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67–632 PDF 2011

[ERRATA] S. HRG. 112–51 

OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

S. 516 S. 843 

S. 916 S. 917 

MAY 17, 2011 

( 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
[ERRATA] 

S. HRG. 112-51 

The referenced hearing held before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources was inadvertently printed without the 

responses to questions from Secretary Salazar. This errata provides 

those responses as part of the hearing record. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY SALAZAR TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

Question 1. Mr. Secretary, what are the greatest challenges facing your regional 

headquarters in the Gulf? Other than critical pay authority for highly qualified engineers, what can Congress do to ensure better morale in your agency and aid in 

recruitment? 

Answer. The reforms and organizational changes that we have put in place since 

the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill are far-reaching and their success depends in large part on providing the new agencies with the financial resources, 

tools, training and culture to be effective. Improving the safety of offshore drilling 

and the effectiveness of government oversight of this inherently risky activity will 

require a substantial infusion of resources into the offshore regulator. We agree with 

the Commission’s strong recommendation for a substantial increase in the resources 

devoted to government oversight of offshore activities because an effective regulator 

is so clearly in the public’s—and in industry’s—interests. The budget allocation in 

the current draft of the Department’s FY 2012 appropriations bill falls short of providing the full funding required to implement the reorganization of BOEMRE and 

inadequately funds the operational capacity required to implement all of our necessary and far-reaching reforms. For example, it does not provide the requested increase in offshore inspection fees of $55 million that could help to fund the additional needs. Increased resources are essential to creating an efficient, effective, 

transparent and stable development and regulatory environment. 

Question 2. Mr. Secretary, DOI has now issued a number of deepwater drilling 

permits. We all know the issuances started as soon as operators could prove access 

to subsea containment. Can you describe for this committee the process and authorities behind the Notice To Lessees and this requirement? 

Answer. Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331, et seq.), 

the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to regulate the exploration, development, 

and production of mineral resources on the Outer Continental Shelf. The Secretary 

has delegated this authority to the Director of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. Notices to Lessees are authorized in the 

BOEMRE regulations at 30 CFR 250.103, and have historically been issued by the 

bureau as guidance documents to clarify certain bureau regulatory requirements 

and to outline the information to be provided in the various submissions required 

of lessees on the OCS. 

After the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill the Department began the most 

aggressive and comprehensive reforms to offshore oil and gas regulation and oversight in U.S. history. These reforms strengthen requirements in areas ranging from 

well design and workplace safety to corporate accountability, and are necessary to 

ensure that the United States can safely and responsibly expand development of its 

energy resources. 

In November, 2010, BOEMRE issued NTL 2010-N10 informing lessees and operators that a statement, signed by an authorized company official, is required to be 

submitted with each application for a well permit stating that the operator will conduct all authorized activities in compliance with all applicable regulations. This 

NTL clarifies, supplements, and provides more detail about existing regulations, including 30 CFR 254.5(d), and is intended to assure compliance with the requirements of 30 CFR 254.23, 254.24 and 254.26(d). In particular, the NTL provides that 

BOEMRE will evaluate whether an operator has submitted adequate information 

demonstrating access to and ability to deploy adequate surface and subsea containment resources. 

Industry first demonstrated the ability to contain a subsea spill in mid-February 

2011. At that time, we were able to resume issuing deepwater drilling permits. 

Question 3. Mr. Secretary, one of the bills under consideration would create a joint 

permitting office for Alaska OCS issues. The Chukchi Environment Impact Study 
3 

(‘‘EIS’’) is a real driver in our desire to coordinate better. When will BOEMRE finish 

this work and finalize the Chukchi EIS? 

Answer. On August 18, 2011, BOEMRE released the final supplemental environmental impact statement for the Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193, held in February 

2008. The supplemental EIS addresses concerns raised by the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Alaska in its July 21, 2010, decision remanding Lease Sale 193 

back to the agency, and incorporates additional public comment. It also includes a 

new analysis of the potential environmental effects of a hypothetical Very Large Oil 

Spill scenario. 

The final supplemental EIS is available online at: http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/ 

EISlEA/2011l041lFSEIS/2011—041x.htm. BOEMRE is now accepting public 

comments on the document, and any comments received within the comment period 

will be considered by the Secretary in determining whether to affirm, modify, or 

cancel the Lease Sale. The final decision is due to the District Court no later than 

Oct. 3, 2011. 

Question 4. Mr. Secretary, there is a pending exploration plan for work in the 

Chukchi in 2012. BOEMRE has previously indicated that it will work on this Exploration Plan in parallel with finalizing the Chukchi EIS. Is this still the case? 

BOEMRE has begun to review the Chukchi exploration plan and provide feedback 

to the applicant on data gaps and information needs. Is that right? 

Answer. On May 12, 2011, Shell submitted to the Department a Revised Exploration Plan (EP) and associated Revised Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency 

Plan in support of a proposed exploration drilling program on its Chukchi Sea 

leases. However, activities involving these leases are restricted because of the remand issued by the Federal Court for the Alaska District on July 21, 2010. Therefore BOEMRE is treating the Chukchi EP as a draft and will not take any official 

action on the draft EP until after a decision is made to reaffirm Chukchi Sea Lease 

Sale 193. 

A copy of the revised plan and related information can be found at: http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/ProjectHistory/2012lShelllCK/2012xl.HTM 

Question 5. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, the Large Spill Analysis is quite 

different and distinct from the Worst Case Discharge (‘‘WCD’’) at the well sites set 

forth in the Chukchi Exploration Plan. Is that right? 

Answer. Yes. A very large oil spill (VLOS) scenario is hypothetical, and is not an 

analysis of a well that any operator has actually proposed to drill. When an operator 

submits an Exploration Plan, that plan must specify the wells it proposes to drill 

and include an oil spill response plan that includes Worst Case Discharge values 

for these proposed wells. These values take into account specific depth, pressure, oil 

and anticipated reservoir properties for the proposed wells. These values may be 

lower than the hypothetical VLOS scenario used for the overall environmental analysis. 

The final supplemental SEIS contains further discussion (at p. 126) of the similarity and differences between the very large oil spill scenario and the worst case 

discharge analysis. 

