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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 18, 2002

Serial No. 107–101

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

HILLEL WEINBERG, Subcommittee Staff Director & Counsel 

DAVID S. ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DEBORAH BODLANDER, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL BERKOWITZ, Professional Staff Member 

MATTHEW ZWEIG, Staff Associate 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................................ 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia: Prepared statement ................................................................. 3

The Honorable William J. Burns: Prepared statement ........................................ 14

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 35

(1)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:40 p.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. 

The heinous terrorist bombings that claimed so many innocent 

Israeli lives have shocked all Americans. These attacks must stop 

forever if the Palestinian people are ever to witness a Palestinian 

state. Accordingly, decisive efforts must be taken against the terrorists and those who support them, regardless of where they are 

located. 

We therefore call upon President Bush to consider making available to Israel appropriate anti-terrorist resources and whatever 

other assistance we may be able to provide to cut off the head of 

this venomous snake. Moreover, President Bush must make it clear 

to Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian people that no state can 

ever be declared, provisionally or otherwise, until the violence ends. 

Although the Palestinian Authority condemned the attack and 

said in its statement that it would do everything in its power to 

find and stop anyone attempting to carry out operations, mere 

words are insufficient. We must see some action, and that includes 

the confiscation of illegal weapons, as well as the incarceration of 

plotters and planners of terrorism. 

Reforming the Palestinian Authority and its security organs is 

paramount if stability is to be achieved. Chairman Arafat should 

finally step aside and permit other leaders to emerge. 

I want to take this time to welcome Ambassador William Burns, 

Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, before our Subcommittee today. I appreciate his willingness 

to meet with us and to explain the Administration’s positions to the 

Congress and to the American people. Although we have had some 

closed briefings and Mr. Burns has always been available on the 

telephone, this is the first time our schedules have meshed so that 

we could have him appear in open session. 

Ambassador Burns, this is the first hearing held by the Committee on International Relations since the attack on our Consulate 

General in Karachi. Although you are not responsible for that part 

of the world, I would like to express to you our condolences to the 
2

families of the Pakistani security personnel killed in Karachi, our 

best wishes for the recovery of those injured and our continuing 

thanks to the staffs of our diplomatic and our consular posts 

around the world for carrying on under the extremely difficult conditions. We have seen pictures of you in a flak jacket, so we know 

you are not exempting yourself from situations that at least your 

security officers think are quite dangerous. 

President Bush stated in his address to a joint session of Congress in September of last year that the war on terror begins with 

al-Qaeda, but will not end until ever terrorist group of global reach 

has been found, has been stopped and defeated. Those words have 

special resonance in the Middle East, which is home to organizations that share both ideology and methodology with such groups 

of global reach and to their state sponsors. 

As we enter the 10th month in our war on terror, it remains imperative that we address one of the issues that has created fertile 

ground for the development of terrorist movements in the Middle 

East, and that is the steady flow of weapons of varying degrees to 

various groups, to various organizations and states that intend to 

harm the United States or our allies. This includes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as 

exemplified by the ongoing threat to the international community 

posed by Iraq, by Iran and by Syria. 

The State Department recently articulated a vision of a reformed 

Palestinian Authority which is transparent, non-corrupt and does 

not tolerate violence or support terrorism, which would enable negotiations to be restarted with the Israelis, yet the success of these 

initiatives rests on the ability and the motivation of Yasser Arafat 

and the Palestinian Authority to effectively crack down on terrorists operating in areas within its jurisdiction and within the Palestinian Authority itself that consistently fail to do so. 

The Congress joins in the President’s disappointment with Chairman Arafat. Perhaps this is because the Palestinian Authority as 

it is currently existing has become more a part of the problem than 

a part of the solution. The Bush Administration concluded that the 

Palestinian Authority and the Fatah faction of the PLO were involved in the aborted scheme to smuggle 50 tons of Iranian weapons aboard the Karine-A to Palestinian terrorists. 

The influx of weapons to Palestinian terrorist organizations has 

grown exponentially since the outbreak of violence in September of 

2000. These weapons have been smuggled into the Gaza Strip 

through a system of secret underground tunnels which connect 

Egypt to Rafah in the southern part of the Gaza Strip. Despite 

Israeli efforts to locate and destroy those tunnels and to enlist the 

support of Egypt in doing so, many of those tunnels are still very 

active, and the promised Egyptian assistance has been less than 

forthcoming. 

In addition to the Karine-A seizure, Israel has also thwarted several Palestinian efforts to smuggle weapons through the Dead Sea 

and the Jordan River Valley. At least two major attempts to smuggle arms through Jordan were foiled last year, and in May a Jordanian military court convicted four Palestinian Authority members on weapons and explosive charges and sentenced them to up 

to 15 years in prison. 
3

The main place of entry of weapons into the Gaza Strip has been 

via the Mediterranean Sea, and the many seizures clearly reveal 

their sources: Iran, Iraq and Syria. 

Yet the proliferation of conventional arms to known terrorist 

groups are not our only concern. Both Iraq under President Saddam Hussein, Syria under Bashar al-Asad and Iran under Ayatollah Khamenei continue to pose a major threat to peace and stability in the entire region. Nothing brings out more sharply the severe nature of this threat than the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the means with which to deliver them. However, 

their means of deploying weapons of mass destruction are not limited to conventional means. Their continued sponsorship of terrorist groups of global reach provides them an additional mechanism with which to deliver them. 

As long as these regimes continue policies aimed at destabilizing 

the region, they will continue to pose a serious challenge to our nation and to our allies. Giving in to demands of terrorists, and these 

terrorist states sends a terrible message that terrorism pays. The 

sticking point between the Palestinians and the Israelis at Camp 

David and Taba was the reluctance of the Palestinian side to declare the conflict over. 

Prematurely setting up an interim Palestinian state in the West 

Bank and Gaza I think would be a tragic error because it simultaneously clothes the Palestinians with attributes of sovereignty. It 

fails to extract the statement that the major dispute between the 

two sides are settled. 

Moreover, there must be a clear demonstration at a minimum 

that such an interim state can and will have a monopoly on the use 

of force from its territory and that it is committed to a complete 

cessation of violence against Israel. Not to do so would be in effect 

to reward the suicide bombers who have terrorized the Israelis and 

encourage other suicide bombers to continue to challenge them and 

challenge American interests as well more directly. If the people of 

the Middle East come to believe that through violence our Administration’s policies in the region could be transformed to suit their 

purposes, then any prospect for peace and stability in that region 

are truly doomed. 

In closing, it has been suggested that the United States impose 

its solution on the parties. This has never been a good idea and is 

not a good idea today. The parties need our help to reach a solution, but they must arrive at it themselves across the table from 

each other. 

I am pleased to call on our Ranking Member, Mr. Ackerman, for 

an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

The heinous terrorist bombings that have claimed so many innocent Israeli lives 

have shocked all Americans. These attacks must stop forever if the Palestinian people are to ever witness a Palestinian state. 

Accordingly, decisive efforts must be taken against the terrorists and those who 

support them, regardless of where they are located. I therefore call upon President 

Bush to consider making available to Israel appropriate anti-terrorist resources and 

whatever other assistance we may be able to provide to cut off the head of this ven-
4

omous snake. Moreover, President Bush must make it clear to Chairman Yasser 

Arafat and the Palestinian people that no state will ever be declared, provisionally 

or otherwise, unless the violence ends. 

Although the Palestinian Authority condemned the attack and said in a statement 

that it would do ‘‘everything in its power to find and stop anyone attempting to 

carry out operations,’’ mere words are insufficient. We must see action, and that includes the confiscation of illegal weapons as well as the incarceration of plotters and 

planners of terrorism. Reform of the Palestinian Authority and its security organs 

is paramount if stability is to be achieved. Chairman Arafat should finally step 

aside and permit other leaders to emerge. 

I would like to welcome the Ambassador William Burns, Assistant Secretary of 

State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs before the Subcommittee this morning, 

and I appreciate his willingness to meet with us and to explain the Administration’s 

positions to the Congress and to the American people. Although we have had some 

closed briefings and you have always been available on the telephone, this is the 

first time our schedules have meshed so that we could have you appear in open session since last October. 

Ambassador Burns, this is the first hearing held by the Committee on International Relations since the attack on our Consulate General in Karachi and although you are not responsible for that area of the world, I would like to express 

through you our condolences to the families of the Pakistani security personnel 

killed in Karachi, our best wishes for the recovery of those injured, and our continuing thanks to the staffs of our diplomatic and consular posts around the world 

for carrying on under very difficult conditions. I have seen pictures of you in a flak 

jacket so I know you are not exempting yourself from situations that at least your 

security officers think are somewhat dangerous. 

President George W. Bush stated in his address to a joint session of Congress on 

September 20, 2001, that the ‘‘war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but . . . will not 

end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.’’ These words have special resonance in the Middle East, which is home to 

organizations that share both ideology and methodology with such groups of ‘‘global 

reach,’’ and to their state sponsors. As we enter the tenth month in our war on terror, it remains imperative that we address one of the issues that has created fertile 

ground for the development of terrorist movements in the Middle East: the steady 

flow of weapons of varying degrees to groups, organizations and states that intend 

to harm the United States and our allies. This includes the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction and their means of delivery; as exemplified by the ongoing 

threat to the international community posed by Iraq, Iran and Syria. 

The State Department recently articulated a vision of a reformed Palestinian Authority which is ‘‘transparent, non-corrupt, and doesn’t tolerate violence or support 

terrorism’’ which would enable negotiations to be restarted with the Israelis. Yet the 

success of these initiatives rests on the ability and the motivation of Yasser Arafat 

and the Palestinian Authority to effectively crack down on terrorists operating in 

areas within its jurisdiction, and within the PA itself. They have consistently failed 

to do so. The Congress echos the President’s ‘‘disappointment’’ with Chairman 

Arafat. 

Perhaps this is because the Palestinian Authority, as it currently exists, has become more a part of the problem than a part of the solution. The Bush administration concluded that the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah faction of the PLO 

were involved in the aborted scheme to smuggle 50 tons of Iranian weapons aboard 

the Karine-A to Palestinian terrorists. The influx of weapons to Palestinian terrorist 

organizations has grown exponentially since the outbreak of violence in September 

2000. These weapons have been smuggled into the Gaza Strip through a system of 

secret, underground tunnels which connect Egypt to Rafah in the southern part of 

the Gaza Strip. Despite Israel’s efforts to locate and destroy those tunnels and enlist 

the support of Egypt in doing so, many of the tunnels are still very active, and the 

promised Egyptian assistance has been less than forthcoming. 

In addition to the Karine-A seizure, Israel has also thwarted several Palestinian 

efforts to smuggle weapons through the Dead Sea and the Jordan River Valley. At 

least two major attempts to smuggle arms through Jordan were foiled last year, and 

in May a Jordanian military court convicted four Palestinian Authority members on 

weapons and explosives charges and sentenced them to up to 15 years in prison. 

But the main inlet of weapons into the Gaza Strip has been via the Mediterranean 

Sea, and the many seizures clearly reveal their sources: Iran, Iraq and Syria. 

