PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1216

MARY E. EDMONSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

EAGLE NATIONAL BANK; EAGLE NATIONWIDE MORTGAGE 

COMPANY; EAGLE NATIONAL BANCORP, INCORPORATED; ESSA 

BANCORP, INCORPORATED; ESSA BANK & TRUST,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 18-1229

RENITA JAMES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ACRE MORTGAGE & FINANCIAL, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 18-1230

D’ALAN E. BAUGH; PENNY FRAZIER,
2

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

THE FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 18-1260

TRACIE PARKER DOBBINS; GLADYS PARKER,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 18-1262

JILL BEZEK; MICHELLE HARRIS

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. 

FIRST MARINER BANK

Defendant - Appellee.
3

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland at Baltimore.

Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:16-cv-03938-RDB; 1:17-cv-00540-RDB; 1:17-cv01734-RDB; 1:17-cv-01735-RDB; 1:17-cv-02902-RDB)

Argued: December 11, 2018 Decided: April 26, 2019

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which

Judge Keenan and Judge Harris joined.

ARGUED: William James Murphy, ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellants. Ryan Thomas Becker, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellees. Brian David Schmalzbach, 

MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee Bank of America National 

Association. ON BRIEF: Cyril V. Smith, Adam B. Abelson, ZUCKERMAN 

SPAEDER LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Michael Paul Smith, SMITH, GILDEA & 

SCHMIDT, LLC, Towson, Maryland; Timothy F. Maloney, JOSEPH, GREENWALD & 

LAAKE, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellants. George J. Krueger, FOX 

ROTHSCHILD LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Brian Moffet, MILES & 

STOCKBRIDGE P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees Eagle Nation Bank, Eagle 

Nationwide Mortgage Company, Eagle National Bancorp, Incorporated, Essa Bancorp, 

Incorporated, and Essa Bank & Trust. Bradley R. Kutrow, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee Bank of America National Association. Ari 

Karen, OFFIT KURMAN, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees Acre Mortgage & 

Financial, Inc, and The Federal Savings Bank. Michael E. Blumenfeld, NELSON 

MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee First 

Mariner Bank.
4

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Each of the five Plaintiffs in this matter brought a putative class action alleging 

that between 2009 and 2014 certain lenders participated in “kickback schemes” 

prohibited by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et 

seq. But the district court dismissed their claims because the first of the five class actions 

at issue in this appeal was not filed until June 23, 2016, well after the expiration of 

RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations. We, however, hold that, under the allegations 

set forth in their complaints, Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the limitations period 

under the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse the district 

court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ actions.

I.

Because the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ actions under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), we take the non-conclusory factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ 

complaints as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in Plaintiffs’ favor. In re 

GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2015).

Between 2009 and 2014, Defendants—several banks and mortgage companies

(each, a “Lender,” and collectively, the “Lenders”)1

—originated or serviced residential 

mortgages obtained by Plaintiffs. Mortgage brokers and loan officers employed by the 

Lenders referred Plaintiffs to Genuine Title, LLC (“Genuine Title”) to procure title 

 1 The Lenders are Eagle National Bank and several of its predecessors and 

affiliates; Bank of America, N.A.; Acre Mortgage & Financial, Inc.; The Federal Savings 

Bank; and First Mariner Bank.
5

insurance and obtain escrow and settlement services. Plaintiffs allege that Genuine Title 

provided the Lenders with several forms of “unearned fees and kickbacks” to induce 

those referrals, J.A. 8, in violation of RESPA, which forbids, among other things, any 

person from “giv[ing or] accept[ing] any fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any 

agreement or understanding . . . [as] part of a real estate settlement service involving a 

federally related mortgage loan,” 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).

In the scheme’s most basic form, Genuine Title transferred more than $4,000,000 

to an entity named Brandon Glickstein, Inc. (“BGI”), which purportedly provided 

“advertising and marketing” services. J.A. 13–14. Brandon Glickstein, who founded 

BGI, had previously served as “Genuine Title’s lead marketing and account 

representative.” J.A. 13. Using the funds it received from Genuine Title, BGI made 

millions of dollars in direct cash payments to the Lenders’ brokers and loan officers who 

made referrals to Genuine Title. Brokers and loan officers who referred more customers 

to Genuine Title received larger payments from BGI. 

Plaintiffs further allege that Glickstein founded a second company, Competitive 

Advantage Media Group, LLC (“Competitive Advantage”), that made in-kind payments 

to the Lenders’ brokers and loan officers. In particular, Competitive Advantage provided 

“free or discounted leads, postage, and/or marketing materials and services and/or credits 

for mortgage brokers and lenders” associated with the Lenders. J.A. 14. Genuine Title 

allegedly paid for some or all of the promotional materials Competitive Advantage

provided to the Lenders’ brokers and loan officers.
6

According to the complaint, the amount that Genuine Title paid Competitive 

Advantage for the promotional materials Competitive Advantage provided to the

Lenders’ brokers or loan officers varied with the number of referrals the broker or loan 

officer made to Genuine Title. “For example, if a [r]eferring [b]roker who used 

[Competitive Advantage] for his or her marketing materials referred five (5) mortgages 

that closed with Genuine Title in one month, and the agreement with Genuine Title was 

that each closing was valued at $200, Genuine Title would pay [Competitive Advantage]

$1,000 the next month to be applied to the [r]eferring [b]roker’s marketing materials 

produced by [Competitive Advantage].” J.A. 15.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Genuine Title entered into agreements pursuant 

to which a broker or loan officer associated with a Lender that refused to lend to a 

prospective borrower because the borrower failed to meet the Lender’s underwriting 

standards would refer the borrower to another Lender that frequently worked with 

Genuine Title. That second Lender’s broker or loan officer would refer the borrower to 

Genuine Title for title services. Under these agreements, Genuine Title would provide a 

cash or in-kind kickback to (1) the broker or loan officer of the Lender that referred the 

borrower to the second Lender and (2) the second Lender’s broker or loan officer, who

ultimately originated or serviced the borrower’s mortgage and who referred the borrower 

to Genuine Title. Again, the payments to the brokers or loan officers employed by the 

two Lenders varied with the volume of referrals. Neither Genuine Title nor the Lenders 

disclosed the alleged kickbacks to Plaintiffs. 
7

Although the complaint alleges violations between 2009 and 2014, the first of the 

five class actions at issue in this appeal was not filed until June 23, 2016, well after the 

expiration of RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs’ complaints assert that 

Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the limitations period, however, because the Lenders 

fraudulently concealed the alleged kickback scheme. 

To that end, Plaintiffs allege that BGI and Competitive Advantage were “sham” 

entities and that “the use of [BGI and Competitive Advantage] was intended to conceal, 

and did conceal, the Kickback Scheme from borrowers, including Plaintiff, Class 

Members, and regulators.” J.A. 13. In support of the allegation that BGI and 

Competitive Advantage were “sham[s],” the complaints allege, for example, that “[t]he 

Resident Agent for [Competitive Advantage] at the time of organization was Jonathan S. 

