alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §290ii. Requirement relating to the rights of residents of certain facilities

#### (a) In general

A public or private general hospital, nursing facility, intermediate care facility, or other health care facility, that receives support in any form from any program supported in whole or in part with funds appropriated to any Federal department or agency shall protect and promote the rights of each resident of the facility, including the right to be free from physical or mental abuse, corporal punishment, and any restraints or involuntary seclusions imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience.

#### (b) Requirements

Restraints and seclusion may only be imposed on a resident of a facility described in subsection (a) if—

(1) the restraints or seclusion are imposed to ensure the physical safety of the resident, a staff member, or others; and

(2) the restraints or seclusion are imposed only upon the written order of a physician, or other licensed practitioner permitted by the State and the facility to order such restraint or seclusion, that specifies the duration and circumstances under which the restraints are to be used (except in emergency circumstances specified by the Secretary until such an order could reasonably be obtained).

#### (c) Current law

This part shall not be construed to affect or impede any Federal or State law or regulations that provide greater protections than this part regarding seclusion and restraint.

#### (d) Definitions

In this section:

#### (1) Restraints

The term "restraints" means—

(A) any physical restraint that is a mechanical or personal restriction that immobilizes or reduces the ability of an individual to move his or her arms, legs, or head freely, not including devices, such as orthopedically prescribed devices, surgical dressings or bandages, protective helmets, or any other methods that involves the physical holding of a resident for the purpose of conducting routine physical examinations or tests or to protect the resident from falling out of bed or to permit the resident to participate in activities without the risk of physical harm to the resident (such term does not include a physical escort); and

(B) a drug or medication that is used as a restraint to control behavior or restrict the resident's freedom of movement that is not a standard treatment for the resident's medical or psychiatric condition.

#### (2) Seclusion

The term "seclusion" means a behavior control technique involving locked isolation. Such term does not include a time out.

#### (3) Physical escort

The term "physical escort" means the temporary touching or holding of the hand, wrist, arm, shoulder or back for the purpose of inducing a resident who is acting out to walk to a safe location.

#### (4) Time out

The term "time out" means a behavior management technique that is part of an approved treatment program and may involve the separation of the resident from the group, in a non-locked setting, for the purpose of calming. Time out is not seclusion.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title V, §591, as added Pub. L. 106–310, div. B, title XXXII, §3207, Oct. 17, 2000, 114 Stat. 1195.)
### North Dakota 111d Questions for One-on- One Call with EPA

 How were state goals calculated (primarily the demand side energy efficiency block)?  How is re - dispatch of generation addressed in the plan?  How is renewable energy addressed in the plan: in - state and out- of-state renewable energy?  How is new NGCC addressed in the plan?  How are mass based caps calculated?  EPA guidance that is needed: How credit is calculated for demand - side energy efficiency, renewable and lower emitting electricity, and tra nsmissi on efficiency projects.  EM&V Plans? How these projects are monitored and made federally enforceable.  Timing of Plan Submittal – With the almost certain litigation, a lot of time may be wasted on a plan if work starts before the ligation ends.  Clarity - Wh o gets credit for renewable energy in a state?  NSR Applicability – EPA needs to assure sources those projects undertaken solely to comply with 111(d), or increased dispatch of lower emitting units, will not trigger NSR or 111(b) requirements.  Flexibility  To have utility specific regional plans?  Mass and rate in the same state plan for different utilities?  Will EPA truly give flexibility (State deference)?  North Dakota has significant wind capacity. However, much of North Dakota - based renewable wind gen eration capacity has been contracted to out- of- state utilities. Under the Proposed Rule, does North Dakota or the other state(s) with the renewable power contract get to take credit for the wind capacity in their state CO 2 rate calculation? Will EPA recalc ulate the state emission rate limitation if the credit is given to another state?  EPA’s Proposed Rule makes energy efficiency one of the building blocks for a state’s BSER. What if the North Dakota Public Service Commission (NDPSC) conducts a specific anal ysis of North Dakota’s circumstances compared to EPA’s general analysis in the Proposed Rule as to what EPA considers to be realistically achievable? Will EPA recalculate the state emission rate limitation to reflect the NDPSC energy efficiency savings in lieu of EPA’s analysis?  EPA’s Proposed Rule makes renewable energy another building block for a state’s BSER. What if the North Dakota legislature or the NDPSC has a fundamentally different and more North Dakota specific analysis than EPA’s analysis used i n the proposal? Will EPA recalculate the state emission rate limitation to reflect the NDPSC renewable energy outlook or state RPS standard in lieu of their outlook?  If North Dakota is unable to develop its CPP SIP, pass it through public comment, obtain any needed state law changes from the North Dakota legislature (e.g. cap & trade authority) and obtain EPA approval of a CPP SIP within the short time frame EPA has set forth in the Proposed Rule, would EPA adopt/enforce a federal plan? How would EPA devel op this plan? Would the EPA plan contain unit specific emission rate limitations? Given the state rate is dependent upon utilization rates of all affected sources, how would EPA assure compliance?
Exhibit
23







Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm







Board of
Directors and Shareholders


Coachmen
Industries, Inc.