Yet the proliferation of conventional arms to known terrorist groups are not our 

only concern. Both Iraq, under President Saddam Hussein, Syria, under Bashar al-
5

Assad, and Iran under, under Ayatollah Kamenai, continue to pose a major threat 

to peace and stability in the region as a whole. 

Nothing brings out more sharply the severe nature of this threat than the issue 

of weapons of mass destruction and the means with which to deliver them. However, their means of deploying weapons of mass destruction are not limited to conventional means; their continued sponsorship of terrorist groups of ‘‘global reach’’ 

provides them an additional mechanism with which to deliver them. As long as 

these regimes continue policies aimed at destabilizing the region, they will continue 

to pose a serious challenge to United States and our allies. 

Giving in to the demands of terrorists, and these terrorist-states, sends the terrible message that terrorism pays. The sticking point between the Palestinians and 

the Israelis at Camp David and Taba was the reluctance of the Palestinian side to 

declare the conflict ‘‘over.’’ Prematurely setting up an interim Palestinian state in 

the West Bank and Gaza could be a tragic error because it simultaneously clothes 

the Palestinians with attributes of sovereignty yet fails to extract a statement that 

the major dispute between the two sides are settled. 

Moreover, there must be a clear demonstration, at a minimum, that such an interim state can and will have a monopoly on the use of force on or from its territory, 

and that it is committed to a complete cessation of violence against Israel. Not to 

do so would be, in effect, to reward the suicide bombers who have terrorized the 

Israelis and encourages other suicide bombers to continue to challenge them, and 

American interests as well, more directly. If the people of the Middle East come to 

believe that through violence the Bush administration’s policy in the region can be 

transformed to suit their purposes, than any prospect for peace and stability in the 

region are truly doomed. 

Finally, it has been suggested that the United States impose its solution on the 

parties. This has never been a good idea, and it is not a good idea today. The parties 

need our help to reach a solution, but they must arrive at it themselves.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing with Assistant Secretary of State William Burns. We see the 

Secretary about half as often as we would like, but I am sure that 

is, no doubt, twice as often as he would prefer. That aside, Secretary Burns is certainly a tireless public servant, and I am very 

happy that he is here with us today. 

Clearly the Administration’s Middle East policy cauldron is coming to a boil, so it is very appropriate that the Secretary is here 

today to explain what kind of brew is being prepared. Recent contradictions between remarks made by the Secretary of State and 

the President’s spokesman about a so-called provisional state have 

led some of us to wonder whether there are too many cooks that 

are spoiling the broth. 

As we all know, the President has met with leaders from Saudi 

Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, and we are told something big 

will be forthcoming from the Administration soon. Not too detailed, 

but detailed enough. Not too immediate, but not too indefinite. Not 

the Clinton proposal, but not too far from the Clinton proposal. 

Having watched the President dispatch the Vice-President, the 

Secretary of State twice, the CIA Director twice, the Special Envoy 

General Zinni twice, and Secretary Burns more times than anybody 

can count and having gotten nothing from the Palestinians whatsoever and following major addresses at the U.N. and in the Rose 

Garden providing the President’s vision and a response to Arab 

leaders’ calls for a light at the end of the tunnel, I have to admit 

that I am becoming a bit skeptical. So far as I can tell, all of this 

looks like a neatly gift wrapped reward for Palestinian violence and 

terrorism. 

The latest episode in this Palestinian campaign to trade Israeli 

blood for American political engagement took place this morning in 

Jerusalem when a Palestinian suicide bomber blew up a bus which 
6

was filled with school children and office workers. Twenty people 

are known dead, and 50 are wounded. 

Can anybody honestly say that the immense diplomatic efforts 

underway to divide the Palestinian state would still be taking place 

if Palestinian terrorists were not slaughtering random Israeli civilians or, to be more precise, if Israel was not responding to Palestinian terrorists who are slaughtering random Israeli civilians? 

The policy quandary we face is quite simple. Our non-democratic 

Arab partners want to reward Palestinian terrorism by persuading 

the United States to force a democratic ally to accept the creation 

of a Palestinian state under the same Yasser Arafat about whom 

the President so frequently expresses his disappointment. 

It is not obvious to me at least how forcing the creation of even 

a provisional Palestinian state under Yasser Arafat alongside of 

Israel would promote regional stability or actually reduce terrorist 

violence or even the Israeli response to it, which in this very perverse world seems to be so much more horrifying to our friends in 

Europe and the Middle East. I might not be a diplomat or a scholar, but, as a kid who grew up in Brooklyn, I know a shakedown 

when I see it. Maybe the Secretary will be able to explain this to 

us a little better. 

I am also deeply concerned about three other states in the Middle East which have, unfortunately perhaps, received less notice 

than they deserve. Foremost I would say is Syria. In remarks about 

pending legislation, the State Department has been rather effusive 

in its praise for Syria’s cooperation with our government in our war 

against al-Qaeda. 

Before we thank the Syrians too much I would like to know what 

we are doing about Syria’s appalling record of internal oppression, 

its growing weapons of mass destruction programs, its ongoing cooperation with Baghdad and undercutting U.N. sanctions, its close 

relationship with Iran in funneling arms to Hezbollah, its open 

support for Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and several 

other designated foreign terrorist organizations and its continuing 

and illegal military occupation of Lebanon. 

If the Administration believes the remedies being discussed in 

Congress would not work. I hope Secretary Burns will share with 

us whatever alternative steps the Administration intends to take. 

I, for one, would like to see the Department show the same level 

of concern about Syria’s occupation of sovereign Lebanon as we do 

about Israel’s occupation of the disputed West Bank and Gaza. 

I would also hope the Secretary will address the growing concern 

in Congress about the shape—not the size, but the shape of American’s program of assistance to Egypt. Obviously the Egyptian economy has been battered by the combination of global economic turndown, the reduction of the source of transit fees and the drop in 

tourism due to volatility in the region. 

Many of us highly value the relationship we have with Egypt and 

are fully cognizant of the many critical behind-the-scenes contributions that Cairo has made to our war on terrorism. In many ways 

Egypt has been a good friend to us, a fact that Cairo often seems 

eager to keep from the Egyptian people themselves. 

As Congress begins its work—soon, we hope—on this year’s foreign operations appropriations, I would like the Secretary to com-
7

ment on why the ratio of military to economic aid should not 

change. From my view, it looks like Egypt could use fewer guns 

and more butter, but the important thing is to explore whether a 

shift from military to economic assistance would not help Egypt get 

through a difficult economic period and a stronger condition. 

Finally, I am hoping Secretary Burns can shed some light on the 

Administration’s policy regrading Iraq. As one of the few Democrats left in the House who supported the initial decision to use 

force against Saddam, it seems clear to me that President Bush intends to finish the job that his father began. Regardless of whether 

one is in favor or opposed to a campaign to rid the world of Saddam 

Hussein’s reign of terror, there needs to be a much greater level 

of coordination between the President and the Congress on this 

issue. 

I want to be very clear that if the President intends to take action against Iraq he must consult with the Congress in a serious 

and sustained fashion before action is taken. Limited, halfhearted 

proforma briefings when the planes are in the air are not only an 

insult to our constitutional system, but would threaten the public 

support, which will be necessary to sustain the campaign during 

what will be certainly a highly divisive public debate. 

Again I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing, and I look forward to hearing from Secretary 

Burns. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

Mr. Secretary, I look forward to hearing your opening remarks 

and the dialogue that follows. I do want to echo some of the remarks made on the other side of the aisle that Syria’s cooperation 

in the war on terrorism should not go unnoticed. 

However, I think as all of us on the dais feel, we also need to 

figure out where the next step is, where we are going to see movement in Syria more toward the West, more away from their history 

of being with our enemies. Hopefully your remarks will include 

that. 

Secondly, my greatest concern and the one that I am probably focusing on even more than the terrible events in Israel today is the 

likelihood that no movement, a failure to have some sort of dialogue scheduled, which was originally scheduled for July or August, 

to bring the Arab groups back together to take what they began in 

Beirut to the next level. A failure to schedule that and have it happen seems to play right into the hands of the terrorists who have 

in fact been trying to derail and continually derail any opportunity 

for peace. 

I would simply like to urge the Administration, and obviously as 

you go back and forth in this—they used to call it shuttle diplomacy. You have not been granted that name, but I have seen you 

shuttling a great deal as the Secretary. I would hope that the Administration would recognize that we cannot let terrorists take us 

from the type of constructive dialogue that is undoubtedly going to 

happen if in fact we participate with the Arab nations in a plan 

for peace. 
8

To the extent that you have the ability to move that or we can 

assist you in moving that, I would like to say it here loudly. Mr. 

Wexler on the other side of the aisle has been saying it independently. For that reason, I think it goes without saying that with Mr. 

Wexler on one side and me on the other side, I expect everyone in 

between has the same feeling that we have to take the Arab nations to the next level of cooperation in ending a 50-year cycle of 

violence, and we have to take Syria independently out of the Cold 

War as the last combatant of the Cold War that has not at least 

moved toward a center position toward the U.S. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

The Ranking Member of our Full Committee, Mr. Lantos? 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me welcome our distinguished Secretary, and let me begin by offering my 

praise to the President for his speech at West Point. 

This is a speech that will take many months and many reiterations for both the Congress and the American people to absorb, 

but what the President did at West Point was to declare that the 

two generations-old Cold War concept of deterrents and containment is not viable in an age of global terror, and the President expressed his commitment to the principle of preemption. 

Let me say to you, Mr. Secretary, I fully agree with the President, and I strongly urge him to bring this issue to the Congress 

because he will receive overwhelming bipartisan support for a policy of preemption certainly as it relates to Iraq and possibly other 

places. 

I also want to commend our very distinguished National Security 

Advisor, Dr. Rice, who stated over the weekend, and I quote,

‘‘The Palestinian Authority, which is corrupt and cavorts with 

terror, is not the basis for a Palestinian state moving forward.’’

Condoleezza Rice could not be more right, and I think that in 

view of this powerful and colorful statement by our distinguished 

National Security Advisor I trust that rumors with respect to a 

provisional state or an interim state are merely speculations and 

trial balloons of little substance and certainly of no value, but, as 

the National Security Advisor states so clearly, the Palestinian Authority, which is corrupt and cavorts with terror, is not the basis 

for a Palestinian state moving forward. 

Finally, so the Department of State will not feel neglected, let me 

commend you personally, Mr. Secretary, for your statement in today’s prepared speech.

‘‘We simply cannot tolerate the notion that any political cause 

justifies attacks against innocent civilians.’’

We fully agree with you. 

In view of that, it is incomprehensible to all of us, I believe, that 

Arafat and his group, so clearly in cahoots with terrorism, financing it, encouraging it, participating in it through the Al-Aqsa subgroup and others, should be rewarded for its terror. As a matter 

of fact, it appears to me an oxymoron, as our national declared for-
9

eign policy is a global war on terror, to reward terror in the Middle 

East. 