Bach, Esq., the in-house attorney for Genuine Title” and that, at that time, “the address 

for [Competitive Advantage] was the same physical address [as] Genuine Title.” J.A. 14. 

The complaints further allege that some of the brokers or loan officers employed 

by the Lenders “created shell companies to receive the [cash] payments” from BGI,

whereas other brokers and loan officers used previously existing entities for the sole 

purpose of receiving the payments. J.A. 16. According to the complaints, the 

“[p]ayments were made and received in this way to conceal, and did conceal, the 

Kickback Scheme from borrowers, including Plaintiff and other Class Members, and 

regulators.” Id. Once investigators began examining the payments from BGI to the 

Lenders’ brokers and loan officers, “Genuine Title drafted sham Title Services 

Agreements for [r]eferring [b]rokers with the intent to disguise and conceal [cash]
8

payments as legitimate fees for alleged title services provided by [r]eferring [b]rokers, 

and Genuine Title back-dated said agreements.” J.A. 16–17. In support of the allegation 

that the Title Service Agreements were “sham[s],” the complaints allege that the cash 

payments from BGI to the Lenders’ referring brokers and loan officers “were not made in 

accordance with the fee schedule in the Title Services Agreements and the [r]eferring 

[b]rokers performed no services for Genuine Title.” J.A. 17. 

The complaints further alleged that the Lenders concealed the kickbacks by not 

reporting the payments from BGI on HUD-1 Settlement Statements2 and other settlement 

documents the Lenders provided to Plaintiffs, notwithstanding that federal regulations 

require that HUD-1 Settlement Statements “include any amounts received for origination 

services, including administrative and processing services, performed by or on behalf of 

the loan originator,” 12 C.F.R. § 1024, App. A, and provide a good faith estimate of “all 

charges that all loan originators involved in [the] transaction will receive,” id. § 1024, 

App. C. 

Potentially complicating Plaintiffs’ request for relief from RESPA’s limitation 

period based on fraudulent concealment, however, is that Genuine Title, its officers, and 

brokers and loan officers employed by lenders not named as defendants in this case

 2 A HUD-1 Settlement Statement is a standard form provided to borrowers listing 

the “actual charges and adjustments paid by the borrower and seller,” and “given to the 

parties in connection with the settlement.” 12 C.F.R. § 124, App. A. For most mortgage 

transactions occurring after October 3, 2015, borrowers now receive what is called a 

“Closing Disclosure” instead. What Is a HUD-1 Settlement Statement?, Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-hud1-settlement statement-en-178/ (last visited on March 27, 2019).
9

previously have faced legal actions premised on similar conduct. In 2013, for example, 

Edward and Vickie Fangman filed a complaint alleging that Genuine Title provided

kickbacks to mortgage brokers and loan officers affiliated with several mortgage lenders 

and brokers in exchange for referrals. See Fangman v. Genuine Title, No. RDB-14-0081 

(D. Md. 2014). Counsel for the Fangman plaintiffs—the law firms Smith, Gildea & 

Schmidt, LLC, and Joseph, Greenwald & Lake, P.A.—represented some of the Plaintiffs

in the present action. 

Genuine Title filed for bankruptcy in 2014. Thereafter, Genuine Title’s

bankruptcy receiver provided counsel for the Fangman plaintiffs with access to Genuine 

Title’s documents, records, and computer servers. From these records, Fangman counsel 

identified and located prospective class members as well as several additional lenders that 

allegedly received kickbacks from Genuine Title. Counsel then contacted these members 

and filed two Amended Complaints, naming several lenders as additional defendants, 

including, for a short time, two of the defendants in the instant case: Eagle National Bank

and Bank of America, N.A.

Like Plaintiffs, the Fangman plaintiffs sought relief from RESPA’s one-year

limitations period under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The district court in 

Fangman held the plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent concealment—which track those 

asserted by Plaintiffs in the instant case—were sufficient to satisfy Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). See J. v. Genuine Title, LLC, No. RDB-14-0081, 2015 WL 

8315704, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2015). 
10

In reaching that conclusion, the court first held that the Fangman defendants 

engaged in affirmative acts of concealment, including by concealing the business 

relationship between Genuine Title and the defendant lenders, failing to disclose the 

referral payments on the borrowers’ HUD-1 Settlement Statements, and entering into 

sham Title Services Agreements. The court further held the Fangman Plaintiffs 

adequately alleged that they did not and “could not have reasonably known of their cause 

of action until contacted by [their] attorneys.” Id. “Rather than sleeping on their rights, 

[the Fangman] Plaintiffs’ counsel has undergone a large-scale review of Defendant 

Genuine Title’s computer system. It is only through this review, aided by early discovery 

and a proprietary software system, that potential plaintiffs have been identified,” the court 

held.3

 Id. The district court subsequently ruled that the evidence the Fangman plaintiffs 

adduced in discovery was sufficient to satisfy their burden to prove their entitlement to 

tolling based on fraudulent concealment. See Fangman v. Genuine Title, LLC, No. RDB14-0081, 2016 WL 6600509, at *4–7 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2016).

Meanwhile, on January 22, 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and 

the Maryland Attorney General initiated enforcement proceedings against Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“J.P. Morgan”), alleging 

those two financial institutions engaged in a similar kickback scheme with Genuine Title. 

Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan entered into a settlement agreement with the enforcement 

 3 The Fangman plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their claims against Bank of 

America before the district court considered the motion to dismiss. See id. at *1 n.6.
11

agencies, agreeing to pay approximately $35 million dollars. That agreement received 

press coverage in, among other media outlets, The Wall Street Journal, The Baltimore 

Sun, and The Washington Post. 

Additionally, on April 29, 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and 

the Maryland Attorney General brought a separate enforcement action against Genuine 

Title, alleging that Genuine Title, its principal, and affiliates engaged in cash payments 

and other kickbacks in exchange for referrals. Although the case settled, and the 

settlement orders contemplated additional private litigation by consumers, neither the 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau nor the Maryland Attorney General required any 

of the financial institutions named in the enforcement actions to issue any formal notices 

to the public. 

During the pendency of the Fangman litigation and the federal and state 

enforcement proceedings, Plaintiffs’ counsel further analyzed the materials provided by 

Genuine Title’s bankruptcy receiver and identified additional borrowers potentially 

impacted by Genuine Title’s alleged kickbacks to lenders and brokers. Based on that 

analysis, Plaintiffs filed the five putative class actions at issue in this appeal. Each 

putative class action names as defendant a separate financial institution or corporate 

family of financial institutions, which employed brokers and loan officers that allegedly 

received kickbacks from Genuine Title.

Like the defendants in Fangman, the Lenders moved to dismiss on grounds that 

Plaintiffs failed to file their actions within RESPA’s one-year limitations period and were 

not entitled to rely on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to obtain relief from the 
12

limitations period. Unlike in Fangman, however, the district court refused to toll the 

limitations period based on fraudulent concealment and, therefore, dismissed Plaintiffs’ 

actions. See Edmondson v. Eagle Nat’l Bank, No. RDB-16-3938, 2018 WL 582514, at 

*8-9 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2018). 

