UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

August 3, 2016 

Vice President, Operations 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway 

Covert, MI 49043-9530 

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REPORT FOR THE AUDIT OF 

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC’S. FLOOD HAZARD 

REEVALUATION REPORT SUBMITTAL RELATING TO THE NEAR-TERM 

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1-FLOODING FOR PALISADES 

NUCLEAR PLANT (CAC NO. MF6128) 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

By letter dated June 1, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML15146A293), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

informed you of the staff’s plan to conduct a regulatory audit of Entergy Nuclear Operations, 

Inc.’s (the licensee’s) Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) submittal related to the NearTerm Task Force Recommendation 2.1-Flooding for Palisades Nuclear Plant. The audit was 

intended to support the NRC staff review of the licensee’s FHRR and the subsequent issuance 

of a staff assessment. 

The audit, conducted on November 9, 2015, was performed consistent with NRC Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office Instruction LIC-111, “Regulatory Audits,” dated 

December 29, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082900195). The purpose of this letter is to 

provide you with the final audit report which summarizes and documents the NRC’s regulatory 

audit of the licensee’s FHRR submittal. 

 
-2-

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-2621 or by e-mail at 

Robert.Bernardo@nrc.gov. 

Docket No. 50-255 

Enclosure: 

Audit Report 

cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv 

Sincerely, 

~ Project Manager 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

Japan Lessons-Learned Division 

Hazards Management Branch 
 Enclosure

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REPORT FOR THE AUDIT OF ENTERGY 

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC’S. FLOOD HAZARD REEVALUATION REPORT SUBMITTALS 

RELATING TO THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1-FLOODING FOR 

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 

BACKGROUND AND AUDIT BASIS 

By letter dated March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 

request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in 

active or deferred status, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 

Section 50.54(f), “Conditions of license” (hereafter referred to as the “50.54(f) letter”). The 

request was issued in connection with implementing lessons-learned from the 2011 accident at 

the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, as documented in the Near-Term Task Force’s 

review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. Recommendation 2.1 in that document 

recommended that the NRC staff issue orders to all licensees to reevaluate seismic and 

flooding for their sites against current NRC requirements and guidance. Subsequent staff 

requirements memoranda associated with SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137, instructed the 

NRC staff to issue requests for information to licensees pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f). 

By letter dated March 11, 2015, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy, the licensee) 

submitted its Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) for Palisades Nuclear Plant 

(Palisades) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. 

ML15106A681). The NRC is reviewing the aforementioned submittal and has completed a 

regulatory audit of the licensee to better understand the development of the submittal, identify 

any similarities/differences with past work completed, and ultimately aid in its review of the 

licensee’s FHRR. This audit summary was completed in accordance with the guidance set forth 

in NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office Instruction LIC-111, “Regulatory Audits,” 

dated December 29, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082900195). 

AUDIT LOCATION AND DATES 

The audit was completed by document review via a webinar session in conjunction with the use 

of the licensee’s established electronic reading room (ERR) and teleconference on 

November 9, 2015.
- 2 - 

AUDIT TEAM 

Title Team Member Organization 

Team Leader, NRR/JLD Vic Hall NRC 

Technical Monitor Laura QuinnWillingham NRC 

Technical Staff Lyle Hibler NRC 

Technical Deputy Division 

Director 

Andy Campbell NRC 

Technical Branch Chief Aida Rivera-Varona NRC 

NRC Contractor Eugene Yan Argonne National Laboratory 

(ANL) 

NRC Contractor Vinod Maht ANL 

NRC Contractor John Quinn ANL 

A list of the licensee’s participants can be found in Attachment 2. 

DOCUMENTS AUDITED 

Attachment 1 of this report contains a list which details the documents that were 

reviewed by the NRC staff, in part or in whole, as part of this audit. The documents were 

located in an ERR during the NRC staff’s review. The documents, or portions thereof, 

that were used by the NRC staff as part of the technical analysis and/or as reference in 

the completion of the staff assessment, were submitted by the licensee and docketed, as 

necessary, to complete the staff assessment. These documents are identified in 

Table 1. 

AUDIT ACTIVITIES 

In general, the audit activities consisted mainly of the following actions: 

 Review background information on site topography and geographical characteristics 

of the watershed. 

 Review site physical features and plant layout. 

 Understand the selection of important assumptions and parameters that would be 

the basis for evaluating the individual flood causing mechanisms described in the 

50.54(f) letter. 

 Review model input/output files to computer analyses such as HEC-HMS and FLO2D to have an understanding of how modeling assumptions were programmed and 

executed. 

Table 1 summarizes specific technical topics (and resolution) of important items that 

were discussed and clarified during the audit. The items discussed in Table 1 may be 

referenced/mentioned in the staff assessment in more detail. 
 -3- 

 EXIT MEETING/BRIEFING 

On December 23, 2015, the NRC staff closed out the discussion of the technical topics 

described above. 
- 4 - 

Table 1: Palisades Information Needs – Audit/Post-Audit Summary 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

1 All Flood-Causing Mechanisms – Comparison of 

Reevaluated Flood Hazard with Current Design Basis Background: Recommendation 2.1 of the 50.54(f) letter provides instructions for the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR). Under Section 1, Hazard Reevaluation Report, Items c and d, licensees are requested to perform: 

c. Comparison of current and reevaluated flood-causing mechanisms at the site. Provide an assessment of the current design-basis flood elevation to the reevaluated flood elevation for each flood-causing mechanism. Include how the findings from Enclosure 4 of this letter (i.e., Recommendation 2.3 flooding walkdowns) support this determination. If the current design-basis flood bounds the reevaluated hazard for all flood causing mechanisms, include how this finding was determined. d. Interim evaluation and actions taken or planned to address any higher flooding hazards relative to the design basis, prior to completion of the integrated assessment described below, if necessary. 

The Palisades FHRR provides a comparison of the reevaluated flood hazards with the CLB instead of the current design-basis. Section 4.0 of the report summarizes this comparison. Request: Clarify and where necessary correct the comparison of the reevaluated flood hazard to the current design bases. 

The licensee stated that the CLB “is defineapplicable NRC requirements, licensee comspecific design-basis information documenfinal safety analysis report, for the purposeFHRR, current design basis (CDB) and cur(CLB) have the same meaning.” The NRC references to the the CLB as equivalent to the FHRR. As part of the licensee’s resposhowed a modification of FHRR Table 4-1 a) “CLB” was replaced with “CDB” in the t

b) storm surge CDB was clarified as “594

MSL [Design basis flood level]”, 

c) the difference in the Combined Effect R

Height was modified to read “flood leveflood protected elevation...”, and 

d) the table note was modified: “Note: Not 

this flood mechanism was not defined odesign-basis documents. As a result, nmade to reevaluated results.” 

The NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient.
- 5 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

2 Local Intense Precipitation – Site Structures and Critical 

Locations Background: In FHRR Figure 3-1 and Figures 5, 13, and 14 in Calculation No. 32-9226944-002 “Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-evaluation – Local Intense Precipitation,” the identification number for grid elements at locations identified as critical locations of the plant and the important site structures are either illegible or not labeled to reference the locations for the purpose of identifying flooding water depths and elevation based on the reevaluation. Request: FHRR Figure 3-1 (or selected figure from the LIP calculation package) should be modified or an additional similar figure should be provided that shows all the structures listed in Table 3-1 with their names, and representative grid elements for critical locations and their identification numbers. 

In response to this information need requefigures provided that shows all the structurwith their names, and representative grid elocations and their identification numbers. requested that these figures be submitted oThe NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient. 

3 Local Intense Precipitation – Boundary Condition of the 

FLO-2D Model along Lake Michigan Background: Section 2.2.2 of the FHRR reports the highest recorded monthly mean elevation of Lake Michigan as 583.2 feet National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929 (NGVD29). This value was used as a fixed stage (water surface elevation) along the model extent of Lake Michigan as a boundary condition in the FLO-2D model as a conservative approach. Section 2.2.2 in Calculation No. 32-9226944-002, “Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-evaluation – Local Intense Precipitation,” indicates that the constant stage was assigned to the boundary grid elements using the “reservoir water elevation” feature in the FLO-2D model. The staff examined the grid elements at the boundary of the model along the lake (the west edge of the model) as well as the model input files, and didn’t find that the mean lake water elevation (583.2 feet NGVD29) is specified as 

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s updfor its revised model. The model was revislake boundary along the western boundary response. The main conclusion in licenseeadding a lake boundary in FLO-2D model hthe water surface elevation (WSE) at criticaNRC staff reviewed the input and output filrun, and reached the same conclusion althfunction used for lake boundary in FLO-2D method. The main observations and NRC sfollows: 1) A reservoir function was used in the licecreate a reservoir with a specified lake levedepression zone along the western boundareservoir was filled up to the specific lake lestep (0.1 hr) but was not maintained at the 
- 6 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

a fixed “reservoir water elevation” in the model. The staff also reviewed the model results and found that the maximum water surface elevation at the model boundary along the lake is less than 581 feet NGVD29 suggesting that no constant lake level of 583.2 feet NGVD29 is maintained along the lake (the west boundary of the FLO-2D model) as the licensee described in the FHRR. Request: Examine and verify that the model boundary along Lake Michigan in the FLO-2D model is assigned correctly using the highest mean monthly lake elevation (583.2 feet NGVD29) and provide either justification or correct FLO-2D input files if necessary. 

the rest of simulation period (24 hours). It via the simulation period. Apparently, usinto define lake boundary in FLO-2D does noactual lake boundary. 2) To confirm the licensee’s conclusion, the independent run by assigning a constant lawestern boundary of the model. Results froindicate that the WSE at the critical locatioincrease, which means that the WSE at the insensitive to the model boundary of the PaBased on this result, the NRC staff finds thneed to update its model with a correct bouThe NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient.

4 Local Intense Precipitation – Vertical Datum Conversion 

Background: The elevations in the FLO-2D model are used in the NGVD29 datum. The ground surface topography that was developed from an aerial survey conducted in 2014 using Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) technology which uses NAVD88 datum, and the Lake Michigan level that was taken from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Holland tide station uses IGLD85 datum. Section 1.1 and Appendix A in Calculation No. 32-9226944-002, “Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-evaluation – Local Intense Precipitation,” notes that the web-based program, “VERTCON” (NGS, 2014a, and 2014b), results in the following relationship to convert NAVD88 and IGLD85 datums into NGVD29: NGVD29 = NAVD88 + 0.48 ft & NAVD88 = IGLD85 + 0.30 ft 

The licensee stated that “an elevation of 1.to establish the datum conversion from NALake Michigan elevations. The arbitrary elused to simplify the establishment of the colicensee noted that a NOAA web-based proreferences to Appendix A in Calculation No“Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Intenser Precipitation,” to document that usstated that “The resultant datum shift from -0.09 or -0.30 ft based on an input elevatioThe NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient.
- 7 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

The staff performed the datum conversion independently using the same web-based program and tool to verify whether the conversion is correct. The staff verified that the ground surface topography elevation conversion from NAVD88 to NGVD29 is correct. For conversion of Michigan Lake level from IGLD85 to NAVD88, however, the staff found a different relationship for the Palisades site: NAVD88 = IGLD85 + 0.48. The following shows the conversion on the NOAA website: The difference between the two datums for the Lake Michigan at Palisades site is (177.6965 - 77.5518) * 3.28 = 0.47 feet (not 0.30 feet). The 177.55 meters (582.37 feet IGLD85) is the highest recorded monthly mean elevation of Lake Michigan, which is used in the FLO-2D model. The resulting vertical datum converted from 582.37 ft IGLD85 is 582.85 ft NAVD88 and 583.33 ft NGVD29. Request: Examine and verify that the conversion between the vertical datums was done correctly and correct where needed in any references used for this conversion. 

5 Local Intense Precipitation – Supercritical Flow The licensee stated that “the duration in wh

exceeds the permissible velocity of rough a
- 8 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

Background: FLO-2D PRO model limits supercritical flow by reducing the velocity. Thus, the actual velocity at the place where supercritical flow occurs would be higher than the velocity determined by the FLO-2D PRO model. The FHRR identifies a roadway near the cooling tank that has supercritical flow (Figure 3-7) and shows a manually calculated flow velocity based on the maximum flow at that place. The calculated flow velocity at this location is 15.6 feet per second, which is higher than permissible velocity (i.e., 12 feet per second for rough asphalt (USACE, 1984)). Section 6.4 in Calculation No. 32-9226944-002, “Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-evaluation – Local Intense Precipitation,” assumes that this would not cause the significant erosion due to the short duration of high flow rates. Request: Provide the duration that speeds in excess of the permissible velocity last and a reference to support the conclusion that significant erosion would not be anticipated for that duration. 

second at cross section No. 2 was estimateThe licensee concluded that “because the the suggested permissible velocity by only less than an hour, it is likely that if any erosit would be limited.” The licensee describeerosion were to occur, it would happen at cnear the toe of the cooling tower road that Towers.” The licensee stated that erosion not affect critical structures related to safetreferences Calculation No. 32-9226944-00Plant Flooding Hazard Re-evaluation – LocPrecipitation,” in their response.

The NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient. 

6 Local Intense Precipitation – CDB, CLB, and Safety-Related 

Elevations Background: The FHRR uses current design-basis (CDB: e.g., 594.1 ft NGVD29 and 594.4 ft NGVD29 in Section 2.2), current licensee basis (CLB: e.g., flood depth of 5 ft on the east side of Service Building and 0.5 ft for the rest of powerblock area in Sections 2.3.1.1 and 4.1.1 as well as Table 4-1), and safetyrelated elevations (e.g., 594.4 ft NGVD29 in Section 5, Tables 5.1 and 5.3). Request: 

a) Clarify if CDB, CLB and safety-related elevations are 

defined or used differently. 

a) In response to this information need

that the CDB and CLB have the sambe read as CDB where CLB is listedfurther discussion, the licensee agrelevations and the CDB are not intewritten to mean list two different eleto Information Need 1 for CDB and need. 

b) The licensee is going to defer provi

information on associated effects to 

c) This information need is resolved p

and 6a and the NRC staff now has complete the comparision with the r
- 9 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

b) Provide an explanation (in Table footnotes) or 

justification for why the associated effect is bounded by CLB in Table 4-2, if the given effect has not been reevaluated (e.g., wind wave and runups). 

c) Specify that each critical location is bounded or not 

bounded by a selected criterion, such as CDB, CLB, or safety-related elevation, in Table 4-3, which provides the maximum flood elevations and depths based on the FLO-2D results for all the critical locations identified by the licensee. 

d) Provide either references or safety-related elevations 

(as indicated in Table 5-1) to support the evaluation and action for the last three critical locations in Table 5-2. 

d) After discussions on Information Ne

staff determined that this informationeeded. 

7 Local Intense Precipitation – Runoff Loss (Infiltration Loss) 

Background: Section 3.1.2.1.2 of the FHRR and Section 6.2.5 in Calculation No. 32-9226944-002, “Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-evaluation – Local Intense Precipitation,” account for the infiltration loss rate in the model based on the SCS curve number method. The estimation of the infiltration loss rate has some level of uncertainty, even though the SCS curve number method is commonly used. The guidance, NUREG/CR-7046 (NRC 2011), states that the infiltration loss rates should be set to minimum recommended values (FERC, 2001) for the drainage basin where estimated loss rates cannot be validated. The estimated infiltration rate at the Palisades site has not been validated. Request: Evaluate the infiltration loss using the loss rates recommended by NRC (2011) or justify the infiltration loss used. Confirm that loss rate obtained by using the SCS curve number method in the model is the same or more conservative than the loss rate obtained by using this NRC recommended values suggested by FERC (2001). 

The licensee calculated the infiltration rates value instead of minimum value (0.44 instethat they are in the range of the SCS curve The NRC staff determined that the justificawas reasonable, especially given the other model. The HMR-PMP used by the licensedeal of conservatism such that compoundiwith parameter conservatism is not requireR2.1 reviews. In the event that an analysis additional parameter conservatism could bconsider the HMR-based PMP to be primaconservatism. Because the LIP analysis fused a HMR-based event and reasonable most conservative) parameter values, the Nthat infiltration rate value used is reasonabincluded that justification to establish the vausing site specific information. Because thused was in the range of the guidance that (at the upper end, however), the NRC staff reasonable value rather than a conservativparameter was adequate for use in reevalu
- 10 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

 hazard. Considering the other conservatis

analysis, conservatisms do not need to be purposes of the R2.1 site-specific justificatThe licensee referenced NRCS guidance (determination of soil curve numbers, maximand initial abstraction, net constant losses licensee referenced Table 8-8.1, “Minimum Hydrologic Soil Groups” FERC (2001). The NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient. 

8 Failure of Dams and Onsite Water Control/Storage 

Structures Background: In the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 2, licensees are requested to perform an evaluation of flood waves resulting from the breach of upstream dams, including dominotype or cascading dam failures. Water storage and water control structures (such as onsite cooling or auxiliary water reservoirs and onsite levees) that may be located at or above structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety should also be evaluated. Additional effects for earthen embankments, such as sediment, should also be considered. Models and methods used to evaluate the dam failure and the resulting effects should be applicable to the type of failure mechanism and should be appropriately justified. Recent analyses completed by State and Federal agencies with appropriate jurisdiction for dams within the watershed may be used. The staff did not find an evaluation in the FHRR, of onsite water storage and water control structures, nor a statement that none exist at the site. The staff also reviewed PLP-RPT-15-00009 

The licensee stated that “there are no onsstructures (i.e., onsite cooling or auxiliary walevees) located at or above SSCs importanreferenced “PLP FSAR, Figure 1-1, Sht 1 aThe NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient. 
- 11 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

“Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation – Screening for Dam Failures” as posted in the Palisades Electronic Reading Room and found no statement regarding onsite water control/storage structures within it. Request: Provide a flood hazard evaluation of onsite water control/storage structures if any exist, or provide a statement that no such structures exist at the site. 

9 Combined Effect – Flood Event Duration and Associated 

Effects Background: FHRR Section 4.1 and Table 4-4 identifies several associated effects and indicated that the effects of sediment deposition/erosion was not evaluated but determined to be bounded by the CLB. The FHRR also states that the flood event duration parameters were not evaluated. The staff reviewed Calculation No. EA-EC5490-03, “32-9226981-000 - Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-evaluation – Combined Events” and did not find this information. Request: Provide quantitative evaluation for the flood height and associated effects (as defined in Section 9 of JLD-ISG-2012-05) for the combined event, or describe when the evaluation will be performed. Provide flood event duration parameters associated with the combined event, or describe when the parameters will be provided. The flood event duration parameters and associated effects with the combined event include all parameters and effects listed in FHRR Table 4-4. 

The licensee’s response include statementduration and associate effects. These stat“Calculations for hydrostatic, hydrodynamicare included in Sections 2.4 and 6.4 of the Events Calculation (32-9226981-000 – PalFlooding Hazard Re-evaluation – Combine

“Flood durations above sites grade was caapproximately 25 hours. The calculation weduratino of the surge hydrograph above thpresented in Section 6.4 of the Palisades CCalculation, “32-9226981-000 – Palisades Hazard Reevaluation – Combined Events.” “Groundwater in the vicinity of the site is gelevel of Lake Michigan (PLP, 2014). The sabove PLP site grade for approximately 25 data from the FSAR indicates that the sandthe dunes have a slow percolation rate. Beshort duration of flooding and slow percolaunderlying soil, short-term water level chanunlikely to affect groundwater levels in the 
- 12 - 

INFO 

NEED INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDI

Regarding sediment deposition and erosioPLP is not within a high risk erosion area aMichigan Department of Environmental QuAppenix J (MIDEQ, 1996).” The NRC staff concluded that the informatlicensee in response to this information neesufficient. 
- 13 - 

 

ATTACHMENT 1 

Palisades Audit Document List 

1. FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). 2001. Engineering Guidelines for the 

Evaluation of Hydropower Projects, Chapter 8 – “Determination of the Probable Maximum 

Flood.” Washington, D. C. 

2. AREVA. 2014. Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation - Local Intense 

Precipitation. Document No. 32-9226944-002. January 30, 2014. 

3. AREVA. 2014. Palisades Nuclear Plant Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation – Combined Event. 

Document No. 32-9226944-002. January 30, 2014. 

4. NRCS. 2004. Chapter 9 hydrlogi9c Soil-Cover Complexes, Part 630 hydrology, National 

Engineering Handbook. 
- 14 - 

ATTACHMENT 2 

List of Entergy Audit Participants 

Name Organization 

1. Don Bentley Entergy 

2. Gregory Hubers Entergy 

3. Barbara Owens Entergy 

4. Cindy Fasano AREVA 

5. Stacy Thomson AREVA 

6. Chad Cox GZA 

7. Bryant Furtado GZA 

8. David Leone GZA 
 -2- 

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-2621 or by e-mail at 

Robert.Bernardo@nrc.gov. 

Sincerely, 

/RA/ 

Robert Bernardo, Project Manager 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

Japan Lessons-Learned Division 

Hazards Management Branch 

Docket No. 50-255 

Enclosure: 

Audit Report 

cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv 

DISTRIBUTION: 

PUBLIC JLD R/F RidsNRRJLD Resource 

TGovan, NRR LQuinn-Willingham, NRO RidsNroDsea Resource 

RidsNrrDorlLpl4-2 Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource RidsNrrPMFitzPatrick Resource 

RidsRgn3MailCenter Resource RidsNrrLASLent RidsOgcMailCenter Resource 

RidsOpaMail Resource RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCtr Resource CCook, NRO 

ARivera-Varona, NRO KErwin, NRO ACampbell, NRO 

RRivera-Lugo, NRO LHibler, NRO BHarvey, NRO 

MShams, NRR GBowman, NRR 

ADAMS Accession No.: ML16174A248 *via email 

OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NRR/JLD/JHMB/LA NRO/DSEA/RHM2/TR* NRO/DSEA/RHM2/TM 

NAME TGovan SLent LHibler RRivera-Lugo 

DATE 06/24/2016 06/22/2016 07/29/2016 07/29/2016

OFFICE NRO/DSEA/RHM2/BC NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM 

NAME ARivera-Varona GBowman RBernardo 

DATE 07/13/2016 06/26/2016 08/03/2016

OFFICAL RECORD COPY