Finally, since I am anxious to get to your testimony, I would like 

to just say a word about the difference between chronology-based 

policies and criteria-based policies. In the Clinton Administration, 

on one unforgettable afternoon we had the Secretary of State and 

the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff sitting where you sit. They all testified that we will have our 

forces in Bosnia for 1 year. 

I publicly offered them a $1,000 bet because I thought that the 

notion was absurd and simply totally apart from any sense of reality that prevailed in the Balkans. As you well know, Mr. Secretary, our forces are still there many years after the Secretary of 

State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs made this 

absolutely absurd chronology-based policy statement. 

I would hope that this Administration would have learned from 

the mistake of the previous Administration and will not even contemplate the notion of a chronology-based march toward a Palestinian state. If a Palestinian state is to be established, which I personally believe would be highly desirable, the process must be criteria and performance-based, transparency, permanent cessation of 

terrorist activities, the rule of law and an end to corruption. 

May I ask you to take back to Secretary Powell and to the President the judgment of at least one Member of Congress that while 

we very much wish to see two states living side by side in peace, 

mutual respect, prosperity, no incitement, no venomous propaganda or teaching of venomous materials in the public schools, the 

establishment of that state must be criteria- and performancebased and not predicated on some nonsensical chronological construct. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. Cantor? 

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here. First of all, 

I would like to commend you and the President for the leadership 

that you have displayed in the war against terrorism and as well 

the leadership that has been provided in the current struggle in 

the Middle East as evidenced by the President’s statements after 

his meeting with President Mubarak and Prime Minister Sharon. 

I feel that the most important thing is the President has come 

out and made very clear that we are engaged in a common struggle 

among free nations against these terrorists, and it is very important, I think, that we continue to espouse that attitude. But at the 

same time, Mr. Secretary, I would say that it is imperative at this 

critical juncture in the Middle East that the United States take the 

lead in not enforcing premature political concessions in the Middle 

East. 

This concept of an interim Palestinian state, I think given the 

current situation in the Middle East, is not the way to go, but to 

work to insure that a Palestinian leadership emerge that is committed to a lasting peace and that reforms necessary are put in 

place to build that lasting peace. 
10

Again, I commend you for being here today and look forward to 

your testimony, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cantor. 

Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Many of my 

feelings have been expressed by the speakers before me, the Chairman, the Ranking Member, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Cantor. 

I guess what I would like to do in this very short opening statement is ask a few questions on the theory that perhaps some of 

them can get answered in your testimony so that when I get my 

5 minutes to ask questions I can move on to some new questions. 

One, understanding that you are not going to trump the President’s speech and give this forum the story before the President 

has spoken, and perhaps the President is not quite sure what he 

is going to say in this speech yet, I am wondering if you can hypothesize about some of the issues that have been raised about the 

provisional Palestinian state? Again, I join Mr. Lantos in believing 

that since the days of Oslo and perhaps Madrid the inevitability of 

a Palestinian state has been determined and I think is basically accepted by all serious parties here. 

Hypothesize about, in the context of the provisional Palestinian 

state, what is the status of an Israeli decision faced with continued 

suicide bombings and acts of terrorism, having information about 

sources of the planning, the arming and the implementation of 

those acts of terrorism—making incursions into whatever part of 

this provisional state without borders exists. 

Is this to be viewed as an act of war, an action which I think 

most people would think is both self-defense and prevention? Will 

this be viewed based on some change in legal status as an act of 

war? 

Secondly, is Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority making 

the 100 percent effort that the Administration has so clearly spoken about on many occasions? 

Third, is the Administration persuaded, as I read recently that 

the European Commission was persuaded, that the combination of 

the existence of 40,000 armed militia under the control of the Palestinian Authority, the documents presented by the Israeli Government that were captured from Ramallah and other places, the seizure of the Karine-A and the information that has been gathered 

about that, that in fact Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority has facilitated, allowed, tolerated, financed and permitted acts 

of terrorism to be based out of the area that the Palestinian Authority has controlled? 

I will stop there at this point. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

I am going to ask our Members, so that we can get on with the 

testimony by our good Secretary, if they would limit their opening 

statements to 2 minutes. 

We will put their full statement in the record. Since Mr. Burton 

has been waiting patiently and as a senior Member, we will give 

him a few extra minutes. Mr. Burton? 

Mr. BURTON. Does that mean old? First of all, let me agree with 

my colleague, Mr. Lantos, on some of the things he said. I might 
11

go just a little bit further. I do not think there should be discussion 

of a Palestinian state until these acts of terrorism stop. When they 

blow up a bus and kill children on their way to school like they did 

this morning, it all ends. You say when this stuff stops we will 

start talking again. 

I hope the President’s speech reflects that. I would strongly urge 

the President to say we are going to help our good friends and allies in Israel by saying very clearly we will talk about a Palestinian 

state when the terrorism stops and not until. I hope the President 

makes that clear. That is number one. 

Number two, we had before my Committee this week a number 

of women who had their children kidnapped by their fathers and 

taken to Saudi Arabia. These children are American citizens. They 

have been held against their will in many cases, and the mothers 

do not even get to see their children. The Saudi Government has 

said because of Saudi law we cannot get American citizens back, 

and the mothers do not have any rights because in their country 

the fathers’ authority is preeminent. 

That is wrong, and we need to come down hard on the Saudi 

Government and say if these kids are under court order to be with 

their mother and the father takes them for a weekend visit or 

takes them to Paris on vacation and then takes them to Saudi Arabia, we want those kids back. 

It is just wrong for American citizens to be denied access to their 

children or for the children who are American citizens to be denied 

the right to come back to the United States. One of those children 

testified before my Committee that she was beaten, had her hair 

pulled because she did not want to do the things that her father 

wanted her to do there in Saudi Arabia. 

One of the mothers told me that because they were trying to get 

the child back that the father was going to marry her off to a cousin. She was 12 years old, and she did not want to marry him. 

These are the sorts of things that American people do not understand and simply do not know about. 

The Saudis need to know that we respect their country, but that 

our laws as with respect to American citizens are guaranteed by 

the Constitution of the United States, and they should be returned 

to this country. Now, if they want to go back to Saudi Arabia after 

they come back to this country, if they make the decision to go 

back that is their prerogative, but they ought to have the right to 

make that decision here. 

I sent two letters to the President this week, and I gave them 

to one of his top aides because I was meeting with them on homeland security. The President, to my knowledge, made no comment 

to the Saudi Foreign Minister when he was here. Neither did the 

Secretary of State. 

I understand that you were the one that mentioned this, and I 

hope in your remarks and during the question period you will respond because I think the President should have taken this issue 

to the top levels of the Saudi Government and said American citizens should be treated the way our Constitution guarantees, and 

if you are going to do anything else there are going to be reprisals 

against your government. We should do that. We should not be 
12

afraid of Saudi Arabia because they are a big supporter or big supplier of oil to us. That should not be done. 

I have one more thing, Mr. Chairman, that I feel very strongly 

about, and that is this. Saudis are getting visas by just going to 

a travel agent. They do not even have to go through the questions 

that are supplied by our Embassy there. 

In fact, according to this article, there were two, three or four of 

the suicide bombers that blew up the World Trade Center and our 

Pentagon that got their visas from a travel agent. That is just 

wrong, and I hope you will address that as well. These are things 

that need to be corrected, and the Saudi Government needs to 

know that the United States is not going to mess around. We mean 

business. 

The article, incidentally, was in National Review. It is a July 1, 

2002, article. Secretary Burns, I will be glad to get you a copy of 

it. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I would like to associate myself with 

the comments of Mr. Lantos and others. I hope, Mr. Secretary, that 

you will be turning soon or your Administration will be turning 

soon to Congress and the people with a plan to deal with Saddam 

Hussein long before he develops nuclear weapons. 

I hope in your opening statement that you will reiterate the wise 

comments of Ms. Rice, that Mr. Lantos quoted, and recognize that 

if the United States does anything to move forward with the Palestinian state while terrorism persists, the entire world and history 

will regard that as a reward for terror. There are hundreds of 

groups with hundreds of disputes from Sri Lanka to Senegal that 

would also engage in terrorism against America, if need be, if they 

think it is an effective tactic. 

Mr. Secretary, you and talked about UNRWA, the U.N. agency 

that has done such a terrible job of running the Jenin and other 

refugee camps. You have committed to the Congress that none of 

the money in the supplemental will be given to UNRWA, and I 

hope that you will be able to make a similar comment with regard 

to our regular appropriations. There has to be a way for us to meet 

our responsibilities in the Middle East without dealing with this 

particular ineffective U.N. agency. 

Finally, I would like to bring up Iran. Every dollar that that government has after it meets its minimum domestic expenditures 

necessary to stay in power it can devote to achieve the status that 

your State Department has given it as the number one state sponsor of terror or to develop nuclear weapons, smuggle them into the 

United States, and blow up millions of Americans. 

The last Administration allowed certain imports from Iran to 

come into this country and got no quo for its quid. I would hope 

that you would reverse that immediately as a symbol to Europe 

that we cannot tolerate their moving forward with a trade relationship with the government that wants to murder as many millions 

of Americans as it develops the technology to deal with. 

I hope that you will urge the President to enforce ILSA as 

strongly as possible even against Canadian oil companies. Finally, 

I hope that in your opening statement or at some other time that 
13

you will tell us what America will do other than just shrug our 

shoulders if the Europeans go forward with this trade deal with 

Iran and if European and Japanese votes result in a loan of hundreds of millions of additional dollars from the World Bank to Iran. 

I would hope that we would be talking about changing our policy 

in Bosnia and Kosovo or elsewhere, some hugely important act, to 

drive home to the Europeans that we will not just shrug our shoulders and get out-voted if they are going to finance those trying to 

develop nuclear weapons and destroy our cities. 

I yield back. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I understand we have a 15 minute vote followed by three 5 

minute votes. We will try and go as long as we can. If the Members 

can stay with us as long as you can on this first vote, we will try 

to give the Secretary an opportunity to be heard. 

I ask the remaining Members if they would forego their opening 

statements so we can get on with the testimony. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I will be more than glad to do that. May I submit 

my opening remarks for the record? 

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, by all means. Thank you, Ms. Berkley. 

Mr. Wexler, are you willing to do the same, and Mr. Engel? 

Mr. ENGEL. I just wonder if I could have 15 seconds, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. GILMAN. Please, but be brief so we can get on with the testimony. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I agree with everything that was said, but I want to emphasize that the President, 

if he was thinking about making a statement tomorrow with regard 

to a provisional Palestinian state, in view of what happened this 

morning, he really ought not to do it. 

There would be no other thing to read into that than rewarding 

terrorism and allowing them to use terrorism as a negotiating tool. 

It undermines our war on terrorism. It undermines the clarity with 

which the President spoke when he said you are either with us, or 

you are with the terrorists. 

I really wish you would take that back. I think we are virtually 

unanimous here in feeling that strongly about that. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

We will now welcome Assistant Secretary Burns, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs. Please proceed. You may summarize, or you may 

put your full statement in the record. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, good 

afternoon. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear 

again before this Committee. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, 

I would like to submit my prepared statement for the record. 

