Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s 
 


Management of Public Assistance-


Technical Assistance Contracts 
 


OIG-11-02 October 2010 
~l1Jl (!Je fc'~ ~ff J~lcck ; 

Office ofInspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 25028 

Homeland 

Security 

OCT 2 1 2010 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office ofInspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports published as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

effectiveness, and efficiency within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses ofthe Federal Emergency Management 

Agency's management of its Public Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts. We 

contracted with the independent public accounting firm ofFoxx & Company to perform the 

audit. The contract required that Foxx & Company perform its audit according to generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Foxx & Company is responsible for the attached auditor's report dated September 22, 

2010, and the conelusioils expressed in the report. 

The recommendations herein have been developed with the best knowledge available to 

our contractor, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for 

implementation. We trust that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and 

economical operations. We express our appreciation to all who contributed to the 

preparation of this report. 

Matt Jadacki 

Assistant Inspector General 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight 
September 22,2010 

Mr.. Matt Jadacki 

Assistant Inspector GeneraI for Emergency Management Oversight 

Office ofInspector General 

Depaltment ofHomeland Security 

24 - Murray Drive, SW, Building 410 

Washington, DC 0528 

Dear Mr. Jaclacki: 

Foxx & Company pelfonned an audit of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's 

.FEMA) management of Public Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts (PA-TACs). 

The audit was perfonned according to Task Order o. TPDFIGBPAO 000 , Task Order 

No.. 8, dated September 29, 009. 

This report presents the results of the audit and includes recommendations to help 

improve FEMA's management and oversight ofPA-TACs. 

Our audit was conducted according to applicable GovernmentAuditing Standards, July 

200 revision. The audit \.vas a performance audit as defmed by Chapter 1 of the 

Standards, and included a rev-ie\.v and report of program activities with a compliance 

element. We did not pelfonn a financial audit, the purpose ohvhich would be to render 

an opinion on the agency's fina.ncial statements. 

We appreciate the opportunity to have conducted tills audit. Should you ha\ e any 

questiOlLS, or if we can be of any further assistance, please can me at (513) 639-8843. 

Sincerely, 

Foxx & Company 

Maltin W. 0 Neill 

Pattner 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary...........................................................................................................1
 


Background ........................................................................................................................2 
 


Results of Audit..................................................................................................................7
 


Task Order Award Process ............................................................................................7 
 


Recommendation .........................................................................................................10 
 


Management Comments and Contractor Analysis ......................................................10 
 


Performance Measurement for PA-TAC Contractors ..................................................10 
 


Recommendation .........................................................................................................14 
 


Management Comments and Contractor Analysis ......................................................14 
 


Task Monitor Training.................................................................................................14 
 


Recommendation .........................................................................................................16 
 


Management Comments and Contractor Analysis ......................................................16 
 


Long-Term Community Recovery Resources .............................................................17 
 


Recommendation .........................................................................................................19 
 


Management Comments and Contractor Analysis ......................................................19 
 


Task Order Contract File Compliance .........................................................................20 
 


Recommendation .........................................................................................................21 
 


Management Comments and Contractor Analysis ......................................................22 
 


Appendixes 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................23 
 


Appendix B: Management Comments on the Report ................................................25 
 


Appendix C: List of Related Audit Reports and Testimonies ...................................28 
 


Appendix D: Report Distribution ..............................................................................30 
 


Abbreviations 

CO Contracting Officer 
 

COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative
 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 
 

DAE Disaster Assistance Employee 
 

EMMIE Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment 
 

ERPMC Emergency Response Program Management Consultants 
 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 
 

Table of Contents 
 


FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IA Individual Assistance 

IDIQ Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 

LTCR Long-Term Community Recovery 

NEMIS National Emergency Management Information System 

NISTAC Nationwide Infrastructure Support Technical Assistance Consultants 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PW Project Worksheet 

PA Public Assistance 

PA-TAC Public Assistance–Technical Assistance Contract 

RAMP Remedial Action Management Program 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 
 

Executive Summary 

Foxx & Company assessed the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s management of Public Assistance-Technical Assistance 

Contracts. Audit objectives were to evaluate processes and 

procedures for awarding task orders, monitoring and evaluating 

contractor performance, and certifying contractor billings. The 

audit scope covered the FY 2008 task orders issued to respond to 

the Iowa floods (May 2008) and hurricanes Gustav and Ike 

(September 2008). 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency may not be adhering 

to the Brooks Act, which requires the government to select 

engineering and architecture firms based on their competency, 

qualifications, and experience. The agency awarded task orders 

based primarily on an equal distribution of dollars among the three 

contractors, rather than on expertise. 

The agency also did not establish performance standards, nor did it 

evaluate the performance of the contractors. In addition, Task 

Monitors, agency employees responsible for managing and 

monitoring the contractors, had not received written guidance or 

training on how to evaluate contractor performance or certify 

billing invoices. Oversight and evaluation is crucial because more 

than $30 billion in federal dollars have been allocated to the Public 

Assistance program during the past decade. 

The contractors did not respond in a timely manner or provide the 

technical resources the agency needed for Long-Term Community 

Recovery requirements. This lack of resources caused delays in 

the agency’s ability to provide this type of assistance. 

We are making five recommendations that will improve the 

effectiveness of the agency’s management of Public AssistanceTechnical Assistance Contracts. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency generally concurred 

with our recommendations. The agency’s response to our 

recommendations is summarized and evaluated in the body of this 

report and included in its entirety as Appendix B. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

1 
 

 

 

Background 

When disasters occur, local communities respond first, followed by 

the state if necessary. Federal assistance may be requested under 

the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act (Stafford Act) when the magnitude of the disaster exceeds 

local and state capacity. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA) program provides critical 

assistance, in the form of direct assistance and grants, to state, 

tribal, and local governments, as well as certain private nonprofit 

organizations, to enable communities to respond to and recover 

from major, presidentially declared emergencies and disasters. 

FEMA awards grants to provide PA funding for debris removal; 

emergency protective measures; and the repair, replacement, or 

restoration of eligible disaster-damaged facilities, such as medical 

facilities, schools, roads, bridges, and utilities. FEMA also 

provides Individual Assistance (IA) funding through its Individuals 

and Households Program to assist homeowners and renters 

affected by the disaster with housing needs and necessary 

expenses. PA funding has been substantial, totaling more than 

$30 billion for the past decade. For the disasters in our review, 

Iowa flooding in 2008 and hurricanes Ike and Gustav, PA funding 

totaled $3.8 billion and IA funding totaled $845 million (see figure 

1).1 

1

 Disaster #1763 was declared in May 2008 for the Iowa flooding and Disaster #1791 was declared in 

September 2008 for Hurricanes Ike and Gustav. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

2 
 

 

 

 

Figure 1. Public Assistance and Individual Assistance Funding 

for Iowa Flooding and Hurricanes Ike and Gustav (in millions) 

Source: Foxx & Company, using FEMA data for PA funding as of May 2010 

and for IA funding as of July 2010 for Disaster #1763 and Disaster #1791. 

