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“Both CSOs and ISAF 

leadership recognize the need 

for a ‘mature’ civil-military 

dialogue, including Afghan 

National Security Forces, 

which is sustained by relationships built over time where 

a degree of trust allows for 

honest conversation. A highlevel, ongoing policy dialogue 

should focus on ‘communication’ rather than ‘coordination.’ Establishing this ‘steady 

state’ dialogue could facilitate 

better ways of managing 

tensions that develop during 

times of crisis and of eventually fostering a transition 

from ISAF to CSOs.”

September 24, 2010 

The Civil Society-Military Relationship 

in Afghanistan 

Summary

•	 The intense challenge of coordinating government civilians with military actors in the International Security Assistance Forces’ Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan has inhibited 

development of military relationships with civil society. 

•	 The counterinsurgency strategy of “shape, clear, hold, build” invites civil society organizations 

(CSOs) to play key roles in the final “build” stage at the operational level. Yet many CSOs resist 

“coordination” in a mission and strategy different from their own.

•	 CSOs seek greater policy dialogue and “communication” with high-level ISAF decision makers, 

particularly during planning stages. An ongoing, high-level forum for civil society-military policy 

dialogue could help address tensions, provide a mechanism for CSOs to share their conflict assessments, and explore areas for possible collaboration such as in security sector reform.

Introduction

There are different types of civil-military relationships in Afghanistan. The International Security 

Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) stated mission in Afghanistan is to protect the population while extending 

the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 

and decreasing the effectiveness of insurgent elements. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 

model attempts to link security, governance, and development by bringing together military and 

civilian government personnel in civil-military integrated programs. While a range of PRT lessons 

learned reports examine the problems of civilian government-military integration within PRTs, far 

less exists to describe the relationship between ISAF and civil society organizations (CSOs). Civilian 

government and CSOs are different. This report focuses on civil society–military relations.

ISAF views CSOs as important implementing partners for a “soft power” approach to winning 

over allegiance of Afghan citizens in the final “build” stage of their counterinsurgency strategy. 

Many CSOs resist being approached by local PRTs to implement programs they had no part in 

helping to design, especially if the goal or mission contrasts with their own. 

There is broad agreement that Afghanistan requires some form of military (defense), diplomacy, 

and development assistance (the 3D approach), but many debate whether to integrate civilian 

and military efforts.1 Greater dialogue between CSOs, civilian government, and military personnel 

on planning and ongoing conflict assessments may yield better results in achieving long-term 

stability and peace than seeking integration at the PRT field level.

Lisa Schirch

E-mail: schirchl@emu.edu

Phone: 540.383.4859

peaceBrieF56
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan

page 2 • PB 56 • September 24, 2010

Civil Society in Afghanistan

An active civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state. Civil society both works 

in partnership with the state to complement and supplement its capacity and to hold the state to 

account for its responsibilities and the transparency of its governance. 

Compared to similar countries, Afghanistan has a rich and diverse array of civil society groups 

that take collective action on shared interests and values. CSOs include both Afghan and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) but also other social, ethnic, religious, women’s, 

youth, arts, trade unions, traditional, tribal or clan groups, and others. In Afghanistan, definitions 

of civil society can also include shuras, jirgas, Community Development Councils (CDCs) and other 

traditional structures and representatives such as the Ulemah or Maliqs.

2

CSOs in Afghanistan are diverse: a mix of capable and incapable, corrupt and trustworthy, 

willing to work with the military and opposed to military cooperation. CSOs carry out a variety of 

programs including economic development, health, agriculture, human rights, peacebuilding and 

police training. CSOs bring professional skills in management and technical knowledge, cultural, 

religious and language capacity, and broad social networks in local communities.

NGO Principles in the Afghan Context

Humanitarian principles guide many nongovernmental humanitarian and development organizations. The five core pillars include:

•	 The principle of humanity is the commitment to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and 

uphold human dignity.

•	 The principle of the humanitarian imperative is the right for the international community to 

provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed.

•	 The principle of independence is the freedom of humanitarian organizations from political 

goals or ideologies. NGOs make their own decisions, program plans and strategies.

•	 The principle of impartiality is the distribution of goods and services regardless of the 

identity of those suffering.

•	 The principle of neutrality is the commitment NGOs make to not take sides in political or 

military struggles.

Given these principles, ISAF’s status as one of the belligerents in Afghanistan precludes the 

humanitarian community from collaboration and constrains communication. Afghan public perceptions of government corruption, narratives of illegitimate motives, and accusations of civilian 

casualties and improper behavior by ISAF also make coordination with CSOs challenging. NGOs 

perceive that differentiation from ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) allows them to: 

1. Gain access to people in need, even those opposed to ISAF and GIRoA.

2. Develop programs based on humanitarian needs assessment rather than short-term 

political or security goals.