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. BURNS. In light of the terrible event that took place this 

morning in Jerusalem, I also believe it is more appropriate to simply offer a few opening remarks on that tragedy. 
14

We condemn—all America condemns—this terrorist outrage in 

the strongly possible terms. Our hearts go out once more to the 

people of Israel and the grieving families of the victims. Let me be 

clear: Cold-blooded murder of innocent school children has no place 

in civilized society. No cause, however legitimate, can justify terror 

or be advanced through violence. There is absolutely no middle 

ground here. All terror and violence must halt. 

The terrorists who carry out these horrific attacks and those who 

send them on their murderous way are not, as they claim, advancing the Palestinian cause. Quite the opposite. They are betraying 

the interests of their people and inflicting grave harm on legitimate 

Palestinian aspirations and hope for a better future. 

Terror and violence cannot ease the very real suffering of the 

Palestinian people through inflicting pain on innocent Israeli citizens. The time has come for Palestinian leaders to speak out in unequivocal fashion to their people and say enough. 

There must be progress toward peace. There must be a path back 

from this horror to renewed dialogue and hope. The United States 

is committed to doing all it can to help the parties as they move 

forward, but the terror and violence have to cease if they and we 

are to succeed. 

I will stop my opening remarks there. I know there are many 

questions and concerns that have been raised by Members of the 

Committee, and I would be glad to respond to them, including the 

ones that Mr. Berman and Mr. Lantos raised in their opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Chairman Gilman. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with all 

of you the challenges we face in the Middle East, and how we can best promote 

American interests and values. 

Mr. Chairman, the fight against terrorism remains central to defending our interests in the Middle East. As President Bush has stated plainly on many occasions 

since the terrible events of September 11, we simply cannot tolerate the notion that 

any political cause justifies attacks against innocent civilians. In the Middle East, 

we continue to work hard to strengthen regional coalitions to fight terrorism. We 

are pressing leaderships to speak out clearly, and act decisively, against terror and 

violent extremism. We are working hard to close down terrorist financing networks. 

We are also working hard to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, 

technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. In that 

regard, we continue to have very serious concerns about the behavior of some states 

in the region, particularly Iraq and Iran. The Iranian regime continues to develop 

weapons of mass destruction, and to export terror. There can be no doubt about our 

determination to prevent any attempt by Saddam Hussein’s brutal and repressive 

regime in Baghdad to build weapons of mass destruction and once again threaten 

the region. And there can also be no doubt that the region, and especially the people 

of Iraq themselves, would be better off with a different leadership—one dedicated 

to preserving Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to developing the enormous 

potential of its people, and to living in peace with its neighbors. 

This afternoon, Mr. Chairman, I would like to touch briefly on two other challenges that we face: the importance of rebuilding hope in Arab-Israeli peace; and 

the profound longer-term economic, social and political dilemmas facing peoples and 

leaderships in the region. The United States obviously has a powerful interest in 

showing that terrorism, violence and the use of force can never bring a just, lasting 

and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But it seems to me that 

we have an equally compelling interest in demonstrating that a political process 

can—and must—produce that outcome. 
15

Like many members of this committee, I have travelled frequently to the region 

in recent months. I have seen for myself the anger and frustration of ordinary 

Israelis and Palestinians. I have seen for myself the horrific aftermath of a suicide 

bombing in Jerusalem, and the terrible destruction inside Jenin refugee camp. I 

have seen the toll taken on both sides in lives lost and families shattered. And I 

have seen something less tangible, but no less troubling—the loss of hope on both 

sides, the erosion of the dream of peace and reconciliation, the collapse of faith in 

a better future, a future in which two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side 

in peace, security and dignity. 

There has been too much suffering, and too much death. Israelis and Palestinians 

deserve better than this. Both peoples deserve a future that puts an end to terror 

and violence, a future that removes the daily threats to the security of ordinary 

Israelis who worry about whether their children will return safely from school or 

their spouses from the market, a future that ends incitement and hate-language, a 

future that preserves Israel as a strong and vibrant Jewish state. Both peoples deserve a future that puts an end to the corrosive impact of occupation and settlements, a future that stops the daily humiliations of life under occupation, a future 

that brings Palestinians their own state, responsible governance and the chance for 

the normal, dignified lives that they and their children must have. 

None of us should have any illusions about the task before us. It will be very, 

very hard. Moving forward will require many difficult decisions. It will require courage and vision and compassion from leaders, and a willingness to speak plain truths 

to their peoples. It will require the international community to supply a sense of 

purpose and determination and generosity. And it will require all of us to understand that today, even in the grimmest of moments and the most bitter of circumstances, the outlines of enduring peace and security for Israelis and Arabs alike 

are clearer than ever. 

President Bush intends to address those issues shortly, and I hope you will understand that I am not able today to address them in any detail. Let me emphasize 

simply that there are opportunities, as well as dangers, before us. As we seek to 

apply American leadership energetically to those challenges, we have a number of 

assets. The U.S.-Israeli relationship is stronger than it has ever been, and there can 

be no doubt of this Administration’s commitment to Israel’s security and well-being. 

Key Arab states are more actively engaged in support of a return to peacemaking 

than in many months; the recent efforts and visits to the United States of Crown 

Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah 

of Jordan have all been quite constructive. There is genuine interest among many 

Palestinians in political reform and institution-building—in their own self-interest, 

not as a favor to us or anyone else. And there is growing international cooperation, 

centered on American leadership, and reflected in the efforts of the ‘‘Quartet,’’ which 

includes the United States, Russia, the European Union and the UN Secretary General. 

Broadly speaking, our approach will involve a commitment to progress in parallel 

along three tracks, all aimed at the ultimate goal of a permanent two-states solution. The first track is security, where all terror and violence ends. The second is 

reform and economic recovery, where Palestinians—with the active support of the 

international community—build strong institutions in preparation for statehood. 

The third is political, where Palestinians and Israelis renew discussions about their 

future, leading as soon as possible to the emergence through negotiations of a responsible Palestinian state alongside Israel. Central to this concept is the conviction 

that progress along these tracks must be made in parallel; it is clear that there can 

be no real security without a restoration of political hope, just as there can be no 

enduring political progress without security. 

Let me be very clear: Palestinians have legitimate national aspirations; but there 

can be absolutely no justification for suicide bombings or any other form of terror. 

I repeat, Palestinian authorities must do everything possible to confront the terrorists whose acts are causing grave harm to Palestinian interests and hopes for a better future. For us, there is no middle ground on fighting terror. 

Let me turn finally to the broader questions facing the region, and American policy. As crucial as fighting violent extremism and achieving Arab-Israeli peace are 

to the future of the region, they are by no means the only challenges before the societies of the Middle East. Economically and socially, it is obvious to anyone with eyes 

to see that the region faces enormous dilemmas. The truth is that economic and social inequality in many Middle East countries has grown in recent decades, rather 

than diminish. Political, economic and social systems are often intertwined, and 

they appear closed to outsiders. For those who are not already a part of the system, 

advancement seems hopeless. Corruption is becoming a more and more corrosive 

force. 
16

I do not meant to dwell on depressing statistics, but the facts are sobering, and 

unavoidable. Per capita incomes throughout the Middle East are stagnant or dropping, while the size of the labor force keeps growing. 45% of the population of the 

Arab world is now under the age of 14, and the population of the region as a whole 

could double in 25 years. Meanwhile, the Middle East share of world GDP, trade 

and foreign investment continues to shrink. Throughout the region, there is a lack 

of transparency, weak capital markets, barriers to trade, and a workforce lacking 

modern skills. On top of all this, the region faces the lowest per capita water availability in the world. 

The Middle East cannot be healthy socially or politically so long as its economies 

are in crisis. It seems to me that the United States has a powerful interest in doing 

all that we can to help those who want to help themselves in the region, who take 

difficult decisions to open up their economies and expand opportunities for all their 

citizens. While we will not offer a single model for change, we will be strong advocates for enhancing private sector involvement, diversifying economies and narrowing the gap between haves and have nots. Young people should emerge from 

educational systems with appropriate skills for the workforce, not only the skills 

that educational systems are now best equipped to teach. Globalization should be 

viewed not as a threat, but rather as opening a whole new world of possibilities for 

the region’s next generation. 

Politically, the truth is that many political systems in the region do not function 

effectively as mechanisms for citizens to express and work out their discontents. Political structures all too often serve to insulate the regime and governing elite from 

change, rather than lead it. The voices of publics are all too often ignored, until they 

raise them to a shout. Information can no longer be controlled and manipulated, and 

satellite television and the revolution in information technology will become ever 

more profound forces in the years ahead. 

While we as Americans need to be mindful of the limits of our influence and the 

imperfections of our own system, we will work with those who seek to deepen respect for the rule of law, and the rights and sanctity of the individual. Every society 

can find ways to broaden political participation and respect for basic freedom consistent with its own political culture and traditions. 

None of this will happen overnight. But I am convinced that societies which anticipate and get out ahead of inevitable pressures for greater economic and political 

openness will prosper; those that do not will fall farther and farther behind. That’s 

the simple reality of life in the 21st century. It is, as I said, very much in our longterm interest, and it is very much a reflection of our values, to support those who 

want to move toward greater openness. That is why the President has asked Secretary Powell to outline shortly a new American initiative to use all the tools and 

forms of assistance currently at our disposal, as well as some innovative new programs, to support regional efforts to restructure economies, strengthen educational 

systems and build vibrant civil societies. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this 

afternoon. I value greatly the frequent conversations I have with you and the other 

members of the committee. We may not always agree, but I always learn from you, 

appreciate your insights and am grateful for the chance to explain Administration 

policy. I have absolutely no doubt that the challenges before us in the Middle East 

will require continued close cooperation and consultation in the weeks and months 

ahead.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Recent press reports indicate the President may propose a provisional Palestinian state in parts of the West Bank as part of his 

speech this week on policy. Can you comment on the validity of 

those reports? 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, and this also helps address some of 

the concerns that some of your colleagues raised as well. Let me 

just try and say the following. First, President Bush is considering 

a major statement, a public statement, outlining the way forward, 

which could include talking about some of the steps and the way 

stations along the path back to a political process and ultimately 

to the permanent two state solution that I think many, many people accept and support. 

Those steps obviously should include real reform on the part of 

Palestinians, institution building in preparation for statehood, real 
17

performance on security and the discharge of responsibilities by all 

parties. 

I think one of the central themes that President Bush has 

stressed repeatedly and that I am sure he will stress in whatever 

public statement he makes is the theme that Mr. Lantos picked up, 

and that is progress has to be performance-driven. The parties 

must actually deliver on the responsibilities that they have. 

I think another theme is likely to be that as we look at ways of 

renewing both political hope and ultimately a political process that 

it ought to be based on familiar foundations. By that I mean U.N. 

Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the principle of land for 

peace, the same principles that Administrations for decades have 

employed and sought to achieve. 

I hope all of you will understand that I am not able today to go 

into much more detail with regard to choices that the President 

will make and that he will speak to publicly, but I do believe that 

those are some of the central themes that he stressed before that 

I am certain he will continue to stress. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much. I will reserve my further 

questions. 

Mr. Ackerman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot 

of talk about recognizing a provisional Palestinian state. Along 

with that there seems to be universal recognition that as a governing entity the Palestinian Authority has been nothing but a 

total and thorough disaster, unless you could offer another view. 

My question is, has the time come for the Palestinian Authority 

to be functionally bypassed as the administrator of the Palestinian 

self-rule areas, and would the Palestinian people not be better 

served with a financial and administrative control board or an 

international receivership? Maybe you could tell us what purpose 

the PA actually does serve. 

Mr. BURNS. Sure. Mr. Ackerman, what I would stress is that the 

time has come for real transformation, for real reform, for the 

building of strong institutions in preparation for statehood, as I 

said before. 

Palestinians deserve and are capable of creating institutions for 

responsible governance. What that means, I think, is very straightforward—a real separation of powers, transparency, accountability, 

all of the attributes of a political system that works, a system that 

does not depend on any one individual. 

In the conversations I have had with many, many Palestinians 

inside the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative 

Council, in Palestinian civil society, including some of the strongest 

critics of the current Palestinian leadership, what is clear to me is 

that there is a very strong and growing ferment on the part of Palestinians about making those kind of changes. There are many people who are fed up with some of the aspects of governance that Palestinians have experienced over the last few years. 

What is also clear to me is that Palestinians perceive this to be 

very much in their self-interest. This is not a favor to us or to anyone else, and I think that the basis for making progress has got 

to be Palestinian authorship and Palestinian ownership of these 

kind of changes. 
18

Now, I do also agree with you, sir, that there can be a very important role for the international community not only in providing 

tangible support for real reform, not cosmetic changes, but also for 

ensuring that resources that get provided are used in the pursuit 

of those real reforms. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, I regret we are going to have to put 

the Committee in recess until the votes are concluded. We will 

come back as quickly as we can. 

Mr. BURNS. Okay. 

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. Will the Members please take your seats? 

I think our next inquiry will be by Mr. Sherman? Ms. Berkley? 

Mr. Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, and I apologize for the nature of our votes always coming at the worst times. 

The only thing we can say is that we do it to everyone on an equal 

opportunity basis. 

Probably one of the areas that I have the greatest concern for is 

the absence of a response from either a coalition or Israel directly 

as to what should we do post Beirut summit. You know, I hear 

some comments, but even when Prime Minister Sharon was here 

and former Prime Minister Netanyahu, I am not sure that I heard 

where do we go from here or a counteroffer. 

You know, as a former businessman, I always assume that the 

person who loses is the last one to make a counteroffer. Perhaps 

since you spent so much time in the region, do you see that 

counteroffer and how it should come and what it should look like? 

Mr. BURNS. Thanks, Mr. Issa. The first thing I would say is I do 

think that the diplomatic efforts that the Saudi leadership has 

made in recent months, in particular the efforts Crown Prince 

Abdullah has made, reflected in the outcome of the Arab summit, 

is a promising development. 

I think the fact that you had a clear offer, clearer than ever before, from the Arab League of normal relations with Israel and the 

fact that you had the offer of a collective security arrangement with 

the entire Arab world with Israel is a step in the right direction, 

and I think that is something the President has strongly encouraged, including in his own conversations with Crown Prince 

Abdullah. 

I think translating that vision, like any vision, into reality is 

going to require all sides to fulfill responsibilities, including Arab 

states. On the one hand it is very encouraging to see that level of 

activism, that willingness to be engaged, the willingness, for example, that leads Egypt and Jordan to push the Palestinians to reform 

security institutions, to be willing to offer tangible help in accomplishing that. 

Their understanding that it is only through that reform and institution building that a partner is going to emerge in whom 

Israelis have confidence and that Palestinians themselves deserve, 

so their willingness to roll up their sleeves I think is a good thing, 

but you need to see the broad initiative translated in those practical terms. 
19

I think that is something that I know the President very much 

wants to encourage with regard to the Arab states both to reinforce 

the importance of some steps they have taken and also to emphasize the importance of taking other steps. 

For example, while the Saudis have steadily increased their cooperation with regard to terrorism financing, there is more that 

can be done certainly with regard to the flow of private money to 

Islamic Jihad, Hamas and to other groups. That is a very important part of a broad strategy for trying to move back in the direction of a political process. 

Mr. ISSA. I guess my second question may be sensitive, and I 

would understand that probably some of it cannot be said in an 

open hearing, but when Secretary of State Powell visited both Lebanon and Syria there clearly was a message asking those countries 

to reign in Hezbollah, to get them to cease their activities on the 

border at a level. They obviously have gone to a level that had not 

been seen since Israel pulled out of the south of Lebanon. They 

complied. There is no question that there was a request and a response, and my understanding is that response has mostly continued. 

What is the likelihood that we can then ask for the next step, 

which is that that peace be somehow made more final or at least 

be something that we can expect on a continuous basis? Is that a 

reasonable next step in what has now been shown that Hezbollah 

does react to requests from one or the other or both countries? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I think it is a very important challenge, 

and I do not think any of us have any illusions about the difficulty 

of it. 

You are right. When Secretary Powell about 5 weeks ago visited 

Damascus and Beirut, he reinforced the message about American 

concern, about the importance of exercising restraint along the blue 

line because the last thing anybody needs right now at a time 

when the Administration is trying to find a way back to a political 

process is an upsurge in violence across the Lebanese border. I 

think since then there has been relative calm, although none of us 

should be complacent because it is a continuing concern. 

Our relationship with Syria is a very complicated one. We have 

some very serious problems with Syria, as you know very well, and 

we have been very direct in communicating them. We will continue 

to do that. 

We have also made it clear that our agenda, for example, on terrorism extends well beyond al-Qaeda. It is true that the cooperation the Syrians have provided in their own self-interest on alQaeda has saved American lives, and that is a fact, but our agenda 

goes well beyond that. It includes groups like Hezbollah, which 

have been responsible for the killing of Americans in the past, 

which have threatened American interests and which threaten 

them in the future. 

That is a choice that Syria is going to have to make, but there 

has been no question of the importance we attach in our direct conversations, including my own conversations in Damascus 10 days 

ago, about that issue. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 
20

Mr. Berman? Mr. Lantos? 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually have heard, 

or at least gleaned, from the Israelis the counteroffer. It is that 

they welcomed Crown Prince Abdullah’s proposal. 

There is no doubt that there is a little difference between his proposal and as it was filled in at the Beirut meeting of the Arab 

League, but, putting that to the side, they welcomed it primarily 

because the Saudis have been so silent on the issue of their willingness to participate in the normalization process with Israel. 

Furthermore, the Israelis are willing to participate. At the time, 

I think Prime Minister Sharon said we will participate and maybe 

even suggested the idea of an international conference. 

Third, before the process of serious political discussion starts, 

somebody—the Palestinian Authority, the Arab League—has to get 

a hold of these continued acts of violence, that was a precondition 

to moving ahead, and that in effect was an Israeli counteroffer not 

that different than what Senator George Mitchell and his commission proposed and Mr. Tenet as well to the meeting in Beirut. 

What I would like to focus on is, I was wondering if you would 

take up my offer to hypothesize a little bit about in the context—

well, let me put it this way. What is State Department policy, and 

if it is not the same as the Administration’s policy, how does it differ from the Administration’s policy on the issue of targeted shortterm incursions into Palestinian Authority areas, what we refer to 

as Area A, for the purposes of going after selected, specific information regarding new terrorist plots, terrorist presence, bomb factories, weapons warehouses, the kinds of incursions that we have 

seen on a number of occasions in recent months? What is the U.S. 

policy on that? 

Mr. BURNS. I think the U.S. policy, sir, involves a couple of parts. 

The first is, as the President has made very clear, he both understands and supports Israel’s right to defend itself. Any society has 

to defend itself from the kind of terrorist atrocities which we witnessed again this morning. 

The second part of it is the question that the President has also 

asked, and that is the importance of thinking through the consequences of particular actions when they are taken. That is not 

a challenge to the right of self-defense, but it is simply a prudent 

consideration. 

Think through the consequences in terms of their impact on innocent Palestinian civilians, in terms of the impact the day after 

and the day after that on prospects ultimately for renewing an atmosphere in which you can get a political process going again, the 

consequences in terms of again moving back in the direction of a 

political solution because the military solution I think we all understand is not going to work. 

Mr. BERMAN. Do you have reason to believe that the Israelis do 

not think about the consequences of these specific decisions before 

they undertake them? 

Mr. BURNS. No, sir, I do not, but, I mean, that is just something 

as a friend I think it is important for the United States to point 

out and the impact that it does have on ordinary Palestinians. 

Mr. BERMAN. In the context of making the link that you implied 

you did not quite make that the right of self-defense in these situa-
21

tions provides a justification for at least on occasion making these 

incursions. How does that change in the context of the creation of 

a provisional borderless state? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, that is one——

Mr. BERMAN. That issue was raised by a number of people. Analytically, how does that change things? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, let me just offer two comments. First, that is 

probably hypothetical territory that I cannot got into right now, 

and that is for the simple, straightforward reason that there are 

a number of way stations and concepts that the President is considering as he considers this public statement that he may make, so 

I simply cannot get out ahead of choices that might be made. I hear 

very clearly all the concerns that you have raised. 

The second thing I would say is that it seems to me that whatever sort of formal arrangements are made, whatever you call the 

political arrangements, that what is essential over time is to restore serious cooperation between a responsible Palestinian leadership and the Israeli leadership to fight against terrorists and extremists. 

Over the course of the 1990s when that kind of cooperation existed, that was the best insurance and the best prescription for real 

security for both Israelis and Palestinians. Now, it is much easier 

to say that than it is to do it, especially against a backdrop of 21 

months of pain and bitterness and failed leadership in many respects on the part of the Palestinian leadership. 

I think it is essential to keep focused on that and to try and find 

a way in which serious Palestinian security institutions can be rebuilt and provide the basis for renewing that cooperation. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I hope we can have an opportunity 

for a second round. 

Mr. GILMAN. We will try to arrange that. 

Mr. Cantor? 

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, the United States has designated the Al-Aqsa 

Martyrs Brigade as a foreign terrorist organizations, but it seems 

that we are in disagreement with Chairman Arafat because Chairman Arafat was recently on TV stating that the Brigades were not 

involved in terrorism. The information that I have seen would indicate that this organization is part of the PLO and thus comes 

under the control of Mr. Arafat. 

My first question to you is is it your opinion that the disagreement we have with Mr. Arafat lies in our disagreement over the 

definition of terrorism or that Mr. Arafat supports the activities of 

the Brigades? That is question one, Mr. Secretary. 

If I could ask you on a completely different subject, the situation 

having to do with the UNRWA, the United Nations Refugee and 

Works Agency. As we all know, 50 years ago or more UNRWA was 

created as an independent agency of the U.N. established specifically to deal with Palestinian refugees. 

The charge to UNRWA is to provide the Palestinian refugees 

with humanitarian assistance, whereas for the rest of the world’s 

refugees they come under the charge of the U.N. High Commission 

on Refugees, and the charge to that is to seek permanent solutions 

for the problem of refugees with assisting governments, so it seems 
22

we have sort of a bifurcated situation and a special status for Palestinian refugees. 