In Fangman, the district court focused on whether the defendants engaged in 

affirmative acts of concealment and whether the plaintiffs failed to discover the facts 

within the statutory period despite the exercise of due diligence, Fangman, 2015 

8315704, at *7—the traditional factors this Court has recognized bear on fraudulent 

concealment. See Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 

119, 122 (4th Cir. 1995). However, this time, the district court’s opinion dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ action on grounds that they failed to sufficiently allege “extraordinary 

circumstances” prevented the timely filing of their claims. Edmondson, 2018 WL 

582514, at *6–9 (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 136 S. 

Ct. 750, 755 (2016)). 

In dismissing Plaintiffs actions, the district court held no extraordinary 

circumstances were present because (1) Plaintiffs’ counsel had access to the data used to 

identify the Lenders’ alleged wrongdoing “by June 2015” and (2) the named Plaintiffs 

should have discovered the existence of their claims “in May 2015 at the latest” based on 

information publicly disclosed in the Fangman complaint and the media coverage of 

Genuine Title’s wrongdoing. Id. at *7–8. The district court further concluded that no 

“extraordinary circumstances” existed—that this case did not “present one of those rare 

instances where . . . it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period . . . and 
13

gross injustice would result”—because Plaintiffs’ counsel “has already secured

significant awards for their efforts to hold Genuine Title and other financial institutions 

accountable for violating RESPA.” Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted).

Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6), including claims for fraudulent concealment. See Al-Abood ex rel. AlAbood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2000); Wood v. Com., 155 F.3d 564 

(4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (reviewing de novo whether the complaint sufficiently 

alleged fraudulent concealment).

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court properly dismissed the five 

complaints on grounds that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege their entitlement to relief 

from RESPA’s one-year limitations period based on fraudulent concealment. To decide 

this issue, we will consider (A) whether RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations for 

claims under Section 2607, 12 U.S.C. § 2614, is subject to tolling based on fraudulent 

concealment; (B) if so, whether the district court applied the proper test in holding that 

Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege their entitlement to tolling based on fraudulent 

concealment; and (C) whether Plaintiffs’ allegations bearing on fraudulent concealment 

are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
14

A.

We first look at whether RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations for claims under 

Section 2607, 12 U.S.C. § 2614, is subject to tolling based on fraudulent concealment. 

The Supreme Court has held that “time bars in suits between private parties are 

presumptively subject to” tolling on equitable grounds. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 

135 S. Ct. 1625, 1630 (2015) (emphasis in original). To that end, the Supreme Court has 

held that “the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine is to be ‘read into every federal 

statute of limitation.’” Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 122 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 

U.S. 392, 397 (1946)). We believe Holmberg ends the inquiry and makes RESPA’s oneyear statute of limitations, like “every federal statute of limitation,” 327 U.S. at 397,

subject to tolling based on fraudulent concealment.

4 Even so, we follow our sister 

circuits and consider whether the time limitations in Section 2614 operate as a 

jurisdictional bar rendering tolling on equitable grounds categorically unavailable. We 

conclude it does not.

 4 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, a panel of this Court concluded that 

RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations was jurisdictional, and therefore not subject to 

tolling based on fraudulent concealment. See Zaremski v. Keystone Title Assocs., Inc., 

884 F.2d 1391 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished). Unpublished decisions, of course, do not 

constitute binding precedent in this Circuit. Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th 

Cir. 1996). And we are not persuaded to follow Zaremski, which was “sparely reasoned,”

Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (D. Md. 2009), and which 

predates the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence “press[ing] a stricter distinction 

between truly jurisdictional rules . . . and nonjurisdictional ‘claim-processing rules’” and 

admonishing lower courts to “not lightly attach those ‘drastic’ consequences” of treating 

a timely filing provision as jurisdictional, Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
15

When Congress makes a limitations period a jurisdictional prerequisite, then 

courts may not toll the limitations period on any equitable grounds. See Harris v. 

Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2000); see also, e.g., Ramadan v. Chase 

Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 500 (3d Cir. 1998) (“A limitation period is not subject to 

equitable tolling if it is jurisdictional in nature.”). For guidance, “the Supreme Court has 

established a clear statement rule for determining whether procedural rules, including 

time bars, are jurisdictional.” Stewart v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 2019); see 

also Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (holding that “absent

such a clear statement . . . courts should treat [a statutory timeliness requirement] as 

nonjurisdictional in character” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Only if the statutory 

text ‘plainly show[s] that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional 

consequences’ should a court treat a rule as jurisdictional.” Stewart, 912 F.3d at 700 

(quoting Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632 (emphasis added)). Put otherwise, Congress 

must “do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of 

limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it.” Kwai Fun Wong, 135 

S. Ct. at 1632. 

RESPA’s limitation provision states, in pertinent part:

Any action pursuant to the provisions of [this title] may be brought in the 

United States district court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, 

for the district in which the property involved is located, or where the 

violation is alleged to have occurred, within . . . 1 year in the case of a 

violation of section 2607 . . . from the date of the occurrence of the 

violation[.]
16

12 U.S.C. § 2614. Thus, the plain language of Section 2614 does not state—clearly or 

otherwise—that the one-year limitations period is a jurisdictional prerequisite. And, as 

the Ninth Circuit emphasized in holding Section 2614’s statute of limitations provision 

non-jurisdictional, the provision uses the “non-mandatory” term “may” and is therefore 

“far more permissive than several limitations provisions that have been held amenable to 

equitable tolling.” Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 759 F.3d 1023, 1037 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 438–39 

(2011)).

Decades prior to the Supreme Court’s recent effort “to ‘ward off profligate use of’ 

the label ‘jurisdictional,’” Nauflett v. C.I.R., 892 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 153), the D.C. Circuit held that Section 2614’s limitations period 

was jurisdictional, principally because Congress titled the section: “Jurisdiction of 

Courts; limitations,” see Hardin v. City Title & Escrow Co., 797 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986). We do not believe the reference to “Jurisdiction” in the title of Section 2614

bears the interpretive weight placed on it in Hardin, nor does it constitute the “clear 

statement” necessary to render Section 2614’s limitations provision jurisdictional. To 

begin, it is significant that the plain language of the Section 2614’s title references both 

“Jurisdiction” and “limitations,” indicating that Congress viewed the limitations aspect of 

Section 2614 as distinct from the provision’s “jurisdiction[al]” aspect. See Reed Elsevier, 

Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 163–64 (2010) (rejecting the argument that the “presence 

of the word ‘jurisdiction’” in a statute renders the entire statute jurisdictional). 
17

Additionally, we note that “‘[j]urisdiction . . . is a word of many, too many, 

meanings,’” only some of which refer to a “court’s adjudicatory authority”—the crucial 

question in determining whether a statute of limitations is subject to tolling on equitable 

grounds. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–55 (2004) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens 

for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)). Section 2614’s reference to “jurisdiction” “is 

not a ‘jurisdiction-granting provision’”—it does not create a court’s adjudicatory 

authority—but rather deals with “venue” and therefore does not preclude tolling on 

equitable grounds. Merritt, 759 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166)

(emphasis retained).

