53829t-4.eps
171


53829t-5.eps
172


53829t-6.eps
173


53829t-7.eps
174


53829t-8.eps
175


53829t-9.eps
176


53829t-10.eps
177


53829u-1.eps
178


53829u-2.eps
179


53829u-3.eps
180


53829u-4.eps
181


53829u-5.eps
182


53829u-6.eps
183


53829u-7.eps
184


53829u-8.eps
185


53829u-9.eps
186


53829u-10.eps
187


53829u-11.eps
188


53829u-12.eps
189


53829v-1.eps
190


53829v-2.eps
191


53829n2.eps
192


53829m-3.eps
193


53829m-4.eps
194


53829g-1.eps
195


53829g-2.eps
196


53829h-1.eps
197


53829h-2.eps
198


53829k.eps
199


53829j.eps
200


53829i-1.eps
201


53829i-2.eps
202


53829i-3.eps
203


53829i-4.eps
204


53829i-5.eps
205


53829i-6.eps
206


53829w-1.eps
207


53829w-2.eps
208


53829w-3.eps
209


53829x-1.eps
210


53829x-2.eps
211


53829x-3.eps
212


53829x-4.eps
213


53829x-5.eps
214


53829y-1.eps
215


53829y-2.eps
216


53829y-3.eps
217


53829y-4.eps
218


53829y-5.eps
219


53829y-6.eps
220


53829y-7.eps
221


53829y-8.eps
222

Æ


53829y-9.eps