Given what has transpired in Jenin, the appalling humanitarian 

conditions that are there, the fact that there are widespread reports of the Palestinian population dubbing Jenin the suicide capital because that is where most of the suicide bombers come from, 

the fact that it appears that there really are no efforts ongoing to 

stamp out the violence and change the culture in those camps, and 

the fact that the United States provides I think over two-thirds of 

the budget to UNRWA, and that is U.S. taxpayer dollars going to 

support this. They are essentially overseeing a camp which has 

served as a terrorist base. 

Would it not be best if we ceased supporting that and perhaps 

turned over Jenin to the U.N. High Commission on Refugees and 

the likes of Jenin and other so-called camps and put Palestinian 

refugees on an even playing field, if you will, giving them the opportunity for a permanent status situation and permanent solutions for the problem that they are facing in the same type of way 

that UNHCR does in other countries? 

Mr. BURNS. Thanks, Mr. Cantor. Let me try and respond to both 

questions. First on the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, there I would just 

say we flatly disagree with Chairman Arafat. We are convinced 

that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has been responsible for acts of 

terror, and that is the reason that we put them on the terrorism 

list recently, as you know. 

The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, as I understand it, is a very loose 

collection of individuals and small groups which have carried out 

and continue to plan to carry out acts of terror. That is something 

that we flatly oppose and, as we say, we flatly disagree with Chairman Arafat with regard to the statement that he made. 

On the second issue, sir, of UNRWA, let me say first that I understand the concerns that you have raised and Mr. Lantos has 

raised and many of your colleagues have raised before, and I guess 

I would say the following. The Administration/U.S. Government 

takes very seriously our commitment under 301(c) of the Foreign 

Assistance Act to insure that monies that we provide to UNRWA 

is not used in any way which can be even indirectly connected to 

terrorism. 

We have had extensive discussions with the leadership of 

UNRWA about that concern. They have recently reissued a code of 

conduct to their employees trying to reinforce that point. We also 

followed up with the UNRWA leadership about trying to create 

more international positions to provide random checks on various 

UNRWA facilities to make sure that things are conducted properly. 

We have also urged the Israelis as recently as last week where 

they have specific concerns, for example, about UNRWA employees 

or UNRWA facilities to share that information or those concerns 

because that is something that must be followed up on. 

At the same time, I would say that the way in which UNRWA 

has been set up leaves them in the position where, unlike UNHCR, 

they are not responsible in the camps in which they work for overall administration or for security. That is the responsibility of the 

host government. For example, when I served as Ambassador in 
23

Jordan it was the Jordanian authorities who were responsible for 

security. 

Sadly, in some parts of Area A, for example, including Jenin 

Camp, the Palestinian Authority has not exercised in any serious 

way that security responsibility for a long time. What UNRWA 

does is provide essential—absolutely essential—health and educational services, which, as the Israeli Government recognizes, 

would likely not be provided by anyone else if they were not doing 

that. 

I have to also say based on my own travels to different camps 

in the West Bank and my work in Jordan that I have a lot of admiration for individual UNRWA employees who under very difficult 

circumstances have continued to provide those services. 

Now, does that make it a perfect institution? Of course not. As 

I said, I understand the concerns that you and Mr. Lantos and others have raised, and we will continue to follow up on those, but I 

think it is important to understand that UNRWA’s mandate from 

its inception does not include responsibility for overall administration and security. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s times has expired. 

Mr. Lantos? 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to return very briefly to some of the points I raised at the outset and 

hope that you will be able to respond to them. 

First, let me again express my strong support for the President’s 

speech at West Point. As I understand it, it calls for the recognition 

that containment and deterrence are not effective formulas in dealing with international terrorist organizations, nor with states headed by leadership such as that of Saddam Hussein. I think the 

President is absolutely correct, and I think he will find broad bipartisan support for his position. 

Now, there is a movement in this body, as you may or may not 

know, Mr. Secretary, on the part of people who disagree with the 

President’s position on this issue to criticize it by indicating that 

there has been no consultation with Congress on this matter. 

Eleven years ago when the Persian Gulf crisis was brewing, 

President Bush brought to the Congress the issue. At that time, 

with overwhelming Republican and minimal Democratic support, 

including myself, the President prevailed. It is my judgment, Mr. 

Secretary, that if the President now brings this issue to the Congress he will prevail overwhelmingly, but it would be a very serious 

mistake not to bring this issue to the Congress. 

This is one of the most important policy changes of our government in many a year. I think it is a good policy change, but I think 

it can be defeated on procedural grounds if the President merely 

moves and does not consult Congress and asks for our concurrence. 

I would be grateful if you could comment on this. 

Secondly, when the suicide bombing wave was just beginning, 

there was an implicit and at times explicit assertion that clearly 

nothing can be done with respect to Iraq until the Israeli/Palestinian crisis is resolved. I thought at that time, and I am convinced 

now, that that is the wrong sequence; that it will take a long time 

to resolve the Israeli/Palestinian crisis. 
24

If we wait for the resolution of that crisis then the President’s 

prediction that Saddam Hussein will have developed all the weapons of mass destruction he is now working on will have become a 

reality, and, as the President says, it will be too late. 

What is the State Department’s view on the sequence of these 

two issues? Please do not tell me they have to be pursued simultaneously because there is a sequencing issue. It is the judgment of 

some of us that resolving the regime change problem in Iraq will 

make the resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian crisis dramatically 

easier. 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Lantos, let me comment on both of those points 

and then also comment on another point you raised in your opening remarks, and that is the importance that you rightly attach to 

progress being performance driven. 

Let me just stress again that one of President Bush’s essential 

and consistent themes has been exactly that; that the only way in 

which we are going to make progress back toward a political process and ultimately to the kind of vision that he has talked about 

of a two state solution is through performance, through all parties 

actually delivering on their responsibilities. I am sure in whatever 

public statement the President chooses to issue, you will see a 

strong emphasis on that point. 

Mr. LANTOS. May I just interrupt you for a second? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANTOS. In addition to a strong emphasis, am I to anticipate 

in the President’s statement no chronological criteria because I believe that chronological criteria are totally at variance with performance-based criteria whether you establish a 6-month period, a 

6-year period or a six century period? If it is not related to performance, then the criteria becomes meaningless. 

Mr. BURNS. The only thing I will say with certainty, Mr. Lantos, 

is I am sure that anything that is discussed, whatever positions are 

taken, targets are set, will be performance driven. I am absolutely 

sure of that. 

Second, with regard to the point, sir, that you made about consultation, I will reinforce that point and take it back both to the 

Secretary and to the White House because I understand very clearly exactly what you are saying and the importance that not only 

you, but other Members, attach to it. 

Third, with regard to the question of Iraq and the Palestinian/

Israeli conflict, I guess what I would say, sir, is the following. First, 

the President’s policy very clearly is that the United States cannot 

wait until the day when the Iraqi regime might once again threaten our interests, the interests of its neighbors and in fact the interests of the Iraqi people. 

He has been very clear also about his conviction that not only the 

Iraqi people, but the region and the United States, would be better 

off with a different regime in Baghdad, a leadership beyond Saddam Hussein which is committed to preserving the territorial integrity, the sovereignty of that country, and committed to developing through an open and pluralistic society the potential of the 

Iraqi people, which is enormous, and also to living in peace with 

its neighbors. He has been very clear about all that and very clear 
25

also, as I said, that the United States cannot wait until a threat 

re-emerges that will become even more difficult for us to deal with. 

At the same time, we do face a challenge with regard to increasing violence between Palestinians and Israelis. It is not so much a 

question of resolving the conflict, much as all of us would like to 

see that happen and to see a two state solution emerge. It is a 

question of beginning a process that involves progress I think along 

three tracks, as you and many of your colleagues have discussed 

already. One is serious security performance so that Palestinians 

again meet their responsibilities with regard to fighting extremism 

and terrorism. 

Second is real reform and institution building not as an end to 

itself, but in preparation for statehood and as a way of not only 

producing institutions that Palestinians deserve and are capable of, 

but also helping to reassure others in the region, and particularly 

Israelis, about the nature of the partner they are dealing with. 

Third, I believe, is renewing political hope, renewing a sense that 

a political solution is possible. Now, that does not add up to resolving the conflict. What it does add up to in my mind is pointing 

things in a different and more promising direction, and I believe 

that is very important to do even as we deal with the very important challenge and the threat that is posed by——

Mr. LANTOS. If I may just have a brief follow up, Mr. Chairman? 

I quoted earlier Dr. Rice’s statement:

‘‘Frankly, the Palestinian Authority, which is corrupt and cavorts with terror, is not the basis for a Palestinian state moving forward.’’

Does the State Department agree with the express view of the National Security Advisor? 

Mr. BURNS. I agree that there are serious problems with regard 

to the way in which the Palestinian Authority has conducted itself. 

More importantly than whether I agree is the fact that I believe 

many Palestinians share that concern, and they want to see stronger institutions emerge. 

If there is going to be a chance for real progress for Palestinians, 

those institutions are going to have to be developed by Palestinians 

and for Palestinians, and that is something that I think many people in the international community are prepared to support if they 

see a real commitment on the part of Palestinians. There is where 

I would put the emphasis, sir. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mrs. Davis? 

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. You stated in your 

opening remarks earlier, and I believe your words were in quotes, 

there was ‘‘absolutely no middle ground here’’ when you were referring to what happened this morning. 

Based on that, I wonder if you still believe, and this probably 

goes back to what Mr. Lantos said, do you think the President believes that we should provide a provisional state for Palestinians 

at the moment? If we did, would that not be rewarding terrorism? 
26

Also, could you explain what provisional means? That is my first 

question. 

The second question is referring to a letter to the Chairman 

dated May 11, 2002, with regards to some legislation. The State 

Department said,

‘‘I do not encourage or support the introduction of legislation 

during this critical period that appears one-sided to the majority of the nations in the Middle East region.’’

Does that mean that this is a moral equivalence and the direction that the State Department is going to take from here on out 

that regardless of what the Palestinians have done we do not want 

to do anything that would look like we are supporting someone like 

Israel, who is doing nothing but protecting themselves and not condemning what the Palestinians are doing? 

Mr. BURNS. No, ma’am. Let me just respond to both questions. 

First on the question of provisional state, again I apologize, but 

I cannot address directly the question of provisional state. What I 

can address is the theme that you have raised, and that is the 

issue of security and political hope. 

I guess what I would say simply is that you can have all the political visions and the political possibilities in the world, but we are 

not going to succeed in making progress, and this is where I mean 

that there is no middle ground, unless you see real performance on 

security. 

At the same time, I also believe that you are not going to make 

enduring or lasting progress on security unless people have some 

sense of political hope. That does not mean rewarding terror. It 

does not mean rewarding violence. It simply means reaffirming 

what not only this Administration, but many previous Administrations, have stood for in terms of a political solution that cannot be 

arrived at through violence, terror or the manipulation of violence, 

but only through a negotiating process. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Do you believe we can have a provisional state with Arafat in control? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, ma’am, on the issue of provisional state I just 

cannot address it. I think as the President has said himself, I really do not think Arafat is the issue here. 