As of March 2010, FEMA has 4,169 permanent employees who 

work at FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC and at regional 

and area offices across the country. FEMA also has nearly 9,000 

standby disaster assistance employees (DAEs) who are available 

for deployment after disasters.2 In addition, to provide the 

necessary technical resources to support PA operations, FEMA 

awarded three Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 

Public Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts (PA-TACs) in 

June 2006. Services include providing technical assistance to 

grantees and sub-grantees, such as architect-engineer services, 

environmental experts, and other professional services, in support 

of the PA program. The PA-TACs were awarded, for a 5-year 

period of performance, to Fluor, Emergency Response Program 

Management Consultants (ERPMC), and Nationwide 

Infrastructure Support Technical Assistance Consultants 

(NISTAC). 

The amounts paid to the PA-TAC contractors to provide technical 

assistance for the 2008 Iowa flooding and hurricanes Ike and Gustav 

totaled more than $165 million as of May 2010 (see table 1). 

2

 The Stafford Act authorizes the “appointment of temporary personnel, experts, and consultants” to 

supplement FEMA’s permanent staff when a disaster occurs. These hires are known as disaster assistance 

employees (DAEs) or reservists. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

3 
 

 

 

Table 1. Fees Paid for PA-TAC Services as of May 2010 

Contractor Task Order Number Obligation Expenditures 

Fluor HSFEHQ-08-J-0039 $23,058,000 $22,285,143 

Fluor HSFEHQ-09-J-0004 $3,370,000 $1,545,792 

Fluor HSFEHQ-08-J-0031 $6,880,000 $6,394,891 

ERPMC HSFEHQ-08-J-0014 $61,861,060 $61,872,533 

ERPMC HSFEHQ-08-J-0021 $20,796,707 $19,417,321 

ERPMC HSFEHQ-09-J-0003 $7,876,040 $2,424,090 

NISTAC HSFEHQ-08-J-0025 $53,225,534 $46,087,585 

NISTAC HSFEHQ-08-J-0024 $2,409,753 $1,088,190 

NISTAC HSFEHQ-09-J-0003 $8,852,124 $4,398,162 

TOTALS $188,329,218 $165,513,707 

Source: FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Office 

After a disaster is declared, the following sequence of events 

occurs: 

•	 A Preliminary Damage Assessment is completed to 

determine the magnitude and impact of an event’s damage,3 

•	 FEMA field officials submit the Preliminary Damage 

Assessment, which includes PA-TAC resource 

requirements, to the contracting officer (CO) and 

contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR) in 

FEMA headquarters, 

•	 The COTR reviews the requests for PA-TAC resources and 

prepares task orders specifying the PA-TAC technical 

requirements, 

•	 The CO awards the task orders to the PA-TAC contractors, 

•	 Task Monitors, FEMA field employees responsible for 

managing and monitoring the contractors, are assigned to 

each task order, and 

•	 The COTR coordinates with the Task Monitors to verify 

that work was completed as specified in the task orders and 

approves the Task Monitor certification that contractor 

invoicing information is correct. 

The project worksheet (PW) provides the basis for awarding PA 

grants and is used to document the location, damage description, 

scope of work, and cost estimates for each project. The PW 

3

 This is a joint assessment by a FEMA/state team that views the damage firsthand to assess the scope of 

damage and estimate repair costs. The state uses the results of the Preliminary Damage Assessment to 

determine whether the situation is beyond the combined capabilities of the state and local resources and to 

verify the need for supplemental federal assistance. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

4 
 

 

process generally includes an initial site inspection by FEMA 

officials and PA-TAC contractor personnel, who then develop 

PWs that include the scope of work and estimated project costs. 

The number of individual PWs and types of PA funding for the 

Iowa flooding and for hurricanes Ike and Gustav are shown in 

table 2 (data as of May 2010). 

Table 2. Project Worksheets and Public Assistance Funding 

Iowa Flooding 

Hurricanes Ike 

and Gustav 

PA Category PWs 

PA 

Funding 

(millions) PWs 

PA 

Funding 

(millions) 

Debris 

Removal 760 $40.1 1,009 $738.0 

Protective 

Measures 1,788 $210.5 4,706 $621.0 

Roads and 

Bridges 3,169 $94.8 1,134 $38.4 

Water Control 

Facilities 569 $57.6 79 $20.1 

Public 

Buildings 1,367 $702.1 6,073 $715.8 

Public 

Utilities 1,129 $201.7 799 $82.5 

Recreational 

or Other 897 $34.0 1,580 $132.3 

State 

Management 560 $40.0 2 $80.6 

TOTALS 10,239 $1,380.8 15,382 $2,428.7 

Source: FEMA’s EMMIE and NEMIS reporting systems4 

Reports issued by Congress, the White House, the DHS Office of 

Inspector General (OIG), and the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO), among others, identified deficiencies, as well as 

opportunities for improvement, in many aspects of FEMA’s 

disaster acquisition process and the PA program.5 The following 

examples of disaster assistance issues have been reported: 

•	 PA program management suffers from inexperienced 

personnel who are inadequately trained, 

4

 The Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment (EMMIE) system is FEMA’s automated, 
 


enterprise-wide grants management system implemented in July 2008. EMMIE replaces the National 
 


Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS), the previously used electronic grants management
 
 

system.
 
 5

 For a list of related audits, see appendix C. 
 


Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

5 
•	 PA-TAC contractors often began work before state and 

local governments had the capacity to work effectively with 

the contractors on long-term recovery efforts, 

•	 PA program performance objectives and measurements 

need improvement, 

•	 FEMA’s performance measurement efforts need to be 

improved in order to provide the accurate and balanced 

information that is needed to assess, and improve as 

appropriate, the timeliness and performance of the PA 

program, and 

•	 Contract documentation is inadequate and does not provide 

sufficient justification for the acquisition of goods or 

services. 

Disaster response activities require close coordination and 

cooperation among all levels of government, nonprofit 

organizations, the private sector, and individuals. The National 

Response Framework defines key principles, roles, and structures 

of participants who respond to incidents to ensure a coordinated, 

effective national response. FEMA acquisition officials must 

respond quickly to acquire goods and services to assist survivors. 

However, FEMA officials must do so while complying with 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements and utilizing 

their emergency responder partners as outlined in the National 

Response Framework. 

DHS OIG contracted with Foxx & Company to evaluate the 

effectiveness of FEMA’s management of PA-TACs. The audit 

objectives were to evaluate FEMA processes and procedures for: 

•	 Awarding individual task orders, 

•	 Monitoring and evaluating contractor performance, and 

•	 Certifying contractor billings. 