We further note that “the purposes and policies underlying the limitation 

provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the enforcement of the 

rights given by the Act,” see Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965), 

also support treating the limitations period in Section 2614 as non-jurisdictional. 

Congress enacted RESPA to eliminate “kickbacks or referral fees that tend to increase 

unnecessarily the costs of certain settlement services.” 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). In so 

doing, Congress sought to provide consumers “with greater and more timely 

information on the nature and costs of the settlement process” so that they may be 

“protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive 

practices that have developed in some areas of the country.” Id. § 2601(a). As the 

Eleventh Circuit observed in construing a limitations provision in the Truth In Lending 

Act, which also serves to protect consumers from abusive practices by entities that 

originate and service mortgages, treating the limitations provision as jurisdictional 
18

“would lead to the anomalous result that a statute designed to remediate the effects of 

fraud would instead reward those perpetrators who concealed their fraud long enough to 

time-bar their victims’ remedy. We cannot believe this was Congress’ intent.” Ellis v. 

GMAC, 160 F.3d 703, 708 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding the Truth In Lending Act statute of 

limitations non-jurisdictional). 

This reasoning applies equally to RESPA, which uses a “similarly worded” 

limitations provision and serves analogous “consumer-protection purposes.” Merritt, 759 

F.3d at 1038 (internal quotation marks omitted). As one district court in this circuit

correctly observed, “[s]urely RESPA . . . [was] directed at the best as well as the worst of 

swindlers.” Kerby v. Mortgage Funding Corp., 992 F. Supp. 787, 793 (D. Md. 1998). 

We do not believe that Congress intended to allow individuals and entities that conceal 

their unlawful kickback schemes and other RESPA violations to reap the benefit of the 

statute of limitations as a defense. On the contrary, allowing tolling based on fraudulent 

concealment advances the goals Congress sought to serve in enacting RESPA. 

Therefore, we join the majority of our sister circuits and hold that the statute of 

limitations found in Section 2614 is not jurisdictional in nature and may be tolled based 

on equitable grounds, including fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. 

Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 400 n.20 (3d Cir. 2015); Merritt, 759

F.3d at 1036–39; Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1166–

67 (7th Cir. 1997).
19

B.

Having determined that RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to 

tolling on equitable grounds—including fraudulent concealment—we turn to whether the 

district court applied the proper test in holding that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege 

their entitlement to tolling based on fraudulent concealment. This Court long has held 

that to toll a limitations period based on fraudulent concealment, “a plaintiff must 

demonstrate: (1) the party pleading the statute of limitations fraudulently concealed facts 

that are the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) the plaintiff failed to discover those facts 

within the statutory period, despite (3) the exercise of due diligence.” Marlinton, 71 F.3d 

at 122 (citing Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552, 555 (4th Cir. 1974)). This 

Court has repeatedly and consistently applied that three-part framework when a plaintiff 

sought to invoke fraudulent concealment to toll a limitations period, including as recently 

as April 2018. See, e.g., SD3 II LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 888 F.3d 98, 107–08 

(4th Cir. 2018); EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 370 (4th Cir. 2014); Go 

Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2007); Detrick v. 

Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 541 (4th Cir. 1997); Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co., Inc. 

v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 1987).

Notwithstanding this unbroken line of precedent—which the district court 

followed in Fangman—the district court this time applied a different framework in 

analyzing the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment allegations: the Supreme 

Court’s two-step test for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling of 

a statute limitations. Under that test—which the Supreme Court most recently applied in 
20

Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, but which dates, at least, to the Court’s 

decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990)—a plaintiff 

seeking relief from a limitations period based on “equitable tolling” must show “(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way and prevented timely filing,” Edmondson, 2018 WL 582514, at *4–5 

(quoting Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 755). 

Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, we conclude that the two-step test the 

Supreme Court applied in Menominee did not displace this Court’s three-step test for 

determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief from a limitations period based on 

fraudulent concealment. To understand why, it is necessary to recognize the “subtle and 

difficult” differences between the various equitable doctrines that potentially afford 

plaintiffs relief from a limitations period. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 192 

(1997); cf. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he 

taxonomy of tolling, in the context of avoiding a statute of limitations, includes at least 

three phrases: equitable tolling, fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, and 

equitable estoppel”).

The first equitable doctrine that provides for tolling of a limitations period—

referred to most commonly as “fraudulent concealment”—“prevents a defendant from 

‘concealing a fraud, or . . . committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until’ 

the defendant ‘could plead the statute of limitations to protect it.’” Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 

122 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349 (1874)). Put differently, the fraudulent 

concealment tolling doctrine applies in situations “where the defendant has wrongfully 
21

deceived or misled the plaintiff in order to conceal the existence of a cause of action.”

English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987). The purpose of 

fraudulent concealment doctrine is to “ensur[e] that wrongdoers are not permitted, or 

encouraged, to take advantage of the limitations period to commit secret illegal conduct 

without penalty.” Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 125. Under this doctrine, because of the 

defendant’s wrongful acts of concealment, the plaintiff is not aware of the facts giving 

rise to his claim within the limitations period.

The second equitable doctrine that provides for tolling of a limitations period—

referred to most commonly as “equitable estoppel”—applies “where, despite the 

plaintiff's knowledge of the facts, the defendant engages in intentional misconduct to 

cause the plaintiff to miss the filing deadline.” English, 828 F.2d at 1049. Equitable 

estoppel differs from fraudulent concealment in that, unlike with fraudulent concealment, 

the plaintiff is aware of his claim within the limitations period. The plaintiff’s failure to 

timely file his claim derives not from his ignorance of the cause of action, but rather from 

conduct taken by the defendant to induce the plaintiff not to timely file his claim. For 

example, equitable estoppel might apply if a plaintiff did not timely file suit because the 

defendant “promis[ed] not to plead the statute of limitations” as a defense if the plaintiff 

held off on filing suit during settlement negotiations. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 

920 F.2d 446, 450–51 (7th Cir. 1990).

The third equitable doctrine that allows a plaintiff to avoid a statute of 

limitations—referred to most frequently as “equitable tolling”—“focuses on whether 

there was excusable delay by the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409, 414 
22

(9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Equitable tolling is appropriate “in 

those rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it 

would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross 

injustice would result.” Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, equitable tolling may be 

available when a plaintiff’s attorney engages in “serious misconduct” such as “ma[king] 

misrepresentations to the [plaintiff], disregard[ing] the [plaintiff’s] instructions, refus[ing] 

to return documents, or abandon[ing] the [plaintiff’s] case.” Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 

1311, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). Critically, however, equitable tolling 

“differs from [fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel] in that it does not assume a 

wrongful—or any—effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from suing.” Cada, 

920 F.2d at 451; see also Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of City of Chicago, 275 F.3d 593, 

597 (7th Cir. 2001) (characterizing “tolling of the statute of limitations . . . on the basis of 

defendant misconduct” as “the domain of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel” 

(emphasis added)). 