I think the issue that we ought to focus on and that many Palestinians are focusing on right now is the need to build strong institutions, as I said before, in their own self-interest, not as a favor 

to us or anyone else. I think that is a sentiment on the part of Palestinians that we need to encourage and support, and I think it is 

a very important phenomenon right now. 

Ma’am, with regard to the second question about our concerns 

about particular legislation, it is not a function of moral equivalency. Our support, this Administration’s support for Israel’s security, for its well-being, I think has been made abundantly clear, 

and I do not think there can be any question about that. 

When we have concerns about particular pieces of legislation, it 

is often times a function of our concern about preserving the President’s flexibility in dealing with some very difficult relationships, 

whether it is our relationship with Syria, our relationship with others in the region, so that is the basis for it. 
27

It is a question of how to get from here to there in tactics. It is 

not a question of moral equivalency. It is not a question of us in 

any way underestimating the depths of the problems we face. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

Mr. Wexler? 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Mr. Secretary, I would like to recognize what I think has 

been a herculean effort on your part personally in terms of your efforts to pursue a course of progress, and I think the American people owe you a great debt of gratitude for your efforts. 

I would like first, if I could, to just try to elicit from you the official State Department response and, if there has not been one, 

then your own personal assessment with respect to the documents 

that Prime Minister Sharon delivered to the President and I believe to the Secretary not on his last visit, but the visit before that, 

where Prime Minister Sharon argues those documents established 

a significant degree of complicity between or among the Palestinian 

Authority and the infrastructure of terror and implicated Chairman Arafat himself and others. 

I would be curious if you could share with the Committee if there 

has been an official State Department reaction or, if not, your personal assessment, and I ask not only from the point of view from 

judging culpability, but also from the point of view of weighing the 

effectiveness of potential reform efforts by the Palestinian Authority. 

It would seem to me that in order to effectively gauge whether 

reforms at least initially are real or are cosmetic, one of the criteria 

would be to see who it is that was directly involved or indirectly 

involved or not involved and what those people’s roles are under 

the new so-called reform process. 

If I could also inquire of your assessment with respect to the security fence, the 220-some-odd-mile security fence that Israel is 

constructing? Has there been an official State Department position 

taken with respect to that security fence? 

Personally, I believe the strongest argument that the Israelis 

make with respect to the security fence is the analogy that they 

make to Gaza, although obviously it is a very different circumstance, but that in effect it is the same kind of security fence 

that exists already in Gaza and to a degree has worked effectively 

in Gaza, so what could we possibly argue would stand in the way 

of Israel’s right to construct such a security fence at this point? 

My final matter of inquiry, if I could, is with respect to the training of Palestinian security or intelligence officials, which has gone 

on in the past and which may occur again. How are we judging 

which individuals we are training? 

It is my understanding that some of the same individuals that 

were either killed or captured by the Israelis as a part of Al-Aqsa 

or other terrorist groups, that they also had joint membership with 

the intelligence or security forces that in the past had been trained 

by America. I am curious as to what precautions or safety mechanisms we may employ so that that may not happen again. 
28

Mr. BURNS. Sure. Mr. Wexler, let me try and respond to all three 

of the questions you raised. 

On the question of the documents that were provided to us by 

the Israeli Government, there has been preliminary work done on 

them. There has been no sort of conclusive assessment done yet. 

I would just offer my personal view, and that is what I have seen 

of them tend to reinforce the conclusions that we have drawn in 

other documents like the PLO Compliance Act report. It points to 

a failure to exercise responsibility, a failure of leadership on the 

part of the Palestinian Authority leadership with regard to its responsibility to control armed groups, to reign in violence, to discipline people who have been involved in acts of terrorism. 

We will address that in more detail more formally in the next 

PLOCCA report, which we will have up to the Congress before the 

end of June, covering the period that runs through the 15th of 

June and the period in which we actually received the documents 

from the Israelis. 

On the question of the fence, the first point I would make is just 

to stress something I said before to Mr. Berman. First, we understand, and, as the President has made very clear, we support 

Israel’s right to defend itself. It is an understandable security concern, so that is not really at issue here. 

The concern that we have raised has to do with the extent to 

which a particular fence or barrier can become an attempt to fix 

the border unilaterally as opposed to negotiations, and that is simply a concern that we have out there. 

A related concern has to do with reports at least that I have seen 

about land confiscations that may or may not have taken place in 

order to construct the fence. The position that this Administration, 

like its predecessors, has taken on unilateral acts like land confiscation is to express concern and opposition to that. 

Those are the concerns we have, but it is not about the fundamental issue of security. 

Mr. CHABOT [presiding]. Excuse me. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

For the record, I want to read the title of the article I referred 

to earlier, Mr. Secretary. It is called ‘‘Catching the Visa Express.’’ 

It was in the National Review of July 1. 

I hope that you will address this issue of whether or not we are 

allowing travel agents to give visas out to Saudis. Hopefully that 

process has stopped, especially since the tragedy that occurred on 

September 11. We know that some of those people got visas 

through travel agents instead of going through our Embassy there. 

Now, the thing that I want to concentrate on is the rights of 

American citizens. Our State Department for the past 20 or 30 

years has not done anything to help these mothers get their kids 

back. Many of these mothers have been given custody of their children by the Courts. 

The husband kidnaps the kids when he has custody of them for 

the weekend or on a vacation, and he takes them to Saudi Arabia. 

Then the Saudi Government says that our laws, which are religious 

in nature, give complete authority to the husband over the wife 
29

and the children, and, as a result, we cannot do anything about 

getting those kids back. 

We had one case where an Ambassador was trying to help get 

the children back by denying visas to the immediate extended family of the father who kidnapped the children. It was working, but 

the subsequent Ambassador stopped that in its tracks, so they 

never got the children back. 

There are things we can do. We have used the visa privilege in 

other parts of the world with a great deal of effectiveness. I do not 

know why we cannot do that with Saudi Arabia, especially when 

we are talking about the constitutional rights of mothers and the 

children. 

As I said in my opening statement, if we can get them back here 

and then they decide they want to return to Saudi Arabia, they 

have made their decision. To have them sit before a clerk at the 

Embassy or somebody from the State Department and he asked ‘‘do 

you want to go back to America?’’ and the father is sitting there, 

knowing they are going to beat them when they go back home if 

they do not say the right thing, they are going to say oh, no. I am 

happy here. These children cannot give an honest answer because 

of the fear factor. 

The punishment that they endured that was described in my 

Committee was just unbelievable. That is one thing we have to address. I hope the State Department will take a different view than 

they have in the past. 

I am very disappointed. I know the President has a lot on his 

plate, and we are going to be working with him on homeland security and other nations so I am not criticizing the President, but I 

am disappointed that I gave him two letters last week and was 

promised they would be given directly to Prince Saud when he was 

here. 

I wanted him to discuss this issue directly with the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia. As I understand it, you were the one that 

discussed it instead of Secretary Powell or the President. I would 

like to know why that occurred and what transpired during that 

visitation that you had with him. 

We are going to have further hearings on this because we had 

one person at the Embassy in Saudi Arabia tell a mother who took 

her two children to the Embassy saying my children have been kidnapped, and after discussing this with her for a while the consular 

there said you have to leave. 

These are three American citizens. You have to leave American 

territory, our territory. Because we are guests in this country and 

because the mother would not leave with the two children, telling 

the consular that she was going to be arrested and the children 

would go back to the father who had been punishing them severely, 

they ordered two United States Marines to take this mother and 

the two children to the front gate and escort them out of our territory of the United States Embassy. We are going to have hearings 

on that. 

Those sorts of things must end. We must have our State Department and our Executive Branch protecting the constitutional rights 

and liberties of American citizens abroad. I hope that you get the 

message, the State Department gets the message, and the White 
30

House gets the message because if they do not, as long as I am 

Chairman of the Government Reform Committee, we are going to 

keep begging people in making a case, and there is going to be a 

lot of publicity about it. It is something I do not think we want to 

face. 

With that, I would like to hear your comments. 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Burton, let me first say I have spent 20 years 

working for the government in diplomatic service, and I can assure 

you that there has never been a day go by in the discharge of my 

duties when I am not committed to defending the rights of American citizens overseas. I am sure that is true of my colleagues as 

well. That is a fact. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I believe that it has not been the case, Mr. 

Secretary, in our Embassy in Saudi Arabia. I can give you case 

after case where they have not gone to bat for the American people 

and those kids that have been kidnapped. 

Mr. BURNS. Let me address, Mr. Burton, just the concerns that 

you raised, especially with regard to recent contacts with the 

Saudis, because the truth is that Secretary Powell did raise directly 

with Prince Saud a few days ago when he was here the concern 

that you rightly emphasized, and that is the concern about child 

custody for American citizens. He raised it very directly, and he 

stressed the President’s concern about that issue. 

I raised exactly the same concern on behalf of the President with 

Crown Prince Abdullah in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia 10 days ago, 

and what I stressed, sir, was just as you described: The deeply 

painful nature of this issue for the human beings involved. 

This is not to talk about the two different legal systems or anything else. This is to talk about a human concern about keeping 

families connected, and that is a very important thing that as 

human beings, I think, Americans and Saudis, ought to share, that 

American and Saudi leaders ought to share. 

I stressed exactly those same terms to Crown Prince Abdullah, 

and Secretary Powell did exactly the same thing with Prince Saud. 

I hope very much that we can on that human basis produce some 

better results in terms of contacts with people. 

Mr. BURTON. One last question. 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir? 

Mr. BURTON. This is not just a question of what you are talking 

about. These men broke the law. The law gave those children to 

the mothers. They kidnapped the children. They forcibly took them 

away from their mother to a foreign country. 

It is not just a question of human beings being kind to one another and the custody being shared. It is a question of them breaking the law and us not being able to bring them to justice, and 

these men come back into this country with visas given by the 

State Department while there are warrants out for their arrest. 

They come in on diplomatic passports. That is something we cannot 

tolerate. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Engel is no longer with us today? Okay. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I yield my time, Mr. Chairman. 
31

Mr. CHABOT. I am sorry. Did the gentleman say he had no questions? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. I am yielding my time, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back my time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman, is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Wexler asked you a series of 

questions about the Administration’s position with respect to the 

fence. I am curious. From what comments by the Israeli Government, as opposed to the settlers or as opposed to the Palestinians, 

but from what comments by the Israeli Government does the 

United States conclude that there is ambiguity, little less a likelihood, this fence is intended to constitute a unilateral decision by 

Israel to draw a border? 

Mr. BURNS. I have not seen any comments to that effect, sir, so 

what I am simply——

Mr. BERMAN. I mean, you talked about how we are against unilateral acts. My understanding is the Prime Minister, the Defense 

Minister have all talked about this as a defensive measure to try, 

and I do not know how successful it will be, but to try and reduce 

or eliminate these acts of terrorism and the suicide bombers. 