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-52378) pertaining to the Retirement Plan and Trust of Coachmen
Industries, Inc., 2000 Omnibus Stock Incentive Program and Supplemental Deferred
Compensation Plan, Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-59251) pertaining to
the 1994 Omnibus Stock Incentive Program, Registration Statement (Form S-8 No.
2-64572) pertaining to the Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Coachmen Industries,
Inc. and in the related Prospectus of our reports dated March 23, 2009, with
respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Coachmen
Industries, Inc. and subsidiaries and the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting of Coachmen Industries, Inc. and subsidiaries included in
the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2008.











Grand
Rapids, MI


March 23,
2009
§ 146.415 Access to course offerings. ( a ) A recipient shall not provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on the basis of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of its students on such basis, including health, physical education, industrial, business, vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult education courses.
( b ) ( 1 ) With respect to classes and activities in physical education at the elementary school level, the recipient shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later than one year from September 29, 2000. With respect to physical education classes and activities at the secondary and post-secondary levels, the recipient shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later than three years from September 29, 2000.
( 2 ) This section does not prohibit grouping of students in physical education classes and activities by ability as assessed by objective standards of individual performance developed and applied without regard to sex.
( 3 ) This section does not prohibit separation of students by sex within physical education classes or activities during participation in wrestling, boxing, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.
( 4 ) Where use of a single standard of measuring skill or progress in a physical education class has an adverse effect on members of one sex, the recipient shall use appropriate standards that do not have such effect.
( 5 ) Portions of classes in elementary and secondary schools, or portions of education programs or activities, that deal exclusively with human sexuality may be conducted in separate sessions for boys and girls.
( 6 ) Recipients may make requirements based on vocal range or quality that may result in a chorus or choruses of one or predominantly one sex.
#### Suzette Paduano et al., Respondents, v James Boland, Individually and Doing Business as Jim Boland’s Goodyear Tire & Certified Auto Service Center, Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 360]

—Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, plaintiffs’ motion denied, defendants’ motion granted and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this negligence action after Suzette Paduano (plaintiff) slipped and fell in defendants’ parking lot. Supreme Court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for reargument and, upon reargument, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Although labeled a motion for reargument, plaintiffs do not allege that the court “overlooked any significant facts or misapplied the law in its original decision, neces*980sary elements of such a motion” *(Matter of Smith v Town of Plattekill,*274 AD2d 900, 901). Plaintiffs submitted new evidence in support of their motion, i.e., an affirmation of plaintiffs’ attorney explaining why a statement of a witness submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion was not in admissible form, and thus the motion was for renewal *(see, Matter of Smith v Town of Plattekill, supra).*The court should have denied the motion based on plaintiffs’ failure to offer any excuse for not including that explanation in opposition to defendants’ motion, as required on a motion to renew *(see, Matter of Smith v Town of Plattekill, supra; Grassel v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp.,*223 AD2d 803, 804, *lv dismissed in part and denied in part*88 NY2d 842). In any event, the explanation of plaintiffs’ attorney was not an acceptable excuse for plaintiffs’ failure to submit proof in admissible form in opposition to defendants’ motion *(see, Villager Constr. v Kozel & Son,*222 AD2d 1018, 1018-1019; *Jacobs v Schleicher,*124 AD2d 785, 786). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Chautauqua County, Gerace, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Green, Hayes, Scudder and Kehoe, JJ.
**Exhibit 31.1**
**Rule 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) Certification of Principal Executive Officer**
I, James H. Long, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of I-Sector Corporation;
2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) forthe registrant and have:
a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
    Date: May 16, 2005 /s/ JAMES H. LONG James H. Long, Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.1
   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)
  In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Internet Infinity, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 (the Report), I, George P. Morris, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify that to my knowledge:
  (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78o(d)); and
  (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  ****Date: August 18, 2004
By:
/s/ George P. MorrisGeorge P. MorrisChief Financial Officer
 
 
 The above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.
#### §§ 1103.104-1103.109 [Reserved]
Exhibit 32


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Zingo,  Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Holly Roseberry, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350,
as adopted  pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that to
the best of my knowledge: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section  13(a) or  15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934;  and (2) The
information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                                /s/ Holly Roseberry
                                                ---------------------
                                                Holly Roseberry
                                                Chief Executive Officer and
                                                Principal Financial Officer


November 14, 2006
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-2307

In Re: HOWELL W. WOLTZ, 

 Petitioner. 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (3:08-cv-00438-WEB) 

Submitted: May 21, 2009 Decided: May 26, 2009 

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Howell W. Woltz, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Howell W. Woltz petitions for a writ of mandamus 

seeking an order removing the district court judge from his case 

due to alleged bias. We conclude that Woltz is not entitled to 

mandamus relief. 

Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner 

has a clear right to the relief sought. In re First Fed. Sav. 

& Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, 

mandamus is a drastic remedy and should only be used in 

extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 

426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 

(4th Cir. 1987). Woltz fails to demonstrate a clear right to 

the relief sought. Accordingly, we deny Woltz’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the petition for writ of 

mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

PETITION DISMISSED
§ 1006.995 Principal. *Principal* means— ( a ) An officer, director, owner, partner, principal investigator, or other person within a participant with management or supervisory responsibilities related to a covered transaction; or
( b ) A consultant or other person, whether or not employed by the participant or paid with Federal funds, who— ( 1 ) Is in a position to handle Federal funds;
( 2 ) Is in a position to influence or control the use of those funds; or,
( 3 ) Occupies a technical or professional position capable of substantially influencing the development or outcome of an activity required to perform the covered transaction.
§ 19.11-6 Death during active duty. ( a ) *Annuity for surviving former spouse.* In the event a participant dies before separation from the Service and leaves a former spouse, such former spouse is entitled to a regular survivor annuity under § 19.11-2 computed as if the participant had retired on the date of death unless a court order or spousal agreement is on file in the Department waiving such entitlement or providing for some other computation, or unless the former spouse had been found missing and an election filed under the procedures of § 19.11-4 waiving a survivor benefit for that person. Any assumed service authorized to be used under paragraph (b) of this section in computing the annuity for a surviving spouse may not be counted as “years of marriage” when determining whether the previous spouse qualifies as a “former spouse” under the definition in § 19.2(k) or when computing the pro rata share under § 19.2(s). A former spouse is entitled to an additional survivor annuity under § 19.10-5 provided death occurs on or after the effective date of a spousal agreement providing for the additional annuity.
( b ) *Annuity for surviving spouse.* If a participant who has at least 19 months of civilian service credit toward retirement under the System, excluding extra service credited for unhealthful post duty in accordance with section 816 of the Act, dies before separation from the Service, and is survived by a spouse as defined in § 19.2(v) such survivor shall be entitled to an annuity equal to 55 percent of the annuity computed in accordance with § 19.10-1 less any annuity payable to a former spouse under paragraph a. If the participant had less than three years of creditable civilian service at the time of death, the survivor annuity is computed on the basis of the average salary for the entire period of such service. If, at time of death, the participant had less than 20 years of creditable service, the annuity shall be computed on the assumption that the participant has had 20 years of service, but such additional service credit shall in no case exceed the difference between the participant's age on the date of death and age 65. A spouse is entitled to an additional survivor annuity under § 19.10-5 provided death occurs on or after the effective date of a spousal agreement providing for the additional annuity.
( c ) *Annuity for a child or children.* If a participant described in paragraph (b) of this section is survived by a child or children, each surviving child is entitled to an annuity as described in § 19.11-7.
( d ) *Annuity changes.* Annuities based on a death in service are subject to the provisions of § 19.11-5 governing commencement, adjustment, termination and resumption of annuities.
#### Branimir Kadoic, Appellant, v 1154 First Avenue Tenants Corp. et al., Respondents. (And Other Actions.)

[716 NYS2d 386]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Stephen Crane, J.), entered July 13, 1999, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant building owners’ liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), and granted defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment to the extent of dismissing plaintiffs cause of action under Labor Law § 200, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant plaintiffs motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff has established that a lack of proper safety equipment was the proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff presented an essentially consistent version of the circumstances of the accident in both his deposition testimony and affidavit, demonstrating that, whether or not the sign he was attempting to remove actually touched him or the ladder, the force of the sudden release of the sign caused him to lose his balance and fall. Regardless of the propriety of the method plaintiff used to remove the sign, it is plain that the ladder he used was not an adequate safety device for the task he was performing, rendering defendants, who admittedly provided no safety devices, absolutely liable under section 240 (1) *(Dunn v Consolidated Edison Co.,*272 AD2d 129). As to the dismissal of the cause of action under Labor Law § 200, we find, as did the IAS Court, that defendants had no notice of the asserted dangerous condition with respect to the sign. Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Tom, Wallach, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.
#### Leonard Kropp, Respondent, v Incorporated Village of Freeport, Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 667]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Se-gal, J.), entered November 19, 1999, as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs causes of action sounding in breach of contract.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs causes of action sounding in breach of contract is granted, and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

The Supreme Court erred in failing to dismiss the causes of action sounding in breach of contract. The plaintiff failed to *290exhaust his administrative remedies since he did not first seek review by the Nassau County Civil Service Commission (see, *Matter of Plummer v Klepak,*48 NY2d 486, *cert denied*445 US 952; *Matter of Ray v New York City Dept. of Correction,*212 AD2d 387). Pursuant to section 28 of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiffs claims should have been addressed first at the administrative level (see, *Matter of Levine v Board of Educ.,*173 AD2d 619; *Matter of Rissinger v State Univ. of N. Y.,*199 AD2d 745). Thompson, J. P., Luciano, Feuerstein and Schmidt, JJ., concur.