3. Use an “acceptance” security model based on consent by local communities, Taliban 

and ISAF. NGOs say they become “soft targets” for insurgents when they are called the “soft 

power” of the government or military. 

Status of Civil Society-Military Relations in Afghanistan

Civil Society-Military Guidelines: The civil-military guidelines developed by the Kabul-based 

Agency Coordinating Body on Afghan Relief (ACBAR) outline humanitarian principles as well as 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan

page 3 • PB 56 • September 24, 2010

a protocol for NGO-military interactions in Afghanistan. These principles are fully consistent with 

the USIP-facilitated “Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Nongovernmental 

Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.”3 These guidelines 

provide some clarity to humanitarian assistance. They are less clear on the protocol for broader 

civil-military relations on peacebuilding, development, and security sector reform activities. 

Civil Society-Military Working Group: A Civil-Military Working Group in Kabul began addressing issues between CSOs and ISAF beginning in 2001. Turnover at these meetings was high. The 

parties started sending lower level representatives, and the working group became irrelevant. 

According to ACBAR Director Laurent Saillard, the meetings became a bitter exchange of mutual 

antagonism with each side coming with a PowerPoint presentation to try to explain themselves to 

the other side. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) facilitated this 

relationship, but was unsuccessful. Some countries portrayed the civil-military working group as 

evidence of civil-military “coordination,” which angered the NGO community. By the spring of 2010, 

this working group was no longer meeting.

Civil Society-Military Contact Group: In light of the impasse, ACBAR wrote a concept note for 

the design of a more exclusive, high-level, less structured civil society-military “Contact Group” that 

was submitted to U.N., ISAF, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NGOs. This pragmatic approach has no election of members, no agenda, no minutes and scaled down expectations. The Contact Group is composed of a small number of primarily international NGO directors 

meeting with the deputy commander of ISAF, General Nick Parker. Currently, the Contact Group 

focuses on specific cases of violations of humanitarian space. To facilitate clearer records and more 

accurate reporting, ACBAR has begun collecting data of violations of the civil-military guidelines to 

document lessons learned and field-level incidents. 

The Need for Policy Dialogue between Civil Society and Military Leaders: Both CSOs and 

ISAF leadership recognize the need for a “mature” civil-military dialogue, including Afghan National 

Security Forces, that is sustained by relationships built over time where a degree of trust allows 

for honest conversation. A high-level, ongoing policy dialogue should focus on “communication” 

rather than “coordination.” 

ISAF and CSOs would each benefit from this dialogue in a number of ways. First, establishing 

this “steady state” dialogue could help manage ongoing tensions regarding humanitarian space 

and field-level conflicts. Second, all sides recognize the need for a dialogue to plan a transition 

from ISAF to ANSF lead in providing security and the implications of this for local government 

and civil society. Third, some CSOs want to inform and advise international military personnel on 

culturally attuned policies so as to do less harm and be more effective in fostering development, 

security and governance. 

For example, the Kabul-based NGO and research institute Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 

regularly conducts research on a wide variety of issues related to civil-military relations in Afghanistan. Their staff assisted in the research report “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds”4

 that documents the 

perceptions of Afghan citizens toward PRTs and challenges some of the basic assumptions of the link 

between development and security. CPAU’s research on the “Drivers of Radicalization,”5 commissioned 

by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, found that perceived government failures to perform and the behavior of foreign forces have a greater influence on radicalization 

than unemployment or religious fanaticism.

Civil society solutions to community problems can support wider government programming. 

The Afghan Civil Society Forum Organization (ACSFO) and its partners conducted research on and 

developed a pilot project for improving democratic policing.6 The program improved community 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan

page 4 • PB 56 • September 24, 2010

confidence in the police by creating a democratic process for individuals and community groups 

to communicate their interests and concerns to the local police and government, enabling more 

accountable, effective and responsive policing. 

An Agenda for Civil Society-Military Dialogue

A range of issues could help frame an agenda for an ongoing, high-level civil society-military policy 

dialogue. 

1. Comprehensive Development & Governance Plan: There are tensions between ISAF’s 

efforts to increase GIRoA’s state legitimacy and CSO interests in holding GIRoA to account 

and fostering wider, more long-term good governance and development. A comprehensive 

development program could disaggregate and coordinate the tasks of developing a stable 

peace between state building, nation building, and citizen building. A joint CSO-ISAF assessment of PRT successes and challenges could contribute to this.