I have heard no statement that would indicate there is any ambiguity about whether or not it is supposed to constitute a legal or 

de facto border. 

Mr. BURNS. Right. Sir, I am not accusing anyone of raising that 

at all. What I am saying is as a matter of self-defense our position 

is very clear about Israel’s right to defend itself and to take those 

security measures that are essential to protecting Israeli citizens. 

The only question I think that we have to keep in mind is the 

possibility that facts that you create on the ground can then become justification for broader political issues like borders. It is a 

concern that we need to keep in mind. That is all. 

Mr. BERMAN. All right. 

Mr. BURNS. And then the practical concern on land confiscation. 

That is a real concern. 

Mr. BERMAN. I understand. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you. 

Mr. BERMAN. Okay. So there are concerns and real concerns. 

Back to a question I raised earlier that we did not get a chance to 

discuss. 

Again, I am struck by this whole issue of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority and terrorism. Can he control, or can he not control terrorism? When I think of a police force armed far beyond 

anything ever contemplated in the Oslo Accords, 40,000 people at 

least at its high point, patrolling Area A where there were no 

Israeli security forces during much of this time since the 1995 

withdrawals and the presence of bomb factories and terrorist cells 

and terrorist networks, it is incomprehensible to me that in an 

area that small with a police force that large, if the government 

had truly wanted to stop the work that led to acts of terrorism 

could not have stopped it. 

Add to that the documentation that was presented to the U.S. 

Government by the Israelis captured from the Palestinians, the stories and events around Karine-A. What is your conclusion about 
32

the Palestinian Authority’s role in the facilitation, the condoning, 

the allowing and perhaps the financing and organizing of clear acts 

of terrorism? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, Mr. Berman, you asked in your opening comments first a question about is the Palestinian Authority and its 

leadership making a 100 percent effort against terrorism, and the 

answer to that question is no. 

The second point that you raised is something that we have addressed in very straightforward terms, and that is what we have 

seen is a pattern in which the Palestinian leadership has failed to 

exercise its responsibility and fulfill its commitments to exercise effective control and consistent control over armed groups on the territory that it controls. 

That is borne out by evidence not just that the Israeli Government has provided us, but that we have discussed with you on 

many occasions before. It is a record of failure to exercise that kind 

of consistent and effective leadership and responsibility. 

Mr. BERMAN. I guess I am trying to see if you will go that one 

step that seems to me is logically compelled further, and that is 

that the Palestinian Authority knew and allowed this activity to go 

on; not just some notion of they were negligent in not stopping it, 

but there was a conscious realization that this was going on, where 

it was going on, with whom, who was undertaking it, and they 

made a conscious decision not to stop it. 

Mr. BURNS. The conclusion we have drawn, sir, the best I can 

put it, I guess, is that, you know, what we have seen is significant 

elements of groups, whether it is the Al-Asqa Martyrs Brigade, the 

Tanzim, Force 17, involved in acts of violence and terrorism. There 

is no question about that. 

Second, we have not seen compelling evidence that would suggest 

that the leadership of the Palestinian Authority has directed particular acts or has been complicit in particular acts. 

As I said, that in itself is irresponsibility because that leadership 

does have a responsibility to discipline people who are involved in 

that, and there have been some instances in which people have 

been arrested and steps have been taken. That is true. There have 

also been some instances recently in which much clearer public 

condemnations of those kind of acts have been issued. That is also 

true. 

The general pattern has been one of not fulfilling that basic responsibility, and I think it underscores the importance of creating 

the kinds of institutions and security services that are both capable 

of carrying out those responsibilities and also demonstrate the political will to do them. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, is recognized for a 

quick one question, and then the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Schiff, will be recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, the question is short, and 

the answer probably would require that you revise and extend, if 

you do not mind. 

I have a specific concern that the years of borrowing that Lebanon has done has put it into a position where, depending upon 

whose estimates you use, it is four, five or six times what the 
33

World Bank considers to be an acceptable debt load. It certainly 

has enabled four times the debt load that Jordan has. 

Some say that is an imminent collapse of the money supply. 

Some say it is not. If you could give us back your comments I guess 

for the Members and make sure they get it on what you think is 

likely to happen and what you think the impact of that devaluation, default or whatever should and if it happens is? 

I will be very brief. My personal opinion is if it does happen, it 

takes an already difficult situation and makes it much more difficult for you to accomplish your mission, and I think it is an area 

in which this Committee has a role to play. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Is the gentleman going to submit that response? 

Mr. BURNS. Sure. I would be glad to get back to Mr. Issa. I know 

you do not have much time. 

Mr. ISSA. I have time. I am just not sure the Chairman can give 

me any more time. 

Mr. CHABOT. I have been informed that the room was promised 

out to another group that needs to take over. 

The gentleman from California is recognized to ask a final question. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the Chair for yielding. I just want to raise 

a concern and get your thought on the philosophy of the Administration. 

I recognize you have a very difficult job to do in both the fact 

that we are an ally of the state of Israel and at the same time the 

Administration has a vital role to play in fostering peace in the 

Middle East and has to have credibility with the Arab nations and 

with the Palestinians as well. 

In that context, a concern that I have that was raised even last 

year in the wake of September 11 and the President’s announcement of support for a Palestinian state was the timing of certain 

actions that we take may give the erroneous impression that they 

are a result of terrorist attacks being committed either against us 

in the case of September 11 or in the case of Israel, as we saw 

today and have seen over the last several months. 

The risk that I am concerned about is that actions that we take, 

whether it is the proposal being quoted now for an interim state 

or whether it is other new terms that are favorable to the Arab nations, will be perceived as a result of the terror being brought 

against the Israelis. 

The question I have is how is the Administration dealing with 

that challenge; that is taking action in such a way that we are not 

rewarding terrorists, that we are not encouraging terrorism, and is 

that not a risk with any new U.S. initiative at this time? 

Mr. BURNS. Sir, I understand the concern, and it is a very good 

question and one we wrestle with as well in terms of thinking 

through timing and tactics and other issues. I guess I would respond quickly, because I know you do not have much time, with 

several points. 

First, it has been the position of President Bush, this Administration and its predecessors going back for decades that the only 

real solution to the problem, the conflict that divides Arabs and 
34

Israelis, is a political one. It has to be achieved through negotiations. That is point one. 

Second, President Bush has been as clear as any American President has been that that solution cannot be achieved through terror, 

violence, the manipulation of violence. There is only one path right, 

and that is a process of negotiations. 

The challenge I think, sir, is to try and make clear that terrorists 

cannot set the agenda here. Terrorists and the acts that they commit, which are designed in most cases explicitly to undermine the 

prospects for a political solution, cannot be allowed to take off the 

table political hope. 

It is important for us to remind people that even as we are going 

to fight vigorously and decisively terrorism and violence, we are 

going to be just as vigorous and decisive in the pursuit of peace. 

That is something I think we owe to our interests, we owe to 

Israel’s interests, its security, its well-being. 

We owe it to the interests of our friends in the area, as well as 

to the interests of ordinary Palestinians, people who in many ways 

have suffered a great deal over the course of the last year and a 

half, who face conditions every day which are extremely difficult. 

I think we owe it to all of those interests to try and remind people that a political solution is not only possible, but it is something 

which has to be pursued even as we are equally clear that you cannot get from here to there through terror and violence and that we 

have to close off that pathway, but we also have to be clear that 

there is another that is open. It is a very tough balance to strike, 

but, I mean, I think that is what we have to aim to do, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank you. I would just comment to conclude that 

that is the goal and the effort. The perception of the world will be 

on what our actions are. If our actions indicate a willingness to acquiesce in the face of terror, then all the rhetoric that we espouse 

about fighting terror will be of no avail. I know you are mindful 

of that, and I appreciate your testimony today. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Schiff. The very last point I would 

make is simply to stress what I said before and the President’s 

very firm conviction about progress being performance-driven. 

There is nothing automatic about making progress back toward 

a political process. People have to work hard. They have to make 

difficult choices. They have to be willing to fight terror and violence 

to get there. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. In light of the late hour and 

the fact that this room has been promised already to another group 

who is waiting to get in here, I will forego my questions. 

Mr. Secretary, I would conclude by requesting that if Members 

have questions that they would be able to submit them to you for 

written answers within a reasonable period of time. 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Without objection, that will be ordered, 

and the Committee now is adjourned. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(35)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHELLEY BERKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Recent statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell suggest 

that the administration is considering recognition of a ‘‘provisional’’ 

Palestinian state. I am astounded by this notion. I believe such recognition would have the appearance of rewarding terror. 

Recognizing a provisional Palestinian state would send the wrong 

message—that if you send suicide or homicide bombers to kill 

enough innocent people, the world will pressure Israel to give in to 

your demands. It would also be inconsistent with the basic principle of Oslo that only by renouncing terror and committing to a 

process of negotiations would progress with the Palestinians be 

achieved. 

Past administrations have been unequivocal that the United 

States will not give into terrorists’ threats, and we will not cave to 

their demands. Doing so would only invite more terrorism—both in 

the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on the larger 

world stage—particularly as we are engaged in our war on terrorism. This is a frightening prospect, and one I will not support. 

Such a shift in U.S. policy would amount to a reward for Palestinian terrorism. 

National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice was recently quoted 

as saying, ‘‘Frankly, the Palestinian Authority, which is corrupt 

and cavorts with terror . . . is not the basis for a Palestinian state 

moving forward.’’ The most immediate question is whether the administration would recognize a provisional state headed by Yasir 

Arafat and his Palestinian Authority. Notwithstanding this critical 

question, there are other important issues the administration 

would have to address. 

The very notion of a provisional state raises some serious questions. For example, how much sovereignty would such a state have? 

It has been difficult enough holding the Palestinian Authority accountable for terrorist acts initiated from within its territory—

would it be more or less responsible for any such future acts of terror? And, would it be allowed to enter into treaties and alliances 

with other states, such as Iraq? I also worry about the prospect of 

a Palestinian military and how it would affect the balance of power 

in the region. 

Another concern is the territorial implications of a provisional 

Palestinian state. Aside from the potentially explosive question of 

where its capital would be located, there are other difficult matters 
36

to think about. Since the Six Day War in 1967, the basis for talks 

(including the Oslo process) was United Nations Resolution 242. 

This resolution discusses an Israeli withdrawal from ‘‘Territories 

occupied in the recent conflict . . .’’ It specifically does not raise 

the need for Israel to withdraw from ‘‘All the territories.’’ Further, 

it states Israel’s right to live within ‘‘Secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.’’

Therefore, I am respectfully requesting that Secretary William 

Burns responds to my office in a timely fashion to the following 

questions:

1. Does the U.S. Administration envision Israel withdrawing 

from ‘‘all’’ the territory gained during the defensive war of 

1967?

2. Is it the policy of the U.S. that Israel must impose upon 

itself borders that cannot be defended?

3. With respect to Jerusalem, does the Administration expect 

Israel to leave the Jewish Quarter of the Old City?

a. Would the Administration support stripping Israel of 

sovereignty over the Western Wall?

Æ