Question 6. Mr. Secretary, I am concerned that the BOEMRE’s work on the Very 

Large Spill analysis is going to create confusion and backlash, because the general 

public will not distinguish between this analysis and the much, much lower WCD 

of the specific wells. What is BOEMRE doing to make this distinction clear? 

Answer. In general, the values for worst case discharge (WCD) under the regulations may be higher or lower for a specific well than a very large oil spill (VLOS) 

scenario. The revised Draft SEIS for Lease Sale 193, issued in May 2011, was the 

first National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document post-Macondo that included an analysis of a VLOS scenario to more thoroughly address the potential for 

oil spill impacts. The discussion in that document and in the final supplemental 

EIS, issued on August 18, presents the similarities and differences between the 

VLOS scenario and the WCD analysis. Similar and appropriate discussion will be 

included in all future NEPA documents. 

Question 7. Mr. Secretary, why does every different agency with an interest in a 

project have to do its own EIS? For instance there is a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Marine Fisheries Service EIS in the works and it 

seems that a key role of a coordinating office—whether that’s the President’s coordinating task force or one perhaps established by legislation under consideration— 

would be reconciling one EIS against another. But, in order to increase efficiency, 

couldn’t BOEMRE’s comprehensive EIS be used for all of these purposes since other 

agencies are involved in creating it anyway? 

Answer. We have learned through the tragedy of the Deepwater Horizon event 

that environmental analysis of the potential impacts of development activities is 

both necessary and important. Federal agencies establish their own National Envi-
4 

ronmental Policy Act procedures, in line with requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality, for the specific agency’s authorities and decisionmaking processes. Agencies are, however, encouraged to incorporate by reference information, 

findings, and recommendations from existing studies and NEPA analyses into subsequent NEPA analyses and documents in order to make them more concise and 

focused. Additionally, when it is possible for one NEPA document to include the 

analyses to support decisions for multiple Federal actions, different Agencies may 

either work together (dependent upon need, timing, and available resources) as colead agencies on an EIS (as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) and BOEMRE are doing in the Gulf of Mexico for seismic activities), or one 

Agency may adopt the NEPA document of another agency (as NOAA preliminarily 

plans to coordinate on BOEMRE’s Atlantic Coast seismic EIS), if the necessary information is included to support the decisions of the adopting agency. 

On May 23 BOEMRE and NOAA announced a new collaborative effort, implemented through a Memorandum of Understanding, that will increase coordination 

and collaboration between the two agencies to support environmentally sound offshore energy development. The MOU, which is consistent with recommendations 

from the President’s Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling, specifies how the two agencies will cooperate and coordinate by: 

1. Defining specific processes to ensure effective and timely communication of 

agency priorities and upcoming activities; 

2. Identifying and undertaking critical environmental studies and analyses; 

3. Collaborating on scientific, environmental and technical issues related to 

the development and deployment of environmentally sound and sustainable offshore renewable energy technologies; and 

4. Increasing coordination and collaboration on decisions related to OCS activities, including with respect to research and scientific priorities. 

Question 8. Can you please describe in detail the President’s plan for extending 

offshore leases affected by the moratorium, including what classes of leases, which 

areas, or which specific leases will see such extensions? Will all extensions be one 

year? 

Answer. The details of this policy, originally announced by President Obama as 

part of the Administration’s Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, were provided 

by Secretary Salazar in a June 16, 2011, memorandum directing BOEMRE to issue 

a Notice to Lessees and Operators (NTL) describing how operators can request extensions for up to one-year or until drilling activities commence (whichever is less) 

on their qualifying deepwater leases. As described in the memorandum, in order to 

qualify for such a suspension, leaseholders must demonstrate that there was no oil 

or gas production on the lease as of May 15, 2011; that the lease is in deepwater 

(depths greater than 500 feet); and that the lease is scheduled to expire on or before 

December 31, 2015. The lease extensions will provide lessees and operators additional time to proceed with exploration and development of their leaseholds while 

fully complying with important safety, environmental, spill response and containment requirements. A copy of the memorandum can be found at: http:// 

www.interior.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Implements-Steps-to-Increase-Responsible-Domestic-Energy-Production.cfm 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY SALAZAR TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LANDRIEU

Question 1. Secretary Salazar, as you know, the President on Saturday announced 

in his radio address that he would extend ‘‘drilling leases that were affected by the 

moratorium.’’ When the moratorium was in place, companies were not allowed to 

participate in any activity related to the development of new wells. They could not 

file permit applications, they could not explore—they simply couldn’t develop their 

leases. As such, Senator Hutchison and I introduced the LEASE ACT, as a matter 

of fairness to give this time back to these lease holders. I am very encouraged to 

hear the President’s remarks and I am hoping you can speak specifically to how the 

agency is going to extend these leases? Will all leases in the Gulf be extended? For 

how long will they be extended? Please be very specific. 

Answer. The details of this policy, originally announced by President Obama as 

part of the Administration’s Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future, were provided 

by Secretary Salazar in a June 16, 2011, memorandum directing BOEMRE to issue 

a Notice to Lessees and Operators (NTL) describing how operators can request oneyear extensions for their qualifying deepwater leases. As described in the memorandum, in order to qualify for such a suspension, leaseholders must demonstrate 

that there was no oil or gas production on the lease as of May 15, 2011; that the 

lease is in deepwater (depths greater than 500 feet); and that the lease is scheduled 
5 

to expire on or before December 31, 2015. The lease extensions will provide lessees 

and operators additional time to proceed with exploration and development of their 

leaseholds while fully complying with important safety, environmental, spill response and containment requirements. A copy of the memorandum can be found at: 

http://www.interior.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Implements-Steps-to-IncreaseResponsible-Domestic-Energy-Production.cfm 

Question 2. On May 2nd, Director Bromwich stated that his agency has broad authority to regulate service companies who provide services to oil and gas operators. 

This is very troublesome to many of my constituents who provide these services to 

oil and gas operators. Can you please explain how BOEM will seek to regulate these 

service companies? In addition, can you point to the specific law or regulation that 

gives BOEM the authority to regulate offshore service companies? 