Nine PA-TAC task orders issued to provide public assistance 

recovery services in response to the 2008 disasters of hurricanes 

Gustav and Ike in Texas and Louisiana and floods in Iowa were 

reviewed. The PA-TAC base contracts FEMA awarded to the 

three contractors that currently provide the PA-TAC services 

specified in the task orders were also reviewed. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

6 
 

 

 

Results of Audit 

Task Order Award Process 

FEMA may not be adhering to the procedures required by the Brooks Act 

for awarding individual task orders to the three contractors that currently 

provide PA-TAC services in response to disasters. 

The Brooks Act (Public Law 92-582) was enacted on October 27, 1972.6 

It amended the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 

in order to establish federal policy concerning the selection of firms and 

individuals to perform architectural, engineering, and related services for 

the federal government. The Brooks Act requires that U.S. government 

agencies select engineering and architecture firms based upon their 

competency, qualifications, and performance. 

FEMA did comply with the Brooks Act in awarding its three PA-TAC 

base contracts in June 2006. These base contracts provide architectengineer, consultant, and other professional services in support of the PA 

program for a 5-year period. FEMA awarded IDIQ contracts to three 

technically qualified firms: Fluor, ERPMC, and NISTAC. Fluor was 

ranked as the highest qualified, ERPMC was second, and NISTAC was 

third. Subsequently, FEMA has awarded individual task orders under 

these base contracts to obtain PA-TAC services for specific disaster 

recovery efforts from FY 2006 to the present. However, for all nine task 

orders in the scope of our review, the primary reason contractors were 

selected was “Equal distribution of dollars between the TACs.” 

To select the PA-TAC contractors for individual task orders, FEMA uses a 

Technical Evaluation/Negotiation Memorandum Checklist. This checklist 

has a section titled “Reason for Contracting Officer’s Technical 

Representative/Contracting Officer Selection of TAC,” which lists several 

justifications (see table 3). 

In all the cases we reviewed, the primary justification for selecting a 

certain contractor for a task order was “Equal distribution of dollars 

between the TACs,” rather than competence, qualifications, and 

experience. Following is a summary of the selection reasons: 

6

 The contracts were awarded pursuant to the Brooks Architect-Engineer Act, 40 U. S. C. §§ 1101, et seq. 

(hereinafter referred to as the Brooks Act), and FAR Subpart 36.6. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3: Reasons Cited for PA-TAC Selection 

Fluor Fluor Fluor ERPMC ERPMC ERPMC NISTAC NISTAC NISTAC 

Justifications 

for PA-TAC 08-J- 09-J- 08-J- 08-J- 08-J- 09-J- 08-J- 08-J- 09-Jselection 0039 0004 0031 0014 0021 0003 0025 0024 0003 

Equal 

distribution of 

dollars 

between TACs X X X X X X X X X 

Equal 

distribution of 

type of damage 

and degree of 

magnitude 

between TACs X X X X X X X 

Contractor 

already located 

in the 

geographic 

area X 

Equal 

distribution of 

smaller 

disasters 

Contractor is 

knowledgeable 

of disaster and 

will maintain 

continuity of 

services 

Contractor has 

unique 

technical 

expertise 

currently 

unavailable 

from other 

TACs 

Requested by 

Region 

Source: Foxx & Company, based on FEMA task order files 

The DHS OIG Office of Counsel reviewed the Brooks Act requirements 

and our finding, and stated that it appeared that FEMA employees 

awarding individual PA-TAC task orders may have relied on section 1103 

of the Brooks Act, which states that an agency head must conduct 

discussions with at least three firms and select, in order of preference, at 

least three firms that he or she considers most highly qualified to provide 

the required services. However, FEMA did not engage in the next step 

required by section 1104, to negotiate with the most highly qualified firm 

selected under section 1103, offering services at a price which is fair and 

reasonable. Therefore, because the PA-TAC contract primarily involves 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

8 
 

 

 

 

architectural and engineering services, FEMA may not be adhering to the 

Brooks Act. 

Counsel cited section §1103(c) which provides that “for each proposed 

project, the agency head shall evaluate current statements of qualifications 

and performance data on file with the agency, together with statements 

submitted by other firms regarding the proposed project. The agency head 

shall conduct discussions with at least 3 firms to consider anticipated 

concepts and compare alternative methods for furnishing services.”7 

There was no documentation in the task order files to indicate that FEMA 

was conducting discussions with all three firms each time a task order was 

awarded. Without an evaluation of qualifications, questions arise whether 

FEMA may be using a less qualified contractor to do the work, possibly 

negatively affecting the survivors and the community. In addition, a 

contractor may have already been in place at a disaster location, been 

more qualified and familiar with the community and issues, and thus could 

have been a better resource and responded more quickly. 

Officials from DHS OIG met with officials from FEMA’s Office of Chief 

Counsel to discuss this matter. FEMA’s Counsel said that the application 

of the Brooks Act to the issuance of PA-TAC task orders was an issue 

across the government, different agencies dealt with it differently, and 

there was no government-wide ruling on this issue. FEMA’s Chief 

Counsel is in the process of requesting an opinion from the Department of 

Justice on the application of the Brooks Act to individual task order 

awards. 

Conclusion 

FEMA may not be adhering to the Brooks Act when it awards 

individual task orders to the contractors based primarily on the 

equal distribution of dollars among the contractors, instead of on 

the contractors’competencies, qualifications, and performance. 

7

 Counsel’s research revealed that the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 provided for multiple 

awards and task and delivery order contracts (Pub. L. No. 103-355 section 1054(a) (1994) and 41 U.S.C. 

sections 253h, 253i, and 253j). However, the Act specifically stated that it did not modify or supersede 

responsibilities under the Brooks Architect-Engineer Act. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

9 
Recommendation 

We recommend that the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Office of Chief Counsel: 

Recommendation #1: 

•	 Follow through on its request for an opinion to the Office of 

Legal Counsel, or the Federal Programs Branch, Civil 

Division, at the Department of Justice regarding how the 

Brooks Act applies to the awarding of individual Public 

Assistance-Technical Assistance Contract task orders, and 

•	 If the Department of Justice finds that the current method of 

awarding Public Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts 

does not adhere to the Brooks Act, work with applicable agency 

officials to ensure that future task order awards follow the 

legally required process. 

Management Comments and Contractor Analysis 

FEMA partially concurs with this recommendation. FEMA stated that 

they are coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security’s Office 

of General Counsel, which intends to review the issue and will transmit a 

request for an opinion to the Department of Justice, if necessary. 

Contractor Analysis: After review of the DHS General Counsel’s 

response, the OIG will re-evalauate the recommendation. The 

recommendation is considered unresolved and open. 

