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© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“Without the international 

community’s and the Afghan 

government’s implementation 

of a coherent vision for local 

governance in Afghanistan, 

local politics will likely remain 

volatile, with some councils 

even serving as destabilizing 

forces. However, such a coherent vision can be developed 

by acquiring local knowledge, 

forging strong relationships 

between informal leaders 

and government officials, 

and by focusing on a much 

smaller number of local shuras

that are seen as legitimate 

and truly representative in 

their respective areas.”

September 7, 2010 

Many Shuras Do Not a Government 

Make: International Community 

Engagement with Local Councils in 

Afghanistan

Summary

•	 The need to engage local Afghan leaders and support community decision making has 

recently been promoted as a key element of both development and counterinsurgency 

strategies in Afghanistan.

•	 The resulting proliferation of community councils—commonly called shuras or jirgas—

sponsored by different actors within the Afghan government and international community 

has decreased the effectiveness of local governance and rule of law in many places. 

•	 Traditional Afghan dispute resolution and governance bodies are most effective when they 

are formed by local residents and genuinely reflect the interests of the community. Their 

legitimacy decreases if international or government sponsors create shuras or jirgas to 

promote their own interests.

•	 This paradox creates a dilemma for programs designed to foster good governance: how to 

promote community self-rule that reflects traditional values and mechanisms and that develop 

locally, while adhering to rigid counterinsurgency and development timelines and strategies.

•	 These so-called ‘traditional’ political structures have an important place in local governance 

in Afghanistan, but the international community should not assume that such bodies fairly 

represent their respective communities. Rather, sound understanding of local dynamics and 

in-depth consultation with local government actors and community leaders are necessary to 

help ensure that such bodies are represented and thus, legitimate within the community. 

•	 A more coherent, sustainable vision of long-term local governance and coordinated strategies 

between the Afghan government and international forces is necessary to bring both stability 

and development to Afghanistan. In particular, this Peace Brief supports the attempts to create 

a coherent long-term goal of local governance based on legitimate local actors, most likely 

selected through elections.

Shuras and Local Governance in Afghanistan

The Arabic word shura is generally translated into English as ‘consultation.’ A shura is a ubiquitous 

institution involving local politics in Afghanistan.1 The word is often translated simply as ‘council’ 

Shahmahmood Miakhel

E-mail: smiakhel@usip.org

Noah Coburn

E-mail: ncoburn@usip.org

peaceBrieF50
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Many Shuras Do Not a Government Make: International Community 

Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan page 2 • PB 50 • September 7, 2010

and generally implies a political gathering, usually of men, that represents all groups in an area. In 

practice, shuras are amorphous entities, often changing from area to area, with the tendency to 

break down and reorganize quickly. The shifting nature of these political bodies has rarely been 

addressed2 and the recent focus on these bodies as a point of engagement between local leaders, 

the Afghan government and international forces has in some cases been problematic.3

Ideally, shuras are councils of respected leaders which represent the political groups within a 

given community. Shuras are found at both the village and district level in much of Afghanistan. 

Despite the presence of shuras in many districts, they are shaped and operated in different ways. 

Other shuras are smaller and have specific functions, such as khwakhogai shuras or ‘sympathy’ 

shuras in the east of Afghanistan which organize funds for funerals and other ceremonies for 

poor residents. Most of the Afghan government and international community’s recent focus on 

shuras has been on village or district level shuras which have traditionally addressed a wide range 

of issues from questions of local governance to dispute resolution. A shura’s authority rests on 

the legitimacy of its members, and whether it represents the community. In many areas, shuras

continue to play an important and stabilizing role in local governance, dispute resolution and 

political negotiations.

This Peace Brief suggests that shuras and other ‘traditional’4 bodies have the potential to 

strengthen local governance in Afghanistan, but the current strategy of shura-creation and 

promotion has generally undermined local governance in the short term. A large number of these 

councils have been set up with little coordination, resulting in increasingly complex local political 

situations. Actors on all sides take advantage of the ambiguities created by multiple councils, when 

customarily there would likely have been only one. The power of each new or specialized shura

created to address a particular development or security need results in the inefficient use of funds 

and weakened local governance structures. Without the international community’s and the Afghan 

government’s implementation of a coherent vision for local governance in Afghanistan, local 

politics will likely remain volatile, with some councils even serving as destabilizing forces. However, 

such a coherent vision can be developed by acquiring local knowledge, forging strong relationships 

between informal leaders and government officials, and by focusing on a much smaller number of 

local shuras that are seen as legitimate and truly representative in their respective areas. 

