Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General

TSA's Security Screening Procedures 

for Employees at Orlando International 

Airport and the Feasibility 

of 

100 Percent Employee Screening 

(Revised for Public Disclosure) 

(Redacted)

OIG-09-05 October 2008
 

 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

October 28, 2008

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

In response to a congressional request from U.S. Representative Bennie G. Thompson, 

Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, and Representative Ric 

Keller, our report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Transportation Security 

Administration’s oversight of security-screening procedures for airport employees with 

access to secure areas of an airport. It is based on interviews with employees and 

officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of 

applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is 

our hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical 

operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the 

preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 


Inspector General 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 


Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 

Results of Review ................................................................................................................8


 Security Breach at the Orlando Airport Highlights the Need for Additional TSA 


 Situational Awareness and Management Oversight Capabilities ...............................9 


 TSA Needs to Improve its Initial Situational Awareness Protocols.............................14 


Recommendations.........................................................................................................17


 Management Comments and OIG Analysis .................................................................17 


 TSA Needs Changes to Improve Security and Its Regulatory Oversight

 of Non-TSA Airport Employees...............................................................................19 


Recommendations.........................................................................................................23


 Management Comments and OIG Analysis .................................................................23 


 100 Percent Airport Employee Screenings Raises Feasibility Issues...........................25 


 Vulnerabilities Would Persist With 100 Percent Airport Employee Screenings..........29 


 Achieving an Integrated, DHS-Wide Perspective on Security at 

Airports Is Needed ....................................................................................................32


 Recommendations.........................................................................................................34


 Management Comments and OIG Analysis .................................................................34 


Conclusion ....................................................................................................................35
 
Appendixes

 Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology..........................................................36 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ..........................................38 


Appendix C: TSA’s List of Disqualifying Criminal Offenses


 (49 CFR § 1542.209 (d))....................................................................46 


Appendix D: Airport Layout.........................................................................................47 


Appendix E: Major Contributors to this Report ...........................................................51 


Appendix F: Report Distribution ..................................................................................52 


Abbreviations 

ADASP Aviation Direct Access Screening Program
 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 


FAM Federal Air Marshal 


MCO Orlando International Airport 


OIG Office of Inspector General 


SIDA Secure Identification Display Area 


SJU Luis Munoz Marin International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico 


TSA Transportation Security Administration 


VIPR Visible Inter-Modal Protection and Response 

 

OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

At the request of Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the 

House Committee on Homeland Security, and Representative Ric Keller, 

we reviewed the events surrounding a March 5, 2007, security breach at 

the Orlando International Airport in Florida. The breach involved two 

Comair Airline employees who smuggled 14 firearms and 8 pounds of 

marijuana onboard a Delta Airlines commercial airplane bound for San 

Juan, Puerto Rico. Specifically, we assessed (1) the actions, events, and 

communication surrounding the incident; (2) the Transportation Security 

Administration’s current oversight of airport employees; and (3) the 

feasibility of 100% airport employee screening for individuals accessing 

an aircraft or the secure areas of an airport. 

The Transportation Security Administration has made improvements to 

address vulnerabilities associated with the “insider threat” highlighted by 

the March 5, 2007, incident. These improvements include the widespread 

implementation of two random and deterrent-based screening programs: 

the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program and the Visible Intermodal 

Protection and Response Program. In addition, the Transportation 

Security Administration started conducting Security Threat Assessments 

of airport employees to assess whether workers have ties to terrorism or 

are in violation of immigration and admissibility laws. 

Even with these improvements, the Orlando incident revealed the need for 

additional changes. Specifically, the Transportation Security 

Administration needs improvements in its ability to obtain and maintain 

situational awareness of incidents, as well as updating its regulatory 

framework that governs airport employee conduct. These changes are 

necessary before a decision is made about implementing 100% employee 

screening. 

We are making six recommendations to assist the Transportation Security 

Administration in improving the overall security posture at airports. In 

response to our report, the Transportation Security Administration has 

proposed plans and actions that, once implemented, will reduce a number 

of the deficiencies we identified. The Transportation Security 

Administration concurred with all six recommendations. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 1 
 

Background 

On March 5, 2007, two Comair Airline employees from Orlando 

International Airport (MCO) in Florida successfully smuggled 14 firearms 

and 8 pounds of marijuana aboard Delta Airlines Flight #933 bound for 

Luis Munoz Marin International Airport (SJU) in San Juan, Puerto Rico. 

Both individuals were later arrested; one in Puerto Rico upon the flight’s 

arrival, and one in Orlando the following day. 

On March 8, 2007, Representative Ric Keller requested that we review the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) role in the events 

surrounding this incident, to determine whether the absence of specific 

screening policies for airport employees facilitated this security breach. 

On March 26, 2007, Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of 

the House Committee on Homeland Security, contacted us with a similar 

request. After considering both requests, we agreed to review the 

incident, as well as assess the security-screening procedures for non-TSA 

employees working at federalized airports nationwide. 

During subsequent discussions with congressional staff, we agreed to 

focus on three questions: 

�	 Did TSA policies cause MCO to be susceptible to security breaches, 

particularly involving the introduction of prohibited items into any 

secure areas of the airport? 

� What is the overall effectiveness of TSA’s oversight of airport 

employees? 

�	 What is the feasibility of implementing 100% airport employee 

screening for individuals accessing an aircraft or the secure areas of an 

airport? 

Currently, Congress is pursuing the 100% airport employee screening 

issue. In March 2007, H.R. 1413 was introduced by Representative Nita 

Lowey. This bill calls for TSA to implement a pilot program to screen all 

airport workers with unescorted access privileges to secure areas at seven 

airports. In April 2007, a similar bill, S. 1095, was introduced by Senator 

Charles Schumer. This bill calls for TSA to screen all individuals who 

have access to the secure areas of airports. This would include airport 

employees, commercial airline carrier employees, contractors, and 

vendors. Neither bill was enacted during our fieldwork. 

On December, 26, 2007, the President signed the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2008, which mandates TSA evaluate 100% 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 2 
 

employee screening at three airports and assess alternative employee 

screening measures at four other airports. Congress provided TSA $15 

million for this pilot program, which was scheduled to run from May 2008 

through July 2008. 

The three airports participating in the 100% employee screening pilot 

program were Boston Logan International Airport in Massachusetts, 

Craven Regional Airport in North Carolina, and Jacksonville International 

Airport in Florida. The four airports piloting alternative screening 

measures were Denver International Airport in Colorado, Kansas City 

International Airport in Missouri, Mahlon Sweet Field Airport and 

Southwest Oregon Regional Airport in Eugene and North Bend, Oregon 

respectively. 

TSA’s Current Oversight and Screening of Non-TSA Airport 

Employees 

TSA has more than 1,200 Transportation Security Inspectors who conduct 

oversight by inspecting airport, airline, and cargo security operations for 

compliance with applicable regulations. These inspections are scheduled, 

conducted randomly, and may include one or all of the security elements 

required by TSA. 

TSA’s oversight of non-TSA airport employees covers a number of 

different areas, including an airport’s security program, its badging 

process, and “challenge” program. Since March 2007, TSA has also 

developed three additional security programs that focus on airport 

employee screening. The Aviation Direct Access Screening Program 

(ADASP) is a random and deterrence-based program; and the Visible 

Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) Program, is a TSA response 

capability that may be random as a deterrent, or may be targeted. The 

third program is TSA’s Security Threat Assessment vetting. 

Airport Security Programs and Related Employee 

Oversight Elements 

Title 49 USC 1542; Airport Security, requires that each airport 

serving domestic and foreign commercial air carriers have an 

airport security program. This program must provide for the safety 

and security of persons and property against acts of criminal 

violence, aircraft piracy, and the introduction of unauthorized 

weapons, explosives, or incendiaries onto an aircraft.1 Of the 21 

1

 49 CFR § 1542.101. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 3 
 

elements required of all airport security plans, 3 directly relate to 

the oversight of airport employees the certification of access 

control systems, criminal history records checks, and the use of 

personnel identification systems.2 

Certification of Access Control Systems 

An airport’s access control system is required to ensure that only 

those individuals authorized to have unescorted access into the 

secured areas are able to gain entry. For those not authorized 

unescorted access, the airport operator must also establish 

procedures for escorting individuals in secured areas of the airport. 