2. Time Horizons: CSOs generally takes a long-term, relationship-based approach to development. Because of security, political and economic pressures, U.S. government and military 

officials often attempt shorter-term, quick-impact development. The challenge is to design 

short-term programming that contributes toward long-term goals and to design long-term 

programming that supports short-term objectives. Addressing the contradictions in timeframes requires more extensive discussion between CSOs and ISAF policymakers.

3. Impartiality and Legitimization: ACBAR would like to be equidistant from ISAF and Taliban and engage in dialogue with both of them so as to gain acceptance by all sides. Some 

CSOs such as Medicins Sans Frontiers have negotiated for the safety of their staff and projects with the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. Yet ISAF could perceive CSO work in Taliban-controlled 

areas as legitimizing the Taliban, who could take credit for these development projects 

(and vice versa). Further discussion on conflict-sensitive development should explore the 

legitimizing impact of development aid on local armed groups.7

4. Development of Shared Standards: CSOs and ISAF could jointly define a set of shared 

standards for accountability, evaluation and monitoring for development, governance and 

security programming as well as transparency on cost and sustainability.

5. Consultation with Civil Society and Afghan Leadership: Civil society consultation is often a perfunctory “ticking of the box” with a few NGO leaders after governments or donors 

have already decided what they want to do. Genuine civil-military dialogue could enable 

greater accountability between GIRoA and Afghan civil society.

6. Mechanisms for Funding CSOs: While military funding allows more programming for 

CSOs, it can also make it difficult for NGOs to gain acceptance or to follow local demanddriven development priorities. CSOs seek venues to provide consultation and feedback on 

current funding mechanisms to the military and donor community.

Endnotes

1. Andrew Wilder. Winning “Hearts and Minds” in Afghanistan—Assessing the Effectiveness of 

Development Aid in COIN Operations. March 2010. https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/

attachments/34085577/WP1022.pdf?version=1 

2. Elizabeth Winter. Civil Society Development in Afghanistan. London School of Economics’ Center 

for Civil Society. June 2010.
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

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About This Brief

This brief is a report on a one-day 

civil-military roundtable to identify 

tensions, tradeoffs and opportunities 

found in the civil society–military 

relationship in Afghanistan. The 

event was held at U.S. Institute of 

Peace on June 4, 2010 and was 

organized by the 3D Security Initiative of Eastern Mennonite University 

in partnership with the U.S. Institute 

of Peace, the Kroc Institute for 

International Peace Studies at the 

University of Notre Dame, National 

Defense University’ Center for 

Complex Operations, and U.S. 

Army Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute. Three civil 

society leaders from Afghanistan 

presented their work and perspectives: Director of Afghan Civil Society 

Forum-organization (ACSFO) Eng. 

Aziz Rafiee, Program Director of 

Cooperation for Peace and Unity 

(CPAU) Mirwais Wardak, and Director of Agency Coordinating Body 

on Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Laurent 

Saillard. Funding for the event 

came from the Connect U.S. Fund, 

the Compton Foundation, and the 

Ploughshares Fund. The author, Lisa 

Schirch, is the founding director of 

the 3D Security Initiative and a professor of peacebuilding at Eastern 

Mennonite University’s graduate 

Center for Justice & Peacebuilding. 

3. See this link for the complete set of guidelines: http://www.usip.org/resources/guidelinesrelations-between-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-hostile-or-potentially-hostile-envi 

4. “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil Military Relations.” Sippi 

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Mirwais Wardak, Idrees Zaman, Annabel Taylor. Research conducted 

for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies 

Afghanistan Group (BAAG), 2008. http://www.cpau.org.af/docs/Afghan%20Hearts%20Afghan%20

Minds%20-%20Exec%20Sum.pdf 

5. “Testing Hypotheses of Drivers of Radicalisation in Afghanistan: Why do men join the Taliban 

and Hizb-i Islami? How much do local communities support them?” By Sarah Ladbury in collaboration with Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), Afghanistan, August 2009. http://d.yimg.com/

kq/groups/23852819/1968355965/name/Drivers%20of%20Radicalisation%20in%20Afghanistan%20Sep%2009.pdf 

6. “Democratic Policing: A Needs Assessment Survey.” Afghanistan: Afghan Civil Society Forum, 

February 2010. http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBIQFjAA&url=h

ttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.undp.org.af%2FPublications%2FKeyDocuments%2FDemocraticPolicin

g_0310_BaslineSurv.pdf&ei=KZw1TKLYLIL6lwe93eDUBw&usg=AFQjCNH4Ut4ak9IaFUBZzMrZdhLc

u1p61A&sig2=PgAI8StnwbvUeIaVvcKDRQ 

7. Mary Anderson. “Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace—or War.” Boulder, CO: Lynne 

Rienner Publishers, February 1999.

The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan

page 5 • PB 56 • September 24, 2010