Shuras and Stability 

Despite their traditional roles, a combination of poor security, forced displacement, targeted assassination and local corruption has eroded the functioning of shuras in many areas of Afghanistan in 

the past decades. Likewise, the international community’s increased focus on shuras as a means for 

creating stability and delivering economic funds has in some cases actually destabilized areas.

In many areas, particularly where the international community and Afghan government have 

a limited presence, district councils have more concentrated authority that can be key to local 

stabilization programs. A formalized relationship between the central government and locals 

increases the strength of the local council by highlighting to the community their ability to 

access government and international funds. At the same time, it also allows the district governor 

the ability to ensure that such councils fairly represent the people of the district. Success relies 

on the personalities of the actors involved. This relationship works best when figures such as 

the provincial governor and district governor are uncorrupt and have sound knowledge of the 

politics of the area. For example, one district council in Kunar province approached the provincial 

governor to ratify its authority in order to increase its legitimacy within the community. The council 

saw the importance of creating a formal link with the government as a way to increase stability 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Many Shuras Do Not a Government Make: International Community 

Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan page 3 • PB 50 • September 7, 2010

and generate future development projects in the area. The governor had asked the community 

to send representatives from each political group in the community. The governor, who is from a 

neighboring province and has several years experience in Kunar, refused to acknowledge the body 

until it had done this effectively. 

While this example represents the shura in its ideal form, it is also possible for local commanders or groups to co-opt and corrupt local councils through bribery or intimidation. In such cases, 

the council is usually de-legitimized in the eyes of local residents and generally, it is only when 

such corrupted councils are sustained by outside resources (e.g., government or military funds, 

revenue from the narcotics trade, etc.) that they continue to maintain authority in the community. 

In another less destabilizing but still troubling example, development projects are undermined 

when local leaders establish shuras and claim they are representative of the local community in 

order to secure international reconstruction funds. These leaders often collect these donations for 

their own purposes and to distribute to their own constituents. International groups are often still 

quick to partner with and fund groups because of their perceived legitimacy. This funding practice 

has resulted in the increasing number of nongovernmental groups in urban centers, such as Kabul, 

claiming to represent “the people.”

The International Community and Community Shuras

International involvement in Afghanistan has complicated local governance issues, as evident 

in the role of shuras in local politics. For example, the recent influx of cash through development 

projects, and the related attempts to use local councils as consultative bodies on the selection 

and design of these projects, has created serious tensions in some areas. In the city of Jalalabad—

where USIP has a pilot project focusing on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms—

community development councils (CDCs) set up under the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 

Development’s National Solidarity Program (NSP) often compete directly with local mosque and 

neighborhood shuras. These groups are often composed of overlapping groups of elders, all struggling for influence and resources. 

More alarmingly, work by the Afghan government and international community has disrupted 

and distorted local political processes. Military negotiations with tribal elders have in some places 

incited violence between local groups, particularly when groups feel as if funds and power are 

not being distributed equitably. This was particularly true regarding an attempt to purchase the 

loyalty of the Shinwar tribe in Nangarhar earlier this year. The attempt triggered violence within 

the Shinwari tribe and with neighbors who felt that they had not been represented at meetings 

between the military and tribal elders—despite best efforts by the U.S. military to ensure that all 

groups were represented among the 130 elders at the meeting where the deal was announced.5

 

While military officials assumed the large gathering of local elders legitimized the deal, many in 

the tribe still felt unrepresented or not adequately compensated.

Nevertheless, the international military relies on meetings with local shuras to address local 

concerns and ‘win hearts and minds.’ Such community consultations can be effective. For example, 

in some cases, reintegration shuras established to transfer International Security Assistance (ISAF) 

detainees to communities appear to have been successful in the short term thus far. However, 

too often internationally summoned shuras can become at best simple displays of force and at 

worst, they can disrupt local political balances, putting lives at danger. For example, journalist 

Anne Marlowe recently detailed futile attempts by the U.S. military to prop up unpopular Afghan 

government officials in Zabul at a shura between dozens of U.S. and Afghan military officials, the 

governor and 19 local elders.6

 In another case, U.S. Marines in Helmand claimed to have held 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Many Shuras Do Not a Government Make: International Community 

Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan page 4 • PB 50 • September 7, 2010

‘teenage shuras,’ despite the importance Afghans place on the role of elders in local governance.7 

Even stories once heralded by the military as successes, such as the approach outlined by U.S. 