Answer. Over the past year and in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 

we have been implementing a number of critical reforms to strengthen the regulation of offshore oil and gas drilling and strike the appropriate balance between resource development and regulatory oversight. An important component in this reform strategy is the judicious exercise of regulatory authority over not only offshore 

operators, but contractors as well-as their work must also be done safely in order 

for development to proceed responsibly. Our legal authority encompasses the activities of all entities involved in developing offshore leases, to be exercised as we deem 

appropriate and as safety demands. The reason that the historical practice, has focused on regulating operators was that it served to preserve clarity and the singular 

responsibility of the operator. We believe that we can hold operators responsible— 

and in most cases solely responsible—without sacrificing the ability to pursue regulatory actions against contractors for the most serious violations of agency rules and 

regulations. 

Question 3. Secretary Salazar, I would like to take a moment to discuss with you 

some of the provisions in S. 917, the OCS Reform Act of 2011. For instance, Section 

4 of the bill seeks to change the National Policy for the Outer Continental Shelf to 

be more environmentally friendly. However, my staff has found that the National 

Policy currently in law already has environmental safeguards built in and in addition, your agency, BOEM has reviewed the environmental protections under current 

law and has made changes post Deepwater Horizon where necessary. As such, in 

your opinion, do our current laws and regulations do enough to protect our environment while safely producing domestic oil and gas? Doesn’t the current law already 

have enough environmental safeguards, making this provision irrelevant? 

Answer. As noted in this question, a number of the changes in S. 917 highlight 

the need for increased safety of operations and consideration of the marine and 

coastal environment, including the need for integrated programs for both environmental research and technological research and development. A focus on strengthened safety and oversight and the environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas operations are—and have been—priorities of the Administration and have been reflected in a number of the reforms that the Department has made since the Deepwater Horizon spill. Statutory changes will ensure compliance with these important 

safety and environmental protection obligations in the future. 

Question 3a. In addition, Section 10 of this legislation would create a ‘‘National 

Commission’’ whose purpose is to examine and report on the facts and causes relating to the Deepwater Horizon explosion. I don’t necessarily have anything against 

this, except that establishing a Commission now seems very untimely and outdated 

given the President’s Commission and other investigations. This is what I mean 

about this legislation needing to be modified. We simply are not in the same place 

we were last year. Do you agree that establishing a Commission now is untimely? 

Is there a need to establish this Commission? 

Answer. Chairman Bingaman’s and Ranking Member Murkowski’s amendment in 

the nature of the substitute for S. 917 did not include the provision creating a national commission. We note, however, that over the months during and since containment of the spill associated with the Deepwater Horizon explosion, multiple reviews and investigations—some still ongoing—have resulted in reports indicating 

the need for change. Bodies ranging from the President’s Commission on the BP 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, the Department of the Interior’s 

Inspector General, the Department’s own Safety Oversight Board, to multiple Committees of the House and Senate, have indicated the need for reform not only of the 

way the Department does business but of the way oil and gas operations are carried 

out on the Outer Continental Shelf. We believe that these investigations have been 

beneficial, and have served to highlight the need for the kinds of reforms that this 

Administration is implementing to the way oil and gas operations are carried out 

on the OCS. 
6 

Question 3b. Finally, this legislation has a conflict of interest section that puts 

restrictions on pre and post employment of BOEM employees, gift restrictions and 

heightened penalties for employees that violate these regulations. I know that Director Bromwich is actively trying to recruit new employees to work at BOEM. The 

conflict of interest provisions in this legislation seem very onerous. Can you please 

tell me whether the agency has in place regulations to mitigate conflicts of interest? 

Or how the Department of Interior addresses conflicts of interest? If your Department does have these regulations, is there a need to treat BOEM different from 

your other agencies? Do you feel that this section could hamper your Department’s 

efforts to attract top notch employees? 

Answer. BOEMRE Director Bromwich has recently noted that the bureau issued 

a tough new recusal policy last year that requires employees in district offices, 

where inspections and permitting functions reside, to notify their supervisors about 

any potential conflict of interest and request to be recused from performing any official duty in which such a potential conflict exists. Examples include: inspectors are 

now required to recuse themselves from performing inspections of the facilities of 

former employers. Also, our inspectors must report any attempt by industry or other 

bureau personnel to inappropriately influence or interfere with their duties. 

BOEMRE will also soon be issuing a broader version of the policy that applies these 

ethical standards across the agency. 

This policy does present operational challenges for some district offices in the Gulf 

region, which are located in small communities where the primary employers are 

offshore companies. However, the need for tough rules defining the boundaries between regulators and the regulated is compelling and necessary to assure the public 

that our inspections and enforcement programs are effective, aggressive, and independent. Already there is evidence that these new rules are being followed. An internal review conducted by the bureau found more than 50 instances, from September 2010 through April 2011, in which inspectors in the Gulf of Mexico appropriately recused themselves from a specific assignment in compliance with the policy. 

We note that the changes in S. 917 would criminalize legal employment by employees of the two new bureaus even if they did not violate the behavioral restrictions of 18 USC 207 and 5 CFR 2641. Current regulations impose no restrictions 

concerning the organization from which an employee may seek post Federal employment; instead, all restrictions pertain to the nature of the work the employee may 

perform for the organization as compared to the responsibilities carried out while 

employed by the Federal Government. We would like to continue working with the 

Committee on this issue. 

Question 4. As you know, Mr. Secretary, I have been watching the permits number very closely. As of yesterday, only 53 shallow water permits have been issued 

since June 8, 2010. As a reminder, shallow water permits were not put under the 

moratorium and they were not supposed to be affected by it. However, anyone 

watching the situation in the Gulf knows that is not the case. In 2010, from January to April, 42 shallow water permits were issued. In 2009, 48 shallow water permits were issued during the same time frame. In 2011, BOEM has only issued 25 

shallow water permits during the January-April period. This is almost a 50 percent 

reduction from 2009 levels. Clearly, the permitting process has been slowed for the 

shallow water industry, which wasn’t supposed to be affected by the moratorium. 

As such, can you please walk us through the permitting process at BOEM? I am 

told that the individual departments do not talk during the permit review, so there 

is no collaboration. How many people are involved in the review process and how 

do they work together? 

In particular, can you explain whether there are inefficiencies in the system that 

can be reformed to speed up the process to get our permit numbers back to historic 

levels? While it is true that at the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident offshore 

production levels were at an all-time high, the EIA has estimated that production 

in the Gulf of Mexico will decline by 680,000 barrels a day by 2012. This is a significant decline, and is about half of the global exports from Libya. 