These requirements ensure escorted individuals are continuously 

accompanied or closely monitored while in secured areas.3 

An access control system must limit access from the public area to 

the secure area of an airport. The public areas are the portions of 

an airport such as parking facilities, airline ticketing, and baggage 

claim, where access control or screening is not required. The 

airport operations area includes aircraft movement areas, aircraft 

parking areas, loading ramps, and safety areas for use by aircraft. 

The secure area is the portion of an airport as specified in the 

Airport Security Plan, where aircraft operators and their 

contractors enplane and deplane passengers and sort and load 

baggage. Within the secure area is the sterile area, also a portion 

of an airport specified in the Airport Security Plan, where 

individuals have access to boarding aircraft and their property must 

be screened prior to entering. At many airports, the entire secure 

area is also defined as a sterile area. Figure 1 illustrates the 

relationship between the airport operating areas. 

2

 49 CFR § 1542.103. 

3

 49 CFR § 1542.211. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 4 
 

Figure 1: Airport Operations Area Security Distinctions 

Criminal History Records Check and Security Threat Assessment 

To become eligible for unescorted access into the secured area, an 

individual must be subjected to a fingerprint-based criminal history 

records check and the Security Threat Assessment.4 For the 

criminal history records check, TSA works with the American 

Association of Airport Executives, which is responsible for 

collecting this information from airports and providing it to TSA. 

TSA then forwards this information to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation for processing, and the bureau posts the results to a 

secure, password-protected website. Airport and airline personnel 

security officers can then review the information and determine 

whether an individual can be granted access based on a list of 

disqualifying criminal offenses. The results are also provided to 

TSA. A full list of the disqualifying crimes is in Appendix C. 

TSA also determined that, in addition to a criminal history records 

check, there was a need to have additional threat information 

regarding individuals who applied for or are granted unescorted 

access at airports. Effective October 1, 2007, TSA mandated that 

all airport employees would need a TSA-adjudicated Security 

Threat Assessment before airport operators could issue any type of 

personnel identification media. This identification, also known as 

a Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge, is frequently 

4

 49 CFR § 1542.209. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 5 
 

 

used for unescorted access to the secure areas of an airport.5 The 

Security Threat Assessment is a TSA-initiated, name-based check 

that processes individual names through criminal, terrorist, 

immigration, and admissibility-related databases. Some of the 

databases used in conducting the Security Threat Assessment 

include: 

�	 The Terrorist Screening Database, which contains 

information about known or suspected terrorists; 

�	 The No-Fly List, which contains the names of people who 

are not permitted to board a commercial aircraft for travel 

in the United States; and 

�	 The Selectee List, which is a security measure in the United 

States that selects passengers for additional screening or 

secondary inspections. 

TSA officials said it conducts Security Threat Assessments on all 

new airport employees and vets current employees on a perpetual 

basis. The perpetual vetting will allow for a comparison of new 

threat information against the names of existing airport employees 

to account for any derogatory developments. 

Use of Personnel Identification Systems 

To use an access control system, an individual must successfully 

complete the criminal history records check and the Security 

Threat Assessment, and obtain a SIDA badge for unescorted access 

to the secure areas of an airport. 

Guidelines for SIDA badge systems are described in 49 CFR 

1542.211. A SIDA badge must convey a full-face image, full 

name, employer, and identification number of the individual to 

whom it is issued. The badge must also be displayed on the 

outermost garment above the waist level. There must also be 

procedures to ensure accountability of the badges, including 

retrieving expired badges, reporting lost or stolen badges, and 

securing unissued badge stock and supplies. 

The personnel media system must be audited at least once a year to 

ensure the integrity and accountability of all identification media. 

5

 Security Directive, SD 1542-04-08E, Security Threat Assessment and Reporting Requirements for 

Individuals with Any Form of Airport Personnel Identification Media. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 6 
 

Also, as specified in the airport security program pursuant to 

TSA’s Complete Airport Security Program Guide, an airport is 

required to revalidate or reissue SIDA badges when 5% of all 

issued, unexpired, identification media are lost, stolen, or 

otherwise unaccounted.6 When it is determined that 5% of the 

SIDA badges are unaccounted, the airport must issue new 

identification media to all authorized persons or revalidate its 

current SIDA badges. The new or revalidated SIDA badges must 

be visually distinct from the media being replaced. 

In addition, the air carriers and airport tenants who receive 

identification media must provide immediate notification to the 

airport operator when an individual’s access authority is revoked, 

limited, or the SIDA badge is lost or stolen. When an individual is 

terminated, the access media must be retrieved and returned to the 

airport operator. 

Finally, each airport is also required to establish and implement a 

challenge program.7

 This program requires each SIDA badge 

holder to confront any individual who has accessed the secured 

areas and is not displaying a SIDA badge that authorizes the 

individual to be present in the area. 

Additional TSA Security Measures 

for Airport Employee Oversight 

TSA also has developed two additional security programs that 

focus on airport employee screening. On March 9, 2007, TSA 

began conducting ADASP operations nationally, on a mandatory 

basis. This program was designed to conduct random screening 

operations inside the secure area in an airport, thus providing an 

additional layer of security at airports. Under this program, 

Transportation Security Officers can screen TSA, airline and 

airport employees, as well as passengers and their accessible 

property. These officers also can inspect vehicles entering an 

airport operations area. ADASP operations consist of five 

screening processes: 

�	 Verification of a SIDA badge within the secure area; 

�	 Screening individuals and their accessible property at a 

boarding gate; 

�	 Aircraft inspection; 

6

 Complete Airport Security Program Guide For Category X – III Airports. May 10, 2006. 7

 49 CFR § 1542.211(d). 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 7 
 

�	 Explosive Trace Detection sampling of accessible property 

or aircraft; and 

�	 Cargo screening. 

In June 2007, TSA also began conducting VIPR operations within the 

aviation environment. Prior to this time, VIPR operations had been 

conducted only in modes of transportation outside of the aviation 

environment. A VIPR team works with local security and law 

enforcement officials to supplement existing security resources by 

providing additional deterrence and detection capabilities, while 

introducing an element of unpredictability into transportation security. 

These operations are intended to disrupt potential terrorist planning 

activities. Depending on operational needs, teams can be formed with 

resources from TSA’s Transportation Security Officers, Transportation 

Security Inspectors, Bomb Appraisal Officers, Federal Air Marshals 

(FAM), and Behavior Detection Officers. In addition to TSA resources, 

other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agents, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection Officers, U.S. Coast Guard personnel, and explosivesdetection canine teams are used to form VIPR operation teams. 

Results of Review 

TSA policies and procedures did not cause the March 5, 2007, security 

breach at MCO because there were no specific airport employee screening 

mandates in place at that time. However, the breach highlights need for 

such policies and procedures to reduce the vulnerabilities that were 

exposed. In addition, TSA’s handling of this incident raises questions 

about TSA’s ability to obtain and maintain situational awareness of the 

incident and the regulatory framework that governs the conduct of 

employees working at an airport. While the insider threat which 

includes any current or former employee who has, or had, authorized 

access or knowledge about an organization’s exploitable internal 

workings remains a concern throughout the aviation community, 100% 

airport employee screening may not have prevented the March 5, 2007, 

incident at MCO. Before a decision is made whether to implement 100% 

employee screening, changes are necessary as to how TSA conducts its 

oversight of non-TSA airport employees. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 8 
 

Security Breach at the Orlando Airport Highlights the Need 

for Additional TSA Situational Awareness Management 

and Oversight Capabilities 

The following events are described as they unfolded at MCO and SJU 

airports. Although SJU follows Atlantic Standard Time, all times 

indicated are Eastern Standard Time. On March 5, 2007, Delta Airlines 

Flight #933 was scheduled to depart from MCO at 11:00 a.m., and arrive 

in SJU at 1:41 p.m. Flight #933 was prepared to depart from the gate at 

10:55 a.m., five minutes before its scheduled departure time. 

Figure 2: Delta Flight #933 Schedule – March 5, 2007 

Flight From To Departure Arrival 

Scheduled Actual Scheduled Actual 

DL 933 MCO SJU 11:00 a.m. 11:04 a.m. 1:41 p.m. 1:38 p.m. 

