DEPA

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TMENT F THE ARMY •

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NITED S TAT S O

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F AME RI C

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THIS W E' L L D E F E N D

Joint Publication 3-32

Joint Maritime Operations

8 June 2018

i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for joint maritime 

operations. It describes the maritime domain; addresses considerations for establishing a 

joint force maritime component commander and attendant command relationships; and 

provides principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess joint maritime operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance 

of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations 

for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational 

forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise 

of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and 

prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use 

by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent 

of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and 

executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort 

in the accomplishment of objectives. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents 

of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in 

coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current 

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance 

or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified 

by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders 

should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

KEVIN D. SCOTT 

Vice Admiral, USN 

Director, Joint Force Development 
Preface 

ii JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-32 

DATED 07 AUGUST 2013 

• Changes title from Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

• Revises scope statement. 

• Revises discussion of composite warfare and adds a figure on composite 

warfare commander organization. 

• Revises command and control considerations for specific maritime operations. 

• Adds a paragraph on seapower essential functions. 

• Adds figure on operational employment constructs for amphibious ready 

groups and marine expeditionary units (aggregated, disaggregated, 

distributed). 

• Removes discussion of global fleet station, Maritime Civil Affairs and Security 

Training Command, and maritime expeditionary security force. 

• Revises the discussion on maritime domain awareness. 

• Enhances discussion on assessment. 

• Enhances consistency among other doctrinal publications and Department of 

Defense (DOD) and other United States Government policies. 

• Modifies, adds, and removes terms and definitions from the DOD Dictionary 

of Military and Associated Terms.

 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-33 

Intentionally Blank 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

 General ........................................................................................................................ I-1 

 General Approach to Command and Control ............................................................. I-2 

 Seapower Essential Functions..................................................................................... I-3 

 Joint Maritime Operations .......................................................................................... I-4 

 Maritime Domain ........................................................................................................ I-5 

CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZING FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

 General Organizational Options ................................................................................II-1 

 Component Employment Considerations ..................................................................II-3 

 Command Relationships and Responsibilities ...........................................................II-6 

 Organizing and Manning the Component Headquarters .........................................II-11 

 Task Organization of Subordinate Forces ................................................................II-14 

 Navy Composite Warfare Doctrine .........................................................................II-14 

 Marine Air-Ground Task Force ...............................................................................II-16 

 Multinational Considerations ...................................................................................II-16 

 Supported Maritime Commander Considerations ...................................................II-17 

 Supporting Maritime Commander Considerations ..................................................II-18 

CHAPTER III 

PLANNING JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

 Maritime Planning Processes and Products ............................................................. III-1 

 Integration with Joint Planning Process ................................................................... III-2 

 Organizing the Operational Area ............................................................................. III-2 

 Other General Planning Considerations ................................................................... III-3 

 Assessment ............................................................................................................. III-16 

 Multinational Participation .................................................................................... III-18 

CHAPTER IV 

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND OTHER OPERATIONAL-LEVEL 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIFIC MARITIME OPERATIONS 

 General ..................................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Surface Warfare ....................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Air and Missile Defense........................................................................................... IV-5 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-32 

 Antisubmarine Warfare .......................................................................................... IV-10 

 Mine Warfare ......................................................................................................... IV-14 

 Strike Warfare ........................................................................................................ IV-16 

 Amphibious Operations ......................................................................................... IV-17 

 Naval Surface Support ........................................................................................... IV-18 

 Commander’s Communication Synchronization ................................................... IV-18 

 Maritime Interception Operations .......................................................................... IV-19 

 Maritime Security Operations ................................................................................ IV-22 

 Maritime Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities .............. IV-23 

 Global Maritime Partnerships and Security Cooperation ...................................... IV-24 

 Sea-Based Operations ............................................................................................ IV-25 

 Counterdrug Operations ......................................................................................... IV-27 

 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations .................................................................. IV-28 

 Protection of Shipping ........................................................................................... IV-28 

 Maritime Pre-Positioning Force Operations .......................................................... IV-30 

 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance .......................................................................... IV-30 

 Maritime Operational Threat Response ................................................................. IV-31 

 Riverine Operations ............................................................................................... IV-32 

APPENDIX 

A Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations 

Points of Contact ....................................................................................... A-1 

B References ..................................................................................................B-1 

C Administrative Instructions ........................................................................C-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5 

FIGURE 

I-1 Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace ............................................ I-6 

II-1 Typical Joint Force Maritime Component 

Commander Responsibilities ......................................................................II-2 

II-2 Operational Employment for Amphibious Ready 

Groups with Embarked Marine Expeditionary Units .................................II-4 

II-3 Sample Battle Rhythm .............................................................................II-12 

II-4 Generic Seven-Minute Drill Example ......................................................II-13 

II-5 Composite Warfare Commander Organization ........................................II-17 

III-1 Notional Intelligence Directorate Augmentation Requirements .............. III-5 

III-2 Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Targeting Functions and Responsibilities ................................................ III-7 

III-3 Environmental Considerations ............................................................... III-13 

III-4 Primary Zones Affecting Navigation and Overflight ............................. III-15 

IV-1 Notional Maritime Task Organization ..................................................... IV-2 
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vii 

IV-2 Composite Warfare Commander Integration within the 

Joint Operations Area ............................................................................... IV-3 

IV-3 Examples of Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense 

Command Functions ................................................................................ IV-7 

IV-4 Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Command 

Relationships and Functions ..................................................................... IV-8 

 
Table of Contents 

viii JP 3-32 

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ix 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Discusses the Responsibilities of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

• Explains the Five Essential Functions of Seapower 

• Outlines Organizational Options and Command Relationships for Various 

Maritime Operations 

• Describes the Maritime Domain 

• Discusses Planning Considerations for Joint Maritime Operations

Introduction 

Maritime operations 

include any actions 

performed by maritime 

forces to gain or exploit 

command of the sea, sea 

control, and/or sea denial, 

or to project power from 

the sea. 

Sea control may include naval cooperation and guidance 

for shipping, protection of sea lines of communications, 

air lines of communications, blockades, embargoes 

against economic or military shipping, and maritime 

interception operations (MIO). Maritime operations also 

encompass operations to locate, classify, track, and target 

surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft. In addition, 

amphibious operations increase the commander’s options 

for maneuver in the littorals and forcible entry operations. 

General Approach to 

Command and Control 

The joint force maritime component commander 

(JFMCC) must have the capability to exercise command 

and control (C2) of maritime forces and to accomplish a 

broad range of missions in denied or degraded 

environments. Subordinate commanders execute 

operations independently with a thorough understanding 

of the commander’s intent. Joint maritime operations tend 

to be decentralized, and unity of effort is made possible 

via mission command. 

Mission Command Mission command is the conduct of military operations 

through decentralized execution based upon mission-type 

orders. Commanders issue mission-type orders focused 

on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details 

of how to perform assigned tasks. 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-32 

Seapower Essential 

Functions 

The US Navy employs five functions in a combined-arms 

approach to provide a unique comparative advantage for 

the joint force. 

• Operational access is the ability to project military 

force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of 

action to accomplish the mission. 

• Deterrence influences potential adversaries not to take 

threatening actions. 

• Sea control is the essence of seapower and is a 

necessary ingredient in the successful accomplishment 

of all naval missions. 

• Power projection supports deterrence objectives and 

activities. 

• Maritime security operations (MSO) are conducted to 

establish the conditions for security and protection of 

sovereignty in the maritime domain.

Joint Maritime Operations Joint maritime operations are performed with maritime 

forces, and other forces assigned, attached, or made 

available, in support of the joint force commander’s 

(JFC’s) operation or campaign objectives or in support of 

other components of the joint force. The JFC may 

designate a JFMCC to C2 a joint maritime operation. The 

JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces 

and forces made available for tasking. The degree of 

integration and coordination between joint force 

component commanders varies depending on the 

situation. 

Maritime Domain The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, 

islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, 

including the littorals. Nothing in the definition of, or the 

use of the term domain, implies or mandates exclusivity, 

primacy, or C2 of that domain. The littoral comprises two 

segments of the operational environment (OE). First, 

“seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which 

must be controlled to support operations ashore.” Second, 

“landward: the area inland from the shore that can be 

supported and defended directly from the sea.” 

Diplomatic and Political 

Maritime Issues 

Diplomatic and political maritime issues increase as 

nations attempt to extend their claims over offshore 

resources. These claims lead to disputes over the exact 

extent of maritime borders and exclusive economic zones 

(EEZs). Artificial islands, installations, and structures do 
 Executive Summary 

xi 

not possess the status of islands. Artificial islands are 

treated differently from natural islands under international 

law; they do not create or extend territorial sea, EEZs, or 

continental shelf claims. It is uncertain what constraints 

and restrictions joint forces may face when operating in 

other nations’ territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, 

and continental shelves claimed by coastal states. 

Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

General Organizational 

Options 

The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns 

responsibilities, establishes appropriate command 

relationships, provides coordinating instructions to 

optimize the capabilities of each subordinate, and gains 

synergistic effects for the joint force as a whole. The JFC 

may designate a JFMCC to facilitate unity of effort, focus, 

and synchronize efforts while providing subordinate 

commanders flexibility and opportunity to exercise 

initiative and maintain the joint forces’ operational tempo. 

Normally, joint forces are organized with a combination 

of Service and functional component commands with 

operational responsibilities. The JFC may elect to directly 

task maritime forces. 

Naval Command 

Relationships 

Naval command relationships are based on a philosophy 

of mission command involving centralized guidance, 

collaborative planning, and decentralized control and 

execution. With a long-standing practice of using 

mission-type orders, naval C2 practices are intended to 

achieve relative advantage through organizational ability 

to rapidly observe, orient, decide, and act. 

Forward-Deployed, 

Flexible, Sea-Based Force 

The amphibious ready group (ARG)/Marine 

expeditionary unit (MEU) is a forward-deployed, flexible, 

sea-based force that provides the President and the 

geographic combatant commander (GCC) with credible 

deterrence and decision time across the range of military 

operations. The ARG and MEU affords the GCC a 

responsive, flexible, and versatile capability to shape the 

OE, respond to crises, and protect US and allied interests 

in permissive and select uncertain and hostile 

environments. 

Command Relationships 

and Responsibilities 

The JFC establishes the authority and command 

relationships of the JFMCC. The JFMCC exercises 

operational control over their own Service forces and 

tactical control over other Service forces made available 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-32 

for tasking. Regardless of organizational and command 

arrangements within joint commands, Service component 

commanders are responsible for certain Service-specific 

functions and other matters affecting their forces. 

Maritime Area of 

Operation 

JFCs establish maritime areas of operation (AOs) to 

decentralize execution of maritime component operations, 

allow rapid maneuver, and provide the ability to fight at 

extended ranges. The size, shape, and positioning of land 

or maritime AOs will be based on the JFC’s concept of 

operations (CONOPS) and the land or maritime 

commander’s requirements to accomplish missions and 

protect forces. The AO can be dynamic and evolve as the 

operation or campaign matures. When the JFC designates 

a maritime AO, the JFMCC is the supported commander 

within the AO. 

Organizing and Manning 

the Component 

Headquarters 

The JFMCC’s staff is typically built from an existing 

Service component, numbered fleet, Marine air-ground 

task force, or subordinate Service force staff and then 

augmented as required. A joint air component 

coordination element is often included to coordinate joint 

force air component commander missions. In a maritime 

headquarters, two complementary methods of organizing 

people and processes exist. The first is the doctrinal Ncode structure, which organizes people by the function 

they perform (i.e., intelligence, logistics). The second is a 

cross-functional staff that organizes the staff into boards, 

centers, cells, and working groups that manage specific 

processes or tasks that do not fit well under the N-code 

structure. 

Navy Composite Warfare 

Doctrine 

US Navy composite warfare doctrine allows the officer in 

tactical command (OTC) to assign some or all of the 

command functions associated with mission areas to 

warfare commanders, functional group commanders, and 

coordinators. The warfare commanders that may be 

established include the air and missile defense 

commander, the antisubmarine warfare commander, the 

information operations warfare commander, the strike 

warfare commander, and the surface warfare commander. 

The functional group commanders that may be established 

include the ballistic missile defense commander, the MIO 

commander, the mine warfare (MIW) commander, the 

screen commander, and the underway replenishment 

group commander. 
 Executive Summary 

xiii 

Command by Negation The OTC controls composite warfare commander (CWC) 

and subordinate warfare commander’s actions through 

command by negation. Command by negation 

acknowledges that, because of the often distributed and 

dispersed nature of maritime warfare, it is necessary to 

pre-plan the actions of a force to an assessed threat and 

delegate some warfare functions to subordinate 

commanders. Once such functions are delegated, the 

subordinate commander is to take the required action 

without delay, always keeping the OTC informed of the 

situation. 

Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

Maritime Planning 

Processes and Products 

The JFMCC’s planning is driven by the JFC’s guidance 

and intent, supports JFC staff planning efforts, and should 

be closely coordinated with component planning. Most 

maritime platforms are multi-mission capable and are 

routinely multi-tasked to support different missions and 

warfare commanders. JFMCC, OTC, and CWCs and their 

staffs should be able to recognize and prioritize 

requirements, address conflicts and limitations, and 

integrate the various capabilities of assigned and attached 

forces and those made available for tasking. 

Organizing the 

Operational Area 

Commanders and their staffs should assess friendly factors 

of space, time, forces, and degree of risk tolerance 

individually and then balance them in combination against 

the ultimate or intermediate objective. In harmonizing 

friendly operational factors against the respective 

objective, all considerations, when possible, should start 

with the quantifiable factors of space and time (i.e., 

operational reach). The factor of time is more dynamic 

and changeable than the factor of space. 

Other General Planning 

Considerations 

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Obtaining and 

maintaining accurate MDA is a key enabler of an active 

and layered maritime defense in depth and facilitates more 

expeditious and precise actions by the JFMCC and 

subordinate commanders. 

Sustainment. The sea remains the principal transport 

medium for large, heavy, and bulky items, as well as large 

volume requirements. 

Environmental considerations. Failing to comply with 

applicable environmental requirements (which may 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-32 

include analysis of environmental impacts on a host 

nation) could produce an erosion of support or acceptance 

of the operation at home and abroad. 

Weather. Seasonal fluctuations in weather may have 

strategic significance. Flight operations, amphibious 

operations, and sonar performance may be made more 

difficult by high sea states and extreme high or low 

temperatures. Adverse conditions may also be used to 

advantage. 

Law of the Sea Although the US is not a party to the 1982 United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it 

considers the navigation and overflight provisions therein 

reflective of customary international law and thus acts in 

accordance with UNCLOS, except for the deep seabed 

mining provisions. 

Assessment Assessment is a process that evaluates changes in the OE 

and measures progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the 

OE and the progress of operations; compare them to their 

initial visualization, understanding, and intent; and adjust 

operations based on this analysis. 

Multinational 

Participation 

In a multinational environment, the operational aim for 

maritime forces is to exercise sea control; project power 

ashore; synchronize maritime operations with operations 

throughout the maritime operational area; and support the 

multinational force commander’s CONOPS, intent, and 

guidance in accomplishing the multinational task force 

mission. 

Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for 

Specific Maritime Operations 

The Fleet The US Navy’s traditional and doctrinal warfighting 

configuration is the fleet, commanded by a numbered fleet 

commander. Typically, the fleet commander taskorganizes assigned and attached forces using the Navy’s 

administrative organization as its foundation. The 

JFMCC may create subordinate task forces, who may in 

turn create further subordinate organizations. In each 

case, the establishing authority must designate the 

command authorities for each subordinate organization, to 

include support relationships as required. 
 Executive Summary 

xv 

Surface Warfare Surface warfare encompasses operations conducted to 

destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and 

merchant vessels. These operations typically include the 

planning and directing of surveillance of the maritime 

domain, interdiction, and strikes by aircraft and missiles. 

Air and Missile Defense Countering air and missile threats consists of a 

combination of theater counterair and integraged air and 

missile defense (IAMD). Counterair is the foundational 

framework at the theater level. IAMD synchronizes 

aspects of counterair with global missile defense, 

homeland defense, and global strike. 

Antisubmarine Warfare Undersea warfare (USW) operations are conducted to 

establish dominance in the undersea portion of the 

maritime operational area, which permits friendly forces 

to operate throughout the maritime operational area and 

denies an opposing force the effective use of underwater 

systems and weapons. USW includes offensive and 

defensive submarine, antisubmarine warfare, and MIW 

operations. 

Mine Warfare Maritime MIW is divided into two basic subdivisions: the 

laying of mines to degrade the enemy’s capabilities to 

wage warfare and the countering of enemy-laid mines to 

permit friendly maneuver. 

Strike Warfare Strike warfare operations are naval operations to destroy 

or neutralize targets ashore, including attacks against 

strategic or tactical targets, such as manufacturing 

facilities and operating bases, from which the enemy is 

capable of conducting or supporting air, surface, or 

subsurface operations against friendly forces. 

Amphibious Operations Amphibious operations are complex and may involve all 

components of the joint force. They are typified by close 

integration of forces trained, organized, and equipped for 

different combat functions. The JFC and JFMCC should 

shape the amphibious objective area or operational area by 

employing carrier strike groups and other maritime and 

joint assets prior to the commencement of the amphibious 

operation. 

Naval Surface Fire 

Support 

Naval surface fire support (NSFS) units provide direct or 

general support to other joint force components or 

subordinate forces of the JFMCC. When supporting a 

landing force or other ground forces, an NSFS spotting 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-32 

team is usually attached to the maneuvering forces for fire 

support coordination purposes. 

Other Maritime 

Operations 

Other maritime operations include: 

• Maritime intercept operations. 

• MSO. 

• Maritime homeland defense and defense support of 

civil authorities. 

• Global maritime partnerships and security 

cooperation. 

• Sea-based operations. 

• Counterdrug operations. 

• Noncombatant evacuation operations. 

• Protection of shipping. 

• Maritime pre-positioning force operations. 

• Foreign humanitarian assistance. 

• Maritime operational threat response. 

• Riverine operations.

Conclusion 

This publication provides doctrine for C2 of joint 

maritime operations. 
I-1 

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION 

1. General 

a. This publication provides joint doctrine for the command and control (C2) of joint 

maritime operations. It discusses the responsibilities of a joint force maritime component 

commander (JFMCC) and informs any component tasked to conduct or support the joint 

force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives in the maritime operational area. Maritime 

operations include any actions performed by maritime forces to gain or exploit command 

of the sea, sea control, and/or sea denial or to project power from the sea. Sea control may 

include naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS), protection of sea lines of 

communications (SLOCs), air lines of communications (ALOCs), blockades, embargoes 

against economic or military shipping, and maritime interception operations (MIO). 

Maritime operations also encompass operations to locate, classify, track, and target surface 

vessels, submarines, and aircraft. In addition, amphibious operations increase the 

commander’s options for maneuver in the littorals and forcible entry operations. 

b. The terms “naval” and “maritime” forces are used throughout this publication to 

encompass United States Navy (USN), United States Marine Corps (USMC), and United 

States Coast Guard (USCG) personnel, weapon systems, and organizations. A maritime 

force is any force constituted by the JFC to achieve operational objectives at sea or to 

achieve an objective on land from the sea. 

c. Maritime forces operate on (surface), under (subsurface), or above (air) the sea 

and/or above and on the land in support of amphibious operations, port security, 

infrastructure protection, strike, and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) operations 

and other types of operations across the range of military operations. 

(1) Movement and maneuver of forces within international waters can take place 

without prior diplomatic agreement. 

(2) Maritime forces are mostly a self-deploying, self-sustaining, sea-based 

expeditionary force and a combined-arms team. Maritime forces are manned, trained, and 

equipped to operate with limited reliance on ports or airfields. 

d. Maritime forces can participate in multiple operations ashore. They can execute, 

support, or enable missions ashore by conducting forcible entry operations (such as an 

amphibious assault), seizing/establishing expeditionary advance bases, seabasing of assets, 

moving land forces into the operational area via sealift, providing fire and air support, and 

influencing operations through deterrence. Maritime forces may be employed in littoral 

waters for the conduct of sea control or denial, ballistic missile defense (BMD), and to 

“Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything.” 

Themistocles (524-460 BC) 

Athenian Politician and General 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-32 

support joint force or component C2 platforms. Joint forces can support maritime 

operations with surveillance, logistics, fires, air support, and military engineering. 

e. While the nature of war has not changed, the character of warfare has evolved in a 

way that will significantly affect how the joint force conducts C2 of joint maritime 

operations. The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and changes rapidly. It is 

fluid, with changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that 

rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. The operational environment (OE) and the 

threats it presents are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional in 

nature. JFCs can expect uncertainty and ambiguity to exist in strategic environments and 

OEs. 

2. General Approach to Command and Control 

a. C2 is the means by which a commander synchronizes and/or integrates joint force 

activities. C2 ties together all the operational functions and tasks and applies to all levels 

of warfare and echelons of command. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement 

of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces and operations in the 

accomplishment of the mission. Successful C2 is reinforced by fundamentals, principles, 

and adherence to established tenets. 

b. The JFMCC must have the capability to exercise C2 of maritime forces and to 

accomplish a broad range of missions in denied or degraded environments. C2, in a denied 

or degraded environment, is the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over 

assigned and attached forces, in the accomplishment of a mission, while access to and use 

of critical information, systems, and services are reduced or prevented. Threats to the 

JFMCC’s C2 systems include natural phenomena, as well as state or non-state actors 

employing all means to attack. 

c. C2 of maritime forces is shaped by the characteristics and complexity of the 

maritime domain and the traditions and independent culture of maritime forces. 

Subordinate commanders execute operations independently with a thorough understanding 

of the commander’s intent. Once assigned missions and functions, the subordinate 

commander takes required actions without delay, keeping the superior commander 

informed of the situation. The superior commander retains the authority to deny any 

particular action or exercise command by negation. As such, joint maritime operations 

tend to be decentralized, and unity of effort is made possible via mission command. 

d. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized 

execution based upon mission-type orders. Success requires subordinate leaders at all 

echelons to exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to 

accomplish the mission. Essential to mission command is the thorough understanding of 

the commander’s intent at every level of command. Commanders issue mission-type 

orders focused on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform 

assigned tasks. They delegate decision-making authority to subordinates wherever 

possible, to minimize detailed control and empower subordinates to take initiative and 
 Introduction 

I-3 

make decisions based on understanding of the commander’s intent rather than on constant 

communications. When joint maritime operations are decentralized and reliant on mission 

command, coordination and planning considerations should include the procedures, 

measures, and resources (including time) required to implement those plans. The JFMCC 

and staff should anticipate requirements for joint support, prioritization of operations or 

force elements, and extensive coordination with other affected Service and functional 

component commanders, including multinational partners. 

e. Command by negation and mission command also play a crucial role when the 

electromagnetic spectrum becomes contested. Commanders should consider the potential 

for significantly reduced communications network connectivity up and down the chain of 

command, planning in advance to facilitate successful continuity of operations, 

transmission of authorities, and mission execution while operating in denied, degraded and 

exploited environments. 

3. Seapower Essential Functions 

The USN employs five functions in a combined-arms approach to provide a unique 

comparative advantage for the joint force. 

a. Operational Access. Operational access is the ability to project military force in 

contested areas with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. In today’s 

security environment, operational access is increasingly contested by state and non-state 

actors that can hold even our most advanced forces and weapon systems at risk with their 

own innovative strategies and weapons systems. 

b. Deterrence. Defending national interests requires being able to prevail in conflict 

and taking preventive measures to deter potential adversaries who could threaten the vital 

interests of the US or its partners. These threats could range from direct aggression to 

belligerent actions that nonetheless threaten vital national interests. Deterrence influences 

potential adversaries not to take threatening actions. It is a state of mind brought about by 

the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. Deterrence requires 

convincing those adversaries that a contemplated action will not achieve the desired result 

by fear of the consequences. 

c. Sea Control Operations. Sea control operations are those operations designed to 

secure use of the maritime domain by one’s own forces and to prevent its use by the enemy. 

Sea control is the essence of seapower and is a necessary ingredient in the successful 

accomplishment of all naval missions. Sea control and power projection complement one 

another. Sea control allows naval forces to close within striking distance to remove 

landward threats that threaten access, which in turn enhances freedom of action at sea. 