Answer. Continuously updated information regarding the status of drilling permits can be found at: http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/ 

welllpermits.html 

As of September 1, 2011, 70 new shallow water well permits have been issued 

since the implementation of new safety and environmental standards on June 8, 

2010, including permit applications submitted prior to this date. This is an average 

of more than 7 per month since fall of 2010, compared to an average of 8 permits 

per month in 2009. 

The permit application review process has always involved a back-and-forth exchange of documents and information between the applicant and the BOEMRE Gulf 
7 

of Mexico Region. In that process, permit application submittals are initially reviewed by BOEMRE staff, any deficiencies are identified, and the applications are 

‘‘returned’’ to the operators so that the applications can be ‘‘resubmitted’’ with the 

corrected or missing information. The submission, return, and resubmission of a 

permit are accomplished through the eWell system, a browser-based permit review 

software application. The eWell system’s submittal, return, and resubmittal process 

facilitates iterative, on-going review and communication between the operator and 

the BOEMRE drilling engineer reviewing the permit in an efficient manner that allows the application to be modified and corrected. The process may include several 

rounds of submission and return. 

Because of this process, the Gulf Region has never had to formally deny a permit 

application, though there have been situations in which an operator has ‘‘withdrawn’’ an application because of a decision by the operator not to move forward 

with drilling the well. Absent a withdrawal, the agency and the operator work cooperatively, however long it may take, to ensure that all regulatory requirements are 

met so that the application may be approved. Depending on the specific characteristics of the well, the applicable regulatory requirements, and the company’s readiness 

to demonstrate compliance with the requirements, this process can take anywhere 

from a few days to many months. 

Before a drilling permit can be approved, there are many direct and related approvals that must be in place. These may include but are not limited to: approval 

of the Exploration Plan (EP) or Development Operation Coordination Document 

(DOCD) under which the specific drilling permit is requested; compliance with regulations requiring an Oil Spill Response Plan; compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act; approval of an Oil Spill Financial Responsibility (OSFR) document; a geological and geophysical review of all the relevant hydrocarbon bearing 

zones: determination and verification of worst case discharge scenarios; and a demonstration that blowout preventer control systems comply with regulations. 

The drilling application review process has never involved a submittal followed by 

a simple approval or denial. Rather, BOEMRE is always interactively working with 

the applicants. Given the additional regulatory and informational requirements that 

have been developed and implemented since the Deepwater Horizon incident, the 

time required to prepare and review deepwater permit applications has increased 

as both the operators and the reviewing engineers adapt to the changed landscape. 

The review process, however, remains on-going, interactive, and open-ended. 

Director Bromwich has devoted a team to reviewing and improving BOEMRE’s 

drilling permit review and approval process, a central element to ensuring that proposed drilling operations will be conducted safely. This review and evaluation process must be rigorous but efficient, so that proposed operations are not unduly delayed by the process. The team has been working on plans to address the permitting 

workload in light of current resources, and is developing a comprehensive handbook 

of related policies and practices. This handbook will be designed to assist permit reviewers in carrying out their responsibilities and ensure greater consistency across 

our offices and clarity for industry. 

BOEMRE has also been in constant communication with industry representatives 

and individual operators about the permitting process, and has already addressed 

specific issues with plan approval and permitting processes that include: 

• issuing two guidance documents to provide clarity regarding the steps in the 

permitting process and the requirements that must be satisfied to meet the 

standards; 

• issuing a permitting checklist so that operators can confirm their drilling permit applications are complete before they submit them, thus minimizing the 

need to return applications because necessary information is missing; and 

• development of information technology solutions to improve the efficiency of 

processes while providing operators with greater transparency into the status 

of the permit applications. 

The goal through this process has been to provide greater clarity, transparency 

and consistency in the permitting process. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY SALAZAR TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR HOEVEN

Question 1. During the May 17, 2011, committee hearing in Energy and Natural 

Resources, you testified the Department of Interior has 30 days to approve exploration plans but no deadline to act on permits. Would 60 days be sufficient to review 

and either approve or deny a permit? If not, would 90 days be sufficient to review 
8 

and either approve or deny a permit. If neither 60 nor 90 days are sufficient, how 

many days would the Interior need to review and make a decision on a permit and 

why? 

Answer. Operators continue to receive permits in both shallow and deep water 

under the most aggressive and comprehensive reforms to offshore oil and gas regulation and oversight in U.S. history. These reforms, launched in response to the 

Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill, strengthen requirements in areas ranging 

from well design and workplace safety to corporate accountability, and are helping 

ensure that the United States can safely and responsibly expand development of its 

energy resources. BOEMRE is always interactively working with the applicants. 

Given the additional regulatory and informational requirements that have been developed and implemented since the Deepwater Horizon incident, the time required 

to prepare and review deepwater permit applications has increased for both the operators and the reviewing engineers. The review process, however, remains ongoing, interactive, and open-ended. Given the importance of ensuring that permit 

applicants satisfy these safety and environmental standards, statutory time constraints on permit approval are not warranted and could constrain the ability to ensure that permits meet safety standards. 

Continuously updated information regarding the status of drilling permits can be 

found at: http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/welllpermits.html 

Question 2. On average, how many days does it take the Interior to either approve 

or deny an Outer Continental Shelf permit? 

Answer. The permit application review process has always involved a back-andforth exchange of documents and information between the applicant and the 

BOEMRE Gulf of Mexico Region. In that process, permit application submittals are 

initially reviewed by BOEMRE staff, any deficiencies are identified, and the applications are ‘‘returned’’ to the operators so that the applications can be ‘‘resubmitted’’ 

with the corrected or missing information. The submission, return, and resubmission of a permit are accomplished through the eWell system, a browser-based permit 

review software application. The eWell system’s submittal, return, and resubmittal 

process facilitates iterative, on-going review and communication between the operator and the BOEMRE drilling engineer reviewing the permit in an efficient manner 

that allows the application to be modified and corrected. The process may include 

several rounds of submission and return. Because of this process, the Gulf Region 

has never had to formally deny a permit application, though there have been situations in which an operator has ‘‘withdrawn’’ an application because of a decision by 

the operator not to move forward with drilling the well. Absent a withdrawal, the 

agency and the operator work cooperatively, however long it may take, to ensure 

that all regulatory requirements are met so that the application may be approved. 