Source: TSA, Delta Airlines, and www.flightstats.com 

Just prior to Flight #933 leaving the gate, a police officer from the 

Orlando Police Department, Airport Division, received an anonymous tip 

that a specific airline employee was on board with a weapon. The police 

officer then placed a call directly to Delta Airlines at MCO, informing 

them of the situation. It remains unclear what information the Orlando 

Police officer specifically shared with Delta at this time, but in response to 

that call, the Delta Airlines duty manager at MCO ordered the aircraft held 

at the gate. 

During the hold, officers from the Orlando Police Department removed 

Comair employee Zabdiel J. Santiago Balaguer (Balaguer) and his carryon luggage from the flight. The Delta Airlines duty manager at MCO said 

he then talked to the captain of Flight #933, who said he was comfortable 

with departing from MCO. According to Delta Airlines, Flight #933 then 

taxied to the runway and departed at 11:04 a.m. 

TSA’s Initial Awareness of the Incident 

According to TSA records, the Orlando Police Department placed a 

call directly to TSA personnel at MCO’s East Checkpoint at 11:05 

a.m. This appears to be the first communication TSA received 

regarding the situation with Flight #933. TSA’s records indicate that 

during this call, a police officer informed TSA officials that a Delta 

flight was being directed to return to gate #73 due to a possible 

weapon on board. The Supervisory Transportation Security Officer 

who received the call from the Orlando Police Department notified a 

TSA Security Manager on-site, who in-turn notified TSA’s local 

airport operations center. According to TSA records, incident 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 9 
 

notifications were sent to local TSA leadership at 11:07 a.m. 

Meanwhile, another TSA Security Manager and a Transportation 

Security Officer were dispatched to meet the aircraft at gate #73. 

Both individuals reported that upon arriving at the gate, the aircraft 

had departed, and police were already interviewing Balaguer. 

TSA personnel then conducted a complete screening of Balaguer and 

his carry-on luggage. The only prohibited item they discovered 

during this search was a cigarette lighter. Balaguer was detained by 

the Orlando Police Department until the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation arrived to question him. 

TSA records indicate that following the incident notifications, the 

Federal Security Director’s senior staff at MCO made two bridge 

calls, at 11:17 a.m. and 11:26 a.m., respectively. A bridge call is a 

telephone conference call used by TSA field personnel to 

communicate with headquarters and other security partners in the 

event of a security incident. Each call ended after a few minutes. 

TSA records indicate that the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority 

sent its own incident notification at 11:11 a.m. According to the 

Federal Security Director at MCO, after the plane’s departure, the 

Greater Orlando Aviation Authority notified TSA that they 

suspected another airline employee could also be involved, based on 

a review of the access control systems. The access control logs, 

along with the closed-circuit television system, are used by the 

airport authority to monitor employees entering and leaving secure 

areas of the MCO airport. 

Between 11:40 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., the Greater Orlando Aviation 

Authority confirmed with TSA at MCO that Thomas Anthony 

Munoz (Munoz) was likely on board Flight #933 with a large, black 

duffel bag that was never screened by TSA. Also, at this time, TSA 

and the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority did not know whether 

others were involved. Information from the flight manifest disclosed 

there were approximately 20 non-revenue passengers aboard the 

flight, including Balaguer and Munoz. The non-revenue passengers 

were employed by the airline and did not have to pay for the flight. 

TSA Communications Between the Orlando and San Juan 

Airports While the Flight Was En Route 

At approximately 11:30 a.m., the Federal Security Director from 

SJU received a call from the Federal Security Director at MCO 

advising him of a possible security breach concerning Flight #933 to 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 10 
 

SJU. During this initial conversation, TSA records indicate that 

TSA officials from MCO and SJU decided to conduct a reverse 

screening of Flight #933 upon its arrival at SJU. A reverse screening 

is a search of all aircraft passengers and their luggage upon arrival as 

a result of intelligence or law enforcement-related information. TSA 

officials made the decision to reverse screen Flight #933 prior to the 

Greater Orlando Aviation Authority informing TSA officials at 

MCO about suspicions concerning the involvement of Munoz. From 

12:17 p.m. to 1:00 p.m., TSA officials at SJU made arrangements to 

rescreen all people on board Flight #933 and their carry-on and 

checked luggage. Incident management of the possible security 

breach was handled directly between the Federal Security Directors 

at MCO and SJU. 

Reverse Screening in San Juan Identifies Munoz 

At approximately 1:38 p.m., Delta Flight #933 arrived at SJU. After 

the flight landed and was taxiing to the terminal gate, a member of 

the Delta flight crew made an announcement over the aircraft 

intercom system that TSA was going to conduct a random screening 

of passengers exiting the aircraft. This announcement described the 

screening as a routine security measure. 

According to TSA personnel at SJU, Munoz was one of the first 

individuals to exit the plane. He made a telephone call from his 

cellular phone while exiting the jet bridge. A TSA official present at 

the time said Munoz then approached the Transportation Security 

Officers conducting the screening. Munoz surrendered the black 

duffel bag in his possession, saying, “I’m busted.” After TSA 

personnel opened the bag, it was determined that Munoz was in 

possession of weapons. He was immediately taken into custody by 

the Puerto Rico Police Department. 

A full inventory of the bag later revealed it contained 13 handguns, 

1 M-4 assault rifle, and 8 pounds of marijuana, as shown in Figure 3. 

Munoz was subsequently turned over to the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives for processing. TSA continued 

to screen every passenger and their luggage until the entire flight was 

cleared. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 11 
 

Figure 3: Full Inventory of Munoz’s Black Duffel Bag on Board Flight #933 

Details of the Incident Demonstrate Exactly How Orlando 

Airport Security Was Breached 

During the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ 

initial interrogation of Munoz, he said that he was recently in a 

difficult financial situation. Shortly thereafter he was approached 

by fellow Comair employee, Balaguer, who offered him 

approximately $4,000 to $5,000 to accompany him on a trip to 

Puerto Rico to deliver firearms and marijuana. Munoz said that on 

the morning of March 5, 2007, he and Balaguer arrived at MCO 

around 3:00 a.m., wearing their work uniforms. Internal records 

from the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority verify that on 

March 5, 2007, at 3:39 a.m. Balaguer entered the secure area of the 

airport used to sort and load luggage. 

At 3:44 a.m., closed-circuit television records show Munoz 

carrying a large black duffel bag inside the secure area. At 3:46 

a.m. Balaguer exited the area; Munoz followed at 3:48 a.m. 

Closed-circuit television records again show Munoz exiting the 

secure area, this time without the black duffel bag. Munoz would 

later admit that he hid the duffel bag in the secure area during this 

timeframe. Munoz stayed at the airport while Balaguer left the 

airport. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 12 
 

Later that morning, Balaguer returned to MCO and processed 

through a TSA screening checkpoint as a flying passenger. Once 

at the departure gate, Munoz retrieved the black 

duffel. TSA records indicate that Munoz then hid 

in a bathroom for several hours with the duffel bag 

to avoid detection. Shortly before departure, 

Balaguer and Munoz boarded the aircraft 

separately. Munoz was seated in the first class 

cabin, while Balaguer was seated in the coach 

section of the aircraft and removed as shown in 

Figure 4. 

After initially being released for lack of evidence, 

Balaguer was arrested at his home the following 

evening, March 6, 2007, by Special Agents from 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in conjunction 

with several other law enforcement agencies. In 

June 2007, Balaguer pleaded guilty to carrying a 

firearm during, and in relation to, a drug trafficking 

offense. In October 2007, he was sentenced to 15 

years in federal prison. In February 2008, Munoz 

pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 months in 

federal prison. 

Changes Made to Orlando Airport Security 

Operations As a Result of This Incident 

Following the March 5, 2007, incident, the Greater 

Orlando Aviation Authority mandated that all 

employees with planeside access undergo screening. However, the 

Greater Orlando Aviation Authority officials said that despite 

being labeled 100% employee screening, these new security 

measures only cover employees with direct access to an aircraft. 

All employees entering the sterile or secure areas from the first 

level of the airport were already being screened through the 

passenger checkpoint. 

At MCO, in addition to the first level screening, employee 

screening was instituted at employee-only checkpoints and at 

vehicle checkpoints on the airport perimeter. Before the incident, 

there were eight employee-only access points on the second level 

with no employee screening in place. These employee-only 

checkpoints provide employees who work outside the terminals 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 13 
 

with access to the secure area of MCO. Screenings at the access 

points are performed by TSA Transportation Security Officers. 

All employees working inside the sterile area of the terminal 

beyond the passenger screening checkpoints are required to go 

through TSA passenger security screening on the third level of the 

airport. In addition to TSA’s screening of airport employees, the 

Greater Orlando Aviation Authority performs vehicle and 

employee screenings at all three vehicle access points that lead to 

the secure area of the airport. Screenings at the vehicle access 

points are performed by a contract company. One contract 

employee verifies an employee’s SIDA badge while others search 

the vehicles. Aside from the initial capital costs, estimated at $5.6 

million, the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority said that its annual 

costs for sustaining their employee screening model could range 

from $1 million to $3 million. 

TSA Needs To Improve Its Initial Situational Awareness 

Protocols 

Although TSA’s Security Directive 1542-04-11B requires that an airport 

operator immediately report to the TSA Federal Security Director all 

incidents and suspicious activities that could affect the security of U.S. 

civil aviation; in this case, the report was not immediate.8 As noted 

earlier, TSA officials at MCO became aware of the incident after Flight 

#933 was en route to SJU. We determined that after the aircraft’s 

departure, problems existed with the timeliness, accuracy, and efficiency 

of how information was processed and shared among airport security 

partners. 

After the anonymous tip came into the Orlando Police Department, Delta 

Airlines was contacted first. When the police made this call, Flight #933 

was preparing to depart from MCO. This contact from the Orlando Police 

Department was the only reason Flight #933 did not immediately take off 

with both Balaguer and Munoz on board. 

Nevertheless, once TSA officials at MCO became aware that weapons 

might be on board Flight #933 and that an additional passenger might be 

involved, problems existed with communicating accurate and timely 

situational awareness of the incident. 

8 Aviation Security Directive, SD 1542-04-11B, Incidents and Suspicious Activities Reporting, 

December 8, 2004. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 14 
 

TSA’s Situational Awareness of the March 5, 2007, Incident 

Was Not Adequate 

Initially, problems began when the Federal Security Director at 

MCO and the Freedom Center, formerly known as the 

Transportation Security Operations Center, were not notified of the 

incident in a timely manner. The Freedom Center is the single 

point of contact for security-related operations, incidents, or crises 

within all U.S. land and air modes of transportation. The center is 

to obtain and maintain situational awareness of an incident, while 

allowing Federal Security Directors to manage an incident. The 

first notification that the center received came from Delta 

Corporate Security after the flight departed. Furthermore, the 

information provided to the Freedom Center at this time was 

inaccurate. Despite the fact that the aircraft departed at 11:04 a.m., 

TSA records indicate that Delta Corporate Security told the 

Freedom Center that Flight #933 was returning to the gate due to a 

report of a passenger on board with a weapon. 

As noted earlier, by approximately 11:30 a.m., local TSA officials 

from MCO and SJU had decided to rescreen the flight upon its 

arrival in SJU. Between 11:40 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., the Greater 

Orlando Aviation Authority and TSA officials at MCO confirmed 

that Munoz was aboard Flight #933, and was probably in 

possession of a large, black duffel bag containing either weapons, 

drugs, or both. By all accounts, every interested party should have 

been aware that the flight was going to be rescreened by 

approximately 11:30 a.m., and aware that another suspect was on 

board by 12:00 p.m. However, TSA records indicate that 

inaccurate or untimely information continued to circulate among 

several key TSA officials until after 1:00 p.m. Figure 5 is an 

accounting of the erroneous or untimely exchanges that continued 

to circulate through TSA after 11:30 a.m. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 15 
 

Figure 5: Information Shared Within TSA 

Telephonic Communications Information 

To From 

Freedom Center Federal Air 

Marshals’ Mission 

Operations Center 

Delta Flight #933 has been pulled 

back to the gate [at MCO] per law 

enforcement. 

Freedom Center TSA MCO Employee from Delta Flight #933 

deplaned for drugs. 

Freedom Center Delta Corporate 

Security 

Delta Corporate was advised [by 

TSA] that Flight [#933] was 

arriving with 20 employees 

onboard with weapons and drugs; 

inquiring if aircraft needs reverse 

screening. 

Federal Air 

Marshals’ 

Mission 

Operations 

Center 

Federal Air 

Marshals’ Orlando 

Field Office 

After calling in for a status update, 

the Orlando Field Office is 

informed that a passenger had 

bypassed security at MCO, but 

there was no weapon involved, per 

the Freedom Center. The Orlando 

Field Office contacts the Freedom 

Center for clarification 

SJU Freedom Center SJU reports the flight will be 

rescreened upon arrival because it 

is believed another passenger 

might have weapons on board 

Freedom Center Federal Air 

Marshals 

[Location unknown] 

Request made that the plane be 

reversed screened in SJU 

Despite many serious concerns voiced about this security breach, 

TSA did not take corrective action in several areas. 

�	 First, TSA made limited efforts to investigate the actions of 

Delta Airlines during this incident. We have concerns that 

Delta might have failed to meet its reporting 

responsibilities regarding the Aircraft Operator Standard 

Security Program. As the regulating entity, TSA should 

have conducted a full assessment of Delta Airlines’ role to 

determine whether corrective action was necessary. 

�	 Second, TSA never conducted any internal assessments to 

determine why inaccurate or untimely information 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 16 
 

continued to circulate throughout the organization after 

11:30 a.m. 

� Finally, the information concerning this breach 

disseminated throughout TSA, in its Tuesday, 

March 6, 2007, Executive Daily Summary, inaccurately 

included information that “parts of weapons and drugs were 

found and seized.” It also omitted any mention that the two 

individuals involved were airline employees. 

TSA could have capitalized on a unique opportunity to assess its 

situational awareness capabilities, and redefine its response 

protocols and criteria to mitigate similar, future security breaches. 

At the time of the incident, TSA policies did not cause MCO to be 

susceptible to the security breach, nor did TSA have an 

opportunity to respond prior to the aircraft’s departure from MCO. 

However, TSA’s inability to obtain and maintain adequate 

situational awareness, and continued circulation of inaccurate and 

untimely information, raise concerns regarding TSA’s oversight 

responsibilities. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #1: Enact national security measures that 

ensure TSA has the opportunity to clear an aircraft for departure 

when law enforcement officers intervene prior to a scheduled 

departure. 

Recommendation #2: Evaluate the March 5, 2007, incident at the 

Orlando International Airport in Florida, develop an assessment of 

Delta Airlines’ role, and determine whether incident management 

protocols, oversight responsibilities, or training procedures need to 

be revised. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated TSA’s written comments and have made changes to 

the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of TSA’s 

written response to the report’s recommendations and our analysis 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 17 
 

of the response follows each recommendation. A copy of TSA’s 

response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B. 

TSA Response: TSA concurred with Recommendation 1. In its 

response, TSA management said they have adopted national 

security measures to ensure that TSA has the opportunity to clear 

an aircraft for departure when law enforcement officers intervene 

prior to a scheduled departure. These measures are outlined in a 

TSA/Federal Aviation Administration joint operating procedures 

memorandum and a TSA-issued security directive to airport 

operators. 

In October 2004, TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration 

developed joint operating procedures to provide Air Traffic 

Managers and Federal Security Directors with guidance for 

responding to both immediate and non-life threatening situations. 

The guidance states in part that, “if in the opinion of the Federal 

Security Director, there is an imminent and potentially life 

threatening security situation, the Air Traffic Managers, consistent 

with safety, will comply with the Federal Security Director’s 

requested operational response. 

Additionally, TSA issued a Security Directive (SD 1542-04-11B) 

on December 8, 2004, which requires airport operators to 

immediately notify Federal Security Directors of all incidents and 

suspicious activities that could affect the security of U.S. civil 

aviation. The Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program also 

requires aircraft operators to notify the Freedom Center 

immediately of suspicious activities that could affect the security 

of aviation. TSA is considering procedural changes to ensure that 

Federal Security Directors also receive timely notification of such 

reports. 

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open until procedures are in place to 

ensure that TSA is notified when law enforcement intervenes with 

a flight prior to departure. TSA should also consider that resources 

are made available to respond timely to affected flights, in an effort 

to limit potential flight delays. 

TSA Response: TSA concurred with Recommendation 2. In its 

response, TSA management said after the March 5, 2007, incident, 

TSA and the stakeholders at the Orlando International Airport held 

a series of meetings and made several improvements, including 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 18 
 

meeting with the Delta Station and Operations Managers on duty 

during the incident and changing the reporting procedures to 

ensure TSA is immediately notified whenever law enforcement is 

called to an aircraft. TSA will review the actions taken at MCO, 

develop best practices to share with all Federal Security Directors 

and encourage implementation at other airports. 

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending the receipt of 

documentation that demonstrates: 

�	 Orlando TSA and the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority 

changed the reporting procedure to ensure TSA is 

immediately notified whenever law enforcement is called 

to an aircraft; 

�	 Orlando TSA changed the process to ensure TSA senior 

staff is notified of all law enforcement calls to aircraft; 

�	 Orlando TSA, the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority, and 

other stakeholders including law enforcement conducted 

tabletop exercises to test incident management protocols; 

and, 

�	 Greater Orlando Aviation Authority Airport Security Plan 

change that delineates and clarifies the reporting 

requirements from the airport to TSA. 

TSA Needs Changes to Improve Security and Its Regulatory 

Oversight of Non-TSA Airport Employees 

Since the March 5, 2007, incident, TSA has taken steps in several areas to 

improve its overall security posture at airports, including the introduction 

of its Security Threat Assessment vetting, as well as mandating that all 

airports implement an ADASP program. 

Regulatory Framework is Outdated 

While these changes have improved overall airport security, 

additional changes are necessary to enhance the security posture of 

airports nationwide. Specifically, TSA conducts oversight of nonTSA employees’ at all federalized airports. TSA’s oversight 

covers a number of different areas, including an airport’s security 

program, and its badging process and challenge program. 

However, the regulatory framework that TSA relies upon to 

conduct its oversight is outdated, and does not adequately address 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 19 
TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 20 

 

the vulnerabilities associated with the insider threat stemming from 

any employee with knowledge about an airport’s internal 

operations. 

For example, during our fieldwork, we determined a number of 

airports, on their own initiative, have significantly improved 

security by implementing practices and measures that exceed the 

basic requirements of the airport security program. 

Specifically, the program requires all airports have an access 

control system to prevent and detect the unauthorized entry, 

presence, and movement of individuals and ground vehicles into 

and within the secured area. While some airports we visited have a 

three-tier biometric access control system in place, others rely on a 

basic one-part swipe of a SIDA badge as their access control 

system.9

 Although employees are required to immediately report a 

lost badge, one-part swipe systems could enable anyone to gain 

access to a secure area by simply obtaining a badge from an airport 

employee. While the one-part swipe system is acceptable under 

the current regulations, it provides no assurance that the person 

using the badge is the same person who was cleared through the 

criminal history records check and Security Threat Assessment 

vetting processes. Through the use of the one-part swipe system, 

anyone who obtains an active SIDA badge could potentially 

circumvent an airport’s security by gaining access to the secure 

areas of an airport. 

Furthermore, while the name-based Security Threat Assessment is 

conducted on a recurring basis, conducting the criminal history 

records checks is only required when an employee is initially 

hired. As long as an employee maintains continuous employment, 

a subsequent criminal history records check is not performed. 

When an employee is convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense 

during employment, the employee is required to report the offense 

to the airport operator and surrender his or her access medium 

within 24 hours of the conviction or a finding of not guilty by 

reason of insanity.10 However, we were told by a number of airline 

and airport officials that employees will not voluntarily disclose 

this information because the employees know they will lose their 

jobs. 

9

 A three-tier biometric access control system requires confirmation of a valid SIDA badge, input of a 


personal identification number, and identity confirmation through biometrics before access to the secure 


area is permitted. 


10 49 CFR § 1542.209 (l)(2). 

 

Also, TSA regulations do not have a requirement to conduct 

financial checks on airport employees. In regard to the 

March 5, 2007, incident, one of the individuals arrested said his 

financial problems led to his involvement in smuggling guns and 

drugs from Orlando to San Juan. 

One airport authority Director of Security said changes are needed 

to help harden the vulnerabilities associated with the insider threat. 

This includes implementing new regulations that govern the 

behavior of airport employees, particularly a requirement for all 

airport employees to have recurrent criminal history record checks. 

The Director of Security said TSA needs to modify its official 

guidance and regulations, instead of issuing repeated TSA Security 

Directives, which imply “temporary” changes. The Director also 

said airport authorities are reluctant to make substantial changes 

based upon Security Directives, because directives are subject to 

change on short notice. 

Additional Changes Can Enhance the ADASP Program 

The ADASP program is designed to facilitate random and 

unpredictable screening of airport employees and vehicles entering 

any location or route that provides access to secure, sterile, and air 

operation areas. Although the program was established recently, 

most airport authorities, airlines, airport police, and vendors we 

interviewed said ADASP is an effective deterrent against airport 

employees bringing prohibited items to the airport. However, 

airport employees know the ADASP program is based on random 

screenings, so some might wait until the ADASP team leaves a 

particular location, or they might use another entry point. We were 

also told that employees use their cell phones to alert other 

employees about ADASP locations to avoid screenings. 

During fieldwork, we noticed inconsistent implementation of 

ADASP screening at employee entrance doors. At most airports, 

we observed the ADASP teams setting up screening stations in 

front of the employee access doors to the secured area. At several 

airports we observed employees turning away after seeing the 

ADASP screening station. At another airport, the screening station 

was set up inside the employee entrance door. By placing the 

ADASP team inside, employees were unaware of the screening 

until opening the door to enter the secured area. Once the door 

was open, it was too late for employees to use another access door. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 21 
 

Also at one airport, we observed close coordination between the 

law enforcement officers and the ADASP team. Both shared 

schedules and law enforcement officers accompanied the ADASP 

team while conducting vehicle gate screenings. 

Furthermore, TSA should consider requesting access control logs 

from airport authorities to conduct usage analyses. By analyzing 

the logs, they can determine whether airport employees are using 

other entrances when the ADASP teams are stationed at access 

points. 

TSA Plans Several Changes to Improve Security 

and Its Regulatory Oversight 

Officials from TSA’s Office of Security Operations said that TSA 

wants to move forward with the rulemaking process to require 

airports to conduct stricter employee background investigations. 

Also, TSA wants to improve the monitoring of unattended access 

points, such as perimeter fences, and mandate the upgrade of all 

access control systems to meet certain biometric specifications. 

TSA envisions these improvements taking four to five years to 

implement. Office of Security Operations officials said the initial 

comment period for these regulatory changes should begin before 

the end of calendar year 2008. We are encouraged that the 

proposed changes, once implemented, would improve security and 

enhance TSA’s regulatory oversight of airports nationwide. 

In addition, TSA has partnered with several industry and private 

sector groups, including Airports Council International and the 

American Association of Airport Executives, and has identified six 

alternatives to 100% employee screening that would help mitigate 

the insider threat at airports. These alternatives include: 

�	 Enhancing behavioral recognition training for segments of 

airport employees; 

�	 Increasing random inspections; 

�	 Enhancing training for all airport employees; 

�	 Developing biometric access controls; 

�	 Improving employee background screening; and, 

�	 Deploying additional technologies. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 22 
 

TSA’s Administrator Hawley has advocated against committing 

TSA “to inflexible, resource-intensive measures” that are not 

consistent with its risk-based approach to aviation security.11 

While TSA has taken preliminary steps to address the insider threat 

some employees might present at airports, additional work is 

necessary to ensure that an employee accessing the sterile and 

secure areas of an airport is the actual person vetted and approved 

to work in those areas. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #3: Change the regulatory requirements to 

include provisions for mandating phased-in biometric access 

controls for airport operators, and recurrent criminal history and 

financial records checks for Secure Identification Display Area 

badge employees. 

Recommendation #4: Apply effective and consistent Aviation 

Direct Access Screening Program policies and procedures at all 

airports. 

Recommendation #5: Establish an Aviation Direct Access 

Screening Program working group to consider policy and 

procedure changes based on an accumulation of best practices 

across the country. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA Response: TSA concurred with Recommendation 3. In its 

response, TSA management said it has initiated the process to 

include provisions for a phased-in biometric access control system 

for airport operators. TSA is working on standards for biometric 

access controls systems and recurrent criminal history records 

checks for employees with unescorted access to SIDA portions of 

airports. As for financial records checks, TSA officials said they 

will take the recommendation into consideration. 

11 Testimony of Administrator Hawley before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland 

Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection. April 19, 2007. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 23 
 

In addition, several recently issued documents provide a broad 

perspective of TSA's current thinking about biometric smart cards 

and their application at airport access control points. In May 2008, 

TSA released the Aviation Credential Interoperability Solution 

Technical Specifications to airport and aircraft operators for review 

and comment. This document discusses many of the technical 

issues that TSA will consider in establishing standards. Also, an 

advisory committee sponsored by the Federal Aviation 

Administration recently issued a document that may encourage the 

use of biometrics at airports, RTCA DO 230-B Integrated Security 

System Standard for Airport Access Control, June 19, 2008. The 

document aggregates industry best practices for employing 

perimeter security measures, including the use of biometric smart 

cards at access control points. TSA will consider the document 

when developing its standards. 

Furthermore, TSA management said they completed the employee 

screening pilots at seven airports as mandated in the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2008. TSA and the Homeland Security 

Institute, an independent contractor, will evaluate the result of the 

pilots and report back to Congress as mandated in the Act. 

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending receipt of TSA’s 

finalized standards for the phased-in biometric access controls for 

airport operators and the pilot program results. 

TSA Response: TSA concurred with Recommendation 4. In its 

response, TSA management said to facilitate consistency in 

applying ADASP procedures, TSA established an ADASP 

Coordination Team in April 2007. Part of the team’s responsibility 

is to respond to ADASP questions from the field. The questions 

and responses are made available to all Transportation Security 

Officers. The Coordination Team also reviews the ADSAP 

standard operating procedures to determine whether revisions are 

necessary to clarify procedures. 

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting is necessary. 

TSA Response: TSA concurred with Recommendation 5. In its 

response, TSA management said they formed a headquarters 

ADASP Coordination Team in April 2007. This team consists of 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 24 
 

personnel from TSA’s Procedures Division (part of the Office of 

Security Operations), Special Screening Programs, Transportation 

Security Network Management, Office of Chief Counsel, and 

Office of Compliance. The team collaborates when changes to the 

ADSAP procedures are suggested, including at the conclusion of 

an ADASP Pilot or special operation, and when questions 

regarding ADASP procedures are received from the field. The 

headquarters ADASP Coordination Team reviews the questions 

and provides clarification and guidance by posting the response on 

an electronic database accessible to all Transportation Security 

Officers. 

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting is necessary. 

100 Percent Airport Employee Screenings Raises 

Feasibility Issues 

The March 5, 2007, incident at MCO, and subsequent media coverage 

renewed longstanding concerns about airports and the vulnerabilities 

associated with the insider threat. Even with improvements to its current 

oversight of non-TSA airport employees, some airport industry partners, 

private sector groups, and Congress are calling for 100% airport employee 

screening. While there is no current agreed upon definition of what 100% 

airport employee screening is, there are a number of important questions 

that need to be answered: 

�	 What is the purpose of 100% screening to prohibit threat objects 

from entering the secure areas of an airport or to focus more 

broadly on smuggling or other criminal activities? 

�	 Who will screen airport employees TSA or contracted personnel? 

�	 Will employees be screened to the same standards required of 

passengers? And if so, 

�	 How will exceptions be made for prohibited items from boxcutters to blowtorches which are required by certain employees 

to perform their jobs? 

The answers to these questions will affect the structure and costs 

associated with any model of 100% airport employee screening. Industry 

experts estimate that implementing a generalized version of employee 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 25 
 

screening, across the entire federalized aviation system, could cost 

anywhere from $3 billion to $6.5 billion annually.12 

The vast majority of people are only familiar with airports from the 

passenger’s perspective. Their frame of reference is limited to those 

processes that directly affect them from check-in and passenger 

screening, through the boarding process. However, there is additional 

activity at the airport that the average passenger does not see; activity that 

is vital to the operational health of an airport. This activity includes 

vendor and cargo deliveries, airplane maintenance and fueling, airport 

construction, and grounds keeping, among others. During our fieldwork, 

we visited seven airports to assess the challenges associated with 

screening employees performing functions tied to these processes. We 

met with more than 120 local representatives from TSA, airport 

authorities, law enforcement, and various business interests. 

Perspectives from TSA’s Field Workforce 

Overall, TSA’s senior management in the field, assuming they 

would be charged with implementing any measures associated with 

100% airport employee screening, expressed concern about 

implementing such a mandate. 

One Federal Security Director believed it was important to have 

the capability to perform increased, or even 100% airport 

employee screenings in response to some specific intelligence, but 

remained skeptical that permanent employee screening was 

necessary. Another Director believed it would be unwise to 

consider making any changes to TSA’s current security posture 

unless a 100% employee screening solution was targeted. 

Regardless of one’s position on this issue, all TSA personnel that 

we encountered seemed to agree that any additional responsibilities 

would require a substantial influx in personnel and additional 

resources. One Assistant Federal Security Director for Screening 

said that it would necessitate a “parallel” workforce to screen all 

airport employees. For FY 2008, TSA’s screener workforce totals 

45,438 full time personnel, including 1,100 managers, with a 

budget of approximately $2.64 billion. Thus, creating a parallel 

workforce would necessitate an additional 45,000 employees and 

approximately $2 billion annually to screen all airport employees. 

12 United States Commercial Aviation Partnership (USCAP). Report on USCAP Analysis of H.R. 1413 and 

Alternatives. October 2007. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 26 
 

 

Another Federal Security Director pointed out that the toughest 

change would be ensuring every airport had the local buy-in of the 

airport community. For example, mandated employee screenings 

would require additional support from local law enforcement, 

which may or may not be currently feasible at certain airports. 

Concerns Raised by Airport Authorities and Local Law 

Enforcement 

At each of the airports visited, we spoke with local airport 

authorities and law enforcement about the issue of 100% employee 

screening. Of the seven airports we visited, three had specific 

experiences with employee screening. 

At one airport, TSA assisted with a pilot screening program that 

focused on screening a select portion of airport employees with 

access to passenger aircraft. The pilot screening program was 

conducted for six weeks, and it was limited to only one of the 

airport’s terminals. During our discussions with officials, we were 

informed that 100% employee screening was feasible at this 

airport, but cautioned that consideration would have to be given to 

providing airports with the appropriate number of Transportation 

Security Officers to perform this additional tasking. Officials also 

raised several practical concerns that would have to be addressed 

should permanent employee screening be implemented at every 

terminal, to include the construction of additional bathrooms on the 

sterile side and the relocation of a trash compacting facility in the 

public area. 

At another airport, officials from the airport authority and the 

airport’s police department noted that after September 11, 2001, 

the airport immediately closed all its employee access portals and 

required everyone to go through a passenger screening checkpoint. 

The airport authority eventually reverted to allowing employees to 

go through a reduced number of employee access points, given the 

negative effect the additional employee volume was having on 

passenger screening. However, the reopening of the employee 

access points was accompanied by enhancements to the airport’s 

access control system, which currently includes a biometric handreader system. One airport official said that individuals began to 

question the screening of employees, given that many already had 

what they needed in the sterile area to “take down” an aircraft. 

Finally, the airport authority said employee screening requirements 

would necessitate around-the-clock staffing, particularly at large 

airports, to meet their operational needs. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 27 
 

In addition, another airport authority has employed a third-party 

contractor since 1999 to deter theft, as well as verify the identity 

and validity of all employees using their SIDA badges to access 

the secure area. While not solely focused on screening employees 

before they enter the secure area, the contractor does play an 

important role toward enhancing the overall security posture of the 

airport. 

Opinions at the other airports we visited varied. However, one 

concern all airport authorities raised was the likelihood that any 

development would require significant infrastructure modifications 

to meet new operational requirements. 

Concerns Raised by Airport Business Partners 

At each airport visited, we met with various commercial interests, 

including airlines, concessionaires, vendors, and union officials to 

discuss this issue. These stakeholders raised many of the same 

concerns, which could be grouped into three inter-related 

categories: operations, resources, and costs. 

With regards to the effect employee screening would have on 

airport operations, a number of entities expressed concern 

regarding how employee screening might negatively affect their 

productivity. Many businesses rely on efficient shift changes and 

dual-use employees who repeatedly transition between the public 

and secure areas of an airport. One hundred percent employee 

screening would mean that the same employee would have to be 

rescreened after each egress into the public area before returning to 

the secure area. 

Tied to these operational concerns is the question of how these 

new procedures would be implemented. Currently, most airport 

employees use the nearest access point to enter the secure area in 

the normal course of their duties. However, it is widely assumed 

that should employee screening be mandated, most airports would 

have to close a number of access points to funnel employees into 

specific areas to reduce the costs associated with employee 

screening. This would force those areas to continually process 

large numbers of employees on a regular basis. Assuming TSA 

would be responsible for employee screening, this scenario would 

require those areas to be adequately staffed, in some cases on a 

24-hour basis, to handle the volume of traffic. Many airport 

business partners are concerned that TSA would not be adequately 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 28 
 

staffed to deal with this new mandate, which would cause 

processing delays. 

Finally, should TSA or a contract entity be adequately staffed, 

almost all airport business partners are concerned about how this 

added requirement would be funded. The two options discussed 

target either: 

�	 TSA, which would necessitate a substantial increase in its 

annual budget, or 

�	 The airport operators or airlines, which would likely pass 

those additional costs to passengers through increased 

ticket prices and processing fees. 

Vulnerabilities Would Persist With 100 Percent Airport 

Employee Screenings 

Should 100% airport employee screening be implemented, certain 

vulnerabilities would persist. Mitigating some of those vulnerabilities 

requires the introduction of technological solutions, infrastructure 

upgrades, or some combination of each; even then, no assurances can be 

made. Please see Appendix E for a four-page depiction of a typical airport 

layout. 

Employees and Contraband Baggage 

When discussing persistent vulnerabilities, several TSA officials 

said that two relatively easy ways to introduce contraband into the 

secure area would be for someone to throw a bag over a perimeter 

fence or pass a piece of luggage through a baggage claim to an 

awaiting accomplice. At some airports, baggage belts revolve 

between the public and secure areas of an airport’s baggage makeup area, which is an airport’s baggage staging area used to load 

and unload airline baggage. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 29 
 

Figure 6: Airport Perimeter Fence Line at a Category X Airport and Baggage Claim Egress 

from Public Area to Secure Area 

While such methods are extremely basic and relatively crude, 

numerous TSA and local airport officials expressed concern 

regarding these two possibilities. One TSA official said he 

personally witnessed an attempt to throw a bag over a perimeter 

fence at a particular airport we visited. These vulnerabilities could 

be mitigated with improvements to the perimeter controls and 

baggage claim systems at airports. However, depending on the 

size of the facility and the current state of perimeter controls or 

baggage claim systems, these upgrades could be costly at most 

airports. 

Airline Catering and Provisioning and Vendor Deliveries 

Another method for exploiting commercial aviation involves the 

airline catering and provisioning or vendor deliveries that occur 

daily at airports across the country. Airline caterers and 

provisioners supply aircrafts with meal service for domestic and 

international flights, while vendors, as defined by TSA, include 

anyone who is authorized to conduct business in the airport. 

Vendors supply all the food and consumer goods sold at the 

airport. Typically, the catering and provisioning deliveries are 

made through an airport vehicle access gate. Vendor deliveries 

can be made curbside at a terminal, at a vehicle access gate, or 

both, given the policies and layout of an airport. Depending on the 

size and volume of an airport, this can amount to hundreds of daily 

around-the-clock arrivals. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 30 
 

 

According to the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program, an 

aircraft operator employee or authorized representative not 

employed by the catering company, is required to ensure that each 

catering vehicle is sterile before any catering carts can be loaded 

for delivery.13 An inspection of catering carts must also be 

performed prior to the employee either securing the vehicle with a 

tamper-proof seal or escorting the vehicle directly to aircraft. 

TSA security directives require the airport operator to inspect 

vendor personnel and deliveries at all sterile area access points, 

other than the screening checkpoint, to ensure the security of the 

merchandise.14 Some Federal Security Directors have enacted 

stricter requirements for vendors. For instance, two airports have 

either developed or are pursuing centralized “commissary” or 

“dock” facilities to screen all shipments arriving to the airport; 

however, few other airports have or are contemplating a similar 

approach. 

In addition, law enforcement agencies have recognized the 

vulnerabilities associated with these two processes for years. One 

of the largest known criminal enterprises within the aviation 

industry relied on both baggage handlers and catering employees 

to smuggle drugs on board commercial aircraft. In 1999, the U.S. 

Customs Service, now U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, now the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and the Drug 

Enforcement Agency obtained 58 indictments of individuals 

connected to this narcotics smuggling enterprise operating out of 

Miami International Airport in Florida. 

Cargo Facilities 

Finally, approximately 7,500 tons of commercial cargo are 

transported on passenger aircraft daily. We have identified 

vulnerabilities of the oversight of passenger aircraft cargo in the 

past.15 However, after improvements are made, contraband can 

still be secretly brought into an airport’s operation area. At many 

13 Security of vendor and catering deliveries are covered under the Aircraft Operator Standard Security 


Program, unless otherwise amended locally. See Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program, 


April 22, 2008. 


14 Transportation Security Administration Security Directive 1542-06-01D. The local Federal Security 


Director is permitted to approve alternative site specific procedures as needed. 
 15 Transportation Security Administration’s Oversight of Passenger Aircraft Cargo Security Faces 

Significant Challenges (Redacted). Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. OIG07-57, July 2007. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 31 
 

airports, large cargo facilities effectively function as the boundary 

between the public and sterile areas of an airport. This poses a 

unique challenge for those responsible for ensuring the security of 

these facilities because of the constant movement of goods to and 

from an aircraft. 

While 100% airport employee screening is feasible, there are many 

unanswered questions as to how it would be implemented. These 

questions, raised by TSA, industry partners, and private sector 

groups alike, are valid and need to be addressed prior to taking any 

steps toward implementing 100% airport employee screening. 

Should these concerns not be addressed prior to implementation, 

TSA will be applying resources to a system that is prone to 

vulnerability. 

Achieving an Integrated, DHS-Wide Perspective on Security 

at Airports Is Needed 

The March 5, 2007, MCO incident highlighted the need for accurate and 

timely coordination and communication between all local security partners 

at an airport. Given the complexity of the airport environment, and the 

diverse, and sometimes overlapping responsibilities among key partner 

organizations, timely and effective communication can be achieved only 

when interagency relationships are already formally established and 

exercised prior to an operational crisis. 

At some airports, local partner organizations have developed effective 

working relationships, often on an informal or ad-hoc basis. For example, 

at one airport, we learned that all the local partners regularly participate in 

TSA-led mock exercises, which help foster a sense of cooperation among 

those who would be called upon to act in the event of an emergency. 

These exercises, along with the airport’s daily security meetings, provide 

partners with the opportunity to establish open lines of communication and 

build relationships where they did not always previously exist.16 

Unfortunately, as we learned through discussions with partner 

organizations at several other airports, strained relationships and a lack of 

formal procedures have affected the ability of many airport communities 

to deal with routine situations as well as potential emergencies. 

While DHS officials at the airports would agree that better interagency 

coordination is a desirable goal, it is not easily achieved. As TSA officials 

16 The daily security meetings at this airport are attended by TSA, airline and concession managers, and 

other federal, state, and local governmental partners. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 32 
 

continue to pursue measures that encourage better communication and 

operational practices within airport communities, DHS should also use all 

of its component capabilities, together within the aviation environment, to 

ensure the DHS-wide mission is accomplished. At many airports across 

the country, other DHS components most notably U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

already perform their mandated roles and missions. However, efforts to 

assist another component with its mission are difficult, in part because 

these attempts are not tied to shared funding, resources, evaluations, or 

operational exercises. As a result, there are no current incentives to ensure 

cross-component cooperation, especially when it comes at the expense of 

trying to meet component-specific operational responsibilities. 

Aside from the aforementioned VIPR Program, most airports have not 

established any DHS-wide cooperative efforts. At certain airports, TSA 

has been able to establish strong working relationships with other DHS 

counterparts, but this does not necessarily translate into ongoing crosscomponent cooperation. As a department, DHS must work toward 

institutionalizing cooperation across components in service of its 

overarching mission, similar to the efforts of the Department of Defense’s 

Combatant Commands or the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces. 

An organization that could be used as an applicable model for ensuring 

synergy across DHS mission-sets would be the Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South, a federal interagency task force that combines personnel 

from the military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities in an 

effort to combat illicit trafficking operations in the Southern Hemisphere. 

The integration of personnel from different agencies has been successful 

because the task force has a clear, comprehensive mission supported by a 

unified, joint command. Furthermore, the Joint Interagency Task ForceSouth command has identified collective metrics that can be divided into 

more narrowly defined pieces that closely mirror the core function of each 

parent organization. This allows the components to satisfy their parochial 

interests while serving a broader mission. 

Conceptually, DHS could adapt a similar model to integrate its functional 

operation, given that several components already have a large presence at 

select airports. To be successful, an airport task force would require a 

unified command structure, shared resources, collective metrics, and an 

overarching mission. This model could be scaled to fit a regional 

configuration, which could be overseen by a senior regional director who 

would be responsible for all DHS-related activities in that region. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 33 
 

An airport with established intercomponent working relationships is more 

desirable to implement such a pilot program. While any collaborative 

model will take significant time to implement, refine, and institutionalize 

across DHS, it is important that the components begin focusing on the 

department’s broader mission, rather than individual mandates, roles, and 

responsibilities. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation 

Security Administration, in conjunction with the Director of 

Operations Coordination and Planning, and in coordination with 

other department and component principals: 

Recommendation #6: Establish an intercomponent working group 

among U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, and TSA, with the goal of piloting an 

integrated, DHS-wide operational concept at select airports. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA Response: TSA concurred with Recommendation 6. In its 

response, TSA management said that at airports with a 

combination of international and domestic operations, TSA already 

partners with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives, the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Administration, and state, local, and airport police. TSA said these 

partnerships demonstrate an integrated DHS operational concept. 

TSA management said it will coordinate with its colleagues within 

DHS to discuss the feasibility of establishing a DHS-wide pilot at 

select airports that have ports of entry. 

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending the receipt of 

documentation that discussions on the feasibility of establishing a 

DHS-wide pilot program have taken place. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 34 
 

Conclusion 

A few months after the arrests of Munoz and Balaguer, another MCO airport 

employee agreed to smuggle several firearms on board a commercial aircraft 

destined for Puerto Rico during a conversation with an undercover informant. 

According to published reports, the former JetBlue Airways baggage handler, 

Hiram Rivera-Ortiz, was taken into custody in August 2007. After his arrest, 

Rivera-Ortiz reportedly showed federal agents how easy it was to smuggle guns 

past airport security at MCO. Rivera-Ortiz is currently serving 70 months in 

federal prison. 

This incident reinforces our initial concern about placing a high reliance on 100% 

airport employee screening to address existing airport vulnerabilities. Even with a 

configuration that is conducive to implementing 100% employee screening, the 

insider threat at MCO remains a concern. Furthermore, airports with more access 

points, multiple terminals, larger cargo operations, and fewer resources to allocate 

to upgrades have vulnerabilities that are that much more palpable. 

The concept of 100% airport employee screening is feasible. However, we do not 

believe it is realistic at this time. Regardless of the amount of funding, resources, 

and effort allocated toward this endeavor, vulnerabilities will persist. While the 

intelligence, screening, and law enforcement communities continue to make 

progress in addressing these vulnerabilities, 100% airport employee screening 

cannot entirely bridge existing gaps. As TSA changes its regulatory 

requirements, technology improves, and airports upgrade existing security 

measures, implementing this concept would be more realistic and should be 

revisited. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 35 
 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We assessed a March 5, 2007, security breach where two Comair Airline 

employees at the Orlando International Airport successfully smuggled 14 

firearms and 8 pounds of marijuana on board a Delta Airlines commercial 

airplane bound for San Juan, Puerto Rico. Our review was in response to 

requests from Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the 

House Committee on Homeland Security, and Representative Ric Keller. 

The objectives of our review were to determine: 

�	 whether TSA’s actions and communication surrounding the 


March 5, 2007, incident were appropriate and effective; 


�	 whether TSA’s oversight of non-TSA airport employees is 


adequate; and 


�	 the feasibility of 100% airport employee screening for individuals 

accessing an aircraft or the secure areas on an airport. 

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed or received documentation 

from TSA officials at MCO and SJU, the Greater Orlando Aviation 

Authority, Delta and Comair Airlines at MCO, TSA’s Federal Air Marshal 

Service, and the Freedom Center. We also evaluated TSA’s current and 

former processes for conducting airport employee screenings at MCO. 

To assess the overall effectiveness of TSA’s current airport employee 

screening practices and to determine the feasibility of mandating 100% 

airport employee screening, we conducted site visits at five other airports. 

During site visits, we reviewed current local airport employee screening 

practices, the background screening processes used for airport employees, 

and the SIDA badge monitoring and oversight of airport employee access 

controls. 

At each airport, we met with relevant TSA personnel, including the 

Federal Security Directors, the Assistant Federal Security Directors, and 

Transportation Security Officers. We also met with a number of TSA’s 

partner organizations, including each airport authority, several commercial 

airline representatives, airport concessionaires, aircraft catering 

companies, and union officials to discuss their views on the feasibility of 

100% airport employee screening. 

We also held meetings with union, airport, and airline industry officials 

including the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 

Employees; the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 

Organizations; the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 

Workers; the Airports Council International; the American Association of 

Airport Executives; the International Air Transport Association; and the 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 36 
 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Airline Pilots Association to obtain their views on the feasibility of 100% 

employee screening. 

We interviewed more than 160 people including TSA personnel from TSA 

headquarters, the Office of Security Operations, the Office of 

Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing, the Office of 

Transportation Sector Network Management, Office of Law Enforcement, 

Office of Inspection, Federal Air Marshal Service, and the Freedom 

Center. We also spoke with personnel from U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

We reviewed relevant laws, regulations, policies, procedures, statistical 

information, and airport practices related to these three areas. Our 

fieldwork began in November 2007 and concluded in April 2008. We 

initiated this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections, 

issued by the President’s Council of Integrity and Efficiency. 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 37 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 38 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 39 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 40 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 41 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 42 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 43 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 44 
 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 45 
 

Appendix C
 

TSA’s List of Disqualifying Criminal Offenses (49 CFR § 1542.209 (d))
 

1.	 Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and other aircraft 

registration violations 

2.	 Interference with air navigation 

3.	 Improper transportation of hazardous material 

4.	 Aircraft piracy 

5.	 Interference with flight crew members or flight attendants 

6.	 Commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in flight 

7.	 Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft 

8.	 Conveying false information and threats 

9.	 Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States 

10. Lighting violations involving transporting controlled substances 

11. Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport areas that serve air carriers or 

foreign air carriers contrary to established security requirements 

12. Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility 

13. Murder 

14. Assault with intent to murder 

15. Espionage 

16. Sedition 

17. Kidnapping or hostage taking 

18. Treason 

19. Rape or aggravated sexual abuse 

20. Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or manufacture of an 

explosive or weapon 

21. Extortion 

22. Armed or felony unarmed robbery 

23. Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a controlled substance 

24. Felony arson 

25. Felony involving a threat 

26. Felony involving 

i.	 Willful destruction of property 

ii.	 Importation or manufacture of a controlled substance 

iii.	 Burglary 

iv.	 Theft 

v.	 Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation 

vi.	 Possession or distribution of stolen property 

vii.	 Aggravated assault 

viii.	 Bribery 

ix.	 Illegal possession of a controlled substance punishable by a 


maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year 


27. Violence at international airports 

28. Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the previously listed disqualifying 

criminal offenses 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 46 
 

Appendix D 

Airport Layout 

Airport Layout 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 47 
 

Appendix D 

Airport Layout 

Terminal View 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 48 
 

Appendix D 

Airport Layout 

Passenger Ticketing and Screening View 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 49 
 

Appendix D 

Airport Layout 

Baggage Claim and Ground Transportation View 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 50 
 

Appendix E 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

Angela Garvin, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

Ryan Carr, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 51 
 

Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security Administration 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 

TSA Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

TSA’s Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport 

and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening 

Page 52 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4199, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.