Freedom of action at sea enables the projection of forces ashore. Sea control operations 

are the employment of naval forces, supported by land, air, space, cyberspace, or special 

operations forces, to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Establishing sea control 

may require projecting power ashore to neutralize threats or control terrain in the landward 

portion of the littorals. Sea control operations include the destruction of enemy naval 

forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-32 

establishment of local air and maritime superiority in areas of naval operations. The 

vastness of the world’s oceans makes it impossible for even a preeminent naval power to 

achieve global maritime superiority. Thus, achieving local or regional maritime superiority 

or maritime supremacy may be desired by the JFC for a limited duration to accomplish 

specific objectives. Sea control requires maritime, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. 

d. Power Projection. The US possesses the ability to project significant power from 

the sea. Power projection in and from the maritime area of operations (AO) in which we 

have local sea control includes a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy, 

suppress, or neutralize enemy forces and their logistic support, or prevent enemy forces 

from approaching within enemy weapons range of friendly forces to achieve objectives at 

sea or from the sea. Credible power projection supports deterrence objectives and 

activities. 

e. Maritime Security. The safety and economic security of the US depends in 

substantial part upon the secure use of the world’s oceans. Maritime security operations 

(MSO) are conducted to establish the conditions for security and protection of sovereignty 

in the maritime domain. Additionally, MSO protect maritime resources and counter 

maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, 

environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne migration. Terrorists, pirates, and 

transnational criminals use legitimate maritime traffic to mask their illicit activities, 

threatening safety and security. Identifying, tracking, and neutralizing these threats and 

illicit activities is essential to protecting national security and the global economy. 

Additional tasks are to assist mariners in distress, participate in security cooperation 

operations with allies and partners, share situational awareness, and conduct maritime 

interception and law enforcement operations (LEO). MSO involves close coordination 

among governments, the private sector, international organizations, and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs). 

For more information on MSO, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations,

and Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 3-20-3.1, Multi-Threat Surface Ship 

Defense.

4. Joint Maritime Operations 

a. Joint maritime operations are performed with maritime forces, and other forces 

assigned, attached, or made available, in support of the JFC’s operation or campaign 

objectives or in support of other components of the joint force. The JFC may designate a 

JFMCC to C2 a joint maritime operation. As a functional component commander, the 

JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces made available for 

tasking. 

b. The degree of integration and coordination between joint force component 

commanders varies depending on the situation. For some joint maritime operations, the 

JFMCC may operate without the support of other Service component forces (e.g., open 

ocean submarine operations); whereas for others, there may be detailed integration between 

components (e.g., attack of enemy submarines in port or their supporting critical 
 Introduction 

I-5 

infrastructures ashore). In other cases, tactical control (TACON) of maritime forces may 

be delegated to other joint force components (e.g., close air support [CAS] and strategic 

attack). For sea control operations, TACON of another joint force component’s forces may 

be delegated to the JFMCC (e.g., air operations in maritime surface warfare [SUW]). In 

certain situations, specification of operational control (OPCON) or TACON of forces may 

not be practical. In these cases, the JFC should establish a support relationship, as required. 

All major operations generally necessitate some degree of maritime support to deploy, 

sustain, withdraw, and redeploy forces. 

5. Maritime Domain 

a. The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and 

the airspace above these, including the littorals. Nothing in the definition of, or the use of 

the term domain, implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. Per JP 

2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, the littoral 

comprises two segments of the OE. First, “seaward: the area from the open ocean to the 

shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore.” Second, “landward: the 

area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.” 

b. The maritime domain also has unique economic, diplomatic, military, and legal 

aspects (see Figure I-1). US naval forces operate in the deep waters of the open ocean and 

other maritime environments, including coastal areas, rivers, estuaries, and landward 

portions of the littorals, including associated airspace. In many regions of the world, rivers 

mark and define international borders and facilitate intracontinental trade. Ensuring access 

and securing these waterways are often priorities of state governments seeking to maintain 

stability and sovereignty. There are several thousand straits connecting the world’s oceans, 

but only about 200 are the most vulnerable seaway chokepoints and lines of 

communications. Adversaries may attempt to control the use of an internationally 

recognized strait by restricting access or disrupting passage of friendly naval forces or 

merchant shipping. In the event of regional conflict, small coastal navies operating in close 

proximity to these straits can present a serious challenge to the operations of naval forces 

and merchant shipping. Diplomatic and political maritime issues increase as nations 

attempt to extend their claims over offshore resources. These claims lead to disputes over 

the exact extent of maritime borders and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Artificial 

islands, installations, and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no 

territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the 

territorial sea, the EEZ, or the continental shelf. Artificial islands are treated differently 

from natural islands under international law; they do not create or extend territorial sea, 

EEZs, or continental shelf claims. It is uncertain what constraints and restrictions joint 

forces may face when operating in other nations’ territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, 

and continental shelves claimed by coastal states. 

For more information on artificial islands, see United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea (UNCLOS).

c. Navies of the world may be categorized within a broad spectrum of demonstrated 

capabilities and political mandates. Naval capability, as demonstrated by projection of 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-32 

power, may be viewed as global, regional, territorial, coastal, and self- defense forces. The 

great majority of the world’s navies are small and capable of operating only in their 

respective littoral waters or as constabulary navies. Only a few navies are capable of 

sustained employment far from their countries’ shores. However, whether or not their 

navies are capable of global power projection, most maritime nations also maintain air 

forces capable of conducting operations over the adjacent maritime domain. This air 

capability should be considered while planning operations in the maritime domain. 

Likewise, the multi-mission capabilities of modern naval platforms and their ability to 

project power should be a planning consideration. Ships and aircraft, regardless of source 

(e.g., enemy, adversary, neutral, friendly), are constantly in motion, thereby presenting 

additional challenges for the operational commander to gain and maintain situational 

awareness. 

d. The physical properties of the land-sea and air-sea interfaces, some unique 

undersea properties, and the sheer vastness of the maritime domain render the sea largely 

opaque to many sensors. It provides a hiding place for smuggling operations, submarines 

firing missiles, and conducting naval movement and maneuver. While surface ships can 

be detected by a wide range of sensors, including satellite or air surveillance, it is often 

difficult to identify specific vessels as targets with sufficient certainty to engage them, 

especially if they are not radiating distinctive electromagnetic and acoustic signatures. 

Additionally, weather conditions can change rapidly, and selected characteristics such as 

Figure I-1. Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace 

Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace

Land Territorial Sea Contiguous Zone High Seas

Deep 

Sea Bed

Exclusive Economic Zone

200 nm

Continental Shelf

B

a

s

e

l

i

n

e

Outer Space

National Airspace

24 nautical miles (nm)

12 nm

International Airspace
 Introduction 

I-7 

wave height and sea spray may impact visibility and radar and sensor effectiveness of 

platforms and munitions. 

e. Joint maritime operations occur in blue water, green water, brown water 

environments, and in the landward areas in the littorals, each with its own challenges. 

Operations in blue water (high seas and open oceans) require forces capable of remaining 

on station for extended periods, largely unrestricted by sea state, and with logistics 

capability to sustain these forces indefinitely. Operations in green water (coastal waters, 

ports, and harbors) stretching seaward require ships, amphibious warfare ships and landing 

craft, and patrol craft with the stability and agility to operate effectively in surf, in shallows, 

and the near-shore areas of the littorals. Operations in brown water (navigable rivers, lakes, 

bays, and their estuaries) involve shallows and congested areas that constrain maneuver 

but do not subject maritime forces to extreme surf conditions. Operations on land in the 

littorals may involve landing forces going ashore by embarked aircraft, landing craft, and 

amphibious vehicles from amphibious warfare ships. 

 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
II-1 

CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZING FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

1. General Organizational Options 

a. JFCs at the combatant command (CCMD), subordinate unified command, and/or 

joint task force (TF) command levels all organize staffs and forces to accomplish the 

mission based on their vision and concept of operations (CONOPS). Organizing the 

maritime force should take into account the nature of today’s complex OE; technological 

advances in communications; intelligence collection systems; improved weapons 

capabilities; and how multinational forces organize, train, equip, and conduct operations. 

Equally important in determining how a JFC organizes joint forces are the threat’s nature, 

capabilities, and the OE (e.g., geography, accessibility, climate, and infrastructure). 

b. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes 

appropriate command relationships, provides coordinating instructions to optimize the 

capabilities of each subordinate, and gains synergistic effects for the joint force as a whole. 

The JFC may designate a JFMCC to facilitate unity of effort, focus, and synchronize efforts 

while providing subordinate commanders flexibility and opportunity to exercise initiative 

and maintain the joint forces’ operational tempo. 

(1) Normally, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and 

functional component commands with operational responsibilities (see Figure II-1). The 

JFC normally designates the forces and maritime assets that will be made available for 

tasking by the JFMCC and delegates the appropriate command authority the JFMCC will 

exercise over assigned and attached forces and maritime assets made available for tasking. 

Generally, these forces and maritime assets include navies, marines, special operations 

forces (SOF), coast guards and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary 

shipping managed by the government, civil merchant marines, army/ground forces 

(normally when embarked), and air and air defense (AD) forces. Establishment of a 

JFMCC must not affect the command relationships between Service component 

commanders and the JFC. 

(2) In cases where the JFC does not designate a JFMCC, the JFC may elect to 

directly task maritime forces. Typically, this would occur when an operation is of limited 

duration, scope, or complexity. If this option is exercised, the JFC’s staff assists in 

planning and coordinating maritime operations for JFC approval. The JFC may elect to 

The Sea Services have historically organized, trained, and equipped to perform 

four essential functions: deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime 

security. Because access to the global commons is critical, this strategy 

introduces a fifth function: all domain access. This function assures appropriate 

freedom of action in any domain—the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace, as 

well as in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. 

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 

March 2015 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-32 

centralize selected functions (plan, coordinate, and task) within the staff to provide 

direction, control, and coordination of the joint force. 

c. Naval command relationships are based on a philosophy of mission command 

involving centralized guidance, collaborative planning, and decentralized control and 

execution. With a long-standing practice of using mission-type orders, naval C2 practices 

Figure II-1. Typical Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Responsibilities 

Typical Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Responsibilities































Develop a joint maritime operations plan to best support joint force objectives.

Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/capabilities 

made available.

Request forces of other component commanders when necessary for the 

accomplishment of the maritime mission.

Make maritime apportionment recommendations to the joint force commander (JFC).

Provide maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with JFC 

maritime apportionment decisions.

Control the operational level synchronization and execution of joint maritime 

operations, as specified by the JFC, to include adjusting targets and tasks for 

available joint capabilities/forces. The JFC and affected component commanders 

will be notified, as appropriate, if the joint force maritime component commander 

(JFMCC) changes the planned joint maritime operations during execution.

Act as supported commander within the assigned area of operations (AO).

Assign and coordinate target priorities within the assigned AO by synchronizing and 

integrating maneuver, mobility and movement, fires, and interdiction. The JFMCC 

nominates targets located within the maritime AO to the joint targeting process that 

may potentially require action by another component commander’s assigned 

forces.

Evaluate results of maritime operations and forward assessments to the JFC in 

support of the overall effort.

Support JFC information operations with assigned assets, when directed.

Function as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the JFC.

Perform other functions, as directed by the JFC.

Establish a personnel recovery coordination cell to account for and report the status 

of isolated personnel and to coordinate and control maritime component personnel 

recovery events; and, if directed by the JFC, establish a separate joint personnel 

recovery center for the same purpose in support of a joint recovery event.

Coordinate the planning and execution of joint maritime operations with the other 

components and supporting agencies.

Integrate the JFMCC’s communications systems and resources into the theater’s 

networked communications system architecture, or common operational picture, 

and synchronize JFMCC’s critical voice and data requirements. Ensure these 

communications systems requirements, coordination issues, and capabilities are 

integrated in the joint planning and execution process.
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-3 

are intended to achieve relative advantage through organizational ability to rapidly observe, 

orient, decide, and act. Mission-type orders enable continued operations allowing 

subordinates to exercise initiative consistent with the higher commander’s intent and act 

independently to accomplish the mission in conditions where communications are 

restricted, compromised, or denied. 

d. Since the JFC normally designates a Service component commander to also serve 

as a functional component commander, the dual-designated Service/functional component 

commander will normally exercise OPCON as a Service component commander over their 

own Service forces and TACON as a functional component commander over other 

Services forces made available for tasking. USN multi-mission ships are rarely made 

available for tasking outside the maritime component, because their multi-mission 

capabilities will require them to fulfill JFMCC operational requirements. However, some 

capabilities of multi-mission ships and other maritime forces may be made available to 

other components in direct support. 

e. Forward-deployed maritime force packages, commonly called adaptive force 

packages, are normally comprised of units that train together prior to deploying. These 

tailored force packages may include carrier strike groups (CSGs), expeditionary strike 

groups, and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit 

(MEU). Force packages can be scaled up by adding ships and capabilities or scaled down 

into smaller surface action groups (SAGs), individual ships, or special purpose forces 

designed to conduct numerous types of military operations. 

f. The ARG/MEU is a forward-deployed, flexible, sea-based force that provides the 

President and the geographic combatant commander (GCC) with credible deterrence and 

decision time across the range of military operations. The ARG and MEU affords the GCC 

a responsive, flexible, and versatile capability to shape the OE, respond to crises, and 

protect US and allied interests in permissive and select uncertain and hostile environments. 

ARG and MEU capabilities support initial crisis response, introduce follow-on forces, 

support designated SOF, and other missions in permissive and select uncertain and hostile 

environments, which include, but are not limited to: amphibious assaults, amphibious raids, 

amphibious demonstrations, amphibious withdrawals, and amphibious force support to 

crisis response and other operations (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations, 

humanitarian assistance, or MSO). The ARG and Navy detachments are organized under 

the command of a Navy O-6, while the MEU, with its embarked Marine air-ground task 

force (MAGTF), is under the command of a Marine Corps O-6. Figure II-2 outlines the 

different organizational constructs applicable to ARG/MEU employment. 

For additional information see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

2. Component Employment Considerations 

a. Weighing Options. When the JFC designates a JFMCC, the JFMCC’s authority 

and responsibility are also defined by the JFC. The following are some considerations for 

establishing JFMCC authorities, responsibilities, and timing: 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-32 

(1) Planning. There is a need for detailed, coordinated, concurrent, and parallel 

planning. While JFMCC integrated planning is focused primarily on employment, the 

JFMCC may also be tasked to integrate planning of multi-Service and multinational 

maritime forces for deployment, transition, redeployment, or reconstitution at a level 

subordinate to that of the JFC. 

Figure II-2. Operational Employment for Amphibious Ready Groups with 

Embarked Marine Expeditionary Units 

Operational Employment for Amphibious Ready Groups 

with Embarked Marine Expeditionary Units

Aggregated 

Disaggregated

Distributed







The most common form where the amphibious ready group (ARG) 

with embarked Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is employed under a 

single geographic combatant commander (GCC) who maintains 

operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the 

ARG/MEU. “Split” is a subset of aggregated, where the ARG and 

MEU remains employed within a single GCC’s area of responsibility 

(AOR), but the units are separated by time, distance, or task while 

operating beyond the reach of tilt-rotor aircraft or landing craft. 

Aggregated is the preferred employment construct.

This construct is driven by emergent requirements wherein the ARG 

and MEU is divided into parts to support multiple GCCs. The ARG and 

MEU elements operate within the distinct OPCON/TACON chains of 

the respective GCCs. Disaggregation comes with a corresponding 

degradation of ARG and MEU operational readiness, training, and

maintenance. This is the least preferred employment construct. 

The ARG and MEU is partitioned for emergent requirements for 

multiple GCCs. However, the original GCC to whom it was allocated 

retains OPCON while another exercises TACON of elements that are 

distributed for a specific mission or duration mission. The ARG and 

MEU is able to sustain its elements, facilitate planning, and conduct 

military engagement and joint/combined training across AOR 

boundaries, and is supported throughout operations. ARG and MEU 

communication and computers systems are critical for supporting

distributed operations. The GCC that has OPCON may request reaggregation at any time, and the ARG and MEU commanders cannot 

make changes to capabilities allocated OPCON or TACON without 

approval. Distributed is the preferred employment construct to

support multiple GCCs.
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-5 

(2) Duration. The projected length of an operation should be of sufficient 

duration to warrant the establishment of a JFMCC. The decision to establish a JFMCC 

should also consider the time required for additional personnel and staff sourcing and 

training, the establishment of C2 alterations, and necessary communications system 

support architecture upgrades. 

(3) Maritime Perspective. The JFC desires the focused maritime expertise of a 

JFMCC to enhance the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of joint maritime 

operations. 

(4) JFC Span of Control. When task complexities, JFC staff organizational or 

resource limitations, and environmental intricacies limit the JFC’s effective span of control, 

empowering functional components can provide the flexibility and initiative required for 

success. 

(5) Timing. To permit the JFMCC to fully participate in planning and to 

maximize unity of effort, the decision to establish and designate a JFMCC should occur 

well before the concept development phase of the operation or campaign plan. JFMCC 

representatives should be identified and involved in planning as early as possible. 

(6) Geographic Constraints. The geography of the operational area may dictate 

that only a maritime force can conduct extended operations in a specific location. 

Operations far from a friendly base or advanced base may limit the ability of another 

Service or component commander to conduct timely operations. 

b. Service Component Command 

(1) All joint forces include Service component commands to address 

administrative and logistic support for Service forces. The JFC may choose to conduct 

operations through a Service component commander or, at lower echelons, a Service force 

commander. This most often happens when there are no other Service or multinational 

maritime capabilities provided as part of the joint force and the scope of operations, along 

with the need for stability, continuity, economy, and ease of long-range planning, dictate 

organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations. 

(2) A Navy component command assigned to a combatant commander (CCDR) 

consists of the Navy component commander (NCC) and the Navy forces (NAVFOR) that 

have been assigned to that CCDR. A Marine Corps component command assigned or 

attached to a CCDR consists of the Marine Corps component commander and the Marine 

Corps forces that have been assigned or attached to that CCDR. When a Service command 

is designated as the naval or maritime component to multiple CCDRs, the commander and 

only those specific forces assigned to that particular CCDR are under the combatant 

command (command authority) of that particular CCDR. 

(3) In instances where an NCC is not assigned, NAVFOR may be attached as a 

Navy Service component through the request for forces process. When attached, this Navy 

Service component includes NAVFOR, a designated commander, and appropriate 

command element. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-32 

c. Selecting a Commander. The JFC establishing a functional component command 

has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component 

commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces 

will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always 

consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 

capabilities in selecting a commander. A USMC or USCG officer could be designated the 

JFMCC. 

3. Command Relationships and Responsibilities 

a. Command Relationships Applicable to the JFMCC 

(1) JFMCC responsibilities are to plan, coordinate, allocate, and task joint 

maritime operations based on the JFC’s CONOPS and apportionment decisions. Specific 

responsibilities that are normally assigned to the JFMCC are included in Figure II-1. 

(2) The JFC establishes the authority and command relationships of the JFMCC. 

The JFMCC normally exercises OPCON over their own Service forces and TACON over 

other Service forces made available for tasking. Regardless of organizational and 

command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders are 

responsible for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces: 

internal administration, training, logistics, and Service-unique intelligence operations. The 

JFMCC should be aware of all such Service-specific responsibilities. 

b. Maritime AO

(1) When a JFMCC is established, the JFC will normally designate a maritime 

AO. JFCs establish maritime AOs to decentralize execution of maritime component 

operations, allow rapid maneuver, and provide the ability to fight at extended ranges. The 

size, shape, and positioning of land or maritime AOs will be based on the JFC’s CONOPS 

and the land or maritime commander’s requirements to accomplish missions and protect 

forces. The AO can be dynamic and evolve as the operation or campaign matures. It 

should be of sufficient size and geography to allow for movement, maneuver, and 

employment of weapons systems and effective utilization of warfighting capabilities, as 

well as provide operational depth for logistics, surveillance of the threat axis and the 

enemy’s avenue of approach, and force protection (FP). Within the AO, the JFMCC 

establishes subordinate maneuver space that allows for independent yet supporting 

operations of subordinate elements while enabling the synchronized and effective 

employment of forces across all components. The AO may not encompass the entire 

littoral area; however, it should be large enough for the JFMCC to accomplish the mission 

and protect the maritime force. The AO may include air, land, and sea. 

(2) When the JFC designates a maritime AO, the JFMCC is the supported 

commander within the AO. As supported commander, the JFMCC integrates and 

synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. Although the joint force air component 

commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air 

interdiction effort, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and JFMCC are 
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-7 

supported commanders for interdiction in their respective AOs. To facilitate integration 

and synchronization, the JFMCC has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and 

timing of fires within the maritime AO. 

(3) To facilitate synchronization throughout the theater or joint operations area 

(JOA), the JFC should establish priorities that will guide or inform execution decisions 

throughout the theater or JOA. In coordination with the JFMCC, other commanders 

designated by the JFC to execute theater- or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan 

and execute these JFC-prioritized operations within the maritime AO. Commanders 

executing such a mission must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects. If those 

operations would have adverse impact within the maritime AO, the commander assigned 

to execute the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the 

JFMCC, or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

c. Operational Functions Considerations for the JFMCC. The JFMCC executes 

the operational functions discussed below and can functionally organize to accomplish 

missions. 

(1) C2. The JFMCC commands assigned and attached forces, prepares 

supporting plans to JFC operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs), and 

executes operations as directed by the JFC. Upon JFC approval of the JFMCC’s CONOPS 

or scheme of maneuver, the JFMCC exercises specified authority and direction over forces 

in the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The JFMCC assigns tasks and operating 

areas, prioritizes and allocates resources, manages risk, and publishes operational and daily 

tasking orders for the execution of maritime operational activity. The JFMCC also 

maintains liaison with other components and the joint force headquarters (HQ) to provide 

JFMCC representation to provide timely coordination and achieve unity of effort. 

For more information on the C2 function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

(a) Planning. The JFMCC assists the JFC to plan and prepare OPLANs and 

associated estimates of the situation. JFMCCs planning responsibilities are to: 

1. Develop a maritime supporting plan to best support joint force 

CONOPS and objectives, as assigned. 

2. Develop maritime courses of action (COAs) within the framework of 

the JFC-assigned objective or mission, the forces available, and the commander’s intent. 

3. Coordinate planning with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting, and 

multinational HQs. 

4. Determine forces required and coordinate deployment planning in 

support of selected COAs. 

5. Coordinate the planning and execution of maneuver operations with 

other missions. 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-32 

(b) The JFMCC makes recommendations to the JFC on the employment, 

support, coordination, and assessment of maritime forces. Such recommendations should 

include: 

1. Maritime force structure requirements. 

2. Integration and employment of multinational maritime forces. 

3. Priorities of effort. 

4. Operational limitations. 

5. Intelligence collection priorities. 

6. Space support. 

7. Cyberspace operations. 

8. Assessment of joint maritime operations to include measures of 

effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs). 

(c) Coordination and Deconfliction. Where and when appropriate, the 

JFMCC makes coordination and deconfliction recommendations to the JFC, to include 

airspace management, land-space management, waterspace management (WSM), 

prevention of mutual interference (PMI), fire support coordination measures, target 

priorities, electromagnetic spectrum management, cyberspace operations, 

interorganizational coordination, and liaison requirements. 

(d) Maritime C2 systems are complex and are vulnerable to denial, 

degradation, or exploitation. Without deliberate considerations to mitigate vulnerabilities, 

forces are at a higher risk of being detected, located, and targeted by adversaries leveraging 

multilayered sea denial capabilities. Mitigating the risk requires synchronized 

implementation to align commander’s requirements with the C2 system. To assure 

effective C2, commands should plan to execute in a denied, degraded, or exploitable OE 

so maritime forces can reliably communicate when necessary to sufficiently synchronize 

the warfighting effort. Assured C2 is conducted through the systematically coordinated 

tasking and control of existing C2 system architectures necessary to provide commanders 

with sufficient control of their forces. Assured C2 seeks to facilitate clear understanding 

of how degradation or denial of any part of C2 systems (environment, self- or adversaryimposed) impacts the ability to execute operations to develop an effective C2 plan and 

align C2 systems adequately to ensure mission accomplishment. 

(e) A survivable, networked joint communications system is essential to 

facilitate intelligence collection, coordinate multi-platform execution, provide WSM, and 

avoid friendly fire incidents. Information connectivity, exchange, and integration at all 

levels can help maximize maritime domain awareness (MDA) and mission 

accomplishment. 
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-9 

(2) Intelligence. Understanding the OE is fundamental to joint operations. 

Intelligence should be sufficiently detailed and timely to satisfy the commander’s decisionmaking needs. JFMCC input to provide the maritime perspective of the OE is crucial. The 

JFMCC provides a unique complement of sensors and sensor fusion capability to support 

joint requirements and advocates for the use of other component and national assets to 

provide optimum support to maritime operations. Sonar capabilities and the ability to 

relocate surveillance and reconnaissance assets may provide additional options to the JFC. 

Close coordination with other component commanders and the intelligence directorate of 

a joint staff (J-2), operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), and communications system 

directorate of a joint staff (J-6) early in joint planning is essential to align architectures with 

platform and sensor employment plans to optimize intelligence; surveillance; 

reconnaissance; and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems 

throughout the joint force. The complexity of operating in the maritime domain requires a 

baseline of organic intelligence collection assets in addition to any joint forces and 

capabilities allocated to maintain MDA and to succeed in military operations. NCCs 

typically retain OPCON of organic intelligence collection capabilities (manned and 

unmanned) to enable MDA and fully support the integrated employment of maritime 

capabilities. 

For more information on the intelligence function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 2-0,

Joint Intelligence; and JP 6-0, Joint Communications. 