Army Major Jim Gant in “One Tribe at a Time,”8 have often been met with criticism upon more 

thorough evaluations.9 By working with ‘one tribe at a time,’ it is extremely difficult not to marginalize and exclude others, and recent strategies have not involved enough coordination between 

the national government and international organizations to ensure an inclusive, coherent approach.10 Additionally, local shuras gain and lose legitimacy based upon their ability to represent 

the community and deliver resources equitably. Another current problem is that these approaches 

continue to sustain groups that the community would often otherwise view as illegitimate. This 

exacerbates corruption and inequitable access to political and economic power, thus potentially 

destabilizing an area. 

An array of ongoing or planned programs continues to intensify some existing challenges to 

coherent local governance. For example, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) has set up 22,490 

community councils in 35,200 villages to administer World Bank funded development projects.11

At the same time, under the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), there are plans to 

establish district level shuras in 100 districts (up from just a handful of districts to date), each of 

which will have their own security, development and justice subcommittees. Meanwhile, recent 

proposals emanating from the June 2010 Peace Jirga and the July 2010 Kabul Conference suggested new provincial and district level reintegration councils should be established, in the hopes 

of convincing insurgents to stop fighting. In addition, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and district 

level military units continue to set up community councils of “elders” and other respected leaders 

in an attempt to get increased local acceptance of their activities in the area. 

While there are some positive features in the initiatives mentioned above, the large number 

of existing and planned councils, both indigenous and externally imposed, distorts local political 

incentives. The lack of a clearly defined authority allows local actors to act without accountability, 

take advantage of their positions and play international groups and the military off of one another, 

taking advantage of what one official from the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan 

(EUPOL) recently called “competitive programming among donors.“ Moreover, overlapping roles 

among some of the councils leads to confusion among donors and beneficiaries alike. 

A better approach would be for the international community to support a coherent approach to 

local governance. A plan which would work with the Afghan government to identify, strengthen 

and work with local groups that fairly represent the community. This means conducting research, 

partnering with local organizations and potentially increasing communication between international military and aid groups.12 At the same time, more attention should be paid to provincial 

and district governors, and their ability work with local communities; a sound understanding of 

the personalities involved is pertinent. The international community can strengthen the positions 

of these figures by working more closely with them and simultaneously holding them more 

accountable to both the national government and local communities through the promotion of 

transparent interaction.

How Lack of Coherence and International Programs May 

Weaken Local Political Structures and Governance

•	 Too many shuras dilute the power of their members, fracturing political power in many 

areas, while making these councils less effective at some of their traditional roles, such as in 

dispute resolution.
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Many Shuras Do Not a Government Make: International Community 

Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan page 5 • PB 50 • September 7, 2010

•	 By funding programs that rely on a variety of councils, often without local government 

consultation, the international community may actually incentivize further divisions among 

the councils and may create parallel government structures.

•	 Despite some assumptions by members of the international community, the existence of a 

local council does not automatically imply its legitimacy to the local community. Any group 

of elders is not necessarily a representative shura. Numerous examples also exist of the 

international community relying too heavily on certain local councils that are not actually 

representative of an entire area, thereby exacerbating tensions by excluding certain groups.

•	 Membership in some shuras which are perceived as having international ties can also 

be dangerous, with the Taliban having assassinated several members of internationallysponsored shuras in the south. Singling out certain leaders puts them in danger, risking 

long-term leadership in the country. 

Key Recommendations

•	 When beginning new projects, the international community needs to conduct more 

research on local political structures to determine what types of bodies already exist. 

•	 Instead of setting up new councils, the Afghan government and international actors should 

work with existing councils, striving to make them as representative and effective as possible, avoiding duplication among the councils.

•	 Provincial and district governors can play an important role in identifying and linking with 

legitimate representational political bodies. At the same time, the Afghan government and 

international community should hold the governors more accountable by monitoring for 

corruption, creating incentive programs, promoting transparency, etc. 

•	 In the longer term, the international community should support calls for district council 

elections as outlined in the Afghan constitution. Numerous and serious logistical and 

political issues need to be addressed before such elections can reasonably occur (including 

the defining of district boundaries and conducting a national census). Once locally-elected 

government shuras are established there will be less need for overlapping bodies that 

could confuse jurisdiction. This would be a key step in establishing stable long-term local 

governance across Afghanistan.

Endnotes

1. Jirga, a word that is used in Afghanistan primarily by Pashto speakers, is sometimes used 

interchangeably with the word shura, but more accurately refers to ad hoc groups meeting to 

discuss a specific issue, hence the recent ‘Peace Jirga’ hosted by President Karzai specifically to 

address reconciliation with the Taliban. 

2. An exception to this is Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, 2008, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, 

Zed Books, 41-42. Johnson and Leslie point out the relationship between the growth of bodies 

labeled as shuras and the increase engagement with international organizations, who prefer to 

engage with such ‘representative’ bodies.

3. Anne Marlowe in The New Republic refers to this as ‘the shura strategy.’

4. The word ‘traditional’ is highly problematic since it is questionable how long some of these 

institutions have actually existed in Afghanistan and the clear ways in which they adapt to manipulate international aid and the external intervention in very modern ways. This has created a wider 

debate over the international community’s understanding of many terms such as tribe and arbaki. 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Many Shuras Do Not a Government Make: International Community 

Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan page 6 • PB 50 • September 7, 2010

See for example this Peace Brief and Masood Karakhail and Susanne Schmeidl, 2006, ‘Integration 

of Traditional Structures into the State-Building Process: Lessons from the Tribal Liaison Office in 

Loya Paktia,’ in Publication Series on Promoting Democracy under Conditions of State Fragility, 

issue 1: Afghanistan, Berlin: Heinrich Boll Foundation. Lessons from the Tribal Liaison Office in Loya 

Paktia,’ in Publication Series on Promoting Democracy under Conditions of State Fragility, issue 1: 

Afghanistan, Berlin: Heinrich Boll Foundation. 

5. See Joshua Partlow and Greg Jaffe. “U.S. Military Runs into Afghan Tribal Politics after Deal with 

Pashtuns.” The Washington Post, May 10, 2010.

6. Anne Marlowe. “Shura to Fail: Why U.S. Officials Taking Tea with Local Afghan Leaders Seem to 

be Wasting their Time.” The New Republic, May 13, 2010.

7. “Marines Host ‘Shura’ to Address Afghan Needs.” DoD Live, September 23, 2008. 

8. Jim Grant. “One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan,” second edition. Nine 

Sisters Imports, Inc., December 2009.

9. See for example Michael Daxner, “We are One Tribe—and Live in the Society of Intervention,” 

Afghanistan Analysts Network and “Petraeus and McChrystal Drink Major Gant’s Snake Oil,” January 

18, 2010, The Ghosts of Alexander, www.easterncampaign,wordpress.com. 

10. Somewhat reassuringly, in July and August 2010 meetings that USIP attended with U.S. Special 

Forces in Kabul, the approach of “one tribe at a time” as advocated by Gant was dismissed by U.S. 

commanders as no longer part of their tactical planning—at least when designing programs like 

the village stabilization program (also known as the local defense initiative)—given the likelihood 

of marginalizing other tribal groups. 

11. World Bank Report No.AB5745, March 25, 2010. There are planned expansions of NSP and 

their development councils. 

12. Note, however, that many aid groups shun increased interaction with the military for fear of 

being seen as partial to the foreign military intervention in the country. Thus, the military must 

accept the fact that members of the aid community may want to distance themselves from 

rather than increase communication with the foreign forces. The military cannot compromise 

the safety and independence of nongovernmental organizations who wish to maintain at arms’ 

length from them. 

13. See for example, Alissa Rubin, ”Taliban Slay Elders over Aid Money.” The New York Times, May 

25, 2010.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

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202.429.4725

About This Brief

The authors work in the Kabul 

office of the United States Institute 

of Peace on local governance and 

rule of law projects that help communities resolve conflict, increase 

access to justice and promote rule 

of law. Shahmahmood Miakhel is 

USIP’s country director in Afghanistan. From 2003 to 2005, he was 

Afghanistan’s deputy minister of 

the interior. Additionally, he has 

worked for the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 

the U.N. Development Program 

and the U.N. Office for Project 

Service. Noah Coburn is a political anthropologist focusing on 

informal justice at USIP’s office in 

Kabul. He has been conducting 

research on violence and local 

political structures in Afghanistan 

since 2005. This report is based 

upon observations by the two 

authors, field visits to the south, 

east, southeast, west and center of 

the country, as well as discussions 

with hundreds of local government officials, local leaders and 

members of the international 

community.