As the Supreme Court has recognized, opinions have not always used consistent or 

precise terminology to distinguish these three tolling doctrines. See Klehr, 521 U.S. at

194 (noting that “some courts have said [fraudulent concealment] ‘equitably tolls’ the 

running of a limitations period . . . while other courts have said it is a form of ‘equitable 

estoppel’”) (internal citation omitted). For example, notwithstanding that the doctrine we 

term “equitable tolling” substantively differs from fraudulent concealment and equitable 

estoppel, some opinions characterize all three doctrines as falling under the overarching 
23

heading of “equitable tolling” because each of the three doctrines tolls a limitations 

period on equitable grounds. See, e.g., Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 

F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Rotkiske v. 

Klemm, 890 F.3d 422,427–28 (3d Cir. 2018). Likewise, other opinions characterize 

fraudulent concealment as a subcategory of equitable estoppel because, like the doctrine 

we term “equitable estoppel,” fraudulent concealment tolls a limitations period when a 

defendant’s misconduct precluded a plaintiff from timely filing its claims. See, e.g., 

Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“Equitable estoppel . . . focuses primarily on actions taken by the defendant to prevent a 

plaintiff from filing suit, sometimes referred to as ‘fraudulent concealment.’” (emphasis 

in original)); Shropshear, 275 F.3d at 597 (describing “fraudulent concealment” as “one 

instantiation” of “equitable estoppel”).

Although courts have not always agreed on a uniform terminology for labeling the

various doctrines for tolling a limitations period on equitable grounds—which failure has 

led to some “confus[ion],” Valdez ex rel. Donely v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 182 (2d 

Cir. 2008)—the Supreme Court, lower courts, and commentators agree that the three 

doctrines are substantively different and therefore subject to different pleading and proof

standards. See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 192 (characterizing “equitable tolling” and “equitable 

estoppel” as “different limitations doctrines”); Johnson, 314 F.3d at 413–14; Pearl, 296 

F.3d at 81; Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387; 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam 

N. Steinman, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1056 (4th ed. 2015) (distinguishing “equitable tolling,” 

“equitable estoppel,” and “fraudulent concealment” and noting that fraudulent 
24

concealment “[m]ingl[es] elements from both the doctrines of equitable tolling and 

equitable estoppel”). 

Once one recognizes these substantive differences, the district court’s error in 

applying Menominee’s two-part framework is apparent. Menominee deals not with 

“fraudulent concealment”—the tolling doctrine Plaintiffs seek to invoke. Rather, 

Menominee—and the earlier Supreme Court decisions Menominee follows in applying its 

two-part test—involves the tolling doctrine that is potentially applicable when a 

plaintiff’s failure to timely file suit is not attributable wrongful conduct by the 

defendant—the tolling doctrine this opinion terms “equitable tolling.”

In Menominee, for example, the Supreme Court considered whether the 

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (the “Tribe”) could rely on “equitable tolling to 

preserve contract claims not timely presented to a federal contracting officer.” 136 S. Ct. 

at 753. The Tribe did not timely present its contract claims to a federal contracting 

officer because the Tribe (mistakenly) believed (1) that it was the member of a proposed 

class in an earlier-filed putative class action related to the same alleged wrongdoing and, 

therefore, (2) that the Tribe’s claim was eligible for class-action tolling. Id. at 755. Put 

differently, the Tribe sought “equitable tolling” based on its mistaken belief that it was 

eligible for class-action tolling, despite knowing of its contract claims. Id. at 756–57. 

Applying the two-part test under which a plaintiff must establish “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way and prevented timely filing,” the Supreme Court held that the Tribe was not 

entitled to equitable tolling. Id. at 755–57 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 
25

649 (2010)). In particular, the Court held that the Tribe failed to satisfy the 

“extraordinary circumstances” element because the Tribe’s “mistaken reliance on the 

putative . . . class action was not an obstacle beyond its control.” Menominee, 136 S. Ct.

at 756. “This mistake was fundamentally no different from a garden variety claim of 

excusable neglect . . . such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a 

filing deadline,” and was thus insufficient to meet the “extraordinary circumstances” 

standard, the Court reasoned. Id. at 757 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Menominee, therefore, involved the tolling doctrine this opinion terms “equitable 

tolling.” The Tribe sought relief based on its mistake. Unlike Plaintiffs’ invocation of 

the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine, the Tribe did not contend that the defendant 

was in any way responsible for the Tribe’s failure to timely file its action. 

Notably, all the precedent that Menominee relied on in applying its two-part 

“equitable tolling” test presented the same scenario—a plaintiff seeking tolling of a 

limitations period on grounds that did not involve misconduct by the defendant. See 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 634 (addressing whether a habeas petitioner was entitled to 

equitable tolling based on his attorney’s unprofessional conduct); Lawrence v. Florida, 

549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (addressing whether a habeas petitioner was entitled to 

equitable tolling based on, among other grounds, purported “legal confusion” as to 

whether the relevant limitations period was tolled by the filing of a certiorari petition and 

his counsel’s “mistake in miscalculating the limitations period”); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (addressing whether a habeas petitioner was entitled to 

equitable tolling because “‘state law and Third Circuit exhaustion law created a trap’ on 
26

which he detrimentally relied”); Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (addressing whether plaintiff in 

employment action was entitled to equitable tolling “because his lawyer was absent from 

his office at the time the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] notice was 

received” (emphasis added)). None of these cases involved a plaintiff seeking tolling 

based on fraudulent concealment—the tolling doctrine that applies when a defendant’s 

wrongful conduct prevents a plaintiff from learning of the facts necessary to assert a 

claim within the limitations period—the form of tolling at issue here.

Because Menominee dealt with a different tolling doctrine, it could not—and did 

not—abrogate this Court’s long-standing three-step test for determining whether a 

plaintiff is entitled to relief from a limitations period based on fraudulent concealment. 

See Etheridge v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 9 F.3d 1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1993) (“A decision of 

a panel of this court becomes the law of the circuit and is binding on other panels unless 

it is overruled by a subsequent en banc opinion of this court or a superseding contrary 

decision of the Supreme Court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That this Court has 

applied Marlinton’s three-step framework in assessing fraudulent concealment claims 

numerous times after the Supreme Court first adopted the two-step test applied in 

Menominee—including after Menominee itself—further demonstrates that fraudulent 

concealment differs from the form of equitable tolling at issue in Menominee. See SD3, 

888 F.3d at 107–08; EQT Prod., 764 F.3d at 370; Go Computer, 508 F.3d at 178. 

Tellingly, none of these prior fraudulent concealment opinions discuss, much less apply, 

the two-step test applied in Menominee. 
27

Equally tellingly, none of the cases the Lenders cite as establishing the 

applicability of Menominee to Plaintiffs’ request for tolling on equitable grounds dealt 

with alleged fraudulent concealment; rather, each case deals with the tolling doctrine this 

opinion terms “equitable tolling.” See Cunningham v. C.I.R., 716 Fed. App’x 182, 185

(4th Cir. 2018) (seeking “equitable tolling” based on the plaintiff’s “miscalculation of the 

filing deadline [that] may well have been an innocent mistake”); Knaupf Installation, Inc. 

v. S. Brands, Inc., 820 F.3d 904, 907–10 (7th Cir. 2016) (requesting equitable tolling 

when plaintiff, through no fault of the defendant, did not “realiz[e] that it been removed 

from the class” of a previously filed class action and, therefore, that it was no longer 

entitled to class action tolling); Villareal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 

971–72 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying the Menominee test because the plaintiff did not allege 

that the defendant “actively misled him”).

In sum, we hold that Menominee does not supplant this Court’s long-standing 

three-step framework for analyzing allegations of fraudulent concealment. Accordingly, 

the district court committed legal error when it applied Menominee’s two-step framework 

and dismissed Plaintiffs’ action for failing to satisfy the “extraordinary circumstances” 

element.

5

 

 5 Even if Menonminee’s “extraordinary circumstances” element was a component 

of the fraudulent concealment analysis—which it is not—a defendant’s fraudulent 

concealment of its wrongdoing would seem to constitute per se “extraordinary 

circumstances.” See Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 757 (stating that “relying on actually 

binding precedent that is subsequently reversed” or other “obstacle[s] beyond [a 

plaintiff’s] control” could constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” whereas “garden 

variety . . . excusable neglect” and “simple miscalculation” would not); see also Harris, 

(Continued)
28

C.

Having concluded that this Court’s three-step test for determining whether a 

plaintiff is entitled to invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment continues to apply, 

we now turn to whether Plaintiffs’ allegations bearing on fraudulent concealment are 

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). “Although it is true that the complaint must contain sufficient facts to state 

a claim that is plausible on its face, it nevertheless need only give the defendant fair 

notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests.” Hall v. DirecTV, LLC, 846 

F.3d 757, 765 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, under Rule 9(b) “a party must state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,” including Plaintiffs’ allegations bearing on 

the Lenders’ alleged fraudulent concealment. To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must plead

 

209 F.3d at 330 (noting that in the absence of allegations of wrongful conduct by the 

defendant, the plaintiff “must be able to point to some other extraordinary circumstance 

beyond his control that prevented him from complying with the statutory time limit” 

(emphasis added)). Put simply, a defendant’s affirmative effort to conceal its 

wrongdoing in a manner that prevents a plaintiff from learning the facts necessary to 

allege a cause of action within the limitations period amounts to circumstances “external” 

to the plaintiff’s control in which it would be “unconscionable to enforce the limitation 

period against the [plaintiff] and gross injustice would result.” Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 

184 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29

“the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the 

person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Harrison v. 

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1297, at 590 (2d 

ed. 1990)). Nevertheless, a court “should hesitate to dismiss a complaint under Rule 9(b) 

if the court is satisfied (1) that the defendant has been made aware of the particular 

circumstances for which [it] will have to prepare a defense at trial, and (2) that plaintiff 

has substantial prediscovery evidence of those facts.” Id.

To satisfy the first element of the fraudulent concealment test, a plaintiff must 

“provide evidence of affirmative acts of concealment” by the defendants. Marlinton, 71 

F.3d at 126. “Those acts, however, need not be separate and apart from the acts of 

concealment,” but instead “may include acts of concealment involved in the [alleged]

violation itself.” Id. A plaintiff satisfies its burden to allege an affirmative act of 

concealment if, for example, it alleges that the defendant employed “some trick or 

contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry.” Carrier Corp. v. 

Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, Plaintiffs allege, with particularity, several “trick[s] or contrivance[s]” 

Genuine Title and the Lenders employed to conceal the alleged unlawful kickback 

scheme. Plaintiffs allege that both Genuine Title and the Lenders created and used 

“sham” entities to channel the allegedly unlawful cash kickbacks—entities that, in many 

cases, shared the same registered agent and address as Genuine Title. E.g., J.A. 18–20, 
30

23, 26. The complaints allege the names of the sham entities, the broker or loan officer 

connected to each sham entity, and the dates Genuine Title allegedly funneled kickback 

payments through the entities. The use of sham entities to conceal the source and flow of 

the kickback payments constitutes an affirmative act of concealment. Reiser v. 

Residential Funding Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 940, 947 (S.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that 

alleged use of “sham entity . . . to funnel secret kickbacks” constituted an affirmative act 

of concealment in RESPA case), rev’d in part on other grounds by 380 F.3d 1027 (7th 

Cir. 2004); cf. United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 490 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The creation 

and use of sham businesses is highly relevant to the proof of concealment money 

laundering.”).

The complaints further allege that, after regulators began investigating the 

kickback scheme, the Lenders’ brokers and loan officers entered into “sham” Title 

Services Agreements and “back-dated” those agreements to further disguise the kickback 

scheme. J.A. 16–17. As with the Lenders’ alleged use of sham business entities, the 

alleged creation of sham business agreements—such as the “back-dated” agreements at 

issue here—constituted an affirmative act of concealment. See GolTV, Inc. v. Fox Sports 

Latin Am., Ltd., No. 16-cv-24431, 2018 WL 1393790, at *23 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018); cf. 

State of N.Y. v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1083 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The 

passing off of a sham article as one that is genuine is an inherently self-concealing 

fraud.”).

Finally, Plaintiffs allege the Lenders concealed their kickback scheme by not 

reporting the payments on Plaintiffs’ required HUD-1 Settlement Statements, 
31

notwithstanding that governing regulations required reporting such payments. As the 

Third Circuit has recognized, omitting required information from the HUD-1 Settlement 

Statement form can constitute an affirmative act of concealment for purposes of the 

fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine. See In re Comm. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending 

Practics Lit., 795 F.3d 380, 403 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[I]nclusion of misleading information in 

a HUD-1 can constitute an independent act of concealment.”). 

When taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss—as we must—these are 

adequate factual allegations of acts of concealment. Notably, the district court in 

Fangman reached exactly that conclusion when it considered substantively 

indistinguishable factual allegations. See Fangman, 2016 WL 6600509, at *6.

Having concluded that Plaintiffs satisfied their burden to allege affirmative acts of 

concealment, the remaining question is whether Plaintiffs exercised due diligence to 

uncover the facts supporting their claims and yet failed to uncover such facts within the 

limitations period. See Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 122. Generally, whether a plaintiff 

exercised due diligence is a jury issue not amenable to resolution on the pleadings or at 

summary judgment. See, e.g., TCF Nat. Bank v. Market Intelligence, Inc., 812 F.3d 701, 

711 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Generally, fraudulent concealment and a plaintiff’s due diligence 

are questions of fact unsuited for summary judgment.” (internal quotation omitted)); 

Morton’s Market, Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 1999)

(“[T]he issue of when a plaintiff in the exercise of due diligence should have known of 

the basis of his claims is not an appropriate question for summary judgment.”); Carrier 

Corp., 673 F.3d at 448–49 (declining to dismiss on the pleadings fraudulent concealment 
32

claim on lack of diligence grounds); see also Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 

F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause the period of limitations is an affirmative 

defense it is rarely a good reason to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”). 

Although the district court did not decide whether Plaintiffs’ complaints 

sufficiently alleged diligence, see Edmondson, 2018 WL 582514, at *6, the Lenders 

principally argue that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the diligence requirement because 

Plaintiffs conceded that they did not engage in any inquiry during the limitations period. 

But this Court long has held that “it is possible for a plaintiff to satisfy [the due diligence 

requirement] without demonstrating that it engaged in any specific inquiry.” Marlinton, 

71 F.3d at 128. “If the plaintiff establishes that it was not (and should not have been) 

aware of facts that should have excited further inquiry on its part”—if the plaintiff was 

not on inquiry notice—“then there is nothing to provoke inquiry.” Id.6

 

As explained above, Marlinton continues to set forth this Court’s controlling test 

for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to tolling based on fraudulent concealment. 

See supra Part II.B. In accordance with Marlinton, Plaintiffs allege that they “did not and 

could not have known about the Kickback Scheme, due to Genuine Title and [the 

 6 By contrast, if a plaintiff is “aware of facts that should have excited further 

inquiry,” then, so long as the plaintiff engages in “reasonable further inquiry,” the 

limitations period is tolled—and therefore does not begin to run—until such an inquiry 

would have revealed sufficient facts for the plaintiff to state a claim that would survive a 

motion to dismiss. Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 128; see also SD3, 888 F.3d at 112 (holding

that a plaintiff is on notice when it is aware (or should have been aware) of “enough 

factual information from which [the plaintiff] could plead their cause of action for Rule 

12(b)(6) purposes”). 
33

Lenders’] efforts to conceal the kickbacks from Plaintiff, Class Members, and regulators, 

until contacted by . . . counsel on or about April 20, 2016.” J.A. 18. Likewise, Plaintiffs 

further allege that “[n]o reasonable borrower diligence or investigation would have 

uncovered the fact, mechanics, and extent of this illegal kickback scheme until contacted 

by counsel.” J.A. 185–86.

Nevertheless, the Lenders argue that several pieces of public information should 

have “excited further inquiry” by Plaintiffs, Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 128—private litigation, 

including Fangman, related to Genuine Title’s RESPA violations; the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau’s and Maryland Attorney General’s enforcement actions 

against Genuine Title, Wells Fargo, and J.P. Morgan; and media coverage of those 

enforcement actions. Given that the adequacy of a plaintiff’s diligence is generally not 

amenable to resolution on the pleadings, we conclude that none of these pieces of 

information precluded Plaintiffs’ from meeting their pleading stage burden as to the 

diligence element of the fraudulent concealment test. 

To be sure, the filing of similar lawsuits against the same defendant “may in some 

circumstances suffice to give notice” of possible claims. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust 

Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1171 (5th Cir. 1979). In other circumstances, however, “the mere 

availability of open and readily accessible public records”—such as legal filings—“may 

not suffice by itself to defeat a fraudulent-concealment claim,” particularly if a plaintiff 

lacks “ample reason to look at these records.” Ruth v. Unifund CCR Ptrs., 604 F.3d 908, 

911 (6th Cir. 2010).
34

Regarding Fangman in particular, only two of the Lenders (Eagle Bank and Bank 

of America) were ever parties to that litigation. And Eagle Bank and Bank of America 

were dismissed from the Fangman litigation in its early stages. See J. v. Genuine Title, 

LLC, 2015 WL 8315704, at *1. Indeed, the Fangman plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew 

their claims against Bank of America before the court ruled on Bank of America’s motion 

to dismiss. Id. at *1 n.6. It is difficult to imagine that Plaintiffs in this action could have 

accessed—or did access—the relevant filings, orders, and opinions in Fangman, all of 

which were unpublished and accessible only through a LexisNexis, WestLaw, or a 

PACER account. And the motion to dismiss record before this Court includes no 

evidence that any aspect of the Fangman proceedings was publicized, let alone 

publicized in a media outlet regularly consulted by a Plaintiff, meaning that this record is 

devoid of any “reason [for a Plaintiff] to look at these records.” Ruth, 604 F.3d at 911. 

In the absence of such information, we decline to hold the Fangman litigation, as a 

matter of law, placed Plaintiffs on inquiry notice. Put simply, the fraudulent concealment 

doctrine requires reasonable diligence; it does not necessarily hold individual borrowers 

to the diligence standard of combing court filings in potentially related cases, particularly 

when the borrower has no reason to be aware of the related cases. Additionally, to the 

extent any Plaintiff was, or should have been aware, that Eagle Bank and Bank of 

America were parties to the Fangman litigation, the two Lenders’ early dismissal may 

have led that Plaintiff to reasonably believe that Eagle Bank and Bank of America were 

not involved in the alleged wrongdoing. 
35

Unlike with the Fangman litigation, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 

and Maryland Attorney General’s enforcement actions against Genuine Title, Wells 

Fargo, and J.P. Morgan were publicized, both through agency press releases and in

newspaper articles in the Baltimore Sun and the Washington Post (albeit, on pages 12A 

and A14 of those papers, respectively). But whereas two of the Lenders were (briefly) 

party to the Fangman proceedings, none of the Lenders in this case were parties to the 

federal and state enforcement proceedings, nor were any of the Lenders mentioned in the 

newspaper articles discussing those enforcement proceedings. “[N]otice of one wrong by 

a defendant” does not necessarily “trigger[] a duty for potential plaintiffs to investigate 

all other potential wrongs the defendant might be committing.” Morton’s Market, 198 

F.3d at 834. Just because Genuine Title engaged in an illegal kickback scheme with 

brokers and loan officers employed by certain lenders does not establish, for purposes of 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), that a reasonable borrower would have 

suspected that Genuine Title provided such kickbacks to brokers and loan officers 

employed by other lenders. See In re Cmty. Bank, 795 F. 3d at 404 (“Due diligence does 

not mean that borrowers must presume their bank is lying or dissembling and therefore 

that further investigation is needed.”).

More significantly, the limited record before this Court is devoid of evidence 

suggesting—much less proving—that any Plaintiff had access to, or read, the press 

releases or the newspaper articles that the Lenders maintain placed Plaintiffs on inquiry 

notice. The absence of such evidence sets this case apart from the cases relied on by the 

Lenders in which a court found publicly available information placed a plaintiff on 
36

inquiry notice. For instance, in Pomeroy v. Schlegel Corp., 780 F. Supp. 980 (W.D.N.Y. 

1991), the plaintiff sought relief from the limitations period in a securities fraud case 

based on fraudulent concealment, id. at 983. Following discovery, the defendant moved 

for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff was on inquiry notice—but failed to 

engage in a reasonable investigation—based on a newspaper article discussing an earlierfiled lawsuit alleging the same fraud. Id. at 981. The district court held that, under the 

undisputed facts, the plaintiff was on inquiry notice because the plaintiff admitted during 

his deposition that he read the specific newspaper article discussing the related lawsuit. 

Id. at 983 (“Mr. Pomeroy had inquiry notice of Schlegel’s alleged fraudulent concealment 

when he read about the Hickman lawsuit.”). 

Likewise, in J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc.,

76 F.3d 1245 (1st Cir. 1996), the plaintiff employee benefit plan sought to invoke 

fraudulent concealment to avoid the limitations period in a fraud and breach of fiduciary 

duty case against the investment manager for a retirement plan, id. at 1255–56. The 

plaintiff alleged the investment manager made “material oral and written 

misrepresentations regarding the value and safety of the investments, the amount of profit 

generated by the trades, and the amounts of commissions charged.” Id. at 1256. The 

First Circuit held that the district court properly awarded summary judgment to the 

investment manager on limitations grounds, holding that the undisputed evidence 

established that the plaintiff received several investment prospectuses from the 

investment manager that, coupled with the investment manager’s public statements,
37

provided the plaintiff with “sufficient storm warnings of the alleged misrepresentations 

and the possibility of fraud” to place the plaintiff on inquiry notice. Id. 

Similarly, in Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp., 814 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2016), the 

plaintiff sought relief from the limitations period based on fraudulent concealment in a 

RESPA case alleging that the defendant bank used a reinsurance program that allegedly 

constituted an unlawful fee-splitting agreement, id. at 161. The Third Circuit held that 

the district court properly awarded the defendant summary judgment on limitations 

grounds. Id. at 158. The plaintiffs could not rely on fraudulent concealment, the court 

reasoned, because the plaintiffs received and signed documents during the closing of their 

mortgages that disclosed and explained the allegedly unlawful reinsurance arrangement, 

yet “took no steps to investigate” whether the arrangement violated RESPA. Id. at 161–

62; see also Egerer v. Woodland Realty, Inc., 556 F.3d 415, 422 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting 

a request for tolling based on fraudulent concealment in a RESPA case when a document 

signed by the plaintiffs at closing disclosed the alleged kickback).

Whereas the summary judgment record in Pomeroy, J. Geils Band, and 

Cunningham established that the plaintiff read or received the specific article or 

document that placed the plaintiff on inquiry notice, here the record is devoid of any 

evidence that any Plaintiff read, or even received, the press releases or newspaper articles 
38

that the Lenders claim placed Plaintiffs on inquiry notice. Accordingly, at this early stage 

of the proceedings, Pomeroy, J. Geils Band, and Cunningham are inapposite.7

In rejecting the Lenders’ assertion that Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice based on 

the state and federal enforcement actions and media coverage of those actions, we also 

find it significant that several of the decisions relied on by the Lenders for the proposition 

that publicly available information can place a plaintiff on inquiry notice involved 

plaintiffs that were sophisticated business entities, as opposed to consumers. For 

example, Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1975), 

involved an antitrust action by a defunct tire manufacturer, Dayco, that alleged it was 

forced out of the market as a result of a price-fixing scheme orchestrated by two other tire 

manufacturers, id. at 390. The Sixth Circuit held that Dayco could not obtain relief from 

the limitations period based on fraudulent concealment because congressional hearings 

and a Federal Trade Commission suit had described some of the violations alleged in 

Dayco’s complaint more than a decade before Dayco filed suit. Id. at 394. Those 

 7 As part of its analysis of Menominee’s (inapplicable) “extraordinary 

circumstances” element, the district court relied heavily on the fact that “[i]n June 2015, 

Plaintiff[s’] counsel had access to Genuine Title’s buyers’ names, addresses, telephone 

numbers, property addresses, settlement dates, lender and in some cases mortgage broker 

information.” Edmondson, 2018 WL 582514, at *6. But counsel did not contact 

Plaintiffs to inform them of their potential claims—and become Plaintiffs’ counsel—until 

a year later. The notice component of Marlinton’s three-prong test focus on the 

information known to the plaintiff, not the plaintiff’s counsel. To be sure, once a plaintiff 

hires counsel to investigate a claim, it may be appropriate to impute the counsel’s 

knowledge to the plaintiff. But until that point, a plaintiff cannot be charged with the 

knowledge of his yet-to-be-retained counsel. We know of no opinion holding otherwise, 

nor have the Lenders identified any such opinion.
39

proceedings “should have aroused Dayco’s suspicions, and its failure to investigate 

further at that time was not the exercise of due diligence required in order to employ the 

fraudulent concealment doctrine.” Id. Likewise, the First Circuit held that the 

investment prospectuses placed the plaintiff employee benefit plan on inquiry notice of 

its fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the defendant investment manager. 

See J. Geils Band, 76 F.3d at 1256–57. 

In short, “[i]nquiry notice . . . charges a person to investigate when the information 

at hand would have prompted a reasonable person to do so.” Go Computer, 508 F.3d at 

178 (emphasis added). Thus, the Sixth Circuit in Dayco Corp. held that one should 

expect a reasonable tire manufacturer to be aware of enforcement actions and 

congressional investigations into the tire manufacturer’s competitors, and the First Circuit 

in J. Geils Band held that one should expect a reasonable employee benefit plan to 

review the investment prospectuses it receives from its investment manager. 

But what constitutes reasonable conduct for one type of plaintiff may not 

constitute reasonable conduct for another type of plaintiff. See Morton’s Market, 198 

F.3d at 832. Such is particularly true in determining whether one would expect a 

reasonable residential mortgage borrower to keep abreast of all enforcement actions 

related to the mortgage lending and title services industries. We believe that issue should 

be decided by the finder of fact and is not amenable to resolution on the pleadings or at 

summary judgment. 
40

* * * * *

In sum, Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the Lenders engaged in affirmative acts 

of concealment. And based upon the limited record before this Court, we cannot 

conclude as a matter of law that these Plaintiffs unreasonably failed to discover or 

investigate the basis of their claims within the limitations period. 

III.

For the reasons stated above, the district court erred in holding that the twoelement test applied in Menominee abrogated this Court’s long-standing three-element 

test for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief from a limitations period based 

on the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine. Applying the proper test, we hold that 

Plaintiffs’ allegations as to fraudulent concealment are sufficient to withstand the 

Lenders’ motions to dismiss.8

 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case for 

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

 8 Defendant Bank of America further argues that the complaint against it should be 

dismissed because the plaintiffs “failed to adequately plead valid claims under RESPA.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 60. The district court did not address this argument in its motion-todismiss opinion, and, therefore, we decline to exercise our discretion to address it in the 

first instance.