(3) Movement and Maneuver. The JFMCC is responsible for the movement 

and maneuver of assigned and attached forces. The JFMCC makes recommendations to 

the JFC regarding sealift and seabasing, the movement of supporting forces, and 

coordination of the movement or maneuver of other component forces through the 

maritime AO. 

(a) The JFMCC directs subordinate commanders in the execution of forcelevel operational tasks, advises the JFC of its movement, and coordinates with other 

components and interorganizational entities supporting or affected by joint maritime 

operations. 

(b) Operational movement and maneuver includes moving or deploying 

forces for operational advantage into an operational area and conducting maneuver for 

offensive or defensive purposes. It includes providing freedom of movement and 

maneuver to friendly forces and controlling the OE on land, on and under the sea, in the 

air, or in space where it provides an operational advantage. 

(c) Often, key attributes of the JFMCC’s CONOPS, movement, and

maneuver in the maritime domain can help gain the element of surprise and provide a 

significant advantage over enemies, while allowing the commander to rapidly concentrate 

forces. 

(d) Movement and maneuver using maritime forces are integral to joint 

operations. During maritime operations, commanders use information and initiative to 

apply decisive force and dominate specific regions and dimensions of the OE at the chosen 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-32 

time and place. Maintaining awareness in the transition from the open ocean to littoral 

areas is key to the continuing conduct of maneuver on and from the sea. Whether done at, 

under, or from the sea, maneuver can provide significant advantages in the application of 

maritime power projection in support of joint force operations. Some of the movement 

details and schemes of maneuver are articulated in JFC and JFMCC tasking documents 

which include timing, sequencing, method, and location of entry into the assigned AO. 

For more information on the movement and maneuver function, see JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations. 

(4) Fires. The JFMCC plans the employment of operational fires within the 

maritime AO to develop and integrate multidimensional attacks on the enemy’s centers of 

gravity (COGs) and shape the JFMCC’s AO. The commander, task force (CTF), can 

conduct tactical fires within the maritime AO against targets on the joint target list and 

enemy combatant ships, submarines, aircraft, and other maritime dynamic targets. This is 

particularly important in sustaining the fight in accordance with the maritime commander’s 

intentions during periods of denied or restricted communication. The JFMCC is normally 

tasked by the JFC with providing sea-based fires (e.g., Tomahawk land-attack missile 

[TLAM] or carrier-based strike sorties) in support of other components or higher HQ 

requirements. 

For more information on the fires function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-09, Joint 

Fire Support; JP 3-13, Information Operations; JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare; and JP 3-

60, Joint Targeting. 

(5) Protection. The protection function focuses on preserving the maritime 

forces’ mission capability in four primary ways: active defensive measures, passive 

defensive measures, the application of technology and procedures, and emergency 

management and response. As the mission requires, the protection function also extends 

to encompass protection of US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of 

friendly nations; and interorganizational partners. The JFMCC is responsible for all 

aspects of protection within the assigned AO. FP is part of each mission assigned to 

maritime forces and includes antiterrorism, physical security, and personal security. The 

GCC exercises TACON for FP of all Department of Defense (DOD) forces in the area of 

responsibility (AOR) and stipulates how the TACON for FP of NAVFOR is delegated. 

The delegation of TACON for FP is most commonly done along, but is not limited to, 

Service or functional component lines or geographically determined sectors. 

For more information on the protection function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

(6) Sustainment. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel 

services necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment 

and redeployment of the force. Sustainment provides the JFC the means to enable freedom 

of action, prolong endurance, and to extend operational reach. Sustainment determines the 

depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, 

retain, and exploit the initiative. The JFMCC makes recommendations concerning the 

distribution of material and services commensurate with priorities developed for JFMCC 
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-11 

operations. A GCC may delegate authority for a common support capability to the JFMCC. 

The JFMCC will usually coordinate sustainment delivery for all forces operating from a 

sea base. 

For more guidance on the sustainment function, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 4-0, 

Joint Logistics. 

(7) Information. The information function helps commanders and staffs 

understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its 

application during all military operations. This function provides the JFMCC the ability 

to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information while leveraging the 

inherent informational aspects of all military activities to achieve the commander’s 

objectives and attain the desired end state. The information function encompasses the 

management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint 

functions to influence participants’ perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and human 

and automated decision making. 

4. Organizing and Manning the Component Headquarters 

a. The component HQ organization and staffing will differ depending upon the 

mission, OE, existing and potential adversaries, nature of the crisis (e.g., tsunami, cyclone, 

earthquake), time available, and desired end state. The JFMCC’s staff is typically built 

from an existing Service component, numbered fleet, MAGTF, or subordinate Service 

force staff and then augmented as required. A joint air component coordination element is 

often included to coordinate JFACC missions. The commander should drive the formation 

process and consider the following factors: 

(1) What are the specified and implied tasks? 

(2) Does the staff need subject matter expertise augmentation to effectively 

perform the assigned mission? 

(3) What is the desired and expected timeline for augmentees to arrive at the staff 

or to become available via reachback support from remote locations? 

(4) What mitigating actions has the staff taken to fill short-term gaps until 

required expert augmentees arrive? 

(5) If employing a forward command element (afloat or ashore), have specific 

requirements, responsibilities, and synchronization mechanisms for the split staff been 

designated? 

(6) During split-staff operations, how will the commander’s decisions and 

guidance be shared with the portion of the staff not physically located with the commander? 

(7) Who on the staff establishes and promulgates the battle rhythm (Figure II-3)? 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-32 

b. In a maritime HQ, two complementary methods of organizing people and 

processes exist. The first is the doctrinal N-code structure, which organizes people by the 

function they perform (i.e., intelligence, logistics). The second is a cross-functional staff 

that organizes the staff into boards, centers, cells, and working groups that manage specific 

processes or tasks that do not fit well under the N-code structure and require crossfunctional participation, such as targeting and assessment. The fast pace of military 

operations and cross-talk needed to support an operational-level command has made the 

cross-functional approach the preferred manner of organization, while maintaining the 

doctrinal roles of the N-code structure. The maritime operations center (MOC) can be 

thought of as a loosely-bound network of staff entities overlaying the N-code structure. If 

a Navy component or numbered fleet commander is designated as the JFMCC, their 

existing staff or MOC will normally form the nucleus of the JFMCC staff or MOC. The 

Figure II-3. Sample Battle Rhythm 

Sample Battle Rhythm

2400

1200

1800 0600

FUOPS, MPG

FUOPS, MPG

JFC VTC

JFMCC Targeting 

Guidance to CTFs

Release JFMCC 

Intentions Message

FUOPS Brief to JFMCC and 

Draft Intentions Message

JFMCC Situation Report 

and JPERSTAT Due

JFMCC Daily 

VTC with CTFs

Watch Turnover Watch Turnover

JFMCC MECB





Refine 96-120 hours concepts 

based on JFC guidance

Refine 96-120 hours targeting





Develop 96-120 hours 

concepts based on 

JFC guidance

Plan 96-120 hours 

targeting





Updates 96-120 hour 

operations, key 

decisions, CCIRs, and 

deep operations

Receive JFC guidance







Review 24-72 hours targets

Refine 72-96 hours targets

Review future targeting guidance

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CTF commander, task force

FUOPS future operations

JFC joint force commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JPERSTAT joint personnel status and casualty report

MECB maritime effects coordination board

MPG maritime planning group

VTC video teleconferencing

Legend
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-13 

formalized addition of this cross-functional network and process to the doctrinal N-code 

organizational structure is what constitutes the MOC. The MOC’s focus is on operational 

tasks and activities (versus fleet management or support). It must be recognized, however, 

that when a commander establishes a MOC, the traditional staff code organization does not 

disappear. Indeed, the doctrinal N-code directorates are the foundation of the MOC. They 

supply the manpower, expertise, and facilities needed by the MOC to function. As a 

practical matter, the commander establishes and maintains only those boards, centers, cells, 

and working groups that enhance planning and decision making within the HQ. A fires 

cell, for example, is likely not required during a disaster relief operation. The commander 

establishes, modifies, and dissolves these functional entities as the needs of the command 

evolve. The generic seven-minute drill (Figure II-4) is a tool to aid participants in 

understanding key information about the meeting and focus their participation in an 

efficient and productive manner. Key elements include the purpose, inputs, outputs, 

important members, and timelines. 

c. MOCs provide an organizational framework through which maritime commanders 

may exercise operational-level C2. 

For more information on Navy MOCs, see Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, 

Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War, and Navy Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (NTTP) 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center.

d. Liaison elements from and to other joint force and Service components are also 

considerations in composition and required infrastructure. Joint force command 

relationships, the nature of the mission, and standing Service agreements help determine 

Figure II-4. Generic Seven-Minute Drill Example 

Generic Seven-Minute Drill Example

1. Descriptive and unique

2. Who receives, compiles, and delivers information

3. Allocation of resources (time and facilities), 

and any collaborative tool requirements

4. Brief description of the requirement

5. Staff sections and/or 

required to provide products (once approved by chief of staff, these become specified 

tasks)

6. Suspense date-time group for inputs

7. Products and links to other staff organizations

8. When outputs will be available

9. Who has to attend (task to staff to provide reps)

Name of board or cell:

Lead N-code:

When/where does it meet in battle rhythm?:

Purpose:

Inputs required from:

When?

Output/process/product:

Time of delivery:

Membership codes:

boards, centers, cells, and working groups 

Boards, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups Validation

“Seven-Minute Drill”
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-32 

liaison manning requirements. The naval and amphibious liaison element is the primary 

coordination element at the joint air operations center (AOC). 

For more information on liaison responsibilities and joint force HQ organization, see JP 

3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

5. Task Organization of Subordinate Forces 

a. The JFMCC normally delegates the authority to plan and execute tactical missions 

to subordinate CTF or task group (TG) commanders. This enables the JFMCC to focus 

attention on the operational level and empowers subordinate commanders to employ their 

forces to support the commander’s intent. Individual platforms are assigned or attached to 

these subordinate CTFs. Each CTF is assigned a commander, and only the commander 

reports to the JFMCC. The CTF may further subdivide the TF into TGs, task units, and 

task elements to exercise control at the tactical level. These subdivisions may be organized 

based on capabilities, missions, geography, or a hybrid of all three. 

b. The JFMCC establishes the support relationships between the subordinate CTFs 

for various lines of operation. Further, given the nature of maritime operations and tasks 

assigned to a CTF, each CTF will likely be both a supported and supporting commander 

for a number of missions. As the common superior, the JFMCC organizes the TFs 

structure, delegates appropriate authorities, and establishes supporting relationships across 

the CTFs for the planned operation. These relationships may change by phase of an 

operation. 

c. With respect to amphibious operations, amphibious forces are task-organized based 

on the mission. No standard organization is applicable to all situations that may be 

encountered in an amphibious operation. Each TF may be organized separately or several 

may be combined based upon operational requirements. 

For more information on task organization with respect to amphibious forces, see JP 3-02, 

Amphibious Operations. 

6. Navy Composite Warfare Doctrine 

a. USN tactical commanders typically exercise decentralized control over assigned 

forces through use of composite warfare doctrine. This doctrine establishes a composite 

warfare organization within the task organization by assigning the commander’s warfare 

command functions to subordinates. The composite warfare construct allows the officer 

in tactical command (OTC) to assign some or all of the command functions associated with 

mission areas to warfare commanders, functional group commanders, and coordinators, 

thus supporting decentralized execution. The composite warfare organization enables 

offensive and defensive combat operations against multiple targets and threats 

simultaneously. Flexibility of implementation, reinforced by clear guidance to 

subordinates and use of command by negation, are keys to decentralized control of the 

tactical force. The OTC may implement a composite warfare organization whenever and 

to whatever extent required, depending upon the composition and mission of the force and 

the capabilities of the threat. Within the composite warfare construct, the OTC may 
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-15 

establish a subordinate composite warfare commander (CWC) who in turn may establish 

subordinate warfare commanders and/or functional warfare commanders. The warfare 

commanders that may be established include the air and missile defense commander 

(AMDC), the antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC), the information operations 

warfare commander (IWC), the strike warfare commander (STWC), and the surface 

warfare commander (SUWC). The functional group commanders that may be established 

include the BMD commander, the maritime interception operations commander (MIOC), 

the mine warfare commander (MIWC), the screen commander, and the underway 

replenishment group commander. When the levels of activity and complexity in the 

mission areas involved are considered manageable, the tasks of ASWC and SUWC can be 

assigned to one commander, titled the sea combat commander. 

b. In maritime usage, the OTC is the senior officer present eligible to assume 

command or the officer to whom the senior officer has delegated tactical command. If 

only one task organization (e.g., TF, TG) is operating independently in a portion of the 

maritime operational area, the commander of that task organization is the OTC. However, 

when multiple task organizations are operating together in the maritime operational area, 

the OTC is either the common superior or the commander to whom the common superior 

has assigned OTC command functions. In a maritime operational area that has multiple 

TFs operating within it, the common superior will be the NCC/JFMCC. Unless this 

commander assigns OTC command functions to one of the CTFs, the command will 

simultaneously be an operational- and tactical-level command. Care has to be exercised to 

ensure cross-functional working groups within these commands have clear charters and 

understandings on which level they are supporting and how their products support the 

commander’s decision making associated with that level. When warfare functions are 

assigned to subordinate commanders, it is assumed the necessary authority for command, 

control, direction, and coordination required for the execution of those functions are 

delegated with it. 

c. While acknowledged in joint doctrine, the OTC and CWC are maritime, unique 

constructs. Joint community understanding of these C2 constructs is important when 

coordinating or working with maritime forces. The OTC controls CWC and subordinate 

warfare commander’s actions through command by negation. Allied and multinational 

maritime procedures and instructions use the term command by veto to mean the same 

thing. Command by negation acknowledges that, because of the often distributed and 

dispersed nature of maritime warfare, it is necessary to pre-plan the actions of a force to an 

assessed threat and delegate some warfare functions to subordinate commanders. Once 

such functions are delegated, the subordinate commander is to take the required action 

without delay, always keeping the OTC informed of the situation. The CWC orchestrates 

operations to counter threats to the force, while the OTC retains close control of power 

projection and specific sea control operations. Each CWC focuses on its surveillance areas; 

classification, identification, and engagement areas (CIEAs); and vital areas (see Figure 

IV-2). OTCs who are also CTFs have the concurrent responsibility to support the JFMCC’s 

planning for maritime operations. Although assignment of various warfare commanders 

will allow control of different capabilities on a single platform by multiple commanders, 

only one commander may exercise TACON for the ship’s movements and maneuver. 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-32 

d. The CWC may form temporary or permanent functional groups within the overall 

organization. Functional groups are subordinate to the CWC and are usually established 

to perform duties which are generally more limited in scope and duration than those acted 

upon by warfare commanders. In addition, the duties of functional group commanders 

generally span assets normally assigned to more than one warfare commander. Functional 

group commanders collect and disseminate information. In certain situations, they are 

assigned authorities to respond to threats with assigned assets. When authorized, 

functional group commanders, like warfare commanders, may autonomously initiate 

action. The CWC controls actions through command by negation. They may further 

deploy weapons and sensors, regardless of the commander exercising TACON of the unit 

in which the weapon and or sensor is installed. 

e. Coordinators are asset and resource managers. They carry out the policies of the 

OTC or CWC (if assigned) and respond to the specific tasking of either warfare 

commanders or functional group commanders. Coordinators differ from warfare 

commanders and functional group commanders in that coordinators execute tasking but do 

not initiate autonomous actions. Coordinators may include, but are not limited to, air 

resource element coordinator, airspace control authority (ACA), cryptologic resource 

coordinator, and force track coordinator. Figure II-5 shows the relationship of the warfare 

commanders, functional group commanders, and coordinators. 

For additional information on composite warfare doctrine, see Chapter IV, “Command 

and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for Specific Maritime 

Operations;” NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level 

of War; and Allied Tactical Publication-1, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and 

Procedures. 

7. Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

The MAGTF is the USMC’s principal organizational construct for conducting 

missions across the range of military operations. MAGTFs provide CCDRs with scalable, 

versatile expeditionary forces able to assure allies; deter potential adversaries; provide 

persistent US presence with little or no footprint ashore; and respond to a broad range of 

contingency, crisis, and conflict situations. They are balanced, combined-arms force 

packages containing organic command, ground, aviation, and logistics elements. A single 

commander leads and coordinates this combined-arms team through all phases of 

deployment and employment. As the name indicates, MAGTFs are organized for the 

specific tasks at hand and specifically tailored by mission for rapid deployment by air 

and/or sea. 

8. Multinational Considerations 

Command authority for a multinational force commander (MNFC) is normally 

negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command 

authority could range from OPCON, to TACON, to designated support relationships, to 

coordinating authority. The US, particularly the USN, frequently operates as an element 

of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force and routinely uses NATO doctrine, 
 Organizing for Joint Maritime Operations 

II-17 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (ratified by the US via standardization agreements 

[STANAGs]) to guide those operations. 

For overarching doctrine on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations. For additional information on NATO maritime operations, see Allied Joint 

Publication (AJP)-3.1, Allied Joint Maritime Operations. 

9. Supported Maritime Commander Considerations 

Supporting component commanders should understand the optimal C2 organization 

and execution can differ between maritime and land AOs. Acknowledging and 

understanding these differences as well as C2 optimization in the maritime operational area 

is critical to the successful execution of joint maritime operations. Synchronization of 

efforts within land or maritime operational areas with theater and/or JOA-wide operations 

is of particular importance. 

For additional information on supported maritime commander considerations, see NWP 

3-56, Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War. 

Figure II-5. Composite Warfare Commander Organization 

Officer in Tactical Command

Composite Warfare Commander

Warfare Commanders

Sea Combat Commander

Functional Group Commanders

Coordinators

Submarine 

Operations 

Coordinating 

Authority

Helicoptor 

Element 

Coordinator

Common 

Tactical 

Picture 

Manager

Screen 

Commander

Surface 

Warfare 

Commander

Air 

Resource 

Element 

Coordinator

Maritime 

Interception 

Operations 

Commander

Information 

Operations 

Warfare 

Commander

Launch 

Area 

Coordinator

Force Track 

Coordinator

Underway 

Replenishment 

Group 

Commander

Strike 

Warfare 

Commander

Cryptologic 

Resource 

Coordinator

Mine

Warfare 

Commander

Antisubmarine 

Warfare 

Commander

Airspace 

Control 

Authority

Ballistic 

Missile 

Defense 

Commander

Air and 

Missile 

Defense 

Commander

Composite Warfare Commander Organization
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-32 

10. Supporting Maritime Commander Considerations 

In addition to activities inherent to maritime operations (e.g., fleet AD, SUW, 

amphibious warfare, antisubmarine warfare [ASW]), the JFC may task the maritime 

commander with support responsibilities to other functional component commanders. This 

support includes air and missile defense (AMD), joint fire support, interdiction, strategic 

attack, CAS, and naval surface fire support (NSFS). Supported commanders should 

understand that most maritime platforms are multi-mission capable and are routinely tasked 

to support different missions and warfare commanders. They are rarely made available for 

tasking outside the maritime component because their multi-mission capabilities will 

require them to fulfill activities inherent to maritime operations as well as supporting 

operations. 

For additional information on supporting maritime commander considerations, see NWP 

3-56, Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War, and Chapter 

IV, “Command and Control and Other Operational-Level Considerations for Specific 

Maritime Operations.” 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

PLANNING JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS 

1. Maritime Planning Processes and Products 

a. Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of 

command. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of 

national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to attain a 

specified end state. Planning begins with the end state in mind, providing a unifying 

purpose around which actions and resources are focused. Military planning is a 

comprehensive process that enables commanders and staffs at all levels and in all Services 

to make informed decisions, solve complex problems, and ultimately accomplish assigned 

missions. The JFMCC’s operational-level planning simultaneously supports the strategic 

and operational requirements of the JFC and also frames the tactical-level requirements of 

subordinate commanders. The JFMCC’s planning is driven by the JFC’s guidance and 

intent, supports JFC staff planning efforts, and should be closely coordinated with 

component planning. In conducting joint planning, commanders and staff blend 

operational art, operational design, and the joint planning process (JPP) in complementary 

fashion as part of the overall process that produces the eventual plan or order that drives 

the joint operation. The JPP is an orderly, analytical process that consists of a set of logical 

steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best 

COA; and produce a plan or order. Through the JPP, planners effectively translate the 

commanders planning guidance into a feasible COA and CONOPS by which the joint force 

can accomplish its assigned mission and attain the military end state. It involves 

simultaneous efforts to address near-term and far-term operations and should be flexible 

enough to adjust to dynamic unforeseen situations and new taskings. 

b. Most maritime platforms are multi-mission capable and are routinely multi-tasked 

to support different missions and warfare commanders. JFMCC, OTC, and CWCs and 

their staffs should be able to recognize and prioritize requirements, address conflicts and 

limitations, and integrate the various capabilities of assigned and attached forces and those 

made available for tasking. However, it is important to understand the implications of 

multi-mission tasking (e.g., ASW, strike warfare [STW], CAS, air operations in maritime 

SUW, sea control) on individual platforms and personnel. Factoring these implications 

into decision making, especially regarding command relationships and employment, is 

paramount. Specific capabilities of a single multi-mission ship, or other maritime force, 

may be in direct support of one unit or warfare commander, while other capabilities 

inherent to that same platform are in general support of another. Another complication is 

that this often diverse tasking can change significantly and rapidly, as events in this 

complex environment unfold. The JFMCC manages these shifts in tasking and delineates 

“It is the human element in warfare which may, if understood by the commander, 

prove to be the only way of converting an impossibility into a successful reality. 

With trained men and proper materials, the commander’s task is reduced to the 

preparation of good plans.” 

War Instructions, US Navy, 1944
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-32 

how to provide this varied simultaneous support to sometimes geographically separated 

forces. The JFMCC management mechanism is normally via OPORDs, fragmentary 

orders, daily intentions messages, and operational tasking (messages) (OPTASKs). This 

guidance and direction are normally updated daily but may be modified more frequently 

(i.e., hourly). These directives should incorporate the JFC’s intent, support approved 

subordinate CONOPS, consider requests prompted by the dynamics of the OE, work within 

the required operations tempo, and frame the daily operational planning conducted by the 

JFMCC’s staff and assigned forces. 

c. The Navy planning process assists commanders and their staffs in analyzing the 

OE and distilling information to provide the commander a coherent framework to support 

decisions. The process, which parallels the JPP, is thorough and helps apply clarity, sound 

judgment, logic, and professional expertise. It provides commanders and their staffs a 

means to organize planning activities, transmit plans to tactical forces, and share a critical 

common understanding of the mission. Interaction among various planning steps allows a 

concurrent, coordinated effort and the flexibility required to make efficient use of available 

time. It also facilitates continuous information sharing. 

2. Integration with Joint Planning Process 

a. The JFMCC’s staff planning process is consistent with the JPP as outlined in JP 5-

0, Joint Planning. The JFMCC’s staff uses a synchronization process similar to a JFC’s 

staff to facilitate coordination between subordinates. All levels of command have 

processes for analysis and assessment during execution. Collaboration is critical to 

synchronize planning, execution, and assessment processes and enables multiple echelons 

to work efficiently and effectively together. Creating timely mechanisms for systematic 

assessment and decision making enable the entire force to rapidly adapt and leverage 

opportunities in complex dynamic environments. 

b. JFMCCs and their staffs not only contribute to the JFC’s planning efforts but should 

also contribute to the development of other joint force components’ supporting plans and 

OPORDs. Therefore, maritime staffs should be well versed in the JPP; the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122 series, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System; CJCSM 3130 series, Adaptive Planning and Execution; JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Planning; and approved joint terminology. Multinational 

operations are the norm in the maritime domain, and multinational procedures (e.g., NATO 

STANAGs and ratified AJPs) may impact the maritime component’s battle rhythm and 

processes more so than other joint force components. Therefore, maritime staffs may need 

to refer to NATO publications, such as AJP-3.1, Allied Joint Maritime Operations; AJP3.3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination; Maritime Tactical Publication01, Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures; and Maritime 

Procedural Publication-01, Multinational Maritime Voice Reporting Procedures.