Performance Measurement for PA-TAC contractors 

At the time of our review, FEMA had not established performance 

expectations and did not monitor or evaluate the performance of the PATAC contractors. Without performance metrics or evaluations of 

performance, FEMA was unable to determine whether the PA-TAC 

contractors performed their responsibilities or if the federal government 

received a fair return for PA-TAC services contracts valued at more than 

$188 million. Because FEMA is selecting contractors based on total 

dollars received rather than on qualifications, the selected contractor may 

not be able to properly perform the required tasks. Improved oversight 

and evaluation is crucial because more than $30 billion in federal dollars 

has been allocated to the PA program during the past decade. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

10 
According to the PA-TAC base contract terms, the task orders awarded are 

performance based. FEMA required PA-TAC contractors to provide 

quality assurance and project management plans, which FEMA would use 

to evaluate the contractor’s performance for timeliness, quality, customer 

service, and cost; and would demonstrate the PA-TAC contractor’s 

comprehensive approach to the overall development, management, and 

coordination of the contract task orders. 

In addition, the contract requires the PA-TAC contractors to develop and 

provide monthly status reports that included the following information for 

each task order: 

•	 Brief description of work and the number of personnel onsite, 

•	 Start dates for the periods when personnel are deployed, 

•	 Total contract dollars obligated and status, 

•	 Estimated hours expended for the current month, 

•	 Summary of deliverables submitted, 

•	 Planned activities for the next month, and 

•	 Problems and proposed corrective actions. 

There were two forms of services the PA-TAC contractors provided for 

the task orders in our review. For five of the nine task orders we 

reviewed, the PA-TAC contractors provided an array of technical 

assistance specialists to assist applicants in developing PWs, the 

documentation FEMA requires for providing PA funding and the leading 

task order deliverable. 

For the other four task orders in our review, the PA-TAC contractors 

provided Long-Term Community Recovery (LTCR) services. PA-TAC 

contractors do not create PWs for these services. The deliverables were as 

follows: 

•	 Providing technical support for community recovery planning, 

•	 Writing, reviewing, and revising contingency plans, 

•	 Developing and conducting program evaluations, 

•	 Developing and maintaining Standard Operating Procedures, 

program guides, and job aids, 

•	 Conference planning and delivery support, and 

•	 Developing training. 

The final deliverable was an LTCR plan, which was described as a tool 

used to support and guide community decision-making and to assist 

community leaders to identify priorities for recovery initiatives and 

projects. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

11 
 

 

 

For the nine task orders in our review, the task order files did not contain 

specific information on performance expectations or on how the 

contractor’s performance for developing PWs or producing LTCR plans 

should be evaluated. In addition, none of the Task Monitors we 

interviewed had criteria to evaluate the contractors’ performance for 

creating PWs or LTCR plans. There were no progress reports or other 

documentation indicating how well the PA-TAC contractors were 

performing. FEMA officials told us that the PA-TAC contractors submit 

monthly status reports to the COTR and CO and post the reports to TACManager, FEMA’s web-based reporting site. (Auditor’s note: FEMA 

provided us electronically with a sample contractor “Task Order Activity 

Report” which includes information on PWs, personnel hours for the 

report period, and types of work accomplished. However, the sample was 

not for work under a task order in our review, and FEMA did not offer us 

an opportunity to view the web-based reporting site during our field 

work.) 

FEMA officials did not answer our request for an explanation as to why 

performance expectations were not established for the task orders or why 

contractor performance was not evaluated. According to the Alternate 

PA-TAC COTR, there should be expectations established and monitoring 

of contractor performance.8 The Alternate PA-TAC COTR said that the 

former PA-TAC COTR believed that these contracts were not 

performance based, but the Alternate PA-TAC COTR strongly disagreed 

with that position. The PA-TAC contract states that the task orders 

awarded under the three base contracts will be performance based. After 

conclusion of our field work, the Alternate PA-TAC COTR provided us 

with draft documents which together constitute a proposed Contractor 

Performance Evaluation Plan. These documents have been forwarded to 

various stakeholders for comment. A pilot program to assess the proposed 

evaluation plan is scheduled to begin September 2010. 

A March 2009 Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) report on 

hurricanes Ike and Gustav cited issues with PA-TAC contractor 

performance.9

 It reported that additional actions were needed to ensure 

that project worksheets’ estimated cost of projects were accurate in order 

to avoid costly change orders.10 The report further recommended that 

8

 The FEMA PA-TAC COTR left FEMA in December 2009 and another FEMA employee was designated 

as the Acting PA-TAC COTR in January 2010. A FEMA PA-TAC COTR was appointed in May 2010 and 

the Acting PA-TAC COTR became the Alternate PA-TAC COTR. 

9

 In July 2003, FEMA introduced the RAMP to identify and remedy operational and programmatic issues 

encountered in disaster response and recovery operations and exercises, and to capture lessons learned and 

smart practices. The RAMP replaced the Disaster Corrective Action Program. 10 If the contractor does not accurately estimate costs or scope of work in the initial PW, the PW must be 

revised, which can be time consuming and labor intensive, delaying the start of repair or rebuilding. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

12 
 

 

 

monthly reporting procedures be required to document progress by the 

PA-TAC contractors.11 

The RAMP report also discussed other contractor performance issues 

during recovery efforts after hurricanes Ike and Gustav. For example, it 

took 7 to 10 days to process security background checks and at least 3 

weeks to train the PA-TAC personnel before they could begin work. 

Because PA-TAC contractor personnel did not have a complete 

background check or clearance, some of them were denied access to the 

Joint Field Office and communication network. During this time, the PATAC personnel were getting paid but were unable to perform their 

contract responsibilities. The report also stated that there was limited 

availability of contractor personnel for manning towers used to monitor 

debris removal. Instead, PA applicants monitored and estimated the 

amount of debris being removed. FEMA estimated this process resulted in 

inaccurate estimates and a 15% to 20% increase in the cost of debris 

removal statewide, resulting in an unnecessary expenditure of federal 

funds.12 

DHS OIG recently reported that FEMA needed improved assessments of 

the PA program’s performance.13 FEMA’s performance measurement 

efforts need to be improved to provide accurate and balanced information 

needed to assess, and improve as appropriate, the timeliness and 

performance of the PA program. 

Conclusion 

Task orders awarded using the three PA-TAC base contracts are to 

be performance based, using agreed-upon performance metrics. At 

the time of our review, FEMA had not established performance 

expectations and did not monitor or evaluate the performance of 

the PA-TAC contractors. Without performance expectations or 

adequate monitoring or evaluations, there is no assurance that the 

federal government and the state and local entities are receiving the 

expected PA-TAC contractor services for the federal funds 

expended. 

11 DHS OIG is currently reviewing the RAMP program and will issue a report in the near future. 
 
 12 Debris removal is the clearance, removal, and disposal of items such as trees, sand, gravel, building 
 


components, wreckage, vehicles, and personal property. PA funds are available to eligible applicants for 
 


debris clearance, removal, and disposal operations.
 
 13 DHS OIG, Assessment of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Policies and Procedures, OIG-10-26, 
 


December 2009.
 
 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

13 
Recommendation 

We recommend that the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Public Assistance Division Director: 

Recommendation #2: 

•	 Establish performance expectations and develop 

performance and evaluation criteria for the Public 

Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts, 

•	 Ensure that Public Assistance-Technical Assistance 

Contracts contractor performance is being evaluated using 

the criteria established, and 

•	 Ensure that there are consequences for failure to achieve 

performance expectations. 

Management Comments and Contractor Analysis 

FEMA concurs with this recommendation. FEMA is in the process of 

developing a Technical Evaluation Worksheet to evaluate contractor 

performance. The FEMA Public Assistance Division distributed a draft 

Technical Evaluation Worksheet to FEMA Regional Recovery Divisions 

for review and comment in August 2010. Once reviewed and approved, 

the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative and the Contracting 

Officer plan to utilize the Technical Evaluation Worksheet as the primary 

tool to capture performance. This Worksheet will also be used by the 

Task Monitors in the Regions to evaluate contractor performance on each 

task order. 

Contractor Analysis: We consider FEMA’s planned action for 

establishing a process to evaluate contractor performance responsive to the 

recommendation. Until DHS OIG receives and evaluates the corrective 

action plan and target completion date, this recommendation is considered 

unresolved and open. 

Task Monitor Training 

The management of PA-TAC contractors was inconsistent throughout 

FEMA. Task Monitors had not received job-specific written guidance or 

training on their roles and responsibilities. Nor had they received 

guidance on how to evaluate contractor performance or certify and 

reconcile contractor invoices and billing documentation. As a result, the 

Task Monitors employed their own techniques to manage the PA-TAC 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

14 
contractors and reconcile contractor invoices for hours worked and 

expenses incurred. 

Task Monitors are FEMA employees in the field who monitor contractor 

performance and report to the FEMA PA-TAC COTR in FEMA’s 

headquarters. The PA-TAC COTR works with the Task Monitors to 

ensure that the work was completed as specified in the task order and 

approved. The Task Monitors also certify that the contractor work 

products and invoices for hours and expenses are correct. However, 

without any formal guidance on how to carry out these duties, Task 

Monitors used a variety of means to verify contractor work. 

Some Task Monitors used self-generated schedules to track contractor 

progress on PWs, while others relied on weekly meetings. All 11 Task 

Monitors acknowledged the need for FEMA to clearly define their roles 

and responsibilities. In addition, because FEMA has not provided written 

guidance or training on how to reconcile contractor invoices for hours 

worked and expenses incurred, there was no consistency in how the Task 

Monitors performed the very important certification function. Some Task 

Monitors reviewed timesheets by looking for “outliers”—hours reported 

that deviated markedly from other similar timesheets—while others 

periodically completed desk checks to see if contract personnel were at 

assigned duty stations. 

The level of effort required of each contractor varied by individual task 

order. Consequently, as each task order progressed, careful review and 

oversight was necessary to lessen the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. 

To illustrate, for the LTCR task orders, the following workweek hours 

were cited in various task orders: 

•	 65-75 hours per week per person for the first 23 weeks and then 20 

hours per week for the remaining 17 weeks, 

•	 70 hours per week per person for 17 weeks and 40 hours per week 

for the remaining 20 weeks, 

•	 60 hours per week per person for 20 weeks and then 240 hours per 

specialist to be incurred on a part-time, intermittent basis for the 

next 4 months, and 

•	 60 hours per week per person for 27 weeks and then a 55-hour 

workweek for the remaining 13 weeks. 

Overtime (hours in excess of 40 hours per week) was often billed at one 

and a half times the contract rate for that skill level. Examples of hourly 

rates for specific specialists included $297 for an accountant, $272 for an 

insurance specialist, $243 for a project director, $214 for a construction 

inspector, and $173 for an environmental planner. Considering the 

variation in hours that can be charged and the amount of money involved, 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

15 
it is important for FEMA to have a process for verifying the number of 

hours worked. It is also essential that this review process substantiates 

that the PA-TAC contractor employees are working on tasks requiring 

their technical qualifications. For example, if an engineer is temporarily 

providing administrative services, FEMA should pay the lower hourly rate 

for the service actually provided. To this end, the Task Monitors said 

there was a need for formal FEMA guidance and training on how to check 

hours worked and services provided so FEMA does not pay for time or 

expertise not provided. 

Conclusion 

FEMA has not provided adequate guidance or training to define 

and direct the roles and responsibilities of the Task Monitors. 

Without specific policies and procedures and a standardized 

process to guide the Task Monitors in their job of monitoring 

contractor performance and certifying the accuracy of contractor 

invoices, there is no assurance that these important functions are 

being properly executed. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Chief Procurement Officer: 

Recommendation #3: 

•	 Develop policies, procedures, and processes that define and 

direct the Public Assistance Task Monitor role and 

responsibilities for monitoring and evaluating contractor 

performance and for certifying and reconciling contractor 

invoices and supporting documentation, 

•	 Develop a formal training program to instruct the Public 

Assistance Task Monitors on their roles and 

responsibilities, and 

•	 Develop a certification program for Public Assistance Task 

Monitors. 

Management Comments and Contractor Analysis 

FEMA concurs with this recommendation. FEMA will develop policies, 

procedures, and processes that define and direct Task Monitors and 

develop a formal training program, as well as a certification program, for 

the Task Monitors. FEMA stated that it will implement this 

recommendation no later than September 30, 2011. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

16 
Contractor Analysis: We consider FEMA’s planned actions responsive to 

the recommendation. Until DHS OIG receives and evaluates the 

corrective action plan and target completion date, this recommendation is 

considered unresolved and open. 

Long-Term Community Recovery Resources 

For the disasters we reviewed, contractor staff availability was inadequate 

in quantity and quality to meet LTCR resource needs. FEMA officials 

said there were occasions when the PA-TAC contractors did not respond 

to requests for LTCR services in a timely manner. Also, the PA-TACs did 

not identify or provide the technical LTCR personnel that FEMA needed 

to analyze the impacts of the disaster. The need for personnel caused 

delays in FEMA’s ability to provide LTCR assistance. 

The mission of LTCR is to promote long-term recovery for communities 

suffering extraordinary damages. LTCR resources work with the state to 

identify and coordinate potential sources of recovery funding. Also, 

LTCR provides technical assistance in the form of impact analyses and 

recovery planning support. The LTCR mission is complete when the team 

has identified all potential resources, coordinated with the officials in the 

severely damaged areas, conducted the necessary impact analyses, and 

provided support to launch community recovery plans. LTCR is distinct 

from FEMA’s recovery programs (PA, IA, and Mitigation) in both scope 

and mandate because it is tasked with coordinating and leveraging the 

capabilities of each program to support communities’ recovery goals. The 

three PA-TAC contractors had LTCR services in the scope of their 

contracts. 

Four of the nine task orders in our review were for LTCR services. As of 

May 2010, of the $27 million obligated for these four task orders, $14.7 

million had been paid to the PA-TAC contractors for LTCR technical 

assistance for the Iowa flooding and hurricanes Ike and Gustav. However, 

for three of these four task orders, the Task Monitors we interviewed said 

they encountered difficulty in obtaining LTCR expertise needed from the 

contractor. 

When the PA-TAC contractors could not provide sufficient LTCR 

resources for the hurricanes Ike and Gustav recovery efforts, FEMA used 

permanent full-time employees and DAEs to assist with LTCR needs. 

However, the availability of the permanent full-time staff was limited, and 

the DAE staff did not always have the technical skills to perform the 

LTCR functions. The limited management and technical ability of the 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

17 
 

 

DAE staff created an inability to oversee the PA-TAC contractors, manage 

relationships with communities, and implement outreach functions.14 

A recent GAO report found that the PA-TAC contractor’s LTCR 

coordination and planning efforts began before state and local 

governments had the capacity to work effectively with the LTCR 

resources. The report stated that in Texas and Iowa, state and local 

officials reported that LTCR efforts to begin intensive long-term recovery 

coordination and planning meetings started just a few weeks after the 

disasters, while the state and local governments had limited staff dealing 

with multiple recovery efforts, creating an additional burden and taxing 

their ability to meet contractor needs. The LTCR efforts ended before 

critical long-term recovery coordination and planning needs were fully 

addressed. As a result, state and local officials were left without federal 

coordination and planning assistance during a critical period in the 

15 recovery process. 

Because FEMA had difficulty securing the LTCR expertise it needed from 

the PA-TAC contractors, in June 2009 it awarded a separate IDIQ contract 

to a new contractor to provide planning consultants and related 

professional services in support of FEMA’s LTCR and other disaster 

assistance and recovery operations. 

One month earlier, FEMA authorized the establishment of a dedicated 

DAE cadre of 120 long-term recovery specialists. According to FEMA, 

this dedicated DAE cadre should allow the LTCR program to overcome 

current deployment and organizational challenges and build a team of 

managerial and operational experts. The plan is to strengthen FEMA’s 

long-term recovery managerial and technical capability and provide 

overall success with supporting states in the recovery process. As of May 

2010, FEMA has 35 long-term recovery specialists for this new cadre. 

These personnel have economic development; long-term recovery 

leadership and management; and city, county, or state planning expertise. 

Conclusion 

FEMA, the states, and localities had limited access to LTCR 

resources from the PA-TAC contractors even though this type of 

technical assistance was required by the task orders. Because there 

were no expectations established or evaluations of contractor 

performance, it cannot be determined if the federal government 

14 FEMA Report: Hurricane Ike and Gustav Recovery RAMP (Remedial Action Management Program)
 
 

Report for FEMA Region VI, March 11, 2009. 
 
 15 GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Long-Term Assistance Was Helpful to State and Local Governments 
 


but Had Some Limitations, GAO-10-404, March 2010. 
 


Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

18 
received a fair return for the nearly $15 million that FEMA spent 

on LTCR services. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator of FEMA’s 

Recovery Directorate: 

Recommendation #4: Develop performance expectations, 

evaluation criteria, and a monitoring plan to assess the success of: 

•	 The new Long-Term Community Recovery contractor, and 

•	 The new Disaster Assistance Employee cadre for Long 

Term Community Recovery. 

Management Comments and Contractor Analysis 

FEMA generally concurs this recommendation. FEMA disagreed with 

elements of the analysis and conclusions and stated that the Public 

Assistance Technical Assistance Contracts (PA-TACs) were not initially 

established or structured to fully accomplish the Long Term Community 

Recovery (LTCR) mission. Nonetheless, in order to meet an outstanding 

need for long term recovery support, FEMA chose to provide support for 

the LTCR through the PA-TACs. Recently, in order to better address this 

need and accomplish the LTCR mission, FEMA entered into a stand-alone 

Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity contract for LTCR technical 

assistance and support. FEMA also stated that it will adapt the 

performance-based Technical Evaluation Worksheets and contractor 

performance assessment cited for Recommendation #2 and apply it to the 

use of the LTCR contract. Additionally, FEMA stated that it is developing 

a FEMA Personnel Qualifications System to revise its disaster reserve 

workforce and that the LTCR cadre will participate in this effort to define 

qualifications and credentialing for reservists. 

Contractor Analysis: We consider FEMA’s planned actions responsive to 

our recommendation. Until DHS OIG receives and evaluates the 

corrective action plan and target completion date, this recommendation is 

considered unresolved and open. Where appropriate, changes were also 

made in this section of the report to respond to technical comments 

provided by FEMA. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

19 
 

 

Task Order Contract File Compliance 

PA-TAC task order files were not in compliance with FAR requirements. 

FEMA has a history of not properly managing, tracking, and monitoring 

contracts. In the past several years, reports by the DHS OIG, GAO, and 

others have identified major weaknesses in FEMA’s contract 

management. 

Inadequate contract management provides little assurance that PA-TAC 

contractors were performing as required or that FEMA was obtaining the 

services contracted for under the PA-TAC contracts. Insufficient 

oversight of the contracts increased the potential for a loss of management 

control and created an environment that provided opportunities for fraud, 

waste, and abuse. 

FAR Section 4.801(b) states that the documentation in the contract files 

shall be sufficient to constitute a complete history of the transaction for: 

•	 Providing a complete background as a basis for informed decisions 

at each step in the acquisition process, 

•	 Supporting actions taken, 

•	 Providing information for reviews and investigations, and 

•	 Furnishing essential facts in the event of litigation or congressional 

inquiries. 

FEMA was not in compliance with FAR contracting policies and 

procedures for emergency acquisitions for many of the task order files we 

reviewed. For example, while FEMA has a contract file management 

system, it took months to locate a modification that added $12 million to 

one task order (and this modification was not included in our analysis). 

However, payment records from FEMA’s Federal Finance Center show 

that FEMA paid the contractor the fees for this modification. In addition, 

FEMA did not have documentation in the files on 10 “no cost” 

modifications that were made to the task orders in our review. The 

reasons for these modifications could not be determined from the 

documentation in the files. 

As reported previously, the task order files did not contain the required 

quality assurance surveillance plans to be used by the Task Monitors to 

evaluate the contractor’s performance for timeliness, quality, customer 

service, and cost. Nor did the task order files have status reports on 

monthly progress, or the contractor’s project management plans to 

demonstrate a comprehensive approach to the overall development, 

management, and coordination of the task orders. 

The Acting PA-TAC COTR, who was assigned in January 2010, said that 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

20 
 

incomplete, lost, and missing task order contract files have been an 

ongoing problem in the PA program. He said that most of the contract 

files were “woefully incomplete.” To help remedy this problem, on 

February 1, 2010, he sent a message to his staff stating that in the future, a 

complete copy of each task order file must be made and filed in the PA 

program office. 

The Task Monitors told us they maintained very little documentation in 

the field because it was their understanding that contract files were 

maintained at FEMA headquarters. 

Although FEMA has attempted to improve contract management, our 

review of the PA-TAC task order files showed that there is still a need for 

substantial improvement. Improvements in task order contract file 

documentation and better management oversight are needed to preclude 

creating an environment that provides opportunities for fraud, waste, and 

abuse. 

Conclusion 

FEMA was not appropriately documenting contract files and not 

following federal acquisition contracting procedures and processes. 

As a result, the task order files were not readily accessible to users, 

not in compliance with the acquisition requirements, and did not 

have the information needed for reviews, investigations, or 

congressional inquiries. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Chief Procurement Officer: 

Recommendation #5: 

•	 Include all active Public Assistance-Technical Assistance 

Contract task order contract files in the contract 

management system, 

•	 Reinforce employees’ duties to comply with Federal 

Acquisition Regulation requirements, and 

•	 Include the required quality assurance plans, project 

management plans, and status reports in the contract files to 

provide the government with the basis for evaluating 

contractor performance. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

21 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

22 

Management Comments and Contractor Analysis 

FEMA concurs with this recommendation. FEMA is developing Standard 

Operating Procedures stating that all active contracts will be entered into 

the contract management system, reinforcing employees’ duties to comply 

with Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements and explaining contract 

file preparation and documentation. FEMA stated that this 

recommendation will be implemented no later than December 30, 2010. 

Contractor Analysis: We consider FEMA’s planned actions responsive to 

the recommendation. Until the corrective action plan and target 

completion date are received and evaluated, the recommendation is 

unresolved and open. 
 

 

 

 

Appendix A: 
 


Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
 
 

The objective of this audit was to determine the effectiveness of 

FEMA’s management of its Public Assistance-Technical 

Assistance Contracts (PA-TACs). FEMA is taking actions to 

improve its acquisition function, including contracting, to prepare 

for, respond to, and mitigate the results of disasters, as well as 

improve its day-to-day operations. The DHS-OIG has a 

requirement to determine if FEMA policies have been documented 

and implemented. This performance audit evaluated FEMA’s 

management of services provided by the PA-TAC contractors. 

The specific objectives of the audit were to assess FEMA’s 

processes and procedures for: 

• Awarding individual task orders, 

• Monitoring and evaluating contractor performance, and 

• Certifying contractor billings. 

FEMA is required to adhere to contract management policies and 

procedures that are promulgated in the FAR.16 FEMA also is 

required to adhere to the Homeland Security Acquisition 

Regulation and the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual, Office 

of Federal Procurement Policy guidance, the Stafford Act, and the 

Brooks Act.

17 

This audit focused on FY 2008 PA-TAC task orders issued in 

response to federal emergency and disaster declarations in Texas 

and Louisiana because of hurricanes Gustav and Ike and the floods 

in Iowa. Based on the information provided by FEMA prior to and 

at the Entrance Conference conducted in November 2009, the team 

found that nine task orders were issued for the declarations cited 

above. For these nine task orders, there were 40 actions, 19 of 

which had funding obligations. We reviewed 18 of the 19 funding 

actions; FEMA could not locate the documentation for 1 funding 

action for $12 million. Of the 40 actions, the remaining 21 actions 

were “no cost” modifications. We reviewed 11 of the no cost 

16 The FAR, codified in Title 48 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations, was developed pursuant 

to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-400), as amended by Public Law 

96-83. 

17 FEMA’s statutory authority comes from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act, as amended. The Stafford Act was enacted in 1988 (Public Law 100-707), and it amended the Disaster 

Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-288). The Brooks Act (Public Law 92-582) was enacted on October 27, 

1972. It amended the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to establish federal policy 

concerning the selection of firms and individuals to perform architectural, engineering, and related services 

for the federal government. 

Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

23 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

24 

Appendix A: 
 


Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
 
 

modifications; documentation for 10 modifications was not in the 

contract files and could not be reviewed. 

FEMA awarded three IDIQ contracts in June 2006 to provide 

technical assistance to grantees and subgrantees, architect-engineer 

services, consultants, and other professional services, in support of 

the PA program. We also reviewed these base contracts. 

We obtained information from FEMA headquarters officials and 

field officials in Regions VI and VII. We visited FEMA’s Federal 

Finance Center in Mt. Weather, VA, to obtain payment 

information on the contracts in our review. We also discussed PATAC contract issues with officials in Texas and Iowa. 

We conducted this performance audit according to generally 

accepted government auditing standards (Government Auditing 

Standards, July 2007 revision). 

Our audit considered FEMA policies and procedures implemented 

since the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, as well as other applicable 

federal acquisition requirements. At all locations visited, we 

interviewed officials and obtained documentation to verify changes 

or corrective actions taken. Field work was conducted from 

November 2009 through June 2010. 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

25 

U.S. Ucpartmcm of 110",..1"",1 S.<urih'

.sOOCSUc'e1.SIV -

\\'",hmg,()/\.1)(·2~72

FEMA "'~" ;fJ;

SEP 1 7 1010

MEMORANDUM FOR: Malt Judaeki

AssistUllt Inspector General

Offiec of Emcrgeney Management Oversight

Office of Inspector General

FROM: David J. K8ufimm (Ji--

Director

Office of Policy and Program Analysis

SUBJECT, Comments on OIG own Report, ImprovemenlS Needed i/1

Managing FEMA's Public Assis/ance·Teclll1ical Assistance

COlllracls

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Office of Inspector

General's (OIG's) subject draft audit report. As the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) works toward refining its programs, the OIG's indcpcndcnt analysis of

program pcrfonmmce greatly bencfits our ability to continuously improvc our activities.

Technical comments have been provided under separate cover.

With respect to the Long-Tenn Community Recovery Resources section ofthe report, we

wish to point out that the Public Assistancc Tcchnieal Assistance ContTllcts (PA-TACs)

were not initially established or structured to fully accomplish the Long Term

Community Recovery (LTCR) mission. Nonetheless, in order to meet un outstanding

nlX'd for long tenn recovery support, FEMA chose to provide support lor LTCR through

the PA-TACs. Recently, in order to better address this need and accomplish the: LTCR

mission, FEMA has entered into a stand-alone Indefinite Dclivcl)' Indefinite Quantity

(IDIQ) contract for LTCR technical assistance and support.

FEMA concurs or partially concurs with the draft report's five recommendations. While

we will be providing corrective action plans in our 90-day response, we provide the

following information relative to the five recommendations:

Appendix B 

Management Comments on the Draft Report 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

26 

Recommendation #1:

• Follow through on its request for an opinion to the Office of Legal Counsel, or the

Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, at the Department ofJustice regarding

how the Brooks Act applies to the awarding ofindividual Public AssistanceTechnical Assistance Contract task orders and

• Ifthe Department ofJustice finds that the current method of awarding Public

Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts does not adhere to the Brooks Act,

work with applicable agency officials to ensure that future task order awards

follow the legally required process.

Response: FEMA partially concurs with this recommendation in that we are

coordinating with the Department ofHomeland Security's Office ofGeneral Counsel

which intends to review the issue and will transmit a request for an opinion to the

Department ofJustice, if necessary.

Recommendation #2:

• Establish perfonnance expectations and develop perfonnance and evaluation

criteria for the Public Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts,

• Ensure that Public Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts contractor

perfonnance is being evaluated using the criteria established, and

• Ensure that there are consequences for failure to achieve perfonnance

expectations.

Response: FEMA concurs with this recommendation and is in the process ofdeveloping

a Technical Evaluation Worksheet to evaluate contractor perfonnance. For clarification,

the PA-TAC contracts issued under the contract numbers HSFEHQ-06-D-0487, 0488 and

0489 were awarded as standard statement of work contracts, as opposed to perfonnance

based contracts. However, in order to better be able to assess contractor perfonnance,

FEMA is developing a Technical Evaluation Worksheet. The FEMA Public Assistance

Division distributed a draft Technical Evaluation Worksheet to FEMA Regional

Recovery Divisions for review and comment in August 2010. Once reviewed and

approved, the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) and the

Contracting Officer (CO) plan to utilize the Technical Evaluation Worksheet as the

primary tool to capture perfonnance. The Technical Evaluation Worksheet will also be

used by the Task Monitors in the Regions to evaluate contractor perfonnance on each

task order. FEMA will use the results ofthe evaluation from the Task Monitors, along

with the COTR and CO assessments, to develop the contractors' annual past perfonnance

evaluation.

Recommendation #3:

• Develop policies, procedures, and processes that define and direct the Public

Assistance Task Monitor role and responsibilities for monitoring and evaluating

contractor perfonnance and for certifying and reconciling contractor invoices and

supporting documentation.

Appendix B 

Management Comments on the Draft Report 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 

27 

• Develop a fonnal training program to instruct the Public Assistance Task

Monitors on their roles and responsibilities.

• Develop a certification program for Public Assistance Task Monitors.

Response: FEMA concurs with the recommendation and will develop policies,

procedures, and processes that define and direct Ta'sk Monitors. A fonnal training

program for the Task Monitors will also be developed as well as a certification program

for Task Monitors. Recommendation #3 will be implemented no later than September

30,2011.

Recommendation #4: Develop perfonnance expectations, evaluation criteria, and a

monitoring plan to assess the success of:

• The new Long-Term Community Recovery contractor, and

• The new Disaster Assistance Employee cadre for Long Term Community

Recovery.

Response: FEMA accepts this general recommendation but disagrees with important

elements ofthe analysis and the conclusions drawn, as noted above. The Business

Management Division, which oversees the use ofthe new LTCR IDIQ contract will be

working with the Public Assistance Division to adapt the model ofTechnical Evaluation

Worksheets and contractor perfonnance assessment to be applied to the use ofthe LTCR

IDIQ contract. Additionally, FEMA is undertaking an overall revision to its disaster

reserve workforce though development ofthe FEMA Persormel Qualifications System.

The LTCR cadre will be participating in this effort to define qualifications and

credentialing for DAEs.

Recommendation #5:

• Include aU active Public Assistance-Technical Assistance Contract task order

contract files in the contract management system,

• Reinforce employees' duties to comply with Federal Acquisition Regulation

requirements, and

• Include the required quality assurance plans, project management plans, and

status reports in the contract files to provide the govenunent with the basis for

evaluating contractor perfonnance.

Response: FEMA concurs with this recommendation and is developing Standard

Operating Procedures (SOP) stating that all active contracts will be entered into the

contract management system, reinforcing employees' duties to comply with Federal

Acquisition Regulation requirements and explaining contract file preparation and

documentation. Additionally, the SOP will require each CO to ensure that the required

procurement documents are included in the contract file and a detailed memorandum

signed by the CO is in the file ifthe documents are not available. Recommendation #5

will be implemented no later than December 3D, 2010.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft' report and we look forward

to working with you on other issues as we both strive to improve FEMA.

Appendix B 

Management Comments on the Draft Report 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 
 


Page 28
 
 

Appendix C: List of Related Audit Reports and Testimonies on FEMA 

PA-TACS and Contracting 

DHS OIG: Assessment of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Policies and Procedures, 

OIG-10-26, December 2009 

DHS OIG: FEMA’s Sourcing for Disaster Response Goods and Services, OIG-09-96, 

August 2009 

DHS OIG: Management Advisory Report: FEMA’s Response to Hurricane Ike, OIG-09-

78, June 2009 

DHS OIG: Challenges Facing FEMA’s Disaster Contract Management, OIG-09-70, 

May 2009 

DHS OIG: FEMA’s Implementation of Best Practices in the Acquisition Process, OIG09-31, February 2009 

DHS OIG: Internal Controls in the FEMA Disaster Acquisition Process, OIG-09-32, 

February 2009 

DHS OIG: Challenges Facing FEMA’s Acquisition Workforce, OIG-09-11, November 

2008 

DHS OIG: FEMA’s Sheltering and Transitional Housing Activities After Hurricane 

Katrina, OIG-08-93, September 2008 

DHS OIG: Acquisition Workforce Training and Qualifications, OIG-08-56, May 2008 

GAO: Hurricanes Gustav and Ike Disaster Assistance: FEMA Strengthened Its Fraud 

Prevention Controls, but Customer Service Needs Improvement, GAO-09-671, June 2009 

GAO: Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Continuing Concerns with 

Acquisition Management, GAO-08-1164T, September 2008 

GAO: Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight Needed to 

Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-08-765T, May 2008 

GAO: Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment Needed to 

Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions, GAO-08-263, April 2008 

GAO: Department of Homeland Security: Status and Accountability Challenges 

Associated with the Use of Special DHS Acquisition Authority, GAO-08-471T, February 

2008 

GAO: National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity and 

Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors, GAO-08-369, February 2008 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 
 


Page 29
 
 

Appendix C: List of Related Audit Reports and Testimonies on FEMA 

PA-TACS and Contracting 

GAO: Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight Needed 

to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services, GAO-07-990, September 2007 

GAO: Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery 

Contracts, GAO-06-622T, April 2006 

GAO: Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 

GAO-06-461R, March 2006 

Testimony of Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator, before the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee of Economic Development, Public 

Buildings and Emergency Management, Post-Katrina: What It Takes to Cut the 

Bureaucracy and Assure a More Rapid Response after a Catastrophic Disaster, July 27, 

2009 
Improvements Needed in FEMA’s Management of PA-TACs 
 


Page 30
 
 

 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

FEMA Administrator 

FEMA-GAO-OIG-Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.