SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0982-17T1

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST

COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR GSAMP 

TRUST 2006-FM1 MORTGAGE PASSTHROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES

2006-FM1,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STEVEN SCHEFERS and DENIELLE

SCHEFERS,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendant.

_______________________________________

Submitted September 18, 2018 - Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and Firko.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No. F015174-16.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 26, 2018
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Steven H. Schefers1, appellant pro se and attorney for 

Denielle Schefers.

Parker, McCay PA, attorneys for respondent (Gene 

Mariano, of counsel; Stacy L. Moore, Jr., on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for GSAMP 

Trust 2006-FM1 (Bank), initiated this action against defendants, Steven and 

Denielle Schefers, seeking to foreclose on a mortgage issued in connection with 

a residential loan. Defendants now appeal the October 28, 2016 order striking 

their answer, defenses and counterclaims and denying their cross-motion to 

compel discovery, the December 16, 2016 order denying their motion for 

reconsideration, and the September 20, 2017 final judgment of foreclosure.

2

 

Having reviewed the parties' arguments in light of the record and applicable 

principles of law, we affirm.

I.

We briefly summarize the relevant facts granting all reasonable inferences 

to defendants. R. 4:6-2(e). On December 14, 2005, Steven executed a note in 

 

1 Mr. Schefers is an attorney.

2 The trial court issued a Statement of Reasons/Amplification of Prior Opinion 

on November 14, 2017, pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b).
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the amount of $340,000 to FGC Commercial Mortgage Finance (FGC). The 

same day, Steven and Denielle executed a residential mortgage as security for 

the note to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (MERS) as nominee 

for FGC. On March 24, 2008, MERS assigned the mortgage to the Bank. A 

loan modification agreement was signed by defendants on October 17, 2008, and 

duly recorded on January 20, 2009. Defendants failed to make their scheduled 

payments beginning in October 2015.

When the Bank filed its foreclosure complaint in the Chancery Division 

on May 31, 2016, it possessed both the note and mortgage. An answer was filed 

asserting boilerplate defenses and counterclaims that lacked specificity and did 

not challenge the Bank's prima facie right to foreclose. Voluminous discovery, 

including depositions of Bank representatives, was sought by defendants that

Judge Francis R. Hodgson found would not provide any "new" information or 

shed any light on their "compliance with foreclosure requirements." 

Consequently, on October 25, 2016, the judge granted plaintiff's motion to strike 

defendants' answer and affirmative defenses, dismissed the counterclaims, 

denied defendants' motion for additional discovery, and remanded the case to 

the Office of Foreclosure to proceed as uncontested. On September 20, 2017, a 

final judgment of foreclosure was entered against defendants in the amount of 
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$403,933.26 following rejection of defendants' opposition. Their motion for 

reconsideration was denied.

II.

On appeal, defendants challenge the Chancery Division orders denying 

their cross-motion to compel discovery and granting the Bank's motion to 

dismiss, as well as the final judgment of foreclosure.

We begin our analysis by addressing the order denying defendants' crossmotion to compel. Defendants argue that the judge abused his discretion by 

failing to order discovery. We disagree.

As noted by the judge:

Plaintiff has demonstrated the validity of the [n]ote and 

[m]ortgage and its contractual right to accelerate the 

principal balance in the event of the borrower's default. 

Defendants do not dispute executing the loan 

documents and defaulting on the loan, accordingly, the 

court is satisfied that plaintiff has established its right 

to foreclose on the subject property. 

Defendants failed to allege any facts establishing that the note and 

mortgage are invalid. The general denials asserted in their answer lacked detail 

and specificity. The judge found that the Bank certified as to notice and properly 

served the Notice of Intent (NOI). Hence, defendants do not articulate how 

additional documents or depositions would clarify any factual or legal issues in 
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this case. "A defendant should not be allowed to 'transform the discovery 

process into an unfocused, haphazard search for evidence.'" State v. Gilchrist, 

381 N.J. Super. 138, 147 (App. Div. 2005). Absent specific references to 

documents or anticipated testimony that are integral to resolving this foreclosure 

action, we discern no reason to overturn the judge's decision and find no abuse 

of discretion as to his denial of the cross-motion to compel.

III.

Next, we address the Bank's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaims. 

In accordance with Rule 4:6-2(e), when reviewing a litigant's pleading to 

determine the adequacy of the pleaded claims, the appropriate test is a liberal one. 

Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citation 

omitted). As the Supreme Court instructed, the review must begin by determining 

"whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts." Ibid. (quoting Velantzas v. 

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). The Court further explained that 

courts must review pleadings "in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the 

fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of 

claim . . . ." Ibid. (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 

244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). The review of the allegations should take "a generous 

and hospitable approach," and afford a litigant every "reasonable inference" from 
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the alleged facts. Ibid. "Obviously, if the [counterclaims] [state] no basis for relief 

and discovery would not provide one, dismissal is the appropriate remedy." Banco 

Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166 (2005).

Proof of execution, recording, and non-payment of a mortgage is 

sufficient to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure. Thorpe v. Floremoore 

Corp., 20 N.J. Super. 34, 37 (App. Div. 1952). Defendants do not dispute the 

mortgage execution, recordation, or default in this case. Rather, they allege 

violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 

1692(a)(6), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). 

They also contend that they are entitled to another loan modification. We 

disagree.

In a cogent and comprehensive opinion, the judge correctly concluded that 

the FDCPA does not apply to this case because plaintiff is attempting "to collect 

its own debt" as holder of the note and mortgage as opposed to another entity. 

Furthermore, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to FDPCA violations 

expired on December 14, 2006. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The judge aptly 

determined that defendants' allegations of New Jersey Fair Foreclosure Act 

violations were unfounded because the Bank provided certified copies of the 

NOIs to defendants, in writing, by certified and regular mail, to their last known 
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address, and to their Manahawkin residence, which is the subject of the 

foreclosure, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(b). In her certification, 

Sarah Lee Stonehocker certified that she is employed by Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., the servicing agent for the Bank. She also certified that she personally 

reviewed the relevant business records, which were created at or near the time 

of the events in question. With only assertions of possible misdoings by Ms. 

Stonehocker presented to the court, and no evidence rebutting her certification, 

the judge appropriately relied upon same in making his decision.

IV.

In their answer, defendants enumerated sixteen affirmative defenses as 

follows:

1. Failure to state a claim;

2. Any liabilities already satisfied;

3. Waiver;

4. Failure to mitigate damages;

5. Estoppel;

6. Unclean hands;

7. Statute of limitations;

8. Unjust enrichment;
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9. Laches;

10. Accord and satisfaction;

11. Lack of service of process;

12. Violation of unnamed federal, state, and local laws;

13. Violation of the Fair Foreclosure Act;

14. Defense related to Hurricane Sandy;

15. Defective service of process; and

16. Wrongful foreclosure.

After conducting a painstakingly detailed analysis of each defense, the 

judge appropriately relied upon Rule 4:6-5 in striking all of the defenses. "It is 

well recognized that, where the answer and any proffered defenses fail to 

challenge the essential elements of the mortgagee's right to foreclose, and fail to 

interpose a validly recognized defense, the mortgagee is entitled to a final 

judgment of foreclosure." Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Currie, 284 N.J. Super. 

571, 574-75 (Ch. Div. 1995) (citations omitted).

V.

Lastly, we address the final judgment of foreclosure. Defendants argue 

that they presented "proof of the disputed claims" in response to the Certification 

of Amount Due filed by the Bank. In response to their challenge to the Bank's 
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calculation of advancement of homeowner's insurance premiums, real estate 

taxes, and late charges, the judge found that "defendant[s] [have] not stated with 

specificity any basis to dispute plaintiff's calculation . . . [therefore] their 

opposition can be characterized as general and unsupported." The proofs 

showed defendants were "provided a credit for hazard insurance." We therefore

disagree with defendants and find no numerical discrepancies in the Bank's 

proofs that warrant overturning the final judgment.

To the extent not addressed, defendants' other arguments lack sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.