3. Organizing the Operational Area 

a. Commanders and their staffs should assess friendly factors of space, time, forces, 

and degree of risk tolerance individually and then balance them in combination against the 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-3 

ultimate or intermediate objective. The balancing of operational factors versus objective 

in a major operation may be determined by the framework of a campaign. Any serious 

disconnect or mismatch between the ultimate or intermediate objective and the 

corresponding space-time-force factors might complicate and possibly endanger the 

success of the operation. If the imbalance cannot be resolved, then the objective should be 

changed and brought into harmony with the operational factors. This process is 

complicated and time consuming. It is more an art than a science. In practice, operational 

factors will rarely be completely, or even approximately, in harmony with one another or 

with the assigned objective. 

b. In harmonizing friendly operational factors against the respective objective, all 

considerations, when possible, should start with the quantifiable factors of space and time 

(i.e., operational reach). The factor of time is more dynamic and changeable than the factor 

of space. Normally, the factors of space and time can be calculated with a high degree of 

confidence. On the other hand, the factor of force is often difficult to evaluate properly 

because of the presence of many elements that are hard or impossible to quantify. A 

significant change in any of these factors will invariably disturb the overall balance and 

require a reassessment of all the factors. Hence, the process remains dynamic and the 

commander should remain alert to detect changes that require reassessment. 

c. The factors of space and force in a maritime AO can be balanced by reducing the 

number or scale of the military objectives to be accomplished. For example, limiting 

efforts to obtain sea control to a much smaller area or to specific physical medium (e.g., 

surface and air but not subsurface or surface and subsurface but not air), increasing the 

number or combat potential of the JFMCC or reducing the number of ships/aircraft 

employed in support of other components can achieve this aim. The factors of space and 

time can also be brought into balance by operating from shorter lines of operation, 

employing highly mobile forces, deploying maritime forces closer to the scene of potential 

conflict, pre-positioning weapons/equipment and logistical supplies, reducing the size of 

the operational area, limiting efforts to obtain temporary instead of permanent sea control 

in a given area, achieving operational surprise, conducting military deception, or accepting 

larger risks. 

4. Other General Planning Considerations 

a. Intelligence. The senior intelligence officers of the maritime component should 

know their command’s intelligence and information requirements and be aware of the 

priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) of the higher, adjacent, and supporting and 

subordinate commands, as well as national-level intelligence requirements. Joint 

intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is the analytical process 

used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and 

other intelligence products in support of the commander’s decision-making process. The 

process is used to analyze all relevant aspects of the OE and to determine a threat’s ability 

to operate within that OE. JIPOE products are used to prepare staff estimates; define the 

OE; describe the impact of the OE on threat and friendly forces; evaluate the capabilities 

of threat forces operating in the OE; and determine and describe potential threat objectives, 

COGs, critical vulnerabilities, decision points, COAs, and civilian activities that might 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-32 

impact military operations. The JIPOE effort must be fully coordinated, synchronized, and 

integrated with the separate intelligence preparation of the battlespace efforts of the 

component commands and Service intelligence centers. Additionally, JIPOE relies heavily 

on inputs from several related, specialized efforts, such as geospatial intelligence 

preparation of the environment and medical intelligence preparation of the OE. All staff 

elements of the joint force and component commands fully participate in the JIPOE effort 

by providing information and data relative to their staff areas of expertise. However, JFCs 

and their subordinate commanders are the key players in planning and guiding the 

intelligence effort, and JIPOE plays a critical role in maximizing efficient intelligence 

operations, determining an acceptable COA, and developing a CONOPS. Commanders 

should integrate the JIPOE process and products into the joint forces planning, execution, 

and assessment efforts. The JIPOE process can be applied across the range of military 

operations and to each level of warfare. The JIPOE process is described in detail in JP 2-

01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(1) The JFMCC staff develops a specific collection strategy and posture for each 

operation to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), which 

includes the PIRs, and other requirements. The JFMCC is also responsible for intelligence 

support of subordinate forces and intelligence support tasks directed by higher authority. 

The JFMCC defines tactical-level intelligence responsibilities and prioritizes maritimerelated intelligence requirements of tactical forces. The overall intelligence goal is to 

provide the JFMCC and maritime forces with accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence to 

support an understanding of the area of influence and area of interest. 

(2) The size and composition of J-2 for the JFMCC’s staff is dependent upon the 

joint force maritime component command organization and scope of the operation. 

Intelligence requirements include access to national, theater, and tactical intelligence 

systems/data; core analysis capability; ability to provide warnings; intelligence collection 

management skills; targeting capability; and systems and administrative support. 

(3) When a Service component commander is designated as a JFMCC, the core 

intelligence staff normally assumes additional responsibility for operational-level 

intelligence matters. This can be a significant expansion of the scope of work required to 

support operational-level staff requirements and decision making and may require 

augmentation of the JFMCC’s J-2. Augmentation considerations include the nature of the 

contingency, specific additional skills required to execute the mission, depth of intelligence 

capability in the existing staff, and additional volume and type of intelligence products 

required. Figure III-1 reflects skill sets that are typically required to augment the JFMCC’s 

intelligence staff. 

b. Fires and Targeting

(1) The maritime fires element in the MOC, supported by the CTFs, plans, 

coordinates, synchronizes, and executes organic maritime and joint fires to create lethal or 

nonlethal effects to set the conditions for success in the maritime AO. The JFMCC’s focus 

is on shaping those opponent formations, functions, facilities, and operations that could 

impact the maritime AO. In addition to providing fires from organic sources, the JFMCC 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-5 

synchronizes and integrates all movement and maneuver, fires, and interdiction in support 

of operations within the maritime AO. Fires typically produce destructive effects but can 

be used to produce nondestructive effects. Planners at the operational and tactical level 

should consider naval integrated fires. Naval integrated fires are the coordinated 

employment of capabilities and weapons to create lethal and nonlethal effects by using 

existing deliberate and dynamic targeting decision aids and cross functional working 

groups. Given the unique structure of the maritime force to conduct operations ashore, 

afloat, beneath the sea, and in the air, planners should consider operations where strengths 

are leveraged to create effects in other parts of the OE. The fires element function 

encompasses a number of tasks, missions, and processes, including: 

(a) Conduct organic maritime and joint targeting to select and prioritize 

targets with desired effects and match the appropriate capability (organic maritime or other 

component commanders’ weapons) to them, taking account of command objectives, 

operational requirements, and capabilities. 

(b) Provide joint fire support and joint fires to assist joint forces to move, 

maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. 

(c) Counter air and missile threats to integrate offensive and defensive 

operations and capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority and 

FP. These operations are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles before 

and after launch. 

Figure III-1. Notional Intelligence Directorate Augmentation Requirements 

Notional Intelligence Directorate Augmentation Requirements

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Joint targeting systems analysts and weaponeers

Special security administrators

Cryptologic resource coordinators and signals-intelligence analysis

Collection management personnel

Intelligence analysts

Imagery exploitation analysts

Geospatial information analysts

Intelligence liaison officers (representing each component command and Service)

Production and dissemination personnel as required (multinational)

Foreign disclosure personnel

System administrators to assist with component and multinational support

Unmanned vehicles support and other intelligence collection platform 

operators/interpreters

National intelligence support team

Joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-32 

(d) Divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface

capabilities before those capabilities can be used effectively against friendly forces or to 

otherwise achieve the enemy’s objectives. 

(e) Conduct strategic attack, to include offensive action against military, 

political, economic, or other targets that are selected specifically in order to achieve 

strategic objectives. 

(f) Employ information-related activities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or 

usurp the adversary’s decision-making processes. 

(g) Assess the results of employing fires to determine the effectiveness and 

performance of fires, as well as their contribution to the larger operation or objective. 

(2) Fires from maritime platforms can create a range of effects and are a critical 

component of maritime power projection. Examples of maritime fires employed against 

targets ashore or over land include interdiction, CAS, suppression of enemy AD, counterair 

(offensive and defensive), and NSFS (direct and general). 

(3) The use of fires is one of the principal means of shaping the JFMCC’s AO. 

Information-related activities employed to affect enemy information and information 

systems, are integral to this process. The JFMCC’s interests are those enemy forces, 

functions, facilities, and operations that impact plans and operations. 

(4) Joint interdiction operations are a key focus for JFMCC’s fires. Fires from 

maritime assets may be major active elements of interdiction. The key attributes in the 

JFC’s joint interdiction operations are the flexibility, maneuverability, and speed of fires 

assets. Additional information on maritime interdiction can be found in JP 3-03, Joint 

Interdiction.

(5) Concentrated fires, even from dispersed forces, are possible because of the 

maneuverability of forces and the extended range of their fires. The JFMCC’s resources 

for fires encompass forces assigned by the JFC and may include sea- or shore-based aircraft 

including fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tiltrotor assigned to theater naval forces, MAGTF, 

or other aircraft made available for tasking; armed and attack helicopters; surface- and 

subsurface-launched cruise missiles and torpedoes; land-based surface fires (e.g., artillery, 

mortars, and rockets); surface gunnery, including NSFS; surface-, subsurface- and airlaunched mines; air, land, maritime, space, SOF, and unmanned vehicles; and cyberspace 

capabilities. 

(6) Constant coordination between fires elements will be required due to the 

technical nature of various maritime fires and weapons systems (e.g., programming, 

guidance, and control procedures) and the fact that a single platform’s multiple systems 

may be supporting numerous commanders in geographically separated areas and the 

resultant, often complex, command relationships, including the nature of support (e.g., 

direct, general). The JFMCC synchronizes operational fires and C2 by the active 

participation of the strike and NSFS cell, supporting arms coordination center, and landing 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-7 

force fire support planners, where available, in the planning and targeting processes. 

Specific JFMCC targeting functions and responsibilities are listed in Figure III-2. 

(7) Land and maritime force commanders normally use a four-phase targeting 

process known as decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) for fires planning, execution, 

and interface with the joint targeting cycle. D3A incorporates the same fundamental 

functions of the joint target cycle. The D3A methodology facilitates synchronizing 

Figure III-2. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Targeting Functions and Responsibilities 

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 

Targeting Functions and Responsibilities

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Conduct target development.

Advise the joint force commander (JFC) on the application of maritime 

operational fires. 

Identify maritime fires support requirements to other components.

Provide apportionment recommendations to the JFC. 

Recommend joint force maritime component command assets for JFC allocation. 

Advise on joint fires asset distribution and priority of forces. 

Develop priorities, timing, and effects for interdiction within the joint force 

maritime component commander’s (JFMCC’s) area of operations (AO). 

Develop JFMCC targeting guidance and priorities. 

Develop a prioritized target nomination list for inclusion in the joint target list, 

restricted target list, and the no-strike list. 

Nominate targets for inclusion on the JFC’s time-sensitive target (TST) list and 

maintain their own lists of high priority targets.

Provide appropriate representation to the JFC’s joint fires element (JFE) and joint 

targeting working group/coordination board when established.

Consolidate and nominate deconflicted and prioritized targets for inclusion in the 

joint integrated prioritized target list.

Provide timely and accurate reporting to the JFE in support of joint operations 

assessment.

Provide tactical and operational assessment to the JFE for incorporation into the 

JFC’s overall assessment efforts.

Coordinate components dynamic targeting via established procedures.

Integrate and deconflict JFMCC fires activity with the JFC and other component 

commanders or forces. 

Plan, coordinate, and supervise the execution of deep supporting fire operations 

within the maritime AO. 

Coordinate with designated airspace control authorities for all planned airspace 

requirements. 

Staff and man the time-sensitive strike branch in the assigned operations cell and 

ensure TST activity is in accordance with the JFC’s TST guidance.
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-32 

maneuver, intelligence, and fire support. D3A is not driven by the battle rhythm associated 

with joint air operations. Components strike targets within their AO with organic 

capabilities. If the maritime force has insufficient organic assets to strike a target within 

the maritime AO, or if a maritime target is outside the maritime AO, the targets can be 

nominated for joint targeting and/or prosecution by another component’s assigned forces. 

Likewise, the maritime force will routinely offer excess strike assets for use in joint 

missions and/or as required by other components. As part of deliberate targeting, the 

maritime operational commander coordinates target nominations for the joint target list, 

no-strike list, restricted target list, and maritime prioritized target list for organic strikes in 

the maritime AO. Use of organic capabilities can help to ensure the maritime operational 

commander’s decision cycle is inside the enemy’s decision cycle. Time-sensitive targets 

(TSTs) and targets of opportunity are usually fleeting with very small windows for weapon 

engagement. Commanders and their staffs, in coordination with joint components and 

other departments and agencies, develop dynamic targeting guidance, which should 

include priorities and guidance for dynamic targeting and identification of requirements by 

subordinates; prioritization of targets, including TSTs; guidance for acquisition; TST type 

and description; desired result; approval authority; acceptable risk; and action against the 

targets. The commander should articulate risk tolerance sufficiently to let on-scene 

commanders (OSCs) understand his intent when dynamic targeting requires accelerated 

coordination. The JFMCC and staff must ensure dynamic targeting is understood and 

rehearsed. Components nominate candidate TSTs, high-payoff targets, and high-value 

targets during deliberate targeting. 

For more information on fires and targeting in the maritime domain, see JP 3-60, Joint 

Targeting; JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; and NWP 3-09, Navy 

Fire Support.

c. MDA

(1) MDA is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime 

domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation. 

Obtaining and maintaining accurate MDA is a key enabler of an active and layered 

maritime defense in depth and facilitates more expeditious and precise actions by the 

JFMCC and subordinate commanders. Some degree of MDA is also required to effectively 

operate as a component of the joint force. Achieving awareness of the maritime domain is 

a challenge due to the vastness of the oceans and seas, the large volume of maritime 

commerce, sensor limitations, the great length of shorelines, and size of port areas that 

provide concealment and numerous access points to the land. MDA integrates all-source 

intelligence, law enforcement information, open-source data, and information from public 

and private sectors, nationally and internationally. 

(2) The primary method for information sharing, gaining situational awareness, 

and supporting collaborative planning in the maritime domain is through development and 

maintenance of a maritime common operational picture (COP). Networking maritime 

regions and resources into a COP can present useful data in a form that supports a wide 

range of planning, decision, execution, and assessment requirements. This data can also 

support GCC requirements to achieve an AOR-wide, single integrated COP. The maritime 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-9 

data can range from a global “snapshot” to the detailed information required by the JFMCC 

and subordinate commanders within their specific operational area. As hostilities escalate, 

maritime data may be difficult to acquire or transport due to geographic or atmospheric 

limitations, self-inflicted interference, or enemy attacks on the maritime C2 system. 

d. Sustainment

(1) The sea remains the principal transport medium for large, heavy, and bulky 

items, as well as large volume requirements. Therefore, maritime logistic capabilities are 

an important consideration in the development of the JFC’s concept of logistic support. 

The availability of shipping and the ability to transfer supplies ashore, to include the use 

of joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) capabilities, may influence where and when 

military operations take place. Additionally, SLOCs and ALOCs, as well as aerial ports of 

debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs), may be considered a critical 

vulnerability and will require continual assessment and protection. The military sealift and 

merchant marine vessels, which transport the preponderance of the joint force’s materiel, 

remain dependent upon secure ports and airfields in a potential objective area. Sealift 

operated by multinational partners may vary in its capabilities but should be factored in 

logistics planning. Interagency partners, international organizations, and NGOs are 

unlikely to possess any form of organic sealift. 

(2) Each Service is responsible for logistic support of its own forces, except as 

otherwise provided for by agreement with other departments or agencies; multinational 

partners; or by assignment to a common, joint, or cross-servicing provider. The JFMCC 

will usually assume logistic coordination responsibilities for all Services and forces 

operating from a sea base. 

(3) The GCC may designate common-user logistics (CUL) support for a

particular joint operation. As such, designated Service component commanders may be 

tasked to provide CUL support to other joint forces, multinational partners, or other 

organizations (e.g., other governmental organizations and NGOs) in a JOA. CUL support 

can be achieved from the use of short-term, inter-Service support agreements between 

Service components. CUL support requirements are normally carried out under the 

auspices of an NCC or a numbered fleet commander and may be a JFMCC’s responsibility 

when the JFMCC is designated as the lead component. 

(4) Authority to direct logistics is not included in the JFMCC’s command 

authority. However, a CCDR may assign responsibility for the planning, execution, and/or 

management of as many common support capabilities to subordinate commanders as 

required to accomplish the CCDR’s objectives. 

(5) Among other functions, the JFMCC’s staff monitors and assesses operations 

and coordinates logistics movements and plans to minimize the maneuvers and time 

required to support the resupply of forces at sea and ashore. In general, the JFMCC’s 

logistics readiness center focuses on key logistics issues that may have an adverse effect 

on the maritime portion of the joint campaign and in general manages by exception only. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-32 

Routine administrative, personnel, and logistics management are the responsibility of the 

JFC and subordinate Service component commanders. 

(6) The ability to conduct at-sea transfer of people and materiel, for ship-to-ship 

and ship-to-shore movement or maneuver purposes, is a key enabler to deploy, employ, 

and sustain joint forces. The foundation of this capability is provided by amphibious 

warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and Military Sealift Command ships. Assets such as the 

expeditionary sea base, expeditionary fast transport intratheater connectors, the 

expeditionary transfer dock, improved maritime pre-positioning capabilities, and 

integrated naval logistics should be considered when planning operations and allocating 

forces. When employed in combination with other naval assets, these capabilities enhance 

access by reducing the joint force’s reliance on ports and airfields in the operational area. 

Maritime forces have integral logistic support capabilities, including repair and medical 

facilities that provide individual maritime units and TFs autonomy and the ability to operate 

for extended periods at considerable distance from shore support. 

(7) As crisis, contingency, and major operations result in more demand on 

existing facilities and increased operational tempo, existing shore-based infrastructure may 

become inadequate to meet the needed level of support for the increased numbers of units 

afloat and to Navy and Marine Corps units ashore. The naval advanced logistic support 

sites and naval forward logistic sites should be expanded to assist in providing required 

additional support. That expansion is accomplished through the Navy’s advanced base 

functional components (ABFCs). ABFCs are preplanned modular unit facility designs that 

provide a variety of functional capabilities to extend the commander’s logistic 

infrastructure supporting naval expeditionary operations. Because of this, they can be used 

to extend shore-based infrastructure as much or as little as needed. ABFCs are employed 

when organic, contracted, or host nation (HN) facilities cannot provide the functionality in 

a time frame required by the commander or when having a standardized design will speed 

delivery, such as a common design for schools built during humanitarian missions. ABFCs 

can be combined with other ABFCs or multiplied for different missions or greater capacity. 

An ABFC is designed to be site adapted or configured for a particular mission. ABFCs are 

developed to minimize the planning, acquisition, shipping, and construction time required 

for use. 

(8) Increased demand and operational tempo will often result in greater reliance 

on nonorganic support (e.g., HN support, contracted support). Operational contract support 

(OCS) is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction 

from commercial sources in support of joint operations. The JFMCC may integrate OCS 

and HN support with their plan and follow GCC guidance for requirements development 

and contractor management. For more guidance on OCS, see JP 4-10, Operational 

Contract Support; CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning 

Formats and Guidance; and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support. 

(9) The following provides a non-exhaustive checklist of the JFMCC’s logistic 

planning considerations: 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-11 

(a) Logistic plans should be integrated with CCDR theater sustainment 

annexes and should be synchronized with the JFC’s concept of logistic support, Service 

component, and multinational partner logistic plans. 

(b) Logistic personnel must be involved early in the staff planning and 

undertake an analysis of the logistic support capabilities required for each of the COAs 

being considered. 

(c) Develop a concept of logistics support that supports commander’s intent 

and CONOPS. At a minimum, this should include the priorities of sustainment for each 

phase of the operation, describe how logistics assets will be organized and positioned to 

execute the mission, and command relationships. 

(10) The JFMCC’s logistic directorate normally participates on those boards, 

centers, and working groups battle rhythm events of critical importance to the success of 

maritime operations. The joint logistics coordination board, theater joint transportation 

board, and the joint movement center, which are transportation-related, may have 

significant impact on maritime operations and are examples of higher-level logistic boards 

on which the JFMCC participates. Among other functions, the JFMCC’s staff coordinates 

and directs logistic plans and movements of assets to minimize the time required to support 

resupply of forces at sea. Other boards and centers of significant importance to the JFMCC 

include the joint material priorities and allocation requirements review board, joint civilmilitary engineering board, joint facilities utilization board, joint environmental 

management board, joint contracting support board, and joint petroleum office. 

(11) The JFMCC does not normally convene separate joint logistic boards and 

working groups except when needed to coordinate critical support within the JFMCC’s 

AO. Possible JFMCC-established boards and working groups may include a logistics 

working group and a logistics coordination board. 

(a) The logistics working group is the primary forum to allow action officers 

within the JFMCC and often representatives from subordinate and stakeholder logistics 

commands to coordinate actions as the result of the logistics coordination board or to 

develop recommendations for decision at the subsequent logistics coordination board. 

(b) A JFMCC’s coordination board is the primary forum in which logistics 

collaboration and coordination occurs and offers an opportunity for the logistics director 

or designated representative to discuss planned or developing operations and for 

subordinate logisticians to call attention to a problem the component logisticians cannot 

solve themselves. 

For more information on maritime logistics planning, see NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, and 

NTTP 5-01.4, Navy Planning, Logistics. 

e. C2 Systems Support

(1) Sensor capability resident in the joint maritime force may support the joint 

force collection plan and may be integrated into the joint data network. Sensor tasking 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-32 

procedures, allocation of collection assets, and product dissemination should be determined 

early in the planning process, clearly defined in supporting plans and tactical procedures, 

and be adaptable to changing requirements. The JFMCC’s staff should access theater and 

national sensor products to enhance situational awareness, facilitate targeting, and augment 

organic operational assessment capabilities. 

(2) The JFMCC’s J-6 provides communications system functional expertise to 

the JFMCC. The J-6 staff’s role is to focus on key communications issues that can have 

an adverse effect on the JFMCC portion of the campaign, electromagnetic spectrum 

management, and interference deconfliction. Routine communications system 

management is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate component commands. 

Communications system hardware is normally a Service component responsibility. 

However, the JFMCC designates specific force communications functions on an exception 

basis. Only communications issues affecting the conduct of the operational mission are of 

concern to the JFMCC’s J-6. Guidance to supporting commanders is provided in formal 

standard operating procedures and OPTASKs. 

f. Protection. The JFMCC is responsible to the JFC for all aspects of maritime FP. 

The JFMCC creates FP plans and sets priorities for the forces. FP is a function routinely 

conducted by maritime forces and essential to mission accomplishment. 

g. Environmental considerations should be integrated into planning for maritime 

operations and are included in annex L (Environmental Considerations) of the OPLAN. 

Commanders should take environmental factors into account during planning, execution, 

and conclusion of an operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that 

may be different from the normal practices of the member nations and obtain agreement 

from participating nations, as necessary. Besides agreeing on common goals and 

objectives for the operation, commanders of participating multinational forces should reach 

some understanding on environmental protection measures during the operation. Failure 

to accomplish this may result in misunderstandings, decreased interoperability, and a 

failure to develop and implement a successful environmental annex and plan for the 

operation. Failure to consider environmental factors will also make it harder for 

commanders to ensure compliance with applicable US environmental laws, DOD and 

CCMD policy, and environmental protection obligations imposed by international 

agreements. Among other things, failing to comply with applicable environmental 

requirements (which may include analysis of environmental impacts on a HN) could 

produce an erosion of support or acceptance of the operation at home and abroad. 

Environmental considerations may include those listed in Figure III-3. 

h. Weather. Weather has a significant impact on maritime operations and may 

influence a commander’s decision making. Seasonal fluctuations in weather may have 

strategic significance. Flight operations, amphibious operations, and sonar performance 

may be made more difficult by high sea states and extreme high or low temperatures. 

Adverse conditions may also be used to advantage. A submarine, for example, may use 

poor sonar conditions to avoid detection. The mobility of maritime forces may allow them 

to move to an operating area where conditions are more favorable. An aircraft carrier may, 

for instance, seek out and exploit a localized open window in otherwise poor visibility to 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-13 

continue flight operations. This may be a particularly significant capability when shorebased aircraft are weather-bound. Characteristics such as wave height, precipitation, and 

sea spray impact visibility and radar/sensor effectiveness for platforms and munitions. 

Ducting, which is a phenomenon that allows radar energy to travel extended distances 

within a few hundred feet of the sea surface (under certain conditions), can have a major 

impact on tactical planning and force positioning. 

i. Law of the Sea 

(1) The oceans of the world traditionally have been classified under the broad 

headings of internal waters, territorial seas, and high seas. Airspace has been divided into 

national and international airspace. In the latter half of the 20th century, new concepts 

evolved, such as the EEZ and archipelagic waters, that dramatically expanded the 

jurisdictional claims of coastal and island nations over wide expanses of the oceans 

previously regarded as high seas. The phenomenon of expanding maritime jurisdiction and 

the rush to extend the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and beyond were the subject of 

international negotiation from 1973 through 1982 in the course of the Third United Nations 

Conference on the Law of the Sea. That conference produced the 1982 UNCLOS, which 

came into effect on 16 November 1994. In 1983, the US announced it would neither sign 

nor ratify the 1982 UNCLOS due to perceived fundamental flaws in its deep seabed mining 

provisions. Further negotiations resulted in an additional agreement regarding Part XI, 

which replaced the original deep seabed mining provisions. This agreement contains 

legally binding changes to the 1982 UNCLOS and is to be applied and interpreted together 

Figure III-3. Environmental Considerations 

Environmental Considerations

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Air pollution from ships, vehicles, aircraft, and construction machinery.

Cleanup of base camps and other occupied areas to an appropriate level.

Protection of endangered species and marine mammals in the operational area.

Environmental safety and health.

Hazardous materials management.

Hazardous waste disposal.

Medical and infectious wastes management and disposal.

Natural and cultural resources protection.

Noise abatement, including noise from aircraft operations.

Pesticide, insecticide, and herbicide management to control non-point pollution.

Resource and energy conservation through pollution prevention practices.

Solid waste management and disposal.

Oil and hazardous substance spills prevention and controls.

Water pollution from sewage, food service, and other operations.
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-32 

with the UNCLOS as a single treaty. As of the date of this publication, the Senate has not 

taken action on this treaty. 

(2) Although the US is not a party to UNCLOS, it considers the navigation and 

overflight provisions therein reflective of customary international law and thus acts in 

accordance with UNCLOS, except for the deep seabed mining provisions. President 

Reagan’s 10 March 1983 Oceans Policy Statement provides: first, the US is prepared to 

accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the 

oceans [in the UNCLOS]—such as navigation and overflight. In this respect, the US will 

recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the 

Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the US and others under international 

law are recognized by such coastal states. Second, the US will exercise and assert its 

navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is 

consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention. The US will not, 

however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and 

freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related 

high seas uses (see Figure III-4). The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea document is 

not legally binding but is an agreement upon which the participating nations have a 

standardized protocol of safety procedures, basic communications, and basic maneuvering 

instructions to follow for naval ships and aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea. The 

US has a long-standing policy of exercising and asserting its freedom of navigation and 

overflight rights on a worldwide basis. Challenges of excessive maritime claims of other 

nations are undertaken both through diplomatic protests by the Department of State and by 

transit of US Armed Forces. Freedom of navigation operations, in accordance with DOD 

Instruction S-2005.01, (U) Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program, are designed to be 

politically neutral, as well as non-provocative, and have encouraged nations to amend their 

claims and bring their practices into conformity with UNCLOS. As DOD’s interest in 

mobility and access is global, US military forces conduct freedom of navigation operations 

against excessive maritime claims in every region of the world, irrespective of the identity 

of the coastal state advancing the claims. Although freedom of navigation operations have 

traditionally employed USN ships and aircraft, other force providers such as USCG for 

ships, or US Air Force for aircraft may provide appropriate forces for employment in 

freedom of navigation operations. 

(3) The legal classifications (“regimes”) of ocean and airspace areas directly 

affect maritime operations by determining the degree of control that a coastal nation may 

exercise over the conduct of foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating within 

these areas. The nature of these regimes, particularly the extent of coastal nation control 

exercised in those areas, is set forth in the succeeding paragraphs. 

Information on the maritime claims of coastal nations and US position on those claims can 

be found at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm. 

For additional information on law of the sea matters, see NWP 1-14M/Marine Corps 

Tactical Publication (MCTP) 11-10B/Commandant Publication P5800.A, The 

Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-15 

j. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). While the C2 processes for UASs are similar 

to those for manned assets, several characteristics of UASs can make C2 particularly 

challenging: 

(1) UAS communication links are generally more critical than those required for 

manned systems. In the event of lost communications, a manned aircraft will typically 

continue the mission or return safely to a home base or alternate field. Although UASs can 

be programmed to return to base upon loss of communication, they rely on a nearly 

continuous stream of communications (for flight control and payload) to successfully 

complete a mission. Therefore, communications security, and specifically bandwidth 

protection (from friendly interference and threat action), is imperative. 

(2) UASs may be capable of transferring control of the aircraft or payloads to 

multiple operators while airborne. Close coordination amongst all potential operators is 

required. 

(3) Most larger UASs have considerably longer endurance times than 

comparable manned systems. Commanders and their staffs should exploit this capability 

when tasking UAS assets. 

(4) Compliance with the airspace control order is critical as unmanned aircraft 

cannot see and avoid other aircraft; generally have small radar and visual signatures; and 

may not have identification, friend or foe capability. 

k. Cyberspace. Commander, Fleet Cyber Command (COMFLTCYBERCOM), is 

the Navy’s central operational authority for protection of Navy cyberspace. The Navy 

plans and conducts Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations and 

Figure III-4. Primary Zones Affecting Navigation and Overflight 

Primary Zones Affecting Navigation and Overflight

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Internal waters are landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is 

measured.

The territorial sea is a belt of ocean that is measured seaward up to 12 nautical 

miles from the baseline of the coastal nation and subject to its sovereignty. Ships 

enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.

Innocent passage does not include a right for aircraft overflight of the territorial sea.

A contiguous zone is an area extending seaward from the baseline up to 24 

nautical miles in which the coastal nation may exercise the control necessary to 

prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary 

laws and regulations that occur within its territory or territorial sea. Ships and 

aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms, including overflight, in the contiguous zone.

An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a resource-related zone adjacent to the 

territorial sea—where a state has certain sovereign rights (but not sovereignty) 

and may not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Ships and 

aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms, including overflight, in the EEZ.

The high seas include all parts of the ocean seaward of the EEZ.
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-32 

defensive cyberspace operations (DCO)-internal defensive measures to ensure networks 

and systems are protected from threats in cyberspace. DCO consists of those actions 

designed to defend friendly cyberspace from malicious cyberspace activity. DCO may be 

conducted in response to an attack or exploitation, including the effects of malware, on the 

DODIN including the Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services the 

Navy is directed to defend. The Navy’s DCO mission is accomplished using a layered, 

adaptive, defense in-depth approach, with mutually supporting elements of protection. 

Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) can be used to create effects that support the 

JFMCC when targets have cyberspace vulnerabilities. Requests for OCO missions in 

support of JFMCC operations are coordinated with the CCMD cyberspace support staff 

elements. 

For additional information on cyberspace operations, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

l. Space Operations. Within the MOC, the space support working group (SSWG) 

provides support to all warfare areas, planning teams, and decision forums where space 

systems and services impact operations. The SSWG coordinates with the space 

coordinating authority as required and ensures space-based capabilities and vulnerabilities 

are included in the planning process and that space requirements are integrated into each 

phase of the JFMCC’s OPLANs. The SSWG also provides reachback support for assigned 

forces. The SSWG is tailored to meet individual MOC mission requirements. 

COMFLTCYBERCOM is the Navy’s central operational authority for space in support of 

maritime forces afloat and ashore. COMFLTCYBERCOM directs operations of assigned 

space systems as an integral element of network operations and associated space control 

activities and provides space expertise, support, products, and services, as required. 

COMFLTCYBERCOM provides planners and space reach-back for maritime forces and 

coordinates with other Service space operations organizations, including space operations 

officers on strike group staffs, joint force maritime component command staffs, or 

maritime HQ. 

For more information on space operations, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.

5. Assessment 

a. Assessment is a process that evaluates changes in the OE and measures progress 

of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the 

OE and the progress of operations; compare them to their initial visualization, 

understanding, and intent; and adjust operations based on this analysis. Staffs monitor key 

factors that can influence operations and provide the commander timely information 

needed for decisions. Normally, the plans directorate of a maritime staff coordinates 

assessment activities. JFCs’ staffs may organize assessment under a special staff section, 

a distinct directorate, or within an existing staff organization. Various elements of the 

JFC’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning. 

They are supported by a cross-functional assessment working group in the MOC. Within 

the MOC, the assessment cell hosts assessment battle rhythm events and develops 

assessment products. An assessment cell is a small, permanent cell with the primary duty 

to develop the operational assessment framework during planning and then assess it during 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-17 

execution. The assessment cell is assisted by an assessment working group, which is 

augmented by personnel from the core joint staff areas (e.g., intelligence, logistics) and 

other functional sections (e.g., fires, staff judge advocate, public affairs) as required. The 

assessment cell may also include nonmilitary personnel as appropriate to provide the 

necessary input and analysis assistance regarding diplomatic, political, military, economic, 

social, information, and infrastructure systems within the OE. 

b. Assessment representatives should be active participants in operational planning 

teams to develop and refine effects for MOEs and MOPs; identify critical indicators related 

to decision and decisive points; and develop an assessment framework to collect, analyze, 

and assess indicators, providing the progress of the operation.

c. The assessment cell develops the assessment data collection plan in concert with 

the JFMCC’s assessment working group. This plan includes locally produced products 

that help to organize incoming data for analysis based on information requirements and 

coordination instructions for conducting evaluations in concert with other staff 

organizations. The assessment cell provides assessment information to support J-3 and J5 [plans directorate of a joint staff] planning efforts and recommendations on whether to 

proceed on course with the current plan or adjust the plan based on execution to date. 

d. The assessment process is used to plan, gather, analyze, and interpret MOE data, 

assessment information from the JFC’s staff, other component and staff assessments, 

subordinate and supporting force inputs, and current operations to determine impact on the 

CONOPS, compliance with commander’s intent, and progress on achieving objectives. 

The assessment cell establishes and updates the assessment picture to create a shared 

situational awareness among the staff, subordinates, and other components. These 

assessments support decision making through established battle rhythm events, such as the 

commander’s update brief or commander’s assessment brief, and make planning 

recommendations based on operational trends in risk or opportunity. Assessment efforts 

are continuous and integrated throughout MOC activities. 

e. The JFMCC’s assessment cell should analyze the JFC’s desired effects and 

objectives, develop MOEs and MOPs that are relevant to the JFMCC’s desired objectives, 

ask for clarifications if necessary, and integrate assessment measures and collection 

requirements into the OPLAN, CONOPS, or OPORD. The assessment cell ensures any 

JFMCC’s MOEs and MOE indicators are consistent with, and not contrary to, the JFC’s 

desired effects and objectives. 

f. Throughout planning and execution, the assessment cell should be prepared to 

identify new, desired, or undesired effects. By the time the commander has approved a 

COA, the assessment cell should have developed tentative MOEs, vetted them through 

subordinate elements, and addressed and mitigated any inconsistencies. Once the effects, 

measures, and indicators have been finalized, they should be compared to current 

CONOPS, CCIRs, and any developed decision support matrices to ensure they are 

consistent with critical information requirements and anticipated decisions. 
Chapter III 

III-18 JP 3-32 

For additional information on assessment see, JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and Joint Doctrine 

Note 1-15, Operation Assessment. 

6. Multinational Participation 

In a multinational environment, the operational aim for maritime forces is to exercise sea 

control; project power ashore; synchronize maritime operations with operations throughout the 

maritime operational area; and support the MNFC’s CONOPS, intent, and guidance in 

accomplishing the multinational TF mission. Maritime forces are primarily navies; however, 

they may include landing forces, maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other 

forces charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea that may have the 

ability to rapidly transition between types of operations. As with land forces, command of 

maritime operations will normally be assigned to a multinational force maritime component 

commander (MNFMCC) or a designated CTF. The MNFC will typically assign a maritime 

AO to the MNFMCC or naval CTF, based upon the CONOPS. The MNFC will also establish, 

as required, supported and supporting relationships to assist in prioritizing actions, assist in 

establishing the main effort, and establish formal command/coordination channels between the 

components for a specific operation/mission or phase. A key aspect of maritime operations 

will be sustainability. The following factors will impact the sustainability of maritime 

MARITIME ASSESSMENT EXAMPLES 

Objectives/Effects 

Objective 1: Maritime safety and security in the joint operations area (JOA) 

 Effect 1.1: Regional threats do not impede freedom of navigation in the 

JOA 

 Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) 1.1.1: Increase/decrease in regional 

threat maritime presence 

 MOE indicator 1.1.1.1: Number of hostile ships preparing to get 

under way 

 MOE indicator 1.1.1.2: Number of hostile ships under way 

 MOE 1.1.2: Increase/decrease in engagements with hostile ships

 MOE indicator 1.1.2.1: Number of engagements where hostile 

ships close to X nautical miles (nms) of coalition ships 

 MOE indicator 1.1.2.2: Number of engagements where hostile 

aircraft close to X nms of coalition ships 

 MOE indicator 1.1.2.3: Number of radars active with coalition

ships within X nms 
 Planning Joint Maritime Operations 

III-19 

operations: available surface combatants and amphibious warfare ships, available submarine 

assets, maintenance supply, and storage facilities. 

For more information on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations 
Chapter III 

III-20 JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND OTHER OPERATIONAL-LEVEL 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIFIC MARITIME OPERATIONS 

1. General 

a. While this chapter is not intended as a primer on the conduct of specific maritime 

operations, due to the complexities of the OE and the required integration and coordination 

between elements of the joint force, a discussion of selected aspects of specific maritime 

operations is deemed essential to foster understanding and enhance unified action. The 

following provides a common baseline for all elements of the joint force to better enable 

joint planning and facilitate effective joint maritime operations. 

b. The USN’s traditional and doctrinal warfighting configuration is the fleet, 

commanded by a numbered fleet commander. Typically, the fleet commander taskorganizes assigned and attached forces using the Navy’s administrative organization as its 

foundation. This is a historical organizational framework from which extensive warfare 

doctrine flows. (See Figure IV-1.) 

c. The JFMCC may create subordinate TFs, who may in turn create further 

subordinate organizations. In each case, the establishing authority must designate the 

command authorities for each subordinate organization, to include support relationships as 

required. Although the CTF is normally the CWC, the CTF can designate a subordinate 

commander to be the CWC. CTFs will typically assign forces under TACON to 

subordinate commanders. A CTF who has OPCON can designate a support command 

authority between two or more subordinate force commanders. 

d. Although a CWC and subordinate warfare and functional group commanders can 

be assigned in many different ways, for ease of discussion this publication will use 

composite warfare in the typical context of a strike group comprising multiple varied and 

multi-mission platforms. 

2. Surface Warfare 

a. SUW encompasses operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval 

surface forces and merchant vessels. These operations typically include the planning and 

“In fulfilling our mission, it's important to start with an assessment of the security 

environment. It is tempting to define the challenge solely in terms of our allies, 

partners, and competitors - the state and non-state actors on the world stage. 

While these are critical, it is even more important to understand the dramatic 

changes that have taken place on the stage itself - the character of the 

environment in which competition and cooperation occur. Fundamentally, the 

world has become dramatically more globalized, and this trend is accelerating. 

Our way ahead must account for this new reality.” 

A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority

January 2016 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-32 

directing of surveillance of the maritime domain, interdiction, and strikes by aircraft and 

missiles. To facilitate management and promote common understanding, standard 

terminology and definitions are used to describe important areas in the maritime AO. The 

areas described in Figure IV-2 should be clearly delineated in SUW plans, boundaries 

defined, and specific preplanned responses designated to occur when contacts are present. 

These designated areas should appear on the COP at tactical and operational levels. 

JFMCC allocation of capabilities between TFs, assignment of TF responsibilities, 

maneuver areas, and specific tasking will significantly affect planning for placement of 

these areas and SUW planning in general. 

b. Effective sensor and combat systems management includes: 

(1) Proper modes for sensors and weapons systems; 

(2) Rapid target designation and assignment of targets to weapons systems; 

(3) Use of standard commands and procedures; 

Figure IV-1. Notional Maritime Task Organization 

Notional Maritime Task Organization

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

Legend

Navy Component 

Commander

Warfare Commanders

On-Scene Commanders

Joint Force 

Commander

Numbered Fleet 

Commander JFACC JFLCC JFMCC

Task Force Task Force

JFSOCC

Task Force Task Force

Task Group Task Group

Task Unit Task Unit

Task Element Task Element

Strategic Level

Operational Level

Tactical Level

Combatant

Commander
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-3 

(4) Ability to launch one’s own weapon first and then exploit the tactical 

advantage gained as the opponent is forced into a defensive posture (subject to rules of 

engagement [ROE]); 

(5) Employment of sensors to support battle damage assessment, reattack as 

necessary; 

(6) Designation of a backup system (if available) for each engagement to achieve 

a higher probability of kill; and 

(7) Consideration of employment of weapons as well as maneuver for defensive 

countermeasures. 

Figure IV-2. Composite Warfare Commander Integration within the 

Joint Operations Area 

Composite Warfare Commander Integration within 

the Joint Operations Area

Legend

AO area of operations

CTF commander, task force

CWC composite warfare commander

GCC geographic combatant commander

JFC joint force commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

Maritime AO

(JFMCC/CTF)

Operating 

Area Sea

Land

Operating 

Area

Vital

Area

CWC

2

CWC

1

Classification, Identification, 

and Engagement Area

Surveillance 

Area

Joint Operations 

Area (JFC)

Area of Responsibility (GCC)
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-32 

c. Tactical-Level SUW C2. SUW is conducted by the SUWC. The SUWC is 

responsible for defense of the strike group against surface threats. The SUWC typically 

will: 

(1) Exercise TACON of assigned SUW units, including stationing, 

maneuvering, and engagement. 

(2) Identify requirements for SUW air support to CWC. 

Surveillance area—In surface warfare, the operational environment that 

equals the force’s ability to conduct a systematic observation of a surface 

area using all available and practical means to detect any vessel of possible 

military concern. The dimensions of the surveillance area are a function of 

strike group surveillance capabilities, sensors, and available theater and 

national assets. 

Classification, identification, and engagement area (CIEA). In maritime 

operations, the area within the surveillance area and surrounding the vital 

area(s) in which all objects detected must be classified, identified, and 

monitored; and the capability maintained to escort, cover, or engage. The 

goal is not to destroy all contacts in the CIEA, but rather to make decisions 

about actions necessary to mitigate the risk that the contact poses. The 

CIEA typically extends from the outer edge of the vital area (VA) to the outer 

edge of where surface forces effectively monitor the operational 

environment. It is a function of friendly force assets/capabilities and 

reaction time, threat speed, the warfare commander’s desired decision 

time, and the size of the VA. 

VA. A designated area or installation to be defended by air defense units. 

The VA typically extends from the center of a defended asset to a distance 

equal to or greater than the expected threat’s weapons release range. The 

intent is to engage legitimate threats prior to them breaching the perimeter 

of the VA. The size of the VA is strictly a function of the anticipated threat. 

In some operating environments, such as the littorals, engaging threats 

prior to their breaching the VA is not possible because operations are 

required within the weapons release range of potential threats. Preplanned 

responses should include measures for when contacts are initially 

detected within the VA. 

Note: Potential exists for multiple organizations conducting operations 

within a joint force maritime component commander’s (JFMCC’s) area of 

operations. To ensure unity of command and unity of effort the JFMCC 

should ensure common processes and procedures exist for the shifting of 

tracking across organizational seams. 

Navy Warfare Publication 3-56, Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations 

at the Tactical Level of War
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-5 

(3) Establish joining and control procedures for SUW aircraft keeping the AMDC 

and appropriate airspace control agencies informed, in accordance with the AMDC’s 

directives. 

(4) Order organic strike group aircraft launch and tasking to counter hostile 

surface contacts. 

d. The SUWC directs force action against surface threats for the CWC. This includes 

actions to direct surface surveillance coordination, armed reconnaissance/strike 

coordination and reconnaissance, war-at-sea strike, counter-fast attack craft/fast inshore 

attack craft, and airborne maritime mining missions within the CIEA. The SUWC collects, 

evaluates, and disseminates SUW surveillance information and plans, directs, monitors, 

and assesses the employment of SUW resources. 

For more information on these missions, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-

04.18/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-20.2/NTTP 3-20.8/Air Force 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.74, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare.

e. Typically the SUWC will be embarked in a CVN [aircraft carrier, nuclear], LHA 

[amphibious assault ship {general purpose}], LHD [amphibious assault ship 

{multipurpose}] or, if possible, in a ship equipped with a robust Global Command and 

Control System-Maritime and cryptologic capabilities to facilitate surface contact 

management. With SUW expertise and experience, a destroyer squadron commander will 

normally be assigned duties as the SUWC for a CSG. Typically, there is not a destroyer 

squadron staff assigned to an ARG; therefore, SUWC duties will usually be assigned to the 

amphibious squadron commander or the commanding officer of the amphibious 

commander’s flagship. The SUWC’s staff should be augmented by aviation community 

representatives, including attack, airborne early warning, ship-based SUW helicopter, and 

land-based maritime patrol personnel. 

3. Air and Missile Defense 

a. For joint maritime operations, countering air and missile threats consists of a 

combination of theater counterair and IAMD. Counterair is the foundational framework at 

the theater level. IAMD synchronizes aspects of counterair with global missile defense, 

homeland defense (HD), and global strike. 

b. At the theater level, the JFC determines the most appropriate command 

relationships for the component forces made available for the counterair mission. When 

the JFC organizes the joint force, in addition to a JFACC, the JFC also normally designates 

an area air defense commander (AADC) (for defensive counterair [DCA]) and an ACA 

(for joint airspace control). Normally, the JFC designates the same individual as the 

JFACC, AADC, and ACA, because the three functions are so integral to one another. 

However, if the situation dictates, the JFC may designate an AADC and/or ACA separate 

from the JFACC. In that case, the JFC must clearly establish the command relationships 

of the JFC and the JFACC to the AADC and the ACA. 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-32 

(1) The JFC designates an AADC with the authority to plan, coordinate, and 

integrate overall joint force DCA operations. The AADC is normally the component 

commander with the preponderance of AMD capability and the C2 and intelligence 

capability to plan, coordinate, and execute theater AMD operations, including real-time 

battle management. 

(2) The JFC will define the command relationships between the AADC and joint 

force component commanders. Components will provide representatives, as appropriate, 

to the AADC’s HQ to provide both specific weapon systems expertise and broader mission 

expertise. 

(3) Regardless of the command relationship, all counterair forces are subject to 

the ROE, airspace control, weapons control measures, and fire control orders established 

by the JFACC, AADC, or ACA as approved by the JFC. Additionally, the AADC will be 

granted the necessary command authority to deconflict and control engagements and to 

exercise real-time battle management. 

c. The maritime force benefits from and contributes to the joint area air defense plan 

(AADP) using shore-based and organic airborne early warning, fighter aircraft, ships 

armed with surface-to-air missiles, and electronic warfare systems. The inner layer of 

defense for a maritime force is provided by a combination of point defense missiles, closein weapons systems, and electronic countermeasures. The JFC, JFMCC, and other 

component commanders should plan and document preauthorized response actions and 

delegated command functions to enable tactical force commander execution of 

decentralized operations in the manner expected. The JFC determines the most appropriate 

command relationships for the component forces made available for counterair. 

d. For AMD, engagement zones are often established. The zones’ designations 

include who has authority to engage threats and dimensions based upon the capabilities of 

organic assets. Maritime forces are mobile and usually employ a moving missile 

engagement zone (MEZ) with separate operational areas for air operations. In a littoral 

environment, amphibious operations may encompass a portion of the land AO and function 

as an MEZ. In this case, maritime combatants may be restricted by geography when 

defending selected coastal assets. Linking land-based, surface-to-air missile systems with 

maritime force generated search and fire control data and vice versa can result in improved 

ability to defend the littoral areas. 

For more information on engagement zones, in addition to other AMD threats, see JP 3-

01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

e. When the NCC is designated as the JFMCC, the JFMCC exercises OPCON of 

NAVFOR, to include the multi-mission BMD ships. The JFMCC may retain command of 

multi-mission ships with BMD capability or transfer OPCON or TACON of the ships to a 

subordinate CTF. Typically, the CTF integrates AMD when designated. Figure IV-3 

contains examples of BMD command functions a JFMCC, in coordination with the 

JFACC/AADC, may assign to a CTF. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-7 

f. In the case of maritime AD regions, the JFMCC may recommend establishing a 

regional air defense commander (RADC) and a person to fill this position, normally a CTF, 

to the JFC via the AADC. 

g. The AADC, as the supported commander for BMD operations, receives support 

from other components. The JFMCC operating in support of the AADC for BMD activities 

prepares maritime BMD-capable forces for possible requests for JFMCC support. Figure 

IV-4 is a visual representation of how a JFC and JFMCC may delegate command 

relationships and assign command functions for the achievement of BMD mission 

operational objectives. 

h. BMD Operations. Each GCC is responsible for BMD in their AOR. While the 

GCC of the targeted AOR is normally the supported commander, Commander, US 

Strategic Command, synchronizes planning for global missile defense and will do so in 

Figure IV-3. Examples of Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense Command Functions 

Examples of Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense 

Command Functions































Assisting with integration of force ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans into the joint 

force maritime component commander’s (JFMCC’s) operation plan and, when 

necessary, providing specific guidance to the force.

Assisting JFMCC formulation of guidance for BMD planned responses.

Coordinating and controlling use of maritime BMD sensors.

Controlling BMD nets, especially with respect to procedural integrity and security in 

reporting communication security.

Coordinating and controlling employment of maritime force BMD weapons.

Defining requirements for protection of multi-mission ships with BMD capability.

Directing and controlling BMD actions of forces assigned.

Disseminating criteria for weapon release and expenditure (a matrix if applicable).

Establishing of JFMCC plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for BMD 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities.

Exercising command by negation over all BMD actions initiated by other units of the 

force.

Exercising tactical control, including stationing and maneuvering of assigned 

multimission ships with BMD capability, in accordance with the JFMCC’s policies 

and plans.

Identifying requirements for nonorganic BMD support to the JFMCC.

Planning and coordinating BMD actions of forces assigned to the JFMCC.

Recommending BMD degrees of readiness to the JFMCC (note JFMCC cannot set 

degree of readiness lower than that established by the area air defense 

commander). 

Supporting the task force commander designated by the JFMCC to coordinate 

integrated air and missile defense operations, or if not assigned, direct liaison with 

the area and regional air defense commander.
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-32 

coordination with other GCCs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate United States 

Government (USG) departments and agencies. Synchronizing and coordination 

responsibilities, however, do not include authority to execute or direct operations for crossAOR BMD operations. Command relationships between GCCs for cross-AOR BMD that 

address specific AOR threats, international agreements, and partner-nation support 

requirements are defined by the Secretary of Defense. The JFC’s plan should discuss the 

GCC’s support command relationship for the AOR. JFMCC assets that are BMD capable 

may be tasked to support this effort. 

i. Maritime AMD C2. The MOC’s IAMD cell serves as the JFMCC’s primary 

planning and execution coordination conduit with higher HQ, other Service components 

(e.g., the AOC and US Army Air and Missile Defense Command), subordinate forces, and 

outside support agencies for IAMD requirements. If a subordinate TF commander is 

designated as an RADC, the MOC’s IAMD cell assists with coordination. The IAMD cell 

supports the development of the AADP and provides subordinate AMD planners a conduit 

for providing recommendations and adjustments to the plan. 

Figure IV-4. Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Command Relationships and Functions 

Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Command Relationships 

and Functions

AO area of operations

BMD ballistic missile defense

Legend

operational control

operational control/tactical control

command relationship determined by the joint force commander

support

BMD command functions

* If activated and in place within the AO, BMD command functions would be 

assigned to commander, task force integrated air and missile defense.

Joint Force Air 

Component 

Commander

Supported

Regional Air 

Defense 

Commander

Area Air 

Defense 

Commander

Commander, 

Task Force

1*

Commander, 

Task Force

2

Commander, 

Task Force ....

Support

Forces assigned

Forces 

assigned

Forces 

assigned

Forces 

assigned

Joint Force Maritime 

Component 

Commander

Supporting

Joint Force

Commander
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-9 

(1) The JFMCC normally delegates TACON of AMD ships and assigns planning 

and command functions to the TF commander who has the preponderance of AMD ships. 

If activated and in place within the operational area, these functions may be assigned to a 

commander, task force integrated air and missile defense (CTF IAMD). CTF IAMD 

provides a standardized C2 layer between the numbered fleet commander and subordinate 

maritime commanders focused on tactical-level missions. 

(2) The USN employs the CWC doctrine for tactical AMD. The CWC’s AMDC 

coordinates with the IAMD cell/CTF IAMD to seamlessly integrate maritime forces in the 

execution of the AADP. Depending on the threat and available forces, the AMDC’s BMD 

tasks may be delegated to a separate BMD commander under the CWC. The MOC IAMD 

cell/CTF IAMD plans AMD for ships operating independently and not covered by a CWC 

structure. 

j. The CWC’s AMDC defends the force against air and ballistic missile threats unless 

a separate BMD commander is designated. The AMDC collects, evaluates, and 

disseminates AMD surveillance information to the CWC and the force and also plans, 

directs, monitors, and assesses the employment of AMD resources. The AMDC: 

(1) Recommends RADC/sector AD commander assignments to the CWC for 

submission to/approval by the OTC or JFMCC for follow-on submission to AADC for JFC 

approval. 

(2) Exercises TACON, including stationing and maneuvering of assigned 

surface AMD-capable units. 

(3) Exercises command by negation over all AMD actions initiated by other 

units of the force. 

(4) Coordinates and orders the launch and station of alert AMD aircraft. 

(5) Coordinates movements of friendly aircraft within the air surveillance area 

in cooperation with the ACA. 

(6) Establishes joining procedures for aircraft assigned DCA missions. 

(7) Assigns stations, sectors, and/or patrolling areas, and designates air control 

units for aircraft assigned DCA missions, keeping the ACA informed. 

(8) In coordination with the ACA, establishes and promulgates the identification 

safety range and safety sectors for all friendly aircraft and any special areas or zones 

established for aircraft safety and identification, or to prevent mutual interference. 

k. The AMDC should be supported by a command center capable of providing 

sufficient tactical awareness to manage AMD for the force. The AMDC should normally 

be assigned on the most capable or experienced AMD ship that provides this level of 

support. The alternate AMDC is assigned to a second AMD ship’s commanding officer 

not already assigned warfare or functional group command responsibilities. Any 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-32 

component liaison officers (LNOs) required, such as an Army AD artillery fire control 

officer, would normally embark on the same ship as the AMDC. 

l. AD also includes systems to counter UASs. To effectively counter UASs, the 

airspace control plan and AADP should include detailed procedures for threat unmanned 

aircraft detection, identification, and engagement. With the proliferation of small UASs 

by both joint and multinational forces, many of which do not have identification, friend or 

foe capability and are similar or identical to threat UASs, the airspace control plan should 

include specific procedural control and coordination measures for control and/or 

deconfliction of friendly UASs. Engagement of unmanned aircraft by traditional AD 

capabilities may be problematic due to their small size and slow speed. 

For additional information on countering UASs, see ATP 3-01.15/MCTP 10-10B/NTTP 3-

01.8/AFTTP 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated 

Air Defense System. 

For additional information regarding countering air and missile threats, see JP 3-01, 

Countering Air and Missile Threats.

4. Antisubmarine Warfare 

a. Undersea warfare (USW) operations are conducted to establish dominance in the 

undersea portion of the maritime operational area, which permits friendly forces to operate 

throughout the maritime operational area and denies an opposing force the effective use of 

underwater systems and weapons. USW includes offensive and defensive submarine, 

ASW, and mine warfare (MIW) operations. 

b. Control of the undersea portion of the operational area is vital to the success of 

joint operations. A principal threat comes from enemy submarines. A single un-located 

submarine could create a significant operational, diplomatic, or economic impact. To 

counter this threat, the JFC will coordinate, and when required, integrate assets from the 

joint force to conduct ASW during all phases of the joint operation or campaign. ASW is 

an operation conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of 

submarines. 

c. Although often viewed as a Navy-only mission, the JFMCC may utilize a variety 

of joint forces and combined forces and capabilities (air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, 

and special operations) to facilitate or conduct ASW. In particular, given the nature of the 

operating environment; the size of the area to be covered; and the mission to find, fix, track, 

target, and if required, engage enemy submarines, the use of persistent national and joint 

intelligence collection platforms is one of the essential resources to ASW mission 

accomplishment. For example, tasks to monitor, track, and engage enemy submarines in 

port or transiting on the ocean surface may be effectively accomplished by non-Navy 

aircraft, UASs, broad-area maritime surveillance, or other joint assets. 

d. While the JFC conducts ASW planning inside the JOA, coordination of ASW 

plans and activities with commands outside the JOA will be essential and may require close 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-11 

coordination with other government departments and agencies, multinational partners, and 

HNs. 

e. ASW missions are typically centrally planned under the direction of the JFMCC 

or an NCC and executed in a decentralized manner in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. ASW 

is extremely complex, requiring the coordination and integration of multiple platforms and 

systems to mitigate the risks posed by enemy submarines. ASW planning should include 

consideration of the submarine threat, OE, force planning, intelligence collection, 

communications systems, and C2. 

f. Because it is difficult to detect and track submarines operating underwater, a 

thorough understanding of the OE is a key tenet of success. Intelligence efforts should 

focus on the physical attributes of specific enemy platforms, their supporting physical and 

C2 infrastructure, and past and anticipated employment patterns. Only after a thorough 

analysis of the physical environment and enemy systems will planners be able to properly 

develop the CONOPS. 

g. The physical characteristics of the maritime operational area have a significant 

impact on ASW execution. The highly variable acoustic properties of the underwater 

environment will impact the ability to detect, identify, track, and engage enemy 

submarines. Factors that may affect these properties include surface shipping (including 

that of the joint force and commercial shipping), inherent environmental noise and 

oceanographic properties, and seasonal weather patterns. Acoustic sensor placement will 

be highly dependent on the acoustic properties of the waterspace. Acoustics may not be 

the sole detection capability; hence, an environmental assessment will be required to 

identify the requirements for non-acoustic detection systems (such as satellite imagery). 

h. Maritime forces must be identified early to account for long transit times. Initial 

force planning considerations should include utilization of pre-positioned capabilities, 

early deployment of surface and subsurface forces, and reassignment of forward-deployed 

forces to the ASW operation. Early presence of joint forces may be essential in seizing the 

initiative. 

i. The objective of ASW operations is to assist in the establishment or maintenance 

of maritime superiority by denying enemy submarine influence in the operational area. 

This is accomplished through actions to detect, identify, track, and engage enemy 

submarines. Un-located enemy submarines often have the most influence in the JOA, 

possibly affecting fleet maneuver and commercial shipping operations. The JFC should 

designate enemy submarines as TSTs and develop and implement a comprehensive plan to 

reduce this threat. The operational key is to establish areas for operations where enemy 

submarines will be unable to threaten key assets. 

j. ASW efforts focused on enemy bases and littoral chokepoints can prevent enemy 

submarines from entering open ocean areas and deny them much of the maritime 

environment. Neutralizing enemy submarines prior to getting underway, by planned 

targeting of enemy naval facilities and disrupting critical infrastructure supporting 

submarine operations, is the most effective defense against the enemy submarine threat. 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-32 

Dynamic targeting of enemy submarines may also be possible when the enemy submarine 

remains on the surface. However, if permitted to enter open ocean areas and submerge, 

the level of effort required to neutralize the submarine threat increases significantly. 

k. Protection of surface units or commercial shipping may require ASW emphasis 

near operating areas, SLOCs, chokepoints, friendly and neutral ports, or other critical areas. 

l. Detection of submarines can have a significant impact on maritime operations. 

Even if engagement of enemy submarines is prevented by ROE or other considerations, 

the ability to track enemy submarine movement will shrink the area of influence to the 

known location of the submarine. The integration of intelligence and operations is essential 

to the conduct of ASW. 

m. Sensor employment should be thoroughly analyzed and carefully integrated into 

the CONOPS. Planners must take into consideration the acoustic properties of the 

operating environment. Sensor platforms should be placed to optimize sensor performance 

while minimizing the threat to the sensor platform. Acoustics are not the sole detection 

and tracking mechanism. Intelligence collection planning should emphasize that all joint 

sensors, including those not historically associated with ASW, may provide information 

for application at the operational and tactical levels of warfare. 

n. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance visualization through a COP will 

maximize MDA and enhance ASW execution. Care must be taken, however, to ensure the 

uncertainty inherent in ASW operations is taken into consideration; distinction must be 

made between suspected location of un-located submarines and known submarine 

positions. 

o. Theater Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (TASWC). The TASWC is the 

commander assigned to develop plans and direct assigned assets to conduct ASW within 

the GCC’s AOR. Theater ASW employs available in-theater ASW assets (national and 

combined forces) to track potential submarine threats. Strike groups must coordinate 

transit routes and operating areas with the TASWC to provide maximum protection for 

high-value and mission-essential units. The TASWC may exercise either OPCON or 

TACON of assigned and attached assets. When tasked to support a JFC during an 

operation, the TASWC is established and designated as a CTF or TG commander by the 

JFMCC. The TASWC conducts ASW operations as permitted by ROE. The TASWC 

coordinates ASW with commanders inside and outside the JOA for the JFMCC/NCC. The 

JFMCC or NCC may assign forces directly to the TASWC. The TASWC also directly 

supports other maritime commanders (i.e., strike group commanders) in the conduct of 

tactical ASW and typically provides ASW support to afloat forces as they transit through 

or operate in the AOR. The TASWC should promulgate the WSM and PMI elements in 

effect. As changes to elements of WSM and PMI are promulgated by the submarine 

operating authority (SUBOPAUTH), the TASWC should promptly disseminate that 

information to the force. The TASWC and SUBOPAUTH closely coordinate submarine 

operations, to include WSM and PMI issues. In some cases, the TASWC exercises theater 

ASW and SUBOPAUTH responsibilities. They should maintain direct liaison with the 

joint intelligence center. Successful ASW prosecution requires fusing intelligence, 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-13 

oceanographic data, surveillance, cueing, multiple sensors, sensor technologies, and 

coordination between multiple platforms and staffs. Joint and national intelligence 

collection capabilities must be incorporated into this process.

p. SUBOPAUTH. The SUBOPAUTH is the Navy commander appointed by the 

NCC to ensure safety and PMI, provide WSM, and control the submarine broadcast for 

assigned submarines within a designated operational area. The SUBOPAUTH may 

exercise either OPCON or TACON of assigned and attached assets. Within their 

operational area, SUBOPAUTHs employ WSM to permit the rapid and effective 

engagement of hostile submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly 

submarines. Similar to fire support coordination measures on land, WSM may facilitate 

reducing or eliminating coordination requirements for the engagement of undersea targets 

or impose requirements for specific coordination before engagement of targets. Along with 

other control measures, WSM and associated procedures help ensure surface and air fires 

do not jeopardize submarine safety or interfere with other attack means. PMI is waterspace 

allocation and procedures designed to prevent submerged collision between friendly 

submarines, between submarines and friendly surface ships’ towed bodies, between 

unmanned underwater vehicles and other bodies, and between submarines and any other 

underwater event. 

q. Tactical-Level ASW C2. The ASWC defends the force against submarine threats. 

The ASWC is normally authorized direct liaison with the SUBOPAUTH and TASWC for 

the purposes of sharing ASW information and coordination. The ASWC collects, 

evaluates, and disseminates antisubmarine surveillance information to the CWC and the 

force and also plans, directs, monitors, and assesses the employment of antisubmarine 

resources. The ASWC: 

(1) Exercises TACON of assigned surface ASW units and aircraft whose 

primary mission is ASW, including stationing, maneuvering, and contact prosecution. 

(2) Identifies requirements for nonorganic ASW air support to CWC. Establishes 

the requirements for organic ASW air support. 

(3) Provides WSM recommendations to CWC. 

(4) Issues specific instructions to all friendly units to prevent mutual interference 

between submarines in support, towed array surface ships, and all other friendly units. 

(5) Orders the launch and employment of alert aircraft to counter the submarine 

threat. 

(6) Implements the underwater acoustic part of the emission control plan. 

(7) Coordinates and controls employment of subsurface surveillance 

(8) Promulgate plans to conduct acoustic deception. 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-32 

r. The ASW command center should support temporary installation of acoustic and 

non-acoustic sensor performance prediction systems tailored to reinforce ASW search 

operations. The most capable platform or staff may be assigned the role as the ASWC. 

Typically, a destroyer squadron commodore embarked on the OTC’s flagship is the 

ASWC. The ASWC’s staff is augmented with representatives of the fixed-wing and rotarywing ASW communities and naval oceanographic analysis team personnel. When ASW 

is assigned as the primary mission of submarines operating with a naval force, and if the 

ASWC is also designated as submarine operations coordination authority, a qualified 

submarine officer may be assigned to the ASWC to act as submarine element coordinator 

to achieve required coordination. 

s. The alternate ASWC should also be assigned to a destroyer squadron commodore 

if one is available (e.g., dual carrier operations). If one is not available, an ASW ship’s 

commanding officer not already assigned warfare or functional group command 

responsibilities should be assigned as the alternate ASWC. Similar criteria as those 

discussed for the ASWC should be used when selecting the alternate ASWC. 

5. Mine Warfare 

a. Maritime MIW is divided into two basic subdivisions: the laying of mines to 

degrade the enemy’s capabilities to wage warfare and the countering of enemy-laid mines 

to permit friendly maneuver. 

b. Maritime MIW is one aspect of a coordinated naval, and most likely, joint 

campaign. MIW identifies engagement opportunities that should be considered by joint 

planners to employ friendly mining capability, preclude adversaries from effectively 

employing maritime mining, and defeat the minefield. Actions taken by other elements of 

the joint force may have significant impact on the planning and execution of MIW. Mine 

countermeasures (MCM) operations, for example, are likely to include the use of 

helicopters and unmanned aircraft, requiring coordination with the JFACC. If conducted 

in a hostile or uncertain OE, MCM ships and aircraft will require FP, and enemy assets 

capable of impeding the MCM effort will need to be addressed as part of the joint targeting 

process. MIW operations must be carefully coordinated with the other component 

commanders. 

c. Maritime mining is used to support the broad tasks to establish and maintain 

control of essential sea areas. Mines may be employed either offensively or defensively to 

restrict the movement of surface ships and submarines. They can be used alone to deny 

free access to ports, harbors, and rivers, as well as movement through SLOCs. Sea mines 

can also be used as a force multiplier to augment other military assets and reduce the 

surface and submarine threat. Mining is generally conducted by US Air Force bomber or 

USN strike aircraft. Submarines and surface ships can also be configured to emplace 

mines. 

d. MCM include all actions undertaken to prevent enemy mines from altering 

friendly forces’ maritime plans, operations, or maneuver. MCM reduce the threat and 

effects of enemy-laid sea mines on friendly naval force and seaborne logistic force access 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-15 

to and transit of selected waterways. MCM operations are divided into two broad areas: 

offensive and defensive MCM. 

(1) Offensive MCM. The most effective means for countering a mine threat is 

to prevent the laying of mines, a problem that may require cross-component coordination 

across the joint force. Offensive MCM destroy enemy mine manufacturing and storage 

facilities or mine laying platforms before the mines are laid. Although an adjunct of MIW, 

these operations are not normally conducted by MIW forces. Therefore, staff MCM 

planners nominate enemy mine layer, mine storage and, ultimately, mine production 

facilities and assets up through the JFMCC targeting group for inclusion on joint target 

lists. 

(2) Defensive MCM. Defensive countermeasures are designed to counter mines 

once they have been laid. Some measures are undertaken following the termination of 

conflict solely to eliminate or reduce the threat to shipping posed by residual sea mines. 

However, most defensive MCM operations are undertaken during conflict to support 

(enable) other maritime operations. Defensive MCM includes passive and active MCM. 

(a) Passive MCM reduce the threat from emplaced mines without physically 

attacking the mine itself through reduction of ship susceptibility to mine actuation. Three 

primary passive measures are practiced: localization of the threat, detection and avoidance 

of the minefield, and risk reduction. 

1. Threat localization engenders establishment of a transit-route 

system, referred to as Q-routes, which all ships will use to minimize exposure in potentially 

mined waters. Establishing transit routes should be one of the first steps taken by MCM 

planners, if the routes have not been previously designated, to minimize exposure of 

shipping and permit concentration of active MCM efforts. Minehunting and minesweeping 

are time-consuming operations performed by forces (ships and helicopters) that require 

localized air and maritime superiority in which to operate. The JFC may need to allocate 

significant maritime and air forces to protect the MCM force and prevent the enemy from 

re-seeding areas already cleared of mines. 

2. Detection and avoidance of minefields can be accomplished by 

exploiting intelligence information or organic MCM forces. When the location has been 

established, shipping may be routed around the area. 

3. Risk reduction is primarily practiced by individual ships rather than 

planned and executed by MCM forces. Risk may be reduced by controlling the degree of 

potential interaction with a mine sensor. Against contact mines, a reduction in draft and 

posting additional lookouts can reduce the number of mines with which the ship’s hull 

might strike. Influence mines can be denied the required activation signals by controlling 

the ship’s emissions. Use of on-board magnetic field reduction equipment or external 

degaussing, silencing a ship to minimize radiated noise, or using minimum speeds to reduce 

pressure signature are examples of operational risk reduction. Other types of risk reduction 

involve the enhancement of ship survivability in the event of mine detonation. 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-32 

(b) Active MCM are applied when passive measures alone cannot protect 

traffic. This entails physical interference with the explosive functioning of the mine or 

actually destroying it. Minehunting and minesweeping are the primary techniques 

employed in active MCM. Both require detailed intelligence and extensive planning by 

the mine countermeasures commander (MCMC) to counter the threat effectively. 

e. Planning and execution of MIW operations, both MCM and mining, require 

detailed subject matter expertise. For most operations requiring dedicated MCM assets, 

Commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center, one of the three 

MCM squadron commanders, or one of the forward-based mine division commanding 

officers, will act as the MCMC. For small-scale operations or those operations employing 

a single type of MCM asset, the commanding officer or officer in charge from an airborne 

MCM squadron, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) mobile unit, or expeditionary MCM 

company may be assigned as the MCMC. When assigned as the MIWC, the MCMC also 

plans and executes mining operations. When no MIWC is assigned under the JFMCC, 

responsibility for planning and executing naval mining operations usually rests with the 

CWC. 

f. The command organization and relationships involving MIW forces will vary for 

each operation or exercise. In most cases, MIW operations are conducted under the 

framework of a TF architecture with the MIWC or MCMC reporting directly to the 

JFMCC. MIW can also be executed under the supported-supporting concept (e.g., the 

MCMC, operating as CTF MCM can be assigned as a supporting commander to the 

amphibious CTF in support of an amphibious assault). 

For additional information regarding MIW, see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine 

Warfare for Joint Operations. 

6. Strike Warfare 

a. STW are naval operations to destroy or neutralize targets ashore, including attacks 

against strategic or tactical targets, such as manufacturing facilities and operating bases, 

from which the enemy is capable of conducting or supporting air, surface, or subsurface 

operations against friendly forces. Strike operations may employ ballistic or cruise 

missiles, aircraft, naval surface fires, Marines, and SOF to attack targets ashore. The term 

“strike warfare” commonly includes joint fire support, interdiction, strategic attack, and 

CAS. Amphibious operations may involve extensive application of STW capabilities and 

require coordination with the JFLCC and JFACC, while amphibious raids are also a form 

of strike operations. 

b. STW may be conducted by ballistic and cruise missile-carrying submarines, 

aircraft carrier strike aircraft, SAGs of one or more naval surface vessels with TLAMs, 

naval surface gunnery, rotary-winged aircraft, UASs, and amphibious assault ships. 

Integration of TLAMs with strike aircraft in the same attack requires close coordination 

between the ACA, JFACC, JFMCC, and possibly the JFLCC to deconflict airspace and 

target selection. In openly hostile situations, extensive strike operations and offensive 

application of sea control warfare tasks, particularly with respect to mines and submarines, 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-17 

will be employed to gain access. An important element of gaining access includes 

neutralizing anti-ship cruise missiles prior to surface forces coming within their range. 

Long-range, high-speed, and maneuvering characteristics of such missiles make in-flight 

defeat challenging, necessitating strike operations to neutralize enemy launch platforms. 

c. The STWC plans, directs, monitors, and assesses maritime power projection 

ashore and may strike surface targets at sea at extended ranges from the strike group for 

the CWC. The STWC normally exercises TACON of assigned STW assets. Typically, 

the STWC does not plan or direct TLAM missions. The STWC integrates or coordinates 

carrier air wing (CVW) resources with TLAM missions via the launch area coordinator 

and Tomahawk strike coordinator. The STWC coordinates NSFS missions via the NSFS 

coordinator. The STWC identifies requirements for nonorganic STW air support. When 

Navy TF/TG/ships are operating in or adjacent to a JOA, they are to coordinate STW 

operations with the appropriate AOC. 

d. The STWC should have direct access to the CWC, key strike planning personnel, 

and the intelligence center. Typically, a CVW commander embarked on the OTC’s 

flagship is the STWC for CSGs. The amphibious squadron commodore is normally the 

STWC for ARGs. The staff of the STWC should include air wing representation from each 

of the different capability areas, cruise missile and NSFS officer augmentation, and 

intelligence support. The STWC will normally provide LNOs to the JFACC as part of the 

naval and amphibious liaison element. 

e. The STWC will keep the AMDC and ACA informed of joining and control 

procedures for STW aircraft in accordance with the AMDC’s directives. 

7. Amphibious Operations 

Amphibious operations are complex and may involve all components of the joint 

force. They are typified by close integration of forces trained, organized, and equipped for 

different combat functions. The JFC and JFMCC should shape the amphibious objective 

area or operational area by employing CSGs and other maritime and joint assets prior to 

the commencement of the amphibious operation. Shaping operations establish local 

maritime and air superiority, which is necessary for the amphibious operation to occur. 

The support relationship between the CSGs and other joint forces conducting the shaping 

operations and the amphibious force should be determined and provided in an establishing 

directive. Fundamental principles and guidance on the planning and execution of 

amphibious operations, to include command relationships and logistic support 

requirements, are contained in JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. Doctrine for the 

embarkation and debarkation of the landing force conducting amphibious operations can 

be found in JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation. NATO doctrine ratified 

by the US can be found in AJP-3.1, Allied Joint Maritime Operations. Additional Allied 

doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures can be found in Allied Tactical 

Publication-8 Volume I, Amphibious Operations, and Allied Tactical Publication-8, 

Volume II, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Amphibious Operations. 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-32 

8. Naval Surface Fire Support 

a. NSFS units are normally OPCON to the NCC or TACON to the JFMCC and 

provide direct or general support to other joint force components or subordinate forces of 

the JFMCC (e.g., an amphibious force). When supporting a landing force or other ground 

forces, an NSFS spotting team is usually attached to the maneuvering forces for fire support 

coordination purposes. The JFMCC synchronizes fires with the active participation of the 

JFMCC strike/NSFS cell. For fire support, the JFMCC may exercise C2 through the 

supporting arms coordination center in the amphibious TF flagship or the force fires 

coordination center within the amphibious force organization assigned to the JFMCC. 

b. During an amphibious assault, when the number of ships permits, the commander, 

amphibious TF, will assign each assault battalion a ship in direct support. The ship delivers 

fires in the zone of fire, which normally corresponds to the zone of action of the supported 

unit. When possible, ships capable of performing simultaneous missions may be given 

multiple direct support missions to allow for maximum support to the landing force. 

For additional information regarding NSFS in support of amphibious operations, see JP 

3-02, Amphibious Operations; NTTP 3-02.2M/MCTP 3-31A, Supporting Arms 

Coordination in Amphibious Operations; Allied Tactical Publication-8, Volume I, 

Amphibious Operations; and Allied Tactical Publication-8, Volume II, Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Amphibious Operations.

c. A ship in general support attacks targets in the zone of fire which correspond to 

the zone of action of the supported unit. Prearranged fires are delivered in accordance with 

a schedule of fires published in the amphibious TF OPORD and the NSFS plan in the 

landing force OPORD. Fires may also be allocated to a subordinate unit for a specific 

mission(s). Upon completion of the mission(s), the ship reverts to general support. 

9. Commander’s Communication Synchronization 

a. Commander’s communication synchronization (CCS) is a process that helps 

implement strategic-level guidance by coordinating, synchronizing, and ensuring the 

integrity and consistency of strategic- to tactical-level narratives, themes, messages, 

images, and actions throughout a joint operation across all relevant communication 

activities. JFCs, their component commanders, and staffs coordinate and adjust CCS plans, 

programs, products, and actions with the other interorganizational participants employed 

throughout the operational area, such as the various chiefs of mission relevant to the joint 

operation. Effective CCS focuses processes and efforts to understand and communicate 

with key audiences and create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance 

USG interests, policies, and objectives. 

b. The JFMCC plans actions in the information environment that disrupt and degrade 

adversary decision making and C2 systems, while protecting their own decision making 

and C2 systems. The JFMCC sets the conditions and creates the environment to allow 

tactical units to successfully execute information-related tasks. The CCS cell focuses on a 

range of disciplines and functions to develop a coordinated communication 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-19 

synchronization plan. The CCS cell consists of the CCS cell lead and subject matter experts 

on the use of information-related activities to achieve the commander’s information related 

objectives. Communications between the JFC and the JFMCC may be difficult because of 

the geographic separation of the commands. The JFMCC should normally send a LNO to 

the JFC’s CCS cell to facilitate communications and provide details on employment of 

maritime forces and capabilities. Upon receipt and analysis of the JFC’s mission statement, 

the CCS planning cell passes any details of ongoing CCS themes and shaping efforts to the 

JFC and other component commanders’ planners. The LNO can be instrumental in 

providing the CCS cell with the necessary information and assistance where required. 

c. IWC. The IWC shapes and assesses the information environment, achieves and 

maintains local information superiority, develops and executes CCS plans in support of 

CWC objectives, and supports other warfare commanders. The IWC also ensures joint 

targeting board awareness of information-related objectives to maximize mission 

effectiveness of information-related activities and supporting lethal and nonlethal effects. 

The IWC coordinates with the MOC CCS cell to recommend or deconflict targets for attack 

and to determine potential effects of theater activities on CSG and ARG operations. 

d. The IWC additionally supports operational-level efforts to achieve 

electromagnetic spectrum control. The primary means to gain operational electromagnetic 

spectrum control are: electromagnetic OE sensing and exploitation; electromagnetic 

agility; and electromagnetic fires, which include electronic attack, directed energy, and 

electromagnetic-enabled cyberspace attack. 

For additional information regarding CCS, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-13, 

Information Operations; JP 3-61, Public Affairs; and NTTP 3-13.1, Theater and Campaign 

Information Operations Planning. 

10. Maritime Interception Operations 

a. MIO are efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international 

waters to enforce sanctions against other nations, such as those in support of United Nations 

Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods. 

Boarding teams of Sailors, Marines, SOF, Coast Guardsmen, and specialized law 

enforcement personnel are trained in the techniques of visit, board, search, and seizure 

(VBSS) to conduct MIO worldwide. These boardings are used for specific missions based 

on authorities, laws, and jurisdiction. US warships may be tasked to conduct MIO or to 

provide support to embarked forces tasked with conducting boardings that are beyond the 

capability of normal ship’s force VBSS teams. As in any operation, commanders 

considering opposed or noncompliant boardings must have timely intelligence of the threat 

and associated degree of risk and weigh this against the benefits of apprehension and 

capabilities of the forces to be employed. 

b. USCG law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) may be embarked on various 

vessels for boardings associated with MIO, specifically, for LEO involving vessels 

suspected of illicit activity. Law enforcement, in accordance with Title 14, United States 

Code (USC), Section 89, gives the USCG statutory authority to make inquiries, 
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 3-32 

examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters 

over which the US has jurisdiction for the prevention, detection, and suppression of 

violations of the laws of the US. MIO by warships is authorized under international law to 

support international policy objectives. Navy ships carrying LEDETs support federal law 

enforcement efforts, but Navy and other DOD personnel are generally prohibited from 

direct involvement in law enforcement activity, such as boarding in conjunction with LEO, 

arrest, or seizure. Such personnel may fill support functions, including damage control; 

gas-free engineering; liquid load transfer; use of warning shots and/or disabling fire (while 

under USCG TACON); jettisoned contraband recovery; interpreting; and, at the direction 

of the boarding officer, collection of biometrics and digital evidence search and seizure. 

Counterdrug (CD) operations and alien migrant interdiction operations are examples of 

LEO. LEO by USCG personnel, including LEDETs, are governed by Commandant 

Instruction M16247.1, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM), and NTTP 3-07.4M, 

Maritime Counterdrug and Alien Migration Interdiction Operations. Commandant 

Instruction M16247.1 includes detailed guidance with respect to legal authorities and 

policy (including USCG use of force policy) for USCG law enforcement missions. 

c. MIO lines of authority should be streamlined and must be clearly understood by 

all forces involved in the conduct of the mission. The command structure selected may 

vary but will typically include some form of a support relationship, with the embarked 

forces being the supported command and other forces being in a supporting role; 

notwithstanding, the MIOC continues to be the officer assigned to command the operation 

(i.e., maintain TACON). 

d. Expanded MIO are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of 

Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related 

material that pose an imminent threat to the US and its allies.

e. Historically, MIO is a peacetime measure designed to enforce embargoes 

sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), national authority, or other 

regional organization. Purely peacetime MIO share many operational characteristics with 

the exercise of belligerent rights; however, they are conceptually different. The use of 

lethal force is closely controlled during MIO and is used only where necessary as a measure 

of last resort when all other means of embargo enforcement have failed. The recognized 

sanctioning body establishes the provisions of MIO (e.g., in a UNSCR). After a CCDR 

responsible for conducting MIO is designated, an OPORD is issued that conforms to the 

resolution. The NCC may issue AO-specific OPTASK supplements that address: 

(1) Materials to be identified, tracked, diverted, or seized. 

(2) Disposition of identified goods that are not to enter or leave a specified 

nation. 

(3) Types of suspect vessels expected to transit the operational area. 

(4) Questions to ask the suspect vessel during boarding. 

(5) Criteria for diversion. 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-21 

(6) Percentages of cargo that should be searched on each type of ship. 

(7) ROE. 

(8) Criteria used for classifying contacts and determining cleared vessels from 

possible sanction violators. 

(9) Reporting procedures for initial contact report, boarding summaries, 

challenge summaries, diversion reports, and after action reports. 

f. Conduct of MIO missions is based upon the concept of assessing the physical 

characteristics and resistance level anticipated or known to exist on the unit to be boarded 

versus the abilities of the boarding team. Each boarding is unique and inherently risky and 

characterized as compliant, noncompliant, or opposed boarding. A compliant boarding can 

quickly degrade into a noncompliant or opposed situation for a variety of reasons, a 

significant planning factor. When boarding a suspect vessel via helicopter insertion during 

a noncompliant or opposed boarding, specially trained and equipped forces are required.

g. Traditionally, the primary mechanism for MIO initiation has been through a 

UNSCR. However, other authorizations include consent of a coastal state or flag state, 

consent of the vessel master, an interception as a condition of port entry, belligerent right 

of visit and search, interception of a stateless vessel, or an interception made pursuant to 

the right of self-defense. The authority to conduct MIO is based on international law and 

is given by the UNSC, national authority, or other regional authority. Once it is decided 

the US will participate in an operation, authorization for US forces to conduct MIO 

missions is initiated by the Secretary of Defense after approval by the President. The 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff designates the appropriate CCDR to perform MIO 

based on the geographic location of operations. Depending on the nature and location of 

the threat, national-level leadership of the USG departments and agencies other than DOD 

may participate in the development and approval of COAs to respond to maritime threats 

through the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan. MOTR is a component 

plan of the national strategy for maritime security. The US is party to Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI) agreements with a number of other countries. These PSI agreements, 

entered into in furtherance of UNSCR 1540, Resource Collection, provide legal authority 

for the parties to board each other’s vessels when such vessels are suspected of transporting 

weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. 

h. Tactical-Level MIO C2. As directed by the JFMCC, the MIOC is the OTC and 

serves as the primary authority for VBSS within the AO and gives the authority to conduct 

boardings; designates the supporting ships, supporting air assets, VBSS team, and search 

and rescue team; provides all available intelligence products; assigns communications 

frequencies required; and designates the OSC of the VBSS operation. The MIOC may 

retain the responsibilities of OSC and exercise TACON of all the forces and assets. The 

OSC assumes TACON, conducts surveillance, maintains accurate position data, and 

provides essential elements of information on the suspect vessel. The OSC reports progress 

of the operation to the MIOC and decides whether to go ahead with the mission or abort. 
Chapter IV 

IV-22 JP 3-32 

For further information on MIO, see NTTP 3-07.11M/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.3/Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 13-10Ii, Visit, 

Board, Search, and Seizure Operations. 

11. Maritime Security Operations 

a. Maritime security includes a collection of tasks that are derived from agreed-upon 

international law. MSO are those operations conducted to establish the conditions for 

security and protection of sovereignty in the maritime domain. Examples of MSO include 

missions to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, 

piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne migration. The maritime force 

assists mariners in distress, participates in security cooperation operations with allies and 

partners, shares situational awareness, and conducts maritime interception and LEO. MSO 

involve close coordination among governments, the private sector, international 

organizations, and NGOs. 

b. Counterpiracy. International law has long recognized a general duty of all 

nations to cooperate in the repression of piracy. Piracy is an international crime consisting 

of illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends by the crew 

or passengers of a private ship or aircraft beyond the territorial sea of another nation against 

another ship or aircraft or persons and property on board (depredation is the act of 

plundering, robbing, or pillaging). In international law, piracy is a crime that can be 

committed only on or over the high seas, EEZs, contiguous zones, and in other places 

beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation. The same acts (e.g., armed robbery, 

hostage taking, kidnapping, extortion) committed in the internal waters, territorial sea, 

archipelagic waters, or national airspace of a nation do not constitute piracy in international 

law but are, instead, crimes within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the coastal nation. 

c. Only warships, military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and 

identifiable as being in governmental service may seize a pirate ship or aircraft. A pirate 

vessel or aircraft, and all persons on board, seized and detained by a US vessel or aircraft 

should be taken, sent, or directed to the nearest port or airfield and delivered to appropriate 

law enforcement authorities for disposition, as directed by higher authority. 

d. If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit by a warship or military aircraft 

proceeds from the contiguous zone, EEZ, high seas, or international airspace, into the 

territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace of another country, every effort 

should be made to obtain the consent of the nation having sovereignty over the territorial 

sea, archipelagic waters, or superjacent airspace to continue pursuit. The inviolability of 

the territorial integrity of sovereign nations makes the decision of a warship or military 

aircraft to continue pursuit into these areas without such consent a serious matter. 

However, in extraordinary circumstances where life and limb are imperiled and contact 

cannot be established in a timely manner with the coastal nation, or the coastal nation is 

unable or unwilling to act, pursuit may continue into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, 

or national airspace. US commanders should consult applicable standing ROE and 

OPORDs for specific guidance. Pursuit must be broken off immediately upon request of 

the coastal nation, and, in any event, the right to seize the pirate vessel or aircraft and to try 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-23 

the pirates devolves on the nation to which the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, or 

airspace belong. 

e. Pursuit of a pirate vessel or aircraft through or over international straits overlapped 

by territorial seas or through archipelagic sea lanes or air routes may proceed with or 

without the consent of the coastal nation or nations, provided the pursuit is expeditious and 

direct and the transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage rights of others are not 

unreasonably constrained in the process. 

12. Maritime Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

a. HD. Securing the maritime approaches is essential to keeping the homeland safe. 

Maritime assets are employed to detect, identify, localize, evaluate, sort, and when 

warranted, intercept or interdict threats, as far from the homeland as possible, to prevent or 

defeat an attack. This is a complex task, as threat vessels may not be easily differentiated 

from normal maritime activity and any disruption of commercial trade may have economic 

and financial implications domestically and internationally. It is also critical for DOD to 

maintain unrestricted freedom of movement to ensure the ability to deploy forces overseas. 

Responding to transnational threats requires coordination across the USG to prevent attacks 

on the homeland. Coordination and interoperability with USG departments and agencies, 

and state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) (e.g., USCG, US Customs and 

Border Protection, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation), are important in this effort due 

to overlapping authorities, responsibilities, and potential simultaneous presence of 

response assets for maritime operations in the conduct of HD. Additionally, sharing of 

information and cooperation with multinational partners in regards to global maritime 

activities will greatly assist in the early detection and subsequent interception of maritime 

threats. Coordination often requires diverse communication capabilities with necessary 

planning and periodic training. 

b. Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations include support of US civil 

authorities for major disasters, emergencies, civil disturbance operations, designated 

defense support of civilian law enforcement authorities, and domestic special events. 

Available forces include warships and embarked forces, Navy Expeditionary Combat 

Command, coastal riverine forces, EOD, naval construction forces, and hospital ships. 

See ATP 3-28.1/MCRP 3-30.6/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3.2.67, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), for a list of 

USMC and USN DSCA capabilities in a maritime environment. 

c. DOD, through the relevant CCDR, is prepared to respond to maritime threats from 

the forward regions to the homeland. The use of nonlethal weapons, munitions, and 

devices (e.g., dazzling lasers, acoustic hailing devices, and warning munitions) are integral 

to the execution of the FP mission and should be considered part of a layered defense to 

deter, discourage, delay, or prevent hostile action; limit escalation; and assist in hostile 

intent determination, while minimizing unintended loss of life. DOD maritime forces 

support an active layered defense through extensive operations in the forward regions, 

coupled with a high state of readiness and scalability to varying threat conditions in the 
Chapter IV 

IV-24 JP 3-32 

maritime approaches and homeland. DOD is the lead federal agency in a maritime HD 

scenario, whether by discovery of a threat during normal operations, which requires 

immediate action, or through the protocols established by the MOTR Plan. These protocols 

are based on existing law, desired USG outcome, greatest potential magnitude of the threat, 

response capabilities required, asset availability, and authority to act. During a DOD HD 

operation, USCG forces may be allocated under a provision of TACON (or OPCON, if 

otherwise agreed to) of the supported GCC for HD to defeat the threat to the homeland. If 

the Department of Homeland Security is designated as lead for a maritime threat response, 

USCG retains OPCON of its forces, and USN forces may be allocated to the USCG under 

the provision of TACON to the designated USCG operational commander executing the 

maritime homeland security mission. Navy units under USCG TACON retain Title 10, 

USC, status and remain subject to restrictions placed on Title 10, USC, forces. 

13. Global Maritime Partnerships and Security Cooperation 

a. Global maritime partnerships and security cooperation represent the overarching 

framework by which the USG fosters and sustains cooperative relationships with 

international maritime partners. In concert with other Services, other USG departments 

and agencies, NGOs, and private industry, the USN, USMC, and USCG address mutual 

maritime concerns such as freedom of navigation, the safe flow of commerce, deterrence 

of terrorism, and protection of the oceans’ resources in a voluntary, informal, and 

nonbinding capacity. US maritime forces conduct military engagement with like-minded 

nations to enhance security and governance. This is normally accomplished through 

mutual security training to expand the number of maritime professionals; assisting nations 

in developing maritime awareness, infrastructure, and law enforcement expertise; and the 

ability to respond to maritime threats and challenges. Building partner capacity and 

capability is achieved through security cooperation to include information exchange, 

training and exercise opportunities, multinational operations, and interoperability 

enhancements. 

b. Naval forces provide the means of maintaining a global military presence while 

limiting the undesired economic, social, political, or diplomatic repercussions that often 

accompany US footprints ashore. Culturally aware, forward-deployed naval forces can 

provide a stabilizing influence on regional actors and can prevent or limit conflict. 

Forward-deployed naval forces provide US policy makers a range of options for 

influencing events while minimizing the risk of being drawn into a crisis or protracted 

entanglement. 

c. Security cooperation tasks may include the use of coastal riverine, construction, 

EOD, mobile diving, intelligence, logistics, medical, and training resources. Maritime 

forces may also employ security cooperation MAGTFs to enhance civil-military operations 

or conduct security force assistance activities to build partner capability or capacity. The 

USCG’s Atlantic Area Command and Pacific Area Command have OPCON of the Coast 

Guard’s deployable specialized forces to provide specialized capabilities in incident 

response, maritime law enforcement, port security, and antiterrorism/counterterrorism and 

can be brought together for surge operations which can deploy in advance of a potential
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-25 

conflict to conduct prevention activities or, after a conflict has ensued, to compliment 

conventional forces and contribute to establishing and sustaining stability. 

For additional details regarding security cooperation, refer to JP 3-20, Security 

Cooperation. 

14. Sea-Based Operations 

a. Seabasing leverages operational capabilities, sea-based platforms, logistical 

resources, maneuverability, health services, and tactical lift to support security cooperation 

through presence and interoperability and respond to crises. A sea base provides a JFC 

with a scalable and mobile capability in the JOA from which to exercise C2 or provide 

strike, power projection, fire support, and logistic capabilities where and when needed. Sea 

bases may be composed of individual ships (e.g., amphibious warfare ship, expeditionary 

sea base ship, destroyer, auxiliary ship), CSGs, ARGs and MEUs, expeditionary strike 

groups/Marine expeditionary brigades, maritime pre-positioning ships squadrons 

(MPSRONs) with embarked naval forces, Army pre-positioned stocks, and strategic sealift 

assets. Sea bases may also include other USG department and agency capabilities and 

multinational naval ships and platforms capable of employing forces and capabilities from 

the sea. However, belligerent acts, such as offensive mining, during international armed 

conflict must be performed by a warship, not a naval auxiliary. Therefore, if a US Naval 

Ship is to be used as a platform for belligerent acts, it must first be commissioned as a US 

Ship and the civilian merchant mariner captain replaced by a commissioned naval officer. 

Seabasing can reduce the footprint ashore and minimizes the need to place vulnerable 

assets ashore and a sea base can be established without reliance on HN support. A sea base 

may be composed of forces drawn from each joint force component. Seabasing is 

predicated on the ability to attain local maritime superiority. Discrete and tailored, seabased forces are often deemed preferable among the local populace and government as a 

less obtrusive support option compared to having foreign troops on the ground in their 

country. Joint and multinational seabasing allows support and maneuverable sustainment 

to be phased ashore as required to best support the mission. Seabasing reduces the possible 

negative impact on limited infrastructure ashore and facilitates the protection of logistic 

support. 

b. Seven overarching principles are essential to sea base operations: 

(1) Use the sea as maneuver space. Seabasing exploits the use of the sea—which 

is relatively unconstrained by political restrictions—as operational maneuver space. Seabased operations provide a JFC with the operational flexibility to support the immediate 

deployment, employment, and sustainment of expeditionary forces across the depth and 

breadth of the OE. 

(2) Leverage forward presence and joint capabilities. Joint/coalition forces 

operating from the sea base, in conjunction with other globally based joint forces, provide 

a JFC with credible offensive and defensive capabilities during the early stages of a crisis. 

Forward-deployed joint forces can help to deter or preclude a crisis while enabling the 

subsequent introduction of additional forces, equipment, and sustainment. 
Chapter IV 

IV-26 JP 3-32 

(3) Protect joint/multinational force operations. Seabasing augments the layered 

defenses of maritime forces by enhancing freedom of operational maneuver. The 

integration of these capabilities and freedom of maneuver degrades the enemy’s ability to 

successfully target and engage friendly forces. 

(4) Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection. A force rapidly closing 

the sea base gives a JFC the flexibility to tailor forces to the mission. A sea base can consist 

of one ship or dozens of ships, depending on mission requirements. Seabasing provides a 

JFC the option to mass, disperse, or project joint combat power throughout the operations 

area at the desired time. 

(5) Sustain joint force operations from the sea. Sea-based logistics entails 

sustaining forces through an anticipatory and responsive logistic system to support naval 

forces and selected joint/coalition forces. The sea base is sustained through the interface 

with supply ships and other maritime platforms and aviation assets, enabling naval and 

selected joint forces to remain on station for extended periods of time. 

(6) Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases. Seabasing 

supports power projection capabilities to provide a JFC with multiple access options in the 

JOA, reducing—but not eliminating—reliance on forward basing. 

(7) Create uncertainty for the threat. With its inherent distributed operational 

character, seabasing provides multiple points and means of entry. As a result, the threat is 

at a defensive disadvantage, which creates opportunities to exploit seams and gaps in 

defenses. In addition, it provides flexibility and options for responding to foreign 

humanitarian assistance (FHA) and other crisis response and limited contingency 

operations. 

c. C2 of Sea-Based Operations. The command relationships established to conduct 

operations from the sea base are shaped by the mission requirements and will follow 

established joint doctrine command relationships. A JFC can conduct C2 of operations 

through subordinate joint TFs, Service components, functional components, or a 

combination of Service and functional components. The sea base will typically be aligned 

under the JFMCC or NCC when assigned. The JFMCC may designate a subordinate OTC 

to enable delegation of seabasing tasks as needed to manage the span of control 

commensurate to the mission(s) assigned, size, scope, threat environment, and availability 

of forces. 

d. The decision to conduct joint/multinational seabasing operations depends on the 

tactical situation and the scope and intensity of the assigned mission. Once a decision has 

been made to establish a sea base and to define the capabilities and capacities that must be 

present in the sea base to meet commander’s intent, the following questions should be 

addressed: 

(1) What surveillance and FP capabilities are required to achieve and maintain 

access within the air and surface environments and to enable freedom of movement and 

maneuver for all seabasing lines of operation in support of mission objectives? 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-27 

(2) What surveillance and FP capabilities are required within the JOA to extend 

naval defensive capabilities to protect joint forces operating at sea and ashore? 

(3) What detection and FP capabilities are required to provide adequate defense 

against attacks by naval surface forces, submarines, small boats, and terrorist or suicide 

attacks from surface craft and swimmers? 

(4) In the event of mines, what capabilities are required to detect, identify, 

neutralize, or clear mines to ensure maneuver access across key littoral approaches? 

e. To determine if conditions have been met that no longer require seabasing 

capabilities or applications, the following questions should be posed and answered: 

(1) Are APODs and/or SPODs capable of supporting continued military

deployment, employment, sustainment, and reconstitution? 

(2) Is FP sufficient? 

(3) Is there an internal transportation network available? 

(4) Post APOD and/or SPOD establishment operations ashore may warrant the 

sea base remain. Will throughput be sufficient to support operational needs? 

(5) Does the sea base provide additional flexibility, security, or additional 

distribution capability? 

f. The information infrastructure for the sea base will be an integral part of the larger 

joint C2 infrastructure. The sea base information infrastructure should provide an 

interoperable and scalable integrated C2 infrastructure supporting a common, standardized 

set of joint and multinational C2 capabilities, integrated applications, and hardware. The 

information infrastructure should enhance the ability to rapidly activate and deploy a sea 

base with a common package that can sustain operations for the duration of the 

contingency, support efficient routing of distributed C2 through collaborative networks, 

and decrease the lag between deployment and full operational capabilities. 

For more information on seabasing, see NWP 3-62M/Marine Corps Warfighting 

Publication (MCWP) 13-10, Seabasing, and Allied Tactical Publication-8, Volume I, 

Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. 

15. Counterdrug Operations 

a. GCCs plan and execute DOD CD operations within their AORs. DOD supports 

federal, state, and local LEA efforts to disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal drugs 

into the US. CD is a high-priority, national security, and international cooperation mission, 

with DOD functions and responsibilities based on statutory authority. The Armed Forces 

of the United States also assists our partner nations in their CD efforts. 
Chapter IV 

IV-28 JP 3-32 

b. The C2 relationships established for CD operations will vary based on the 

environment in which they are conducted. Considering most CD operations are in support 

of either partner nations or LEAs, it is important to remember that even though command 

of US military forces will remain within DOD, the overall control of the mission may be 

determined by a lead federal agency or agreements with foreign authorities. 

c. Joint maritime CD operations: 

(1) Use intelligence sources to target specific persons, vessels, and aircraft 

involved in the drug trade. 

(2) Patrol to detect targets of interest using electronic, visual, and intelligence 

means. 

(3) Monitor, track, and hand off targets of interest. 

(4) Intercept, sweep, and potentially search vessels. 

(5) Apprehend suspects and seize vessels and contraband. 

For additional information regarding CD operations, see JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug 

Operations.

16. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 

Joint maritime forces, especially amphibious forces, are often used to conduct 

noncombatant evacuation operations. This is primarily due to their forward-deployed 

posture; ability to maintain forces afloat, thus not taxing the infrastructure ashore or raising 

tensions around the US mission or toward US presence; an ability to provide additional 

forces should the security situation warrant; their self-sustainability; and the ability to 

transition to other types of operations or provide access for the deployment of other forces. 

For additional information on noncombatant evacuation operations, see JP 3-68, 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

17. Protection of Shipping 

a. There are multiple methods and options to protect shipping. One method is to 

conduct wide sea control operations that attempt to protect the waters or known traffic 

routes through which many ships pass. Another method is to gather merchant ships and 

devote protection assets to the convoy, requiring only localized supremacy. Both 

constructs can be used within wider sea control operations if resources permit. When there 

is a severe risk to maritime trade, convoys have been an effective method of reducing the 

scale of the sea control problem. If shipping is gathered in convoys, the area and time over 

which sea control must be exercised for their protection is reduced to a minimum. Convoys 

complicate the attacker’s task and concentrates escorting forces to enhance the 

effectiveness of protection. However, convoys are less likely to deceive the enemy or deny 

the enemy intelligence about the position of friendly shipping. It presents the enemy a 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-29 

much more localized and lucrative target. It is also disruptive to trade. The strategic or 

operational decision to convoy requires careful weighing of advantages, disadvantages, and 

the opportunities for drawing the enemy into decisive action. 

b. During any operation, merchant ship activity needs to be closely monitored, and 

effective coordination and close cooperation between military, civilian, commercial, and 

government organizations is required to provide for the necessary level of liaison and 

safety. In certain situations, maritime forces may be called upon to protect ships of any 

nationality carrying cargoes of interest to the US and its allies. NATO created the NCAGS 

that established an organization and procedures to provide continuous near real time 

situational awareness of merchant shipping in support of maritime HD and the forwarddeployed theater/operational commanders. NCAGS provides accurate and timely 

merchant vessel information, advises the JFMCC with regard to interacting with the 

merchant shipping industry and other MDA and interagency stakeholders, and provides 

advice on the deconfliction and protection of the vessels in the AOR. NCAGS bridges the 

gap between operational forces and merchant shipping by providing a framework for 

communicating directions, advisories, concerns, and information. The range of options is 

designed to allow flexibility in tailoring NCAGS policy to the particular requirements and 

situation in the NCAGS area. In its simplest form, NCAGS is another tool to support the 

operational commander’s overall sea control mission requirement, directed and managed 

as any other warfare mission area asset. 

c. NCAGS operations have evolved with the changing threat posed to merchant 

shipping and by merchant shipping in the context of regional operations and maritime HD, 

where merchant shipping may be the protagonist or target. These operations address the 

traditional protection and control of shipping in a region and the emerging requirement of 

specialized communications to increase maritime situational awareness of merchant 

shipping in the areas of crisis response, maritime security, sea control, civil-military 

operations, counterterrorism, and counterpiracy. NCAGS applies to maritime HD, 

contingency support, and general economic shipping. Maritime HD support assists the 

USCG and fleet commanders with the production of a COP relating to merchant shipping 

within the territorial seas and EEZ waters surrounding the US, its territories, and interests. 

Types of contingency support shipping include naval vessels of the Military Sealift 

Command, shipping operated or chartered by the USG to support naval operations or to 

meet US policy objectives, crisis response shipping, and relief shipping chartered by 

government departments or agencies. Types of economic shipping include vessels 

conducting normal commercial trade worldwide, regardless of flag or ownership, or such 

other shipping that is not under the control or direction of the USG. 

d. Specific to maritime HD operations in the United States Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) AOR, the USCG is the lead Department of Homeland Security agency 

for maritime security. The MOCs work jointly with the USCG maritime intelligence fusion 

centers to form the joint maritime information fusion center. The MOCs provide positional 

information of merchant vessels operating in the USNORTHCOM AOR to improve MDA. 
Chapter IV 

IV-30 JP 3-32 

For additional information on NCAGS, see JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations;

NTTP 3-07.12, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS); and Allied 

Tactical Publication-02, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Manual.

18. Maritime Pre-Positioning Force Operations 

a. A maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) operation is the rapid deployment and 

assembly of a MAGTF in a secure area using intratheater and intertheater airlift and 

forward-deployed maritime pre-positioning ships. An MPF operation is a mission-tailored, 

strategic deployment option that is global in nature, naval in character, and suitable for 

various employment scenarios. The maritime pre-positioning of combat equipment and 

supplies provides a CCDR with deployment flexibility and an increased capability to 

respond rapidly to a crisis or contingency with a credible force. The essential purpose of 

an MPF operation is to establish a MAGTF that is fully prepared to execute an employment 

mission. An MPF operation includes the airlift of MAGTF and Navy elements, the Navy 

support element, and naval port security units with selected equipment into an arrival and 

assembly area to join with equipment and supplies carried aboard maritime pre-positioning 

ships. An MPF operation may consist of one ship interacting with a forward-deployed 

MEU, an MPSRON and a Marine expeditionary brigade fly-in echelon, or a Marine 

expeditionary force falling in on one of the two MPSRONs within the MPF. The MPF is 

one component of the USMC’s rapid response capability triad, which also includes the 

global response force and forward-deployed amphibious forces. An MPF operation may 

also include a crisis response force package to support operations. 

b. An MPF is a temporary organization comprised of a MAGTF with assigned naval 

forces under the MAGTF command element and an MPSRON and NAVFOR under the 

command of the commander, maritime pre-positioning force (CMPF). The command 

relationship established between the MAGTF commander and the CMPF should provide 

for unity of effort, simplicity, and flexibility across the MPF operation phases. It should 

be clearly defined and based upon an assessment of mission requirements. A support 

relationship is established between the CMPF and MAGTF commander in the establishing 

directive. For MPF operations, the Navy support element would consist of Navy 

expeditionary logistics support group (NAVELSG) and naval beach group forces actually 

off-loading the MAGTF cargo and interfacing between the MPSRON vessels and the 

deployed MAGTF. For the MAGTF, NAVELSG forces support the loading and unloading 

of cargo and passengers. If JLOTS becomes part of the sustainment or assault follow-on 

echelon operations, NAVELSG forces will be providing logistics support in many areas. 

For additional information regarding maritime pre-positioning operations, see MCTP 13-

10D/NTTP 3-02.3M, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, and JP 4-01.2, Sealift 

Support to Joint Operations.

19. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 

Maritime forces can provide speed of reaction, operational maneuver, and assured 

access while significantly reducing the footprint ashore and minimizing the permissions 

required to operate from the HN. A forward-deployed ARG/MEU can provide immediate 
Command and Control and Other Operational-Level 

Considerations Specific Maritime Operations 

IV-31 

national response in support of humanitarian and natural-disaster relief operations. This 

includes MAGTF response teams, platoon-sized elements capable of detecting a wide 

range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. Other forward-deployed 

maritime units (e.g., CSGs, individual ships or cutters, and US naval construction force 

units) may provide more limited, immediate relief support (e.g., airlift support, personnel 

recovery, engineering capabilities) and a secure platform for staging or rest and 

recuperation until a larger force arrives. USN ships can provide a safe and accessible 

location for the JFC’s HQ, provide seabasing support to the joint force and have a limited 

ability to produce and distribute electrical power and clean water. Hospital ships, 

expeditionary medical facilities, and forward-deployable preventive medicine units are 

other USN assets that can be tailored to support FHA missions. In addition, coastal riverine 

forces can provide harbor security and FP to Navy ships, limited medical response assets, 

and expeditionary C2 support ashore for FHA missions. The maritime pre-positioning 

ships, with their evolving MPF capabilities, are additional resources strategically located 

around the world that, in combination with supporting naval forces, may respond to a 

regional FHA crisis. Specifically, maritime pre-positioning ships have the capability to 

purify water and transfer it ashore. Bulk petroleum transfer capability is also available 

(dependent on individual ship’s craft/equipment configuration).

For more information on FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

20. Maritime Operational Threat Response 

a. The National Strategy for Maritime Security and the MOTR Plan are directed in 

the National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive13, Maritime Security Policy. The MOTR Plan establishes the protocols to achieve 

coordinated, unified, timely, and effective planning and execution by various departments 

and agencies of the USG. The MOTR Plan addresses the full range of maritime security 

threats to the homeland, including nation-state military threats; piracy; state/non-state 

criminal, unlawful, or hostile acts such as smuggling; threat vessels with cargo; or 

personnel requiring investigation and disposition. 

b. The MOTR Plan predesignates USG departments and agencies with lead 

responsibilities, clarifies interagency roles and responsibilities, and establishes protocols 

and procedures for a coordinated response to achieve the USG’s desired outcome for a 

particular threat. 

c. The MOTR protocols and procedures allow rapid response to short-notice threats 

and require interagency partners to begin coordination activities (i.e., MOTR conference 

calls) at the earliest possible opportunity when one of the following triggers are met: 

(1) Any specific terrorist or state threat exists, and US response action is or could 

be imminent. 

(2) More than one USG department or agency has become substantially involved 

in responding to the threat. 
Chapter IV 

IV-32 JP 3-32 

(3) The agency or department either lacks the capability, capacity, or jurisdiction 

to address the threat. 

(4) Upon resolving the threat, the initial responding USG department or agency 

cannot execute the disposition of cargo, people, or vessels acting under its own authority. 

(5) The threat poses a potential adverse effect on the foreign affairs of the US. 

d. The MOTR coordination process is conducted through a virtual network of 

interagency national and operational command centers. This coordination process 

determines which agency is the right choice to lead the USG response and what other 

departments and agencies are needed to support the response effort. The MOTR protocols 

include a process to transition the lead from one agency to another and dispute resolution 

(i.e., if the USG desired outcome cannot be resolved at the lower levels of government, the 

characterization of a particular threat could ultimately be elevated for resolution by higher 

authority). At the tactical level, it is important to realize that the MOTR process exists to 

achieve a USG desired outcome and coordinate and assist in bringing additional 

capabilities to bear on a threat. 

e. MOTR presents guiding principles that apply to all agencies at all times and sets 

the basic standards for interagency actions to overcome maritime threats to the US. 

f. Successful MOTR execution is fundamentally reliant on the operational 

intelligence linkage. This linkage is optimized through ongoing efforts to achieve MDA. 

21. Riverine Operations 

The coastal riverine force employs small, armed patrol craft to provide a maritime 

security capability that includes surveillance and interdiction, as well as destruction of 

waterborne and land threats in the inshore, coastal, and riverine environment. Coastal 

riverine force capabilities include waterway interdiction, maneuver of craft to counter 

maritime threats, surveillance and intelligence collection, movement to the AO, landing of 

troops and equipment (limited to pierside with sufficient depth), and expeditionary C2 

support ashore. The core competencies of coastal riverine force units can be applied across 

a broad range of military operations. 

For additional information regarding HD, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and for more 

information on DSCA, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. More 

information on the different authorities and requirements between USCG Title 14, USC, 

and USN Title 10, USC, during maritime operations is found in both publications. 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS POINTS OF CONTACT 

Joint Staff/J7/Doctrine Division 

 Web Site: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/ 

 E-mail Support: js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil 

 Phone Number: 1-703-692-7273 (DSN 222) 

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J35 

 Deputy Directorate for Regional Operations, JOD INDO PACOM 

 E-mail Support: js.pentagon.j3.list.j35-dd-ro-jod-pacom@mail.mil 

 Phone Number: 1-703-692-4551 (DSN 224) 

US Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

 Mailing Address: 3300 Russell Road 

 Quantico, VA 22134 

 E-mail Support: doctrine@usmc.mil 

 Phone Number: 1-703-784-6642 

Navy Warfare Development Command 

 Mailing Address: 1528 Piersey Street BLDG O-27 

 Norfolk, VA 23511-2723 

 Web Site: https://www.nwdc.navy.mil 

 E-mail Support: nwdc_nrfk_fleet_pubs@navy.mil 

 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-32 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-32 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. General 

a. National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive -13, Maritime Security Policy.

b. The National Strategy for Maritime Security.

c. National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime 

Security.

2. Department of Defense Publication 

DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW 

Policy. 

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications 

a. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and 

Guidance.

b. CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

c. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

d. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

e. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

f. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

g. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

h. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

i. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

j. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

k. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

l. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

m. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-32 

n. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

o. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

p. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

q. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

r. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

s. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

t. JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

u. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

v. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

w. JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations.

x. JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations.

y. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

z. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

aa. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

bb. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

cc. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

dd. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

ee. JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System.

ff. JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

gg. JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations.

hh. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.

ii. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. 

jj. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

kk. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

ll. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
 References 

B-3 

3. Multi-Service Publications 

a. ATP 3-01.15/MCTP 10-10B/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System.

b. ATP 3-28.1/MCRP 3-30.6/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

c. ATP 3-04.18/MCRP 3-20.2/NTTP 3-20.8/AFTTP 3-2.74, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare.

d. NTTP 3-02.3M/MCTP 13-10D, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.

e. NWP 3-62M/MCWP 13-10, Seabasing. 

f. NTTP 3-07.11M/CGTTP 3-93.3/MCIP 13-10Ii, Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure 

Operations. 

g. NTTP 3-10.1M/MCTP 3-34D, Seabee Operations in the Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force (MAGTF).

h. NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/Commandant Publication P5800.7A, The 

Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. 

4. Navy Publications 

a. NTTP 3-07.4M/Commandant Instruction M16247.4, Maritime Counterdrug and 

Alien Migration Interdiction Operations.

b. NTTP 3-07.12, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS).

c. NTTP 3-13.1, Theater and Campaign Information Operations.

d. NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center.

e. NTTP 4-01.4, Underway Replenishment.

f. NTTP 4-02.1, Medical Logistics.

g. NTTP 4-02.2, Patient Movement.

h. NTTP 4-02.7, Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Environment.

i. NTRP 3-20.3.1, Multi-threat Surface Ship Defense.

j. NTRP 4-10.1, Naval Conventional Ordnance Management.

k. NWP 2-01, Intelligence Support to Naval Operations. 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-32 

l. NWP 3-09, Navy Fire Support.

m. NWP 3-10, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Forces.

n. NWP 3-13, Navy Information Operations. 

o. NWP 3-15 Series, Mine Warfare.

p. NWP 3-20 Series, Surface Warfare.

q. NWP 3-21, Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare.

r. NWP 3-32, Command and Control of Maritime Forces at the Operational Level of 

War.

s. NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare; Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War. 

t. NWP 4-01, Naval Transportation.

u. NWP 4-01.1, Navy Advanced Base Logistics Operations.

v. NWP 4-08, Naval Supply Operations.

w. NWP 4-11, Environmental Protection.

x. NWP 5-01, Navy Planning. 
C-1 

APPENDIX C 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using 

the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: 

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: 

js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content 

(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Navy. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor 

for this publication is the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3). 

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, 

made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. 

Charles Shaver, Navy Warfare Development Command; technical review authority, Mr. 

David Groves, Capabilities Development Directorate, Headquarters, US Marine Corps 

Combat Development and Integration; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, CDR Jonathan 

Vanecko, USN, Joint Staff J-3; Joint Doctrine Analysis Division action officer, LCDR 

Omari Buckley, USN, Joint Staff J-7; and Joint Doctrine Division, Mr. Larry Seman, Joint 

Staff J-7. 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-32, 07 August 2013, Command and Control for Joint 

Maritime Operations.

4. Change Recommendations 

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, 

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: 

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: 

js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. 

b. When a JS directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source 

document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed 

change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other 

organizations are requested to notify the JS J-7 when changes to source documents 

reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Lessons Learned 

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force 

readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-32 

Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons 

learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative 

resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness 

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine 

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, 

events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become 

institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are 

routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the 

development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil 

(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET). 

6. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be 

IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, 

Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD 

Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information. 

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at 

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp 

(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and 

Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base AnacostiaBolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, 

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support 

agencies. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS 

AADC area air defense commander 

AADP area air defense plan 

ABFC advanced base functional component 

ACA airspace control authority 

AD air defense 

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AJP Allied joint publication 

ALOC air line of communications 

AMD air and missile defense 

AMDC air and missile defense commander 

AO area of operations 

AOC air operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

ARG amphibious ready group 

ASW antisubmarine warfare 

ASWC antisubmarine warfare commander 

ATP Army techniques publication 

BMD ballistic missile defense 

C2 command and control 

CAS close air support 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CCMD combatant command 

CCS commander’s communication synchronization 

CD counterdrug 

CGTTP Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures 

CIEA classification, identification, and engagement area 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CMPF commander, maritime pre-positioning force 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COMFLTCYBERCOM Commander, Fleet Cyber Command 

CONOPS concept of operations 

COP common operational picture 

CSG carrier strike group 

CTF commander, task force 

CTF IAMD commander, task force integrated air and missile defense 

CUL common-user logistics 

CVW carrier air wing 

CWC composite warfare commander 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-32 

D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess 

DCA defensive counterair 

DCO defensive cyberspace operations 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODIN Department of Defense information network 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

EEZ exclusive economic zone 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FP force protection 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

HQ headquarters 

IAMD integrated air and missile defense 

IWC information operations warfare commander 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment 

JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JPP joint planning process 

LEA law enforcement agency 

LEDET law enforcement detachment (USCG) 

LEO law enforcement operations 

LNO liaison officer 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCIP Marine Corps interim publication 

MCM mine countermeasures 

MCMC mine countermeasures commander 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 
Glossary 

GL-3 

MCTP Marine Corps tactical publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MDA maritime domain awareness 

MEU Marine expeditionary unit 

MEZ missile engagement zone 

MIO maritime interception operations 

MIOC maritime interception operations commander 

MIW mine warfare 

MIWC mine warfare commander 

MNFC multinational force commander 

MNFMCC multinational force maritime component commander 

MOC maritime operations center 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

MOTR maritime operational threat response 

MPF maritime pre-positioning force 

MPSRON maritime pre-positioning ships squadron 

MSO maritime security operations 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NAVELSG Navy expeditionary logistics support group 

NAVFOR Navy forces 

NCAGS naval cooperation and guidance for shipping 

NCC Navy component commander 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NSFS naval surface fire support 

NTRP Navy tactical reference publication 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OCO offensive cyberspace operations 

OCS operational contract support 

OE operational environment 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPTASK operational tasking (message) 

OSC on-scene commander 

OTC officer in tactical command 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PMI prevention of mutual interference 

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 

RADC regional air defense commander 

ROE rules of engagement 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-32 

SAG surface action group 

SLOC sea line of communications 

SOF special operations forces 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

SSWG space support working group 

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO) 

STW strike warfare 

STWC strike warfare commander 

SUBOPAUTH submarine operating authority 

SUW surface warfare 

SUWC surface warfare commander 

TACON tactical control 

TASWC theater antisubmarine warfare commander 

TF task force 

TG task group 

TLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile 

TST time-sensitive target 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

UNSC United Nations Security Council 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USG United States Government 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USN United States Navy 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USW undersea warfare 

VBSS visit, board, search, and seizure 

WSM waterspace management 
Glossary 

GL-5 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

aircraft carrier. A warship designed to support and operate aircraft, engage in attacks on 

targets afloat or ashore, and engage in sustained operations in support of other forces. 

Also called CV or CVN. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

antisubmarine warfare. Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the 

effective use of submarines. Also called ASW. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

carrier air wing. Two or more aircraft squadrons formed under one commander for

administrative and tactical control of operations from a carrier. Also called CVW. 

(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

carrier strike group. A standing naval task group consisting of a carrier, embarked air wing, 

surface combatants, and submarines as assigned in direct support, operating in mutual 

support with the task of destroying hostile submarine, surface, and air forces within the 

group’s assigned operational area and striking at targets along hostile shore lines or 

projecting power inland. Also called CSG. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

composite warfare commander. An officer to whom the officer in tactical command of 

a naval task organization may delegate authority to conduct some or all of the offensive 

and defensive functions of the force. Also called CWC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: 

JP 3-32) 

contiguous zone. 1. A maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea that may not extend 

beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 

sea is measured. 2. The zone of the ocean extending 3-12 nautical miles from the 

United States coastline. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

fleet. An organization of ships, aircraft, Marine Corps forces, and shore-based fleet 

activities under a commander who may exercise operational, as well as administrative, 

control. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

forward presence. Maintaining forward-deployed or stationed forces overseas to 

demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and 

enhance the ability to respond quickly to contingencies. (DOD Dictionary. Source: 

JP 3-32) 

global fleet station. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.) 

global maritime partnership. An approach to cooperation among maritime nations with 

a shared stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas. 

(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

high seas. The open ocean area that is over 200 nautical miles from shore. (Approved for 

inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-32 

maritime domain. The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the 

airspace above these, including the littorals. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

maritime domain awareness. The effective understanding of anything associated with 

the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment 

of a nation. Also called MDA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

maritime forces. Forces that operate on, under, or above the sea to gain or exploit 

command of the sea, sea control, or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea. 

(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

maritime power projection. Power projection in and from the maritime environment, 

including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces 

or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy 

weapons’ range of friendly forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

maritime security operations. Those operations to protect maritime sovereignty and 

resources and to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, 

transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne migration. 

Also called MSO. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

maritime superiority. That degree of dominance of one force over another that permits 

the conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and 

air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing 

force. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

maritime supremacy. That degree of maritime superiority wherein an opposing force is 

incapable of effective interference. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.) 

naval operation. 1. A naval action (or the performance of a naval mission) that may be 

strategic, operational, tactical, logistic, or training. 2. The process of carrying on or 

training for naval combat to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (Approved 

for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

numbered fleet. A major tactical unit of the Navy immediately subordinate to a major fleet 

command and comprising various task forces, elements, groups, and units for the 

purpose of prosecuting specific naval operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

officer in tactical command. In maritime usage, the senior officer present eligible to 

assume command, or the officer to whom the senior officer has delegated tactical 

command. Also called OTC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

open ocean. Ocean limit defined as greater than 12 nautical miles from shore. (Approved 

for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

prevention of mutual interference. In submarine operations, procedures established to 

prevent submerged collisions between friendly submarines; between submarines and 

friendly, surface ship-towed bodies and arrays; and between submarines, unmanned 
Glossary 

GL-7 

systems, and any other hazards to submerged navigation. Also called PMI. 

(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

riverine operations. Operations conducted by forces organized to cope with the unique 

characteristics of a riverine area and/or to achieve or maintain control of the riverine 

area. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

sea control operations. The employment of forces to destroy enemy naval forces, 

suppress enemy sea commerce, protect vital sea lanes, and establish local military 

superiority in vital sea areas. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

squadron. 1. An organization consisting of two or more divisions of ships or two or more 

divisions (Navy) or flights of aircraft. 2. A basic administrative aviation unit of the 

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. 3. Battalion-sized ground or aviation units. 

(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

submarine operating authority. The naval commander exercising operational control of 

submarines. Also called SUBOPAUTH. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

surface action group. A temporary or standing organization of combatant ships, other 

than carriers, tailored for a specific tactical mission. Also called SAG. (DOD 

Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

surface combatant. A ship designed to engage in attacks against airborne, surface, 

subsurface, and shore targets. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

surface warfare. That portion of maritime warfare in which operations are conducted to 

destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels. Also called 

SUW. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

task component. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.) 

task element. A component of a naval task unit organized by the commander of a task 

unit or higher authority. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

task force. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher 

authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. Also called TF. (DOD 

Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

task group. A component of a naval task force organized by the commander of a task 

force or higher authority. Also called TG. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

task unit. A component of a naval task group organized by the commander of a task group 

or higher authority. Also called TU. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD 

Dictionary.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-32 

theater antisubmarine warfare commander. A Navy commander assigned to develop 

plans and direct assigned and attached assets for the conduct of antisubmarine warfare 

within an operational area. Also called TASWC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 

undersea warfare. Military operations conducted to establish and maintain control of the 

undersea portion of a maritime operational area. Also called USW. (Approved for 

incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.) 

waterspace management. The allocation of waterspace in terms of antisubmarine warfare 

attack procedures to permit the rapid and effective engagement of hostile submarines 

while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines. Also called WSM. 

(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-32) 
Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first

draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment

matrix

FC joint working group

STEP #4 - Maintenance

JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins

24-27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years

after publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

Joint doctrine development

community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint

Publication (JP) 3-32 Operations is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process: