Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC20-284

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MICHAEL A. GORDON,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

September 1, 2022

COURIEL, J.

Michael A. Gordon appeals his convictions and sentences of 

death for the January 15, 2015, first-degree murders of Patricia 

Moran and Deborah Royal. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), 

Fla. Const. We affirm Gordon’s convictions and sentences.

I

The victims in this case were murdered at home, seemingly at 

random, having had no connection to the pawnshop robbery that 

unfolded earlier on the day they died.
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A

Shortly after 5:30 p.m. on January 15, 2015, Chad O’Brien, 

the manager of a Cash America Pawnshop in Auburndale, in Polk 

County, and Richie Soto, one of his pawnbrokers, were talking in 

the store’s office when three armed men rushed into the store,

demanding at gunpoint that O’Brien and Soto get down. Gordon, 

one of those armed men, pointed a rifle at O’Brien; another pointed 

a handgun at Soto.

After noticing O’Brien’s keys, Gordon threatened to kill O’Brien

if he did not immediately unlock the case. O’Brien complied. 

Gordon and an accomplice with a crowbar began stuffing jewelry 

into a bag. When the robber with the handgun yelled that they 

were out of time, the three men grabbed their loot and bolted from 

the store. They loaded into a red SUV idling outside and fled in the 

direction of Haines City.

Back at the pawnshop, Soto called 911 and reported the 

robbery, which the store’s security cameras had captured. Some of 

the stolen jewelry contained GPS tracking devices that had been

activated when the items were removed. The Polk County Sheriff’s 
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Office had access to the devices’ tracking system and officers were 

immediately sent to follow the items’ GPS signals.

Three Haines City Police Department officers responded to 

radio calls that the fleeing SUV was headed their way. As the

officers closed in on it, someone in the SUV opened fire on them, 

with one shot striking a patrol car. The SUV continued to race 

toward Haines City, its occupants continually firing at the pursuing 

officers. When two more officers joined the chase, another patrol 

car was hit. The SUV was speeding and evasively weaving in and 

out of traffic. At last, it made a sharp left turn, nearly tipping over

in the process, drove through a grass median, and pulled into the

Chanler Ridge subdivision in Haines City.

Officers followed the SUV into the neighborhood, where it had 

foundered in a field. Its occupants fled in several directions. One 

man was tracked down by a police dog. Two men had better luck 

and avoided detection at the scene but were arrested the following 

morning.

Meanwhile, one block away, three Chanler Ridge residents had 

stepped outside to see what was going on and spotted a man

running. He identified himself as a neighbor and said that he was 
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fleeing people who were trying to shoot him. The residents were 

suspicious; they did not recognize him. One ran to flag down the

police officers who were swarming the subdivision. Seeing this, the 

unrecognized man fled toward Astor Drive. Hearing the sirens,

additional neighborhood residents gathered and noticed clothes

strewn across multiple yards. One of the residents who had earlier 

encountered the stranger found a rifle in their yard and called 911. 

An officer’s police dog tracked the scent from the items to 618 Astor 

Drive.

While the residents who had encountered the stranger were 

calling 911, a different resident called the authorities to report that 

she heard screaming from her neighbors’ house—at 618 Astor 

Drive. Officers formed a perimeter around the house. It was then 

dark enough that the police had started using their flashlights. 

While searching the fenced-in backyard of the house, two officers 

pointed their lights through a window to see inside the house. Two 

unclothed women with serious lacerations lay motionless on a 

bloody floor. The officers yelled out what they saw to nearby

colleagues and their discovery was soon broadcast over the radio to 

all officers on the scene.
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Deputy Jonathan Quintana-Rivera was standing in the 

driveway guarding the front of the house. Officer Eric Nickels was 

in the street, about 35 feet from the garage door, near the curb. 

Other officers were preparing to enter the house. From inside a 

closed garage they heard loud noises followed by the revving of a car 

engine, then the sound of squealing tires. Gordon, at the wheel of 

the victims’ car, burst through the closed garage door. The garage 

door collapsed on top of the car, staying on its roof while the car 

careened down the driveway.1

To avoid being hit by the car, Deputy Quintana-Rivera dove 

from the driveway onto the lawn. The garage door on top of the car 

blocked Deputy Quintana-Rivera’s view of the driver. Officer 

Nickels, trying to get out of the car’s path, scrambled toward the 

lawn but fell down in the road. Before he could get up, the car 

made a hard left out of the driveway and began accelerating

towards him. Officers began firing at the car. Even though Officer 

1. While the officers’ testimonies disagreed about whether the 

car came out headlights or taillights first, their testimonies were

consistent that it rapidly accelerated to about 35 to 40 miles per 

hour.
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Nickels could not see who was driving, he aimed for the car’s 

windshield, trying to hit the driver. The car sped down Astor Drive 

past Officer Nickels, made a sharp right turn, and crashed to a halt 

in a nearby field.

An officer and his police dog apprehended Gordon about 60 to 

75 feet from the crashed vehicle. Gordon was handcuffed, placed in 

a patrol car, and read his rights. Following Miranda2 warnings, 

Gordon told officers that a man named Tony Wright, as well as two 

of Wright’s family members, were still in the house at 618 Astor 

Drive.

While Gordon was being arrested, a SWAT team was clearing 

the house. They found no other suspects, but they did find the 

remains of 72-year-old Patricia Moran and her 51-year-old 

daughter, Deborah Royal. Their throats had been slashed, their

2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71 (1966) (“At the 

outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he 

must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has 

the right to remain silent. . . . The warning of the right to remain 

silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said 

can and will be used against the individual in court. . . . [A]n

individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he 

has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with 

him during interrogation . . . .”).
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bodies repeatedly stabbed. Several knives were scattered near the

bodies. There was blood throughout the house; two T-shirts in the 

washing machine were covered in blood that was later identified as 

Gordon’s. Medical examiners later concluded that neither woman 

died immediately. Each had defensive wounds indicating she 

attempted to defend herself before she died from the attack.

B

The State charged Gordon in a 15-count indictment for the 

events of January 15. The offenses included: two counts of firstdegree murder, burglary with assault or battery, conspiracy to 

commit armed robbery, robbery with a firearm, grand theft, fleeing 

or attempting to elude, three counts of attempted first-degree 

murder with a firearm, three counts of attempted first-degree 

murder with a vehicle, grand theft of a vehicle, and possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon.3

During jury selection, the assistant state attorney asked 

members of the venire to raise their hands if someone close to them

had ever been charged with a crime. Kimberly James was among 

3. This final charge, possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, was severed before trial and is not before us on appeal.
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the potential jurors who did. She explained that her first cousin 

had been sentenced to 25 years in prison, “[b]ut it didn’t affect me.” 

When asked if there was “anything about that incident that would 

impact [her] ability to be fair and impartial as it relates to this 

case,” she answered “[d]efinitely not.”

At a different point in voir dire, the State asked James whether 

she ever had any casual conversations with anyone about the death 

penalty. “No,” she said. Asked whether her jury service at this trial 

had been the first time she had ever really thought about death 

penalty, James said that she had considered the subject “thinking 

to myself,” perhaps while watching crime-related news. Asked what 

her thoughts about the death penalty were when she saw news 

about it, she said, “sometimes it’s merited and sometimes it’s not

. . . I’m not there to look like at evidence to see whether the person 

should die, you know. I’m not God.”

The State followed up by asking whether her use of the 

phrase, “I’m not God,” was a reference to a religious belief. James 

replied, “It has nothing to do with religion. It’s just how I am as a 

person. I want to see the evidence. If it warrants death, so be it. If 

it warrants life, life.” Asked if she would like to serve on the jury, 
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James said she would. Counsel for the State and for Gordon went 

on to conduct an extensive colloquy with members of the panel, 

including James, on a number of topics.

The State ultimately exercised one of its peremptory strikes to 

remove James—who, like Gordon, is black—from the panel. 

Gordon’s counsel asked the State to supply a race-neutral reason

for the strike. The State replied that James’s statement, “I’m not

God,” caused concern about whether she could be fair and 

impartial in determining whether the death penalty was appropriate 

in this case. At that point, Gordon’s counsel stated that the State’s 

reason for striking James was not sufficiently race-neutral.

