*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders

and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions

of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 5/6/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY COX,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

RAP-A-LOT RECORDS, also known as

Scarface, 

Defendant -Appellee . 

 

No. 95-2236

(Dist. of New Mexico)

(D.C. No. CIV-95-1159-JC)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.
2

Pro se plaintiff Gregory Cox proceeding in forma pauperis appeals the dismissal of

his complaint alleging causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). 

Specifically, Cox alleged in his complaint that he has been targeted by defendants, an

undercover, gang-related, rap music organization, whose purpose is to cause young

people and fans to carry out violence against disabled people. Certain unnamed, nondefendant individuals, allegedly reacting to lyrics of a gangster rap song, threw Cox to the

ground from his wheelchair causing him physical injuries. According to Cox, the

underlying conduct by defendants (i.e., placing violent lyrics in rap music) was

premeditated and part of a conspiracy to commit assault, battery, and murder.

The district court, acting on its own motion, dismissed the complaint with

prejudice. The district court noted that Cox’s section 1983 claim failed because he had

specifically stated that the defendants were not acting under color of state law. As to

Cox’s claim under section 1985(3), the district court found that it was faulty on two

grounds: (1) the handicapped are not a class entitled to protection under section 1985(3);

and (2) the complaint failed to allege with sufficient specificity facts tending to show

agreement and concerted action. 

We review the sufficiency of a complaint de novo, upholding a dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only when it is shown that the

plaintiff failed to plead facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief. Roman v.
3

Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 543 (10th Cir. 1995). As a pro se litigant, we construe

Cox’s complaint liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

We turn first to Cox’s section 1983 claim. A civil rights plaintiff proceeding under

section 1983 must allege and prove that “(a) some person had deprived him of a federally

protected right, and (b) the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of

state law.” Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1991). Unless the complaint

alleges both elements, it does not state a claim under section 1983. Here, Cox’s

complaint specifically states that the defendants were not acting under the color of state

law. Accordingly, the district court acted properly when it dismissed the complaint for

failure to state a claim.

Having concluded that Cox’s complaint fails to state a claim under section 1983,

we move on to consider whether it states a claim under section 1985(3). Properly pleaded

allegations that a plaintiff is a member of a statutorily protected class, and that

conspiratorial actions taken by defendants stem from the plaintiff’s membership in the

class, may support a claim under section 1985(3). Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637

F.2d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 1980). Here, however, Cox has utterly failed to allege any facts

tending to show agreement or concerted action. See Sooner Prods. Co. v. McBride, 708

F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that under section 1983 “mere conclusory

allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must

specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action”). Because
4

Cox alleged no facts to support his conspiracy claim, the district court properly dismissed

the complaint. See Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although a court should construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, “the

court should not assume the role of advocate, and should dismiss claims which are

supported only by vague and conclusory allegations”).

The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue

forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge