alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1508.300 What must I do before I enter into a covered transaction with another person at the next lower tier? When you enter into a covered transaction with another person at the next lower tier, you must verify that the person with whom you intend to do business is not excluded or disqualified. You do this by: ( a ) Checking the *EPLS;* or
( b ) Collecting a certification from that person if allowed by this rule; or
( c ) Adding a clause or condition to the covered transaction with that person.
#### Elsa Grundon, Respondent, v. Adam E. Grundon, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur. (Appeal from an order granting plaintiff’s motion that defendant be directed to pay her $80 to secure a transcript of the evidence of the trial in an action for a separation.) Present — McCurn, P. J., Vaughan, Kimball, Piper and Wheeler, JJ.
§ 225.117 Documentation of informed consent. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, informed consent shall be documented by the use of a written informed consent form approved by the IRB and signed (including in an electronic format) by the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. A written copy shall be given to the person signing the informed consent form.
( b ) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, the informed consent form may be either of the following: ( 1 ) A written informed consent form that meets the requirements of § 225.116. The investigator shall give either the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative adequate opportunity to read the informed consent form before it is signed; alternatively, this form may be read to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative.
( 2 ) A short form written informed consent form stating that the elements of informed consent required by § 225.116 have been presented orally to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative, and that the key information required by § 225.116(a)(5)(i) was presented first to the subject, before other information, if any, was provided. The IRB shall approve a written summary of what is to be said to the subject or the legally authorized representative. When this method is used, there shall be a witness to the oral presentation. Only the short form itself is to be signed by the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. However, the witness shall sign both the short form and a copy of the summary, and the person actually obtaining consent shall sign a copy of the summary. A copy of the summary shall be given to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative, in addition to a copy of the short form.
( c ) ( 1 ) An IRB may waive the requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed informed consent form for some or all subjects if it finds any of the following: ( i ) That the only record linking the subject and the research would be the informed consent form and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality. Each subject (or legally authorized representative) will be asked whether the subject wants documentation linking the subject with the research, and the subject's wishes will govern;
( ii ) That the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context; or
( iii ) If the subjects or legally authorized representatives are members of a distinct cultural group or community in which signing forms is not the norm, that the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and provided there is an appropriate alternative mechanism for documenting that informed consent was obtained.
( 2 ) In cases in which the documentation requirement is waived, the IRB may require the investigator to provide subjects or legally authorized representatives with a written statement regarding the research.
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under Control Number 0990-0260)
#### Margaret E. Bowen, Appellant, v. John L. Collins, Respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Present—■ Clarke, P. J., Laughlin, Smith, Merrell and Greenbaum, JJ.
###### Editorial Note on Part 249

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 249 appear at 57 FR 36501, Aug. 13, 1992, and 57 FR 47409, Oct. 16, 1992.

#### § 249.1300 Form MA, for registration as a municipal advisor, and for amendments to registration.

The form shall be used for registration as a municipal advisor pursuant to section 15B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78*o*-4) and for amendments to registrations.

###### Editorial Note

#### Editorial Note:

For Federal Register citations affecting Form MA-T, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at *www.govinfo.gov.*
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Genevieve Lacinski, Respondent. County of Nassau, Appellant. Philip Ross, as Industrial Commissioner, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Ap-

peal Board, filed May 12, 1976, which held that the claimant was eligible for benefits. Claimant was an employee of Nassau County and was required by their administrative code to be "a citizen and bona fide resident and dweller of the county for at least one year” (Nassau County Administrative Code, § 13-1.0, subd [a], L 1939, chs 272, 701-709, as amd). Claimant sold her home in Nassau County and moved to Suffolk County to live with a daughter with whom claimant had previously resided in Nassau County. Claimant resigned her position with Nassau County because she no longer met the statutory requirement hereinabove set forth. Such a requirement is a reasonable condition of employment and claimant, failing to meet that condition by moving to Suffolk County, is precluded from receiving benefits *(Matter of Keenan [Levine],*51 AD2d 596). Decision reversed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Mahoney, Main, Larkin and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
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United States District Court

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

HUNTER FAE JAMESON

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket Number: 

0971 3:08CR00077­001 WHA

ORDER MODIFYING CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

ON MOTION OF THE COURT, the conditions of supervised release are hereby 

modified to include the following:

1. The defendant shall reside in a Residential Reentry Center (RRC) for a period of up to 30 

days as directed by the probation officer, and shall abide by the rules of that facility.

All other terms and conditions of Mr. Jameson’s supervised release shall remain in place as 

originally imposed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: ____________________________ ____________________________________ William Alsup

United States District Judge

November 12, 2015.

Case 3:08-cr-00077-WHA Document 48 Filed 11/12/15 Page 1 of 1
#### Patricia Dodd, Appellant, v Middletown Lodge (Elks Club) No. 1097, Respondent.

[715 NYS2d 343]

—In an action pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law *(see,*Executive Law § 296), to recover damages for gender discrimination, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Owen, J.), dated January 10, 2000, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, an at-will employee, claims that she was terminated from her job as a bartender at the defendant Middletown Lodge (Elks Club) No. 1097 (hereinafter the Lodge) as a result of gender discrimination. However, the defendant demonstrated the absence of a prima facie case of discrimination under Executive Law § 296, and the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of any material issue of fact *(see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn.,*90 NY2d 623, 631). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the Lodge’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint *(see, Gilroy v Continental Corp.,*237 AD2d 251; *Wozniak v Components Assembly Div.,*220 AD2d 934; *Ioele v Alden Press,*145 AD2d 29). Santucci, J. P., Sullivan, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-11-00634-CV

In re Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc. (“LEAA”) filed this original proceeding

seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to reverse its discovery order dated October

10, 2011 requiring LEAA to respond to certain interrogatories and requests for production of

documents. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its

discretion in issuing its order. Accordingly, we deny LEAA’s petition for writ of mandamus.

_____________________________________________

J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Henson

Filed: December 9, 2011
#### Billy Clark, Respondent, v New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

[717 NYS2d 216]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kangs County (Douglass, J.), entered October 15, 1999, which, upon a jury verdict, finding it 100% at fault in the happening of the accident and awarding damages in the sum of $4,590,000, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it.

*339Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the complaint is dismissed.

At the time of the incident in which the infant plaintiff was injured, he was a resident of the Marcy Projects, a housing development in Brooklyn owned by the defendant, New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter NYCHA). The infant plaintiff was coaching children as they played a football game on an open field located between the buildings of the housing development and near the garbage disposal area for the development. The evidence indicated that there was usually garbage accumulated in and about the garbage disposal area, and that garbage was spilled in the vicinity of the field. During the game, Vincent Hardy, a minor resident of the housing development, now deceased, who was watching the game from the sidelines, picked up a vinyl phonograph record and threw it toward the game’s participants. The record struck the infant plaintiff’s eye, causing a permanent loss of sight. NYCHA asserted a defense based in part upon the theory that Hardy’s actions constituted a superseding intervening event which broke the causal nexus between the plaintiffs injury and any alleged negligence by NYCHA in permitting garbage to accumulate in and around the playing field. The jury, however, found NYCHA to be 100% at fault in causing the accident.

It is well established that while a defendant is liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of its acts, an intervening act will constitute a superseding cause and will serve to relieve a defendant of liability when the act is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuated from the defendant’s conduct that responsibility for the injury should not reasonably be attributed to the defendant *(see, Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply,*82 NY2d 555; *Kush v City of Buffalo,*59 NY2d 26, 33; *Dantzler v New York City Hous. Auth.,*269 AD2d 420; *Elardo v Town of Oyster Bay,*176 AD2d 912). The plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to establish a causal nexus between any alleged breach by NYCHA and the injury sustained by the infant plaintiff. Hardy’s act of throwing the record was not a foreseeable consequence of the alleged failure of NYCHA to maintain the garbage area. Therefore, it constituted a superseding cause which so attenuated the alleged negligence of NYCHA from the ultimate injury that the imposition of liability would be unreasonable under the circumstances *(see, Convey v City of Rye School Dist.,*271 AD2d 154; *Dantzler v New York City Hous. Auth.,*supra;*Ramirez v Velarde,*248 AD2d 697).

In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to reach the parties’ remaining contentions. O’Brien, J. P., McGinity, Luciano and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 18

- 00336

- CR

Jose Gonzales III a/k/a Jose Manuel Gonzales III v. The State of Texas
On Appeal from the 361st District Court of Brazos County , Texas Trial Cause No. 13

- 02077

- CRF

- 361

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. October 3, 2019
### §285l–4. Federal agency action

#### (a) Identification of tests

With respect to each Federal agency carrying out a program that requires or recommends acute or chronic toxicological testing, such agency shall, not later than 180 days after receiving an ICCVAM test recommendation, identify and forward to the ICCVAM any relevant test method specified in a regulation or industry-wide guideline which specifically, or in practice requires, recommends, or encourages the use of an animal acute or chronic toxicological test method for which the ICCVAM test recommendation may be added or substituted.

#### (b) Alternatives

Each Federal agency carrying out a program described in subsection (a) shall promote and encourage the development and use of alternatives to animal test methods (including batteries of tests and test screens), where appropriate, for the purpose of complying with Federal statutes, regulations, guidelines, or recommendations (in each instance, and for each chemical class) if such test methods are found to be effective for generating data, in an amount and of a scientific value that is at least equivalent to the data generated from existing tests, for hazard identification, dose-response assessment, or risk assessment purposes.

#### (c) Test method validation

Each Federal agency carrying out a program described in subsection (a) shall ensure that any new or revised acute or chronic toxicity test method, including animal test methods and alternatives, is determined to be valid for its proposed use prior to requiring, recommending, or encouraging the application of such test method.

#### (d) Review

Not later than 180 days after receipt of an ICCVAM test recommendation, a Federal agency carrying out a program described in subsection (a) shall review such recommendation and notify the ICCVAM in writing of its findings.

#### (e) Recommendation adoption

Each Federal agency carrying out a program described in subsection (a), or its specific regulatory unit or units, shall adopt the ICCVAM test recommendation unless such Federal agency determines that—

(1) the ICCVAM test recommendation is not adequate in terms of biological relevance for the regulatory goal authorized by that agency, or mandated by Congress;

(2) the ICCVAM test recommendation does not generate data, in an amount and of a scientific value that is at least equivalent to the data generated prior to such recommendation, for the appropriate hazard identification, dose-response assessment, or risk assessment purposes as the current test method recommended or required by that agency;

(3) the agency does not employ, recommend, or require testing for that class of chemical or for the recommended test endpoint; or

(4) the ICCVAM test recommendation is unacceptable for satisfactorily fulfilling the test needs for that particular agency and its respective congressional mandate.

(Pub. L. 106–545, §4, Dec. 19, 2000, 114 Stat. 2723.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the ICCVAM Authorization Act of 2000, and not as part of the Public Health Service Act which comprises this chapter.
#### § 231.10 Payment to USAID of excess amounts received by a Noteholder.

If a Noteholder shall, as a result of USAID paying compensation under this Guarantee, receive an excess payment, it shall refund the excess to USAID.
# Missouri Court of Appeals

Southern District

SEPTEMBER 26, 2014

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 30.25(b).

1. Case No. SD32798

Re: STATE OF MISSOURI,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. LARRY EUGENE STURDEVANT,

Defendant-Appellant
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4354 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4354

   To extend the temporary reduction of duty on 4-Propylbenzaldehyde.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 16, 2012

 Mr. Mulvaney introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To extend the temporary reduction of duty on 4-Propylbenzaldehyde.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. 4-PROPYLBENZALDEHYDE.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.40.37 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to 4-Propylbenzaldehyde) is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``Free'' and inserting ``4.2%''; and
            (2) by striking ``12/31/2012'' and inserting ``12/31/
        2016''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) apply 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
### §290cc–34. Definitions

For purposes of this part:

#### (1) Eligible homeless individual

The term "eligible homeless individual" means an individual described in section 290cc–22(a) of this title.

#### (2) Homeless individual

The term "homeless individual" has the meaning given such term in section 254b(h)(5) of this title.

#### (3) State

The term "State" means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

#### (4) Substance use disorder services

The term "substance use disorder services" has the meaning given the term "substance abuse services" in section 254b(h)(5)(C) 1 of this title.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title V, §534, as added Pub. L. 100–77, title VI, §611(3), July 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 522; amended Pub. L. 101–645, title V, §511, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4733; Pub. L. 107–251, title VI, §601(b), Oct. 26, 2002, 116 Stat. 1665; Pub. L. 114–255, div. B, title IX, §9004(e), Dec. 13, 2016, 130 Stat. 1238.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 254b(h)(5)(C) of this title, referred to in par. (4), was redesignated section 254b(h)(5)(B) of this title and the definition of "substance abuse services" was amended to define "substance use disorder services" by Pub. L. 115–123, div. E, title IX, §50901(b)(8)(B)(ii), (iii), Feb. 9, 2018, 132 Stat. 285.

#### Amendments

2016—Par. (4). Pub. L. 114–255 amended par. (4) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "The term 'substance abuse' means the abuse of alcohol or other drugs."

2002—Par. (2). Pub. L. 107–251 substituted "254b(h)(5) " for "256(r)".

1990—Pub. L. 101–645 amended section generally, substituting provisions relating to definitions for provisions relating to nondiscrimination.

1 See References in Text note below.
§ 224.34 Evidence. ( a ) The ALJ shall determine the admissibility of evidence.
( b ) Except as provided in this part, the ALJ shall not be bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, the ALJ may apply the Federal Rules of Evidence, where appropriate, e g., to exclude unreliable evidence.
( c ) The ALJ shall exclude irrelevant and immaterial evidence.
( d ) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
( e ) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if it is privileged under Federal law.
( f ) Evidence concerning offers of compromise or settlement shall be inadmissible to the extent provided in Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
( g ) The ALJ shall permit the parties to introduce rebuttal witnesses and evidence.
( h ) All documents and other evidence offered or taken for the record shall be open to examination by all parties, unless otherwise ordered by the ALJ pursuant to § 224.24.
### §254c–17. Repealed. Pub. L. 108–163, §2(e)(2), Dec. 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 2021

Section, Pub. L. 107–251, title I, §102, Oct. 26, 2002, 116 Stat. 1627, provided for grants to State professional licensing boards to develop and implement State policies to promote telemedicine.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal deemed to have taken effect immediately after the enactment of Pub. L. 107–251, see section 3 of Pub. L. 108–163, set out as an Effective Date of 2003 Amendments note under section 233 of this title.
#### Sophie Houst v. Paul A. McGolrick, Impleaded, etc.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with ten dollars costs, unless appellant comply with terms stated in order. Present — Clarke, P. J., Laughlin, Dowling, Page and Merrell, JJ.
#### § 18.16 Evidence.

The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity are not controlling in hearings under this part. However, the hearing examiner shall exclude evidence which is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.
§ 230.05 Non-impairment of the Guarantee. The full faith and credit of the United States of America is pledged to the performance of this Guarantee. The Guarantee shall be unconditional, and shall not be affected or impaired by: ( a ) Any defect in the authorization, execution, delivery or enforceability of any agreement or other document executed by a Noteholder, USAID, the Fiscal Agent or the Borrower in connection with the transactions contemplated by this Guarantee or
( b ) The suspension or termination of the program pursuant to which USAID is authorized to guarantee the Eligible Notes. This non-impairment of the guarantee provision shall not, however, be operative with respect to any loss arising out of fraud or misrepresentation for which the claiming Noteholder is responsible or of which it had knowledge at the time it became a Noteholder.