Applying a version of the procedure required under the 

circumstances in a Melbourne4 and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 

4. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (“A 

party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory challenge on 

racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis, b) 

show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group, 

and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for 

the strike. If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court 

must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the 

strike. At this point, the burden of production shifts to the 

proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 

explanation (step 2). If the explanation is facially race-neutral and 

the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the 
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(1986), challenge, the trial court found that Gordon was black; that 

the venire member in question, James, was black, and that an

already-seated juror appeared to be black. Next, the trial court 

considered the State’s explanation for striking James. It said, “the 

Court is not persuaded that the comments taken, all the answers 

and responses given by Ms. James to the questions both by the 

State and defense, I do not find that what she said and the reason 

articulated by the State is sufficient to allow the cause[5] challenge.”

strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained 

(step 3). The court’s focus in step 3 is not on the reasonableness of 

the explanation but rather its genuineness.”) (footnotes omitted).

5. Moments later, the trial court correctly referred to the 

strike as a “peremptory challenge” rather than a cause challenge. 

Notably, at the time of the initial peremptory challenge, the trial 

court only ruled on “whether the neutral explanation is facially 

valid,” not exactly what we have held to be required—that is, 

whether the proffered reason is pretextual. Melbourne, 679 So. 2d 

at 764 (“If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court 

believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, 

the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained.”); 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (“The prosecutor therefore must articulate a 

neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.”); 

United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(“Once the prosecution has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for exercising its strikes, . . . the party contesting the strike 

[bears the burden] to demonstrate that the prosecution’s stated 

reasons are pretextual.”).
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When a panel of 12 jurors had been assembled, the State 

again moved to strike James. The trial court asked whether the 

State had any additional grounds. The State answered that James

had also indicated during voir dire that her first cousin had been

sentenced to 25 years in prison. The State reasserted its initial 

reason for striking James, arguing that only James among the 

potential jurors earlier said, “I’m not God,” which to the State 

“indicate[d] that she’s saying to us, ‘Who am I to judge somebody or 

be a part of a process that the death would be imposed? That’s 

God’s job, not anybody else’s.’ ” Gordon’s counsel renewed its 

argument that the State’s proffered reasons for the strike were not 

race-neutral. The trial court deferred ruling on the matter, stating 

it would review its notes in addition to what was being presented by 

the State and the defense.

After seating the other jurors, the trial court stated it had 

“considered the totality of the circumstances . . . and particularly 

the second reason for the peremptory strike to Ms. James,” and 

granted the State’s request to strike Ms. James over the defense’s 

objection.
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After the jury had been selected, defense counsel accepted the 

jury, but renewed all race- and gender-related challenges it had 

made during the voir dire process. Gordon himself was sworn and 

stated that, other than the objections made on his behalf by his 

counsel, he had no objections to the panel as selected.

Trial proceeded, and at the conclusion of the State’s evidence, 

Gordon moved for judgment of acquittal. The trial court granted 

the motion as to one count of attempted murder with a vehicle 

because the officer that the count concerned had previously died

from unrelated causes.

Gordon’s counsel did not concede that Gordon participated in 

any of the charged offenses. For the murders of Moran and Royal, 

Gordon’s counsel argued that Tony Wright, or a different man from 

the fleeing SUV who was not arrested until the next day, could have 

killed the two women. The two neighbors who encountered a 

suspicious man outside their houses identified Tony Wright when 

shown photo packs and testified to that effect later at trial. This 

identification was confirmed by the officer who showed both 

neighbors the photo packs. Gordon’s counsel also contended that 

numerous gaps existed in the police perimeter around 618 Astor 
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Drive. These gaps, Gordon’s lawyers argued, could have allowed 

somebody to escape. They also hypothesized that the murders may 

have occurred before officers surrounded the house.

Following closing arguments, the trial court instructed the 

jury. Guilty as charged, came the verdict, as to the thirteen counts

against Gordon that had not been dismissed or severed.

At the penalty phase, the State sought the death penalty 

arguing that four aggravating factors applied: (1) Gordon’s 

conviction of a prior capital felony or other felony involving the use 

or threat of violence to a person; (2) the first-degree murders were 

committed while Gordon was engaged in burglary or flight after the 

commission of robbery with a firearm; (3) Gordon murdered both 

Moran and Royal to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest; and (4) the 

murders were committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or 

cruel (HAC) manner. The State presented the testimony of an 

expert witness regarding the pain each victim suffered as a result of 

the injuries Gordon inflicted by repeatedly stabbing and cutting her 

with a knife while she remained alive, as well as victim impact 

statements, including photos, from family members and close 

family friends of the victims.
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Gordon presented the testimony of six expert witnesses—a