Depending on the specific characteristics of the well, the applicable regulatory requirements, and the company’s readiness to demonstrate compliance with the requirements, this process can take anywhere from a few days to many months. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY SALAZAR TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SHAHEEN

In the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, the Oil Pollution Act was enacted, which, 

among other things, created an Interagency Committee to focus oil spill research 

and development activities among various federal agencies. Yet, the Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted the lack of oil spill technology and response capabilities necessary to address a spill like the one we saw unfold last summer. There was a perception that we were still using the same technologies to clean up Deepwater Horizon that we used twenty years ago to clean up Exxon Valdez. 

In developing legislation last year with Sen. Mark Udall and Chairman Bingaman 

to address this critical area of need, we heard some reoccurring themes among those 

working in oil spill R&D field. 

One was the lack of dedicated funding for oil spill R&D activities, which was reinforced by the President’s National Oil Spill Commission. We attempted to correct 

this in the legislation Chairman Bingaman, Sen. Udall and I introduced, setting 

aside $25 million a year from oil and gas royalties to fund these critical oil spill 

R&D activities. 

Question 1. Would you agree that we need to find dedicated sources of funding 

to pay for oil spill R&D? 

Answer. As intended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the companies that produce 

and transport oil are supporting research to improve oil spill response capabilities, 

with funding for related activities appropriated from the Oil Spill Liability Trust 

Fund (OSLTF)-including funding for R&D. The OSLTF derives funding from: 
9 

• an 8-cent-per barrel tax, collected from the oil industry on petroleum produced 

in or imported to the United States. This is the largest source of revenue for 

oil spill research; 

• transfers from other existing pollution funds. While no additional funds remain 

to be transferred, total transfers into the trust fund since 1990 have exceeded 

$550 million; 

• interest on the trust fund principal from U.S. Treasury investments; 

• cost recoveries from those responsible for oil incidents; 

• fines and civil penalties for violations of the Oil Pollution Act financial responsibility requirements, the Clean Water Act, the Deepwater Port Act, and the 

Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act. 

With respect to activities within the Department of the Interior’s jurisdiction, in 

September 2010, the Administration requested an additional $8.6 million as a 2011 

budget amendment to the Department’s budget for oil spill research to address key 

research gaps brought to light by the spill and the associated containment and response efforts. A total of $11.7 million was enacted in the FY 2011 continuing resolution, an increase of $5.4 million over FY 2010. The FY 2012 budget request for 

oil spill research is $14.9 million and 22 full time employees, which is a net increase 

of $8.6 million and 4 full time employees over the FY 2010 enacted level. This increase was needed to address several key knowledge gaps brought to light by the 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill and its troubled and lengthy spill containment and response efforts. The additional $8.6 million will provide contract research and four 

full time employees needed to manage the development and monitoring of studies. 

Other agencies in government have received or requested additional funding for 

R&D activities, as well. For example, the Environmental Protection Agencies received approximately $2 million in the supplemental appropriation for research on 

dispersants, and NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration received a $2.9M increase in the FY 2012 President’s Budget Request that would fund competitive external grants to increase NOAA’s spill response capacity and development. 

The Department has also announced the formation of the Ocean Energy Safety 

Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from federal agencies as well as 

the offshore oil and gas industry, academic institutions, and other non-governmental 

organizations. Dr. Tom Hunter, the former head of the Sandia National Laboratory 

who was central to the Macondo well control effort, was selected by the Secretary 

to chair this committee, which will be a center of excellence charged with driving 

research and development and technical innovation across government and industry 

in the areas of drilling safety, well control and subsea containment, and oil spill response. The Administration has proposed that Congress pass legislation to formalize 

this collaboration by authorizing an Ocean Energy Safety Institute to connect government, industry, academia, and outside experts devoted to developing cutting-edge 

safety, containment, and response capabilities. 

Question 2. Since the BP spill, has there been any change in the amount of money 

spent, either by government or by industry, on research and development for new 

technology that aids in response and clean-up? 

Answer. As indicated in the previous response, with respect to activities within 

the Department of the Interior’s jurisdiction, in September 2010, the Administration 

requested an additional $8.6 million as a 2011 budget amendment to the Department’s budget for oil spill research to address key research gaps brought to light 

by the spill and the associated containment and response efforts. A total of $11.7 

million was enacted in the FY 2011 continuing resolution, an increase of $5.4 million over FY 2010. The FY 2012 budget request for oil spill research is $14.9 million 

and 22 full time employees, which is a net increase of $8.6 million and 4 full time 

employees over the FY 2010 enacted level. This increase was needed to address several key knowledge gaps brought to light by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and 

its troubled and lengthy spill containment and response efforts. The additional $8.6 

million will provide contract research and four full time employees needed to manage the development and monitoring of studies. 

The Department has also announced the formation of the Ocean Energy Safety 

Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from federal agencies as well as 

the offshore oil and gas industry, academic institutions, and other non-governmental 

organizations. Dr. Tom Hunter, the former head of the Sandia National Laboratory 

who was central to the Macondo well control effort, was selected by the Secretary 

to chair this committee, which will be a center of excellence charged with driving 

research and development and technical innovation across government and industry 

in the areas of drilling safety, well control and subsea containment, and oil spill response. The Administration has proposed that Congress pass legislation to formalize 

this collaboration by authorizing an Ocean Energy Safety Institute to connect gov-
10 

ernment, industry, academia, and outside experts devoted to developing cutting-edge 

safety, containment, and response capabilities. 

The Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill have placed a renewed 

emphasis on ensuring the safety and protection of our oceans and shorelines. 

Ohmsett laboratory has been operated by BOEMRE for 17 years as part of our mission to ensure that the best and safest technologies are used in offshore oil and gas 

operations. It is the largest outdoor saltwater wave/tow tank facility in North America and is the only facility where full-scale oil spill response equipment testing, research, and training can be conducted with oil in a marine environment under controlled environmental conditions. 

Ohmsett plays a critical role in developing effective response technologies by providing independent and objective performance testing of full-scale oil spill response 

equipment, as well as training first responders who will be using this equipment. 

Many of today’s commercially available oil spill cleanup systems and services have 

been tested at Ohmsett, as have equipment and technology currently under development. The facility is capable of hosting the testing and evaluation of a broad range 

of oil spill response systems and technologies, including chemical treating agents 

and dispersants, fireresistant containment booms, remote sensing and detection instruments, sorbent materials, temporary storage devices, viscous oil pumping units 

and oil water separators. 

Ohmsett is the most cost-effective method for companies to obtain response experience using real oil. The Ohmsett test tank allows testing of full-scale equipment, 

and the tank’s wave generator simulates realistic sea environments while state-ofthe-art data collection and video systems record test results. 

Question 3. The President’s requested FY2012 budget includes a substantial increase in the funds for oil spill R&D, up to $14 million from $6 million. What is 

the plan for how this money would be spent? 

Answer. As noted above, this request is intended to provide an additional $8.6 

million to the Oil Spill Research Program for contract research that will address 

several key knowledge gaps brought to light by the Deepwater Horizon spill and its 

spill containment and response efforts, as well as four FTEs that are needed to 

manage the development and monitoring of these studies.Question 4. Do you feel 

that the Department of the Interior should have a central role among other federal 

agencies in promoting and funding oil spill R&D efforts? 

Answer. The Department, through BOEMRE plays a key role in initiating applied 

research to support decision making relating to offshore energy development, has 

long conducted research in oil spill containment and response, and provides response training at its OHMSETT facility. The Department will continue to play a 

leadership role in both technology assessment and stimulation of innovation on a 

larger scale than its usual study efforts, and will continue to coordinate its efforts 

with other relevant federal agencies. 

Oil Spill R&D Planning 

Another theme we’ve frequently heard is that the Interagency Committee created 

under the Oil Pollution Act has not worked. There was a sense among those we 

spoke to in crafting our bill last year that the Committee lacked leadership and direction. As one example, the Oil Pollution Act required the Interagency Committee 

to develop an oil spill R&D plan, which they did. However, the plan is dated April 

1997 and has not been updated since. 

Question 1. In your view, what can we do to better focus and coordinate our federal oil spill R&D efforts? How can we ensure that there is a known and understood 

path forward on federal oil spill R&D efforts? 

Answer. The Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research 

(ICCOPR) continues to serve as a forum for its federal members to coordinate and 

maintain awareness of ongoing oil pollution research activities. Members of the 

ICCOPR interact in a number of venues, including conferences, workshops, meetings of the National Response Team Science and Technology Subcommittee, and 

through formal meetings. Formal meetings of the ICCOPR are normally scheduled 

on a semi-annual basis. The Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan is currently being revised. 

As noted in the response to question in the previous section, the Department has 

announced the formation of an Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, comprised 

of representatives from federal agencies as well as the offshore oil and gas industry, 

academic institutions, and other non-governmental organizations. It is intended that 

this committee will be a center of excellence charged with driving research and development and technical innovation across government and industry in the areas of 

drilling safety, well control and subsea containment, and oil spill response. 
11 

Building on pre-existing efforts, the Administration has taken additional efforts 

to advance R&D efforts in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For example, 

as mentioned above, the Department of the Interior has announced the formation 

of the Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives from 

federal agencies as well as the offshore oil and gas industry, academic institutions, 

and other non-governmental organizations. Dr. Tom Hunter, the former head of the 

Sandia National Laboratory who was central to the Macondo well control effort, was 

selected by the Secretary to chair this committee, which will be a center of excellence charged with driving research and development and technical innovation 

across government and industry in the areas of drilling safety, well control and 

subsea containment, and oil spill response. The Administration has proposed that 

Congress pass legislation to formalize this collaboration by authorizing an Ocean 

Energy Safety Institute to connect government, industry, academia, and outside experts devoted to developing cutting-edge safety, containment, and response capabilities. 

Question 2. How can we get federal agencies that play a critical role in oil spill 

R&D, including the Interior Department, to better work together? 

Answer. As noted in the response to question 1, the Administration is implementing policies that will assist in focusing and driving future oil spill R&D efforts. 

Role of Science 

I think one of the most troubling things we learned from the BP disaster in the 

Gulf was that science had taken a back seat in the permitting process. At the time, 

one of the scientists who worked for the Minerals Management Service was quoted 

in the New York Times as saying that MMS scientists ‘‘are simply not allowed to 

conclude that drilling will have an impact’’ on the environment (U.S. Said to Allow 

Drilling Without Needed Permits, 5/13/2010). 

Question 1. In your opinion, over the past year has there been any change in the 

culture within the Department of the Interior to take science seriously in the decisionmaking process, and, if the answer is yes, please provide some concrete evidence 

of that change? 

Answer. Significant reforms have taken place at the Department, including in the 

offshore program, over the first 2 1/2 years of the Obama Administration, and a 

focus on science has played a key role in these reforms. We have elevated the role 

of science in bureau decision-making. One of the guiding principles of our reform 

agenda for offshore energy development has been a fundamental change in the approach to decision-making, which includes a renewed commitment to develop thorough, credible and unfiltered scientific data. The reorganization of the bureau will 

ensure independent and rigorous enforcement of safety and environmental regulations and the augmentation of science efforts in bureau activities through added capacity and expertise. Toward this end, last September a Secretarial Order was 

issued establishing a Scientific Integrity Policy for the Department that will cultivate and reinforce a culture of scientific integrity. In the offshore program, we 

have to devote greater resources to, and elevate the role of, our scientists within 

the offshore regulators. 

For example, in March 2010 the Department announced the proposed 2012-2017 

offshore oil and gas leasing program, providing a new approach to oil and gas activities on the OCS aimed at promoting the responsible, environmentally-sound, and 

scientificallygrounded development of oil and gas resources. Through this proposal, 

a new emphasis on both science-based decision-making and public outreach was announced. This included cancelling certain lease sales and clarifying that full environmental analysis through an Environmental Impact Statement will be required 

prior to any decision to lease in any additional areas. 

The Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill focused our attention on the Gulf of 

Mexico and further fueled this drive to reform. The reforms put in place in response 

to that disaster have created a strong and independent agency with the resources, 

tools and authority it needs to hold offshore operators accountable. The bar on industry’s safety practices and equipment has been raised, and companies that want 

to drill now must explain how they will deal with catastrophic blowouts and oil 

spills. 

Science has been returned to its rightful place in decisions about offshore oil and 

gas development. We are conducting a new environmental analysis in the Gulf of 

Mexico that will help provide information to guide future leasing and development 

decisions there. We also continue to work with other federal agencies to conduct 

thorough environmental analysis and scientific study, to gather public input and 

comment, and to carefully examine the potential safety and spill risks as new areas 

are evaluated for potential oil and gas exploration and development on the OCS. 
12 

The science resources available at the Department of the Interior are some of the 

most robust in the United States and include thousands of scientists in the United 

States Geological Survey (USGS), the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the 

National Park Service and BOEMRE. The various programs in the USGS and the 

science and research programs within BOEMRE also play key roles in providing scientific information concerning impacts from offshore energy and mineral exploration. 

Specific examples of this science-based approach include the science gap and sufficiency report issued in June 2011 by the USGS. That report, requested by Secretary 

Salazar, evaluates the science needed to better inform decisions regarding oil and 

natural gas exploration and development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas off Alaska by identifying what the science gaps were in OCS development in the Arctic. 

While there is significant potential for development in this area, it is a frontier area 

with harsh weather conditions and unique fish and wildlife resources that Alaska’s 

indigenous people rely on for subsistence. The report summarizes the large volume 

of existing scientific information, much of it conducted under the auspices of the Environmental Studies Program of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement; identifies where knowledge gaps exist; and provides initial 

guidance on new and continuing research that could improve decision-making. 

The information identified in this report, which can be found at http:// 

pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1370, will help inform the Department’s determinations about 

what we need to know to develop our Arctic energy resources in the right places 

in the right way. Among the major areas noted in the report where additional scientific research, analysis and synthesis could reduce uncertainties include the following: 

• Developing a better understanding of the effects of climate change on physical, 

biological and social conditions as well as resource management strategies in 

the Arctic; 

• Developing foundational geospatial data on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf; 

• Synthesizing existing scientific information on a wide range of topics on the 

Arctic; 

• Building upon advances in spill-risk evaluation and response knowledge by developing better information on key inputs to spill models (such as oceanographic, weather, and ecological data); 

• Improving dialogue and using collaborative, comprehensive science planning, 

both domestically and internationally. 

Another recent specific example is the use of the Outer Continental Shelf Scientific Committee, chartered to advise the Secretary of the Interior, through 

BOEMRE, on the feasibility, appropriateness, and scientific value of the bureau’s 

OCS Environmental Studies Program. The Scientific Committee is a vital part of 

the Department’s ongoing efforts to ensure that the appropriate scientific information is available on which to base decisions affecting offshore energy production on 

the OCS. 

In February 2011, the Department announced the establishment of a new policy 

to ensure and maintain the integrity of scientific and scholarly activities used in Departmental decision making. The policy follows on the Memorandum to the Heads 

of Departments and Agencies on Scientific Integrity issued in December and includes the designation Dr. Ralph Morgenweck, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Senior 

Science Advisor, to serve as the Department’s first Science Integrity Officer. This 

new policy, which will be updated as necessary, is based on the principles found in 

Secretarial Order 3305 and guided by the Office of Science and Technology Policy 

memo, issued in December 2010. The policy applies to all Departmental employees 

when they engage in, supervise or manage scientific or scholarly activities; analyze 

and/or publicly communicate scientific or scholarly information; or use this information or analyses to make policy, management or regulatory decisions. Additionally, 

the policy includes provisions for contractors, partners, grantees, leasees, volunteers 

and others, who conduct these activities on behalf of the Department. 

Under this new policy, the Department will: 

• Use clear and unambiguous codes of conduct for scientific and scholarly activities to define expectations for those covered by this policy. 

• Facilitate the free flow of scientific and scholarly information, consistent with 

privacy and classification standards, and in keeping with the Department’s 

Open Government Plan. 

• Document the scientific and scholarly findings considered in decision making 

and ensure public access to that information and supporting data through established Departmental and Bureau procedures-except for information and data 
13 

that are restricted from disclosure under procedures established in accordance 

with statute, regulation, Executive Order, or Presidential Memorandum. 

• Ensure that the selection and retention of employees in scientific and scholarly 

positions or in positions that rely on the results of scientific and scholarly activities are based on the candidate’s integrity, knowledge, credentials, and experience relevant to the responsibility of the position. 

• Ensure that public communications policies provide procedures by which scientists and scholars may speak to the media and the public about scientific and 

scholarly matters based on their official work and areas of expertise. In no circumstance may public affairs officers ask or direct Federal scientists to alter 

scientific findings. 

• Provide information to employees on whistleblower protections. 

• Communicate this policy and all related responsibilities to contractors, cooperators, partners, permittees, leasees, grantees, and volunteers who assist with 22 

developing or applying the results of scientific and scholarly activities on behalf 

of the Department, as appropriate. 

• Encourage the enhancement of scientific and scholarly integrity through appropriate, cooperative engagement with the communities of practice represented by 

professional societies and organizations. 

• Examine, track, and resolve all reasonable allegations of scientific and scholarly 

misconduct while ensuring the rights and privacy of those covered by this policy 

and ensuring that unwarranted allegations do not result in slander, libel, or 

other damage to them. 

• Facilitate the sharing of best administrative and management practices that 

promote the integrity of the Department’s scientific and scholarly activities. 

Question 2. As we restructure the handling of drilling permits within the Department of the Interior, how can we instill a commitment to scientific integrity within 

the new administrative units? 

Answer. Director Bromwich has devoted a team to reviewing and improving 

BOEMRE’s drilling permit review and approval process, a central element to ensuring that proposed drilling operations will be conducted safely. This review and evaluation process must be rigorous but efficient, so that proposed operations are not 

unduly delayed by the process. The team has been working on plans to address the 

permitting workload in light of current resources, and is developing a comprehensive handbook of related policies and practices. This handbook will be designed to 

assist permit reviewers in carrying out their responsibilities and ensure greater consistency across our offices and clarity for industry. 

We have also elevated the role of science in bureau decision-making. One of the 

guiding principles of our reform agenda for offshore energy development has been 

a fundamental change in the approach to decision-making, which includes a renewed commitment to develop thorough, credible and unfiltered scientific data. The 

reorganization of the bureau will ensure independent and rigorous enforcement of 

safety and environmental regulations and the augmentation of science efforts in bureau activities through added capacity and expertise. Toward this end, last September a Secretarial Order was issued that establishes a Scientific Integrity Policy 

for the Department that will cultivate and reinforce a culture of scientific integrity. 

In the offshore program, we have to devote greater resources to, and elevate the role 

of, our scientists within the offshore regulators. 

By the end of the current fiscal year, we intend to separate the former MMS’s 

resource management and leasing functions from its safety and environmental enforcement responsibilities by establishing the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 

Enforcement (BSEE) and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). 

BSEE will be responsible for overseeing the safety and environmental and regulatory compliance of offshore oil and gas and renewable energy operations. The functions of BSEE include oil and gas permitting, facility inspections, regulations and 

standards development, safety research, field operations, environmental compliance 

and enforcement, review of operator oil spill response plans, production and development conservation, and operating a national training center. This will provide the 

engineers who review permit applications and the inspectors who ensure compliance 

with our workplace and drilling safety regulations with greater independence, more 

budgetary autonomy, and clearer mission focus. The mission of BSEE will be to 

independently and rigorously enforce safety and environmental regulations. Our 

goal is to create a toughminded, but fair, regulator that can effectively keep pace 

with the risks of offshore drilling and will promote the development of a safety culture in offshore operators. 

BOEM will be responsible for promoting and managing the development of the nation’s offshore resources, including oil, gas and renewable resources. This mission 
14 

involves ensuring that the nation’s offshore energy resources are made available for 

wise and economically sound development with appropriate protections for the environment. The structure that we have developed and that we are implementing ensures that effective reviews of the environmental impacts of proposed projects in our 

oceans are closely analyzed and well-understood; that these impacts are given appropriate weight during decision-making related to resource management; and that 

the appropriate balance is struck. These processes must be both rigorous and efficient so that operations can go forward in a timely way and with confidence that 

appropriate steps to mitigate potential environmental effects are taken. 

We are creating the senior position of Chief Environmental Officer within BOEM, 

who will be responsible for ensuring that environmental concerns are appropriately 

balanced in leasing and planning decisions and for coordinating and promoting scientific research relative to our oceans. 

Question 3. There is a need for balance between making sure that permits are 

issued in a timely manner and the time it takes to make sure that the drilling will 

be done in a safe and environmentally responsible manner. Do you feel that any of 

the proposed legislation we are considering today achieves the correct balance? 

Answer. We agree that striking this balance is a key component of the program. 

As noted in the Department’s testimony for this hearing, S. 917 includes several 

new planning requirements intended to promote safe and responsible development. 

These include a requirement for detailed descriptions of equipment and plans to address potential well blowouts, which is consistent with Notice to Lessees 2010-N06, 

issued by BOEMRE and that clarifies that current regulations require that new filings for drilling permits, exploration plans, or development plans contain information specifically addressing the possibility of a blowout and the detailed steps that 

lessees or operators would take to prevent blowouts. 

The legislation would also extend the deadline for the Department to review and 

approve exploration plans; require that lessees obtain a drilling permit after approval of an exploration plan; and require that, prior to approval of such a permit, 

an engineering review of the well system be completed and reviewed. The Administration supports this authority providing for longer review time and stronger reviews of exploration plans prior to drilling. 

Question 4. Have we learned anything from the scientific work that has been done 

since the spill occurred that will help ensure that future drilling operations are done 

safely? 

Answer. We are using spill-related scientific work to understand what happened; 

to inform our reform and restoration efforts; and to help guide future development 

on the OCS. 

We have also elevated the role of science in bureau decision-making. One of the 

guiding principles of our reform agenda for offshore energy development has been 

a fundamental change in the approach to decision-making, which includes a renewed commitment to develop thorough, credible and unfiltered scientific data. The 

reorganization of the bureau will ensure independent and rigorous enforcement of 

safety and environmental regulations and the augmentation of science efforts in bureau activities through added capacity and expertise. Toward this end, last September Secretary Salazar issued a Secretarial Order establishing a Scientific Integrity Policy for the Department that will cultivate and reinforce a culture of scientific 

integrity. In the offshore program, we have to devote greater resources to, and elevate the role of, our scientists within the offshore regulators. 

On the ground, industry has worked through the Marine Well Containment Company and the Helix Containment Group to develop well containment systems, cutting edge technology that meet the new, more stringent, requirements established 

by BOEMRE in its regulations. 

In addition, a significant amount of science has been, and continues to be, carried 

out in the Gulf Region as a result of the spill. This science is contributing, for example, to our knowledge of the fate of oil released from such depths, as discussed in 

the response to the next question. Similarly, information and experiences from the 

Deepwater Horizon spill, as well as the Exxon Valdez spill, have been used by the 

USGS to evaluate and inform the science needed to better inform decisions regarding oil and natural gas exploration and development in the Beaufort and Chukchi 

Seas off Alaska. 

Question 5. It appeared in news reports that we had a difficult time even figuring 

out where the oil from the spill went. Has there been any recent scientific work that 

has helped us determine what happened to the oil? 

Answer. There has been some new work on this topic, and more will be published 

by the end of the year in a special issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy 

of Sciences. Although it is still premature to draw final conclusions regarding details 

of the fate of the oil, some of these studies help to shed new light on this question. 
15 

Scientists working on the oil flow rate from the well at first were puzzled by the 

fact that the apparent flow rate from the oil well, as measured by the oil on the 

ocean surface by the USGS estimated much less than the rate measured directly 

at the well in the deep sea by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. A recent 

publication in the journal Geophysical Research Letters by a team of NOAA scientists, who measured hydrocarbons evaporating from the ocean surface to the atmosphere, may help resolve this paradox indicating a large portion of the oil remained subsurface. These new data could explain the lower apparent flow rate at 

the ocean surface in the earlier USGS estimate. Also, research publications by 

David Valentine and colleagues at the University of California Santa Barbara demonstrate that microbes rapidly consumed methane in the deep ocean. The USGS has 

published data (available at http://www.usgs.gov/oilspill) from shoreline surveys that 

will help determine the impact of the oil that made landfall. Research into the oil’s 

migration and distribution around the Gulf of Mexico is continuing and may help 

provide a more complete picture of where the oil went over time.