former prison warden, a neuropsychologist, a neurocognitive 

imaging specialist, a neurologist, a clinical pharmacologist, and a 

clinical and forensic psychologist—and that of Gordon’s sister, 

Theresa Gordon. Several of the experts concluded that Gordon 

might have brain damage from the extensive abuse he endured as a 

child. The jury heard evidence that Gordon’s IQ as measured when 

he was in the second grade was 80, and that a more recent adult IQ 

test had returned a score of 70.6 Gordon’s records showed a variety 

of mental health diagnoses, including schizophrenia, schizoaffective 

disorder depressive type, bipolar disorder, psychosis not otherwise 

specified (NOA), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

Gordon’s sister testified to extensive emotional, verbal, physical, 

and sexual abuse and neglect that she and her brother endured at 

the hands of their father with the tacit consent of their mother. On 

6. No specific IQ score automatically establishes that an 

individual is intellectually disabled. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 

723 (2014). To be barred from receiving the death penalty due to 

intellectual disability, a defendant must exhibit (1) significantly 

subaverage general intellectual functioning, and (2) concurrent 

deficits in adaptive behavior, (3) that shall have manifested before 

age 18. § 921.137(1) Fla. Stat. (2013).
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rebuttal, the State called Gordon’s father David Michael Gordon, 

who denied that he had ever abused his children.

The jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the four aggravating factors asserted by the State existed and that 

those aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances 

and recommended that Gordon receive the death penalty.

In its sentencing order the trial court found that all four 

aggravating factors applied to both murders. Additionally, the trial 

court found that Gordon established the following mitigating 

circumstances and assigned them the following weight: he was 

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 

(little weight); he suffered from mental illness (little weight); he 

suffered from toxic stress syndrome (moderate weight); he was not 

receiving proper treatment (little weight); he was abused and 

abandoned by his family (little weight); and he was smoking 

synthetic cannabinoids7 on the date of the murders (little weight).

7. Specifically, the trial court found that Gordon was 

smoking K2 or “spice” the day of the murders, both of which are 

street names for synthetic cannabinoids. This drug is ingested by 

smoking plant material that has been sprayed with additives or by

using a liquid in an e-cigarette. Synthetic Cannabinoids (K2/Spice)
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Next, the trial court found that Gordon failed to establish the 

following mitigating circumstances: his capacity to appreciate the 

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 

requirement of law was substantially impaired; he was an 

accomplice in the murders and his participation was relatively 

minor; and there were other factors in his background or life or the 

circumstances of the offense that should mitigate his sentence.

Based on the trial court’s review of the evidence, its weighing 

of the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, its

consideration of the jury’s sentencing recommendation, and noting 

that it would reach the same conclusion even in the absence of the 

aggravator of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, the trial court 

sentenced Gordon to death for each murder on February 7, 2020. 

Gordon appealed his convictions and sentences on February 24, 

2020. We denied Gordon’s motion to reconstruct the record to 

reflect the races of certain venire members who later served on the 

jury. This appeal followed.

DrugFacts, Nat. Inst. on Drug Abuse (July 2020), 

https://nida.nih.gov/publications/drugfacts/syntheticcannabinoids-k2spice.
- 17 -

II

Gordon raises seven issues on appeal and the State raises one.

Two issues raised by Gordon—the State’s strike of juror Kimberly 

James and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions for attempted first-degree murder of Deputy Sheriff 

Quintana-Rivera and Officer Nickels—merit individualized 

discussion.

A

Gordon argues that the State was impermissibly motivated by 

race when it struck venireperson Kimberly James from the jury, 

and that its proffered reasons for the strike were pretextual. We 

reject this argument as improperly preserved.

In State v. Johnson, we said, “[T]he party opposing a 

peremptory strike must make a specific objection to the proponent's 

proffered race-neutral reason for the strike, if contested, to preserve 

the claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the proffered 

reason was genuine.” 295 So. 3d 710, 716 (Fla. 2020). A trial 

court’s decision will only be reversed if it is clearly erroneous. 

Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 320 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he trial court’s 

decision turns primarily on an assessment of credibility and will be 
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affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” (quoting Melbourne,

679 So. 2d 759, 764-65 (Fla. 1996))). Therefore, the defendant 

must create a record containing the legal grounds for his or her 

objection. See Johnson, 295 So. 3d at 714-15 (“If the opponent of a 

peremptory strike fails to challenge as pretext a proffered reason 

found to be race-neutral, then the trial court is usually left with 

nothing other than the legal presumption that the proponent 

exercised the strike for a genuine reason.”).

Here, Gordon objected that the State’s proffered reasons for its 

strike—first, James’s “I’m not God” comment, and second, her 

statement during voir dire that her first cousin had been sentenced 

to 25 years in prison—were “insufficiently race-neutral.” But the 

State’s proffered reasons were facially race-neutral, and Gordon’s 

objection did not put the trial court on notice of the argument he 

advances here—that the State’s facially race-neutral reasons were 

pretextual, and why. “[P]roper preservation requires the following 

three steps from a party: (1) a timely, contemporaneous objection; 

(2) a legal ground for the objection; and (3) ‘[i]n order for an 

argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific 

contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or 
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motion below.’” Fleitas v. State, 3 So. 3d 351, 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2008) (quoting Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 940 (Fla. 2005)). 

Here, the second two requirements were lacking. The trial court 

must be presented with a reason to doubt the genuineness of the 

State’s proffered race-neutral reason for a strike, for it is the 

genuineness of the reason upon which the trial court must rule. 

For this Court to meaningfully review a trial court’s decision to 

allow a strike, the objecting party must specify its objection by 

giving some reasoning as to why the proffered reason for the strike 

is pretextual. Was it, for example, a consideration that would have 

applied to other members of the venire, some of whom were seated? 

Or was it a consideration that would not bear on the juror’s ability 

to weigh the evidence as required? That cannot be said of Gordon’s 

counsel’s objection here, which did not put the trial court on notice 

as to the reason the challenged strike was allegedly a pretext for 

racial animus, and therefore did not contain a proper legal ground 

for the objection or a specific contention for us to review.

Next, Gordon compares James’s voir dire responses with the 

responses of allegedly similarly situated venire members who 

ultimately served on the jury. But he makes this comparison for 
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the first time before us; Gordon failed to preserve for review a 

comparative analysis of venire members’ responses to voir dire.

We have said that, for this Court to compare voir dire 

responses in a Melbourne appeal, the party must have raised the 

issue to the trial court. In Hoskins v. State, we found that, because 

“at trial Hoskins did not mention [the similarly situated] jurors . . . 

his [Melbourne] claim is waived as to these jurors.” 965 So. 2d 1, 

10 (Fla. 2007). Likewise, in King v. State, we said that, “[a]lthough 

King now contends that there were other jurors on the panel who 

[were similarly situated], defense counsel did not raise that 

challenge before the trial court. Accordingly, that challenge has 

also been waived.” 89 So. 3d 209, 230 (Fla. 2012).

It was Gordon’s burden to preserve a comparison of venire 

members’ responses for our review. Despite multiple opportunities 

during jury selection, he failed to make that comparison, or to 

provide, in a manner amenable to our review, an explanation for 

why the State’s proffered reasons for striking James were 

pretextual. For example, when the State accepted without objection 

each of the venire members who gave similar voir dire responses to 

James, Gordon could have noted that the State did not strike 
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people who had similar, or closer, relationships with incarcerated 

people than James. Or, when the trial court asked Gordon to 

accept the final jury panel, he could have analyzed any comparable 

responses from other members of the panel. Instead, Gordon made 

a blanket statement purporting to preserve all race- and genderbased challenges made during voir dire.

On this record, which contains no reasoned, preserved 

objection regarding the genuineness of the State’s proffered raceneutral reason for a peremptory strike, we have no basis upon 

which to revisit the trial court’s decision to seat the contested juror.

B

Gordon’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails 

because competent, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict

finding him guilty of two counts of attempted first-degree murder 

with a vehicle. To sustain a conviction on appeal, there must be 

“substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict” with all 

evidence viewed “in the light most favorable to the State.” Bush v. 

State, 295 So. 3d 179, 200-01 (Fla. 2020). Evidence is competent if 

it is “sufficiently relevant and material”; evidence is substantial if 

there is enough that “a reasonable mind would accept [the evidence] 
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as adequate to support a conclusion.” De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 

2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957), cited with approval in Bush, 295 So. 3d at 

201. If “a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” then the 

conviction must be upheld. Bush, 295 So. 3d at 201 (quoting 

Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 2019)).

Of the three elements of attempted first-degree murder,8

Gordon says that the State failed to produce enough evidence to 

prove one: that his actions were premeditated. Gordon is correct in 

describing the scene of the crime as chaotic, especially after he 

burst through the garage door. Both the officers he was later

convicted of attempting to kill testified that they could not see who 

was driving the car—implying that Gordon could not see them 

either. Gordon argues that the evidence adduced at trial supports

8. The three elements of attempted first-degree murder are: 

“(1) an act intending to cause death that went beyond just thinking 

or talking about it; (2) premeditated design to kill; and (3) 

commission of an act which would have resulted in the death of the 

victim except that someone prevented the defendant from killing the 

victim or the defendant failed to do so.” Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 

17, 21 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds in Valdes v. State, 

3 So. 3d 1067, 1077 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 6.2; §§ 

777.04, 782.04, Fla. Stat. (2015).
- 23 -

his claim, that he was trying to escape, just as readily as it 

supports the State’s claim, that he purposefully attempted to hit the 

officers as he drove.

But this argument ultimately fails because it rests on a 

misunderstanding of what constitutes and what establishes

premeditation. Premeditation is “understood as requiring proof that 

the defendant was aware of the consequences of the actions that 

caused death, and that the defendant had the opportunity for 

reflection prior to committing the fatal act.” Sparre v. State, 164 So. 

3d 1183, 1200 (Fla. 2015). Premeditation does not require lengthy 

deliberation on the part of the actor; the intent to commit 

potentially fatal acts “may be formed a moment before the act but 

must exist for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection as to 

the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result of 

that act.” Brown v. State, 126 So. 3d 211, 221 (Fla. 2013) (quoting 

Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)). While Gordon’s 

arguments center around his state of mind as he drove the car, 

there is competent, substantial evidence to support the jury’s 

conclusion that Gordon had already formed the requisite intent 

before he left the garage.
- 24 -

Specifically, the State presented ample evidence to support the 

jury’s finding that Gordon had sufficient time to reflect upon his 

plan to flee and realize the danger to others inherent in his plan. 

Gordon had been part of a high-speed police chase in the hours 

before the murders, so he knew officers were actively pursuing him. 

The jury heard that officers had shone flashlights through the 

windows of 618 Astor Drive onto the women’s bodies, then shouted 

to one another outside of the house upon discovering the victims’ 

bodies. From this evidence, the jury could permissibly infer that 

Gordon knew officers had tracked him down and surrounded the 

house. See Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 578 (Fla. 2007) 

(discussing evidence the jury could have relied on to make the 

inference that the killing was premeditated); Bargesser v. State, 116 

So. 11, 12 (Fla. 1928) (“The jury are the judges of the 

reasonableness, probability, and credibility of the explanation 

offered by the defendant.”); Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 

U.S. 140, 156 (1979) (“Inferences and presumptions are a staple of 

our adversary system of factfinding. It is often necessary for the 

trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime—

that is, an ‘ultimate’ or ‘elemental’ fact—from the existence of one or 
- 25 -

more ‘evidentiary’ or ‘basic’ facts.”). Still, in an attempt to escape, 

Gordon plowed the victims’ car through the closed garage door with 

no warning. On this record, we cannot say that the jury lacked 

competent, substantial evidence to support its conclusion as to 

premeditation.

C

We briefly address the other issues raised by the parties.

We reaffirm our decision in Lawrence v. State that the Eighth 

Amendment does not require comparative proportionality review of 

death sentences. 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the 

mitigating evidence in this case. A trial judge need not mention 

every relevant piece of evidence in mitigation to properly weigh 

aggravating and mitigating factors under our laws and the Eighth 

Amendment. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175 (2006) (“In 

aggregate, our precedents confer upon defendants the right to 

present sentencers with information relevant to the sentencing 

decision and oblige sentencers to consider that information in 

determining the appropriate sentence. The thrust of our mitigation 

jurisprudence ends here.”) A sentencing order is valid when the 
- 26 -

sentencing judge “expressly evaluate[d] . . . each statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 

Woodel v. State, 804 So. 2d 316, 326 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Ferrell v. 

State, 653 So. 2d 367, 371 (Fla. 1995)). While judges cannot merely 

list out the mitigators with no analysis, neither must they 

individually discuss each and every piece of evidence submitted for 

each mitigator. See Woodel, 804 So. 2d at 327 (rejecting a list-like 

sentencing order that engaged in no analysis and failed to assign 

weight to aggravators or mitigators).

In Lowe v. State, we upheld the trial court’s weighing of 

mitigators where “it [was] apparent that the trial court considered 

each of the mitigating circumstances proposed by [the defendant] 

and determined that such circumstances hardly distinguished [the 

defendant] from other members of society, were supported by 

‘underwhelming’ evidence, or were in fact not mitigating.” 259 So. 

3d 23, 64 (Fla. 2018). Here, too, the trial court identified the 

evidence that supported its conclusion regarding the assigned 

weight of each mitigator. It balanced that weight against that of the 

aggravating factors in the prescribed manner. On this record, we 
- 27 -

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evaluation of 

aggravation and mitigation.

We have previously held that the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment does not require a 

categorical bar against the execution of persons who suffer from 

any form of mental illness or brain damage. McCoy v. State, 132 

So. 3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2013). The Eighth Amendment broadly 

protects two classes from execution: people who are intellectually 

disabled and minors. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

(intellectual disabilities); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)

(minors). Gordon’s argument that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 

his execution because he is mentally ill and brain damaged is 

without merit. At trial, the testifying expert diagnosed Gordon with 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), PTSD from severe 

childhood abuse, and schizoaffective disorder depressive type. The 

trial court heard evidence that Gordon tested to an IQ of 70, 

borderline to the threshold for an intellectual disability. It also 

heard testimony from experts that brain imaging showed Gordon 

had suffered extensive traumatic brain injury earlier in life, and 

that he likely suffers from chronic traumatic encephalopathy, which 
- 28 -

is caused by repeated head trauma and leads to neurological 

deterioration.

Yet we have held that, for the purposes of the Eighth 

Amendment, the existence of a traumatic brain injury does not 

reduce an individual’s culpability to the extent they become

immune from capital punishment. Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 

26-27 (Fla. 2010) (emphasizing this Court has repeatedly rejected 

the argument “that defendants with mental illness must be treated 

similarly to those with mental retardation because both conditions 

result in reduced culpability”); Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 867 

(Fla. 2007) (“To the extent that Connor is arguing that he cannot be 

executed because of mental conditions that are not insanity or 

mental retardation, the issue has been resolved adversely to his 

position.”).9

9. See also Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 887 (Fla. 2013)

(“Additionally, in [Carroll’s] habeas corpus proceeding in federal 

court, Carroll claimed that he is mentally ill and, under the 

rationale of Atkins, persons who are unable to control their conduct 

due to mental illness act with lesser moral culpability and should 

be exempt from execution. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 

refused to extend Atkins to mentally ill persons absent a decision 

from the United States Supreme Court barring execution of the 

mentally ill. Thus, Carroll’s claim in this proceeding that he is less 
- 29 -

The evidence that Gordon committed the murders of both 

Patricia Moran and Deborah Royal is sufficient to sustain his

convictions. In appeals contesting a death penalty sentence, 

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(a)(5) and our precedent 

create “a mandatory obligation to determine the sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain [a] homicide conviction.” Truehill v. State, 211 

So. 3d 930, 951 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 

184 (Fla. 2007)). In conducting a sufficiency review, we view the 

evidence “in the light most favorable to the State to determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cozzie v. State, 

225 So. 3d 717, 733 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 

2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006)). Here, there is competent, substantial 

evidence to support Gordon’s convictions for first-degree murder. 

The DNA analysis, witness testimony, police dog tracking, and 

Gordon being the only living person found within the police 

culpable because of his mental illness and should be treated 

similarly to the classes of persons protected by Atkins and Roper is 

procedurally barred. Even if not untimely and procedurally barred, 

this Court has rejected similar claims on the merits in the past.”) 

(citation omitted).
- 30 -

perimeter all strongly support the jury’s verdict that Gordon 

murdered Patricia Moran and Deborah Royal. Accordingly, 

sufficient evidence exists to sustain his homicide convictions.

III

We affirm Gordon’s convictions and sentences of death.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, and GROSSHANS, JJ., 

concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v. 

State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned 

this Court’s decades-long practice of proportionality review in direct 

appeal cases, I can only concur in the result.

Further, because I agree that Gordon failed to properly 

preserve the Melbourne10 issue with respect to juror James, I 

concur in the result.

10. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996).
- 31 -

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,

Jalal A. Harb, Judge

Case No. 532015CF000476A000XX

Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, 

Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A. 

Buchwalter, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee